Encyclopædia

of

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Cuchulainn Cycle.

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Cosmogony and Cosmology (Indian), **Cow** (Hindu), **Daitya, Death and Disposal of the Dead** (Jain), **Demons and Spirits** (Jain), **Digambaras, Divination** (Hindu).

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Crimes and Punishments (Teutonic and Slavic), **Death and Disposal of the Dead** (Slavic), **Divination** (Litu-Slavic).

SCOTT (CHARLES ANDERSON), M.A. (Camb.).
Professor of New Testament in Westminster College, Cambridge.
Donatists.

SCOTT (WILLIAM MAJOR), M.A.
Minister of George Street Congregational Church, Croydon; author of *Aspects of Christian Mysticism, The Life of John Howe.*
Devotion and Devotional Literature.

SCOTT-MONCRIEFF (PHILIP DAVID), M.A.
Late Assistant in the Department of Egyptian and Assyrian Antiquities in the British Museum.
Coptic Church, Death and Disposal of the Dead (Coptic).

SELIGMANN (CHARLES G.). M.D.
Lecturer in Ethnology in the University of London; author of *The Melanesians of British New Guinea*, and joint-author of *The Veddas.*
Dinka.

SERGI (GIUSEPPE).
Professor of Anthropology in the University of Rome.
Death and Disposal of the Dead (Greek).

SHAW (CHARLES GRAY), Ph.D.
Professor of Philosophy in the University of New York; author of *Christianity and Modern Culture, The Precinct of Religion, The Value and Dignity of Human Life.*
Culture, Desire.

SHOWERMAN (GRANT), Ph.D.
Professor of Latin in the University of Wisconsin; Fellow in the American School of Classical Studies at Rome, 1898–1900.
Criobolium, Cybele, Death and Disposal of the Dead (Roman).

SMITH (KIRBY FLOWER), Ph.D. (Johns Hopkins), LL.D. (Vermont).
Professor of Latin in the Johns Hopkins University.
Drama (Roman).

SMITH (MARY CAMPBELL), M.A.
Dundee.
Controversy.

SÖDERBLOM (NATHAN), D.D. (Paris), Hon. D.D. (Geneva, Christiania, St. Andrews).
Élève diplômé de l'École des Hautes Études; Professor in the University of Upsala; Member of the Chapter of Upsala; Prebendary of Holy Trinity in Upsala.
Creed (Parsi), **Death and Disposal of the Dead** (Parsi).

SPENCE (LEWIS).
Edinburgh; author of *Mythologies of Ancient Mexico and Peru*, *The Popol Vuh*, *A Dictionary of Mythology*, *The Civilisation of Ancient Mexico.*
Cosmogony and Cosmology (North American), **Covenant** (American), **Cross** (American), **Divination** (American).

STAMOULI (ANTON ANASTASION).
Formerly on the editorial staff of the Greek daily 'Atlantis' of New York.
Doukhobors.

STARBUCK (EDWIN DILLER), Ph.D.
Professor of Philosophy in the State University of Iowa; author of *The Psychology of Religion.*
Double-mindedness, Doubt.

STAWELL (FLORENCE MELIAN).
Certificated Student of Newnham College, Cambridge (Classical Tripos, 1892, Part I. Class I. Div. I.); sometime Lecturer in Classics at Newnham College.
Cyrenaics.

STOKES (GEORGE J.), M.A. (Trinity College, Dublin).
Of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-Law; Professor of Philosophy and Jurisprudence in University College, Cork, National University of Ireland.
Delict.

STONE (DARWELL), M.A., D.D.
Principal Pusey Librarian, Oxford; author of *A History of the Doctrine of the Holy Eucharist.*
Councils (Early Christian).

STRAHAN (JAMES), M.A.
Edinburgh.
Conversion, Creation, Criticism (Old Testament), **Divine Right.**

SUDHOFF (Prof. Dr. KARL).
Direktor des Instituts für Geschichte der Medizin an der Universität zu Leipzig.
Disease and Medicine (Teutonic).

TAKAKUSU (JYUN), M.A., D.Litt. (Oxford), Dr.Phil. (Leipzig).
Professor of Sanskrit in the University of Tokyo.
Dhyana.

TAYLOR (ALFRED EDWARD), M.A. (Oxon.), D.Litt. (St. Andrews).
Professor of Moral Philosophy in the United College of SS. Salvator and Leonard, St. Andrews; late Fellow of Merton College, Oxford; Fellow of the British Academy; author of *The Problem of Conduct* (1901), *Elements of Metaphysics* (1903), *Varia Socratica* (1911).
Continuity.

THOMPSON (R. CAMPBELL), M.A., F.S.A., F.R.G.S.
Formerly Assistant in the Department of Egyptian and Assyrian Antiquities in the British Museum (1899–1905); formerly Assistant Professor of Semitic Languages in the University of Chicago (1907–1909).
Demons and Spirits (Assyro-Babylonian), **Disease and Medicine** (Assyro-Babylonian).

THOMSON (J. ARTHUR), M.A.
Regius Professor of Natural History in the University of Aberdeen; author of *The Study of Animal Life*, *The Science of Life*, *Heredity*, *The Bible of Nature*, *Darwinism and Human Life.*
Consanguinity, Development (Biological).

THRAEMER (EDUARD), Dr.Phil.
Ausserordentlicher Professor für classische Alterthumswissenschaft an der Universität zu Strassburg, seit 1909 emeritiert.
Disease and Medicine (Greek and Roman).

THURSTON (HERBERT), B.A., S.J.
Joint-Editor of the Westminster Library for Priests and Students; author of *Life of St. Hugh of Lincoln*, *The Holy Year of Jubilee*, *The Stations of the Cross.*
Confirmation (Roman Catholic), **Councils** (Modern Christian).

TOD (DAVID MACRAE), M.A., B.D. (Edin.).
Minister of St. James' Presbyterian Church, Huddersfield; formerly Cunningham Fellow, New College, Edinburgh.
Covetousness.

TRAILL (JOHN).
Late Missionary of the United Free Church of Scotland at Jaipur, Rajputana.
Dadu, Dadupanthis.

TROELTSCH (ERNST), Dr. theol., phil. jur.
Geheimer Kirchenrat; Professor der Theologie an der Universität zu Heidelberg.
Contingency.

WADDELL (L. AUSTINE), C.B., C.I.E., LL.D., F.L.S., F.R.A.I., M.R.A.S., Lt.-Colonel, I.M.S.
Late Professor of Tibetan in University College, London; author of *The Buddhism of Tibet*, *Tribes of the Brahmaputra Valley*, *Lhasa and its Mysteries.*
Death and Disposal of the Dead (Tibetan), **Demons and Spirits** (Buddhist, Tibetan), **Divination** (Buddhist).

WALKER (WILLISTON), Ph.D., D.D., L.H.D.
Titus Street Professor of Ecclesiastical History in Yale University.
Congregationalism.

WALSHE (W. GILBERT), M.A.
London Secretary of Christian Literature Society for China; late 'James Long' Lecturer; author of *Confucius and Confucianism*; editor of *China*.
Confucius, Cosmogony and Cosmology (Chinese), **Crimes and Punishments** (Chinese), **Death and Disposal of the Dead** (Chinese).

WATT (WELLSTOOD ALEXANDER), M.A., LL.B., D.Phil.
Author of *An Outline of Legal Philosophy*, *The Theory of Contract in its Social Light*, *A Study of Social Morality*.
Contract.

WENLEY (ROBERT MARK), D.Phil., LL.D. (Glasgow), D.Sc. (Edinburgh), Litt.D. (Hobart).
Professor of Philosophy in the University of Michigan; author of *Modern Thought and the Crisis in Belief*, *Kant and His Philosophical Revolution*.
Conscientiousness, Cynics.

WHITLEY (WILLIAM THOMAS), M.A., LL.D., F.R.Hist.S., F.T.S.
Secretary of the Baptist Historical Society; formerly Principal of the Baptist College of Victoria, and Secretary of the Victorian Baptist Foreign Mission.
Connexionalism.

WILDE (NORMAN), Ph.D.
Professor of Philosophy and Psychology in the University of Minnesota.
Doubt.

WILLETT (HERBERT LOCKWOOD), A.M., Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Semitic Languages and Literatures, and Dean of the Disciples' Divinity House, in the University of Chicago.
Disciples of Christ.

WILSON (GEORGE R.), M.D., M.R.C.P. (Edin.).
Late Medical Superintendent of Allanton House; author of *Drunkenness, Vice and Insanity*.
Delusion.

WISSOWA (GEORG), Dr. jur. et phil.
Ordentlicher Professor an der Universität zu Halle; Geheimer Regierungsrat.
Divination (Roman).

WOODS (FRANCIS HENRY), M.A., B.D.
Rector of Bainton, Yorkshire; late Fellow and Theological Lecturer of St. John's College, Oxford.
Deluge.

WORKMAN (HERBERT B.), M.A., D.Lit.
Principal of Westminster Training College; Member of the Board of Studies in the Faculty of Theology, London University; author of *The Dawn of the Reformation*, *Persecution in the Early Church*, and *Christian Thought to the Reformation*.
Constantine, Crusades.

WÜNSCH (RICHARD), Dr.Phil.
Ordentlicher Professor der Klassischen Philologie an der Universität zu Königsberg.
Cross-roads (Roman).

YOUNGERT (SVEN GUSTAF), Ph.D., D.D.
Professor of Philosophy and Greek New Testament Exegesis at Augustana College and Theological Seminary, Rock Island, Ill.
Cosmogony and Cosmology (Teutonic).

CROSS-REFERENCES

In addition to the cross-references throughout the volume, the following list of minor references may be useful:

Topic.	Probable Title of Article.
Conflict of Duties	Casuistry, Duty.
Conformity (Religious)	Nonconformity.
Congo	Negroes and West Africa.
Conjeeveram	Kanchi-puram.
Conservation	Energy, Force.
Constitutions	Bulls and Briefs, Lutheranism.
Consubstantiation	Eucharist, Lutheranism.
Corvée	Labour.
Cosmic Egg	Cosmogony and Cosmology.
Cosmography	Geography (Mythical).
Cowardice	Courage.
Creationism	Soul.
Credulity	Belief.
Darbyism	Brethren (Plymouth).
Dastur	Priesthood (Parsi).
Dayaks	Indonesia.
Debendra Nath Tagore	Brāhma Samāj.
Debt	Usury.
Decree	Election.
Deprivation	Atimia, Discipline.
Diana	Roman Religion.
Diaspora	Judaism.
Dionysos	Greek Religion, Drama.
Dioscuri	Greek Religion, Twins.
Disestablishment	State.
Doppers	Sects (Chr.).
Dragon	Cosmogony and Cosmology, Symbols.

LISTS OF ABBREVIATIONS

I. General

A.H. = Anno Hijrae (A.D. 622).
Ak. = Akkadian.
Alex. = Alexandrian.
Amer. = American.
Apoc. = Apocalypse, Apocalyptic.
Apocr. = Apocrypha.
Aq. = Aquila.
Arab. = Arabic.
Aram. = Aramaic.
Arm. = Armenian.
Ary. = Aryan.
As. = Asiatic.
Assyr. = Assyrian.
AT = Altes Testament.
AV = Authorized Version.
AVm = Authorized Version margin.
A.Y. = Anno Yazdigird (A.D. 639).
Bab. = Babylonian.
c. = *circa*, about.
Can. = Canaanite.
cf. = compare.
ct. = contrast.
D = Deuteronomist.
E = Elohist.
edd. = editions or editors.
Egyp. = Egyptian.
Eng. = English.
Eth. = Ethiopic.
EV = English Version.
f. = and following verse or page: as Ac $10^{34f.}$
ff. = and following verses or pages: as Mt $11^{28ff.}$
Fr. = French.
Germ. = German.
Gr. = Greek.
H = Law of Holiness.
Heb. = Hebrew.
Hel. = Hellenistic.
Hex. = Hexateuch.
Himy. = Himyaritic.
Ir. = Irish.
Iran. = Iranian.
Isr. = Israelite.
J = Jahwist.
J″ = Jehovah.
Jerus. = Jerusalem.
Jos. = Josephus.
LXX = Septuagint.
Min. = Minæan.
MSS = Manuscripts.
MT = Massoretic Text.
n. = note.
NT = New Testament.
Onk. = Onkelos.
OT = Old Testament.
P = Priestly Narrative.
Pal. = Palestine, Palestinian.
Pent. = Pentateuch.
Pers. = Persian.
Phil. = Philistine.
Phœn. = Phœnician.
Pr. Bk. = Prayer Book.
R = Redactor.
Rom. = Roman.
RV = Revised Version.
RVm = Revised Version margin.
Sab. = Sabæan.
Sam. = Samaritan.
Sem. = Semitic.
Sept. = Septuagint.
Sin. = Sinaitic.
Skr. = Sanskrit.
Symm. = Symmachus.
Syr. = Syriac.
t. (following a number) = times.
Talm. = Talmud.
Targ. = Targum.
Theod. = Theodotion.
TR = Textus Receptus.
tr. = translated or translation.
VSS = Versions.
Vulg. = Vulgate.
WH = Westcott and Hort's text.

II. Books of the Bible

Old Testament.

Gn = Genesis.
Ex = Exodus.
Lv = Leviticus.
Nu = Numbers.
Dt = Deuteronomy.
Jos = Joshua.
Jg = Judges.
Ru = Ruth.
1 S, 2 S = 1 and 2 Samuel.
1 K, 2 K = 1 and 2 Kings.
1 Ch, 2 Ch = 1 and 2 Chronicles.
Ezr = Ezra.
Neh = Nehemiah.
Est = Esther.
Job.
Ps = Psalms.
Pr = Proverbs.
Ec = Ecclesiastes.
Ca = Canticles.
Is = Isaiah.
Jer = Jeremiah.
La = Lamentations.
Ezk = Ezekiel.
Dn = Daniel.
Hos = Hosea.
Jl = Joel.
Am = Amos.
Ob = Obadiah.
Jon = Jonah.
Mic = Micah.
Nah = Nahum.
Hab = Habakkuk.
Zeph = Zephaniah.
Hag = Haggai.
Zec = Zechariah.
Mal = Malachi.

Apocrypha.

1 Es, 2 Es = 1 and 2 Esdras.
To = Tobit.
Jth = Judith.
Ad. Est = Additions to Esther.
Wis = Wisdom.
Sir = Sirach or Ecclesiasticus.
Bar = Baruch.
Three = Song of the Three Children.
Sus = Susanna.
Bel = Bel and the Dragon.
Pr. Man = Prayer of Manasses.
1 Mac, 2 Mac = 1 and 2 Maccabees.

New Testament.

Mt = Matthew.
Mk = Mark.
Lk = Luke.
Jn = John.
Ac = Acts.
Ro = Romans.
1 Co, 2 Co = 1 and 2 Corinthians.
Gal = Galatians.
Eph = Ephesians.
Ph = Philippians.
Col = Colossians.
1 Th, 2 Th = 1 and 2 Thessalonians.
1 Ti, 2 Ti = 1 and 2 Timothy.
Tit = Titus.
Philem = Philemon.
He = Hebrews.
Ja = James.
1 P, 2 P = 1 and 2 Peter.
1 Jn, 2 Jn, 3 Jn = 1, 2, and 3 John.
Jude.
Rev = Revelation.

III. For the Literature

1. The following authors' names, when unaccompanied by the title of a book, stand for the works in the list below.

Baethgen = *Beiträge zur sem. Religionsgesch.*, 1888.
Baldwin = *Dict. of Philosophy and Psychology*, 3 vols. 1901–1905.
Barth = *Nominalbildung in den sem. Sprachen*, 2 vols. 1889, 1891 ([2]1894).
Benzinger = *Heb. Archäologie*, 1894.
Brockelmann = *Gesch. d. arab. Litteratur*, 2 vols. 1897–1902.
Bruns-Sachau = *Syr.-Röm. Rechtsbuch aus dem fünften Jahrhundert*, 1880.
Budge = *Gods of the Egyptians*, 2 vols. 1903.
Daremberg-Saglio = *Dict. des ant. grec. et rom.*, 1886–90.
De la Saussaye = *Lehrbuch der Religionsgesch.*[3], 1905.
Deussen = *Die Philos. d. Upanishads*, 1899 [Eng. tr., 1906].
Doughty = *Arabia Deserta*, 2 vols. 1888.
Grimm = *Deutsche Mythologie*[4], 3 vols. 1875–1878, Eng. tr. *Teutonic Mythology*, 4 vols. 1882–1888.
Hamburger = *Realencyclopädie für Bibel u. Talmud*, i. 1870 ([2]1892), ii. 1883, suppl. 1886, 1891 f., 1897.
Holder = *Altceltischer Sprachschatz*, 1891 ff.
Holtzmann-Zöpffel = *Lexicon f. Theol. u. Kirchenwesen*[2], 1895.
Howitt = *Native Tribes of S. E. Australia*, 1904.
Jubainville = *Cours de Litt. celtique*, i.–xii., 1883 ff.
Lagrange = *Études sur les religions sémitiques*[2], 1904.
Lane = *An Arabic-English Dictionary*, 1863 ff.
Lang = *Myth, Ritual and Religion*[2], 2 vols. 1899.
Lepsius = *Denkmäler aus Ægypten u. Æthiopien*, 1849–1860.
Lichtenberger = *Encyc. des sciences religieuses*, 1876.
Lidzbarski = *Handbuch der nordsem. Epigraphik*, 1898.
McCurdy = *History, Prophecy, and the Monuments*, 2 vols. 1894–1896.
Muir = *Sanskrit Texts*, 1858–1872.
Muss-Arnolt = *A Concise Dict. of the Assyrian Language*, 1894 ff.
Nowack = *Lehrbuch d. heb. Archäologie*, 2 vols. 1894.
Pauly-Wissowa = *Realencyc. der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, 1893–1895.
Perrot-Chipiez = *Hist. de l'Art dans l'Antiquité*, 1881 ff.
Preller = *Römische Mythologie*, 1858.
Réville = *Religion des peuples non-civilisés*, 1883.
Riehm = *Handwörterbuch d. bibl. Altertums*[2], 1893–1894.
Robinson = *Biblical Researches in Palestine*[2], 1856.
Roscher = *Lex. d. gr. u. röm. Mythologie*, 1884.
Schaff-Herzog = *The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Relig. Knowledge*, 1908 ff.
Schenkel = *Bibel-Lexicon*, 5 vols. 1869–1875.
Schürer = *GJV*[3], 3 vols. 1898–1901 [*HJP*, 5 vols. 1890 ff.].
Schwally = *Leben nach dem Tode*, 1892.
Siegfried-Stade = *Heb. Wörterbuch zum AT*, 1893.
Smend = *Lehrbuch der alttest. Religionsgesch.*[2], 1899.
Smith (G. A.) = *Historical Geography of the Holy Land*[4], 1896.
Smith (W. R.) = *Religion of the Semites*[2], 1894.
Spencer (H.) = *Principles of Sociology*[3], 1885–1896.
Spencer-Gillen[a] = *Native Tribes of Central Australia*, 1899.
Spencer-Gillen[b] = *Northern Tribes of Central Australia*, 1904.
Swete = *The OT in Greek*, 3 vols. 1893 ff.
Tylor (E. B.) = *Primitive Culture*[3], 1891 [[4]1903].
Ueberweg = *Hist. of Philosophy*, Eng. tr., 2 vols. 1872–1874.
Weber = *Jüdische Theologie auf Grund des Talmud u. verwandten Schriften*[2], 1897.
Wiedemann = *Die Religion der alten Ægypter*, 1890 [Eng. tr., revised, *Religion of the anc. Egyptians*, 1897].
Wilkinson = *Manners and Customs of the Ancient Egyptians*, 3 vols. 1878.
Zunz = *Die gottesdienstlichen Vorträge der Juden*[2], 1892.

2. Periodicals, Dictionaries, Encyclopædias, and other standard works frequently cited.

AA = Archiv für Anthropologie.
AAOJ = American Antiquarian and Oriental Journal.
ABAW = Abhandlungen d. Berliner Akad. d. Wissenschaften.
AE = Archiv für Ethnographie.
AEG = Assyr. and Eng. Glossary (Johns Hopkins University).
AGG = Abhandlungen d. Göttinger Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften.
AGPh = Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie.
AHR = American Historical Review.
AHT = Ancient Hebrew Tradition (Hommel).
AJPh = American Journal of Philosophy.
AJPs = American Journal of Psychology.
AJRPE = American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education.
AJSL = American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literature.
AJTh = American Journal of Theology.
AMG = Annales du Musée Guimet.
APES = American Palestine Exploration Society.
APF = Archiv für Papyrusforschung.
AR = Anthropological Review.
ARW = Archiv für Religionswissenschaft.
AS = Acta Sanctorum (Bollandus).
ASG = Abhandlungen der Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften.
ASoc = L'Année Sociologique.
ASWI = Archæological Survey of W. India.
AZ = Allgemeine Zeitung.
BAG = Beiträge zur alten Geschichte.
BASS = Beiträge zur Assyriologie u. sem. Sprachwissenschaft (edd. Delitzsch and Haupt).
BCH = Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique.
BE = Bureau of Ethnology.
BG = Bombay Gazetteer.
BJ = Bellum Judaicum (Josephus).
BL = Bampton Lectures.
BLE = Bulletin de Littérature Ecclésiastique.
BOR = Bab. and Oriental Record.
BS = Bibliotheca Sacra.
BSA = Annual of the British School at Athens.
BSAA = Bulletin de la Soc. archéologique à Alexandrie.
BSAL = Bulletin de la Soc. d'Anthropologie de Lyon.
BSAP = Bulletin de la Soc. d'Anthropologie, etc., Paris.
BSG = Bulletin de la Soc. de Géographie.
BTS = Buddhist Text Society.
BW = Biblical World.
BZ = Biblische Zeitschrift.

CAIBL=Comptes rendus de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres.
CBTS=Calcutta Buddhist Text Society.
CF=Childhood of Fiction (MacCulloch).
CGS=Cults of the Greek States (Farnell).
CI=Census of India.
CIA=Corpus Inscrip. Atticarum.
CIG=Corpus Inscrip. Græcarum.
CIL=Corpus Inscrip. Latinarum.
CIS=Corpus Inscrip. Semiticarum.
COT=Cuneiform Inscriptions and the OT [Eng. tr. of *KAT*²; see below].
CR=Contemporary Review.
CeR=Celtic Review.
ClR=Classical Review.
CQR=Church Quarterly Review.
CSEL=Corpus Script. Eccles. Latinorum.
DACL = Dict. d'Archéologie chrétienne et de Liturgie (Cabrol).
DB=Dict. of the Bible.
DCA = Dict. of Christian Antiquities (Smith–Cheetham).
DCB=Dict. of Christian Biography (Smith–Wace).
DCG=Dict. of Christ and the Gospels.
DI=Dict. of Islam (Hughes).
DNB=Dict. of National Biography.
DPhP=Dict. of Philosophy and Psychology.
DWAW=Denkschriften der Wiener Akad. der Wissenschaften.
EBi=Encyclopædia Biblica.
EBr=Encyclopædia Britannica.
EEFM=Egyp. Explor. Fund Memoirs.
ERE=The present work.
Exp=Expositor.
ExpT=Expository Times.
FHG=Fragmenta Historicorum Græcorum (coll. C. Müller, Paris, 1885).
FL=Folklore.
FLJ=Folklore Journal.
FLR=Folklore Record.
GA=Gazette Archéologique.
*GB*²=Golden Bough ² (Frazer).
GGA=Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen.
GGN=Göttingische Gelehrte Nachrichten (Nachrichten der königl. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen).
GIAP=Grundriss d. Indo-Arischen Philologie.
GIrP=Grundriss d. Iranischen Philologie.
GJV=Geschichte des Jüdischen Volkes.
GVI=Geschichte des Volkes Israel.
HDB=Hastings' Dict. of the Bible.
HE=Historia Ecclesiastica.
HGHL=Historical Geography of the Holy Land (G. A. Smith).
HI=History of Israel.
HJ=Hibbert Journal.
HJP=History of the Jewish People.
HN=Historia Naturalis (Pliny).
HWB=Handwörterbuch.
IA=Indian Antiquary.
ICC=International Critical Commentary.
ICO=International Congress of Orientalists.
ICR=Indian Census Report (1901).
IG=Inscrip. Græcæ (publ. under auspices of Berlin Academy, 1873 ff.).
IGA=Inscrip. Græcæ Antiquissimæ.
IGI=Imperial Gazetteer of India² (1885); new edition (1908–1909).
IJE=International Journal of Ethics.
ITL=International Theological Library.
JA=Journal Asiatique.
JAFL=Journal of American Folklore.
JAI=Journal of the Anthropological Institute.
JAOS=Journal of the American Oriental Society.
JASB=Journal of the Anthropological Society of Bombay.
JASBe=Journ. of As. Soc. of Bengal.
JBL=Journal of Biblical Literature.
JBTS=Journal of the Buddhist Text Society.
JD=Journal des Débats.
JDTh=Jahrbücher f. deutsche Theologie.
JE=Jewish Encyclopedia.
JGOS=Journal of the German Oriental Society.
JHC=Johns Hopkins University Circulars.
JHS=Journal of Hellenic Studies.
JLZ=Jenäer Litteraturzeitung.
JPh=Journal of Philology.
JPTh=Jahrbücher f. protest. Theologie.
JPTS=Journal of the Pāli Text Society.
JQR=Jewish Quarterly Review.
JRAS=Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.
JRASBo=Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Bombay branch.
JRASC=Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Ceylon branch.
JRASK=Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Korean branch.
JRGS=Journal of the Royal Geographical Society.
JThSt=Journal of Theological Studies.
*KAT*²=Die Keilinschriften und das AT (Schrader), 1883.
*KAT*³=Zimmern-Winckler's ed. of the preceding [really a totally distinct work], 1903.
KB or *KIB*=Keilinschriftliche Bibliothek (Schrader), 1889 ff.
KGF=Keilinschriften und die Geschichtsforschung, 1878.
LCBl=Literarisches Centralblatt.
LOPh=Literaturblatt für Oriental. Philologie.
LOT=Introduction to Literature of OT (Driver).
LP=Legend of Perseus (Hartland).
LSSt=Leipziger sem. Studien.
M=Mélusine.
MAIBL=Mémoires de l'Acad. des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres.
MBAW = Monatsbericht d. Berliner Akad. d. Wissenschaften.
MGH=Monumenta Germaniæ Historica (Pertz).
MGJV=Mittheilungen der Gesellschaft für jüdische Volkskunde.
MGWJ=Monatsbericht f. Geschichte u. Wissenschaft des Judentums.
MI=Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas (Westermarck).
MNDPV = Mittheilungen u. Nachrichten des deutschen Palästina-Vereins.
MR=Methodist Review.
MVG=Mittheilungen der vorderasiatischen Gesellschaft.
MWJ = Magazin für die Wissenschaft des Judentums.
NBAC=Nuovo Bulletino di Archeologia Cristiana.
NC=Nineteenth Century.
NHWB=Neuhebräisches Wörterbuch.
NINQ=North Indian Notes and Queries.
NKZ=Neue kirchliche Zeitschrift.
NQ=Notes and Queries.
NR=Native Races of the Pacific States (Bancroft).
NTZG=Neutestamentliche Zeitgeschichte.
OED=Oxford English Dictionary (Murray).
OLZ=Orientalische Litteraturzeitung.
OS=Onomastica Sacra.
OTJC=Old Testament in the Jewish Church (W. R. Smith).
OTP=Oriental Translation Fund Publications.
PAOS=Proceedings of American Oriental Society.
PASB=Proceedings of the Anthropological Soc. of Bombay.
PB=Polychrome Bible (English).
PBE=Publications of the Bureau of Ethnology.
PC=Primitive Culture (Tylor).
PEFM=Palestine Exploration Fund Memoirs.
PEFSt = Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly Statement.
PG=Patrologia Græca (Migne).
PJB=Preussische Jahrbücher.

PL = Patrologia Latina (Migne).
PNQ = Punjab Notes and Queries.
PR = Popular Religion and Folklore of N. India (Crooke).
PRE[3] = Prot. Realencyclopädie (Herzog-Hauck).
PRR = Presbyterian and Reformed Review.
PRS = Proceedings of the Royal Society.
PRSE = Proceedings Royal Soc. of Edinburgh.
PSBA = Proceedings of the Soc. of Biblical Archæology.
PTS = Pāli Text Society.
RA = Revue Archéologique.
RAnth = Revue d'Anthropologie.
RAS = Royal Asiatic Society.
RAssyr = Revue d'Assyriologie.
RB = Revue Biblique.
RBEW = Reports of the Bureau of Ethnology (Washington).
RC = Revue Critique.
RCel = Revue Celtique.
RCh = Revue Chrétienne.
RDM = Revue des Deux Mondes.
RE = Realencyclopädie.
REG = Revue des Études Grecques.
REg = Revue Égyptologique.
REJ = Revue des Études Juives.
REth = Revue d'Ethnographie.
RHLR = Revue d'Histoire et de Littérature Religieuses.
RHR = Revue de l'Histoire des Religions.
RN = Revue Numismatique.
RP = Records of the Past.
RPh = Revue Philosophique.
RQ = Römische Quartalschrift.
RS = Revue sémitique d'Épigraphie et d'Hist. ancienne.
RSA = Recueil de la Soc. archéologique.
RSI = Reports of the Smithsonian Institution.
RTAP = Recueil de Travaux rélatifs à l'Archéologie et à la Philologie.
RTP = Revue des traditions populaires.
RThPh = Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie.
RTr = Recueil de Travaux.
RWB = Realwörterbuch.
SBAW = Sitzungsberichte der Berliner Akad. d. Wissenschaften.
SBE = Sacred Books of the East.
SBOT = Sacred Books of the OT (Hebrew).
SDB = Single-vol. Dict. of the Bible (Hastings).
SK = Studien u. Kritiken.
SMA = Sitzungsberichte der Münchener Akademie.
SSGW = Sitzungsberichte d. Kgl. Sächs. Gesellsch. d. Wissenschaften.
SWAW = Sitzungsberichte d. Wiener Akad. d. Wissenschaften.
TAPA = Transactions of American Philological Association.
TASJ = Transactions of the Asiatic Soc. of Japan.
TC = Tribes and Castes.
TES = Transactions of Ethnological Society.
ThLZ = Theologische Litteraturzeitung.
ThT = Theol. Tijdschrift.
TRHS = Transactions of Royal Historical Society.
TRSE = Transactions of Royal Soc. of Edinburgh.
TS = Texts and Studies.
TSBA = Transactions of the Soc. of Biblical Archæology.
TU = Texte u. Untersuchungen.
WAI = Western Asiatic Inscriptions.
WZKM = Wiener Zeitschrift f. Kunde des Morgenlandes.
ZA = Zeitschrift für Assyriologie.
ZÄ = Zeitschrift für ägyp. Sprache u. Altertumswissenschaft.
ZATW = Zeitschrift für die alttest. Wissenschaft.
ZCK = Zeitschrift für christliche Kunst.
ZCP = Zeitschrift für celtische Philologie.
ZDA = Zeitschrift für deutsches Altertum.
ZDMG = Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft.
ZDPV = Zeitschrift des deutschen Palästina-Vereins.
ZE = Zeitschrift für Ethnologie.
ZKF = Zeitschrift für Keilschriftforschung.
ZKT = Zeitschrift für kathol. Theologie.
ZKWL = Zeitschrift für kirchl. Wissenschaft u. kirchl. Leben.
ZM = Zeitschrift für die Mythologie.
ZNTW = Zeitschrift für die neutest. Wissenschaft.
ZPhP = Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Pädagogik.
ZTK = Zeitschrift für Theologie u. Kirche.
ZVK = Zeitschrift für Volkskunde.
ZVRW = Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft.
ZWT = Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie.

[A small superior number designates the particular edition of the work referred to, as *KAT*[2], *LOT*[6], etc.]

ENCYCLOPÆDIA

OF

RELIGION AND ETHICS

C

CONFIRMATION. — **I. Names.** — The word 'confirmation,' as used in this article, indicates an act, closely connected with baptism, in which prayer for the Holy Spirit is joined with some ceremony, such as the laying on of hands or anointing, through which the gift of the Spirit is believed to be conferred. So long as confirmation continued to be administered at the same time as baptism, the two forming a single rite, the need of a special name for the former was not much felt. The rite as a whole was known as baptism, and the part of it which was associated with the gift of the Spirit was designated by terms derived from its most prominent ceremony, such as 'laying on of hands' (*ἐπίθεσις χειρῶν*, He 6^{2}; *ἡ χειροθεσία*, Clem. Alex. *Exc. Th.* 22; *Const. Ap.* ii. 32, iii. 16, vii. 44; cf. Firmilian, *ap.* Cyp. *Ep.* 75; *impositio manus*) and 'chrism.' The word 'seal' (*σφραγίς*), originally, it seems, applied to baptism (Hermas, *Sim.* IX. xvi. 2–4; Iren. *Dem.* 3), was early used of confirmation, with reference to the signing of the baptized with the cross (Clem. Alex. *Strom.* ii. 3; Cornelius, *ap.* Eus. *HE* VI. xliii. 14 f.; cf. *Const. Ap.* iii. 17). 'Confirmation,' now universally accepted as the name of the rite in the West, does not appear to have been so used before the 5th century. It occurs in Faustus, Bishop of Riez, formerly Abbot of Lérins, *de Sp. S.* ii. 4 (ed. Engelbrecht, Vienna, 1889, p. 143), *hom. in die Pent.* (Bigne, *Max. Bib. Pat.*, Paris, 1677, vi. 649), and the cognate verb is similarly applied by St. Patrick (*Ep.* 2), who spent some years at Lérins. It appears, therefore, to have originated in Gaul, and probably at Lérins, though it was perhaps not fully established as a name of the rite at Lérins when St. Patrick left that monastery *c.* A.D. 415 (Bury, *Life of St. Patr.*, 1905, pp. 294, 336 ff.), since in his *Confession* (38, 51) he uses the word *consummare* instead of *confirmare*. St. Ambrose had at an earlier date used the latter verb with a similar but not identical meaning (*de Myst.* 42); and in the middle of the 5th cent. Pope Leo I. (*Ep.* 159) applies it to the laying on of hands on those who had been baptized in heresy. In Egypt at the present day the rite is called *tathbit*—a word exactly equivalent to 'confirmation.' In the 9th cent., when confirmation was deferred, the newly baptized were said to be 'confirmed' by the reception of the Holy Communion (Alcuin, *Ep.* 90; Jesse Ambian. *Ep. de bapt.*; Amalarius, *de Cær. Bapt.* 4; Raban. Maur. *de Cler. Inst.* i. 29).

2. Confirmation in the Apostolic Age.—A study of Ac 19^{1-6}—the account of the twelve disciples who had been baptized into John's baptism—seems to yield the following results. St. Paul's first question implies that a reception of the Holy Spirit usually, though not always, synchronized with admission to the Christian Society, and that in the case of disciples whose conversion was not due to the preaching of him or his immediate companions (v.^{2} *ἐλάβετε πιστεύσαντες*). It is also implied in what follows that the outpouring of the Spirit was not a result of the act of baptism (v.^{3}), but that it was mediated, at least in St. Paul's practice, by a laying on of hands which normally followed immediately upon baptism (v.^{6}). Since apparently St. Paul, in accordance with his rule (1 Co 1^{14-17}), which was also that of other Apostles (Ac 10^{48}, cf. 2^{38}), did not himself baptize the Ephesian disciples, though he laid his hands upon them (v.$^{5f.}$ *ἐβαπτίσθησαν . . . ἐπιθέντος τοῦ Παύλου*), it may be inferred that, while baptism was commonly administered by persons of lower ministerial rank, confirmation was reserved for those who had a higher place in the ministry, if not for Apostles.

These conclusions are confirmed by the narrative of the planting of the Church in Samaria (Ac 8^{12-17}). From it we learn that the practice of the older Apostles coincided with that of St. Paul. Baptism by itself did not convey the gift of the Spirit. That was mediated by a laying on of hands by Apostles, with prayer for the Holy Spirit (vv.$^{15.\,17}$), the baptisms having been previously performed by Philip, and perhaps by others of inferior ministerial office who accompanied him. It is hinted that, at least when St. Luke wrote, according to established usage the bestowal of the Holy Spirit was not separated in time from the administration of baptism (v.^{16}).

In each of these cases the reception of the Spirit was manifested by the exercise of miraculous powers (8^{18} 19^{6}). But it would be contrary to the teaching of the NT as a whole to suppose that such manifestations were of the essence of the gift. If we may suppose (Chase, *Confirmation in the Apostolic Age*, p. 35) that 2 Ti $1^{6ff.}$ refers to

Timothy's confirmation, rather than to his ordination, it proves that the graces looked for as a result of the laying on of hands were such as 'power and love and soberness' (cf. Ac $2^{41ff.}$, where 'wonders and signs' are confined to the Apostles).

The inferences which have here been drawn from Ac 8^{12-17} 19^{1-6} are corroborated by many references in the Epistles to a reception of the Holy Spirit on admission to the Church (Ro 5^{5}, 2 Co 5^{5}, Eph $1^{13f.}$ 4^{30}, 1 Jn 2^{27} 3^{24}), in some of which St. Paul uses the very phrase ascribed to him by St. Luke, as pointing to a laying on of hands, *πνεῦμα ἐλάβετε* (Ro 8^{15}, 1 Co 2^{12}, 2 Co 11^{4}, Gal $3^{2f.}$), while others appear to indicate that the bestowal of the gift was an act distinct from and following the washing (1 Co 6^{11} 12^{13}, 2 Co $1^{21f.}$, Tit $3^{4ff.}$). To these may be added He 6^{2}, where *βαπτισμοὶ ἐπίθεσίς τε χειρῶν* must at least *include* a laying on of hands closely connected with a Christian act of lustration.

3. A review of the evidence afforded by the NT, therefore, leads to the belief that in the Apostolic age a rite of confirmation was widely, if not universally, used, the main parts of which were prayer and imposition of hands. But it has been held that at this period, as in later ages, with the laying on of hands was associated an anointing of the neophytes. In support of this view it has been urged (Chase, *op. cit.* p. 53): (*a*) that unction and imposition of hands are 'closely related symbolical acts' in both OT and NT (cf. Nu 8^{10} with Ex 28^{41}, etc.; and Mk 6^{5} 8^{23} and Ac 28^{8} with Mk 6^{13} and Ja 5^{14}); (*b*) that anointing is associated with confirmation in the earliest sub-Apostolic records (Iren. *Hær.* I. xxi. 3; Tert.; *Can. Hipp.* 134–136; to the authorities cited by Chase may be added Theophilus of Antioch; see below, § **6** *a*); (*c*) that the supposition adds force to such passages as 2 Co $1^{21f.}$, 1 Jn $2^{20. 27}$.

It must be noticed, however, (*a*) that no Scripture evidence has been produced that unction was used *along with* the laying on of hands; while, on the other hand, it was, among both Jews and Gentiles, an accompaniment of the bath (Swete, *The Holy Spirit in the NT*, 1909, p. 386, citing Ru 3^{3}, Ezk 16^{9}, to which add Sus ^{17}); (*b*) that neither Irenæus (*loc. cit.*) nor Theophilus makes any reference to the laying on of hands; and both Tertullian and *Can. Hipp.* connect the unction not with it but with the immersion (see below, §§ **21**, **26**, cf. § **22**); (*c*) that, if 2 Co $1^{21f.}$ enumerates in order the acts of the initiatory rites, *σφραγισάμενος* is naturally regarded as indicating baptism (see above, § **1**), and the implication, therefore, is that the unction preceded baptism, and was separated by it from confirmation. The connexion of the unction with the gift of the Spirit in 1 Jn $2^{20. 27}$ does not by itself establish the contention. It may, however, in part account for the close relation which subsisted in later times between the unction and the imposition of hands, leading in some cases to the overshadowing, or even the superseding, of the latter by the former.

On the whole, the reasonable inference from the facts appears to be that unction was a primitive accompaniment of baptism rather than of confirmation.

4. The passages of the NT examined in § **2** point to confirmation by laying on of hands after baptism. Nevertheless, it must be remarked that there is no indication that any feeling of incongruity was occasioned by the outpouring of the Holy Spirit upon Cornelius and his friends before they were baptized (Ac 10^{44-48}), and it is recorded that Ananias laid hands on Saul that he might be 'filled with the Holy Ghost,' and afterwards baptized him (Ac 9^{17}). These facts suggest the possibility that confirmation may regularly have preceded baptism in some regions, concerning whose customs in this matter the NT supplies no information. It will be found that this suggestion has some bearing upon peculiarities of the early Syrian rite of initiation (§ **7**).

5. References to confirmation in the sub-Apostolic period.—It was not to be expected that the scanty remains of the earliest extra-canonical Christian literature would supply many references to confirmation. In the *Didache* and Justin Martyr's *1st Apology*, both of which contain accounts of the baptismal rite, explicit mention of it might, indeed, have been looked for. The absence of such mention in the former may, however, be accounted for by supposing that its administration belonged to apostles and prophets, for whose guidance the *Didache* was not intended. In Justin, on the other hand, but few details of the baptismal rite are given (*1 Apol.* 61), and we are told (ch. 65) that, after the washing, the neophyte was brought into the assembly, where prayer was made for him and others, followed by the kiss of peace and the Eucharist. That this is a vague account of the confirmation is rendered probable by its resemblance in general outline to *Can. Hipp.* 135 ff. (see below, §§ **26**, **28**). Irenæus seems to imply that a laying on of hands followed the immersion, both being included in the rite of baptism. Thus in *Hær.* III. xvii. 1, 2 he seems to distinguish the grace of baptism from the gift of the Spirit; and in *Dem.* 3 he describes the former as forgiveness of sins and regeneration, while in *Dem.* 41 f. he speaks of the Apostles as baptizing their converts and giving them the Holy Spirit, and connects this with the present life of the Church, by describing believers as the habitation of the Spirit given in baptism (cf. *Hær.* IV. xxxviii. 1, 2).

6. The ancient Syrian rite.—About the ceremonies of baptism used in Syria in earlier centuries there is a considerable amount of evidence, which must be set out as briefly as possible.

(*a*) From Theophilus, Bishop of Antioch (*c.* 180), we learn (*ad Autol.* i. 12, ii. 16) that anointing with the 'oil of God' was, when he wrote, an important feature of the initiatory rite; and his statement that the name 'Christian' was derived from it implies (see Ac 11^{26}) that he believed it to date from the Apostolic age. According to him, the immersion conveyed re-birth and remission of sins.

(*b*) *Clementine Recognitions*, iii. 67 (Gersdorf, p. 110; Lagarde, p. 119) (*c.* 200 [?]). A description of baptism is put into the mouth of St. Peter. It includes anointing with oil sanctified by prayer, immersion in the threefold Name, and Holy Communion.

(*c*) *Didascalia*, III. xii. 2 f. (Funk, p. 208) (*c.* 230). When speaking of the duties of deaconesses at the baptism of women, the writer mentions anointing by the bishop with the oil of unction on the head 'at the laying on of hands.' An anointing of the rest of the body by deaconesses or other women follows, and then the baptism by the bishop or by deacons or presbyters, at his command. Funk accounts for the absence of reference to a post-baptismal unction by supposing that the deaconesses had no share in it; but it must not be assumed that there was any unction after the baptism.

(*d*) *Syr. Acts of Judas Thomas*, in Wright, *Apoc. Ac. of Ap.* (vol. ii. Eng. tr.), 1871 (3rd cent.). This work contains five detailed accounts of baptisms (pp. 165, 188, 257, 267, 289), which, combined, give the following results: After the blessing of the oil, the candidates are anointed with the seal on the head, the men first. Their bodies are then anointed, in the case of the men by Judas, in the case of the women by a woman. They are subsequently baptized and communicated. There is no intimation of a consecration of the water, and apparently no recognition of a distinction between the grace conveyed by the anointing and by the immersion.

(*e*) Aphraates (*c.* 345). In one of his few allusions to the baptismal rite this writer mentions the unction before the baptism (*Dem.* xii. 13), though he does not actually state that the former preceded the latter in the rite. He does not, apparently, mention the gift of the Spirit, but he connects both regeneration and the putting on of spiritual armour with 'the water' (*Dem.* vi. 1, xiv. 16).

(*f*) Ephraim, *Epiphany Hymns* (Eng. tr. by Gwynn in *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, vol. xiii.) (*c.* 350). From many allusions we gather that the baptismal rite included the following elements in the order in which they are here mentioned: (1) anointing with 'the seal' (iii. 1, 2, v. 8); (2) the baptism (xi. 8, xiv. 41 f. [for the order of these two, see iii. 1, 17, iv. 1, vi. 9, 20, viii. 22]); (3) vesting of the neophytes in white (vi. 15, 18, xiii. 1, 5, cf. iv. 3); (4) crowning (xiii. 5); and (5) communion (vii. 23, viii. 22, cf. iii. 17, xiii. 17). From *Sermo Exeg. in Ps.* cxl. 3 (*Opp. Syr.*, Rome, 1737–43, ii. 332) it appears that the anointing

'with the seal of the Holy Spirit' on the head was followed by unction of the members of the body. In the commentary on Jl 2[24] (*ib.* 252) mention is made of the oil and fragrant *μύρον* with which the '*midhe*' are sealed and put on the armour of the Holy Spirit. [In this passage '*midhe*' may mean 'baptizandi,' in accordance with the order implied in the *Epiphany Hymns* (see the passage quoted in Diettrich, p. 63, n. 15).] The priest is the minister both of the unction and of the baptism (*Epiph. Hymns*, iv. 4, v. 8 f.).

(*g*) *History of John the son of Zebedee* (4th cent. [?]), in Wright, *op. cit.* Two baptisms are described in detail (pp. 38, 53). The 'fine scented' oil was first consecrated, and then the water, fire appearing over the former after consecration. Afterwards the candidates were signed on the forehead, and their bodies anointed. Then followed the baptism, the vesting in white, the giving of the kiss of peace to the neophytes, and the communion. The immersion was 'for the forgiveness of debts and the pardon of sins,' while the appearance of fire on the oil may indicate that the unction conveyed the gift of the Spirit.

(*h*) *Apostolic Constitutions* (*c.* 380). The *Ordo Baptismi* agrees closely with that of the contemporary Church of Jerus. (below, § 18). But that the compiler, in introducing a second, post-baptismal, unction, was consciously innovating upon Syrian custom, is clear. (1) Upon it alone of the component parts of the rite does he comment, and his remark upon it is polemical in tone (vii. 44): *ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἀκόλουθα λεγέτω· ἑκάστου γὰρ ἡ δύναμις τῆς χειροθεσίας ἐστὶν αὕτη. ἐὰν γὰρ μὴ εἰς ἕκαστον τούτων ἐπίκλησις γένηται παρὰ τοῦ εὐσεβοῦς ἱερέως τοιαύτη τις εἰς ὕδωρ μόνον καταβαίνει ὁ βαπτιζόμενος ὡς οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι κ.τ.λ.* (2) He connects the gift of the Spirit with unction before baptism, while the post-baptismal unction is merely 'the seal of the covenants' or 'the confirmation of the confession' (iii. 16 f., vii. 22).

(*i*) St. Chrysostom (*c.* 390), in discourses delivered at Antioch, makes it plain that he regarded the bestowal of the Holy Spirit as mediated by unction (*in 1 Tim.* ii. 2), and as closely connected with baptism, which was followed by Holy Communion (*in Mt.* xii. 6, *in 1 Co.* xxx. 2; in the latter passage Mason [*Relation of Confirmation to Baptism*[2], p. 365] mistranslates *ἀπὸ τοῦ βαπτίσματος* 'directly after baptism'). Preaching at Constantinople, he implies that there confirmation followed baptism; but, by his remark that it was not wonderful that Cornelius received the Spirit before baptism, since 'this takes place also in our own day' (*καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῶν τοῦτο γέγονεν*), he hints that elsewhere it preceded it (*in Ac.* xxiv. 2). He distinguished the 'Spirit of remission,' which the Samaritans received at their baptism, from the 'Spirit of signs' subsequently given, and probably held that the former was the gift bestowed in later times by the anointing (*in Ac.* xviii. 2 f. cf. xl. 1 f.).

(*j*) *Life of Rabbula*, in Overbeck, *S. Ephr. Syri sel. opp.*, p. 164 (*c.* 450). On his arrival at the river Jordan, Rabbula 'recited the Belief before' the priests, who then 'anointed and baptized him; and immediately after he was come up from the water' a cloth was wrapped about his body 'after the custom of the spiritual kindred of Christ.' The latter ceremony no doubt corresponded to the vesting of the neophytes in white.

(*k*) Theodoret, *in Cant.* i. 2 (*c.* 450). Those who are being initiated are said, after renunciation and profession of allegiance (and therefore before baptism), to receive 'as it were a certain royal seal, the unction of the spiritual ointment, receiving thereby, as in a figure, the invisible grace of the all-holy Spirit.' To argue (Mason, *op. cit.* p. 374), against the natural force of the words, that the unction followed baptism, because it was made with ointment (*μύρον*) and not with oil, is to assume that the Syrian usage of this period agreed with that of other places and other times. There is independent evidence that in Syria scented oil or ointment was used for the preliminary unction (above, *f*, *g*). In fact, in Syria to a comparatively late date, and in early writers elsewhere, there seems to have been no sharp distinction between *μύρον* and oil (see below, § 10, and Hippol. *in Dan.* i. 16). Elsewhere, as here, Theodoret seems to assume that normally the gift of the Holy Spirit conveyed by the laying on of hands preceded baptism (*in Heb.* vi. 1 ff., cf. *Qu. in Nu.* 47).

(*l*) Narsai, *Homilies*, 21, 22 (Nestorian, end of 5th cent.). According to these homilies, after the consecration of the oil the candidate was signed with it, first on the forehead and then over the whole body. After this—the water having been consecrated—he was immersed, and, on ascending from the font, was given the kiss of peace, clothed, and communicated. By the oil the Spirit was imparted (Connolly, in *TS* viii. 40, 43, 45, 50–52).

(*m*) *Baptism of Constantine*, in Overbeck, *op. cit.* p. 355 (*c.* 500 [?]). After the blessing of the font, Constantine is said to have been anointed with oil, baptized, and communicated.

(*n*) Severus, Patriarch of Antioch (Monophysite, 512–519), habitually speaks of anointing with chrism as following and completing baptism. Since he quotes the *Testamentum Domini* as authoritative on the subject of baptism, it may be inferred that the rite, as he practised it, resembled that which is described in that work. See especially *Epp.* ix. 1, 3 (ed. E. W. Brooks).

(*o*) The catholicos Isô'yāhb I. (Nestorian, 580–596). In his *Quæstiones* (Diettrich, *Die nestor. Taufliturgie*, p. 94 ff.) directions are given for the baptism of adults by a priest, and for the baptism of a sick person by a deacon. In each case a signing with oil (of men on the breast, of women on the forehead) is followed by the baptism. The only acts mentioned subsequent to baptism are the clothing of the women by the deaconesses and their crowning by the priest, and the administration of the Eucharist, if it is customary, by the deacon to the person baptized by him.

7. From this evidence some important inferences may be drawn. It would seem that throughout Syria up to the 5th cent., and among the Nestorians to the end of the 6th cent., the initiatory rite included three principal acts—unction, baptism, and communion of the baptized. The unction consisted of two parts—the signing of the head (3rd and 4th cents.), forehead (4th and 5th cents., and later in the case of women), or breast (6th cent.), and the anointing of the body. The gift of the Holy Spirit is usually associated with the unction (see above, § 6 *f*, *g*, *h*, *i*, *k*, *l*, and cf. *c*, where the unction is 'at the laying on of hands'); and in this connexion it should be noticed that the evidence for the consecration of the oil is earlier than for the consecration of the font (see *b*, *d*). There is no trace, apart from the *Apostolic Constitutions*, of any important act following the immersion except the communion of the baptized. Thus, according to the earliest known custom of the Syrian Christians, confirmation preceded baptism. It is not difficult to believe that this usage was simply a development of local primitive practice. In places where the laying on of hands for the imparting of the gift of the Spirit took place before baptism (above, § 4), if the baptismal unction also preceded the immersion (see § 3), the laying on of hands and the unction would in time come to be closely associated. Thus the confirmation would become the unction 'at the laying on of hands' (§ 6 *c*). Finally, in accordance with a tendency of which there are many examples, the unction would supersede the laying on of hands, except so far as the signing of the person with oil could be so described (cf. § 6 *k*).

In the early part of the 3rd cent. (§ 6 *c*) confirmation was reserved to the bishop, but, according to all later authorities, the entire rite is administered by one person—bishop or priest—assisted by a deacon or deaconess. It will be observed that there is early evidence for three minor ceremonies between the immersion and the baptismal Eucharist—the kiss of peace (§ 6 *g*, *l*), vesting in white (§ 6 *f*, *g*, *j*, *l*, *o*), and crowning (§ 6 *f*, *o*).

8. **Modern Nestorian rite.**—The Syrian ritual was re-cast shortly after the middle of the 7th cent. by the catholicos Isô'yāhb III. (652–661), and the office of baptism drawn up by him is the basis of the rite as now practised by the East Syrians. He allowed the pre-baptismal anointing to remain; indeed, he seems to have restored the ancient custom of an unction (that is, probably, a signing with oil) on *the head*, followed by an anointing of the body. The result of this change has been much confusion, through the persistence of 6th cent. customs, in the existing MSS. But in one point all agree. In the formula pronounced at this unction there is no reference to the gift of the Spirit. No special grace seems to be connected with it, and in a rubric it is described as a symbolic act indicating that 'the acknowledgment of the Trinity is imprinted on the heart' of the person about to be baptized. It no longer corresponds to confirmation.

The distinguishing feature of Isô'yāhb's ritual is, in fact, confirmation *after* baptism. It consists of two main acts—the imposition of the hand upon the head of the baptized with an appropriate prayer, and the signing of the forehead with oil (not ointment), accompanied by a formula. Some of the MSS omit mention of the use of oil in this signing, but there is good evidence that it was ordered by Isô'yāhb, and it is apparently still customary (A. J. Maclean, *Recent Discoveries illustrating early Christian Life and Worship*, 1904, p. 68). In the present Nestorian rite, as everywhere in the East, the priest is the minister

of confirmation. But it is characterized by several unusual features. The priest (not the bishop) consecrates the oil at each performance of the rite, the laying on of the hand is separated from the signing, and there is no use of ointment, as distinct from olive oil, at any part of the rite.

That post-baptismal confirmation was actually introduced by Išô'yāhb III. follows almost certainly from the evidence given in § 6, for there seems to have been no catholicos between Išô'yāhb I. and Išô'yāhb III. who was a liturgical reformer. The supposition is confirmed by the fact that Išô'yāhb III. was a traveller, who must have had some knowledge of non-Syrian rites (Connolly, *op. cit.* p. xlix), and by the number and magnitude of the variations of existing rituals from each other, and from the *Ordo* drawn up by him—a natural consequence of so startling an innovation.

One or two of these may be mentioned. Išô'yāhb seems to have given no direction about the ceremony of crowning. Hence in some MSS it is omitted. In one it is described as a custom in some places. In another it appears in its original position after the vesting, and therefore before confirmation (Diettrich, *op. cit.* p. 87). Its present place is after the final signing (Maclean-Browne, *The Catholicos of the East*, 1892, p. 272). Again, Išô'yāhb I. ordered that the water should not be let out of the font till after the mysteries—*i.e.* apparently the Eucharist—had been administered (Diettrich, *op. cit.* p. 94). Išô'yāhb III., on the contrary, ordered that it should be let out before the confirmation (*ib.* p. 92). Nevertheless the older usage persisted, and is still followed (*ib.* pp. 50 f., 82, 101 f.).

The post-baptismal Eucharist was retained by Išô'yāhb III., and apparently still remained in the time of Elias III. (1176–1190; see Diettrich, *op. cit.* p. 101); but it has long fallen into desuetude (*ib.* p. 91 f.).

9. **Rites of the Syrian Monophysites.**—We have seen (§ 6 *n*) that post-baptismal confirmation with chrism is implied in the letters of Severus of Antioch. It is, in fact, probable that its introduction into Syria was due to him. Tradition ascribes to Severus a Gr. *Ordo Baptismi* which was translated into Syr. by James of Edessa in the latter part of the 7th cent., and received the approbation of Gregory Barhebræus six hundred years later (Denzinger, *Ritus orient.* i. 266, 279, 280). Four of the existing rituals, of which two bear the name of Severus and one that of James, while the fourth is anonymous (*ib.* p. 267), resemble one another closely, and are apparently all derived from the Syr. *Ordo* of James of Edessa, and thus ultimately from the Gr. of Severus. The anonymous ritual probably represents a recension subsequent to that of Barhebræus. There is also a short office for the baptism of the dying (*ib.* p. 318), attributed to Severus' contemporary Philoxenus, Bishop of Mabug or Hierapolis (*c.* 485–519). All these Orders contain a post-baptismal signing or unction. In two respects they stand apart both from ancient Syrian and from modern Nestorian usage: they have no form for the blessing of the oil, which is consecrated, not by the priest at the baptism, but by the bishop (*ib.* p. 361); and at the final unction unguent, likewise consecrated by the bishop, is used instead of oil.

10. On the other hand, among the liturgical reforms attributed to Peter the Fuller, Patriarch of Antioch (471–488), by Theodorus Lector (Valesius, *Hist.*, ed. Reading, 1720, iii. 582), was the consecration of the μύρον in the church before the whole people. This might seem to give colour to the supposition that post-baptismal confirmation was introduced among the Monophysites by him. But Peter, Bishop of Edessa (498), appears from the *Chronicle* of Joshua the Stylite (32, ed. Wright, p. 23), written during his episcopate, to have adopted the principal reforms of the Fuller about A.D. 500: among other things, 'he [prayed] over the oil of unction on the Thursday (before Easter) before the whole people.' From this passage it would seem that Theodorus quoted the actual words of the Fuller, and that the latter used μύρον as equivalent to oil (cf. § 6 *k*). It may be inferred that what the Fuller did was to reserve the consecration of the oil of unction to the bishop, and that post-baptismal chrismation had not come into use at Antioch in 488, or at Edessa by the end of the century.

11. The post-baptismal confirmation consisted of a prayer followed by a threefold signing of the baptized with chrism on the forehead and other parts of the body, with the formula, 'N. is signed with the holy chrism, the sweetness of the odour of Christ, the seal of the true faith, the complement of the gift of the Holy Ghost, in the Name,' etc., followed by an anointing of the rest of the body, the vesting in white, and prayers, one of which contained a petition for the sending forth of the Holy Spirit upon the neophytes.

That this form of confirmation is a later addition is perhaps already sufficiently clear. But this becomes still more evident when we consider the portion of the office which immediately precedes the immersion. Here the Monophysite rituals seem to follow ancient usage more closely than the Nestorian. Before baptism the candidates are signed on the forehead with oil, and their bodies are anointed. The connexion between these two acts is obscured in all the MSS by the interpolation between them of the consecration of the water. They are accompanied by prayers which distinctly associate with them the gift of the Spirit.

The first prayer has the petition: 'Vouchsafe to send upon them thy Holy Spirit.' The second begins: 'Holy Father, who by the hands of thy holy Apostles didst give the Holy Spirit to those who had been baptized, send now also, using the shadow of my hands, thy Holy Spirit on those who are about to be baptized . . . that they may be worthy of thy holy anointing.' This is evidence that a laying on of hands once preceded this unction, though no mention is made of it in the extant rituals (cf. § 6 *c*, *k*). The third runs: 'Thou who didst send upon thy only-begotten Son . . . thy Holy Spirit . . . and didst sanctify the waters of Jordan, may it please thee that the same thy Holy Spirit may dwell upon these thy servants . . . and do thou perfect them . . . purifying them by thy holy laver,' etc. This extract seems to indicate (1) that the consecration of the font originally followed the anointing, and (2) that the indwelling of the Spirit preceded the purification of the laver.

Thus the Monophysite rite is strangely anomalous. It has two distinct anointings, one before and the other after baptism, by both of which it is implied that the gift of the Holy Spirit is mediated. The former was at one time accompanied by an imposition of hands, and the references to the gift of the Spirit in immediate connexion with it are still much more precise and emphatic than in connexion with the latter, which is now regarded as the confirmation.

12. Of the attendant ceremonies, the vesting, the crowning, and communion follow the chrismation. All are omitted in the anonymous ritual.

It has not been thought necessary to take account here of two rituals used by the Monophysites, bearing the name of St. Basil, since they are not of Syrian origin. One is a mere translation of the Gr. *Ordo*, the other incorporates some Syrian elements (Denzinger, *op. cit.* p. 318).

13. **Maronite rite.**—It is probable that the two closely similar early Maronite baptismal rituals (Denzinger, *op. cit.* pp. 334, 351) are derived from an Order drawn up by James of Serug († 521), whose name appears at the head of one of them. But that they have been subjected to considerable revision is evident; *e.g.* the baptismal formula is not in the third person, as in all other Eastern Orders, but in the first, as in the Latin rite. This assimilation to Western standards was carried much further about the year 1700, when the Order now in use was composed (*ib.* pp. 334, 350). Till that revision, however, some ancient Syrian characteristics were preserved. The oil was consecrated at each baptism, and at the consecration

the deacon bid the prayers of the people that those who were to be baptized might be made 'pure temples for the habitation of the Holy Spirit.' Again, the pre-baptismal unction was divided into two parts, as in the Monophysite rite, by the consecration of the water. Before this consecration the candidate was signed with oil on the forehead, the prayer following, 'Let thy Holy Spirit come and dwell and rest upon the head of this thy servant,' etc.; after it the priest again signed him with oil, this time on the head, and the deacon anointed his body. After the baptism the candidate was signed with chrism, and then his body was anointed (*ib.* p. 349), or the principal members were signed (*ib.* p. 357), a formula being used similar to that of the Monophysite rite. In an accompanying prayer (not in all MSS) the words occur, 'Grant us by this seal the union of thy Holy Spirit.' Thus in this rite there is the same anomaly as in the Monophysite, proving that the post-baptismal confirmation had no place in the ancient Syrian Order from which it was derived.

14. The attendant ceremonies are the vesting—which in one Order retains its original place immediately after baptism (*ib.* p. 357), and in the other (*ib.* p. 349) is postponed till after the chrismation—the crowning, and the communion.

15. **Armenian rites.**—The Armenian baptismal ritual is said to have been drawn up by the catholicos John Mandakuni (*c.* 495). It was revised at the end of the 9th cent. (Conybeare, *Rituale*, p. xxvii ff.). The extant office obviously differs much from the original from which it was derived. After the consecration of the 'holy oil,' the filling and consecration of the font takes place, and then the baptism. After this there is a prayer for the baptized, and an anointing with the 'holy oil,' with which the forehead and several members of the body are signed, in each case with an appropriate formula. In these formulæ no mention is made of the Holy Spirit.

The consecration of the oil at the beginning of the baptismal office proper seems to imply an unction before immersion, which has fallen into desuetude (cf. Denzinger, *op. cit.* pp. 35, 57). At present simple oil is not used at all, and this prayer of consecration is said over the chrism which has been already consecrated by the catholicos at Etchmiadzin (*ib.* p. 34; Neale, *Hist. East. Ch.*, 1850, Introd. p. 967). The single petition for the grace of the Holy Spirit in the prayer before the anointing is so wanting in definiteness that this act can scarcely be regarded as a confirmation. It is less emphatic than the clause in the prayer of consecration, 'Send the grace of thy Holy Spirit into this oil, to the end that it shall be to him that is anointed therewith unto holiness of spiritual wisdom,' etc. On the whole, it appears that this rite is of Syrian origin, and that it once had two unctions, with each of which the gift of the Spirit was associated (cf. §§ 11, 13). As in the modern Nestorian rite, the unctions were probably performed, not with chrism, but with oil consecrated by the priest in the course of the office; though the use of chrism consecrated by the catholicos was certainly in vogue to some extent as early as the 7th cent. (Denzinger, p. 55).

16. After the unction follow the vesting, crowning, bowing to the altar, and communion. The prayer used at the bowing to the altar has no special appropriateness to this ceremony; but it contains words which imply a laying on of the hand ('Stretch forth thy unseen right hand and bless him'), and is perhaps misplaced.

17. The baptismal office of the Paulicians of Armenia (Conybeare, *Key*, p. 96) has neither anointing nor imposition of hands, but after the affusion there are prayers for the gift of the Holy Spirit to the baptized, interspersed with lessons (Mt 3^{13-17}, Ac 2^{1-4}, Mk 1^{9-11}, Gal 3^{24-29}, Lk $3^{21f.}$, Ac 8^{26-40} [with the 'Western' additions in vv.$^{37. 39}$], Jn 20^{19-23}; but not Ac $8^{14ff.}$ $19^{1ff.}$). One of the prayers seems to imply that communion followed (*ib.* p. 98, cf. p. xlix). The minister is the 'elect one.' This rite cannot be said to include an act of confirmation, but it was probably derived from one in which confirmation followed baptism.

18. **Orthodox Eastern rite.**—The baptismal office of the Orthodox Church (Goar, Εὐχολόγιον, 1647, p. 350) closely resembles that which was used at Constantinople in the 8th cent. (Conybeare, *Rituale*, p. 389), and both belong to a group which comprises the *Ordo Baptismi* in *Const. Ap.* vii. 39–45 (cf. iii. 16 f.) and the rite as described by St. Cyril of Jerusalem (*Cat. Myst.*) and ps.-Dionysius (*Hier. Eccl.* ii. 2, 3). The *Ordo* in *Const. Ap.* seems to represent an attempt to bring the Syrian rite into agreement with that of the Church of Jerusalem. It accordingly preserves some Syrian features.

Combining the testimony of all these documents, we learn that the following series of acts in the modern office has descended from the 4th cent.: anointing with exorcized oil, consecration of the font, baptism, vesting in white, anointing with chrism on the forehead and other parts of the body (the vesting follows the chrismation in St. Cyril), and communion. In St. Cyril and ps.-Dionysius the second unction is associated with the gift of the Spirit, and in the present rite it is accompanied by the formula, 'The seal of the gift of the Holy Spirit' (cf. the spurious can. 7 of C. Constantinop. I.). It is, therefore, rightly described as confirmation. It is said, however, that the chrism is now administered with a spoon (Maclean, *Rec. Discoveries*, p. 68); thus no vestige of the primitive laying on of hands remains at this point of the rite. That *c.* A.D. 325 it was still an act distinct from the chrismation is shown by the evidence of Macarius, Bishop of Jerusalem (Conybeare, *Key*, pp. 183, 186).

Among the Orthodox the chrism is consecrated by the Patriarch apart from the administration of baptism. The practice of the 4th cent. in this matter is somewhat obscurely described by Macarius (*ut supra*).

It is possible that the rite of the Church of Jerusalem with its modern Greek derivative was developed from an ancient Syrian rite in which confirmation preceded baptism. But however that may be, it is highly probable that many of the more modern features of the Monophysite, Maronite, and Armenian rituals—especially post-baptismal confirmation with chrism—were borrowed from it (cf. Conybeare, *Key*, p. 179).

19. **The Egyptian rite.**—The baptismal rituals of the Alexandrian Copts (Denzinger, *op. cit.* p. 191) and the Abyssinians (*ib.* p. 222) vary so slightly from each other that they may be treated as one. There are two unctions, but the first is performed outside the baptistery and is separated from the baptism by a long interval. Immediately after the baptism comes the confirmation. The priest, standing before the altar, prays for the bestowal of the Holy Spirit on the baptized, and signs his forehead or head with chrism in the threefold Name. Other parts of the body are then signed, each with an appropriate formula. This is succeeded by the laying on of the hand with a formula in which the words occur, 'Receive the Holy Ghost,' and another prayer for the neophyte, including a petition for the sending forth of the Spirit upon him. Both oil and chrism are consecrated by the Patriarch of Alexandria (*ib.* pp. 54, 248 f.).

By means of the newly recovered Sacramentary of Serapion and the evidence of contemporary writers, it has been shown that an Order of confirmation identical with this in its main features was in use in Egypt in the 4th cent. (Brightman, in *JThSt* i. 252 f., 263 ff., 268 ff.). Indeed, some of its elements can be traced much further back. Origen alludes to the final unction in several places (*Hom. in Lev.* vi. 5, *in Rom.* v. 8; *Sel. in Ezk.* 16). The laying on of hands seems also to be implied by him, and if so, he certainly regarded it as of Apostolic origin (*de Princ.* I. iii. 27; cf. Clem. Alex. *Exc. Th.* 22). In Egypt alone has the laying on of hands been preserved, apart from the signing with chrism, by an unbroken tradition, as part of confirmation. In the 4th cent., indeed, it preceded instead of following the chrismation (Brightman, *loc. cit.* p. 265); but in Abyssinia at present there is laying on of hands with prayer for the Holy Spirit, before as well as after the chrismation. In early times, as now, the priest administered the chrism, but only as the delegate of the bishop (Ambrosiaster, *Qu. Veteris et Novi Test.*, ci. 5; *in Eph.* iv. 12).

20. After confirmation follow the vesting, crowning, and communion of the baptized. In Abyssinia and, until comparatively recent times, at Alexandria, they received milk and honey in the Eucharist. At Alexandria only milk is now given. No early evidence has been discovered for the crowning; but the vesting is alluded to in the 4th cent., the baptismal Eucharist is referred to by Origen (*Sel. in Ex.* [*PG* xii. 283]), and apparently the giving of milk and honey is mentioned by the writer of the *Ep. of Barnabas* (6) and by Clem. Alex. (*Pæd.* i. 6).

21. **The African rite.**—In several passages (*de Præsc. Hær.* 36, 40; *de Bapt.* 6 ff., 17; *de Res. Carn.* 8; *adv. Marc.* i. 14; *de Cor.* 3; *de Pud.* 9) Tertullian alludes to the ceremonies of the rite of initiation. From them we learn that immediately after the immersion the baptized was anointed, perhaps over the whole body ('perungimur,' *de Bapt.* 7). He was afterwards signed with the cross, apparently on the forehead. The laying on of the hand followed, and finally the Eucharist. At some point of the rite the neophyte received a mixture of milk and honey. The exact position of this ceremony is doubtful; but it was certainly between the anointing and the Eucharist, and probably immediately after the former. It is possibly hinted in one place that the baptized was crowned (*de Præsc.* 40).

The imposition of the hand is separated from the unction by the signing, and probably the giving of milk and honey. Moreover, while the spiritual effect of baptism is remission of sins, of unction consecration, and of the signing protection, the gift of the Holy Spirit is attributed to the imposition of the hand. The unction, therefore, is connected with baptism rather than with confirmation (cf. BAPTISM [Early Chr.], vol. ii. p. 387ᵃ (β)). The proper minister of the entire rite is the bishop, but with his authority it may be performed by a presbyter or a deacon. Tertullian holds that in case of necessity a layman may baptize (and confirm); but it seems to be implied that this opinion was not generally accepted. Since Tertullian (*de Cor.* 3) claims the authority of long-standing tradition for several of the ceremonies, it is probable that he describes the rite as it was practised in Carthage at least as early as the middle of the 2nd century.

22. The letters of Cyprian on the baptism of heretics confirm and supplement the information given by Tertullian. According to him, the special gift of baptism is remission of sins (*Ep.* lxix. 11, lxx. 1, lxxiii. 6, lxxiv. 5) and regeneration (lxxiv. 7); but the regeneration is not complete without the gift of the Spirit (lxxii. 1, lxxiii. 21), which is conveyed by the laying on of the hand (lxxii. 1, lxxiii. 6, lxxiv. 5). Thus baptism and confirmation are distinct, yet closely related as parts of the same rite (lxx. 3, lxxiii. 9). The immersion was immediately followed by unction (lxx. 2), and it is implied that the unction was connected rather with baptism than with confirmation. The gift of the Spirit is not associated with it in the one passage in which it is mentioned; and in that passage, arguing against the validity of heretical baptism, as distinct from confirmation, Cyprian makes a point out of the invalidity of the unction which accompanied it. It is to be added that he speaks of sanctification (*sanctificatio*) as one of the benefits conferred by baptism, in the narrower sense (*e.g.* lxix. 1, 8, 11, lxx. 2, lxxiii. 18 f., lxxiv. 5, 7), just as Tertullian had connected the same (*consecratio*) with unction. The act by which the Holy Spirit was communicated was, therefore, the imposition of the hand. But this act was accompanied by prayer for the Holy Spirit and signing of the baptized on the forehead (lxxiii. 6, 9; *ad Demetrian.* 22). At some time in the course of the rite, probably after confirmation, the kiss of peace was given (lxiv. 4). The bishop confirmed, but apparently he did not usually baptize (lxxiii. 9). The oil used in the unction was consecrated on the altar at the Eucharist, and therefore not at the administration of baptism (lxx. 2).

23. The mode of administration of the rite remained much as it was in the 2nd cent. till at least the beginning of the 5th; but the giving of milk and honey was transferred to the baptismal Eucharist (C. Carthag. III. c. 24, longer form).

For the order, see St. Augustine, *Serm.* 324; for consecration of oil at the Eucharist, *de Bapt. cont. Don.* v. 28; for conferring the Holy Spirit by imposition of hand with prayer, *ib.* iii. 16, *de Trin.* xv. 46, *Retract.* i. 12. 9, *Tract. in Ep. Jo.* vi. 10; for communion, *Serm.* 224, 227, 228; for the bishop as minister, *de Trin.* xv. 46, and for the presbyter acting in his stead, *Serm.* 324.

By the second half of the 5th cent. the unction had become a more prominent feature, and was closely connected with the imposition of the hand, for which it was a preparation (Optat. Milev. iv. 7, vii. 4; Aug. *contra litt. Pet.* ii. 239), though it still always followed baptism (Avitus Vienn. *Ep.* 24). The material used seems to have been no longer simple oil (Optat. *loc. cit.*; Aug. *de Trin.* xv. 46, *cont. litt. Pet.* ii. 104). The unction, though not apparently held to convey the Spirit, is the 'sacramentum Spiritus sancti' (Aug. *Serm.* 227, *Tract. in Ep. Jo.* iii. 5, 12). During this period attempts were made to abolish the consecration of the chrism by priests, which appears to have been the older custom; but the practice still continued (C. Carth. II. c. 3, III. c. 36; C. Hipp. c. 34; Joan. Diac. *Ep. ad Senar.* 8).

24. **The Gallican rite.**—The rite which prevailed most widely in the West in early centuries was that known as the Gallican, which was used in North Italy, Gaul, Spain, probably Britain, and Ireland. The earliest descriptions of it are found in Ambrose, *de Mysteriis*, and another tract founded upon it, viz. ps.-Ambrose, *de Sacramentis*. These witness to the use of North Italy *c.* A.D. 400. In this rite baptism was immediately followed by an anointing with chrism on the head or forehead (Prudent. *Psychom.* 360; Patr. *Ep.* 3; *Missal. Bobbien.*; cf. *Stowe Missal*), with the formula 'Deus . . . qui te regeneravit . . . ipse te unget,' etc. After the chrismation the feet of the candidates were washed (Maximus Taurin. *Tract.* iii.; Cæsarius, *Serm.* clxviii. 3, cclvii. 2 [*PL* xxxix. 2071, 2220], *Serm. de unct. cap.* [*PL* xl. 1211]; C. Elib. c. 48; and the Orders), and they were vested in white. They then received the *signaculum spirituale*—apparently a signing with the chrism (cf. Greg.

Tur. *Hist. Franc.* ii. 31)—which was accompanied by a prayer for the septiform Spirit, no doubt similar to that which occurs in all later Western rites, including the Anglican (Isidor. *de Eccl. Off.* II. xxvii. 3; Ildefons. *de Cogn. Bapt.* 127). Finally, they communicated (*Sac. Gall.*; *Sac. Goth.*; *Stowe Missal*; Zeno Veron. *Tract.* ii. 38, 53). Since there is early evidence that confirmation consisted of two acts—chrismation and 'imposition of the hand' or 'benediction' (Gaul: C. Arans. I. c. 1 f.; Gennadius Massil. *de Eccl. Dog.* 52; Avitus, *Ep.* 24; Spain: Isidor. *op. cit.* II. xxv. 9, xxvii. 1; Ildefons. *op. cit.* 121–125, 128 f.)—it may be inferred that both the unction and the *signaculum*, though not in immediate sequence, belonged to it. In some *Ordines* the *signaculum*, or laying on of hands, disappeared as a separate act (Gaul: German. Paris. *Ep.* 2; *Sac. Gall.*; *Sac. Goth.*; North Italy: Maximus Taurin. *ut supra*; *Missal. Bobbien.*; Ireland: Patr. *Ep.* 2 f.; *Stowe Missal*), and with it the invocation of the septiform Spirit. Thus the 'confirmation' was reduced to an anointing with chrism, perhaps including a signing, without any direct prayer for the Holy Spirit. If this was the use of the Irish Church in the 12th cent., the statement of St. Bernard (*Vita S. Mal.* 3), that confirmation was not practised in Ireland, is not only intelligible but justified.

25. It is clear that about the end of the 4th cent. baptism and confirmation were ordinarily administered by the same person (Ambr. *op. cit.*; ps.-Ambr. *op. cit.*; Pacianus, *Serm. de bapt.* 6, *Ep.* i. 6; Zeno Veron. *Tract.* ii. 53). This, according to Ambrose and Pacianus, was the bishop; but ps.-Ambrose seems to make the presbyter the minister of both (Wordsworth, *Ministry of Grace*, 1901, p. 80). A century earlier the Synod of Elvira (cc. 38, 77) implies that if a presbyter baptized he also confirmed, and that presbyterial confirmation prevailed widely in later times, in spite of continual efforts to suppress it, there is abundant evidence (Gaul: C. Arans. I. c. 1 f.; C. Arel. II. c. 26 f.; Gallican Statutes [C. Carth. IV.], c. 36; Leo, *Ep. de priv. Chorep.*; C. Epaon. c. 16; C. Antisiodoren. c. 6; C. Hispal. II. c. 7; *Sac. Gall.*; *Sac. Goth.*, cf. C. Vasen. c. 3; North Italy: *Missal. Bobbien.*; Ireland: *Stowe Missal*; Spain: C. Tolet. I. c. 20; Mart. Bracar. *Capitula*, 52; Isidor. *op. cit.* II. xxvii.; Ildefons. *op. cit.* 128, 131; cf. Montanus, *Ep.* 1 [Mansi, viii. 788]; C. Bracar. II. c. 19).

This summary of the evidence will suffice to show that between the Gallican and the Eastern confirmation rites there are many points of resemblance. Gallican usages gave place to Roman in France at the end of the 8th century. They had a more prolonged existence in Spain, Milan, and Ireland (Duchesne, *Orig.* p. 97 ff.).

26. **The Roman rite.**—If the Gallican rite resembled those of the Eastern Church, the baptismal rite of Rome was akin rather to that of Africa. According to the *Canons of Hippolytus* (134 ff.), in the Rom. use of *c.* A.D. 200, the priest, immediately after administering baptism, signed the baptized on the forehead, mouth, and breast with the χρῖσμα εὐχαριστίας, or oil of unction, which had been consecrated by the bishop at an earlier stage of the office, and then proceeded to anoint his body. The baptized was then vested and brought into the church, where he was confirmed by the bishop. The confirmation consisted of imposition of the hand and a prayer, in which there was a thanksgiving for the outpouring of the Holy Spirit, and a petition that the neophyte might receive the earnest of the Kingdom, followed by the sign on the forehead without oil.

That this represents early Rom. practice is confirmed by Hippolytus, *in Dan.* i. 16, where the oil used in the bath is said to signify 'the powers (δύναμις [read δυνάμεις?]) of the Holy Spirit wherewith (αἷς) the believers are anointed after the laver, as though (ὡς) with ointment,' the implication being that oil was not actually used in conferring the Holy Spirit.

Thus the unction was connected with baptism, not with the laying on of hands.

The imposition of the hand continued to be the principal act in confirmation till at least the end of the 4th cent., when it was accompanied by the prayer for the septiform Spirit (Jerome, *cont. Luc.* 9; Siricius, *Ep. ad Himer.*). But by that time the unction on the forehead seems to have come to be regarded as closely associated with it, and as belonging, like it, rather to the bishop than to the priest. In 416, Pope Innocent I. *permitted* an additional unction, which must not be on the forehead, by the priest after baptism. This is the first notice of the double chrismation, which soon afterwards became the regular practice of the Roman Church (Innoc. *Ep. ad Dec.* 6, cf. 9; Joan. Diac. *Ep. ad Senar.* 6, 14). A signing of the head with chrism after baptism, with a formula almost identical with that of the Gallican rite (§ 24), is enjoined in the *Gelasian Sacramentary* and in later Rom. books.

27. The development of the Rom. order of confirmation is instructive. In the *Gelasian Sacramentary* (which agrees with the description of the Rom. rite in the Epistle of Jesse of Amiens, A.D. 812), and the 9th cent. *Ordo* of St. Amand (Duchesne, *op. cit.* p. 453)—as in the much later *Liber S. Cuthberti* (C. Wordsworth, *Pontif. S. Andreæ*, 1885, App. 5)—the imposition of the hand, with the prayer for the septiform Spirit, is preserved, and at the subsequent chrismation a special formula is used. In the *Gregorian Sacramentary* the laying on of the hand gives place to the raising of the hand. In later orders the raising or extending of the hand is sometimes accompanied by the formula 'Spiritus sanctus superveniat,' etc., the prayer for the septiform Spirit following, and a formula more or less resembling the Gelasian being used with the signing. Of the latter the latest form is that which Pope Eugenius IV. (*Decr. pro Armen.*) declared to be the 'form' of the sacrament.

28. In the *Canons of Hippolytus*, and in most later Orders in which confirmation immediately follows baptism, the communion of the neophytes is enjoined. The communion commonly followed baptism when confirmation was deferred, though it is sometimes ordered with the reservation that it is to be administered only if the neophytes are of suitable age. Two ceremonies anciently followed confirmation (*Can. Hipp.*)—the kissing of the neophyte, with the words, 'The Lord be with you,' and the giving of milk and honey. The former has disappeared from all later Orders, but the memory of it is preserved in the words 'Pax vobiscum' after the chrismation. The latter continued till the 6th cent. (Joan. Diac. *op. cit.* 12). The bishop has always been the minister of confirmation in the Rom. Church, though apparently Innocent I. (*ut supra*) permitted priests to confirm in cases of necessity if authorized to do so by the bishop. The bishop has also always consecrated the chrism (but see Joan. Diac. *op. cit.* 8).

29. **The mingling of Roman and Gallican rites.**—In early centuries the Rom. rite was used only in the immediate neighbourhood of the city. That it had not been adopted in the Gr. district of Lucania at the end of the 5th cent. is easily understood (Gelas. *Ep.* ix. 6, 10); but it is more surprising that at the beginning of the same cent. Pope Innocent I. should find it necessary to urge a bishop of Umbria to bring the customs of his diocese into conformity with those of Rome. From his letter to Decentius (416) it may be gathered that at Eugubium (Gubbio) the consecration of the chrism was not reserved to the bishops, and that presbyters anointed the baptized with chrism (apparently on

the forehead) and laid hands upon them, with an invocation of the Spirit. Thus in Eugubium (*c.* 400) the baptismal rite was of the Gallican type (cf. Leo, *Ep.* 168). Innocent compromised matters with Decentius by suffering the chrismation by the priest to remain, provided it was not on the forehead, and provided the baptized was subsequently confirmed in Rom. fashion by the bishop. One result of his letter, which was widely quoted as an authoritative document, was, no doubt, the modification of Gallican usage in a Romeward direction in many places; another was the introduction into the Rom. baptismal office of the post-baptismal chrismation. The Western rite, in fact, combines the Gallican and the earlier Rom. confirmation Orders, which suffices to explain the anxiety of Gallican writers like Rabanus Maurus (*de Cler. Inst.* i. 28–30; cf. Theodulf. *de Ord. Bapt.* 14; Jesse of Amiens, *Ep. de bapt.* [*PL* cv. 790]), not long after the suppression of the Gallican customs, to distinguish the spiritual effect of the two chrismations, assuming that each of them conveyed a gift of the Spirit. The phenomenon is not unlike that which presents itself in the rites of Western Syria (above, §§ 11, 13, 15). The consequence of the interaction of the Rom. and Gallican rites, exemplified in this striking case, is that the present Latin confirmation rite is not purely Roman, though it is not now possible to distinguish in all cases those features which were developed within the Rom. Church from others which may have been imported from without. Cf. the following article.

30. The separation of confirmation from baptism.—For many centuries in the West, confirmation has been divided from baptism by a considerable interval. The beginning of this separation of the rites may be traced to the 3rd cent., when the validity of heretical confirmation was denied even by those who admitted the validity of heretical baptism (but see E. W. Benson, *Cyprian*, 1897, p. 420). By them persons baptized in heresy, when they joined the Catholic Church, were admitted by a ceremony analogous to, if not identical with, confirmation. Later on we find cases contemplated in which confirmation at the time of baptism was impossible, either because the minister was a deacon or a layman, or because the baptizing priest had no chrism (C. Elib. cc. 38, 77; C. Araus. I. c. 2). But the practice of administering confirmation apart from baptism in ordinary cases had a different origin. The Rom. tradition of restricting the administration of confirmation to bishops involved its postponement in the case of all persons baptized by a priest in the absence of the bishop. This, of course, became more frequent as the Church spread beyond the cities, as bishops became fewer in proportion to the number of Christians, and infant baptism became the rule. It was already common at the end of the 4th cent. (Jerome, *loc. cit.*; cf. Anon. *de Re-baptismate*, 4 f.). But the separation of the rites did not become universal in the West for many centuries, and, when confirmation was postponed, it was usually only deferred till the offices of a bishop could be had. If it was not administered in infancy, the delay was due to the negligence of parents or of the bishops themselves. On the eve of the Reformation, infant confirmation was still the normal practice (see, *e.g.*, Tindale, *Answer to More*, 1531, ed. Parker Soc., 1850, p. 72). At a much earlier period, however, there was a movement towards admitting to confirmation only those of more mature age (Gratian, *Decr.* III. v. 6; Syn. Colonien. 1280, c. 5), and in the latter part of the 16th cent. it became the rule, both in the Rom. and in the Anglican Communion, that candidates for confirmation should have come to years of discretion (Eng. Pr. Bk.; *Cat. ad paroch.* ii. 3, § 8; cf. *CQR* xxiii. 72 ff.).

For information about modern offices of confirmation and substitutes therefor, in the Reformed Communions, it must suffice to refer to the works named at the close of the following list of authorities, and to art. BAPTISM (Later Chr.), vol. ii. p. 404.

LITERATURE.—F. H. Chase, *Confirmation in the Apost. Age*, Lond. 1909; A. J. Mason, *The Relation of Confirmation to Baptism*[2], Lond. 1898; L. Duchesne, *Orig. du culte chrétien*[2], Paris, 1898 (Eng. tr. *Chr. Worship*, 1903); H. Denzinger, *Ritus Orientalium*, Würzburg, 1863, vol. i., and *Enchiridion symbol. et defin.*[10], Freiburg, 1908; J. A. Assemani, *Codex Liturgicus Ecclesiæ Universæ*, Rome, 1749, vols. i.–iii.; E. Martène, *de Ant. Eccles. Ritibus*, Antwerp, 1700; A. J. Maclean, *The Ancient Church Orders*, Cambridge, 1910, ch. vi.; G. Diettrich, *Die nestor. Taufliturgie*, Giessen, 1903; R. H. Connolly, 'The Liturgical Homilies of Narsai' (*TS* viii. [1909]); F. C. Conybeare, *Rituale Armenorum*, Oxford, 1905, *The Key of Truth*, Oxford, 1898; F. E. Brightman, 'Sacramentary of Serapion' (*JThSt* i. [1899–1900] 88); Procter-Frere, *New Hist. of Book of Com. Prayer*[3], Lond. 1908, ch. xiv.; J. Dowden, *Workmanship of the Pr. Bk.*, Lond. 1899, pp. 33–37, *Further Studies in the Pr. Bk.*, Lond. 1908, ch. xii.; J. H. Blunt, *Annotated Book of Com. Prayer*, new ed. 1903; W. Caspari, *Die evangel. Konfirmation, vornamlich in der lutherischen Kirche*, Leipzig, 1890.

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CONFIRMATION (Roman Catholic).

—As a supplement to the data furnished in the preceding article, the following points illustrating the position of Confirmation in the present teaching and practice of the Roman Catholic Church seem worthy of note:—

1. Dogmatic tenets.—The doctrine according to which Confirmation is named as the second of seven Sacraments is clearly enunciated at least as early as the middle of the 12th century. In a sermon which is put into the mouth of St. Otto, Bishop of Bamberg († 1139), by his biographer Herbord (*c.* 1159), the preacher, addressing the newly baptized Pomeranians, discourses at some length of the seven Sacraments. Enumerating them in their order, he says:

'The second Sacrament is Confirmation, that is, the anointing with chrism on the forehead. This Sacrament is necessary for those that are to conquer, to wit, that they be protected and armed by the strengthening of the Holy Spirit, as they will have to fight against all the temptations and corruptions of this present life. Neither is this rite to be deferred until old age, as some suppose, but it is to be received in the vigour of youth itself, because that age is more exposed to temptation' (Pertz, *MGH* xxii. 733).

Most of this doctrine, including the sevenfold number of the Sacraments, can be shown to have been taught by Radulfus Ardens fifty years earlier, in his as yet unprinted *Speculum Universale* (see Grabmann, *Gesch. der scholast. Methode*, i. 259), but much vagueness still prevailed regarding the nature and definition of a Sacrament. A decretal of Innocent III. in 1204, included in the *Corpus Juris Canonici* (Friedberg, Leipzig, 1876–80, ii. 133), outlines further the main points upon which stress was laid by scholastic theologians both before and after the Council of Trent.

'By the unction,' he says, 'of the forehead with chrism (*per frontis chrismationem*) is denoted the imposition of hands, which is otherwise called Confirmation, because by this means the Holy Spirit is bestowed for increase and strength. Hence, while a simple priest (*sacerdos vel presbyter*) may perform other unctions, this ought not to be administered by any one but a high priest, that is to say a bishop, seeing it is recorded of the Apostles alone, whose vicars the bishops are, that they conferred the Holy Spirit by the imposition of hands' (cf. Ac 8[14ff.]).

During the Council of Florence (1438–1445), a bull was issued by Eugenius IV., known as the *Decretum pro Armenis*. This, taken as a whole, was not so much a dogmatic decree, defining points of faith, as an instruction to secure uniformity of practice. A portion of it, which consists of a compendious treatise on the Sacraments, is taken almost word for word from an opusculum of St. Thomas Aquinas, *De fidei articulis et septem sacramentis*. The 'matter' of the Sacrament is declared to be chrism, *i.e.* oil mixed with balsam, and the 'form' to be the words, 'I sign thee with the sign of the cross, and I confirm thee with the chrism of salvation in the name of the Father and

of the Son and of the Holy Ghost,' spoken both then and now by the bishop in administering the unction. In view, however, of the imperfectly dogmatic nature of the *Decretum pro Armenis*, this decision is not held to be an infallible pronouncement. On the contrary, the more commonly accepted view regards the act of unction as itself constituting an imposition of hands, so that the 'matter' comprises both the unction with chrism and the laying on of hands.[1]

The most prevalent theory, then, concerning Confirmation regards the 'outward sign' of the Sacrament as consisting in the act of the bishop, who makes the sign of the cross with chrism upon the candidate's forehead, whilst he pronounces the words already quoted. The Council of Trent, in its systematic review of Sacramental doctrine, is very guarded in its affirmations concerning Confirmation. It contents itself with declaring that it is 'truly and properly a sacrament,' and 'one of the seven, all of which were instituted by Jesus Christ our Lord.' It denies that 'it was in olden days nothing else but a sort of catechism in which those who were entering upon youth gave an account of their faith in the presence of the Church.' It condemns those (Reformers) who had declared that to attribute any virtue to the chrism used in Confirmation was an outrage to the Holy Ghost. It also rejected the view that every simple priest could administer the Sacrament; but, by pronouncing that a bishop was 'the *ordinary* minister,' it tolerated the practice by which simple priests in special cases receive from the Holy See faculties to confirm. Finally, the Council declares (Sess. vii. can. 9) that 'in Confirmation a character is imprinted in the soul, that is, a certain spiritual and indelible sign, on account of which the Sacrament cannot be repeated.' It will be observed that this leaves many questions open. In particular, nothing is said as to the time and manner of the institution by Christ, whether direct or indirect; and no definition is given regarding the matter and form—for example, as to whether the use of chrism is essential to the validity of the Sacrament.

Of late years another pronouncement, which, however, is not usually regarded as possessing infallible authority, has been made in the decree of the Inquisition, *Lamentabili sane*, of 3rd July 1907. This, in its 44th heading, condemns the following proposition as an error, viz., 'there is no proof that the rite of the Sacrament of Confirmation was employed by the Apostles; while the formal distinction between the two Sacraments, Baptism and Confirmation, has no place in the history of primitive Christianity' (Denzinger-Bannwart, *Enchiridion*[10], Freiburg, 1908, n. 2044).

Lastly, it should be noticed that, according to the teaching outlined in the above-mentioned *Decretum pro Armenis*, and universally held by Catholic theologians, the Sacrament of Baptism is *vitæ spiritualis janua*, and consequently no other Sacrament can take effect except in the case of those who have first been admitted to the life of supernatural grace through these portals. Hence it follows that, if Confirmation should precede Baptism, it would be invalid.

2. Adjustment of theory to historical fact.—It must be sufficiently obvious that, accepting the foregoing as a summary of approved Roman teaching upon the Sacrament of Confirmation, some explanations are needed to bring these tenets into accord with the facts of early Church history set forth in the preceding article. Attention may be directed, in particular, to the following points:—

(1) Although Trent teaches that Confirmation, like all the other Sacraments, was instituted by Christ, nothing is positively laid down concerning the manner of that institution, *i.e.* whether immediate or mediate, whether *in genere* or *in specie*. Modern theological opinion seems to favour the view that Christ did Himself immediately institute all the Sacraments (*i.e.* that we do not owe their institution to the Church, acting upon His general commission), but that He did not Himself give them all to the Church fully constituted. As a recent authority puts the matter:

> 'On some Sacraments particularly essential to Christianity, Baptism and Holy Eucharist for example, Christ explained Himself completely, so that the Church has had from the very beginning full and entire consciousness of these sacramental rites. As to the rest, the Saviour laid down their essential principles, leaving to development to show the Apostles and the Church what the Divine Master wished to accomplish. . . . In other words, Jesus instituted immediately and *explicitly* Baptism and Holy Eucharist; He instituted immediately but *implicitly* the five other Sacraments' (Pourrat, *Theol. of the Sacraments*, Eng. tr. p. 301 f.).

(2) It would be readily conceded that, in the case of such a Sacrament as Confirmation, the historical evidence is in some respects imperfect and obscure. The Church does not claim to clear up all the dark passages, but she claims to supplement by supernatural guidance and theological reasoning the data which we owe to natural research.

(3) With regard to the early recognition of the gift of the Holy Spirit as a distinct rite following Baptism, great stress is usually laid by Roman Catholic theologians, and deservedly, upon the opening of the heavens and the descent of the Holy Ghost in the form of a dove upon our Saviour after His baptism in the Jordan. This, taken in combination with the NT passages cited in §§ 2 and 3 of the preceding article, seems to provide a sound historical foundation for such an immediate but implicit institution of the Sacrament by Christ as has just been spoken of.

(4) The extensive treatment which, following Connolly's *Homilies of Narsai*, pp. xlii–xlix, has been given to the peculiarities of the ancient Syrian rite in the preceding article (§§ 7 and 8), tends to obscure the very local character of the observances by which the gift of the Spirit seems to be connected with unctions *preceding* baptism. At Jerusalem itself, where the testimony of St. Cyril is explicit, as well as at Constantinople, Alexandria, Northern Africa, Rome, and throughout the West, we find full and clear historical evidence which not only establishes the practice of conferring the Holy Spirit *after* baptism, either by unction or by imposition of hands, but points to a very marked consciousness of the distinction between the two rites; in other words, to the recognition of Confirmation as a sanctification of a separate order, often conferred by a separate minister. For a discussion of this subject the reader may be referred to Dölger, *Das Sakrament der Firmung*, while the same writer, in an article in the *Röm. Quartalschrift* (1905, pp. 1–41), has dealt with the archæological evidence of early date, which establishes the existence in many places, *e.g.* at Naples, Rome, and Salona in Dalmatia, of a separate Confirmation chapel (*consignatorium, chrismarium*) distinct from the baptistery. In the Syrian Church, however, the accounts given of the unction, *e.g.* the lengthy discussion of Narsai himself, do *not* seem to remove it from the category of a mere ceremony subsidiary to baptism, while the effort made in the *Apostolic Constitutions* to alter the Syrian practice, introduc-

[1] This point of view may be curiously paralleled by some of the prayers of the early coronation rituals, in which the sovereign is described by the officiant prelate as receiving his crown *per impositionem manus nostræ* (*e.g.* in Legg, *Three Coronation Orders*, Henry Bradshaw Soc., 1900, p. 62); and it is supported by the wording of the *Professio Fidei* of Michael Palæologus, drafted at the Second Council of Lyons (1274), which speaks of the *sacramentum confirmationis quod per manuum impositionem episcopi conferunt chrismando renatos.*

ing an unction with chrism after baptism (see Connolly, p. xlvii), points to a consciousness that the former practice was fundamentally incomplete. Or, can it be that, after all, a post-baptismal unction was in use, although for some unaccountable reason it is not formally spoken of in the Syrian texts? It is certainly strange that, as has been pointed out by A. J. Maclean (*JThSt*, Jan. 1910, p. 316), 'in the present East Syrian rite the post-baptismal anointing is not explicitly mentioned, though it is usually administered in practice.'

(5) With regard to many other points—*e.g.* the alleged re-administration of Confirmation when heretics were reconciled to the Church (see previous article, §§ 22 and 30), the reservation to the bishop of the power of consecrating the chrism, or, again, the history of the introduction of the unctions with the 'oil of catechumens' and chrism, which now precede and follow the administration of baptism in the Roman rite—it is submitted that our ancient authorities do not speak with sufficient clearness to warrant any certain conclusions. Much difference of opinion upon such matters exists even among writers of the same theological sympathies.

3. **Modern liturgical details.**—Two or three details of the ritual prescribed in the *Pontificale Romanum* call for brief comment.

(1) The bishop holds his hands out over the candidates while saying certain preliminary prayers. This action was formerly considered by some to constitute a *manuum impositio*, and to be of the essence of the rite.

(2) The candidates—it is not now the custom to confirm children before they are seven or eight years old—are presented to the bishop by a godfather or godmother, according to sex. This practice seems, however, to date back to the time when Confirmation was administered immediately after Baptism, at which period the same godparents served for both ceremonies.

(3) A curious rubric, still printed, though obsolete in practice, directs that the candidate who is not an infant shall place his foot upon the foot of the godfather. This seems to be a vestige of some feudal practice of commendation, and may be compared with a similar practice in Teutonic marriages (cf. Grimm, *Deut. Rechtsalterthümer*, Berlin, 1881, pp. 142, 155–156, and Weinhold, *Deutsche Frauen*², Vienna, 1882, ii. 40 ff.).

(4) After the unction, the bishop is directed to give the newly confirmed a slight blow on the cheek, with the words *Pax tecum.* This is most probably an imitation of the blow by which knighthood was conferred (cf. the *Ordo* 'De Benedictione Novi Militis,' in the *Pontificale Romanum*; and Martène, *de Antiq. Eccles. Ritibus*, Venice, 1783, ii. 240). But there is perhaps something also to be said for the view that the blow may have originally been given to the child to impress upon his mind the fact of his confirmation (cf. Tougard in *Précis historiques*, Jan. 1888; Heuser in *Amer. Eccles. Review*, May 1889; and F. Brenner, *Verrichtung der Firmung*, p. 68), much as the boys of the parish were formerly whipped at specified places on the occasion of the 'beating of the bounds.' An early instance, before 1200, of the mention of such a blow in administering confirmation occurs in the Life of St. Hugh of Lincoln (Giraldus Cambrensis, *Opera*, vii. 95).

LITERATURE.—The best historical account is that of F. J. Dölger, *Das Sakrament der Firmung*, Vienna, 1906. A very full treatment of the subject is also given by various critics in Vacant-Mangenot, *Dict. de théol. cathol.*, Paris, 1905, iii. 975–1103. Consult also Chardon, *Hist. des sacrements*, Paris, 1745; N. Gihr, *Die heil. Sakramente*, 2 vols., Freiburg, 1899; B. Nepefny, *Die Firmung*, Passau, 1869; Van Noort, *Tract. de Sacramentis*, Amsterdam, 1905; M. Grabmann, *Gesch. der scholast. Methode*, Freiburg, 1909; P. Pourrat, *La Théol. sacramentaire*³, Paris, 1909 (Eng. tr., St. Louis, Mo., 1910); F. Brenner, *Geschichtl. Darstell. der Verrichtung der Firmung*, Würzburg, 1820; J. Pohle, *Lehrb. d. Dogmatik*³, Paderborn, 1907; J. Turmel, *Hist. de la théol. positive*, Paris, 1904; Tanquerey, *Synopsis Theol. Dogmat.*¹¹, Paris, 1908, vol. ii.; L. Billot, *De Ecclesiæ Sacramentis*, Rome, 1898; C. S. J. Pesch, *Prælectiones Dogmaticæ*, vol. vi.³, Freiburg, 1908; F. Probst, *Sakramente und Sakramentalien in den drei ersten Jahrhunderten*, Tübingen, 1872; G. L. Hahn, *Die Lehre von den Sakramenten*, Breslau, 1864.

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CONFORMITY.—The ethical question regarding conformity is, How far may a man, from regard to the feelings or authority of others, consent in outward action to what, apart from such regard, he is not inwardly convinced is right or true, or what he is even inwardly convinced is not right or true—more shortly, How far may a man conceal or act against his own inward conviction, in deference to the feelings of other persons or to external authority? Such a question cannot be simply set aside as illegitimate, unless we are prepared to assert for certain abstract formulæ of duty (*e.g.* that we ought to speak the truth) a kind of absoluteness which ignores the social ends to which all duties are relative, and ignores also the way in which a general rule, valid under ordinary and tacitly assumed conditions, may be modified or abrogated by the presence of extraordinary conditions not contemplated in the general statement. No one would seriously contend, *e.g.*, that the duty of promise-keeping requires the promiser not to stop even to save a drowning man's life, if by so doing he would have to break an appointment. On the other hand, it is evident that our question is, as it has been called (Morley, *On Compromise*), 'a question of boundaries,' a question involving a conflict of duties. And, so far as the decision of such questions turns upon the infinite variety and subtle details of personal relations between individuals, ethical science can have nothing to say beyond the vaguest generalities, such as that, on the one hand, we ought not unnecessarily to wound other people's feelings, or that, on the other, we ought not to suppress our convictions except for grave reasons. It is difficult, *e.g.*, to see how the writer just quoted is entitled to say, so emphatically as he does, that 'one relationship in life, and one only, justifies us in being silent where otherwise it would be right to speak; this relationship is that between child and parents' (*op. cit.* p. 165). If we take a duty such as that of a son to support and care for his parents in old age, it is obvious that the duty is one which falls upon a son as such: the relationship is the very basis of the duty. But we can hardly say the same of the duty of suppressing one's convictions: here the relationship seems to require only that added degree of deference which a son will naturally pay to his parents' opinions in all relations of life. And, if so, it is surely paradoxical to contend that a like deference is not equally obligatory in the more intimate relation of husband and wife.

It would seem, then, that the only cases in which we can look for a definite development of ethical doctrine in regard to conformity—as distinguished from mere casuistical discussion—are those in which some external authority has a peculiar claim upon our conformity, in a sense analogous to that in which parents have a peculiar claim to their boy's obedience or to their adult son's support. The two authorities which most evidently possess such a claim, and whose claims most need discussion, are the State and the Church. How far is a citizen morally permitted or obliged to obey legal injunctions of whose nature or objects he disapproves? How far, *e.g.*, is military service to be obligatory upon a Quaker, payment of Church rates upon a Dissenter? And the question of obligation is, of course, both accentuated and modified when the citizen is himself an official of the State acting as such; *e.g.*, how

far is a soldier or a subordinate officer, when ordered to fire upon a mob, relieved from all moral responsibility by the fact of his superior's command? Very similar questions are raised by the Church's claim to authority. How far may a layman, and still more a clergyman, subscribe a creed which he does not fully or literally believe?

All that can be attempted here is to point out some of the more general considerations which must be kept steadily in view if these questions are to be adequately discussed. In the first place, we must put aside as an empty truism—irrelevant or even question-begging—the assertion that a man must at all costs obey his conscience. For our problem is precisely to determine what, in the above cases, conscience really commands. We cannot, then, from the ethical point of view, start with a deliverance of conscience as a fixed datum. (From the political point of view, the ruler must needs take the conscience of any section of his subjects as a datum to be reckoned with. Not that he is obliged to give way to their conscience if he thinks them wrong,—for the sanctity of conscience can extend, in any ultimate sense, no further than the amount of moral truth which it apprehends,—but he must take it into account as one of the data of his problem. A Christian ruler might be very unwise in trying to enforce monogamy on a Muhammadan population, and yet the United States be entirely justified in putting down Mormonism.) In the second place, we must be on our guard against a fallacy into which we are likely to fall, if we begin by considering what the individual's duty would be, apart from his relation to the external authority, and then bring in this relation as a modifying circumstance. For we are then apt to think of the relation as *merely* a modifying circumstance, in the sense of being essentially subordinate to the abstract rule of duty. That is to say, we are apt to assume beforehand that the relation to the external authority *cannot* be important enough to alter the whole character of the duty. And thus, by the very form in which we put our question, we already go far to prejudge the answer. It would be absurd, *e.g.*, to begin the consideration of the duty of military service in time of war by laying down that we may not kill a man who has done no wrong, and then go on to ask whether we may break this rule at the command of the State. If, with Tolstoi, we begin by putting the question in this form, we have already committed ourselves, tacitly or by implication, to that denial of the value and authority of the State as an institution to which he proceeds to give open expression (*Kingdom of God is within you*, 1894, ch. vii.). But, on any less extravagant view than his, it is impossible for the citizen of a State, that is to say, the institution on which the whole system of law and order in life practically depends, to treat his relation to the State in any matter of public duty as a mere qualifying circumstance to be taken into account *after* his duty has been *otherwise* determined. In any matter of public duty the real question at issue as regards conformity is always this, Do I think *the particular human interest*[1] that is endangered by conformity so vital, that I, with others of like mind, am prepared to endanger, by our refusal of service or our passive resistance or our active rebellion, the institution on which *the whole fabric of human interests* depends? This, at any rate, is the question of principle. To say, with regard to a particular case, that no such danger to the State is likely to ensue, is (1) to admit that the interest, however important in itself, is a narrow one; and (2) to ignore the fact that the State depends on a *universal habit* of obedience, which is undermined in some degree by every example of disobedience. If, then, the citizen cannot answer the above question of principle in the affirmative, he does no wrong by conformity—provided always, of course, that in his capacity as a citizen he uses all lawful means to secure the particular interest endangered.

We have illustrated the duty of conformity, as regards the ordinary citizen, from the supposed case of a citizen required to serve in the army. It is worth while to illustrate the duty of an official of the State from the corresponding case of a soldier required, *e.g.*, to fire on a mob. For it is interesting to observe that our English system of law commits in practice, and in an even aggravated form, the same mistake as that to which we have objected in theory. It treats the soldier's special duty of obedience to military law as a mere qualifying circumstance in relation to his general civic duty to obey the ordinary law of the land; or, rather, it says he must obey both laws, and choose as best he can which to obey when they conflict. Hence 'he may . . . be liable to be shot by a court-martial if he disobeys an order, and to be hanged by a judge and jury if he obeys it' (Dicey, *Law of the Constitution*[6], 1902, p. 298, and cf. case cited p. 297, note 4). In the actual working of the legal machinery the absurdity of this situation is, of course, largely relieved by reliance on the common sense of a jury and by the power of the Crown 'to nullify the effect of an unjust conviction by means of a pardon' (Dicey, p. 301). But the situation illustrates very well the practical consequences of the theoretical error.

The question of religious conformity differs from that of civic in this respect, that membership of a Church is voluntary in a sense in which citizenship is not. We ought not, indeed, to exaggerate this difference, for in the case of a person of strong religious convictions, and of (what may be roughly called) 'high' Church views, it may amount to very little in practice. We can hardly wonder, *e.g.*, at the submission with which Roman Catholic disbelievers in Papal Infallibility received the decree, when the choice lay between submission and excommunication. Provided that we recognize, however, that Protestants and Nonconformists are, in the very nature of the case, disposed to take a less grave view of schism in the ecclesiastical sphere than the secular moralist must take of rebellion in the civic sphere, the question of principle and the general considerations to be kept in view are otherwise similar. If we begin by assuming that the repetition of a creed in a church service is to be judged like an ordinary assertion made with reference to a simple matter of fact in words chosen by ourselves, and that subscription to a creed is to be judged like an ordinary promise made with reference to a particular act in terms chosen by ourselves, and that the only question as regards conformity, accordingly, is whether and how far we may relax the ordinary rules of truth-speaking and promise-keeping in church matters without bad results, we simply prejudge the answer from the outset. We may as well go on to repudiate creeds and Churches altogether, as Tolstoi repudiates the State. Argument about the function of a creed and the adequacy of actual creeds does not fall within the scope of this article, any more than argument about unity and schism. So it will here be simply assumed that the kind of creed with which we are practically concerned is to be regarded as a traditional symbol of the Church's

[1] It might be objected that what is endangered by war is, not a particular human interest, but the sanctity of human life in general. But the objection simply repeats the original fallacy. There is no World-Empire which could assert the sanctity of human life against warring States, and therefore we have to choose, not between a cosmopolitan and a civic patriotism, but between a civic patriotism and anarchy.

faith, and is to be interpreted by the authority of the present-day Church itself. From the point of view thus assumed we must regard such an accusation as that of 'hard, flat, unmistakable falsehood' (Sidgwick, in the controversy referred to in literature below), brought against clergymen who do not accept certain propositions in the Apostles' Creed in their literal sense, as analogous to the accusation of murder brought against soldiers who, under orders, fire on an enemy or on a riotous mob. The only objective definition of the extent of the clergyman's obligation is that which is given to it by the authoritative organs of the Church's government. And if he satisfies his own ecclesiastical superiors, outsiders have no right to apply to his action a standard which implicitly sets aside the Church's authority. We need not, of course, deny that a Church would do well to revise a creed which in any considerable measure has ceased to afford an adequate expression of its faith. But this is a question of the Church's obligation rather than of the individual clergyman's. Just as a citizen may—within wide limits—rightly conform to a law which he thinks unjust, so too a churchman may—within corresponding, if perhaps narrower, limits—rightly conform to a creed that contains propositions which he thinks untrue (whether in a historical or in a religious sense)—provided always, of course, that the churchman, like the citizen, has used all lawful means to have the evil remedied.

A special difficulty is caused by the fact, just alluded to, that propositions may be true in a religious sense, while false in a literal, historical, or scientific sense; or, to put the distinction in a less objectionable or ambiguous way, a proposition intended to express a genuine religious truth, which the believer does accept, may express it in a form which he is unable to accept, not because of any religious reason, but because the proposition so formulated combines the genuine religious truth with other statements neither true nor religious; *e.g.*, to very many religious persons the Divinity of Christ is inconceivable apart from His miraculous birth, but to others 'it is just blasphemy to suppose that the divinity of a man who comes nearer to God than other men consists in some abnormality of his physical organization' (Nettleship, *Philosophical Remains*, 1897, p. 105; cf. whole Letter). If the Church at large enforces the former view, while the individual takes the latter, the case is specially hard, because the individual then finds himself expelled from the communion of the Church, although he is not conscious of any real or religious divergence from its faith. See also art. NONCONFORMITY.

LITERATURE.—On the general ethical principles: T. H. Green, *Proleg. to Ethics*, Oxford, 1883, bk. iv. ch. ii., and *Princ. of Polit. Obligation* (reprinted from *Works*, vol. ii.), Lond. 1895, especially sect. H. On conformity generally: J. Morley, *On Compromise*[2], Lond. 1877 (often reprinted). On the ethics of religious conformity: an interesting discussion between J. Sidgwick and H. Rashdall in *IJE*, vols. vi. and vii., 1896–7, continued by Sidgwick, *Practical Ethics*, Lond. 1898, pp. 142 ff., and T. O. Smith, *IJE*, vol. x.

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CONFUCIAN RELIGION.—The Confucian religion is the ancient religion of China, the worship of the Universe by worship of its parts and phenomena. In the age of Han, two centuries before and two after the birth of Christ, that Universalism divided itself into two branches—Taoism and Confucianism, and simultaneously Buddhism was grafted upon it. Buddhism probably found its way into China principally in the universalistic form which is called Mahāyāna, so that it could live and thrive perfectly upon the congeneric stem. And so we have in China three religions, as three branches upon one root or trunk, which is Universalism.

The Chinese Empire was created in the 3rd cent. B.C., when the mighty Shi Hwang, of the Ts'ing dynasty, which had ruled in the north-west since the 9th cent. B.C., destroyed in streams of blood the complex of States which, up to that time, had existed in the birthplace of higher East Asian culture, the home of Confucius and Mencius. But the House of Ts'ing did not exist long enough to organize the great creation of this first Emperor of China. It collapsed after a few years, giving place to the glorious House of Han, which maintained itself and its throne till the 3rd cent. A.D. This dynasty, in organizing the enormous young Empire, built up a political constitution, naturally and systematically taking for its guide the principles, rules, and precedents of the old time, that is to say, the ancient literature, in so far as it was not irrecoverably lost in the flames which Shi Hwang, in a frenzy of pride, had kindled to devour it. With a view to the completion of this gigantic task of organization, this classical literature was sought for, restored, emended, commented upon, and thus there arose a classical, ultra-conservative State-constitution, which, handed down as an heirloom to all succeeding dynasties, exists to this day. The religious elements contained in the classics were necessarily incorporated with that constitution, together with the political, seeing that everything contained in the classics was to be preserved and developed as a holy institution of the ancients; in other words, those religious elements became the State religion. This is, in consequence, now fully two thousand years old. Its basal principle, Universalism, is, of course, older, much older than the classical books by which it has been preserved. As is the case with many origins, that of China's Universalism is lost in the darkness of antiquity.

With the classical books the name of Confucius is inseparably associated. Five are called *King*; the others are called *Shu*. Certainly Confucius did not write them all; they belong partly to a much older, partly to a later, period. He is held to have written only one *King*, the *Ch'un-ts'iu*. Three other *Kings*, called the *Shu*, or Book of History, the *Shi*, or Songs, and the *Yih*, or Natural Mutations, he is said merely to have compiled or edited; and even this may not be true. In the books which constitute the fifth *King*, entitled *Li-ki*, or Memorials on Social Laws and Rites, he and his disciples are mentioned so frequently that this classic appears to have been composed from information about him, and from sayings originating with himself. The four *Shu* originated almost entirely with disciples of the sage; they contain sayings, doctrines, and conversations of their master, mostly of an ethical and political complexion. The titles are: *Lun-yü*, or Discourses and Conversations; *Chung-yung*, or Doctrine of the Mean; *T'ai-hioh*, or Great Study; and *Meng-tszĕ*, or (Works of) Mencius.

We may then just as well call Confucianism Classicism, and the classics the holy books or bibles of Confucianism. Universalism, which it represents, is known by the name of Taoism. Indeed, its starting-point is the Tao, which means the 'Road' or 'Way,' that is to say, the road in which the Universe moves, its method and processes, its conduct and operation, the complex of phenomena regularly recurring in it—in short, the Order of the World, Nature, or Natural Order. Actually, it is in the main the annual rotation of the seasons, the process of renovation and decay of Nature; and it may, accordingly, be called Time, the creator and destroyer. According to the classics, Tao is the *Yang* and the *Yin*, the two cosmic souls or breaths which represent the male and the female part of the Universe,

assimilated respectively with the fructifying Heavens, and with the Earth which they fructify, as also with heat and cold, light and darkness. The vicissitudes of these souls, indeed, every year produce the seasons and their phenomena.

Universalism defines the Yang as a supreme universal *shen*, or deity, living, creating, which divides itself into an infinite number of *shen*, and deposes them into beings; and it defines the Yin as a universal *kwei*, likewise divisible into myriads of particles, each of which, in a man, may form his other soul. Accordingly, creation is a continuous emanation or effusion, and destruction a never ceasing re-absorption, of particles of the Yang and the Yin. These particles, the *shen* and *kwei*, are innumerable. The Universe is crowded with them in all its parts. A *shen*, being a part of the Yang, or the beatific half of the Universe, is a good spirit or a god, and a *kwei*, belonging to the Yin, is, as a rule, a spirit of evil, a spectre, a devil, or demon. As there is no power beyond the Tao, there is no good in the Universe but that which comes from the *shen*, no evil but that which the *kwei* cause or inflict.

We may, accordingly, say that Confucianism is a universalistic Animism, polytheistic and polydemonistic. The gods are such *shen* as animate heaven, the sun and moon, the stars, wind, rain, clouds, thunder, the earth, mountains, rivers, etc.; in particular also the *shen* of deceased men are gods. And *kwei* swarm everywhere; this is a dogma as true as the existence of the Yin, as true also as the existence of the Tao, or Order of the World. They perform in that Order the part of distributers of evil, thus exercising a dominant influence over human fate. But, since the Yang is high above the Yin, as high as heaven which belongs to it is above the earth, Heaven is the chief *shen*, or god, who rules and controls all spectres and their actions; and so theology has this great dogma, that no spirits harm men without the authorization of Heaven or its silent consent. They are, accordingly, Heaven's agents for punishing the bad; and this dogma is a principal article in the Confucian system of ethics.

1. Because the Emperor stands at the head of the realm, nay, of the whole earth, he is the head of the State religion. He acknowledges the superiority only of Heaven, whose son he is. Heaven is the natural protector of his throne and house, which would unavoidably perish if, by wicked conduct, he forfeited Heaven's favour. Heaven is the highest god that exists, there being in the Chinese system no god beyond the world, no maker of it, no Jahweh, no Allah. It bears to this hour its old classical names, *T'ien*, Heaven; *Ti*, Emperor; or *Shang-ti*, Supreme Emperor (cf. also vol. iii. p. 549 f.).

The most important sacrifice offered to this god takes place on the night of the winter-solstice, an important moment in the Order of the World, when Heaven's beneficent influence is re-born, because the Yang, or light and heat, then begins to increase after having descended to its lowest ebb. The sacrifice is presented on the so-called Round Eminence (*yuen khiu*), also known as the Altar of Heaven (*T'ien tan*), which stands to the south of the Tatar city. This altar, quite open to the sky, is composed of three circular marble terraces of different diameters, placed one above the other, all provided with marble balustrades, and accessible by staircases which exactly face the four chief points of the compass. At the northern and eastern sides there are buildings for various purposes. A wide area, partly a park with gigantic trees, and surrounded by high walls, lies around this altar, which is the largest in the world. On the longest night of the year, the Emperor proceeds to the altar, escorted by princes, grandees, officers, and troops, to the number of many hundreds. Everybody is in the richest ceremonial dress. The spectacle, illuminated by the scanty light of large torches, is most imposing. Every magnate, minister, and mandarin has his assigned place on the altar and its terraces, or on the marble pavement which surrounds it. On the upper terrace, a large tablet, inscribed 'Imperial Heaven, Supreme Emperor,' stands in a shrine on the north side, and faces due south. In two rows, facing east and west, are shrines which contain tablets of the ancestors of the Emperor. Before each tablet a variety of sacrificial food is placed—soup, meat, fish, dates, chestnuts, rice, vegetables, spirits, etc., all conformably to ancient classical precedent and tradition. On the second terrace are tablets for the spirits of the sun, the moon, the Great Bear, the five planets, the twenty-eight principal constellations, and the host of stars; furthermore, there are those of the winds, clouds, rain, and thunder. Before these tablets are dishes and baskets with sacrificial articles. Cows, goats, and swine have been slaughtered for all those offerings, and, while the ceremonies are proceeding, a bullock or heifer is burning on a pyre as a special offering to high heaven. The Emperor, who has purified himself for the solemnity by fasting, is led up the altar by the southern flight of steps, which on both sides is crowded by dignitaries. Directors of the ceremonies guide him, and loudly proclaim every action or rite which he has to perform. The spirit of Heaven is invited, by means of a hymn accompanied by sacred music, to descend and settle in the tablet. Before this tablet, and subsequently before those of his ancestors, the Emperor offers incense, jade, silk, broth, and rice-spirits. He humbly kneels, and knocks his forehead against the pavement several times. A grandee reads a statutory prayer in a loud voice, and several officials offer incense, silk, and spirits to the tablets of the sun, moon, stars, clouds, rain, wind, and thunder. Finally, the sacrificial gifts are carried away, thrown into furnaces, and burned.

This Imperial sacrifice is probably the most pompous worship which ever has been paid on this earth to a divinity of Nature. It is attended by a large body of musicians and religious dancers, performing at every important moment.

In the same vast altar-park there is, to the north of the Round Eminence, another altar of the same form, but of smaller dimensions, bearing a large circular building with dome or cupola, called *ki nien tien*, or 'temple where prayers are sent up for a good year,' that is to say, for an abundant harvest throughout the Empire. Here a sacrifice is offered by the Emperor to Heaven and to his ancestors, in the first decade of the first month of the year; while, to obtain seasonable rains for the crops, a sacrifice is presented in the same building, in the first month of the summer, to the same tablets, as also to those of rain, thunder, clouds, and winds. This ceremony is repeated if rains do not fall in due time or sufficiently copiously. These sacrifices are mostly performed by princes or ministers, as proxies of the Son of Heaven.

The ritual for all the State sacrifices is similar to that for Heaven, but the pomp and offerings vary with the rank of the gods.

Next to Heaven in the series of State divinities is Earth, called officially *Hu-t'u*, or 'Empress Earth,' whose square altar of marble, open to the sky, is situated in a vast walled park, outside the northern wall of Peking. Here a solemn sacrifice is offered annually by the Emperor, or his proxy, on the day of the summer solstice, to the tablet

of Earth and to those of the Imperial ancestors, and, on the second terrace, to the tablets of the chief mountains, rivers, and seas.

From the fact that the Emperor, in performing the sacrifices to Heaven and Earth, allots a second place to the tablets of his ancestors, it follows that they stand, in the system of the State religion, next to Heaven and Earth in rank. Solemn sacrifices are offered to them by the Emperor in the *T'ai miao*, or 'Grand Temple,' on the south-east of the Palace grounds, and at the mausolea, in temples erected there, one in front of each grave-mound.

Next in rank to the Imperial ancestors in the pantheon of the State are the *Sié-Tsih*, or gods of the ground, and of millet or corn. They have their large open altar in a park to the west of the Grand Temple. The Emperor sacrifices there in spring and autumn, or sends a proxy to perform this high-priestly duty.

2. The above are the so-called *Ta-szĕ*, or 'Great Sacrifices.' Next in rank are those of the second category, the *Chung-szĕ*, or 'Middle Sacrifices.' These are presented at various altars or temples erected in or about Peking. The Sun-god has his large walled park, with round, open altar-terrace, outside the main east gate, to the region of sunrise; the Moon-goddess has her square altar outside the west gate. because the west is the region in which the new moon is born. Sacrifices are offered there to the sun by the Emperor or his proxy, at the astronomical mid-spring, when the sun conquers darkness; the Moon receives her sacrifice on the day of mid-autumn,—autumn being, in China's natural philosophy, associated with the west, where the new moonlight is born.

The other State-gods of this Middle Class are the famous men of fabulous antiquity who introduced the Tao, or Order of the Universe, among men, thus conferring on them the blessings of civilization, learning, and ethics. They may be enumerated as follows:—

(1) *Shen Nung*, the 'divine husbandman,' the Emperor (28th cent. B.C.) who taught people husbandry. He is worshipped by the Emperor, or his proxy, with a sacrifice on an auspicious day in the second month of the spring, when the works of husbandry are supposed to begin, this rite being performed on an open square altar in a walled park, situated west of the great Altar of Heaven.

(2) *Sien-ts'an*, or 'the first breeder of silkworms,' supposed to have been the wife of the Emperor Hwang (27th cent. B.C.). In the first month of spring, the Empress, followed by a great train of court-ladies, presents a sacrifice to her on an altar in the park of the Palace.

(3) 188 Imperial and princely rulers of the past. The five Emperors of the oldest mythical period receive special sacrificial worship in a temple in the Palace, viz. Fuh Hi, Shen Nung, Hwang-ti, Yao, and Shun, together with the founders of the house of Cheu, and Confucius.

(4) Confucius. He is worshipped together with his nearest ancestors, and over seventy earlier and later exponents of his doctrine and school, all of whom have tablets in his temples throughout the Empire.

(5) State deities also are the men and women who, in the course of the centuries, have been distinguished for Confucian virtue and learning. Four temples are built for them near every Confucius temple.

(6) The *T'ien Shen*, or 'deities of the sky,' that is to say, of the clouds, the rain, the wind, and thunder.

(7) The *T'i-ki*, or 'earth-gods,' are the ten principal mountains of the Empire, besides five hills and ranges of hills which dominate the site of the mausolea of the present dynasty; further, the four seas or oceans at the four sides of the Empire or of the earth, and the four main rivers of China, viz. the Hwang-ho, the Yang-tze, the Hwai, and the Tsi; and, finally, the mountains and streams in the neighbourhood of Peking, and various others within the Empire.

(8) Next comes *T'ai-sui*, or 'the Great Year,' the planet Jupiter, whose path in the heavens governs the arrangement of the almanac which is annually published by Imperial authority, and gives the various days considered suitable for the transaction of the various business of life. This god thus rules the Tao, or revolution of the Universe, and consequently the Tao of human life, which, in order to bestow happiness and prosperity, must fit in with the Universal Tao, or course of Time.

3. The third section of the Confucian State religion embraces the *Kiün-szĕ*, or 'Collective Sacrifices.' These are all offered by mandarins to the gods in the following lists: (1) the *Sien-i*, or 'physicians of the past,' patriarchs of the art of promoting and preserving human health: Fuh Hi, Shen Nung, and Hwang-ti; (2) *Kwan-yü*, the war-god of the present dynasty, a great hero of the 2nd and 3rd cents. A.D.; (3) *Wen-ch'ang*, a star in the Great Bear, the patron of the classical studies on which is based the selection of State officials, who by their rule maintain the Tao among men; (4) *Peh-kih kiün*, 'the ruler of the north pole'; (5) *Hwo shen*, 'the god of fire'; (6) *P'ao-shen*, 'the cannon-gods'; (7) *Ch'ing-hwang shen*, 'gods of the walls and moats,' that is to say, the patron divinities of walled cities and forts throughout the Empire; (8) *Tung-yoh shen*, the 'god of the Eastern Mountain,' *i.e.* the Thaishan in Shan-tung; (9) four *Lung*, or dragons, gods of water and rain, for whom temples exist in the environs of Peking, apparently for the management and regulation of the *fung-shui* of the city and the Imperial palace; (10) *Ma Tsu-p'o*, the goddess of the ocean and water; (11) *Hu-t'u-shen*, or 'god of the ground'; and *Szĕ-kung shen*, the patron of architecture, to each of whom, before any building works are undertaken, sacrifices are offered on altars erected on the site of the building; (12) *Yao shen*, 'the gods of the porcelain kilns'; (13) *Men shen*, the gods of certain Palace doors and gates of Peking; and (14) *Ts'ang-shen*, 'the gods of the store-houses' of Peking and Tung-chow.

Many of these State sacrifices are also offered by the authorities throughout the provinces, on altars or in temples which have been built for this purpose in the chief city of each province, department, or district—namely, those of the gods of the ground and of millet; those of Shen Nung, Confucius, and the gods of clouds, rain, wind, and thunder; those of the mountains and rivers in the country; those of the walls and moats of the city; and those of Kwan-yü. In Peking, as in the provinces, there are, moreover, temples, built with the same official design, for a great number of historical persons who have rendered services to the dynasties and the people. They have, on that account, received titles of honour from the Emperors, and have their special temples in the places where they lived and worked. There are also similar temples for former wise and faithful princes, nobles, and statesmen; for men who have sacrificed their lives in the service of the dynasty, etc.

4. Lastly, three sacrifices are prescribed to be offered annually by the authorities all through the Empire for the repose and refreshment of the souls of the departed in general.

All the State sacrifices take place either on certain fixed days of the calendar, or on days which are indicated as favourable and felicitous.

This synopsis of the State pantheon shows that the Confucian religion is a mixture of Nature-worship and worship of the dead. It is the rule to represent the gods who are believed to have lived as men, by images in human form, and the others by tablets inscribed with their principal divine titles. Images as well as tablets are inhabited by the spirits, especially when, at sacrifices, these have been formally prayed to or summoned, with or without music, to descend into those objects. Confucian worship and sacrifice, then, being actually addressed to animate images, is idolatry. Certainly it is quite inconsistent with the Chinese spirit to think of such tablets and images as mere wood and paint.

The religion of the State, performed by the Son of Heaven as high priest, and by ministers and mandarins all through the Empire as his proxies, is thoroughly ritualistic. Since, during the Han dynasty, under the auspices of Emperors and by the care of illustrious scholars, the classics were rescued from oblivion, an elaborate ritual, based on those classics, was at the same time called into existence in the form of rescripts, regulating in minutest detail every point in the State religion. Subsequent dynasties framed their institutions in general, and their ritual of the State religion in particular, on those of the House of Han, though with modifications and additions of more or less importance. Instances of eminent statesmen presenting memorials to the throne, in which they criticized rituals and proposed corrections, abound in the historical works; and these instances prove that formal codifications of rites have always been in existence since the reign of the House of Han.

These codifications have for the most part been preserved in the dynastic Histories, but it is not possible now to decide whether they are given in their entirety or in an abridged shape. None of them equals in elaboration that of the Khai-yuen period (713–741). This vast compendium of statutory rites of the T'ang dynasty is a systematic compilation of nearly all the ceremonial usages mentioned in the classical books, with a few additional elements borrowed from the House of Han. It was drawn up by the statesman Siao Sung, assisted, as we may admit, by a body of officials and scholars, and it has been the medium through which the most ancient religious institutions of China have held their place as standard-rites of the State religion to this day. The *Ta Ts'ing hwui tien*, or Collective Statutes of the Great House of Ts'ing, are moulded on it. It is also the prototype of the *Ta Ts'ing t'ung li*, or General Rituals of the Great Ts'ing dynasty, which is an official codification of the rites proper for the use of the nation and its rulers. Therefore, whoever is able to read and interpret Chinese texts has it in his power to study and describe in its details the State religion from official printed documents.

The conclusion is, of course, ready to hand, that the State religion is instituted for no other purpose than to influence the Universe by the worship of gods who constitute the Yang, in order that happiness may be [illegible] to the Emperor and his house and to the people. It is, in other words, a religion purporting to secure the good working of the Tao, or Universal Order thus naturally to frustrate the work of the Yin and its spectres. Thus the exercise of that religion is [illegible] the highest duty of rulers, whom the Tao has [illegible] to secure that good working [illegible] men. The people are not allowed to take part in it, except by erecting the State temples and altars, and keeping them in good repair at their own cost and by their own labour. The only religion allowed to them by the State is the worship of their own ancestors, which is classical and therefore Confucian.

Yet, as everywhere in the world, religious instincts in China go their own way, in spite of official rescripts. Not content with the worship of their ancestors, the people freely indulge in the worship of Confucian deities. In villages and in other localities they have temples for the worship of mountains, streams, rocks, and the like. The god of the earth in particular enjoys much veneration; in all quarters the people have erected temples or chapels and shrines to him; they regard and worship him as the god of wealth, and the patron divinity of agriculture. And everywhere the people resort to certain State temples in the chief towns of provinces, departments, and districts, and worship the idols there after their own fashion.

This popular worship of Confucian divinities being practised all through the Empire, the images of gods exist by tens of thousands, the temples by thousands. Almost every temple has its idol gods which are co-ordinate or subordinate in rank to the chief god, so that China fully deserves to be called the most idolatrous country in the world. This religion is also practised in private houses, many of which have altars for gods and goddesses, to whom, on fixed days, sacrifices are annually presented.

The worship of ancestors is mentioned in the ancient classics so often, and in such detail, that we cannot doubt it was also the core of the ancient religion. It has assumed the form of a most elaborate system of disposal of the dead. Washing and dressing of corpses, coffining and burial, and grave-building are matters of the greatest solicitude. The erection of large tumuli for princes and nobles was always the rule in China, and the mausolea built for emperors and princes were magnificent structures. Those of the present ruling dynasty certainly belong to the greatest and grandest which the hand of man ever produced.

The ancestral cult is regulated in the State ritual by special rescripts for all classes of the Chinese people. Many a well-to-do family possesses its ancestral temple, where the soul tablets of its older generations are preserved, and where sacrifices are offered to them. In the dwelling-house a part of the altar is set apart for the worship of the latest generations. A temple in front of the altar serves for the offerings, which are presented by the family on various fixed days in the calendar, with the father or grandfather at their head. Besides, there is an altar on each grave, which has been built with some outlay, and the mausolea of the great of this earth have even a temple, containing an altar with the tablet of the soul which rests with the body in the grave. In the first months and years after the burial, certain sacrifices are offered on the grave; later on there is one sacrifice in every year, in spring, in the *Ts'ing ming* season, reserved for visits to the fam[illegible] repairing them. [illegible] tombs are visited on many other [illegible], further, art. COMMUNION WITH THE DEAD (Chinese).

No doubt ance[illegible] ethical element. [illegible] fathers is alway[illegible] in the temple of the family, and will deter [illegible] a son or daughter from evil. Ancestor-worship strengthens the ties of family life, as it supplies the descendants with a rallying point in the common ancestral altar. It thus fosters a spirit of mutual help in the emergencies of life, and it has exercised a powerful influence upon Chinese family life and social institutions.

LITERATURE.—See end of next article.

J. J. M. DE GROOT.

CONFUCIUS.—The system which is known in the West as Confucianism is described in China as *Ju-kiao*, or 'School of the Learned,' and professes to conserve the teachings of K'ung Fu-tsu, the philosopher Kung, whose name is familiar to Westerns under the Latinized form of Confucius. *Jü-kiao* represents orthodoxy in China, all other systems being nominally heterodox, though Taoism and Buddhism have, as a result of long association, been popularly admitted to a place among the 'three Schools.' Buddhism is, of course, exotic in its origin, but Taoism is based upon the same ancient materials as Confucius requisitioned. Lao-tse, or Laocius, to whom is attributed the system known as *Tao-kiao*, or 'School of the Way,' commonly known as 'Taoism,' was a strenuous reformer, who boldly applied the teachings which he discovered in the ancient Chinese records to the amelioration of existing conditions, making non-interference and the suppression of personal ambition the keystones of his system. Confucius made no profession of original thought, and confessed himself to be but a transmitter of the manners and maxims of the 'good old times.' What he attempted to do was to apply to the degenerate days in which he lived the best elements of the accumulated wisdom and experience of the past, which he found locked up in the ancient records, and reflected in the time-honoured ceremonials. These he endeavoured to elucidate and emphasize, not only *viva voce* to the ardent disciples who flocked to him from all quarters, and to the feudal lords whom he interviewed in the course of his wanderings from State to State, but also by carefully prepared and annotated editions of the early writings for the benefit of posterity. His highest hope was to lead the rulers of the feudal kingdoms, by easy stages, to the gentler manners of the past, and thus to initiate a reign of peace. In order to appreciate the standpoint of Confucius and his contemporary Laocius, it is necessary that the political circumstances of their times should be carefully considered.

1. The times in which Confucius lived.—The Chow dynasty, established by King Wu (1122 B.C.), was in a declining condition at the time when Confucius was born, and the central authority, which gave its name to the Central State, or 'Middle Kingdom,' as the Chinese call their Empire even to-day, was powerless to enforce its dicta upon the turbulent States which were its nominal vassals. Constant war, with its dreadful concomitants, was the 'sign of the times.' The soldier was in the ascendant, the schoolmaster unemployed. Agriculture languished for lack of manual labour, and plague, pestilence, and famine wrought untold horrors upon the feudal kingdoms. In the midst of scenes such as these a son was born (551 B.C.) to an ancient officer of the K'ung family, who had distinguished himself by commanding physique and martial powers in the wars of his times, and who was then living a retired life in the State of Lu, situated in the modern province of S[illegible] f K'iu [illegible] s o[illegible] e ([illegible] g [illegible] r [illegible]

The life of K'ung K'iu, or, as we [illegible], Confucius, may be divided into 5 periods: (1) 551–531, covering his early boyhood, his marriage at the age of 19, and his appointment to the office of keeper of the State granaries, and, a year later, to that of guardian of the common lands; (2) 530–501, when he devoted himself to the work of teaching, and gradually collected around him an enthusiastic band of disciples, at the same time completing his own education and labouring at a new edition of the ancient Odes and Historical Records; (3) 500–496, when, for a short period, he acted as magistrate in his native State, and, as a result of the signal success of his methods, was promoted to the office of Minister of Works, and, subsequently, to that of Minister of Justice, resigning his office only when he found his counsels unavailing to turn the reigning Duke from the evil ways he had adopted; (4) 496–483, when he wandered over a large number of the feudal States, vainly endeavouring to induce their rulers to reform their manners and return to the ancient ways; and (5) 483–478, the last period of his life, spent in his native State, during which he devoted himself to the completion of his literary labours in connexion with the ancient records, and to the production of his one original work, the *Ch'un-ts'iu* = 'Spring and Autumn' annals.

2. The Confucian library.—The materials upon which the system known as Confucianism is based are to be found in the various *King*, or Canons, and the *Shu*, or Writings, which are attributed to Confucius and his disciples. These have been variously tabulated at different periods of history, but are nowadays generally described as the 'Four *Shu*' and the 'Five *King*' (see preceding art., p. 12b).

3. The doctrines of Confucius.—When the condition of the feudal kingdoms in Confucius' time is borne in mind, it will be seen to follow naturally that the great object towards which he directed his efforts was the tranquillizing of the Empire. The possibility of effecting this aim he demonstrated in three ways: (1) by his redactions of the ancient historical records and poetry, showing, to the present and to all future ages, the method by which the great rulers of antiquity, Yao, Shun, and others, had succeeded in controlling and directing the 'black-haired people'; (2) by his personal instructions and counsels to the various nobles whom he interviewed in the course of his journeyings through the feudal kingdoms, and to the ardent students who delighted to sit at his feet; and (3) by his own example in the small spheres which were entrusted to him, and where his methods are represented as being entirely successful. This, indeed, was the cardinal principle which he so frequently emphasized, viz., that, if Sage and Sovereign could be combined in one person, the difficulties of empire would disappear. The force of example was the great motive power he sought to apply to every exigency; if the lord paramount would but imitate the ancient worthies, the various princes would be excited to emulation, and thus, through every grade of society, the process would be continued until the whole nation was reformed. The stages by which this process was to be completed are thus described in the 'Great Learning' ['Great Study']:

'The ancients who wished to illustrate illustrious virtue throughout the Empire first ordered well their own States. Wishing to order well their own States, they first regulated their families. Wishing to regulate their families, they first cultivated their persons. Wishing to cultivate their persons, they first rectified their hearts. Wishing to rectify their hearts, they first sought to be sincere in their thoughts. Wishing to be sincere in their thoughts, they first extended to the utmost their knowledge. Such extension of knowledge lay in the investigation of things. Things being investi[illegible] knowledge became complete. Their knowled[illegible] thoughts were sincer[illegible] ir thoug[illegible] were thus re[illegible]ir hear[illegible] were cultivat[illegible]ersons [illegible] were regulated[illegible]milies [illegible] were rightly go[illegible]ed, the whole Em[illegible]

As to [illegible]us aids to the [illegible] this purpose [illegible]ius could only propose the illustrious e[illegible] of antiq[illegible]ty. [illegible] delighted in disc[illegible]romise [illegible]

sion men to perform certain tasks, and protect them whilst in the execution of them, but, for the carrying out of those commissions, man must depend upon his own unaided abilities, upon that 'nature,' predisposed towards goodness, which Heaven had conferred on him, and to which he himself must allow its full development, in harmony with the observed course of Nature and the examples of the great sages of the past. The gifts of nature vary in different individuals. There are four great classes of mankind: (1) those who possess intuitive knowledge; (2) those whose natural abilities enable them to learn with ease; (3) those who, though naturally dull, are able by earnest application to become learned; and (4) those who decline the attempt to acquire knowledge because of natural incapacity and indifference. Yet, in spite of the diversities of natural gifts, it is possible for every man, by means of self-culture, to reach the highest development of which his nature is capable; and nothing less than this should satisfy the aspirant. 'Rest in the highest,' or 'Cease only when the acme is reached,' is the key-note of the 'Great Learning.' Confucius himself aimed high; he did not expend his strength in the interests of common men, but concentrated his efforts on the education of rulers, either those who were already in office or those who were likely to attain to power, believing that, if he should succeed in implanting his opinions amongst the highest classes, the regeneration of the masses would follow as a matter of course.

There is practically nothing of a religious nature in Confucianism pure and simple. Religion, in the strict sense, existed in China long before his day, and survives even to the present in the sacrifice to Shang-ti, described on p. 13, which the Emperor offers as the representative of the myriad people. Confucius seems to have directed all his energies to the promotion of self-culture, adopting an attitude of strict reserve on the question of religion. He certainly countenanced the religious observances of his time so far as they were consonant with the ancient rites, and did not openly rebuke the extravagances which existed, as, for instance, the burial alive of human victims, which was not unknown in his day. Perhaps in this matter he was guided by a principle which he enunciated, viz., 'When good government prevails in a State, language may be lofty and bold, and actions the same. When bad government prevails, the actions may be lofty and bold, *but the language may be with some reserve.*' It may be that he had but little sympathy with the religious decadence of his own times and the abuses which were then prevalent, but he evidently considered it no part of his mission to attack them in any iconoclastic spirit, and he preferred to adopt an attitude of strict reticence towards the question of religion, recommending the observance of the accustomed ritual, but deprecating a too close inquiry into the spiritual phenomena. He evidently regarded the offering of sacrifice as of great subjective value, but professed ignorance of the meaning of the great sacrifice to Shang-ti. He certainly added nothing to the contemporary knowledge of God or of spirits; he had nothing to say with regard to death or the hereafter; the 'present distress' was a sufficient occasion for the exercise of his disciplinary methods; the present life was the only theatre in which he sought to inspire men to act their part. The existence of the Empire was imperilled through the unceasing struggles of the feudal States, and his great endeavour was to induce their several rulers to suppress their overweening ambitions, and to cultivate that moderation, that harmonious balance, which is emphasized in the 'Doctrine of the Mean'; so that the various parts of the social organism might work together smoothly and with mutual profit, like a perfectly fitted and well-oiled machine, each State furnishing its quota of Imperial service, each ruler and officer occupying his appointed place, and all friction being avoided, so that the Middle Kingdom might become once more a model to the barbarians on its frontiers, and a power which no alien combination might venture to impugn.

Confucius was, above all things, a political reformer, but one who founded his political principles upon moral bases. He wished the harmony of Nature to be reflected in the world of men, and hence the very first essential in his system was the cultivation of knowledge, especially natural science. But, by a strange irony of fate, the chapter of the 'Great Learning' which was supposed to deal with this fundamental question has been lost, and what remains is occupied with the lesser details which appear as branches detached from the tree. The abortive attempts of later philosophers to deal with the phenomena of Nature are described in art. COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY (Chinese).

The steps in the process of self-culture have already been enumerated; the completion of knowledge leads to sincerity in thought, for the reason that the scholar who has thus attained enlightenment can no longer be deceived by outward appearances or inward imaginings. Being thus freed from the deceptive influences of passion, emotion, fear, etc., he is able to rectify his heart, *i.e.* to restrain wayward thoughts, feelings, and tendencies; as a consequence, his outward actions are conformed to the highest ideals of propriety, *i.e.* the cultivation of the person; and, from this point, he becomes a centre of influence which extends to his family, his State, etc., so that the whole Empire is made tranquil and happy.

This may be said to be the Confucian gospel in a word, and it will be evident that it is based upon the conviction that man's nature is originally good, and merely requires cultivation on right lines to bring it to its highest perfection. Confucius admitted that 'by nature men are nearly alike; by practice they get to be wide apart.' It follows, therefore, that what is prescribed for rulers should also apply, in a measure, to the mass of the people; they may not have the opportunity of pursuing their studies to the same degree, but all must share in the process of self-culture, and thus bear a part in the tranquillizing of the Empire, which is to be brought about by the regulation of the individual State, family, and person.

In the family and social relations the recognition of a common brotherhood is to be the inspiration and obligation of all corporate life. 'Within the four seas all are brethren,' and this is the idea which underlies (1) the principle of 'Benevolence,' which is the first of the five cardinal virtues. Upon this follow: (2) 'Uprightness of Mind,' *i.e.* the exhibition of moral excellence, as the word seems to denote; (3) 'Propriety in Demeanour,' the observance of convention, including the orthodoxies of religious worship, etc.; (4) 'Practical Sagacity,' or 'Knowledge of Affairs'; and (5) 'Good Faith.' The whole may be combined in the word which may serve as a rule of life—Reciprocity or Considerateness, *i.e.* 'What you do not want done to yourself, do not do to others.' These were to be regarded as the special characteristics of rulers; but the five cardinal relations, upon which the whole social structure is based, were required of all classes, and were defined as those existing between sovereign and subject, father and son, elder brother and younger, husband and wife, friend and friend. Filial conduct and its correlate of fraternal subordination may be described as the corner-stones of the system, for upon them depend

not only self-culture, but also the regulation of the family and the government of the State. It may have been for this reason that Confucius was willing to overlook the extravagant attention paid to ancestor-worship, because it served to emphasize his own doctrines of Divine right and the paramount importance of acquiescence in the prevailing order. He anticipates St. Paul in saying, 'Let every soul be in subjection to the higher powers . . . the powers that be are ordained of God' (Ro 13[1]). The appointment of a new ruler is described as the 'receiving of Heaven's decree'; every subject of the State must, therefore, accept his ordered place, and every member of the family, in like manner, must fulfil his part with loyal submission. There must be 'no contrariety' in the home or in the State; no trespass beyond the appointed limits, no disruption of the social harmonies. This is the teaching of the 'Doctrine of the Mean,' which follows on the 'Great Learning'; *i.e.* the avoidance of all *eccentricity*, or departure from the normal course as exemplified in Nature. Equilibrium and Harmony are the two essentials to happy social relations and a contented empire, Equilibrium being the negative side when the mind is not aroused by feeling or emotion, and Harmony the positive side when feeling is excited but acts in due accord with its environment.

Amongst the factors which conduce towards correctness of conduct are included Poetry, which inspires to the attempting of noble deeds; Ceremonials, by which the habit of correct action is established; Music, which, if orthodox, produces an atmosphere congenial to the cultivation of virtue, and gives a finish to character; and Archery, which is recommended as exercising a moral discipline.

From the above it may be seen how little of a transcendental character there is in the teachings of Confucius. The process of self-culture must proceed independently of any spiritual aid, except in so far as the conventional rites of sacrifice may be considered as of such a nature—a supposition which appears to be negatived by the fact that to Confucius they were evidently of little objective value.

The doctrines thus enumerated find illustration in the *Analects*, or Counsels, of Confucius—a collection of acts and sayings attributed to him by his immediate disciples; and they are represented in concrete form in the person of the 'princely man,' or ideal scholar, who is constantly held up as a standard of imitation, and a criterion of conduct—an ideal which, by the way, Confucius himself disclaimed having attained.

The principles of Confucius found further exposition in the writings of Mencius (Mêng k'o, 372–289 B.C.), who is accorded the title of 'Second Sage,' or the next in order of dignity to Confucius himself. The work which bears his name enlarges on the topics of Benevolence and Righteousness, which formed the subject of his discussions with the rulers of the several States he visited and the disciples he gathered. But the most popular exponent of Confucianism was Chu Hsi, or Chucius (A.D. 1130–1200), whose commentaries on the classical books are now generally accepted as the highest standard of orthodoxy. Like Confucius, he proceeds upon the assumption that human nature is originally good, but applies his speculations to the hitherto unsolved problem of the origin of evil. So great has been the influence of Chucius upon modern thought in China, that 'Chucianism' might be substituted for 'Confucianism' as descriptive of the later development of the tenets of Confucius and his followers.

4. **Secret of the success of Confucianism.**—In view of what has been stated above as to the absence of religious motive in Confucianism, it may be asked how the system which is thus denominated attained its present popularity and general acceptance. As a matter of fact, Confucius utterly failed to convince his generation of the value of the methods he so ardently advocated. Outside of the circle of those who formed his school of disciples he appears to have had few admirers. No ruler of his day was prepared to put his opinions to the test; only in the small sphere which he himself occupied, for a short period, in his own State of Lu, was he able to demonstrate their practical character. His personal influence over his immediate followers must have been immense, though his family life was unfortunate; but, when his despairing complaint of the non-appreciation of his doctrines and non-recognition of his character had been silenced by death, and after his favourite disciples had passed away, it seemed as if the very memory of the sage was about to perish. Many years elapsed before any national attempt to commemorate him was initiated, but succeeding ages and dynasties have vied with one another in elevating him in the scale of posthumous dignities, until, at the beginning of the present century, he was at last raised to the pre-eminent position of 'Co-assessor with Heaven and Earth.'

No doubt the intense patriotism of Confucius was a feature which won the hearts of those who delighted to learn from him; everything was subordinated to the well-being of the distracted Empire, and to this end he was prepared to sacrifice his personal ambitions, and to subject himself to ignominy and even physical danger. His doctrine of the Divine right of virtuous sovereigns, even though usurpers, was entirely congenial to the founders of later dynasties, such as the Han line of rulers, who were anxious to conciliate the student classes that had suffered so severely under the regime of the short-lived Ts'ing dynasty, and who sought to find justification for their claim to the supreme authority in the literature which their predecessors so greatly feared. The masses were well content with the abolition of the severe measures with which the first Empire (the Ts'ing) had familiarized them, and were prepared to accept the new conditions. Hence it was the policy of the new rulers and the scholars to come to an understanding, and an active endeavour was made to restore the Confucian literature which survived the fires of Ts'ing, for such writings were now almost the sole survivors of the ancient records, and were regarded with a new interest and an ever growing veneration. The course of time served only to deepen the impression, though Confucianism did not succeed in obtaining exclusive recognition until long ages of conflict with Taoism and Buddhism had passed. The masses, too, were predisposed in favour of the Confucian system, not only because of its intrinsic excellence, but because it advocated the rights of the people, and aimed at individual happiness as well as at the larger issue of national tranquillity. Hence it was to the interest of all classes—the newly established rulers, the scholarly classes, and the majority of the people—that the system of Confucius should be accepted as a moral code, even though the feudal conditions to which it owed its birth, and for the amelioration of which it had been designed, had long passed away. The establishment of the Hanlin academy and of the system of literary examinations, during the T'ang dynasty (A.D. 755), had the effect of encouraging the study of the Confucian classics amongst all sections of society, since a complete knowledge of the text was required by those who presented themselves for examination with a view to official employment.

5. **Defects of Confucianism.**—The failure of

Confucianism to satisfy the cravings of man's spiritual nature, its attitude of reserve on questions affecting the unseen world, its silence with regard to sin and its remedy, and its equivocal references to the possibility and value of prayer—all these have had the effect of paving the way for the introduction of Buddhism, with its doctrines of an All-merciful One, its spiritual aids and consolations, its plans of salvation and theory of a 'Western Paradise,' and its recognition of woman's place in its propaganda (cf. art. CHINA [Buddhism in]). Here also is offered a field where Christianity, when once relieved of the prejudice and suspicion which now encompass it, will find a place and a welcome, and the true Sage whom Confucius dimly outlined, the true 'Coming One' of whom the Buddha prophesied, will be recognized in Jesus Christ, in whom alone the highest definition of brotherhood is exhibited, and in whom alone fatherhood, in the ultimate sense, is propounded—the Fatherhood of God, whose offspring is not limited to the confines of the four seas, but embraces 'all nations of men' who 'dwell on all the face of the earth' (Ac 17[26]); in whom also is found that motive power which can compensate for the weaknesses and disabilities of a corrupted human nature, and can enable men to attain to the highest perfection—a standard far transcending that which Confucius had in mind when he enunciated his great axiom, 'Rest in the highest excellence.'[1]

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CONGREGATIONALISM.—1. The name.—The term 'Congregational' came into general use about the beginning of the great Civil War in England, and contemporaneously in New England, as descriptive of a form of Church polity in which the local congregation is the unit of organization and the source of ecclesiastical government (*e.g.* Richard Mather, *An Apologie*, London, 1643 [written 1639], p. 6, and generally in the literature of the succeeding years). From the last decade of the 16th cent. its adherents had been nick-named 'Brownists,' from Robert Browne (see BROWNISM). Against this name they protested (e.g. *A True Confession*, Amsterdam, 1596, title; *An Apologeticall Narration*, London, 1643, p. 24). They were also called 'Separatists,' because of their withdrawal from the English Establishment. The title 'Independency' was attached to the system at about the same time as that of 'Congregationalism' (in 1642), and, though an object of early protest (e.g. *An Apologeticall Narration*, p. 23), long remained its usual designation in Great Britain, though it is now generally supplanted by 'Congregationalism.' In America it was never in use. 'Congregationalist,' as a title of the adherents of the polity, is encountered in 1692 (C. Mather, *Blessed Unions*, Boston); and 'Congregationalism,' in 1716 (I. Mather, *Disquisition on Ecclesiastical Councils*, Boston, p. vi). As a polity, Congregationalism is much more wide-spread than the Congregational name. The Baptists, the Plymouth Brethren, the Disciples of Christ, the Unitarians of the United States, as well as certain sections of the Adventists and of the Lutherans, are congregationally governed. In this article, however, only that group of Churches to which the name 'Congregational' is attached by historic, popular, and official usage, will be considered.

[1] Cf. J. Iverach, *Is God Knowable?*, 1884, p. 112 f.

2. Fundamental principles.—Early Congregationalism was a product of the devotion of the Reformation epoch to the Bible. That period exalted the Bible as the only rule of faith and practice. If the Scriptures teach fully all that it is requisite for men to know or believe, and all duties of the Christian life, it was but logical to raise the question whether they did not also contain a complete and authoritative guide as to the nature, organization, officering and administration of the Christian Church. It was the conviction that the Bible contains such a pattern that gave rise to Congregationalism.

'The partes of Church-Government are all of them exactly described in the word of God . . . soe that it is not left in the power of men, officers, Churches, or any state in the world to add, or diminish, or alter any thing in the least measure therein' (*Cambridge Platform*, 1648, ch. i.; see also *A True Confession*, 1596, of the London-Amsterdam Church, ch. xx.).

Examining the Scriptures, therefore, in the light of the knowledge of their age, and under a profound conviction of an inspiration which made every portion a word of God, the Congregationalists of the 16th and 17th cents. denied the existence of national or territorial Churches; and, while holding that the invisible Church 'conteyneth in it all the Elect of God that have bin, are, or shal be' (*A True Description*, Dort, 1589, p. i), affirmed that none but local associations of experiential Christians are visible Churches. Each of these Churches has Christ as its immediate and only Head. Each 'hath powre and commandement to elect and ordeine their own ministerie,' as well as 'to receive in or to cut off anie member' (*A True Confession*, chs. xxiii. and xxiv.). Each local church is therefore a completely self-governing body.

There can be no doubt that early Congregationalism felt a mystical conviction, not now characteristic of it, that Christ is in so real and true a sense the Head of each church of His disciples, and they are so one with Him by covenant, that the acts of such a church, though those of human agents, are in vital reality His acts, whether in the admittance of members, the choice of officers, or the administration of discipline.

That which distinguishes between a chance assemblage of Christian people and a church is that the members of the local congregation are united into church-estate by 'a willing covenant made with their God' and with one another (R. Browne, *A Booke which sheweth*, Middelburg, 1582, p. 3). 'A company becomes a Church, by joyning in Covenant' (R. Mather, *An Apologie*, p. 5). Yet this covenant is not necessarily formal, though it is more desirable that it be so, for 'wee conceive the substance of it is kept where there is a real agreement and consent of a company of faithful persons to meet constantly together in one congregation for the publick worship of God and their mutuall edification' (*Cambridge Platform*, ch. iv.). The only fit persons to enter into such a covenant, and hence the only proper church-members, are those of personal religious experience; but, by a comparison with the Abrahamic covenant of Gn 17[7], early Congregationalists argued that the children of such covenanting members were included in the parents' covenant and were themselves therefore church-members. The status of such children, when grown to maturity and not conscious of a personal religious

faith, was a sore puzzle to New England Congregationalism from the middle of the 17th to the end of the 18th cent., and led to the strenuous controversies known as the Half-Way Covenant discussions; but the belief of Congregationalism has always been that the true material of church-membership is to be found only in conscious and purposeful Christian discipleship.

Such a local church as has been described should have no officers but those of NT example—'pastors, teachers, elders, deacons, helpers' (*A True Confession*, ch. xix.). The 'pastor' 'hath the guift of exhorting and applying especiallie'; the 'teacher' that 'of teaching especiallie' (R. Browne, *A Booke which sheweth*, p. 32). Both preached, though the teacher gave special attention to doctrinal exposition. Both administered the sacraments. The 'ruling elder' was a disciplinary officer, reckoned to the ministry, whose 'work is to joyn with the pastor and teacher in those acts of spiritual rule which are distinct from the ministry of the word and sacraments' (*Cambridge Platform*, ch. vii.). Only in the absence of pastor and teacher could the ruling elder preach, and in no case could he administer the sacraments. All three officers, known as 'teaching' and 'ruling' elders, were chosen by the congregation they served, and, in earliest Congregationalism, were ordained by representatives of the congregation. Ordination, being considered but the recognition of a charge in a particular church, was to be repeated at each fresh entrance into office. But by the time that the *Cambridge Platform* was adopted, in 1648, custom was changing, and ordination was passing from the membership of the particular church to the hands of those already in the ministry. 'In such churches where there are no elders, and the church so desire, wee see not why imposition of hands may not be performed by the elders of other churches' (*ib.* ch. ix.). Ordinations by the membership of the local church ceased soon after the middle of the 17th century. Two other classes of officers were recognized as to be chosen by the church. Of these the more important were 'deacons,' whose work was 'to receive the offrings of the church, gifts given to the church, and to keep the treasury of the church, and therewith to serve the tables which the church is to provide for, as the Lord's table, the table of the ministers, and of such as are in necessitie' (*Cambridge Platform*, ch. vii.). Theoretically desirable were 'helpers' or 'widows' 'to minister in the church in giving attendance to the sick' (*ib.*); but, though an instance or two of their appointment may be found in early English Congregational practice, none held office in New England.

Each local church was from the first free to express its faith in its own language, and to make such tests for admittance to its membership as it chose. Congregationalists from the beginning felt, however, that churches had relations of fellowship one with another, which were generally pictured as those of sisterhood in a common family of God.

'There be synodes or meetings of sundrie churches, which are when the weaker churches seeke helpe of the stronger, for deciding or redressing of matters, or else the stronger looke to them for redresse' (R. Browne, *A Booke which sheweth*, p. 30). 'Allthough churches be distinct, and therfore may not be confounded one with another; and equall, and therfore have not dominion one over another; yet all the churches ought to preserve church-communion one with another' (*Cambridge Platform*, ch. xv.).

The two principles of local autonomy and fellowship have always been the foci of Congregationalism, and the latter has preserved it from Independency. The principle of fellowship gave rise almost at the settlement of New England to the occasional council—a meeting of pastors and lay delegates from such churches as the church seeking advice chooses to summon, called to give counsel in such matters as the ordination, installation, and dismissal of ministers, cases of discipline beyond the power of the local church to control, and similar ecclesiastical exigencies. Such councils have always been a feature of American Congregational practice, though not employed in Great Britain.

3. Present Congregational principles and organization.—Early Congregationalism, as thus described, has undergone much modification in detail, though its essential features still remain unaltered. Modern Congregationalism, like its prototype, still conceives of the Church as a local company of experiential Christians, autonomous, yet owing fellowship to sister churches. But it does not find, as its early leaders did, any hard and fast pattern of the Church in the Scriptures. It would emphasize the congregational as a desirable, rather than as the only rightful, polity. Congregationalism sees the merits of that polity in its democracy, its voluntaryism, its capacity to develop full, rounded, Christian manhood and womanhood, its freedom, and its flexibility. The number of officers supposed by early Congregationalism to be required by Scripture proved long ago beyond the power of a small congregation to maintain. Though instances of the 'teacher' and 'ruling elder' continued late into the 18th cent., and a single example of the 'ruling elder' may be found in the 19th, most Congregational churches, on either side of the Atlantic, had before the close of the 17th cent. reduced their officers to a pastor and several deacons. These are the chief officers of a Congregational church at the present time. Of comparatively modern growth are such additional officers as a superintendent of the Sunday School, a treasurer, a choir-master, and the like. Only the pastor is now ordinarily ordained. In a few churches deaconesses have been recently introduced, and, in most, several members are chosen, usually annually, to serve with the pastor and deacons as an executive committee by which the admittance of members and other ecclesiastical business are primarily considered, though with ultimate reference, on its recommendation, to the whole body of the church.

The larger fellowship of the churches is expressed not only in the occasional councils, characteristic of the United States, of which mention has been made, but in a close-knit network of regularly recurrent meetings in which larger or smaller groups of churches are represented. Some 'Associations' came into existence in Great Britain in the time of the Commonwealth, and probably survived the vicissitudes of the Restoration; but, beginning with that of Devonshire, organized in 1785, county 'Associations' spread rapidly through England. The desire for a larger expression of fellowship found embodiment in the additional organization of a 'Union' for Scotland in 1812, and for England and Wales in 1832. The latter now meets twice a year. In the United States, the first voluntary ministerial 'Association' was formed in Cambridge, Mass., in 1690. In Connecticut, 'Consociations' of ministers and lay delegates were organized in 1709. The system of meetings representative of churches by pastors and lay delegates was not generally introduced, however, till the early years of the 19th century. It is now universal in American Congregationalism. A variety of nomenclature exists, but uniformity is now being sought, so that the local groups into which churches are confederated shall be known as 'Associations,' and the larger State-wide organizations as 'Conferences.' After preliminary gatherings representative of the Congre-

gationalism of the United States as a whole, held in Albany, N.Y., in 1852, and in Boston, Mass., in 1865, the 'National Council of the Congregational Churches of the United States' was formed in Oberlin, Ohio, in 1871, and has met triennially since. Similar organizations exist in Canada and the British colonies. In 1891, an International Council, representative of world-wide Congregationalism, met in London, and subsequent sessions were held in Boston in 1899, and in Edinburgh in 1908.

None of these representative bodies, though composed of delegates from the churches, possesses judicial or legislative authority. Their action is purely advisory; but such action, in actual practice, carries great weight. An important function discharged by the local Associations in Great Britain and America is that of certification of ministerial good-standing; and efforts are being made in America to constitute the local Association the regular ordaining body instead of the occasional council.

4. Relation to the State.—Original Congregationalism denied the existence of a State Church, and practised voluntaryism in church maintenance and ministerial support. As a party of protest it could not do otherwise. At the same time it held, with Calvinism in general, that civil rulers ought 'to establish and mayntein by their lawes every part of God's word, his pure relligion and true ministerie' (*A True Confession*, ch. xxxix.). It was natural, therefore, that wherever Congregationalism became the dominant faith, it entered into an intimacy of association with the State, not wholly justified, perhaps, by a strict construction of its principles. The political history of England afforded few such opportunities. Under Cromwell, Congregationalists enjoyed some State patronage; and, in 1658, a council of the Congregational Churches of England, the 'Savoy Synod,' met in London with Governmental approval, though not directly called by the Government, its work being a revision of the Westminster Confession and a statement of polity. From the Restoration to the present day Congregationalism has not been in a position to receive Governmental support in Great Britain, and therefore counts voluntaryism among its cardinal principles.

In the New England colonies the situation was widely different. In Massachusetts the political franchise was from 1631 to 1664 confined by law to members of Congregational churches. In New Haven Colony it was similarly restricted from 1639 to 1665. Between 1638 and 1655 all the Congregational colonies of New England passed statutes basing ministerial support on universal taxation. The colonial legislatures, though maintaining the theory of ecclesiastical autonomy, were really the ultimate bodies of appeal in ecclesiastical controversies. By civil authority 'Synods' were called, composed of ministers and representatives of churches, to discuss doctrinal and administrative problems in 1637, 1646, 1662, 1679, 1708, and 1741. The Congregational churches were a real 'Establishment,' from the support of which Episcopalians were not relieved in Massachusetts and Connecticut till 1727, and Baptists and Quakers not till 1728 and 1729. This connexion with the State continued in Connecticut till 1818, and in Massachusetts till 1834. Since then, in America, Congregationalism has had purely voluntary support; but voluntaryism has never been a fundamental contention in America as in Great Britain. American Congregationalists have, however, cheerfully acquiesced in the separation of Church and State characteristic of the United States.

5. Continental antecedents.—It is difficult to estimate the possible influence of the more radical Continental parties of the Reformation age in the origin of Congregationalism. Their direct connexion it is impossible to demonstrate, and English Congregationalism seems far more a radical growth out of English Puritanism than any effect of Continental discussions. Nevertheless, the fact deserves notice that many of the most characteristic positions of Congregationalism were anticipated by the radicals of the Reformation age, notably the Anabaptists (see art. ANABAPTISM).

Originating in Switzerland in 1523 or 1524, and apparently arising nearly contemporaneously in other parts of the Continent, the Anabaptists were known chiefly for their rejection of infant baptism, their chiliastic hopes, their condemnation of oaths, their opposition to war, their denial to Christian disciples of the right to hold civil office, and their criticism of the Augustinian theology. Congregationalism followed them in none of these things. But they also held that the Church is made up of local congregations of experiential Christians, and that each congregation is self-governing, and is empowered in democratic fashion by the suffrages of its members to choose and ordain its own officers and administer its own discipline. They held that the Bible is the all-sufficient rule of faith and practice. In these principles Congregationalism agreed with them. Drawn mostly from the ignorant lower orders of the population, though not without a few educated leaders, the Anabaptists were severely persecuted by Catholics and Protestants alike; and, in the opinion of their opponents, the movement bore its appropriate fruitage in the frightful fanaticism in Munster in 1534–1535. The fanatical element was only a fraction of the Anabaptist party, however, and notably under the lead of Menno Simons (1492–1559) it grew in orderly fashion, especially in the Netherlands, where it obtained protection from William the Silent, and became wide-spread among the artisan classes. The terrible wars with Spain through which the Netherlands independence was achieved drove thousands of Protestant Dutch and Walloon working-men to England, where they constituted a not inconsiderable element in the population of London, and more than half the inhabitants of Norwich—cities intimately identified with the beginnings of Congregationalism—at the very time when Congregationalism had its origin. It is not probable that any large portion of the Netherlands exiles were Anabaptists, but there were Anabaptists among them; and it is not impossible that some more or less unconscious infiltration of Anabaptist ideas may have prepared the way for Congregationalism. Of this, however, there is no direct proof, though the similarity between some of the principles of the Anabaptists and those of the Congregationalists makes the question of a connexion an interesting problem.

6. History.—The beginnings of Congregationalism, so far as they can be definitely traced, were associated with Puritanism, of which it was the most radical expression. The form of the Church caused relatively little discussion in the early years of the English Reformation, and, when discussion arose, it was forced by practical rather than by theoretical considerations. England presented a most difficult problem at the beginning of the reign of Elizabeth. A clergy and a population, a great proportion of whom, while eager to maintain England for Englishmen, were averse to any considerable doctrinal changes, had accepted with outward conformity the restoration of a uniform service in the English tongue, and admitted the royal supremacy over the Church.

From a Governmental point of view it was eminently wise to make the transition from Roman Catholicism as easy as possible, and to keep as many of the ancient clergy in office as would acquiesce in the new institutions, without inquiring too minutely into their spiritual fitness. From the religious standpoint, however, such a course was extremely distasteful, especially to those more earnest Protestants who, like many who had gone into exile under Queen Mary, had drawn their ideals from Geneva. These men desired the abolition of such vestments and ceremonies as seemed to them calculated to preserve what they deemed Roman superstitions. They wished to see an earnest, educated, preaching ministry established in every parish, and to institute a vigorous discipline by which the Church could be purged from unworthy members. They were soon nick-named 'Puritans.' Their attempts to effect these results, especially the modification o vestments and ceremonies, encountered the opposition of Elizabeth and her spiritual agents, the bishops—an opposition based in large measure on a desire to avoid controversy and civil discord. But this opposition aroused further questioning, which ushered in a second stage of Puritanism. Men, of whom Thomas Cartwright (1535–1603) was typical, began to ask whether a form of Church government that opposed reforms which seemed to them so desirable was Divinely warranted. By 1569, Cartwright, who became that year Lady Margaret professor of Divinity in Cambridge, was attacking the constitution of the

Church of England itself, and urging its further reformation along lines essentially borrowed from Presbyterianism as it had been developed under the influence of Calvin and his disciples. This seemed to him and to his party the Scriptural model of what a Church should be. Cartwright held to the existence of a national Church. The disaffected Puritan was not to separate from it; but to labour in it to introduce as much of what he believed to be Gospel order and discipline as he might, and to wait for the strong hand of civil authority to reform the often-altered Church of England into full conformity to what he deemed the Divine pattern. To come out from it and to found different churches was no part of the duty of a Christian. These views of Cartwright represented the opinions of the vast majority of Puritans down to the Great Rebellion.

To the more radical thinkers of the time this condition of things seemed intolerable. They would come out from the Church and organize at once as they believed the Church should be organized. They were 'Separatists.' Such was an obscure company of which Richard Fitz was pastor, which was arrested in Plumber's Hall, London, 19th June 1567, and has often been called 'the first Congregational Church.' But their Congregationalism, though evident, was not systematically developed. The first careful theoretic exponent of Congregationalism was Robert Browne (1550?–1633), whose life and doctrines are considered in art. BROWNISM. Whether through the influence of his books, or as an independent illustration of the same tendencies which led Browne to separation, a similar movement soon showed itself in London, under the leadership of a radical Puritan clergyman, John Greenwood (?–1593), and a lawyer of ability, Henry Barrowe (1546?–1593). Arrested in 1587, they were yet able to write from their prison treatises of which Barrowe's *A Briefe Discoverie of the False Church*, 1590, is the most important. Their sympathizers increased, however, and, in 1592, a Congregational Church was formed in London, or, if organized four or five years earlier, as is possible, was then more definitely established, with Francis Johnson (1562–1618) as its 'pastor' and Greenwood as its 'teacher.' This activity excited the authorities. On 6th April 1593, Barrowe and Greenwood were hanged for denying the queen's ecclesiastical supremacy, and the rest of the church was gradually driven into exile. It found a refuge in Amsterdam, where its experience proved stormy owing to exaggerated attempts to enforce discipline.

The same causes which had resulted in the movements in which Browne and Barrowe were leaders induced a company of advanced Puritans in Gainsborough and the region about Scrooby to organize two Separatist churches, probably late in 1605 or early in 1606. Of that in Gainsborough, Rev. John Smyth (?–1612) was the leader; and in that meeting in the home of William Brewster (1560?–1644), postmaster in Scrooby, Rev. Richard Clyfton, Rev. John Robinson (1576?–1625), and the youthful William Bradford (1590–1657), in addition to Brewster himself, were the most prominent. Compelled to leave England, both congregations found a refuge in Amsterdam, where Smyth and his associates adopted Baptist principles. The Scrooby exiles, under the lead of Robinson, removed, in 1609, to Leyden; but, being anxious to live on English soil, even across the Atlantic, a minority of the church, under the spiritual oversight of 'ruling elder' William Brewster, made the voyage in the *Mayflower*, and established the colony of Plymouth in New England in 1620. Meanwhile, in 1616, a Congregational church, which still exists, was founded in the Southwark district of London by Rev. Henry Jacob (1563–1624), who had been a member of the Leyden congregation.

It may be doubted, however, whether Congregationalism would have developed in power on either side of the Atlantic had it not been for the stimulus of the great Puritan struggle with Charles I. Puritan thought, despairing of securing the reforms desired in England, inclined to seek the New World to which the Scrooby-Leyden Pilgrims had already shown the way. In 1628 the advance-guard of Puritan emigration, under John Endicott, landed in Salem, Massachusetts. On 4th March 1629 the royal charter creating the 'Governor and Company of Massachusetts Bay' was sealed. The same year the Salem colony was largely reinforced. In 1630 no fewer than 1000 persons left old England for the new, and the emigration ran full tide till the advent of the Long Parliament in 1640 changed the political situation in the homeland. To the Massachusetts colony of 1629, Connecticut was added in 1635–1636, and New Haven in 1638. These settlers were Puritans, not Separatists. They were, many of them, men of wealth and position, and they had among them a large proportion of well-educated, influential ministers. Yet the remarkable fact is that, on their arrival in the new land, they organized their ecclesiastical institutions, beginning with the church in Salem in 1629, essentially on the model of Separatist Plymouth. The explanation is that the Scripture model of Church government seemed to them that which Separatism had already anticipated, and, under the freedom of the plastic conditions of new settlements, they created churches of practically the same type as the earlier Separatist congregations. But, as has been indicated in the section on the relations of Congregationalism to the State, these New England churches became a real Establishment, and enjoyed State support in a manner for which the earlier Separatism never had opportunity, and which it repudiated in principle. The history of Congregationalism in 17th-cent. New England was largely that of growth in numbers by reason of the slow increase of the population, of a declining religious enthusiasm, and of discussions arising from the development of polity. Education was fostered not only by lesser schools, but by the founding of Harvard College in 1636, and of Yale College in 1701. There was little doctrinal division, all the churches representing the current Puritan Calvinism, and there was remarkable uniformity in organization, worship, and method.

Congregationalism made slow progress in England from its permanent establishment in Southwark in 1616 to the meeting of the Long Parliament in 1640. Its chief representatives found refuge in New England or in the Netherlands. But, with the outbreak of the struggle between King and Parliament, and the return of a number of the exiles, it grew very rapidly. Though the Westminster Assembly, which began its sessions in 1643, was overwhelmingly Presbyterian, it included five determined Congregationalists and several at least partial adherents. The desire of Cromwell and the army for a large toleration was favourable to the spread of Congregationalism. Congregationalists were appointed to many important ecclesiastical and educational posts under the Protectorate, and enjoyed the cordial favour of Cromwell. The Savoy Synod, held in London in 1658, gathered the representatives of 120 churches. Congregationalists suffered with other Nonconformists from the repressive policy of the Restoration, but their churches were not extinguished, and at the Revolution in 1689 the Toleration Act secured them legal standing, under rather onerous conditions, in common with other Dissenters. The enthusiasm of the epoch of the struggle between King and Parliament and of the Commonwealth was spent, and Congregationalism shared in the spiritual decline of the first half of the 18th century. It was touched, however, but slightly by the Arian and Socinian defection that made such inroads on contemporary English Pres-

byterianism. During the latter half of the 18th cent. it felt with increasing power the stimulus of the great Evangelical movement which the Wesleys and Whitefield had initiated, and experienced a profound spiritual re-awakening which led to rapid growth. County Associations were generally established between 1785 and 1810. The London Missionary Society, nominally an undenominational organization for carrying the gospel to the heathen, but increasingly Congregational in constituency, came into being in 1795. The Home Missionary Society was organized in 1819, and the Colonial Missionary Society in 1836. The year 1832 saw the formation of the Congregational Union of England and Wales. The period from that time to the present has been one of healthful growth and spiritual fruitfulness.

In Scotland, Congregationalism did not gain a permanent foothold till the last decade of the 18th cent., when it won its way as the supporter of a warm, evangelical type of piety and preaching. Its hold on the Scottish people has been relatively small, but it has proved a vigorous force in the religious life of the nation.

The earlier part of the 18th cent. witnessed a decline in the spiritual vigour of Congregationalism in America as in England. From this condition in America it was powerfully aroused by the 'Great Awakening' in 1740–1742, through the preaching of George Whitefield, Jonathan Edwards, and other promoters of the revivals. The 'Awakening' led to division of sentiment, though not to actual separation, in the New England churches—the 'Old Lights' opposing its methods, which the 'New Lights' favoured. With Jonathan Edwards (1703–1758) a great theological development began, essentially Calvinistic in fundamentals, but with no little modification of historic Calvinism. This was continued by Joseph Bellamy (1719–1790), Samuel Hopkins (1721–1803), Jonathan Edwards the younger (1745–1801), Nathanael Emmons (1745–1840), Timothy Dwight (1752–1817), Nathaniel W. Taylor (1786–1858), and others, and produced the most distinctive school of theology that America has originated. In the Revolutionary War the Congregational churches sympathized warmly with the colonial cause. The year 1792 saw the beginning of a great epoch of revivals, which continued to recur at intervals till 1858. By 1800, Congregationalism, which had been practically confined to New England, began to spread westward with the settlement of the country, and the process was initiated which has resulted in the establishment of nearly three-quarters of the present Congregational churches of the United States beyond New England borders.

By 1815 a Unitarian movement, the roots of which ran back into the 18th cent., was felt especially in Massachusetts, and resulted in a separation, which still continues, from the main Congregational body. The American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions was organized in 1810 to do the work indicated in its title. Home missionary work was begun by State bodies, commencing with Connecticut in 1774, and resulted, in 1826, in the formation of a Home Missionary Society of national scope. The American Missionary Association, which has laboured chiefly among the Negroes and the Indians, came into being in 1846; and the Congregational Church Building Society dates from 1853.

World-wide Congregationalism has expressed its fellowship in International Councils, of which previous mention has been made.

7. **Beliefs.**—Congregationalism has been a system of Church polity rather than a peculiar form of faith. In its early history it stood, in common with Puritanism in general, on the basis of Calvinism. The Cambridge Synod in New England, in 1648, approved the doctrinal portions of the Westminster Confession; and the Savoy Synod in London, ten years later, expressed a like concurrence, except for slight modifications. The 'New England Theology' of the 18th and 19th cents., whatever its departures from earlier Calvinism, belonged to the Calvinistic school. It regarded itself as an improved or 'consistent' Calvinism. The Declaration adopted by the Union of the Congregational Churches of England and Wales in 1833 is distinctly, though mildly, Calvinistic. The National Council of the Congregational Churches of the United States, held in Boston in 1865, was with difficulty prevented from adopting a declaration that the faith of the Churches was 'that which is commonly known among us as Calvinism.' The Declaration was frustrated by the determined efforts of those who deprecated any party shibboleth. But the later years of the 19th cent. witnessed a rapid decline of interest in the older doctrinal discussions. The 'Declaration' adopted by the National Council at Oberlin, in 1871, was designed by its omissions to make the way easy for those of Arminian sympathies. The 'Creed,' prepared in 1883 by a commission appointed by the National Council, maintains the same neutrality between Calvinism and Arminianism. It will be remembered that these various expressions of belief have the value only of testimonies, each local church being free to declare its faith in its own way. Since the last of them was set forth, however, the Congregational churches, in common with Protestantism generally, have been passing through a period of theological re-statement—the result of Biblical criticism, of the wide prevalence of an evolutionary view of history, of the new emphasis on the Divine immanence, and of a quickened conception of social service as a main aim of the Christian life, whether of individuals or of Churches. No body of Christians has on the whole been more willing to welcome these newer views than the Congregationalists, but the degree in which they have been accepted varies widely in different churches. It is not sufficient, however, to disturb their sense of fellowship and of continuity with their historic past, or the broad fundamental outlines of their conception of the meaning of the Gospel.

8. **Worship.**—The Congregational churches, at their origin, shared to the full the Puritan objections to ceremonies and vestments which seemed to savour of Romanism, and, like the more radical Puritans in general, they rejected fixed forms of prayer. They long confined the hymns of their services to rhymed portions of Scripture. It was not till the first half of the 18th cent., through the influence of the English Congregational hymn-writer, Rev. Isaac Watts (1674–1748), that this prejudice against hymns 'of human composition' gradually broke down. The typical Congregational service of the 17th cent. began with a prayer in words of the minister's own choosing, followed by the reading of Scripture, generally with comments verse by verse, then the singing of a psalm, the sermon, a second free prayer, a second psalm, and the benediction. This order was slightly modified, very possibly through the influence of the Westminster *Directory*, so that the sequence became commonly a brief prayer of invocation, reading of the Scriptures, usually without comment, singing, a 'long prayer,' the sermon, prayer, singing, and the benediction. This remained the almost universal order till within half a century, and still constitutes an approximate outline of Congregational worship. The last few decades have witnessed a large use of responsive readings, anthems, and other efforts at the 'enrichment' of

service, and the individual freedom of each congregation makes possible a considerable variety of usage. Opposition to some use of fixed forms of prayer is waning, but Congregational worship is still non-liturgical in its fundamental character. The Lord's Supper has been observed since the early days of Congregationalism at intervals of a month or two months. Till near the close of the 18th cent. Congregational worship involved two services, such as have been described, each Sunday, and in large towns a mid-week 'lecture,' which was really another sermon. About the end of the 18th cent. the 'prayer-meeting' was generally introduced for the cultivation of the Christian life —by prayer, Scripture exposition, singing, and informal addresses, under the presidency of the pastor, but with free participation by the laity. It has been ever since a feature of congregational worship, but its successful maintenance, save in times of unusual religious interest, is generally regarded as one of the most difficult of pastoral problems.

9. **Characteristics.**—Congregationalism has always favoured education, both in the pulpit and in the pew. In England many 'academies' were founded after the Toleration Act and throughout the 18th century. A number of these have become flourishing 'colleges,' their aim being to train a learned ministry and to provide the higher education for laymen which ecclesiastical tests, now abrogated, then made unattainable in the Universities. In the United States the Congregationalists have been foremost among religious bodies in planting colleges and fostering schools. The Congregational spirit has not been sectarian, however, and these institutions have been freely opened, and have not been used as a means of denominational propaganda.

Congregationalists have been greatly interested in home and foreign missions. The efforts of the Rev. John Eliot (1604–1690), begun in 1646, for the conversion of the Massachusetts Indians, led to the incorporation by the Long Parliament, in 1649, of the first English Foreign Missionary Society, the 'President and Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in New England.' The establishment of the London Missionary Society in 1795 and of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions in 1810 has already been noted.

The flexibility of Congregationalism has made it easy to try experiments in methods of Christian work, and these churches, as a whole, have always been ready to welcome novel activities which seemed to promise greater usefulness in Christian service.

10. **Problems.**—The problems of Congregationalism are those of democracy generally. That which is most pressing is how to secure efficiency without sacrificing democratic liberty. Congregationalism has proved itself admirably adapted to rural conditions among a homogeneous population of intelligence. It has been less successful in cities where contrasts in wealth and education are extreme. Each church being a self-governing, democratic community, there is always danger that those congregations in the more needy parts of a city will be unduly weak in resources both of money and of men of ability. Congregationalism endeavours, with partial success, to counteract this tendency by Home Missionary aid and superintendence. There is also the peril, in city communities, where congregations are gathered largely by elective affinity, that a church may become essentially a religious club. As in all democratic bodies, union for strategic advance is often accomplished at the cost of undue effort, or is not achieved at all. In order to make itself more efficient in these respects, without forfeiting the essential autonomy of the local church, Congregationalism, both in Great Britain and in America, is at present displaying a centralizing tendency. The advisory powers of Associations are being extended and increased, and a system of superintendency, by committees or individuals, without judicial or mandatory powers, but with large advisory influence, is in process of development. The watchword of this movement, now felt on both sides of the Atlantic, is 'a more efficient Congregationalism.'

11. **Statistics.**—In the statistics of Congregationalism only those who have become church-members by a profession of personal Christian experience are included. The figures, it is usually thought, must be multiplied five-fold to represent the total number of adherents.

In the following table only church-members are included:

Countries.	Churches, Chapels, and Stations.	Church Members.	Sunday-School Scholars.
England and Wales	4,652	459,147	675,785
Scotland	211	35,920	34,521
Ireland	40	2,262	4,621
Channel Islands	12	333	444
Canada—			
Nova Scotia	21	831	733
New Brunswick	8	277	73
Ontario	88	5,538	4,574
Quebec	56	3,725	2,959
Newfoundland	13	324	368
British Guiana	53	5,146	4,663
New South Wales	82	4,956	8,443
Queensland	50	2,227	4,594
South Australia	63	3,388	6,011
Victoria	87	4,219	7,448
Western Australia	43	1,189	2,284
New Zealand	36	2,241	2,633
Tasmania	49	902	1,897
South Africa	338	17,565	7,938
American Zulu Mission	49	2,406	2,225
Natal	47	503	668
Sierra Leone	1	506	250
Jamaica	45	3,422	1,570
China	3	527	425
India	15	598	418
Japan	94	13,806	10,044
Syria	2	83	..
United States	6,991	730,718	696,367
Independent and Mission Sunday Schools	..	..	49,776
American Foreign Missionary Churches	554	73,671	73,685
	12,703	1,376,424	1,605,417

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WILLISTON WALKER.

CONNEXIONALISM.—There are many systems of Church organization in which itinerant evangelists link together scattered congregations, and maintain a strong corporate feeling by regular meetings among themselves, when they as a body arrange the sphere of work for each, and often exercise other functions of government. Such systems are usually styled 'Connexional,' and although that name is also employed more loosely, it is such systems that are here compared with one another. They flourish where a democracy, or an oligarchy, is inspired with a zeal for propaganda, and especially where a revival is prompted and supported by Bible study.

Connexional elements may be traced even in the Apostolic era, when the Apostles allotted among themselves their fields of labour, and when St. Paul and his comrades travelled widely, and kept in touch with the churches they founded, both by visits and by letters, and by delegates to supervise, such as Timothy, and Tychicus, and Titus. But the Greek churches brought over the Greek love of independence, and the Third Epistle of John shows at the close of the Apostolic age a local minister revolting against the mere presence of any visiting missionary. This tendency was reinforced by a jealousy between the officers of business, appointed primarily to 'serve tables,' and the gifted brethren, including those who were set apart to give themselves to the ministry of the word. The local administrators steadily gained in esteem at the expense of the travelling evangelists, and, when the Montanist movement failed, the reaction within the Catholic Church practically ended the career of the evangelists. They survived only on the frontiers of Christendom, and we shall see that connexionalism flourishes best in the mission stage of a church, and in communities which emphasize evangelism.

While a bureaucracy of church officials developed, on lines suggested by the Roman civil service, there was no room for connexionalism in this diocesan system. But among the laity there arose a new plan of organization, whereby those who were in thorough earnest about their Christian life put themselves under severe discipline as monks. Basil for the East, and Benedict for the West, produced bodies of rules to order the community life, and these were widely adopted. But neither the one nor the other contemplated evangelism as a leading feature; salvation of self rather than salvation of others was the chief aim. Although the Iro-Scottish monks had a loftier conception, yet they conspicuously lacked the faculty of organization, and their foundations remained isolated. Two races have displayed a genius for method and order—the Roman and the English,—and certain developments of the Benedictine scheme due to these nations show signs of connexionalism.

Thus Stephen Harding in 1119 inspired the Cistercian method, whereby the religious belonged to an Order rather than to a single House. Year by year the Abbots of the Houses met in consultation, and in theory not only the humbler members, but the Abbots themselves, could be transferred from convent to convent. Since, however, no systematic plan of rotation was adopted, or even any rule that rotation should take place, there was in practice much inertia. And as the aims of the Order did not exalt evangelism, there was no special motive for circulation.

A century later the English Benedictines moved in the same direction, but the Italians evolved farthest, producing the Silvestrine, the Celestine, and the Olivetan organizations. Instead of officers being appointed for life, they had fixed terms of duty; a General Chapter chose a nominating committee which selected them. This line of evolution culminated in 1432, with the approval of the Cassinese constitution. Details of these schemes are given by Abbot Gasquet in his Introduction to Montalembert's *Monks of the West* (Eng. tr. 1861–79).

It might have been expected that the friars would show more originality, that their ideal of brotherhood would express itself in a democratic rule, and that their ideal of service would impel them to steady organized work for others. But the movement was soon captured by the Roman Curia, and the time-honoured diocesan pattern was adopted, with the slight changes needed for definitely local groups of professed Christians instead of areas within which a professed clergy ministered to a population nominally Christian. Thus friaries were grouped into congregations under a provincial, and all were ruled by a minister-general. The Roman monarchical ideal prevailed in the plan of government.

But a similar movement, originated by Peter Waldo of Lyons, being discountenanced by the authorities, was free to elaborate its own machinery (Newman, *Manual of Church History*, i. 571–8). In 1218 a conference was held at Bergamo, when, amongst other matters, the polity came up for discussion. An annual meeting was held, usually in Lombardy, when probationers were admitted to membership after long training and testing. They made promises of celibacy, poverty, and readiness to evangelize, quite on the Franciscan model. But, once the initiate was admitted, he found himself a member of a governing corporation, which not only recruited itself and saw to the purity of the whole body, but also required reports from every part of the field, and administered the funds of the community, gathered during the year. The Lombards, indeed, with the Italian instinct, decidedly preferred a single head, chosen for life; and they favoured a general life tenure of all offices. The Germans, again, upheld the plan of Waldo, that all offices should be terminable, and that there should be no single head, but several rectors. In this matter the two parties apparently agreed to differ, maintaining their own customs and recognizing the legitimacy of each others' officers. But the unique feature is that the annual meeting had full powers, and actually exercised them in the appointment of all officers, in allotting to each member his work, and in determining its nature and sphere. To some extent this scheme influenced the Bohemian Brethren and the Moravian Anabaptists, though these bodies

adopted the Italian plan of a single head holding office for life.

In 1527 an important conference was held at Augsburg, when delegates from the 'Brethren' organized on new lines (Lindsay, *Hist. of Reformation*, Edinb. 1907, ii. 435). All the officers of all the congregations within a convenient district chose a committee of themselves to act for the group, and the committee chose a president. The districts associated on the same principle, and thus a pyramid of committees was erected. To these people, popularly known as 'Anabaptists,' is therefore due not only the machinery of a single congregation, which was presently taken over by Calvin in his *Institutio*, and put in practice at Geneva, but also the machinery for an alliance of congregations, adopted in France during 1559, and in Scotland next year, and so well known as the Presbyterian scheme. But the 'Brethren' had one feature which was dropped by the French, the Scots, and the Dutch—an order of evangelists whose business it was to travel and propagate the faith. It is not quite clear how these were appointed, or how their routes were determined—if, indeed, appointment and travelling were not spontaneous rather than systematic. And, although several conferences were held, the persecutions of the next few years were enough to disorganize any machinery.

A year after the fall of Münster, an important meeting was held a few miles away at Bockholt, when the Anabaptists of Lower Germany and England re-organized and adopted the connexional plan (Barclay, *Inner Life of the Religious Societies of the Commonwealth*, 88). Each congregation sent delegates to an annual meeting, which stationed the ministers and arranged for the support of those who itinerated, besides aiding poor congregations and members. This system was developed in the Netherlands and up the Rhine, and, though many divisions occurred,—into Mennonites, Waterlanders, Doopsgezinden, Flemings, Old Flemings, Frisians, etc.,—yet each body held to the connexional type. As most of these Connexions held the doctrine of passive resistance, and objected to bearing arms or taking oaths, they found their position extremely awkward during the Napoleonic era; and the renewed conscriptions of the last forty years have caused their practical disappearance from Europe, and their emigration to America (Barclay, *op. cit.* 243). In the New World may still be found the remnants of these ancient bodies, and of kindred organizations like the Schwenkfeldians, true to the connexional type in that the annual meeting governs; but, as the numbers have greatly diminished, the vote is exercised not by officers alone, but by all male members.

Recurring to the Reformation period, we find forty churches in Lombardy and Switzerland acting together; and a special convention was held at Venice in 1550 (Newman, *Hist. of Anti-Pedobaptism*, Philad. 1896, pp. 327–9). The Waldensian plan so well known in the vicinity had been adopted in general outline, and the government lay in the hands of the itinerant preachers, who associated with themselves candidates under training, and not only visited all the congregations, but also ordained the local ministers. These churches mostly adopted anti-Trinitarian views, and were persecuted till they left the district; but many members went to Moravia and Poland, where they spread their tenets, so that the 'Socinians' were indebted to them for hints on ecclesiastical polity as well as on doctrine.

The Reformed Churches took over from the Anabaptists the general scheme of organization, and especially the principle that, whether in a single congregation or in a court supervising several congregations, the power was vested entirely in the officers. Ordinary members might have a voice and vote in electing an elder, but his ordination rested with the existing elders, who thus tended to become a self-perpetuating caste. Ruling elders were usually local, but preaching elders or ministers were liable to move; in Germany and Scotland the authority of the State was interposed in various matters, extending occasionally to the location of a minister, and thus the autonomy of the Churches was crippled. Owing partly to the high educational qualifications of the Reformed ministry, and partly to general inertia, long tenure of a pastorate became customary, and thus one frequent feature of a Connexion was obscured. But in theory the whole spiritual government of a Presbyterian church resides with the ordained members, and they have at least a veto on any increase of their number, or on the translation of any minister; nor is his personal preference a decisive factor any more than the wish of a single congregation. While these theories are still upheld, the connexional element is not extruded, however little certain powers may be actually exercised. Yet there has been much specialization, so that ruling elders hardly rank themselves with ministers on the ground of their common ordination; and their interests are so local that they hardly consider themselves a class apart from their fellow-members, with a corporate life of their own; still less do the officers as such pursue systematically a policy of extension, a policy which seems closely linked with the vigour of connexionalism.

In England, voluntary sects were unable to organize till the general relaxation of government in 1640. Then the General Baptists, who for thirty years had been in close contact with the Waterlanders of Amsterdam, entered on a vigorous campaign of evangelism. As churches were gathered in different parts of the country, they were kept in touch, and the earliest minutes that survive testify to some plan of organization. Thus, thirty congregations in and near Leicestershire and Lincolnshire sent delegates to a conference in 1651, which stated the faith and order which they held in common: in concise terms they set forth that gifted men are set apart for preaching, and are maintained by voluntary gifts. Five years later a 'General Assembly' was held in London, attended by delegates from Surrey, Kent, Sussex, Bucks, Northants, and other parts. The constitution of the Assembly is not stated, but the minutes show two classes of superior officers: Elders are explicitly said to be local, bound to serve their own congregations for life, and having no status in other congregations; Messengers exercise a general superintendence over whole districts, but are forbidden to choose other Messengers without the unanimous consent of the Churches. The minutes are signed by ten Messengers and eight Elders (Brit. Museum, *Add. MSS* 36709).

In 1678, Thomas Grantham published a folio on primitive Christianity, and, when expatiating on the officers of the Christian Church, he put in the forefront the Messengers or Apostles, whose permanent functions were to succeed the original Apostles 'as Travelling Ministers, to plant churches, and to settle those in order who are as Sheep without a Shepherd.' These, like the Bishops (or Elders) and Deacons, were to be elected by the free choice of the brotherhood and then ordained: and it is expressly laid down that the power of ordination is not limited to those who were already ordained, but is shared by all who have received the gifts of God's Holy Spirit. Then, in discussing General Assemblies, which were proved to be Scriptural, and were therefore

held regularly by the General Baptists, not only the Messengers and Elders who signed were admitted to the meetings, but also any gifted brethren who chose to attend. The office of Messenger was evidently regarded askance by some. So, from the analogy of Timothy and Titus, it was claimed by Grantham that, while they had a larger circuit, had business in many places, and so were greater servants than the fixed ministers, yet they had no jurisdiction over other bishops (Grantham, *Ancient Christian Religion*, 186). Then, in a special treatise, Grantham showed that the actual practice of the Brethren was to 'send forth Men to act Authoritatively, both in preaching to the World, and setting things in order to remote Congregations, to exercise Discipline by Excommunication of Offenders and remitting the Penitent; by ordaining them Elders, and dispensing to them the Holy Mysteries or Ordinances' (*op. cit.* 160).

Grantham wrote on his own authority only, but probably expressed the feeling of the Fen districts —Lincoln, Hunts, and Cambridge. In the same year a meeting of the General Baptists, near Bucks and Oxon, adopted a Confession, drawn up by Monk, another Messenger, in which Article xxxix. is very explicit:

'General Councils, or assemblies, consisting of bishops, elders, and brethren, of the several churches of Christ, and being legally convened, and met together out of all the churches, and the churches appearing there by their representatives, make but one Church, and have lawful right and suffrage in this general meeting or assembly, to act in the name of Christ, it being of Divine authority, and is the best means under heaven to preserve unity, to prevent heresy, and superintendency among or in any congregation whatsoever within its own limits or jurisdiction,' etc.

In a long article, xxxi., 'Of Officers in the Church of Christ,' we see a slight difference of opinion as to the power of ordination:

The bishop or messenger is to 'be chosen thereunto by the common suffrage of the Church, and solemnly set apart by fasting or prayer, with imposition of hands, by the bishops of the same function, ordinarily; and those bishops, so ordained, have the government of those churches that had suffrage in their election, and no other ordinarily; as also to preach the word or gospel to the world, or unbelievers. And the particular pastor, or elder, in like manner is to be chosen by the common suffrage of the particular congregation, and ordained by the bishop or messenger God hath placed in the church he hath charge of,' etc. (Hanserd Knollys Society, *Confessions of Faith*, pp. 159, 160).

When after 1689 the organization comes into full light, and its records become continuous, we find not only this order of Messengers fully rooted in the esteem of the Connexion, but numerous Associations established, each of which was supposed to have one Messenger at least, while all sent representatives to the General Assembly. As everything depended on voluntary consent, the choice of a new Messenger was a matter of careful negotiation between the Assembly and the Association concerned, usually extending over more than a year, and generally the consent was sought of the church where he was a member. Ordination was by authority of the Assembly, or of the Association concerned, and was usually performed by the existing Messengers. In practice the office was maintained by voluntary subscription, which, however, was not large enough to free the officer from the necessity of supporting himself, often by manual labour. The Messenger usually resided for life within his district, and visited all the churches there freely. The order was considered superior to the Eldership, both priority and presidency being conceded. But there are no signs that the Messengers ever met together apart from the Elders of local churches, or that they acted as a corporate body. The Elders were so far from any system of itinerancy, that in 1696 it was resolved that no Elder might leave his own people and be established as Elder over another people in another place (T. Goadby, *By-paths of Baptist History*, London, 1871, p. 244). The funds of the Connexion were vested in lay trustees, on trusts so loosely expressed that the Messengers never tried to assert any legal claim to them. (The Minutes of Assembly are published by the Baptist Historical Society.)

As the Connexion lost vitality during the 18th cent., whole Associations ceased to meet, and therefore their Messengers died out, while the local churches, in many cases, asserted their independence. Then the foundation of the New Connexion of General Baptists effectually stopped the revival of the Old Connexion, and attracted some of its component parts. Yet, even at the present day, there are about a score of churches, unobtrusively pursuing their way, with their Messengers, keeping up their General Assembly, and showing still this primitive connexional system, though completely devoid of that which inspires it, the spirit of propagandism.

In the 17th cent. this organization had been copied and developed by the Society of Friends, who were also in direct contact with the Dutch Mennonite Connexion (Barclay, *op. cit.* 342). While a group of local Friends formed a church for local purposes, the provision of evangelists was clearly beyond the power of such a group. At first George Fox organized, then associations of local churches recognized, ministers and certified them as fit to travel; these then shared his responsibility, both gathering converts and organizing them into churches, even appointing the first Elders (*ib.* 388). By 1661 a regular Yearly Meeting was established in London for the whole Society (*ib.* 392). As custom became settled, it was agreed that the Travelling Ministers were *ex officio* members of this Yearly Meeting, and Fox even applied to them the term 'Apostles,' which the General Baptists also had borrowed from Scripture. The other members were to be chosen by the quarterly meetings out of the local Elders, but these did not always sit with the 'Public Labourers' (*ib.* 404). These Travelling Ministers retained for themselves the right to organize and control their own work of evangelization, which fell entirely into their hands when Fox passed away. They met regularly on Monday and Sunday to arrange where they would preach; they discussed openings for new work, and the character of those who wished to be recognized as ministers, and they kept a roll of their own membership (*ib.* 381).

The fervour of the age died down, and propagandism became of less importance, so that the Travelling Ministers lost their pre-eminence. In 1735 the Yearly Meeting forbade their meeting to control its own membership, and within twenty years they were brought under the direction of Mixed Meetings, in which the dominant element was a new kind of Elder, whose main business was to administer, not to preach. Thus, with the cessation of evangelizing came the transformation from the connexional type in the Society. The pyramidal series of courts remains, but the Travelling Ministers now form a very small element in them, and in the Society.

The general decay of the 18th cent. was met by the vigorous evangelism of Whitefield and Wesley; and, as crystallization took place, it was on the connexional system. In 1744 six clergymen and five lay preachers met, and traced the foundations of the Methodist polity; forty years later, Wesley enrolled a deed in Chancery which settled the government of the Connexion, while in the same year a Conference at Baltimore organized the Methodist Episcopal Church in America. The United Empire Loyalists laid the foundation of Methodism in Canada, while from

England other Methodists spread throughout the British dominions. Questions of Church polity, however, have been fiercely debated, and have led to many secessions in both England and America, which have only partially been offset by reunions; the very principle of these secessions calls in question the connexional scheme. As Wesley organized it, the body with supreme authority in spiritual matters was a Conference of a hundred ministers. These, however, he desired to act in harmony with the whole number of mutually recognized ministers, and his wishes have invariably been respected. Thus all questions of doctrine, of discipline, and of ministerial standing and employment, are settled by the ministers in full conclave. It was against the exclusion of other members that revolts chiefly occurred, and the resulting bodies, such as the Primitive Methodists and the United Methodists, temper their Conferences with laymen in at least an equal proportion. Even the Wesleyan Methodists now have a Representative Conference, with equal numbers of ministers and laymen meeting first and dealing with all matters of policy and finance. But here it is to be noted that the trust deeds on which chapel property is held ensure that the enjoyment is secured to the ministers stationed by the Pastoral Conference. The Methodist Episcopal Churches have moved on similar lines; but here the bishops retain their exclusive powers, and when met as a body they define the duties of each member. While an increasing deference is paid to local wishes, the supreme authority technically resides in the Conference, and in England at least the Conferences regularly exercise their powers. The itinerant system is being encroached upon by the claims of central offices or by the new system of Central Missions, in which continuity of service is regarded as important. Wesley's three year rule is also being relaxed, both in the parent body by ingenious constructions of the Deed Poll, and in the offshoots by open legislation.

The title of 'Connexion' was adopted by other bodies, such as the Calvinistic Methodists of Wales, the Countess of Huntingdon's chaplains, and the New Connexion of General Baptists. Historically these originated almost independently of one another and of other bodies, and in their gradual organization they have profited by the experience of Methodists and Presbyterians, besides steadily rejecting the central feature of the ever-present Episcopal system; thus they have given new extensions to the term 'Connexion.'

The Leicester preachers, who formed the nucleus of the New Connexion of General Baptists, had retained all power to themselves at first, and so had the Yorkshire preachers who joined with them; but soon the local officers were associated, and, when negotiations were undertaken with the Lincolnshire churches of the Old Connexion, they explicitly repudiated the office of Messenger as not of Divine institution, although they were ready to discuss its expediency. The first rules were drafted by ministers alone, who advised that the Association should be open only to ministers and elders; but the separate churches made steady efforts to secure local control by the whole body of local members. Thus in 1817 their historian summed up to the effect that they were in their discipline strictly congregational, that each society allowed no foreign control even from its own Conferences or Association, and that the rights of church members were sacred against the encroachments of their own officers (A. Taylor, *Hist. of Eng. Gen. Baptists*, Lond. 1818, ii. 468). In that year also the basis of representation in the Association was settled on such terms that the pastors were far outnumbered by the lay delegates. Twenty years later a new constitution was drafted, but was carefully emended, to ensure the independence of the churches; and the united action was reduced to the consideration of cases referred spontaneously by Conferences, churches, or individuals, to the management of the academy and of some publications, to the conduct of home and foreign missions (J. H. Wood, *Hist. of the Baptists*, Lond. 1847, p. 278). Even as regards the ministry, the advisory committee to report on applicants had equal numbers of laymen and ministers, while the ministers had no joint function peculiar to themselves. When we note, also, the disappearance of any itinerant system, it will appear that the mere name of Connexion survived the reality in this case; and since 1891, in order to establish more intimate relations with Baptists of another school, the meetings of the Association have been reduced to a mere formal gathering.

Similarly, the Countess of Huntingdon's Connexion has long ceased to show any connexional vitality, and the methods of its churches and ministers approximate to the Congregationalists. In the Principality, however, the Calvinistic Methodists have moved the other way, as is shown in their adoption of the title 'Presbyterian Church of Wales'; yet, while the ministers are ordained only with the approval of an Association, and have part of their time claimed by the whole body rather than by the local congregation, there is a feature of Connexionalism still discernible.

Many mission fields present good examples of connexional principles. Often the whole body of foreign workers are associated into a Synod or Conference, which reviews the progress of the band, decides on plans, and allots the individual members to their departments. Rarely, indeed, do the native converts have any voice at all in such a meeting, though a native minister may have a seat in Conference as a worker. Sometimes the decisions of the Conference are subject to review by a committee chosen by the subscribers who defray the expenses, and by this feature a special complication is introduced into the connexional machinery. This power of the purse is one of the most important factors in the modification of Connexionalism. Not only may a committee sitting in Britain tend to regard the workers abroad rather in the light of civil servants, to be moved about at the will of an ecclesiastical Foreign Office; but also in home affairs a rich Methodist circuit often appears to obtain the particular ministers it wishes, even against the apparent good of the whole Connexion. Yet this same power of the purse can manifestly be used to stereotype connexional methods in the drawing up of trust deeds, so that all ecclesiastical property, buildings and endowments alike, can be placed under the control of the Conference of workers, and not of local supporters.

Another menace to Connexionalism, as to all other organizations, is the irrepressible ambition of some men to wield power. In the early days, an outside autocrat like Constantine was able to capture and transform the machinery of the Church. For many centuries within Christian circles, a steady claim to supremacy has been put forth from Rome by an oligarchy of Pope and cardinals, who have succeeded in rendering nearly every revival subservient to their concentrated rule. Nor is it needful to look outside connexional circles: the corps of ministers most readily arranges to perpetuate itself, excluding the mass of members from all direct influence; it reaches out beyond the stationing and supervising of its own members, to the control of all activity, on which it can at least interpose a veto. Such encroachments have more than once excited revolt,

and led to the formation of other bodies in which such domination is expressly guarded against. Within the body of active self-governing workers there has often arisen some commanding figure, whose actual influence extends far beyond the nominal position he holds; but such a phenomenon is equally common under any system of management, and no such leader has proved able, or even desirous, to found a dynasty which may subvert the general principles.

In estimating the permanence of the type, we have to bear in mind that details of organization are not prescribed in the New Testament, but a few principles are insisted upon as fundamental. None is more urgently reiterated than: 'All ye are brethren; one is your Master, even the Christ.' Again, the primary object of the Church is evangelization: Go everywhere, tell all peoples, enlist the converts, instruct them in the ways of Christ; such are the purposes for which the Church was called into being. Propagandism and brotherhood are thus to be inwrought in any scheme. Now, as a matter of history, every great revival of religion has been marked by an appreciation of these elements, and has fashioned its machinery on somewhat connexional lines. True, the Franciscans were brought under the control of the Curia, but the very struggle against this, and the rapid degeneracy from the spirit of Francis, show the natural relation of Connexionalism to these principles, so that the disappearance of the one imperils the existence of the other. Similarly the transformation of the connexional type among the old General Baptists and the Friends reflects the decay of the spirit of propaganda in those bodies. But the great Methodist Churches, with their firm grasp on the evangelistic purpose of their existence, and their warm fraternity, hold fast to the connexional system as the best embodiment of their principles. And whenever a revival takes place, even on a microscopic scale, it seems natural that those who are actively concerned shall meet simply as brethren to consult and arrange mutually as to the division of labour.

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W. T. WHITLEY.

CONSANGUINITY.—By 'consanguinity' is meant blood-relationship, and more particularly, close blood-relationship. When we speak of a consanguineous union, we mean that the two organisms are near relatives; when we speak of a high degree of consanguinity in a herd or in a community, we mean that there has been much in-breeding or endogamy. It is desirable to know what the biological facts are in regard to the results of the sex-union of closely consanguineous organisms, but it must be admitted that clear-cut facts are few. It should also be noted that, as the range of living creatures expresses a very long gamut, we must be very careful in arguing from one level to another. What is normal and apparently wholesome at one grade of organization may not be desirable at another.

It seems to have been securely established that some hermaphrodite animals habitually fertilize their own eggs. This autogamy has been proved in some tapeworms and flukes—not auspicious illustrations; it seems sometimes to occur in the freshwater hydra and a few other free-living animals. There are numerous self-fertilizing flowers, though there is no case known where cross-fertilization is impossible. It may also be that one hermaphrodite liver-fluke sometimes inseminates another, so that the habitual autogamy may be interrupted. In the great majority of hermaphrodite animals, such as earthworms and snails, cross-fertilization is the invariable rule. It is also relevant to recall the fact that in many of the small Crustaceans, in many Rotifers, and in some insects, such as Aphides, there may be long-continued parthenogenesis—generation succeeding generation without loss of vitality, although the eggs develop without any fertilization. In some of the Rotifers the males are still undiscovered; Reaumur kept Aphides breeding parthenogenetically for over three years (50 consecutive generations), and Weismann kept females of a common water flea (*Cypris reptans*) breeding in the same way for eight years. This shows that at certain levels of organization a vigorous life may be kept up for many generations, not only without any introduction of 'fresh blood,' but without the presence of any males.

A number of careful experiments have been made on in-breeding, but there is imperative need for more. Weismann in-bred mice for twenty-nine generations, and his assistant Von Guaita continued the experiment for seven more generations, but the only notable general result was a reduction of the fertility by about thirty per cent. Some experimenters, such as Crampe, have found that the in-breeding of rats resulted in disease and abnormality, but this was not observable in the equally careful experiments of Ritzema-Bos. He in-bred rats for thirty generations; for the first four years (twenty generations) there was almost no reduction in fertility; after that there was a very marked decrease of fertility, an increase in the rate of mortality, and a diminution of size. These and other experiments on mammals, though insufficient to be satisfactory as a basis for generalization, suggest that very close in-breeding may be continued for many generations without any observable evil effects, and, on the other hand, that there are limits beyond which in-breeding becomes disadvantageous. It is certain that, if there be well-defined hereditary predisposition to disease in the stock, then in-breeding soon spells ruin.

'Extensive experiments by Castle and others [see *Proc. Amer. Acad.* xli. 731–786] on the in-breeding of the pomace-fly (*Drosophila ampelophila*) led to the general result that "inbreeding probably reduces very slightly the productiveness of *Drosophila*, but the productiveness may be fully maintained under constant inbreeding (brother and sister) if selection be made from the more productive families"' (J. A. Thomson, *Heredity*, 1908, p. 393).

Some of the histories of domesticated breeds are so well recorded that they may be ranked as carefully-conducted experiments, and it seems that some very successful breeds of cattle—such as Polled Angus—have in their early stages of establishment involved extremely close in-breeding. When we examine the pedigree of famous bulls and stallions, we find in some cases an extraordinarily close consanguinity. Valuable results have often been attained by using the same stallion repeatedly on successive generations.

From breeding experiments four general results seem to be clear: (1) that progressive results have usually followed mating within a narrow range of relationship; (2) that close in-breeding has a great utility in fixing characters or developing 'prepotency'; (3) that close in-breeding may go far without any injurious effect on physique; and (4) that, if there be any morbid idiosyncrasy, close in-breeding tends to perpetuate and augment it.

Darwin paid much attention to the question of in-breeding (see *Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication* [London, 1868], etc.), and his general conclusions were:

(1) 'The consequences of close interbreeding carried on for too long a time are, as is generally believed, loss of size, constitutional vigour, and fertility, sometimes accompanied by a tendency to malformation.' (2) 'The evil effects from close interbreeding are difficult to detect, for they accumulate slowly and differ much in degree in different species, whilst the good effects which almost invariably follow a cross are from the first manifest.' (3) 'It should, however, be clearly understood that the advantage of close interbreeding, as far as the retention of character is concerned, is indisputable, and often outweighs the evil of a slight loss of constitutional vigour.'

From his researches on flowering plants, Darwin concluded that there was 'something injurious' connected with self-fertilization; and although he came to recognize that self-fertilization was more frequent and more successful than he had at first believed, he adhered on the whole to the aphorism, 'Nature abhors perpetual self-fertilization.' In his book on *Cross and Self Fertilisation* (1876), however, he says: 'If the word "perpetual" had been omitted, the aphorism would have been false. As it stands, I believe that it is true, though perhaps rather too strongly expressed.' The fact is that self-fertilization in flowers is for the most part relatively, and not absolutely, injurious.

In the present state of our knowledge, it seems fair to say that there is little biological evidence to show that there is anything necessarily disadvantageous or dangerous in close consanguineous unions. These seem often to occur in nature in isolated and restricted areas, and they are frequent in successful breeding. It must be admitted that evil effects *sometimes* follow prolonged consanguineous pairing in the artificial conditions of stock-breeding, but it must not be hastily inferred that these evil effects are necessarily due to the consanguinity. There may be persistence of unwholesome conditions of life which have a cumulative evil effect as generation succeeds generation, or there may be some organic taint in the early members of the stock which becomes aggravated, just as a desirable organic peculiarity may be enhanced.

Bateson expresses the view of most biologists when he says:

'It should perhaps be pointed out categorically that nothing in our present knowledge can be taken with any confidence as a reason for regarding consanguineous marriages as improper or specially dangerous. All that can be said is that such marriages give extra chances of the appearances of recessive characteristics among the offspring. Some of these are doubtless bad qualities, but we do not yet know that among the recessives there may not be valuable qualities also' (*Mendel's Principles of Heredity*, new ed., London, 1909, p. 226).

When we take into account such evidence as there is from animals and from plants, and such studies as those of Huth (*Marriage of Near Kin*[2], 1887), and the instances and counter-instances of communities with a high degree of consanguinity, we are led to the conclusion that the prejudices and laws of many peoples against the marriage of near kin rest on a basis not so much biological as social.

See MARRIAGE.

LITERATURE.—The literature has been given throughout the art., but see also under MARRIAGE.

J. ARTHUR THOMSON.

CONSCIENCE.

CONSCIENCE.—The term 'conscience' is derived from the Lat. *conscientia*, which meant originally 'joint knowledge,' or the knowledge which we share with others. It soon came to denote, however, what we mean by concomitant knowledge, that is, consciousness or self-consciousness, and only in later literature had it the meaning which we attach to 'conscience.' Even then it was not exactly what we mean by it as the arbiter and motive power in right and wrong. The Greek equivalent of Lat. *conscientia* was συνείδησις. This was in use by Plato and the Stoics, and denoted joint knowledge, and with the Stoics it also denoted the knowledge of right and wrong. In Cicero *conscientia* can often be translated indifferently 'conscience' or 'consciousness.' It is the same with the French term *conscience*.

It is more distinctively in modern times that a radical difference is marked between the idea of consciousness and that of conscience. Consciousness with us is a purely intellectual function, a generic term for the phenomena of mind, or for that concomitant act of mind which Hamilton has well called the 'complement of the cognitive energies.' 'Conscience' is a term with a moral import, though complicated with the intellectual, and implies an emotional content at the same time. 'Consciousness' is thus a term for Psychology, and 'conscience' one for Ethics, with the distinction, however, that consciousness is implied in the problems of Ethics, while conscience is not necessarily so implied in those of Psychology. 'Conscience' is thus a name for the function of distinguishing between right and wrong, and of enforcing the one or preventing the other. The difference between the ancient and the modern conception of it is determined by the difference between their ideas of morality, and may be said to reflect the whole difference between their ethical and religious civilizations. The morality of antiquity, in so far as it was a subject of reflexion, hardly got beyond the conception of prudence—except, perhaps, with the Stoics. That of modern times involves the idea of duty or devotion to a law which may require sacrifice. There is no doubt a perfect reconciliation between these two points of view when we come to make a concrete examination of the facts to which they are supposed to apply; but in their abstract formulæ they seem opposed to each other. In its conception of rational conduct antiquity sacrificed a proximate to a remoter interest; modern ideas assume to deny all interest or happiness, and to demand unswerving obedience to law. But when this is carefully scrutinized it often turns out to be a sacrifice of the interests of the present life to a remoter interest in a life to come. The Christian system was the originator of the phrases which came to express inflexible obedience to duty; but this system was based on the immortality of the soul, and on the rewards and punishments apportioned to the nature of one's conduct in this life. Hence, when its moral conceptions are subjected to analysis, they do not differ absolutely in kind from those of antiquity, but they take two worlds into account where the ancient took only one, namely, the present world. The difference, so far as it is a difference, was between a materialistic and a spiritualistic view of the present life, and also between merely intelligent action and such action as involved duty with personal sacrifice.

The difficulty of comparing our modern conception of conscience with that of the ancients is apparent in the philosophy of Plato. Though he used the etymological equivalent of the modern term 'conscience,' this was not the term for one of the main functions of conscience with us.

'Reason' was the function which did service for conscience, and even this was not the motive agency in the direction of the will, but the guide for other influences. The myth of the chariot with the two steeds represents Plato's conception of the moral nature. Plato's distinction was between 'rational' and 'irrational' conduct, by which he meant the distinction between intelligent and ignorant conduct. Irrational action was under the influence of desire and passion, two unruly steeds which in their behaviour never looked before and after, but rushed into action without deliberation or reflexion. Reason was the charioteer whose function it was to direct these two steeds or impulses towards an end which represented knowledge of what the subject does, instead of blind passion. In this conception, however, reason furnishes light but not power. The motive agency was in the desires and passions, and reason only gave counsel or directed them, without providing any other end than these impulses offered. It took a more spiritual age to supply an end which was distinct from that of sense and passion, and so to modify the conception which gave rise to the more modern idea of conscience. The distinction between right and wrong with Plato, and, for that matter, with all Greece, was that between the prudent and the imprudent, between what was best for the individual and what was injurious to him, and the judge of this was intelligence, not conscience in our use of the term. The nearest conception to ours was the Stoic obedience to law, a law too which sacrificed the impulses and started the reflective mind towards the later Christian doctrine. But it was still an appeal to reason, and tried to reconcile its opposition to passion by insisting upon traditional ethics in details. But other Greek thinkers conceived reason as the director, not the commander, of the impulses, and so the Greek point of view was not that of the supremacy of conscience, but the supremacy of reason, thus making prudence instead of law its standard of morality. The emotional element of conscience the ancients did not recognize. The influence which introduced this factor into the conception was partly the Christian idea of sacrifice, and partly the idea of respect for an inner law of life and conduct, suggested by the Stoic ethics, and made effective in the Christian system by the necessity of eschewing politics. This conception was explicitly formulated in later thought, and especially in the ethics of Immanuel Kant, as represented in his 'categorical imperative,' an unbending sense of duty, regardless, in some thinkers, of all consequences, and in others of pleasure and pain. Here it denotes not only the consciousness of moral distinctions, but also an impelling motive or influence towards the execution of the right and the evasion of the wrong.

The Furies, or *Erinyes* (*q.v.*), are often regarded as mythological representations of the Greek idea of conscience. But this interpretation of them is due to certain analogies with the more modern conception of remorse as a punishment for sin inflicted by conscience on the transgressor. The Furies were not inner monitors, but external agencies punishing the individual for the violations of the moral law. Remorse is an inner punisher. In the rationalistic stage of Greek reflexion there was a tendency on the part of some thinkers to give a subjective interpretation to the idea of the *Erinyes*, but this never availed to suggest to them the modern idea of conscience as a distinct function of the mind. There was no tendency in Greek thought to combine the ideas of reason, self-consciousness, and penitence for sin so as to form the complex idea which has done so much service in modern times. The consciousness of sin was not a characteristic of the Greek mind.

It was the general character of Christianity that gave rise to the new conception of conscience, and this was because it created a new morality. The Greek never got away from the secular view of things. Whatever his talk about the Divine, he associated it with the æsthetic and political view of the world; his ethical interests were confined to the present life and its joys. But Christianity extended the horizon of human hope beyond the present, and created the brotherhood of man, a new social feeling and interest. At the same time it brought a doctrine of personal salvation, based upon the idea that the present life was a probation for a better, and that man's only hope of happiness in the next life was his conformity to duty here. With this new social ideal, the extension of man's horizon of hope, and the strenuousness of his conception of duty and limited probation, the idea of morality was formed with a direct reference to a spiritual as opposed to a material or carnal world. Morality was conceived as possibly demanding a sacrifice of all that the Greek mind valued in life, namely, the world of sense, or the intellectual world of speculation—which was only the grosser sense-world a little refined. The transfer of happiness to a spiritual world forced morality to neglect that end here, and gave a very abstract meaning to duty. It also laid so much stress on the moral law, and so little on mere intellectual culture, that morality became the important characteristic of the man who was to be saved; that is to say, his morality and not his wisdom saved him. This, too, was the consequence of the democratic as opposed to the aristocratic view of social relations involved. In all, however, it substituted moral for intellectual virtues, and started civilization on a new tack, which was to make conscience more important than culture, while it gave a larger content to the conception of man's moral nature. As conduct rather than knowledge came to be the condition of salvation, the idea of conscience took root as the most important part of man's constitution, and it was appealed to not only to secure individual salvation, but also as the characteristic in man which reflected his lineage with the Divine.

The early Fathers defined conscience as the director of man's spiritual nature, and the distinguisher between right and wrong. Apparently not until Descartes did it take on the special import of an inner faculty to punish the soul for its sins. The function of remorse was recognized long before, but it took philosophic reflexion to introduce the idea into the scholastic conception of conscience. The same conception prevails in Spinoza. But this is entirely altered when we come to Kant. He identifies conscience with the function of the 'categorical imperative,' or sense of duty. Conscience, he says, is not the product of experience, but an inherited or original capacity of the soul, and is identical with the law of duty. This was equally a departure from the ancient idea that it was an intellectual function, and from the Cartesian idea that it was the after-emotion of the soul in regard to conduct. It was not, with Kant, a faculty of judgment determining means to end, or deciding when any particular course was right or wrong, but the faculty which impelled the right attitude of mind towards any course which the judgment made right or wrong. The consequence was that conscience was convertible with the inner sense of duty or the compulsory nature of the moral law.

Bishop Butler's view preceded that of Kant historically, but was much the same as that of the great German. It did not have the same development, but it reflected the logical consequence of the age toward this view. Butler expounds his conception of conscience in his *Sermons*, which are an analysis of human nature. There is a tendency to emphasize the emotional element, but the intellectual is admitted as essential to it. He says:

'There is a principle of reflection in men, by which they distinguish between, approve and disapprove their own actions. We are plainly constituted such sort of creatures as to reflect upon our own nature. The mind can take a view of what passes within itself, its propensions, aversions, passions, affections, as

respecting such objects, and in such degrees; and of the several actions consequent thereupon. In this survey it approves of one, disapproves of another, and towards a third is affected in neither of these ways, but is quite indifferent. This principle in man, by which he approves or disapproves his heart, temper, and actions, is conscience' (*Serm.* i. § 7 f.).

He is careful subsequently to insist that the function involves 'reflexion,' and distinguishes it from the appetencies or natural affections, as the agency which can give their promptings stability and rationality. The conception at this point takes on some resemblance to that of Plato, with additions from the course of Christian development. But in completing his conception of it he assigns a supremacy to conscience which is based not on its power but on its right to prior judgment in questions of right and wrong.

'Thus,' he says, 'that principle, by which we survey, and either approve or disapprove our own heart, temper, and actions, is not only to be considered as what is in its turn to have some influence; which may be said of every passion, of the lowest appetites: but likewise as being superior; as from its very nature manifestly claiming superiority over all others—insomuch that you cannot form a notion of this faculty, conscience, without taking in judgment, direction, superintendency. This is a constituent part of the idea, that is, of the faculty itself: and, to preside and govern, from the very economy and constitution of man, belongs to it. Had it strength, as it has right; had it power, as it has manifest authority; it would absolutely govern the world' (*Serm.* ii. § 19).

In respect of the idea of authority, this view is strikingly like that of Kant, but it contains an element of judgment and emotional attitude after the act which does not appear to make a part of Kant's conception. Kant starts with a law of rational action which is to hold good for all rational beings, and makes this an imperative duty which is to regulate conduct without regard to consequences or external relations and conditions. External deeds are with him neither good nor bad. The only good or bad thing in the world is a good or bad will, and any will governed by the 'categorical imperative,' or sense of duty, is moral, regardless of what the external act is. One does not need to know the means to an end or to reflect on consequences in order to be virtuous in this conception. Neither the amount of intelligence or wisdom nor the after-emotional effects of approval or disapproval have anything to do with virtue, but only the right attitude of the will and reverence for the law. The motive or mere sense of duty was sufficient to determine the whole character of conduct, and this motive constituted the nature of conscience.

Both these schools or tendencies resulted in the conception that conscience is a simple and unique faculty of the mind. This was especially indicated in the simplicity of its function in the Kantian system, and in the view that it was not a product of experience, and with the English thinkers it was further favoured by the emphasis placed upon its presence in man as an evidence of the Divine. The Kantian argument for immortality and the existence of God pointed in a similar direction, as it rested on the moral nature of man. Both schools treated conscience as an implanted power and not the result of experience, and accordingly their conception came into conflict with the implications of the doctrine of evolution. This theory attempted to derive conscience from various elements in man's social nature, and refused to regard it as an implanted and unique faculty of the mind. The controversy between the two schools was made clear by the relation of the idea of conscience to the theistic interpretation of the cosmos. The last resource of the theologian for the proof of a Divine existence had been the unique and moral character of conscience. Evolution had assumed that it had proved its claims in all other matters, and was reluctant to make an exception of conscience. It was only natural that it should so treat the question, and it was unfortunate for the theistic view of things that it seemed to stake its claims on the integrity of its argument regarding the origin of conscience.

This controversy, however, is not the best setting for the consideration of conscience. We should first see what we think it is as a fact, and we can then discuss its origin. The tendency since the rise of the controversy has been to consider conscience not as a unique or simple faculty, but as a complexus of mental phenomena organized with reference to moral ends. Instead of being made a separate faculty—the 'faculty' Psychology having been abandoned—it is considered as the *mind occupied with moral phenomena.* This enables us to conceive it as the organization of all that intelligence and feeling which are connected with the actions called moral or immoral. There was an approximation to this view in the conception of Butler, but it was concealed by the prevailing interest in other questions. But, taking conscience as a complex instead of a simple function, the present writer would recognize three general elements in it: (1) The *intellectual* or *cognitive* element, which is concerned with the perception of the means to ends, and the fact of some end which we agree to call the good as distinct from the merely true. Other mental functions are called in to estimate what shall be the good as distinct from the true, but the intellectual judgment and perceptions are involved in determining both the fact of this ideal and the necessary means to its realization, and on these means rests a part of the judgment of right and wrong. In fact, right and wrong hardly have any meaning without this conception of means to ends. (2) The *emotional* element, which is primarily the valuation of facts and things in relation to our welfare, whether they represent retrospective or prospective feelings. Hence they divide into what we shall call the *judicial* and the *legislative* feelings. The judicial feeling represents the approval or disapproval of self or actions in their relation to the moral law. The legislative feeling is the sense of duty, or 'categorical imperative,' and commands obedience as the retrospective feelings pass judgment on acts already done. (3) The *desiderative* element, or that mental state which may be called reverence, good-will, or conscientiousness, and is representative of respect for law, where the sense of duty represents a sense of compulsion often against the desires. The highest condition of conscience is that in which respect for law is substituted for the imperative which feels a struggle against natural desire.

These various elements will include all the social instincts which figure so prominently in the theories of Darwin and Spencer and the evolutionists generally. The important point, however, is that they show the moral nature or conscience to be complex and not simple. The view solves some perplexities in the evolutionist controversy. The difficulty proposed by the older view, in its effort to utilize the distinction between man and the animal in respect of morality, was that evolution could not account for this new increment in the process of creating man, and that, since it was not derived from anything like it in previous organic life from which man was supposed to be developed physically, a special creative act was necessary to account for it in man. But with the analysis of conscience into elements which may be found in all consciousness, animal or otherwise, we may suppose that the process of evolution has only organized or consolidated elements otherwise separate into a systematic tendency to act in the direction we call conscience. In this manner we may admit the uniqueness of the function, and so its distinction from animal life, while we at the same time accept the evolution, if not of the ele-

ments, certainly of the organic whole for which the term stands. The distinction as a whole between man and animal is preserved, while the identity of their elements is maintained, evolution being formative, not creative.

The consequence of this view is that conscience is no more simple than the æsthetic faculty or any other function of the mind. It receives a distinct name merely because of the importance attaching to certain fixed relations between men and their conduct. All the functions of the mind are employed in the determination of action, and it seems simple only because we are in the habit of seizing some one particular mark in the whole for denominating the process; and, in any case in which a single term is used to denominate a fact, a natural tendency arises to consider that fact a simple one. But in matters of moral character there are many mental states and many external relations involved, and so long as conscience is a term to denote the moral nature it must include all these factors.

The problem, however, of its origin is not so important as its validity as a function of mind. The perplexity created by the controversy of the religious mind with the evolutionist was caused by the original conception that its meaning and value as a function of mind depended on its origin. The assumption was that, unless it had a Divine origin, its authority was impaired. In other words, its validity was made to depend on its creative origin instead of upon its judgment of facts. The consequence was that evolution only enforced the conclusion which the theist admitted hypothetically. But once realize, as we do in all other scientific and philosophic problems, that historical origin does not determine validity, and the authority of conscience will depend on the same criteria as those which determine ordinary truths, and not upon any contingency of its remote source, whether it be a simple or a complex faculty. We do not make any other scientific truth depend on the cause of its origin but upon its conformity to facts and the law of things. It must be the same with the dictates of conscience. They are valid or invalid irrespective of the mode of their origin, and because of their relation to the welfare of the individual.

LITERATURE.—L. Stephen, *Science of Ethics*, Lond. 1882, ch. viii.; T. H. Green, *Proleg. to Ethics*, Oxf. 1883, bk. II. ch. v., and bk. IV. ch. i.; I. A. Dorner, *Chr. Ethics* (Eng. tr. 1887), pt. I. ch. iii. 2nd div. 2nd sect.; H. Paulsen, *Syst. of Ethics* (Eng. tr. 1899), bk. II. ch. vi.; see also Butler, *Sermons*, ed. W. E. Gladstone, Oxf. 1896; Darwin, *Descent of Man*, Lond. 1871; and H. Spencer, *Principles of Ethics*, Lond. 1893.

JAMES H. HYSLOP.

CONSCIENCE (Babylonian).—As is indicated in the art. CONFESSION (vol. iii. p. 825), the Assyro-Babylonians felt strongly the consciousness of the commission of sin and wrongdoing, and herein the idea of conscience appears plainly, and must have presented itself with all its force to their minds. Confession of sin, in fact, can exist in all sincerity only when conscience speaks to a man, and tells him that he is in fault—when,

'Sitting in lamentation,
In bitter mutterings and *pain of heart*,
In evil weeping, in evil lamentation,
He mourns like a dove; tearfully night and day,
To his merciful god like an ox he lows, (and)
Bitter lamentation he constantly makes.'[1]

The Assyr.-Bab. conception of sin, however, differed from that prevailing in a Christian community, as the failings of a religious man belonging to those ancient nationalities might be due to causes over which he had no control—the effects of the actions of evil spirits, or the ritual uncleanness brought about by acts of forgetfulness or by the effects of illness. The disadvantage arising from this consisted in the disfavour of the gods, or of the king as the gods' representative, and there was a desire to avoid such disfavour in future by refraining from the commission of the misdeeds which brought it about. This, though not the Christian idea of conscience (including, as it does, the feeling of remorse), may have tended to bring about the frame of mind which we understand thereby, or something akin to it.

An excellent example of the heart-searchings of the Babylonians and their remorse of conscience is given by the 2nd tablet of the *Šurpu*-series. Here the afflicted man has not only to ask himself whether he has committed the sins of blasphemy, uncleanness, bribery (?) to thwart the ends of justice, used false balances, removed his neighbour's landmark, etc., but must also put to himself searching questions as to whether he has separated father and son (or other near relatives), refrained from freeing the captive, failed to enable the imprisoned to see the light of day, whether, being 'upright of mouth,' his heart was nevertheless faithless, and whether, while saying 'Yes' with his mouth, 'No' was in his heart.[1] As these queries run to about 80 lines, it will easily be recognized that the Babylonian, in his conscientiousness, was exceedingly thorough.

In fact, we may, perhaps, see in the last of the following lines something expressing the idea which the word 'conscience' contains:

'On account of his eye, which is filled with tears, [accept thou his] lamentation;
On account of his troubled face, [accept thou his] lamentation;
On account of his mind (?), from which tears depart not, [accept thou his] lamentation;
On account of his lips, on which a bridle is placed, [accept thou his] lamentation;[2]
On account of his hands, which rest spread abroad, [accept thou his] lamentation;
On account of his breast, which complains like a resounding flute, [accept thou his] lamentation.'[3]

In this extract the breast, the seat of the feelings, may be regarded as the inner conscience of a man, and as practically synonymous with the heart, when used in the same sense. In the Laws of Ḫammurabi, the person who had a complaint to make was recommended to go before Merodach and Zērpanîtum in prayer, 'with perfection of heart.' 'Perfection of heart' would, therefore, seem to have been an expression equivalent to freedom from the consciousness of sin—a clear conscience. In the fullest sense of the words, therefore, the great gods of Babylonia exacted, for their favour, not only that rectitude in the sight of the world which every right-minded person desires, but also a good conscience, such as would urge one to repentance, contrition, reconciliation, and restitution when the interests of his fellow-men were involved.

Numerous inscriptions, mostly of the nature of penitential psalms and litanies, might be quoted in illustration of the above, but very little fresh information is to be obtained from them.[4] Their cumulative evidence, however, shows the Babylonians in a most favourable light, notwithstanding that the objects of their worship were the gods and goddesses of their national pantheon. Religious in the extreme, the constant aim of the believer among them was a clear conscience, without which there was no hope of happiness, but, on the contrary, pain and grief in this world, and, to all appearance, separation in the world to come from the deity whom they worshipped.

LITERATURE.—This is given in the notes.

T. G. PINCHES.

[1] *WAI* iv.[2] pl. 26, 50 ff.

[1] Zimmern, *Beitr. zur Kenntnis der bab. Rel.*, Leipzig, 1896, pp. 2–7.

[2] Sumerian: *Šumdum sikur-e šubbâta ira-* . . .; Babylonian: *Ina šapti-šu ša lagaa nadâ* [*bikit-su liqê*?].

[3] Haupt, *Akkad. u. sumer. Keilschrifttexte*, Leipzig, 1881, no. 19, with additions. The text being imperfect, the above rendering is given with reserve. For a rendering without the additions, see Jastrow, *Rel. Bab. u. Assyr.* ii. (Giessen, 1908) p. 81, lines 13–16.

[4] See Jastrow, *op. cit.* ii. 1–137 ('Klagelieder und Bussgebete').

CONSCIENCE (Egyptian).—The actual word 'conscience' does not occur in the indexes of Egyptological works—which is *a priori* a significant fact. For not only must we suppose that the word has no exact equivalent in the Egyptian vocabulary (any more than have the terms 'sanction,' 'morality,' 'remorse,' etc.), but we must also conclude that the literature of ancient Egypt has nothing to say on the subject. Of course, we find numerous writings on propriety, on duty, on everything connected with the vast domain of ethics in general; but there is nothing that bears directly upon the phenomena of conscience in themselves. Since, on the other hand, we still find most delicate manifestations of what we might call an *organized* conscience in Egypt, in its literature and religious works, we must presume that the Egyptians had quite a different conception of conscience from ours for both of the senses in which the word is used to-day. Psychologically, they connected it with very different phenomena, and with methods of perception of the 'ego' which are no longer ours. Morally, conscience was regarded as playing a part in concepts grouped in a different way from that followed by our method. Or, rather, Egyptian thought arranged the operations of the moral conscience in separate and independent categories, whereas we make them a unity. It would take too long to investigate whether this fact is due to the general inability of the Egyptians to make abstract definitions, or, on the other hand, to the method whereby Egyptian intellectual civilization originally formed the foundations of its knowledge. The latter is probably the more correct view.

These radical differences of terminology explain, at any rate, why the question has never yet been entered into in modern works of Egyptology. These speak very often of the moral culture of Egypt, but never of its conscience or of the possible formation of the same (the work of Flinders Petrie, *Religion and Conscience*, is the only exception at present; but note also the restriction made in the Literature at the end of this article). In fact, the complete absence in ancient Egypt of definition or treatment of the subject forces us to a long process of reconstruction of the Egyptian conscience by means of the direct study of whatever implicit manifestations of conscience can be seen in the whole collection of Egyptian writings. Thus, inscriptions such as a prayer, a hymn, a biography, or a copy of a deed of division or a lawsuit; or testamentary or epistolary papyri; or even magical incantations may supply a detail here or there; and the sum of such contributions may gradually make it possible to reach a knowledge of Egyptian conscience. This study is necessarily a very intricate one; but it is indispensable for our ultimate understanding of the duties and divisions of Egyptian morality, of which so much has been said. What follows cannot be any more than a first attempt, of provisional character.

It is a common thing to read that the Egyptians 'had a conscience superior to that of the other peoples of classic antiquity.' Such an expression is ambiguous. Its actual meaning, as Petrie rightly notes (*op. cit.* 86), must be that the *theoretical standards* were nowhere so well defined and apparently so high as in Egypt. The gradual development of these standards can be followed in a long historical series of documents.[1] But the study of this evolution constitutes an inquiry which belongs to moral and social history. It amounts, in short, to an attempt to disentangle the notion of the *co-ordinate* moral system, with its sanctions and its more or less successful attempts at a codification of duties—the whole being organized on the standards of which we have just spoken. An investigation of this nature must be accompanied by that of the word 'duty,' because it is connected logically with the conception of moral obligation, and with the various questions attached thereto (nature of duty, categories, origins, sanctions, etc.). This has been the treatment followed in almost all the works occupied with the word 'conscience' in general.

It appears, then, to have been a mistake to study the 'duties' of Egyptian morality in connexion with conscience, as Petrie has done (*op. cit.*); and an examination of his work shows precisely that, among the hundreds of obligations and prohibitions figuring among the duties, the majority (food tabus, ritual and sexual tabus, etc.) arise from sources quite apart from the true domain of conscience.

We must, consequently, occupy ourselves exclusively with the phenomenon 'conscience' considered by itself, *i.e.* that immediate intuition of good and bad, that inward feeling, instinctive (from its appearing innate), which shows itself contemporaneously with an action. There is in it a quasi-spontaneous disposition of the mind to make the judgment (which it forms on actions and intentions) subordinate to an idea that appears to be *sui generis*.

Applying as it does to a dead race, and to a race which has left no didactic matter of its own on the subject, our study must be cautious, and should begin by limiting our field of inquiry as much as possible. Thus we must dismiss as too wide the definition that 'conscience is the mass of intuitions as to what is good or bad,' because an apparent intuition may be an acquisition that has become so rapid by force of habit that it seems instinctive (either by individual education or by hereditary transmission of the tendency). This suggests the subject of physical movements (*e.g.* 'struggling' movements) which seem instinctive, but are not necessarily innate. Petrie (*op. cit.* 92) shows very clearly that similarly the body of intuitions which we call conscience is the accumulated heritage of centuries. Not one of the apparent 'intuitions' brought to light by Egyptian writings can be classed with any degree of certainty among the primordial phenomena. They must be studied as one of the fundamental elements of a social morality composed of all the individual consciences brought together, and it belongs to ethics to investigate how heredity has impressed them little by little until they have the force of instinct (cf. A. Leroy, *Religion des primitifs*, Paris, 1909, p. 211).

Thus limited, the question comes to be whether there is in the body of Egyptian literature a means of defining the *initial* element (we must avoid the words 'innate' and 'acquired'), or the *earliest possible* elements from which the Egyptian moral conscience seems to proceed. In a question of this type, if we do not want it to extend indefinitely, it is a good method of procedure to apply to Egypt the principal theories relating to the origin of conscience among primitive peoples, and to investigate whether what we know of Egyptian religion and ethics agrees with them.

At the very outset, it seems certain that the Egyptian conscience cannot be brought into connexion with the Divine world of the nation. The literary expressions employed in the question as to 'whether conscience is the herald of the Lawgiver or the Lawgiver Himself' have no precise meaning here. If we can prove that social morality is the product of the body of individual

[1] Especially if we use documents very much neglected as a rule, such as: the 'Negative Confession' of the Roman era; the 'Duties of the Governor' (Rekhmara inscription), and, generally, the biographies of the first Theban empire. Hitherto we have made too exclusive a use of the celebrated ch. cxxv. of the Book of the Dead and of the 'Treatises on Wisdom' (inaccurately called 'Treatises on Morality').

consciences, and show the initial separateness of morality and any given religious system, we see that this separation naturally affects the origin of conscience. Now this separation of morality from religious beliefs has been attempted time after time, since Tylor, in all the religions of uncivilized or semi-civilized peoples. But nowhere is this phenomenon more scientifically clear than in Egypt, where, from the time of the pre-historic texts of the Funerary Books to the Roman Empire, the accession of the gods to the domain of morality was a slow process. Right down to near the latter period, Osiris was almost the only god connected with a moral idea (Ptah of Memphis is *perhaps* an exception, if we judge by the latest discoveries, in his temples, of stelæ to the name of 'Ptah who hears the plaint of the wretched' [cf. Petrie, *Memphis*, i., Lond. 1908, p. 17 ff.]). The other gods neither prescribed nor taught anything of morality. They only punished those who did them wrong, and blessed their benefactors. It may even be remarked, as one of the strongest characteristics of Egyptian religions, that this neutrality of the gods persists throughout the whole domain of ethics.

The systems which base conscience on 'sympathy' seem incapable of explaining its manifestations in Egypt. Not one of the texts of the monuments, *e.g.*, or of the moral or popular literature, makes any mention of, or even allusion to, anything of the nature of the Shinto doctrine of *kami*. In Egypt, 'to follow the dictates of the heart' would lead to very different results from those of a fundamental concept that 'the heart is good.' On the contrary, the total impression given by Egyptian writings may be summed up in two remarks which do not favour this system. (1) We find a great lack of those ideas which are often regarded as indications of the 'sympathetic' origin of conscience. These are the feelings which are usually qualified with 'temporary sanction,' and are called the pleasure and joy of doing good, and the remorse, regret, and repentance for evil-doing. Inversely, certain chapters of the Pyramids and the Book of the Dead, and certain reflexions of the popular tales, offer lamentable analogies, in point of 'sympathy,' with the present mental status of the very lowest races among those studied in the Congo (cf. *Notes sur la vie familiale et juridique de quelques populations au Congo Belge*, ser. iii. fasc. i. [Brussels, 1909]). (2) The study of 'sanctions' properly so called (of very different kinds, of course) reveals an *organization* (*i.e.* a *formation*) which shows its connexion with fundamental elements that are quite different, and perhaps even totally opposite.

The history of this will be examined elsewhere (see ETHICS). Here, however, we should note this tangle—at first sight inextricable—of the most various fundamental sanctions. The lowest of these are based on violation of 'tabus,' and have no possible connexion with any moral action whatever; the others show themselves as consequences, conceived from a utilitarian point of view (and recognized as such *by experience*), of incoherent series of actions which are not arranged in any kind of rational groups. We see this in the absolute and persistent inability of the Egyptians to compose any kind of reasonable list of sanctions. All that we find (Treatises on Wisdom, Book of the Dead, Maxims, Proverbs, Instructions, etc.) are lists formed in reference, not to classes of duties, but to the individuals or forces whence these sanctions proceed: the gods, chiefs, the dead, the family. Sometimes, indeed, there is a suggestion of the motives of command or prohibition. But then we find a vast confusion: the career, renown, long life, the gratitude of men, business gains and losses, eschatological conditions, reciprocity, etc. Few documentary sources give the idea of a moral conscience with any other basis better than that of 'innate goodness' or 'sympathy.'

The *innate* appreciation of right and wrong, which many regard as the irreducible, constitutive element of the moral conscience, seems at first sight a good theory for Egypt. There is probably no other ancient literature so impregnated with ideas of right and justice. Discourses like the one supposed to be addressed by the king to his vizier on the duties of the guardians of justice (cf. Newberry, *Rekhmara*, Lond. 1900, p. 33), the statements of ch. cxxv. of the Book of the Dead, and especially the constant references of the biographical inscriptions to equity and hatred of wrong in all its moral and social forms, would seem to picture the very inmost mental state of the race. A critical examination of the texts, however, makes this tempting hypothesis untenable. In eschatology, we find that the idea of 'retribution' or that lofty idea of the 'average of years of good fortune' (cf. Griffith, *Stories of the High Priests*, Oxford, 1900, pp. 41–66) is of very late appearance, and the most perfect injustice preceded it, for—as has been noticed—the famous 'Negative Confession' confines itself to a magical affirmation without proofs. Finally, the moral concept which it supposes in relation to the actions of this life is not ancient in respect of its insertion in the Book of the Dead; there is no getting over the plain fact that, while we have for several years been in possession of about two hundred specimens of the Book of the Dead of earlier date than the XVIIIth dynasty, we have not *one* containing a single line of the only moral chapter of this literature. It is the same with the ordinary inscriptions, where the development can be followed from the *mastabas* of the IVth dynasty. Right and wrong do not appear at first except in the form of affirmations of the lawful ownership of various goods, or the absence of wrong done to those things of which the deceased has need—which is quite a different thing. Even reducing it to its humblest form (as conceded, *e.g.*, by Réville, *Prolégomènes*[3], Paris, 1881, p. 276), we cannot reach the evidence of a primordial, irreducible element, consisting of an *innate* feeling of right, for any one of the ancient Egyptian cases. On the other hand, it is not easy to find satisfaction in a system like that taken up lately by Leroy (*op. cit.* 205), which posits at the outset an irreducible *innate* idea of right, while admitting the infinite and contradictory variety of practical applications. It is an evident paralogy to make, from the establishment of a connexion by mental operation, an entity existing by itself. The philological examination of the texts that one would apply to this special exposition might arrive some time at the evidence of the primitive confusion of the notions of goodness and utility, but never at an abstract conception of right; such a process would lead rather to conclusions remarkably like that suggested by the examination of the moral ideas of the races recently examined in Equatorial Africa, in the basin of the Congo, or in British East Africa.

Petrie's conclusion is the theory of *utility* brought to perfection by heredity (*op. cit.* 88).

His views may be summed up as follows: The conscious idea of right and wrong conforms at its basis with what is useful or the reverse for the community. Passing centuries have gradually done away with this idea, and have imposed on the individual, and thereafter on his descendants, respect for it (if not intelligence); so that his manner of appreciating it has, like hereditary movements, become instinctive. In fact, the primitive reasoning of the ancestor has been transmitted to his posterity in the form of propensities to conscience.

This theory of Petrie's is a remodelled form, to suit Egypt, of the conception that we find elsewhere in all sorts of analogous forms; *e.g.* 'le précepte devient axiomatique dans la conscience par hérédité' (Réville, *op. cit.* 276); or the elementary principles are 'l'utilité, l'opinion, les sentiments affectifs, l'hérédité' (G. Le Bon, *Premières civilisations*, ed. 1905, p. 95), etc. The whole idea seems well adapted to the Egyptian world, so well organized in all its workings for social co-operation and utility.

But this is a narrow basis, and must be broadened. Such a system does not explain why Egypt, having the same constitutive elements of conscience as the other African peoples, should have developed its moral conscience further than

they. A more precise and intricate mechanism must be found, and can be found—in the present writer's opinion—in a careful examination of Egyptian literatnre. A total of 500 or 600 proverbs, maxims, precepts, ideas, or thoughts of a moral type, extending from the IVth dynasty to the Christian era, will suffice for this inquiry, the business of which is not to define the idea of duty or its working out (see ETHICS), but to find the elements of formation of what we call conscience *in Egypt*. The development of the utilitarian and social datum will appear as the result of the combination of two chief elements.

The first consists essentially in the feeling that there is no indifferent action, and that every action has consequences for its author. This idea is by no means of the same nature as that of right and wrong. It is not even the idea of responsibility, but it contains the latter in embryo. It also includes the future idea of *reciprocity*, applied to the doer of the action. It thus reduces itself to the form: 'If I do this, the same will be done to me (or will happen to me)'; then to the form: 'I shall not do that, so that the same may not be done to me (or happen to me).' A comparison of the mentality of the black African of to-day with the Egyptian texts makes it possible to hold that this idea of the necessary consequences of every good or bad action is a truly innate idea, or, if not innate, at least the most primitive instinctive idea that can be found. It does not presuppose, so far as appears, a developed intelligence or a long education. The African—to continue our illustration—is surrounded by an infinite number of forces and spirits of such importance that every human action and movement affects them, for good or ill—we might almost say, most often for ill. And this pessimism, rightly remarked as a characteristic of the African mind, is still visible in Egyptian literature. The action, with its consequences, agreeable or harmful or displeasing to one or other of those innumerable spirits and forces, begets the immediate perception of a good or evil consequence for the doer. This is clearly seen in the case of numerous interdictions of a ritual nature, or in the mysterious vengeance of spirits and gods offended unawares, or in violent deaths. The famous ch. cxxv. itself, looked at from this point of view, shows itself to be composed from the very same elements as those of a Kavirondo or Ubangi native's conscience. And the idea that other men, neighbours and fellow-men, are linked, by their death or by their guardian-spirits, to this sum of mysterious forces brought into motion by every action, seems to have supplied the natural means for the extension of this primitive feeling.

Whether the original mental operation is *innate* or not will not be discussed here. The positive fact is that what, in every case, is described as the first manifestation of the feeling of conscience among the 'non-civilized' Africans is at the foundation of Egyptian mentality. Experiment naturally gave this feeling definiteness and precision, and, low as we may judge it from the moral point of view, it started a great forward movement on the day when it became the idea of *necessary reciprocity*, attached to the actions or intentions. We can still detect that stage very clearly in Egypt (especially in the popular tales), when this idea is embodied in the vague form of a sort of 'fatality,' whose consequences man lets loose by his own action. It is only later, and in a very imperfect form, that this mechanism is connected with precise interventions: (1) with the dead as punishing or rewarding (cf., *e.g.*, the expression 'your gods [*i.e.* your deified dead] will bless you if you do,' etc.); (2) with the guardian-deities of the dead. And yet, even in historic times, the perception of the results of the evil action is attached to forces that are quite vague and undefined, such as chance, misfortune, and accident. These are the survivals, modified by time, of the 'spirits' of the most ancient Egyptian beliefs. Never have national religions been able to rise higher.

If we find at the base of Egyptian thought first fear, and then, with progress, the idea of personal responsibility, we must demonstrate why finally this sort of 'conscience' later developed so differently in Egypt and among the African peoples of whom we have been speaking. A second factor came into play, which was indispensable to the evolution, and it seems that it was this factor which organized the Egyptian conscience, with its special traits, with its imperfections—but also with its nobility. The second element consists very probably in the idea of order, or the idea of the harmony of the world—later designated by the word κόσμος. The first knowledge of 'order' in the progress and forces of the world naturally began as purely material order, in the domain of physics and geography. We have explained in art. CALENDAR (Egyptian) the important part played in this question by the observation of the stars, and the idea that the Divine influences of the stellar powers governed the world. As the heavenly vault set the example of order, and directed events on earth, the knowledge of the laws and harmonies of the sensible world followed. A relation of this kind between the astral world and the earth seems to have been made very much more natural in Egypt by the character of the climate, in which the regularity of certain rhythms and the well-defined character of certain opposites were noticeable (the periodicity of the Nile's rise, the fixity of the seasons and winds, the contrast between the desert and the valley, etc.). The knowledge of this supposed co-relation helped the Egyptians to establish the first ideas of the correspondence that could exist between this regular rhythm of the material world and the individual efforts of men to associate their own activity therewith in a beneficial manner. Hence arose a more and more clear comprehension of the identity of what is useful for man with what is indicated by the order of astral powers. Such a conviction must in its turn engender gradually, as the foundations of intuitive conscience, the ideas of the necessity of all uniting together for the common struggle, of the necessity of solidarity, of the superiority of the general interest over the particular, and of the dependence of the individual upon the community.

The whole question, then, in the special case of Egypt, turns upon the theory that the origin of conscience 'se rattache aux efforts faits par l'homme depuis la préhistoire pour se civiliser par la coopération et la solidarité' (G. Le Bon, *Origines*, 1906, p. 191). But, instead of general hypotheses, we have here documentary evidences of this evolution; *e.g.* in the very frequent references in the ancient texts to the important rôle, from a moral standpoint, filled by the questions relating to water, irrigation, and the struggle against the desert (cf. ch. cxxv. of the Book of the Dead; certain passages in the panegyrics of the lords of Syut in the Xth dynasty; or of Beni Hasan in the XIIth, etc.). The idea of a higher authority and an earthly hierarchy being necessary in this world, as they are in the celestial world, for the common good, is also a result of a conscience based on the vision of the κόσμος; this vision has likewise impregnated all the literature of the 'moral' type.

In conclusion, from the vague fear common to all primitive societies, the nature and climate of Egypt developed the more fertile and definite idea of an arrangement of the forces and beings of the sensible world into regular armies, some of which are man's allies and preside over the progress of the world, while others try to harass the world and so hurt man. The comprehension of consequences was followed by the comprehension of the necessity of social order, the comprehension of social interest, etc. Owing simply to its complex origin, Egyptian conscience never succeeded, in its reasoned elaboration of duties, in separating ritual *tabu* from the obligation of the moral domain. These were for the Egyptian two different forms of the necessary co-operation of men for the maintaining of the order requisite to society.

A satisfying counter-proof of this view is supplied by a comparison with a certain number of living races in the uncivilized parts of Africa. It might be concluded that the degree of organization of the moral conscience in Africa is

usually proportionate to the clearness of the conception of order in the terrestrial world, meteorological or astronomical (cf., *e.g.*, the comparative series of the collection of *Monographies descriptives* by Van Overbergh, Brussels, 1907 ff., with what is said of the Bavili and of Benin by R. E. Dennett, *At the Back of the Black Man's Mind*, London, 1906, and *Nigeria Studies*, 1910, for the various manifestations of conscience among these peoples).

The Egyptian idea, then, ends in something very analogous to the statement of Chinese wisdom, that the natural order of the world is bound up with its political, social, and moral order, and is even quite identical with it. Only—in spite of passages of certain texts—the Egyptians do not seem to have been able to formulate this view with the same theoretical clearness. It is in any case curious to notice—and here we have probably more than a simple coincidence—that, just as the sanctions of Taoism in China are of late date, so in Egypt the organization of *definite* sanctions (rewards and punishments in permanent categories) did not appear until well after the actual organization of the moral conscience.

The history of this organization will be discussed in art. ETHICS. We need only observe here (1) that the material κόσμος has become harmony, equity, and moral and intellectual truth by a series of evolutions which can be shown philologically by the series of Egyptian texts, and that this series is analogous to the series which has gradually transformed the data on the human voice, cry, or vibration, into concepts where the word 'voice' is taken to mean the spoken word, and then becomes the equivalent of λόγος; and (2) that the appearance of the moral conscience, based on the comprehension of the κόσμος, does not in any way assume the attribution of a properly so-called moral character to the beings or forces directing the κόσμος. These simply did their own work in this world, without ever making any express demand upon the Egyptian's co-operation; and the latter simply sought, for his own good, to bring his efforts into harmony with those of the directors of the supposed order. Hence he derived, among innumerable other acquisitions, a certain number of ideas on conscience, morality, interdictions, obligations, etc. A significant fact in this respect is that, in the majority of cases, the sanctions of these obligations and interdictions are tacked on to all possible kinds of beings and things, except beings of a Divine character.

LITERATURE.—As was said at the beginning, the only work really dealing with the subject is W. M. Flinders Petrie's little book, *Religion and Conscience in Ancient Egypt*, London, 1898. Even here we must observe that the real question of conscience is treated only on pp. 86–109, the rest of the book being practically given up to a summary of Egyptian mythology (pp. 1–85), and an examination of the various categories of duties (pp. 109–163).

GEORGE FOUCART.

CONSCIENCE (Greek and Roman).—I. *GREEK*.—**1. Definition.**—Conscience operates when the individual passes an intellectual judgment on definite acts, accomplished or purposed, of his own, and decides whether these acts are right or wrong. Such judgments, being self-regarding, are always accompanied by self-satisfaction, or self-dissatisfaction, according as the individual feels he has fulfilled, or fallen short of, the moral law; conscience punishes or approves, deters or suggests. It has an intellectual side and an emotional side; it may be enlightened or the reverse, sensitive or the reverse. Its enlightenment is to be estimated by the moral ideal of the individual; he may obey the moral law through fear of punishment here or hereafter; through hope of reward here or hereafter; or simply in order to realize the ideal self. The most educated conscience is that of the man who has the highest ideal, who wishes to realize the best life of which humanity is capable. The sensitiveness of conscience depends partly upon heredity, and partly upon habit and training. Some people naturally feel their shortcomings more acutely than others, while indulgence in vice always tends to lessen the shame felt at such indulgence.

2. Homer and early times.—Although there is embedded in the Greek language the notion, in later times developed by philosophers, that virtue and sin have an intellectual side (Homer's phrase for 'versed in wickedness' is ἀθεμίστια εἰδώς, 'knowing lawless deeds' [see, for example, *Od.* ix. 189, 428, xx. 287]), yet the most common moral terms used in early times refer to the emotional side of conscience. In Homer we have: (1) αἰδώς (αἰδέομαι), used of those who feel reverence towards the gods (*Il.* xxiv. 503; *Od.* ix. 269, xxi. 28), towards suppliants or guests (*Il.* i. 23, 377, xxi. 74, xxii. 419; *Od.* iii. 96, iv. 326), or of those who inhibit their passions in order to realize some higher end (*Il.* v. 530, vi. 442, vii. 93, xiii. 122, xv. 561, 657, 661, xxiv. 44; *Od.* iii. 24, vi. 66, 221, viii. 172, 324, 480, xiv. 146, xx. 171). The substantive may be rendered 'shame at offending gods or men,' 'respect for the moral rebuke of others,' 'modesty,' 'sense of honour,' 'self-respect.' (2) If αἰδώς sometimes approximates to the 'lawgiving conscience' which precedes an act, αἰσχύνομαι (*Od.* vii. 305, xviii. 12, xxi. 323) generally represents the shame (or the fear of it) inflicted by the 'judging conscience,' although it is not always possible to distinguish between the terms. (3) The indignation felt by others at transgression is represented by νέμεσις (*Il.* vi. 351; *Od.* ii. 136, xxii. 40), but occasionally νέμεσις is self-regarding (*Od.* ii. 64, 138, iv. 158; *Il.* xvi. 544, xvii. 254), and on one occasion (*Od.* i. 263) θεοὺς νεμεσίζετο means 'he stood in awe of the gods.' (4) A feeling of reverence for the rights of humanity is expressed in *Il.* xviii. 178 by σέβας, and in *Il.* vi. 417 by the verb σεβάσσατο.

The moral sanctions of the Homeric Greek were thus (i.) fear of the gods, (ii.) respect for public opinion (φάτις ἀνδρῶν, *Od.* xxi. 323), and (iii.) self-respect (Helen calls herself 'a dog,' *Il.* vi. 356), and a sense of honour which sometimes led to deeds of heroism. Achilles would rather die than fail to avenge his friend Patroclus (*Il.* xviii. 95 ff.)—an instance of devotion to duty which Socrates, in the Platonic *Apology* (28 C D), quotes with strong approval. Conscience, in fact, was acting, although as yet no special word existed to represent it, while the intellectual side was less developed than the emotional.

3. Individual merged in the citizen.—The characteristically Greek respect for public opinion found freer scope as city life developed, and as State discipline became the chief educator of the Greek people. The citizen looked upon morality as submission to the will of a corporate body. 'We lie here in obedience to our country's commands,' was the epitaph of the noblest heroes that Greece ever produced. The law, in fact, was invested with a peculiar sanctity of its own, and the individual found moral satisfaction in yielding implicit obedience to the powers that be; in modern language, he surrendered his conscience to the general conscience, and was content to be guided by the latter. Plato (*Crito*, 51 E) makes Socrates personify the Laws, who point out that every citizen has virtually agreed to abide by them, and not to prefer his own sense of right and wrong. That such was the belief of the historical Socrates is shown by Xenoph. *Mem.* IV. iv. 12, where τὸ νόμιμον is equated with τὸ δίκαιον. It was generally felt that the vast majority of men needed some strong external constraint. Hesiod (*Works*, 182 ff.) dreads the departure of moral fear from the earth, and the Platonic Protagoras (*Prot.* 322 B C) calls αἰδώς and δίκη the bonds of political and social life. The language of Æschylus is stronger still. 'Who,' asks Athene (*Eum.* 699), 'is righteous if he fear nothing?' In a remarkable passage of the *Ajax* of Sophocles (1073 ff.) it is stated that φόβος and αἰδώς are a necessary defence to both States and armies; that only δέος and αἰσχύνη can bring a man safety. Plato, in a yet more striking passage (*Laws*, 699 C), makes φόβος and αἰδώς responsible for the Athenian victories over Persia. The

Athenians, he says, had a despotic mistress in αἰδώς, through whom they were the willing slaves of the laws (698 B), and those who would be good must be similarly disciplined.

4. Unwritten laws.—But, in spite of the tendency to merge morality in legality, the Greek was aware that the individual ought to form moral judgments for himself when the laws were silent. The jurymen at Athens swore to decide suits according to the laws, but, when these were no guide, to judge the case conscientiously (γνώμῃ τῇ ἀρίστῃ, Aristotle, *Rhet.* i. 15. 5; cf. Æsch. *Eum.* 674). Again, the Greek acknowledged certain great 'unwritten laws,' of which Socrates (Xenoph. *Mem.* IV. iv. 19 f.) mentions four—to worship the gods, honour parents, avoid incest, and repay benefactors. Occasionally the unwritten laws might clash with those of the State; then the individual must decide between them. The tragedians are constantly depicting situations in which a character has to choose between the traditional code and some higher moral end. Philoctetes is a good example, while Antigone readily faces death rather than obey the edict of Creon, and, by leaving her brother unburied, violate the unwritten laws.

5. Decay of State discipline.—It is remarkable that the notion of conscience was more clearly apprehended just at the time when the morality of the masses began to decline, that is, during the period subsequent to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. The reason is partly that, as the State discipline slackened, the vicious and weaker characters, no longer having so firm a check upon them, grew more immoral, while the stronger and nobler natures (not necessarily the philosophers) learned to obey an inner law of righteousness. But the latter were comparatively few, and Plato, in the second book of the *Republic*, repeats the story of Gyges' ring in such a way as to show his own belief that the many are incapable of being virtuous for the sake of virtue.

6. Decay of State religion.—Not only the State discipline, but the belief in the State religion, had by this time lost much of the power it once possessed. Few thinking men continued to believe in the existence, let alone the providence, of Zeus, Apollo, and the other Olympians. The story told by Herodotus (vi. 86) of Glaucus and the Delphic oracle illustrates how the State religion had once been, in some respects at least, a good moral influence. When, however, the Divine sanction failed to exert effective control, the individual conscience more clearly manifested itself. In yet another way did the decay of belief in the Olympic pantheon further the development of the idea of conscience: the early Greek had thought, with a strange inconsistency, that the gods both tempted men to sin and punished sin; at first he blamed the gods for leading him astray; then, deprived of this excuse, he began to blame himself.

7. Other components in Greek religion.—But there were other and more abiding components than Olympian worship in the religion of the Greeks. One should note the φαρμακός, or scapegoat, mentioned by Hipponax (frag. 4 ff., ed. Bergk) and Aristophanes (*Frogs*, 733). Fear of spirits (probably Pelasgian in origin, as it is not to be found in Homer), especially dread of a murdered man's ghost, gave rise to the ideas of an avenging deity (ἀλάστωρ), and of blood-guilt (παλαμναῖος, προστρόπαιος, ἐναγής). The latter might infect a whole family, or even a State (Thuc. vii. 18). Doubtless at first the infection (μίασμα, μύσος) was regarded as something material, to be cleansed by expiatory ceremonies, or it might even be personified (Furies, μητρὸς ἔγκοτοι κύνες [Æsch. *Choeph.* 1051]); but in time the doctrine was spiritualized. Xenophon (*Cyrop.* VIII. vii. 18) speaks of the fears that the souls of wronged persons bring upon murderers, and of the avenging spirits (παλαμναίους) which they cause to visit the unholy; while Euripides interprets the Furies of Æschylus as the stings of conscience (*Orestes*, 396).

Orphism introduced the doctrine that the soul was exiled from heaven because of sin, and that reunion could be achieved only by purification. In Homer the gods lead men to transgress, but Orphism taught that guilt arose from man himself. Abstinence and rites were the Orphic means of cleansing; but, however degrading this teaching might be in unscrupulous hands (Plato, *Rep.* ii. 364 E), it was possible to give it a spiritual interpretation (νηστεῦσαι κακότητος [Empedocles, 406, ed. Karsten]), and it most certainly helped to foster a sense of sin. The doctrine of ὁμοίωσις (becoming like unto God) is Orphic in origin, and gave to the world an ideal which increased in moral value as the idea of the Divine nature was purified and ennobled. According to Orphism, man was good and bad, Divine and human. The realization of man's dual nature must have tended to develop the individual conscience. In the Pythagorean sect, which owed much to Orphism, examination of the conscience was enjoined (according to C. Martha, *Études morales sur l'antiquité*, 1883) from early times, and in the *Hippolytus* of Euripides we have an Orphic who is horrified at the suggestion to commit a sexual offence. In the history of morals the idea of physical impurity generally precedes, and leads up to, the conception of a guilty soul.

8. Morality and the human heart.—Whatever the origin may have been, the 5th cent. witnessed the development of the idea that the human soul (ψυχή, φύσις, φρήν, νοῦς) is the supreme judge in the sphere of morality. The mere fact that philosophers like Xenophanes criticized the Homeric theology on moral grounds, shows that they regarded human nature as superior to religious tradition. This thought is specially prominent in the plays of Euripides. The *Ion* is an angry protest of the human soul against a conscienceless god who ravishes maids and leaves them to their shame (*Ion*, 892; cf. 880). The heart of man is considered by Euripides to be the seat—possibly the source—of virtue and of vice. Chastity is said to reside in the human φύσις (*Bacchæ*, 314, 315, *Hipp.* 79, *Tro.* 987, 988); Theonoë (*Hel.* 1002, 1003) has a 'mighty shrine of righteousness' in her φύσις; the unhappy Phædra exclaims, 'My hands are pure; the stain is on my soul' (*Hipp.* 317). Conscience the lawgiver and conscience the accuser are both manifest in these dramas. The countryman in the *Electra* is too honourable to consummate the marriage which has been forced upon Electra; Macaria goes voluntarily and readily to an awful death in order to save her kindred; Orestes is tormented by the consciousness of matricide. Like many other men of a sensitive moral nature, Euripides is painfully aware that the times are out of joint; oaths are no longer sacred, and αἰδώς has vanished from the earth (*Medea*, 439). This dramatist, perhaps more than his great predecessors, admired the beauty of self-sacrifice; Alcestis and Macaria are worthy successors to Prometheus and Antigone.

The Greek of the 5th cent. was thus fully aware of the working of conscience, and he began to use special words to describe it. These laid stress, not upon the emotion which follows a judgment of conscience, but upon the intellectual character of that judgment. One word is σύννοια, 'deep thought' (Eurip. *And.* 805), which does not appear to have become popular in the moral sense. Another is σύνεσις, 'understanding,' used by Euripides to describe the remorse of Orestes (*Or.* 396), by Menander (fr. incert. 86, Meineke), who says that 'conscience doth make cowards,' and by Polybius (XVIII. xxvi. 13). The last passage is to this effect: 'There is no more terrible witness, or more formidable accuser, than the conscience that dwells in each man's soul.' But the most

common term is the verb *σύνοιδα*, with its participial substantive *τὸ συνειδός*, meaning either (*a*) 'to be cognizant,' or (*b*) 'to share in the knowledge of another.' This verb expresses at once the intellectual character of a judgment of conscience and the dual nature of human personality. It is impossible to decide when the term first acquired its moral meaning, but it is used of a clear conscience by Sophocles (*ap.* Stob. *Flor.* xxiv. 6) and (with a negative) by Plato (*Rep.* 331 A, *τῷ μηδὲν ἑαυτῷ ἄδικον ξυνειδότι ἡδεῖα ἐλπίς*), and of a guilty conscience by Euripides (*Or.* 396) and by Aristophanes (*Wasps*, 999, *Thesm.* 477). Stobæus has collected a number of passages dealing with *τὸ συνειδός* in his *Florilegium*, ch. xxiv., and it is interesting to note that he attributes to Pythagoras an exhortation 'to feel shame most of all before oneself,' and the statement that conscience deals more cruel blows than the lash. We are reminded that the Pythagoreans laid stress upon self-examination, not as an exercise of memory, but as a moral discipline.

One other word for conscience may be noted here. A scruple is sometimes called *ἐνθύμιον*, 'something lying heavy on the heart' (Herod. viii. 54; Thuc. vii. 50; Antipho, *Tetral.* ii. 1, 2, 4, 9; Soph. *Œd. Tyr.* 739; Eurip. *Her. Fur.* 722).

9. Shame before the self.—A clearer distinction now begins to be drawn between the shame which results from fear of punishment or disgrace, and the shame which accompanies loss of self-respect. Democritus, a profound moralist without an ethical system, looks for happiness in serenity of soul (fr. 9–11, ed. Natorp). Sin should be avoided, not through fear, but because it *ought* to be avoided (*διὰ τὸ δέον*, fr. 45). Even when alone, a man ought not to do or say anything base. He should be ashamed before himself rather than before others (fr. 42). He should no more do evil when nobody will learn about it than when everybody will do so; it is best to reverence oneself (*ἑαυτὸν μάλιστα αἰδεῖσθαι*, fr. 43). The Attic orators not only emphasize the uneasiness of conscience resulting from the fear of discovery, but also extol the life that is free from self-reproach, although the two ideas are sometimes combined. Antipho (*Tetral.* i. 3, 3) mentions as moral checks both fear (*φόβος*) and dread of sin (*ἀδικία*), and he thinks that a jury will be influenced by respect for 'the gods, piety (*τοῦ εὐσεβοῦς*), and themselves' (*Or.* vi. 3, cf. also vi. 1). Isocrates (*Nic.* 39 A) bids us envy not the rich, but those conscious of no sin. Fear of punishment or of disgrace may be implied here, but a clearer note is sounded in [Isocrates] 5 B: 'Never expect to hide a sin. Even if others learn nothing of it, you will be conscious of it yourself.' Lysias (*Or.* xix. 59) speaks of one who thought that a good man ought to help his friends, even though nobody should know about it. In the pseudo-Demosthenic speech against Aristogiton, the writer says (780) that 'there are altars of justice, discipline, and honour (*αἰδοῦς*) among all men; the fairest and holiest are in the soul and nature of the individual.' Socrates is made in the Xenophontic *Apology* (§ 5) to avow that in the past he has enjoyed the most pleasant possession a man can have, the consciousness that his life has always been holy and just (cf. also Xen. *Apol.* § 24, and Stob. *Flor.* xxiv. 13). Finally, a fragment of the comic poet Diphilus (*ap.* Stob. xxiv. 1) denies that a man who is not ashamed before himself when he has done wrong can be ashamed before others who are ignorant of it.

10. Philosophy and conscience.—It has been maintained, and as energetically denied, that this clearer realization of the shamefulness of sin is to be attributed to the work of the philosophers. Both seem to have been due to the same cause, namely, the decay of old beliefs, but it is perhaps unreasonable to deny a real, though indefinite, influence to philosophic ethics. It should be noticed, however, that *σύνοιδα* and *τὸ συνειδός* are popular, not philosophic, expressions.

There are plenty of examples throughout the course of Greek literature and Greek history of the individual deliberately following the dictates of his better self, but such acts are rarely associated with the words employed to designate 'conscience.' The latter (*τὸ συνειδός*, etc.) generally refer, not to the law-making conscience, but to an adverse decision of the judging conscience, and to the self-dissatisfaction which accompanies it. Now, it was with the enlightenment of morality that Greek ethical philosophy chiefly concerned itself. As a rule it passed over the shame that accompanies wrong-doing, and never tried to make it the highest moral motive. Convinced that vice is ignorance, both Socrates and Plato devoted their lives to educating the moral sense; and Plato constantly insists that mere conscientiousness, like that, for example, of Euthyphro, is not sufficient. But if sin is nothing more than a mistaken notion of what is good, no place is left for shame and remorse. Carried to its logical conclusion, the doctrine denies either the existence or the reasonableness of moral praise and moral blame. Socrates trusted to reason to guide him aright in moral questions, and doubtless fathered any scruples he might occasionally feel on his *δαιμόνιον*—probably a hallucination of the sense of hearing.

(1) *Plato.*—Plato regarded as true morality only that which springs from knowledge of the idea of good. Morality founded on fear he continually disparages, especially if the fear be that of public opinion (cf. *Crito*, 47 C, *Phædo*, 82 A B, and *Euthyphro*, 12 C), though he admitted that the majority of men were incapable of 'philosophic' virtue, and should be compelled to obey, not the fluctuating general conscience, but the dictates of philosophic rulers (*Rep.* 519, 520). Consequently, *αἰδώς* is for the many rather than for the few, and it and fear form the two warders of the ideal State (*Rep.* 465 B). Towards the end of his life, Plato emphasized more the value of awe and reverence. Every legislator, he says in the *Laws* (647 A), will hold moral fear in high honour: fear, law, and true reason are the principles that keep the appetites in check (783 A); strong public opinion restrains a man from incest, the fear of committing which, even unknowingly, makes a man ready to kill himself (Œdipus, Macareus, 838 C). But what Plato valued was the fear that checks crime, not the shame that follows it, and he therefore set little store by the popular conception of *τὸ συνειδός*; it is the old man Cephalus in the *Republic*, the representative of the old morality, who is made to sound the praises of a 'conscience void of offence,' and to enlarge on the terrors of the wicked.

Conscience the lawgiver, though working in the hearts of men, was as yet but feebly apprehended as an idea, and herein the work of Plato bore fruit. The keynote of his ethical philosophy is that the really virtuous man must know what the good is, *i.e.* must have an educated morality. And when a man knows what virtue is, he cannot help acting virtuously; for no one is voluntarily wicked. Sin is a disease of the soul (*Gorgias*, 479 B), and he who sees this will submit to anything, even to death, to rid himself of the plague. Even though the gods and men are unaware who is righteous and who is not, righteousness accompanied by all the punishments of sin is better than unrighteousness accompanied by all the rewards of virtue (*Rep.* 366 D E). Plato felt that the enlightened soul, brought face to face with sin in all its nakedness, would turn from it in disgust.

(2) *Aristotle.*—Aristotle, taking the end of man to be a full and virtuous life, the result of habituation and practical wisdom, never discusses conscience. The first principles of the science of human conduct, he thought, were perceived immediately, by a kind of intuition (*αἴσθησις*, *Ethics*, 1142 a). He values highly self-respect, and the beauty and desirableness of virtuous actions; *αἰδώς* he regards sometimes as modesty, befitting only the young

(1128 b), sometimes as a shrinking from the ugliness of sin (1116 a, 1179 b). Emphasizing as much as Plato the necessity of an enlightened intelligence for truly virtuous conduct, Aristotle did good service by insisting (again with Plato, *Laws*, 653 B) upon the importance of training youth by habituation to love good and to hate evil (*Ethics*, 1104 b).

(3) *Stoics.*—It has been held that the Stoics, with their individualism, their doctrine of the self-sufficiency of man, their neglect of public opinion, their elaboration of the idea of duty (προσῆκον, κατόρθωμα), and their exhortations to live a life according to the Divine reason implanted in the heart of man, did much to develop the notion of conscience. Some believe that they coined the word συνείδησις, but this is more than unlikely. By συνείδησις conscience is described in the (of course apocryphal) sayings of Bias and Periander recorded by Stobæus (*Flor.* xxiv. 11, 12), in Wis 17[11], in the NT, in Diodorus (iv. 65. 7: διὰ τὴν συνείδησιν τοῦ μύσους εἰς μανίαν περιέστη), in Lucian (*Amores*, 49), and in the proverbs assigned to Menander (*Monosticha*, 654: conscience is a god to all mortals). Chrysippus (Diog. Laert. vii. 85) used the word, but he meant, not conscience, but consciousness. Even the later Stoic writers, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, though they constantly mention the action of conscience, seem purposely to avoid the word συνείδησις. The fact is that all the Greek words for 'conscience' look, with scarcely an exception, to conscience the judge, and are associated with shame. Plutarch, in his famous description of conscience (*Moralia*, 476 F), says, in wonderfully modern language, that it wounds and pricks the soul. Thought, which softens other pains, only increases this; the guilty mind punishes itself. The Greeks, familiar as they were with the working of conscience the legislator, had no special word to describe it, although its emotional side is hinted at in αἰδώς. Now, the Stoics attributed 'absence of emotion' (ἀπάθεια) to their wise man; yet, though he would not entertain fear of disgrace (Diog. Laert. vii. 112, 116), he would feel αἰδώς. It was the legislating conscience, ὀρθὸς λόγος, that the Stoics emphasized; but, while Roman Stoicism came to express this by *conscientia*, among the Greeks it had no generally recognized name.

(4) *Epicureans.*—Perhaps it was the Epicureans who developed the idea of a guilty conscience, and this would account for the Stoics avoiding the term συνείδησις. At any rate, Epicurus held that sin is an evil only because of the fear of discovery (Diog. Laert. x. 151), and a graphic description of conscience the accuser is to be found in the poems of the Epicurean Lucretius (*de Rer. Nat.* iii. 1014–1023, cf. iv. 1135). Probably, however, philosophy, whether Stoic or Epicurean, had less influence than the facts of moral experience, which were more and more cosciously realized by the popular mind.

II. **Summary.** — From the earliest times the Greeks had terms referring to the emotional side of conscience in most of its aspects. From the end of the 5th cent. σύνεσις and σύνοιδα were used to denote the intellectual aspect of conscience the judge. Orphism had emphasized the dual nature of human personality, while the gradual decay of the State religion and of State discipline, along with the intellectual movements of the 5th cent., forced men to realize that they had a judge in their own hearts. The idea, present from the first, that a man should feel shame before himself grew clearer; the hatefulness of sin was more acknowledged, and is urged with unsurpassed moral force in the writings of Plato. From the first it was felt that man owes allegiance to his better self; that he must obey, not only the traditional code, but the dictates of an inner law. Hinted at occasionally in αἰδώς, this feeling was not crystallized into a special term; but the philosophers laid stress upon educating this better self, and thereby enlightening morality. Of the individualistic schools, the Stoics insisted on obedience to an inner law of reason, the Epicureans on the fears that follow wrong-doing. The growth of the idea of conscience was due to the development of the people; philosophy merely tried to inspire higher ideals by which conscience might judge. As the notion of conscience developed, morality appears to have declined. The relaxation of the bonds of external discipline, while it caused the few to acknowledge an inner judge and lawgiver, allowed the many to sink into superstition and moral degradation.

It should be noticed in conclusion that among the Greeks conscience was as yet scarcely connected with religion. The Christian's conscience accuses the sinner before God; the Greek's conscience accused him before himself. Cf. general art. CONSCIENCE.

II. *ROMAN.*—The Greeks, although they had many words denoting the emotions connected with moral self-criticism, failed to bring into common use any term summing up all their experience of the action of conscience; the Romans, richer in words denoting obligation, crystallized into *conscientia* the different aspects of conscience soon after Stoic teaching began to be effective.

1. **Common moral terms.**—*Pietas*, one of the commonest moral terms, signifies a sense of duty, not only towards the gods (Cicero, *de Nat. Deor.* i. 115, *Top.* 90), but also towards country, parents, and friends. It combines the notions of loyalty, respect, and (sometimes) affection. *Fides* (faithfulness, trustworthiness), 'the foundation of justice' (Cic. *de Off.* i. 23), was thought to be a virtue peculiarly characteristic of the early Romans. It is combined with *pudor* and *probitas* in Cicero (*de Rep.* iii. 28), and moralists insisted that it meant loyalty to intention rather than to the spoken word (*de Off.* i. 40). The formula *ex animi sententia* was used of conscientious fulfilment of an oath, while *pudor* denoted the shame which prevents or follows a violation of the moral law. But in no term is the notion of conscience more clearly implied than in *religio*. Originally used of a feeling of awe towards an unknown object, it came to mean a scruple as to the proper means of propitiating a divinity. Cicero distinguishes it from *superstitio*; and though, when applied to the worship of the gods, it contains little moral meaning, when used metaphorically it often denotes or implies the action of conscience. Thus Cicero combines it with *auctoritas*, *æquitas*, *fides*, and *timor* in describing the character of certain witnesses, and it often denotes conscientious carrying out of a duty (*ad Fam.* xi. 29, *pro Font.* xiv. [40], *pro Roscio Com.* xv. [45]; Livy, xxiii. 11). The remorse caused by conscience is not infrequently described by such phrases as *morsus animi* (Livy, vi. 34), *tormenta pectoris* (Tac. *Ann.* vi. 6), and *flagella mentis* (Quint. *Declam.* xii. 28; cf. Juv. xiii. 194, 195).

2. **Obligation to external, and to internal, law.** —In early times obligation was felt to an external moral law; it was only when the Republic was tottering to its fall, and the State religion ceased to hold the hearts and minds of men, that the inner voice of conscience was heard more clearly. We cannot trace the development of the idea so well as in the case of Greece, because, with the exception of Plautus and Terence (who adapted or translated Greek originals), there is very little Latin literature of earlier date than the 1st cent. B.C. But it cannot be doubted that much of the change was due to the teaching of the Stoics, especially of Posidonius and Panætius, who exhorted men to follow the deity within them, *i.e.* the Divine reason, of which a portion has been given to each

individual. The conception of this deity (δαίμων), this fragment of the Divine mind, this guide and protector, must have helped to develop the notion of conscience; indeed, Epictetus (fr. 97) speaks of God handing men over to be guarded by 'their innate conscience.' Cicero, in speaking of the sanctity of an oath, warns us (*de Off.* iii. 44) that he who takes an oath summons as witness God, 'that is, his own mind'; and the same writer is the first to employ the noun *conscientia* (*pro Roscio Am.* 67).

The verb *conscire* occurs only once (Hor. *Ep.* I. i. 61), and is there used (with a negative) of a clear conscience. *Conscius* is often used without any moral meaning, but once in Plautus (*Most.* 544) *animus conscius* has the sense of a guilty conscience; this phrase and *mens conscia* are occasionally found with the same meaning in later writers (Lucret. iii. 1018, iv. 1135; Ovid, *Fasti*, i. 485; Sallust, *Cat.* 14). Ovid (*Fasti*, iv. 311) uses *conscia mens recti* of a clear conscience that laughs at slander; but in Virgil (*Aen.* i. 604), *mens sibi conscia recti* probably refers to conscience the guide, which leads men to differentiate between right and wrong.

In the sense of 'consciousness,' *conscientia* is rare, but it is exceedingly common in most writers after Cicero with the meaning 'conscience.' The first time it occurs it is joined to *animi* (Cic. *pro Roscio Am.* 67, 'conscientiae animi terrent'—the writer's rationalistic interpretation of the Furies), and, as Mulder remarks (*De conscientiæ notione*, p. 97 f.), the expressions *animi conscientia*, *mentis conscientia* (the latter in Cic. *pro Cluent.* 159) are intermediate between the vague *pectus*, *animus*, *mens*, on the one hand, and plain *conscientia* with its full moral meaning on the other.

From Cicero onwards the idea of conscience grows more distinct and more full of meaning. It is regarded as Divine (Cic. *Parad.* iv. 29); it accuses and judges (Livy, xxxiii. 28; Tac. *Hist.* iv. 72; Sen. *de Ben.* vi. 42); it is a witness (Sen. *Ep.* 43; Quint. *Inst. Or.* v. xi. 41; Juv. xiii. 198). *Bona conscientia*, *mala conscientia*, 'clear conscience,' 'guilty conscience,' are terms which do not appear to be used by Cicero, but are common enough in Seneca and other later writers. But *conscientia* (with a genitive case added) not infrequently occurs in Cicero with the meaning of 'a clear conscience,' which he calls 'fruit' (*Phil.* ii. 114), 'a reward' (*de Rep.* vi. 8), 'a joy' (*ad Fam.* v. 7), and 'a comfort' (*ib.* vi. 6, 12).

3. Conscience the lawgiver valued as a guide.—The Stoic teaching, insisting as it did upon obedience to the Divine reason in the heart, led men not merely to fear conscience, but to value it highly as a director of life. Cicero recognizes conscience as a lawgiver (*ad Att.* xiii. 20), and so does the younger Pliny (*Ep.* i. 22), while the idea is especially common in Seneca. Conscience, from Cicero onwards, is considered a better guide than public opinion (Cic. *de Fin.* ii. 71, *ad Att.* xii. 28; Livy, xxxiii. 28; Pliny, *Ep.* i. 8, iii. 20; Sen. *de Ben.* vi. 42), though it is difficult to decide whether these are cases of the judging conscience or of the legislating conscience; indeed, it is impossible to keep these quite distinct, as a judgment on a past act is, of course, a guide to future conduct.

4. Summary.—Conscience, then, was always acting, but at first it took the form of a strong feeling of obligation to an external moral law that was sanctioned by tradition, religion, and the State. As the influence of these grew weaker, men transferred their allegiance to their own hearts, and realized that they had within them an accuser, a judge, and a guide. The Stoic doctrine of a Divine reason immanent in each individual was a most powerful aid to a clearer conception of conscience; the writings of Cicero and Seneca, who were both imbued with Stoicism, afford the best evidence of the way in which the notion of conscience developed.

The ethical terms used by the early Greeks emphasized chiefly the emotional side of conscience; those used by the early Romans laid stress on moral obligation. Among both peoples the development of the idea of conscience was due to the decay of the State religion and of the State discipline, and the consequent turning of men's thoughts inwards; but, whereas the Greek philosophers made little use of the popular term τὸ συνειδός, and devoted their energies to improving the moral ideal according to which conscience judges, the Roman Stoics appear to have adopted the term *conscientia*, and to have made it express far more than its Greek equivalent. The Greek word nearly always stands for a guilty conscience; the Latin word, although very often associated with guilt, not infrequently denotes moral self-satisfaction or the inner promptings of conscience the lawgiver. Neither word is associated with the State religion; but, while philosophic religion neglected τὸ συνειδός, *conscientia* was naturally used as an equivalent of the Stoic 'guardian,' the fragment of Divine reason implanted in the heart of each individual. Hence Christianity found in *conscientia* a term whose fuller meaning it could develop by its doctrine of the Holy Spirit accusing, exhorting, and 'leading into all truth.' But it should be noticed that the ancients made no attempt to analyze psychologically the conception of conscience, which remained to the last popular rather than philosophic, in spite of its adoption by Roman Stoicism.

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CONSCIENCE (Jewish).—Conscience is an essential element in the system of Jewish ethics. It is the motive power and the last arbiter for the moral rectitude of man; it is the judge, and at the same time the highest standard by which his actions in his relation to God and to his neighbours are measured. Conscientiousness in the fulfilment of duties is a moral heightening of the principle of duty, and is the necessary preparation for the virtues of mercy and love. The principle of righteousness which underlies conscience may be of a purely legal and ceremonial character, whereas conscience goes beyond simple legal forms, and springs from higher motives than those of obedience to the law and the performance of ceremonies. The motive force is a truer conception of the relation between man and God, and the acknowledgment of the principle that human perfection can be attained only by imitating, as far as human power allows, the ways of God. The 'hallowing of life' is the real object of all the laws, and still more so of the moral injunctions and acts of conscience which supplement them and assist in achieving the purpose of making the Jewish nation 'a kingdom of priests and an holy nation' (Ex 19⁶). More than once is the sanctification of life enunciated in the Pentateuch, and the reason given is 'because I am holy.' The holiness of God is the ultimate reason and explanation of the laws which would cause man, who had been formed

'in the image of God,' to reach a higher standard, and place him almost on a par with the angels (Ps 8^5). As explained by the Rabbis, the various instances recorded in the Bible of God's direct communion with the Patriarchs were intended to teach their descendants how to act. 'Just as God clothes the naked (Adam and Eve), so should man clothe the naked; just as God visits the sick (Abraham), so should man make it his duty to visit the sick; just as God buries the dead (Moses), so must man bury the dead; just as God comforts the mourners, so must man comfort the mourner' (*Gen. rabba*, viii., *Pirḳe R. Yehudah*, § 25); in fact, all acts of charity and benevolence, all those duties which a man is bound to perform, not in virtue of a direct command or a legal prescription, but prompted by his 'heart,' are to conform to the Divine standard and promote the hallowing of life—the sanctification of God's name. And all the blessings that follow from it—peace, happiness, charity, goodwill, love—make man approach the Divine. The seat of this higher conception of moral duty—self-imposed duty, not duty imposed from without—was placed in the 'heart,' which stands in Hebrew for mind, sentiment, feeling, conscience.[1] Hence 'a pure heart,' 'a clean heart,' as mentioned by the Psalmist, means a clean conscience, a pure mind, a noble conception of duty fulfilled without any other motive than the desire of self-sanctification.

In Jewish teaching, however, the legal and the purely ethical have never been really separated, but have been treated as concomitant principles. For, as remarked above, the justification and explanation of the former were sought in the latter, and both were to lead to the sanctification of life. Thus we read: 'And the heart of David smote him' (1 S 24^5). In Isaiah 58 these ethical principles are summed up in a masterly manner, and show us the workings of that spirit of holiness in the practical walks of life. The other books of the Prophets teem with denunciations against 'hardness of heart,' harsh treatment of widows, orphans, and slaves, and dishonest dealings with one's neighbour. Moral perfection is thus defined by the prophet Micah (6^8): 'He hath showed thee, O man, what is good; and what doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God?' 'To do justly' was the particular realm of the mind, the work of conscience for God's sake, the work assigned to 'the heart' (cf. Concordance, *s.v.* 'Heart'; and the expressions 'with all thy heart,' 'with the whole heart,' etc.).

These ethical principles and guides of life, in addition to the legal prescriptions, found terse expression in proverbs and maxims, saws of wise men, and teachings left by venerated persons—a kind of moral compendia like the Books of Proverbs and Ecclesiastes. The authors of some of the apocryphal books followed these examples, and the Books of Sirach and the Wisdom of Solomon, as well as Fourth Maccabees, are nothing other than such moral compendia. Direct reference to conscience we find in Sir 42^8 and Wis $17^{10\,(11)}$, which are in the spirit of Jewish ethical teaching. A special class of ethical literature starts from the same period, *i.e.* before the destruction of the Temple, and it has continued to our day—the literature of 'Testaments,' or ethical wills of some great personage. These circulated afterwards far and wide, and became recognized moral guides independent of the codes of laws which regulated the strictly formal mode of life. It would be out of place here to discuss the whole range of ethical teaching; hence we must limit ourselves to those

[1] As will be seen, there is no Hebrew word which corresponds entirely with 'conscience.'

passages that refer to 'conscience,' uprightness, moral responsibility, in the daily relations between man and man—references found scattered throughout these books. A brief survey of this branch of literature, however, is imperative for the historical sequence of such teachings, and in view of the fact that ethics had not been reduced to a system, or split up into sections differentiating the moral value of one principle as opposed to another. All stand on the same footing, and demand the same attention. There is no room for eclecticism in these collections. The oldest example is perhaps the *Testament of Tobias*, which emphasizes, as he had done in his lifetime, the moral duty of burying the dead—one of those pious duties and works of charity which the law does not prescribe, and neglect of which is not punishable by its letter, but whose fulfilment was a matter of conscience for every pious Jew. More important is the reference (To 14^{10}) to the *History of Achiacharus* (Ahiḳār), since recovered and restored to its place at the end of the Book of Tobit. This is a collection of wise maxims and guides to proper deeds and moral actions, though in the versions preserved it is more in the nature of worldly practical wisdom of not too elevated a type. Its interest lies also in another direction; the form of address, 'O my son,' etc., is repeated in a large number of treatises to be mentioned later on. Richer is the harvest yielded by the *Twelve Testaments*, in which apparently the very word 'conscience' occurs for the first time in Palestinian texts: Reub. 4^3 'Even until now my conscience causeth me anguish on account of my impiety' (cf. Charles, *ad loc.* p. 9). In other testaments the same idea occurs: Jud. 20^5, where the corresponding word is 'heart,' and similarly Gad 5^3. To this category of testamentary teaching the present writer would assign also the famous collection of the 'Fathers of the Synagogue,' called 'The Chapters' (*Pirḳe Aboth*) after they had been grouped together in chapters. They can only be properly understood as such testamentary injunctions, the last wills of the leading men of the Great Synagogue and their successors in the high position of spiritual guides and leaders of the people during the period of the Second Temple. The authors have been grouped chronologically, and these chains of ethical maxims served the purpose of being a chain of tradition. In reality they are the principal ethical teachings representing the ethical wills of those sages, and as wills they fall naturally into their place, whilst hitherto they had been a riddle. A few examples may suffice:

'Rabban Gamaliel, the son of R. Judah the Prince, said: "An excellent thing is the study of the Torah combined with moral discipline (*derekh ereṣ*), for the practice of both causes sin to be out of remembrance"' (ii. 2).[1]

'Hillel said: "Judge not thy neighbour until thou art come into his place"' (ii. 5). According to R. Eleazar, the good way to which a man should cleave is 'the possession of a good heart,' and the evil to be shunned, 'a wicked heart' (ii. 12, 13), where 'heart,' no doubt, is to be taken in the Biblical sense. 'R. Eliezer said: "Let the honour of thy friend be dear unto thee as thine own"' (ii. 14). 'R. Jose said: "Let the property of thy friend be dear to thee as thine own"' (ii. 16). Among those who have no share in the world to come, R. Eleazar the Muddaite places the man who puts his fellow-man to shame in public. It is the moral and not the legal sin which is to be shunned, and if committed it is to be expiated by 'repentance and good deeds,' as is often repeated here (iv. 15; cf. Taylor, *Sayings of the Jewish Fathers*[2], Cambridge, 1897, *ad loc.*).

Round this collection of maxims grew up a whole cycle of similar teachings, accretions, and additions from other sources, and examples drawn from the lives of other sages. It also was commented upon by the most prominent writers of subsequent ages. One of the oldest is a small collection known as the 'Work (or Story) of R.

[1] The phrase *derekh ereṣ* has hitherto been wrongly translated 'worldly business.' It can only mean, at least in this passage, 'moral discipline,' and one of the later compilations intended to serve as a 'moral guide' bears the title *Derekh ereṣ*.

Judah the Prince' (*Ma'aseh R. Yehudah ha-Nāsī*), and later on developed into the 'Chapters of R. Judah the Prince' (*Pirḳe di Rabbenu ha-Ḳaddosh*). Another is 'The Will of Eliezer the Great,' or 'The Ways of the Pious' (*Ṣavaath R. Eliezer ha-gadol*, or *Orḥoth Ṣaddiḳim*), agreeing in many points with the history of Achiacharus. It shows exactly the same development as other collections of maxims, apologues, and saws in universal literature, inasmuch as, to one portion, or to a small, old, and genuine section, other elements of a similar tendency are added. The names of the reputed authors vary, and a compilation ascribed originally to Talmudic authorities, *i.e.* Eliezer ben Hyrkanos, is then transferred to a much later Eliezer of the year 1050. The substance, however, is the same; and most of these collections merely repeat older materials, increased in later times by some similar maxims from other sources. The burden of the message of these collections is to seek the judge in one's own conscience, and to find the punishment for moral guilt in remorse of conscience, in the consciousness of a fall from a moral height, and in the desecration or profanation of the Sacred Name. In a much more elaborate manner the theme is enlarged upon in the 'Chapters *or* Maxims of R. Nathan' (*Aboth di R. N.*) of the 7th–8th cent., into which much of the accumulated matter had flowed; and in the book called *Derekh ereṣ*, 'Moral Guide' (of which two recensions have been preserved—'Major' and 'Minor'), and in the *Tanna dcbe Eliahu*, in which the prophet Elijah is the teacher. The feeling of inner responsibility for moral faults and the glory in conscientious performance of ethical deeds have found in this book a powerful, and at the same time an elevating, poetical expression. The way to shun sin, to lead a pious, modest, exemplary life, full of humility and charity, and to accomplish 'the duties of the heart' is here expounded in simple and withal dignified language. This book belongs still to the Talmudic period, and is certainly anterior to the 9th century.

But the postulates of ethical teaching were not limited to mere maxims, highly appreciated and honouring to those who had formulated them, but still of a purely theoretical value. On the contrary, as far as possible, they were introduced into the fabric of consistent legislation, and, though many of the acts in question were not indictable before the regular tribunal, the conscience and religious principles of the individual remaining the ultimate forum before which they could be brought, some of them at least were brought within the four corners of the Law, and were made offences amenable to its rigours. Starting from the prohibition of oppression, fraud, and violence against widows, orphans, and strangers (Ex $22^{21ff.}$, Lv 19^{33}), and, more especially, of fraud and overreaching in business transactions (Lv $25^{14.17}$ 'And if thou sell aught unto thy neighbour, or buy of thy neighbour's hand, ye shall not wrong one another'; 'And ye shall not wrong one another; but thou shalt fear thy God'), the Rabbis have extended the effects of these prohibitions very far, and have very clearly defined the principle of overreaching, and also established the rule that it applied to Jew and non-Jew alike. They have shown a high conception of moral duty and obligation, and have applied a lofty standard of moral rectitude in the interpretation of these commands, which are called 'subjects left to the discretion of the heart' (*Debārîm ha-mesurim la-leb*; the 'heart,' of course, stands for 'conscience'). The law is called *Ona'ah*, from the hypothetical root of the Heb. word *hōnāh* in the above Biblical passages. They have made this law very severe, and any deviation from its strict application makes the sale or purchase void. To take advantage in any way of favourable legal circumstances, or of ignorance, or of quibbles, is sufficient to annul the transaction.

Oppression by means of word alone and not by deed is considered even worse than overreaching in the matter of money (*Bab. meṣ.* 58*b*): 'If a man repents, he must not be reminded of his sins'; 'If a man is a proselyte, he must not be told of his heathen ancestry, for money can be restored, but spiritual agony can never be made good.' 'Nor is a man to ask for the price of an object unless he has the intention of buying,' for he is thereby deceiving the vendor, who is unable to read the man's heart (Mishn. *Bab. meṣ.* ch. iv.; see also Lampronti, *Paḥad Yiẓḥaḳ*, *s.v.* 'Ona'ah' [the whole of the Rabbinical literature on the question of overreaching, from the Mishna down to the 17th cent.]). 'If a man, under a flimsy pretext, withdraws from a bargain, they say: "May He who obtained redress (by punishment) from the men of the Flood and the men of the Dispersion (of Babel) be sure to obtain redress from (*i.e.* to punish) the man who does not keep his word"' (Mishn. *Bab. meṣ.* iv. 2). In addition to overreaching, the Sages also inveigh strongly against obtaining a good opinion under false pretences, which they call 'stealing a good opinion' (*Genebath Da'ath*): 'Of seven kinds of thieves, those who steal a good opinion [create a false impression in their favour] are the worst, for, if they could, they would attempt to deceive the Almighty' (Tosefta, *B. ḳamma*, vii.). 'He who deceives man by such devices is like unto him who attempts to deceive God' (*Kallah rab.* fol. 18*a*). 'Do not invite a man to dine with thee when thou knowest that he is not then inclined to eat'; 'one must not open a jar of oil or wine pretending to do it in honour of a guest, if it [has to be opened as it] is already sold to a customer, and thereby create a good opinion by false appearance of consideration, be it a Jew or a Gentile' (*Hullin*, 94*a*; *Shulḥan Arukh Hoshen Mishpat*, ch. 228; and Maimonides in his *Principles of Ethics*).

The reason for all these precepts is that they are inimical to the sanctification of life, and cause the defamation of the Divine Name, which are in the keeping of man's conscience, and left to the 'discretion of the heart.'

'A queen having lost her jewels, it was announced by royal proclamation that whoever should find and return them within thirty days would obtain a rich reward, but if after thirty days, he would be put to death. R. Samuel b. Sosarti, having found them, returned them after thirty days. When asked why he did so, as he was exposing himself to suffer capital punishment, he replied: "If I had returned the jewels within the thirty days, the people would have said that I had done so for the reward; I have therefore kept them till now, so as to show, even at the risk of severe punishment, that one is bound to return the property found even if it belonged to a Gentile"' (Jerus. Talm., *Bab. meṣ.* ch. ii.). Again, 'R. Shimeon b. Sheṭaḥ bought an ass from an Ishmaelite. When his pupils examined it more closely, they found a jewel hanging round its neck, and they said to him: "O master, it is a blessing from above, thou hast become rich!"; whereupon he replied: "I bought the ass and not the jewel," and he returned the jewel to the Ishmaelite owner' (*ib.*).

It would be easy to multiply examples and maxims of an ethical character from the Talmudic literature.

The Talmudic Sages coined a word for moral obligation which affords us a glimpse into the working of their mind. They use the verb *ḥayyab*, from the Bibl. root *ḥob*, which means 'material debt,' and employ it to designate man's moral 'indebtedness,' his moral 'obligation,' which he must fulfil, lest by neglect he become 'guilty.' The moral duty stands at least on a par with his legal obligations, and most of the ethical duties mentioned in the Talmud are regularly introduced by the formula *ḥayyab ādām*, 'a man is bound' (of course by moral conscience) to do this or that. This formula has since become stereotyped, and is never used in connexion with legal commandments.

In this ethical Haggada the material is not arranged according to any system, starting, as it were, from the fundamental principle of the love of God or of His Unity, and then deducing from it those secondary principles which form the subject of a moral life. The teaching was of a purely practical nature; the people did not care to follow it up to its theoretical beginnings. The Bible set the example. There also the laws and commandments are not arranged in any systematic order, and some of the fundamental principles are placed next to matters of relatively minor importance. At the end of the 9th cent., however, a great change took place. Under the influence, indirectly

of Greek, and directly of Arabic, philosophic speculations, the Jews began to develop systems of religious philosophy in which special attention was often paid to the ethical side of the Jewish faith. Whilst, in the older period of Hellenism, Jewish thinkers were influenced by Plato and the Stoa, such as Philo and the author of the pseudo-Josephus 'On the Rule of the Intellect,' and were more or less guided by allegorical interpretations of the Bible, the philosophers of later times were mostly under the influence of Aristotle and his Arabic commentators, such as al-Fārābī († 950), Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna, † 1038), Ghazālī († 1111), and Ibn Rushd (Averroës, † 1198), while the purely theological speculation of the adherents of the *Kalām* (the Mutakallimun) also found followers among the Jews.

Before referring to the Jewish philosophers, it is of interest to mention a fact hitherto entirely ignored in connexion with the dissemination of their moral teachings. Such collections of maxims as are mentioned above were also put into verse, and formed terse epigrams or long didactic poems —a form better adapted to render them popular, for the masses do not care for historical or theoretical investigations, and still less for philosophical justifications of moral conduct. Fragments of the ancient saws of Ben Sira were then collected, and other collections of a similar nature were made. It is owing to this tendency that about that period (9th–10th cent.) the Book of Sirach was re-translated into Hebrew, as the language of the newly discovered version testifies. It is the period of 'Achiacharus' in its modern recension (Luḳman, etc.). A century later no less a person than the last of the great *Gĕonîm* of Babylon, Hai (940–1039), wrote his rhymed didactical poem *Mūsar Haskel*—also a kind of moral *vade-mecum* adapted to the understanding of the people, and probably taught in the schools and otherwise learnt by heart. It agrees also with the 'will' of Eleazar, Achiacharus, etc. A few examples must suffice.

'My son, my first word is: Fear the Lord; and with each of thy deeds give praise unto Him' (vv. 1. 3). 'Forgive the sin and transgression of thy neighbour, and be ready to accept repentance and regret.' 'Be not treacherous or seek strife, and foster not rebellion' (vv. 75 ff.). 'When thou hearest the defamation of thy neighbour, cover it up and pretend not to have heard it' (vv. 88–89). 'Wisdom is to walk in the path of faithfulness and of the fear of God; and true understanding (character) is to avoid evil.' 'Be an (honest) judge among thy people' (vv. 114 ff.). 'In all thy transactions choose righteousness; have pity on the poor and miserable, and appoint an adviser and admonisher to thy soul' (vv. 135 ff.). 'Let thy heart (mind) beware of pride (proud insolence)' (168). 'Do not say to thy neighbour, Come to-morrow, when thou canst give to-day; give and do not tarry.' 'Judge thyself as thou wouldst judge others' (176).

His contemporary Samuel Ha-Nagid imitated Hai in Spain, in his *Ben Ḳoheleth* ('Son of Ecclesiastes'). On other didactic poems we need not dwell.

To return to the Jewish philosophers, we note that, though they were all bent on finding in Judaism the highest expression of Divine truth, and aimed at leading to the highest good, yet they differed in their definition of the *summum bonum* and in the means of attaining it. To cultivate all the virtues was the road which led to the knowledge of God, and in this knowledge was to be found the ultimate goal of human perfection, *i.e.* nearness to God. Hence sometimes the intellect and moral conscience were not clearly distinguished from one another. This is not the place to discuss the various systems of ethics evolved by these Jewish philosophers. It may suffice to point out that every system of thought among Arabs and mediæval Scholastics is to be found among the Jews. Of those thinkers some—like Saadya, Gabirol, Ibn Zaddiḳ, and Maimonides—are more rationalistic, assigning to the knowledge of God and to Wisdom the highest potentiality for good, and considering that the highest aim is to be attained by moderation, by the rule of the intellect over the actions and thoughts of man, while others incline more to the mystical side. To the latter category belongs Beḥay, the first philosopher to write a special work on the 'Duties of the Heart' (such is the title of the book, *Ḥoboth ha-Lebaboth*). He recognizes human conscience as the last arbiter and the true inward prompter and guide in all moral actions which lie outside the specifically legal injunctions. He lays special stress on the elevating and purifying influence of moral consciousness, and therefore leads up to a kind of religious asceticism or Quietism, by recommending retirement from life, abstinence, and prayer as means for attaining perfection. Without being morbid, he exhibits a high moral sensitiveness, and has had a lasting influence upon succeeding generations. One can trace his influence especially in a whole series of subsequent writings.

These philosophical writings, being almost all composed in Arabic, had to be first translated into Hebrew, and only then could they gain a wider circulation. The writings of Saadya thus reached France and Central Europe, through the medium of the Hebrew anonymous translation which was used by Berechyah ha-Naḳdan (second half of 12th cent.) in his two ethical compilations—the 'Compendium' and the 'Refiner' (*Ḥibbur* and *Maṣref*, ed. H. Gollancz, London, 1902). He eliminated the entire speculative part, and retained only the ethical, which he augmented with excerpts from the writings of Ibn Gabirol, Beḥay, and Nissim.

Of sin and repentance he says: 'From the passage Hos 14[1f.] "Return, for thou hast stumbled," we learn that we should have an inward regret at our guilt, and that we should reflect that our sins have proved unto us a wretched stumbling-block' (p. 71, ed. Gollancz). He speaks most emphatically of the 'duties of the heart.' All action rests upon the heart's intention and upon the secret thoughts; their study must necessarily precede the study of the physical, practical performance of the commandments. And he goes on to relate the following: 'A pious man once said to his disciples, "If you had no sins whatever, I should be afraid lest you had something worse than sins." And they asked, "What can be worse than sins?" He answered: "Insolent pride, for it is written, Every one that is proud in heart is an abomination unto the Lord"' (Pr. 16[5]) (ch. cxxii. p. 113 [Heb.]). Very beautiful is the chapter devoted to 'the heart' (ch. iii. in the *Maṣref*), in which the author has skilfully collected verses of the Bible, teachings of the Sages, and philosophical speculations, to show that Reason, Law, and Tradition demand of a man the performance of those actions by which human perfection can be attained, and that man must be guided by an enlightened understanding and a pure heart, *i.e.* by pure conscience.

Of the same way of thinking as Beḥay was Abraham b. Ḥiyah (middle of 12th cent.), although he was more emphatic about fasting and repentance to assuage the pangs of stricken conscience, and to serve as the means of avoiding sin. Like Beḥay, he shows points of contact with the teaching of Ghazālī and of the *Ṣūfīs* (the pure brethren). Of the Intellectuals, or, better, of those who derive all the moral virtues—charity, piety, energy, loving-kindness, love of God, moral rectitude, etc. —from the knowledge of God, and seek the road to that knowledge in the 'middle way,' the most prominent is Maimonides. He enunciates his views in his commentary on the 'Chapters of the Fathers,' in the chapters on the 'Knowledge of God' in his great Compendium of the Law, in his 'Guide of the Perplexed,' and in other writings. The problem which agitated the philosophers of that time, and, one may add, the philosophers of religion at all times, was that of human free will, with the concomitant problem of reward and punishment, of virtue and vice, of human perfection and debasement. He decides unhesitatingly, in accordance with the general consensus of Jewish opinion, that man is a free agent in all his moral actions. Man's soul is the seat of know-

ledge, and from it alone emanates the impulse to action or inaction (Introd. to *Aboth*, ch. viii.). It is his moral conscience which causes reward or punishment for deeds which are neither commanded by the Divine legislation nor forbidden by it (*Guide*, iii. 17, fifth theory). In ch. liii. Maimonides defines the meaning of the Heb. words *ḥesed* ('loving-kindness'), *mishpāṭ* ('judgment'), and *ṣĕdāḳāh* ('righteousness'), and says of the last:

'The term *ṣĕdāḳāh* is derived from *ṣedeḳ*, "righteousness." It denotes the act of giving every one his due, and of showing kindness to every being according as it deserves. In Scripture, however, the expression *ṣĕdāḳāh* is not used in the first sense, and does not apply to the payment of what we owe to others. When we, therefore, give the hired labourer his wages, or pay a debt, we do not perform an act of *ṣĕdāḳāh*. But we do perform an act of *ṣĕdāḳāh* when we fulfil those duties towards our fellow-men which our moral conscience imposes upon us, *e.g.* when we heal the wound of the sufferer.' And again: '*ṣĕdāḳāh* is a kindness prompted by moral conscience, and is a means for attaining perfection of the soul.'

He also insists on the harmony between good action and good thought: in the exercise of human free will the good must be sought for its own sake; and the evil must be shunned because of its inherent wickedness, not out of fear of punishment or in the expectation of reward (Com. to *Aboth*, i. 3, on the passage: 'Be like servants who minister to their master without the condition of receiving a reward'). He rebukes men who, though they do not possess a certain virtue, yet, appreciating its perfection,

'sometimes desire to make others believe that they possess that virtue. Thus people, *e.g.*, adorn themselves with the poems of others, and publish them as their own productions. Also in various branches of science, ambitious yet lazy men appropriate the opinions expressed by other persons, and boast of them that they have originated these notions' (*Guide*, ii. 40).

And he condemns men who seek honour at the expense of others and spread insinuations and slanderous statements (*Hilch. Teshubah*, iv. 4). He is no less emphatic in his condemnation of those who try to overreach Jew or Gentile, or create a false opinion in their favour. Such men are an abomination before the Lord,[1] for the aim and object of a moral life is to approach the Divine.

'Having acquired the true knowledge of God, the knowledge of His Providence, and of the manner in which it influences His creatures in their productions and continued existence, he (*i.e.* man) will then be determined always to seek loving-kindness, righteousness, and judgment, and thus imitate the ways of God' (*Guide*, iii. 54, *ad fin.*; cf. Jer $9^{13f.}$). With this sentence Maimonides concludes his *Guide*.

The next period, which commences almost with the close of the philosophical era at the end of the 13th cent., shows the deep impress of those two streams of thought reaching down from the past. The ethical and the philosophical, the mystical and the rationalistic, the purely practical and the deeply spiritual, moral, and unselfish teaching were caught up in one current and gathered into one stream (cf. Berechyah, above). A new word is used to denote this new ethical literature—*Mūsar*, 'Moral Discipline,' foreshadowed in Hai's poem, and occurring already in the Proverbs as 'moral teaching' (1^2, cf. 4^{13} 5^{12} etc.). Henceforward it denotes 'piety,' 'religious-moral life,' embracing the legal in a narrower and the ethical in the largest sense. The works belonging to this period inculcate the practice of virtue, honesty, piety, resignation, charity, love of one's neighbour, and saintliness of life. There is a psychological reason for the abundance of such books from the 13th cent. onwards. It was the time of the direst persecution of the Jews in many lands, and, unless the Sages and teachers of those generations had fortified the moral courage of the harassed and unfortunate people, every trace of consciousness of the moral duties of man would have been obliterated. The sense of sin and chastisement, of Divine visitation justified by inward backsliding, was deepened by these books of *Mūsar*, in which the best teaching of the past was placed before the readers in as simple a language as could be commanded. Each author, following the bent of his own inclination, laid stress now on one side of the moral life, now on the other. Thus, some would exhort to fasting and ascetic practices; others to works of unselfish love of God and men; others would teach wisdom, moderation, patience, and freedom from passion; but all were united in the conviction that human life is worthily lived only when it is placed in the service of God, for the benefit of mankind, and for the glorification of His name. A man's conscience must be pure, and every one is equally responsible for thought as for deed, whether prescribed by the Law or left to the discretion of one's own heart, for God sees everything, and nothing is hidden from Him. We are, and ought to be, the judges of our actions, and to us is left free choice to decide which way to turn.

What lends special importance to this *Mūsar* literature is the fact that most of these books of *Mūsar* were translated at an early date into the vernacular language for the benefit and instruction of the middle-class Jews, who were not sufficiently acquainted with the Hebrew to read them in the original language. These books became the literature *par excellence* of Jewish women; they were translated into the Jewish-German and the Jewish-Spanish languages, and parts also into Arabic and Persian, thus becoming real 'household treasures.' Shabbethai Bass gives a list of no fewer than 120 such books in his bibliography (*Sifthei Yeshenim*, printed in the year 1680, fol. 15*a*), exclusive of the numerous commentaries on the 'Chapters of the Fathers' (*ib.* fol. 18*a*). A few of the more prominent may be mentioned, for, besides reminiscences of, and direct quotations from, the older literature, the authors have added some more instructions—personal expressions of their own conceptions of the duty and moral obligation incumbent on every Jew. Here, of course, the notions of the fear of God and the love of God prevail, for everything must be done out of that love and for the sake of hallowing His name by moral actions, and thereby sanctifying human life.

Naḥmanides, in 1267, writes to his son from Acco a 'moral epistle,' in which he enjoins, among other things, that he be modest and humble: 'When thou speakest, bend thy head and lift up thine heart (*sursum corda!*), and speak quietly, and consider every man whom thou addressest as being greater than thou art. If he be poor and thou rich, or thou a greater scholar than he is, then think that thou art more full of guilt; or, if he be sinning, that he is doing it out of ignorance, unintentionally, and not deliberately. In all thy deeds and thoughts remember Him of whom it is said that His glory filleth the world.'

Jonah of Gerona († 1263), known as the *Ḥasid* and *Ḳaddosh*, *i.e.* Martyr, wrote, in the strain of Beḥay, his famous *Sha'arei Teshubah*, 'Gates of Repentance,' and *Sefer ha-Yir'ah*, 'Book of the Fear of God,' where the feeling of consciousness of the gravity of sin and the duty of repentance are expounded in a masterly manner. He says: 'There are people who believe that, if you do not transgress any of the written laws, you cannot commit sin, for it is connected with active work. And yet there is no greater loss for the soul than to imagine that purity consists only in not having gone the way of active sin, and not also in the neglect of the performance of deeds of charity and of good works. For the highest perfections can be achieved only by carrying out injunctions (which are not direct legal commandments, but ethical demands), such as the exercise of free will, love of God, contemplation of His loving-kindness, the recognition of God's ways in His visitation of man, and, above all, in the sanctification of His name by worship, fear, and by cleaving unto Him' (*Sha 'arei Teshubah* ii. §§ 14, 17). 'Do not pretend that thou art not able to help by word or deed, for, if thou refusest, thy strength will wane' (*ib.* § 70). 'Thou shalt not take a bribe (Ex 23^8) means also, Thou shalt not allow thy judgment to be influenced by flattery, for the purity of conscience will thereby be clouded (*ib.* § 98).

Almost contemporary with these were Yehudah the Pious in Germany (12th cent.), and his pupil Eleazar of Worms († 1238), and Yeḥiel b. Yeḳutiel in Rome (1278), as well as Moses of Couçy in France (1233–45), who wrote ethical treatises and guides for a moral life—the 'Book of the Pious,' *Sefer Ḥasidim* (Yehudah); the 'Perfection of Human Conscience,' *Ma'alath*

[1] He refers, of course, to the Talmudic passages quoted above (*Ḥullin*, 94*a*, and *B. ḳamma*, 113*a*).

ha-Middoth (Yeḳutiel); and the great Code of Laws, *Sefer Miṣwoth ha-Gadhol* (Moses of Couçy). Each of these men represents a special school of thought. The first two are of a mystical disposition, Quietists; the writer in Rome follows, on the whole, the philosophical writers; while the codifier of the Law, like Maimonides, introduces chapters on ethical duties into the very Code: 'Be fair to every one, be he a Jew or a Gentile.' 'Money obtained by sweating the workman, or by buying stolen goods and idols as ornaments, brings no blessing.' 'Draw the attention of the Gentile to his mistake (in any business transaction); and better live on charity and begging than appropriate the money of others, which will be a disgrace to Judaism and to the Jewish name.' 'Be honest with every one, no matter to what faith he belongs.' 'Those who clip the coin, who sell short measure, who practise usury, are a curse; and there is no blessing in their money.' 'Do not say, "I will repay evil," but trust in God, and He will help thee.' 'If any one has defrauded thee or brought false witness against thee, or has ruined thee, do not avenge the injustice by doing the same to him.' 'Do not listen to slander' (Yehudah Ḥasid). 'Act in such a manner that thou needst not be ashamed of thyself.' 'Keep thine imagination pure, so that thy deeds may be likewise.' 'Know that the reward from the Lord is in accordance with thy resistance to sin.' 'The highest aim and ambition of man should be to fulfil the commandments, to sanctify His name, and to sacrifice himself for God's sake' (Eleazar). 'A Sage said: "Whoever sows hatred reaps regret."' 'Be true and honest, as our Sages say: "Let your yea be yea and your nay nay."' 'If a Gentile trusts you and relies upon your word, you must in all your transactions justify his confidence and be true and honest, so that the name of God be sanctified' (Yeḳutiel). 'Whosoever is a novice in the fear of God shall say every morning on rising: "To-day I will be a faithful servant of the Lord; I will beware of wrath, lying, hatred, strife, and envy; I will not look (lustfully) upon women, and I will forgive those who hurt me."' 'Whoever forgives is forgiven; hard-heartedness and implacability are grave sins unworthy of a Jew' (Moses of Couçy).

The mystical philosophy of religion embodied in the *Zohar*, the chief exponent of the later Ḳabbālā, recognizes no less emphatically the call of conscience. The fulfilment of moral duties is not only a reward in itself, but it is the main cause of the harmony of the world and of the uninterrupted flow of Divine grace from the highest spheres down to the mundane sphere. 'Woe unto the sinners, for they keep the Divine glory in exile,' is a constantly recurring phrase. The mystical philosophy has in this case not contributed to weaken the moral fibre, and a high tone of ethical loftiness pervades the pages of the *Zohar*.

In conclusion, a few wills may now be mentioned. That of Asher b. Yeḥiel is of special interest on account of the fact that his code of the Law, with slight modifications, is the direct source of the recognized standard religious Jewish Code. He died in 1327, and by his will continued the old tradition, which was carried on to the end of the 18th cent. and even later. Among the authors are men like his son, Yehudah b. Asher († 1349), Abraham, and his grandson Sheftel Hurwitz (17th cent.), and the founder of the sect of the modern *Ḥasidim*, Israel Ba'al Shem-Ṭob (end of 18th cent.). Differing somewhat in their views on Divine worship, they are at one in the conception of moral duty and human responsibility, as lying not in the fulfilment of legal commandments alone, but to a greater degree in the performance of moral obligations for which there is no incentive by the promise of reward, and no threat of punishment for neglect.

Last, not least, the 'Shining Lamp,' *Menorath ha-Mā'ōr*, of Israel ben Joseph Alnaqua († 1391), preserved partly in the *Reshith Ḥokhmah*, 'Beginning of Principles of Wisdom,' of Elijah de Vidas (16th cent.), and the compilation of Isaac Aboab under the same name, *Menorath ha-Mā'ōr*, contain the gist of the ethical and Haggadic teaching of the Rabbis. Though a rather large volume, this book has been the household book of Jewry from the time of its compilation (*c.* 1300) to the present day. It has been translated into many languages, and, together with the Book of Elijah de Vidas, it is the Golden Treasury. The love of one's neighbour, and the principles of moral rectitude, of moral duty, of the heinousness of clandestine sin and open hypocrisy, of the happiness wrought by repentance and a clean conscience, of loving-kindness and mercy as Divine attributes to be imitated by man, of moral perfection to be attained not only by outward ceremonial law or by fulfilment of prescribed legislation, but by following the inner voices of the soul and the unwritten commands of the Divine in man, of the hallowing of life and the sanctification of the name of God—of all this the book is full. Its aim is summed up in exemplifying the words of the prophet, in the light of Maimonides' interpretation that the highest duty of man is to fulfil acts of *ḥesed*, 'loving-kindness,' *mishpāṭ*, 'judgment,' and *ṣĕdāḳāh*, 'righteousness': 'For I am the Lord which exercise loving-kindness, judgment, and righteousness, in the earth: for in these things I delight, saith the Lord' (Jer 9[24]). This has remained the guiding principle for 'conscience' in Judaism.

LITERATURE.—In addition to the authorities cited in the article, see **L. Zunz**, *Gottesdienstl. Vorträge der Juden*[2], Frankfort, 1892, p. 103 ff., 'Ethische Hagada,' also *Zur Geschichte und Literatur*, i., Berlin, 1845, p. 122 ff. 'Sittenlehrer'; **D. Rosin**, *Ethik des Maimonides*, Breslau, 1876; **M. Lazarus**, *The Ethics of Judaism*, 2 vols., Philadelphia, 1901–2; art. 'Ethics' in *JE*; **S. Baeck**, 'Die Sittenlehrer,' in *Jüd. Literat.*, ed. Winter-Wünsche, iii., Trèves, 1896, p. 627 ff.; **I. Suwalski**, *Hayyei ha-Yehudi al pi ha-Talmud*[2], Warsaw, 1893.

M. GASTER.

CONSCIENCE (Muslim).—**1. Names for the phenomenon.**—The normal manifestations of the conscience, whether in individuals or in communities, are to be found in uneasiness about acts perpetrated in the past, and the desire to make amends for them, or in refraining from perpetration, on grounds of abstract right and wrong. These manifestations are to be found among moral agents with few or no exceptions, but they are not always labelled with a name. Probably the nearest equivalent in Arabic is the word *al-zājir*, 'the restrainer,' defined as 'God's preacher in the heart of the believer, the light cast therein which summons him to the truth'; but it obviously refers to the second group of manifestations only, and its limitation to 'Believers' is due to the fact that in a sense, according to the Islāmic system, the unbeliever can do no wrong, as being outside God's covenant. For the first group probably the word *sarīra*, 'the secret,' *i.e.* the secret self, would be the nearest synonym; this is the word used in the maxim 'God concerns Himself with your consciences,' embodied by Omar I. in his *Instructions to a Judge*. The modern Islāmic languages employ conventional translations of the European words; in Turkish *vijdan* (properly 'sensation') is employed, in Arabic *ḍamīr* ('the hidden being'). But for the adjective 'conscientious' it is probable that a paraphrase would have to be used.

2. The conscience in law.—The maxim quoted above was of the highest importance for the development of Islām. Whereas St. Paul says, 'he is not a Jew who is one outwardly' (Ro 2[28]), the Prophet's doctrine was, 'he is a Muslim who is one outwardly,' *i.e.* who pronounces a certain formula and pays a certain rate. In virtue of this principle, and another to the effect that Islām cancelled all that was before it, the Prophet's most stubborn opponents and persecutors might be admitted to the privileges of Islām without any atonement for their former conduct being necessary, or any guarantee that their conversion was dictated by anything but fear. The phrase 'union of hearts' was applied to the winning over of opponents by bribes. The inquisition into people's private character and opinions, carried on by some Islāmic sovereigns, was in open contradiction to the Prophet's principles, and confession of secret sin was so far from being encouraged by the Prophet, that, in a tradition of fair authority, he is represented as doing his utmost to dissuade a man from confess-

ing. In the maxim quoted from Omar the reference is to the credibility of Muslim witnesses, into which no inquiry may be made. Provided they are not notorious evil-livers—a term which is clearly defined—all Muslims are credible. On the other hand, to religious performances the maxim 'acts are by their intentions' applies. And Omar held that the Divine power would intervene to expose cases of shameless hypocrisy which would seriously interfere with the course of justice.

3. Conscience as a guide to the individual.—So far as the conscience is identical with the moral sense, or instinctive notions of right and wrong, the Prophet's system took little account of it; indeed, its tendency was to make the Prophet's revelations and practice the sole source whence knowledge of right and wrong could be obtained. His followers constantly handed their consciences over to his keeping, being unwilling to set their opinion against his. The fact that he claimed obedience only *in licitis et honestis* shows that he did not really claim the infallibility which logic compelled his followers to ascribe to him. That logic was, however, irresistible; for, if the right of private judgment were once allowed, clearly people could not be compelled to accept Islām at all. Although, then, there are occasional attempts at basing a system of ethics on either reason or the natural sense of right, these are not really in accordance with the spirit of the religion. The reference is regularly to the Qur'ān, the practice of the Prophet, and the sayings of his followers: 'Whoso makes them his model goes right' is a common saying. The scope allowed to the conscience in private affairs by Muslim writers is similar to that indicated by the maxim *noblesse oblige*. So the formula, 'I appeal from you to yourself,' *i.e.* 'your better self,' is occasionally heard.[1] Hence the word *abiyy*, 'refusing,' is often applied by poets to a soul which declines of itself to enter humiliating courses.

4. The public conscience.—In Oriental despotisms the sovereign does not, as a rule, pay much regard to public opinion, and it might be hard to find any case in Muslim history in which the conduct of the sovereign had been of itself actively resented; neither parricide nor fratricide, debauchery, nor even heresy, appears to have of itself stirred up such indignation among the subjects as to cost a sovereign his throne. The assassination of the monster al-Ḥākim, the Fāṭimid Khalīf (A.D. 1021), seems to have caused more indignation than his long catalogue of atrocities. Cases are therefore of interest in which concessions are made by the sovereign to the public conscience, to the extent of salving it; for such concessions imply that the sovereign thought it worth salving. A fiction with which we meet in Egyptian history more than once is the discovery of buried treasure, enabling the sovereign to build a mosque—there being a doubt whether the Muslims would attend worship in one which had been built out of ill-gotten gains. The murder of a brother was occasionally explained in an official document as an accidental death,[2] etc.; but, on the other hand, clever usurpers not infrequently gathered followers by stirring up public indignation against those whom they wished to overthrow. The Umayyad and 'Abbāsid dynasties both won their first triumphs in this way. It was at times thought worth while to murder a saintly man and make it appear that a sovereign had perpetrated the crime, with the view of getting him dethroned.[3] Similarly, in our time there have been suspicions of atrocities being engineered in the Ottoman empire for the purpose of rousing the conscience of Europe. The best-informed political writers in the East insist on the maxim, 'the people follow the religion of their kings,' and the maxim, 'even in your conscience curse not the king' (Ec 10[20]), represents the prevailing practice.

[1] Yāqūt, *Dict. of Learned Men*, ed. Margoliouth, 1910, vol. v. ('Life of Ibn al-'Amid').
[2] Ibn al-Athīr, ix. 161 (Cairo, 1303).
[3] *Ib.* ix. 29.

5. Noteworthy manifestations of the conscience.—Although the lives of the Muslim sovereigns, as told by their chroniclers, frequently, if not ordinarily, display absolute ruthlessness, yet in their relations with those persons who played the part of the Hebrew prophets, conscientiousness seems to have been the rule rather than the exception. Cases in which the sovereign, however arbitrary, permitted himself to be rebuked by a saint, and even followed the saint's advice, are quite common.[1] A saint might even denounce the doings of a Khalīf from the pulpit.[2] The following anecdote of the Ghaznavid Maḥmūd b. Sabuktakīn illustrates the conscientiousness of an Oriental despot. A traditionalist was summoned to repeat edifying matter before the Sultan. The man commenced his discourse before he had been asked, and a slave was told to box his ears. The blow rendered the preacher permanently deaf. The Sultan was deeply distressed at this result, and offered abundant gifts in compensation; the traditionalist declined them all, saying he would accept nothing but what had been taken from him, the power of hearing. Requests from the Sultan for pardon were met merely with a reference to the final judgment. To this stubborn reply the Sultan answered with an embrace.[3]

There is a considerable literature on the desirability of cleansing the 'inner man,' of which Ghazālī's 'Scrutiny of the Hearts' may be mentioned as an example.[4]

LITERATURE.—This is given in the article.

D. S. MARGOLIOUTH.

CONSCIENTIOUSNESS.—Conscientiousness (from 'conscience' [*q.v.*]) may be described as an attitude within the moral life, a source of virtue, rather than one of the virtues. Judgment, with its intellectual reference, and integrity, with its emotional reference, are involved, imparting direction to conduct, and tending strongly to the adaptation of habit on the basis of new values.

Developed morality presupposes two main groups of elements which interact with each other. These are the objective and the subjective, often termed the universal (or social) and the individual (or personal). The former consists of customs and usages, of conventions, observances, and legal or quasi-legal codes, of social and political institutions. All, in turn, are integral to a cultural organization such as a race, a people, or even an epoch. The latter, though inseparable from the former, consists of the peculiar contribution resultant upon the reaction of individuals to the norms of the social unity. So long as this response remains unconscious or unreflective, personal character misses complete distinctiveness, and tends to keep the level of the general, customary average. But when, thanks to a subtle admixture of intellect and emotion, men place themselves in a reflective attitude towards the norms of the communal spirit, conscientiousness supervenes, and obligation acquires an enhanced, because positively recognized, influence upon character.

'Conscientiousness, then, is reflective intelligence grown into character. It involves a greater and wider recognition of obligation in general, and a larger and more stable emotional response to everything that presents itself as duty; as well as the habit of deliberate consideration of the moral situation and of the acts demanded by it' (J. Dewey, *Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics*, 1891, p. 200).

In a word, conscientiousness is marked by the

[1] *e.g.* Ṭabarī, iii. 668. [2] *JRAS*, 1907, p. 309.
[3] Yāqūt, *Dict. of Learned Men*, v.
[4] *Mukāshafat al-qulūb*, Cairo, 1323.

presence of a reinforced requirement of conscience, and by the effort to meet it. Yet, even so, the condition of moral anxiety, accompanied by habitual introspection, can hardly be accepted as an equitable account of the matter. This view savours too much of temporary circumstances, associated, say, with such supposititious entities as the 'Nonconformist conscience,' the 'New England conscience,' or the like. Possibly the Puritan strain led Green to formulate his over-subjective analysis:

'There remain the cases (1) of reflexion on past actions of our own, (2) of consideration whether an act should be presently done, which it rests with ourselves to do or not to do. In both these cases, the question of the character or state of will which an action represents may be raised with a possibility of being answered. Given an ideal of virtue . . . a man may ask himself, Was I, in doing so and so, acting as a good man should, with a pure heart, with a will set on the objects on which it should be set?—or again, Shall I, in doing so and so, be acting as a good man should, goodness being understood in the same sense? . . . The habit in a man of raising such questions about himself as those just indicated, is what we have mainly in view when we call him conscientious' (*Prol. to Ethics*, 1883, p. 322 f.).

But conscientiousness is not to be identified with conscience 'in its extreme form of self-reflectiveness,' which 'investigates with the searching power of an expert, in order to discover the slightest deflection from what it holds to be good. It is because of its personal or individual character that it is able to put forward a claim to independence of the State or of any social order' (S. Alexander, *Moral Order and Progress*, 1889, p. 157 f.). Accordingly, one may accentuate the subjective aspect of conscientiousness readily, and thus minimize the objective reference. If it be reduced to a mere analysis of internal moods, it may very well indicate weakness rather than strength of character.

'The simply ethical temper is related to spiritual productiveness as mere good taste is to creativeness in poetry and art. With so circumspect a step it makes no way; and, though it never wanders, never flies. For ever occupied in distinguishing, it acquires the habit of fear instead of love—nay, above all things, *fears to love*. Its maxims are maxims of avoidance, which shape themselves into negatives, and guard every avenue with the flaming sword of prohibition, "Thou shalt *not*." In apprehension of possible evil, it dares not surrender itself to any admiration and fling itself into unrestrained action for any haunting end: the admiration must first be scrutinized, till it has cooled and its force is gone; the end in view is traced through a thicket of comparisons, till it is lost in the wood. Nothing, accordingly, is more rare than a character at once balanced and powerful, judicial and enthusiastic; and faultless perception is apt to involve feeble inspiration' (James Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theory*[2], 1886, ii. 60).

Thus the division of opinion regarding conscientiousness has its roots in the two groups of elements inseparable from morality. If the objective factor be emphasized, knowledge of social demands, or insight into their nature, is viewed as the dominant feature. If, on the other hand, emphasis be laid on the subjective factor, self-examination, with anxiety about personal moods and feelings, assumes primary importance.

In the Greek world, where our sense of conscientiousness had not developed, but where 'wisdom' (σοφία, σύνεσις, not yet συνείδησις) played a parallel rôle, the community-aggregate of predispositions and tendencies in the realm of values (cf. Grote, *Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates*, 1865, i. 249) furnished plentiful material which was regarded as neither good nor bad. The 'wise man' was likened to an artist, who shaped this raw stuff into the masterpiece of a model life. For example,

'Aristotle presents us with the general type of a subtle and shifting problem, the solution of which must be worked out afresh by each individual in each particular case. Conduct to him is a free and living creature, and not a machine controlled by fixed laws. Every life is a work of art shaped by the man who lives it' (G. L. Dickinson, *The Greek View of Life*[6], 1907, p. 137).

Accordingly, paradox though it may seem, virtue was knowledge, in the sense that the superior, and therefore thoughtful, citizen superimposed a conscious (reflective) attitude upon the traditional custom of the πολιτεία. In this way the 'higher law' of wisdom was made manifest. But, leaving the imperfect Socratics out of account (cf. CYNICS, CASUISTRY), it bore rather upon group-norms than upon the independent 'conscientious' judgment of the individual. The internal thrust of the principle had to await Stoicism and the Christian consciousness.

Nevertheless, the classical moralists of Greece did originate the idea of inward principle, of individual reaction upon the cultural situation, with the result that, consequent upon profound civil vicissitudes, the Stoic conception of 'conscience,' based on the independence of the 'wise man,' grew up and acquired fixity. In this way, dynamic progress in morality, as contrasted with static custom, was enlivened—not, however, without pathological accompaniments, because the restraints of the old society weakened. Despite this, two heritages had been prepared for the Christian consciousness: the conception of inner principle, mediated individually; and the doctrine that, in the sphere of morality at least, whatever might be said of religion, this inward principle must be adjudged by the mind. Thus the contrast between the two elements—the objective or social and the subjective or individual—took definite shape. And successive conceptions of conscientiousness witnessed, if not a struggle, then a lack of balance, between them. At one time, as in the mediæval view of 'prudence,' the objective tended to assert itself; at another, as in the Puritan emphasis on 'righteousness,' the subjective exercised primacy. In a word, men constructed their description of the source of virtue on the basis of current relative evaluation of the virtues.

The very fact, then, that the Christian consciousness has substituted 'conscientiousness' for the 'wisdom' of the Greeks—and this finally—suffices to show that the internal and individual had won full recognition. The conscientious man must use discernment, according to the inward principle, with reference to the norms of social custom. Moral progress and initiative pivot upon this. On the other hand, this initiative is concerned about these same customs—to discover how they may be preserved lively. And yet, of necessity, this process means that, because they are subjects of concern and of consequent new estimate, they must alter.

Conscientiousness, then, may be described as genuine concern, mediated intelligently, for all such values. This cannot but result in approval and disapproval; and these attitudes are traceable in part to emotional convictions about an inward ideal. So far as the conscientious man has made this ideal his own, being able to say, 'This one thing I do,' it has become 'the way and the truth' for him. Accordingly, in the issue, conscientiousness turns out to be an energetic pursuit of an individual-social ideal—an ideal that appeals to emotion mainly through objective associations, and to intellect mainly through intelligent personal reactions to those associations. The conscientious man is at once responsive to social achievements and ends, and considerate of the one principle whereby these ends are relegated to their due places in a harmonious whole. He *feels* that his own goodness is bound up with that of others, hence personal assertion of the norm as he envisages it; he *knows* that his own progress must depend ultimately upon the clearness of his apprehension of the inward principle. Thus reflective insight, on the basis of affective conviction, grasping and transforming group-norms, constitutes the moral attitude known as conscientiousness. For this reason, the latter is held to be the source and guardian of virtue. It serves itself *the* central factor to be reckoned with in an active moral consciousness.

But, further, this implies that conscientiousness

is characterized by disinterestedness. Otherwise, it would not include a concrete estimate of the entire import of an action. Self-assertion here becomes a species of self-forgetfulness. For by this quality the self-reference of conscientiousness is merged in a larger whole. So, if this quality be emphasized, conscientiousness may find a place in the list of virtues. It would then stand as the chief of the cardinal virtues, thus becoming more or less identical with what modern moralists have termed the 'good will.' This implies that it is the guarantee, not of mental acumen or of æsthetic taste, but of goodness realizing itself throughout the entire circle of a life which, in turn, draws sustenance from the norms of the community. In these norms the conscientious man discovers new stimuli to the inner principle. But the necessity for reflexion rules out supposititious automatic deliverances of an equally supposititious 'internal tribunal'—'conscience.' Briefly, vital interest in the good, as the principle reveals it, at once sets problems, and points the conditions of their solution. Fusion of sober judgment with earnest aspiration, and fusion of restraint, mediated socially, with fervent desire, both passing over into will, constitute the modern counterpart of the Greek 'wisdom.' And this species of ethical apperception which imports our experience into a moral order, and also perceives that it is originated from a moral order, is true conscientiousness. It is the pre-requisite and accompaniment of any end which moral beings can adopt for the completion of their well-being. Hence its inevitable relation to questions which pass over into the field of religion.

See also CONSCIENCE, ETHICS (Christian), WISDOM.

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R. M. WENLEY.

CONSCIOUSNESS.—What is consciousness? From the dawn of modern philosophy the question has been discussed, and psychology and philosophy have endeavoured to find a reply. The answers have been very various, but we may not summarize them in this article. To summarize those given from the time of Descartes onwards would be to write a history of modern philosophy. And at present the question is more widely and more incisively discussed than ever before. Some philosophers and psychologists almost insist on discarding the name altogether, while others make the results of the analysis of consciousness the whole of their philosophy. For example, A. E. Taylor writes:

'This is perhaps the place to add the further remark that, if we would be rigidly accurate in psychological terminology, we ought to banish the very expression "consciousness" or "states of consciousness" from our language. What are really given in experience are attentive processes with a certain common character. We abstract this character and give it the name of "consciousness," and then fall into the blunder of calling

the concrete processes "states" or "modifications" of this abstraction, just as in dealing with physical things we make abstraction of their common properties under the name of "matter," and then talk as if the things themselves were "forms of matter." Properly speaking, there are physical things and there are minds, but there are no such things in the actual world as "matter" and "consciousness," and we do well to avoid using the words when we can help it' (*Elements of Metaphysics*, p. 79 n.). In the text, with all the emphasis of italics, Taylor says: 'We cannot too strongly insist that if by "self-consciousness" is meant a cognitive state which is its own object, there is no such thing, and it is a psychological impossibility that there should be any such thing as self-consciousness. No cognitive state ever has itself for its own object. Every cognitive state has for its object something other than itself' (*ib.* p. 79).

Taylor makes short work of consciousness; and if we took his view, the writing of an article on consciousness might be dispensed with. But, as we are hardly able to conceive what is meant by a cognitive state which has an object which is something other than itself, we may be permitted to go on. It is scarcely consistent with the ordinary use of language, and certainly quite inconsistent with the use of psychological language, to speak of a cognitive state in active relation with an object. For whom is the state, and who is aware of it? But this question may be better discussed at a later stage. Meanwhile it may be safely said that the word 'consciousness' denotes some phase or aspect of our mental life, and that it is not identical with any of the other aspects which we apply to particular mental processes or states. It is not feeling, nor is it willing, nor is it thinking; but these states or processes have this at least in common, that they are conscious states. The contrast does not lie between feeling and consciousness, or between willing and consciousness, or between thinking and consciousness. The contrast lies between consciousness and unconsciousness. For the characteristic of every mental state, or of every mental process, seems just to consist in the fact that they are states of a conscious subject, and that they are for that subject.

While this is so, many questions of interest and importance arise as to the relations of the subject to its states, as to the distinction, if there is a distinction, between the phrases 'states of consciousness' and 'consciousness of states.' Is consciousness to be identified with the sum of its states? Can we neglect the reference to a subject, and proceed to analyze, compare, classify, and arrange these states according to the laws of their growth, their interrelations, and so on, leaving out of sight, as common to them all, their relation to a common subject? This has been done, and, in fact, it is the ordinary psychological procedure. But there is always a sort of uneasiness about proceeding in this way; for many inconvenient questions arise as to the subject for whom the experiences are, and the unity to which they are referred. Ideas, processes, and states come and go; they cluster together, they occupy our attention, and they seem to pass into the unconscious. It is natural that the scene of their appearance should be likened to a theatre, and that, while they have passed from the scene, they should have a sort of existence behind the scenes. It may be well to quote the classic illustration of Hume:

'For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call *myself*, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch *myself* at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception. When my perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound sleep, so long am I insensible of *myself*, and may truly be said not to exist. And were all my perceptions removed by death, and could I neither think, nor feel, nor see, nor love, nor hate, after the dissolution of my body, I should be entirely annihilated, nor do I conceive what is further requisite to make me a perfect non-entity. If any one, upon serious and unprejudiced reflexion, thinks he has a different notion of *himself*, I must confess I can reason no longer with him. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well as I, and that we are essentially different in this particular. He may, perhaps, per-

ceive something simple and continued, which he calls *himself*; though I am certain there is no such principle in me.

But, setting aside some metaphysicians of this kind, I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement. Our eyes cannot turn in their sockets without varying our perceptions. Our thought is still more variable than our sight; and all our other senses and faculties contribute to this change; nor is there any single power of the soul which remains unalterably the same, perhaps for one moment. The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. There is properly no *simplicity* in it at one time, nor *identity* in different; whatever natural propension we may have to imagine that simplicity and identity. The comparison of the theatre must not mislead us. They are the successive perceptions only that constitute the mind; nor have we the most distant notion of the place where these scenes are represented, or of the materials of which it is composed' (Hume's *Works*, ed. Green and Grose, Lond. 1909, i. 534 f.). Or, again, a little further on: 'What we call mind is nothing but a heap or bundle of different perceptions united together by certain relations, and supposed, though falsely, to be endowed with a certain simplicity and identity.'

It is a curious passage, and the more we study it the more curious it appears. There is the suggestion of a theatre, so often made since by other psychologists, and no sooner is it made than it is withdrawn. Yet it has fulfilled its aim. It has directed our attention to the stage, and has so far served its purpose. But a theatre suggests a stage, and players, and spectators. These suggestions, however, are somewhat inconvenient, and raise awkward questions. So we are told that 'the comparison of the theatre must not mislead us.' For it is 'the successive perceptions only that constitute the mind.' One is compelled to ask, What is a perception, and what is a succession? Above we were told that 'several perceptions successively make their appearance—pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations.' The perceptions make their appearance—to whom? Hume had formerly spoken of 'what I call *myself*.' So it is to what he calls himself that the perceptions appear, and all the passing, re-passing, and other movements are perceived by himself. And yet the mind that perceives, that looks on at the gliding show, is nothing but the bundle or collection of different perceptions. Is the mind aware that it is a bundle? Or that it is a collection? Whence came the bundle or collection? And how does it recognize itself to be a unity? In the passage before us, Hume is unable to state his argument without the implication, in every sentence, of what he formally denies. He is in the presence of a unique fact—the fact of a succession of perceptions which recognizes itself as a bundle or collection. How is it so? We are careful to state it in his own language, for that language implies the unity of the conscious subject to which all the gliding appearances are referred. It would appear that we are face to face with a unique kind of thing—a thing which seems at the same time to be knower and known, actor and spectator, a show and the spectator for whom the show is. For all these passing, re-passing, and gliding appearances, so felicitously described by Hume, had an existence only for himself; and, while other people may have similar experiences, these particular experiences were for him alone. And he was something more than the bundle of perceptions, he was the self for whom the perceptions were. We do not require here to discuss the relation of body and mind (see Body and Mind, Brain and Mind, Mind), or of physiology and psychology. Nor can we dwell on the attempts to deduce the unity of consciousness from the unity of the nervous system. There is a parallelism between the growth of mind and the growth of an organized nervous system. Physiology has often given useful hints to psychology. There are parallels between the evolution of the organism and the evolution of consciousness. But, while that is so, the fact of consciousness remains without parallel, and its nature must only be described and not explained. It is interesting, for example, to follow Herbert Spencer through his works setting forth the Synthetic Philosophy, from the First Principles, through Biology and Psychology to Sociology and Ethics. It is of special interest to mark the description of the origin and growth of these, and then to notice how psychology enters in. After he has described the evolution of the nervous system, he seeks to correlate the stages of evolution with a corresponding mental growth. How about consciousness? Whence did it come?

'In its higher forms, instinct is probably accompanied by a rudimentary consciousness. There cannot be co-ordination of many stimuli without some ganglion through which they are all brought into relation. In the process of bringing them into relation, this ganglion must be subject to the influence of each—must undergo many changes. And the quick succession of changes in a ganglion, implying, as it does, perpetual experiences of differences and likenesses, constitutes the raw material of consciousness. The implication is that, as fast as instinct is developed, some kind of consciousness becomes nascent' (*Psychology*, Lond. 1885, sect. 195).

So far we obtain only a raw material of consciousness and some kind of nascent consciousness. Another passage from the *Psychology* seems to show how a consciousness must arise:

'Separate impressions are received by the senses—by different parts of the body. If they go no further than the places at which they are received, they are useless. Or, if only some of them are brought into relation with one another, they are useless. That an effectual adjustment may be made, they must be all brought into relation with one another. But this implies some centre of communication common to them all, through which they severally pass; and as they cannot pass through it simultaneously, they must pass through it in succession. So that, as the external phenomena responded to become greater in number and more complicated in kind, the variety and rapidity of the changes to which this common centre of communication is subject must increase—there must result an unbroken series of these changes, there must arise a consciousness. Hence the progress of the correspondence between the organism and its environment necessitates a gradual reduction of the sensorial changes to a succession; and by so doing evolves a distinct consciousness—a consciousness that becomes higher as the succession becomes more rapid and the correspondence more complete' (sect. 179).

It is interesting to note how, in the description of the process, Spencer is constrained to assume, as in existence, the consciousness whose genesis he is seeking to describe. He speaks of 'perpetual experiences of differences and likenesses' in the ganglion through which the numerous stimuli are co-ordinated. If these exist, then we submit that the work supposed to be effected by consciousness is already being done. If these stimuli can be co-ordinated by a ganglion, what is the need of a consciousness to do a work already sufficiently provided for? As we read on, the wonder increases. The impressions received by the senses must be adjusted, and the adjustment is made through a centre of communication through which they pass in succession. But this centre, through which the impressions pass in succession, does a business which is ever on the increase, and, in order that its work may be done, a consciousness must arise. Why? As a matter of fact, a consciousness has arisen—something which is aware of the various changes within itself, which also has a certain power of intervention. But in the description of the whole process no place is left at which a consciousness can enter in. Either one must hold that consciousness has been implicitly present from the beginning, or it can never appear on the terms assigned to its entrance by Spencer.

That there is a relation between consciousness and the nervous states of the organism is unquestionable. But the origin and character of that relationship are not sufficiently described by Spencer. From the above account of the origin of consciousness, it appears as altogether a superfluous addition to a nervous system. The work of co-ordination has been already accomplished, and has, indeed,

automatically proceeded until the stimuli have learned how to pass through a centre, and to pass in orderly procession. Yet, on the whole, consciousness is greatly needed in the system of Spencer. For 'all mental action whatever,' we are told a little further on, 'is definable as the continuous differentiation and integration of states of consciousness' (*op. cit.* ii. 301). Are the states of consciousness determined by the states of the organism? Are they part of the integration and differentiation of matter and motion? Or is there only a parallelism between the two? Is psychophysical parallelism the ultimate word on the relationship between the two? Or is the consciousness simply an epiphenomenon, a mere accompaniment, or, in the metaphor of Huxley, is it simply the ticking of the clock which is mistaken for its function?

Leaving on one side the questions of the origin of consciousness as unanswerable, and the further questions of the relations of mind and body as too large for our proper theme, let us ask, What is really meant by conscious life, or, in other words, by consciousness? As we reflect on what happens when we attend to the processes of our inner life, we note three main characteristics: (1) There is the fact of change; without change, or without the entrance of a new fact into consciousness, there is no consciousness. Continued sameness would mean unconsciousness. (2) There is the preservation or reproduction of previously given elements, with some connexion between elements formerly given and those that are new. (3) There is the inward unity of recognition. In the stream of the inner life there are always present those three factors. Thus synthesis is the fundamental fact of all consciousness. But the synthetic activity of consciousness has always a certain end in view. This will become abundantly clear as we look at the mental attitude towards an object. This attitude is threefold, corresponding to the three aspects of mental activity. Consciousness is always occupied with some object. It is not needful to define the object for our present purpose. But, be it what it may, (1) it is an object of knowledge; we seem to know it, or to know something about it. (2) It brings to us some pleasure or pain; it affects us in some way. (3) We tend to alter it, transform it, take possession of it, and master it. We desire to have a clearer view of its character, or to make it serve our purpose. An object is thus related to us in three ways; and these three are the fundamental aspects of conscious activity—knowing, feeling, and striving, which are three aspects of the same mental state, not to be separated from each other, not to be thought of as successive in time, but elements of one concrete experience. From any of these points of view we arrive at the conclusion of the unity of the subject, which recognizes all these attitudes as its own. Cognition, recognition, or any other name descriptive of the cognitive attitude, presupposes the unity of the subject. The feeling of pleasure in activity, or of pain in the interruption of the activity, presupposes a central point into relation with which the changing elements of consciousness are brought. Similarly, it may be shown that all conative activity presupposes the unity of the subject, for it is the attempt to bring the object into harmonious relations with the other objects formerly or presently held together in our experience.

Thus from many points of view, as we look at the living, moving, thinking, willing, concrete being, we are presented with the fact of a unitary consciousness, of a real self, capable of a real experience. Yet it has been possible for systems to be constructed, theories of knowledge to be promulgated, psychological theories to be set forth, and views to be argued, from which personalism has been excluded, and all reference to self and the unity of the self avoided. It is worth while to see how this has been possible. The possibility of it has not been without advantage in the interests of science. What does science desire to accomplish? A man of science does not know anything, does not desire to know anything, save the objects in their causal relation to one another. He seeks to look at things as parts of Nature, strives to construct and to model them until he has arranged them in their sequence as causes and effects. He strives to find the linkages, and, when he has linked all things together in a scheme which seems to include the whole, he is satisfied with his work. But, in order to fulfil this purpose, he has to make himself a martyr to science. He is no longer a man with his will and his purpose, a living, breathing man with a life of his own; he has become what we may call an abstract spectator, a consciousness which simply becomes aware of the ongoings and the linkages of the energies of the universe. Such a personality is not a real man. The standpoint of the spectator involves certain abstractions. He has put aside all interests, all living attitudes, and all the varied manifoldness of his concrete life, and has converted himself into a mere onlooker, whose whole aim is to understand the ways in which things are linked together. It is so far an artificial attitude, but in this abstraction from all that relates to personal will and purpose lies the enormous strength of the scientific attitude. It enables the onlooker to regard the processes of the world as the outcome of laws, to bring them into relations, to master them, and harness them to the fulfilment of his purposes. In fact, the scientific spectator who desires simply to know and to master the system of the world, abstracts altogether from his own life-interests, even from his own individuality, becomes merely a spectator of processes which are not for this individual or for that, but the same for every one. Further, not only does he abstract from all personal interests and from all individual proclivities, he finally comes to abstract from the activity of the knowing subject itself, and to look at the world as a system complete in itself, and independent of any subject. This mere abstract knower, who has detached himself from every personal characteristic, attitude, and interest, who simply watches the processes of Nature and registers them, is a useful creature for many purposes, but he can scarcely be taken as a complete and adequate representative of what consciousness, or self-consciousness in the fullness of its concrete being, means.

Science must proceed after the fashion described, if it is to do its work. But we ought to remind ourselves of the limitations prescribed by this attitude. In particular, we are not to put this abstract spectator, who has reduced himself to the stature of a mere spectator, in the place of the living man. The synthetic unity of apperception, to use Kant's phrase, may be all that is required for the purposes of explaining and describing the world, but this abstract attitude of the subject is not sufficient when we seek to speak of consciousness or of self-consciousness as it is in living experience. In the science of psychology we have also to assume this abstract attitude. Before the psychologist are the perceptions and thoughts, the feelings and emotions, the judgments and volitions, which he is to study and describe. He is well aware that the only key to the understanding of them lies within himself. No one save himself is aware of these conscious states, so far as they are his own. They are for him part of his own individual experience, and no one else has these particular experiences. But he has to take them as typical, and the subject

which has the experience becomes an abstract detached subject, a spectator who stands outside of the skull of everybody, and is supposed to have the manifold life of every conscious subject open to his gaze. It is necessary to make these abstractions; to make them is indispensable for the solution of particular problems, and helps us to attain to that mastery of the world which is essential for the fulfilment of the tasks of life. It is not needful to quarrel with the abstract attitude of every science, or to accuse it of wilful neglect of many elements in conscious life; our quarrel arises only when these special scientific aspects are set forth as complete and exhaustive accounts of the world.

To deal rightly with the question of consciousness which we have in hand, we must not be content to regard it as it appears in abstract science—merely as that which is aware of the processes of the world's ongoing, or merely as the abstract subject which meets us in psychological treatises. To neglect the subject and all its individual experiences, hopes, fears, and wishes, is quite right on the part of the physicist, the chemist, and the naturalist; and so to exclude the individual, and to declare that biography forms no part of psychology, is quite legitimate when the psychologist is seeking to understand the process of consciousness in general. But if the aim is to understand the fullness, the manifoldness, the complexity, as well as the unity, of mental life, the method is inadequate. The psychologist looks at the inner life as mere contents of consciousness. This consciousness only becomes aware of what is going on, and from this point of view it is nothing more. All contents are of equal value, or, rather, they are of value simply because they have a place in the stream of consciousness. But this view of consciousness is of value only to the psychologist, whose business is to describe and explain the contents of consciousness, and to organize them into a system. When we look away from the peculiar business of psychology, and speak of men in their habit as they live, we are aware of a great deal of which psychology takes no notice. There is the life which the poet sees, expresses, and interprets; there is the life of which the historian writes, which he seeks to interpret and to understand; there is the world of political, social, moral, and religious interests; and all of us are in that world—each a separate personality, characterized for selves and others as personalities, with the power of looking before and after, of foreseeing ends, and adopting means to realize them, of forming ideals, and of living up to them. Again, in every act of ours, in every feeling, every volition, and every thought, we are conscious of a self which expresses itself in aims and meanings. We see ourselves girt about with duties, laden with responsibilities, and we feel that we have a meaning in ourselves, and a place in the world.

We are not called on to explain here the different meanings which the self has for the psychologist, and for all others, such as the poet, the historian, the jurist, the artist. In the works of all these we are in a field of personal will and personal interest; in the company of the psychologist we are merely in the presence of a consciousness which is reduced to the aspect of being only aware of its contents, and has no special interest in, or preference for, any of these contents. Such a potentiality we may leave on one side as we proceed to deal with consciousness. What is it? Well, it is not to be identified with the sum of all its states, or with the sum of all its real or consistent presentations. It is not the stream of changes which goes on within it, or merely the awareness of the contents of that stream. It is not knowing, or willing, or feeling, for outside of it there is no feeling, no willing, no knowing. Consciousness is the condition of all mental life; without consciousness there is no mental life. A psychical fact is simply a fact in consciousness, and it is nothing else. Unconscious knowing is a phrase to which we can attach no meaning. Just as little can we interpret a willing of which we have no consciousness.

Consciousness, therefore, is undefinable. Like all ultimates, we must simply accept it as the condition of the explanation of all else, itself remaining unexplained. It may not be identified with the sum of its states, any more than we can identify a real whole with the sum of its parts. For, after we have summed up the parts, there remains unaccounted for the wholeness of the whole. A machine is not the sum of its parts, and an organism is something more than the sum of its structures and functions. This statement, true of every whole, is uniquely true of the whole of consciousness. It is not a faculty in addition to other faculties, as memory is different, say, from imagination; it is implied in all the faculties of the mind. It is an essential property of every process that goes on within the mind. The simplest view is that which regards consciousness as the sphere in which immediate experience goes on. We are baffled by the very simplicity of the immediate operation of consciousness. We are baffled also by the fact that out of this simplicity are evolved all the results of the activity of consciousness in relation to the world and to self. Sciences, poems, histories, all the outcome of human endeavour, are due to the activity of consciousness. But what we are conscious of at any given moment is simply the mental states, activities, and passivities, and the presentations with which they work. What we insist on here is that consciousness cannot be deduced from anything else.

Certainly it cannot be deduced from the play of unconscious forces, or from the elaboration of correspondences between the growth of consciousness and the evolution of a nervous system. It may be well to dwell for a little on the attempts made to deduce consciousness from the play of unconscious forces. 'Latent mental modifications,' 'unconscious cerebrations,' are among the phrases used in this connexion. W. James, in discussing the 'mind-stuff' theory, thus deals with the distinction between the unconscious and the conscious being of the mental state:

'It is the sovereign means for believing what one likes in psychology, and of turning what might become a science into a tumbling-ground for whimsies. It has numerous champions, and elaborate reasons to give for itself. We must therefore accord it due consideration' (*Principles of Psychology*, i. 163 f.).

In answer to the question, Do unconscious mental states exist?, James enumerates no fewer than ten proofs,—an almost exhaustive list,—submits them to a drastic criticism, and returns the verdict, 'Not proven.' Of one proof he says:

'None of these facts, then, appealed to so confidently in proof of the existence of ideas in an unconscious state, prove anything of the sort. They prove either that conscious ideas were present which the next instant were forgotten; or they prove that certain results, *similar* to results of reasoning, may be wrought out by rapid brain-processes to which no ideation seems attached' (*ib.* 170). The tenth proof may be quoted more fully: 'There is a great class of experiences in our mental life which may be described as discoveries that a subjective condition which we have been having is really something different from what we had supposed. We suddenly find ourselves bored by a thing which we thought we were enjoying well enough; or in love with a person whom we imagined we only liked. Or else we deliberately analyze our motives, and find that at bottom they contain jealousies and cupidities which we little suspected to be there. Our feelings towards people are perfect wells of motivation, unconscious of itself, which introspection brings to light. And our sensations likewise; we constantly discover new elements in sensations which we have been in the habit of receiving all our days, elements, too, which have been there from the first, since otherwise we should have been unable to distinguish the sensations containing them from others nearly allied. The elements must exist, for we use them to discriminate by; but they must exist in an unconscious state, since we so

completely fail to single them out. The books of the analytic school of psychology abound in examples of the kind. Who knows the countless associations that mingle with his each and every thought? Who can pick apart all the nameless feelings that stream in at every moment from his various internal organs, muscles, heart, glands, lungs, etc., and compose in their totality his sense of bodily life? Who is aware of the part played by feelings of innervation and suggestions of possible muscular exertion in all his judgments of distance, shape, and size? Consider, too, the difference between a sensation which we simply *have* and one which we *attend to*. Attention gives results that seem like fresh creations; and yet the feelings and elements of feeling which it reveals must have been already there—in an unconscious state' (*ib.* 170 f.).

Thus far the statement of the proof of unconscious mental states is real and existent. Of this argument, or proof, so fully stated, James says:

'These reasonings are one tissue of confusion. Two states of mind which refer to the same external reality . . . are described as the same state of mind or "idea," published, as it were, in two editions; and then, whatever qualities of the second edition are found openly lacking in the first are explained as having really been there, only in an "unconscious" way. It would be difficult to believe that intelligent men could be guilty of so patent a fallacy, were not the history of psychology there to give the proof. The psychological stock-in-trade of some authors is the belief that two thoughts about one thing are virtually the same thought, and that this same thought may in subsequent reflexions become more and more *conscious* of what it really *was* all along from the first. But, once make the distinction between simply *having an idea* at the moment of its presence, and subsequently knowing all sorts of things *about it*; make, moreover, that between a state of mind itself, taken as a subjective fact, on the one hand, and the objective thing it knows, on the other, and one has no difficulty in escaping from the labyrinth' (p. 172).

He deals with the latter distinction first, and thus concludes:

'There is only one "phase" in which an idea can be, and that is a fully conscious condition. If it is not in that condition, then it is not at all' (p. 173).

His language in dealing with the distinction between simply having an idea and knowing all sorts of things about it we quote fully, as it is of the highest importance in view of what we must discuss presently:

'The truth is here even simpler to unravel. When I decide that I have, without knowing it, been for several weeks in love, I am simply giving a name to a state which previously *I have not named*, but which was fully conscious; which had no residual mode of being, except the manner in which it was conscious; and which, though it was a feeling towards the same person for whom I now have a much more inflamed feeling, and though it continuously led into the latter, and is similar enough to be called by the same name, is yet in no sense identical with the latter, and least of all in an "unconscious" way. Again, the feelings from our viscera and other dimly-felt organs, the feelings of innervation (if such there be), and those of muscular exertion which, in our spatial judgments, are supposed unconsciously to determine what we shall perceive, are just exactly what we feel them, perfectly determinate conscious states, not vague editions of other conscious states. They may be faint and weak; they may be very vague cognizers of the same realities which other conscious states cognize and name exactly; they may be unconscious of much in the reality which the other states are conscious of. But that does not make them, *in themselves*, a whit dim or vague or unconscious. They *are* eternally as they feel when they exist, and can, neither actually nor potentially, be identified with anything else than their own faint selves. A faint feeling may be looked back upon and classified and understood in its relations to what went before or after it in the stream of thought. But it, on the one hand, and the later state of mind which knows all these things about it, on the other, are surely not two conditions, one conscious and the other "unconscious," of the same identical psychic fact' (p. 174).

Apart from the somewhat curious phraseology, which would seem to imply that a state is conscious of its own object—which is rather startling—the argument seems conclusive. Yet it may be well to note that a reference to the conscious subject, when we speak of a conscious state, is always in order. But it is misleading to speak of conscious states cognizing faintly or fully, when we mean that the subject cognizes through these states more or less fully. But, as we follow James through the subsequent evolution of his thought, we feel that he seems to have departed from the conclusion reached in the passages we have quoted. At all events, he writes as follows:

'I cannot but think that the most important step forward that has occurred in psychology since I have been a student of that science is the discovery, first made in 1886, that, in certain subjects at least, there is not only the consciousness of the ordinary field, with its usual centre and margin, but an addition thereto in the shape of a set of memories, thoughts, and feelings, which are extra-marginal and outside of the primary consciousness altogether, but yet must be classed as conscious facts of some sort, able to reveal their presence by unmistakable signs. I call this the most important step forward, because, unlike the other advances which psychology has made, this discovery has revealed to us an entirely unsuspected peculiarity in the constitution of human nature' (*Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 233). Again: 'The *sub-conscious self* is nowadays a well-accredited psychological entity; and I believe that in it we have exactly the mediating term required. Apart from all religious considerations, there is actually and literally more life in our total soul than we are at any time aware of. The exploration of the trans-marginal field has hardly yet been seriously undertaken; but what Mr. Myers said in 1892 in his essay on the Subliminal Consciousness is as true as when it was first written: "Each of us is in reality an abiding psychical entity far more extensive than he knows—an individuality which can never express itself completely through any corporeal manifestation. The Self manifests through the organism; but there is always some part of the Self unmanifested, and always, as it seems, some power of organic expression in abeyance or reserve." Much of the content of this larger background against which our conscious being stands out in relief is insignificant. Imperfect memories, silly jingles, inhibitive timidities, "dissolutive" phenomena of various sorts, as Myers calls them, enter into it for a large part. But in it many of the performances of genius seem also to have their origin' (p. 511 f.).

The sub-conscious self can, according to Sanday, do even more wonderful things than these:

'Besides the upper region of consciousness, there is a lower region into which the conscious mind cannot enter. It cannot enter, and yet it possesses a strange magnetic power by which the contents of the lower region are, as it were, drawn upwards and brought within the range of its cognition. This lower region is a storehouse of experiences of the most varied kinds; in fact, all the experiences that make up human life.' Having described these experiences, the author goes on: 'All these things are latent. The door of that treasure-house, which is also a workshop, is locked, so far as the conscious personality is concerned. For it there is no "harrowing of hell," no triumphant descent into the nether world, followed by a release and return of captives on any large scale. The door is locked against any such violent irruption. And yet, in some strange way, there seem to be open chinks and crevices through which there is a constant coming and going, denizens or manufactured products of the lower world returning to the upper air of consciousness, and once more entering into the train and sequence of what we call active life, though, indeed, the invisible processes of this life are just as active as the visible. It appears to be the function of the sub-conscious and unconscious states to *feed* the conscious. There is that continual movement from below upwards of which I have been speaking. A never-ending train of images, memories, and ideas keeps emerging into the light. But only in part are they subject to the will and conscious reason. Only in part do they come *at call*. And only in part do they come in fully organized form. . . . The wonderful thing is that, while the unconscious and sub-conscious processes are (generally speaking) similar in kind to the conscious, they surpass them in degree. They are subtler, intenser, further-reaching, more penetrating. It is something more than a mere metaphor when we describe the sub- and unconscious states as more "profound"' (*Christologies, Ancient and Modern*, Oxf. 1910, pp. 142–145).

The wonderful passage just quoted prompts one to ask a number of questions. We are told that the door of the treasure-house is locked; yet Sanday seems to have obtained the key, for he describes the treasures which are there, and the work which is done there, and is able to compare it with the work done in the upper air. He is able also to declare that the processes down below are subtler, intenser, further-reaching, more penetrating. How has he come to know all this? If it be so, what is the use of a consciousness if the sub-conscious and the unconscious can do so much better work, and at so much less cost? As for ourselves, we are inclined to say of these fancies that they are 'whimsies'—the word Professor James himself employed when dealing with the question of the existence of unconscious mental states. James has seemingly changed his view on the matter, and we submit that he was bound to answer his own arguments as these are set forth in his *Principles of Psychology*. These seem to us as cogent as they were before what he calls the discovery in 1886. When he declares that 'the sub-conscious self is nowadays a well-accredited psychological entity,' we are surely entitled to ask what meaning he attaches to the word 'self' in this connexion. In the interesting chapter on the consciousness of self in the *Principles of Psychology*, he speaks of the constituents of the self as the material self, the social self, the spiritual

self, and the pure ego. In the course of the discussion he says that the substantialist view of the soul '*is at all events needless for expressing the actual subjective phenomena of consciousness as they appear.* We have formulated them all without its aid, by the supposition of a stream of thoughts, each substantially different from the rest, but cognitive of the rest and "appropriative" of each other's content. At least, if I have not already succeeded in making this plausible to the reader, I am hopeless of convincing him by anything I could add now. The unity, the identity, the individuality, and the immateriality that appear in the psychic life are thus accounted for as phenomenal and temporal facts exclusively, and with no need of reference to any more simple or substantial agent than the present Thought or "section" of the stream' (*op. cit.* i. 344).

It is true that this passage relates only to the active subjective phenomena of consciousness as they appear. Are we to have one method and one form of process as applied to the phenomena of consciousness, and another when we apply them to the sub-conscious and the unconscious? Under what heading are we to place the entity called 'the sub-conscious self'? Is it material, social, spiritual? Or is it the pure ego? Yet the sub-conscious self is 'a well-accredited psychological entity.' Are we to lay stress on the adjective 'psychological,' or on the substantive 'entity'? We should like to know a little more regarding the sub-conscious self, but it seems that it is really outside the scope of psychological investigation. The door is locked, and no one can find the key. The effects of this doctrine of the sub-conscious self on psychology, ethics, and theology are so far-reaching, and to us so disastrous, that a thorough investigation of it and its claims is urgent. That investigation cannot be made here and now; we are concerned with it only so far as it bears on our present theme.

What are we to make of this wonderful sub-conscious self, which does such marvellous things? Are we to take it as a positive conception, and with Hartmann use it as an explanatory principle, when all other sources of explanation fail? Then we say with Höffding: 'Psychology is on secure ground only when it confines itself to the clear and certain phenomena and laws of consciousness' (*Psychology*, Eng. tr. p. 73). True, Höffding immediately adds: 'But, starting from this point, it discovers the unconscious, and sees, to its astonishment, that psychological laws prevail beyond the province of conscious life. In what follows we shall adduce some examples to make this clear.' Reference is made to memory, to the physiology of the senses, to instinct, and to tact, to the fact that an unconscious activity can be carried on simultaneously with a conscious, as 'when a spinner turns the wheel, and draws out the thread, while her thoughts are far away.' But, as the outcome of the whole discussion, Höffding cautiously says:

'Notwithstanding the intimate connection and close interaction between the conscious and the unconscious, the latter remains for us a negative conception. The unconscious processes are cerebral processes just as much as the conscious, but whether, like these, they are of several kinds, we do not know. Instead of speaking of unconscious thought or unconscious feeling, it would be safer—if we wish to avoid all hypotheses—to speak with Carpenter and John Stuart Mill of unconscious cerebration, were not this expression unsuitable, as suggesting, in the first place, the mistaken notion that there may be consciousness of cerebration, properly so called, and because, in the second place, it might appear to affirm that there is nothing at all in unconscious activity related to what we know in ourselves as conscious states' (p. 81).

While mental activity may extend beyond consciousness, and while self may have a larger range than the consciousness is aware of at any one time, it is not possible for psychology, or for clear science, to seek for the principles of rational explanation anywhere save in the conscious life itself. The unconscious must remain a negative conception. It is simply metaphor, and bad metaphor at that, to speak of 'invasions,' of 'rushes' and 'uprushes,' from the lower world, and it is vain to seek for explanations of the ongoing of our mental life from what is supposed to have gone on in the sub-conscious self. We must exhaust the possibilities of consciousness, as the source of explanation, ere we seek to bring in the sub-conscious and the unconscious as a positive principle of explanation, as, from the very nature of the case, it is impossible to bring these into clear consciousness, or into consciousness at all. Instead of saying, with Sanday, that the function of the unconscious is to feed the conscious, it would be more consistent with the facts to say that the unconscious and the sub-conscious are storehouses of products manufactured by consciousness, and kept *in retentis* until they are needed. Habit has been described as lapsed intelligence, and is the outcome of repeated conscious processes, so often repeated that they have become automatic. Similarly it may be possible to deal with all the evidence of sub-conscious and unconscious activity of the self so as to show that all or most of these activities had conscious beginnings, and, in any case, that they are not unrelated to conscious activity either in the past or in the present.

At all events, it is not from these unconscious or sub-conscious experiences that our evidence is derived, out of which are built up those conclusions which make up the science, the poetry, the history, and the philosophy of the world. For the principles which underlie these achievements of the human mind, the linkages which bind them together, and the certainty which they attain to are derived from the conscious and not from the unconscious activity of the mind. The basis of certainty lies in consciousness. Its affirmations, its intuitions, are the foundations on which we build. Not on invasions from the sub-conscious, nor on uprushes from the unconscious come those convictions of truth, reality, and necessity, which turn the raw material of our experience into the organized knowledge of the race.

'The necessity of thought which is manifested in the certainty of particular acts of judgment owes its distinctive character in the last instance to the unity of self-consciousness. Every particular judgment may be repeated, with the consciousness of the identity of subject and predicate as well as of the act of judgment; starting from the same data, it is always the same synthesis which takes place, and our self-consciousness cannot exist apart from this invariability. Thus our judging ego, with its unvarying activity, is opposed to particular acts of judgment as a universal, as the same and the permanent which binds together the different and temporarily separated acts of thought. With the confidence of the movement in each particular case is connected the consciousness of unvarying repetition, of return to the same point. In this constancy, which presents a general law in contrast with the particular act, we are conscious of judgment as something withdrawn from the sphere in which we have a subjective choice and are free to bring about alterations; we are conscious of it in the same way as when it maintains itself in some particular act against contradiction. Because this identity and constancy of our action is the condition of our consciousness as one and undivided, it is also the final and fundamental basis upon which we can fall back' (Sigwart, *Logic*, Eng. tr. i. 187).

It is one of the merits of Sigwart's great treatise on Logic that he brings all the logical judgments into close relation to the unity and identity of self-consciousness. We know no work in which this has been done so thoroughly and so convincingly. Take another passage, dealing with certainty:

'The certainty that a judgment is permanent, that the synthesis is irrevocable, that I shall always say the same—this certainty can be forthcoming only when it is known to depend, not upon momentary psychological motives, which vary as time goes on, but upon something which is immutably the same every time I think, and is unaffected by any change. This something is, on the one hand, my self-consciousness itself, the certainty that I am I, the same person who now thinks and who thought before, who thinks both one thing and another. On the other hand, it is that about which I judge, my thought itself as far as regards its invariable content, which I recognize as identical each time, and which is quite independent of the state of mind of the individual thinker. The certainty that I am and think is final and fundamental, the condition of all thought and all certainty whatever. Here there can be none but immediate and self-evident certainty; we cannot even say that it is necessary, for it is prior to all necessity. In the

same way, the certainty of my consciousness that I think this or that is immediate and self-evident; it is inextricably interwoven with my self-consciousness; the one involves the other' (p. 240).

The form under which consciousness exists is that of the distinction of subject and object. As factors in the synthesis of consciousness there are to be distinguished the object of which we are conscious, and the subject which is conscious of the object. The object is for the subject, and is either a state of the subject, or an activity of it, or a quality of external things. When this distinction is clearly made, there is a clear consciousness; when vaguely made, there is a vague consciousness; when it is not made at all, there is no consciousness. When we are conscious, we are conscious of something, and we are conscious of that something only as we distinguish it from self, and place it over against self as its object. We are not to enter into the age-long controversy as to whether there can be a merely sensitive consciousness which is neither subject nor object, but consists only of particular feelings. It has been widely contended that a purely sensitive consciousness is possible, and that the reference to subject and object, which all admit as characteristic of full-grown consciousness, arises out of associated experiences. These are classified as vivid and faint, the vivid coming from the object, and the faint from the subject. Out of these particular feelings association builds up the conception of both subject and object. But Hume does not allow any validity to this conception; it is only a fiction of the mind. Herbert Spencer, while he strives to account for the distinction of subject and object by the associationalist theory eked out by the theory of evolution, does admit, or rather lays stress on, the distinction between subject and object, as a cardinal principle of his synthetic philosophy. But the mere addition of units of conscious feeling could never reach a unitary consciousness. For these units of feeling are each different from all the rest, and, as they begin in time, they perish as soon as they appear, unless they are held together by reference to the self whose they are. States of consciousness can never be without a consciousness of states. If there is to be a consciousness of states, there must be a subject which discriminates itself from the states, can hold them together for discrimination or comparison, and can distinguish all of them as states of itself.

Consciousness may range from the simplest awareness to the closest discrimination. It may be vague and narrow, or it may be clear and comprehensive. The lowest range of consciousness may be dim and indefinite, as when we are dropping off to sleep, or when our attention is directed to something else. In fact, many impressions may be made on our senses which rise only to the threshold of consciousness, and perhaps may not rise even to the threshold.

'In these cases, consciousness approaches a vanishing point, and often reaches and passes it. The object exists for us only as a vague objectivity without definite significance. They emerge from this state only by a voluntary or involuntary direction of our attention towards them. If, now, we choose to call this state unconscious, and reserve the name of consciousness only for clear or distinct consciousness, we should say that very many mental states exist below consciousness. This has often been done, and the theory maintained that we may have manifold sensations and feelings without being conscious of them. But this is simply the extravagance of confounding a vague and imperfect consciousness with none, the truth being that we may have vague and unobtrusive sensations without directing our attention to them; the lower limit of consciousness does not admit of being definitely fixed' (Bowne, *Introd. to Psychological Theory*, p. 239 f.).

The truth is, that we are unable to express consciousness save in the form 'I am thinking this or that, I am feeling pain, I am doing this act, or I am intending to take such a course of action.' It is quite true, as Hume says, that we always find ourselves in some particular state, but in every state, whatsoever it may be, we find ourselves. It is not possible to interview a blank self, or to abstract the ego, so as to have an idea of it as we have of external objects, or of events of a particular kind in consciousness, nor can we make our self completely an object, for, even if that were possible, there is always that subjective activity of the subject which goes on while we seek to make the ego completely objective. While this is so, yet the further step which is so often taken, namely, to abstract altogether from the subject, and to make conscious activity only a stream of thought, or a mere aggregate, seems altogether illegitimate. Can we have a stream of thought, without a single permanent subject of our psychic activities? Even a stream has its identity, and anything which we can call a unity is something more, as already observed, than the sum of its parts. But can we really think of a feeling in abstraction from something that feels, or of a willing without a subject that wills, or of a thought without a thinker? Can we really think of our psychical life in an impersonal way? It is possible to describe, as in fact we do, the outward happenings of the world, and in an impersonal way to say 'it rains,' 'it thunders,' 'it hails,' 'it storms,' 'it is dark,' or 'it is a stormy night.' Try this in describing the psychic life, and immediately we feel how incongruous it is. 'It thinks,' 'it wills,' 'it feels,' 'it is in pain,' 'it is full of joy'—we can write so, as we can write nonsense, but the incongruity is too obvious, when plainly put, to allow us for one moment to regard it as an adequate account of the facts.

Even when a psychologist reduces the phenomena of consciousness to a stream of thought, he is constrained in unguarded moments to speak of our will, our psychical states, thus adding to the stream that factor without which it could not have been even a stream. In the mere statement of the case—a statement which seems at first to eliminate the necessity of a subject—one is forced to imply the subject in every statement. One is compelled to imply a subject. For ideas, feeling, or will are not there in a vacuum; they are, after all, only modes of consciousness. We may neglect a pain which nobody feels, a pleasure which is pleasant to nobody, or a will and a purpose which is the activity of no one. Is it possible to imagine or conceive a perception of these inner experiences where there is no perceiver, a perception which is only the bare object perceived, a mere subjectless feeling? How are we to account for the connexion of all the events of seeing, hearing, feeling, and for the recognition we have that we have had these experiences before, and that we have a memory of them, without the supposition of a subject whose experiences they were? Is it possible for any one really to think of an impersonal stream of thought, which binds into unity all the particular psychical events of our experience, and to suppose, further, an additional impersonal event, by which all the other impersonal events are gathered into one, while yet this additional event is only a phantom, an illusion, although it has the strange power of seeming to itself identical through all the successive moments of its experience? Can we really think so? Is it not easier, more consistent with the facts, to assume the subject as real, as present to all its states, and as able somehow to hold them together, and to group them according to their real resemblances. Can any one think of himself as the sum of the events of his experience, only with the inexplicable addition that it is he who thinks them so? Hume boldly calls this a fiction, and Stuart Mill calls it a 'final inexplicability,' and neglects it as a source of explanation. Is it not the easiest solution simply to acknowledge

that the ideas of persistence and duration find their simplest explanation from the supposition that we are, and know ourselves to be, identical in time?

While we have thus to postulate continuity of the conscious subject—for on any other supposition we should be unable to account for the ideas of change, continuity, or permanence—there are many questions which remain for discussion and for settlement. It is almost a matter of course to say that psychical events as such exist only in so far as they are present in consciousness; their distinctive character lies in the fact that they are conscious. A seeing, of which we know nothing, a pain of which we are not aware, an act of volition which takes place without our being able to notice it, are not possible, for the seeing, etc., is only by means of consciousness. While this is true, it is also true that there are different degrees and modes of becoming conscious. When a consciousness has attained to some fullness of self-possession, and is in possession of the results of experience, there is for such a consciousness a fund of experience organized into masses, and any new experience can take up a new feeling or idea into such an ideal mass already formed. The process is so fully described in many psychological textbooks that we need not dwell on it here. Thus, we refer any new experience of colour to the class of colours we already know, and, being in possession of these names, we name the new experience of colour accordingly. But there was a time in the growth of the subject when names were not in our possession. These names of general ideas are formed gradually from particular perceptions, which at the beginning had no name. But even for the particular perception, or for the particular experience, there is this indispensable condition, that there should be a discrimination of the particular elements which co-exist at every moment, and some notice taken of them. These two conditions must be present before we can properly speak of consciousness at all.

At this earliest stage of conscious life, ere the subject is in possession of the wealth of organized experience, the subject is, as it were, lost in the object.

'Our immediate consciousness of objects seems at first to be a mere presentment of them to the passive subject, to a self that is not in any way occupied with itself, or even conscious of itself at all. The outwardly directed gaze seems simply to admit the object, and not to react, still less to be aware of itself as reacting, upon it. But, in the *first* place, we have learned to recognise that, whether we are conscious of it or not, there *is* always a reaction, an analytic and synthetic activity of thought, even in our simplest perceptive consciousness; for, without this reaction, no idea of any object as distinct from, and related to, other objects could ever arise to trouble the self-involved sleep of sense. Apart from such reaction, we might say that the sensitive subject would remain for ever confined to itself, were it not that in that case there would properly be no self to be confined to; for where there is no outward, there is, of course, no inward life. It is thus the mental activity of the subject that creates for him a world of objects, or, to put it more simply, that enables him to become conscious of the world of objects in which he exists. . . . In the *second* place, not only is the subject active in perception, but he necessarily and inevitably has an inchoate consciousness of himself as a subject, in distinction from the subjects which that activity enables him to apprehend. For to apprehend an effect, as such, is to distinguish it from, and relate it to the self that is conscious of it. It is to refer an idea or feeling to that which is other than the self, to reject it from the self and to objectify it; and such a rejection or repulsion necessarily involves, on the other side, a withdrawal of the self from the object. The simplest outward-looking gaze, which seems to lose itself in the object to which it is directed, yet recognises that object as other than itself or its own state; and, indeed, all its absorption in the object may be said to be its effort to heal the breach, of which, in the very act of perception, it has become conscious. Hence we come to the result that, even in its utmost apparent *passivity* of perception, the mind is *active*; and even in its utmost absorption in the *object*, it is conscious of the *self* in distinction from it. It is true that the subjective aspects of the consciousness of objects are at first latent, or they are present only in an imperfect and inchoate form. Attention is not specially directed to them; and in any description which the individual would give of his own consciousness, they would generally be omitted. But they are always there. For it is not possible, in the nature of things, that there should be an object, except for a subject, or without that subject distinguishing the object from itself, and itself from the object. In this sense there can be no consciousness of objects without self-consciousness. Even, therefore, if the word "I" be delayed for a little, the inchoate thought of it cannot be wanting to one who is conscious of objects as such' (Edward Caird, *The Evolution of Religion*, i. 183–185).

As we know consciousness in ourselves, it has a beginning, a growth, and a history. Thrust into the midst of conditions not realized, slowly learning to find itself at home in the world, and gradually coming to the knowledge that there is an external order to which it is related, the self-conscious being, in intercourse with things, comes, so far, to the knowledge of the world and of itself. The story need not be told here, but there is a story, for the finite personality does come to the knowledge of itself. It learns to distinguish between itself and the world. But consciousness becomes clear and definite when it recognizes that there are distinctions among its objects, and relations into which these can be gathered up. These relations become ever more clear and definite, and, as knowledge progresses, consciousness finds itself in an ordered world, and, just in proportion to its recognition and mastery over the order of the world, is its recognition of itself as the counterpart of the order of the universe. Its own rational principles are realized there, and it becomes more rational as it recognizes the objective value of its own rational nature, as embodied in a rational world. But we may not regard the distinction of self and not-self as if it were identical with the distinction of subject and object. The first may be called an ontological distinction, for it relates to the distinction between two things which make up the whole sphere of being, whereas the distinction between subject and object describes a mental function. The contents of the two are constantly changing. At one moment the object may be this table, with its shape, colour, material; and the next moment it may be the mental process which passed through the mind when the table was the object. The object may be things in the outward world, or it may be the state of consciousness by means of which we deal with the outer world. It may be the thing I see, or it may be the vision through which I see it. The distinction between subject and object is the form under which consciousness always takes place; subject and object are a relation within one experience, and they are essential to the reality of that experience.

It may be observed that the conception of self, like all other conceptions, is one of gradual growth, and the time of its full realization is, for us, not yet. We are not to look for the self as if it were laid on a shelf, a thing among other things. It is the subject of all experience, and usually it is the last conception which is reached by the conscious subject itself. This late recognition of the conception of itself may be paralleled by the late emergence, in the history of thought, of the problem of thought itself. Nothing is nearer to us than thought, and yet the problem of thought is one of the very hardest to grasp. Spontaneous thought deals with objects rather than with itself, and reflexion is hard. Thought hides behind itself; it is so occupied with its processes and problems that it does not reflect on them, and, having reached conclusions unreflectingly, often takes these as original data given from without. Knowledge is taken for granted, and the knowing process was for a long time utterly neglected. Nor had knowledge any suspicion of the complexity of the knowing process, nor did knowledge find it necessary to submit itself to an analysis of the process of knowing or to inquire into its own validity. It was

inevitable that in the long run the question of the possibility of knowledge should arise, but it could not arise until knowledge had been at work for a long time, and had attained to some mastery over itself and its work. So is it with the problem of the self. As shown by Caird in the quotation above, the consciousness of the self in the consciousness of objects is at first latent; it may be delayed, but it is always implicitly there. As a matter of fact, it may always be latent and never come into clear consciousness at all. Self-experience may be the only form which self-consciousness may assume. The self may be so lost in the process of experience, so absorbed in its feelings, desires, and thoughts, that it may never reflect on itself, and never ask consciously what it is. It may remain on this level all through life. Absorbed in its object, living out its experience of pleasure, engrossed in its own pursuits, and interested in the success of its plans, it may never seek to reflect on its own nature or on the order implied in the most simple experience. One may be active, energetic, far-sighted, wise, and yet may have never given a single hour to the thought of that self which has all these characteristics, for in the history of human thought and its evolution the simplest and most fundamental of all problems are the latest to emerge into the light.

The two factors—subject and object—which always represent the form which experience has, are not, at the outset, explicitly distinguished, and experience may go on all through life without any clear consciousness of the distinction. Yet the two inseparable factors are always there. It is always possible, however, to focus our attention on the one factor or on the other. The mind may direct attention on the object or on the subject. The consciousness of self may remain at the level of mere self-experience; it may be so absorbed in the object as never to ask itself about itself. It may, indeed, neglect itself altogether, and may so seek to formulate its experience as to make the subjective factor disappear. Thus it may seek to become a philosophy, and find a sufficient explanation of experience in a something which does not require a subject of knowledge at all. But such a philosophy, though it constantly reappears, is after all inadequate to answer the questions which constantly recur and which we need not here restate. For immediately the question arises as to the subject for whom all experience is possible, and, when we ask this question, the answer must be that a self which is conscious at all has implicitly within itself the possibility of a complete self-consciousness. Focusing our attention, then, on this factor of experience, we can regard it as the subject of experience which takes up all particular experiences, rules them, binds them into a system, and makes them elements in one consistent experience. In this event self-consciousness would have attained its ideal, for it would have reached the goal of self-knowledge and self-control. The conception of a perfect self-consciousness consists in the fact that it is in possession of itself, and can set the bounds of its own experience. Self-knowledge, self-reverence, self-control—in these, and not in finitude or infinitude, lies the conception of a perfect selfhood. But for finite beings, for us men, this ideal is a goal, and cannot be an actual attainment. For we do not set the limits of our own experience; we are subject to inrushes from without, we have experiences which are inherently irrational, and we have feelings which are sometimes uncontrollable, and generally there is so much of our experience which is simply given that we cannot be said to be masters of ourselves. Yet the growth of a rational personality is measured by the progress of the mastery which it has over the elements of its own experience, and the power of placing every impulsive and merely emotional element under the guidance of reasonable self-consciousness.

Thus, then, we may regard the self as conscious of itself in all its manifold experiences. Knowledge is possible, because all the objects of knowledge can be brought into relation to the self. Objects out of all relation to the conscious self are for that self non-existent. Whether we look at the self-conscious being from the point of view of knowledge, or from the ethical, or the æsthetic, or the religious point of view, the result is to raise our estimate of the self-conscious being to the highest. For each of these affirms that the self-conscious being is the postulate without which truth, beauty, goodness are without meaning or worth. The conscious subject is the subject for whom all objects are; it is also the subject in which goodness is realized, and ethics affirms that the self is that in which goodness is to be realized through a continual process of self-realization and self-determination. The world of beauty has no meaning without the seeing eye and the ideals which the self in intercourse with the world builds up for itself.

We do not require to follow out the results of the analysis of self-consciousness into its further issues, or to enter into the discussion regarding an absolute, all-inclusive self-consciousness. Whoever seeks to follow out that argument into all its consequences may find it fully unfolded in the works of Hegel and his followers, as well as in the works of Green, of the two Cairds, of Royce, and of many others. It may, however, be said that it is scarcely possible to describe the totality of things according to the analogy of one self. The Hegelian philosophy is a perfect description of the way in which an inchoate self arrives, or may arrive, at self-consciousness. It is of the highest value from that point of view. But to make it absolute seems too great a demand. For this is a universe of many selves, and the unity of the universe cannot be construed after the fashion of the growth and evolution of one self. While, therefore, the world is indebted to the Hegelian idealists for the analysis of self-consciousness, and for the far-reaching results of that analysis, the attempt to construe the life of the universe after that analogy cannot be regarded as final.

Ere we close, it may be well to notice the argument of Bradley, because it would make all the contendings of this article invalid. We quote his summary:

'We had found that our ideas as to the nature of things—as to substance and adjective, relation and quality, space and time, motion and activity—were in their essence indefensible. But we had heard somewhere a rumour that the self was to bring order into chaos. And we were curious first to know what this term might stand for. The present chapter has supplied us with an answer too plentiful. Self has turned out to mean so many things, to mean them so ambiguously, and to be so wavering in its applications, that we do not feel encouraged. We found, first, that a man's self might be his total present contents, discoverable on making an imaginary cross section. Or it might be the average contents we should presume ourselves likely to find, together with something else which we call dispositions. From this we drifted into a search for the self as the essential point or area within the self; and we discovered that we really did not know what this was. Then we went on to perceive that, under personal identity, we entertained a confused bundle of conflicting ideas. Again the self, as merely that which for the time being interests, proved not satisfactory; and from this we passed to the distinction and the division of self as against the not-self. Here, in both the theoretical and again in the practical relation, we found that the self had no contents that were fixed; or it had, at least, none sufficient to make it a self' (*Appearance and Reality*[2], p. 101 f.).

In his own ironical way Bradley had said elsewhere:

'There remains still left a third moral, which, as I am informed, has been drawn by others, that if we are not able to rest with the vulgar, nor to shout in the battle of our great schools,

it might be worth our while to remember that we live on an island, and that our national mind, if we do not enlarge it, may also grow insular; that not far from us there lies (they say so) a world of thought, which, with all variety, is neither one nor the other of our two philosophies, but whose battle is the battle of philosophy itself against two undying and opposite one-sidednesses; a philosophy which *thinks* what the vulgar believe; a philosophy, lastly, which we have all refuted, and, having so cleared our consciences, which some of us at least might take steps to understand' (*Ethical Studies*, p. 38).

Perhaps *Appearance and Reality* is the endeavour to think what the vulgar believe. But there is left in it no shred of belief of what the vulgar believe. Of the whole work set forth with such amazing ability in the last named treatise this much may be said, that it amounts to a demonstration of the uselessness of the attempt to interpret experience from a mere abstract point of view. Bradley finds that all the categories and relations of thought abound in contradiction. Inherence, predication, quality, identity, causality, unity, space, and time are full of contradictions. When we arrive at the question of the self and its reality, contradictions swarm more and more. What is the way out of this network of contradictions? They are somehow removed in the Absolute. These contradictions are Appearance, and Reality has somehow absorbed them into itself. But it would be quite possible to show that the same method used by Bradley to discredit Appearance would work havoc also with the Absolute. That is on the supposition that his logical procedure could be carried out in the Absolute. The greatest contradiction we know is the contradiction between the rigour of his logic as applied to Appearance, and the slackness of it as applied to the Absolute. Apart from this, is not the method of Bradley simply an illustration of a wrong conception of the categories, and of their application?

'The epistemological interest makes us unwilling to admit anything that cannot be conceptually grasped. Accordingly it seeks to make ideas all-embracing. At the same time it is clear that this view is a tissue of abstractions. The impersonal idea is a pure fiction. All actual ideas are owned by, or belong to, some one, and mean nothing as floating free. We have already seen that the various categories of thought, apart from their formal character as modes of intellectual procedure, get any real significance only in the concrete self-conscious life of the living mind. Apart from this, when considered as real, they become self-destructive or contradictory. The idealism of the type we are now considering assumes that these categories admit of being conceived in themselves, and that they are in a measure the pre-conditions of concrete existence, and in such a way that we might almost suppose that a personal being is compounded of being, plus unity, plus identity, plus causality, etc. Thus personal existence appears as the outcome and product of something more ultimate and fundamental. The fictitious nature of this view has already appeared. When we ask what we mean by any of these categories, it turns out, as we have seen, that we mean the significance we find them to have in our self-conscious life. In the concrete the terms have no meaning except as it is abstracted from our own personal experience. The only unity we know anything about, apart from the formal unities of logic, is the unity of the unitary self; and the only identity we know anything about is no abstract continuity of existence through an abstract time; it is simply the self-equality of intelligence throughout its experience. And the change which we find is not an abstract change running off in an abstract time, but is simply the successive form under which the self-equal intelligence realizes its purpose and projects the realizing activity against the background of its self-consciousness. Similarly for being itself; in the concrete it means the passing object of perception, or else it means existence like our own' (Bowne, *Personalism*, p. 253 ff.). Again, 'The notion of the self can easily be taken in such a way as to be worthless. We are asked of what use the self is, after all, in explaining the mental life. How does its unity explain the plurality and variety of consciousness?, and the answer is that it does not explain it, and yet the unity is no less necessary. For the consciousness of plurality is demonstrably impossible without the fact of conscious unity. This unity does not, indeed, enable us to deduce plurality, and hence the plurality must be viewed as an aspect of the unity, but not as an aspect of an abstract unity without distinction or difference, but a living conscious unity, which is one in its manifoldness and manifold in its oneness. Taken verbally, this might easily be shown to be contradictory, but, taken concretely, it is the fact of consciousness, and none the less so because our formal and discursive thought finds it impossible to construe it' (*ib.* p. 261 f.).

The unity of consciousness, the identity of the self-conscious life, the progressive realization of the self in intercourse and in interaction with the world and with its fellows, are thus among the most sure of our beliefs, and among the most indispensable of our postulates. Many further questions arise which cannot be discussed here, for the adequate solution of any one problem involves the solution of every other. But no problem can be solved on a merely impersonal plane, and no category is of value except as a function of the concrete personal life.

LITERATURE.—The following is a selection from the vast literature dealing with the question: **Adamson**, *The Development of Modern Philosophy*, 1903; **Bowne**, *Introd. to Psychological Theory*, 1886, also *Personalism*, 1908; **Bradley**, *Appearance and Reality*, 1893 (2nd ed. 1897), also *Ethical Studies*, 1876; **Edward Caird**, *The Evolution of Religion*, 2 vols. 1893; **Höffding**, *Outlines of Psychology*, Eng. tr. 1892; **James**, *The Principles of Psychology*, 2 vols. 1891, also *Varieties of Religious Experience*, 1902; **Green**, *Works*, ed. Nettleship, vol. i. (1885); **Külpe**, *Outlines of Psychology*, Eng. tr. 1895, also *Introd. to Philosophy*, Eng. tr. 1897; **Lotze**, *Metaphysic*, Eng. tr. 1884; **Ladd**, *Philosophy of Knowledge*, 1897; **Münsterberg**, *Psychology and Life*, 1899; **Shadworth Hodgson**, *The Metaphysic of Experience*, 4 vols. 1898; **Stout**, *Manual of Psychology*, 2 vols. 1898–9; **Sigwart**, *Logic*, 2 vols., Eng. tr. 1895; **Ward**, art. 'Psychology,' in *EBr*[9], also *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, 2 vols. 1899; **Taylor**, *Elements of Metaphysics*, 1903; **Wundt**, *Human and Animal Psychology*, Eng. tr. 1894; **Villa**, *Contemporary Psychology*, 1903; **Royce**, *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*[3], 1897, also *The World and the Individual*, 2 vols. 1900–1; see also the Histories of Philosophy, such as Ueberweg, Höffding, Erdmann.

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CONSECRATION.—'Consecration,' or 'dedication,' may be defined as the solemn setting apart of persons or things for some particular religious work or use. The essence of any such rite or ceremony is to be found in the performance, whenever possible, of some act which is typical, or symbolical, of that for which the setting apart or consecration takes place. This act, either from the first or in process of time, is naturally accompanied by some announcement to the congregation of what is being done or intended, and by forms of prayer asking for the Divine approval and blessing; but no such accompaniments are really essential to the consecration itself, though they increase the dignity of the occasion and tend to general edification. This is, indeed, true of all symbolical rites and ceremonies in their ultimate simplicity, and the Biblical narrative well illustrates the truth in its account of the marriage of Adam and Eve (Gn 2[22]), where the essence of the marriage rite is described in the simple statement that 'the Lord God brought unto the man' the woman whom He had made of the rib taken from his side.

With regard, however, to the consecration of persons or things in the stricter sense with which we are now dealing, we see traces of the original idea in various instances. The ordination of a lector (reader) consists in permitting him for the first time to read the Gospel in the course of the service.[1] A priest is made by permitting him (as in the modern Roman Pontifical) to celebrate the Holy Mysteries simultaneously with the consecrating bishop;[2] and in the same way an altar, and even a church itself,[3] are consecrated by being first used for Holy Communion, and so on. Again, there are cases where the act is more conveniently and suitably symbolical rather than typical: *e.g.*

[1] Cf. Cyprian, *Ep.* xxxiii. 2, where he speaks of a young lector Aurelius thus: 'Dominico legit interim nobis, id est, auspicatus est pacem, dum *dedicat lectionem*' (while he acts in his new capacity as lector).

[2] See Procter and Frere, *New Hist. of Book of Com. Pr.*, Lond. 1901, p. 669 note.

[3] Cf. the letter of Pope Vigilius to Profuturus of Braga (A.D. 538): 'consecrationem cuiuslibet ecclesiae in qua sanctuaria non ponuntur celebritatem tantum scimus esse missarum.' See J. Wordsworth (*On the Rite of Consecration*, p. 6 f.), who points out the significance of the fact that the words κυριακόν and *Dominicum* are used both for the Lord's House or Temple and for the Lord's Supper or Sacrifice; see also Duchesne, *Origines du culte chrét.* p. 404 (Eng. tr.).

the doorkeeper of the church receives the keys of the church doors, the sub-deacon receives the chalice and paten (the vessels of his office), the virgin is veiled to signify her marriage with Christ (or His Church), the lector himself actually receives a copy of those Gospels which he is henceforth privileged to read, and so on. The Greek word commonly used to denote dedication of buildings (ἐγκαίνια; cf. καινίζειν and καινοῦν[1]) itself suggests that the idea here emphasized lies at the root of the ceremonies employed.

It is hardly necessary to say that the Christians were not the first to introduce the practice of thus consecrating, or dedicating, persons or things to religious purposes. Apart from the well-known custom of the Jews (*e.g.* in dedicating houses, Dt 20[5], Ps 30 [title]; or city-walls, Neh 12[27]; or the Temple, 2 Ch. 5. 6; Jos. *Ant.* XI. iv. 7 f., XV. xi. 6), both the Greeks and the Romans (and other nations as well) observed such ceremonies for their priests and sacred buildings. But for Christians, during a considerable period after the foundation of their faith, anything but the simplest and least imposing ceremonies in connexion with consecration would have been both out of place and practically impossible. This article does not deal (except incidentally thus far) with the ordination of the clergy (see ORDINATION). We proceed, therefore, to consider the cases (chiefly those of buildings) to which the word 'consecration' is more usually applied in the present day.

During the first three centuries of the Christian era we have little evidence, if any, of regular rites or ceremonies being in use when places or buildings were set apart for Divine service. Of course, such places or buildings gradually became more and more numerous, and more and more carefully restricted to religious purposes, as persecution decreased and the affairs of the Church became more settled. But we can easily imagine that, almost from the first, forms and ceremonies grew up in connexion with their dedication; for instance, as J. Wordsworth has reminded us,[2] the two primary conditions were probably 'a transference of previous ownership on the part of the Founder, and an acceptance of the trust by the Bishop of the Diocese'; and the only essential ceremony was the solemn celebration of the Holy Eucharist.[3]

'The part played by the Founder or Builder would, in accordance with Jewish and heathen precedent, be a considerable one; and Christian custom, acting in accordance with the principles of Roman law, would prescribe the dedication by solemn and ceremonial use. The *usurpatio juris* of the Christian Society in its new home could hardly be otherwise exemplified than by the Sacrament in which believers, gathered under the presidency of their chief pastor, came together to meet their Lord in His new house, to plead His sacrifice, and to feast upon it.'[4]

We have to dismiss as evidence the quotation from Philo Judæus, *de Vita Contempl.*, given by Eusebius (*HE* ii. 17. 9) and adduced by Bona (*de Reb. Liturg.*, Rome, 1671, I. xix.): ἐν ἑκάστῃ δὲ οἰκίᾳ [of the Therapeutae in Egypt] ἔστιν οἴκημα ἱερὸν ὃ καλεῖται σεμνεῖον καὶ μοναστήριον κ.τ.λ., because Eusebius's identification of the Therapeutae with the Christian ascetics of S. Mark in Alexandria is baseless and next to impossible. And the statement in the Calendar from the Library of the Queen of Sweden, quoted by Baronius (*Annal.* A.D. 57, no. 100), 'Kal. Aug. Romae dedicatio primae ecclesiae a beato Petro constructae et consecratae,' is unhistorical;[1] and so, no doubt, is the assertion attributed to Euodius (Niceph. ii. 3), who was the first bishop of Antioch, that James was consecrated first bishop of Jerusalem, and that the seven deacons were ordained in that house in which Christ instituted the Lord's Supper, and where the Holy Ghost descended on the Apostles.

It is not till the cessation of the persecution of Diocletian that we are on safe ground with regard to any actually recorded service of dedication. Eusebius (*HE* x. 3) speaks of the restoration of peace at that time being marked by the founding of new churches, and, among other signs, mentions ἐγκαινίων ἑορταὶ κατὰ πόλεις καὶ τῶν ἄρτι νεοπαγῶν προσευκτηρίων ἀφιερώσεις, a notable instance being the dedication of the Church at Tyre (in the name of Paulinus), which took place A.D. 314, and at which the historian himself preached the inaugural sermon.[2] There was a large concourse of bishops, clergy, and people on the occasion, and the Holy Mysteries were apparently celebrated, but no other distinctively initiatory ceremony is mentioned. This occasion is historically important, because it seems to be the first recorded instance, both (1) of a kind of consecration service, and (2) of a church with what is now commonly called a 'dedication,' *i.e.* consecrated under the title of a patron saint. Subsequently, instances of both sorts become more and more frequent.

As Duchesne (*loc. cit.*) has pointed out, the church of S. Paulinus at Tyre is a representative of one out of two types of church in the first ages, viz. what we should now call the parochial church of a town or district. Of this type there would sometimes be more than one needed and provided in any single town or district, the principal one of which would, of course, be the 'cathedral,' as we now call it, where the bishop's throne was set up. Churches of this type seem often to have been known by the names of their founders or other great persons connected with the place (*e.g.* at Tyre above, S. Denys and others at Alexandria [Epiph. *Hær.* lxix. 2; *PG* xlii. 205], and S. Ambrose at Milan);[3] or by some great Christian doctrine or event (*e.g.* 'Αγία Σοφία at Constantinople [A.D. 360], or the 'Ανάστασις at Jerusalem).[4] A church called *Dominicum aureum* was dedicated at Antioch by Constantius in 341 (Socr. ii. 8; Sozom. iii. 5).

The other type of church was that which was connected with the tombs of martyrs and other saints. In the catacombs (*q.v.*) at Rome, and in the burying-places (*cœmeteria, polyandria*) generally, the custom gradually grew up (1) of keeping the anniversary of such persons' death (*natalis*) or burial (*depositio*) by a service at their grave, their very tombstone often forming the altar for the consecration of the Sacred Elements; and then (2) of holding services there more frequently than once a year.[5] After a time a church was built over the spot, and called after the name of the martyr or confessor who lay buried under its altar (hence the term *martyrium*, and the like, applied to churches). As churches had to be

[1] ἀφιέρωσις is another noun, and ἀναθεῖναι another verb.
[2] *Op. cit.* p. 6.
[3] Cf. the two corresponding regulations from the letter of Pope Vigilius, quoted above: 'omnes basilicae cum missa debent semper consecrari, et nullus presbyter missas celebrare praesumat nisi in sacratis ab episcopo locis.' These, though not so early as they claim to be, probably embody ancient tradition (Wordsworth, *l.c.*). The *Liber Diurnus*, which gives us very early Roman usage, speaks of dedications without *missæ publicæ* or *publica processio*, but these are (according to Duchesne, *op. cit.* p. 404) 'cases of monastic oratories not open to the public,' so that the inaugural *missæ* would be of a *quasi*-private nature.
[4] Wordsworth, *loc. cit.*

[1] Cf. *Mart. Hier.*; D'Achéry, *Spicileg.* (Paris, 1655–67) tom. iv. The Church of S. Peter ad Vincula on the Esquiline was dedicated in the name of both S. Peter and S. Paul on Aug. 1, in the episcopate of Felix IV. (432–440). There may, however, have been some church-building there before that date.
[2] Quoted by him at length (*loc. cit.* 4).
[3] The *Gel. Sacramentary* (ed. Wilson, Oxford, 1894, p. 140 f.) contains 'orationes et preces in dedicatione basilicae quam conditor non dedicatam reliquit,' and also '[missa] in ejusdem conditoris agendis.'
[4] The mediæval cathedral at Aix in Provence is said to be dedicated to the Transfigured Saviour; and in later times we have dedications like the Ascension, Corpus Christi, etc., or even Holy Cross, House of Prayer, and the like.
[5] Hence what are called the 'stations,' and the 'station days' of early Roman service-books and calendars.

more numerous than martyrs' tombs, it also became sufficient to have some portion of a saint or some small personal relic of him (*pignora, sanctuaria*), perhaps only a piece of linen dipped in his blood, or even portions of the Gospel or of consecrated bread, to represent or symbolize the 'patron' in each case; and eventually this second type of church was adopted, though very gradually, and not so universally as is sometimes imagined, at all events throughout Western Christendom.[1] See, further, art. COMMEMORATION OF THE DEAD.

Perhaps we may at this point distinguish yet a third type of church of which we sometimes hear in ancient history, viz. buildings which were adapted from secular or heathen purposes to Christian. It used to be held that this was the origin of the *basilica* form of church, the Roman law-court or business-exchange being turned into a Christian building; but this theory has been, we think, successfully disproved of late years.[2] We do, however, hear of heathen temples being so converted, though it is probable that in many cases the old building was pulled down and a new one erected with the old material; *e.g.* the Pantheon at Rome was consecrated by Boniface IV. (608–614) under the title of S. Mary ad Martyres on May 13; and Martène (*de Ant. Ritt.*, Antwerp, 1700, II. xiv. 4–5) gives other instances in both East and West.[3] Jewish synagogues were also subjected to the same treatment.[4]

As to the *ceremonies* connected with the dedication of churches, considerable diversity must have prevailed from the first, if we are to judge by such scanty evidence as we possess; and this diversity lasted in the West well into the Middle Ages. At Tyre in 314, as we have seen, the ceremonial is of the simplest; a large assembly of bishops, clergy, and laity from the town and neighbourhood assisted at the first celebration of the Holy Mysteries, and a dedicatory sermon was preached. More than 200 years later the essence of dedication was still distinctly recognized as consisting in the public celebration of the Holy Communion and nothing else. In 538, Vigilius, Bp. of Rome, writes to Profuturus of Braga (in Spain) to the effect that, in the case of ordinary churches, it is not even necessary to sprinkle holy water by way of consecration,[5] since this is sufficiently effected by the celebration of Mass; in the case of churches of the second type above described, the relics of martyrs (*sanctuaria*) must be previously deposited in the church, or, if they have been removed, they must be replaced. The 'Leonine' Sacramentary contains a 'missa in dedicatione [ecclesiae]'; but this is, of course, for use either after the dedicatory rite itself or on the anniversary day.[6]

It is noticeable that, while the earliest form of the 'Gregorian' Sacramentary does not provide for the dedication of churches, the 'Gelasian'[1] does; and this, combined with other evidence or indications given and discussed by Duchesne (*op. cit.*), suggests that, in this as in other cases, the local Roman church was originally inclined to a severe simplicity in matters of ritual, and that the fuller ceremonies and forms of prayer which afterwards obtained and are still in use in the Roman Communion are traceable to foreign or 'Gallican' influences.[2] It seems not unlikely also that those ceremonies in the Western rite which are distinctive of consecration proper are ultimately derived from the East (*e.g.* from the Byzantine ritual), and that only the part relating to the deposition of relics in the new building is originally Roman. The student cannot fail to be struck, as Duchesne and others have pointed out, with the fact that this deposition of the relics, as given in its fullest form in the two most ancient *Ordines Romani*,[3] partakes distinctly of a funeral character, while the 'Gallican' ceremonies all point to the idea of adapting the Christian baptism of persons to the dedication of buildings. The modern Roman service is a combination of the two types of ceremony, but in it the deposition of the relics is to some extent outbalanced and overshadowed by the consecration rites proper.

A concise description in detail of the regulations and order of service as now provided in the Roman Pontifical is subjoined, and will be found useful, both because it exhibits most of the rites that have gradually gathered round the occasion in Western Christendom, and because it is the basis on which, since tne Reformation, the Bishops of the Anglican Communion bave, with varying degrees of exactness, drawn up their Consecration Offices.

With regard to the first point, it will be well to bear carefully in mind what J. Wordsworth has remarked in the valuable treatise (*On the Rite of Consecration*, p. 13) to which reference has already been made: 'I conjecture that (here), as usual, in process of time, diverse ceremonies were heaped together without much regard to their congruity.' Wordsworth makes this remark with special reference to the ceremony of the *abecedarium* (see below), but one feels its applicability to a good deal of the present overloaded service. As to post-Reformation forms of consecration, the student will find a list of those 'in use in the 17th century' on p. 27 f. of the same treatise, and the present Sarum Form on p. 30 ff. (with the music). This is much the most satisfactory adaptation of ancient forms and uses, Eastern as well as Western, that the present writer is acquainted with. The S.P.C.K. also publish the forms authorized for the dioceses of London, Truro, Worcester, Wakefield, and Winchester; and of these the first three more or less follow the old lines, whilst the last two are based on Bp. Andrewes' Form (1620). It may be added that no Form would seem to be really adequate which does not provide that the consecrating bishop shall conclude the consecration with a solemn Eucharist, either at the time itself, or, if the service take place in the evening, at a reasonably early hour the next morning.[4] This provision is made in the Form of the modern Irish Church, and in that of the Church of the United States of America.

The similar description of the modern Eastern rite, with which this article concludes, will be likewise interesting both in itself and as illustrating much that has been said during the course of our discussion.

i. *MODERN ROMAN USE.*—I. Preparatory regulations.—(1) Consecration may take place any day, but by preference on Sunday or a Saint's day. (2) The archdeacon is to give notice of the day fixed beforehand. (3) The consecrator, the clergy, and the people should fast before the service. (4) On the evening before, the consecrating bishop prepares the relics which are to be deposited in the church, placing them under seal in a suitable casket, with three grains of frankincense and a written record of the consecration, and laying the

[1] See on this point a valuable paper by Wickham Legg, in no. lxxiii. of *Ch. Hist. Soc.'s Tracts*, p. 53 ff., and another by J. Wordsworth in no. lii. of the same series, p. 19 ff. (already quoted). Cf. also P. Lejay's article on the Ambrosian Rite in *DACL*, pp. 1437–9. 'I would venture to suggest that the reason of the absence of the rite from this [English] form of consecration was that the early British and Irish Churches only dedicated their churches to living saints. In this case no relics could be had, and therefore the rite was of necessity omitted' (T. Olden on the *Leabhar Breac*, 1900, vol. iv. pt. ii., S. Paul's Eccl. Soc. p. 99).

[2] *E.g.* by G. Baldwin Brown, *From Schola to Cathedral*, App. i. p. 217 ff.

[3] Cf. Bede, *HE.* i. 30.

[4] Cf. *Gel. Sacram.* p. 141 f. (ed. Wilson), which gives 'orationes et preces in dedicatione loci illius ubi prius fuit synagoga.'

[5] This, which is now such an important part of the Roman rite, seems originally to have been practised by Christians to purify their private houses rather than their churches (see Duchesne, *op. cit.* p. 407 [quoting *Lib. Pontif.* i. 127]).

[6] P. 15, ed. Feltoe, Camb. 1896; the collect here speaks of 'hostias quas maiestati tuae in honore beati apostoli Petri cui haec est basilica sacrata deferimus,' and each of the other formulæ also mentions S. Peter.

[1] P. 133 ff., ed. Wilson.

[2] On this point, see E. Bishop, *Genius of the Roman Rite*, 1899; and Wickham Legg, *Rec. Lit. Research*, p. 3 ff.

[3] One, that of S. Amand (Paris, 974) of the late 7th cent. printed by Duchesne (*op. cit.* p. 456 ff.); the other, that of Verona, edited by F. Bianchini (*Anast. Biblioth.* iii. 48).


[4] See Wordsworth's remarks (*op. cit.* p. 9 f.).

casket on a bier with lighted candles under a tent before the principal door.[1] Vigil is kept, and Nocturns and Lauds are sung before the relics that night.[2] (5) Inside the church a large number of articles have to be prepared for various purposes during the service, and care has to be taken that the church has a free passage round it outside. (6) On the morning of the day itself the bishop enters the church in ordinary dress, and sees that everything is in order, and that the 12 candles over the 12 consecration crosses on the inner walls are lighted.[3] He then leaves the church empty, save for one deacon vested in amice, alb, girdle, and white stole, who stands behind the principal door, when it is closed upon him.

2. The ceremony.—(1) The service proper is now begun. The bishop, having fully vested himself, and being attended by another deacon, a sub-deacon, acolytes, and other ministers, goes to the place where the relics are reposing, and the seven Penitential Psalms are recited. He then proceeds to a faldstool before the church door, and, kneeling there, after an antiphon and collect ('Actiones nostras, quaesumus, Domine,' etc.),[4] says with the choir the first portion of the Litany.

(2) The next ceremony is the exorcizing and blessing of salt and water, which, being afterwards mixed and again blessed, are made use of in the following manner: First the bishop sprinkles himself and his assistants, whilst the choir sing the usual antiphon, 'Asperges me,' etc.; he then marches three times, preceded by two candle-bearers, round the outside of the church, sprinkling the walls as he goes,[5] the choir singing an appropriate responsory; each time he reaches the principal door, he first kneels and says a collect, and then performs this very ancient and dramatic ceremony:[6] he stands on the threshold and strikes the door with the butt end of his staff,[7] saying, 'Attollite portas, principes, vestras,' etc. (Ps 23[7] Vulg.); the deacon from within (see above) inquires, in the words of ver. 8, 'Quis est iste rex gloriae?' and the bishop answers, 'Dominus fortis et potens,' etc.; at the third time those who stand by call out 'Aperite,' the bishop makes the sign of the cross on the threshold, the door is opened, and the procession passes in, the bishop proclaiming, 'Pax huic domui,' and the deacon from within replying, 'In introitu vestro.'

(3) Whilst the bishop goes to the centre of the building, two antiphons are sung, the use of the second of which is very ancient, 'Zacchæe, festinans descende' (see above). Then, during the singing of the 'Veni, Creator Spiritus,' one of the ministers sprinkles ashes[8] in the form of a S. Andrew's cross (*decussis*) on the floor of the nave,[1] thus:



The second part of the Litany is next said to the end, but with special petitions by the bishop, standing, for the church and its altar now in act of being consecrated. After this the bishop says two collects, the second an ancient one ('Magnificare, Domine,' etc.),[2] and then, whilst the choir sings the song of Zacharias (Lk 1[68ff.]), with antiphon 'O quam metuendus,' etc., between every two verses, he occupies himself in writing with the end of his staff the letters of the Greek alphabet on the cross aforesaid, from the left Western corner to the opposite Eastern corner, and of the Latin alphabet from right to left.[3]

(4) This done, the bishop approaches within a fair distance (*spatio congruenti*) of the high altar, and says three times: 'Deus, in adiutorium meum intende, ℟ Domine, ad adiuvandum me festina,' with the 'Gloria Patri.' Hereupon salt and water are for a second time exorcized and blessed (with new formulæ); ashes also are blessed and mixed with the salt and water; then wine is blessed and added to the mixture.[4] Finally, two prayers are uttered: (i.) that the Holy Spirit may be sent down upon the mixture;[5] and (ii.) that all kinds of

[1] This is most conveniently the west door, if the structure has one.

[2] All this is in accordance with very ancient use, probably Gallican (see *Sacramentary of Drogon, Bishop of Metz* [826–855], quoted by Duchesne, *op. cit.* p. 487 ff., and described by Delisle, *Mém. sur d'anciens sacramentaires*, Paris, 1886, p. 100 ff.).

[3] Gallican. These crosses are still often to be found in our English churches. 'It is said that the English use differed from the foreign in having crosses both within and without. The Irish use shows its primitive character in ordering the crosses to be cut with a knife, no doubt on wooden posts,' etc. (J. Wordsworth, *op. cit.* p. 16; cf. Wickham Legg, *op. cit.* p. 54).

[4] *Pontifical of Egbert*, 1853 (Surtees Soc.), *Benedictional of Archbp. Robert* (H. Bradshaw Soc.); cf. *Gel. Sacr.* (p. 327, ed. Wilson, 1894). The antiphon now is 'Adeste, Deus unus omnipotens,' etc.; in the above-named Pontificals it is 'Zacchæe, festinans descende,' etc., which now comes later in the service.

[5] This is the first of two sprinklings that occur; see note 1 on next col. for comments on the origin of the practice.

[6] Gallican. *Egb. Pont.*, *Bened. of Archbp. Robt.*, etc.

[7] The earliest word for 'staff' here is *cambuca* (or *cambuta*), 'shepherd's crook,' perhaps derived from κάμπτειν.

[8] The introduction of ashes on which to write looks very like a later artifice to enable the 'bishop to do something which at first he would have been able to do without difficulty' (J. Wordsworth).

[1] The origin of this rite, which is probably Gallican, has puzzled the learned. It has been connected with the cross drawn by the Roman augurs in laying out a *templum*, and by the surveyors (*agrimensores*) in measuring out land for a colony (*e.g.* de Rossi, *Bullet. di archeol. christ.*, 1881, p. 140 ff.). The application of the second usage is approved by Duchesne (*op. cit.* p. 417), and by H. le Clercq and P. Lejay (*DACL*, p. 58, 1438). On the other hand, Wordsworth (*op. cit.* p. 11 ff.) criticizes the applicability of either usage to the rite in question. The surveyor's cross was, he says, 'one of 4 right angles,' 'like the St. George's cross on our flags, cutting the four sides into equal portions,' and the letters they used were in no way attached to these lines, but 'scattered all about the plane.' It is therefore, of the two, more likely that the peculiar Christian rite came from 'a vague memory' of the old laying out of a heathen temple than from the other; and he prefers de Rossi's suggestion that the figure is really a Greek χ and the initial of our Lord's name in that language. 'To write His name' symbolically upon the new church floor 'would be a very fitting mark of His ownership.' He further conjectures that the ceremony originally belonged to the laying out of the first sketch or foundation of the building rather than to the actual consecration (see note 5 above); cf. the Gr. σταυροπήγιον and the modern laying of the foundation-stone. The antiphon, 'Fundamentum aliud nemo potest,' etc., and the Psalm 86, 'Fundamenta eius,' etc., which are found at this point in *Bened. of Archbp. Robt.*, tend to corroborate the view suggested. It may be added that the ceremony, as at present practised, is rather ineffective, and does not appear to fit at all well into the rest of the service.

[2] Duchesne thinks that this and two other prayers which occur later on (*Deus qui loca*, etc., and *Deus sanctificationum*, etc.) may have been borrowed by the Gallican Rite from some Roman *Missa Dedicationis*. This first one occurs in the *Gelasian Sacram.* (p. 140, ed. Wilson) in such a *Missa*, but in the Missal of Gellone, *Egb. Pont.*, *Greg.* (472 Mur.), etc., in the same place as now. The other two are both found in *Pont. of Egbert* and *Bened. of Archbp. Robt.*

[3] In some early Sacramentaries it seems as if the Latin alphabet was written on both the intersecting lines, and we hear also of the Hebrew alphabet being likewise sometimes used. To Wordsworth (*op. cit.* p. 12) 'the alphabet seems to be another symbol of Christ as the word of God, not only Alpha and Omega, but all that lies between,—every element, in fact, of human speech.'

[4] This holy water is technically called in later times 'Gregorian,' as though instituted by Gregory the Great; its use seems to have been common to both the Roman and the 'Gallican' Rites, though in the letter of Bp. Vigilius to Profuturus (A.D. 538) it is mentioned only to be disapproved of ('nihil iudicamus officere si per eam [ecclesiam] minime aqua exorcizata iactetur'). The *ordo* of Verona (see note 3 on p. 60[b]) mentions the use at the end of the service, but this may be a later addition.

[5] Gell., *Egb. Pont.*, *Bened. of Archbp. Robt.*, etc.

benefits typified by it may accrue to the newly consecrated building. The bishop then signs the inside of the church door with two crosses, using his staff, and uttering another prayer suitable to the action. Returning to his former position, he invites the congregation to pray for a blessing upon the building, 'per aspersionem huius aquae cum vino, sale et cinere mixtae.'[1]

(5) *Consecration of the altar.*—The choir begins by singing Psalm 92 ('Judica me,' etc.), with the antiphon ('Introibo,' etc.),[2] while the bishop, standing before the altar, dips his thumb into the 'Gregorian' water and makes a cross first in the middle of the *mensa* and then at each of its four corners, saying, 'Sanctificetur hoc altare,' etc., each time. At the conclusion of the introit, the bishop, having said the prayer 'Singulare illud,' etc., goes seven times round the altar, sprinkling the holy water with a branch of hyssop, whilst the antiphon ('Asperges,' etc.) and Psalm 50 ('Miserere mei,' etc.) are said.[3]

(6) All the walls and pavements of the church inside are sprinkled in the same manner three times, during the singing of Psalms 121, 67, and 90, with various antiphons. Two prayers[4] (both ancient) and a preface follow, the bishop standing with his face towards the door.

(7) The bishop now goes up once more to the altar, mixes some cement with holy water, which he duly blesses, and throws what remains of the water away at the base of the altar.

(8) His next duty is to go and bring the relics solemnly to their new resting-place in, or under, the altar that has been prepared for them.[5] This he does with much ceremony while the choir sings Psalm 94 ('Venite, exultemus,' etc.), with several antiphons. But, before entering the church with his sacred burden, he carries it once round the building outside, and delivers a set oration at the principal door, on the duty of treating churches with reverence[6] and on the importance of endowments, after which the archdeacon reads two decrees of the Council of Trent. The bishop next addresses the founder of the church as to his intentions in maintaining it and the clergy attached to it, and, on being satisfied with regard to them,[7] asks for the people's prayers on his behalf, whereupon the responsory ('Erit mihi Dominus in Deum,' etc., Gn $28^{21.22}$) is sung. The bishop also signs the outside of the door with chrism, which he has brought down with him from the sanctuary. At last the procession enters the church itself bearing the relics, while Psalms 149 and 150 are sung, with various antiphons. After a collect ('Deus, qui in omni loco,' etc.),[8] the bishop first signs with chrism the receptacle[1] in which the relics are to be laid, and then places the vessel containing them therein.[2] While the antiphon 'Sub altare Dei,' etc., is sung, he censes the relics, and fixes with the cement he has previously prepared (see above) the slab upon the *confessio.* Further antiphons are sung, and other collects ('Deus qui ex omni cohabitatione [or coaptione],'[3] etc., and 'Dirigatur oratio nostra,' etc.) are said while this work is carefully completed.

(9)[4] The *mensa altaris* (*i.e.* the upper slab) is then censed, anointed, and blessed with a number of antiphons, collects, and Psalms (83, 91, 44, 45, and 86). In this part of the ceremony *oleum catechumenorum* as well as *sanctum chrisma* is used for anointing, to typify the right of confirmation as the completion of the initiatory rite.

(10) After this the 12 consecration crosses on the inner walls of the building (see above) are each separately visited to be anointed, censed, and blessed, after the singing of Ps 147, an antiphon, and two responsories.

(11) Incense is now specially blessed, and has then by the bishop's own hands to be formed into 5 crosses, placed with holy water, oil, chrism, and wax on the 5 crosses of the *mensa*, and lighted with antiphons and prayer ('Domine sancte,' etc.).[5] The ashes are carefully removed, the bishop says another prayer and preface,[6] and Ps 67 is sung, with an antiphon. The altar is yet again anointed in silence, and, after two more prayers ('Majestatem tuam,' etc.,[7] and 'Supplices te deprecamur,' etc.), the bishop goes to his throne near the altar and cleanses his hands with bread, while the subdeacons wipe the *mensa* with coarse towels.

(12) The other vessels and ornaments of the church and altar are then similarly dedicated with antiphons, responsories, Ps 62, and collects, and at last, when the altar has been properly vested and prepared, the *Missa dedicationis* is solemnly celebrated.

At the end of the service the ashes on which the alphabet was traced are removed, and the whole church is cleansed.

ii. *MODERN EASTERN RITE.*—For this we must take the Orthodox Greek Church as the norm. Here there is a general resemblance to the Western rite; but, though there has been a certain amount of elaboration introduced into the service during the last 200 years,[8]—partly, perhaps, in the direction of assimilation to Western usage,[9]—yet it is, on the whole, a simpler ceremony, and there are important divergencies.

To begin with, there is a short and simple form

[1] This ceremony seems to be somewhat delayed by the intrusion of the consecration of the High Altar and others if required, though, no doubt, that ceremony consists in part of sprinkling with the water.

[2] The usual introit at Mass.

[3] The rite may be derived from the Christian practice of sprinkling holy water in their dwellings (see Duchesne, *op. cit.* p. 407, and cf. *Gel. Sacr.* p. 285 ff. [ed. Wilson], which provides two forms of 'Benedictio aquae spargendae in domo'). See note 5 on p. 60ª above.

[4] These are the prayers mentioned in note 2 on p. 61ᵇ above. The preface is in *Pont. Egb.* and *Bened. of Archbp. Robt.*

[5] It seems probable that this might at one time take place on another day or even, as has already been mentioned, not at all in certain cases. In the *Ambr. Pontifical* (ed. Magistretti, Milan, 1897), *Pont. Egb.*, and *Bened. of Archbp. Robt.*, the deposition of relics is placed later in the service, after the blessing of the linen and other apparatus; in the *Pontifical* of Dunstan there is a separate heading here: 'Incipit ordo quomodo in sancta Romana ecclesia reliquiae conduntur'; and similar evidence is supplied by other Pontificals; see Dewick's remarks in a footnote to Wordsworth, *op. cit.* p. 22.

[6] For an early instance of reverence for churches in a hitherto neglected portion of Christendom, cf. canons 38 and 58 of Rabbûla, Bp. of Edessa (A.D. 411–435), quoted by F. C. Burkitt, *Early Eastern Christianity*, London, 1904, p. 148 f.

[7] All these (exhortation, decrees, and address) or any of them may be omitted now.

[8] *Bened. of Archbp. Robt., Greg.* (481 Mur.), etc.

[1] This is now called 'confessio, id est, sepulchrum altaris.' The term *confessio* is found also in many early books; it is equivalent to *martyrium*, and means the hollow place beneath the altar which is still to be seen in some of the oldest Roman churches, and which is the origin of the later and larger crypts, marking the place of burial of the martyrs over whom the church was first raised.

[2] The only direction now is that this should be done 'veneranter,' but in the *Ambr. Pontif.* and *Pont. of Egb.*, as also in *Greg.* (481 Mur.), the rubric requires that a veil should be stretched in front of the altar at this point ('extenso velo inter eos [*sc.* clericos] et populum'). Both the *Bened. of Archbp. Robt.* and the *Pont. Egb.* characterize a prayer at this part of the service as 'oratio post velatum altare,' but it is not quite clear whether the word does not here mean 'vested' rather than 'veiled.' What this veil was which Duchesne considers 'Gallican' is uncertain; perhaps it was only the ordinary altar curtain, which there is reason to believe used to be drawn before the altar at the consecration in the Mass (see Wickham Legg, *op. cit.* p. 9).

[3] *Gel.* (p. 139, ed. Wilson) and *Greg.* (482 Mur.), *Bened. of Archbp Robt.*, etc.

[4] Sections (9), (10), and (11) seem each to be of 'Gallican' origin.

[5] *Greg.* (485 Mur.).

[6] Both of these are found in *Greg.* (484–5 Mur.) and *Bened. of Archbp. Robt.*

[7] *Greg.* (486 Mur.) and *Bened. of Archbp. Robt.*

[8] See Neale, *Gen. Introd. to Hist. of East. Ch.*, London, 1850, p. 1043, etc.

[9] But see what is said on p. 60ᵇ above.

provided for laying a foundation-stone. This consists of first censing the site, the choir going in procession with the bishop round the foundations, singing the ἀπολυτίκια of the saint in whose name the church is to be dedicated. Then, after a prayer on the site of the future altar, the bishop takes a stone, makes the sign of the cross with it, and lays it somewhere on the foundation, saying, 'God is in the midst of thee,' etc.

In due time, when the church is built and ready for use, the dedication (ἐγκαίνια) itself takes place. The following articles have to be prepared beforehand: 4 drams of pure wax, 20 drams each of mastic, myrrh, aloes, incense, resin, and ladanum, 2 vessels, some paper and twine, a litre of finely powdered marble, relics of martyrs with a little silver receptacle, holy chrism, 10 cubits of linen cloth, 2 napkins, 4 pieces of white soap, a new sponge, a vessel of wine, 4 pieces of cloth embroidered with the figures or names of the Evangelists, the καρασάρκιον[1] and as many ἀντιμίνσια[2] as the bishop intends to consecrate (see below, p. 63[b]).

Then, on the evening before the day fixed for the consecration, the bishop and clergy meet in the new church. The relics are placed upon the δίσκος (paten) in three parts on the altar, and covered with the ἀστερίσκος and the ἀήρ. A short service is conducted, consisting of the Blessing, the Trisagion, the Lord's Prayer, certain τροπάρια, and the Dismissal (ἀπόλυσις).

Next, if the church is to be fully dedicated (*i.e.* not as a mere oratory or for temporary use),[3] the relics are taken out into some neighbouring consecrated church, and laid upon the altar there; otherwise, this adjournment does not take place, and whatever service there is, is performed in the new building. Vigil is kept that night in presence of the relics. (1) There is a special ἑσπέρινος (Vespers), with proper ἰδιόμελα and three proper lessons (viz. 1 K 8^{22-61}, Ezk 43^{27}–44^{4}, and Pr 3^{19-35}). (2) Later on, again, there is a special ὀρθρός (Lauds), in which the Gospel is that of the saint of the dedication; the proper canon, with its nine odes, is attributed to John of Damascus. This service is concluded with the great Doxology.

Next day, after a short rest, the bishop and clergy assemble once more in the new church. In one vessel the wax, mastic, etc., are all melted together in a fire. In the other water is heated. The *mensa* is taken off its supporting pillars, and paper is wrapped round the latter, projecting an inch above the top, so as to hold the powdered marble when it is poured in. Thereupon the priest begins the office of the Prothesis, while the bishop proceeds to the old church, where he dons his episcopal robes, and orders the Liturgy proper to be begun. A procession is formed, in which the people carry lighted tapers, the clergy the Gospels, and the bishop the relics on his head. They start for the new church, singing various τροπάρια, and marching round the precincts, till they reach the doors, outside which the relics are deposited on the τετραπόδιον.[4] After the προκείμενον, the Epistle (ἀπόστολος; He $2^{11-\text{end}}$) and the Gospel (Mt 16^{13-20}) are read.

After this, another procession takes place round

[1] A linen cloth, the length of the Holy Table, forming the middle one of its three coverings.

[2] The bottom cloth upon the Holy Table is so called. The natural derivation of the word would be as if it were a substitute (ἀντί) for the *mensa*, and this seems to accord with the use of the article; but it is always spelt with ι, not ε, and *μίνσος* is said to be a canister (Neale, *op. cit.* p. 186).

[3] The word for this is ἐντεθρονισμένος, which is said to imply the setting up of the bishop's throne in it, because every church in his diocese is potentially his cathedral, and becomes so for the time when he is present (see Neale, *op. cit.* p. 1043, note, and Fortescue, *Orth. East. Ch.*, London, 1907, p. 404, note 2).

[4] This four-legged table usually stands near the *iconastasis* for the use of the clergy (see Neale, *op. cit.* p. 1044).

the outside of the church, whilst they sing the 3rd ode of the canon mentioned at ὀρθρός above. This is followed by a second Epistle (He 9^{1-8}) and Gospel (Lk $10^{38-\text{end}}$).

For a third time they march round the walls, while the 6th ode of the canon is sung. Then the relics are laid upon the τετραπόδιον as before, the bishop prays, and a τροπάριον is sung. Standing before the closed church doors, the clergy sing Ps $24^{7\text{ff.}}$, some from within demanding 'Who is the King of Glory?' and those without answering.[1] Thereupon the doors are thrown open, and the procession enters the church; the bishop, passing up the nave, solemnly places the relics in their receptacle, pours chrism on them, and prays. The powdered marble and the hot mixture of wax and other ingredients are then poured round the base and at the top of the pillars of the altar, and the *mensa* is securely replaced and fixed thereon. While the cement cools and dries, Pss 145 and 23 are sung.

They then swathe the bishop in the 10 cubits of linen which have been provided, and fasten the 2 napkins over his arms, so that his vestments are entirely protected from being soiled in the ceremonies which ensue.[2] After this he kneels down (this being an unusually solemn attitude for prayer in the East) and recites a long prayer of dedication, and the deacon says the litany (ἐκτενῆ). Then the bishop washes the *mensa*, first with the soap and warm water during the singing of Ps 84, next with the wine[3] while Ps $51^{7\text{ff.}}$ is sung, using the ἀντιμίνσια to wipe it off; lastly, he makes three crosses with the chrism (or oil) on the *mensa*, spreading the oil from them all over the top, and also on the pillars, while Ps 133 is being sung.

The vesting of the altar next takes place. At the corners of the *mensa* the 4 cloths with the Evangelists' names or figures on them are fixed with the cement; over them the κατασάρκιον, with its four tassels at the corners, is spread, during the singing of Ps 132; then, after washing his hands, the bishop takes the outer covering (called ἐπενδύτης) and unfolds it over the *mensa* while they sing Ps 93. Lastly, he takes all the new ἀντιμίνσια which are to be consecrated, and spreads them out, one on top of the other, on the altar; and on the top of all he puts an ἀντιμίνσιον which has already been consecrated; meanwhile Ps 26 is sung.

After this, first the altar, then the whole church, is censed. Next the ἀντιμίνσια are anointed, where they lie, with chrism into which the relics or something which has been in contact with them have been pounded, so as to communicate their virtues to the ἀντιμίνσια. Each pillar in the body of the church is likewise anointed with the sign of the cross. The deacon says a συναπτή, and the bishop recites another long prayer. Finally, the Liturgy proceeds to the end as usual, the Epistle now being He 3^{1-4}, and the Gospel Jn $10^{22\text{f.}}$

The Liturgy must be repeated for 7 successive days on the new altar, and the new ἀντιμίνσια remain there as before. After that they are all regarded as fully consecrated, and may be distributed as occasion requires.[4]

It will thus be seen that at a consecration chief stress is laid on (*a*) the erection of the altar in the new church, and (*b*) the hallowing of the ἀντιμίνσια, which can never be a separate service, and is

[1] Neale (*op. cit.* p. 1044, note) thinks this dramatic way of singing these verses is a modern interpolation from the Roman rite, and that it was not known to Goar or his editors in the 17th or early 18th century. But this is somewhat doubtful.

[2] S. Simon of Thessalonica interprets this as symbolizing the grave-cloths of our Lord (see Neale, *in loc.*).

[3] It has been suggested as probable that a blooming vine-spray or rose-branch was originally used at this point, and that the idea of the wine was borrowed from the West.

[4] Their proper position in future is below the κατασάρκιον, next to the surface of the *mensa* itself.

peculiar to the East. The Syrians, however, are said to use slabs of wood instead of cloths for this purpose, and in cases of necessity permit the Eucharist to be offered on a leaf of the Gospels, or even on the hands of a deacon.[1]

See also ANOINTING, EUCHARIST, KING, ORDINATION, PRIEST, SACRAMENT, SANCTIFICATION.

LITERATURE.—G. Baldwin Brown, *From Schola to Cathedral*, London, 1886; Caspari, art. 'Kirchweihe,' in *PRE*[3]; Duchesne, *Origines du culte chrétien*, Paris, 1889 [Eng. tr., *Christian Worship*, 1903], ch. xii.; H. le Clercq in *DACL*, p. 58; P. Lejay, *ib.* p. 1437 ff.; H. F. Stewart, *Invoc. of Saints*, London, 1907, Appendix, p. 108 ff.; J. Wickham Legg, *Three Chapters in Rec. Lit. Research* (Ch. Hist. Soc. lxxiii.), 1903; J. Wordsworth, *On the Rite of Consecration of Churches* (Ch. Hist. Soc. lii.), 1899; J. M. Neale, *General Introduction to History of Eastern Church*, 1850; A. Fortescue, *Orthodox Eastern Church*, London, 1907; G. Horner, *Coptic Consecration of Church and Altar*, London, 1902.

C. L. FELTOE.

CONSENT.—The usual meaning of the noun 'consent' is voluntary agreement to, or acquiescence in, another's proposal. The verb is used similarly: 'to consent' is voluntarily to accede to, or acquiesce in, what another proposes or desires; to agree, comply, yield. The original meaning of the word (from Lat. *consentire* = 'to feel, think, judge, etc., together') is almost obsolete. It is rarely used to denote agreement in sentiment, opinion, or judgment, though this meaning is preserved in the phrases 'common consent,' 'universal consent' (*consensus gentium*). Thus we find it in Sidgwick's *Methods of Ethics*[6] (1901), bk. i. ch. viii. § 3. We are led, he says, to endeavour to set at rest doubts as to the validity of the particular moral judgments of men 'by appealing to general rules, more firmly established on a basis of common consent.' And in Matthew Arnold's *Mixed Essays*, 1879 ('Equality'), we find the sentence: 'As to the duty of pursuing equality, there is no such consent among us' (p. 49). Most of the primary, and some secondary, meanings of the word have, however, been taken by other words, so that we now speak, *e.g.*, of *assenting* to statements, doctrines, and creeds, and of *consenting* to proposals. Examples of this use of the word are to be found as early as the 12th cent. (see *OED*, *s.v.*).

A stage logically intermediate between the primitive and modern uses is the employment of 'consent' to denote agreement in a course of action. 'When the wills of many concur,' says Hobbes, 'to one and the same action and effect, the concurrence of wills is called consent' (*Works*, IV. xii.), and in Lk 14[18] we read that 'all with one consent began to make excuse.' There is no reference to the sentiment, opinion, or judgment of the persons concurring to act.

But in its modern prevalent use 'consent' denotes a type of volition which implies acquiescence in what is proposed by another, an acquiescence, not in the proposer's sentiment or judgment, but merely in his proposal.[2] The state of mind preceding consent seems to include some reluctance to the action proposed. The reluctance may be of any degree, from mere indifference, through definite disinclination (which may be due simply to lack of light), to decided aversion. In the typical case of consenting, the reluctance is overcome without ceasing to exist. When reluctance ceases, the end takes on a more or less desirable character. An end desired is our own, whatever be the psychological origin of the idea of the end. It may have been suggested by another because he approved of it or desired its realization; but, while the end is his only, and not attractive to us, there may be an indifference, at least, if not a more positive reluctance, to adopt it. When it touches us and creates desire or wins approval, it becomes to that extent our own end, and ceases to be what we acquiesce in. We consent to, that is, voluntarily acquiesce in, an end which is not our own in the sense explained. Consent so defined raises difficult moral problems.

The fact that a deed is done reluctantly does not do away with the fact that it is willed, nor, according to John Stuart Mill (*Utilitarianism*, 1901, ch. ii.), does it affect the morality of the action. It may affect our judgment of the character of the person doing it, but the morality of the volition depends upon the nature of the whole result which was foreseen to depend upon the volition. The apothecary in selling poison to Romeo said, 'My poverty, not my will consents,' but he could not disclaim responsibility for the poisoning proposed by Romeo. He did not wish the poisoning, yet 'the consent, though said not to be of the will, might have been enough to hang for' (T. H. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, 1890, bk. ii. ch. ii.). A man who consents to a wrong action may plead poverty, compulsion, etc., as extenuating circumstances, but would these affect our judgment of his culpability, except in the same way as similar considerations would affect our judgment of an action which he conceived and carried out entirely on his own initiative?

It is difficult to fix the nature and the degree of responsibility attaching to consent, since acquiescence in any particular case may signify much or very little. It may mean, *e.g.*, anything between non-interference and full co-operation. Would we give as much credit to one who permits a good deed to be done as to another who actively helps to perform it? Would we blame equally persons who allow an evil to be done, assist in doing it, or do it entirely themselves? Salome consented to the proposal of Herodias that John the Baptist should be beheaded, and demanded his head of the king. Herod consented and ordered the execution (Mt 14[8ff.]). Herodias, Salome, and Herod willed the death. Were they equally responsible and reprehensible? Again, acquiescence in the same deed may have a different moral significance in the case of different persons. Pilate consented to the demand of the people to crucify Jesus Christ. Jesus consented to die. The consent of the one showed him to be a weak and unjust ruler; the consent of the other revealed Him as a Saviour of men. It is clear, therefore, that, in order to determine the moral significance of an act of consent, the whole complex result willed must be analyzed into its elements and considered in their relation to one another, and also in relation to the concrete conditions in which the person willing finds himself. The situation is often very complicated. The acquiescence of Jesus in His own death, *e.g.*, was an act of obedience to His Father's will, yet consenting to that will involved the committing of a crime by the Jews and Pilate. Matheson (*Studies of the Portrait of Christ*, 1899-1900, bk. ii. ch. iii.) thinks that the agony of Gethsemane was largely due to His aversion to allow such a crime, and to doubt whether it could be in accordance with the will of God. 'Taking up the cross' for a Christian frequently means consenting to a course of action which he does not desire, and cannot see the reason for, or the reasonableness of; nevertheless he acquiesces, in the belief that he is doing the will of God, and that the will of God is good.

Submission of the will to authority of any kind amounts, directly or indirectly, to acquiescence in what is proposed by others. Obedience is consent, so is compromise; co-operation involves it. We cannot live in social relations with others without

[1] See art. 'Antimensium,' in *DCA* i. 91 f.

[2] 'There is a distinct difference in consciousness between the consent of belief and the consent of will. The consent of belief is, in a measure, a forced consent,—it attaches to what stands in the order of things whether I consent or no. The consent of will is a forceful consent—a consent to what shall be through me' (Baldwin, *Handbook of Psychology*, 1891, 'Will and Feeling,' p. 171).

having, now and again, to do things for them which we do not ourselves desire, and on which we may not be able to pass judgment. For it is not easy to know whether the ends which our fellow-men set themselves to realize with our help are, on the whole, good. The goodness of particular ends is, within limits, relative to the individual. An end which is good for one to aim at may be bad for another. This is true irrespective of our conception of the ultimate ideal of life. Even if the ultimate good be one and the same for all, it is individualized in a different form for every life, and each claims the right to realize it in his own way. This seems a legitimate claim, and consequently the good man may feel called upon to regard consent to special ends which he does not desire, and is not in a position to approve or disapprove, as a normal duty. By recognizing the claims of his neighbours to his love and help, he admits also their right to expect him sometimes to acquiesce in their purposes and to trust their judgments. He must act, not on his own insight, but in dependence on that of others. His will must consent to theirs. The appeal of many proposals may depend not so much on their intrinsic reasonableness, as on the persons making them. Therefore the wise man is only partially able to realize the ideal of a life according to reason. He can scarcely hope that the ends which his fellow-men seek are always good. Moreover, good men often come into apparent conflict with one another, and co-operation is limited by competition.

A more difficult problem is raised by a consideration of the fact that man's life is lived in a world over whose course he has very little control. If the world is the result of blind forces utterly indifferent to human ends, the wise man has no ground for hoping that life will ever be satisfactory. He cannot acquiesce in such a world. His mind and heart must protest against it, however useless the protest may be. If these forces form a mechanical system, whose operations can be traced and related, man's intelligence may bow to the inevitable order, and seek to understand it, but his conscience does not consent to such a scheme. The moral will would be inevitably opposed to a merely mechanical cosmical process. It cannot acquiesce in a world which is not based on moral principles, and which is not ultimately amenable to human ends.

And even on this assumption a completely rational life is an ideal which is scarcely realizable by any one in the present state of existence. And, therefore, Kant (cf. *Critique of Practical Reason*) maintained that immortality is a necessary moral postulate. He maintained, moreover, that the existence of the supremely Good Will must be postulated as creator and governor in order to secure complete harmony between the perfect moral will of man and the conditions of his happiness. There appeared to be no other way of guaranteeing the realization of the *bonum consummatum*.

Many of the higher religions teach submission to this sovereign will, whose ways are often inscrutable, as the highest duty. The Christian position is that we should will that God's will be done, and consent, therefore, to all that is involved in the operations of that will, whether we like and approve them or not; knowing, in the words of St. Paul, that 'all things work together for good to them that love God' (Ro 8[28]). In a sense such a view effects a partial synthesis between the two attitudes of acting from rational insight and consenting to the order of the world. For, if its fundamental assumptions are true, a man acts autonomously and rationally in willing continuously the realization of the supremely good and reasonable will; and also by consenting, in detail, to particular events, and to particulars of conduct, even when unable to desire and approve them. The practical problem then reduces itself to knowing what that will intends us to do.

A synthesis of a different kind is attempted in some metaphysical systems, such as that of Spinoza (cf. his *Ethics* and *Treatise on the Improvement of the Understanding*). Everything that exists, Spinoza thought, follows eternally and necessarily from the being of the One Substance. The end of life is to obtain rational insight of an intuitive kind into this being, to see self as one of its modes, and to acquiesce in the order of things. When the order of the Universe—Substance, Nature, God, Truth, are Spinoza's terms—is understood, we more than acquiesce in it; we find satisfaction in the knowledge. Supreme and enduring happiness consists in the intellectual love of God (*amor intellectualis Dei*).

For consent in marriage, see MARRIAGE.

LITERATURE.—This is sufficiently indicated in the article.

DAVID PHILLIPS.

CONSEQUENCE.—If a proposition p implies a proposition q, but q does not in turn imply p, then p is called the antecedent and q the consequent; whereas, if each implies the other, they are preferably called equivalents. *Logical consequence* is thus the relation obtaining between a conclusion and its premisses, such that if the premisses are true the conclusion is true. The reverse of this relation—the relation holding between the consequent and an antecedent—is logical presupposition. That is, the consequent is logically presupposed by the antecedent; for only if it be true can the latter be true, whereas the antecedent might be false and the consequent still true.

By *causal consequence*, on the other hand, is meant the relation between an antecedent event and its effect; and the philosophically important question at once arises, Are the two types of consequence the same? For a century it has been believed that Hume and Kant proved successfully that the relation between cause and effect is not that of logical consequence, by showing that we discover causal relations not by deduction, but by observation and experiment, or inductively. But this does not follow; for, though it is true that our discovery of causal relations is usually made inductively, the relations discovered are logical. Moreover, many causal relations have been deduced, to wit, those inferred in mechanics and mathematical physics. Indeed, all causal laws can be explicitly formulated as propositions of the type p implies q. Perhaps what confuses us is that the temporal relation between an antecedent cause and its effect is foreign to logical consequence, and that the antecedent event seems to us, for practical reasons, necessary for the effect, and not the effect for it. But the effect is quite as necessary for the cause as the cause for the effect; and, though in a temporal system, such as the world is, events must be related in time, still this relation is logically accidental to the generic relation whereby from the nature of one part of the world-system we are enabled to infer the nature of another part. This generic relation is that of logical implication, and is either the causal relation or a class of which the causal relation is a member. See CAUSE, CAUSALITY.

LITERATURE.—Spinoza, *Ethics*, pt. i.; Hume, *Inquiry concerning Human Understanding*, sects. iv.-vii.; B. Russell, *Principles of Mathematics*, London, 1903, chs. iii. and iv.

WALTER T. MARVIN.

CONSISTENCY (Ethical).—In so far as ethics is a theory, we must ask whether such a theory is open to the test of consistency; and in so far as ethics bears upon conduct, we must inquire whether consistency also applies to the practical sphere. In

regard to its *theoretical* aspect, the question arises whether ethics is simply knowledge of moral facts, or whether it must fashion an ideal to serve as a rule for conduct; whether, that is to say, it merely describes, or also enjoins and commands. If it be merely descriptive, its sole aim will be to discover the characteristic and essential features of morality. The latter view has very largely come into favour in modern times.

1. **Consistency in naturalistic ethics.**—*Utilitarianism*, *Eudæmonism*, or the *Ethics of Feeling*, proposes to explain the origin of morality. It starts from phenomena; it examines the native capacities of mankind, and even tries to trace the development of these. It occupies itself with the psychological analysis of impulses, feelings, and emotions, with man's relations to his environment, and his dependence upon, or relative independence of, this environment; with his relations to Nature, to his fellows, and to the communities in which he finds himself; with suffering and his reaction against it; with his estimate of things by means of a 'value-judgment,' which may itself be variously construed, and with the origin of these value-judgments. In so far as ethics bears this empirical character, its business is to subject the conduct of men to historical and psychological investigation, to analyze it, to discover, if possible, the laws which actually regulate human life and which furnish a standard of value for conduct, and to determine the class of actions most conformable to this standard. For this school, in fact, the only important matter is to draw from the boundless mass of material such general truths as will be valid within this particular sphere.

It is impossible on these lines ever to get beyond probability or merely relative points of view. An ethical theory of this sort is inevitably tied down to the relative. Consistency can find no footing here. All that is required is to bring the manifold data under general categories by induction. Empirical thinkers, and more especially sceptics, who place their mark of interrogation upon everything, will even tell us that the endeavour to introduce consistency into ethics is a mere futility, and really prevents us from doing justice to the facts. A moralist like Bentham, for instance, will have nothing to do with consistency. For, though he admits the validity of the general proposition that morality is concerned with the good of the whole, he yet holds that experience alone shows what makes for this good. Laws derived from the facts are only of relative value. A change in the facts will necessarily involve a change in the laws. Those who favour the historical method give special prominence to the fact that ethical ideas undergo extensive modifications, and that every age has its own particular assortment of such ideas, won from the most heterogeneous points of view, and therefore quite incapable of being reduced to unity. Effete conceptions—vestiges of earlier modes of thought—still continue to operate in certain circles, or in the general consciousness, at a time when other usages and ideas, by no means reconcilable with the old, have come to the front. Hence, it is said, the collision of duties and the existence of contradictory views of moral life are just what we might anticipate, and accordingly the demand for consistency is sheer folly. Moral judgments are thus the result of a psychical and historical process—the mere temporary compromise between the competing interests of the day. To look for consistency under such conditions is to shut one's eyes to the facts. A like judgment must be passed upon the theory which finds morality in the spontaneity of our nature, which builds upon instinct and unconscious tendency, and which, as wholly averse to rational principles, would trace moral action to the impulse of an inherent goodness in mankind, or of partly conscious, partly unconscious, propensity; or, again, would even bring in the operation of a natural creative potency. On this theory, also, the entire function of ethics is to describe the impulses as they appear in experience.

The explanation of this antipathy on the part of empirical ethics to the idea of consistency is that the system merely registers and describes the various types of ethical thought and action, classifying them under general headings, and refraining from any attempt to harmonize these, on the ground that the moral ideas and phenomena emerge in the most diverse departments of human life, in the most disparate phases of culture, and in ages most remote from one another, and that accordingly they cannot well be brought into organic unity. Indeed, many even maintain that the sphere of practica is the proper arena for the irrational, for a power quite impervious to reason. Here, it is said, we encounter the fact of personality; here the concrete, the merely particular, comes into play—that which in the last resort eludes the grasp of thought. All general principles are therefore but bare abstractions, drawn from a limited field of experience, and as divergent as the data they refer to.

2. **Consistency in religious ethics.**—Frequently, too, even *religious* ethics gives no more consideration to the idea of consistency than does empirical ethics. The ethics of religion has usually been content to give sacred sanction to a traditional morality, which has grown up amongst a people under the most heterogeneous influences; or it has, at most, added sundry directions regarding ceremonial observances, ecclesiastical duties, and especially works of piety. We need not expect to find a harmonious consistency under such conditions.

We have an instance of this in *Jewish* ethics, with its multifarious precepts regarding individual conduct, and regarding social, ceremonial, and political affairs. The ethics of the *Persian* religion embraces a vast array of ceremonial and moral ordinances, together with injunctions regarding social duties, such as planting trees, killing noxious animals, and the like. Jewish and Persian ethics, however, so far agree in resolving all the various regulations into a formal *unity*, namely, the will of God, as the source of all; and it is the same will which fixes the penalty of transgression and the reward of obedience.

A second type of religious ethics is that which admits a dualistic morality. In *Buddhism*, for instance, there is one morality for the monks and another for the laity. The universalism of this religion was not carried to its final issues: thus, woman was placed in a lower rank than man, and the system of caste was left undisturbed; and, while the leading principle of Buddhistic ethics was the complete surrender of desire in a life of patience and contemplative wisdom, this was subsequently enjoined in different degrees for laymen and monk respectively. The monks were required not only to eschew adultery, but to abstain entirely from sexual intercourse, to avoid luxury, and to give themselves to meditation. A distinction was also made between venial and mortal sins. Rules of propriety were added to moral obligations. A consistently developed ethical theory is thus clearly out of the question.

The same is true of the ethics of *Brāhmanism*. The Law Book of Manu contains an exposition of duties, as also injunctions regarding the retention of the caste system and regarding submission to the Brāhmans. On the other hand, there is, as early as the Upaniṣads, the formula *Tat tvam asi*, 'That (the Cosmos) art thou,' which bids each find himself in his fellow-man; and, while asceticism, solitary meditation, and withdrawal into the forest count for more than family or business life, yet a compromise is made between the two by the regulation that the forest life shall be adopted only after a man has lived in a family and brought up a son.

Consistency is likewise alien to the ethics of *Roman Catholicism*. For one thing, morality is here made to rest upon the isolated fiat of an external authority; for another, a distinction is drawn between obligations and counsels. Moreover, the sacrament of penance prescribes a series of external works; while, finally, the monastic ethics of the *religiosi* is severed from the ethics of the laity.

Nevertheless, it would be wrong to imagine that religious ethics must necessarily assume this double form, or that it can be no more than a mere aggregation of contingent and isolated commands, and must in consequence lack consistency.

As a matter of fact, the ethics of *Confucius*, who put a check upon belief in spirits, soothsaying, and exorcism, and who read a Divine revelation in the natural and social order, exhibits a more homogeneous and self-consistent character than any of the above. 'The wise man obeys the law and awaits his destiny; that is the sum-total of duty.' This law sets forth the right hierarchy of social relationship in the subjection of the wife to the husband, of children to parents; in family affection, which is to be nurtured by ancestor-worship; in the separation of the sexes, as providing a 'barrier for the people'; in the subordination of the younger to the older, and of the subject to the ruler.

The law also decrees that this social order shall be represented in the ritual. Kindness to the poor, the friendless, the widow, and the orphan, is commended, and great stress is laid upon faithfulness in friendship. The governmental system should aim at nurturing a peaceful, industrious, and contented people. It quite accords with all this that Confucius sets great store by ancient tradition and history, as exhibiting the decrees of heaven in punishment and reward. Observance of this moral order is at the same time a religious duty. It is obvious that, notwithstanding the aphoristic form which this moral teaching tends to assume, nearly everything is dominated by a single thought.

Finally, the ethics of *Christianity* exhibits certain features which not only imply that the entire moral life is brought under one point of view, but also set forth a consistent moral ideal.

3. Consistency in rational ethics.—(*a*) *As the application of an abstract law.*—While religious ethics, therefore, either as giving formal sanction to incongruous usages, or as massing together arbitrary laws, or as separating the moral interests of religion from those of the secular life, tends *in the main* to dispense with consistency, the case is quite different with *rational* ethics. The fundamental tenet of the latter school is that the moral is grounded in the rational; and, even if a distinction be made, as by Kant, between practical and theoretical reason, the test of consistency holds good in either. When Kant wishes to prove that a breach of the universal moral law is indefensible, he points to the contradictions which such a breach involves. If we would test the validity of a maxim, we have but to ask how it would work as a universal law. Thus, for instance, the refusal to implement a promise, were it made a universal rule, would result in a state of things where no promise was accepted, *i.e.* the maxim would defeat its own purpose. The criterion applied here is therefore that of logical consistency. Similarly, in his *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant resorts to the logical categories as furnishing a more precise definition of freedom. In one form or another, rational ethics makes out a case for an unconditional factor in morality, and it must vindicate the claim of this unconditional and universal principle to be supreme, *i.e.* to determine everything that comes within its province; in a word, it demands consistency.

Consistency in rational ethics is, primarily, the requirement that the practical side of life in its entirety shall be brought to the test of the universal moral law, and made subject to it.

Thus the *Stoics* maintained that all morality lay in the one supreme virtue, namely, harmony with the law of nature or of reason. From the same standpoint *Kant* treated morality in a purely formal way, taking reverence for the law as the sole motive. This law, however, being as yet wholly abstract, is incapable of positively determining the concrete materials of conduct. *Given* conditions are brought within the scope of the law; they are not, however, derived from the law, but only tested by it. For example, the institution of marriage is not deduced from the law, nor is its place in the ethical economy assigned by the law; the sole question is whether, marriage being assumed, the universally valid law can take effect in the relationship. Strictly speaking, in such a case we can say only that the law must not be infringed; we cannot determine the actual duties of marriage. It is, in fact, precisely on this account that Kant distinguishes between duties of perfect and those of imperfect obligation. Thus, for instance, the obligation of developing one's natural powers is an imperfect one, because, while the maxim of such effort is undoubtedly a law, the mode and degree of the effort are in no way defined by it, but are left to personal choice. Even on Kant's view, therefore, there is a certain permissive sphere in morals, to which the consistency of the moral law cannot be extended—a sphere for casuistry, in which particular cases cannot be decided by the law.

Kant's mode of applying the test of consistency in the field of rational ethics stands in contrast with that of *Herbart*. On the one hand, the unifying principle from which Herbart starts is an æsthetic *a priori* judgment regarding relations of will, and from this judgment proceed the ethical ideas. On the other hand, he enumerates five such relations of will (recalling the five axioms of Whewell), which he simply places side by side. To look for consistency here is apparently out of the question, as these five ideas are neither traced to, nor derived from, a single principle. Closer examination, however, reveals that these ideas are in fact held together by the thought of a harmony in all the principal relations of will, while a similar unifying potency is attributed to the conception of living society, which combines all the ideas in harmonious unity, embracing both individual and social relations of will. Looked at in this way, the ethics of Herbart presents us with a much more concrete ideal than Kant's universal abstract law, and so exhibits a higher degree of consistency.

(*b*) *Consistency in the structure of the concrete moral ideal.*—The criterion of consistency is applied even more cogently by those who seek by speculative methods to give the ideal a concrete form. It was on these lines that *Plato* fashioned his ideal Republic, which he regarded as the highest image of the Good upon earth, though his dualism stood in the way of a perfectly consistent theory. In the main, however, he sought to delineate a harmonious antitype of the Idea of the Good; and it was his conviction of the universal supremacy of this Idea that moved him to incorporate in his scheme the concrete conditions of human life and the special faculties of the soul. In the *Laws*, it is true, he somewhat lowers the Ideal in favour of the existent civic situation, yet this does not so much imply a surrender of consistency as a desire to actualize his ideal State amid given conditions. The Idea of the Good which manifests itself in the individual (as virtue) and in the State—the macrocosm of man—is set forth by Plato with the strictest consistency as the unifying principle of morals. This is even more true of *Aristotle*. With him, the one νοῦς is supreme in man, laying down just proportions for all emotions and all goods; and, although he gives an empirical tabulation of the particular virtues rather than a classification dominated by a universal principle, yet his guiding thought is that the dianoetic virtues are concerned with the development of the practical intelligence, while the ethical virtues have to do with reason's mastery of the passions by exercise. In effect, therefore, according to Aristotle, virtue is one, viz. the supremacy of reason, which, however, can be adequately realized only in the State—the State itself, again, being founded upon the home. Aristotle also agrees with Plato in linking his doctrine of virtue to the Idea of the Supreme Good, but he concedes a much wider scope to the operation of reason in practical life, and thus carries out his ethical doctrine in a more consistent way.

In modern times, *J. G. Fichte* and *Schleiermacher* have urged the importance of unity in ethical theory, and have given complete consistency to the moral ideal. True, Schleiermacher discarded imperative ethics and advocated the descriptive method. In his opinion, however, ethics is not an empirical or inductive, but rather a speculative, science. The moral ideal is not an ideal of obligation, but it is described as the ideal by which men act—duty; or in terms of the faculty which manifests itself as lawful—virtue; or in terms of the result of action—the highest good. In all this Schleiermacher applies the ideal with such rigorous consistency as to demand that every man, with due allowance for his individual nature, shall construct and realize his ideal concretely and in full detail. He gives no place to the distinction between perfect and imperfect obligations, or to the collision of duties, since at every moment only one mode of action is ethically possible—that, namely, which in the circumstances best furthers the entire moral process. Morality being an integral whole, every action is in its degree a reflexion of this whole. The distinction he draws between symbolizing and organizing action he admits to be relative only, since each includes the other in smaller compass; the same is true of the universal and the individual factor. Each ethical province therefore in a measure embraces the other, and, when combined, they constitute the highest good—*a unity absolutely complete in itself.* The ideal has no gaps, and, consequently, nothing

is merely permissive. The ideal embraces the entire range of human conduct; in fact, even the mode of action in any given situation is determined by fixed rules.

According to Schleiermacher, reason is a power which moulds nature to new issues; and among modern thinkers it is he who has most consistently developed the thought that the whole spiritual life of man is ethically determined, no phase whatever being left out. His *Theological Ethics* bears the same character. It simply describes how the religious impulse—the Divine spirit operating as the intensified power of reason—works as the constraining motive in the determination of moral action in its details, and how it strengthens this rational action (as it is called in his *Philosophical Ethics*) without running counter to it or altering its content. The man who is in harmony with the Spirit of God is, in thought and feeling, an integral concentrated force, which manifests itself in the moral ideal, and effects the highest good. This concrete form of the ideal exhibits a far more strict consistency and uniformity than does the abstract idea of universally valid law.

(*c*) *Consistency in the historical development.*—We can scarcely look for a more exigent standard of consistency in ethics than that of Schleiermacher, but we may give more consideration to the fact of *development*. Schleiermacher's ideal is really timeless. No doubt he holds that the speculative view of ethics may be brought into relation with historical science and practical life by means of critical and technical studies, and he desiderates that full account be taken of the individual's special place in the Kingdom of God; he even grafts upon the ideal the laws by which the whole course of conduct must be directed; but, nevertheless, he practically overlooks the factor of development in the moral consciousness. In his *Kritik der bisherigen Sittenlehre* he submits the history of ethics to a searching investigation, but from a purely critical point of view. This defect was made good by J. G. Fichte, and notably by *Hegel*; subsequently also by *Chalybäus*,[1] *Harms*,[2] and *von Hartmann*.[3] These thinkers took account of the successive stages through which morality had passed, and contended for consistency in the ethical idea. As an example we may take Hegel's *Rechtsphilosophie*, which also comprises his ethics.

In the history of moral experience Hegel sees a logically necessary process of development. He argues that the component factors of the moral idea are exhibited in the several stadia of the developing moral consciousness; that they are all conserved in the highest stadium, and incorporated in the all-embracing unity of the moral organism. From the *pre-moral condition* of the natural life, with its impulses, out of which, in process of time, grows a system of wants, Hegel differentiates the stage of *abstract law*, in which man is subject to an external arbitrary norm, expressed primarily in the regulation of property and contract. Next, consciousness passes, by an inner necessity, from this purely outward phase of freedom to the stage of *morality*, which lays stress upon inner feeling in an abstract and one-sided way. Advance is then made to the stage of *Sittlichkeit*, or *established observance*, in which moral thought allies itself with an objective content embodied in the moral community. This content manifests itself first of all in the family, which forms an expression of natural feeling, and in which individual property becomes family property; it then appears as civil society, with its system of wants, police regulations, and corporate institutions; finally comes the State, which assimilates the results of the whole development. The State conserves the family and civil society, in which the individual finds his satisfaction; it conserves the inner disposition, which now acquires a concrete ethical content; it conserves the sphere of abstract law, and even the life of natural impulse together with its system of wants.

Now we may possibly take exception to some of the details of this sequence, but we cannot well ignore its leading idea, viz. that man advances from a state of nature to a state of average morality characterized by statutory law; that, passing from the stage of positive enactment, he formulates the law abstractly as good disposition; and that, finally, he transforms this abstract morality into concrete established observance, thus arriving at a Supreme Good which recapitulates in itself all the preceding stages. The idea of consistency in ethical knowledge is thus extended to the process of development, and at the final stage we are brought to a provisional harmony in which the consistency of the ethical idea is revealed as the economy of the moral organism.

(*d*) *Consistency in the relation of Ethics to the ultimate principle of Philosophy.*—Speculative moralists, however, carry consistency to still further lengths. Not only do they assign to ethics, as a special science, its proper place in the system as a whole—as even Kant does, in his distinction of theoretical and practical reason—but they either trace it to, or deduce it from, an ultimate unity, a supreme integral principle, thus *fitting it organically into a complete philosophical rationale of the universe.* Such is the procedure of *Plato*, who holds that true knowledge involves morality, and that morality carries with it insight into truth, and who therefore regards the science of knowing, or dialectics, as the cardinal science, embracing not only knowledge but also the supreme content of knowledge, *i.e.* true being or the Ideas, of which the highest is that of the Good and Beautiful. These Ideas Plato deems to be realities, so that the True and the Good and the Beautiful are one. The subject-matter of metaphysics or dialectics, which embraces the knowledge of being, is identical with the Good and Beautiful; and, as this highest Idea is Deity, metaphysics, religion, and morality are in the last resort one—just as truth, goodness, and beauty cannot be dissevered. Plato's differentiation of physics and ethics from dialectics is due to the fact that the good and beautiful of the actual world is only a copy of the real—a mere representation in material form, since the world is the sphere of becoming.

Although *Aristotle* and the *Stoics* likewise aspired to place ethics in its right connexion with philosophy as a whole, yet their endeavours after unity, their ideas of consistency, were not carried out so fully as Plato's, the reason being that their interest in experience and the special sciences was greater than his, and so far deranged their philosophical views. On the other hand, we have a striking instance of consistency in the work of *Spinoza*. Even his mathematical method, which in reality is logical rather than mathematical, supplies an illustration of this. He regards metaphysics, ethics, and religion as constituting an integral whole; and, further, his theory of the parallelism of thought and extension enables him to incorporate physics into this unity. Here, therefore, we have an attempt on a grand scale to connect ethics organically with the entire system, and to enforce the principle of consistency to its extreme limit. A similar course is followed by the *Absolute Philosophy* of Germany, as exemplified by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, and, as they take the historical process into account, their system is even more comprehensive than that of Spinoza. Hegel looks upon man's whole moral experience in its several gradations as a phase of development in the self-manifestation of the Absolute, or the Idea, which actualizes itself in moral life in order to attain, in æsthetic intuition, in religious conception, and, finally, in philosophic thought, a survey of the whole process. Moral life is thus an aspect of the Idea, a stadium in its development. Here consistency reaches the acme of rigour. *Schleiermacher*, too, endeavoured to bring ethics into organic connexion

[1] *System der spekulativen Ethik* (Leipz. 1850).
[2] See his admirable work *Die Formen der Ethik* (Berlin, 1878), afterwards incorporated in his *Ethik*, ed. Wiese (1889), 12, 47 ff.
[3] *Phänomenologie des sittlichen Bewusstseins* (Berlin, 1879).

with his whole philosophy. For him, as for Schelling, the highest principle was indifference, *i.e.* the absolute unity of opposites. This principle is confronted by the world, where, in virtue of the underlying unity, the several opposites of thought and being, real and ideal, manifest themselves as diverse, indeed, yet not inconsistent. This interfusion of real and ideal, if the former preponderates, is nature; if the latter preponderates, it is reason. Reason and nature, however, tend towards a state of mutual adjustment, reason becoming nature by its activity, and nature likewise labouring to become reason. Thus ethics becomes physics, and physics ethics. Still another opposition confronts true scientific knowledge. Our thought is at once speculative and conditioned by experience. Hence the science of reason and the science of nature have each a speculative and an empirical side. The speculative science of reason is ethics; the empirical is history. The speculative science of nature is *Natur-philosophie*, while the empirical embraces the special natural sciences. Ethics and history are interlinked by technical and critical studies. Such is Schleiermacher's way of making ethics an organic part of universal science.

4. General investigation.—It appears from the foregoing synopsis that moralists differ very greatly in regard to consistency as applied to ethical theory, the main cleavage corresponding to that between the empirical and the rational interpretation of morality. If morality be regarded as merely a means to the greatest possible good, then reason itself must be similarly interpreted, and, on this view, consistency comes into consideration only in so far as it is conducive to the same end. This general good, it is alleged, is best served by obedience to rules which have been inferred from experience. But absolute laws, laws permitting of no exception, are scarcely within the scope of such a hypothesis. General rules are deduced from limited empirical data, and, if such data be augmented, the rules will be correspondingly modified. They are, by their very structure, incompatible with absolute validity. Should it be asserted, for instance, that a man must, with a view to his own happiness, subordinate his personal interests to those of others, this law will be recognized by him only so long as he finds it to his own advantage. Thus ethics, if it be but a means to a relative end, cannot itself get beyond relativity, and must renounce consistency.

The same result follows when a purely empirical theory of development is applied to morality. Altered conditions or the progress of civilization will necessitate a change in moral laws. Since, on this theory, ethics merely summarizes the best directions for human well-being under given circumstances, and since the variability of such directions and maxims is held to prove the relative character of the science, strict consistency is put out of court. As corroborative of this view, it is alleged, in particular, that ethics must needs keep within the limits of the attainable, and that it is impossible to apply the idea of consistency at all hazards. If we bear in mind the way in which men really act, the way in which impulses, feelings, and passions are adjusted by the psychical mechanism, and in which we become conscious of this adjusting process, we can formulate rules which, so far from remaining mere ideals, take account of men's actual capacities and circumstances, and are therefore capable of being put into practice.

But even the most extreme empiricism must allow that morality emerges only when certain demands are made in reference to the data of experience—demands which this school finds so little self-explanatory that it has recourse to all manner of 'sanctions' to establish their authority. Without the antithesis of an ideal confronting the data of experience as a regulative law, morality is impossible. It may, indeed, be said that this ideal is simply the resultant of our empirical value-judgments, a product derived from experience by abstraction. Thus, for instance, the law of altruism, as against egoism, may be traced to the experience that other-regarding conduct brings an increase of satisfaction. But the question then arises whether this generalization is universally valid; and, again, whence comes the faculty by which such generalizations are made. The truth is, this faculty of abstraction is that by which we colligate the manifold in a unity, on the assumption that it is amenable to law. The ideal set up by the moral reason is something more than an aggregate of rules, derived by abstraction from value-judgments; it is in reality reason's own craving for unity, which it seeks to realize in the ethical judgment it applies to the facts of volition. The unity which is not overtly given in our various impulses, feelings, and passions is demanded by reason, and the demand cannot be met by anything relative. It is a fact that a number of moralists take their stand upon the unconditional character of morality; and this fact can neither be explained nor explained away by the empirical school. Reason cannot rest till it has moulded the manifold into a unity, and in the ethical field this means not only that reason constructs ideals, but that its ideals are consistent. It is, of course, true that different epochs have different ideals, but this by no means implies that the ideals of any period were defective in the matter of consistency. Reason has built up its ideals in ever-enlarging form; it has in ever-increasing measure incorporated therein the various spheres of conduct; and, by defining the mutual relations of these spheres, it has attained perfect symmetry in its ideal. Indeed, reason has at length reached a point where it can survey the whole historical sequence of ideals in a single view, and where it seeks to grasp the process of development by which the approved elements of the earlier ideals are taken up into the ampler range of the later. In short, if by an inherent necessity the moral reason is to carry out its task of ideal-making, and if its demand for unity is put forward unconditionally, then the entire field of voluntary action must be subjected to its authority, and its ideal must seek to effect the complete organization of moral life. In ethics, therefore, consistency is an unconditional requirement. Since the whole spiritual life of man is touched by the will, it must of necessity fall under the moral ideal.

It has been said, indeed, that the concept can never reach the concrete, the particular. But, while this is the case, we can nevertheless form the *concept of the particular*, and can accordingly assign the particular to its proper place in the ethical system, subordinating it to the whole in such a way as to make it an organic part thereof—a component which, so far from causing any dislocation, really works with all the rest as mutually complementary, and is thus wrought into the harmony of the whole. If it be deemed pedantic thus to bestrew the whole way of life 'with man-traps of duty,' it must be frankly conceded that there are sections of life where movement must be free, as, for example, the sphere of recreation, of sociality, of imagination, or the æsthetic sphere. But the moral ideal encompasses these tracts in such a manner as to permit a certain freedom therein, provided that there be no over-stepping of the limits laid down by the moral system as a whole. Here, therefore, we have no exception to

the moral law, but simply an application of the ethical principle that each sphere shall be dealt with in its own way, while ever remaining a constituent part of the moral organism, and keeping within its own bounds. Here too, therefore, the unifying formative reason may manifest itself in constructing ideals.

Further, consistency, to be effective, must be complete. No doubt, it is at present a prevalent view that a narrow and one-sided policy achieves the best results. An oppressed class, for instance, demands its rights: these are not to be won, it is said, by deliberations as to how that particular section of society is to be fitted into the social organism; nothing but the ruthless enforcement of its claims can secure for it improved conditions of life, though eventually, of course, such amelioration may benefit the whole. Again, it is asserted that a State attains prosperity not by enthusiasm for the ideal of humanity, but by a self-centred struggle for a recognized place in the council of the nations. Or, again, the individual who has formed new religious views must, it is held, not walk softly or make compromises, but must carry his views into effect ruthlessly, *i.e.* consistently. Mankind, in short, makes progress only by the one-sided pursuit of narrow aims. Society is so constituted that, while one man is carrying out his ideals with inexorable consistency, his action is being circumscribed by the interests of others. The whole process culminates in the mutual adjustment of interests. Thus the striving of reason for unity at length attains its end unconsciously, although the several parts seemed to be inharmoniously distributed. Progress is secured by mutual conflict. It is wrong, therefore, to lay the burden of this final adjustment upon the individual; all that we can expect from him is consistency in his own particular sphere, and in the advocacy of his special interests.

Plausible as such a theory may seem, and numerous as are its champions, it is nevertheless untenable. Were it consciously put into practice, it would forthwith plunge nations, classes, municipalities, and individuals—in fact, human society at large—into embittered strife, without a single reconciling element. Passions would become rampant, and animosities more virulent. We must preferably hold to the other view, viz. that the individual shall recognize the rights of others; that each class, each group, shall feel itself to be an organic part of the larger whole, the State; and each nation a section of the human race; and that in the conflict of opinion every man shall take pains to apprehend what is good in the view of others. As a matter of fact, it is not laid upon men to prosecute their individual aims with relentless consistency, but rather to realize those aims in a manner compatible with the ideal, so that personal interests may be advanced without detriment to the larger whole. Such a mode of apprehending the moral task demands, without doubt, a higher degree of intelligence. But a consistency which is merely sectional is no consistency at all, and is incapable of securing true progress, for it carries within itself the seed of reaction, which will sooner or later germinate. Moral development proceeds from the more simple conditions to the more complex; but, for that very reason, the prime necessity is to gain control of these complicated conditions by taking into account the various relevant elements which they contain, and by subordinating them to the unifying and moulding power of reason. Our abiding problem is to systematize the whole ethical data in harmony with the ideal, for only such an issue can adequately meet the unconditional demand for unity which reason makes.

5. **Consistency between the moral ideal and practice.** — The more perfectly consistency is attained in the formation of ideals, the less possible is it to ignore the discrepancy between the ideal and the actual moral situation. When the reality is compared with the ideal, it appears incongruous, contradictory, one-sided, narrow, circumscribed, rent by antitheses—in a word, bad; while the ideal itself seems but a futile and impracticable demand. In particular, it is rational ethics, with its special insistence upon a logically constructed ideal, which is mainly affected by the discrepancy, so that its boasted consistency would here seem to become abortive. Plato traces the defects of the empirical world—as compared with the Idea—to matter, and thus ends in dualism. Spinoza deduces not only the inadequate ideas and affections, but also the adequate ideas—not only human servitude, but also human freedom—from the same mathematical necessity, and can therefore make his ideal avail at most only for the favoured few. Nor could Hegel dislodge this discrepancy; for, though he held the antithesis to be the very mainspring of progress, and as such to be subject to logical sequence, the contradiction was not thereby removed. Above all, Kant felt the opposition between the practical reason and the natural propensities so intensely that he went to the very verge of dualism. Even Schleiermacher was forced to recognize a difference between the speculative moral ideal and actual moral practice, and accordingly he introduced—in his *Christian Ethics*—a 'purifying activity,' which was in reality a confession of the discrepancy. Now this contradiction seems to turn the consistency of the moral ideal into a mere abstraction. Consequently many thinkers of to-day would have us recognize a certain irrational factor in the world, a factor which necessarily precludes a consistent application of the moral ideal to the facts of life. According to von Hartmann, the will is non-logical, and the sole task of ethics is to evince this fact, moral action being in the end simply an anodyne to the will, which finds no satisfaction in any moral result. Here the antagonism is carried to such a point that moral action is made a means to its own ultimate abrogation. From all this it would appear that the consistent formation of ideals, as essayed more especially by the rational school of moralists, comes to grief upon the incongruity between the ideal and the actual.

Now this would undoubtedly be true, were the construction of ideals the final task of ethics. Such, however, is not the case. Nature, and especially human nature, is so constituted that it must have recourse to reason as a means to its own harmony and perfection. The first stage, therefore, is the idealizing activity of reason, the outcome of which is the rationally harmonized image of nature. But this is *only* the first stage; and, when once consistency has been realized here, a further advance is made, for now practice is to be moulded into conformity with the ideal. Thus the contradiction above noted is simply a necessary point of transition—necessary, that is, if we are to have ethical life or action at all. In other words, if moral results are to be achieved by the rational activity of the soul, then the end, the task set before us, must first of all be known; and only when it is known can we proceed to the task of realizing it. The antithesis between the rational ideal and human nature, as it is, is not an absolute one. The truth is rather, that life, as we know it, awaits the rational action of the soul as the medium by which it is to be harmonized and transfigured. The initial, or idealizing, stage of the moral process of reason is therefore responsible for no more than the harmonious, consistent for-

mation of the ideal. Once this has been attained, consistency makes the further demand that the ideal shall not remain a bare ideal, but shall be realized. It is impossible to rest satisfied with the mere self-consistency of the ideal: consistency must also govern its practical application to life.

Now, as regards this practical accomplishment of the ideal, we must bear in mind that there are two factors in the process. There is, first of all, the application of the ideal to the concrete facts of life; and, secondly, its realization on the part of the will. In either aspect we must take account of consistency, *i.e.* of the requirement that the unifying impulse of reason shall operate throughout with absolute authority.

The application of the ideal to the concrete case implies the faculty of taste or judgment,—Kant's *Urtheilskraft*,—the instinctive form of which is conscience. In accordance with what has already been said, this immediate judgment of conscience cannot be self-sustaining, but, in so far as it is valid, it pre-supposes knowledge of the moral ideal, as well as the right use of the concrete ideas of the end which have been grafted upon the ideal by education. Now, since practical life sets particular tasks before us, and since a particular task requires a particular time for its performance, the question arises, what action ought to ensue at a given moment—for, of course, the ideal, as something concrete, has various sides. But it is impossible to act consistently with reference to more than one side at a time, and, if we take the one nearest to us as the most important, our act will be consistent in a partial sense only. The ecclesiastic, for example, may fix his mind so intently upon the interests of his church as to be oblivious of other duties. Such a one-sided consistency is the result of limitation, and leads to fanaticism: *fiat justitia, pereat mundus*! We may, in fact, find a consistency which is so rigid as to verge upon puerility, as, *e.g.*, when some positive law, such as Sabbath-observance, is over-emphasized in the manner of the Pharisees. The vital matter is rather to keep the ideal before the mind in every act. Every act must be of such a kind as will, in its degree and place, further the entire moral process; only so can the ideal be realized in each particular case. This may seem too great a burden to lay upon the generality of mankind. How many, it may be asked, are so far advanced in ethical knowledge, or so proficient in the exercise of their judgment, as to be capable of subjecting every case to such thorough-going reflexion? The majority trust to their conscience, which may be said to express the average ethical culture of the day, and at best they plead for some modification of the universal law in view of their personal circumstances. For instance, in regard to the obligation of philanthropy, they point to the state of their resources, or to their responsibility to those that have the first claim upon them; and, on the whole, they fare wonderfully well with this instinctive judgment, for they are in this way making a genuinely consistent application of the ideal. The explanation is, of course, that every man finds himself in a certain situation, in certain definite relationships; and a whole array of actions —provision for one's family, assiduity in one's calling, etc.—have become matters of use and wont. With respect to such things there grows up a certain moral conviction, which requires no special preliminary consideration, since, so to speak, it has become transformed into flesh and blood. Thus the immediate judgment of conscience is, in general, the consistent application of the ideal to the particular case.

It is different when one takes an active part in public life. Exact knowledge will then be required, so that one's decisions may be of the right kind; and a mature reflexion upon one's own faculty of judgment will be no more than proper. The same thing applies when we are confronted with important issues. Here also a man must carefully weigh all the salient facts of the situation, so that his action may in its own measure meet the entire moral demands of the occasion. The realization of the ideal will in such instances call for a developed tact and foresight, while these qualities will also be needed in order to understand the faculties by which, and the conditions in which, we must act, as well as the laws of the objects we wish to work upon. Self-knowledge and knowledge of facts are the pre-requisites of framing right ends and applying appropriate means. No relaxation of consistency is discernible here, for it is precisely the world as *given* which is to be transformed by the moral ideal. On the contrary, consistency demands that everything necessary to the accomplishment of that great end shall be done.

When, however, the intelligence has been thus brought to bear consistently upon particular cases, it is then required, first, that the will shall harmonize with the intelligence, and, secondly, that the appropriate mental and bodily organs shall be at the disposal of the will. The former desideratum is in this instance the fundamental union of the will with the moral ideal, *i.e.* the good will combined with love or enthusiasm for the ideal. This good will is also of crucial importance for particular volitions. But, in the second place, the volition can be carried into effect only by the exercise of the relative organs, and here the significance of psychology and psychophysics for ethics comes into view. We need not, however, speak of this aspect in detail. Enough has been said to show that in ethics the idea of consistency, alike in the formation and in the practical realization of the moral ideal, is of decisive importance.

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A. DORNER.

CONSOLATION, COMFORT (Christian).—*Consolation* is an act or process of giving comfort; the state of being comforted; or the condition and consciousness of relief from anxiety and distress, or of support in sorrow and affliction. *Comfort* is a complex emotion induced by means of consolation, or the act or process of comforting; but, although it is to be classed among the emotional states, it has certain well-defined presentational aspects. In its fullest, and especially in its religious, sense, there is the consciousness of a person whose presence, words, or acts are the source of the feeling of comfort, and constitute the consoling element. Although there are several weakened uses of the term 'comfort,' and it is often employed in an abstract and derived sense, the personal (or quasi-personal) source is always implied. The immediate effect upon the will is that of solace or soothing, restraint from agonizing or neurotic effort, and the inhibition of excited acts. The subconscious effect is that of a tonic, and the will is braced thereby for healthful exercise.[1] Whilst the consciousness of a personal presence and influence is the dominant feature in religious consolation, there is always, in the background at least, the presentation of something that produces pain,

[1] See W. James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 505.

distress, or anxiety. Probably in most cases the cause of the painful feeling is at first the focus of attention, but the process of consolation forces it into the background as the comfort is being experienced. The consciousness of personal help and support is the positive element in the case, whilst the negative is the sense of relief and mitigation.

As consolation and comfort play an exceedingly important part in the Christian consciousness and in the offices of religion, the connotation of these terms in devotional literature is in general identical with Scripture usage, from which it is derived. The Heb. word נֶחָמָה (Ps 119^{50}, Job 6^{10}) has its root-meaning in the act of breathing pantingly or sighing, probably as the expression of deep, sympathetic feeling on the part of the consoler. It especially refers to God as the Comforter of His people in their affliction, calamity, or persecution, or even in their repentance. In most cases, as in Ps $119^{50.76}$, comfort is given to the righteous, as such, in their tribulation, but in some other instances, as in Is 40^{1}, the comfort follows upon repentance, and Jahweh is represented as having changed from His state of anger to that of pity and compassion for His people. The richest form of comfort in the OT is probably what is often designated 'the motherhood of God' (Is 66^{13}).[1]

The NT conception of consolation and comfort in general has no reference to sin, but refers rather to the persecution, distress, and tribulation to which the faithful are exposed. The word most frequently employed is παράκλησις, whose primary significance is that of the ministrations of one called to assist, counsel, or relieve. παραμυθία (1 Co 14^{3} only) refers to comfort given by word or speech, whilst παρηγορία (Col 4^{11} only) brings out the aspect of soothing. The presence of God is the dominant feature in Christian consolation, together with the promises, assurances, and pledges of support and ultimate victory through Christ. God as manifested in Christ is the Comforter of His children; but more specifically the presence and power of God realized in the Spirit, through whom Christ returned to His disciples at Pentecost, indicate the significance of the Holy Spirit being designated the Comforter (παράκλητος, Jn $14^{16.26}$ 15^{26} 16^{7}).

There are two instances in the NT where comfort may be considered to have reference to repentance and forgiveness. The first instance is that of the second Beatitude (Mt 5^{4}), but it is by no means certain that the 'mourning' (οἱ πενθοῦντες) refers to one's own sin. The other case is in 2 Co 7^{10}, where it appears that St. Paul experiences the comfort on account of the godly sorrow which is felt by the Corinthian converts. The most familiar instance in devotional literature of the function of comfort in remission of sin is in the Book of Common Prayer immediately after the Absolution, in the Office of Holy Communion: 'Hear what comfortable words our Saviour Christ saith,' etc. The personal ministrations of sympathy, love, and support in the midst of sorrow and pain are far more prominent in the NT and in Christian literature than deliverance from the evils themselves. It is as though the inevitableness of suffering were recognized, especially the forms of it that Christians are called upon to bear for their Master's sake and as incidental to their work of extending the Redeemer's kingdom. 'All that would live godly in Christ Jesus shall suffer persecution' (2 Ti 3^{12}). In the sense, therefore, in which tribulation is regarded as partaking of Christ's sufferings, and as the result of well-doing or endured for righteousness' sake, consolation is not given in the form of the removal of such grievances, but in the consciousness of the Divine presence and approval, and the grace of God to support and sustain throughout all these experiences.

Whilst the Divine Being is the ultimate source of comfort, the 'Father of mercies and God of all comfort' (2 Co $1^{3f.}$), it is explicitly taught by St. Paul that Christian believers should in their turn become comforters of those who need sympathy and strength. In harmony with this injunction, the consolations of religion may be administered by the officers of the Church and by all who have had to pass through such experiences themselves. They are to be the instruments whereby the Divine comfort is mediated and brought to bear upon other souls and lives. Barnabas, who was exceptionally gifted in this respect, was fitly surnamed 'son of consolation' (υἱὸς παρακλήσεως, Ac 4^{36}).

The circumstances under which the administration of consolation is needed by the Christian and generally commented upon in devotional and in homiletical literature will now be summarized.

(1) *Physical or mental limitations, pain, or distress.*—The comfort consists in the knowledge of the disciplinary value of suffering, the consciousness of the transcendent power of the spiritual in the realized infirmity of the flesh, and the acquisition and development of the gifts and graces of sympathy, tenderness, and gentleness with other sufferers, together with patience and fortitude. 'Tunc non est melius remedium quam patientia, et abnegatio mei in voluntate Dei' (à Kempis, *de Imit. Christi*, lib. ii. c. ix. 6). The classic example of this form of consolation is that of St. Paul's 'thorn in the flesh,' and his comment thereupon, 'Most gladly therefore will I rather glory in my weaknesses, that the strength of Christ may rest upon me . . . for when I am weak, then am I strong' (2 Co $12^{9f.}$).

(2) *Anxiety, perplexity, and care.*—Here the Christian needs the assurance that he is in the hands of an All-wise and All-loving Heavenly Father, and that, so long as he makes God's cause and kingdom his chief interest and aim, all that is necessary for the effective discharge of his duty and the accomplishment of his work will be secured to him (Mt 6^{33}). As God is in the whole environment of our life, so shall those who trust in Him be under His direction, as they are beneath His protecting hand.

(3) *Depression and spiritual desolation.*—The best consolation under these conditions is the exhortation to continue in the prayerful and persistent discharge of duty and Christian work, and to wait patiently for the revealing of God's face and favour, and especially not to rely too exclusively upon one's feelings. Von Hügel points out the need for the 'sober and stable, consistent and persistent, laborious upbuilding of moral and religious character, work, and evidence,' instead of yielding to 'fierce and fitful,' 'wayward and fleeting feelings,' in the hours of darkness and isolation of soul (*The Mystical Element of Religion*, i. 5 f.). The exercise of faith strengthens the Christian in the consciousness that prayer for light and joy will sooner or later be heard, and that the inner witness will be given.

(4) *Difficulty in Christian work, opposition and persecution.*—Here the conflict of wills comes into play, and the determination of the heart against God and in defiance of the gracious influences that are brought into operation. This is particularly distressing when, as in the time of persecution, the opposition assumes an aggressive form. Christians are exhorted in the NT not to grow faint-hearted or weary in bearing their testimony even though they may have to seal it with their blood

[1] The Arab. تَعْزِيَة signifies the act of 'being kind to,' or 'patient with' (a person), and consequently 'comfort.'

They are encouraged to take comfort in the prospect and promise of the ultimate triumph of the truth and the all-conquering power of love which refuses not to suffer and to die. Moreover, they are to regard their sufferings borne in love on behalf of others as the means whereby the hearts of their opponents and persecutors are to be reached, and they are taught to pray and hope that the opposition will be ultimately broken down. The line of consolation adopted by the Fathers in encouraging the Churches to endure persecution was in general to remind them of the predictions of our Lord and the Apostles (Irenæus, *adv. Hær.* lib. iv. c. xxiii.); to point to the notable examples of martyrdom, from the death of Abel to the passion of our Lord (Cyprian, *Ep.* lv.); and also to seek to win the hearts of men by 'Christ's new way of patience' (Tert. *adv. Marcion.* lib. iv. c. 16).

(5) *Bereavement.*—Those who are bereaved are comforted by the blessed memories of the past, which ever remain as a sacred treasure, and by the promises that they shall meet again those who die in the Lord, for their life is assured in the Resurrection life of the Conqueror of death and the grave. St. Ambrose stated the ground of the Christian's hope thus: 'Habent gentiles solatia sua, quia requiem malorum omnium mortem existimant. . . . Nos vero ut erectiores praemio, ita etiam patientiores solatio esse debemus; non enim amitti, sed praemitti videntur, quos non assumptura mors, sed aeternitas receptura est' (*de Excessu Fratris sui Satyri*, lib. i. c. 71). St. Paul refers to the state of the sainted dead, and their final triumph through their Lord, and admonishes the Thessalonians to 'comfort one another with these words' (1 Th 4^{18}).

(6) *Death and the fear of death.*—Beyond all other consolations the consciousness of the presence and power of Christ—the Resurrection and the Life, who has triumphed over the last enemy—is assured to the believer. So closely related is the dying saint to his Lord, that St. Paul speaks of him as being amongst those who are asleep in (or through) Jesus (διὰ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ, 1 Th 4^{14}), and as dying unto the Lord (Ro 14^{8}). This thought is also carried out by St. John in the Apocalypse: 'Blessed are the dead which die in the Lord' (ἐν Κυρίῳ, Rev 14^{13}). This relationship ensures to Christian believers the hope of heaven, eternal life, and a glorious resurrection.

Whilst the experiences here summarized call for consolation, and that consolation is found in the promises of Scripture and in waiting upon God, there is always an implicit reference to the Divine Being Himself as the primary source of comfort. Thomas à Kempis clearly expresses this when he says: 'Unde non poteris, anima mea, plene consolari nec perfecte recreari, nisi in Deo, consolatore pauperum ac susceptore humilium' (*de Imit. Christi*, lib. iii. c. xvi.). In a secondary or derived sense, the words of God, His attributes, and His gifts are often referred to as being in themselves comforts, just as, in ordinary affairs, material things are designated 'comforts' if they minister to our well-being, not being luxuries on the one hand, or necessaries on the other. Also it is one of the duties and privileges of Christian believers to be the means of communicating the comfort they have received of God to other souls, by sympathy and tenderness, and by the support of collective faith and intercessory prayer. In the exercise of this function of consolation, the reflex action is experienced, which, in no slight degree, brings a sense of satisfaction, and even of joy, in being of service to suffering humanity.

Further, comfort is realized by Christians in the consciousness of community with their Lord in His sufferings, in being partakers with Him in the work of redemption, in drinking of the cup from which He drank, and in being baptized with His baptism. In tribulation incurred in the service of humanity, and incidental to the accomplishment of His work, there is, as St. Paul expressed it, the filling up what is lacking of the afflictions of Christ (Col 1^{24}). The Mystics of all schools have always been accustomed to direct the attention of the persecuted to the cross of Christ as the chief source of consolation, especially where sufferings have resulted from devotion to His cause. In contemplating thus the marks of His pain and anguish and the sense of desolation that He endured upon the cross, they have realized that they were one with Him in bearing reproach and ignominy, even though they could not suffer as He did in expiation of human guilt. Moreover, the thought of the transcendence of Christ's sufferings inspired a feeling of gratitude and an inspiration to the believing soul to endure 'the contradiction of sinners' without complaint or impatience. John Newton, in his well-known hymn, 'Begone, unbelief,' etc., dwells upon this thought—'Did Jesus thus suffer, and shall I repine?' These considerations inspired the hymn of John Keble, in *The Christian Year*, for Good Friday, that to the cross the mourner's eye should turn 'with softer power for comfort' in earth's darkest hour than on any bright day.

The full meaning of Christian consolation is not exhausted apart from the conception of the mystic union of Christ with the believer. There is a sense in which the Church has ever been conscious that, as Christ is the head of the body of believers, He suffers not only for their sins, but in all the sorrows and tribulation that God's people have to endure. God's consolation is, in this mystical sense, the realization of Christ's presence with us in all life's painful experiences, in His humanity and His eternal priesthood. The realization of God's presence in Christ bears the promise of ultimate triumph, and, although Christ's disciples shall have tribulation in the world, their final conquest is secured and guaranteed in His victory over all.

LITERATURE.—There is no subject more frequently referred to in the whole of devotional literature than consolation, but the specific treatment of it is somewhat slight. For psychological treatment, see **W. James**, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, London, 1902 (chapters on 'Saintliness' and 'Mysticism,' and the Conclusions); **Fr. von Hügel**, *The Mystical Element of Religion*, 2 vols., London, 1908–9 (esp. the Introduction and pt. iii.). Devotional works: **Thomas à Kempis**, *de Imitatione Christi* (in various editions and Eng. translations); **St. Francis de Sales** (frequent references scattered throughout his writings); **J. H. Burn**, *Manual of Consolation*, London, 1902; **Père Huguet**, *The Consoling Thoughts of St. Francis de Sales*, Dublin, n. d.; **Frassinetti**, *Consolation of a Devout Soul*, London, 1875; **Cowper, Newton, Doddridge, etc.**, *Comfort for the Mourner*, London, 1822; **R. Buchanan**, *Comfort in Affliction*, Edin. 1871; **C. H. Spurgeon**, *Twelve Sermons for the Troubled and Tried*, London, 1896; **J. H. Jowett**, *The Silver Lining*, London, 1907–8; **E. Romanes**, *The Hallowing of Sorrow*, London, 1896; **H. Black**, *Comfort*, London, 1910. Cf. also **Chrysostom**, *ad Stagirium* (*PG* xlvii.); **Honoratus**, *Ep. consolatoria* (*PL* l.); **J. Hinton**, *The Mystery of Pain*, London, 1866, ^{4}1870; **C. Kingsley**, *Out of the Deep*, London, 1880; **S. A. Bronke**, *Sunshine and Shadow*, London, 1886; **J. E. Hopkins**, *Christ the Consoler*^{2}, London, 1879, ^{4}1884.

J. G. JAMES.

CONSOLATION (Greek and Roman).—In Greece the germs of a literature of consolation can be traced to ancient times. The dead were commemorated in threnodies, which were designed also to console the bereaved, and a great vogue was enjoyed by a *threnos* of Pindar, in which the ideas of the Orphic eschatology were drawn upon for consolation, and which is made use of in the pseudo-Platonic dialogue *Axiochos*. In Athens it was customary, probably after the Persian wars, to engage a rhetor to deliver a funeral oration—like that, *e.g.*, which Thucydides puts into the mouth of Pericles—regarding those who had fallen in battle; and it was usual at the close to address the relatives in consoling terms. Several of these

orations are still extant; one, the *epitaphios* of Hyperides, is known to have been delivered in 322 B.C. The grounds of consolation are set forth in ch. 20 of the *Menexenos* of Plato, which is a parody upon the sophistic *epitaphios* of the type seen in that composed by Gorgias. Philosophy likewise had at an early stage wrought out certain consolatory lines of thought, and it is possible that the writings of Antisthenes the Cynic may have suggested what Xenophon makes Socrates say in the *Apology*. Aristotle's dialogue 'Eudemus on the Soul,' and the 'Callisthenes on Mourning' of Theophrastus, were also well stored with consoling sentiments. But the standard work of the kind was that of Crantor the Academic (*c.* 270 B.C.) 'On Mourning,' which was sent by the author to a friend whose children had died, and which Cicero calls 'aureolus et ad verbum ediscendus libellus' (*Acad.* ii. 135). As it treated of sorrow not as a reprehensible emotion—in the manner of the Stoics—but rather as a natural impulse, requiring only to be kept within bounds, the book found many readers; and, when Cicero, in 45 B.C., essayed the composition of his *Consolatio* for his own comfort after the demise of his daughter Tullia, he made Crantor's work the basis of his own, while he reproduced its ideas a little later in the *Disp. Tusc.* (esp. i. 19-72). Plutarch does the same thing in the piece addressed to Apollonia. Epicurus also had elaborated many comforting sentiments, as he was specially concerned to deliver men from the fear of death; he sought to convince them of the painlessness of dying, and of the absolute cessation of perception thereafter, thus grappling with the popular superstitions about the terrors of the under world (Lucret. *de Rer. Nat.* iii., with Heinze's com.).

Nor had the rhetoricians neglected the consolatory oration, and in the Hellenistic period—perhaps even from the time of Isocrates—they had framed for this species of composition certain rules, which in their later form are found in the *μέθοδος ἐπιταφίων* of pseudo-Dionysius and the *περὶ παραμυθητικοῦ* of Menander (4th cent. A.D.). These rules are followed not merely by heathen, but even by Christian, funeral discourses (cf. F. Bauer, *Die Trostreden des Gregor v. Nyssa*, Marburg, 1892). It is specially worthy of note that the plan of composition elaborated by the rhetoricians was taken over by poetry, the most outstanding instance of this being the *Consolatio ad Liviam* which bears the name of Ovid, and which is neither a fabrication of the Renaissance period nor, as was long believed, a product emanating, under Seneca's influence, from the later school of rhetoric, but a poem actually presented to Livia upon the death of Drusus in 9 B.C. The rhetorical scheme had also an influence upon the work of Statius (esp. *Silvæ*, ii. 6: 'Consolatio ad Flavium Ursum').

Among the elements of a consolatory oration a special place is given to the praise of the deceased. According to the detailed rules for the *ἐγκώμιον*, this permitted of great amplification. The discourse likewise described the way in which the departed would be received by his ancestors and the heroes of antiquity. The bereaved were also shown that their experience was common to mankind, that not only individuals but whole kingdoms had perished, that life is simply a trust from the Deity, and that excessive grief can profit neither the mourner nor the dead. Instances were also given of men who, like Priam, would have been happier had they died earlier.

A distinct species of this literature appears in the 'consolations' addressed to those who had been banished, as, *e.g.*, Seneca's letter to his mother Helvia, and Plutarch's *περὶ φυγῆς*. In these, as in works of consolation generally, special use is made of the ideas expressed in the popular diatribe of the Cynics, emphasis being laid upon the thought that the home of the wise man is not a particular city but the whole world. Here, too, the writers drew extensively upon the examples of celebrated exiles, such as Antenor, Evander, and Diomedes.

LITERATURE.—K. Buresch, *Leipziger Studien*, ix. (1886) 1; A. Gercke, in *Tirocinium Philologum* (Bonn, 1883); Skutsch, 'Consolatio ad Liviam,' in Pauly-Wissowa, iv. 933; A. Giesecke, *De philosophorum veterum quæ ad exilium spectant sententiis* (Leipzig, 1891).

W. KROLL.

CONSTANCY.—This quality is most clearly manifested by instinct (*q.v.*)—the innate tendency to respond similarly to similar influences. Reasoning introduces variations. As a large part of the experience of savages is due to instinct, their conduct can be predicted till they are moved by thought, and then they are erratic; for guiding principles are lacking, with the result that waywardness and fickleness are conspicuous. Attention is irksome to them (as to children), and tasks that are readily begun are swiftly abandoned. The civilized man criticizes and often resists instincts, while he compels the various choices that are open to him to move in directions favourable to his designs. Constancy may belong to a single thread of a life, or it may be characteristic of the entire collection of activities. An affection of love or hate may abide for years without having occasion to display itself and without affecting the ordinary conduct; at length the opportunity comes, and the fires that had been hidden blaze out. In other cases there are purposes which day by day mould all the circumstances and call into their service every power of body and mind.

(1) *Social influences and the necessity of obtaining a livelihood* account for many sorts of constancy. Personal tendencies to variation are subject to limitations imposed by the opinions and plans of others. To a large extent we must all comply with demands made upon us, and it is so hazardous to forsake the career to which one has been bred, that the trade or profession chosen secures the service of the entire life. Success requires patience and perseverance. Hand and mind gain facility by continuous endeavours, the spur to which is often the necessity of providing for domestic needs. Nevertheless, in the most mechanical calling there may live affections and aspirations due to an ever fresh willingness; in the moss-covered well there is spring water. The soul can steadily rise, though outwardly the man appears to be treading a mill-round. Fidelity to persons and to causes frequently makes music in what appear to be monotonous histories.

(2) *Tendencies to constancy are not equally strong in all natures.* There are weather-cock, and there are stubborn, souls; for flexibility and firmness are partly to be ascribed to constitution. Undisciplined no one can be satisfactory, but the discipline required differs in each case. Some vessels drift to and fro and are in danger of foundering, while others stick fast on the rocks and look as if they would be battered to pieces by the waves; the Christian religion would guide the one class and release the other. To change the constitution is a miracle of which Christianity believes itself to have the secret. Shallow soil can be deepened and rock can be dissolved; hence there may appear corn-producing fields, and gardens lovely and fragrant with flowers.

(3) *When is constancy admirable?* Only when it is a quality of aims that enrich human experience, when it belongs to a purpose to convert moral ideals to the actual, to acquire and spread truth, to respond gladly to whatsoever is pure and lovely,

to love men and to labour for their good, to make one's life valuable to humanity. Such purposes admit minor changes, whereas evil motives, such as pride, may lie behind some forms of constancy. In order to maintain a vitally important consistency, superficial inconsistency is often imperative. There cannot be a righteous adhesion to opinions the falsity of which has been demonstrated, for 'constancy in mistake is constant folly.' Would not a resolution never to vote differently, never to espouse another faith, imply that in youth infallibility had been acquired? An abiding loyalty to truth necessitates changes in beliefs, habits, and allies. But serious men cannot alter easily or without pain. The lower consistency is abandoned for a higher, and the abandonment is often accompanied by loss of what is dear, without any apparent compensating gain.

(4) *The conditions of constancy.*—Failing the predominance of one idea or affection, the ideas and affections must be of a kind to work together with a good measure of harmony. 'A double-minded man is unstable in all his ways' (Ja 1[8]). Serious and deep contradictions are ruinous. A commanding purpose (or purposes that harmonize with one another) will consolidate and organize the impulses and desires, so that, from being a mob, they are converted into an army. Noble aims will gather about themselves the strength and warmth of the lower impulses: and after a time the habit of beating down sensual and unsocial impulses will cause the soul to move more and more easily on the higher than on the lower paths. Courage will be required, and sacrifices also. Devotion to the interests of persons can survive the discovery of unworthiness in those whom one loves; and the cause espoused can still be served, though it fails to gain popular approbation; 'many waters cannot quench love' (Ca 8[7]). Generally there is the sympathy of some companions whose support helps to keep the fires of zeal burning. Especially is constancy promoted if the general plan of life or some particular design or way is believed to have the favour of heaven; for then there is the assurance of supernatural assistance, and all the rills and streams of one's purposes seem to be drawn into the river of God's will. The human will is never so firm as when it thinks itself to be merged in God's, and great confidence possesses the aspirant to sanctity who reads, 'This is the will of God, even your sanctification' (1 Th 4[3]).

(5) *The effects of constancy.*—In Oliver Cromwell's Bible was the inscription, 'O. C. 1644, Qui cessat esse melior cessat esse bonus.' Mere visits to realms of thought, or occasional excursions into any sphere of activity, are insufficient to make deep marks on character, or to give skill in any handicraft or profession. A few warm days in winter can produce no harvest. Who can be an accomplished musician, scientist, linguist, without persistent toil? Great are the differences between the results of *κατοικέω* and *παροικέω*. A favourite word in the Fourth Gospel is *μένω*: the branch that 'abides' in the vine bears much fruit (Jn 15[5]). No wonder that Bunyan had an aversion to the lives of Mr. Pliable and Mr. Temporary, seeing that such men not only fail to reach the Celestial City, but even discourage other pilgrims. By constancy power is accumulated and capitalized, skill is acquired, and the soul makes for itself a tradition which it is ashamed not to honour. While the man becomes a law to himself, observers can rely upon him and infer his future from his past conduct, for there is logical connexion between the past and the present. Constancy makes the good better and the bad worse. See also PERSEVERANCE.

LITERATURE.—J. Sully, *Outlines of Psychology*, new ed., London, 1894, ch. on 'Habit'; W. James, *Psychology*, London, 1892, vol. ii. ch. iv.; T. Carlyle, *Past and Present*, bk. ii. ch. xvii. 'Beginnings,' and bk. iv. ch. iv. 'Permanence'; Carveth Read, *Natural and Social Ethics*, London, 1910.

W. J. HENDERSON.

CONSTANTINE.—I. Life.—Flavius Valerius Aurelius Constantinus was born on 27th Feb. of a year uncertain, generally given as 274, but probably a little later.[1] The place was Naissus (Nisch) in Dardania (Servia) (Anon. Valesii, 2; Constant. Porphyrogenitus, *de Thematibus*, ii. 9 [in Migne, *PG* cxiii.]). The fiction of his birth at York, current in all mediæval English historians (the silence of Bede, *HE* i. 8, should be noted), arose from a misunderstanding of the phrase 'illic oriendo' (*Panegyr.* vi. 4), which refers to his accession, not his birth. Constantine's father, M. Flavius Valerius Constantius (the surname Chlorus is not found until late Greek writers), was a noble Dardanian soldier, whose mother was the niece of the emperor Claudius. His mother, Flavia Helena (b. about 250; Euseb. *Vita Constantini*,[2] iii. 46), was the daughter or servant (Ambrose, *de Obitu Theodosii*, 42) of an innkeeper of Drepanum in Bithynia, a city rebuilt by Constantine in 327 in her honour and re-named Helenopolis. Her marriage to Constantius was probably irregular (Anon. Vales. 1; Zosimus, *Res Gestæ*, ii. 8; these passages should not be pressed as more than morganatic [see *Digest.* xxv. 7]) until after the birth of her son (cf. Constantine's legislation, *infra*, V. i. *d* (2)). When Constantine was about 14, his father was promoted by Diocletian to the rank of 'Cæsar' (1st March 293), with the government of Gaul and Britain, on condition that he divorced Helena and married Theodora, daughter of the emperor Maximian. Constantine did not accompany his father, but was left at Diocletian's court at Nicomedia, possibly as a hostage, until the growing jealousy of Galerius, after the abdication of Diocletian and Maximian (1st May 305), compelled him to a memorable ride across Europe to his father's camp at Boulogne (Lactant. *de Mortibus Persecut.*[3] 24; Anon. Vales. 3, 8), where he arrived in time to share his father's victories over the Picts (Eumenius, *Panegyr.* vii. 7).

The death of Constantius at York (25th July 306) was followed by the proclamation by the army of Constantine as 'Cæsar' (Zos. ii. 9; 'Augustus' in Euseb. *HE* viii. 13, *VC* i. 22, though this higher honour was not ratified by Galerius until the following year [*Panegyr.* vi. 5; coins in Eckhel, *Doct. Num. Vet.* viii. 72; Lact. *MP* 25]). His seat of government was Trèves, which he embellished with many buildings. In 307 he strengthened his position by his marriage at Arles to Fausta, the daughter of Maximian. The Empire was thus divided between six rulers: in the East, Galerius, Licinian (Valerius Licinianus Licinius), and Maximin Daza; in the West, Constantine (Gaul and Britain), Maximian, who had re-assumed the purple, and his son Maxentius. But Maximian, after a crafty intrigue against Constantine, was captured and forced to strangle himself in Feb. 310 (Lact. *MP* 29, 30; Eumen. *Panegyr.* vii. 20), while the death of Galerius at Sardica (Anon. Vales. 3, 8) in May 311 led to the division of the Empire between Constantine, Licinian, and Maximin Daza. The three refused to recognize Maxentius, whose tyranny in his province of Italy, Africa, and Spain, gave Constantine an excuse for the invasion of Italy (Euseb. *HE* ix. 9. 2, *VC* i. 26; Nazarius, *Panegyr.* x. 19, 31; Zos. ii. 14 says Maxentius was the aggressor). He

[1] Seeck, *Gesch. d. Untergangs d. antik. Welt*, i. 435 n., gives 280 as the date, but his reference, *CIL* i.[2] p. 302, seems inaccurate.

[2] Hereafter cited as *VC*.

[3] Hereafter cited as *MP*.

crossed the Alps (Sept. 312) either by Mt. Cenis or by Mt. Génèvre (see the contemporary [A.D. 333] *Itin. Anon. Burdigalense*, ed. Geyer in *CSEL* xxxix. 5), captured Susa and Verona (Oct.), and within 58 days of declaring war defeated the sluggish Maxentius at Saxa Rubra, about 9 miles N.W. of Rome. The drowning of Maxentius in attempting to escape over the Milvian Bridge (Ponte Molle) completed his triumph, 28th Oct. 312 (Anon. Vales. 4, 12; Lact. *MP* 44; Euseb. *HE* ix. 9; there is a full account in Seeck, *op. cit.* i. 109-137).

Constantine's victory was followed, early in 313, by a conference at Milan with Licinian, and by the marriage of Licinian to his sister Constantia. The defeat of Daza by Licinian near Adrianople (30th Apr. 313) and his death in August at Tarsus left Constantine and Licinian in sole possession—the ex-emperor Diocletian dying probably that same summer (Seeck, *op. cit.* i. 459 f., following as his source Idatius, *Consulares Fasti*, dates 3rd Dec. 316) at Salona. But the concord of the two was hollow. The first civil war between them was ended by the triumphs of Constantine at Cibalis (Vinkovci in Hungary), 8th Oct. 314, and Mardia in Thrace (Anon. Vales. 5; Zos. ii. 18-20), after which a truce was patched up, Constantine leaving Licinian in possession of Thrace, Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt. Constantine now devoted himself to internal reforms, from which he was called away by the war with the Goths and Sarmatians in Illyricum and Dacia (322) and the final struggle with Licinian. The victories, in spite of Licinian's superior forces, of Adrianople (3rd July 323) and Chrysopolis (Scutari, 8th Sept. 323) were followed by the humiliation and enforced death of Licinian in 324 (Soc. *HE* i. 4; Euseb. *VC* ii. 18; Zos. ii. 28; Entrop. *Brev.* x. 6) and the re-union of the Empire under one head.

The foundation by Constantine of a new capital (4th Nov. 326 [Anon. *de Antiq. Constant.* i. 3, in A. Banduri, *Imperium Orientale*, Paris, 1711]; see Burckhardt, *Die Zeit*, etc. 415; but de Broglie, *L'église*, etc. i. 440 f., dates in 328) at Byzantium is one of the great events of history. In reality it continued Diocletian's policy of ruling from Nicomedia. It was dedicated on 11th May 330 (Gibbon, ed. Bury, ii. 157 n.), under the title of New Rome. The removal of the seat of government was completed by an entire re-organization of the Empire, the new absolute monarchy of Diocletian which had taken the place of the old principate being consolidated and systematized (see Seeck, *op. cit.* ii.). Constantine's last years, though years of peace, were unfortunate. His character degenerated (Eutrop. *Brev.* x. 7), his expensive building operations drained the Empire of its resources (Zos. ii. 32, 35, 38; Schiller, *Röm. Kaiserzeit*, ii. 230), his habits became effeminate, and his jealousy of a rival made his family life miserable. His eldest son Crispus, the offspring of an early irregular marriage with Minervina, had shown great ability in forcing the straits of Hellespont against the superior fleet of Licinian (323), yet he was executed (July 326) at his father's command (Amm. Marcell. xiv. 11), though the reason for this act is obscure. This was followed, possibly a year or two later, by the execution of his wife Fausta on the charge of adultery.[1] In 331 Constantine was forced to attack the Sarmatians, who had encamped near the Danube. His victory—for his supposed defeat is a curious error of Gibbon (ii. 217)—was the last of his successes. He died near Nicomedia on Whitsunday, 22nd May 337, though he nominally reigned for four months (until 9th Sept.) after his death.

[1] For detailed investigation of this domestic tragedy see Görres and Seeck, 'Die Verwandtenmorde Constantin's des Grossen,' in *ZWT* xxx. [1887], 343 ff., xxxiii. [1890] 63 ff.

In spite of the claims of Rome, he was buried at Constantinople in the great church of the Trinity (later called 'Holy Apostles'), which he had completed for the purpose the previous Easter. At Rome the heathen senate enrolled him among the gods (V. Schultze, *Untergang d. gr.-röm. Heidentums*, 1887-92, i. 66), though the medal struck to commemorate this was made of a Christian type (King, *Christian Numismatics*, 1873, p. 53). In 1204, his tomb was destroyed by the Latin crusaders on their capture of Constantinople.

Constantine's life, like that of Charles the Great, has become legendary, and was one of the favourite romances of the mediæval Church. On these see the critical studies of E. Heydenreich, esp. 'Constantin der Grosse in den Sagen des Mittelalters' in *Ztschr. f. Geschichtswissenschaft*, ix. [1893] 9. 1 ff.

II. **Extent of the Church at the time of Constantine's 'conversion.'**—At the outset of an inquiry into the great change brought about by Constantine, it is of importance to understand the extent and influence of the Church and its attraction for any statesman.

(*a*) *Numbers.*—Materials for forming an estimate of the strength of Christianity under Diocletian will be found in Harnack's elaborate survey (*Expansion of Christianity*, Eng. tr. ii. [1904] 240-456). From a careful study it would appear that in the East the Christians, except in a few towns, were still only a small minority, at the most—one-ninth or so of the whole (H. Richter, *Weström. Reich* [1865], p. 85)—and in the West they would be considerably less. Unfortunately we do not know the population of the Empire. The figure of Gibbon (i. 42), 120 millions, is absurdly large; J. Beloch (*Bevölkerung d. gr.-röm. Welt*, 1886) gives it under Augustus at 54 millions, but this seems too small. If we take it at 60 millions under Nero, the great famines, etc., in the middle of the 3rd cent. would have reduced it to slightly less under Constantine. At the outside, therefore, the Christians would scarcely number five millions (Gibbon's proportion, $\frac{1}{20}$ [ii. 65], thus comes to the same result), or less than the Jews, who numbered over six millions, of whom one million were in Egypt. In Rome in 250 we calculate from Eusebius, *HE* vi. 43. 11, that the Christians numbered between 40,000 and 50,000 in a city of nearly a million, *i.e.* $\frac{1}{20}$, though this proportion would be higher in the time of Constantine. In the country districts the Christians were far less numerous than in the towns.

(*b*) *Influence.*—But what the Christians lacked in numbers they more than made up by their organization, unity, wealth, and driving power. In these matters only the Jews could equal them, but Judaism was hindered by its Law from ever becoming an international religion. The Christians, shut off from the pleasures of the world, had grown immensely rich, while their morality, sobriety, and enthusiasm would attract any statesman who looked deeper than popular rumour. For any statesman anxious to infuse new life into a dying world Christianity had no rival except, possibly, Mithraism, for Neo-Platonism, etc., had no value for the vulgar; nor must we overlook the value to the statesman of the Christian doctrine of immortality (Burckhardt, *op. cit.* p. 140).

III. **Personal relation to Christianity.**—The personal relation of Constantine to Christianity is a subject of much importance, as upon its decision many questions, both theological and ecclesiastical, depend. As to the date of his 'conversion' the earliest authorities are contradictory. Lactant. *Instit. Div.* vii. 27, a work finished before 311, would be conclusive, but the passage has been shown by its editor, Brandt (*CSEL* xix. 668), to be an interpolation. Equally

conclusive would be sentences in the letter of Constantine to the bishops at Arles in 314 or 316 (Optatus Milev. *Mon. Vet.* [*CSEL* xxvi. 208]), but these probably reflect merely the opinions of Hosius (see *infra*, IV. (*b*)). Zos. ii. 29 (cf. Soz. *HE* i. 3) dates the conversion after the execution of Crispus, to the remorse for which he attributes it. For our part we first detect a warmer note as to Christianity about 314, in Constantine's letter to Chrestus (Euseb. *HE* x. 5). As regards his whole relation to Christianity, the data are involved and have been variously interpreted, while the difficulty has been increased by the delay of his baptism until his death. The whole problem has been rendered additionally obscure by the complex imperfect character of Constantine himself—calculating, shrewd, superstitious, often cruel, cynical—whose one great instance of consummate foresight alone entitles him to be called 'Great.' Brieger (*Ztschr. f. Kirchengesch.* iv. [1881] 163 ff.) and Gibbon make it altogether a question of politics; but, as Bury has pointed out (Gibbon, ii. 566), this is to ascribe to Constantine a freedom from superstition which, though natural in an English deist of the 18th cent., was altogether unknown in the 4th. Schiller (*op. cit.* ii. 213) believes that his ideal was a syncretistic fusion of the best elements of Christianity and paganism. But Constantine's powers of observation must have shown him the impossibility of any such syncretism; the refusal of precisely such syncretism lay at the root of the whole persecution of Diocletian. As a summary of the following survey we incline to think that Constantine at first leaned to toleration for political reasons, as a system of balance or equal opportunity for heathenism and Christianity; and that the success of his arms and the identification of his vanquished foes with heathenism (cf. Constantine's *Oratio ad Sanct. Coetum*, 23–26, of which this is the concluding thought) led to a policy of self-interest passing into an intellectual, possibly even a moral, conviction; with the consequent effort, but without unstatesmanlike haste, to supplant heathenism by Christianity, and in certain directions (see *infra*, V. i.) to alter the laws accordingly. The relapse of his last years was rather moral degeneration than any reaction (Burckhardt) towards paganism, while at its best his religion was probably a 'strange jumble' (Niebuhr, *Rom. Hist.*, Eng. tr. [1828 ff.] v. 449) of creed and superstition.

(*a*) *In early life.*—That Constantine's mother Helena was a Christian before her divorce has been asserted (Theodoret, *HE* i. 17); but Eusebius (*VC* iii. 47) ascribes her conversion to her son. While there is no reason to identify his father Constantius' leaning towards Monotheism (Euseb. *VC* i. 17, ii. 49) with a belief in Christianity, it is of importance to note his tolerant disposition. During the great persecution of Diocletian it was only in Constantius' provinces of Gaul and Britain that there was any safety for Christians (Optat. Milev. i. 22),[1] though even Constantius thought it well to conform to the edict of Diocletian to the extent of destroying the churches (Lact. *MP* 15, as against Euseb. *HE* viii. 13. 13). Here and there also there were one or two martyrs—not necessarily, of course, by Constantius' orders.[2] To the tolerant practice and disposition of his father we must add the influence of Nicomedia, at the palace of which Constantine was brought up. The power of the Christians, whose great basilica towered up against the palace, the fact that, in the court itself, Prisca the wife and Valeria the daughter of Diocletian, the influential eunuchs Dorotheus and Gorgonius, and Lucian the chamberlain, were Christians (Lact. *MP* 15), the resistance of the Christians to Diocletian's edicts, and the chaos produced by attempts to carry out the edicts—all must have impressed him with the folly and impossibility of a policy of persecution (cf. Constantine's *Orat. ad Sanct. Coet.* 25). Yet, while in Gaul, his personal cult appears to have been that of Apollo or the sun-god (Eumen. *Panegyr.* vii. 21), and even late in his reign he was still under its influence, so that, *e.g.*, his statue at Constantinople was a mutilated sun-god from Athens (cf. *infra*, V. ii. (*c*) 'Sunday').

(*b*) *In his struggle with Maxentius.*—Rumours of the persecution in the East under Galerius and Maximin Daza would confirm Constantine in his conception of its folly and in his policy of toleration (Lact. *MP* 24. 9). He was therefore a willing party in signing, with Licinian, Galerius' edict of toleration (30th Apr. 311). In his struggle with Maxentius, the plea of Constantine's invasion was the deliverance of Rome from his tyranny and vices (Euseb. *HE* ix. 9. 2, *VC* i. 33; *Panegyr.* ix. 4; Julian, *Cæs.*, ed. Hertlein, pp. 405, 422), and the Christians as such were tolerably treated (Optat. Milev. i. 18). As regards the famous vision at the Milvian Bridge opinion will always be divided. In our earliest authority (Lact. *MP* 44, written in 314, probably by the tutor of Crispus), Constantine was warned in a dream on the night before the battle to draw the monogram of Christ (☧) upon the shields of his soldiers.

For the form of the monogram and *labarum*, see Smith-Cheetham, *DCA* i. 494. We may note that the *labarum* (derivation unknown), or standard with this monogram, appears on Græco-Bactrian coins of the 2nd and 1st cent. B.C., and also on Tarantine coins of the 3rd cent. B.C. (cf. Soc. *HE* v. 17, and Soz. *HE* vii. 15, for symbols of the cross as a sign of immortality on temples of Isis; see also Schiller, *op. cit.* ii. 205 n.; Madden, *Num. Chron.*, 1877, p. 17 ff.). According to E. Rapp (*Das Labarum und d. Sonnencultus*, Bonn, 1865), there is no well-attested use of the *labarum* as a Christian symbol before 323 (see below, p. 78b, top).

The familiar story is not found in Euseb. *HE* ix. 9, which is silent on the subject, but occurs in the later *VC* i. 28 (cf. also *ib.* ii. 55; Soz. *HE* i. 4), where Eusebius states that Constantine told it him 'long afterwards and confirmed it with an oath,' but gives no date. The value of this personal statement is discounted by the silence of Constantine in his *Orat. ad Sanct. Coet.*, where surely of all places he would have dilated upon it. Oaths with Constantine were also very common. Allowing for exaggerations in the intervening years, we may take it that something external happened, possibly a solar halo, which not unfrequently assumes the form of a cross,[1] and that this was interpreted by Constantine as an augury of Divine intervention. There is proof of the dream in the inscription by the Senate on the arch of Constantine, dedicated in 315. The 'instinctu divinitatis' (*CIL* vi. 1139) there alleged as the cause of victory (cf. Constantine, *Orat. ad Sanct. Coet.* 26) has been shown to be original and no later addition (cf. Lanciani, *Pagan and Christian Rome*, 1892, p. 20 f.; Garrucci, in King, *op. cit.* p. 20). Additional proof is found also in the pagan *Panegyr.* ix. (written in 313) ch. 4 'te divina præcepta,' ch. 11 'tu divino monitus instinctu.' Whether this 'cæleste signum,' as Lactantius,

[1] Spain, where persecutions abounded, was not, as is often stated, in his government, but was under the charge of Datian, an officer of Maximian.

[2] For the martyrs in Britain—St. Alban (very doubtful), Aaron, and Julius (more doubtful still)—see Bede, *HE*, ed. Plummer, ii. 17–20; Haddan-Stubbs, *Councils*, Oxford, 1869–78, i. 6; Harnack, *Expansion*, ii. 410, n. 4.

[1] This explanation was first given by Fabricius (*Bib. Græc.* vi. 8–29. Stanley (*Eastern Church*, p. 181) refers to the Aurora Borealis of 1848 and its curious popular interpretations; cf. Nazarius, *Panegyr.* (written in 321), ch. 14, of the hosts in the sky in 312–313 that were 'the talk of all Gaul.'

loc. cit., calls it, was a miracle[1] brings in considerations beyond our scope.[2]

We are told (Euseb. *HE* ix. 9. 10, 11, *VC* i. 40) that, after the victory of the Milvian Bridge, Constantine erected at Rome a statue of himself, with the spear he usually carried in his right hand shaped like a cross. As evidence the *VC* is almost valueless, and Brieger thought that the passage in *HE* was an interpolation. But Eusebius mentioned this statue in a speech at Tyre in 314 (*HE* x. 4. 16), and this seems to decide its existence and the general belief in the East in 314 as to Constantine's position, though the popular Christian rumour might not be a correct interpretation of the artist's work.[3] The spear-cross was probably designedly ambiguous. A more important evidence of Constantine's favour for the Christians is his handing over to the Roman bishop (before Oct. 313; see *infra*, p. 79ᵇ) of the 'domus Faustæ,' a palace possibly of his wife, formerly belonging to the Lateran family (Gregorovius, *Rome in Middle Ages* [Eng. tr. 1894 ff.], i. 88), which became the residence of the Bishops of Rome (*Lib. Pontif.*, ed. Duchesne, i. 191). The erection of the churches commonly attributed to him (Lateran, St. Peter's) is probably a little later, if we may judge from the fact that they were built with pagan spoils (Greg. *op. cit.* i. 92), though the small St. Paul's (*fuori le muri*), the foundation of which was wrongly attributed to Constantine, would come under the head of the oratories restored after the edict of Milan (Duchesne, *op. cit.* i. 178, 195; Lanciani, *op. cit.* p. 150 ff.; Greg. *op. cit.* i. 100). On the whole the evidence of Constantine's churches in Rome (the list of which in the *Lib. Pontif.* is very exaggerated) is inconclusive as to the date of his conversion.

(*c*) *Between 312 and 323.*—After the victory of the Milvian Bridge, Constantine and Licinian promulgated at Milan, in the spring of 313, a second edict of toleration—'free liberty to choose that form of worship which they consider most suitable'—and restoration of forfeited churches and property.

For this edict see Euseb. *HE* x. 5, and for its original Latin form, Lact. *MP* 48. Note the non-committal religious references—'Quidquid est divinitatis in sede caelesti.' This edict was second to that of Galerius, to which the 'hard conditions' (αἱρέσεις) of § 4 refers. Mason (*Persecution of Diocletian*, 1876, p. 327 ff.) has exploded the older idea (still held in *DCB* i. 638) that Constantine issued a second edict of toleration at Milan, before the Milvian Bridge, and that this was the third.

But, until 323, Constantine kept a balance between Christianity and heathenism, though inclining more and more to the former (see *infra*, IV. (*c*)). About 317, he selected the Christian Lactantius to be the tutor of his son Crispus (b. 306[?]; Jerome, *de Vir. Ill.* 80). From 315 onwards, pagan emblems (Mars, 'Genius Pop. Rom.,' Sol) disappeared from his coins, and indifferent legends ('Beata tranquillitas,' etc.) took their place. This period of neutrality was ended by his conflict with Licinian. In 319, Licinian had begun to oppress the Christians, especially in his army (Workman, *Persecution in Early Church*, 1906, p. 187 n.), though without much bloodshed (Euseb. *HE* x. 8; *VC* i. 49-56, ii. 1, 2; Sozomen, *HE* i. 7; for a clear examination see F. Görres, *Die Licin. Christenverfolgung*, Leipzig, 1875, esp. p. 29 ff. To this persecution belong the Forty Martyrs of Sebaste [see O. v. Gebhardt, *Acta Mart. Selecta*, 1902, pp. 166-181]). This foolish move gave Constantine the opportunity of appearing as the advocate of the Christians (323), who were really far more numerous in Licinian's domains than in the West. The struggle thus became a crusade, and the *labarum* was stamped on most coins (Euseb. *HE* x. 9, *VC* ii. 6-12; Schiller, *op. cit.* ii. 211; Madden, *Num. Chron.*, 1877, p. 53 ff.).

(*d*) *From 323 to his death.*—After his conflict with Licinian, Constantine, according to Eusebius, put his hand seriously to the work, forbidding pagan sacrifices in general (see *infra*, p. 81ᵃ), and building churches (*VC* ii. 44-46). But, on the whole, his attitude to paganism was cautious, though his aversion to the old faith would be increased by his unfortunate reception in heathen Rome in 326, which led to his abandoning it for Constantinople. After this he seems to have increased the privileges of the clergy (Soz. *HE* i. 8, 9), and he rewarded towns that turned temples into churches (Soc. *HE* i. 18; Soz. *HE* ii. 5), in several cases because of immoral rites (cf. Euseb. *Laud. Constant.* 8). Many temples were also despoiled for the founding of Constantinople, and by his expressed wish the new city was free from organized heathenism (Euseb. *VC* iii. 48). At the same time the existing temples of Byzantium—Cybele, Castor and Pollux, etc.—were not destroyed, and the city itself was dedicated to Tyche (Fortuna), though without temple services (Zos. ii. 21; Schultze, *op. cit.* ii. 281; for this Tyche, Bury refers to a study of J. Strzygowski, 'Die Tyche v. Konstant.' in *Analecta Graeciensia*, Graz, 1893). By this time Constantine's 'conversion,' hitherto chiefly political, had become an intellectual belief in Christianity as an historical religion capable of proof (see Constantine's remarkable sermon, *Orat. ad Sanct. Coct.*, esp. chs. 4, 11, 18, 19, where the Sibyl and Virgil's 4th *Eclogue* are appealed to). The return of his aged mother Helena from her pilgrimage to Palestine (undertaken in 326, possibly because of her son's execution of Crispus), with two nails from the Cross, one of which he turned into the bit of his war-horse,[1] led to his foundation at Jerusalem of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre on the site of a temple of Venus (Soc. *HE* i. 17; Euseb. *VC* iii. 30), and he also prepared a form of common daily prayer for the army (Euseb. *VC* iv. 20).

Though not even a catechumen, Constantine delighted in preaching sermons, in Latin, to the applauding crowds; one of these has been preserved to us by Eusebius (*VC* iv. 29). But at the same time his alienation from Catholicism towards Arianism was increasing (see *infra*, p. 80), helped probably by the death of his mother Helena (*c.* 330 [Euseb. *VC* iii. 47]; buried at Constantinople [Soc. *HE* i. 17]). The fact that he did not take any steps either to become a catechumen or to be baptized until he felt near to death, may be explained as due either to political balancing, or to lack of decision, or, more probably, to the belief that baptism, like the heathen lustrations, ensured the remission of sins, and to the growing dread of post-baptismal sin. He was finally baptized by the Arian bishop Eusebius of Nicomedia (Euseb. *VC* iv. 62-63; Jerome, *Chron.*, ann. 2353 [in *PL* xxvii. 680]). In the Greek Church he has practically been canonized by the title Ἰσαπόστολος, 'Equal to the Apostles.'

Into the large question of the advantage or otherwise to the Church of Constantine's adoption of

[1] J. H. Newman (*Essays on Eccles. Miracles*, 1843, p. 103 ff.) and de Broglie (*op. cit.* i. 216 ff.) give the best defence of this view.

[2] It may be of interest to note that the signs would probably be read in Latin—'in hoc signo vinces'—and not Greek—τουτῷ νίκα—as Constantine spoke Latin. The annalists are divided on the subject.

[3] Cf. Eusebius' mistake (*HE* vii. 18) of a statue of Æsculapius at Paneas for one of Jesus.

[1] Soc. *HE* i. 17; Soz. *HE* ii. 1; too characteristic to be an invention. But the rest of the chapter—'the Invention of the Cross'—must be discredited owing to the complete silence of Euseb. *VC* iii. 26, 30, and of the *Itin. Burdigalense* (written 333 [in *CSEL* xxxix.]). The story is first found in Cyril of Jerusalem (b. 315), *Ep. ad Const.* 3, the genuineness of which is, however, doubtful.

Christianity as the State religion, we cannot enter. The familiar lines of Dante (*Inferno*, xix. 115),

'Ah! Constantine! to how much ill gave birth,
Not thy conversion, but those rich domains
That the first wealthy Pope received of thee,'

have really a wider significance than the false donation; and the judgment of Mill (*Essay on Liberty*, ch. 2) deserves to be pondered: 'It is a bitter thought how different the Christianity of the world might have been, had it been adopted as the religion of the Empire under the auspices of Marcus Aurelius, instead of those of Constantine!' For a contrary judgment cf. Newman, *Arians*, 1871, p. 248.

IV. **Constantine and the Church.**—(*a*) *Relations of Church and State.*—Nothing was further from the intention of Constantine than to abandon to the Church any portion of his Imperial prerogative, and this determination would be increased by the sycophancy of the Court clergy. Into his adoption of the new religion he carried all the old Roman ideas, for his 'conversion' was not a revolution in the political genius of the Empire. Whatever crudity there may have been about his religious opinions, his views as an official were clear. To the Roman governor religion was a department of the civil service. The consequences of this are apparent in the after history of the Church. The Emperor, it is true, could not be the Pontifex Maximus of the new religion—this title, retained by Constantine, was dropped by Gratian (Zos. iv. 36), and in time lapsed to the Bishop of Rome—but the new autocracy founded by Diocletian and himself (on this see Gibbon, ch. xvii., with Bury's appendix) made this of less moment than for the early Cæsars. For that matter, the official title of the new monarchy was the higher 'deus' (Schiller, *op. cit.* ii. 33, 34). In consequence, in the Eastern Church the Emperor was always the supreme head, as his modern representative, the Czar, is to-day; but in the West the abandonment by Constantine of Rome for his new capital gave the bishops of Rome their great opportunity.

Thus Constantine and his successors, while giving the Church Councils full liberty of discussion, insisted that their own consent was necessary to confer validity on the canons; and they regulated the business by Imperial commissioners, often laymen. So, at the Council of Arles, Constantine deputed Bishop Marinus to preside (Euseb. *HE* x. 5. 19; Mansi, ii. 469); at the Council of Nice, Bishop Hosius of Cordova (on this complicated question see *DCB* i. 168, and, for the Rom. Cath. view, Hefele, *Councils*, Eng. tr. 1871, i. 37 ff.); while at the Council of Tyre (335) he sent the consular Dionysius as commissioner (Euseb. *VC* iv. 42; *PL* viii. 562). The doctrine asserted by Constantine was never wholly lost even in the Roman Catholic Church, and was of great influence as late as the Council of Constance (cf. also Articles of the Anglican Church, no. 21).

(*b*) *Constantine and heresy.*—To the Roman magistrate religious recusancy was tantamount to political disaffection. Constantine and his successors were therefore driven, almost before the ink on the decree of toleration was dry, to deal with heresies and schisms within the Church itself. To allow the Church to be rent into diverse parties would be to destroy the very solidarity and universality ('catholic') which had marked it out to the politician from all other religions as destined to become supreme. Hence the anxiety of Constantine to secure the peace of the 'legitimate Catholic Church' (Euseb. *HE* x. 5. 20).

(i.) Constantine's first intervention was in regard to the Donatists (*q.v.*).

For Constantine and the Donatists we have Optatus Milev. *de Schismate Donatist.* (written about 375) i. 22 f.; but Optatus is neither complete nor altogether trustworthy. We also possess a valuable collection of anonymous documents, *Decem Monumenta Vet. ad Donatist. hist. pertinentia*, usually bound up with Optatus (best ed. of both by C. Ziwsa in *CSEL* xxvi. [1893]; also by Dupin [1702] and Migne, *PL* viii. 674 ff.). Certain letters of Augustine (*Epp.* 88, 43) add to our knowledge. For a critical examination see O. Seeck, 'Quellen u. Urkunden über die Anfänge des Donatismus' in *Ztschr. f. Kirchengesch.* x. [1889] 505–568, and L. Duchesne, *Le Dossier du donatisme*, Paris, 1889.

In answer to the appeal of the Donatists (15th Apr. 313) forwarded by Anulinus, proconsul of Africa, Constantine summoned Cæcilian, bishop of Carthage, and the ten accusing bishops to appear at Rome before a synod over which he instructed Pope Miltiades to preside (Euseb. *HE* x. 5. 18; August. *Ep.* 88, *c. Crescon.* iii. 81). At the same time, prompted by Hosius, bishop of Cordova, he gave Cæcilian certain marks of his esteem (Euseb. *HE* x. 6). The synod met (2-4 Oct. 313) in 'the *casa* of Fausta on the Lateran,' and the decision was given against the Donatists (Optat. *op. cit.* i. 23–24; Aug. *contra Ep. Parmen.* i. 10; *Ep.* 43, 5 [14]). On the further appeal of the Donatists, Cæcilian was detained at Brescia (*ib.* i. 26), and two bishops were dispatched by Constantine to Africa to make inquiries 'ubi esset Catholica.' As they reported in favour of Cæcilian, the Donatists pressed the appeal, and Constantine ordered the case to be re-tried at Arles (Euseb. *HE* x. 5. 21; Optat. *op. cit.* i. 26; *Decem Mon. Vet.* iii. iv. v.).[1] About the same time (Feb. 15, 315) a commission was appointed by Constantine to inquire into the guilt of bp. Felix of Autumni.[2] Of the decisions of Arles we have only fragmentary evidence (F. Maassen, *Quellen des canon. Rechts*, Graz, 1870, p. 188 ff.), and its date, 1st Aug. 314 or 316, is uncertain, though probably the latter.[3] As the Donatists were still not satisfied, Constantine heard their appeal at Milan (10th Nov. 316; Augustine, *c. Crescon.* iii. 16, 67, 82, iv. 9, *ad Don.* 19, 33, 56), and confirmed the decisions of the Councils (August. *Brev. coll. Carth.* d. iii. c. 12 ff., *contra Ep. Parm.* i. 11; cf. *PL* viii. 750). Constantine thereupon issued edicts confiscating the churches of the Donatists (August. *Ep.* 105, 2, 9; 88, 3), though within a few years (5th May 321) he adopted a policy of toleration or indifference (Optatus, *Dec. Mon. Vet.* viii., *Brev.* iii. 40, 42; cf. Aug. *ad Don.* 56, *Ep.* 141, 9).

(ii.) As regards other heretics, Eusebius (*VC* iii. 63–65) tells us of his zeal against 'Novatians, Valentinians, Marcionites, Paulians' (*i.e.* followers of Paul of Samosata), those 'who are called Cataphrygians' (*i.e.* Montanists) and the confiscation of their meeting-places to 'the Catholic Church.' Thus, as Eusebius puts it, 'the savage beasts were driven to flight.' Constantine's refusal to 'heretics' of the privileges granted to the Church became part of the law of the Empire (*Cod. Th.* xvi. 5. 1; *Cod. Just.* i. 5. 1; in 326).

(iii.) To the greater Arian difficulty which distracted the Eastern Church [see art. ARIANISM, vol. i. p. 777] the attention of Constantine seems to have been drawn about the year 319. As a majority of the bishops of Asia appeared to support Arius' cause, Constantine, in the hope of ending the dispute, first sent his confidential adviser Hosius, bishop of Cordova, to Bishop Alexander of Alexandria and the presbyter Arius, with a characteristic letter begging them to lay aside 'this insignificant subject of controversy' and co-operate

[1] If no. v. is genuine, it was either dictated by Hosius or shows interpolations. It does not seem to the present writer that it can be safely used with reference to Constantine's character and Christianity at this period.

[2] This is the correct form, not *Aptungi*. For the text of this trial see *Dec. Mon. Vet.* ii., in *CSEL* xxvi. 197, and for its date L. Duchesne, *op. cit.* p. 644.

[3] So Seeck, *op. cit.*; but Duchesne, *op. cit.* p. 640, argues for 314; time for the events seems to the present writer to demand the later date. For the decisions see *Dec. Mon. Vet.* iv. (*CSEL* xxvi. 206), also in *PL* viii. 818; August. *Ep.* 43. For the council see *PL* viii. 815; Hefele, *Councils*, Eng. tr. i. 180 ff.

with him in restoring unity (Euseb. *VC* ii. 64–72). As this failed, Constantine, on the advice of Hosius (Sulpic. Severus, *Chron.* ii. 40, 5 ed. Halm in *CSEL* i.), summoned a Council which met at Nicæa (19th June–25th Aug. 325). The 'ecumenical' (οἰκουμένη, *i.e.* 'of the Empire,' cf. Lk 2[1] and *CIL*, *passim*) character of the Council—about 10 bishops from the West, and 308 from the East (Athanasius, *ad Afros*, 2; cf. Soc. *HE* i. 9)—and its importance alike mark the beginning of a new era for Christianity. Its controversies do not concern us; but for our present purpose it should be noted that the influence of Constantine for peace was considerable (Theod. *HE* i. 11), that the Council was summoned in his name (Euseb. *VC* iii. 6), that Constantine presided at the opening (*ib.* iii. 10 ff.) and addressed it at its close (*ib.* iii. 21), and that he communicated its decision to the Church of Alexandria (Soc. *HE* i. 9). But in 328 there was a change of policy. Whether owing to the influence of his sister Constantia, the widow of Licinian, who had herself been influenced by Eusebius of Nicomedia, or because Constantine was now more in touch with the speculative East than in his earlier years, he sought a less stringent enforcement of Nicene doctrine. The Arianizing Eusebius of Nicomedia, who had been banished at the close of the Council, now reappeared and gained the Emperor's ear. The result was seen in the deposition of Athanasius (cf. vol. ii. p. 169, or W. Bright in *DCB* i. 186) by the Council of Tyre (335), his banishment by Constantine (336) to Trèves, the rehabilitation of Arius by Constantine (Soc. *HE* i. 26), and the order that he should be received back into fellowship at Constantinople (336). The death of Constantine left the Arian trouble to his successors, under whom Arianism became still more identified with Court circles.

We may point out that Constantine's whole policy as regards heresy and unity fastened upon the Church for sixteen hundred years a policy of intolerance. The result was soon seen in the case of Priscillian (see PRISCILLIANISM).

(*c*) *Endowments.*—The supposed 'Donation of Constantine,' all-important historically as this falsehood proved, need not detain us. It carried with it the story of Constantine's leprosy, and baptism by Sylvester at Rome.

The story will be found in *PL* viii. 567–578. Its date was probably the 8th century. In 1229 two men who ventured to doubt its genuineness were burnt at Strassburg, and as late as 1533 it was deemed heresy to dispute it (Lea, *Inquisition in Middle Ages*, 1888, iii. 568 n.). Its overthrow by L. Valla (*in Donat. Const. Declam.* in Brown, *Fascic. Rerum Expetend.* [1690] i. 132) was one of the first results of the Renaissance.

The benefactions of Constantine were, however, considerable. For instance, he sent Cæcilian, bishop of Carthage, 3000 *folles* (φολλεῖς), or purses, *i.e.* nearly £18,000 (Euseb. *HE* x. 6; cf. *VC* iv. 28). Great sums were also spent on the building of churches (Euseb. *HE* x. 2. 3. 4), especially at Jerusalem (Holy Sepulchre [Euseb. *VC* iii. 34–40]), Bethlehem (*ib.* 43), Nicomedia (*ib.* 50), and Rome. Of his benefactions to the great basilicas at Rome we possess a list that seems authentic (*PL* viii. 803 ff.), though many of the gifts mentioned are later accumulations (Duchesne, *Lib. Pont.* i. Introd. p. 152). Of great importance from another standpoint is his order of fifty copies of the Scriptures 'legibly described and of a portable size' (Euseb. *VC* iv. 36).

V. Influence of Constantine's establishment of Christianity upon legislation.—The following are the most important evidences of the growth, during the reign of Constantine, of specifically Christian laws or of the influence of Christian sentiment.

i. *MORALS.*—(*a*) *Slaves.*—There was no abolition of slavery; this was not a burning question in the Early Church. But slaves condemned to games or to the mines must not be branded in the face, 'which is fashioned in the likeness of the Divine beauty' (*Cod. Th.* ix. 40. 2, March 315; *PL* viii. 119). In dividing estates, families of slaves must not be separated (*Cod. Th.* ii. 25, in 334; *PL* viii. 376). Masters must not kill or wantonly torture their slaves (*Cod. Th.* ix. 12, chs. 1, 2 in 319 and 326; *Cod. Just.* ix. 14; *PL* viii. 161). But the wording of this last law left many loopholes of escape, while fugitive slaves must not only be given up (*Cod. Just.* vi. 1. 4, in 317; *PL* viii. 150), but could be examined by torture (*Cod. Just.* vi. 1. 4. 6, in 317 and 333) or deprived of a foot (*ib.* vi. 1. 3, undated). The abolition of crucifixion (Soz. *HE* i. 8) and the breaking of legs (Aur. Victor, *Cæs.* 41) would chiefly apply to slaves. But the illegality of Christians being held as slaves by Jews (Euseb. *VC* iv. 27; *Cod. Th.* xvi. 9. 1, 2, 4, xvi. 8. 6; cf. *Cod. Just.* i. 10) witnessed rather to the growing hatred of the Jews (cf. *Cod. Th.* xvi. 8. 1; *Cod. Just.* i. 9. 3; *PL* viii. 130, in Oct. 315).

(*b*) *Gladiators.*—Gladiatorial shows were prohibited in 325 (*Cod. Th.* xv. 12. 1; *PL* viii. 293; *Cod. Just.* xi. 44; cf. Euseb. *VC* iv. 25; Soc. *HE* i. 18), though the law was certainly not enforced in Italy. That at Constantinople there were never any gladiatorial shows may be ascribed to the influence of Christianity, when we remember Constantine's bloody slaughters at Trèves in his early life (Eumen. *Paneg.* 12).

(*c*) *Adultery*, etc.—(1) Concubinage was disallowed for married men (*Cod. Just.* v. 26 in 326; cf. *Digest.* i. 25. 7). (2) Rape, etc., was to be severely punished, the woman, even if not a consenting party, by disinheritance; abettors, if slaves, by burning, if freemen, by banishment (*Cod. Th.* ix. 23. 1; *PL* viii. 195–198, in April 320).

(*d*) *Children, debtors*, etc.—(1) Poor parents were forbidden to kill their infant children, the care of whom was henceforth to be an Imperial charge (*Cod. Th.* xi. 27. 1, 2; for Italy first in 315 [*PL* viii. 121], then for Africa and other provinces in 322 [*PL* viii. 236]). The Christian sentiment of this law (cf. Lactant. *Instit.* vi. 20) is more obvious than its correct political economy. Exposure of children was not forbidden until 374 (*Cod. Just.* viii. 51. 2, ix. 16. 7). The growing poverty of the Empire alone was responsible for Constantine's allowing the sale of infant children by poor people (*Cod. Th.* v. 8. 1; v. 7. 1, in 329 and 331; cf. *Cod. Just.* iv. 43)—a practice forbidden in 294 by Diocletian (*Cod. Just. l.c.*). (2) Illegitimate children were legitimized by after-wedlock in the case of free-born women (*Cod. Just.* v. 27. 1, 5, in 336; cf. *PL* viii. 387–389). (3) Debtors must not be scourged, or, except in special cases, imprisoned (*Cod. Th.* xi. 7. 3, in Feb. 320; *PL* viii. 189). Prisoners were not to be confined without air and light, or with 'chains that cleave to their bones,' or to be imprisoned before trial (*Cod. Th.* ix. 3. 1, 2; *Cod. Just.* ix. 4. 1, 2, in 320 and 326; *PL* viii. 199, 299).

ii. *CLERGY AND CHRISTIAN WORSHIP.*—(*a*) The 'Catholic' clergy were freed from the discharge of civil duties (*Cod. Th.* xvi. 1, 2, in Nov. 313, Oct. 319; *PL* viii. 102, 180), but in July 320 the abuse of this led to its restriction (*PL* viii. 200), as was also the case in June 326 (*Cod. Th.* xvi. 2, 6; *PL* viii. 314). (*b*) Exception was made to the *lex Papia Poppæa* against celibacy in favour of the clergy, thus allowing them to inherit (*Cod. Th.* xvi. 2. 4). (*c*) Public works and the sitting of the courts were forbidden on Sundays, 'dies solis' (*Cod. Th.* ii. 8. 1; *Cod. Just.* iii. 12. 2, in July 321; *PL* viii. 224; note the balanced 'dies solis,' which would suit Mithraism also). (*d*) Manumissions were permitted to be solemnly made in

churches as well as in temples (*Cod. Th.* xvi. 2. 4, iv. 7. 1; *Cod. Just.* i. 13. 1, 2, in 316 and Ap. 321; *PL* viii. 214 f.). As these manumissions were made on Sundays, and especially at Easter, Christianity became associated in the public mind with the release of slaves.

iii. *PAGAN WORSHIP AND RITES.*—(*a*) Prohibition of pagan sacrifices in general (Euseb. *VC* ii. 44, 45, iv. 23, 25).

That there was such a law may be inferred from *Cod. Th.* xvi. 10. 2, 'law of our divine Father,' but it was certainly not carried out in the West, where the progress of Christianity was but slow (S. Dill, *Roman Society in the Last Century of the W. Empire*, 1898, vol. i. ch. i.; cf. A. Beugnot, *Hist. de la destruction du paganisme* [Paris, 1835], i. 106 ff.). Moreover, Constantine more than once proclaimed liberty to the pagans to enjoy their temples (Euseb. *VC* ii. 56, 60; Constant. *Orat. ad Sanct. Coet.* 11; cf. Libanius [*c.* 384], *Orat. pro Templis* [ed. Foerster], iii. xxx; Symmachus, *Ep.* x. 4). The question is well discussed in de Broglie (*op. cit.* i. 446–451). Beugnot (*op. cit.* i. 100) takes the prohibition to refer to nocturnal and private sacrifices only.

(*b*) The re-enactment, Feb. and May 319, of the law of Tiberius against divination (*Cod. Th.* ix. 16. 1, 2; *PL* viii. 155, 162). In Dec. 319 the consultation of *haruspices* was allowed when public buildings were struck by lightning (*Cod. Th.* xvi. 10. 1; *PL* viii. 202).

LITERATURE.—(*a*) *SOURCES.*—The estimate we form of Constantine depends chiefly upon the value we attach to the conflicting authorities. Some of the Latin sources may conveniently be read in Migne, *PL* viii., 'Opera Constantini'; but, as this is both incomplete and uncritical, and contains much that is false, it should be used with care, especially as regards Constantine's correspondence. For the Life of Constantine we gain most from the following: *The Panegyrists*, inflated Gallic orations delivered on state occasions, but with a valuable residuum of fact. Two, delivered in 307 and 313, are of unknown authorship, three are probably by Eumenius (297, 310, 311), and one by Nazarius (321); in Migne, *PL* viii. 581 ff., or, better, A. Bähren's *XII Panegyrici Lat.* (1874), to which edition references have been made by number and chapter. Another work of special pleading, though from a different standpoint, is the *de Mortibus Persecutorum* (best ed. by S. Brandt, in *CSEL* xxvii. [1897]). This work, ascribed in the MS to an unknown L. Cæcilius, was attributed before the close of the 4th cent., *e.g.* by Jerome in 393 (*de Vir. Illust.* 80), to L. Cæcilius Firmianus Lactantius. The genuineness of this ascription has been assailed by his editor, S. Brandt (*SWAW* cxxv. [1892]), and justified by Bury (Gibbon, ii. 531–532). The date is probably about 315. Of the works of Eusebius of Cæsarea, the *HE*, published early in 325, is of great value, but the *Vita Constantini* (*VC*) in four books, written between 337 and 340, is a pious eulogy (see Socrates, *HE* i. 1) rather than serious history (best ed. of Eusebius by Heinichen [1868–70]; good Eng. tr. by McGiffert and Richardson [New York, 1890]). Of contemporary non-Christian writers we may mention Constantine's secretary Eutropius, *Breviarium ab urbe condita* (ed. F. Ruehl, 1887, or H. Droysen in *MGH* ii. [1878]). A most valuable source is the anonymous fragment first printed by H. Valois, hence called *Anonymus Valesii* (best ed. by Mommsen in *Chronica Minora*, *MGH* [1892] i. 7–11). As the clerical passages in it have been shown by Mommsen (*op. cit.* pref. p. 6) to be interpolations from Orosius, it was probably written before the establishment of Christianity. The valuable contemporary pagan history of Praxagoras is known to us only in a brief summary of Photius (in C. Müller, *FHG* iv. 2 [Paris, 1851]).

Of later writers we may single out Eunapius of Sardis (347–414). His *History* (ed. C. Muller, *ib.* iv. 7–56) was one of the main sources of the anti-Christian Zosimus, whose *History* (ed. L. Mendelssohn, 1887) was written towards the close of the 5th cent., and is of great value in spite of its bias. The *Oration on Constantine* of Julian the Apostate (ed. F. C. Hertlein, 1875–76) is always of value for what it concedes. Ammianus Marcellinus (b. 330) in his great work *Res Gestæ* (ed. V. Gardthausen, 1874, Eng. tr. Ph. Holland, 1609), though a pagan, treats Christianity without bitterness. Another important source is the *Chronicon Paschale* (ed. T. Mommsen in *MGH* i. [1892] 199 ff.). Of the Christian historians, Socrates (*HE*) and Sozomen (*HE*), who both wrote about 440, add little to Eusebius, while the later Greek chroniclers may safely be neglected. For Constantine and the Donatists see *supra* IV. *b.* (1), p. 79.

The Laws of Constantine, an important source, must be studied in the *Codes of Theodosius* and *Justinian*, especially the former. As the *Code of Theodosius* is very bulky (ed. Godfrey, with valuable commentaries, 6 vols., Leipzig, 1736–45; also ed. Hänel, Bonn, 1842), the student may content himself with the chronological excerpts in Migne, *PL* viii. 92–400. For the *Code of Justinian* reference should be made to the ed. of P. Krueger (Berlin, 1877). Almost as important as the written sources is the evidence of Constantine's coins and medals. The value of these has been well brought out by Schiller (*op. cit. infra*). For further study reference may be made to the well-known works of H. Cohen, *Descr. hist. des monnaies frappées sous l'empire romain* (Paris, 1863); J. Eckhel, *Doct. Num. Vet.* vol. viii. (Vienna, 1797). Garrucci's *Numismatica Constantiniana* (Rome, 1856) does not seem to be in the Brit. Mus. (1910), but is partly translated in C. W. King, *Early Christian Numismatics* (Lond. 1873). M. Madden's 'Christian Emblems on the Coins of Constantine the Great' (in the *Numismatic Chronicle*, London, 1877–78) is of great value.

(*b*) *RECENT WRITERS.*—Constantine has been treated with great fullness in all Church Histories and Dictionaries (the art. by J. Wordsworth in Smith's *DCB* is of special value), and in numerous monographs. (For a good list of these up to 1890 see Richardson's Introd. in Schaff, *Ante-Nicene Library*, 'Eusebius,' pp. 455–465.) The following works are essential for the general history: E. Gibbon, ed. J. B. Bury (1896; new edition, 1910 ff.), with valuable notes and appendixes; and H. Schiller, *Gesch. d. röm. Kaiserzeit*, 2 vols. (Gotha, 1887). Of special monographs mentioned in this study the following may be singled out: J. Burckhardt, *Die Zeit Constantin's des Grossen* (Basel, 1853; 2nd ed., Leipzig, 1880); O. Seeck, *Gesch. des Untergangs der antiken Welt*, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1895–1901); V. Schultze, *Gesch. d. Untergangs d. gr.-röm. Heidentums*, 2 vols. (Jena, 1887–92). Of older works, the conservative J. V. A. de Broglie, *L'Église et l'empire rom. au ive siècle*, 3 vols. (Paris, 1856), A. P. Stanley, *Eastern Church*[5] (1876; brilliant portrait of Constantine), and G. Boissier's *La Fin du paganisme*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1891), should not be overlooked.

H. B. WORKMAN.

CONSUMPTION (Economic). — Since *The Wealth of Nations* gave the consumer rather than the producer or the merchant the first right to consideration, questions relating to consumption have always been prominent in Economics, though, especially in English books, they have not been formed into a separate branch of doctrine. It was thought that general questions about desire and utility were matter for Ethics, and should have a place in the preface, but not in the body, of Economics. This is still a common view, even when it is held that 'a true theory of consumption is the keystone of political economy' (Keynes, *Scope and Method of Polit. Econ.*, Lond. 1891, p. 107). And the special or more practical questions of consumption are then taken up under the familiar heads of production (*q.v.*), distribution (*q.v.*), and public finance or policy. The place which the general doctrine of consumption is now likely to hold is due to a better systematizing of the matter of Economics—as a science rather than into a series of co-ordinate divisions. The theory of value is made the centre, and from it come two questions, viz. the conditions of demand and the conditions of supply. The question of demand is that of consumption.

Its topic is utility, and its cardinal notion the Law of Diminishing Utility. An object or service has utility so far as it satisfies a desire. When bought it is bought for its utility; when consumed it is only the utility that is destroyed; when produced it is utility that is given to it.

The Law of Diminishing Utility is: other things being equal, there is always a point beyond which the utility of a commodity diminishes for every additional quantity of it that one possesses. It might be called the Law of Diminishing Desire. Its basis is the familiar fact that as a desire becomes satisfied it becomes exhausted for the time being. This is true not merely of appetites, but of higher desires whose satisfaction begets others. And it is true for indirect consumption (when commodities are used as means of production) as well as for direct consumption (when they directly satisfy a desire). Simple though the law is, it has (1) an important theoretical use, and (2) still more important practical applications.


1. *Theoretically* it accounts for the price which a buyer is willing to pay—(*a*) for different quantities of the same goods, and (*b*) for different goods, and so it accounts (*c*) for the prices that have to be paid in any market.

(*a*) The first case is directly contemplated in the law, and is best illustrated in the price that one is willing to pay for any necessary commodity. Necessaries have the greatest utility because they are necessary, and in the pinch of famine they command the highest prices. But beyond a certain quantity they are not necessary, and then their

utility is limited by the simple desire of consuming them. As this desire becomes satisfied, the pleasure in consuming diminishes, and with it the utility of the commodity, till it vanishes altogether, because the desire is satisfied.

(*b*) Similar considerations are apparent when we ask what we are willing to pay for different commodities. It depends, of course, on our desires. But the interest of the question is that these are in competition, since we cannot satisfy them all even if we had the means; and the special economic interest of the question is that our means are limited. It is the question how a given income is spent. And in terms of the general law we have these two answers: (1) every one seeks to secure the greatest Total Utility from his income, and (2) he does this by looking to the Marginal Utility of his various purchases in order to make it equal in them all. The first statement is obvious, but the second needs explaining. By marginal utility is meant the utility of any commodity, or quantity of it, that a buyer is just willing to take at a certain price. His debate with himself is always whether he could do better with his shilling now or in the future; and, if he buys and regrets, it is always because he might have had a greater utility for his shilling if he had bought something else with it, or if he had kept it. To spend well is not to buy the same degree of utility with every shilling, for infinite or necessary utilities are usually cheap. The difference between the price for which one gets them, and the price that one would be willing to pay for them, is called the Consumer's Surplus.

These notions of surplus utility, total utility, and marginal utility are most clearly presented in diagram. For every commodity there can be drawn a curve representing all three. The shape of the curve is different for different commodities and for different consumers; but in accordance with



the general law of diminishing utility it shows in all cases a more or less regular fall in utility with every addition to the quantity bought. Annexed is the general curve for any necessary commodity. On O X are marked the units of quantity bought, and so of the price paid; and the diminishing areas drawn on them represent the diminishing utilities, the first being infinite, representing the infinite utility of that unit. The areas having equal bases, their difference may be represented by their height, and a curve drawn as in the figure. If a consumer buys 7 units, the marginal utility is that of the last portion, and he makes this his marginal purchase, because for the same unit of money he expects a greater utility of spending it on something else than on an eighth unit of this commodity. The total utility is represented by the total area of the figure, and the surplus utility by the area A Y *y a*. Taking all his purchases into account, it is clear that he will have nothing to regret (except, of course, the nature of his desires) if his marginal purchases have all an equal degree of utility. For he will thus have the greatest total utility from his income.

(*c*) A commodity has a different marginal utility for different consumers, the difference being due to the difference in their incomes and their desires. Hence with every price at which a commodity is offered there corresponds a certain demand; and, in general, the greater the price the less the demand, and the less the price the greater the demand. It is in expectation of a sufficient demand at a profitable price that commodities are produced, and it is on the correctness of his expectations, and not on the cost of production, that a producer relies for his price and profit. This is the essential consideration in the familiar law of supply and demand which accounts for all values that are fixed by competition (*q.v.*).

2. As the ultimate aim of economic effort is to consume what is produced, the *practical* questions regarding consumption may run into great detail; and their answers easily run to one-sidedness if the questions are not systematic. This is seen in the conflict of popular opinions about the spending of the rich. It would be hard to say whether people approve more of the rich man who spends much, and so spreads his wealth, or of the rich man who spends little, and appears, therefore, not to give work to others. And whatever may be thought of the spendthrift, the miser, and the philanthropist as individuals, there is great diversity of opinion about the first two, and some about the philanthropist, as members of the body economic. And not all professional economists appear to have reconciled the truth in the two opposite statements that 'demand for commodities is not demand for labour,' and that 'want of work is due to under-consumption.'

The aim of economic organization and effort is, under conditions, to produce the greatest total utility; and, if we ask how economic progress is to be estimated, we ask the conditions on which this total utility depends. First it depends on the quantity and quality of wealth produced, and so on the full and the most efficient use of the labour and the natural and acquired resources of a country. And in looking at the economic progress of a country we are apt to look no further than at the amount and quality of wealth that is thus produced, and at its distribution with a view to further production. But the amount of utility in wealth depends on the intensity and variety of the desires for whose satisfaction the wealth is consumed. This is the head under which all practical questions of consumption find their place. It is conveniently divided into two by considering, first, the satisfaction of desires that all seek to satisfy, and then the satisfaction of other desires. Regarding the former, it is apparent that the total utility from a country's produce is greater when the margin at which the very poor cease to purchase is extended, and the margin of others is contracted so as to exclude waste and gluttony. A country of great houses and vile hovels is so far not making so much of its wealth as one where the houses are less great and the hovels less vile.

But it is when we turn from more or less necessary desires that we see the complexity of the question that may be organized from the point of view

of consumption. It is here that there is the nearest connexion between Economics and Ethics. The moral ideal is that of complete living, and requires a character having variety and depth of interests or desires, quite as much as one having these in unity or system, and so in harmony. In economic progress there must be this variety and depth if the utility of wealth is to grow with its increase; and an obvious point is that many desires—most of the higher desires, intellectual, æsthetic, and social—are very little destructive of utility. The cost of creating them, *e.g.* by education, is greater than the cost of gratifying them, and is therefore much the more important consideration. The most destructive desires need no learning.

It is also obvious from the nature of consumption that no comment on an economic system can be more severe than that it makes, or even lets, the poor grow poorer while the rich grow richer. The comment is often made, but it is made mainly on the erroneous ground that the gain of one must always be the loss of another. It has not been true in fact of our present economic system (see DISTRIBUTION); still the comment might with advantage be more absurd on the face of it. From the same point of view it would be a very adverse comment on the progress of invention if it could still be said that the labourer has not been spared any of the severity and exhaustion of muscular work that he had before the revolution in industry. For nothing tells more against a wealth of life. But, on the contrary, the saving in mere hardness of toil has been one of the best fruits of invention (see PRODUCTION).

While there is ground for charging defects in consumption not to thriftlessness merely, but to the bad distribution of wealth and the struggle to have rather than to enjoy, there is a source that is at least as serious. So long as individual wealth is devoted to the service of a few desires, its increase must be consumed with diminishing utility. Luxury is for the most part such a spending, both when it is for self-indulgence and when it is for ostentation (see LUXURY). But the evil is not so much in the presence of luxury as in the absence of the desire for better things. The pursuit of wealth has been far more eager than the pursuit of desires wherewith to give it the fullest utility. There is not yet any general belief that they can become so absorbing as those that need no learning. The common view of education is much more concerned with giving power to acquire than power to enjoy; and we are all children enough to enjoy no property of a thing so much as that it is our own. Such reflexions do not point to a want of progress but to the long way to go, and to the fundamental way in which economic depends on moral progress.

The statistics of consumption that have most practical interest are concerned with the expenditure of small incomes. There are two methods of collecting them. One, the 'intensive' method, makes a minute study of individual families and their mode of life. It is most completely represented in the work of Le Play (1806–1882) and his school. Examples of it—though not so minute—are to be found in Booth, *Life and Labour of the People in London* (1889–97); Rowntree, *Poverty* (1901); and in *Family Budgets* (1896), collected by members of the Economic Club. The other, the 'extensive' method, looks rather to the quantity of its facts. Its chief expositor was Ernst Engel (1821–1896), who formulated a law, usually called Engel's Law, of which the main part is that as income rises the proportion of it spent on food diminishes. And later statistics from various countries give a general support to his view that this proportion may be used as a comparative measure of well-being, viz. the higher the proportion of earnings spent on food, the poorer a community, and any class in a community. An excellent example of the method is to be found in the U.S. *Bulletin* for 1903 of the Bureau of Labour. 'The figures of income and expenditure furnished in detail by 2567 families in 33 States, representing the leading industrial centres of the country, comprise the material for the detailed study of the cost of living. Certain data which do not enter so much into detail were collected in regard to the cost of living in 25,440 families.' For the United Kingdom the Board of Trade carried out an inquiry, and published an interesting memorandum on it in its *Second Series of Memoranda* with reference to British and Foreign Trade (1904), and within the last few years it has published extensive Reports on the *Cost of Living of the Working Classes* in the principal towns of the United Kingdom (1908), of Germany (1908), of France (1909), and of Belgium (1910). The German Imperial Statistical Office published in 1909 a report on the cost of living of 892 families with a small income. A full account of it will be found in the U.S. *Bulletin of the Bureau of Labour*, May 1910.

LITERATURE.—A general treatment of the statistics of consumption is given in R. Mayo-Smith, *Statistics and Economics* (=pt. ii. of *Science of Statistics*), Lond. 1899, with a bibliographical note on p. 19; and a fuller treatment and note are to be found in art. 'Konsumtionsbudget' in J. Conrad's *Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften*², Jena, 1900. There is a 'Bibliography of Studies on the Cost of Living' in the *Bulletin of the Bureau of Labour*, May 1910.

W. MITCHELL.

CONTEMPT.—This word is used either (*a*) in the subjective sense of the act of despising, or (*b*) objectively of the condition of being despised. In illustration of (*a*), Murray (*OED, s.v.*) quotes from Marbeck's *Book of Notes* (1581) the following passage: 'Contempt consisteth chiefelie in three things: for either wee contemne onelie in minde . . . or lastlie when we adde words or deedes, which have ignominie or contumelie ioined with them.' One of the most familiar usages of the word is in the technical expression 'contempt of court,' as referring to any failure to recognize or obey the ruler of a court of justice or other legal authority. In the passive sense (*b*), the expression 'bring into contempt' may be adduced; more rare is the use of 'a contempt' as equivalent to 'an object of contempt' (Gn 38²³ AVm).

1. Terminology.—In the primitive ages the superiority of the physically strong over the physically weak was accompanied by a feeling of scorn, which readily reflected itself in speech. The defeat of a foe, or the successful outwitting of inferior skill or cleverness by force of arms or cunning, tended to create a vocabulary of contempt (see art. BOASTING for similar phenomena). The word δειλός ('coward') in Homer came to mean 'worthless' and 'insignificant' (cf. the apostrophe ὦ δειλέ, 'poor creature'). All languages exhibit the interjectional forms of contempt. Sometimes the same monosyllabic exclamation is used to express other emotions, so that its exact force can be determined only by the context (cf. 'tush!' 'pish!' 'pshaw!' or Lat. *phy* or *phu*). There are also dissyllabic words such as *atat* (or *attat*) in Latin, οὐά (Mk 15²⁹, of derisive joy or horror), 'avaunt!' and the like. Then we have phrases like ἐς κόρακας of Greek comedy, and *I in malam crucem* of Plautus and Terence. These suggest obvious analogies in English and other languages. Argumentative scorn expresses itself in the Latin use of *scilicet*, ironical or contemptuous assertion of what is obviously false (cf. *nisi vero*). More obvious still, as exhibiting the feeling of scorn or disgust, is the opprobrious apostrophe

common to all languages (cf. *carcer*, *crux*, *patibulum*, ῥακά [Mt 5^{22}], μωρέ [*ib.*], 'dog,' 'cur,' 'cullion' [Shakespeare, *Taming of Shrew*, IV. ii. 20], 'geck and gull' [*Twelfth Night*, V. i. 351], 'John-a-dreams' [*Hamlet*, II. ii. 595], 'zed' [*Lear*, II. ii. 69, a term of contempt, because last letter in the alphabet], *et hoc genus omne*). 'The Philistine said to David, Am I a dog, that thou comest to me with staves?' (1 S 17^{43}); cf. 'After whom dost thou pursue? after a dead dog, after a flea?' (1 S 24^{14}). 'The Eastern street dog is a type of all that is cowardly, lazy, filthy, treacherous, and contemptible' (*HDB*, *s.v.* 'Dog').

Both in the Heb. of the OT and in the Greek of the NT the verbal forms expressing various degrees of scorn, derision, or disparagement are remarkably rich. In the OT we find בּוּז and בָּזָה [original meaning dub.]; מָאַס with the root idea of rejection; לִיץ where the idea of scorn is connected with the mimicry of a foreigner's speech; and שָׂחַק, 'smile.' In the NT we have ἀτιμάζω, ἀθετέω, ἐξουθενέω, καταφρονέω, περιφρονέω, ὀλιγωρέω, and the expressive ἐκμυκτηρίζω (Lk 16^{14} 23^{35} = 'turn up the nose at'). The mimetic or descriptive verb is as conspicuous in exhibiting the feeling of disgust as in other cases (cf. 'strut,' 'swagger'); and the word ἐκμυκτηρίζω recalls Shakespeare's 'I will bite my thumb at them' (*Romeo and Juliet*, I. i. 48 f., a contemptuous action for beginning a quarrel); 'to give her the avaunt,' *i.e.* to send her away contemptuously (*Henry VIII*. II. iii. 10); or Pistol's expression (*2 Hen. IV*. V. iii. 124), 'Fig me, like the bragging Spaniard' (thumb thrust between first and second fingers as a mark of contempt and insult). The word ἐμπαίκτης (2 P 3^{3}, Jude ^{18}; in 2 P 3^{3} ἐμπαιγμονή is also found) suggests rather more obviously external act or gesture than καταφρονητής (Ac 13^{41}). It may be noted in passing that contempt takes in literature the form of satire, in art that of caricature (see art. 'Satire' in *EBr*^{9} and 'Caricature' in *EBr*^{10}).

From Lucilius down to the present day scorn is an ingredient of satire. 'Facit indignatio versum,' said Juvenal (*Sat.* i. 79); and it was a wholesome loathing of decadent morals that inspired such a satire as the Sixth, his 'Legend of Bad Women' (Mackail). The contempt of satire is fierce and bitter; but it can also be genial, as in Don Quixote, where the follies of mediæval chivalry are held up to derision. There is a similar distinction in the art of the caricaturist.

2. Psychology.—The psychological analysis of contempt has not often been attempted. It obviously belongs to the category of what Wundt calls the objective emotions (*Outlines of Psychology*, ed. 1908, p. 197), and is generally to be classified as a species of anger, finding a place in what the same writer distinguishes as the 'excitement-depression' series of emotions, or in what Royce prefers to call 'the restlessness and quiescence' series (*Outlines of Psychology*, 1903, p. 178). Macdougall, in his *Introduction to Social Psychology*, draws a distinction between scorn as a binary compound of anger and disgust, or a tertiary compound, if positive self-feeling is added to these, and contempt, which he regards as 'a binary compound of disgust and positive self-feeling, differing from scorn in the absence of the element of anger.' In ordinary usage, however, scorn (*q.v.*) and contempt are used interchangeably; and, while some kinds of contempt are notably free from anger and suggest serene self-esteem, *e.g.* the attitude of the educated towards the illiterate, there are other forms in which one may detect the element of indignation, *e.g.* the loathing which a noble mind feels towards a cruel or ignoble deed. In Shakespeare's *Twelfth Night*, III. i. 157 f., Olivia remarks:

> 'O, what a deal of scorn looks beautiful
> In the contempt and anger of his lip!'

where obviously contempt is regarded as of close kinship with anger.

Disgust, aversion, and shrinking from an object are undoubtedly marked features of contempt; sometimes this is accompanied by facial and other physical reaction, sometimes it is merely intellectual, as when Horace remarks: 'Odi profanum vulgus et arceo' (*Od.* III. i. 1). While, then, we can distinguish the main elements which make up the emotion of contempt, its quality is capable of multitudinous subtle gradations and internal shadings, corresponding with the objects and situations which call it forth.

3. Ethics.—(1) *In the OT.*—Contempt, as an emotion which, like anger, finds expression in word and deed, or as part of a mental condition, naturally passes into the sphere of ethical judgment. It is an element in the character of the Psalmist's God, as when he says, 'The Lord shall have them in derision' (Ps 2^{4}, referring to the rebellion of His disaffected subjects; so of the heathen, Ps 59^{8}). In both passages the conception of contempt is associated with laughter. Such graphic anthropomorphism is not obsolete: *e.g.* R. Browning's lines,

> '. . . Happy that I can
> Be crossed and thwarted as a man,
> Not left in God's contempt apart . . .'
> (*Easter-Day*, xxxiii.),

where a failure of ideal is associated with the sense of Divine rejection and wrath. The monotheistic contempt for idol-making and idolatry (cf. Is $40^{19f.}$) in prophetic literature is an expression of the belief in God's unique and unapproachable righteousness. In the OT, especially in the Wisdom literature, the 'scorner,' or contemptuous man, (לֵץ) is a familiar figure. He not only does evil, but scoffs at the good (Ps 1^{1}), seeks wisdom and finds it not (Pr 14^{6}), dislikes reproof (15^{12}), is an abomination (24^{9}), and is punished (21^{11}, Is 29^{20}). The 'scorner,' in fact, belongs to the class 'fool,' which is so conspicuous in the teaching of Proverbs: the fool despises wisdom (Pr 1^{7}), his neighbour (14^{21}), and the duty of obedience to parents (30^{17}). Esau's despising of his birthright (Gn 25^{34}) was the indication of 'profanity' (He 12^{16}) or spiritual apathy, in the same way that Israel's contempt for Jahweh's statutes and judgments (Lv $26^{15.\ 43}$, Ezk $20^{13.\ 16.\ 24}$, Am 2^{4}) or for 'the word of the Holy One' (Is 5^{24}) was the sign of an evil heart. Objectively, national failure brings a nemesis of derision (Jer $48^{26f.\ 39}$), or such derision may be an element of persecution (20^{7}, La 3^{14}).

(2) *In the NT.*—We have already cited the passage (Mt 5^{22}) where Jesus deals with the contemptuous terms 'Raca' and 'Thou fool,' and condemns them on the ground that they indicate a defective disposition of the heart and are therefore to be judged under the new law before the same tribunals and punished by the same penalties as were offences, like homicide, under the old dispensation. Thus, our Lord's treatment of contempt is in harmony with the principles of His general ethical teaching. Moreover, so far as contempt was an anti-social sentiment and opposed to the recognition of the claims of a common humanity, the law of compassion, and the sense of the infinite dignity of the individual soul, it was to be sternly repressed. 'Take heed that ye despise not one of these little ones' (18^{10}), *i.e.* the humble and helpless of humanity. The idea of scornful rejection of the truth is contained in the warning, 'He that rejecteth (ἀθετῶν) you rejecteth me' (Lk 10^{16}). Jesus thought of the Pharisees as those that 'trusted in themselves that they were righteous, and despised (ἐξουθενοῦντας) others' (18^{9}).

He did not hesitate to use the language of contempt respecting the unreality of Pharisaic morals on the ground 'that their whole life was an acted play,' and that their zeal for righteousness was unwarmed by love for their brothers, for men as such; nor did He scruple to use the term 'that fox' (13^{32}) of Herod Antipas as summing up his moral cowardice and cunning. But contempt of man for man, of class for class, the disparagement of lowly conditions, even of sinners (as opposed to their sins), is ruled out by the example and teaching of Christ. Christ's view of man was 'a transvaluation of all values.' The first promise of the changed view of humanity is given in the *Magnificat*, 'He hath exalted them of low degree' (1^{52}).

The Greek contempt for humility, the arrogance (ὑπερηφανία) which Theophrastus (*Characters*, § iv.) defined as 'a certain scorn for all the world beside oneself,' was excluded for ever from the higher ethics of Christianity. Evolutionary ethics, of which the extreme is reached in the thought of Nietzsche, still glorifies brute strength and satirizes the 'slave-morality' of the crowd, but the 'super-man' who alone will be tolerated by the world is not the embodiment of strength, physical and intellectual, but the embodiment of perfect love. Aristotle's 'lofty-minded man' looks down upon others 'justly (for he judges truly); but most people do so at random' (*Ethics*, iv. 3). Even the limitation of the parenthesis, however, fails to convince us; for in the same context we are told that 'he is not lavish of praise: for this reason he speaks no evil, not even of his enemies, *unless it be to show his scorn*.' Contrast this with Christ's teaching, which enjoins the love of one's enemies and exalts meekness. The noblest character of ancient teaching 'walks, like contempt, alone' (*Timon of Athens*, IV. ii. 15), and views his fellows (to quote Shakespeare again) through the 'scornful perspective' which contempt lends him (*All 's Well*, V. iii. 48). He is quite oblivious of the claims of human brotherhood. In fact, his snobbery is hardly distinguishable from that satirized by Thackeray, and is equally out of harmony with the Christian spirit. Pride of birth, intellect, and dominion is by Dante (*Purg.* x. xi. xii.) consigned to the first terrace of purgatory, from which the poet is escorted by the angel of Humility to the sound of celestial voices, singing, 'Blessed are the poor in spirit' (xii. 3 ff.).

The haughtiness which despises its inferiors, whether it take the form of reserve (εἰρωνεία) or of active scorn (ὕβρις), is as incompatible with the humanitarian ideal of Christianity as the institution of slavery. The treatment of any human being as a chattel or instrument is no longer tolerable. 'Base things of the world and things that are despised did God choose' (1 Co 1^{28}). The scorn of the man of the world for piety is an index of an oblique moral vision (cf. the Master of Ballantrae's contempt for his steward's strict and puritanical notions ['my evangelist,' he calls him ironically] in Stevenson's *Master of Ballantrae*). St. Paul warns the Thessalonians (1 Th 5^{20}) against contempt of 'prophesyings,' implying that manifestations of the Spirit have to be judged with careful discrimination, and that they are not to be distrusted because fanaticism or unreality accompanies them in particular instances. Contempt is often a form of bigotry, and the symptom of defective charity or tolerance; and not seldom it is implicit in a cold rationalism or in the materialism which rejects immortality and religion. On the other hand, to be despised by the general conscience is no mean punishment. 'Let no man despise thy youth' (1 Ti 4^{12}), or 'Let no man despise thee' (Tit 2^{15}), is a summons to the cultivation of moral dignity, which at all stages of our life, and not in youth alone, is the fine flower of a Christian personality. If, on the one hand, contempt is opposed to humility, reverence, compassion, and love, it is, on the other hand, a legitimate element of the moral indignation of which the Founder of Christianity is the noblest exemplar.

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R. MARTIN POPE.

CONTENTMENT.—Contentment—the condition of being satisfied—is a state of mind which may be regarded as a purely ethical product, or as a phase of religious experience. In the philosophy of life we are able to differentiate three types of contentment: Oriental, Græco-Roman, and Christian; and we propose to treat the subject under these heads. Royce, in his *Outlines of Psychology* (1903), has classified emotions under two dimensions, namely, restlessness and quiescence. If this classification be accepted, it is obvious that the virtue of contentment gathers up into one experience the emotions of the quiescent order.

1. Oriental.—The essential element in the Oriental scheme of life is the suppression of desire. This is common to Brāhmanism and Buddhism. Barth (*Religions of India*, Eng. tr. 1882, p. 84) has remarked that the Hindu mind recognizes 'no medium between mental excitement and torpid indifference.' Pantheism, fatalism, the denial of personality and of any real immortality but that of the act—these impress upon all that the Oriental produces 'a certain monotonous character compounded of satiety and ungratified zeal.' So far as we can arrive at any conception of *nirvāṇa*, we may think of it as the serenity of the monk, exempt from all desire, contemplating without passion all that the average man holds dear—love and hate, power and oppression, riches and poverty, fame and contempt—and awaiting with complete *ataraxia* the advent of death. The *nirvāṇa*-on-earth reached by the *arhat* is a pledge of the *nirvāṇa*-after-death, his 'refreshment from the fire of passion' being the earnest of his 'refreshment from the fire of existence' (cf. Poussin, *Bouddhisme*, p. 103 [*Buddhism*, p. 14]). Some exponents of Buddhism point out that, while *nirvāṇa* is negatively the destruction of selfish desire and ignorance, it is positively universal sympathy or love for all beings. Cf. 'A Vow of the Bodhisattva' (Suzuki, *Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, p. 398):

> 'For the sake of all sentient beings on earth,
> I aspire for the abode of enlightenment which is most high;
> In all-embracing love awakened, and with a heart steadily firm,
> Even my life I will sacrifice, dear as it is.
>
> In enlightenment no sorrows are found, no burning desires;
> 'Tis enjoyed by all men who are wise.
> All sentient creatures from the turbulent waters of the triple world
> I'll release, and to eternal peace them I'll lead.'

When it is objected that contentment can find no place in a scheme of life in which *karma*, or the law of moral causation, prevails, the reply is made that the selfishness of the rich will bear inevitable retribution in a future existence, while the sufferings of the poor, if the poor do not despair of them and yield to temptation, will bring them a future fortune. On the other hand, it is argued that human inequalities are not to be ascribed to the diversity of the individual *karma* (Suzuki, *op. cit.* p. 189 f.). Poverty is not the result of evil deeds. The economic sphere is not that in which the law

of *karma* operates. If a man lives in obscurity and misery, he is not concerned to find the explanation of these things in the past, nor is he anxious about the future. Social injustices and economic inequalities are inevitable in the present order.

'A virtuous man is contented with his cleanliness of conscience and purity of heart. . . . In point of fact, what proceeds from meritorious deeds is spiritual bliss only,—contentment, tranquillity of mind, meekness of heart, and immovability of faith' (*ib.* p. 190 f.).

Again, the true conception of *karma* is not merely individualistic; that is, it is not true that our deeds affect only our own fate. These deeds

'leave permanent effects on the general system of sentient beings, of which the actor is merely a component part; and it is not the actor himself only, but everybody constituting a grand psychic community called "Dharmadhātu" (spiritual universe), that suffers or enjoys the outcome of a moral deed' (*ib.* p. 192 f.).

In this way the inherent contradictions of the Buddhist view of life are modernized by an enthusiastic exponent; nevertheless, the denial of a Supreme Being and of personal immortality leaves us with a scheme of life so mechanical and cold that contentment becomes merely a fatalistic joyless acceptance of things as they are. Granting the admirable and even noble idealism of the Oriental, we miss the cheerfulness of the Christian saint who rests in the belief that a Universal Love dwells at the heart of creation and 'sweetly orders all that is.' Moreover, the ideal of contentment proclaimed by Buddhism is remote from life: it is too abstract and academic; it is the offspring of the cloister, and consequently eclectic and esoteric. Even when it glorifies compassion and charity, it loses itself in vagueness, and, except in some rare passages of the teaching of Śākyamuni, proclaims a universal benevolence rather than specific acts of sympathy. If love be 'the fulfilling of the law' and the condition of true contentment, it has no real place in a philosophy which denies the reality of the ego, or in a religion in which saintliness is synonymous with impassibility.

At the same time, it is but just to remember that, whatever its stress on extreme renunciation of all the joys of life may have been, Brāhmanism was far more human in its concept of contentment than was Buddhism. Thus the *Mahābhārata* (iii. 92, xii. 12502) can say that 'no end is there of greed [lit. "of thirst"], (but) contentment is the highest good' (*santoṣaḥ paramaṁ sukhaṁ*), or we may read in the collection of quatrains attributed to Bhartṛhari: 'Poor be he whose greed is great; if the mind be content, who is rich (or) who is poor?'

2. Græco-Roman.—While in Eastern thought the extinction of desire is the *summum bonum* of the ethical or religious life, a quite different idea of personality was held by the thinkers of Greece. They were frankly humanistic in their outlook. The glory and power, the gifts and virtues, of the individual life, the supremacy of reason and wisdom, and the harmony and perfectibility of the soul were cardinal points in their system. We begin with the Socratic identification of virtue and knowledge. For a man to know what he is doing and why—in a word, wisdom—this is his supreme possession. Without claiming to have discovered an abstract theory of the Good or the Wise, and while on the whole sceptical as to the possibility of such a discovery, Socrates provisionally conceived of the Good or the Wise as the faithful performance of the customary duties of life, and proclaimed that therein lay the secret of happiness. But what impressed his contemporaries was his independence of judgment and fearless criticism of conventional notions, rather than his love of knowledge. The result was the appearance of two opposing schools of thought—the Cynics, of whom Antisthenes and Diogenes were the notable figures, and the Cyrenaics, of whom Aristippus was the head. The watchword of the first was self-mastery—the practice of endurance and asceticism; that of the second, pleasure—the serene and untroubled pursuit of the pleasure of the moment, regardless of consequences. Neither to Plato nor to Aristotle was the practical conduct of life of such moment as the pursuit of truth and the ideal interpretation of the universe. With the advent of the Hellenistic period, about 300 B.C., the interest of the State or community became subordinated to that of the individual. The realism of Cynic and Cyrenaic was succeeded by the systems of Zeno and Epicurus, in which once more 'ethics is the end and goal; and an ethic, moreover, which looks only to the interest of the individual.' To Stoics and Epicureans the supreme interest is the possession of individual independence, the saving of one's own soul, and the ordering of life nobly and happily. The Epicurean doctrine (see EPICUREANS) was far from being a mere glorification of voluptuousness and immoral living. The picture given by Seneca of the Epicurean garden leaves on us the impression of a life of frugality and leisure—'plain living and high thinking.' The pleasure which Epicureanism regarded as the end of existence was not mere sensuality; it rather consisted, in its finer forms, of freedom from pain or disturbing elements (ἀταραξία). The pleasures of mind were nobler than those of body. It is not material enjoyments that are the givers of pleasure; 'it is sober reasoning,' says Epicurus in his letter to Menœceus, 'searching out the reasons for every choice and avoidance, and banishing those beliefs through which the greatest tumults take possession of the soul.' Another word that sums up the contented life is αὐτάρκεια ('self-sufficiency'), which was afterwards to be used in Christian ethics. 'We consider self-sufficiency a great good in order that, if we do not possess much, we may be satisfied with little' (Diog. Laert. x. 130 on Epic.). Nowhere do we find the spirit of Epicurean contentment so charmingly expressed as in the odes of Horace, the poet who, enamoured of his Sabine farm ('satis beatus unicis Sabinis,' *Odes*, II. xviii. 14) far from the haunts and din of city life, urges his friends to 'sweet content' ('desiderantem quod satis est,' *Odes*, III. i. 25), to calmness of outlook ('quid sit futurum cras fuge quaerere,' *Odes*, I. ix. 12) or to patient endurance:

'Aequam memento rebus in arduis
servare mentem' (*Odes*, II. iii. 1 f.).

In such phrases we discover the fascination of the Epicurean ideal 'of withdrawing from political and dialectical conflict to simple living and serene leisure, in imitation of the eternal leisure of the gods apart from the fortuitous concourse of atoms that we call a world' (H. Sidgwick, 'Ethics,' *EBr*[9]).

The Stoic conception of contentment may be summed up in the word ἀπάθεια ('impassivity'). The Stoic sage did not, like an Oriental *yogi*, regard all phenomena as illusions; nor did his essentially Pantheistic view of the universe destroy his sense of personal freedom and volition. Man can enter, by virtue of his gift of reason, into relationship with the Eternal reason. His one aim, indeed, is to live a life of reason, or, as the Stoic phrased it, a life 'in conformity with Nature.' Such a life is the true virtue, and is its own reward, quite apart from external goods or advantages. The average man conceives of pain, sickness, and death as evils; to the sage living the life of reason they are merely 'indifferent.' Human passions are only diseases of the reason. The sage 'will strive to keep the mastery over such faulty fancies, and be true to the consummate virtue,

which is passionless and calm.' Such is the Stoic *apathy*.

'It postulated,' says Capes (*Stoicism*, p. 49), 'not only the absolute supremacy of reason, but its rightful claims to be the only motive force within the soul, for it would make a solitude of all besides and call it peace; but it implied no torpor of ecstatic reveries and mystic contemplation, such as those which Eastern ascetics have enjoyed, in their attempts to close every pore and inlet of emotion, and to end almost in pure nothingness of individual being.'

This type of contentment is illustrated *passim* in the writings of the Roman Stoics—Seneca, Epictetus (see esp. the latter's chapter on 'Contentment,' *Diss.* i. 12 [Long's tr.])—and also in the *Thoughts* of Marcus Aurelius (cf. esp. bk. viii.).

3. Christian.—Before considering the Christian ideal of contentment, with which the Stoic found itself confronted in the early ages of Christianity, we may glance for a moment at the OT. The pure monotheism of the Hebrew saint and his unswerving belief in a Divine Providence shaped for him an experience widely different from those which we have considered above. The possession of God is his true wealth. 'The Lord is my shepherd; I shall not want' (Ps 23[1]). Sadness, pain, exile, loss of wealth and property, drought and disease, were nought compared with his unshaken sense of God's presence and reality. Cf. the magnificent psalm of cheerful submission in Hab 3[17-19], which Cowper has reproduced in the well-known hymn, *Sometimes a light surprises*, or the memorable cry of resignation, 'The Lord gave and the Lord hath taken away; blessed be the name of the Lord' (Job 1[21]). In the Wisdom books we find happiness associated closely with a common-sense view of life's limitations; *e.g.* Pr 15[17] 17[1] 19[1] etc., or, more nobly, with the possession of wisdom (Pr 3[13-19]). So far as the Prophetic writings are concerned, a clear apprehension of evils, social and political, a remorseless unveiling of injustice and oppression, and fierce invectives against idolatry, meaningless ritual, and false materialism, are combined with unswerving faith in the Divine guidance and in the ultimate victory of the Divine righteousness. The panic-stricken despair of the materialist is nobly contrasted with the calm of the monotheist in Is 30[15ff.] (cf. art. 'Contentment' in *HDB*). Generally speaking, in the writers of the OT contentment is the fruit of faith.

In the NT the same association of contentment with belief in God is evidenced in the teaching of our Lord. The new feature is the sublime conception of God's Fatherhood. It is the Fatherhood of God which points Christ's warning against anxiety and adds an immortal beauty to the words in Mt. 6[24-34]. Christ does not proclaim insensibility to the ills of life. He recognizes them, but calls upon us to live as children, to believe that God cares for us, and perfectly to trust the love, the wisdom, and the power of our Heavenly Father. This conception dominates the whole of His teaching. He uttered warnings against the love of wealth (Mt 6[19]), against self-seeking (Mk 10[40]), against social discontent (Lk 12[13-15]),[1] and against selfish slothfulness (Mt 25[24-28]). The last passage shows that Christ condemned inertia, while He praised activity when its end was not selfish but 'the Kingdom of heaven.' It was no part of His plan to encourage agitation against social and political evils, or against public institutions which were inimical to the highest interests of humanity; but He proclaimed the positive conception of the Kingdom of heaven, as an ideal of human life wherein the interest of the individual became one with the interest of the community; in other words, a corporate righteousness, the foundation of which was love binding individuals and classes together. The Christian conception of contentment never makes resignation to life's limitations and ills a mere passive attitude of the soul; submission to God's will in life and death is an energy or act of a sanctified will. Such it was in our Lord's acceptance of the cross as the will of His Father. Dante's words (*Par.* iii. 85), *e la sua volontate è nostra pace* (see the wonderful exposition of these words in Morley's *Life of Gladstone*, i. 215), give the secret of Christian calm.

It is also to be noted that contentment in the NT is closely associated with the truth of immortality. St. Paul can cheerfully bear 'the sufferings of this present time' as 'not worthy to be compared with the glory which shall be revealed in us' (Ro 8[18]). And it is this belief that differentiates his αὐτάρκεια ('self-sufficiency') from that of the Epicurean. 'His steadfast equanimity does not spring from contemplation of the great negative that life must soon end, but from the great positive that true life has no end' (Medley, *Interpretations of Horace*, 1910, p. 58, and cf. Lucretius, v. 1117 f.,

'Quod si quis vera vitam ratione gubernet,
divitiae grandes homini sunt, vivere parce
aequo animo ').

Moreover, if, as Lightfoot suggested, there was a reference in St. Paul's epistles to the Stoic ideal of the sage and citizen of the world as alone possessing absolute wealth and freedom, that ideal is transfigured in the Christian experience. 'Already are ye filled, already ye are become rich, ye have reigned without us. We are fools for Christ's sake, but ye are wise in Christ; we are weak, but ye are strong; ye have glory, but we have dishonour' (1 Co 4[8. 10]). Cf. also the passage in 2 Co 6[10] 'as sorrowful, yet alway rejoicing; as poor, yet making many rich; as having nothing, and yet possessing all things.' St. Paul's sublime inner resources, as being one with Christ and the sharer of His crucified and risen life, render him independent of outward conditions—'in everything at every time having every self-sufficiency . . . in everything enriched' (2 Co 9[8. 11]); and finally, 'I have learnt in whatsoever circumstances I am to be self-sufficing . . . I have all strength in Him that giveth me power . . . I have all things to the full and to overflowing' (Ph 4[11. 13. 18]). The Stoic attains his universal kingship 'by self-isolation: the other by incorporation' (Lightfoot, *Philippians*, p. 305). 'Godliness with contentment (αὐταρκείας) is great gain' (1 Ti 6[6])—thus does the Apostle sum up the wealth of the Christian saint. Heroism, patience, courage, endurance, whether we look for them in the annals of persecution and martyrdom, or in the daily round of common life with its constant cares and trials, may be regarded as the fruits of contentment, the αὐτάρκεια which inhabits what Wordsworth calls the

'central calm subsisting at the heart
Of endless agitation.'

LITERATURE.—For the Oriental aspects of the subject two recent volumes, written from quite opposite points of view, may be consulted: L. de la Vallée Poussin, *Bouddhisme: Opinions sur l'histoire de la dogmatique* (Paris, 1909), and D. T. Suzuki, *Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism* (London, 1907). Of the former there is a concise summary in English: *Buddhism*, a tr. published by the C.T.S. in the series *Lectures on the History of Religions*. Besides works quoted there are also to be named: W. W. Capes, *Stoicism* (Lond. 1880); W. L. Davidson, *The Stoic Creed* (Edin. 1907); W. Wallace, *Epicureanism* (Lond. 1880); R. W. Dale, *Laws of Christ for Com. Life* (Lond. 1885), p. 157 f.; F. Paulsen, *Syst. of Ethics* (Eng. tr., Lond. 1899), pp. 491 and 503; H. Sidgwick, art. 'Ethics,' in *EBr*[9] and *Outlines of Hist. of Ethics*, Lond. 1886 (where *EBr* art. is considerably altered and enlarged); J. B. Lightfoot, *Philippians*[4], Lond. 1878 (Essay on St. Paul and Seneca).

R. MARTIN POPE.

CONTINGENCY.—The term *contingentia*, as applied to that which is actual and accidental in contrast to that which is logically necessary and in accordance with law, originated with the Schoolmen. The idea involved goes back, however, to the problems of Greek philosophy. The thinkers

[1] Cf. Paulsen, *System of Ethics*, p. 491, for relation of contentment to covetousness.

of Greece, once they had discovered the significance of general conceptions, and of the order of things typified thereby, came to distinguish between the world which moves in accordance with these conceptions and that which is not wholly determined by them. The former, at this stage of thought, was identified with the sphere of the heavenly bodies, the latter with the sublunary world, where the rigid sway of law—the authority of form and conception—was circumscribed by accident and anomaly. It was only upon a basis of materialism that Democritus was able to trace a rational order throughout the entire universe, while Heraclitus, the Eleatics, and the Stoics did the same only in virtue of their pantheistic principles. The philosophy of the Church, on its metaphysical side, attached itself, not to the two last-named schools, but to Aristotle and the Neo-Platonists. In this way it also took over the idea of 'contingency'; and accordingly we find it urging, now, with Aristotle, the imperfection of the lower sphere, and now, with Neo-Platonism, the disorganization of the pure Idea by matter and sense. In the ecclesiastical philosophy, moreover, the term 'contingency' acquired a new meaning from its connexion with Judæo-Christian Theism. It was now used to express the volitional nature of the Creator, who is not limited by universal laws, but actually reveals the most profound elements of His being in the contingency of what eludes these laws. Thus, as Conceptual Realism (*universalia ante res*) evoked counter-movements of an empirical character, and interest in maintaining the freedom of the Divine will tended to strengthen them, there arose in Scholasticism various attempts to reconcile the validity of the pure Idea with a recognition of the actual—compromises which ranged from the specifically Aristotelian systems to Mysticism and Nominalism.

Not until the dawn of modern philosophy was there a revival of the pantheism of Heraclitus and the Stoics, as represented in the philosophies of Nature that sprang up with the Renaissance; and, as it came to be recognized, in consequence of the newer investigation of Nature, that the laws of the sidereal world are identical with those of the lower sphere, there arose a fresh wave of pure Rationalism which excluded contingency. Then the mathematico-physical interpretation of the world, with the system of Spinoza in the forefront, made this revived Rationalism supreme. All the more vigorous, however, was the reaction of that Empiricism which, with its insistence upon the fact of contingency, took shape in the hands of Locke and Hume, of Leibniz and Kant; for, in spite of the fundamental Rationalism of the latter two thinkers, the one distinguished between the *vérités de raison* and the *vérités de fait*, the other between the rationality of the categories and the contingency of the matter of experience. The problem having thus been placed upon the new basis of a universal cosmic order, the Aristotelian view of contingency as confined to the sublunary world was, of course, discarded, as was also the Neo-Platonic identification of contingency with the irrationality of matter and sense. But contingency emerged once more in connexion with a general cosmical movement in epistemology and metaphysics, as the term was now used to signify the irrational factor beside and within the rational, and as the idea came into immediate touch with the questions regarding the conception of Deity; the thought of a creative will which acts without motive was pitted against that of a logical necessity by which the world proceeds from the Idea. It was in these controversies that the full significance of the conception of contingency was at length realized.

The various aspects of the problem must be considered in detail, as follows:

1. **The difference between the universal and necessary categories of thought and the facts embraced, unified, and controlled by these categories.**—The facts, as such, are irrational and contingent. We cannot comprehend why this or that should exist; and, even if any particular thing be rationalized in virtue of its derivation from another, yet that other itself remains contingent. Should it be affirmed, however, that the whole manifold of phenomena can logically be deduced from the fact of the world as a whole,—a consummation which as yet is not even remotely possible, and remains at best a logical postulate,—nevertheless, the existence of the world itself would still remain irrational and contingent. The truly incomprehensible thing, as D'Alembert puts it, is that anything should exist at all. Here, in fact, we have the reason why metaphysics must, in the ultimate resort, refer the existence of the actual to the arbitrary fiat of Deity, precisely as was done by Augustine and the Nominalists, and, in another form, by the modern theories of Schelling and von Hartmann. Yet even so decided a rationalist as Descartes fell back upon the same explanation of the world as a whole.

2. **The contingent elements in rational and logical necessity itself.**—The so-called 'cosmic law,' 'cosmic idea,' and 'cosmic unity' are never more than phantasms of the mind, or postulates, and are incapable of actual realization. The objective fact is in reality a number of laws operating together, by the simultaneous application of which to the particular the latter becomes intelligible. But this very plurality of laws makes the laws themselves contingent, alike in relation to one another and to the ideal of the one supreme cosmic law. Then there is the further difficulty of depicting the manner in which the real is controlled by the laws. If we are not prepared to fall back upon the myth of Plato's Ideal world, or of Scholastic Realism,—as is instinctively done nowadays by most of those who make much of the idea of law,—we must interpret the laws of Nature as primarily of subjective import, *i.e.* as lending order, form, and perspicuity to the facts—an import which is undoubtedly involved in the orderly nature of the world, though we cannot see how. This procedure, however, introduces an excessive degree of arbitrariness and contingency into the idea of law. And if we seek, with the modern idealism of Kant and Fichte, to explain the agreement of law with reality on the theory that the world is generated by consciousness, yet the fact remains that the application of the laws which regulate the world, and are to be regarded as forming an organized unity, is in all cases guided by some particular interest of the mind engaged, and consequently furnishes a rationale, not of the entire reality, but only of that special aspect favoured by the interest in question. Such a selective and isolating procedure, however,—and no other is possible,—also involves an element of contingency.

3. **The idea of individuality.**—Even if we assume the existence of a universal rational order, yet we must admit that every single concrete phenomenon found in this network of rationality has a certain individual content, *i.e.* it cannot be fully explained by universal laws, but always exhibits some special and distinct element not derivable therefrom. This holds good alike of the simplest natural event and of the most delicate complex of psychical life. As a matter of fact, the universe itself and its development do not form a particular case of a general conception, but are absolutely unique. The problem of individuation is therefore identical with the problem of contingency in its general sense. The fact of individuality plays havoc with every

system of thoroughgoing rationalism, which accordingly usually endeavours to deny or ignore the existence of the particular, or to interpret it as something else. This is what Leibniz means when he says that Spinoza would be right if there were no monads.

4. **The problem of the new.**—On the principles of a purely rational system, nothing new could ever emerge in the world of the real. Everything would be involved in the existence of the whole, and therefore eternally present therein; or the apparently new would be only a phase and form of forces always present in unvarying quantity. It is clear, however, that on either alternative the new is got rid of by a mere evasion. In the first case, it still persists as something that has emerged in the process of development, as that which distinguishes the actual from the potential; in the second, as appearance and manifestation. A thoroughgoing rationalism must, like the Eleatic school, repudiate movement and becoming altogether, for, if it does not, then the admission that something has come into existence which was not contained in the antecedent situation implies an element of contingency. Hegel, in importing into the rationality of the Idea the principles of negation and transition to the antithesis, and in basing metaphysics on the principle of becoming, really, though surreptitiously, provides a place in his system for the contingent and irrational. Metaphysically expressed, this contingent element is the idea of creation and 'positing,' which is here applied to the particular in the same way as to the universe in § 1 above. Epistemologically expressed, it is the idea of a causality of non-equivalence, as opposed to the causal equivalence with which alone a consistent rationalism can be satisfied. In the causality of equivalence the nexus signifies identity of essence, with a mere change of form. In causal non-equivalence the nexus provides a place for the new. The endeavour to reduce all our knowledge of causes to the former category is hopeless, and accordingly an element of contingency clings to the conception of causality itself.

5. **The connexion between contingency and freedom.**—Freedom, in the sense of self-determination by universal laws, and our concurrence therewith, as contrasted with the haphazard of a purely psychical motivation, involves *per se* no contingency whatever. On the contrary, as determination by universal moral and social law, it forms the true germ of the conception of law in general, which is first of all realized in the personal sphere, and then transferred to the uniformities of the world-process. In reality, however, the causal 'must' of the process of things, when judged by the absolute standard of ideal values, manifests itself as something contingent. For, if these values represent the true significance of the existent, it is impossible to see why they should demand for their realization this particular sphere of causality. Moreover, freedom, in the sense indicated, implies the exclusion of absolute rational necessity from that sphere of objectivity which is at once the base and the theatre of its activity, since it demands, in the order of things, a certain elasticity, in virtue of which it may intervene in the manifold and mould it to its own ends. From this side also, therefore, an element of contingency insinuates itself into the conception of universal laws—a conception which is thus once more shown to include an element of the merely actual, and to be no longer a conviction of the absolutely valid. In relation to the ideal of universal necessity, interrupted or variable laws are contingent. Here, in fact, we touch the grounds, as well as the limits, of determinism, which is never more than a deduction from the axiom of the absolute rationality of things, and never reaches the level of a truth scientifically proved.

6. **Contingency in the ideas of freedom themselves.**—While the ultimate cognizable source of the idea of law, and, therefore, of unconditional necessity also, lies in the ideas of freedom, absolute value, and validity, yet the particular elements of that ideal order cannot be regarded as in themselves necessary. Our observation does not carry us beyond an actual control of the soul by ideas bearing this or that interpretation, but we can never derive these from the conception of absolute necessity. As regards their form, moral ideas may be unconditionally necessary, but their content is dependent upon the actual conditions of human life. Here we come upon the root of the old Scholastic controversy whether the moral laws are good because God wills them, or whether God wills them because they are good. We thus see that the idea of contingency pierces even to the deepest sources of all ideas of necessity.

The problem of contingency, then, in its various aspects, contains *in nuce* all the problems of philosophy, just as from the opposite side they are all contained in the problem of Rationalism. The question of contingency is in reality the question as to the relation of the irrational to the rational, of the actual to the logical, of creation to the eternity and necessity of the world. The reconciliation of these opposites is impossible. The actual thinking activity of man consists in a continuous combination of the antitheses. Absolute Rationalism, with Pantheism as its logical conclusion, and absolute Irrationalism, with its logical consequence of the irrelation and incoherence of things, or Polytheism, are alike impossible. The final synthesis does not lie within the scope of human thought, and all attempts to reach it lead to contradiction.

In its religious aspect, the idea of contingency implies the vitality, multiplicity, and freedom of the world in God, and, indeed, the creative freedom of God Himself; while Rationalism, on the other hand, signifies the unity of the world, the supremacy of the super-sensuous, the comprehension of all things in a universal Divine law. Here, again, the logical solution lies beyond us. In actual practice, it is true, Judæo-Christian Theism takes cognizance of both sides at once, and is therefore, speculatively, the most fertile religious principle. Even that interpretation, however, has its incoherences and its contradictions. But, in the last resort, it remains to be said, such antinomies are ineradicably present in every anti-theistic system as well—in Pantheism and Nominalistic Empiricism alike.

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CONTINUITY (Gr. *συνέχεια, τὸ συνεχές*; Lat. *continuatio, continuum*).—We may perhaps distinguish three stages in the history of the notion of continuity: (1) a pre-scientific stage, in which the notion is no more than a simple description of certain obvious facts of sense-experience; (2) a second stage, in which scientific philosophy first arrives at an apparently clear and distinct conception of the continuous as a peculiar kind of magnitude which cannot be divided into units. This stage of reflexion makes its appearance for the first time in the Eleatic criticism of the assumptions of Pythagorean Geometry, and culminates in the Philosophy of Aristotle, in which the conception of a 'uniform continuous motion' is central for the whole doctrine of Nature.

Mathematically, it leads to the sharp contrast between Arithmetic as the science of non-continuous, and Geometry as the study of continuous, magnitude, which we find carried out in the elements of Euclid. (3) The third stage, represented by the labours of the 19th cent. mathematicians, and embodied in such theories of the continuous as those of Dedekind and Georg Cantor, consists essentially in the attempt to develop, by means of an extension of the notion of number, a purely arithmetical conception of the continuum, and so to restore the correspondence, broken down by Eleatic criticism, between Geometry and Arithmetic. That the new mathematical conceptions must, as they become more widely known, exercise an important influence on the development of philosophical thought in general is clear, though it is perhaps yet too early to predict the precise form which that influence will take.

1. The primary notion of continuity.—Here, as in all study of the technical concepts of science, we have to begin by going back to the history of Greek thought in its expression in language. As abundant evidence proves, the primary notion implied by *συνεχές* is 'having nothing between,' 'presenting no sensible gap,' 'hanging together.' Thus, with reference to space, we find Thucydides speaking of the siege-works at Platæa as *ξυνεχῆ οἰκήματα*, 'buildings without a gap,' which, as he goes on to say, looked like an unbroken wall (iii. 21). So, with reference to time, in the medical writers of the 5th cent. *συνεχεῖς πυρετοί*, 'non-remitting fevers,' are distinguished from *διαλείποντες πυρετοί*, 'periodical fevers,' and in Thucydides (v. 85) a *ξυνεχὴς ῥῆσις*, or 'uninterrupted address,' is contrasted with a free conference, in which each point made by one party is immediately answered by the spokesman of the other. In all these cases we are dealing with a simple experience not yet coloured by scientific reflexion. Every one knows the difference between an unbroken line and a series of dots with sensible intervals between them, between a steady persisting pain and one which comes and goes, between the flight of a missile and that of a bird. The former seem to 'hang together,' the latter do not; and it is this sensible 'hanging together' which the plain man has in mind when he speaks of the former as 'continuous.' So far no distinction has been made between a 'continuous' and a 'discrete' kind of magnitude, one which cannot, and one which can, be broken up into ultimate units, themselves indivisible. The plain man, for instance, would not object to talking of a 'continuous' series of integers (*e.g.* those from 1 to 10), though he commonly looks on an integer as a 'collection of ones' (exactly as Aristotle did). He would call the series 'broken' only if one of the members were left out.

2. The Pythagorean Mathematics and the Eleatic criticism; views of Plato and Aristotle.—Serious reflexion on the presuppositions involved in the notion of the 'unbroken' first meets us in the criticism of the Eleatic philosophers of the 5th cent. on the mathematical and cosmological views of their Pythagorean neighbours. Amid all the uncertainty which surrounds the reconstruction of early Pythagoreanism, one thing seems certain. The Pythagoreans were primarily interested in Arithmetic because they saw in it the key to the interpretation of Nature. In particular, they looked on Geometry, the foundation of all genuine physical science, as an application of Arithmetic. 'Things are made up of numbers' because they are endowed with geometrical form and magnitude, and are therefore ultimately made of points, and a point is simply a 'unit having position' (*μονὰς θέσιν ἔχουσα*). The point differs from the 'unit,' or 'number 1,' only in the additional peculiarity that it 'has position.' Hence, since a whole number (*ἀριθμός*) is simply a 'collection of units,' and since a geometrical figure is a collection of 'units having position,' there is an absolute correspondence between Arithmetic, the science of number, and Geometry. This is why, in the Pythagorean scheme of the sciences, retained by Plato in the *Republic* and *Epinomis*, Arithmetic is made to take precedence of Geometry. The later arrangement, followed by Euclid—in which Geometry, so far as it can be pursued without the study of incommensurables, comes first (bks. i.–iv. vi.), Arithmetic next (bks. vii.–ix.), and then the theory of surds (bk. x.)—is due to the effects of the criticism of which we have now to speak.

The Pythagorean doctrine itself led very directly to consequences which were fatal to its own assumptions. If lines are simply made up of an integral number of 'units,' it ought to be possible in theory to answer the question how many points there are in any given terminated line. In other words, all lines ought to be commensurable, since the 'unit' measures them all without remainder, just as any two integers, even if prime to each other, yet have 1 as their G.C.M. But an immediate consequence of the 'Pythagorean theorem' (Eucl. i. 47) itself is that there is no assignable whole number of 'units' in the base of the equilateral right-angled triangle. In other words, $\sqrt{2}$ is incommensurable with any integer. If the Pythagoreans employed a strictly scientific method for their crowning achievement—the inscription of the dodecahedron in the sphere—they must likewise have known the construction of the 'golden section' (Eucl. ii. 11), which introduces us to another 'irrational' magnitude, $\sqrt{5}$. The legends which assert that Hippasus of Rhegium was drowned by the brotherhood for revealing one or other of these facts show how acutely the Pythagoreans felt the contradiction between their assumption and their conclusion. Hence, it is not wonderful that their critics should have pressed it to the utmost. Parmenides (fl. *c.* 475 B.C., according to Plato) had already attacked their fundamental position by asserting in his poem that, since *μὴ ἐόν* ('what is not,' 'empty space') is a pure unreality, *τὸ ἐόν* ('what is,' 'body') cannot be divided at all, because it is *ξυνεχὲς πᾶν* ('all hanging together'), and *ἐὸν ἐόντι πελάζει* ('what is touches what is'). In other words, a body cannot be made up of 'units.' Similarly he had denied the reality of all temporal succession. Time is not made up of 'moments,' because what is 'never was and never will be, since it is *now*, all at once, one, unbroken' (*ἐπεὶ νῦν ἔστιν, ὁμοῦ πᾶν, ἕν, συνεχές*). This conclusion would be immeasurably strengthened by the discovery of surd or 'irrational' lengths (*i.e.* lengths which have not, to the unit of measurement we assume, the *λόγος*, or *ratio*, of one whole number to another). We may put the difficulty thus. The Pythagorean conception of the point as a 'unit' of length involves the view that, if on a terminated straight line AB we mark off points corresponding to the successive integers, we have only to make our unit of length sufficiently small (*i.e.* to take our successive points near enough together) to exhaust all the points of the line. The discovery of a single 'surd' length is enough to show that this is false. However close together we take our points, we shall never have included one which lies from the origin at a distance equal to the diagonal of a square on the 'unit' length; or again, there will not be among them any point at which a straight line is divided in 'extreme and mean ratio.' Such a conclusion would, of course, be destructive of Geometry, because it would invalidate some of its most fundamental constructions. How far the study of surds was advanced

in the 5th cent. we do not know, but probably not far, since in the *Theætetus* (p. 147 D ff.) Plato assumes the discovery of the successive quadratic surds from $\sqrt{3}$ to $\sqrt{17}$ to have been a recent achievement of his friends, Theodorus, Theætetus, and the younger Socrates. Plato and his school are known to have given much attention to the subject, which was especially advanced by Theætetus, and an incidental reference in the early Peripatetic tract on 'Indivisible Lines' shows us that they had already examined and named at least two of the types of surd expressions studied in Euclid x.—the ἀποτομή and the ἐκ δυοῖν ὀνομάτοιν.

But, even without the explicit study of surd magnitudes, results equally fatal to the Pythagorean identification of Geometry with applied Arithmetic can be derived from the argument from infinite divisibility, and it was this argument which was specially pressed home by Parmenides' pupil, Zeno of Elea (fl. *c.* 450, according to Plato). To appreciate Zeno's employment of the argument, we need to bear in mind that what the Greeks called ἀριθμός is always a natural whole number or integer. (Even in Euclid, the notion of a rational fraction does not occur. What we regard as rational fractions he always treats as *ratios* of one integer to another.) Now, argued Zeno, any length, however small, can be bisected, but no number of repeated bisections will ever leave us with an indivisible 'unit,' but only with a length which can be bisected again. Or, since the argument shows that the 'units' in any length must be infinitely numerous, if the 'unit' has any magnitude at all, every length will be infinite, while, if we take the 'units' to be zeros, every length will be infinitely small, since the sum of an infinity of zeros is still zero. Yet again, if a point has magnitude, the addition or subtraction of one point will alter the length of a line, while, if the point can be added or subtracted without affecting the length of the line, it has no magnitude, and is nothing at all (see the fragments of Zeno in Diels, *Vorsokratiker*², i. [1906] 130, 133 f.). The famous 'paradoxes' of Zeno, dealing with the concept of motion (for which see Diels, *loc. cit.* p. 131 f.; Burnet, *Early Gr. Philosophy*², pp. 366–369; Milhaud, *Les Philosophes-géomètres de la Grèce*, pp. 130–140), are all aimed at the same notion of space and time as made up of minima of length and duration, and, as against this conception, are unanswerable. They do not, however, really prove all that Zeno meant they should.

From Plato (*Parmenides*, 128 D) we learn that Zeno's object was to 'reinforce' the doctrine of Parmenides that 'the All is One,' by showing that the rival theory that it is Many leads to absurd results. He meant, then, to show that space and time cannot be continua of points or moments. All that he really proved was that they cannot consist of points or moments which themselves have magnitude, that the 'elements' of a continuum cannot be 'units' homogeneous with the continuum constructed out of them. He has, in fact, shown that there must be more points on the line, more moments in the shortest lapse of time, than there are members of the series of natural numbers, or, what comes to the same thing, that, though every continuum is infinitely divisible, infinite divisibility is not an adequate criterion of continuity. He has not shown that the number-system itself is not capable of an extension which would make it possible to establish a genuine one-to-one correlation between its members and all the points of a terminated straight line. Since, however, the Greeks had no conception of any method of constructing numbers other than the adding of successive units to an aggregate, the effect of Zeno's criticism was, in time, to effect a complete revolution in their conception of Geometry. Plato, indeed, clings to the old view of number as the foundation of Geometry, but that was probably, as we shall see, merely because he did not share the common view which identified number with whole number. But the Academy, whose results are represented for us by the work of Euclid (the last of a series of στοιχειωταί, all whose predecessors seem to have been connected with the Platonic school), re-arranged the curriculum of Mathematics in a way which can have been due only to the Eleatic criticism. In the final form given to the στοιχεῖα, or A-B-C, of the subject by Euclid, Plane Geometry comes first (bks. i.–vi.), embracing the theory of Proportion as re-cast by Eudoxus, so as to make it applicable to incommensurables and commensurables alike (bk. v.), then Arithmetic (where all the magnitudes are *ex hypothesi* commensurable [bks. vii.–ix.]), then the study of Incommensurables (which, for the Greeks, meant expressions involving quadratic surds [bk. x.]), finally Solid Geometry, culminating in the inscription of the dodecahedron (bks. xi.–xiii.). The effect is that the question of the commensurability or incommensurability of the lines dealt with is never raised in the books which treat of Plane Geometry. Only once does Euclid in these books explicitly undertake the construction of a surd magnitude—viz. in ii. 11, the construction of the 'golden section,' which had to be dealt with early because it is required for the inscription of the pentagon (iv. 11), and this in its turn for that of the dodecahedron (xiii. 17). In ii. 11 alone is it tacitly presupposed that a straight line possesses a continuity which is more than the capacity for being infinitely divided into aliquot parts, and it is interesting to see that the scholia to the proposition (Euclid, ed. Heiberg, v. 248–251) specially call attention to the fact that the 'problem cannot be represented by numbers,' 'is not explicable by counters.' We may note that the researches of the Academy into 'irrationals,' as represented by Euclid x., do not go beyond the consideration of various types of surds involving the extraction of a square root. This limitation is, in fact, the theoretical counterpart of the practical restriction to constructions which can be carried out with ruler and compass, for 'an analytical expression is capable of construction by ruler and compass only when it can be derived from given magnitudes by a finite number of rational operations and square roots, since the intersection of two straight lines, of two circles, of a straight line and a circle, is always equivalent to a rational operation or the extraction of a square root' (F. Klein, *Vorträge über ausgewählten Fragen der Elementargeometrie*, Leipz. 1895, *ad init.*). A further discovery of the 5th cent., which, if it could have been followed up, would have been even more fatal to the old arithmetical treatment of Geometry, was that of the so-called *quadratrix* (τετραγωνίζουσα), made by Hippias of Elis. This curve, which gets its name from the fact that, if it could be mechanically described, it would solve the problem of 'squaring the circle,' has for its equation in polar co-ordinates $\rho = \frac{\omega}{\sin \omega} \times \frac{2\,R}{\pi}$, and is thus the first example in Greek mathematics of a transcendental function.

Summing up, we may say that the actual effect of the Eleatic criticism was to establish a sharp distinction between number, as composed of 'units,' and μέγεθος ('continuous magnitude'), which has no 'unit' or 'minimum.' A number is simply πλῆθος μονάδων, an 'aggregate of ones' (Euclid vii., def. 1, 2), and consequently any two numbers have a 'common measure.' The straight line, being infinitely divisible into lesser straight lines, has no 'unit,' and hence two such lines often have no

'common measure,' and are therefore incommensurable. The point is put very clearly in the introductory scholium to Euclid x. (Heiberg, v. 415):

'The Pythagoreans first began to investigate commensurability, being the first to discover it from their study of numbers. For, whereas the number 1 is a common measure of all numbers, they failed to find a common measure of magnitudes (μεγεθῶν). The reason is that any number, however you divide it, leaves you with a least part which admits no further division. But no magnitude, though you divide it *ad infinitum*, leaves you with a part which is a minimum . . . but only with a part which can itself be divided *ad infinitum*.'

Thus, owing to the criticism of Zeno, infinite divisibility came to be regarded as the sufficient criterion of continuity. In language the effect of the polemic was that the old definition of the point as a 'unit with position,' which we know to be Pythagorean, was replaced by that which now stands at the opening of Euclid's *Elements*, 'A point is that which has no parts' (σημεῖόν ἐστιν οὗ μέρος οὐθέν). In thus being indivisible the point does not, of course, differ from the 'unit,' or 'number 1' (μονάς) (cf. Plato, *Republic*, 525 E), but it can no longer be called μονάς, because it is now clearly seen that, unlike the 'unit,' the point cannot be a 'measure' of anything. Hence in Plato and Aristotle μονάς always means the *number* 1; for 'point' Aristotle always says σημεῖον or στιγμή, while Plato (see Aristotle, *Metaph.* A 992a, 21) employed the designation ἀρχὴ γραμμῆς, 'the beginning of the line.' There are perhaps still perceptible traces of 5th cent. opposition to the consequences which Zeno had drawn from infinite divisibility. Protagoras, like Zeno, a member of the Periclean circle, argued, in 'refutation' of the geometers, that a circle and tangent have a stretch, not a single point, in common (Aristotle, *Metaph.* B 997b, 35). This looks like an attempt to deny the infinite divisibility of the line, and to identify the *minimum visibile* with the unit of extension, and thus to get rid of the notion of incommensurability. Hence it may be, as Burnet has suggested (*op. cit.* 188), that the formula Protagoras chose for his relativism, 'Man is the *measure* of all things,' was influenced by opposition to the new doctrine of magnitudes which have 'no common measure.' The anti-mathematical argument of Protagoras led to a rejoinder from his greater townsman Democritus, in the catalogue of whose works drawn up in the 1st cent. A.D. by Thrasyllus we find one on 'the contact of the circle and the sphere,' and another on 'irrational lines.' According to Plato and Aristophanes (*Clouds*, 144 ff.), who are unwillingly confirmed by Xenophon (*Mem.* IV. vii. 3, 5), Socrates, too, was among the mathematicians, and it may be noted that in the three chief places where Plato makes him exhibit mathematical interests (*Meno*, 82–85 B, *Theætetus*, 148 AB, *Republic*, 546 BC) a problem involving surd magnitudes is, in each case, under consideration.

Plato's attitude towards the problem raised by the discovery of surds, and the recognition that the infinitely divisible cannot be made of 'units,' is, at first sight, perplexing. He is deeply interested in the study of surd expressions, and fully aware of the infinite divisibility of μεγέθη, but refuses to take the step of severing Geometry from Arithmetic, and of selecting elementary Plane Geometry (which can be studied without any reference to the existence or non-existence of 'units') as the subject with which Mathematics should begin. To the last he insists that Arithmetic, the theory of numbers, is the foundation on which all other branches of Mathematics should be based, and the clue to their meaning. We can exempt him from the charge of inconsequence only by supposing that his retention of Arithmetic as the corner-stone of Mathematics was due to a conviction that 'number' is not exhausted by the series of the natural numbers, the μοναδικοὶ ἀριθμοί, or numbers made up of units, which Aristotle always asserts are the only numbers there are. If the concept of number be widened so as to take in the surds, so Plato probably thought, we may still adhere to the notion of one-to-one correspondence of the points on a terminated line with the members of the number-series, without incurring any of the difficulties which were fatal to the old Pythagorean geometry. (Just so, our ordinary Analytical Geometry rests on assuming such a correspondence of the points of the line with the complete series of the real numbers.) That Plato had formed some such conception of a possible extension of the concept of number seems clear from more than one consideration. The suggestion, as Milhaud has shown (*op. cit.* bk. ii. ch. 5), explains why Aristotle regards it as a capital point against Plato to insist that there is no way of generating numbers except by the addition of units, and why so much is made in *Metaphysics* M of the complaint that the 'numbers' of which the Platonic 'Ideas' are composed are not all συμβλητοί, commensurable with one another. Aristotle is, in effect, complaining that Plato's theory presents us with expressions like $\sqrt{2}$, $\sqrt{3}$, $a+\sqrt{b}$, and the like; whereas he himself holds that there is no place for them in the number-series, just as Euclid is always careful to speak of such magnitudes as μεγέθη, and to symbolize them by straight lines and rectangles. Positive evidence to the same effect is furnished by a remarkable passage of one of Plato's latest works, the *Epinomis*, the point of which is to maintain that all Mathematics is really the study of the generation and properties of numbers (*Epin.* 990 C ff.). We are particularly told here that the names 'geometry' and 'stereometry' are altogether misleading, and the former is said to be 'extremely absurd.' 'Geometry' is 'manifestly an assimilation, effected by reference to surfaces, of numbers which are not in their own nature similar'; and 'stereometry' is the 'study of numbers raised to the third power, and similar to the nature of the solid, where again those which are dissimilar are made similar by a further device.' (The passage should be read in Burnet's edition, the only one in which the text has not been perverted by editorial dullness.)

The passage just quoted represents the highest development of the Platonic theory of number. It is clearly an attempt to vindicate for the number-series itself the same character of a continuum as that which belongs to the straight line, by finding room in it for numbers answering to the irrational lengths of Geometry. If we followed out Plato's suggestions in his own spirit, what they would lead to would be something of the following kind. Taking a terminated straight line, we might first assign the co-ordinates 0 and 1 to its end-points. Then, by infinitely repeated division, we should get one and only one point corresponding to each rational fraction between 0 and 1. Then, by inserting further points corresponding to all the irrationals between 0 and 1, we should obtain points corresponding to the whole series of algebraic numbers. The resulting number-series would not, however, exhaust the points on the line, and would therefore not possess the continuity of the point-series, since it would contain no terms whose co-ordinates are transcendental numbers, though it would contain an infinity of points not obtainable by the process of repeated division.

Aristotle's statement that Plato refused to speak of 'points,' but called them instead 'the beginning of the line,' seems to indicate another attempt to face a difficulty inherent in the current conception of whole number. From the earliest times of Pythagoreanism downwards, we find it regularly assumed that the number-series must begin with 1,

the 'unit.' But the criticism of Zeno had shown that we cannot think of the 'point' as a 'unit length.' If the correspondence between Geometry and Arithmetic is to be kept up, as Plato wished it to be, we must begin our number-series with something which answers to a zero of magnitude in Geometry; the first number must be 0, not 1. It was, no doubt, this character of the point as a zero which led Plato to avoid recognizing it as a distinct entity, and to call it 'the beginning of the line.' It seems most probable, however, that he did not clearly draw the right conclusion that, in the same way, 0 is the beginning of the number-series. More probably he thought of the point, as Xenocrates is known to have done, as an 'infinitesimal line,' and must be added to the list of thinkers like Leibniz, who have been led astray in their theory of the continuous by this phantasm of a thing which is somehow at once something and nothing.

Further interesting contributions are made to the theory of continuity in the puzzling dialogue *Parmenides*. Without raising the question of the purport of the dialogue as a whole, we may note the references made in its antinomies to the difficulty of regarding a continuum as constructed out of real elements. We may take first the treatment of 'contact' (p. 148 D ff.). When a number of things are in contact, each 'lies next to' (ἐφεξῆς κεῖται) that which is in contact with it; *e.g.* if a straight line is made up of distinct 'units' in contact with one another, the units must leave no gaps between them, and each must have a definite 'next adjacent' unit. In modern phraseology, the line must be a 'well-ordered' assemblage of points. Hence, in a series of n members there must be $(n-1)$ contacts. It is therefore inferred that, 'if there is not *number* in τὰ ἄλλα' (the things 'other than the One,' 'the Many'), the 'One' cannot 'be in contact with them.' For Geometry this plainly means that, if the points on the line are not 'units' (and the criticism of Zeno had shown that they are not), no point on a line has an immediately adjacent or next point. Since every integer *has* a *next* integer in the actual number-series, this means that the points on a terminated straight line, taken in the order of their distances from one of the end-points, cannot be symbolized by the series of integers. Continuity, as exhibited in the line, must be something other than the mere unbroken succession of the whole number-series 1, 2, 3, . . . n, . . . Later on (155 E–157 B), we have an argument to show that the very concept of change leads to the thought of time as a series of 'moments' which have no duration, just as the points on a line have no extension. When a body which was moving comes to rest, or *vice versa*, there is a transition from the one state to the other. This cannot take place 'in time,' *i.e.* there is no interval, however small, in which the body is neither moving nor at rest, but passing out of motion into rest; in any given interval it is either moving or stationary. Hence the transition occupies no duration, but happens instantaneously, and we are compelled to form the 'paradoxical' (ἄτοπος) conception of the 'instantaneous' (τὸ ἐξαίφνης). The paradox seems to lie in the fact that it is hard to decide whether the moment at which the velocity 0 is reached should be counted as the last moment of motion or as the first moment of rest. We must, in the one case, think of the time during which the body moves as having no last moment, in the other of the time during which it is stationary as having no first moment—an immediate consequence of the consideration that no moment has a 'next' moment.

In Aristotle we meet with none of the anticipations of a riper thought which fascinate us in Plato, but we have, by way of compensation, a very explicit account of continuity, in so far as infinite divisibility may be taken as a sufficient criterion of it. The notion is fundamental in the Aristotelian system, because the steady and uninterrupted process of the development of latent potentialities into actualities, which, for Aristotle, constitutes 'Nature,' depends in the last resort upon the uniform and continuous movement of the heavens, and continuous movement demands the continuity of time and space. Hence any denial of the continuity of extension, duration, and movement is fatal to Aristotle's whole *Naturphilosophie*. The tract on the *Categories* gives us the general view current in Academic circles and presupposed by the more special discussions in Aristotle's discourses on 'Physics.' τὸ πόσον (*quantum*) has two species —τὸ διωρισμένον (elsewhere also τὸ διαιρετόν), 'the discrete'; and τὸ συνεχές, 'the continuous.' The vital difference between them is that the 'parts' (μόρια) of the 'discrete' *quantum* have no κοινὸς ὅρος, or 'common boundary,' at which they join; *e.g.* 10 (for Aristotle always confuses the number *of* a collection with the collection itself, and many of his attacks on Plato arise from inability to see that, though there are many pairs of things in the world, there is only one number 2, and this number itself is not a 'pair') consists of 7 + 3, but no one of the 'units' of the 7 is identical with any unit of the 3. But the 'parts' of a 'continuous' *quantum* always have such a 'common boundary,' which, in the case of the line, is a point; *i.e.* when the terminated straight line AB is divided at C, the writer reckons C as belonging both to AC, of which it is the last point, and to CB, of which it is the first, thus illogically counting the one point C twice over. Similarly with time: the present moment 'joins on' (συνάπτει) both to the past and to the future. It may be taken either as the first or as the last moment of an unbroken time-series. This is the really important point in the distinction drawn for us between the two kinds of *quanta*, since it implies, of course, that the συνεχὲς πόσον or continuum is infinitely divisible, and therefore does not consist of units or minima. It is added that not all continua are composed of parts which 'have position'; *e.g.* since the past, present, and future are not all co-existent, no part of time is 'anywhere' relatively to the rest. The parts have not position, but only 'order' (τάξις), and *so* far resemble the members of the whole number-series. (We must not, of course, press this analogy too far, since it would lead to the view that the 'parts' of time form a 'well-ordered' aggregate, in which each term has an immediately next term. Time would then be made up of minima of duration, and would *not* be continuous in the writer's sense [*Categories*, 5^b–6^a].)

More characteristic is the account given in *Metaphysics* Δ 1020^a, 7 ff.—πόσον (*quantum*) means 'that which can be divided into constituents inherent in it, whereof each is one and "this"' (τὸ διαιρετὸν εἰς ἐνυπάρχοντα ὧν ἑκάτερον ἢ ἕκαστον ἕν τι καὶ τόδε τι πέφυκεν εἶναι [1020^a, 8]). Such a *quantum* is a πλῆθος, or assemblage, if it can be numbered; a μέγεθος if it can only be measured. Thus a πλῆθος can be divided into countable non-continuous elements, but a μέγεθος only into continua. (We cannot, *e.g.*, divide a line into points, but only into lesser lines, so that infinite divisibility is taken as the criterion of μέγεθος, 'continuous quantity.') A delimited (πεπερασμένον) πλῆθος is a whole number; a delimited μέγεθος is a line, surface, or body, according to the number of its dimensions. Thus there is only one kind of magnitude which is continuous in its own right (καθ' αὑτό) —extension. Time and movement are continua, not in their own right, but derivatively (κατὰ συμβεβηκός), in virtue of their connexion with the μέγεθος *per se*, extension. Since the trajectory of

a moving body is a continuum, the motion is a continuum also, and therefore also the time occupied in the transit. A fuller, but logically unsatisfactory, account is given in the *Physics*. The Eleatics had held that the continuous is indivisible (a theory which meets us again in Spinoza). Aristotle points out that, on the contrary, only the continuous is infinitely divisible (185^b, 10). So we are told in bk. Γ that 'motion' (the fundamental category of a science of 'Nature') is generally held (δοκεῖ) to be one of the continua, and it is in the continuous that the 'infinite' first makes itself noticeable. Hence, those who give definitions of continuity commonly presuppose the concept of the infinite, on the ground that 'what is divisible *ad infinitum* is continuous' (200^b, 18). The point that the one primary continuum is spatial recurs in bk. Δ, ch. xi. Time is relative to change (μεταβολή), since it is only where we perceive change that we are conscious of duration. If the 'seven sleepers' woke up, they would not be aware that time had elapsed during their sleep. They would 'connect the former *now* with the subsequent *now*, and make one of them.' To know what time is, we have to ask in what way it is related to *motion* (τί τῆς κινήσεώς ἐστιν). But what moves, moves *from* somewhere *to* somewhere. The character of motion depends on that of the path it traverses. Motion is thus continuous because its path is so, and time is continuous because motion is. Time is 'the *number* of motion in respect of before and after' (220^a, 24). The use of the word 'number' is unhappy, since Aristotle is never tired of insisting that there are no numbers but the μοναδικὸς ἀριθμός, the whole numbers made by addition of *units*; and the definition, taken strictly, is thus inconsistent with the view that there is no minimum of duration. The Platonic account (see *Timæus*, 37 D, and the Academic collection of ὅροι) that time is the *measure* (μέτρον) of motion, which Aristotle sometimes repeats, is thus much more accurate.

We finally reach Aristotle's own formal definition of τὸ συνεχές in *Physics* E 227^a, where it is given as the last resultant of a whole series of previous definitions. Things are 'together' (ἅμα) when they are in 'one and the same primary place' (ἐν ἑνὶ τόπῳ πρώτῳ), *i.e.* enclosed in the same circumambient surface. Two things of which the extremities are 'together' are 'in contact,' or 'touch' each other. A thing is 'between' (μεταξύ) two others, when something which is continuously changing arrives at it 'before it reaches the end of the process of change' (*i.e.* C is between A and B, if, in moving continuously from A to B, you pass C before reaching B. Thus the 'derivative' notion of continuous movement is illogically employed to define the 'primary' continuum of extension!). We now define 'next after,' and 'immediately adherent.' A term in an ordered series is 'next after' (ἐφεξῆς) another when there is no term of the same kind between them. The phrase 'adherent to' (ἐχόμενον) means both 'next after' a given term and 'in contact' with it (ὃ ἂν ἐφεξῆς ὂν ἅπτηται). Finally, continuity is a special case of immediate adherence, which arises when the two 'ends' (πέρατα) of things which immediately adhere become one and identical (λέγω δ' εἶναι συνεχὲς ὅταν ταὐτὸ γένηται καὶ ἓν τὸ ἑκάτερον πέρας οἷς ἅπτονται). Alexander of Aphrodisias, as we learn from Simplicius, found this passage hard to interpret, and with good reason. Apart from the logical *hysteron proteron* already noted, there is a further difficulty involved in the definitions of 'together' and 'contact.' What is meant by 'the same primary place'? Simplicius escapes from Alexander's uncertainty as to whether the notion of continuity is not tacitly presupposed by such a phrase only by giving it a purely relative sense; it may mean at will 'in the same town,' 'the same house,' 'the same room,' etc. In fact, it has no definite meaning at all. The same defect attaches to the subsequent definitions, which depend on that of 'together.' Two things are 'in contact' when their extremities are 'together.' And such contact may exist without continuity. The extremities, as in the case of things which are merely 'adherent,' may be 'together' and yet remain distinct. Such a definition does not satisfy our geometrical notion of 'contact.' However small we take the 'primary place' of the two extremities to be, so long as the extremities remain distinct, there is no contact. However small the distance between a straight line and a circle may be, so long as it remains finite at all, the straight line is not a tangent; it becomes a tangent only when there is one point, and only one, which lies both on the circle and on the straight line. Thus, surfaces which 'adhere' must be absolutely identical. Aristotle is, in fact, assuming (with an eye to his astronomical theories) that we can have a set of concentric spheres enclosed within one another so that no space is left between the convexity of one and the concavity of the next outermost, and yet that the convexity and the concavity remain distinct surfaces. But this is geometrically impossible.

The one point of real interest which emerges from the discussion is the hint of a connexion between the notion of continuity and that of series. As Aristotle states the connexion, it is open to unanswerable criticism, since the very impossibility of dividing the continuous into 'units' shows that a continuum, as given, cannot consist of members each having a 'next following term,' but the main idea has borne remarkable fruit in our own days in Cantor's 'ordinal' definition of the continuum, and a striking attempt has been made by Zermelo (in *Mathematische Annalen*, LIX. iv. 514 ff.) to show that any continuous series (*e.g.* that of the points on a terminated straight line) permits of *an* arrangement of its members such that every one has a 'next following' member. That no member of such a series as given in experience has a 'next' member is, with laudable inconsistency, insisted on by Aristotle himself. 'Nothing continuous can be made out of indivisibles, *e.g.* a line cannot be made out of points' (*Phys.* Z 231^a, 24). For, by definition, the extremities (ἔσχατα) of things which are continuous coalesce, but an indivisible point or moment has *no* extremities. The consequence is that the line cannot 'consist of' points, since even by infinitely repeated division we can only break it up into lesser lines, which are, again, divisible. συνεχῆ can be divided only into συνεχῆ, or, as Bradley has put it, space (and time) are 'lengths of lengths of—nothing that we can find' (*Appearance and Reality*[2], London, 1897, p. 37). On the straight line, *e.g.*, we can find nothing but points, yet it *is* not a series or class of points, but something more, though what that something is we cannot say. This leads Aristotle to break with the Platonic view that Arithmetic, Geometry, and Kinematics form a single science with a single body of postulates. 'Physics,' so he unhappily concludes, is distinct from Mathematics, and Mathematics itself falls into two distinct doctrines, each with its own peculiar postulates—the theory of the διωρισμένον πόσον, or number, Arithmetic; and Geometry, the theory of the συνεχὲς πόσον—and it is a logical fallacy to attempt to prove a conclusion which belongs to the one science from the postulates of the other (οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν ἐξ ἄλλου γένους μεταβάντα δεῖξαι, οἷον τὸ γεωμετρικὸν ἀριθμητικῇ, *Anal. Post.* A 75^a, 38). Zeno has at last come by his rights, in spite of Aristotle's personal failure to appreciate his historical significance.

To consider the way in which Aristotle goes on to develop the view that the regular and continuous development from potentiality to actuality which makes up the life of Nature, as we see it in the evolution of the adult organism from the germ, and of the germ, in turn, from the adult organism, or even in any steady qualitative change from one 'opposite' (*e.g.* white, hot, dry) to its contrary (black, cold, moist), depends upon the domination of Nature by the unending 'uniform' and continuous circular revolutions of the celestial spheres—would take us too far from our immediate subject. We may merely note that it is an indispensable feature of this view that these revolutions are 'irreversible,' and always take place not only with uniform velocity, but in the same sense, since a sudden reversal would be equivalent to a momentary breach of continuity. The moving body would, Aristotle thinks, have to be twice at the same point X, if X is to be both the goal of the movement in one direction and the starting-point for the movement in the other. Motion in a straight line without reversal is excluded by the assumed finitude of the universe, and thus, according to Aristotle, only the circle remains, since it is the only curve of which 'every part is congruent with every other,' *i.e.* the only curve of constant curvature. (For all this, see *Physics* Θ, *de Cœlo*, and *de Generat.*, *passim*; *Metaph.* Λ, chs. vi.–viii.)

From the special tract against Xenocrates and his assumption of infinitesimal lines which are indivisible (*de Lineis Insecabilibus*, a work of some early Peripatetic, apparently not Aristotle himself) nothing can be drawn for our purpose, though it is historically interesting, as showing that the study of at least some of the irrationals examined in Euclid x. goes back to Plato and his immediate followers, as does also the notion of the 'infinitesimal.' Some interesting notices are preserved to us by Sextus Empiricus, in bk. x. of his attack on Dogmatic Philosophers, which reveal the fact that the polemic of the Megarian formal logicians against Aristotle's whole conception of the gradual development of potentiality into actuality, of which we read, *e.g.*, in *Metaphysics* Θ 1046^b, 29–32, was connected with a revival of Zeno's arguments against motion. Diodorus Cronus (Sextus, *contra Mathematicos*, x. 86) specially attacked the notion of a 'state' of motion, *i.e.* a time at which one cannot say of a moving material point (an ἀμερὲς σῶμα, *i.e.* a 'material point,' not an 'atom' in the sense of Democritus or Epicurus, since the atom was *not* ἀμερές) that it *is* at any position, but only that it is moving *from* one position *to* another, though one can, Diodorus admits, say that such a body must *have* moved, when it is seen first at A and afterwards at B. The view of the reality of a 'state of movement' here attacked is, in fact, one of the chief difficulties inherent in Aristotle's whole treatment of continuity.

Nothing would be gained by following the history of the notion of continuity in Greek philosophy beyond the time of Aristotle. The Stoics, to be sure, influenced later thought considerably by their vigorous insistence on the idea of the absolute continuity of *matter*, but neither they nor the Neo-Platonists, whose doctrines may be called the final outcome of Greek speculation, added anything to what Aristotle had laid down as to the logical analysis of the concept of the continuous itself. The sharp division between the two kinds of πόσα, those which are divisible into ultimate 'units' (the 'discrete' *quanta*) and those which are not (the συνεχῆ, or continuous πόσα), the adoption of infinite divisibility as the criterion of continuity, and the consequent view that incommensurables belong to Geometry and have no place in Arithmetic—were the permanent legacy from the ancient to the modern philosophy of the continuous.

3. Modern attitude.—The general acquiescence in Aristotle's distinctions makes it unnecessary to treat at any great length of the views of most modern philosophers on the nature of a continuum. For the most part these views have been determined by the conception of infinite divisibility as the sufficient and necessary condition of continuity. Even Descartes seems to have been blinded to the real difficulties of the subject by his familiarity with the practice of employing the symbols of Algebra indifferently to denote rational and irrational magnitudes. He appears never to have asked himself what conception must be formed of number, if we are to recognize such expressions as $\sqrt{3}$, $\sqrt[3]{2}$, and the like as numbers, and thus his *Géometrie*, with all its historical importance, can scarcely be called a contribution to the philosophy of Mathematics. Nor does it appear that the continuity which he claims for matter amounts to more than infinite divisibility, the absence of real 'atoms' or 'units' of extension. Hobbes explicitly accepts the Aristotelian definition, 'Continua inter se tum spatia tum tempora duo dicuntur, quorum *est aliqua pars communis*' (*de Corpore*, vii. 10); 'Corpora etiam duo . . . continua dicuntur eadem ratione qua duo spatia' (*ib.* viii. 9). Spinoza even reverts to the Eleatic position, according to which extension, because continuous, is not really divisible at all, and is supposed to have parts or elements only by an illusion: 'Substantia absolute infinita est indivisibilis' (*Ethica*, i. 13); 'ex his sequitur . . . nullam substantiam corpoream, quatenus substantia est, esse divisibilem' (*ib.* corollarium). Hence he infers that *quantitas* is divisible only so long as we merely *imagine* it—*i.e.* think inaccurately about it; when we form the *concept* of it, we see it to be 'infinita, unica, et indivisibilis' (*Ethica*, i. 15, schol.). It should follow that we can form no *concept* of a plane, a straight line, or a point—a conclusion which would be the *reductio ad absurdum* of Spinozism. Similarly Kant's critical philosophy throws no real light on the nature of a continuum. Indeed, if we take seriously the *Aesthetik*, with its account of the way in which the mathematical concepts of space and time are generated, we shall clearly be led to think of both as composed of minima, and therefore not continuous, though, to be sure, this account conflicts with the repeated assertion that both are 'infinite *given* wholes.' (The 'synthetic unity of apperception' cannot help us here, since it is just as much manifested in the counting of the units of a group of 'discrete' *quanta* as in that 'drawing' of a line of which Kant has so much to say.) So, when we are told in the account of the 'Schematism of the pure Concepts of the Understanding' that if we think of any number, *e.g.* 5 or 500, this thought is 'the representation of a method for representing in an image an assemblage conformably to a certain concept,' we see at once that Kant is thinking exclusively of the natural integers, which do *not* form a continuum. How it can be true that 'the pure image of all magnitudes (*quantorum*) of the outer sense is space, and that of all objects of the senses in general is time,' and that 'the pure *schema* of magnitude (*quantitatis*) as a concept is number, which is a representation which comprehends in one the successive addition of one to one,' remains an unsolved mystery, unless space and time are to be non-continuous; and the difficulty is only increased when Kant goes on to say that both space and time are '*quanta continua* because no part of them can be given, . . . except in such a way that the part is once more a space or a time.' Nothing can conceal the fact that Kant is trying to combine Aristotle's denial that a συνεχές can consist of minima with a theory which requires the construction of space and time out of such minima. He even repeats in this very connexion the old criterion of continuity, that it is 'that property of magnitudes in virtue of which no part of them is the minimum (no part simple).' It is, therefore, not to be wondered at that the 'antinomies' of the *Transcendental Dialectic* have really nothing to do with the problems of continuity. What their *theses* presuppose is merely the summation of infinite series, and the difficulties Kant professes to find in such a summation exist just as much where every term of the series has a next term as where it has not; *e.g.* the difficulty, if there is one, about the completion of the synthesis exists just as much when we consider 2 as the sum of the series $1 + \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2^2} + \ldots \frac{1}{2^n} + \ldots$ as when we ask whether the 'world had a beginning in time,' as Hegel correctly saw. In principle, Kant,

like Aristotle, identifies the infinitely divisible with the continuous.

Hegel's own account is so largely coloured by metaphor, and so distorted by his determination to prove that every concept is precisely what it is *not* (that, *e.g.*, perfect continuity and absolute discreteness are the same thing), that it is far from easy to say what his real meaning is. Since, however, he supposes Kant's second antinomy (everything must be, and yet cannot be, composed of simple elements) to be concerned with continuity (*Werke*, iii. 216), he, too, presumably means by continuity no more than divisibility *ad infinitum*. His enthusiastic praise of Zeno, and of Aristotle's treatment of the problems of space, time, and motion, points to the same conclusion (*ib.* p. 227). The vagueness of Hegel's notions may be seen from the fact that he actually regards the *Anzahl*, or cardinal number, of a group as itself a group of 'units,' and asserts that it is at once 'continuous' (because it is *one* group among others) and 'discrete' (because it is a *group* of units [*ib.* p. 233 f.]).

Leibniz may fairly demand separate consideration, in virtue of the peculiar stress which he lays on the Principle of Continuity as fundamental, not only for Mathematics, but for Metaphysics. This principle, as stated by him, is much more than an assertion of the continuity of space, time, and motion. Since his philosophy requires a denial of the validity of a vacuum, he is led further to maintain the continuity of matter against all forms of the atomic theory. Further, the conception is regarded as holding not merely of *phenomena*, but of the substances or 'monads,' whose interrelations and internal self-development are the reality of which the extended and temporal world is symbolical. Real substances form a continuous hierarchy, in which each member differs from some other by a purely infinitesimal difference. Or, as Leibniz himself states the principle in a letter to Malebranche, dated 8th Dec. 1692, 'datis ordinatis etiam quaesita sunt ordinata et consentanea.' Hence the absolute continuity of the series of monads has the continuity of the various μεγέθη as an immediate consequence (Couturat, *Logique de Leibniz*, p. 233 ff.). A special case of this principle is the correspondence between soul and body, which Leibniz describes as follows Couturat, *Opusc. et frag.* p. 521): 'God has from the beginning constructed soul and body with such skill that . . . omnia quae in uno fiunt per se perfecte respondeant omnibus quae in altero fiunt.' As to the nature of the continuity thus asserted, we learn much from the dialogue on motion composed by Leibniz on his journey of 1676 to visit Spinoza (*op. cit.* pp. 594-627). The question there raised is whether the moment at which a man dies may be regarded as at once the last moment at which he is alive and the first at which he is dead (as it must be, according to the Aristotelian account of τὸ συνεχές). To say that Aristotle's view is correct seems to violate the law of contradiction; to reject it seems to imply that two moments—the last of life and the first of death—are immediately adjacent, and, if moments can be immediately adjacent, why not points? (*ib.* p. 601). But we are thus led to conceive of extension and time as made up of series of indivisible points and moments (*ib.* p. 608), and find ourselves involved in the 'labyrinth of the continuum.' For we are forced to say that the number of points in the side of a square is infinite, and, since we can draw one and only one parallel from any point in the diagonal to a given side, and since this parallel cuts two of the sides of the square in determinate points, the diagonal will contain the same number of points as the side, and will therefore be equal to it. This Leibniz regards as a proof that the line cannot be an aggregate of points (*ib.* p. 611). The number of points in each will, in fact, he argues, be identical with the 'number of all numbers,' since in both cases it is infinite. Leibniz's way out of the difficulty is to deny that there is a 'number of all numbers,' since, as he holds, such a number, if there were one, would be the greatest possible integer, but there *is* no greatest possible integer. Hence there is no such thing as a *ratio* of one infinite to another (*ib.* p. 612 f.), and no assignable number of points on a line. There are as many as we choose to take, but we never take all there are to take. It is, indeed, true that every portion of extended matter is actually infinitely divided, but it is divided into portions which are themselves continua, not into points, and no portion is actually divided into all the minor parts possible. Thus, in the end, Leibniz adheres to the position that the continuous cannot be composed of simple elements, and it is for this very reason that space and time and motion are regarded by him as merely phenomenal, since the real, as we read at the beginning of the *Monadology*, must be composed of *simple* elements. How these views are to be reconciled with the further positions that there is at least one continuum, that of the monads themselves, which does consist of simple elements, and that order in space is phenomenal of the order of real monads, it is not very easy to see.

4. **The number-continuum in modern Mathematics.**—Under this head it is impossible to say more than a few words in the present article. The reader who wishes for more information may be referred to the works mentioned in the annexed bibliography, especially to the brief and luminous chapter on the continuum in Couturat's work, *Les Principes des mathématiques*. As we have seen, the first discovery of the continuum was due to the discovery of incommensurable magnitudes in Geometry, which led to the age-long severance of the originally united studies of Arithmetic and Geometry. It has been the great achievement of the modern Theory of Assemblages to show that the number-system is so far from being inadequate to cope with the continuity of the points of the straight line (the so-called 'linear continuum') that the only precise definition of continuity we can obtain is one which can be stated in terms involving nothing but the properties of ordered numerical series, and that the only certainly known linear continuum is that of the 'real' numbers. In other words, it is no immediate datum of intuition that the straight line is absolutely continuous. Its continuity is postulated, not intuited, and means no more than the *assumption* that there are on every terminated straight line as many distinct points as there are distinct real numbers in a given segment of the number-series, such as that composed of all the 'real numbers' $>0<1$. To begin with, we have to see that none of the old familiar criteria of continuity is really adequate to express the property which we have in mind when we speak of the continuousness of this number-series. It is clear that infinite divisibility is no such criterion, since it gives us only a series corresponding to that of the *rational* fractions. By no process of infinite division of a unit length could we ever arrive at such quotients as $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}$, $\frac{1}{\sqrt{3}}$. This corresponds to the arithmetical consideration that the complete assemblage of rational fractions between 0 and 1 does not form a continuous series, since it omits all the fractions which have surds for their numerator or denominator or both. Even the inclusion in the series of all fractions having algebraical

surds in their numerator or denominator would not make it completely continuous, since we should still have no place left for the infinitely numerous fractions involving 'transcendental' numbers in their numerator or denominator. In fact, it is possible to make such an arrangement of the series of rational fractions, and even of algebraical fractions, that each term of the series has an immediately next term. In other words, both series can be so arranged that each member corresponds in order to one and only one member of the series of natural integers, 1, 2, 3. . . . Their ordinal number, or 'type of order,' is thus the same as that of the series of integers itself. Nor, again, is the number-continuum adequately defined by the property that no term of the series as taken in ascending order has an immediately adjacent term. For this would obviously be true of the assemblage of rational numbers, and again of that of all algebraic numbers, though neither of these exhausts the whole of the number-series. The task of the modern theorist is thus a twofold one. He has first to formulate a satisfactory definition of the concept 'real' number, showing not only how the assemblage of 'real' numbers is logically related to that of integers or 'natural' numbers, but also how the existence of the 'real' numbers follows from that of 'natural' numbers. Secondly, he has to identify the peculiar characteristics which distinguish the whole assemblage of 'real numbers' from those of 'natural' or 'rational' or 'algebraic' numbers; that is, he has to point out the criterion of the continuity of a series.

It is the achievement of Cantor to have first stated this criterion exactly, and afterwards to have re-cast it in terms involving nothing but the notion of serial order, and entirely independent of any appeal to our intuition of space. We can here do no more than give Cantor's two definitions of the linear continuum with such brief explanation as is necessary for their comprehension. To understand his original definition we have first to make clear the meaning of the terms 'point manifold,' 'limiting point,' and 'derivative.' By a 'point manifold' is meant any aggregate of numerical values whatsoever. Any 'point' X is said to be a 'limiting point' of such a manifold M, if, given a finite number ϵ, however small, there is always at least one 'point' of the manifold M which is at a finite 'distance' less than ϵ from X. (Such a limiting point may, or again may not, be itself a 'point' of M.) The 'derivative' of M is the assemblage formed by all the limiting points of M. When every 'point' of M is one of the limiting points of M, and every limiting point of M also a 'point' of M, that is, when the manifold M is identical with its own 'derivative,' M is said to be *perfect*. Further, M is said to be *zusammenhängend*, or 'cohesive,' when, if any two points of M, p_o, p, be given, it is always possible to find in M any finite number of points $p_1, p_2 \ldots p_n \ldots$ intermediate between p_o and p such that the distances $p_o{-}p_1$, $p_1{-}p_2 \ldots p_n{-}p$ are each less than a given finite number ϵ, however small ϵ may be. The definition of the linear, or one-dimensional, continuum is, then, that it is a 'point manifold' which is both perfect and cohesive. It is manifest that the series of 'real' numbers between 0 and 1 satisfies these conditions, and that the removal of even a single term from it would prevent this realization. The series of 'rational fractions,' on the other hand, would satisfy the demand for cohesiveness, but would not be 'perfect,' since the surd fractions are obviously limiting points of the series of rational fractions. With the postulate that to every real number from 0 to 1 we can assign one and only one corresponding distance on the straight line, the straight line is also obviously a linear continuum satisfying the definition (Couturat, *Principes*, p. 91 f.). It still, however, remains the fact that Cantor's first definition retains the appearance of an appeal to geometrical intuition. The notion of 'distance,' in however metaphorical a sense, is employed in explaining both cohesion and perfectness. And this means, as Couturat says, that the definition is essentially relative. 'It defines a continuous manifold only by reference to another manifold (metaphorically called space), which is already continuous, in which it may have limiting points not contained in itself' (*op. cit.* p. 92). Hence it is only in Cantor's second definition, where no notions but those of serial order are presupposed, that we get 'an absolute definition of a continuum by means of its intrinsic properties.' To obtain the definition, we start again with certain auxiliary conceptions. We consider the type of order exhibited by the rational numbers which are >0 and <1. This series has three peculiarities: (1) it is *denumerable*, that is, we can rearrange its terms so that they correspond one to one with the successive integers; (2) it has neither a first nor a last term; (3) between any two terms there is always a third; and these three characteristics are proved sufficient for the complete determination of the type of order exhibited by the series. Any series possessing them may then be called a series of the type of order η. Next we have to introduce the notion of what Cantor calls a 'fundamental series.' We may confine our attention to the case of an ascending fundamental series. By this is meant a series in which the terms have the type of order η just defined. Such a series S is said to have a limit in η, if there is a term in η which is the *first* after all the terms of S. We then call any manifold *perfect* if all the 'fundamental series' contained in it have a limit in it, and if all its terms are limits of 'fundamental series' contained in it. With these presuppositions, the type of order θ, belonging to a one-dimensional continuum, is defined as follows: 'The manifold θ (1) is perfect, and (2) contains within itself a denumerable manifold E, such that there is always at least one term of E between any two terms of θ.' The definition is manifestly satisfied by the series of 'real' numbers, since it can readily be shown that the series is 'perfect' in the sense defined, and that, moreover, there is always at least one term of the series of the 'rational' numbers between any two 'real' numbers (Couturat, *op. cit.* p. 93 f.; B. Russell, *Principles of Mathematics*, London, 1903, vol. i. ch. 36).

The two definitions are not exactly equivalent, since we can construct series which satisfy the second without satisfying the first (*e.g.*, to take an example from Couturat, the manifold composed of the real numbers <1, together with those from 2 to 3 inclusive, satisfies the requirements of the 'ordinal' definition, but not those of the other, since there is always a finite interval >1 between the number 2 and any of those which precede it). But every assemblage which satisfies the first, or 'relative,' definition clearly also satisfies the second, or 'absolute.' This might be regarded as a ground for doubting whether Cantor's final result is quite the same thing as an analysis of what is implicitly contained in the simple pre-scientific notion of continuity as unbrokenness. But it remains true that his analysis succeeds in defining for us, by means of purely intrinsic properties, the continuity of the 'real' numbers, and that we have no reason to think that Geometry requires us to ascribe any different kind of continuity to the straight line. We are thus finally enabled to remove the apparently insuperable barrier established by the Eleatic criticism be-

tween Geometry and the theory of number. Every geometrical proposition can once more be stated in terms which involve only the notions with which the study of number has already made us familiar. 'This fact,' as Couturat says (*op. cit.* p. 97), 'finally refutes all the doctrines which regard the notion of the continuous as arising from sensuous intuition and refractory to the understanding.'

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iii. *MODERN DEVELOPMENTS*: G. Cantor, 'Grundlagen einer allgemeinen Mannichfaltigkeitslehre' (*Mathematische Annalen*, xxi. [1883]), also 'Beiträge zur Begründung der transfiniten Mengenlehre' (*ib.* xlvi. xlix. [1895, 1897; French tr. by Marotte, *Sur les fondements de la théorie des ensembles transfinis*, Paris, 1899]); R. Dedekind, *Stetigkeit und irrationale Zahlen*[2], Brunswick, 1892; P. du Bois-Reymond, *Die allgemeine Funktionentheorie*, Tübingen, 1882; L. Couturat, *De l'Infini mathématique*, Paris, 1896 (see esp. Appendix 4, on Cantor), also *Les Principes des mathématiques*, Paris, 1905 (with specially valuable Appendix on Kant's Philosophy of Mathematics); A. Schöonflies, 'Die Entwickelung der Lehre von den Punktmannigfaltigkeiten' (*Jahresber. der deutschen Mathematiker-Vereinigung*, viii. 2, Leipzig, 1900); B. Russell, *The Principles of Mathematics*, i. Cambridge, 1903; G. Vivanti, *Teoria delle funzioni analitiche*, Milan, 1901 [pt. i. contains a very simple and lucid exposition of the main principles of the Theory of Assemblages]; E. W. Hobson, *Theory of Functions of a Real Variable*, Cambridge, 1907. The progress actually made in the re-arithmeticizing of pure mathematics, due partly to modern research into the notions of infinity and continuity, and partly to the development of symbolic logic, can be traced in the successive volumes of G. Peano, *Formulaire de Mathématiques*, Turin, 1901. The latest edition, reckoned as vol. v. of the complete work, appeared in 1908 with the title *Formulario Matematico*, the necessary verbal explanations and annotations to the logical symbols in which the propositions are written being now given in what the author calls an 'uninflected Latin,' and not in French, as was the case in the earliest editions.

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CONTRACT.

—i. *DEFINITION.*—If one makes an engagement to go to dinner at a friend's house, no contract arises, because the purpose of the engagement is not such that the law will deal with it; or again, if one buys an article in a shop for ready money, that is not usually termed a contract, because there the whole transaction is terminated, as it were, on the instant; but, if one undertakes to pay for the article afterwards, a continuing contract emerges, because, in this case, the agreement gives rise to an undertaking which *can* be appropriately enforced by law. From these examples we see that contract is really the combination of two legal ideas—that of *agreement* and that of *obligation*. In the case of the invitation to dinner there is agreement, but no legal obligation connected with it; in the case of the sale of goods for ready money, the obligation fades away as soon as it arises. But, according to the Indian Contract Act, for example, 'an agreement enforceable by law is a contract' (Sect. 2 (h)); and, where we find such an agreement, we find a legal tie, an obligation, something for the law to take hold of, directly affecting the contracting parties. In other words, the agreement, as it has been put, 'contemplates something to be done or forborne by one or more of the parties for use of the others or other,' to which the law can attach itself; and it is generally said that it must be the intention, or implied intention, of the parties that the relation should have a legally binding effect. Sir Frederick Pollock, writing with reference to the English law, adds to the word 'agreement' the word 'promise' (*Principles of Contract*[7], 1902, pp. 2, 3, 5). But that is a minor subtlety. Theoretically, at least, we can fix our attention on an agreement as the starting-point in which there must be, as it is frequently stated, the meeting of two minds in one and the same intention. And thus the more technical treatment of contract fits into those statements of the doctrine in which it is regarded as a phase of the legal will, constantly to be found in the works of philosophical jurists—especially German jurists. The relation represents the meeting of individual wills in one intention, as opposed to the individual's endeavours to realize his will by means of the materials found in the world around him, which gives rise, logically, to the conception of property. In the former case, the individual meets his fellows; in the latter, the external, material world.

It has, however, been suggested that it is not necessary, in order that a contract should be entered into, that the wills of the parties should be really at one (Holland, *Jurisprudence*[10], 1906, ch. xii.). Should we not say, it is argued, that here emphatically the law regards not the will in itself, but the will as manifested voluntarily? There are well-founded expectations which the law endeavours to protect by its enforcement of contract, and these do not always arise from expressions which truly represent the intention. What of the case in which a party enters into a contract, resolved all the time not to perform his part, yet inducing another party to enter into it on the contrary supposition? Surely the contract will hold good. Is it not the will, as expressed, and nothing more, that the law regards, leaving the question of a true *consensus* on one side, as beyond its province altogether? The language of positive systems of law, it is said, moreover, is ambiguous on the point; for the question is practically a new one, and it has not till recently been seriously considered how far a true *consensus*, in the significance explained above, is needed. In answer to this doctrine, it may be maintained that, although the inner agreement is a fact to be proved, and in some cases is not allowed to be disproved, the agreement itself is vital to the theory of contract. The inference drawn is that there was an agreement; and such inferences depend for their reasonableness and usefulness on the fact that in the vast majority of cases they are sound. Without reference to the will—to the inner intention, if one chooses—the expression of agreement would be meaningless. It must in the last resort be connected with the man, with the personality; and not merely attach itself to outward forms of expression. Unless this is done, we obtain a view of contract which is too scholastic to be satisfactory.

The two main aspects of the agreement by which the tie is created find their typical form in the ideas of offer and acceptance, which give rise to a large body of law in a developed system. On the other hand, such facts as error, fraud, misrepresentation, undue influence, and force operate on the consent embodied in the agreement, and may vitiate it wholly, or create a flaw which renders it reducible from one side. These are most usefully studied in relation to some definite legal

[1] The ordinary collected texts of ancient and modern philosophers have been omitted from this list.

system. Again, the State itself places certain legal restraints upon contract generally, with regard to its subject-matter; these are more important from the standpoint of the general reader. In Pollock's work on *Contract*, agreements are said in English law to be unlawful and void (1) if the matter or purpose with which they deal is contrary to positive law; (2) if it is contrary to positive morality recognized as such by law; (3) if it is contrary to the common welfare, as tending to prejudice the State in its external relations, or in its internal relations, or as tending to improper or excessive interference with the lawful actions of individual citizens (*op. cit.* 275). And we may say generally that the State will refuse to recognize a contract not only when it is simply illegal (without further explanation being offered), but also when the object is *contra bonos mores*, or when it is against 'public policy' and cannot be allowed free scope in the State's own organization. In the case of public policy, the disputable points which arise are numerous, and the dividing lines between what the State should, and what it should not, do are extremely difficult to find. Then we may couple with such restraints the complicated subject of *form*. The modern tendency is towards simplicity of form. Complexity is undoubtedly repugnant to the spirit of our own days, when the bustle of commercial enterprise demands essentials and nothing but essentials. A complicated form, however, prevents a bargain from being rashly made, and it renders it easier to prove afterwards what has taken place. The tendency to reduce the 'solemn form' can have free scope only so far as is possible with a due regard to the exigencies of proof.

ii. *CLASSIFICATION.*—Contracts have very frequently been divided into *principal* and *accessory*; and this division is a good one. It is not so clear that the division of the first class into *onerous* and *gratuitous*, often made, is equally useful (although Kant declared that it was the rational one); for principal contracts seem rather to fall into several distinct groups. The following list will afford the reader a bird's-eye view of the field of modern contract. It follows mainly the arrangement given by Holland in his *Jurisprudence*.

1. Principal contracts.—Principal contracts are those which are entered into, so to speak, for their own sake, as opposed to accessory contracts.

(1) *Contracts of alienation.*—These may be gratuitous, when they are contracts to give, but are not generally so. In fact, a contract to give is generally enforceable by law only in certain limited cases. But gifts made in view of marriage are not considered as mere gifts, for marriage is an onerous consideration. Then under this head fall barter and exchange, when regarded as contracts; and, more important, sale. A distinct line should be drawn between barter and sale; the essence of sale seems to be, in the simplest words, the giving of something for *money*. Specific formalities are generally imposed upon contracts for sale of certain important classes of property, such as the *res mancipi* of the Roman Law, 'real property,' immoveables. Apart from these, perhaps the most important variation in the views taken of the contract by different legal systems is connected with the transfer of the property sold. Sometimes a contract of sale, in the usual case, *per se*, transfers the property—it has the power of transference by itself. Sometimes it has no such legal consequence; it remains an agreement to transfer merely. The parties to the contract, again, may have various duties, but two of them are generally recognized. The duty of the seller is to deliver the goods, and the duty of the purchaser is to accept and pay for them. These duties, regarded from the point of view of rights, yield the main rights of purchaser and seller.

(2) *Contracts dealing with hiring, loan*, etc.—Hiring has largely superseded gratuitous loan; and the law of hiring has been extended in many directions. Two important branches of it in the commercial world are contracts for carriage and agency. Both in commercial and in domestic life we find contracts for the hire of servants engaging much attention. As regards immoveables, hiring is generally guarded by specific restrictions. In a loan for consumption, we find money or certain kinds of things given to the opposite party on the undertaking that he shall on a future day return, not necessarily the things themselves, but their equivalent in kind. It is in connexion with this branch of the law that the interesting problems of how to treat usury from the legal point of view arise. In a loan for use, again, which is in essence gratuitous, the identical thing lent is returned. In deposit, one gives a thing to another in order that the latter may keep it for him gratuitously and restore it upon demand.

It will be observed that this group of contracts is very miscellaneous. Holland has attempted to minimize the confusion by making the two principal divisions of (*a*) contracts for permissive use, and (*b*) contracts for service. In the first class (*a*) he places (1) loan for consumption; (2) loan for use; and (3) 'letting for hire.' In the second (*b*) he places contracts (1) for care-taking; (2) for doing work on materials; (3) for carriage; (4) for professional or domestic services; (5) for agency; (6) for partnership. Then, under a separate head (*c*) he places contracts for negative services, in which one party undertakes to abstain from certain acts—a mode of contract somewhat grudgingly recognized by law. This procedure helps to introduce some order into the mass of almost intractable material; although, for example, it places contracts for partnership under contracts for service—a doubtful arrangement. The reader, however, may certainly begin by taking the whole of the large class of contracts with which we are dealing as capable of being split up into three divisions—permissive use, service, negative service—although he may afterwards come to consider the principles of grouping somewhat strained. Partnership, which is thus disposed of under 'service,' is said to be the relation which subsists between persons carrying on a business in common, with a view of profit (Partnership Act, 1890); and the law of partnership widens out into the whole law of Joint Stock Companies.

Agency deserves special notice. It is itself a contract, as has been pointed out; but it is also an important instrument in extending the power of contract. It enables us, as it were, to move objects at a distance. Through it, the contractor can work at the other side of the world. In the ordinary use of the term, agency is constituted where one person is employed to act for another—to represent him in dealings with third persons. A distinction between a general and a special agent is often made; but it is of doubtful value logically; it seems to be most consistently drawn between an agent whose business has a defined scope and character, apart from the terms of his agreement with his principal, and one who is merely empowered to do certain specific acts. The main logical point to be noticed in the law of agency is that, when the agent contracts as an agent with third parties, he binds his principal, and then, so to speak, drops out of the transaction. If he binds himself, he is something more than a mere agent; and any exceptions are modifications of the general principle. On the other hand, it must be noticed that the agent does not really act

as the blind instrument of his principal, as the pen or the hand acts. His real usefulness arises from his being an intelligent instrument, and without the help of such intelligent instruments many of the tasks of modern commerce would be quite impossible.

(3) *Contracts of marriage.*—But marriage is only technically and in a somewhat strained sense a contract. No doubt it cannot be entered into without the consent of at least two parties. But the relationship stands by itself; and even in a system of law, like that of Scotland, which favours the contractual construction, there are grave difficulties in regarding it as a contract in anything more than a very technical sense. In contract, the tendency is to allow the contracting parties to attach what conditions they please to their bargain, provided these are not against 'good morals' or 'public policy'; it may be conditional in its origin, and its duration is dependent on the will of the parties. In marriage these features are not present. When it is entered into, it is not governed by private contract in its most important particulars, but by the fixed rules of the law of husband and wife. It cannot be entered into on condition that a certain event shall happen, or that it shall be dissolvable at pleasure, or that it shall last for a certain fixed period of time. The relation between the two persons, also, extends an influence to their relatives and maintains that influence even after death ends the marriage. The husband and wife create not only their own *status*, but the *status* of their children; and that *status* can never be taken away or infringed by the acts of the parties (Fraser, *Husband and Wife*[2], 1876, ch. ii.). Such considerations, primarily applicable to Scots Law, show us how marriage must be differentiated from an ordinary contract. Of course, it may be said that all these restrictions are made merely with the object of maintaining 'good morals' and furthering 'public policy.' But the whole tendency of contract is to leave the parties as far as possible to shape their own bargain; and, where we have a relation so governed in its essentials by the law—so restricted to meet the needs, as the law conceives them, of family life—as marriage is, it is only in a very peculiar and, as we have said, technical sense that it can be called contractual. It derives its type not from the contracting parties, but from moral and social considerations, which are held to be superior to their wishes; and these considerations not only *restrict* it, but *shape* it.

A distinction must, of course, be drawn between an engagement to marry in the future—an 'engagement' in popular language—and an engagement which actually amounts to a marriage. The former more nearly approaches a contract of the ordinary type than the latter, provided it is recognized by the system of law which governs it as a fit subject for legal interference. When that is the case, we find unfulfilled engagements frequently giving rise to actions for breach of promise of marriage. On the whole, such actions seem to be discouraged by the systems of law in vogue on the Continent; and many jurists are of opinion that they ought to be abolished in our own country. But this opinion, it should be noted, does not imply that actions for *seduction* should be discontinued.

(4) *Wagering contracts.*—This is an unfortunate name for an important group. In these contracts, one of the effects of the contract, as regards profit and loss, either for all the parties, or for some of them, depends upon an uncertain event. But it is almost impossible to define them satisfactorily; and that statement must be taken as merely explanatory. Broadly, bets and stakes are not enforceable in modern law. And the most important group under the general head is formed by contracts of insurance—marine, fire, and life insurance, and less important types. Of course, these are not logically gambling transactions, but are rather attempts to eliminate the risks of the unforeseen.

2. Accessory contracts.—There is a large number of contracts which may be entered into as accessory to the main transaction; and these form, as previously stated, a second main branch of the subject. It may suffice to name a few of them—indemnity, suretyship, warranty, ratification. A promissory note forms such a contract. Suretyship is in many systems a formal contract; and the guarantee may sometimes support an obligation which is merely natural, *i.e.*, which itself cannot be enforced—a curious point.

3. There are certain legal relations placed on the borders, as it were, of contract proper, which must not be forgotten. Thus the Indian Contract Act speaks of certain relations resembling those created by contract. Broadly speaking, they correspond to the Roman division of obligations which arise not *ex contractu*, but *quasi ex contractu*. They may, therefore, be described as *quasi-contracts*; they have also been called 'implied contracts'; but it is perhaps better to reserve this name for those cases where the implication is most clearly seen. They are, at any rate, analogous to contract; for it is necessary, in following out the ramifications of a legal system, to hold that a *nexus* analogous to that of contract is sometimes created from force of circumstances, though not by express agreement. Often the person bound may reasonably be held to have agreed to the formation of the tie, but that is not perhaps essential in all circumstances. Thus the doctrine of *negotiorum gestio* consists, in principle, in the management of the affairs of an absent person (or sometimes of a person merely unable to attend to his affairs himself) by one who undertakes that task without the knowledge of the other; and, it is not infrequently stated, on the presumption that the other, had he known the circumstances, would have approved. There does not seem to be any peculiar difficulty in treating of such relations, except that they do not yield very readily to analytic classification.

iii. *EXTINCTION OF CONTRACTS.*—Contracts may be extinguished in various ways—by performance, by such legal facts as events which excuse performance, or by release of performance. Or there may be a substitute for performance interjected; or it may simply happen that the non-performance of the contract alters the whole aspect of affairs and gives rise to a new set of rights. Performance is the natural, and undoubtedly also the usual, mode of closing the transaction.

iv. *SOCIAL BEARING OF CONTRACTS.*—Contract, standing as it does at the centre of the great department of Private Law, has many important bearings on the general problems of society. It forms an endeavour made by the State to set up a sanction for expectations of good faith which have grown up through the dealings of the averagely fair-minded man. True, it has been suggested that contract is merely the taking of a risk, since the only universal consequence of a contract is to make the defaulter pay damages; but, as already pointed out, it is the observance of contract that is usually contemplated; it is performance, and not payment of damages, that makes the social wheels go round. And the State, having brought its sanction to bear on this enormous mass of relations, finds itself compelled to interpose certain restrictions—to lay down those limitations of which we have spoken before. What precisely these ought to be, and how they ought to operate, depends on

many different social considerations. Is the exploitation of the individual by his fellows—the driving of a hard bargain wrung from a man's necessity, when his poverty, but not his will, consents, or the over-reaching of one not worldly-wise—a fit matter for State interference? Are combinations of 'labour' to be recognized wholly or partially, or altogether condemned? Are contracts for service to be regulated, when the claims which arise under them bid fair to reduce one party to the position of existing merely as an instrument for the realization of another's personality instead of being an end in himself? Slavery, it is certain, cannot now be tolerated; but how far will the law, if it attempts to abolish various forms of so-called practical slavery, accomplish good, or how far will it merely afford encouragement to laziness and fraud? These questions and many others are among the implications of contract, though doubtless they lead us far beyond the subject of contract itself. Probably most of them must be answered, not abstractly, but in relation to the particular community with which we have for the time being to deal. What is one man's freedom is another man's ruin. The character and state of social advancement of the community must always be taken into consideration. But, however that may be, the importance of the great branch of law which deals with the right to another man's conduct can never be safely ignored.

LITERATURE.—In addition to the works mentioned in the text, the following may be consulted: W. R. Anson, *Principles of the English Law of Contract* [11], 1906; G. J. Bell, *Principles of the Law of Scotland* [10], 1899, for the Scots Law; F. Pollock, *First Book of Jurisprudence*, 1896, pt. i. ch. 8; Kant, *Philosophy of Law*, Eng. tr. 1887, sect. 31; W. A. Watt, *Theory of Contract in its Social Light*, 1897.

W. A. WATT.

CONTROVERSY.—1. The term 'controversy' is not exclusively applied to the weapon with which battles have been fought in the field of theology and philosophy, and skill in disputation has not been valued by professed dialecticians alone. Professor Edward Caird tells us that the philosopher Kant was keenly alive to the uses of controversial methods as a mental training, and that in the year 1758 he announced to his class on metaphysics that on two days in the week he would treat polemically the doctrines expounded on previous days, this being 'one of the most excellent means to attain to profound views of any question' (*Critical Philosophy of Kant*, i. 162). This polemical method consisted in first proving a proposition and then trying to prove its opposite —an exercise of the intellect to which attention has often been devoted in schools of learning, with a view to cultivating a high standard of controversial ability. To Kant it did not so much bring dialectic skill as rivet into the attitude of criticism a mind already critical, even sceptical. The essential thing for him, as for Socrates, was the problem of knowledge, the limitations of our knowing, the question how far we can know anything at all. So throughout life he practised earnestly the polemical method which he recommended to his students, using it as a touchstone to test what is knowable and expose the illusions of the understanding. To this attitude of mind, this deep-seated love of inquiry and discussion, we owe what is considered the greatest system of philosophy of modern times—a philosophy critical alike in spirit and in name.

2. The Kantian 'dialectic,' however, is not a new phenomenon in the history of philosophical thought. In the connotation which it bears for him, that of an arguing for and against, Kant inherited the term from the Stoics and Aristotle. But the practice of dialectic is to be connected with the name of Socrates. As friendly discussion in the market-place about the ethical problems which alone were of interest or moment to him, Socrates held it to be the ideal method of philosophizing. He thought that there *were* answers, more or less definite, to these questions, and that this was the way in which the answers were to be got. This earnest conviction, this seeking after truth in the belief that it is to be found, is one of the essential respects in which Socrates is to be distinguished from the class of professional Sophists to which, in the eye of the ordinary Athenian, he undoubtedly belonged. These men were in the first place teachers of argument and rhetoric, and regarded disputation of this kind as an end in itself. They argued in order to show their pupils how arguing should be done; they talked for victory. But they did not stop here. They were from some points of view extremists in philosophy, and they often took up a concept or idea with the deliberate purpose of showing it to be full of contradictions, and hence unthinkable. The Sophist did not hesitate to tackle any question, or, as Aristotle would say, to 'talk persuasively' on any subject. As the exponents and popularizers of an esoteric philosophy—they were not for the most part originators of new doctrine—they raised problems in the spheres of ethics, politics, and religion, debating freely, in a spirit of tolerant scepticism, questions the mere discussion of which in the eyes of the old-fashioned was not only new, but impious and depraving. Like Abelard, who has been called the mediæval counterpart of such a teacher as Protagoras, the Sophist at his best, they thought that every question could be argued for and against, or in Abelard's phrase, *sic et non.* To them none was sacred. At the first glance, criticism of this kind seemed wholly destructive; many of its immediate effects were undeniably pernicious. But this beating about, this disputing and overturning, was of supreme value, not only in the interests of education, but also in the narrower field of dialectic. It was owing to the Sophists mainly that Aristotle was able to draw attention to a clearly marked difference in the matter of our thought. He saw that relatively few problems belong, like those of mathematics, to the sphere of what is strictly demonstrable, and that beyond this, on the vast mass of questions which puzzle and interest mankind, we can have discussion, but can never have certainty.

3. It was, however, in the Middle Ages that dialectic or discussion in the Platonic and Aristotelian sense became professedly the vehicle of philosophical inquiry. Bound as they were at every step by tradition and authority, the methods of the Schoolmen were formal and pedantic; in this respect they were less fortunate than the thinkers of antiquity. At the same time the mediæval method of exposition, in so far as it was a method of argument, was that of Hellas. To write dialogues in the Platonic manner was no longer the fashion, nor was it, perhaps, within the powers of men of that age; but, though the written word was untouched by the finer graces of poetry and imagination, yet never in the history of philosophy and theology—a sphere of learning at that time co-extensive with literature —have skill in controversy and dialectical ability brought wider fame to their possessors; never were these talents enthroned higher among the objects of intellectual ambition than in the time of Abelard and his rivals. These wandering teachers of the Middle Ages, whose mission it was, after the manner of the ancient Sophists, to popularize the learning of the schools, were also in the most literal sense gladiators in the arena of philosophical controversy.

4. Turning from the sphere of history and

speculative thought to that of everyday life, we find that here the uses of controversy are less obvious, but not less real. In the ordinary sense of the word it may be nothing more than negative criticism, the mere raising of objections to a doctrine or theory brought forward. But, even so, it is of practical value in sharpening the faculties and clearing up confusion in the mind. For contradiction, whether it proceeds from conviction or not, is always stimulating, and even a superficial discussion of most questions is enlightening. When, however, controversy is fairly carried on, that is, with candour and moderation, in a spirit of honest inquiry, it is of great ethical and educative value. The prejudices of the fair-minded rarely withstand the presentation of fact or the persuasion of sincere conviction. We start, most of us, knowing but one side of controverted questions; an argument with an intelligent opponent will show us the other side, and expose the weaknesses of both positions. If our conclusions are sound, we shall realize their value; if they are faulty, light will be thrown on the premisses on which they are based. John Stuart Mill, in his eloquent defence of liberty of thought and discussion, says that every one ought to make a habit of seeking this experience, and that outside the sphere of mathematics no man's opinions deserve the name of knowledge except in so far as he has gone through the mental process which would have been required of him in carrying on an active controversy with opponents (*On Liberty*, ch. 2).

5. The benefit to the individual of such a knowledge of most subjects no open-minded person is likely to deny. But there is a deeper aspect of the question. It has often, and rightly, been said that controversy is the battlefield upon which truth comes into collision with error, and that by means of it alone we can acquire new truth. The progress of the race is thus best served by unlimited freedom of discussion, by such a right 'to argue freely according to conscience' as Milton held to be among the first of human liberties. Mill lays stress upon another point. It is a matter of history that the ethical and religious doctrines of the world owed their preservation and development to the fact that they were vigorously defended against attack in the earlier stages of their existence. What is true of sects and nations applies equally to the spiritual life of individuals. It is the convictions for which we must fight that we are in least danger of losing. It is beliefs which are most universally accepted, most rarely questioned, that are apt to become least full of meaning to us, even to be accepted by us mechanically. It would be easy to multiply instances of this. Can the precepts of Christianity, for example, be said to bear the same literal meaning for us as they did for the Founder and the persecuted of the early Church? Or, to take the case of religion in Scotland, is there in Scotsmen of to-day the fire, the blind devout faith, the love of the Church, which animated their forefathers? Most people, even allowing for change of circumstances and conditions, are inclined to answer these questions in the negative. Certainly creeds and opinions do seem to draw the breath of life from the heat of battle, to grow faint and languid when the struggle is over. This is one sense in which peace and harmony do not make for progress.

6. Every theory, however sound, has its limitations. All doctrines may be, in the main, erroneous; at the best they can contain only a part of the truth, for the truth lies always somewhere between the extreme positions on which man takes his stand. While the progress of knowledge, in spite of apparent disheartening retrogressions, bears always onward and upward, its course is, as Hegel says, a zigzag movement, tending now in the direction of one of these opposite poles of thought, now in the direction of another. Dogmatism (to use Kant's expression for these extremes), criticism, and scepticism follow one another, and are succeeded by dogmatism—a new dogmatism—again. But in this struggle of theory with theory, of half truth with half truth, the way is gradually becoming clearer, the fresh starting-point is always a little higher, and, human intelligence being limited and fallible, all this can come about only in this way.

LITERATURE.—The reader will find the source of most of the ideas suggested above in such works as: E. Caird, *Critical Philosophy of Kant*, 1889; Hegel, *History of Philosophy*, Eng. tr. 1892-96; and J. S. Mill, *On Liberty*, 1859, pt. ii. See also well-known Histories of Greek Philosophy, such as that of Zeller, of Ueberweg, of Erdmann, and of Schwegler. On the significance of the work of the Sophists, the student may be referred to G. Grote, *History of Greece*, new ed., 1870, pt. ii.

M. CAMPBELL SMITH.

CONVENTICLE.—The word is derived from Lat. *conventiculum*, dim. of *conventus*. According to Bingham (*Orig. Eccles.*), it originally signified no more than an assembly, and was frequently used by ancient writers for a church. It came to be applied specifically to meetings of religious associations, particularly private and secret gatherings for worship. Later it became a term of depreciation or reproach, implying that those of whom it was used were in opposition to the ruling ecclesiastical authorities; for example, it was applied to a cabal of mutinous monks in a convent or monastery. Ultimately it came to mean religious meetings of dissenters from an Established Church, held in places that were not recognized as specially intended for public worship or for the exercise of religious functions. It implied that a condition of affairs obtained in which the State made a distinction between a form or forms of religion whose practice and propagation were authorized by statute, and such as were expressly prohibited by enactment. This usage has received legal sanction in Britain.

In this sense the term 'conventicle' may be, and has been, widely applied. Harnack (*Mission and Expansion of Christianity*[2], 1908, ii. 318) uses it of the meetings of the adherents of Mithraism in the Eastern parts of the Roman Empire throughout the domain of Hellenism (Greece, Asia, Syria, Egypt, etc.), in which regions it was a banned cult, while those who professed it were regarded as belonging to a barbarous and illicit sect (F. Cumont, *Mystères de Mithra*[2], Brussels, 1903). To attend 'conventicles' was the hall-mark of fanaticism, according to Celsus, who represented the contemporary opinion which cherished a lively contempt for all who attached themselves to religions competing with the Imperial cultus.

In accordance with the accepted usage of the word, Church historians properly assert that Christianity took its rise ecclesiastically from a conventicle. Such was the meeting in the Upper Room of the first disciples of Christ after the Ascension (Ac 1^{13}). This gathering was the type of those which soon began to meet for prayer, mutual edification, and memorial observances, in private houses such as that of Mary, the mother of John (Ac 12^{12}). Within a short time they drew upon themselves the suspicions of the Jewish ecclesiastical authorities, who branded the new faith as impermissibly heretical, and instituted a persecution directed to the harrying and suppression of these conventicles, one of their most zealous agents being he who became the Apostle Paul.

When Christianity became a world-religion and spread in all directions throughout the Roman Empire, it was at first tolerated, and enjoyed Government protection, along with many other cults in vogue. Religions had to receive licence from the State, which was jealous to secure itself against the danger of conspiracies maturing under the guise of religious confraternities. Largely through the influence of political considerations

(see Gwatkin, Harnack, Dill, Weinel, etc.) Christianity soon became suspect, and a *religio illicita*. Its meetings thus became strictly conventicles. Harnack applies the term to characterize such house-meetings as that mentioned in Col 4[15], and Schaff uses it in his account of the primitive period as descriptive of the 'ecclesiolae in ecclesia,' the independent separate units of the Church as they existed in the various centres in which it had found footing—Rome, Corinth, etc. (*Kirchengesch.*, 1851, i. 454). In the succeeding century the catacombs (*q.v.*) were the scene of Christian conventicles (Withrow, *The Catacombs of Rome*, new ed., London, 1895, p. 104).

With the establishment of Christianity by Constantine as the State religion, all its meetings were legitimized, and the term of odium could no longer be rightly applied. In the 4th and 5th centuries the description again became applicable to the meetings of such Christian nonconformists as the Montanists and the Donatists, which were prohibited by the State under penalty of proscription and death. This policy was rigorously encouraged by the leaders of the Churches enjoying State recognition and support.

When the corruptions of the Church of Rome aroused a growing hostility in the 13th and 14th centuries, those who were united in the attitude of protest began to abandon the churches and to associate themselves in private or secret meeting-places. Against these the machinery of suppression was quickly put into operation, and once more conventicles entered into history. In England the word was early applied to the meetings of the followers of Wyclif, who, recognizing the incompetence and neglect of the regular clergy, sent out peripatetic preachers to meet the spiritual needs of the people. Both the practice and the word were carried by the Lollards (as the most determined supporters of Wyclif were called) to Scotland, where they did much to initiate or strengthen the movement of revolt from the ecclesiastical domination of Rome.

It was not, however, till after the Reformation that 'conventicle' became a term with a legal connotation, according to which it was descriptive of the meeting-place or assemblage for worship or consultation of those who departed from the Established Church of England. Queen Elizabeth, in her contest with Puritanism, strenuously asserted the royal supremacy in matters religious and ecclesiastical, and insisted upon the rigorous application of the Act of Uniformity, which demanded that all subjects of the realm must conform to the usages and tenets of the Church established by law. Clerical nonconformity was punished by deposition. As the result of the inquisition that followed, so many ministers were deprived of their livings that their places either could not be filled at all or were filled by incompetent and unpopular substitutes. Large numbers of the people refused to accept the ministrations of these substitutes, and gathered together for worship in private houses or other suitable places. These conventicles were, under that name, expressly declared illegal. The 11th Article of the Book of Canons (drawn up in 1603) censures 'the maintainers of conventicles'; the 12th, 'the maintainers of constitutions made in conventicles,' and the 73rd runs thus:

'Forasmuch as all conventicles and secret meetings of priests and ministers have ever been justly accounted very hateful to the state of the Church wherein they live, we do ordain that no priests or ministers of the Word of God, nor any other persons, shall meet together in any private house or elsewhere to consult upon any matter or course to be taken by them, or upon their motion or direction by any other, which may any way tend to the impeaching or depraving of the doctrine of the Church of England, or the Book of Common Prayer, or any part of the government or discipline now established in the Church of England, under pain of excommunication *ipso facto*.'

Under these enactments the adherents of Anabaptism (*q.v.*), which had been propagated in England by refugees from the Continent, were ordered to leave the Kingdom. Even during the subsequent reign of Puritanism, the meetings of this particular body were regarded and treated after the same fashion by the Protector Cromwell, who was incensed by their aggressive fanaticism. For other persecuted sects, with only one or two exceptions, there was a breathing-space of toleration and freedom.

After the Restoration of the Stuart dynasty, established Episcopacy once more became intolerant under the ægis of Charles II. An Act of Uniformity was promulgated in 1662, which ordained the expulsion from his charge of any clergyman who refused to subscribe to everything contained in the Book of Common Prayer and to the doctrine of the King's supremacy in matters ecclesiastical, and held by the Solemn League and Covenant of 1643, prohibiting such from exercising his religious functions in private houses. 2000 clergymen were ejected from their livings in one day for declining to comply with these tests. This enactment was reinforced in 1664 by a statute called 'the Conventicle Act,' which rendered illegal any gathering in a private house for religious worship attended by a number exceeding by five the regular members of the household, under penalty of fine, imprisonment, or transportation. A second version of this Act deprived these outed ministers of the right of trial by jury, and empowered any justice of the peace to convict them on the oath of a single informer, who was to be rewarded with a third of all fines levied (D. Neal, *Hist. of the Puritans*, new ed., Lond. 1822, iv. chs. 7, 8). Large numbers of nonconformists were put in jail. Pepys, in his diary of August 7, 1664, observes: 'I saw several poor creatures carried by, by constables, for being at conventicles . . . I would to God they would conform.' He refers to Quakers, who were amongst the worst sufferers during the persecution consequent on the passing of the Acts. Bishop Burnet, in his *History of his own Time*, 1724–34, i. 471, admiringly describes how they resolutely declined to obey the law, and openly and fearlessly continued their prohibited meetings. They would hold them in the street before the closed doors of their meeting-houses, when these were shut by order. The children, who might not be arrested because of their youth, would also hold conventicles in the street in the absence of their parents in jail, suffering patiently the jeers and cuffs of magistrates and unsympathetic onlookers (F. S. Turner, *Quakers*, London, 1889, p. 164).

Identical measures were taken during the same reign to secure the suppression of Presbyterianism in Scotland, where it had been the popular and dominant form of religion since the Reformation. From 1662 to 1678 various Acts were passed by the Privy Council and the Court of High Commission, prohibiting conventicles and imposing penalties of increasing severity upon those who attended them, masters being made responsible for their servants, landlords for their tenants, magistrates for the citizens of the burghs over which they presided. It was forbidden to supply denounced persons with meat or drink, or to harbour or have intercourse of any kind with them. These measures proving unavailing to effect their purpose, it was ultimately enacted that attendance should incur the penalty of death. Those in command of the military, and even the common soldiers themselves, were given authority to inflict it immediately on the spot of capture, without the formality of a legal trial—an authority which was used without scruple or mercy in numerous instances by such as

Claverhouse. This policy proved, however, quite abortive. The bulk of the religious population in the south and south-west districts continued to attend the conventicles, which were arranged and conducted by the outed ministers. Where the congregation was too large for any suitable private house, resort was had to barns, granaries, or such like commodious buildings. Frequently, however, the number of those who flocked to these illegal gatherings amounted to thousands, and the result was the institution of field-conventicles—meetings held, sometimes under cover of night, in the open air, on moors or hills, or in glens and ravines, or wherever safety and suitability could be combined. These frequently lasted for hours, the preaching taking up a large portion of the time. At such conventicles, the ordinances of the Church according to Presbyterianism were faithfully observed. Baptism was administered, and Communion was dispensed, often to hundreds together, and even thousands, the rite taking days to celebrate, several ministers officiating in turn. When repressive measures became more severe and attendance at these gatherings was enacted to be a capital offence, the men came armed with such rude weapons as were obtainable—scythes, flails, etc. Sentinels were posted at look-out points; for the royalist soldiery, aided by spies and informers, often succeeded in surprising these meetings. It was the attack upon such a conventicle that precipitated the battle of Drumclog, 11th June 1679, which issued in the only victory gained by the Covenanters (as the upholders of Presbyterianism were called), and the only defeat sustained by Claverhouse (known in song as 'Bonnie Dundee'), the most zealous and efficient of the military persecutors. During the years of persecution culminating in the 'Killing Times,' it is calculated that some 18,000 people suffered in one way or another for attending these conventicles. Yet they kept alive and deepened an intense religious faith in the land, while greatly raising the moral tone of many districts in which they were held, as, *e.g.*, at places on the borders where pillagers and moss-troopers became peaceful and honest. Their impressive solemnity, intensified by the conditions under which they were held, frequently turned the hearts even of enemies present in disguise (A. Smellie, *Men of the Covenant*, 1904; R. Simpson, *Gleanings among the Mountains*, 1846; W. H. Carslaw, *Heroes of the Covenant*, 1900).

After the Revolution of 1688 and the accession of William of Orange to the British throne, an Act of Toleration was passed, relating to England, which exempted from the penalties of the laws against conventicles those who took the oath of allegiance and subscribed to the doctrinal sections of the Thirty-nine Articles. Meeting-houses were required to be registered, and then came under protection of the law. In Scotland all the repressive Acts were abrogated; Presbyterianism was restored by the State to its ecclesiastical supremacy.

Similar measures of suppression in Continental countries resulted in the resort of the persecuted to similar kinds of meeting. During the merciless and prolonged attempt of Philip II. of Spain in the Netherlands to compel conformity to the Roman Catholic Church, the Protestant party headed by *Les Gueux* ('The Beggars') were forbidden free exercise of their worship, and immediately field-preachings were organized all over the country, of the same character as those in Scotland—conducted by the excommunicated ministers and surrounded by armed guards and sentinels (Lindsay, *History of the Reformation*, Edinburgh, 1906–7, vol. ii. bk. iii. ch. v.). The same scenes were enacted in the southern districts of France during the heroic struggle of the Huguenot Camisards ('les Enfants de Dieu,' as they called themselves [see CAMISARDS]) to assert religious freedom against the suppressive measures of Louis XIV., inspired by Cardinal Richelieu's vision of a unified France, spurred by the incitements of Madame de Maintenon (herself once a Huguenot), and encouraged by the eloquence of the great preacher Bossuet. Their field-conventicles were called desert-preachings—the name 'desert' being borrowed from the Bible as descriptive of the solitary places, in wild mountain-regions, in which the meetings were commonly held. A peculiarity of these Camisard gatherings was the large part played by the 'prophets'—men and women, and occasionally children, generally quite uneducated and often normally of small capacity for speech or thought—who spoke or were accepted as speaking under the direct inspiration of the Holy Spirit, after the manner of the prophets in the primitive Church (Peyrat, *Hist. des pasteurs du désert*, Paris, 1842; C. Tylor, *The Camisards*, London, 1893).

In the history of German Protestantism the conventicle played a part in Pietism (*q.v.*). The *collegia pietatis*, established by Spener and his followers, provoked the opposition of the strictly orthodox Lutherans, and considerable disturbance was the result, as at Frankfort, where the police interfered. All sorts of scandal were rife about these conventicles, and the over-enthusiastic manner in which some of them were conducted lent colour to the charges. In Württemberg a wise middle course was adopted. Those conventicles in which the great principles of Lutheranism were respected received legal sanction, while the more radical assemblages were banned (cf. *PRE*³ xv. 790, xviii. 612). In Sweden, Pietism roused similar opposition, and a law of 1726 forbade all conventicles conducted by laymen, though private devotional meetings under the direction of the clergy were permitted, this law not being repealed until 1858 (*PRE*³ xviii. 33, 36).

At the present time, it is perhaps only in Russia, with the Greek Church in a position of ecclesiastical supremacy recognized by the State, that conventicles in the strict sense can still be said to continue. Measures of repression are from time to time directed by the Government against dissenting sects which have incurred its suspicion and hostility, such as the Stundists (*q.v.*) and the Doukhobors (*q.v.*), who were denied the liberty of private meetings for worship. The spirit of tolerance seems, however, to be rapidly gaining ground, and nonconformists of any kind, on giving satisfactory assurances to the police, are generally permitted liberty of worship according to their accepted mode. The signs of the times point to the spirit of religious toleration soon becoming universal, with the consequent cessation of that hostile and repressive attitude of State or Established Church to any form of religion which resulted in conventicles.

LITERATURE.—This is sufficiently indicated in the article.

A. MITCHELL HUNTER.

CONVERSION.—I. Ethnic Conversion.—Conversion, the greatest of moral events, is not the monopoly of one religion. It is a human as well as a Christian fact. As there is one blood in the veins of all nations, and one breath in all nostrils, so there is one Divine Spirit brooding over and striving within all souls. God has made all men with a capacity for conversion, with possibilities of response to the highest call (Ac 17[27]). And in every age and race there have been minds that have turned to the light, hearts that have felt the 'expulsive power of a new affection,' wills that have striven, and not all in vain, to attain the ideal. We need not grudge the name or the idea

of conversion to many experiences recorded in non-Christian literature. 'Faciasne quod olim *mutatus* Polemon?'[1] (Hor. *Sat.* II. iii. 253 f.).

The movement which was initiated by the religious teachers of Greece led to many conversions from polytheism to monotheism, and it had its saints and martyrs. Dill has shown that, towards the beginning of the Christian era, Græco-Roman philosophy became evangelical; it sent out an array of preachers to convert men to a higher and purer ideal (*Rom. Society from Nero to M. Aurelius*, London, 1904, bk. iii. ch. ii.). 'Some of the schools even developed a true pastoral activity, exercising an oversight of their members, and seeking to mould their moral life and habits according to the dictates of true wisdom' (Menzies, *Hist. of Religion*, London, 1895, p. 301). 'I regard myself,' said Seneca, 'not so much as a reformed, but as a transfigured man' (*Ep.* 6). The science of Comparative Religion is proving the truth of the intuition that there is 'a light which lighteth every man' (Jn 1^9). The conversion of Gautama, afterwards known as the Buddha, is as real a fact as that of Saul of Tarsus, Francis of Assisi, or any other spirit that has ever obeyed the heavenly vision. This pampered child of fortune turned from his pleasures and palaces as illusion and vanity; he sought and found, as he believed, the cause of sorrow and the way to subdue it; and he drew a vast stream of mankind after him to the religion of renunciation. It was the best they could do; they followed the gleam; they loved the highest when they saw it. Similar phenomena are found in Confucianism, Islām, and all other great religions. God has not left Himself without witness in any nation, and the same choice between good and evil, between self-seeking and self-sacrifice, presents itself in some form or other to every human being. The spiritual ascent of man has been accomplished by a long series of conversions, from the lowest fetishism to the highest theism. To Christian philosophy, every upward movement of the human mind suggests that 'Christ, in His universal relation to humanity, may be able to pour His new life into open hearts, even when there is complete ignorance concerning the facts of His history and work' (Clarke, *Outline of Christian Theology*, Edinburgh, 1898, p. 398). And yet, so great is the difference between all such movements and the experience which is called Christian conversion, that one cannot but acclaim the essential truth of a well-known passage in Carlyle's *Sartor Resartus*:

> 'Blame not the word [conversion]; rejoice rather that such a word, signifying such a thing, has come to light in our modern Era, though hidden from the wisest Ancients. The Old World knew nothing of Conversion; instead of an *Ecce Homo*, they had only some *Choice of Hercules*. It was a new-attained progress in the Moral Development of man: hereby has the Highest come home to the bosoms of the most Limited; what to Plato was but a hallucination, and to Socrates a chimera, is now clear and certain to your Zinzendorfs, your Wesleys, and the poorest of their Pietists and Methodists' (bk. ii. ch. 10).

2. Conversion in the Bible.—The term 'conversion' (ἐπιστροφή) occurs but once in the Bible (Ac 15^3). At the close of his first great mission, St. Paul went to Jerusalem to take counsel with the Apostles and elders, and he and Barnabas passed through Phœnicia and Samaria 'telling the whole tale (ἐκδιηγούμενοι) of the conversion of the Gentiles, to the great joy of all the brethren.' It was a momentous event, pregnant with the mightiest issues, marking an epoch in the history of the world. In the LXX the verb *ἐπιστρέφω* stands for הָפַךְ, סָבַב, and הֵסֵב, and times without number for שׁוּב and הֵשִׁיב. In AV of the OT 'convert' occurs five times—in Ps 19^7 (Vulg. *convertens animas*), where RV uses 'restoring'; in Ps 51^{13}, where RV retains 'sinners shall be converted,' while the margin has 'shall return'; in Is 1^{27}, where RVm changes 'her converts' into 'they that return of her'; in Is 6^{10}, where RV has 'turn again'; and in Is 60^5, where 'converted' becomes in the RV 'turned.' In the NT *ἐπιστρέφω* appears very frequently, and in AV it is nine times rendered 'convert'; but this word appears only twice in RV (Ja $5^{19.20}$), being everywhere else changed into 'turn' or 'turn again.' But, wherever the Gr. word is followed by *ἐπὶ τὸν κύριον*, *ἐπὶ τὸν θεόν*, or the like, it undoubtedly connotes all that is commonly signified by 'convert,' *e.g.* in Ac 9^{35} 11^{21} 14^{15} 26^{20}, 1 P 2^{25}.

The Bible is the drama of the conversion of the world, of the turning, or rather the return, of man to God. The sacred writings must, in the last resort, always determine and control our conception of the origin, growth, and nature of the spiritual life. Without them there would be no Christian conversion, for there could be no adequate knowledge of God as revealed by Christ Jesus. If we are able to trace the lineaments of the soul of a Christian, it is because we have in the Bible the gradually perfected norm of the new life.

i. THE OT.—The OT is a mine of gold for the inductive study of the facts of conversion, but the prospector has to encounter certain initial difficulties. The subject of conversion is often the nation as a whole, and the part played by the individual is usually left to be inferred instead of being directly expressed. Again, the Oriental mind is not analytic; it reasons *a priori*; it is noumenal rather than phenomenal. Where the West says, 'Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere *causas*,' the East is content with '*causam*.' To search for secondary causes, to pry too curiously into the subjective conditions of spiritual experience, seems to it not only superfluous, but even a little profane. 'This is Jahweh's doing' (Ps 118^{23}), 'The king's heart is in the hand of the Lord as the watercourses: he turneth it whithersoever he will' (Pr 21^1), 'None can stay his hand' (Dn 4^{35}), are characteristic Eastern utterances. Once more, the Hebrew habit of thinking in pictures—due in great measure to the absence of abstract terms from the language—causes many spiritual experiences to be clothed in a figurative or symbolical garb. The psychologist must be a very skilful as well as reverent exegete who would re-tell in modern scientific phraseology the story of the conversion of Jacob at Bethel, of Moses in Arabia, of Solomon at Gibeon, of Isaiah in Jerusalem. The last of these experiences, enshrined in an incomparably vivid and illuminating page of autobiography (Is 6^{1-8}), presents a type of conversion in Israel which is no doubt, in some respects, unique and incommunicable, but in its broad outlines may be regarded as normative. Four distinct momenta are enumerated in the thrilling and transforming experience. There is a *vision*, flashed upon the young Hebrew's inner eye, of the King, Jahweh of hosts, whose glory fills the earth. There is a *conviction* of sin, personal and national, concentrating itself like a subtle poison in unclean lips. There is the unutterable comfort of *absolution*, which comes in the hand of a Divine messenger, by the way of the altar, to a heart wrung with anguish. And there is a *mission*, Divinely offered and humbly accepted, to live in the service of God for the welfare of men.

Just because Israel's moral and spiritual ideal—

[1] 'Polemon was a youth of Athens, the son of Philostratus, who spent the greater part of his life in riot and drunkenness. He once, when intoxicated, entered the school of Xenocrates, and was so struck with the eloquence of the academician, and the force of his arguments, that from that moment he renounced the dissipated life he had led, and applied himself totally to the study of philosophy. After the death of Xenocrates he succeeded in the school where his reformation had been effected' (Lemprière, *Class. Dict.*, ed. 1839, *s.v.* 'Polemon').

their conception both of God and of man—was so much higher and purer than that of any other nation of antiquity, conversion was to them a more real and radical experience than elsewhere. Theologically construed, conversion was, in their eyes, always a reversion, not to a low but to a high type, not to an animal but to a Divine pattern. This was not a movement contrary to nature; it was man finding himself, realizing his own true nature. But the general point of view was intensely ethical rather than speculative. Historically, the one aim of the spiritual leaders of Israel was to constrain the backsliding nation to 'return,' to 'be converted,' unto Jahweh. 'Let the wicked return unto Jahweh,' 'Return ye, and turn yourselves from all your transgressions,' 'Turn yourselves, and live,' 'Take with you words, and return unto Jahweh' (Is 55^{7}, Ezk $18^{30.32}$, Hos 14^{2}). The Prophetic literature rings with the clear call to a definite change of spiritual attitude. Conversion is always equivalent to repentance and faith. But the same Hebrew word (שׁוּב) expresses both the turning to and the turning again from Jahweh, conversion and perversion, and the two movements form the perpetual systole and diastole of the heart of Israel. The possibility of conversion is based upon the consciousness of Divine redemption in the past and the hope of Divine co-operation in the present. 'Return unto me; for I have redeemed thee,' 'Turn thou me, and I shall be [or, that I may be] turned' (Is 44^{22}, Jer 31^{18}). God alone can replace the old antagonism by a new disposition, can change the stony heart into one of flesh. The command, 'Make you a new heart and a new spirit' (Ezk 18^{31}), would be a mockery if it were not accompanied by the promise, 'A new heart also will I give you, and a new spirit will I put within you' (36^{26}), and unless there were a Divine response to the prayer, 'Create in me a clean heart, O God, and renew a right spirit within me' (Ps 51^{10}).

The Book of Psalms gives lyrical expression to the joy of conversion, to the triumph of the soul's return unto its rest in God. The Psalms have many authors, and it matters little whether any singer describes his first or a subsequent spiritual experience, or whether 'the I Psalms' are intended to mirror the heart of the nation as well as the individual. Be that as it may, no human document has greater value for the psychologist of conversion. Here (especially in the Penitential Psalms, 6. 32. 38. 51. 102. 130. 143) he finds 'the sick soul' sighing, groaning, despairing, sure that God has hidden His face, spending nights in sleepless agony, tossing wearily to and fro, watering the couch with tears. Here is the tortured conscience, whose sins are exposed in the light of God's countenance, gnawed with remorse, seized with the pains of Sheol. Here is the sense of inward uncleanness, of hereditary sin, the horrible feeling of being sunk in the miry clay of a deep pit from which there is no deliverance. Here is the piercing cry out of abysmal depths, the prayer for Divine mercy and forgiveness. And here is the glimmering light in the darkness, the blaze of spiritual illumination, the clear vision of God, the sense of His redeeming love; and, lastly, the rapture of deliverance, the gratitude that words can never utter, the desire to tell to others what Jahweh hath done for the soul, that sinners may be converted unto him.

At an early period the Hebrew nation began to devote much care to the training of the young. There was an enthusiasm for education (see EDUCATION [Jewish]), and the discipline was never merely intellectual, but always primarily ethical and spiritual. 'The fear of Jahweh is the beginning [or, it may be, 'the chief part'] of wisdom' (Pr 1^{7}). Here 'wisdom' is almost equivalent to 'religion.' It was often personified by its lovers, and praised as a mother or a bride (Pr 2. 3), and even as the eternal companion of Jahweh (Pr 8). The great aim of Hebrew parents—no mention is made of schools—was so to 'train up a child' in the service of God and in the atmosphere of healthy piety, that in his manhood he should need no sudden, violent, convulsive return unto Jahweh from a life of sin and shame. How entirely such pædagogy corresponds with our latest ideals of education, we shall see later. That the end was often realized, we cannot doubt. Some of the noblest servants of God knew that they were sanctified from their mother's womb (Jer 1^{5}, Lk 1^{15}). There was no time when they did not reverence and love Jahweh, no time when they played the fool, no time when they needed to hear the arresting trumpet-voice, 'Turn ye, turn ye . . . why will ye die?' (Ezk 33^{11}). But there are incalculable elements in human nature as well as defects in the best education, and the sons of many servants of Jahweh—such as Eli, David, Josiah—showed that it is always in man's power to abuse the mystery of his freedom and defeat the grace of God.

Conversion in the OT was often a profound and radical change. The desire for God—the hunger, the thirst, the panting, the fainting—was pathetic as it was passionate, and the response to the human cry was the outstretching of a strong arm that not only wrought deliverance from evil, but drew men into close and satisfying fellowship with God. Yet the joy of conversion was never quite full. It was for a long period troubled by the idea that spiritual restoration must necessarily be followed and attested by material prosperity. To the end it awaited a fuller revelation of the Fatherhood of God, the atonement of sin, and the hope of immortality. There was to be a final answer to the oft-repeated prayer, 'Turn us again, O God, and cause thy face to shine, and we shall be saved' (Ps $80^{3.7.19}$).

ii. THE NT.—In the NT, conversion is the chief end of all teaching and preaching. It has rightly been called (*Ecce Homo*[11], London, 1873, p. 243) 'the true *articulus stantis aut cadentis ecclesiae*.' Jesus began His ministry by preaching repentance and faith (Mk 1^{15}), which are together equivalent to Christian conversion. The call of the early Church was, 'Repent ye, therefore, and be converted, that your sins may be blotted out' (Ac 3^{19}). The language in which conversion is described varies greatly, as do the subjective experiences of individuals; but the root or core of the change is always the same. It is figured as a translation out of darkness into marvellous light (1 P 2^{9}), as a being born again, or 'from above' (Jn 3^{3}), as a redemption from all iniquity (Tit 2^{14}), as a passing out of death into life (Jn 5^{24}), as a turning from the power of Satan unto God (Ac 26^{18}), as a new creation (2 Co 5^{17}), as putting off an old and putting on a new man (Col 3^{9}), as becoming children of God (Ro 8^{16}), as having Christ dwelling in the heart by faith (Eph 3^{17}), as a dying and rising again (Ro 6^{2-8}). Practically, it is a new life which turns all the forces of one's being into a new channel. All the energies that formerly made a man a sinner are now employed to make him a saint. His carefulness, indignation, zeal, and revenge are directed against his sin (2 Co 7^{11}). The converting power is never the mere force of truth, or the beauty of holiness, but always the fascination of a Person. The whole life of the convert organizes itself anew around Christ living, dying, rising, and reigning; He is the power of God unto salvation (Ro 1^{16}). The NT tells of multitudes who have been reclaimed from vice, and never gone back. Science regards all facts with reverence, and the NT abounds in such transfigured realism as the fol-

lowing: 'Neither fornicators, nor idolaters, nor adulterers, nor effeminate, nor abusers of themselves with mankind, nor thieves, nor covetous, nor drunkards, nor revilers, nor extortioners, shall inherit the kingdom of God. And such were some of you: but ye were washed, but ye were sanctified, but ye were justified in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ, and in the Spirit of our God' (1 Co 6^{9-11}). NT conversions have been classified as moral, spiritual, intellectual, and practical (John Watson, *Inspiration of our Faith*, p. 79 ff.); and such groupings are useful, if not logically perfect. There are conversions from sin to holiness, from doubt to faith, from legality to grace, from selfishness to service. But we must beware of analyzing the indivisible self into so many faculties, and ascribing conversion to the exercise of one of them, to the exclusion of the others. Conversion is the response of the whole personality—whether regarded as mind, or heart, or will—to the personal Christ. It is man's meeting with Christ, believing in Christ, gaining new life in Christ. Intelligence, emotion, volition are all mastered by the Author and Finisher of Christian faith. The harmonious functioning of every energy of the mind is the perfect spiritual life.

Jowett, in a fine essay on 'Conversion and Changes of Character,' calls attention to the fact that 'with the first believers the influence of Christianity was almost always sudden.' He finds that this lay in the nature of things. The earliest converts had no Christian training in childhood and youth. When they heard the gospel, they were pricked with the sense of sin, they were melted with the love of Christ, and they needed no time of probation. But their conversion, however sudden, and however wonderful the attending circumstances, was none the less sincere and lasting. They became the very opposite of their former selves; their spiritual nature came again like the flesh of a little child (Jowett, *Theological Essays*, p. 40). Sometimes the change was violent and dramatic, as in the case of St. Paul, whose conversion is the most momentous in history; sometimes it was quiet and unsensational, as in the instances of Zacchæus, Matthew, Lydia, Timothy. But, whether the type was explosive or gentle, the change was radical and complete. And it is important to note that it was always the opposite of a gradual and laborious reformation.

'Easier to change many things than one is the common saying. Easier, we may add, in religion or morality, to change the whole than the part. Easier, because more natural, more agreeable to the voice of conscience and the promises of Scripture. . . . Take care of the little things of life, and the great ones will take care of themselves, is the maxim of the trader. But more true is it in religion that we should take care of the great things, and the trifles of life will take care of themselves. Christianity is not an art acquired by long practice; it does not carve and polish human nature with a graving tool; it makes the whole man; first pouring out his soul before God, and then casting him in a mould' (Jowett, *op. cit.* 55).

For certain purposes, theology distinguishes conversion from regeneration. They are the human and the Divine side of the same experience. Regeneration is the gift of God's grace, the power or principle of the new life implanted by His Spirit; conversion is the act of human freedom, the voluntary turning of the heart to God. The one is a necessity—'ye must be born again' (Jn 3^7); the other, a duty—'repent and be converted' (Ac 3^{19}). Regeneration occurs but once, conversion may have to be repeated. 'Convert your conversion' is the keen counsel of Adolphe Monod (*Saint Paul*[3], Paris, 1859, p. 114). St. Peter's faith never failed, for his Master prayed for him, and his love never grew cold; but in a moment of temptation he denied his Lord, and his need to be re-converted was painfully evident (Lk 22^{32}). And if there is any truth in the *Domine, quo vadis?* legend, he had yet another conversion at the very end of his life, and it was again a look on the face of Christ that wrought the change. 'And Peter turned, and rushed on Rome, and died.' Conversion plays too important a part to be exhausted in a single decision.

'The whole life of a man,' says Fraser of Brea, 'is a continued conversion to God, in which he is perpetually humbled under sense of sin, and draws nearer and nearer to God, with more fervent faith and love, and daily walks closer with the Lord, endeavouring at perfection. And God doth, as it were, act over and over again His work in the heart, forming His people more exactly than before: and therefore no wonder they meet with something like a second, yea, and a third and fourth conversion, especially where there are backslidings' (*Memoirs*, Edinburgh, 1738, ch. v. 3).

St. Paul describes his own conversion objectively in the Acts, and subjectively in his Epistle to the Romans. Ro 7 is the most searching analysis ever given of the divided self, the *homo duplex*. Whether it mirrors a first or second or still later spiritual conflict is immaterial, for each crisis is in many respects the same. How forcibly the Apostle's self-dissection illustrates the teaching of the modern psychologist!

'The . . . basis of the twice-born character seems to be a certain discordancy or heterogeneity in the native temperament of the subject, an incompletely unified moral and intellectual constitution. "Homo duplex, homo duplex!" writes Alphonse Daudet. . . . Heterogeneity may make havoc of the subject's life. There are persons whose existence is little more than a series of zigzags, as now one tendency and now another gets the upper hand. Their spirit wars with their flesh, they wish for incompatibles, wayward impulses interrupt their most deliberate plans, and their lives are one long drama of repentance and of effort to repair misdemeanours and mistakes. . . . The higher and the lower feelings, the useful and the erring impulses, begin by being a comparative chaos within us—they must end by forming a stable system of functions in right subordination' (James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, London, 1902, lect. viii. p. 167 ff.).

While the battle rages in the Apostle's soul, while his heart is a kingdom divided against itself, and in all the chambers of his being his moral ideal is torn between friends and foes, his anguish is pitiful. 'O wretched man that I am,' he cries, 'who shall deliver me?' (Ro 7^{24}). But in the end, by the power of Christ, his higher self triumphs over his lower; his divided spirit is healed; peace and harmony take the place of civil war and turmoil; and the most tragic lament in the Bible is followed by the finest pæan-song.

3. Conversion in Church history.—The supreme task of the Church is the conversion of the world—the making disciples of all nations (Mt 28^{19}). The apostolic and evangelic continuity of spiritual life is to be maintained, the Christian faith is to be propagated, the Kingdom of God is to come, through an unbroken succession of conversions. All the preachers who have profoundly moved the heart of mankind—master-spirits like Chrysostom, Savonarola, Luther, Wesley—have made conversion their theme. And, from a scientific point of view, the evidential value of conversions is the highest.

'St. Augustine,' says Romanes, 'after thirty years of age, and other Fathers, bear testimony to a sudden, enduring, and extraordinary change in themselves, called *conversion*. Now this experience has been repeated and testified to by countless millions of civilized men and women in all nations and all degrees of culture. It signifies not whether the conversion be sudden or gradual, though, as a psychological phenomenon, it is more remarkable when sudden and there is no symptom of mental aberration otherwise. But, even as a gradual growth in mature age, its evidential value is not less' (*Thoughts on Religion*[6], p. 162).

The theology of the Church was early caught in the meshes of the problem of the relation of Divine grace to human freedom in the experience of conversion. Thought has moved between two extremes. On the one hand, the sovereignty of God is emphasized, grace is irresistible, the number of the elect is certain and must be made up, the Divine good pleasure is certain to take effect. Under such conditions, man, impotent in the grip of original sin, is converted almost against his will. He is scarcely more than an automaton; his salvation appears to be due to his mere good

fortune; he chances to be a vessel unto honour. On the other hand, human liberty is accentuated; conversion is viewed as the outcome of forces resident in man himself; he has a native power to repent and believe, and the new life is from first to last a hard-earned, self-obtained, personal possession. The age-long controversy between Augustinian and Pelagian, Calvinist and Arminian, regarding the fact of conversion has now spent much of its force. With the help of a better psychology we can do justice to both the Divine and the human initiative. God is all-operative love, and man's whole equipment is His gift. All the conditions of human life are Divinely ordered, and man has an intense consciousness of dependence. He has nothing that he has not received. But part of his equipment is his freedom. He is above the mechanical order of nature. He has a real and not an illusive sovereignty. He is conscious of acting of his own accord, and of using the causal order for ends which he himself chooses. He is a free, self-determining personality, and his conversion can only mean that under the impulse of love he voluntarily and joyfully surrenders himself to God. A German theologian illustrates the interaction of Divine sovereignty and human freedom in conversion by the familiar process of persuading and being persuaded—*Anregung und Ueberzeugung* (Seeberg, art. 'Bekehrung,' in *PRE*[3]). Every man is constrained by the love of Christ; but every man is fully persuaded in his own mind. If the convert calls the grace or fascination of Christ 'irresistible,' he speaks with the enthusiasm of a lover; but it is bad theology to change the warm logic of the heart into a cold dogma of the intellect. Man may after all use the Divine gift of freedom to oppose—it may be to thwart—the will of God. The wise use of individuality is to make Divine ends personal ends, and to pour forth all the energy of one's being in the service which is perfect liberty.

Conversion meant in the Middle Ages, as it still does in Roman Catholicism, the adoption of a creed and submission to the authority of the Church. In Protestant theology it always means the rebirth of the soul, but in the Anglican Church there is a strong tendency to regard regeneration and conversion as independent experiences, separable in time, and different in important aspects. Certainly, if regeneration is mediated by baptism, the subject of which is usually unconscious of the rite, while conversion is the deliberate turning of the will to God, the personal acceptance of Christ by faith, then the second process is often separated from the first by a long interval; and it is possible to contend, as Anglican theology sometimes does, that 'a regenerated man is not necessarily a converted man.' If the effect of baptism is that 'it remits all sin, original and actual; that it bestows sanctifying grace, and endues the soul with the heavenly virtues of faith, hope, and charity; that it makes the recipient a member of Christ, the child of God, and an inheritor of the kingdom of heaven' (V. Staley, *The Catholic Religion*, London, 1893, p. 243), there can be little need for another religious phase called conversion. But this view appears to lose all touch with the central truth and vital experience of the NT, to empty the Christian religion of its moral and spiritual contents, and to reduce it to the level of a magical formula.

4. Conversion in the light of science.—Professor Henry Drummond was an eye-witness of the facts of conversion, as the youthful comrade of Mr. Moody in a great revival of religion. From that time he never ceased to advocate a scientific treatment of the phenomena of the spiritual life, which he happily called 'the contemporary activities of the Holy Ghost.' There can be nothing presumptuous in the endeavour to classify the facts and discover the laws of the new life. To the man of science all facts are sacred, and before the fact of conversion, as before any other, he will sit down 'as a little child.' Far too scanty attention has been given to the human side of soteriology. In order to understand the Saviour better, we must look more to the saved. Christ asked that He might be believed 'for the very works' sake' (Jn 14[11]), and He worketh hitherto (5[17]). The serious study of the facts of conversion may be the best present-day mode of handling the Word of life. The Christ of history may be reached through the Christ of experience. Christianity, as Harnack reiterates, is 'eternal life here and now in the power of God and in His presence.' Its best evidence is the logic of life. *Solvitur ambulando*, it is proved by its present spiritual movements and triumphs. In the realm of experimental theology, the twentieth century may join hands with the first.

During the last dozen years there has been a remarkable response to the plea for a science of conversion, for an empirical study of 'the soul of a Christian.' It has fittingly come from the psychologist rather than the theologian; and the new quest has characteristically been urged with special keenness in America. The publication of Starbuck's *Psychology of Religion* in the 'Contemporary Science Series' (1899) marked an epoch in the modern Church. In this book and its numerous successors the whole spiritual realm has been annexed by science. Religious experiences without number have been collected, classified, and described. 'That cruel reticence,' whereof Ruskin complained, 'in the breasts of wise men which makes them always hide their deeper thoughts,' has to a great extent been overcome. Law and order have been introduced into an apparent chaos. Theology, which has been too long metaphysical, has become experimental; it has been brought into line with the whole scientific movement; it has found a concrete basis in the facts of the spiritual life. Dynamics have taken the place of statics. Conversion is no longer regarded as a mere mystery or portent, before which we must stand in silent amazement. It abides our question and becomes articulate. It expresses itself in the language of the modern mind. It welcomes the application of the canons of science, and yields up many of its secrets to patient and reverent research. It has a rationale. It is seen to have discoverable relations to other known psychological facts. And, in the spiritual as in the natural world, God is a God of order. He arranges everything upon definite principles. The law of cause and effect controls the spiritual life. Arbitrariness must once for all be eliminated from the fortunes of the soul. God's action is always causal, never casual. His sovereignty is as different from the 'mere good pleasure' of an Eastern despot as day is from night. The science of conversion is still in its infancy, but certain conclusions seem to have been securely won.

(1) *There is a conversion period.*—The re-birth does not take place with the same frequency in all the seven ages of human life, though a man may be born again when he is old. Conversion is in general a fact of adolescence. It is closely related to those great physical and mental changes which mark the transition from childhood to youth and manhood. It is the time of storm and stress, in which Nature calls for readjustment all along the line. As reason, feeling, and moral sense mature, they precipitate a spiritual crisis. The soul awakes and aspires. The spiritual development proceeds, as a rule, *pari passu* with the physiological and

psychological development, and a wide induction proves that

'among females there are two tidal waves of religious awakening, at about 13 and 16, followed by a less significant period at 18; while among males the great wave is at about 16, preceded by a wavelet at 12, and followed by a surging up at 18 or 19' (Starbuck, *op. cit.* p. 34). 'Feeling plays a larger part in the religious life of females, while males are controlled more by intellection and volition' (*ib.* 65). 'Conversion for males is a more violent incident than for females, and more sudden' (*ib.* 95). And 'one may say that if conversion has not occurred before 20, the chances are small that it will ever be experienced' (*ib.* 28).

(2) *Conversion is often sudden.*—This statement is sometimes received with incredulity and even contempt, but psychology completely justifies it by bringing it into relation with other well-known mental processes. There are moments, as Browning says in his *Cristina*,

'When the spirit's true endowments
Stand out plainly from its false ones.'

Our best thoughts are often startling intuitions, 'flashes struck from midnight.' The seeker after truth utters his sudden 'Eureka,' and so does the seeker after a Saviour (Jn 1[41. 45]). Love, both natural and spiritual, is often love at first sight; when two souls, like two dewdrops, rush into one, the time element counts for nothing; the psychological moment has in it the quality of eternity. Our wills and our hearts are ours to make them God's, and life's most momentous decisions may be swiftly over.

'The world and its laws,' to quote Jowett again (*op. cit.* p. 53), 'have nothing to do with our free determinations. At any moment we can begin a new life.' R. L. Stevenson prays the Celestial Surgeon to *stab* his spirit broad awake (*Underwoods*, p. 46). 'A word did it,' said Savonarola of his own conversion.

Even those who have never avoided God, never dishonoured Christ, often become suddenly and profoundly conscious of their need of conversion; and there are creative periods of the mind when the repulsion from evil and the attraction to good are tremendously strong. While, however, the actual change is frequently swift, there is almost invariably a season of preparation for it. Conversion is the climax of a gradation, the crisis of a process more or less drawn out. The evidence on this point is all but unanimous. We may even accept Vinet's strong statement: 'Rome might more easily be built, than a man converted, in a day. Such a prodigy is possible with God; but in a thousand, in ten thousand cases to one, we may safely predict that He will not perform it' (*Outlines of Theology*[3], 1870, p. 84). Vinet is here perhaps misusing language, confounding the means with the end, the way with the goal. He does not for a moment deny that the final *coup* is often instantaneous. In such cases conversion is the firing of a slowly-laid train, the bursting of a silently-maturing bud, the transformation scene in the life-long drama of the soul. It is evident that much is lost by the deliberate postponement of decision.

'Convert me, but not yet,' was Augustine's prayer. 'Men are quick to feel, and keen to know; but they are not only slow, they are averse to decide. Yet it is for decision that Christianity calls, it is for decision that the energetic universe calls, far more than for a mere impression in repose. A crisis has from time to time to be forced, a crisis of the will' (P. T. Forsyth, *Preaching and the Modern Mind*, 1907, p. 131).

(3) *Conversion may be unconscious.*—There is a happy class of Christians who cannot tell when or how they began to believe; who have 'no bitter regrets, no broken lives, no ugly memories.' Theirs is the *anima naturaliter Christiana*, the *schöne Seele* that has always been on the side of the angels. It was the teaching of Bushnell that, under the pervasive influence of the Christian family, the child should grow up a Christian, and never know himself to be otherwise. The Christian life, being natural to man, should begin with the beginnings of conscious experience; and a great wrong is done to a child when he is led to imagine that he must wait till he comes to years of discretion and then have an experience which will make him a Christian. If God's will for him is realized, there will be no rude break, but a beautiful continuity, in his spiritual life. 'Of such is the kingdom of God' (Mk 10[14]), said Jesus of the children of Galilee, and the prevention of a fall from the grace vouchsafed to childhood should be the aim of all education.

'That is the ideal type of conversion in a Christian land; and it is the scandalous neglect of duty by Christian parents and by the Church which has made it less frequent than it should be' (D. W. Forrest, *The Christ of History and of Experience*, 358).

'The child is father of the man;
And I could wish my days to be
Bound each to each by natural piety.'

Some, indeed, deny that in this experience there is any conversion at all. Francis Newman distinguished the 'once-born' from the 'twice-born' Christian, and this idea—legitimate enough as a protest against an exclusively revivalistic type of conversion—has been taken seriously by some psychologists and greatly overworked. It is not a Christian idea. Jesus assumes in many indirect ways the natural sinfulness of the human heart and its need of regeneration. Even the child who is 'sanctified from his mother's womb' is twice-born. The most 'sky-blue' and 'healthy-minded' Christian is regenerated. Science is here rendering a valuable service to theology. It has proved that every man has a sub-conscious as well as a conscious self, and that changes both small and great occur in the subliminal region of the mind.

'Consciousness is a very poor witness to what takes place in the abysses of soul life. The remembered experiences of individuals are pitifully fragmentary and puerile, and often absurdly mistaken as to cause, process, issue, and object' (Hall, *Adolescence*, p. 341).

We are largely the creatures of instinct and unconscious imitation, and, if many things are wrought into the fabric of our being without our knowledge, why not the grace of God?

'Think you, 'mid all this mighty sum
Of things for ever speaking,
That nothing of itself will come,
But we must still be seeking?'

God 'giveth his beloved in sleep' (Ps 127[2]), and His beneficence is as wonderful in an unconscious as in a conscious regeneration. But see, on this whole subject, art. CONSCIOUSNESS, p. 53.

(4) *Conversion must not be stereotyped.*—The phenomena of the spiritual life are marvellously complex, and psychology teaches us to resist every attempt to standardize, normalize, conventionalize it. Every individual has his own ancestry, his own history, his own idiosyncrasy, and therefore his own spiritual experience. The variety of grace is like the variety of nature. God does not repeat Himself; He loves originals more than duplicates. The conversion on the way to Damascus cannot be a pattern for all men. There need not always be the same tragic intensity, the same high lights, the same deep shadows. The diversities of operations of the selfsame Spirit must all be orthodox. But every man is tempted to make his own experience a kind of law for other people. Schleiermacher thinks that the religious life is, in its inception and growth, the product of feeling; Herrmann believes that 'greater and higher than all the emotions within the Christian, there rises and towers religious thought.' The type of religious experience that seems native to a cultured community is calm and restrained; but the fervours of the Salvation Army and the Methodist meeting are to the psychologist no less natural.

Théodore Monod tells of a French friend who thus described his conversion: 'I cannot say that I had a very strong sense of sin. I just felt happy in the love of God. God did to me as a mother will sometimes do to her child who has overslept himself; he woke me with a kiss' (Moody, *Sovereign Grace*, Lond. 1899, p. 116). The Christian of the unconscious type, who has never felt a single reaction or upheaval, may join hands with the convert who knows himself to be a brand plucked from the burning, to whom conversion is a thing volcanic or cataclysmic, in whom 'habits of years' standing are overthrown in as many

moments,' and whose 'very organic impulses and desires are so utterly transformed that he can scarcely recognize himself' (Pratt, *Psychology of Religious Belief*, p. 251).

(5) *Conversion is still a mystery.*—In being studied scientifically, spiritual phenomena lose none of their Divine significance. Psychology has done much and will yet do more; it even asserts that, 'if we know the person psychologically, we can prophesy quite correctly the type of his conversion, whether sudden or gradual, quiet or excited' (Cutten, *Psych. Phen. of Christianity*, p. 255). But, after all, psychology can see only the under side of conversion. Spiritual life, like natural life, is in its final cause and real nature inscrutable. Nothing can be more crude than the notion that to discover the reign of law is to eliminate God and mystery. Law is only God's uniform method of working, and 'He is in the field when He is most invisible.' We have not to deal with a God remote from the world and manifested only through occasional interferences with the order of Nature, but with a God whose dwelling and working are in the lives of men. Just as the correlation of brain states with mental states does not prove the case of the materialist, so the correlation of conversion with certain mental and physical forces is far from proving that the inception and growth of the spiritual life is not a Divine act.

'That it [conversion] may all be due to so-called natural causes,' says Romanes, 'is no evidence against its so-called supernatural source, unless we beg the whole question of the Divine in Nature' (*op. cit.* p. 163). Even Ritschl, with all his dislike for mysticism, never denies that God Himself is present and operative in regeneration, using the religious community as His medium, not His substitute. 'This wonderful change,' says Pfleiderer, 'is not arbitrarily brought about by man himself, but experienced as a thing that has happened to him; it appears to him as the operation of a higher power, as the gift of undeserved divine favour or *grace*. And is not this in truth the case? Careful thought, in fact, can do nothing but confirm what the believer holds as a truth requiring no proof' (*Philosophy of Religion*, Eng. tr. iv. [1888] 128).

Froude complains that conversion, like other Christian doctrines, has been 'pawed and fingered by unctuous hands for now near two hundred years. The bloom is gone from the flower. The plumage, once shining with hues direct from heaven, is soiled and bedraggled. The most solemn of all realities have been degraded into the passwords of technical theology' (*Life of Bunyan*, London, 1880, p. 34). But all that is needed to bring back the bloom to the flower and the plumage to the wing is a new springtime. Human errors and caricatures do not alter Divine facts, any more than the mists extinguish the stars. A wide survey of the data of the spiritual life leads to the conclusion that the majority of conversions have little of the picturesque or dramatic in them; that some take place beneath the threshold of consciousness; that others are but dumb yearnings of penitence and faith towards God; that the memorabilia of soul-life are usually very brief, the convert sometimes limiting himself to the wondering exclamation, 'Whereas I was blind, now I see' (Jn 9^{25}). Yet every conversion enfolds in itself a Divine secret—the mystery of life—whose power and beauty will gradually be unfolded to the eye, but whose inner significance no mind can penetrate. The psychological study of the New Life will probably do more than anything else to convince the twentieth century of the immanence and the transcendence of God.

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JAMES STRACHAN.

CONVICTION.—**I.** *Conviction in relation to belief.*—Conviction that certain doctrines of religion are true is seldom or never the result of a rational process: it rather springs from a feeling in the mind that the doctrines suit a mental and emotional condition and bring peace to the soul. As Schopenhauer has well said:

'Man has, as a rule, no faculty for weighing reasons and discriminating between what is false and what is true; and, besides, the labour which nature and the needs of nature impose upon him leaves him no time for such inquiries, or for the education which they presuppose. In his case, therefore, it is no use talking of a reasoned conviction; he has to fall back on belief and authority' (*Religion: a Dialogue*, tr. by T. B. Saunders, 1889, p. 19).

Conviction implies active acceptance of propositions as indubitably true. It is not in itself any proof of truth, because different people may have diametrically opposite convictions, and some convictions have led to most lamentable results in persecutions, and in denial of equality in human rights and liberties. Bagehot remarks, in discussing 'The Emotion of Conviction':

'Nor is this intensity a sign of truth, for it is precisely strongest on those points in which men differ most from each other. John Knox felt it in his anti-Catholicism; Ignatius Loyola in his anti-Protestantism; and both, I suppose, felt it as much as it is possible to feel it' (*Lit. Studies*, 1879, ii. 414).

All experience shows that the personal equation, idiosyncrasy, or state of development of each ego is a prominent factor in the determination of convictions. The convictions of the two clever men, Cardinal Newman and his brother F. W. Newman, were widely apart, although their heredity was the same, and their upbringing was under identical general circumstances. In the case of these two thinkers, the divergence, of course, could only have been due to their different emotional and mental natures in different stages of development, for the same subject-matter of conviction was before the mind of each of them.

Conviction, then, as a feeling of reality indicating truth, is not fully trustworthy in respect of propositions as a whole, yet we may be assured that when the feelings are stirred, there are elements in the doctrines believed which are true relatively both to some universal principles and to the corresponding principles in man. For man is potentially, though not actually, the measure of the universe. The outer form of beliefs is often false, while the inner life—that which awakens emotional response—is true either for higher or for lower stimulation to development. Convictions suitable and useful to low stages of human evolution are eventually outgrown and seen to be erroneous. They are then replaced by others more true to outer and inner conditions, and more efficacious in promoting the growth of the soul.

There is also what may be called a coercive element in belief and conviction. This proceeds from pressure of environment, eventuating in the imposing of the customary opinion of those around on the unresisting and undiscriminating mind. G. F. Stout has said:

'There must . . . in the framing of a belief be always some endeavour to conform to conditions other than, and independent of, our own subjective tendencies. Our inability to attain ends otherwise than through certain means constitutes a restriction of mental activity within more or less definite channels' (*Manual of Psychology*[2], 1901, p. 567 f.).

It is only the thinker who can stand alone; most people do not think, but readily come under the

personal influence of those who confidently and plausibly proffer doctrines and statements for the acceptance of ill-equipped minds.

Respecting conviction as the result of a mental process, and determined by evidence, there is usually a change of belief and of mind-content. Here we have the force of evidence driving out old belief and substituting new; conviction then leaves old opinion and clings to new. In this case the feeling of reality comes as a response to the force of evidence applied by comparison and judgment.

'What is believed to be real (and so said to be known) is indeed mainly a matter of intellection; but it is also a matter of both feeling and will. In respect of all the higher intellectual, æsthetical, ethical, and religious realities, feeling and choice largely determine knowledge through the dependence of this belief on them. Yet we have spoken of this belief as feeling, not because it is a special form of affective phenomena, but because as conviction—having that warmth of colouring which the word implies—it may be regarded as a sort of universal affective accompaniment of the intellectual and voluntary aspects of all knowledge' (G. T. Ladd, *Psychology*, 1894, p. 514).

Convictions are beliefs accepted and vitalized by the emotions of those convinced that realities are indicated by them. The acceptance of beliefs is partly determined by the absence of contradictory beliefs in the mind when the new propositions are tendered. This fact Buckle long ago pointed out.

'The sense that anything we think of is unreal can only come when that thing is contradicted by some other thing of which we think. *Any object which remains uncontradicted is ipso facto believed and posited as absolute reality*' (W. James, *The Principles of Psychology*, 1905, vol. ii. p. 288 f.).

The absence of antagonistic ideas in the mind permits indiscriminately the acceptance of true and of false forms of belief. Children may be brought up to believe almost anything religious. In the same way the presence of beliefs antagonistic to proffered ideas may as often keep out the true as the false. Bias towards false forms, and erroneous prejudice, make impossible the advent of certain truths to the soul. Hence it is that new general truths are seldom acquired after mental maturity. Minds usually become hopelessly biased long before middle age. While credulity may sometimes permit the truth to enter, constant incredulity resists the truth and hugs old errors.

The test of actuality we find in our own consciousness and life. '*Whatever things have intimate and continuous connexion with my life are things of whose reality I cannot doubt*' (James, *op. cit.* p. 298). Doctrines strongly stirring the higher emotions, and not conflicting with prejudice, appeal with a force which carries conviction with it, though the doctrines may vary with all the religions of the world. Truth hides under many forms. We may be sure that, in all these varying doctrines as applied to the human heart, there is a living element of eternal truth. God does not forsake the beings that have emanated from Himself. Each soul has the conditions and the knowledge it can bear and make use of under the religion it is born to or adopts.

2. *Conviction of sin* is usually present in the state of consciousness known as conversion (*q.v.*), or change of heart. It is a 'sense of sin,' a feeling of unworthiness and general wretchedness, accompanied by a strong desire to lead a better life. It is shown by a more or less sudden distaste for accustomed thought, language, and conduct, and by a new-found yearning within for an improved state of being. Conviction may last for days, months, or years before the crisis, or conversion, supervenes, and this is followed by restfulness of mind and lightness of heart. Conversion is described by Starbuck as a sudden forsaking of the lower for the higher self:

'A process of struggling away from sin, rather than of striving toward righteousness; . . . it seems to be a step in growth which calls into activity the deeper instincts. . . . The feelings, which are the primal elements in consciousness, function so strongly. In the tendency to resist conviction we see, also, an indication that the new life is forcing its way even against the person's will' (*The Psychology of Religion*, 1899, p. 64).

Though the proximate cause of conviction of sin is often fear of torments to come, yet we may be sure that behind this fear there are certain emotional and mental conditions ripe for a change to a higher state.

Viewing the phenomena observable at great religious revivals, such as the movement among the Welsh people in the years 1904–1905, we may recognize, despite certain objectionable features and mistaken views and conduct, the action of the Holy Spirit in meeting the aspirations of those who are struggling amid the difficulties and illusions of the lower planes of emotion. It is through the power of the Spirit, which is the life-force of the universe, that the transmutation of the emotions is effected, and this must be at the bidding of the lower nature. The raising of the emotions to higher levels is part of the process of evolution, and, when accomplished, is a sign of the soul's development, or growth in grace.

LITERATURE.—The literature is given in the article.

G. A. GASKELL.

CONVOCATION.—This is the name given to the general assembly of the clergy of the Church of England. The older name was 'synod,' of which 'convocation' became the equivalent when English began to take the place of Latin in the official documents of the Church. We read of the 'Synode of London' in 1553, but of the 'convocation holden in London' in 1562. The synodal activity of the Christian Church is coeval with her life. It gradually took form in diocesan, provincial, and national synods, and these different forms of synods were held wherever Christianity was established. The British Church, in common with the rest of Christendom, was familiar with conciliar action—witness the Council of Verulam in A.D. 446. In Anglo-Saxon times, Church Councils were assembled 'acourse with our Parliaments' as national synods, while the bishops and clergy in addition were constituent members of the 'great council' of the nation.

In Norman times the conciliar activity of the Church became still greater. Bishops, abbots, priors, archdeacons, and deans were summoned; but the first known instance of the representative element occurs in 1225 under Langton. Later in this century, however, we have proof of direct representation in a provincial synod, for in 1273 we find Archbishop Kilwarby issuing his mandate to the Bishop of London in these terms:

'You are to direct on our part each of the suffragan bishops of our Church to call and bring with him to the aforesaid synod three or four of the greater, more discreet, and prudent persons of his Church and diocese, that by the assistance of their common counsel such important affairs of the Church of God by His aiding mercy may be brought to a happy conclusion.'

Four years later 'proctors of all clergy of each diocese' were specifically named in a similar mandate. In 1283, Archbishop Peckham ordered the attendance of two proctors for the clergy of each diocese as well as one for each cathedral and collegiate church, and this seems to have become the rule for the Province of Canterbury. In the Province of York, the rule, dating from 1279, was that two proctors for the clergy should attend from each archdeaconry. Side by side with provincial synods were diocesan synods, which were held under their several bishops to enforce the decrees of the provincial synods. National synods fell into disuse through the jealousy felt by the two Archbishops of their respective claims.

It is to be noted that this synodal action of the Church preceded the attempt made by Edward I. in 1295 to incorporate the clergy into his newly-

devised parliamentary system. The king hoped that the clergy would not only meet, as heretofore, as the spiritual councillors of the Archbishops, but that they would also add to their spiritual duties the further duty of sitting in Parliament as his council, especially to make it easier for him to raise money by taxation. The king's attempt, however, failed through the refusal of the clergy to obey the royal summons addressed to them, through the Archbishops, in the famous *præmunientes* clause. The Crown acquiesced, after 1340, in the rule that the clergy should tax themselves in their Convocation, and in consequence the attendance of proctors in Parliament did not outlive the following century. The writ with the *præmunientes* clause is still issued at the summoning of every Parliament, but is never obeyed. Convocation, however, is still summoned in both Provinces whenever Parliament is summoned, though it would seem that there is nothing to hinder its meeting at other times 'if the existence of affairs shall so require.'

Convocation, in common with the Church of England as a whole, lost much of its independence, and at the same time much of its power and influence, at the Reformation. The Act of Submission (25 Henry VIII. c. 19) embodies in its preamble an Act of Convocation abjuring all power to make or act on any canons without the king's consent; and it affirms that Convocation always had been, and ought always to be, assembled only by the king's writ. Accordingly, Convocation was reduced to an instrument of the 'Supreme Head' or 'Supreme Governor' for ecclesiastical purposes, and was given the duties of considering forms of public worship, articles of religion, and canons, though not as possessing any independent effective authority. Indeed, it is now an established rule of law that canons made by the clergy in Convocation are of no binding power over the laity.

After the Restoration, Convocation prepared in 1661 the Act of Uniformity, revised the Prayer-Book, and re-modelled the canons. The same Convocation is remarkable as being the last to grant a clerical subsidy—acting, it is said, in dropping the custom, upon a verbal agreement made between the Lord Chancellor Clarendon and Archbishop Sheldon. This has been declared to be 'the greatest alteration in the constitution ever made without an express law.' Since this change Convocation has ceased to enjoy any political importance.

After the Revolution, the history of Convocation is a story of bitter conflicts between the two Houses, in which Atterbury, Wake, and Burnet played leading parts. This conflict culminated in 1717, when the Lower House was about to censure the writings of Bishop Hoadley, whereupon Convocation was prorogued by royal writ, and met no more (except formally till 1741) until it was again summoned for business in 1852, through the efforts of Bishop Wilberforce and others.

Convocation now assembles concurrently with Parliament, being summoned by a royal writ addressed to the Archbishops. In Canterbury the Upper House consists of 23 members, the Lower of 154. In the Province of York the corresponding numbers are 9 and 69. The custom of separating into Upper and Lower houses dates from the end of the 14th cent., when the inferior clergy began to withdraw into a lower room, viz. one under the chapter-house of St. Paul's Cathedral, or a school-room in the crypt.

Though Convocation is described in Canon 139 of 1604 as 'the true Church of England by representation,' it remains an unreformed body. The official element is preponderant, and the large body of stipendiary curates is without any voice in the election of clergy-proctors. It is not surprising, therefore, that Convocation exercises but little influence over the minds of the majority of the members of the Church of England, though it affords an excellent opportunity for the more highly-placed clergy to discuss affairs as they affect the Church, and though its debates and reports are of a uniformly high order, and are frequently of permanent value. See also art. CHURCH OF ENGLAND.

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W. F. COBB.

CO-OPERATION.—Co-operation (*i.e.* literally 'working together') might express any combined action of two or more persons for any purpose. It is used in general, and will be employed here, to denote the combinations of working men for production or distribution of commodities, including incidentally some other forms of mutual help. In 1794, Dr. Shute Barrington, bishop of Durham, established a co-operative store at Mongewell, in the county of Oxford, for the benefit of the poor of that and three small adjoining parishes. A quantity of bacon, cheese, and other articles was procured from wholesale dealers to be subdivided and sold at prime cost for ready money. The salesman was an infirm old man who could not read or write, but his honesty was unimpeached, and he was allowed a shilling a week as well as the benefit of the shop. The transactions of 1796 amounted to £223. The net saving to the poor in the cost of their supplies was 21 per cent. In 1800, the Rev. Dr. Glasse opened a similar village shop at Greenford in Middlesex. The receipts for six months exceeded £150, and the margin of saving was from 15 to 25 per cent according to the nature of the article sold. A third was established about the same time at Hanwell, by the Rev. G. Glasse, vicar of that parish, with like success. In all three cases, great good was done by avoiding the burden of debt.

In 1795, a co-operative saw-mill was established at Hull, and it continued in operation for a hundred years. In 1796 a parish windmill was erected by subscription on Barham Downs in the county of Kent, and in 1797 one at Chislehurst. A co-operative society at Nottingham has existed for more than 100 years.

In 1844, a few workmen of Rochdale joined in establishing a society called the 'Equitable Pioneers,' and that Society was so successful that their example was followed in many parts of the country. It now has more than 16,000 members holding £300,000 in shares, and its sales amount to £340,000 a year. A portion of its profits is yearly applied to educational purposes. The paid up capital consists largely of accumulation of past profits. No credit is given. By its means the workmen of Rochdale have been enabled to supply themselves with necessaries of life, genuine in quality and at a cheap price, and to accumulate out of their savings and the profits of their trade a capital sum averaging nearly £20 for each shareholder. This Society was registered as a Friendly Society under the Act of 1846.

In 1850, the Rev. F. D. Maurice, the Rev. Chas. Kingsley, Mr. J. M. Ludlow, Mr. T. Hughes, Mr. E. Vansittart Neale, and others, joined in the formation of a Society for promoting Workmen's Associations, and commenced a Working Tailors' Association. The excellent motives and aspirations

by which they were actuated had been eloquently set forth in a series of tracts by those accomplished men; and, if they could have found a body of members and officers capable of carrying out their ideas in a business-like manner, the associations which they formed might have done lasting good. As it was, their enterprise greatly impressed the public mind and rendered it familiar with the idea of co-operation. Though their initiative as patrons of co-operation was a failure, they remained the true friends, and in some sense the apostles, of the co-operative movement, and to their advice and counsel is due much of the success that has attended that movement under the direct management of the working men themselves.

The undertakings which experienced this early check were productive; those which followed the lines laid down by the Rochdale pioneers were distributive, though, in the long run, it has not been unusual for a distributive store to find it worth while to undertake productive business as well. It is obvious that a productive enterprise has elements of difficulty that are absent from a mere distributive store. The essential principle of co-operation seems to be that the man who contributes his labour to the production of the commodity is entitled to share in the produce after a sufficient sinking fund to replace the capital expended in the plant has been set aside, and hence a system of profit-sharing has been introduced, upon which, of late, attempts have been made to establish productive businesses. There is reason to think, however, that the distributive element in co-operation will remain its more prominent feature.

The sharing of profit implies logically the sharing of loss; and this is the rock upon which some productive enterprises have split. Yet it is evident that the social reforms which were in the minds of the early promoters of co-operation are to be realized rather by the productive element of it than by mere distribution, useful as that is in many respects.

A further development of co-operation has arisen in the union of a number of stores to form a wholesale society; and the wholesale societies of Manchester and Glasgow are striking examples of the power of associations of working men to carry on gigantic undertakings by means of small savings. The Manchester society (to which more than 1000 societies contribute) effected sales of goods for nearly £25,000,000 and earned profits exceeding £600,000 in the last year recorded. It acts as the banker of the smaller stores, and transacts a vast business in that capacity. It owns a fleet of ships, and has warehouses both at home and abroad in which a variety of industries are carried on. The total number of societies registered under the Industrial and Provident Societies Act in the United Kingdom is 2800; the number of members exceeds 2,500,000; the amount of funds, £58,000,000. It will be readily inferred from these figures how great has been the influence of these societies upon the welfare of the industrial population. The same inference may be drawn from the fact that, according to a previous return, 344 societies had built or aided in building 37,000 houses for their members, while more than £8,000,000 had been expended in building those houses or been advanced to the members to enable them to do so.

Another branch of co-operative enterprise has had more success abroad than in this country. People's Banks and agricultural credit societies flourish in Italy and in Germany, and are now being actively promoted here. In Ireland, Sir Horace Plunkett has established a number of co-operative creameries with excellent results.

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E. W. BRABROOK.

COPTIC CHURCH.—*Introductory.*—When Christianity was first introduced into Egypt, it found itself confronted not only by the religious environment common to all Hellenistic provinces of the Roman Empire, but also by the influence of the old native religion. The latter, although beginning to show signs of the rapid decay which was soon to overtake it, was still immensely powerful, especially in the towns and villages situated at some distance up the Nile, away from Alexandria. In certain ways it had scarcely been touched by Hellenic influence, and had, indeed, rather itself influenced Hellenic thought. It had certainly impressed itself strongly on the imagination of the Platonic idealists of Alexandria, as is evidenced by Plutarch's treatise *de Iside et Osiride* and by bk. xi. of the *Metamorphoses* of Apuleius. But, although at the beginning of the Roman period the native priests still kept alight the sacred lamp of religious knowledge, the general mass of the people had become ignorant of a great number of the lesser-known deities, and of the meaning of much of the ceremonial. Nevertheless, the main doctrines of the old religion were as firmly rooted as ever. The worship of the gods of the dead was still paramount, and especially there remained unshaken the belief in the dead man-god Osiris, who had been slain by the power of Evil, but who lived again as king of the dead. The people still believed in the so-called 'resurrection,' that is to say, they thought it was possible that the dead might live for ever if the same ceremonies were carried out which enabled Osiris to escape corruption. Also, if we may rely on such papyri as that containing the tale of Setne Khaemuas and Si-Osiri, not only was the weighing of the dead man's good and evil deeds still thought to be necessary before the soul could pass the judgment-hall of Osiris, but very elevated notions of morality and justice played an important part in the hopes pertaining to eternal felicity. On the other hand, the Greek syncretists of Alexandria had adopted the cult of Osiris and Isis, and had transcendentalized it out of all knowledge, to suit the current Platonic doctrines of the day; according to them, the *mysteries* of the Egyptian religion were to be understood only by the esoteric, after long study and strict asceticism. Platonism had also involved the large Jewish community in Alexandria, and demanded from its devotees, as we know from Therapeutic ideals, the practice of asceticism and contemplation. There can be little doubt that these two things—(1) the belief in a future life to be obtained through a god who had himself overcome death, and (2) the transcendentalized form of Osiris- and Isis-worship adopted by the Greeks, which demanded asceticism and abstention from the desires of the flesh—largely influenced the early Christian communities in Egypt.

1. Introduction of Christianity into Egypt.—The tradition that St. Mark was the earliest to preach the gospel of Christ in Alexandria is first related by Eusebius, but prefaced by the word φάσι. In spite of the tradition being firmly rooted to this day, it has little historical value. When and by whom the gospel was introduced into Egypt is unknown, and, indeed, the whole history of the Alexandrian Church is enveloped in obscurity until the episcopate of Demetrius (A.D. 189–231), when it appears as a flourishing institution, with a school of philosophic learning attached to it which must already have made its influence felt far beyond the city itself. Eusebius (*HE* vi. 11–13) states that 'thousands' were martyred from Egypt and all the

Thebaid during the persecution of Septimius Severus in 202; and Clement (*Strom.* vi. 18), writing at about this date, tells us that Christianity had spread to 'every nation, village, and town,' so that, even allowing for exaggeration, there can be no doubt that the new faith had made great progress during the first two centuries of our era. Harnack (*Expansion of Christianity*[2], 1908, ii. 166 ff.) has collected a list of districts where we have definite evidence of Christian communities prior to the persecution under Diocletian in 303. Archæological research has borne out the literary evidence in several of the localities. They are as follows: the districts of Prosopitis, Athribis, Sais and Arsinoë, Antinoë, Thmues, Philadelphia in the Arsinoite nome, Alexander Insula in the Fayyum, Hermopolis Magna, Nilopolis, Ptolemais in Pentapolis, Berenice in Cyrenaica, Oxyrhynchus, the oasis of Khargeh, and Esneh (Latopolis). As to the form of Church government during the earliest period little is known. It is possible, though by no means certain, that the *Didache*, or *Teaching of the Twelve Apostles*, was compiled in Egypt, and may represent the primitive form of Church government in that country. From this work, generally assigned to the earliest age of the Church, the order of bishops and deacons would appear at first to have been entirely subordinate to that of the 'apostles' and 'prophets,' and to have been, at the time of the writer, a comparatively recent organization. The 'apostles' were itinerant missionaries and evangelists, while the 'prophet' alone was allowed to have a fixed abode in any locality. The latter commanded extraordinary reverence, and the first-fruits of the community were his by right. He spoke in ecstasy, and presided at the *Agape*. Nevertheless, both from the warnings uttered in the *Didache* against false prophets, and from the *Shepherd of Hermas*, we know that the office of prophet was frequently abused by fraudulent persons, and it gradually lost prestige until the more thorough organization of bishops and deacons eventually supplanted it. By the time of the episcopate of Demetrius the form of government represented by the *Didache* would have disappeared (if it ever had been in force in Egypt), and we know that Demetrius himself was the first to appoint other bishops (three in number) outside Alexandria, thus probably bringing the scattered communities for the first time under his central jurisdiction. Hitherto they had probably been under the direction of deacons and presbyters.

It is probable that the earliest Gospels in circulation in Egypt were not the canonical ones. In Clement's day, besides the four canonical sources for the life and teaching of Christ, there were still in general use two other Gospels known as the *Gospel according to the Hebrews*, and the *Gospel according to the Egyptians*. There is every reason to suppose that these two documents preceded the four Apostolic Gospels in Egypt, and were in all probability the ones used by the earliest Christian community there, for it is not likely that they would have forced themselves into popularity if the four sources bearing more authoritative names had been in the field from the first. Clement, however, sharply distinguishes between these two Gospels and the four canonical ones; and, although they were apparently used side by side, it is evident that the two earlier were beginning to be dropped by the more orthodox at the commencement of the 3rd century. The *Gospel according to the Hebrews* was read chiefly by Jewish converts, either in Aramaic or in a Greek translation. It appears to have had Ebionite tendencies, in spite of its close parallelism with canonical sources. The *Gospel according to the Egyptians* implies by its title that it was intended for use either by the native Egyptians, as distinct from the Alexandrians, or else by the Gentile converts in distinction from the Jewish. The latter inference is the more probable, as there seems to have been little attempt at first to reach the masses of the native Egyptians, the appeal of the new faith being made almost entirely to those of Hellenic birth or education. Here again we find that, in spite of the close parallel between the known fragments and the canonical sources, there is not only a tendency to Modalism, but also a strong tinge of Encratism. The latter was the doctrine of the Encratites (*q.v.*), a very early sect within the Church, which set up extreme asceticism and abstinence from sexual intercourse as the Christian ideal. There can be little doubt that the asceticism affected by the devotees of Isis and the Jewish Therapeutæ had become thus introduced in very early times into the Christian communities of Alexandria. Clement, however, defends the *Gospel according to the Egyptians* from the charge of extreme Encratism.

It was hoped that the finding of the now famous 'Sayings of Jesus' at Oxyrhynchus by Grenfell and Hunt would have thrown some light on these early uncanonical versions; not only have they not done so, but their own origin is extremely uncertain.

The first series of these 'Sayings' (eight in number) was found in 1897 with a host of other valuable literary fragments, and their date, on palæographical grounds, is to be assigned to about the year 200 or shortly after. Each saying is prefaced by the words 'Jesus saith'; four have their equivalent in the canonical sources; one is too fragmentary to be made out; and three are new, with a tendency to mysticism and a harsh and severe judgment of mankind. Harnack saw in them excerpts from the lost *Gospel according to the Egyptians* (*Expositor*, Nov., Dec. 1897), but other theologians and the finders themselves were not by any means unanimously in agreement with him. The second series, found in 1903 on the same site, written on the back of a land-survey list, is attributed to Thomas and another disciple whose name is missing. This, however, may only be a bold claim on the part of the writer. They agree in form and in date with the first series, but differ in being less akin to canonical sources. One of the sayings is almost exactly parallel with a quotation of Clement's from the *Gospel according to the Hebrews*, and can therefore be assigned to that work without hesitation. But whether each series is a selection of sayings from any one Gospel or from different Gospels is a matter of considerable doubt; Grenfell and Hunt themselves came to the conclusion that the find was a collection of 'sayings' as such, and that the theory of extracts was unjustifiable.

There was also found at Oxyrhynchus a fragment of an uncanonical Gospel, which unfortunately breaks off just where it appears to be closely parallel with the known passage from the *Gospel according to the Egyptians*, in which Jesus is represented as advocating extreme asceticism as the Christian ideal. Altogether it must be admitted that the Oxyrhynchus finds have served to puzzle rather than to enlighten us with regard to the early Christian documents of Egypt.

But we are at least able to surmise that there was considerable uncanonical competition with the canonical sources, and that the uncanonical Gospels were strongly tinged with the ascetic ideals prevalent at the time in Alexandria; also, incidentally, that a Christian community flourished as far south as Oxyrhynchus in A.D. 200, if not earlier.

Archæology also helps to throw light on this early period of Christianity in Egypt, although here again the evidence is scattered and obscure. It was the custom at this time to ferry the mummies of the dead down the river, with wooden tickets, or *tesseræ*, tied round the neck, bearing the name of the deceased and of the cemetery to which the body was to be consigned. A large number of these *tesseræ* exist in museums to-day. One at least (in the Berlin museum) from Akhmim was that of a Christian; and, although the symbol ☧ on it has caused it to be considered post-Constantinian in date, there are good reasons for assigning it to an earlier period. There are also other tickets couched in phraseology known to be Christian, but which cannot be absolutely identified as such. They at least prove that in this neighbourhood Christians were mummified and buried in the same

cemeteries as their pagan brethren—from which we may presume that these early Egyptian Christians still believed in the necessity of preserving the body in order that the existence of the soul might be assured (see DEATH, etc. [Coptic]). From the same site there came the fine collection of tapestry, some of which dates from the earliest times of the Roman empire. The symbols of the fish and the cross occur as patterns, and these have been thought to have come from very early Christian burials. If this be so, it points to a Christian community existing in Akhmim early in the 2nd century. We also have as evidence the *libelli*, several of which have been preserved to us. These were certificates issued, during the persecution of Decius (A.D. 250), to those who had recanted by sacrificing publicly to the gods. Those to whom they were issued were known as *libellatici*; and, although it is not always certain that it was a Christian to whom the *libellus* was granted, the probability that it was so is very strong. Mention must be made of the *Epistle* of Psenosiris (a presbyter who had fled to the oasis of Khargeh, probably during the Decian persecutions), in which he commends a female exile Politike to a fellow-presbyter. It is also probable that one at least of the mummies found at Antinoë is the remains of a Christian burial that may be dated as early as the close of the 2nd century.

The name of the deceased, according to Gayet, was Euphemiaan, a devotee of some Gnostic sect. The evidence for the latter supposition is, however, slender. The cords which bound the shroud were sealed with a curious mixture of pagan and Christian sealings, including the ☧; but, if the contention that this symbol is evidence of a post-Constantinian age be correct, the early date assigned must be abandoned. Another remarkable object from the same site is a shroud, with the figure of a handsome woman painted on the exterior, in the manner of the beginning of the 2nd century. The hand is represented as clasping a peculiar form of gilt 'crux ansata,' or symbol of life. Whether this is Christian there must be considerable doubt.

2. Gnosticism and Arianism.—Although our knowledge of the early Christian communities in the upper country is so remarkably slight, when once the Church became well established in Alexandria the Christians began to form an important part of the community of that city, while the works of Clement and Origen prove that the intellectual stimulus of the pagan Hellenic schools was not lost upon the Christians. The famous 'catechetical' school, founded, according to Eusebius (*HE* v. 10), in the earliest days of the community, and presided over in turn by Pantænus, Clement, and Origen, was designed not only to teach catechumens, but also to appeal, by a system of philosophy, to cultivated pagans. In an age of apologists its influence was very considerable, but confined entirely to those of Hellenic education. Such a propaganda was useless to the natives of the upper country. The power, too, of Demetrius, as sovereign bishop of all Egypt, was very great; and he must have occupied a position similar to that of the pagan 'Chief Priest of Alexandria and all Egypt,' and the Jewish Ethnarch. This powerful position was retained by his successors until it reached its highest point under Athanasius, and lasted, indeed, until the Council of Chalcedon. On the whole, too, at first the Alexandrian Church had good opportunity of developing itself free from interference; for, with the exception of the persecutions of Severus in 202 and of Decius in 250, there was little or no external pressure brought to bear on the Christians. The real enemy at this time lay within the Church itself in the shape of the Gnostic sects. The earliest record of the conflict between those who professed a higher *gnosis* and the preachers of the simple gospel is the dispute between St. Peter and Simon Magus, the latter of whom appears to have been the first to associate Christianity with Gnostic mysteries. From Palestine the esoteric cult quickly spread to Egypt by what was called a 'counter-Apostolic succession' of famous Gnostic teachers, and perhaps reached its height in the systems promulgated by Basilides and Valentinus, both of whom laboured in Egypt (Epiphanius, *Hær.* xxiv. 1, xxxi. 7). See BASILIDES, GNOSTICISM, PISTIS SOPHIA, VALENTINUS.

We know from the Christian writers and apologists, chiefly from Hippolytus and Epiphanius, how wide-spread Gnosticism became in Egypt, and how it threatened to become a menace to the Church in the early part of the 3rd century. Perhaps the so-called letter of Hadrian to Servian (in reality a 3rd cent. document) may be interpreted in this light when it speaks of

'people who worship Serapis being Christians, while those who call themselves bishops of Christ are adherents of Serapis. . . . No Christian presbyter but is an astrologer, a soothsayer, a vile wretch. When the Patriarch himself visits Egypt, he is forced by some to worship Serapis, by others to worship Christ.'

In spite of the venom which characterizes this attack on the Alexandrians, it points to the fact that the syncretism rife at the period had attacked the Christian religion also. This is borne out to a considerable extent by archæological discoveries in Upper Egypt. The excavations at Antinoë conducted by Gayet have revealed Christian burials of a very peculiar type. Some of the rock-cut tombs had chapels built before the entrance, stuccoed inside and covered with frescoes, most of which have unfortunately perished, but what fragments have been discovered are typical of the earliest forms of Christian symbolism. Two of the bodies at least in this cemetery were equipped with wine-jars and baskets for bread, perhaps intended for a mystic Eucharist for the dead, while another burial contained a model in terra-cotta of several persons seated at a table, the whole forming a group, supposed to represent the *Agape*. Many peculiar objects were found, including a kind of primitive rosary, or board for counting prayers, surmounted by a cross. It is possible that the old Egyptian idea that the welfare of the soul depended upon the nourishing of the body by magical food still survived. The bodies of Christians at this time were always mummified, and in some cases the remains of martyrs were preserved in the houses, for the gaze of the faithful, in accordance with the pagan custom of the time (Athanasius, *Vita Antonii* [*PG* xxvi. 967]). The chapels and provisions of food may therefore be a continuation of the old pagan custom whereby the soul of the deceased was nourished by the mystic food of the Eucharist. This is borne out not only by one of the Acts of the Council of Hippo (393), which forbade the burial of the holy elements with the dead, but also by the fact that in the oasis of Khargeh a number of Christian tombs were provided with a chapel containing a niche for food-offerings after the pagan manner (Myres, *Man*, 1901, No. 91). On the other hand, we may perhaps see in these peculiar customs traces of some Gnostic rite, such as the mystic sacrament mentioned in *Pistis Sophia*, performed for the remission of sins. Syncretism can go no further than the mummy of the so-called Christian priest from Dêr el-Bahari. It is probably of very early date—possibly the beginning of the 3rd century. On the shroud the deceased is represented holding in one hand a cup, in the other corn-ears—according to Naville (*Deir el Bahari*, 1898–1901, ii. 5), emblems of the Eucharist. On his left shoulder is the *swastika* emblem, and below is the barque of Socharis adored by the gods Anubis and Apnat.

Although, during the persecution of Decius in 250, large numbers of Christians appear to have recanted, the persecution of Diocletian in 303 found the Church stronger and resistance much more stubborn. Many were martyred, and the

Copts reckoned their dates from this stormy period—'the era of martyrs.' In the succeeding reign, numbers languished in the dye factories of the Thebaid, and in the porphyry mines of the desert ('Mart. Pal.' in *TU* xiv. 4); but with the accession of Constantine to sole power, Christianity was adopted as the State religion, and thus placed in a stronger position than ever before. But, although, within the Church, Gnosticism was fast waning, and the more fantastic sects had become objects of ridicule, a new trouble broke out in 319, owing to the preaching of Arius, a presbyter of the Church of Saint Baucalis in Alexandria, on the relationship of Christ to the Father.

This is not the place to go into the full details concerning the doctrinal struggle which shook the Church to its foundations. It is sufficient to say here that Arius implied that the Son was inferior to the Father. He argued that, as the Son was begotten of the Father, there must have been a time when the Son did not exist. Therefore the Son was not co-eternal with the Father, and not of the same nature, but of like nature. The Son was not God, or eternal, or omniscient, but a creature (κτίσμα), although, as such, beyond all mortal comparison. The opposition to this doctrine was headed by a young deacon in the household of the patriarch Alexander, named Athanasius. The quarrel proceeded with unprecedented bitterness and intriguing on both sides. The Emperor was appealed to, but, rather than give a decision, he summoned a council of bishops at Nicæa to formulate a creed. Their decision led to the formulation of the famous creed of the orthodox party and to the excommunication and banishment of Arius; but, on his offering a written explanation, the Emperor directed that he should be received back into the Church. Athanasius, who had meanwhile (328) succeeded Alexander as bishop of Alexandria, refused to obey the Emperor's order, and, at a council of bishops held at Tyre, he in his turn was deposed and banished. On the death of Constantine in 337, Athanasius returned to Alexandria with the support of Constantine II. and Constans; but, on the death of the former in 340, Constantius III., partner in the Empire and an Arian, succeeded in deposing him, and had Gregory elected as patriarch by a council of bishops held at Antioch. Athanasius withdrew only when an armed escort and threats of violence on the part of its commander, who conducted the Arian patriarch to the city, compelled him to retire. In the absence of Athanasius his supporters kept up constant rioting, and burnt the metropolitan church. A temporary peace was later patched up, and Athanasius returned as bishop; but the death of Constans enabled Constantius again to depose him—not without violence, for the Athanasians resisted vigorously. The bishop escaped into hiding with his friends, and George of Cappadocia was chosen as Arian patriarch. The succession, however, of the pagan emperor, Julian, led to more rioting, and George was murdered. Athanasius returned again, in spite of opposition at first on the Emperor's part, and succeeded in holding his office through this and the following reigns of Jovian and Valens (although the latter was an Arian) until his death in 373. See, further, ARIANISM, ATHANASIUS.

But the seeds of discord had already been sown in the Egyptian Church before the Arian controversy broke out. During the persecution of Diocletian, Peter, who was then bishop of Alexandria, and was in the end martyred, fled from Alexandria. During his absence, Meletius, bishop of the important see of Lycopolis, ordained and intruded priests into other dioceses, and assumed the character of primate. He has also been charged by Athanasius and Socrates, but without good reason, with having denied the faith under persecution. When affairs had settled down somewhat under Alexander, Meletius's case was brought before the Council of Nicæa, and that assembly severely censured him. During the life of Alexander, Meletius acquiesced quietly, but on the accession of Athanasius he flung himself into the ranks of the opposing party, seemingly not so much because he sympathized with the Arian doctrines as out of dislike to Athanasius, and, as he possessed a considerable following, the quarrel was thereby embittered and intensified.

3. Eremite movement.—The foregoing tends to show that, as soon as Christianity began to get the upper hand in Egypt, the Church itself was rent with violent factions, which led to the disorder and turbulence which characterized the 4th and 5th centuries. Meanwhile a new factor had appeared on the scene—a new movement which was to have world-wide influence throughout the whole of Christendom. We have seen how, even in the early days of the Church, when Christianity was confined mainly to those of Hellenic birth or education, there was a tendency to asceticism or mysticism. In their extreme forms these two movements led to fantastic Gnostic systems, but the more sober and quiet side manifested itself among those Christians who carried out their ascetic ideals, not by withdrawing from the world, but by living in the midst of their own households, observing fasts, abstaining from marriage, and devoting themselves to prayer and the care of the sick and the poor. But, although these ascetic ideals, which affected the Egyptian Church to such a remarkable degree, and, through it, in later times the Church throughout the world, seem to have had their origin in Egypt, it is curious to note that the native Egyptian character in the past had exhibited little or no tendency either to asceticism or to mysticism. Magic in pagan Egypt was, and had always been, of an eminently practical kind, and, so far as we can judge, never included philosophic mysticism of any sort; indeed, the native mind was incapable of any of the higher subtleties of thought. It seems, therefore, that these two potent forces were introduced into Egypt by the Greeks, through the medium of Platonic and Pythagorean philosophers, and associated with the native Egyptian religion by the Platonizing of the Osiris and Isis cult. We know that the Jewish community in Egypt was subject to an identical process. The fragments of lost Gospels, as well as the works of Clement and Origen, prove how these ideals, prevalent in the pagan and Jewish communities of Alexandria, exercised their influence on the early Christian Church. During the 3rd cent., however, Christianity began to make many converts among the native worshippers of Osiris and Isis, among those of the population who were little influenced by Hellenic ideas, had little or no Greek blood in their veins, and were quite as incapable of understanding Clement's or Origen's conception of Christianity as Plutarch's theories about Osiris and Isis. Nevertheless, the ascetic side of the new faith seems to have appealed strongly to them, although the mystic and philosophic ideas interwoven with asceticism were not in the least comprehended. The literal practice of asceticism became at once a thing of paramount importance, and its wide-spread influence was due in the first place to the example of one man—Anthony, the first to cut himself off from intercourse with the world, and to perform those extraordinary feats of endurance which appealed so strongly to the Egyptians, and produced countless hosts of imitators.

Our chief authorities for the history of this movement are *The Life of Anthony* (a work attributed to Athanasius), Cassian, and especially the *Lausiac History*. The arguments of the school of Weingarten, that these are monastic works of the 6th cent., may be said to have been finally disposed of by Dom Cuthbert Butler in his admirable edition of the *Lausiac History*. From these sources we draw a wealth of material concerning the ascetic movement, which is supplemented by the later Coptic documents. The first man who actually led the ascetic life, cut off from his fellow-men, was one Paul, who was driven into the desert during the Decian persecutions in 250, and there may well have been others who were forced to lead solitary lives owing to the same circumstances; but it is to Anthony that the world looks as the founder of eremitic solitude.

Born probably about the year 250, of *fellah* parents, Anthony was converted to Christianity as a boy by hearing the Gospels read in a church. (As he is said to have known no Greek, this presupposes the existence of a Coptic version at this early date.) For fifteen years he lived with ascetics, who at that time practised the ascetic life in huts built outside the town;

but, deeming this insufficient, he withdrew to the desert, and endured a life of strict solitude in a cave for upwards of twenty years. During this period large numbers were fired with his enthusiasm, and the burning deserts of Lower Egypt, especially those of Scete and Nitria, swarmed with solitaries who were following his example. About the year 305 he was induced to quit his cave and organize these bands of monks, and, later, he was even persuaded by Athanasius to come to Alexandria to preach against Arianism. He died at an advanced age, and left special directions that his body should not be preserved by mummification, as he had expressed his detestation of the Christians continuing this pagan custom. The ideals of monachism that he left as a heritage are remarkable for the fact that they possess little system. There was no particular Rule of Life in the Antonian communities, although the elder and more leading ascetics were looked to for advice, and sought as arbiters in disputes. The monks would visit one another frequently, and discourse on the Scriptures and the life of the Spirit, but there were also those who dwelt in the further desert of 'cells,' who were hermits indeed, living out of sight and hearing of their fellow-men and one another, enduring the most extraordinary physical deprivations, and warding off absolute intellectual stagnation by repeating long passages from the Psalms and other Scriptures learnt by heart. Although the monks assembled on Saturdays and Sundays in the great church, the other days of the week were spent mostly in solitude. The whole system was individualistic, each working for his personal advance in virtue, contending against his fellows in severities and mortification of the flesh, and striving, as Dom Butler says, 'to make a record' in austerities, and to outdo the others in the length of his fasts, and his general observance of the ascetic life.

About the same time that Anthony left his desert cavern to organize his followers, Pachomius, another Egyptian, founded a more cohesive system of monachism in the south, at Tabennisi. Pachomius also was born of pagan parents, and, according to the Coptic 'Life,' was for some time a member of one of the communities of Serapis at Shenesit (Chenoboscium). These communities, although hardly ascetic in the stricter sense of the word, were priestly organizations bound by definite rules; and it is quite possible that Pachomius may have utilized some points in their system when, after he had been converted to Christianity, he founded his cœnobitic monastery of monks. Briefly, the Pachomian organization was as follows. In place of the friendly and almost family relation of the monks to one another in the Antonian communities, he substituted a much more definite system. The monastery was divided into houses presided over by a superior and steward, in each of which the monks carried on a particular trade—gardening, husbandry, carpentry, iron-work, dyeing, tanning, and so forth; and these trades were carried on, not as penances, but as a useful occupation in life. It would appear that the austerities of the northern monks were not attempted, although any one monk could practise especial severities if he pleased. Food was to be eaten in sufficient quantities for a man's daily need, and meals were to be taken in common, although the cowl was to be drawn over the head so that each should be invisible to his fellow while eating. They learnt the Scriptures by heart, and assembled in the great church only on the more solemn festivals. So rapid was the extension of Pachomius's system, that at his death (*c.* 345) it included eight monasteries and many hundreds of monks, while his sister had founded a similar institution for women.

It is difficult to give a just estimate of this movement, which is the most outstanding, not only in Egypt, but in the entire Church of the time. That the monks offered in many cases examples of great patience, self-denial, and singleness of heart and spirit is not to be denied. On the other hand, few of his followers seem to have been possessed with the kindliness and shrewdness that are generally attributed to Anthony. Many of them outdid one another in the severity of their ascetic self-discipline, but it would appear in many cases that the general result was a stunting of the intellect and a narrowing of the outlook on life. Amélineau, whose acquaintance with the documents of this period is very extensive, has said that it has been customary to hold up the monks of the pre-Chalcedon days as a pattern of virtue, and the Jacobite as a picture of vice, whereas, as a matter of fact, there is little to distinguish between the two; that the Egyptian monk, although given to asceticism, was at times a very ordinary mortal, 'mangeant net, buvant sec,' and prone to irregularities of life. Certainly even the most admiring chroniclers relate with perfect frankness sad lapses from virtue on the part of individual ascetics. This, however, does not imply that all were bad, and there is no doubt that at first the ascetics were, on the whole, animated by a high ideal. They threw themselves passionately on the side of Athanasius during the Arian controversy, and sheltered him in their desert communities while he was in exile. It is highly improbable that they understood the complicated doctrinal point involved; it was sufficient for them that Arius seemed to desire to dethrone the Son from His equality with the Father. But, as time went on, they became fiercer, more bigoted, and a prey to the inherent superstitions of their race. Childish miracles and belief in innumerable devils took the place of the old magic and demonology which had fascinated the Egyptians in pagan times, while in the following century the fact that hordes of fierce monks could be summoned to Alexandria by the patriarch led to the increase of religious turbulence and sectarian strife.

There is no doubt that the adoption of Christianity as the State religion and the rise of monasticism were the immediate forerunners of a period of steady deterioration throughout the Egyptian Church. The death-knell of paganism was already rung, and with it that of the culture and freedom of philosophic thought that had made Alexandria the intellectual centre of the Hellenistic world. In 379 the Emperor Theodosius attempted to force the Christian faith on the entire population of the Roman Empire, and this was followed in 385 by the sack of the temple of Serapis and the conversion of other pagan temples into churches. Meanwhile the character of the illiterate monks began to assert itself, and their child-like faith in angels and demons led to the communities of Scete being accused by the patriarch Theophilus of Origenism, while the unscrupulousness of the latter's methods, as revealed in the incident of the Tall Brothers, led to recriminations and unedifying quarrels. In fact, the power of the patriarch had risen to such a pitch that he did not hesitate to consider that those who were his theological opponents were rebels against the Emperor, and, acting in accordance with this idea, he took some troops and destroyed several of the Nitrian monasteries. During the reign of his successor, Cyril, turbulence and disorder increased rather than diminished. The Christians organized a wholesale plundering of the Jews in Alexandria, whose quarters were sacked by hordes of monks and fanatics, and the richest element of the community was driven into exile. This was followed by the murder of Hypatia, a young and beautiful woman, who strove to keep alight the lamp of pagan culture by lectures on Neo-Platonic philosophy. The bigotry and turbulence of the Christian mob at this period seem to have known no bounds. But, as the Patriarchs grew more powerful, and the Christians more fanatical, the relations between the Egyptian Church and Constantinople became more and more strained, until open rupture took place on a question of doctrine, which was decided at a Council held at Chalcedon in 451.

4. **Monophysitism.**—The controversy which had been the cause of the Council of Nicæa was concerned with the relationship of the Son to the Father. The fresh divisions that were taking place in the Church were now due to disputes on the nature of the Son—whether that nature was human or Divine, or both. Cyril, who had already been on bad terms with the See of Constantinople when it was occupied by John Chrysostom, had later taken a violent part in opposing the doctrines of Nestorius, which implied that the Divine nature was not incarnate in Christ, but subsidiary to the human nature. The chief opponent of the doctrine of Nestorius was a young priest named Eutyches, who, in his zeal to assert the Divine nature of Christ, went further than the Alexandrian school and Cyril were prepared to go, by asserting that, after the Incarnation, Christ had

only one nature—the Divine. Meanwhile, Cyril had died in 444, and Dioscuros, his successor, warmly supported the cause of Eutyches, backed by the majority of the Egyptian monks. Eutyches was finally declared excommunicate and banished, at the Council of Chalcedon, but he counted among his adherents the majority of the Egyptian Christians. Added to the ever-increasing friction between Constantinople and the Alexandrian See, due to the turbulence and fierce independence of the Christians of Egypt, was the peculiar bent of the Egyptian mind, unable to appreciate the subtleties of argument indulged in by the Greeks and Levantines. The attempts of the Arians to dethrone Christ from His equality with the Father they could understand, but two natures which were yet one nature—this was beyond their comprehension. Henceforward the cry was 'One Nature,' and it has remained so to this day. Egypt at this time might be described almost as one vast monastery, and the fierce ascetics of the desert stoutly maintained the doctrine of the single nature of Christ. The power of the monastic institutions was now almost paramount, and the authority exercised by such monks as Shnoute and Bgoul was enormous. The tendency was to unite the systems of Pachomius and Anthony by combining the cœnobitic or true monastic organization with the strict asceticism of the Antonian eremites, and the network of monasteries was fast extending all over the country.

5. During the 6th century.—The century following the separation of the greater part of the Egyptian Church from the orthodox at the Council of Chalcedon is remarkable in Alexandria only for the unedifying disputes between the Monophysite patriarchs and the orthodox, or *Melkites*, as they were called because of their adherence to the Imperial influence of Constantinople, and, in the upper country, to the growing power of the monastic system. The land was held largely by the monasteries, whose ruins now are not the least remarkable feature all over Egypt. The cultivation was chiefly in the hands of the monks. It is stated in the Life of Shnoute that his monastery fed the prisoners captured from a raid of the Blemmyes for three months at a cost of 265,000 drachmæ, with 85,000 *artabai* of wheat and 200 *artabai* of olives. The numerous inscribed *ostraka*, and the commencement of a vast Coptic literature, consisting chiefly of Lives and Sayings of holy men and monks, show the commercial and literary activity of the monks. They were strong enough to prevent Imperial pressure for the over-exaction of taxes, and in this way maintained to a certain extent the dwindling prosperity of the country, although the minority who were not connected with the monastic institutions were crushed by cruel burdens. But religious life was gradually sinking to a low ebb, and was distinguished by little spirituality. While the Alexandrians were occupied with the opposing factions of Melkites and Monophysites, the monks of Upper Egypt were engrossed in petty squabbles between monastery and monastery, or the enumeration of absurd miracles wrought by the foremost ascetics. Religious life, like political, was fast losing all dignity and depth.

6. The Persian and the Arab domination.—In the year 616 the break-up of the Imperial power in Egypt began with the occupation of the country by the Persians on behalf of the Sasanian king Chosroës. For ten years they held sway in Egypt. Whether the Copts welcomed their new masters is a matter of some doubt. That they hated the Byzantine domination is certain. Ever since Justinian had given the Melkite Patriarch the military authority of a prefect, in the futile hope of coercing the Monophysites into orthodoxy, the Copts had been harried and oppressed by the Imperial power. The whole nation now looked to their own elected Patriarch, not so much as the champion of the Monophysite doctrine, but as the leader of the nationalists against the minions of Imperial bigotry and corruption. The wonderful victories of Heraclius, who drove out the Persians and re-conquered Jerusalem and the Holy Sepulchre, were a cause of rejoicing to orthodox and Monophysite alike throughout the Eastern Empire, and it is possible that a wiser statesman than the Emperor might, amid the universal rejoicings of Christendom, have secured some kind of reconciliation. But Heraclius would extend no tolerance to heretics, with the result that a few years later, when a sterner and more implacable enemy was at the gate, the Copts of Egypt were ready to welcome him. In 642, Egypt was ceded to 'Amr ibn al-'Asi, who had conquered it in the name of Islām.

The Arab tradition is that the conquest was aided by the treachery of one called Muḳauḳis (probably the Byzantine honorific title μεγαυχής), who is generally supposed to have been the Coptic Patriarch. It must be mentioned, however, that it has been ably argued by A. J. Butler in *The Arab Conquest of Egypt* (1902), that the Copts were intensely hostile to the Arabs, and that the treacherous 'Muḳauḳis' was none other than Cyrus, the Melkite Patriarch. It is probable that the Copts, after years of oppression on the part of the orthodox and Imperial party, welcomed their new masters as a change which, as they thought, could not in any case be for the worse.

From the doctrinal and ethical point of view, the Coptic Church has little history of interest during its long subjection to the rule of Islām. The Arab invaders imposed a poll-tax on all infidels, and it is probable that from the first many were converted to the faith of Muhammad in order to avoid payment. For the first three centuries or more, it is true, considerable activity is evinced by Coptic literature, which is represented during this period by countless MSS, chiefly of a homiletic character, or containing Lives of holy men, although such important historical works as the *Chronicles* of John of Nikiou must not be overlooked. Such art as was still possessed by the Christian workman was either suppressed or forced into the service of his masters. The Copts, as they gradually became a smaller and smaller section of the population, were ostracized by the Muhammadans and cut off from all intellectual stimulus and growth. They do not seem to have shared in any way in the artistic and intellectual triumphs characteristic of certain periods among the Muslims. It is true that under some rulers individual Christians rose to high office, but their position was usually even more precarious than that of their Muhammadan colleagues. Frequently they were subjected to severe persecution, and were forced to wear dark cloaks; and under Hakim, since Muslim and Christian were much alike when naked in the public baths, they were compelled to have a cross branded on their bodies in order that none of the faithful might wittingly be polluted by contact with the infidel. Such a system was bound in time to crush the Christians almost out of existence. The monasteries dwindled, and finally, in the 17th cent., the Coptic language itself ceased to be spoken, although certain portions of the Scriptures are still read in the churches to this day in the ancient language. The Copts seem to have been little influenced by the victories of the Crusaders, and, indeed, as Crusaders and Copts looked on each other as heretics, little co-operation would have been possible. It is interesting to note that the surrender of Constantinople to the Turks seems to have reacted badly on them even in their then wretched state of ignorance; for in the correspondence, so long after that event as 1617, addressed by Cyril, then Coptic Patriarch, to George Abbot, archbishop of Canterbury, we

read: 'On account of our sins we are become the most contemptible of all nations; and with the overthrow of the Empire have lost the liberal arts' (Neale, *Hist. of the Eastern Church*, ii. [1850] 385). From the 16th cent. onwards the Roman Church has made intermittent efforts to convert the Copts to Roman Catholicism, but with little success. They have clung to their own Monophysite doctrine, and to their ritual of St. Mark, with the same doggedness with which they have resisted Islām.

7. The Coptic Church of to-day.—After centuries of oppression and ostracism, the Copts to-day are naturally a people apart. The males having intermarried little with the Arabs, they are supposed to represent more faithfully the old Egyptian type; but this is doubtful. Several of their fine churches, some of them dating from Byzantine times, are still in use, although stripped for the most part of their woodwork and pictures. The liturgy and ritual of St. Mark are in use. The Eucharist is in one kind, only the priests taking the wine; the bread is given to the communicants in wooden spoons, and confession is obligatory before receiving the Eucharist. Women are not allowed into the body of the church, but confined to the narthex. There are five great fasts: (1) the Fast of Nineveh, for three days and three nights before Lent; (2) the Great Fast (Lent), occupying 55 days; (3) the Fast of the Nativity, during the 28 days before Christmas; (4) the Fast of the Apostles, following the Festival of the Ascension; (5) the Fast of the Virgin, for 15 days prior to the Feast of the Assumption. The Festivals are those of the Nativity, *el Ghitâs*, or Baptism of Jesus, the Annunciation, Palm Sunday, Easter (the Great Festival), Ascension, and Whitsunday. Baptism is universal, and, though attempts have been made by the Patriarchs in the past to enforce its early application, boys, as a rule, are not baptized till they are 40, and girls till they are 80, days old. Circumcision is general. The hierarchy to-day consists of the Patriarch, 12 bishops, and priests and deacons. The Patriarch is always elected from among the monks of the Monastery of St. Anthony. In recent years the Copts have acquired considerable wealth, and in some districts have become important members of the community. Their willingness to be educated is shown by the fact that, though they are only 6 per cent of the population of Egypt, 17 per cent of the children at school are Copts. This education is enhanced by the schools of the foreign missionaries, which supply teaching of a sort that enables the Copts to become clerks and book-keepers—occupations to which their talents are admirably adapted; but attempts to turn them into Protestants or Roman Catholics are of doubtful wisdom. The monastic system is still in force, and some of the ancient monasteries are inhabited by a few monks; but the monks themselves are narrow and ignorant, while in a few cases they have not a very good reputation for an orderly life. With regard to marriage, and more especially death, the Copts have adopted many of the customs of their Muslim neighbours.

This article cannot be closed without some mention of the Copts as missionaries. During the 6th and 7th centuries the whole of Nubia was Christianized, and for many years the Arabs were opposed by the Christian kingdoms which had their centres at Dongola, Alwa, and Soba. But the missionary efforts of the Copts did not stop here, for Christianity was afterwards introduced into Abyssinia. In connexion with this, mention may be made of the recently found gravestone of a Coptic bishop of the island of Sai, beyond the second cataract, probably dating from the 9th cent.; the ruins of churches between Ḳasr Ibrahim and Wadi Ḥalfa, the subject of a recent monograph by Mileham (*Churches in Lower Nubia*, Univ. of Pennsylvania, 1910); and also the newly discovered Nubian version of the Life of St. Menas, published (1909) by Budge for the Trustees of the British Museum. The Christian communities of Nubia, which at one time extended from Assuan to the Blue Nile, gradually crumbled away, from pressure exerted either by the neighbouring heathen tribes, or by the Muslims, until they were finally exterminated by the powerful Fung dynasty of negro kings at the end of the 15th century. Abyssinia, however, remained Christian and Monophysite, and its Metropolitan is still a Coptic bishop appointed by the Patriarch of Alexandria.

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P. D. SCOTT-MONCRIEFF.

CORN, CORN-SPIRIT.—See HARVEST.

CORNERS.

CORNERS.—Among the Semitic peoples, as among others also, an especial sacredness or significance was supposed to pertain to the corners of structures, fields, and other objects. The evidence for this conception can be most widely traced among the Semitic peoples in connexion with buildings.

1. Bab.-Assyrian.—Among the Babylonians and Assyrians it took the form of making a deposit of inscriptions and images under the corner or corners of a temple, palace, or tower. The inscriptions were, in the Assyrian and Neo-Babylonian periods, usually in the form of hexagonal, octagonal, or decagonal cylinders, or cylinders in the form of barrels. Such deposits, placed under the corners or built into them, were found by Taylor at Mugheir, Loftus at Senkereh, Rawlinson at Birs Nimroud, Botta and Oppert at Khorsabad,[1] and Rassam at Kouyunjik. The great cylinder of Ashurbanipal was found at the corner of a room, not at the corner of a building. Many of the chronicles of the Bab. and Assyr. kings were prepared and deposited in little receptacles of masonry at the corners of walls. At Telloh, de Sarzec found similar receptacles which contained bronze statuettes of human figures,[2] both male and female, and of animals.[3] The making of these deposits was probably, as in Egypt, accompanied by sacrifice. Thus Sargon of Assyria (722–705 B.C.) says (Cylinder Inscription, l. 60): 'To the brick-god, the lord of brick foundations, and to the chief architect, Bel, I offered a sacrificial lamb, I poured a libation, I raised the lifting up of hands.'[4]

In emphasizing the importance of this custom, Perrot and Chipiez are led into one slight error. They state that king Nabu-na'id (555–538 B.C.) says that he sought for the corner-stones of Ḫammurabi and of one of the Kassite kings, digging until he found them. The impression is that he identified the corner-stones of the respective kings by reading the inscriptions deposited in connexion with them—an idea which is gained from a translation of an inscription of Nabu-na'id made by Oppert when the science of Assyriology was young. We now

[1] See Perrot-Chipiez, *Hist. de l'art dans l'ant.* ii. 328–333; and George Smith, *Assyr. Discoveries*, London, 1883, p. 59.

[2] See *TSBA* vii. 57, and Plan A.

[3] See Perrot-Chipiez, *op. cit.* 329; E. de Sarzec, *Découvertes en Chaldée*, Paris, 1884, p. 53 ff.

[4] See Lyon, *Keilschrifttexte Sargons*, Leipzig, 1883, p. 37.

know that a *temenu* was not a corner-stone, but a paved court or terrace. Since such pavements were usually made of bricks, each one of which was stamped with the name of the builder, they were easily identified.

2. Egyptian.—In Egypt, foundation deposits have been found at several places. One made by Thothmes IV. of the XVIIIth dynasty is reported from Memphis;[1] another set was found at each of the corners of a temple at Nebesheh built by Aahmes II. of the XXVIth dynasty;[2] another, under a XXVIth dynasty building at Defenneh founded by Psametik I.;[3] a complete set belonging to a building of Hophrah, at Naukratis;[4] and at three corners of a temple of the Ptolemaic period, at Gemaiyemi.[5] At Thebes, foundation deposits showed that a temple built by Queen Tausert of the XIXth dynasty once stood on a spot south of the Ramesseum, although the temple itself had entirely disappeared.[6] At Abydos, foundation deposits, or the receptacles for them, were found from Thothmes III. and Amenophis III. of the XVIIIth dynasty,[7] Sesostris III. of the XIIth dynasty,[8] and Pepi of the VIth dynasty.[9] At Koptos, a box (though robbed of its contents) was found under a threshold;[10] at Kahun, a receptacle (still full) under the middle of a building of Sesostris II. of the XIIth dynasty;[11] and, at Illahun, deposits at the corners of a temple also by the last-mentioned monarch.[12] At Gizeh no such deposits were found under the temples belonging to the IVth dynasty.[13] These deposits in Egypt consisted of plaques of copper or stone on which the name of the builder was inscribed, together with models of the tools and materials which were used in the construction. At Defenneh, however, the bones of birds and animals offered in sacrifice were also found, together with the ashes of sacrifices which had been consumed. These showed that the sacrifice was the important feature connected with the deposits, and that the other objects were incidental to it. A similar deposit has recently been found under the corner of the castle of a Nubian chieftain of the time of the XVIIIth dynasty in Egyptianized Nubia. This differed, however, from the Egyptian deposits in that it consisted of ten mud-sealings. These represent a conqueror wearing the Nubian ostrich feather, who holds a crouching captive by a cord. On a level with the chief's shoulder is the figure of an animal like a dog.[14]

3. Canaanite.—The evidence for the sacredness of corners and for foundation sacrifices in ancient Palestine is of a more grim nature. At Gezer the skeleton of a woman was found built into the wall of a house at the corner.[15] More numerous, however, were the skeletons of children found under the corners, children having been used for such sacrifices oftener than adults.[16] The sacrifices at Gezer, like the Egyptian deposits, were not always placed at the corners. The skeleton of a man, and sometimes those of children, were found buried under the middle of a house or a room.[17] With these sacrifices, vessels to contain food for the victims were also buried, as sometimes were lamps. Later, the sacrifices themselves were omitted, but the bowl and lamp were still used as foundation deposits.[18] At Megiddo and Taanach, foundations were apparently consecrated by human sacrifices, but those reported were not found at the corners, but in the centre of the houses or rooms.[1]

4. Hebrew.—From the sacred nature and importance of corner-stones, which in the earlier time led to such ceremonies as have been described, certain literary uses have survived in the Old Testament. Thus Jer 51[26] and Job 38[6] use 'corners' and 'corner-stones' as synonyms for 'foundations.' In Jg 20[2] and 1 S 14[38] 'corners' is used figuratively for 'chiefs'; in Zec 10[4] 'corner-stone' is apparently a synonym for 'ruler.' In Is 28[16] it occurs in an enigmatic passage, where, whether the 'corner-stone' is a figure for a king or a kingdom, or for trust in Jahweh or the relation of Jahweh to His people, the result is righteousness. Such figurative uses of 'corner' led in two late passages to the thought that it was the crowning stone of a corner, not the foundation stone, which was important (see Ps 118[22], Zec 4[7]).

In Zec 9[15] the 'corners of the altar' are mentioned as being 'filled.' These were projections which were sometimes called 'horns' (see ALTAR [Semitic], § 17). Possibly, like the corners of buildings, the corners of the altar were thought to be specially sacred.

The sacredness which attached to corners was applied by the Hebrews to the hair. Lv 19[27] reads, 'Ye shall not round the corners of your heads, neither shalt thou mar the corners of thy beard.' As under certain circumstances hair was regarded by the Semites as sacred to Jahweh (see W. R. Smith, pp. 323-331), possibly the corners were all considered to be sacred to Him. One might infer from the statement of Herodotus (iii. 8) about the hair of the Arabs that they sacrificed the 'corners' of their hair to their god. Whatever the motive of the Levitical regulation,—whether to differentiate their custom from that of the heathen Arabs, or simply to keep locks sacred to Jahweh untouched,—it has produced among the Jews of modern Palestine and elsewhere in the Orient and in Eastern Europe, as well as among the strictly orthodox Jews of Russia and Poland, the curious custom of permitting the lock at each side of the forehead to grow long. These locks are curled and permitted to hang down in front of the ears, presenting a peculiar appearance, and distinguishing the Jew from all other religionists in that land (cf. Mannheimer, in *JE* ix. 595).

Another Hebrew regulation, arising from the sacredness of corners, was the law which forbade a man in harvest to reap the corners of his field (Lv 19[9] 23[22]). Because the corner of the field was sacred to Jahweh, the grain which grew in it must be left, that the poor might come and gather it. This regulation was generally observed in OT times, as the Book of Ruth shows. Since the law was indefinite, however, just what this law demanded of a farmer became a matter of debate when the oral law developed. The results of these discussions were afterwards embodied in the Mishnic tract *Pe'ah*, or 'Corner.' Perhaps because the Bab. Jews were nearly all engaged in commerce, this tract is copied in the Bab. Talmud without additions. But in Palestine, where the Jews were still agriculturists, the law of the 'corner' was still vital and developing, so that the Jerusalem Talmud contains a Gemara upon the Mishnic text.

The first problem to which the Rabbis addressed themselves was how much the owner of a field must leave for the poor in order to satisfy the law. It was agreed that a just man would leave one-

[1] Petrie, *Memphis*, vol. i., London, 1909, p. 8.
[2] Petrie, *Nebesheh (Am) and Defenneh (Tahpanhes)*, London, 1888, p. 14.
[3] *Ib.* p. 55.
[4] Petrie, *Naukratis*, London, 1886, p. 28.
[5] Petrie, *Nebesheh*, etc., p. 39 f.
[6] Maspero, *Manual of Egypt. Archæology*[5], p. 49.
[7] Petrie, *Abydos*, vol. i., London, 1902.
[8] *Ib.* vol. iii., 1904, p. 10.
[9] *Ib.* vol. ii., 1903, p. 11.
[10] Petrie, *Koptos*, London, 1896, p. 11.
[11] Petrie, *Kahun, Gurob, and Hawara*, London, 1890, p. 22.
[12] Petrie, *Illahun, Kahun, and Gurob*, London, 1891, p. 5.
[13] A private letter from Reisner.
[14] See D. Randall Maciver, *Areika*, Oxford, 1909, p. 9.
[15] See Macalister, *Bible Side Lights*, p. 168 ff.
[16] *Ib.* p. 170 ff.
[17] *Ib.* p. 169 ff.
[18] *Ib.* p. 171.

[1] See Schumacher, *Tell el-Mutesellim*, Leipzig, 1908, pp. 45, 54; Sellin, *Tell Ta'annek*, Vienna, 1904, p. 61.

sixtieth of the field as a 'corner,' though the amount might vary with the size of the field, the number of the poor, and the richness of the yield. If a man left one stalk standing, he could not be held to have broken the law, for the sacred text did not define the size of a corner. Seemingly all possible questions were raised and decided by the Rabbis. For example, they decided that a man fulfilled the law if he left the proper amount in the middle of the field instead of in a corner; that the law applied to leguminous plants as well as to grain; that it applied to the following trees: tanners' sumac, the carob tree, nut trees, almond trees, vineyards, pomegranates, olive trees, and the date palm. They had to decide when the 'corner' should be estimated before the tithes were paid, and when after; when two men shared a field, whether they must both leave a 'corner'; if a man raised two kinds of grain in his field, whether he must leave a corner for each; if a man left a 'corner' for the poor and they did not take it, how long he must wait before he could take it himself; whether, if something more than what was intended were left in the field through forgetfulness, the owner could return for it, or whether it must be counted as a 'corner'; whether a rich man, who, when on a journey, had been compelled to avail himself of *pe'ah*, was obliged to restore it; and many other points such as arose in administering the law.

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CORRUPTION AND BRIBERY.—I. Ancient Rome.—For first-hand information on bribery in ancient Rome we naturally turn to the speeches of Cicero, *pro Cn. Plancio* and *pro L. Murena*. As we study these, we feel inclined to subscribe to the dictum of Montesquieu upon the condition of Rome and her provinces under the Republic: 'La liberté était dans le centre, et la tyrannie aux extrémités.' The provinces were the farm of the Roman people, and the provincials were the live stock to be fleeced by the governor. Whether a Cæcilius or a Cornelius obtained a province, it is at once clear that the main aim of the governor, during the year of his provincial life, was to acquire enough money to purchase that supreme object of his ambition—the consulship. In order to ingratiate himself with the people, he therefore supplied the citizens of Rome with large quantities of corn below cost price, the deficiency being made up by the province. When the rivalry for the consulship grew acute, it became usual for a candidate, anxious to secure his election, to give the people a *munus*, or 'treat,' in the way of a gladiatorial show. A *munus*, it may be remarked, sometimes cost the candidate a matter of seven thousand pounds. All this expense came out of the amount accumulated during the year of provincial life, and an ample margin had likewise to be provided to bribe the jury who should try the successful candidate for bribing the tribes. This indirect bribery of the people dated from the beginning of the 6th cent. of Rome.

'For five hundred years,' writes Mommsen (*Hist.* iii. 40), 'the community had been content with one festival in the year, and with one circus. The first Roman demagogue by profession, Gaius Flaminius, added a second festival and a second circus [in the year 220 B.C.]; and by these institutions—the tendency of which is sufficiently indicated by the very name of the new festival, "the plebeian games"—he probably purchased the permission to give battle at the Trasimene lake.'

In 159 B.C. the *lex Cornelia* punished with exile those found guilty of bribing the electors with money; it is, therefore, evident that the direct purchase of the votes of the electors must have existed a considerable time before the passing of that law. Indeed, as early as the year 432 B.C., we meet with the first law against *ambitus*, forbidding persons to add white to their dress to signify that they were candidates. 'Ne cui album,' Livy informs us (IV. xxv. 13), 'investimentum addere petitionis liceret causa.' This measure reminds us of the (English) Corrupt Practices Act of 1854, prohibiting the giving of cockades to voters. The *lex Poetelia* (358 B.C.) forbade candidates to carry on their canvass anywhere save in the Forum and Campus Martius. 'De ambitu,' writes Livy (VII. xv. 12), 'ab C. Poetelio tribuno plebis auctoribus patribus tum primum ad populum latum est; eaque rogatione novorum maxime hominum ambitionem, qui nundinas et conciliabula obire soliti erant, conpressam credebant.' The laws against *ambitus* increased in number, but decreased in value. In 181 B.C. the *lex Cornelia Baebia* was passed (Liv. XL. xix. 11). Attempts were made to remedy the corrupt practices of the day by the *lex Gabinia*, or Ballot Act (139 B.C.), and the *lex Maria*. In the former it was enacted that in elections voting should be by ballot, *i.e.* by writing the name of the candidate on a ticket or tablet (*tabella*). By the latter, C. Marius, in his second consulate (104 B.C.), established the *pontes*, or narrow passages to the voting-booths, by which he designed the protection of the voters against the evil influence of the astute electioneering agents. Regular agents (*interpretes*) were employed to arrange the bargain with the elector, and the money promised (*pronuntiata* [cf. Cic. *pro. Planc.* 45; *Ep. ad Att.* I. xvi. 13]) was paid by the candidates themselves, either directly to the paymasters (*divisores* [cf. *Ep. ad Att.* IV. xvi. 7; *pro Planc.* 55]) for distribution, or to trustees (*sequestres*) appointed by the parties, who held it until the elections were over. Cicero, in the *de Lege Agr.* (ii. 4), terms the *lex Gabinia* the law whereby 'Liberty can assert herself without a word'; but in practice the voice of Liberty was as much stifled then as it was afterwards in the case of the English boroughs. In Rome, as in England, electors appear to have habitually adhered to their contracts.

By the *lex Ælia Calpurnia* (67 B.C.), a heavy fine was imposed on the candidate who should use bribery, whether successful or not; and this law deprived him for ever of the right of holding an office or sitting in the Senate, in this respect surpassing in stringency even the Corrupt Practices Prevention Act, under which the disability to sit in the House of Commons or to vote at an election to Parliament lasts only seven years. This just law contains a provision which grates somewhat harshly on our ears. If a person convicted of bribery secured the conviction of another on the same charge, in the eyes of the law his guilt was wiped out. The *lex Ælia Calpurnia* seems to have inflicted a fine on *divisores* and other agents, thus recognizing a principle which was long ignored in English legislation. The law in question was repeated, with additional rigour as to its penal clauses, in the *lex Tullia de ambitu*, which was passed in Cicero's consulate (63 B.C.). The purport of this measure is given in the *Scholia Bobbiensia* (p. 309) and in Dio Cassius (xxxvii. 29), as well as by Cicero himself in several passages of the speeches *pro Murena* (47, 89), *in Vatinium*, and others (*pro Sest.* 133; *Interr. in Vat.* 37; *pro Planc.* 83).

In his desire for reform, Cicero was supported by all true patriots, amongst others by Servius Sulpicius, who wished for some change of the laws

relating to elections under certain conditions, viz. to establish *confusio suffragiorum*, or 'mass-voting,' as a means of preventing bribery, whenever a fresh election took place in consequence of an elected magistrate having been convicted of *ambitus*. We also begin to hear of *iudices editicii* to try cases of bribery. The Senate, on Cicero's motion, declared by a *senatus-consultum* the provisions of the *lex Ælia Calpurnia* applicable to any candidate who should keep about him hired followers, or who should entertain the people with gladiatorial shows —except under the peculiar circumstances of its being required by a testamentary disposition—or refreshments of any kind. The last clause is perhaps the earliest law against 'treating' of which we find record. In the provinces the *lex Coloniæ Genetivæ* likewise forbade treating at municipal elections. By it—and the provisions sound wonderfully modern—no candidate is to give, or cause to be given, dinners; he is not to have more than nine any day at dinner; nor is he to give, or cause to be given, bribes or gifts; nor is any one else to give dinners or bribes for him. The penalty for the violation of this statute is five thousand sesterces. The *lex Tullia* of Cicero's consulate confirmed the provisions of the *lex Ælia Calpurnia*, punished corrupt candidates with ten years' exile, and inflicted severe penalties on corrupt electors. It prohibited the candidate from exhibiting gladiatorial shows or public amusements within two years of the commencement of his candidature.

If efficiently enforced, the *lex Tullia* should have stamped out bribery. Roman history, however, shows how little effect this law exercised in putting an end to corruption. The price of the consulate showed no tendency to fall. The quotations for the year 54 B.C. show the enormous figure of ten million sesterces—practically £100,000—offered for the first voting division alone. A few facts about some of the chief men speak eloquently as to the spread of bribery. In the year 62 B.C., Cæsar owed nearly £250,000 sterling. When twenty-four years of age, Marcus Antonius owed £50,000; fourteen years later his liability was no less than £300,000. Cicero (*Ep. ad Att.* IV. xv. 7) writes to Atticus: 'Bribery is at boiling point. *Ecce signum*! On 15th July interest on money rose from 4 to 8 per cent.' This means that money was so much in demand for the electors that the rate of interest doubled. The Senate felt impelled to take action, and in 61 B.C. two noteworthy decrees were passed. By one it was rendered lawful to search the houses of magistrates suspected of having money deposited with them to be used for corrupt purposes (*ib.* I. xvi. 13). By the other it was enacted that any magistrate in whose house bribing agents should be harboured should be held guilty of a State offence. When Cicero (*pro Planc.*) speaks of a sum of money hidden in the Flaminian circus, and seized by the authorities, he clearly implies that the concealers thereof meant the voters to find it.

This ancient plan has been imitated in modern times. For example, in 1868 each freeman in the city of Dublin received his £5 note from a hole in the wall. At Shaftesbury, in 1774, an alderman of the town, disguised as Punch, passed through a hole in the door twenty guineas to each voter, for which each was obliged to sign a bill payable to a fictitious Glenbucket, in order to disguise the nature of the transaction.

The two decrees of 61 B.C. were as ill obeyed as their predecessors. In the year 59 B.C. was carried the *lex Licinia de Sodaliciis*, which forbade the corruption of the tribes by means of the illegal organization of clubs. This law brings before us the difference between legal and illegal canvassing, and at times the border line between the two was thin. For example, it was right and proper to give treats or public shows to the voters in their tribes (*tributim*), but it was illegitimate if given to the people *en masse* (*vulgo*). It was right and proper to employ *liberalitas* in the conduct of the election, while it was wrong and improper to use *largitio* (*pro Mur.* 77). It was fitting that candidates should look to their *sodalicia*, or 'brotherhoods,' for assistance at the time of election; but, if they employed the *sodales* to mark off the tribe into small companies (*decuriæ*), each to be brought by the wiles of one of the brotherhood to favour a particular candidate, then the Licinian law pronounced this candidate guilty of using undue influence (on the *modus operandi*, cf. *pro Planc.* 44-47, also 37, 39). Unsuccessful candidates could be punished for ordinary *ambitus*, but only successful ones could be tried under the provisions of the Act *de Sodaliciis*. In 52 B.C. Pompeius introduced a measure against bribery, intimidation, and illegal influence, which applied to offences committed so far back as 20 years before his third consulship. That the offenders were many is evident from the letters of Cicero. In *Fam.* VII. ii. 4 he writes: 'I am kept incessantly at work by the number of trials under the new Act.' The retrospective clause proved of grave importance, and in the issue hastened the fall of the Republic. Julius Cæsar perceived the hopelessness of attempting to suppress corruption by statute, and he endeavoured to minimize its effects by reserving to himself the choice of half the candidates. Under the Empire the all-important power of the Princeps left no room for *ambitio*, save in the restricted sphere of election to municipal office. The attention of Augustus was directed not against electoral corruption, but against the bribing of jurymen. Cicero's reference to this is well known. Clodius had been acquitted on the charge of violating the rites of the Bona Dea, when Cicero gave evidence against the *alibi* which he set up. 'The jury,' sneered Clodius, 'did not give you credit on your oath.' 'Yes,' retorted Cicero, 'twenty-five out of the fifty-six did; the remaining thirty-one refused you credit, for they took the bribe in advance.'

When we bear in mind the scanty amount of legislation in early times, it is obvious that strenuous efforts—at least on paper—were made to put down corruption. In practice, however, little was done, and we feel inclined to think that many of these laws savoured of the pious resolutions often passed at public meetings nowadays. The laws, like the resolutions, looked well. An unenlightened electorate like the Roman may have a vague sense of public duty which we may call Imperialism. Unless moved by this spirit, or unless highly organized by the party system, it is almost inevitable that bribes will be employed with such voters. The Roman lacked this sense of Imperialism, and he certainly lacked the party spirit.

'Party phrases,' writes Mommsen (iii. 300), 'were in free circulation: of the parties themselves there was little trace in matters really and directly practical. Throughout the whole seventh century the annual public elections to the civil magistracies, especially to the consulship and censorship, formed the real standing question of the day, and the focus of political agitation; but it was only in isolated and rare instances that the different candidates represented opposite political principles; ordinarily the question related purely to persons, and it was for the course of affairs a matter of indifference whether the majority of votes fell to a Cæcilian or to a Cornelian. The Romans thus lacked that which outweighs and compensates all the evils of party-life—the free and common movement of the masses towards what they discern as a befitting aim—and yet endured all those evils solely for the benefit of the paltry game of the ruling coteries.'

2. Ancient Greece.—Greek history discloses a purer state of affairs than Roman, and this is due, *inter alia*, to the fact that Imperialism and party spirit prevailed to a large extent in Greece. Nicias knew that he could reckon on the spirit of Imperialism when he reminded his soldiers, in dire straits in the harbour of Syracuse, of τὸ μέγα ὄνομα τῶν Ἀθηνῶν. The democracy of Athens possessed

a political education superior to the Roman, and her citizens developed a sense of duty to the City of the Violet Crown, not possessed to the same extent by him who owed allegiance to the City of the Seven Hills. When no longer moved by these better feelings, party spirit (ἐριθεία) exercised much influence. Solon saw the useful aspect of loyalty to party when he punished the citizen who, on the outbreak of any sedition or attempt at revolution, should stand aloof and take part with neither side—an enactment that we find in some Continental constitutions. Aristotle (*Pol.* v. ix. 11) records the terms of an oligarchical oath taken on assuming office. 'And I will be malignant,' it runs, 'against the people, and I will devise against them whatever evil I can.' In order to meet with a parallel to this frank statement of one's duty to his party, we must refer to the notorious remark of President Andrew Jackson when he proclaimed the doctrine, 'To the victors belong the spoils.' The dependence of office on lot, the mode of electing the elders in Lacedæmon (Plutarch, *Lycurg.* 26), rendered electoral corruption impossible in Greece. One fact is highly significant. The word δεκάζειν, the only Greek word for 'to bribe,' is a very rare verb indeed, and its normal use is for tampering with juries rather than with electors. Aristotle does not recognize electoral corruption at all, unless such be his meaning when he says that in Carthage the most important offices, including even the throne and the command of the forces, were 'purchasable' (ὠνητάς, *Pol.* II. xi. 10), adding the outspoken reflexion, 'It is natural that a man should make money of his office if he has to pay for it.' Perhaps his meaning is that it may have been possible to purchase high office in Carthage, just as it was possible, till our own day, to purchase commissions in the British army or judicial positions in France. If his meaning is that office was accessible only by bribery,—and this seems to be the view of Polybius (VI. lvi. 4),—then in this respect Carthage, in the opinion of Aristotle, was unique in the ancient world.

The payment of persons invested with public functions to induce them to use them unjustly, and of juries to procure verdicts against the evidence, were, however, grave forms of corruption. The quarrels of Demosthenes and Æschines show how untrustworthy the public functionaries became, and the history of Sparta illustrates the same matter (Herod. ix. 87, 88).

Pausanias, for example, when attainted of treason, returned to Sparta in the certainty that he could buy off his punishment (Thuc. i. 131). Laotychides, Pleistoanax, Astoychus, Cleandridas, and Gylippus all took bribes. Thucydides tells us (viii. 45) that the trierarchs and generals of the Lacedæmonian and allied fleet—all save Hermocrates—took money from Tissaphernes to betray the interests of their country. Themistocles (Herod. viii. 4, 5) took and administered bribes; but it was to save, not to betray, his country. Aristotle evidently thought that the ephoralty in Sparta was corrupt. 'The ephors,' he remarks, 'are chosen from the whole body of the people, so the office often falls into the hands of very needy persons, who accordingly have shown themselves corrupt' (*Pol.* II. ix. 19). As he terms the ephoralty 'the keystone of the constitution,' we may infer that Sparta was more corrupt than the majority of the Greek States.

One remark of Aristotle shows clearly how little electoral corruption prevailed in Greece. He condemns canvassing; he condemns even the candidate's application for office. 'The man,' he informs us, 'who is fit for the place should have it, whether he wants it or not. No one would apply for office if he were not ambitious; and ambition and covetousness are the most common motives to crime' (*Pol.* II. ix. 27). With regard to corruption, Aristotle was plainly afraid of the embezzling of public moneys, and the dishonest discharge of public functions. To meet the former abuse, he proposes (V. viii. 19) that transfers of public money should be made in the presence of all the citizens, and that duplicates of the accounts should be deposited with certain bodies; and, to counteract the latter, that there should be 'certain distinctions ordained by law for those who have a good name for probity.' In England and other countries the latter provision is customarily observed. Aristotle holds that public officials should be absolved from the necessity of supporting themselves while serving the State. They must have leisure to govern. But at the present time, he writes (*Pol.* III. vi. 10), 'for the sake of the profit to be made out of the public purse and official position, men want to be always in office. They hunt after places with such eagerness that one might imagine they were invalids to whom health was impossible except when in office.' These official salaries, however, must not be so great as to excite cupidity. A mere competence was not the goal of that 'ambition' which Aristotle regarded with such alarm.

3. The East.—In the West we are accustomed to speak of the dangers of democracy; but in this, as in so many other particulars, no such language prevails in the East. In India—till lately, at least—the people are not to be feared. 'Blessed are the poor and needy' is the familiar account of Holy Writ. St. James, however, stands in some dread of the influence of the rich and powerful (cf. chs. 2. 5). In the East the masses are never the objects of attempts at corruption, but the classes are; whereas in the West the exact reverse holds good. The corruption in the East assumes the terrible form of being directed from below upwards. The aged Samuel, when he invites the closest examination of his conduct, exclaims, 'Whose ox have I taken? or whose ass have I taken? or whom have I defrauded? whom have I oppressed? or of whose hand have I received any bribe to blind mine eyes therewith?' (1 S 12^{3}). Amos, in his denunciation of the rule of Jeroboam II., exclaims, 'They afflict the just, they take a bribe, and they turn aside the poor in the gate from their right' (Am 5^{12}).

In the OT the acceptance of a bribe is expressly forbidden (Ex $23^{1.6.8}$, Dt 16^{19}), and one of the grievous woes of Isaiah is launched at them 'which justify the wicked for reward, and take away the righteousness of the righteous from him' (Is 5^{23}; cf. Job 15^{34}, Am 2^{6}), while 'he that despiseth the gain of oppressions, that shaketh his hands from holding of bribes . . . shall dwell on high' (Is $33^{15f.}$). Accordingly, Jehoshaphat forbade his judges to accept bribes (2 Ch 19^{7}; cf. Ex 18^{21}), though it is only too obvious that the Hebrews were by no means unfamiliar with corruption (Is 1^{23}, Ezk 22^{12}, Mic 7^{3}, Mt $28^{12ff.}$), among the cases being the betrayal of our Lord by Judas. Talmudic Judaism was very severe on bribery, though it seems to have been permissible, before the time when the judge received a regular salary, for him to accept an equal amount from each of two litigant parties before trying a case (*JE* iii. 379–381).

Zoroastrianism, with its intense horror of falsehood, was naturally strongly opposed to bribery, though no specific mention of corruption occurs in the extant Avesta texts. According to the late Pahlavi vision of *Arṭā-Virāf* (ch. lxxix., ed. Haug and West, Bombay, 1872, p. 194), the soul of the bribe-taker suffered horrible torture in the world to come. Both in China and in Japan the corrupt judge is severely punished; and it may here be noted that in ancient America, among the Aztecs, such a judge suffered the death penalty in grave cases of bribery, while for lighter forms of venality he was degraded from office, with the additional contumely of having his head shorn (Post, *Grundriss der ethnolog. Jurisprudenz*, Oldenburg, 1894–95, ii. 328).

In the East it is always the people who bribe, it is always the officials who are bribed; and in India

the difference between East and West is conspicuous. It is perfectly true that the Hindu law-books rank bribery in the class of 'open thefts,' and that the crime was punishable by fine, confiscation of property, banishment, loss of the case, etc. (Jolly, *Recht und Sitte* [=*GIAP*, ii. 8], pp. 125, 142); but, in spite of this, the native Indian under British rule is greatly puzzled by the apparent purity of the English officials. That they are really incorruptible he cannot believe. He looks on incorruptibility as Charles II. looked on honour and virtue. Yet he knows that he could not dare to offer a bribe to the 'Burra Sahib' directly. It must, he thinks, be conveyed through successive grades of native servants about the Court, and it will surely—for, after all, an Englishman is not different from other mortals—be accepted, if offered with sufficient discretion. No experience can teach him that pure administration of justice is an existing fact, or anything else but a means subtly devised for making small bribes ineffectual.

A native became an Indian Civil Servant, and, as such, accepted presents. His principle in so doing was that of Francis Bacon. He gave his judgment on the merits of the case. If the plaintiff won, he kept his gift and returned that of the defendant, and *vice versa*. The hard thing is that the Indians understood and admired the attitude of this judge, while that of his British colleague was incomprehensible to the native mind. That incorruptibility is regarded as a rare virtue is clearly shown in a memoir of the Hon. Onoocool Chunder Mookerjee, who attained the position of a judgeship in the High Court. 'Such was the integrity of this remarkable man,' writes his nephew, 'that, having taken a brief from one party in a case and read it, he invariably refused a fee from the other side.'

4. **Great Britain and Ireland.**—We turn from the East to the West, and we find the whole situation changed. With us the tendency is to corrupt the people in many insidious ways. In Stuart days the members of Parliament were corrupted because they were not easily amenable to public opinion. It was then thought necessary to lubricate the wheels of political machinery with golden oil; but, as the people gained more control, this bribery of their representatives slowly passed away. Tampering with judge and jury was once common in England.

A statute of the reign of Henry VII. in the year 1494 recites that 'perjury is much and customarily used within the city of London among such persons as passen and been impanelled upon issues joined between party and party.' *The Dance of Death*, translated from the French in the same reign by John Lydgate, and adapted to the England of his day, mentions a juror who had given a false verdict for money. Stowe tells us that in 1468 many London jurors were punished by having papers fastened to their heads, setting forth how they had been tampered with in such and such a suit. A letter from the Bishop of London to Cardinal Wolsey, given by Grafton in his *Chronicles*, says that a London jury would find Abel guilty of the murder of Cain. Jardine, in his *Criminal Trials*, p. 8, maintains that the 'proceedings against persons accused of State offences in the early periods of our history do not deserve the name of trials; they were a mockery of justice.'

The impeachment of Bacon made possible the long line of incorruptible judges and immaculate juries that justly forms the glory of England, though the want of publicity gave a longer duration to the existence of bribery by bestowal of office and valuable consideration. This state of affairs is painfully apparent in the reign of George III. For example, 388 peers were created, nearly all for political jobbery (May, *Constitutional History of England*, i. 282). Bad as matters were in England, in Ireland they were a great deal worse.

'I long,' wrote Lord Cornwallis, Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, to the Duke of Portland on 12th Dec. 1798, 'to kick those whom my public duty obliges me to court. My occupation is to negotiate and job with the most corrupt people under heaven. I despise and hate myself every hour for engaging in such dirty work, and am supported only by the reflexion that without a union the British Empire must be dissolved.'

Corruption in England, as in Rome, assumes the shape of bribery of the electorate. This reached its widest development in the days of George III. Writing to Lord North, 16th Oct. 1779, the king said, 'If the Duke of Northumberland requires some gold pills for the election, it would be wrong not to satisfy him.' Aristotle laid down that man was a political animal, but the evidence of election petitions goes to prove that man is an aurivorous animal. If Rome gave her citizens bread and circuses, England was no whit less lavish to her electors. Charles II. held that every man had his price, and the perusal of the details of electioneering almost tempts us to agree with him. If the struggle for the consulate in the 700th year of the Roman Republic produced an offer of nearly £100,000 for the vote of *prærogativa*, it is humiliating to reflect that a little over a hundred years ago, in 1807, when Wilberforce contested Yorkshire against Lord Milton and the Hon. Henry Lascelles, the total expenses of the candidates exceeded a quarter of a million. In the same year, at Wootton Bassett, the price of a single vote rose from twenty guineas to forty-five. From the will of Lord Vernon, £5000 seems to have been the recognized sum paid in 1812 for a seat in Parliament. At so recent a date as the General Election of 1874, corruption was organized on a large scale. 'The moment the trumpet is sounded for a General Election,' deposes a witness before a Norwich Election Commission, 'there seems to spring from the ground, as it were, a host of employment-seekers.' This form of corruption, the bribing of voters by offering good wages for the discharge of nominal functions during the period of election, is now the subtlest form of bribery, except perhaps the bribery which takes the form of munificent donations to local charities. The days are gone when the beautiful Duchess of Devonshire could buy a butcher's vote with a kiss, when the genial Dick Steele could win over the women with an apple—stuffed with guineas—as a prize for the best wife.

5. **America.**—In the far Western world, our cousins do not seem to have got rid of corruption. Parts of the United States are no better than the small boroughs of Southern England were before the Corrupt Practices Act of 1883. Venality occurs, according to J. Bryce (*American Commonwealth*, ii. 238), chiefly in connexion with private legislation. Foreign missions and consulates, department bureaus, custom-house and revenue offices, army and navy contracts, postmasterships, agencies, and places of all sorts are the spoils of the victors. The essence of the United States system is that paid offices are given and taken away for party reasons. In England, less than sixty men vacate their places with a change of ministry; in America, all officials do so, except those who are appointed after passing the Civil Service examinations. Corruption, of course, is not confined to the taking or giving of money bribes, for by graft there is the taking or giving of bribes in kind. Thus the person corrupted may receive the allotment of a certain quantity of stock or shares in a company, or of an interest in a profitable contract, or of a land grant. Another form may be the doing of a job, *e.g.* promising a contractor that he shall have the clothing of the police or the cleansing of the city thoroughfares, in return for his political support; giving official advertisements to a particular newspaper which puffs you; promising a railroad president, whose subscription to party funds is hoped for, to secure the defeat of a bill seeking to regulate the freight charges of his road, or threatening its land grants.

The effects of Andrew Jackson's famous doctrine of 'To the victors belong the spoils' can perhaps best be seen in the operations of the Tammany Ring in New York City. The cost of erecting and furnishing the County Court House was estimated in 1868 at $250,000, but before the end of 1871 about $13,000,000 had been expended upon it, and it was still unfinished. The items of $404,347 for safes and $7500 for thermometers show how the extra money had disappeared. The total price which the city paid for the privilege of being ruled by Tammany from the beginning of 1869 to Sept. 1871—that is, thirty-two months—amounted to no less a sum than $81,000,000.

6. France.—France believes as thoroughly as America in the creed of Andrew Jackson. As in Greece, so in France, direct tampering with the electorate hardly exists. The Wilson scandals showed that political corruption was wide-spread in the Republic. The public and private bribery of the supporters of the Second Empire left many evil traces behind it. The embellishment of the capital fostered a spirit of jobbery, infecting all the departments of the State. The most dreadful of all the scandals was the Panama affair. The thrift of France had subscribed fifty millions sterling for the piercing of the Isthmus of Panama, undertaken by M. de Lesseps. In 1892 it was known that most of the money had disappeared, and at the trial it was clear that corruption accounted for the disappearance. Floquet avowed that, when Prime Minister, he had laid hands upon £12,000 of the Panama funds, and had utilized it in combating the enemies of the Government on questions unconnected with the Canal (Bodley, *France*, p. 503). He based his defence on the perilous doctrine that, under normal circumstances, it was the right and the duty of the Ministry to supervise the distribution of such subsidies so as to prevent them from being used to the prejudice of the Government (Chambre des Députés: Séance du 23 Décembre 1892). This principle has been followed by ministers both before and since the days of Floquet. The party system is probably the strongest purifying agent in Parliamentary government under extended suffrage. But, as in Rome, so in France. In neither country did the party system exist, and consequently, in both, corruption prevailed. No doubt, the general working of the Parliamentary system assists the operation of a corrupt policy. It is, however, clear that the absence of government by parties means the presence of bribery. 'The great motive power,' concludes Bodley (p. 515), 'to keep wavering members on the path of parliamentary integrity is the party system, and this is wanting in France.' Indirect tampering with the electorate can always be observed. There is a bridge to be built, or a *lycée* to be instituted, especially in the *arrondissement* which shows itself faithful to the Government. Here we must meet with the kind of corruption we are certain to encounter in the future.

'Perhaps we are not at liberty to forget,' writes Sir Henry Maine in his *Popular Government* (p. 106), 'that there are two kinds of bribery. It can be carried on by promising or giving to expectant partisans places paid out of the taxes, or it may consist in the directer process of legislating away the property of one class and transferring it to another. It is this last which is likely to be the corruption of these latter days.'

Corruption used to appeal to individuals; now it appeals to classes. The farmer is bribed with an anticipation of prairie rent, and the artisan is bribed by the prospect of protective legislation. The future alone can disclose whether the old form or the new form of corruption is the more dangerous.

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R. H. MURRAY.

COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY.

COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY (Introductory).—By cosmogony is meant the theory of the origin of the universe. The existence of a developed cosmogony seems to be characteristic of a somewhat advanced degree of thought. Among the Australians, for example, such careful observers as Spencer, Gillen, and Howitt record no cosmogonic myths, and the South American Indians and even the Finns have but scanty legends of this type. On the other hand, the Polynesians and North American Indian stocks have cosmogonies of considerable elaboration. The reason for this deficiency in certain parts of the world evidently lies in the amount of abstract thought required for the development of a cosmogony; for, though the existence of living beings, especially those of human kind, presents a creation problem which even primitive man endeavours to solve in many ways long before attempting to account for the beginning of the universe, these solutions do not come, strictly speaking, within the scope of cosmogony, but rather within that of creation (*q.v.*). Yet it must be remembered that at least the rudiments of cosmogonic ideas may exist among tribes which are not now known to entertain them. A further element of difficulty is introduced into the study of primitive cosmogonies by the unconscious absorption of foreign elements derived from Christian missionaries, just as is the case with legends of the Flood.

Throughout all cosmogony run certain basal principles, and it is also noteworthy that legends of this character, at first discordant and contradictory, gradually become harmonized and unified with the progress of religious speculation. Cosmogonic myths, almost without exception, seek to explain the creation of the world from the fewest possible elements. Among the Babylonians, where at least two divergent systems of cosmogony may be traced, the primal element of the universe was water, symbolized and ruled by Tiamât, the personification of 'chaos,' until she was slain by

the god Marduk. This cosmic ocean recurs in other systems as well, notably in some of the Hindu cosmogonies and in the Egyptian legend of the Creation. Yet in various parts of the Nile Valley different cosmogonies were held; at Elephantine it was believed that Khnum had made the cosmic egg from the mud of the Nile; while at Memphis, Ptah was said to have carved the earth, like a statue, into its present form. Among the Greeks, with their highly developed philosophic and abstract thought, a large number of cosmogonies were devised, the prime component of the universe being ocean, according to Homer; earth, according to Hesiod; air, according to Epimenides; ether, according to the rhapsodic cosmogony; water and earth, according to Hieronymus and Hellanicus; water and slime, according to Athenagoras; and water, according to Thales. The Greek cosmogonies may be divided into three classes: those beginning with a spiritual principle, as Zeus; those beginning with an abstract principle, as Chaos, Time, and Night; and those beginning with a material principle, such as water, earth, and ether. Of these, the third category is doubtless the most primitive, although even the Hesiodic cosmogony is so highly developed that it is a system of philosophy rather than of religion. An almost equal degree of speculative thought appears in the earliest record of India's cosmogony. The late 129th hymn of the tenth book of the Rigveda describes the 'That,' or abstract universe, as fired with inward meditation that resulted in the creative *Kāma*, which corresponds strikingly and curiously with the cosmogonic Eros of the Greeks. Other Vedic hymns vaguely ascribe the creation of the world to various deities, while a late hymn of the Rigveda (x. 90) declares that the world was formed from the different members of the body of a giant. In the later development of Hindu thought the universe is the creation of Brahmā (or of Prajāpati or some other All-God), while the universe itself is conceived as a cosmic egg—a legend as early as the *Brāhmaṇas*, and recalling the cosmic egg of Egypt, the Polynesian creation-myths, and the Greek Orphic mysteries. It is also noteworthy that creation is ascribed to sexual congress in cosmogonies so diverse as the Hindu, Maori, and Taoist.

The Greek and Hindu cosmogonies may be termed *quasi*-philosophic, while the Babylonian creation-myth is rather one of opposition. In the Iranian legend of the origin of the universe the same element of opposition appears, and at the same time it may possibly illustrate the bond which links the two. The earliest form of the legend is marked by a conflict between Ormazd and Ahriman, and the entire cosmic process is a series of beneficent creations by the former and of maleficent counter-creations by the latter, thus affording an analogue, in a certain sense, with the conflicts of the children of Papa and Rangi in the New Zealand creation-myth. At a later period, however, philosophic speculation evolved the doctrine of 'boundless time,' from which both Ormazd and Ahriman, represented by Light and Darkness in Manichæism, were sprung. It is clear that this unitarian tendency is a later development; and if one may argue from analogy it would seem that the earliest Greek cosmogony, instead of being philosophic like the Hesiodic version, was based on opposition, as Hesiod's account itself seems in places to imply.

The order of creation naturally varies in different cosmogonic legends. In one of the numerous systems of Egyptian cosmogony the primal spirit and primal matter co-exist from all eternity in indissoluble union. The primal spirit longs to create, thus recalling the cosmic Desire (*Kāma*, Ἔρως) of the Hindu and Greek systems. This results in motion of the primal material, whose basal qualities thus become visible. With the aid of one of them the cosmic egg is formed, from which arises Rē, the god of light, who forms the world and all that it contains. In the Iranian account, as given by the *Būndahiśn*, the order of earthly creation is sky, stars, moon, sun, land, sea, river, plants, animals, and man. A certain similarity with the Greek cosmogonies, as represented by Hesiod, is shown in the Germanic version given by the *Völuspá*, in that the creation of the gods, to which the Babylonian creation tablets also refer, is elaborately described. The basal elements are primeval time, Ginnungagap (which corresponds, in many respects, to the Greek Chaos), and primeval matter. The gods Odin, Hoenir, and Lódhur raise aloft the sun and moon (or the earth). After this Midhgardh, the home of mankind, is built; the plants are produced by the warmth of the southern sun; the seasons are ordained. The home of the gods is then built, and the three Norns, or Fates, appear, while the cosmogony closes with the creation of dwarfs and men. In this last system the cosmic egg, which plays so prominent a part in many creation-legends, is replaced by the cosmic tree, which is, at least to a certain extent, paralleled by the golden lotus of the Hindu *Purāṇas*.

A curiously isolated cosmogony is found in Chinese Taoism, which derives the four seasons from the conjunction of the male and female principles Yang and Yin. The four seasons, in their turn, produce the eight *kwa*, or phenomena of Nature, which are the source of the universe. Equally isolated is the general type of the North American Indian cosmogony, which is essentially one of opposition. It presupposes the prior existence of another world before the earth of man. In this world dwelt the gods, who gradually came into conflict with each other, and in the struggle all, with a few exceptions, were transformed into those objects, both animate and inanimate, to which they were in disposition most closely akin, thus giving rise to beasts, birds, reptiles, trees, rocks, and everything else. Meanwhile, the divinities who had escaped metamorphosis departed to other regions, the present world being occupied by American Indians.

In entire keeping with the late development of cosmogony and its pre-eminently philosophic character, there is almost no instance of an ethical import being attached to it. Few peoples seem to have thought of a design for which the world was brought into being. The Iranians, however, held that the universe was created for the glory of Ormazd, who should finally triumph completely over the machinations and creations of the evil Ahriman. In conclusion, it must be noted that the concept of creation *ex nihilo* was practically unknown to the ancient world. It is present neither in Babylonian, Egyptian, nor Greek; and its existence in Iranian thought is at least problematical. On the other hand, the keenest philosophers of antiquity, the Hindus, evolved the idea as early as the Rigveda, even though but vaguely, declaring in a late hymn (x. 72. 2): 'in the primal age of the gods being was born of non-being' (*devānāṁ pūrve yuge 'sataḥ sad ajāyata*).

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LOUIS H. GRAY.

COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY (North American).—1. **Athapascan family** (widely distributed in many tribes from Hudson's Bay to the Pacific).—The Athapascans of the North-west attribute the phenomena of creation to a raven,

whose eyes were fire, whose glances were lightning, and the clapping of whose wings was thunder. On his descent to the ocean, the earth instantly rose, and remained on the surface of the water. From this being, also, the Athapascans traced their descent.[1] Yetl by name, it saved their ancestors from the flood, and succoured them by bringing them fire from heaven. It probably sprang, with the Mexican god Quetzalcoatl, from some common original form. The more eastern Athapascans believe their ancestors to have sprung from a dog, probably an eponymous totemic being.

2. **Iroquoian family** (Hurons, Mohawks, Oneidas, etc., situated from the St. Lawrence to the Roanoake, and the Cherokees in Eastern Tennessee).—The Iroquois tribes believe in a similar myth. Their original female ancestress fell from heaven. There was as yet no land to receive her, but presently it 'suddenly bubbled up under her feet, and waxed bigger, so that ere long a whole country was perceptible.'[2] Some Iroquois tribes, however, believed that amphibious animals, such as the otter, beaver, and musk-rat, beholding her descent, hastened to dig up sufficient earth from beneath the waters to provide her with an island upon which she might dwell.[3] Several Iroquois tribes regarded a mountain near the falls of the Oswego River in New York State as the locality in which their forefathers originated, and the name of the Oneida ('People of the stone') is held to indicate some such relationship.

3. **Algonquian family** (formerly distributed over an area embracing a space from Newfoundland to the Rockies, and from Churchill River on the north to Pamlico Sound on the south).—The words for 'light' and 'rabbit' in the Algonquian tongue are the same, so that Manibosho or Michabo, the sun, their creative agency, has become confounded by them with the rabbit. The myth relates that one day, when Michabo was hunting, the wolves which he used as dogs entered a great lake, and disappeared there. He entered the lake to rescue them, but it rose suddenly, overflowed its banks, covered the land, and destroyed the world. Michabo dispatched the raven to find a piece of earth wherewith to rebuild the land; but, after having searched everywhere, the bird returned, and reported that it could find none. Then he ordered the otter to dive for some, but the animal returned to the surface without any. At last he sent down the musk-rat, which returned with a small piece, which sufficed for Michabo to re-create the solid earth as it now stands. The trees having lost their branches, he shot arrows at their bare trunks, and the arrows became new limbs. He then avenged himself upon the malevolent beings who had caused the flood, and married the musk-rat, by whose aid he peopled the world.

4. **Muskhogean family** (Creeks, Choctaws, Chickasaws, Seminoles, etc., confined chiefly to the Gulf States east of the Mississippi).—The Muskhogees believe that before the Creation a great body of water alone was visible. Over the dreary waste two pigeons flew to and fro, and at last espied a blade of grass rising above the surface. Dry land gradually followed, and the mainland and islands took their present shapes. In the centre of the hill *Nunne Chaha* was the house of Esaugetuh Emissee, the 'Master of Breath,' who moulded the first man from the clay which surrounded his abode. The waters still covered the earth, so that he was compelled to build a great wall to dry the mud-fashioned men upon. When the soft mud had hardened into flesh and bone, he directed the waters to their present places, and gave the dry land to the men whom he had made. Here we cannot doubt that the appearance of the two pigeons signifies the brooding of the creative spirit upon the waste of waters. The similarity of this myth to the Creation story of Genesis is most remarkable.

5. **Siouan family** (Dakotas, Winnebagoes, Mandans, etc., dwelling on the right bank of the Mississippi and Missouri valley).—The Mandan branch of the Sioux possess a very complete creation-myth, which bears a strong resemblance to those of the Karaya Indians of the Amazon and the Warrau Indians of Guiana. They affirm that the entire nation resided in an underground village near a great subterranean lake. The roots of a grape-vine penetrated to their habitation, and some of the more adventurous of them climbed up the vine, and were rewarded with a sight of the earth, which they coveted because of its richness in fruits and the plentifulness of buffalo meat. The pioneers returned laden with grapes, the taste of which so enchanted the people that they resolved to forsake their subterranean dwelling for the delights of the upper world. Men, women, and children clambered up the vine; but, when about half the nation had ascended, a corpulent woman who was climbing up broke the vine with her weight, and by her fall filled up the gap which led to the upper world. At death, the Mandans expect to rejoin their forefathers in their original seat, the good reaching the ancient village by way of the lake, which the burden of the sins of the wicked will not allow them to cross. The cognate Minnetarees had a tradition that their original progenitor emerged from the waters of a lake, bearing in his hand an ear of maize—a typical example of the culture-hero myth. As regards the actual creation of the earth, the Mandans had a vague tradition, resembling that of the Muskhogees, concerning the brooding of pigeons upon the primeval waste of waters.

6. **Californian sub-families.**—California was, and is now, sparsely peopled by a number of Indian tribes belonging to as many as twenty-one distinct linguistic families. The mythologies of these tribes were, however, very similar to one another, and were characterized by unusually well-developed and consistent creation-myths, which are perhaps best typified by that of the Maidu, formerly dwelling in the Sacramento Valley and the adjacent Sierra Nevada. Their mythic era appears to fall into a number of periods, each of which is dealt with by a group of myths. It is in the first of these that their creation-myth makes its appearance, with the coming of Kodoyanpe the Creator, and Coyote. They discovered the world, and proceeded to place it in fitting order for its first inhabitants. These they made from small wooden images, but, as they engaged in violent conflict, they were metamorphosed into animals. Kodoyanpe conceived an antipathy to Coyote, whose evil desires clashed with his beneficent wishes, and resolved upon his destruction. In this he was assisted by a being known as 'the Conqueror,' who destroyed many monsters and evil beings which later would have endangered the life of men who were yet unborn. In the last scene of the cosmic drama Kodoyanpe is defeated by Coyote, and takes his flight eastwards—which shows, at least, that he is not a sun-god. The Indians then spring from the places where the small wooden figures of the 'first people' had been buried. Unlike most American creation-myths, this is a veritable creative act, not a mere re-construction of the universe. In the beginning was only the great primeval waste of waters upon which Kodoyanpe and Coyote dropped in a canoe. Of the origin of these supernatural beings the Maidu were ignorant; but a neighbouring people, the Achomawi, pushed their cosmogonic legend much

[1] Mackenzie, *Hist. of the Fur Trade*, 1801, p. 83; Richardson, *Arctic Expedition*, 1851, p. 239.
[2] *Soc. Hist. of New York*, c. 1650, iv. 130.
[3] *Relacion de la Nouvelle France*, 1636, p. 101.

further back. According to them, at first there existed only the shoreless sea and the clear sky. A small cloud appeared thereupon, which gradually increased in size, and then condensed until it became the silver-grey fox, the Creator. Then arose a fog, which, condensing, became Coyote. The Ashochimi of California told of the drowning of the world so that no man escaped. But, when the waters retired, the Coyote went forth and planted the feathers of various birds, which grew into the various tribes of men.[1]

7. **Chinookan family** (a distinct family, formerly dwelling on Columbia River).—The creation-myth of the Chinooks is practically the same as that of the Maidu, and relates how Italapas, the Coyote, encountering a heavy surf at a place called Got'at, was afraid that he might be drifted away, and threw sand upon the surf, saying, 'This shall be a prairie, and no surf. The future generations shall walk on that prairie.' The Chinookan mythology is rich in myths of the other world, and in cosmogonic sun-, moon-, and star-myths, which are dealt with at length in art. CHINOOKS.

8. **Caddoan family** (Pawnees, Kichai, Wichita, etc., dwelling in Nebraska and Arkansas).—The Caddo believed that they came originally from the under world, and related that the first individual to emerge into the light of day was an old man, carrying in one hand fire and a pipe, and in the other a drum. He was followed by his wife with corn and pumpkin-seed. They spoke of a creator, Atius Tirawa, intangible and omnipotent, whose house was the heavens, and whose messengers were the eagle and the buzzard. He it was who called sun, moon, and stars into being, and ordered them their various circuits.[2]

9. **Shoshonean family** (Hopi or Moqui, Comanches, etc., inhabiting a tract from Oregon to Texas, and from Nevada to Colorado).—The Shoshonean stock had originally no conception of a Great Spirit. They speak of the earth as always having existed, and of the human race as having emerged through an opening in the earth called the *Sipapu*, which was identified with the Grand Cañon of the Colorado. The dead they suppose to return to the under world. The Sky-father and Earth-mother they hold as responsible for the upkeep of the universe.

10. **Pueblo Indians** of New Mexico (Zuñis, etc.).—The Zuñis believe that the Creator—Awonawilona, Maker and Container of all—existed before the beginning of time, in the darkness which knew no beginning.[3] He then conceived within himself, and, projecting his creative thoughts into the void of night, evolved fogs potent with growth. He next took upon himself the form of the Sun, the father of men, who thus came into being, and by whose light and brightness the cloud-mists resolved themselves into water, gradually evolving into the primeval sea. Then from his flesh, 'outdrawn from the surface of his person,' he made the seed of two worlds, and fecundated the sea therewith. By the heat of his rays green scums formed, which became the 'Fourfold containing Mother-earth,' and the 'All-covering Father-sky.' Terrestrial life sprang from the embraces of these, and they separated. These twain were described as 'transmutable at thought, manifesting themselves in any form at will, as dancers may by mask-making' (Cushing, *op. cit.* 379 f.). Then, from the lowest of the four wombs of the world, the seed of men and living things took form and grew, until the lowest cave or womb grew over-full of living and half-finished creatures, men among them, and the press became so great that Poshaiyankya, the wisest and foremost of men, arising from the nethermost sea, obtained egress from the first world-cave through such a dark and narrow pathway that movement was difficult. Alone did Poshaiyankya come from one cave to another into this world, then island-like, lying amidst the world-waters, vast, wet, and unstable. He sought and found the Sun-father, and entreated him to deliver the men and the creatures from that nethermost world. In another variation of the legend the people were delivered by one Janauluha, a master magician, who, bearing a staff plumed and covered with feathers, guided imprisoned humanity upward to the light. He then created birds of shining plumage, the raven and the macaw, who were the spirits of winter and summer, and the totems of the two original clans of men.

[1] Stephen Powers, *Indian Tribes of California*, Washington, 1877, p. 200.
[2] G. B. Grinnell, in *JAFL*, 1893, p. 113.
[3] F. H. Cushing, 'Zuñi Creation Myths,' in *13 RBEW*, 1896.

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LEWIS SPENCE.

COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY (Babylonian).—The cosmology generally accepted in Babylonia had its origin at Eridu, the primitive seaport of the country, on the shores of the Persian Gulf. Here the land was constantly growing through the deposition of silt, and the belief consequently arose that the earth had originated in the same way. The water of 'the great deep,' accordingly, came to be regarded as the primordial element out of which the universe was generated. The 'Deep' was identified with the Persian Gulf, which was conceived as encircling the earth, and as such was called the *Nâru Marratu*, the 'Bitter' or 'Salt River.' On its inner bank in the extreme north was 'the Mountain of the World,' on which the sky rested and the gods had their seat. An early Babylonian map of the world (*Cuneiform Texts*, xxii. 48) places at certain distances from one another on the outer bank a number of *nagê*, or 'coastlands,' which, however, seem to owe their origin to the discovery of the existence of countries beyond the region of the Euphrates and Tigris, made subsequently to the period when the primitive system of cosmology first became an article of belief. In one of the islands off the mouths of the Euphrates and Tigris the Babylonian Paradise was located, where the Chaldean Noah and other ancient heroes were supposed to dwell.

Apsû, 'the Deep,' belonged to the orderly framework of Nature; the waters of the annual inundation which irrigated the Babylonian plain poured into it, and the trading vessels which brought wealth and culture to Eridu passed over its bosom. Hence it became the home of Ea, the culture-god of Eridu; his palace was within it, and his throne, *Du-azagga*, 'the holy mound,' was identified with an island which had been formed on the eastern side of the Gulf. But there was another aspect under which the watery element could be regarded; the thunderstorm and the whirlwind rose out of the Gulf, carrying destruction in their path, and the deep itself had once burst its bonds and destroyed mankind with a deluge. Under this destructive and anarchic aspect the watery element was known as *Tiamtu* or *Tiamât* (Heb. *Tĕhôm*), which was mythologically pictured as a dragon, the enemy of the gods of light and law. While Apsû, the Deep, had been the origin of all things in the present orderly universe, Tiamât was a yet older principle, whose anarchic waters still existed beyond the limits of the universe, in the waters above the firmament and the waters below the earth and sea, which were always ready to break forth once more as soon as the barriers of law that confined them were removed. The conception of Tiamât

probably emanated from Nippur in northern Babylonia, and was harmonized with difficulty with the cosmology of Eridu (Sayce, *Religions of Ancient Egypt and Babylonia*, pp. 376, 377).

The cosmological beliefs of Eridu are embodied in a bilingual (Sumerian and Babylonian) poem, discovered by Pinches (*JRAS*, 1891, pp. 393–408), which, however, in its present form has been much modernized by the introduction of lines referring to Babylon and the other chief cities of later Babylonia, and the substitution of Merodach, the god of Babylon, for Ea, the god of Eridu. The original version began as follows:

'No holy house, no house of the gods in a holy place had as yet been built,
No reed had grown, no tree been planted,
No bricks been made, no brick-mould formed,
No house been built, no city founded,
No city built, no man (*adam*) made to stand upright;
The deep was uncreated, Eridu unbuilt,
The seat of its holy house, the house of the gods, unerected:
All the earth was sea,
While within the sea was a current' (literally 'watercourse,' *piśannu*).

Then we are told how

'[Ea] tied (reeds) together to form a weir in the water,
He made dust and mixed it with the reeds of the weir,
That the gods might dwell in the seat of their well-being;
The cattle of the field (*Edinnu*), the living creatures in the field, he created;
The Tigris and Euphrates he made and set them in their place,
Giving them good names.
Moss and seed-plant of the marsh, rush and reed he created,
He created the green herb of the field,
The earth, the marsh, the jungle,
The cow and its young, the calf, the sheep and its young, the lamb of the fold.'

Of far later date is the so-called Epic of Creation, which is really a hymn in honour of Merodach and his overthrow of Tiamât and the powers of chaos. As this involved the creation of the existing world, the poem is prefaced by an account of the origin of the universe as it was conceived in the schools. The cosmology is frankly materialistic, abstract principles taking the place of the gods who are themselves the offspring of the principles, in flagrant contradiction of the rest of the Epic, in which the god Merodach appears as the creator. The Semitic idea of generation is invoked in order to explain the creation, which thus becomes a process of evolution, the old animistic objects of Sumerian worship being introduced to form the links in the chain of development. Water remains the primordial element, but an attempt is made to reconcile the antagonism between the two conceptions of this element, according as it is regarded as anarchic or as under the dominion of law, by making Apśu (the Deep) and Tiamât (the watery chaos) complementary principles whose union resulted in starting the evolutionary process. The first lines of the Epic run thus:

'When above unnamed was the heaven,
(And) earth below by a name was uncalled,
Apśu (the deep) in the beginning (*ristû*) being their begetter,
(And) the flood (Mummu) of Tiamât the mother of them all,
Their waters were embosomed together (in one place),
But no reed had been harvested, no marsh-plant seen;
At that time the gods had not appeared, any one (of them)
By no name were they called, no destiny [was fixed].
Then were the gods created in the midst of [heaven?],
Lakhmu and Lakhamu appeared [the first].
The ages multiplied, they . . .
Ansar and Kisar (the Upper and Lower Firmaments) were created . . .
Long were the days, forth came . . .
Anu their son, [Bel and Ea].'

The cosmogony of the Epic is reproduced by Damascius, a contemporary of Justinian (*de Prim. Princip.* 125 [p. 384, ed. Kopp, 1826]).

'The Babylonians,' he says, 'like the rest of the barbarians, pass over in silence the one principle of the universe and constitute two, Tavthê (Tiamât) and Apasôn (Apśu), making Apasôn the husband of Tavthê, and denominating her "the mother of the gods." And from these proceeds an only-begotten son Môymis, which, I conceive, is no other than the intelligible world (νοητὸς κόσμος) proceeding from the two principles. From them also another progeny is derived, Lakhê and Lakhos (corrupted in the MSS into Dakhê, Dakhos); and again a third, Kissarê and Assôros; from which last three others proceed, Anos and Illillos (corrupted into Illinos) and Aos. And of Aos and Davkê (Damkina) is born a son called Bêlos (Bel-Merodach), who, they say, is the fabricator of the world.'

Here Mummu, 'the flood' or chaos, who is identified with Tiamât in the cuneiform text, becomes the son of Tiamât and Apśu, and is accordingly explained by Damascius as the ideal world—that is to say, the world as it exists in the mind before it is realized externally. Such an explanation, however, is excluded by the Epic, where Mummu would rather correspond with the 'darkness' which in Gn 1[2] is said to have been 'upon the face of the deep.'

According to the Babylonian legend, the appearance of the gods of light and order was followed by the revolt of Tiamât (or, as it would seem, according to another version, of Apśu). But the powers of darkness and chaos were overthrown by Bel-Merodach, who cut Tiamât in two, and stretched the sky across one of the two halves, thus preventing the waters which were in her veins from breaking forth again, while the other half was similarly confined under the earth and sea, the springs of which it feeds. The conquest of Tiamât was followed by the creation of man, who was brought into existence in order to build temples and altars and offer sacrifices and prayers to the gods. The world, however, had to be prepared for the reception of man by fixing the movements of the celestial luminaries, and so regulating the sacred calendar, and then by creating plants and animals which could be offered or used in the service of the temple. The heavenly bodies had existed before the war with Tiamât, since the deities with whom they were identified had been the offspring of the trinity or triad of Anu, En-lil, and Ea. Indeed, Bel-Merodach himself was originally a Sun-god.

In the Epic, allusion is made to another system of cosmology, which ascribed the universe to the creative word. Merodach is described as destroying and creating by his word alone, and so proving his fitness to destroy the forces of anarchy and create a world that should be governed by law.

Another system of cosmology was that which emanated from Nippur (now Niffer) in northern Babylonia. In this Tiamât, the dragon of the subterranean waters of chaos, was the elementary principle, the earth having risen out of it in the form of a mountain. The brood of chaos, composite creatures who belonged to a first and imperfect creation, continued to exist in the dark underground, which was also the dwelling-place of the ghosts and demons of night. How the world-mountain was believed to have been formed we do not yet know. At the Syrian Hierapolis (Membij) the waters of the deluge of the Babylonian Sisythes were believed to have drained off into a cavern beneath the temple, which was accordingly kept securely closed, and Simi, the daughter of the supreme god Hadad, was said to have put an end to the attacks of a demon by filling the pit in which the monster lived, with the water of the sea (Cureton and Renan, in Pitra, *Spicilegium Solesmense*, ii. p. xliv).

LITERATURE.—H. Gunkel, *Schöpfung und Chaos* (1895); A. H. Sayce, *Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion as illustrated by the Religion of the Ancient Babylonians* (1877), ch. vi., and *Religions of Ancient Egypt and Babylonia* (1902), pt. II. ch. vi.; L. W. King, *The Seven Tablets of Creation* (1902); M. Jastrow, *Die Religion Babyloniens und Assyriens*, Giessen, 1909

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COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY (Buddhist).—I. Preliminary notes.—

(1) In the earliest times, speculations on the universe were apparently regarded as wrong. We may recall the attitude of the Buddha towards (heretical) doctrines of the infinity or non-infinity of the world (see AGNOSTICISM [Buddhist], vol. i. p. 221), and his efforts to give a moral or psychological meaning to

the researches of natural science: when a monk wants to know where the material elements (earth, water, etc.) stop in their extent, the Buddha explains, by way of answer, how people are delivered from desire and from existence. Obviously that is where the problem lies; the exterior world, in fact, exists only as long as one is conscious of it (*Dīgha*, i. 215).[1]

It is probable that a large number of Buddhists, imbued with the 'moralism' of their master, avoided frivolous curiosities,—'non-Buddhist' 'mundane' disciplines (*lokāyata*),[2]—and were content with denying, on the one hand, a supreme personal creating power (a lord, *Īśvara*), against the theists, the Brāhmans; and, on the other, the innate independent power of things (*svabhāva*), against the *svabhāvavādins*, the materialists. The formula, 'The diversity of the world comes from the act,'[3] contains for a well-informed Buddhist the Alpha and Omega of the necessary cosmological information.

But, long before the time when the Mahāyānist books demanded that the learned Buddhist, the preaching Bodhisattva, must have a knowledge of lay sciences,[4] a Buddhist cosmology was formed, constituting a very well developed collection of various opinions and systematizations; and, in fact, accurate information on cosmological questions seems to have been as ancient as the statements defending or ridiculing the speculations of this kind which we recalled above.

The aim of the present article is to give an outline of Buddhist cosmology, without entering into details (except on a few points which have not yet been published, or are obscure), and without spending time over variants. It should prove interesting, and profitable for the history of the sects, to study the history of the various theories, to distinguish the most ancient elements and aspects of them, and to note the succession of borrowings, inventions, and arrangements. Such a study, however, is possible for only a limited number of the theories; we shall endeavour to pursue it wherever we can with prudence.

(2) *Meaning of the word.*—'Cosmology' seems to be the most accurate translation of *lokaprajñapti*, 'world-teaching,' a term denoting that part of the Sarvāstivādin *Abhidharma* ('summaries and systematization of matters of doctrine' [see ABHIDHAMMA, vol. i. p. 19]) which deals with cosmological problems—the origin, arrangement, and destruction of the universe.[5]

But the *lokaprajñapti* deals also with questions that we do not include as cosmological: the Buddhists, in fact (at least the Sarvāstivādins), distinguish two 'worlds' (*loka*)—the *bhājanaloka*, 'receptacle-world,'[6] the universe as the abode of beings (*sattva*), and the *sattvaloka*, 'world of beings,' *i.e.* the mass of living beings. There are, accordingly, two *lokaprajñapti*, the first a 'cosmology,' the second a 'zoology' (*sattva*=ζῷον).[7]

There are, naturally, close connexions between these two 'worlds,' for the first is made for the second, being created and arranged to form a shelter for it. The whole of demonology, anthropology, and theology (*i.e.* pantheology) is connected with cosmology. Although it is difficult to separate the two, we shall give special prominence to the facts considered by our sources as relating to the 'receptacle-world' (*bhājanaloka*); *e.g.*, the abodes of the gods, the length of their lives, the dimensions of their bodies, and their 'non-embryogeny' are 'cosmological,' while their psychology and the right they possess or do not possess to the exercise of virtue are 'zoological' (*sāttvalaukika*). The beings, likewise, in one and the same class, inhabiting the same part of the 'receptacle-world,' may differ in their method of generation; men, serpent-dragons, and *garuḍas* (mythic birds) are not always born from the womb or the egg; the *chakravartin* kings (see art. CHAKRAVARTIN, vol. iii. p. 336 f.) resemble gods far more than men, etc.—none of this is cosmological.

[1] Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, London, 1899, i. 280; cf. the 'foolish questions' in *Milinda*, p. 295 (*SBE* xxxvi. 153).

[2] Rhys Davids, *op. cit.* i. 166, and Bendall's review in *Athenæum*, June 30th, 1900; also *Śikṣāsamuchchaya*, p. 192, 7.

[3] *Karmajaṁ lokavaichitryam* (*Abhidharmakośa*, iv. st. 1). On *karma* as the cause of the universe, see art. KARMA.

[4] e.g. *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, ch. viii.

[5] This last part, the destruction of the universe, has been treated in the art. AGES OF THE WORLD (Buddhist), vol. i. p. 189. The *Abhidharma* of the Pāli language does not seem to include any *lokapaññatti*.

[6] This expression does not appear to exist in Pāli, where we find *saṅkhāraloka*, 'material world' (including trees, etc.) (see Childers, *Dict. of the Pali Language*, London, 1875, p. 453), and *okāsaloka* (=*avakāśaloka*), 'room-world.' Spence Hardy (see Childers, p. 299) translates 'the world of space,' 'the far-extended vacuum' (see *Visuddhimagga*, vii. [*JPTS*, 1891–3, p. 99]).

[7] The *pudgala paññatti*, which constitutes one of the sections of the Pāli *Abhidharma* (*JPTS*, 1883), is the enumeration and definition of the various categories of 'individuals,' 'noble individuals' (*āryapudgalas*), etc., from the moral standpoint, particularly from the point of view of their progress in the 'way' of *nirvāṇa* (*JPTS*, 1905, p. 133).

Nevertheless, in order to understand the cosmological system, we must know the main lines of the distribution of beings (*sattvaloka*). There are (1) 'immaterial' beings, who form the 'immaterial' category (*dhātu*), the *ārūpya*; they are nowhere; they have no place in the 'receptacle-world' (but see below, § 8); (2) beings called 'material' (*rūpin*),[1] but of a subtle material; they inhabit the higher part of the 'receptacle-world,' *i.e.* the *rūpadhātu*, or 'material category or region,' according as we regard the beings or their habitation (see § 7); and (3) material beings, of grosser substance the lower they are in the scale, living in a world of gross material, concupiscent (*kāmāvachara*, *kāmabhuj*, *kāmaprabhāvita*), and subject to sensual and especially sexual desire (men alone are capable of continence, *saṁvara*, in this respect); these beings occupy the lower part of the 'receptacle-world,' the *kāmadhātu*, or 'concupiscence category or region.'[2]

On the other hand, beings are divided into five categories, two good and three bad, called *gati*, 'destinies,' 'kinds of existence,' themselves further subdivided into numerous sub-*gatis*: (1) the gods (*devas*) of three classes, according as they constitute the first *dhātu* (four kinds), or inhabit the second *dhātu* (sixteen kinds and sixteen 'places,' *āvāsa*), or inhabit the third *dhātu*, the *kāmadhātu* (six kinds and six 'places') (see below, § 6); (2) men, who are allotted four places, the four continents (see below, § 4); (3) ghosts (*pretas*), one place [see below, § 5 (iii.)]; (4) animals, one place [see below, § 5 (ii.)]; and (5) the damned, eight places: eight hells [see below, § 5 (i.)]. According to this division, there would be twenty places in the *kāmadhātu*. Indeed, it is not at all a satisfactory division,[3] for there are numerous categories of beings who have no place in it, notably the *asuras*.

Many treatises, some of them of ancient date, regard the *asuras* as a sixth *gati*, placing them between men and ghosts (see *JPTS*, 1889, p. 105 [this is the opinion of the *Andhakas* and several *Uttarāpathakas*]; Burnouf, *Lotus*, 1852, p. 309 [*SBE* xxi. 7]; Pitāputrasamāgama, ad *Bodhicharyāvatāra*, ix. 73; *JPTS*, 1884, p. 158, etc.). But the authorities on *Abhidharma*[4] (*Kathāvatthu*, viii. 1; the Sarvāstivādin *Saṁgītiparyāya* [in *JPTS*, 1905, p. 102]; Chandrakīrti's *Pañchaskandhaprakaraṇa*)[5] hold that the *asuras* are not a *gati*. Some of them have the same colour, pleasures, and length of life as the gods or the ghosts, and intermarry with them.[6] Nevertheless, the *asuras* have a well-defined place or places (see below, § 5 (iv.)).

As regards the numerous demi-gods, good and bad genii, vampires (*rākṣasas*), dragons (*nāgas*), divine birds (*garuḍas*), and celestial musicians (*gandharvas*, cf. *Mahāvyutpatti*, § 166), some of them have a definite place in hell (demons of torture), at the foot of Meru, or near the deities whose followers or commensals they are (see below, § 5 *ad fin.*); others have the position rather of magician-ghosts. Popular mythology had shrewd theories concerning them, but they do not appear to have much importance in 'cosmology' (*lokaprajñapti*).

(3) *Sources.*—The most systematic work on Buddhist cosmology is undoubtedly the second

[1] *Rūpa* is usually translated 'form,' *arūpa*, 'formless,' and *ārūpya*, 'formlessness.' But, although 'matter' is far from being to us what *rūpa* is to the Buddhists, the present writer prefers the translation 'matter' (see C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist Psychology*, London, 1900, p. xliii; *JPTS*, 1884, p. 27 f.; *Mahāvyutpatti*, § 101, etc.).

[2] Generally translated 'desire-sphere,' but 'desire' is inaccurate. There is desire, attachment (*rāga*), in the 'region of matter,' but only 'attachment to life' (*bhavarāga*); in the 'region of concupiscence' there is also 'attachment to sensual pleasures' (*kāmarāga*), 'concupiscence.'

[3] Cf. al-Bīrūnī on 'the different classes of created beings and their names,' *India*, tr. Sachau (1910), ch. viii.

[4] Buddhaghosa refers to *Majjhima*, i. 73; see *Dīgha*, xxxiii.; *Avadānaśataka*, xli.; *Madhyamakavṛtti*, p. 269, 9 and note.

[5] Tanjur, *Mdo*, xxiv.

[6] See *Kathāvatthu*, *loc. cit.*; cf. *JPTS*, 1884, p. 158.

treatise of the *Abhidharma* (*Abhidharmaśāstra*) of the Sarvāstivādin school, entitled *Prajñaptiśāstra*, the first section of which is the *Lokaprajñapti* (Tanjur, *Mdo*, lxii. ; see Takakusu, *JPTS*, 1905, pp. 77, 117, 142).[1] On this section is based the *Abhidharmakośa* of Vasubandhu[2] (ch. iii. st. 1–44 *sattvaloka*, 45–102 *bhājanaloka*), known particularly for the commentary of Yaśomitra, *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*.[3]

A Tibetan work of the end of the 18th cent., *Dpag-bsam-ljon-bzaṅ* (=*Kalpadruma*), ed. by Sarad Chandra, Calcutta, 1908, refers to the same *Abhidharmakośa*, which is quoted by Georgi, *Alphabetum Tibetanum* (Rome, 1762), p. 470, and used, along with other Sarvāstivādin sources and the Chinese literature of the two vehicles, by S. Beal, *Catena of Buddhist Scriptures* (London, 1871), p. 15 f., the most complete work that we have on the subject as yet.

The ancient sources (Pāli and Skr. 'Little Vehicle'), which are the most interesting of all, are somewhat scanty and scattered; they will be mentioned *ad locum*.

The Pāli commentaries have had little attention from this point of view. Probably most of the information they contain has passed into the works of Spence Hardy, *Manual of Budhism* (London, 1860), and *Legends and Theories of the Buddhists* (London, 1866).[4]

2. Foundation of the universe: the 'great elements.'—(*a*) An important cosmogonical feature can be traced in the earliest Buddhist texts, and is evidently pre-Buddhistic. When Ānanda inquires as to the causes of earthquakes, Buddha answers as follows: 'This great earth, Ānanda, is established on water, the water on wind, and the wind rests upon space. And at such a time, Ānanda, as the mighty winds blow, the waters are shaken by the mighty winds as they blow, and by the moving water the earth is shaken.'[5] Another *sūtra* relates the questions of the Brāhman Kāśyapa: 'On what rests the earth?'—'On the circle of water.' 'And the circle of water?'—'On the wind.' 'And the wind?'—'On the ether.' 'And the ether?'—'You go too far, O Brāhman. The ether does not rest on anything; it has no support'[6] (see below, § 9).

[1] By the kindness of Dr. Cordier, the present writer has been enabled to use extracts from this work, for the *dvīpas* in particular (see below, § 4). Prof. Takakusu seems to be mistaken when he says the section does not exist in Chinese (see p. 118 of his art.).

[2] On this work see the article in vol. i. p. 20; Burnouf, *Introduction à l'hist. du bouddhisme indien*, Paris, 1844, pp. 563–574 ff.; and the article of Takakusu. The present writer is indebted to Mr. F. W. Thomas for a copy of ch. iii. (Tibetan tr.).

[3] This source will be quoted as *A.K.V.*, and the folio in the MS of the 'Société asiatique' will be given; sometimes reference will be made to the MS of Burnouf (Burn.) in the 'Bibliothèque nationale.'

[4] The European works most frequently referred to in this art. are: Warren, *Buddhism in Translations* (Cambridge, Mass., 1896); Burnouf, *Lotus de la bonne loi* (Paris, 1852), and *Introduction à l'hist. du bouddhisme indien* (Paris, 1844); Rémusat, *Mélanges posthumes* (Paris, 1843); Georgi, *Alphabetum Tibetanum* (Rome, 1762); Köppen, *Religion des Buddha* (Berlin, 1857–59); Waddell, *Buddhism of Tibet* (London, 1895); C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist Psychology* (London, 1900). See also literature at art. AGES OF THE WORLD (Buddhist).

[5] See *Dīgha*, ii. 107 (*SBE* xi. 45), and cf. *Divyāvadāna*, p. 204; also *Aṅguttara*, iv. 312; *Milinda*, p. 68 (*SBE* xxxv. 106); Beal, *Catena*, p. 47. The authorities of Rémusat, *Mélanges posthumes*, p. 79 f., sometimes add a circle of fire between water and wind, and a circle of diamond (where the relics of the Buddhas are enclosed) between wind and ether.

[6] Quoted in *A.K.V.*, and translated by Burnouf, *Introd.* p. 448 (see *SBE* xxxv. 106); cf. *Madhyamakavṛtti*, p. 166, n. 5; Śaṅkara, ad *Brahmasūtras*, II. ii. 4; Rāmānuja, ad II. iii. 1. For the Vedic origins of this notion, spoken of by Burnouf, cf. *Bṛhadāraṇyakop.* iii. 6; *Aitareyabrāhmaṇa*, xi. 6. 4: 'The sky rests on the air, the air on the earth, the earth on the waters, the waters on the reality (truth, *satya*), the reality on the *brahman*, the *brahman* on the *tapas* (creative fervour)'; *Chhāndogya*, i. 9. 1: 'It is the space whence all these creatures proceed and into which they again descend' (see Oltramare, *Théosophie brahmanique*, Paris, 1906, i. 292; Deussen-Geden, *Phil. of the Upanishads*, Edin. 1906, p. 214 ff.).

(*b*) The Buddhists admit four 'great elements' (*mahābhūta*),[1] called great because they are the substance of all material things; they are earth, water, fire, and wind, or, as Mrs. Rhys Davids expresses it, earth-element, fluid-element, flame-element, and air-element (for their specific qualities reference may be made to *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, § 962 [=C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Bud. Psych.* p. 241], and to *Visuddhimagga*, xi. [tr. by Warren, *op. cit.* p. 157], where their functions in the human body are especially treated. Cf. also *Majjhima*, i. 185 and iii. 240 [quoted in *A.K.V.*, Burn. 42a], and *Śikṣasamuchchaya*, p. 244, a re-cast of *Majjhima*, iii. 240). The 'great elements' constitute the *bhūtarūpa*, 'element-matter,' whence is derived 'elementary matter,' 'dependent matter' (*bhautikaṁ rūpam*, *upādāya rūpam*), *e.g.* the sense-organs, in so far as they are distinct from 'the eye of flesh,' etc. This kind of matter is subtle and refined, in contradistinction to the elements that are solid and gross (*sūkṣma*, *praṇita*; *audārika*, *hīna*).

The common Indian belief that there is a fifth great element, viz. ether (or space, *ākāśa*),[2] is accepted by the Vaibhāsikas, who quote the *sūtra* mentioned above [2 (*a*)]; and it would not be difficult to find documentary or logical arguments in their favour. [*Ākāśa* is reckoned a *dhātu* (a term that often denotes 'element': *pṛthivīdhatu*, 'earthy-element,' etc.), and the *Abhidharma* ranks it in the category of *rūpa* (matter).] But for the Sautrāntikas and Mādhyamikas *ākāśa* is simply 'space' (not 'ether'), 'void' (*vyoman*=sky), not a thing (*artha*), but simply the absence of anything tangible, that which gives place to things, whence its name (*avakāśaṁ dadātity ākāśam*).[3] This is only a name, as the past, *nirvāṇa*, and the person (*pudgala*) are only names (says a *sūtra*). But the Buddhists do not deny a 'far extended vacuum,' eternal, infinite, not made (*asaṁskṛta*), the great nonentity to which, according to the materialists (*Dīgha*, i. 35: *Saṁyutta*, iii. 207), the senses and intelligence return at death.

3. The small universe: general notions.—We shall see below (§ 9) that the Buddhists imagined great 'cosmoi,' or 'chiliocosmoi,' but we shall first consider the 'small universe,' the creative unit of these great combinations, which extend to the farthest limits of space.

The starting-point of the 'small cosmology' is the old Indian and Brāhmanic geographical notion: in the centre of the world is a great mountain (Meru, Sumeru = Himālaya), where the gods dwell, and round which the sun moves. To the south lies India (*Jambudvīpa*); to the other sides, the other continents. The following is the Buddhist description, in its most systematic form (*Abhidharmakośa* and commentary). When the time has come for a new creation, after chaos, when everything is burnt up or 'volatilized' (see art. AGES OF THE WORLD [Buddhist]), the heaven of Brahmā appears first of all (and the gods who had been reborn in higher heavens come to be re-born here); then the heavens of the gods *Paranirmitavaśavartins*, *Nirmāṇaratis*, *Tuṣitas*, and *Yāmas* (see § 6); next, much lower, come (1) the wind-circle (*vāyumaṇḍala*), infinite in surface, resting on space, and 1,600,000 *yojanas* (or leagues) in thickness.[4] On this wind-circle, the cloud of the creation pours a sea of 1,120,000 leagues of golden water in a circle of 1,203,450 leagues' diameter. This sea, set in motion by the wind, gives (2) the water-circle (*āpmaṇḍala*), of 800,000 leagues' thickness, and (3) the golden earth (*kāñchanamayī bhūmi*), which rises to the top like cream on milk, 320,000 leagues in thickness. The cloud then pours on this golden earth gold, precious stones,

[1] C. A. F. Rhys Davids (*op. cit.* pp. 166, 197, 205) translates *mahābhūta* 'the things-that-have become, die grossen Gewordenen, τὰ γιγνόμενα, a far more scientific term than elements or στοιχεῖα'; but possibly the expression *mahābhūta* is pre-Buddhist, and is used in a sense that is not specifically Buddhist. What is not matter (*rūpa*)—thought, etc.—although 'becoming' *par excellence*, is not *bhūta*.

[2] There is a good summary on *ākāśa*, 'space' or 'ether,' in Vasudev Anant Sukhtankar, *Vedānta according to Rāmānuja* (Vienna, 1908), p. 52. See also Burnouf, *Lotus*, p. 615; *Ślokavārttika*, pp. 380, 770 (Chowkhambā Skr. Ser.), tr. pp. 196, 435 (*Bibl. Indica*, 1907); Sarad Chandra, *Tib. Dict.* (Calcutta, 1902), p. 425; *Śikṣāsamuchchaya*, pp. 249, 323; *Madhyamakavṛtti*, pp. 129, 271, 389, 413, 505, 528; *Aṅguttara*, i. 176; *Majjhima*, iii. 241; *Kathāvatthu*, vi. 6. 7; and C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *op. cit.* p. 193 (cf. *Visuddhimagga*, *JPTS*, 1891, p. 124, and *JPTS*, 1884, pp. 27, 29).

[3] '*Ākāśa* is great, since it gives place to the production (*bhava*?) of all *rūpa*, but it is not a *bhūta*' (Chandrakīrti, *Pañchaskandhaprakaraṇa*, p. 275a).

[4] Certain sources give the names of the whirlwinds of this wind-circle; see Beal, *Catena*, p. 101; cf. below, p. 137. According to *Abhidharmakośa*, iii. 87, the *yojana*=8 *krośa* (= the length the voice can carry) =4000 'arcs' (*daṇḍa*?) =16,000 hands (*hasta*, i.e. 'cubits') =16,000×24 fingers (*aṅguli*).

earth, water, iron, etc., which form (*a*) in the centre of the system, Mount Meru; (*b*) eight mountains, or concentric chains of mountains, seven of which (of gold) are quite near Meru and near each other, while the eighth (of iron) is almost at the very edge of the system; (*c*) oceans flowing between the concentric mountain-chains; and (*d*) islands, notably four great islands or continents situated in the largest of the oceans—the 'exterior' ocean, between the 7th and 8th mountains.[1]

The outside mountain is called Chakravāla, and this name is also applied to the entire 'small universe,' *lokadhātu*, or *chāturdvīpakalokadhātu*, 'four-continents-universe.'

Chakravāla (*°vāṭa*, *°vāḍa*, the *Sakwala* of Sp. Hardy) = 'circle,' 'bracelet,' 'horizon' (see E. Senart, *Essai sur la légende du Buddha*², Paris, 1882, p. 6 ff.). In the northern sources there are a *chakravāla*-mountain and a great-*chakravāla*-mountain, called 'black mountains' or 'time-mountains' (*kālaparvata*; see Maheśvara, ad *Amarakośa*, 2, 2, 2; *Dharmasaṅgraha*, § 124; *Lalitavistara* [Halle, 1902], p. 132; *Lotus*, in *SBE* xxi. 233; *Sikṣāsamuchchaya*, p. 246). Perhaps the 'great *chakravāla*' envelops a group of small universes (see below, § 9). Between three universes, which form three tangent circles, there is a dark region, 'intramundane darkness' (*lokāntarika*), a special hell—a cosmic abyss, which recalls the *anārambhanaṁ tamas*, 'unsupported darkness,' of *Rigveda*, i. 182. 6, vii. 104. 3 (see *Dīgha*, com. on ii. 12; Sp. Hardy, *Legends*, p. 110; Burnouf, *Lotus*, p. 832; and Beal, *Catena*, p. 64).

The iron-mountain-range, Chakravāla, like the continents, rests on the golden earth. It is 312½ leagues high and 312½ broad, and 312½ leagues above the level of the exterior ocean which it surrounds. This ocean is 322,000 leagues in extent,[2] and is bounded on the inner side by the *Nemiṁdhara* range ('felly-bearing'), 625 leagues in height and breadth, and 312½ leagues in projection (above the ocean's level). Then there is an ocean of 1250 leagues;[3] then *Vinataka*, 'inclined,' 1250 in height and breadth, 625 in projection; an ocean of 2500 leagues; *Aśvakarṇa*, 'horse-ear,' 2500; an ocean of 5000; *Sudarśana*, 'beautiful,' 5000; an ocean of 10,000; *Khadiraka*, 'acacia (?),' 10,000; an ocean, 20,000; *Iṣādhara*, 'plough-pole-bearing,' 20,000; an ocean, 40,000; *Yugaṁdhara*, 'yoke-bearing,' 40,000; an ocean, 80,000; Mount Meru, 160,000 leagues high, 80,000 leagues above the level of the ocean, 80,000 leagues broad, and 320,000 leagues in perimeter. The distance, therefore, from the axis of Meru to the Chakravāla-mountain is 600,437·5 leagues; the diameter of the whole is 1,200,875 (*Abhidharmakośa*).

As regards the order of the mountains, we have followed *A.K.V.*, *Divyāvadāna* (p. 217), Beal, Eitel (*Handbook of Chinese Buddhism*, London, 1888); there are curious variations in *Mahāvyutpatti*, § 194; *Dharmasaṅgraha*, § 125; *Mahāvastu*, ii. 300; *Śikṣās.* p. 246; *Visuddhimagga*, and *Nemijātaka* (*Jātaka*, vi. 125). Cf. a curious discussion in Burnouf, *Lotus*, p. 844, on the commentators on some of these divergencies; cf. also Sp. Hardy, *Legends*, p. 82. The names of the mountains are sometimes doubtful, e.g. *Īśadhara*, *Īsādhara*, *Iṣādhāra*, *Iṣādhara*, *Iṣāndhara*. The dimensions of the mountains and oceans also differ. The Pāli documents have, as the starting-point of their calculations, a Meru of 168,000 leagues high, with base 84 × 84, and 80,000 above sea-level (ancient source, *Aṅguttara*, iv. 100); from this, if we adopt a scheme that appears as classical in all sources, we get 42,000 for the first ocean, and the same for the first circular chain of mountains, then 21,000. . . . This would give a greater total diameter than that which we got according to the *Abhidharmakośa*. Now, the Pāli *Jinālaṁkāra* has for the diameter of Chakravâla 1,119,440 (Sp. Hardy, *Legends*, p. 85, seems inaccurate), and the *Visuddhimagga* has 1,203,450, *i.e.* the number attributed by the *Kośa* to the water-circle, which, according to *A.K.V.*, exceeds Chakravāla by 2575.

The seven concentric mountain-ranges have the generic name of *Kulāchala*, 'principal, noble mountains.' They are composed of gold, being excrescences of the golden earth. They are 'like walls,' their height and thickness being equal. One may ask, however, whether they are perpendicular, or, like our mountains, inclined. The answer is that they are really a little broader at the base (*A.K.V.*). It is not clear whether they are circular or form squares. They are often represented square; I-tsing believes the earth to be square, like Buddhist convents. It is quite certain that, in the Sanskrit *Abhidharma*, Meru is a parallelepiped.[1]

[1] See an excellent map of the Chakravāla (100,000 leagues to an inch) in Gogerly, *Ceylon Buddhism*, Colombo, 1908.

[2] There are numerous legends on this 'great ocean'; see Sp. Hardy, *Legends*, p. 121. On the *Mahāsamudra* we may refer to *Saṁyutta*, v. 441.

[3] The generic name of the seven 'interior' oceans is *sīdanta* (?), Tibetan *rol-mtsho*, 'lakes with gentle waves.' For their particular names, see *Dharmasaṅgraha*, § 126; Childers, *s.v.* 'Sāgaro'; Sp. Hardy, *Legends*, p. 84; Rémusat, *op. cit.* p. 80.

4. *Dvīpas*, 'islands' or 'continents,' (abodes of mankind).[2]—In the 'exterior' ocean, facing the eastern, southern, etc., sides of Mount Meru, and lit up in succession at distances of 6 hours after each other by the sun turning round Meru, are four islands (*dvīpa*, *dīpa*). They are formed of excellent earth, and rest on the golden earth, or circle of gold (*kāñchanachakra*), with a depth of 80,000 leagues of water (cf. *Divyāvadāna*, p. 197, 7). These islands are supposed to be on a level with the ocean, and it appears that, in this general definition, the small variations that constitute our earthly mountains are not taken into consideration.[3]

(1) In the east is the *Pūrvavideha*, 'Eastern Videha,'[4] in the form of a half or crescent moon, to which are attributed, nevertheless, four sides: three 2000 leagues (*yojana*) long, the fourth 350 leagues (perimeter, 6350 leagues). The men in this continent dwell in towns and villages, and live for 250 years; they are 8 cubits (*hasta*) in height, and their faces, like the continent itself, are half-moon-shaped.[5]

(2) In the south is *Jambudvīpa*,[6] 'Rose-apple-tree's continent,'[7] our continent, the continent where the Buddhas are born. It is a chariot in form, with four sides: three 2000 leagues long, the fourth 3·5 leagues (perimeter, 6003·5). The men there live 100 years at most;[8] their height is from 3·50 to 4 cubits; they resemble the continent in shape. (3) In the west is the *Aparagodāna* (or -*°godānīya* or -*°goyāna*), 'Western pasturage.'[9] It

[1] The present writer does not know the source of Sp. Hardy's curious description (*Manual of Budhism*, p. 10); Meru is round; at the summit and at the base it is 10,000 leagues in diameter, halfway up (at the sea-level) 50,000, and halfway up the projecting part 30,000 leagues. On Brāhmanical authorities concerning Meru, see Böhtlingk-Roth, *s.v.* 'Meru'; Fausböll, *Indian Mythology*, 1903; E. W. Hopkins, *JAOS*, 1910, p. 360; Al-Bīrūnī, *India*, i. 242, 327.

[2] The Pāli canonical sources seem very scanty; thus the enumeration of the *dvīpas* is missing in the chapter of the 'Fours' in the *Aṅguttara*, while the *Saṁyutta* speaks of four *dīpas*, the possession of which is not so precious as that of the four verities. See Spence Hardy, *Manual*, pp. 4, 14, *Legends*, p. 85; Warren, pp. 40, 64; *Mahāvyutpatti*, § 154; *Dharmasaṅgraha*, § 120; *Divyāvadāna*, p. 214 ff.; *Lalitavistara*, p. 149; Georgi, *Alph. Tibet.* p. 473; Köppen, *Buddhism*, i. 233; Waddell, *Lamaism*, p. 397; Rémusat, *Fo-koue-Ki*, Paris, 1836, p. 81, *Mélanges posth.* p. 71; Beal, *Catena*, pp. 21, 35. The Brāhmans have various nomenclatures for the continents, and notably one of four: *Bhadrāśva* ('good horses'), *Jambu*, *Ketumāla*, *Uttarakurus* (see E. W. Hopkins, *JAOS*, 1910, p. 368, and art. COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY [Indian]).

[3] Sarad Chandra (*Tibetan Dict.* p. 1173 ff.) gives the names of the mountains of the several continents—six, four, five, and two respectively—with the names of the wild beasts inhabiting them.

[4] *Videha* = the modern Tirhut; Tibetan *lus-hphags*, 'noble body' (play on the Skr. word *deha*, 'body'), 'because the human height there is double what it is in our continent,' *i.e.* in the *Jambudvīpa*.

[5] *Bhūmivaśāt*, 'because of the influence of the place, as well as the inhabitants of the Himālaya or the Vindhya mountains, have particular characteristics' (*A.K.V.* 256a; cf. Sp. Hardy, *Legends*, p. 85). Notice the good foundation for this ethnographical observation. The inhabitants of these parts of India are really of Tibetan race or 'autochthonous.'

[6] Also *Jambusaṇḍ(h)a*, 'thicket of *jambu*-trees' (*Aṅguttara*, iv. 90; *Suttanipāta*, 552; *A.K.V.* 252a).

[7] On this name, see art. COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY (Indian), *Aṅguttara*, i. 104 (1883). According to Śarad Chandra (*Tib. Dict.* p. 1048), this continent is also named 'from the *jam-jam* sound made by the falling from heaven of the leaves of the wishing-tree into the river Ganges.' We are not concerned with the Buddhist geography of this continent (Sp. Hardy, *Manual*, p. 15, etc.).

[8] The *Vibhaṅga* (*PTS*, 1904, p. 422) knows only one length of human life (which is the same as that of *Jambu*): *vassasatam alpam vā bhiyyo vā*. Life differs in one and the same continent according to the period of the age of the world (see AGES OF THE WORLD [Buddhist], vol. i. p. 189).

[9] This is, at least, the meaning of the Tibetan *Nub ba-laṅ-spyod*, but *godā* is a geographical name.

is round, *i.e.* it has three sides of 2500 leagues (perim. 7500);[1] length of human life, 500 years; height, 16 cubits. (4) In the north, the *Uttarakuru*, 'Northern *Kuru*-land'[2] (*Auttarakaurava*), is an oblong, 4 × 2000 leagues. There are neither villages nor towns; length of life, 2000 years; height, 32 cubits.

The above dimensions are those of the *Lokaprajñapti* and the *Abhidharmakośa* (ii. 53 f.). The *Lalitavistara* has them arranged in this order—9000, 7000, 8000, and 10,000 leagues; Sp. Hardy has 7000, 10,000 (in length and breadth), 7000, and 8000.

In the diagrams which the Buddhist cult (Great Vehicle and Tantrism) uses for the 'offering of the universe,'[3] the continents are represented: (1) half-moon (*ardhachandra*) and white, (2) triangular (*tryaśra*) and golden, (3) circular and red, and (4) square and dark blue.

According to the 'northern' sources, there are alongside of each continent two small continents (*upadvipas*), of the same shape but half the size, in the following order, starting from N.E.E.: Deha and Videha, Chāmara (Chowrie [?]) and Aparachāmara (Western Chowrie), Sāṭas-island and Uttaramantrin-island, Kurus-island and Kauravas-island. Their inhabitants are monstrous creatures with three eyes, legs, and ears (*Kalpadruma*). According to *Jātaka*, i. 63 (Warren, p. 64), there is an archipelago of 500 islands round each continent.

The *Mahāvyutpatti* names the last four 'little continents' according to the names of their inhabitants (cf. *uttarāḥ kuravāḥ* [*Mahābhārata*, vi. 208])—*Śāṭa*, an inhabitant of Śaṭa, an ancient geographical name, although the readings *Śāṭā* and *Śāṭhā* have a feminine appearance; Tibetan *gyo-ldan*, 'deceitful' (= *śaṭha*); *Uttaramantrin* = *lam-mchog-hgro*, 'best-way-going.' For *kurus* and *kauravas* (*sgra-mi-sñan* and *sgra-mi-sñan-zla*, according to Desgodins), see Waddell, p. 399.

5. Unhappy existences (*apāya*).—(i.) THE DAMNED.[4]—(*a*) *Hot hells.*—Twenty thousand leagues under *Jambudvīpa* (the southern part, or part under Bodh Gāya) is the *Avīchi* hell ('no release' [?]), forming a cube of 20,000 leagues. Above it are seven other hot hells, called (in descending order): (1) *Sañjīva*, 'reviving,' because winds re-animate the dying damned; (2) *Kālasūtra*, 'black string,' which cuts the damned into pieces (cf. *JPTS*, 1884, p. 76); (3) *Saṅghāta*, 'dashing together,' between mountains, etc.; (4) *Raurava*, 'weeping'; (5) *Mahāraurava*, 'great weeping'; (6) *Tāpana*, 'heating'; and (7) *Pratāpana*, 'greatly heating' (*A.K.V.* ad iii. 58).

Some authorities (cf. *A.K.V.* and Beal, *Catena*, p. 57) think that the hells are pyramidal in shape, each of them being smaller towards the upper part, 'like a heap of grain.' We are told also that each hell is 4000 leagues deep. According to the *Kalpadruma*, there is, first of all, a layer of 500 leagues of white clay, then 500 leagues of black clay, then the *Sañjīva* and the other six hells occupying 10,000 leagues, the last of them, *Pratāpana*, reaching 19,000 leagues underneath the surface of the *Jambudvīpa*; then the *Avīchi* is 20,000 leagues.[5]

No name seems to exist in the earliest Pāli texts for the burning 'great hell' of *Majjhima*, i. 337, iii. 167, 183 (cf. *Aṅguttara*, i. 138), which is also the hell in which schismatics suffer for an 'age of the world' (*kalpa*) (see *Chullavagga*, vii. 5, 4; *Aṅguttara*, v. 76, etc.). This hell is clearly the *Avīchi* of the later literature.[6] See, *e.g.*, the description in *Majjhima* of the *mahāniraya*, which has three names: (1) *chhaphassāyatonika* (cf. *Saṁyutta*, iv. 126), 'six organs (suffering)'; (2) *saṁkusamāhata*, 'reunion of javelins,' because every thousand years (or every hundred years) two javelins pierce the heart of the damned, and meet inside it; and (3) *pachchattavedaniya*, 'to be known only by personal experience.' After innumerable centuries the guilty one passes into the *utsada*, a zone which surrounds the great hell, and where there is access through four gates to the four cardinal points, and there suffers the pain called *vuṭṭhānima*.

[1] $\pi = 3$ in the *Abhidharmakośa*. Sp. Hardy has 3·14285 (*Manual*, p. 10).

[2] Different from the Kurus (Central India) and the Southern Kurus. It is Ptolemy's *Ottorokorra* (see art. BLEST, ABODE OF THE [Buddhist], vol. ii. p. 687, and [Hindu] *ib.* p. 698 f., and also *Aṅguttara*, iv. 396, on the moral and spiritual characters of the *Uttarakurukas*). The Tibetan translation of this word, like several others, is onomatopoetic, *sgra-mi-sñan*, 'disagreeable sound' (*ku-rava*; *ku-√ru*, *ku*, a pejorative, *ru*, 'to make any noise'), 'for during the seven days before death, one hears the disagreeable sound of the death.'

[3] See 'Ādikarmapradīpa,' in Poussin, *Bouddhisme; Études et Matériaux*, Brussels and London, 1898, p. 224; Waddell, *Lamaism*, p. 398 (with plate); Georgi, *Alph. Tibetanum*, p. 472.

[4] See art. HELL (Buddhist). The chief sources for the Buddhist hells are *A.K.V.* fol. 256; *Kalpadruma*, p. 5; *Mahāvastu*, i. 4; Nāgārjuna's 'Epistle,' in *JPTS*, 1886; Chandragomin's 'Epistle,' in *Zapiski*, iv. 29 ff.; *JPTS*, 1884, p. 154; Beal, *Catena*, p. 57; Waddell, *Lamaism*, p. 92; and on the pains, *Aṅguttara*, i. 138 (Warren, p. 257); *Divyāvadāna*, p. 375; *Majjhima*, no. 129; *Kathāvatthu*, xx. 3. A comparison with the Brāhmanical and Hindu sources is instructive and necessary (see especially Feer, '*L'Enfer indien*,' in *JA*, 1892, ii. [partly translated in the *JBTS* of India, 1894, pt. iv. app. ii.]).

[5] Cf. Sp. Hardy, *Manual*, p. 27. Waddell makes the hells begin 11,900 leagues below the surface.

[6] *Avīchi*, 'no refuge,' 'no release.' The Chinese sources mention various regions in the *Avīchi*; cf. the *Saddharmasmṛtyupasthāna* (Nanjio, *Catalogue*, 1883, pp. 679, 804) quoted in *Sikṣāsamuchchaya*, p. 69 f., the 'terrible-birds' (3000 leagues), 'the infernal precipice,' 'the hole with wheels,' etc.

On each of the four sides of each hell there are four *utsadas* (*ussada*; *osupat* in Sp. Hardy, *Manual*, p. 27), excrescences (cf. *narakakumbha*, 'hell-jar,' 'hell-prominence'), ante-chambers, or rather 'post-chambers,' of hell, in which the damned in succession are tortured on leaving hell (in which they are sometimes finally rejected). They are: (1) *kukūla* (*kukkūla*), 'fiery pit,' 'chaff-fire'; (2) *kuṇapa*, 'corpse-quagmire' (cf. *gūthaniraya*); (3) *kṣuramārga*, 'razor-road,' etc. (etc. = *asipattravana*, 'sword-leaved forest,' and *śālmalīvana*, 'seemul-forest' with cruel birds); (4) the *nadī*, 'river,' by its name Vaitaraṇī, the Indian Styx, which is conjectured to be as early as the Brāhmaṇas (cf. *Khārodakā nadī* [*Majjhima*], *A.K.V.* iii. 59).[1]

Hell contains sixteen *utsadas* (*brgyad-po kun-la lhag bcu-drug*, 'to each of the eight, sixteen *utsadas*' [*A.K.V.*]). A primitive idea, which is more satisfactory, is to regard the four *utsadas* as so many zones surrounding the igneous cage in the centre.

The damned of the *Sañjīva* live there for 500 years of 12 months of 30 days, but each day is equal to the length of the life of gods in the heaven of the Four Kings (see below, § 6), and so on, life in the *Tāpana* being calculated as a function of the life of the *paranirmitavaśavartin* gods (see *ib.*). In the *Pratāpana* life lasts for half of an *antarakalpa* (see art. AGES OF THE WORLD [Buddhist], vol. i. p. 188), in the *Avīchi* one *antarakalpa* (*A.K.V.*). The interpretation of the *Kośa* is, therefore, similar to Buddhaghoṣa's (*Kathāvatthu*, xiii. 1), which fixes the existence of the damned, called *kalpastha*, 'lasting a *kalpa*,' at $\frac{1}{80}$ of a (great) *kalpa*, while the *Rājagirikas* understand a great *kalpa* here (see the texts concerning schismatics quoted above).[2]

(*b*) *Cold hells.*—According to the northern sources, eight cold hells are distinguished: (1) *Arbuda*, (2) *Nirarbuda*, (3) *Aṭaṭa*, (4) *Hahava*, (5) *Huhuva*, (6) *Utpala*, (7) *Padma*, (8) *Mahāpadma*. (1), (2), (6), (7), and (8) are named from the shape of their inhabitants; in (1) and (2) the damned are like *arbudas*, 'a round mass' ('bubble,' 'tumour,' 'first-month fetus'); in (6), (7), and (8) they resemble lotuses. The names of (3), (4), and (5) are onomatopoetic: the teeth of the damned, knocking against each other with the cold, produce the sound *aṭaṭa*, etc. (*A.K.V.*).[3]

These hells, which are 2000 leagues deep, are arranged in stages, like the hot hells, and near them (*Kalpadruma*); or—a view which seems preferable—they are placed in the 'intra-mundane darkness' (*lokāntarika niraya*), among the Chakravālas (Beal, *Catena*, p. 64, according to *Abhidharmaśāstra*; *Dialogues*, ii. 9). Sp. Hardy (*Manual*, p. 59) places the ghosts (*pretas*) in this darkness.

The ancient Pāli texts, *Saṁyutta*, i. 152, *Aṅguttara*, v. 172, and *Suttanipāta*, p. 123 (*SBE* x. 119), give the same nomenclature with a few variants and additions (Kern, *Manual of Ind. Buddhism*, Strassburg, 1896, p. 58); but the names, originally at least, did not refer to distinct hells. They denoted the periods, increasing by the multiple 20, during which the damned person lives in hell: 'If there were a load of sesamum seed containing sixty bushels (20 *khārīs*), and a man after the lapse of

[1] On the *utsadas*, see Morris, in *JPTS*, 1887, p. 144; *Mahāvyutpatti*, § 215; Burnouf, *Lotus*, p. 568; E. Senart, *Mahāvastu*, i. 6, 372 note, iii. 369, with which cf. *Majjhima*, iii. 185 (Neumann, iii. 354, translates *kukkūḷaniraya* wrongly as 'dogs' hell'), *JPTS*, 1884, p. 155, 1887, p. 47; Śarad Chandra, *Tib. Dict.* p. 983; Waddell, p. 96; *Suttanipāta*, v. 670.

[2] Buddhaghoṣa gives a different interpretation (ad *Kathāvatthu*, xi. 5).

[3] *Arbuda* = Tib. *chu-bur*, 'water-bubble'; *nirarbuda* = *chu-bur-rdul-ba-can*, 'dust-bubbles' (but elsewhere *rdol-ba-can* [?]); then *so-tham-pa*, 'chattering of teeth,' and *a-chu . . . zer-ba*, 'where one says "Akiu"'; *ut-pa-la lta-bur gas-pa*, 'where one is split [by the cold] like an *utpala*,' *i.e.* the damned are split into 8, 30, or 60 pieces, according to the number of petals of the lotus after which the hell is called (Georgi, *Alph. Tibet.* p. 266; cf. Beal, *Catena*, p. 63, and Waddell, p. 95).

every hundred years were to take from it one sesamum seed, that load would sooner dwindle away than one Abbuda hell; and even as are twenty Abbuda hells, so is one Nirabbuda hell.' The *Abhidharmakośa* (iii. 84) has the same method of counting for the *arbuda*, etc. *Arbuda*, etc., are what are called 'high numerals' (*Mahāvyutpatti*, § 246 [101-102], § 250 [9-14]; see AGES OF THE WORLD [Buddhist], vol. i. p. 188b).

(c) There are some hells about which we know nothing but the names, *e.g.* the *Saṁsavaka* (*Vimānavatthu*, p. 50), and the traditions of the Great Vehicle are rich in multiple inventions. We may mention the hells that the Tibetans call 'ephemeral' (*ñi-tshe-ba*), which are the 'frontier hells' of Beal (*Catena*, p. 65), Skr. *prādeśika* or *pratyekanarakas*(?) (see *Mahāvastu*, i. 458, and Burnouf, *Introduction*, p. 320). They are reserved for small sins or for special categories of sinners (see art. BODHISATTVA, vol. ii. p. 744b). They are found on the borders of the hells, in the ocean, in the world of men, and in the deserts of *Jambudvīpa*. There are 84,000 of them.

(ii.) ANIMALS.—The animals form the class immediately above the damned. They are divided into many categories (e.g. *Majjhima*, no. 129), and their special abode is the 'exterior ocean'; but, as everybody knows, they are met with in the world of men, and (in spite of what certain heretics say) not in the world of the gods (*Kathāvatthu*, xx. 4).

(iii.) PRETAS, 'THE DEAD' or 'GHOSTS.'—The popular beliefs concerning the dead have not yet been systematized, as may be seen from the *Petavatthu* and the literature of every epoch (see artt. DEATH, etc. [Buddhist], STATE OF THE DEAD [Buddhist], etc.). Speaking generally, we may say that the *pretas* dwell almost everywhere throughout the world of men, but especially in the kingdom of *Yama*, which is divided into 36 provinces, situated 500 leagues below *Jambudvīpa*. There they live 500 years, a day being equal to a human month.[1]

(iv.) ASURAS, 'NON-GODS.'[2]—Their abode is especially in the caverns of Mount Meru, below the level of the sea, where there are four towns of 11,000 leagues, at depths of 20,000, 40,000, 60,000, and 80,000 leagues, namely, 'Shining,' 'Startassel,' 'Deep,' and 'Golden town,' with Rāhu (the spirit of the eclipse), Kaṇṭhamālādhara, Puṣpamālādhara, and Vemachitra as kings.[3] But they often leave their abysses to conquer Meru, and fight with the 'Thirty-three gods' and their vanguard (dragons and *yakṣas*); hence the mistake made by some authors in saying that they dwell on the fourth stage of Meru.

There is an infinite number of *yakṣas* (*yakkha*, 'a being to be worshipped,' 'a powerful spirit' [Kern, *Manual*, p. 59]), terrestrial (*bhauma*, living on the surface of the earth and under the earth), atmospheric, etc.[4] Three categories occupy a special place in our sources (*Abhidharmakośa*, iii. 56) as inhabitants of Mount Meru.

On Meru there are four terraces (*pariṣaṇḍa*, *ban-rim*) of 16,000, 8000, 4000, and 2000 leagues, separated from each other by 10,000 leagues. The fourth is reserved for the Four Kings, who are classed as gods (*devas*) (see below, § 6); the other three are inhabited by (1) the *yakṣas karoṭapāṇis*, 'bowl in hand,' (2) the *yakṣas mālādharas*, 'bearing garlands,' and (3) the *yakṣas sadāmadas* (*sadāmattas* [*Dīgha*, ii. 260]), 'always drunk.'[1]

1 A study of the *pretas* 'with magical power,' and of the king of the *pretas* (*pettirāja*), as well as that of the 'guardians of the hells' (who may bear the name of god [*Kathāvatthu*, xx. 3]), etc., belongs to the doctrine of existing beings rather than to cosmology.

2 On the *asuras*, see above, p. 130; and art. DAITYA.

3 According to *Kalpadruma*, p. 5; Beal (*Catena*, p. 51) is of a different opinion. See Burnouf, *Introduction*, p. 601 (incorrect); Köppen, i. 246; Nāgārjuna's 'Epistle,' in *JPTS*, 1886, p. 27; *Mahāvyutpatti*, § 171; *Divyavadāna*, pp. 126, 148, 222; *Mahāvastu*, i. 30, ii. 344, iii. 138, 254. The *Mahāvastu* speaks of five armies of *asuras*, but mentions only three kings—Vemachitrin, Rāhu, and Muchilinda. The *Kathāvatthu* (viii. 1) associates the companions of Vepachitti with the gods, and the *kalakañjakas* with the *pretas*. On the war of the *asuras* with the *suras*, see *Aṅguttara*, iv. 433; *JPTS*, 1903, p. 143, etc.

4 We may mention the twenty-eight generals of the *yakṣas* referred to in *Lalitavistara*, p. 202.

6. **Heavens of the concupiscence-world** (*kāmadhātu*).—(*a*) On the fourth terrace of Meru is the retinue of the Four Great Kings (*chāturmahārājakāyikas*, *catummahārājikas*), 80,000 in all (?),[2] and (higher up, if we are to believe *Dīgha*, i. 216) the Four Great Kings, rulers of the cardinal points. These are the first beings who regularly receive the name of 'gods,' and are classed as such. The length of their life is 500 years, a day being equal to 50 human years, and their height is $\frac{1}{4}$ *krośa* (= $\frac{1}{8}$ *yojana*, 'league'). Perhaps the numerous servants and courtiers of the Great Kings, the *gandharvas*, 'celestial musicians,' etc., although they are not *devas*, ought to be regarded as belonging to this category.

Half-way up Meru are the chariots of the sun (51 leagues), of the moon (a league further down), and of the stars. These deities do not form a special class.[3]

(*b*) On the summit of Meru are the gods 'who have the Thirty-three at their head' (*trāyastriṁśas*; *tāvatiṁsas*), to the number of 100,000 (?), and, above them (according to *Dīgha*), is their king Śakra, *devānam inda*, 'the Indra of the gods.' Their town, 'Lovely view,' is 2500 miles square, and contains the Palace of Victory (*vaijayanta* [*Majjhima*, i. 253]), etc. They live for 1000 years, one day being equal to 100 human years (*Dīgha*, ii. 327),[4] and their height is $\frac{1}{2}$ *krośa*.

Then there are palaces which might be called aerial (*vimāna*):[5]

(*c*) 160,000 leagues above *Jambudvīpa*, *i.e.* 80,000 above the Thirty-three, and 80,000 leagues broad, the palace of the *yāmas* gods,[6] whose king Suyāma, according to *Dīgha*, dwells higher up. Length of life, 2000 years, one day = 200 human years; height, $\frac{3}{4}$ *krośa*.

(*d*) The abode of the *tuṣitas*, 'satisfied' or 'blissful'; the residence of a future Buddha before his last existence; king, Saṁtuṣita; length of life, 4000 years; height, 1 *krośa*.

(*e*) The abode of the *nirmāṇaratis*, 'who have their pleasure in creation,' 'happy creators'; king, Sunirmita, 'well-built.' According to the *A.K.V.*, the meaning of this name is 'enjoying self-created pleasures,' in contrast with the inferior gods, who enjoy objects which are presented to them on account of their deserts (cf. *Itivuttaka*, p. 94). Length of life, 8000 years; height, $1\frac{1}{4}$ *krośa*.

(*f*) 1,280,000 leagues above *Jambudvīpa*, 640,000 leagues broad, the abode of the 60,000 *paranirmitavaśavartins* (*paranirmita*, and sometimes wrongly [?] *pari°*), having Vaśavartin, 'the sovereign,' as king (*Dīgha*, i. 219). The name of these gods means 'rulers over the things created by

1 See *Mahāvyutpatti*, § 163, 36-38; Burnouf, *Introduction*, p. 599 (quoting Georgi, p. 480); *Mahāvastu*, i. 30; *Divyāvadāna*, p. 218 (which mentions *nāgas*, 'dragons,' resting on the water [*udakaniśrita*] at the foot of Meru); Morris, *JPTS*, 1891, pp. 21-25. These *genii*, *dii minores*, are sometimes called *devas*, especially the *karoṭapāṇis* (*Divyāvadāna* and *Mahāvyutpatti*); so also the *bhaumās devās* in *Lalitavistara*, etc. *Deva-putra*, 'god-son,' 'divine,' is sometimes an epithet of greater gods.

2 According to *Lalitavistara*, p. 46, 19.

3 See *A.K.V.* iii. 60; Beal, *Catena*, p. 71; Spence Hardy, *Manual*, p. 26.

4 Here, as elsewhere, years consisting of 12 months of 30 days are meant. In *Divyāvadāna*, p. 225, the day of Śakra and of the Thirty-three is equal to only one human year; hence a total of 360,000 human years.

5 The Tibetan translation means 'non-measurable (*vi-māna*) mansions.' These palaces may be spiritual, *i.e.* they are composed of subtle matter: 'splendid, pagoda-shaped palaces, movable from place to place by an effort of will' (Childers, *Dict.* p. 574); see *Vimānavatthu*, and Böhtlingk-Roth, *s.v.* 'Vimāna.'

6 The meaning of *yāmas* is not clear. The Tibetan is *hthab-bral-ba*, 'free from battle,' because they have not to wage war with the *asuras*, as the Thirty-three have to do. The *yāmas*, as we have seen (§ 3), are created before the *chakravāla*. The kings are named in *Lalitavistara*, p. 44.

others,' 'disposers of others' creations' (C. A. F. Rhys Davids' tr.), *i.e.* they themselves create, or they cause others to create, the objects of enjoyment which they desire. Length of life, 160,000 years, one day = 16,000 human years; height, 1½ *krośa*.

Some sources regard Māra, the Satan of early Buddhism, as the Supreme god of the world of concupiscence, and assign a special place to him, Mārabhavana, with 68,000 good assistants. Length of life, 32,000 years (see *Lalitavistara*, index, and Beal, *Catena*, p. 83, who adds, from the Chinese *Dīrghāgama*, the weight of the clothing of each class; it varies from 1 oz. to $1\frac{1}{16}$ oz.).

The gods of 'concupiscence' (*kāmabhogin*) enjoy sensuous pleasures: but there is a progressive refinement in their food (see C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Buddh. Psych.* p. 197). In the higher spheres the sexual act is accomplished by binding (*āliṅgana*, among the *yāmas*), by joining hands (*pāṇyāpti*, among the *tuṣitas*), by smiling (*hasita*, among the *nirmāṇaratis*), or by a simple look (*ikṣita*, among the *paranirmitavaśavartins*) (see *A.K.V.* iii. 62, and Georgi, p. 483). On the birth of the gods, who do not come out of the womb, although they are not 'apparitional beings' (see § 7), see Beal, *Catena*, pp. 74, 78, and cf. Waddell, *Lamaism*, p. 86.

The Four Kings and the Thirty-three are well-known in the Brāhmanical sources, and are much older than Buddhism. There are several Brāhmanical references to the *yāmas* (*suyāmas*), *tuṣitas*, *nirmāṇaratas* (*Mahābhārata*, xiii. 18, 74; see Burnouf, *Introd.* p. 604 f.), but they are probably borrowed from Buddhism (*tuṣitā brahmakāyās*).

The sextuple division of the gods of concupiscence appears in the earliest Buddhist books, e.g. *Majjhima*, ii. 194, iii. 100, *Dīgha*, i. 216; and the length of the lives is fixed just as in the scholastic era (*Vibhaṅga*, p. 422). But lists of gods, like *Dīgha*, ii. 256 (six series of ten divine groups, *kāyas*), seem to be older than this sextuple division (see reference to *yāmas*, etc., on p. 261).

7. Heavens of the material world (*rūpadhātu*) **or Brahmā-world.**—Probably the most ancient documents on divine beings superior to the *devas* properly so-called, to the gods of desire, are *Dīgha*, i. 17, 34, 195.[1] The following is a summary. According to the 'names, expressions, turns of speech, designations in common use in the world' (the indifference of Buddhists to what is not the way of salvation is clearly shown in these precautions of the ancient editor, who seems to have been conscious that the Buddha regards such things as accessory and un-sure), there are three classes of gods (or kinds of existence, *attabhāva*), which must not be called by each other's names, viz. (1) 'divine, having form (or material, *rūpī*), belonging to the sensuous (or sexual) plan (*kāmāvachara*), feeding on solid food,' in a word, 'solid' (*olārika*), 'formed of the four great elements'; (2) 'divine, having form, made of mind, with all major and minor links complete, not deficient in any organs,' in a word, 'made of mind' (*manomaya*);[2] (3) immaterial (formless), made up of consciousness (or thought, *saññā*) only.

To the first class belong the six categories of gods 'who enjoy pleasures' (*kāmabhuj*), the Four Kings, . . . the *paranirmitavaśavartins*.

We must now consider the second class, *rūpāvachara*, or gods of the realm of matter, of whom Brahmā is the ancient type and the representative *par excellence* to such a degree that the 'world of matter' is called the 'world of Brahmā.' The gods here are born without parents, by apparitional birth (*aupapātika*); they are not immaterial, but their matter is subtle (*sūkṣma*, *praṇīta*), for they feed on joy (*prītibhakṣa*), and are luminous—the same as the first men (see art. AGES OF THE WORLD [Buddhist], vol. i. p. 190ᵃ). We may compare the *ṛibhus* of *Mahābhārata*, iii. 15461: 'They have divine bodies, and not material forms' (*vigrahamūrti*).[3] The idea of the progressive refinement of the body of the gods is old (*Śatapathabrāhmaṇa*, x. i. 5. 4; *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, ii. 1-5 [Rhys Davids, *Dialogues*, i. 48]); and with the Brāhmans the worlds of Prajāpati (cf. *Majjhima*, i. 2) and

[1] See Rhys Davids, *Dialogues*, i. 46, 259, 260 (line 2 to be read: 'The second has form.' . . .); cf. *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī*, *ad loc.*

[2] On *manomaya*, see art. BODHISATTVA, vol. ii. p. 742ᵇ, note §; also *A.K.V.* 265.

[3] See Fausboll, *Indian Mythology*, p. 144.

Brahmā were placed above the heavens of the *karma*-gods (gods owing to their merit) and the birth-gods (*Taitt. Up.* ii. 8; Windisch, *Buddha's Geburt*, Leipzig, 1908, p. 15). Being by his nature invisible to the inferior gods, Brahmā creates a 'solid' body for himself when it pleases him to show himself to the Thirty-three (*Dīgha*, ii. 210). In this respect there is some resemblance between the *Kenopaniṣad* and *Dīgha*, i. 220. The connexion is still more marked with *Majjhima*, i. 330, where Brahmā (the god Brahmā then called *Baka*, 'Heron') tries in vain to disappear from the eyes of Buddha; he was more successful with Varuṇa, the Vedic god.

The text which we have quoted, 'divine . . . with all major and minor limbs complete' (cf. *Majjhima*, ii. 17, l. 26), is clear enough: the *rūpa*-gods possess all the organs of the body. This opinion, however, came to be regarded as almost 'heretical' by Pāli orthodoxy as well as by Northern orthodoxy (see *Vibhaṅga*, p. 418: *Kathāvatthu*, viii. 7, with the commentary, and *A.K.V.* [Burn. 44]). Smell (*gandha*) and taste (*rasa*) are solid food (*kavaḍīkārāhāra*), and consequently cannot be perceived by the gods of *rūpadhātu*; therefore noses and tongues are useless to them. If these gods possess these organs, it is replied that it is merely for reasons of beauty. The sexual organ is of no use to them, and it would detract from their beauty if it were not hidden as it was in the body of Śākyamuni (see *Suttanipāta*, p. 99 = *SBE* x. 100, and elsewhere). This discussion, which we might consider rather frivolous, is characteristic of a part of scholastic Buddhism; there are some points in it which we shall never see clearly, and about which the Buddhists themselves are confused.

The Buddhists, making the most of the theory of the four *dhyānas* (*jhānas*, 'trances'), have established very coherent systems on the hierarchy of the so-called 'material' celestial spheres. The complete table is as follows:

(i.) FIRST-TRANCE HEAVENS.—(1) *Brahmapārṣadyas* (or *°kāyikas*),[1] retinue of Brahmā; length of life, 20 small ages of the world (20 *antarakalpas* = ½ great *kalpa*); height, ½ league. The heaven is situated 2,580,000 leagues above *Jambudvīpa*,[2] and is 1,290,000 leagues broad. These numbers have to be doubled for the following heavens. (2) *Brahmapurohitas*, 'Brahmā-chaplains'; length of life, ½ great *kalpa*; height, 1 league. (3) *Mahābrahmāṇas*, 'Great Brahmās'; length of life, ¾ *kalpa*; height, 1½ league.[3]

The common opinion is that there are as many stages as there are classes of gods. But some say that 'Brahmā has no distinct abode; only in the middle of the *purohita*-heaven there is a high storeyed tower, and this is the abode of Brahmā.' Every trance-heaven has a king, ministers, and people (Beal, *Catena*, p. 95; cf. *Aṅguttara*, ii. 126, where Brahmakāyika [life, 1 *kalpa*] is the general name of the gods of the first trance). Contrast with this *Dīgha*, i. 216: the retinue of the great Brahmā does not know 'where, why, whence Brahmā is.' This text is not familiar with *purohitas*. On the other hand, according to *A.K.V.*, the Kashmīrians do not distinguish the *purohitas* from the great Brahmās. It will be noted that this plural, 'great Brahmās,' is strange, because there cannot be, and in former Buddhist mythology there was not, more than one Brahmā. But the early texts, when mentioning several 'prænomens' of different Brahmās, probably believed to belong to different cosmoi or to different ages of the world, have opened the way for this new idea. On different classes of Brahmās, see below, § 9.

(ii.) SECOND-TRANCE HEAVENS.—(1) *Parīttābhas* ('Limited splendour'); length of life, 2 *kalpas*; height, 2 leagues. These figures are doubled for the next five classes. (2) *Apramāṇābhas*, 'Im-

[1] Mentioned in *Saṁyutta*, i. 145, 155. The *Lalitavistara* (p. 150) draws a distinction between *°kāyikas* and *°pārṣadyas* (see also p. 44).

[2] According to *Kalpadruma*. Feer (*AMG* v. 535) says 256, *i.e.* double the height of the heaven of the *paranirmitavaśavartins*.

[3] We give the heights and lengths of life according to the *A.K.V.* 'The first gods of the *rūpa*-world are ½ *yojana* in height; another ½ *yojana* must be added for the following classes, and one must double from the *parīttābhas*.' As regards the length of life, the Pāli sources have for these three classes ⅓, ½, and 1 *kalpa* (*Vibhaṅga*, p. 424; Warren, p. 290). The text quoted in the commentary to *Kathāvatthu*, xi. 5, however, assigns a *kalpa* to the *brahmakāyikas*; but, according to Buddhaghoṣa, it refers to a *kappekadesa*, *i.e.* a portion of a *kalpa*. The *Abhidharmakośa* has ½, 1, 1½ *kalpa* (see Feer, *AMG* v. 535); but its commentary, the *Vyākhyā*, maintains that *kalpa* must be taken to mean ½ *kalpa*, therefore ¼, ½, ¾. It refers to a large *kalpa*; but, according to the *Kalpadruma*, the length of life in the *rūpa*-world extends from a small *kalpa* ($\frac{1}{80}$ of a large *kalpa*) to 16 small *kalpas*.

measurable splendour.' (3) *Ābhāsvaras* (*Ābhassara*), 'Radiant.'[1]

(iii.) THIRD-TRANCE HEAVENS.—(1) *Parīttaśubhas*, 'Limited beauty.' (2) *Apramāṇaśubhas*, 'Immeasurable beauty.' (3) *Subhakṛtsnas* (*Subhakiṇha*, wrongly *Subhakiṇṇa*), 'Complete beauty';[2] length of life, 64 *kalpas*, *i.e.* until the return of the destruction of the cosmos by wind (see AGES OF THE WORLD [Buddhist], vol. i. p. 188); height, 64 leagues.

(iv.) FOURTH-TRANCE HEAVENS.—(1) *Anabhrakas* ('Cloudless'); 125 *kalpas* and leagues (not 128, which would be double that of the *Subhakṛtsnas*); these numbers are doubled for the following classes. (2) *Puṇyaprasavas*, 'Merit-born' (Tib. *bsod-nams-skyes*), or perhaps 'Merit-begetting' (?). (3) *Bṛhatphalas* (*Vehapphalas*), 'Abundant fruit.'[3] (4)-(8) bear the generic name of *Śuddhāvāsa*, 'Pure abode,' whence *Śuddhāvāsikas*, *Śuddhāvāsakāyikas*, 'inhabitants of the Pure abodes.'[4] (4) *Avṛhas* (*Avihas*), 'Effortless' (?).[5] (5) *Atapas* (*atappa*=*atāpya*), 'No heat,' 'Cool gods.' (6) *Sudṛśas* (*Sudassa*), 'Beautiful.' (7) *Sudarśana* (*Sudassin*), 'Well-seeing.' (8) *Akaniṣṭhas*, 'Sublime' (='not youngest,' 'not smallest'), also called (or subordinated to) *Aghaniṣṭhas*, 'at the end (*niṣṭha*) of the compact' (*agha*), *i.e.* 'at the top or the end of the material world';[6] length of life, 16,000 *kalpas*; height, 16,000 leagues.

The total number of 'places' or 'stages' in the *rūpa*-world, therefore, is seventeen, according to the *Abhidharmakaśa* (iii. 2); the Kashmirians suppress one of them (see above, p. 135b). The Pāli tradition of *Abhidharma* counts only sixteen; it has neither the *Anabhrakas* nor the *Puṇyaprasavas*, but it adds the *Asaṁjñasattvas* (°*devas*, 'unconscious beings,' 'gods') as follows: FOURTH TRANCE.—(1) *Asaññasattas*, (2) *Vehapphalas*, (3) Pure abodes, five in number. [In later documents, *e.g.* in *Abhidhammatthasaṁgraha*, v. 2-6, 10, tr. Warren, *Buddhism*, p. 289, the *Asaññasattas* come after the *Vehapphalas*; and the same arrangement occurs in Northern texts, viz. *Lalitavistara*, p. 150, *Dharmasaṅgraha*, § 128; Beal, p. 85 (according to *Dīrghāgama*?), which add the *Asaṁjñasattvas* to the list of the *Kośa*.][7]

Lastly, certain sources place the heaven of Mahāmaheśvara, the Great Lord, Śiva, above the *Akaniṣṭhas*—a non-Buddhist idea borrowed from Hinduism (*Mahāvyutpatti*, § 161; Triglotte, 53; Rémusat, *Fo-koue-ki*, p. 146).[1]

We shall now venture to make some more or less hypothetical remarks on the origin and development of this theological cosmology. It is probable that Brahmā was at first regarded as the greatest god (see *Dīgha*, i. 222, ii. 210), and his name has remained attached to the *rūpa*-world (see, *e.g.*, Index *s.v.* 'Visuddhimagga,' Warren-Lanman, *Buddhism in Translations*, Cambridge, Mass., 1909, *Subhakiṇhabrahmaloka*, etc., and even *Rupārūpabrahmaloka*, material and immaterial Brahmā-world). Scholars have established a hierarchy of beings according to *vijñānasthiti* (position [?] of intellect) (*Dīgha*, ii. 69, cf. *Aṅguttara*, iv. 40): (1) *Brahmakāyika*, (2) *Ābhassara*, (3) *Subhakiṇha*, and, according to the trance (*Aṅguttara*, ii. 126), . . . (4) *Vehapphala*, for which the catalogues of 'abodes of beings' (*sattvāvāsa*) have (*Aṅguttara*, iv. 401), . . . *Asaññasatta*. On the other hand, *Majjhima*, i. 2, enumerates Prajāpati, Brahmā, Ābhassara, Subhakiṇha, Vehapphala, and Abhibhū. To get a scheme very near the classical (scholastic) scheme, the classes of Ābha and Subha had to be formed in imitation of the classes of Brahmā (*pārṣadya*, *purohita*); and this is what we find in *Majjhima*, iii. 102: Parittābha, Appamāṇābba, Ābhassara, Parittasubha, etc. The Vehapphalas of *Majjhima*, i 2, are kept, and in place of the Abhibhūs are put four categories: Aviha . . . Akaniṭṭha. But *Dīgha*, ii. 52, adds the fifth category, Sudassi (Sudarśana). It is possible, therefore, to follow to a certain point the scholastic work which has amalgamated separate traditions and speculations; from an epithet like *ābhāsvara* a class of gods was made, and in the end three classes and three heavens were deduced from it.

8. Immaterial sphere (*arūpadhātu*, *ārūpya*).—There are two views on the *ārūpya*. According to the first, which keeps to the letter of the canonical texts,[2] the *ārūpya* is not part of the receptacle-world; it contains only 'spiritual' beings, free from matter, disembodied intellects (*vijñāna*), consisting in thought (*saññāmaya*). When the transmigrating *vijñānas* are re-born (if we may say so) into this category, they create the intellectual apparatus (*nāman*) for themselves, but do not accumulate matter (*rūpa*), or organs of knowledge (*ṣaḍāyatana*).

Instead of 'places,' the *ārūpya* presents four 'aspects' (*ākāra*), according to the state of the pure intelligences which constitute it. There are (1) the realm of the infinity of space (*ākāśānantyāyatana*), (2) the realm of the infinity of intellect (*vijñāna*°), (3) the realm of nothingness (*akiṁchaniyāyatana*), and (4) the realm of neither consciousness (or notion) nor not-consciousness (*naivasaṁjñānāsaṁjñāyatana*),[3] according to the kind of meditation in which the mind finds itself absorbed for 20,000, 40,000, 60,000, and 80,000 'great *kalpas*.'[4]

The first three realms are *vijñānasthitis*[5] (*Dīgha*, ii. 69; *Aṅguttara*, iv. 40), 'meditations on which intellect (*vijñāna*) dwells (*sthiti*)'—an intellect which has in this world been absorbed in one of the meditations, 'space is infinite,' 'intellect is infinite,'[6] 'there is nothing,' and finds itself, for countless centuries, in the same meditation—and *vijñānasthitis* only, for intellect is disincarnated and without any relations to matter (*rūpa*). Like the *Asañjñāsattvas*, 'Unconscious,' the fourth 'realm' is not a *vijñānasthiti*, but a *sattvāvāsa*, 'dwelling-place of beings,' or an *āyatana*, 'place,' for it does not include attachment to (or dwelling of intellect upon) any kind of existence, being established on an absolute indifference (*upekṣā*).

[1] *Ābhassara* appears in several early texts, not as the name of the third category of the second trance, but (1) as the general name of the gods of the first rank (*Saṁyutta*, i. 114) above Brahmā (cf. the gods 'of beyond' [*taduttarī*] in *Aṅguttara*, iii. 287); see, e.g., *Dīgha*, i. 17; *Aṅguttara*, iv. 89, v. 60. During the period of chaos the future Buddha dwells among the Ābhassaras (see art. AGES OF THE WORLD [Buddhist], vol. i. p. 190, on the Buddhist Genesis); and (2) as the general name of the gods of the second trance in *Aṅguttara*, ii. 127 (life, 2 *kalpas*).

[2] General name of the gods of the third trance in *Aṅguttara*, ii. 127 (life, 4 *kalpas*). In ii. 231 this expression means 'completely happy'; but *śubha* is taken to mean 'beauty' in *A.K.V.* 265*a*; Warren translates it 'lustrous.'

[3] General name of the gods of the fourth trance in *Aṅguttara*, ii. 128 (life, 500 *kalpas*).

[4] *Saṁyutta*, i. 26; *Majjhima*, i. 82. A future Buddha is never re-born in these heavens, which are reserved for the *Anāgāmins*, saints who obtain *nirvāṇa* without being re-born in the world of men (*A.K.V.* 207b: *JPTS*, 1905, p. 102).

[5] Tibetan *mi-che-ba*, 'not great' (from *abṛhat*); Chinese, according to Beal, 'without heat,' and, according to Eitel, 'no thought.' These gods are named in *Saṁyutta*, i. 35, 60; *Dīgha*, ii. 50.

[6] *Lalitavistara*, 44, 13 (*niṣṭhagatāś chā kaniṣṭhāś cha*); *Mahāvyutpatti*, § 161; Beal, p. 85, n. 10; Wogihara, *Asaṅgas Bodhisattvabhūmi*, Leipzig, 1908, p. 18, who quotes *A.K.V.* *Akaniṭṭha ajyeṣṭha*, 'neither the youngest nor the oldest,' is an epithet of the Maruts (*Rigveda*, v. 59. 6, v. 60. 5). The *Akaniṣṭhas* are the most distinguished gods, *paṇītatara* (*Dīgha*, ii. 286). References to these gods are comparatively rare in the ancient texts. The *Saṁyutta* uses the phrase *uddhaṁsota* . . . *akaniṭṭhagāmin*, 'mounting . . . going to the *akaniṭṭha*.'

[7] It should be noticed that the *Vibhaṅga* (p. 425) attributes the same length of life (500 *kalpas*) to the *Asaññasattas* and to the *Vehapphalas*; and Beal (p. 95), following the *Vibhāṣā* (Sarvāstivādin), explains that the heaven of the Unconscious (like the world of Brahmā) is inhabited by heretics. By all other reports, it is similar to that of the *Bṛhatphalas*. We may, therefore, believe that the Asaṁjñin heaven does not form a separate region, *bhūmi* or *pradeśa*, and understand why the *Abhidharmakaśa* is not concerned with it in its nomenclature of the heavens of the *rūpa*-world. On the Unconscious, see esp. *Dīgha*, i. 28; Rhys Davids, *Dialogues*, i. 41 note, ii. 66; *Kathāvatthu*, iii. 11.

[1] See also *Lalitavistara*, p. 4, l. 12, 6. 12, 42. 12, 112. 3, etc.

[2] This is the orthodox theory (*Vibhaṅga*, pp. 138, 419; *Kathāvatthu*, viii. 8; *Abhidharmakośa*, iii. 3, with comm. 224 a, 254 a, Chandrakīrti's *Pañchaskandhaprakaraṇa*).

[3] This is the 'summit of existence' (*bhavāgra*). It will be seen (Waddell, *Lamaism*, p. 85, and art. ĀDIBUDDHA, vol. i. p. 91b, inaccurate) that the *Akaniṣṭhabhavana* has been placed above the immaterial heavens to serve as a dwelling-place for Ādibuddha.

[4] The numbers are already given in *Aṅguttara*, i. 267, but there they refer to *kalpas* without the epithet 'great.'

[5] See Childers, *Dict.* p. 579; *Dialogues*, ii. 66.

[6] It is very difficult to form an exact idea of these meditations or concentrations (*samāpatti*), especially of the second. Is it the same as the contemplation of 'the invisible, infinite thought' (*viññāṇa*) of *Majjhima*, i. 329? This would be a doctrine similar to the *Vedānta* and the *Yogāchāra*. See *Compendium* (*PTS*, 1910), p. 64. It is well known that these 'concentrations' are given by Buddhist tradition as previous to Sākyamuni (e.g. *Majjhima*, i. 164; Warren, p. 335).

But we must not regard the double negation 'neither consciousness . . .' as an absolute negation of consciousness; thought (*chitta*) and its derivatives (*chaitta*) remain, although in a very attenuated state.[1] In fact, if thought happened to cease in these immaterial existences, the result would be *nirvāṇa*; and we know (*Aṅguttara*, i. 267) that 'non-converted' persons (*pṛthagjana*) may reach them without being worthy of *nirvāṇa*, without being free from the danger of falling back again into hell or among the *pretas*.

Several schools maintain the existence of 'matter' in the 'Immaterial World.' This refers to a 'fine or attenuated form of matter,' according to the *Mahāsāṁghikas*, but such that it includes the five kinds of perceptible knowledge (*vijñāna-kāyas*).[2] The syllable *ā* of *ārupya*, 'formlessness' (which is the *vṛddhi*, initial emphasis, of the abstract word derived from *ărūpa*, 'formless'), is explained as a diminutive (*iṣadarthe*). An argument in favour of this opinion is that the intellect (*vijñāna*) needs a material support (*āśraya*), and this support must be the special 'matter' called *hṛdayavastu*, 'heart-thing' (according to the *A.K.V.* the opinion of the Tāmraparṇīyas, *i.e.* the Buddhists of Taprobane, the Sinhalese).[3] Another argument is that, according to the formula of 'dependent origination' name (intellectual data) and matter (*rūpa*) proceed from *vijñāna*.[4]

9. Cosmic systems, chiliocosms.—It is possible that the most ancient Buddhist cosmology did not imagine anything but the 'small universe,' the *chakravāla* properly speaking; but, in documents which appear to be very archaic (agreeing, in fact, with what we believe we know of the teaching of the Buddha), the notion of the infinity of the world is stated—from which arises that of the existence of other universes (*lokadhātu*) or *chakravālas* similar to ours;[5] and in the *Aṅguttara* (i. 227) we find great combinations of 'thousands of universes,' which will remain the basis of the 'great cosmology,' if we may thus express it, namely: (1) A system of a thousand universes, 'small chiliocosm,' *sahassī chūḷanikā lokadhātu*,[6] or *sahassadhā loka* (*ib.* v. 59); (2) a system of a million universes, a thousand 'small chiliocosms'; this is the 'middle chiliocosm,' *dvisahassī majjhimikā lokadhātu* ('two-thousandth middle universe'); and (3) a system of a thousand million universes, 'great chiliocosm,' or 'three-thousandth great-thousandth universe,' *tisahassī mahāsahassī lokadhātu*.[7]

[1] See *Kathāvatthu*, iii. 12; Beal, *Catena*, p. 91; C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Buddh. Psych.* p. 74 f.; *Saṁgītisutta* (*Dīgha*, xxxiii.), in Burnouf, *Lotus*, p. 809; *Aṅguttara*, v. 7, 318.

[2] See Beal, *Catena*, pp. 92, 104: Wassilieff, *Buddhismus*, 1860, p. 237 (261).

[3] See *A.K.V.* (Burn. 28b), cited in Burnouf, *Lotus*, p. 513 (cf. Walleser, *Phil. Grundlage des älteren Buddhismus*, Heidelberg, 1904, p. 106). On the *hadayavatthu*, 'basis' or 'site,' of the *sensorium commune* (*manas*), see C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *op. cit.* p. 129, note; cf. p. 173 and index: *JPTS*, 1884, p. 28; *Visuddhimagga*, *JPTS*, 1891, p. 124, and Burnouf, *Introduction*, p. 569; the rôle of the heart in the ancient Hindu philosophy is well known (Böhtlingk-Roth, *s.v.* 'Dhātu,' p. 934b).

[4] *Kathāvatthu*, viii. 8; cf. Warren, *Buddhism*, p. 178, l. 15, and see also *Saṁyutta*, iii. 53.

[5] The *Brāhmaṇas* admit the infinity of the world upwards and sideways (see *Pañchaviṁśabrāhmaṇa*, xviii. 6, 2, in Hopkins, 'Gods and Saints of the Great Brāhmaṇa,' *Trans. Connecticut Acad.* xv. 25, July 1909). The theory that the world is infinite across, and finite in upward and downward directions, is condemned in *Dīgha*, i. 23 (Rhys Davids, *Dialogues*, i. 36; see AGNOSTICISM [Buddhist], vol. i. p. 224b, note). A tradition which was long in being attested (*Atthasālinī*, § 374, quoted in Burnouf, *Lotus*, p. 844, wanting in the 'Chapter of the Fours' of the *Aṅguttara*, as Rhys Davids remarks, *loc. cit.*) states that four things are infinite: space, the number of universes, the number of living beings, and the wisdom of a Buddha.

[6] *Lokadhātu*, masc. in *Mahāvastu*, i. 40, 7, and *Sikṣāsamuchchaya*, p. 246; fem. in Pāli, *Mahāvastu*, ii. 300, 16, *Karuṇāpuṇḍarīka*, p. 4, etc. The word *sukhāvatī*, 'the happy' (see BLEST, ABODE OF THE [Bud.], vol. ii. p. 688b), must be understood as *sukhāvatī lokadhātu*, 'the happy world,' and not as *sukhāvatī bhūmi*, 'the happy earth or storey.'

[7] The Skr. forms in *Mahāvyutpatti*, § 153, *Bodhicharyāvatārapañjikā*, ad ii. 14; *sāhasraś chūḍiko lokadhātuḥ; dvisāhasro madhyamo . . .; trisāhasraṃahāsāhasro. . . .* There are variants in *Mahāvastu* and elsewhere (*trisāhasrā . . .*). See Lefmann, *Lalitavistara übersetzt*, Berlin, 1874, p. 208. *Chūḍika*, *chūlika* (Pāli-Prākrit *chūla*, *chūḷa*, 'small,' cf. Skr. *kṣulla*) is traced to *chūḍā*, 'top,' 'crest' (tuft left on the head after tonsure), but see *Saddharmapuṇḍarika*, p. 327 (*kṣudrakalokadhātu*).

The traditional meaning of the words *dvisahassī*, *tisahassī*, seems to be quite clear. The *Aṅguttara* says that the *dvisahassī* $=1000$ *sahassī*, and the *tisahassī*$=1000$ *dvisahassī*. *Dvi* and *ti* are exponents, not multipliers. We find 1000, 1000^2, 1000^3. Schmidt's interpretation, 'das grosse Tausend der 3000 Welten,' is wrong; and Köppen (*Buddhismus*, ii. 337) is also inexact, if we can trust the *Aṅguttara* and the *Abhidharmakośa*. But it must be remembered that the universes appear grouped in triads in order to form the hell of 'intramundane darkness'—which justifies the number 3000. But in the multiplication of 1000 by 1000 there are other differences which strike scholars: 'The holy words of Buddha cannot be in disagreement; how is it then that there are so many differences in the accounts found in the *sūtras* and treatises (*Abhidharmaśāstras*)? For instance, in regard to the number of mountains called Sumeru (there is a Meru is each small universe, *chakravāla* [see above, p. 131]), if we rely on the *Āgamas* (=Pāli *nikāya*, 'canonic collection') and the *Kośa*, each great chiliocosm has one thousand million, whereas the *Suvarṇaprabhāsa* and the *Avataṁsaka* (Great Vehicle) say there are only ten millions. Then with regard to the various measurements and the contradictory statements relating to the number of the *rūpa*-heavens,[1] how are these differences to be accounted for?'[2]

In order to establish a sort of coherence among these multiplications of universes and on account of theories on the more or less complete destructions of the world, the following arrangement has been imagined:—

One thousand *chakravālas* make a small chiliocosm, with 4000 continents, 1000 Merus, and 1000 heavens of Brahmā-gods (gods of the first trance). This small chiliocosm is surrounded by a mountain which separates it from the neighbouring small chiliocosms; and there is by way of a roof, so to speak, a heaven of gods of the second trance. The middle chiliocosm includes 1000 heavens of this second trance, with as many small chiliocosms beneath them; the walls reach up to the third trance; it is covered by a heaven of the third trance. The great chiliocosm comprises 1000 heavens of this trance, and is crowned with a heaven of the fourth.

The documents which show this superimposing do not seem to be very old (Köppen, i. 236; Rémusat, *Mélanges posthumes*, p. 94; but Beal, p. 103, cites the *Vibhāṣāśāstra*). The *Lalitavistara* (p. 150) certainly does not know it, for it informs us that the great chiliocosm contains a thousand million (100 *koṭis*) heavens of each kind.

We must point out a certain number of cosmic multiplications which are independent of and probably previous to the chiliocosmic conception; e.g. *Mahāvagga*, i. 6, 31 (*Jātaka*, i. 63), *ayaṁ dasasahassī lokadhātu* (where the reference is to 10,000 worlds and not to 1000^{10} worlds); *Dīgha*, ii. 139, where the gods of ten universes (*dasāsu lokadhātusu*) gather together to be present at the death of the Buddha. There are different kinds of Brahmā-gods; in *Dīgha*, ii. 261, Mahābrahmā, 'the great Brahmā,' reigns over 1000 Brahmā-worlds; *Majjhima*, iii. 101, distinguishes between a *Sahasso brahmā*, 'thousandth Brahmā,' governing a *sahassī lokadhātu* (cf. *Aṅguttara*, i. 277), a *Dvisahasso* . . . and a *Dasasahasso* (10,000th-Brahmā), governing a *dasasahassī lokadhātu* (cf. *Saṁyutta*, i. 146). See *Visuddhimagga*, xiii. (Warren, p. 321; S. Hardy, *Manual*, p. 2; Burnouf, *Lotus*, p. 363) on the three 'fields' or 'domains' (*kṣetra*) of a Buddha: 'Birth-domain (*janma*°) comprises 10,000 worlds; all tremble at different moments in the life of a Buddha (cf. *Mahāvagga*, i. 6, 31). Authority-domain (*ājñā*) comprises a hundred thousand times ten millions of worlds (=100 great chiliocosms); over all extends the protecting power of the "formulæ of protection" (the so-called *parittas*) given by the Buddha. Knowledge-domain (*jñāna*°) is without limit.' The *Mahāvastu* mentions a *buddhakṣetra* equal to 61 great chiliocosms, and an *upakṣetra* equal to 244 great chiliocosms (i. 121, cf. pp. xxxii and 471, and iii. 341). In the later literature 'great chiliocosm' and *buddhakṣetra* are, as a rule, synonymous (cf. *Aṅguttara*, i. 228).

The chiliocosm did not satisfy the Buddhist imagination. The *Mahāvastu* (i. 122) and the *Mahāyānasūtras* consider that the number of chiliocosms, or 'fields of Buddha,' is infinite in every direction (e.g. *Lotus*, xi.; *SBE* xxi. 232), and there are quoted, by the dozen, names of these 'great universes' (e.g. *Karuṇāpuṇḍarīka*); and in the *Avataṁsaka* we get a systematic arrangement of these chiliocosms.

On whirlwinds rests the Fragrant Ocean, which carries an infinite number of world-germs (*lokabīja* [?]); from it there issue lotuses infinite in number—very far removed, indeed, from each other. From each of these lotuses is born a universe (great chiliocosm), above which (separated by whirlwinds) there are three, then five, and so on up to the twentieth tier, where there are 39 great chiliocosms. We are not told whether this development of a 'world-germ' is in the form of a *tranche* or of a fan, or whether it is to be understood as an inverted

[1] The text says *arūpā*-heavens. This must be a mistake (see above, p. 136).

[2] *Shou-lun*, tr. in Beal, *Catena*, p. 103.

pyramid (1, 3^2, 5^2, . . . 39^2). But, on the other hand, we learn that the universe in which we are, the *Sahalokadhātu*,[1] forms part of the thirteenth stage, and constitutes the 'field' of the Buddha Vairochana (see art. ADIBUDDHA, vol. i. p. 99ª note ‖), and that, on the same level at the same stage, in the extreme west, is the blessed universe of the Buddha Amitābha, the *Sukhāvatī*, where a *kalpa* of our universe is equal to a day and a night (see art. BLEST, ABODE OF THE [Buddhist], vol. ii. p. 688ᵇ).[2]

LITERATURE.—See preliminary note 3 on p. 130 f., and p. 131ª, note 4, and works mentioned throughout the article. See also the tr. of the *Abhidhammasaṅgaha* by Shive Zan Aung and C. A. F. Rhys Davids under the title *Compendium of Philosophy* (*PTS*, London, 1910), the tr. of *Dīgha*, ii., by T. W. and C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, ii. (Oxford, 1910). Reference must also be made to Mañjughoṣahāsavajra's *Siddhanta*, i. fol. 223–248.

L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN.

COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY (Celtic).

—We do not know the ancient Celtic ideas with respect to the origin of the world. According to Strabo (IV. iv. 4), the Druids, as well as others, said that the soul and the world were immortal, and that one day fire and water would prevail. On the other hand, the Celts of the Adriatic said to Alexander: 'We fear only one thing, and that is that the sky may fall on us' (Strabo, VII. iii. 8). This belief in the fall of the sky is seen frequently in the oaths of Irish epic poetry. In a note on the hymn of Ultan (verse 9) mention is made of the two pillars of the sky.

These confused and contradictory ideas do not enable us to re-construct Celtic cosmology. It would be dangerous, besides, to look for this cosmology in the Christian legends of the Irish Middle Ages, or in the so-called secrets of the bards of the Island of Britain, or in the oral traditions of Armorican Brittany; for the elements contained in these different sources are either foreign or modern in origin. See also art. CELTS, vol. iii. p. 298.

LITERATURE.—Roget de Belloguet, *Ethnogénie gauloise*, Paris, 1861–75, iii. 137; C. Jullian, *Histoire de la Gaule*, Paris, 1907, i. 360, ii. 126, 175; H. Gaidoz in *Zeitschrift für celtische Philologie*, 1897–1901, i. 27 f.

G. DOTTIN.

COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY (Chinese).

—Chinese theories of cosmogony and cosmology may be said to be of comparatively modern date. They profess, however, to be based on a system which claims an almost immemorial antiquity, *i.e.* the 8 trigrams, which are usually attributed to Fu-hsi (2852 B.C.), though somewhat contradictory accounts are given as to their ultimate origin. These figures were intended to represent the stalks of the milfoil (*Ptarmica sibirica*), which were employed by diviners in close association with the lines which were produced on the shell of the tortoise, as described in art. COMMUNION WITH THE DEAD (Chinese), vol. iii. p. 731ᵇ. The stalks were divided into longer and shorter lengths, and the order in which they were drawn and disposed, in varying combinations of long and short or 'strong' and 'weak' lines, was interpreted in accordance with the arbitrary methods which prevailed from time to time, but of which the details have not been handed down. It may, however, safely be assumed that the function of the trigrams was limited to questions of tribal or domestic interest, and that nothing of a theological or cosmological character was attached to them.

The trigrams were arranged in 8 groups thus:

☰ ☱ ☲ ☳ ☴ ☵ ☶ ☷

A new arrangement was invented by Si-peh (1231–1135 B.C.), during his two years' imprisonment at the hands of the ruler of the Yin dynasty, and it is probable that to him is also due the combination of the original 8 trigrams to form the 64 hexagrams which are the basis of the *Yi-king*, or Canon of Permutations, commonly known as the Book of Changes.

Si-peh, afterwards canonized as Wên-wang (= King Wên), appended to each of the hexagrams an explanatory outline, giving the general sense supposed to be conveyed by the figure, but his son Tan, better known as Chow-kung (Duke of Chow), added an analysis, showing how each line of the hexagram was to be interpreted so as to contribute to the general conclusion which his father had established. The deductions of King Wên, with the analyses of the Duke of Chow, form the text of the *Yi-king*. Throughout the 64 chapters of the original work there is nothing whatever of a cosmological character; the compilers were entirely occupied with political and personal matters, endeavouring to learn from the omens furnished by the stalks and their representative symbols the probable results of certain courses of conduct which were in contemplation. The harmless trifling, as it seemed to his jailers, with which the prisoner, Si-peh, employed his leisure, was in reality a means by which he was able to develop his revolutionary schemes without let or hindrance; none but himself knew the significance attaching to the harmless straws with which he amused himself; and when, in course of time, his liberty was restored, he was enabled to consummate his schemes with complete success.

A new element is, however, introduced in the 10 Appendixes to the *Yi-king* which bear the imprimatur of Confucius, though it seems probable that only the first and second are properly attributed to him. To Confucius it seemed inevitable that the thought which had been expended upon the hexagrams, by sages so eminent as Si-peh and his son, could not fail to be of permanent value, and that, though the political conditions which had first inspired their studies no longer existed, the lessons which they contributed might be applied with equal value to the troublous circumstances of his own times. Hence Confucius, in later life, devoted a great deal of attention to the study of the *Yi-king*, frankly acknowledging the difficulty he experienced in the interpretation of its cryptic phraseology, and in adapting its lessons to his own enlarged conception of the scope of the work. Later commentators, building upon the theory that the three lines of the early trigrams represent the three powers—Heaven, Earth, and Man—attempt to transfer the lessons of the figures from the smaller stage of human affairs to the larger theatre of universal Nature. In the Appendixes, therefore, we discover, in an ever-ascending scale, the application of the hexagrams to the constitution and course of Nature, the later chapters furnishing some of the material out of which Chu-hsi (Chucius, A.D. 1130–1200) developed his scheme of cosmogony and cosmology, which now represents modern Chinese philosophic thought on the subject.

A word of explanation may here be necessary in order to show the mechanism of the developed

[1] This expression seems to denote a great chiliocosm, but it is certain that its natural meaning should be the small universe, the *chakravāla* in which we live. *Saha* is an adjective; we find a fem. form *sahā* (*Mahāvyutpatti*, § 154, 21; *Divyāvadāna*, p. 293, 19; *Mahāvastu*, ii. 379, 21; *Laṅkāvatāra*, in Burnouf, *Introduction*, p. 596; *Karuṇāpuṇḍarīka*, p. 119; Wilson, ii. 32; and probably *Rājataraṅgiṇī*, i. 172, where A. Stein reads *mahī*), and more rarely the masc. form *saha* (Triglotte, § 46, and *sahalokanātha*, in *Mahāvastu*, ii. 385). This expression, which has been translated 'enduring,' 'suffering,' or 'supporting' (from root *sah*), is not clear. The Tibetan *mi mjed* or *mjed* (see Jäschke, *Tib. Dict.*, London, 1881, p. 174) does not shed any light on the question, and the designation of Brahmā as *Sahāmpati* (*Sahāpati*) remains obscure (Burnouf, *Introduction*, p. 594; Beal, *Catena*, p. 10; Eitel, *Handbook*, p. 134).

[2] The present sources are Rémusat, *Mélanges posthumes*, p. 96; Beal, *Catena*, p. 121. The two authors differ on many points; *e.g.* Beal regards *Sahā* as the name of the whole thirteenth stage. Between the *Sahā* (centre of this stage) and the *Sukhāvatī* (regarded not as a chiliocosm but as a privileged *chakravāla*, with no hell, and no cosmic mountains), there are 10,000,000,000 universes. The original source is the *Avataṁsaka*—a word which denotes a part of the Chinese canon of the Great Vehicle (Nanjio, *Catal.*, 1883, p. 32 ff., on which see Tāranātha, p. 03, and Wassilieff, *Buddhismus*, esp. p. 157 [171] f.).

system of the *Yi-king*. Each trigram bears a distinctive name, as well as a local habitation or direction, together with a natural affinity, quality, etc. Thus the 6th group, as arranged by Si-peh, originally the first group according to the earlier system, consisting of 3 unbroken or 'strong' lines, is denominated *k'ien*, which means 'untiring,' 'strength,' etc., and represents Heaven, a sovereign, a father, etc. Its locality or direction is north-west; its affinity, ether; its quality, humidity, etc.

The hexagrams are formed by the combination of 2 trigrams, and also have distinctive names. Each line bears a certain relation to the other lines; thus the first or bottom line in the lower trigram is related to the first line of the upper trigram, *i.e.* to the 4th line of the hexagram. The position of the various lines is a most important consideration—sometimes a 'strong' line is found in a 'weak' place, and *vice versa*.

An illustration from Legge's *Yi-king* (*SBE*, xvi. 71) may serve to indicate the method of interpretation. The 7th hexagram, known as *sze*, is written thus: ䷆, consisting of the 2 trigrams *k'ân* ☵, representing water, and *kw'un* ☷, representing earth, suggesting, by the combination, waters collected on the earth, or, in the language of the diviner, multitudes of people mustering for purposes of defence or attack. The 'strong' or undivided line occupies the most important place in the *inner* or lower trigram, *i.e.* the middle, second only to the middle place in the *outer*, or upper, trigram, which is the paramount position in the whole figure. The 'strong' line, therefore, occupying a secondary position, must stand for the leader of the host; were he to occupy the highest position, *i.e.* the 5th line from the bottom—the middle line of the upper trigram—he would represent the sovereign. These, of course, are perfectly arbitrary preconceptions.

The Duke of Chow thus interprets the figure: 'The first line (reckoning from below), divided, shows the host going forth according to the rules (for such a movement). If these (rules) be not good, there will be evil.' Legge adds: 'The line is divided, a weak line in a strong place, not correct; this justifies the caution which follows.'

'The second line, undivided, shows (the leader) in the midst of the hosts. There will be good fortune and no error. The king has thrice conveyed to him his charge.'

'The third line, divided, shows how the hosts may possibly have many commanders; (in such a case) there will be evil.' Legge explains: 'The third place is odd, and should be occupied by a strong line, instead of which we have a weak line in it. But it is at the top of the lower trigram, and its subject should be in office or activity. There is suggested the idea that its subject has vaulted over the second line, and wishes to share in the command and honour of him who has been appointed to be commander-in-chief. The lesson of the previous line is made of none effect. We have a divided authority in the expedition. The result can only be evil.'

'The fourth line, divided, shows the hosts in retreat: there is no error.' Legge comments thus: 'The line is also weak, and victory cannot be expected; but in the fourth place a weak line is in its correct position, and its subject will do what is right in his circumstances. He will retreat, and a retreat is for him the part of wisdom.'

'The fifth line, divided, shows birds in the fields, which it is advantageous to seize (and destroy). There will be no error. If the oldest son lead the host, and younger men be (also) in command, however firm and correct he may be, there will be evil.' Legge interprets the Duke's findings thus: 'We have an intimation [in this passage] . . . that only defensive war, or war waged by the rightful authority to put down rebellion and lawlessness, is right. "The birds in the fields" are emblematic of plunderers and invaders, whom it will be well to destroy. The fifth line symbolizes the chief authority, but here he is weak or humble, and has given all power and authority to execute judgment into the hands of the commander-in-chief, who is the oldest son; and in the subject of line 3 we have an example of the younger men who would cause evil if allowed to share his power.'

'The topmost line, divided, shows the great ruler delivering his charges (to the men who have distinguished themselves), appointing some to be rulers of States, and others to be chiefs of clans. But small men should not be employed (in such positions).' Legge thus comments: 'The action of the hexagram has been gone through. The expedition has been conducted to a successful end. The enemy has been subdued. His territories are at the disposal of the conqueror. The commander-in-chief has done his part well. His sovereign, "the great ruler," comes upon the scene, and rewards the officers who have been conspicuous by their bravery and skill, conferring on them rank and lands. But he is warned to have respect in doing so to their moral character. Small men, of ordinary or less than ordinary character, may be rewarded with riches and certain honours; but land and the welfare of its population should not be given into the hands of any who are not equal to the responsibility of such a trust.'

To turn now to the main deduction of King Wên, of which the above is the detailed explanation. We find the lessons of the hexagram thus expressed: '*Sze* indicates how (in the age which it supposes), with firmness and correctness and (a leader of) age and experience, there will be no error.'

It will be observed, from this example, how the character of the lines (whether divided or undivided), their place in the hexagram (whether odd or even, *e.g.* 1, 3, 5; or 2, 4, 6), and their mutual relation to each other (2 corresponding to 5, etc.) are all of great importance in the exposition of the lessons they are supposed to convey. The mutual relation of the 2 trigrams in each hexagram is also a matter of importance.

This specimen will serve to show how little there is of any cosmological element in the original Book of Changes, and how far the modern commentators have wandered from the intention of the compiler and his earliest expositor; in fact, it was only by an arbitrary forcing of the primitive modes of divination, and the introduction of entirely new ideas in the Appendixes, that Chucius succeeded in building up the system which is attributed to him, and which has only the slightest affinity with the diagrams of King Wên. A rough parallel might be established between the diagrams and our modern playing cards, in which the calendar may be said to be represented, though with no cosmological intention, the 4 suits representing the 4 seasons; the 13 cards in each suit = the 13 sidereal months; the 52 cards = the 52 weeks of the year; the 364 pips (including the value of the 'coat' cards) = the days of the year, etc.; and, as the cards are now employed by pretended 'fortune-tellers' as a key to the secrets of human existence, so the hexagrams of King Wên came to be applied, in course of time, to issues much larger than were ever contemplated by their inventor.

The chief exponent of the modern system was Chucius, whose name is pre-eminent amongst the philosophers of the Sung school of the 11th and 12th centuries in China. Confucius and Mencius were practical philosophers, but Chucius was not content to accept the fact of Heaven and Earth, which had been sufficient for the great teachers who preceded him; he endeavoured to establish a systematic theory of the origin of all things, finding in the *Yi-king*, as he supposed, a groundwork for his researches. He was further aided in his speculations by Taoistic and Buddhistic suggestions, as well as by other philosophic concepts which may well have reached China by that time, and which to an ardent and omnivorous student would prove attractive. It is not unlikely that he was familiar with Persian and early Christian ideas propagated by the Nestorian teachers in the centuries preceding him.

It is very important to bear in mind that the earliest conception of the Chinese regarding the universe was a theological one, while the later system of Chucius is philosophical; and it is owing to this fact that Chucius found himself involved in frequent difficulties in the endeavour to harmonize the two. The ancient or theological concept takes its starting-point from Shang-ti, or Heaven; the Taoistic or philosophic theory goes no further back than the 'Great Extreme'; but Chucius, though professedly no theologian, appears unable to elimin-

ate from his system some traces of the ancient conviction that behind all phenomena there is a power, variously described as Heaven, the 'Controller,' the 'Great Framer' (or 'Potter'), etc., while he shrank from any suggestion of anthropomorphism, and disclaimed the view that that power actively interfered in the affairs of men.


As a matter of fact, the theories of Chucius are not intended to account for ultimate beginnings; his conception of the present world is that it is but one of a long series of similar existences which have flourished in turn, and have been corrupted, each disappearing eventually from view and giving place to a new world. He makes no attempt to explain how the primal element came into being, but finds his starting-point in the theory of the existence of a Natural Law which he denominates *Li* (pronounced *Lee*), and a vital essence which he calls *K'i* (pronounced *Chee*). He does not inquire wherein this Law resides, or where this vital 'breath' is derived from. The theologian may contend for the recognition of a Divine creator or framer, but Chucius, though he does not traverse the argument, declines to discuss the subject. In inquiring, therefore, into the evolution of this present world, he finds its material basis in *K'i* (vapour, breath, air, etc.), and its active principle in *Li*—both eternal in their nature, as existing before the clock of time began to strike, yet admitting of a priority of order in the case of *Li*. The alternate action and inaction of *Li*, in the sphere of *K'i*, produced the positive and negative forms, *Yang* and *Yin*, variously represented as Light and Darkness, Heaven and Earth, Male and Female, etc., whose vicissitudes constitute the *Tao*, or Course of Nature, as reflected in the 4 seasons, the alternations of day and night, etc. The *Yang* and *Yin* contain the 'Five elements' in embryo, viz. metal, wood, water, fire, and earth, of which water and fire are regarded as the simplest forms. Each element possesses a *Yang* and a *Yin* quality, and all are pervaded by *Li*. As a result of the interaction of these two 'forms'—the *Yang* and the *Yin*, which are in constant motion—a certain amount of 'sediment' is precipitated to the centre of the whirling mass and becomes Earth, whilst the more subtle excreta are flung upwards to the outer ring of the circle, and become Heaven. Earth remains motionless in the centre, whilst the Heavens revolve continually, as the movements of the heavenly bodies serve to show.

The myriad creatures were produced by the spontaneous coagulation of the finer essences of the five elements in the *Yang-Yin*, forming a hermaphroditic being or pair, which in course of time separated and gave birth to the male and female species which now constitute the human race.

It will be seen at a glance how far removed these theories are from the system of divination attributed to King Wên, and it seems inevitable that they represent an interpretation of that system entirely alien to the purpose which inspired its first exponents. From Chucius' own words, we are led to conclude that the study of the *Yi* had made little progress during the centuries which had elapsed from the days of Confucius until his own time. It seems probable that the later Appendixes, popularly ascribed to the great 'Master' himself, belong to a period long posterior, and they seem to reflect opinions which began to be current only in Chucius' days. Philosophers such as *Shao-yung* (A.D. 1011–1077), of whom Chucius says, 'From the time of Confucius no one understood this (*i.e.* the relation between the Great Extreme, the 8 diagrams, etc.) until Shao explained it,' and Chow Tun-i (A.D. 1017–1073), to whom is attributed the circular diagram of the Great Extreme, apparently made use of the *Yi* as a vehicle of Taoistic ideas, and applied to the 'strong' and 'weak' lines of King Wên the system of *Yang* and *Yin*, which nowhere appears in the text of the *Yi*, but which is suggested by the words of Lao-tze in the *Tao-Tê-King*):

'Tao produced unity; unity produced duality; duality produced trinity; and trinity produced the innumerable objects; the innumerable objects, carrying the feminine or shadow principle on the one side, and the masculine or sunlight principle on the other, created a just harmony by their respective clashes of primitive impulse or ether' (Parker's tr.).

It may be assumed, therefore, that the Chinese cosmogony is of comparatively recent origin, and that the ancients were content to accept the fact of the universe without abstruse theorizing as to its origin and method. The Sung philosophers adopted the trilinear figures of the *Yi*, but devised a new diagram of what they called the 'Great Extreme,' viz. a circle intended to represent the ultimate principle *Li*, which, in their system, indicates the limit of philosophical discussion. This circle was subdivided thus:



to illustrate the interaction and constant gyrations of the *Yang* and *Yin*, i.e. the primal essence, or *K'i* in its 2 forms, the motive power in which is *Li*. Another circle represents the *K'i* as divided into its constituent elements, *i.e.* the five active principles—water, fire, wood, metal, and earth. Sometimes the four seasons are represented.

From these we may learn that, according to Chucius, the world came into existence as a result of the operation of *Li*, or 'Natural Law,' setting in motion the *K'i*, or 'vital essence,' which, by the interaction of its two forms, *Yang* and *Yin*, containing the 5 elements, threw off, in its perpetual revolutions, the excreta which coagulated respectively into Heaven, on the outward edge, and Earth, in the centre; and that the vicissitudes of *Yang* and *Yin* account for the regular succession of day and night, the alternate waxing and waning of the same being the cause of the four seasons; and that, when the great cycle, calculated as occupying a *kalpa*, or 129,600 years, is accomplished through the exhaustion of the *Yang* element in man, as exhibited by moral declension and universal corruption, the whole system is resolved into its constituent elements, and a new heaven and earth are called into being.

Man's place in Nature.—As to the place which man occupies in this system, since man is compounded of the five elements constituting the *K'i*, or vital essence, in which the *Li* operates, he is described as a microcosm—a world in miniature—from which it follows that every man has within him a 'spark of the Divine.' In some men the *Yang* predominates; in others the *Yin*. Of the former are the Sages, the great men of past and present times; the latter are represented by the 'mean' men, the dull, the criminal, etc. As in the case of Nature, so man has his seasons of spring, summer, etc., and his days and nights, and, like the world, comes to an end by the exhaustion of the *K'i*, or vital breath. His great business, therefore, is to frame and fashion his life so as to live in conformity with the *Tao*, or observed order of the universe. 'No contrariety' must be his motto. By so doing he may attain in time the proud distinction of being an associate of Heaven and

Earth. As to his future, neither Lao-tze, Confucius, nor Chucius has anything to say; probably, from the philosophical point of view, death to them, though they would not discuss it, meant a return to the original chaos, like the universe at the end of its cycle of existence; or, to express it in the polite but equivocal phrase of ancient and modern days, a 'return to Heaven.'

The philosophic idea was, however, too lofty and illusive for common acceptance, and, during the Sung dynasty, the tradition of a 'first man' was evolved, ascribing the ancestry of the human race to a certain P'an-ku, of whom it is stated in the *Lu-she* (Mayers' tr.):

'When the great first principle had given birth to the two primary forms, and these had produced the four secondary figures, the latter underwent transformations and evolutions, whence the natural objects depending from their respective influences came abundantly into being. The first who came forth to rule the world was named *P'an-ku*, and he was also called the "Undeveloped and Unenlightened" (*i.e.* the Embryo).'

This idea is now almost universally accepted by the mass of the unlearned in China, and by not a few of the scholarly class, being, as it were, a sort of concretion of the indefinite theories of the Chucian philosophers as to the origin of man.

The place occupied by spiritual beings.—Though Confucius and Chucius (16 centuries later) were unwilling to enter into the question of spiritual existences, and though the latter expressly declared the difficulties involved in such a theory, the fact that the earliest records refer so frequently to the existence of spirits made it necessary that a place should be found for them in the Chinese philosophy, and, accordingly, the *Kuei-shen*, or spirits, were adopted as representing, so to speak, in personal form, the activities at work in the changing phenomena of Nature; but the ancient doctrine that the spirits are the ministers of God, carrying out His behests, on the analogy of the officers of State fulfilling the decrees of the sovereign, survives, in a somewhat debased form, in the popular opinion which invests the earth and air with a numberless host of good and evil spirits or demons.

The place of God.—In the earliest days of which we possess any record, Shang-ti, or God, appears to have occupied a chief place in the mind of China's rulers, but at the beginning of the Chow dynasty (12th cent. B.C.) we find the terms 'Heaven' and 'Earth' coming into prominence, representing the operations of God in Nature and Providence, and, as a consequence, Shang-ti is removed to a greater distance than that intimate relation in which he seems to have stood *vis-à-vis* his votaries in the earlier days. Later developments contributed towards the increasing of this distance, and the attitude of Confucius towards metaphysical and transcendental questions tended to widen the chasm. Chucius appears to have relegated God to a position of infinite remoteness and unknowableness, though he did not deny the possibility of there being an ultimate ruling power, of whose existence individual students must satisfy themselves; and he refers to the 'Great Framer,' the 'Root of the Great Extreme,' the 'Heavenly decree which set in motion the primal elements,' etc. His conviction seems to be that God, or the 'Infinite,' invested the *K'i*, or vital essence, with His own *Li*, or Law, and then allowed the creation to develop itself spontaneously, He Himself taking no further active share in the affairs of Nature or of human life. Such a contention, indeed, was directly contrary to the earlier beliefs, and led Chucius, unwillingly, into conflict with the received opinions. He, however, steadily refused to discuss the matter, and insisted that every man should be 'fully persuaded in his own mind' and make his own investigations. Here again the agnosticism of Chucius was unable to overcome the immemorial persuasion of his fellow-countrymen, that the 'Supreme Ruler' interferes actively in the affairs of the nation, and sends forth His agents, including spirits and sages, to fulfil His behests. Hence it happens that Shang-ti is still worshipped officially by the Emperors of China, and Heaven is invoked by the mass of the people, whilst the spirits are solicited to exert their influence on behalf of their petitioners. The theological concept has thus survived the philosophical, and, by a strange inconsistency, the materialism of Confucius and Chucius, as represented by the modern Chinese literate, is exhibited in a country which, above all others, is remarkable for its active and almost frenzied addiction to the propitiation of spirits and demons.

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W. GILBERT WALSHE.

COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY (Christian).—**I. Early.**—The early Christians were not seriously perplexed by questions of cosmogony. They had come into a heritage, whereby they had grown up into the current Palestinian-Jewish ideas of the origin and constitution of the world. Moreover, they looked out upon the world and the whole realm of Nature from the purely religious standpoint. 'In the beginning God' (Gn 1[1]) was the primary article of their faith. It was Jahweh, the God of Israel, who had 'measured the waters in the hollow of his hand, and meted out heaven with the span, and comprehended the dust of the earth in a measure, and weighed the mountains in scales, and the hills in a balance. . . . It is he that sitteth upon the circle of the earth . . . that stretcheth out the heavens as a curtain, and spreadeth them out as a tent to dwell in. . . . I am Jahweh, and there is none else. . . . I form the light, and create darkness: I make peace, and create evil. I, Jahweh, do all these things' (Is 40[12-22] 45[5-7]). Psalms 8 and 104 express the same idea of the sole, beneficent creatorship of God, and in Psalms 33 and 148 creation by the *spoken word* is confidently expressed. The Book of Job is likewise pervaded by this belief, and the same is true of Pr 8[22-31]. These seem to have been the primary sources from which the early Christians drew their conception of the material cosmos and God's relation to it. This simple religious view found free expression in their prayers: 'O Lord, thou that didst make the heaven and the earth and the sea, and all that in them is' (Ac 4[24]). And Jesus had expressed His faith in the same direct and simple way. To Him God was 'Lord of heaven and earth' (Mt 11[25]), who 'maketh his sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sendeth rain on the just and the unjust' (Mt 5[45]). His heavenly Father also feeds the birds of the heavens, and clothes the grass of the fields (Mt 6[26ff.]). The disciples, like their Master, were absorbed in the thought of the loving care of God, and His gracious provision for all His creatures. 'In him,' says St. Paul, 'we live, and move, and have our being' (Ac 17[28]).

But the profound and enduring impression which Jesus made upon His followers soon constrained them to associate Him with the Father in the work of creation. It was He who had brought redemption from sin, and given them a glad new sense of sonship with God. But Lordship in the spiritual world must and did ultimately involve equal Lordship in the material world and in the whole realm of the Divine activity. This idea was early expressed by St. Paul, who says: 'To us there is one God, the Father, of whom are all things, and we unto him; and one Lord, Jesus

Christ, through whom are all things, and we through him' (1 Co 8[6]); 'for in him [the Son] were all things created . . . things visible and things invisible . . . and he is before all things, and in him all things consist' (Col 1[16f.]; cf. He 1[1f.]). 'By faith we understand,' says the author of the Ep. to the Hebrews, 'that the worlds have been framed by the word (ῥήματι) of God' (He 11[3]). 'In the beginning was the Logos,' says St. John, 'and the Logos was with God, and the Logos was God . . . all things were made by him' (Jn 1[1-3]; cf. Rev 4[11]). The specific use of the word Logos by the Fourth Evangelist completed and confirmed a development which had been in progress for several decades, by which Jesus as the Son was definitely classed with God the Father, and associated with Him in the creation and government of both the visible and the invisible world. It also tended to reconcile and adjust the Christian faith to the late Jewish development of the concept 'wisdom' (Pr 8, Sir 24, Wis 8, and the like) and the current Hellenistic idea of the Logos (Book of Wisdom, Philo Judæus, and the like). Christian cosmology henceforth was definitely related to the Person of Christ.

But the tragic fate which overtook Jesus, and His own utterances concerning the machinations of the 'prince of this world,' together with His teachings regarding His 'return,' and the 'day of judgment,' and the 'last things,' made a deep and solemn impression upon His disciples. Everything seemed to constrain them to believe in the presence of an opposing Satanic power in the universe (Ac 5, 8, 13; Rev 2[13] and oft.). St. Paul speaks of the 'lawless one' . . . whose 'coming is according to the working of Satan' (2 Th 2[8f.]); he declares that the 'whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now' (Ro 8[22]), and that 'our wrestling is not against flesh and blood, but against the principalities, against the powers, against the world-rulers of this darkness, against the spiritual hosts of wickedness in the heavenly places' (Eph 6[12]). The Book of Revelation attempts to describe this great world-drama, this duel between good and evil, and the final triumph of the 'Lamb that hath been slain.' In this more or less incoherent and dualistic view of things, we have the outcropping of Babylonian and Persian ideas, which for several generations had been occupying a large place in Jewish thought (see *Test. Twelve Patriarchs*, *Bk. of Jubilees*, *Bk. of Enoch*, *Assump. of Moses*; cf. Mt 4[1f.] 12[24f.] 13[39], Jn 8[44] 12[31], Ac 13[10], 2 Co 11[3], Eph 2[2] 6[16], Ja 4[7], 1 P 5[8], He 2[14], 1 Jn 3[8], and oft.). Christian cosmology, accordingly, becomes profoundly affected by the resurgence of Bab.-Pers.-Jewish ideas, and takes on a dualistic cast.

The lapse into 'sins of the flesh' on the part of professing Christians, as well as the appalling moral corruption of environing paganism, gradually led to the conviction that sin has its primal seat in 'the flesh.' Here, again, we have the outcropping of ideas already rife in current Judaism and paganism. St. Paul's teaching was more or less infected by the half-assumption of the physical basis of sin, and he exhibits a distinct tendency toward asceticism (Gal 5[16ff.], 1 Co 3[1ff.] 7[1ff.], Ro 7[14ff.]). The whole trend of thought within the Christian Church gradually became reactionary and ascetic. Some began to withdraw from marital and social relations and to 'flee from the world.' Asceticism entered as a constituent element into Christian ethics, and soon coloured the whole view of things, giving its character to contemporary cosmology. If evil is inherent in matter, or, rather, if matter is inherently evil, the question of the creation and government of the world by an all-wise and beneficent God becomes seriously complicated. The Christians were, as a rule, inclined to emphasize the Genesis story of the 'Creation' and 'Fall,' and thereby to shield God from complicity in the introduction of evil into the universe. But there were other and diverse accounts of the origin of the cosmos and the entrance of evil into it.

The Gnostics were not only the 'first Christian theologians,' but the first cosmogonists and cosmologists. Indeed, their primary concern was to discover and develop a theory of the cosmos which should shield the Supreme Being from all complicity in, or responsibility for, its creation, which seemed to them to involve also the production of evil. They, accordingly, assumed that the material cosmos arose through the more or less blind and perverse activity of the Demiurge, who was far removed from the Supreme God and the heavenly Pleroma. Although man was created by the Demiurge, he yet received, through 'Sophia,' sparks from the Divine nature, and is struggling to get free from his material bondage. Ascetic discipline is, accordingly, one of the means by which the Gnostic is to overcome 'sin in the flesh,' and secure salvation. Another means is the rational revelation which the Logos made to the world when He became manifest in the Christ. The 'prince of this world' must be overthrown by the Supreme God, who has sent His Son to rescue men from their bondage to evil (= ὕλη). In all these Gnostic views we have but the exaggeration or perversion of ideas that were then present in current Christian thought, and which had come as a heritage from Judaism and environing paganism. In other words, Gnosticism (*q.v.*) was but an aberrant form of the Christian faith, and its crude and fantastic cosmologies were, after all, only abortive efforts to solve the riddle of the universe in a supposedly Christian fashion. The cosmic views of the Gnostics persisted in modified forms in Neo-Platonism (*q.v.*) and in Manichæism (*q.v.*).

The Apologists, contemporaries of the Gnostics, fell back, as a rule, upon the simple 'Creation' and 'Fall' stories of Genesis, and thereby escaped the worst excesses. They also made ample use of the Platonic-Stoic-Philonian Logos idea, and emphasized the mediatorship of the Logos in the work of creation. They were likewise surcharged with a belief in demons and opposing Satanic powers, but they looked forward to the destruction of the material cosmos and the overthrow of all hostile forces. Justin Martyr and Athenagoras speak of God as having fashioned the world out of formless material (ὕλη), but Theophilus declares that God created all things *ex nihilo* (ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων). Each based his assumption upon Gn 1[1f.] 2[4f.] (Justin, *Apol.* i. 10, 20, 59, 67; Athenag. *Apol. for Christ.* 15; Theophilus, *Autol.* i. 6, 7, 10, ii. 4, 6, 10; cf. Tatian, *Addr. to Greeks*, 5 and 12; Aristides, *Apol.* 1 and 4). The Apologists, as a rule, thought of evil as inherent in matter, and accordingly were inclined towards asceticism; but they preserved, to a degree, the simpler religious view of Apostolic times, which they derived mainly from the OT.

Irenæus and Tertullian, Clem. Alex., Origen, and Hippolytus reject the Gnostic theory of the creation of the world by the Demiurge, and emphasize the function of the Logos-Son in the whole realm of the Divine activity. The NT writings are now quoted as authoritative Scripture, but the OT is also heavily drawn upon to explain God's relation to the cosmos. But, as was to be expected, these men were 'children of their own times,' although seeking to pass on a heritage. Some of the earlier crudities were retained, especially the belief in evil as somehow inherent in material things. With some slight aberrations, the Church Fathers of the 3rd cent. were true to the unformulated cosmology of the OT and NT, coloured by the speculations of the Apologists

(Iren. *c. Hær.* I. iii. 6, x. 1 f., xxii. 1, II. x. and xi., V. xviii.; Tert. *adv. Herm.* 29–34 and 45, *adv. Prax.* 19, *adv. Marc.* i. 15 and 16; Clem. Alex. *Str.* vi. 16; Origen, *de Prin.*, Præf., I. ii., II. i. iii. ix., III. v., *c. Cels.* vi. 49–61, *Com. in Joh.* i. 17 and 22; Hippol. *Phil.* i. 1 f., *c. Noct.* 9–14; cf. Arnob. *adv. Gent.* ii. 58; Lactant. *Div. Inst.* ii. 10, vii. 5; *Symb. Apostol.*).

The Nicene Fathers make no distinct advance upon the cosmology of their predecessors. Athanasius refutes the heathen views of the origin and constitution of the universe (*c. Gent.* 6, 7, 29, 35–40), and emphasizes the co-operation of the Son in the work of creation (*c. Arianos*, i. 22, 29, ii. 21). Eusebius, in his *Præp. Evang.*, describes the cosmologies of the Phœnicians, Egyptians, and Greeks (i. 6–11), and later expands the Creation-story of the Hebrews, quoting, in confirmation of his own views, from Philo, Origen, Dionysius Alex., Maximus, Plato, and others (vii. 10–22, viii. 13 f., xi. 29–38, xiv. 23). Plato he assumes to have derived his knowledge of the creation and constitution of the universe from Moses. Eusebius then sets forth the teaching of the Stoics and Neo-Platonists by extended quotations, testing always by the Genesis story. The standard exposition of Gn 1 and 2 meets us in Basil's *Hexaemeron*. But the treatment here is homiletical and fervently religious. In this we are reminded of the early Christian view of things (NT; Clem. Rom. 20 and 33; Herm. *Past.* Vis. i. 3, 4, iii. 4, 1; *Didache*, 3 and 10).

Augustine has only incidental allusions to cosmology, but is chiefly interested in defending the Creator from complicity in the origin of evil. This he does by assuming that sin has its principal seat in the will. Rebellion against God on the part of both angels and men was the beginning of sin and the cause of 'all our woes, with loss of Eden' (*Conf.* vii. 5–7, 9, 15–20, xii. 7, 8, 12, 15–29, *de Civ. Dei*, xi. 4, 6–23, xii. 10–15). The eschatological element, which was so prominent in Apostolic times, has practically disappeared in Augustine. It began to wane at the opening of the 2nd cent., and diminished as the Church became established in the Empire and set about to conquer the world. In other respects the cosmological elements remain in about the same proportions.

The picture which the early Christians made for themselves of the cosmos and its related parts is not easily portrayed. The earth is, of course, central in their universe, and is surrounded and sustained from beneath by the chaotic watery abyss. Above is the firmament, which supports the heavens as a fixed vault, furnishing a path for the sun and all the planets. Beyond and above the firmament are the fixed stars, and all the hosts of heaven. The waters above the firmament are separated by it from the waters beneath, and serve as a fountain to refresh the earth with timely showers. Sheol, or Hades, was placed beneath the earth, and served as the prison-house, or waiting-place, for departed spirits. The cosmos as a whole was conceived as having been created for the sake of man and the heavenly intelligences, and as ruled over in wisdom and righteousness. It reveals the glory of God, and interprets His majesty and eternal Divinity.

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E. K. MITCHELL.

2. Mediæval and modern.—In the period from the fall of the Roman Empire to the 10th cent. there was little thought upon these subjects. The leaders of the Church were content to follow the teachings of the Fathers, and Augustine's interpretation of the formation of the world was accepted without question. The first one to depart from the accepted belief, or to try to explain it in a philosophical way, was John Scotus Erigena. In his study of the writings of Dionysius he became acquainted with Neo-Platonic ideas, and he tried to apply these to the Biblical account of Creation. He departed from the views of the Fathers by bringing in the theory that all things emanate from God. His views are expressed in his book entitled *Concerning the Division of Nature*, including under 'Nature' the sum-total of existence. Nature in this sense is divided into four species: that which creates and is not created; that which is created and creates; that which is created and does not create; that which neither creates nor is created. The first of these—that which creates and is not created—is God as the essence, source, and substance of all things, the one Being who truly exists. Erigena's view is pantheistic, in that he teaches that God created the world out of His own essence. He held to an all-including unity because God is all. It was easy for him to reconcile his apparent pantheism with the teaching of the Church, by saying that the Divine essence was the nothing out of which the world was created.

Through the Middle Ages the Schoolmen gave little attention to the subject of Creation. They were content to accept the views which had been handed down to them, and those who failed to do this were sure to come into conflict with the Church authorities. It was agreed that the universe came into being and was sustained and governed by the Divine will. Whether the six days of Creation were days of twenty-four hours each was open to some discussion; but two points must be agreed to by the orthodox, viz. that the universe was created out of nothing, and that it was not from eternity, but had a beginning in time. The most profound thinker on this subject in the mediæval period was Anselm of Canterbury, who modified the traditional views by the introduction of Platonic ideas. He explains (*Monolog.* ix.) the meaning of the expression *ex nihilo* by saying that there is no way by which anything can be made by another unless it previously exists in the mind of the one making it. Before creation things existed eternally, from God and in God, as ideas. They did not exist as individuals, but in the sense that God foresaw and predestined that they would be made. They were in the Divine mind as an example, similitude, or rule of what was to be made. Before the making of the universe it was in the thought of the Supreme Being, but no material existed out of which it was to be made. Yet it was not nothing in its relation to the reason of the One making. By reasoning in this way Anselm is able to reconcile his philosophical views with the accepted interpretation of the account given in Genesis. There is one passage (*Cur Deus Homo*, i. 18) in which he implies that perhaps the six days of Creation were different from the days with which we are acquainted. Thomas Aquinas discusses the subject at considerable length, but adds little to the current views. He accepts the Biblical cosmology, admitting that there is room for a difference of opinion about the six days. Like Albertus Magnus, he teaches that Creation was a miracle which cannot be comprehended by the natural reason. He believed that it was not possible to demonstrate that matter was not eternal, deprecating the efforts of other men to make the temporal character of the material universe a matter that could be proven.

He taught that it was an article of faith to believe that the world was created in time.

Contemporary with the Schoolmen were the various heretical sects, differing in some respects from the orthodox in their views of the creation and government of the world. The most divergent from the commonly accepted views were the dualistic sects, which at the same time claimed to be Christian. They went by various names, such as Cathari, Albigenses, and so on. They seem to have gained their heretical views from contact with the religions of the East, where dualism was very common at the time. In general they held that there were two principles, or spirits, or creators, which had to do with the making of the universe visible and invisible. These two were the good and the evil, and both were from eternity, though some held that the evil spirit was originally good and had fallen from his first estate. The evil spirit was the author of the OT, and the maker of all visible Nature. He had created man as a physical being, and was the cause of all natural phenomena and all disorders in Nature. The good spirit was the author of the NT. He was also the creator of the human soul, which had been captured and imprisoned by the evil spirit.

In the later Middle Ages there arose various schools of Mystics. Some of these were heretical and frankly pantheistic. Others, like Master Eckhart, considered themselves orthodox Christians, but were unable to escape the suspicion of pantheism. Eckhart was in agreement with Aquinas in his belief that there existed from eternity a world of ideas distinct from the world of creatures. He explained what seemed to his contemporaries to be pantheism, by saying that creatures are made in time and out of nothing, and that they existed from eternity in God in the same sense that a work of art exists in the mind of the artist before it takes material form. The existence of the creation from all time was in the Divine reason. God exists in created visible objects as their essence. The external world is but the reflexion of the innermost essence of God.

The modern Roman Catholic Church holds to the teaching of Aquinas, but allows a difference of opinion on unimportant points. What a Roman Catholic must believe to-day in regard to cosmology and cosmogony is defined by the Vatican Decrees. The Council declared against the statement that matter alone exists, and in opposition to the view that the substance and essence of God and of all things are one and the same; also in opposition to the view that finite things, both corporeal and spiritual, or at least spiritual, have emanated from the Divine substance, or that the Divine essence by the manifestation and evolution of itself became all things, or that God is universal or indefinite Being, which, by determining itself, constitutes the universality of things. The positive statement by the Council was that God from the very beginning of time produced out of nothing the world and all things both spiritual and corporeal.

The Protestant position, as given in the earlier creeds, is merely a paraphrase of the cosmology found in Genesis. The Westminster Confession states: 'It pleased God in the beginning to make or create out of nothing the world and all things therein in the space of six days' (iv. 1). The Belgic Confession is more explicit: 'We believe that the Father by the Word created of nothing the heavens, the earth, and all creatures, as it seemed good unto Him, giving unto every creature its being, shape, forms, and several offices to serve its creator.' 'We believe that He doth also uphold and govern them by His infinite power for the service of mankind to the end that man may serve His God' (Art. xii.).

There is, of course, no authoritative statement for Protestantism relating to Christian cosmology and cosmogony. With the freedom of investigation which characterizes modern Protestantism, there are many divergent views. Some still hold to the statements of the older creeds, and believe that the conclusions of science have nothing to do with religion. The extreme holders of this position maintain that the world was made in six days of twenty-four hours each, but this view has a decreasing number of adherents. Others believe that the account of Creation given in Genesis is strictly scientific, and that the statements there found correspond in a minute degree to the facts of geology. Others consider that the account in Genesis agrees with the facts only in a general way. Others regard the account as a myth or legend corresponding to the Creation stories in Assyrian and Babylonian literature. The only points upon which modern Protestants agree are that God is the source of the universe; that it came into being as a result of the free exercise of His will; and that it is continually under His care and control.

See also art. CREATION.

LITERATURE.—Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.*; T. Harper, *The Metaphysics of the School*, 1879; art. 'Création,' in *Dict. de Théol. Cath.* iii. 2079-2093. See also 'Creation' in J. Agar Beet, *A Manual of Theology*, 1906; W. Adams Brown, *Christian Theology in Outline*, 1907; W. N. Clarke, *An Outline of Christian Theology*, 1898; I. A. Dorner, *A System of Chr. Doctrine*, Eng. tr. 1880–82; G. P. Fisher, *Hist. of Chr. Doctrine*, 1896; C. Harris, *Pro Fide*, 1905; C. Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, 1872-73; W. G. T. Shedd, *Dogmatic Theology*, 1889-94; H. C. Sheldon, *A Hist. of Chr. Doctrine*, 1886; A. H. Strong, *Systematic Theology*, 1907-9; T. B. Strong, *A Manual of Theology*[2], 1903.

C. M. GEER.

COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY (Egyptian).—We shall here divide this subject into three stages: (1) earth-myths, (2) sun-myths, (3) theology.

1. Earth-myths.—The attention of primitive man was naturally first directed to explaining tangible Nature—the earth, the sea, and the mists which lay on the land. The most elementary distinction between racial views is the sex of the earth and of the abyss or sea, which from its blueness was naturally thought to be of the same nature as the blue sky—the heavenly ocean. In Egypt the sky (Nut) was feminine, the land (To) was masculine. Exceptionally in the 13th cent. B.C., when Semitic influence was strongest, the sexes were reversed, as in Hebrew *shāmayīm* ('heavens') is masculine, and *'ădāmāh* ('earth') is feminine. Similarly in Babylonia, Ea (the deep) and Anu (the sky) are masculine, while Damkina (the land) is feminine. The same attribution is adopted by Greek, Latin, and German, and in the New Zealand mythology. Egypt was, therefore, exceptional in the sex of land and sky.

These elements of land and water were thought to have been evolved in the primal chaos of the universal ocean (Nu or Nun), when 'not yet was the heaven, not yet the earth, men were not, not yet born were the gods, not yet was death' (Pyramid of Pepy I., l. 663).

This idea passed to Hesiod, along with the same sexes as in Egypt:

> 'From chaos were generated Erebos (masc.) and black Night (fem.),
> And from Night again were generated Ether and Day,
> Whom she brought forth, having conceived from the embrace of Erebos.' (*Theogony*, 123 ff.)

He probably derived it through the Sidonians, who, Damascius asserts, 'before all things place Chronos, and Pothos, and Omichlēs. And by a connexion between Pothos and Omichlēs, as the two principles, are generated Aer and Aura.' This view then seems to have prevailed in the eastern Mediterranean.

The lifting of the watery mists, which are seen rising each morning from the Nile, the parting of them from the earth and the raising of them to the sky, was a work variously attributed

to Ra (the sun) or Shu (the atmosphere). The heaven (Nut) was forced apart from the earth (Keb or Seb); and usually Shu is represented upholding Nut over his head.

Similarly in New Zealand, the earth and heaven clave together in the darkness, and had produced gods and men. The gods try to part them, but cannot until the god and father of forests, birds, and insects strives; 'his head is now firmly planted on his mother the earth, his feet he raises up and rests against his father the skies, he strains his back and limbs with mighty effort. Now are rent apart Rangi and Papa, and with cries and groans of woe they shriek aloud. . . . It was the fierce thrusting of Tane which tore the heaven from the earth, so that they were rent apart, and darkness was made manifest, and so was the light' (G. Grey, *Polynes. Mythol.*, Lond. 1855 [reprint, p. 3]).

In Egypt it was similarly assumed that Seb and Nut had produced Ra or Shu before they were separated.

2. Sun-myths.—The genesis of the sun (Ra) is variously attributed to Seb and to Nut. According to one view, Ra was 'the egg of the great cackler,' Seb being, by a play on words, equated with the goose. In another view, Ra was born as a calf of the celestial cow, or child of the sky-goddess; and this may be the motive for regarding the sky as feminine. Another, and a more general, view, when the theologic frame of creation came forward, was to posit the formation of Ra direct from the chaos Nun, and so make him an ancestor of Seb and Nut. Probably this view was that of the Heliopolitan Ra-worshippers, as distinct from the older Seb- and Nut-worshippers in the Nile valley. Ra came into being 'while as yet there was no heaven, . . . and there was nothing that was with him in that place where he was . . . resting in the waters of Nun, and he found no place where he could stand' (Erman, *Religion*, p. 26). Ra then united with his own shadow, and from his seed created Shu and Tefnut, in the midst of the chaos. Shu certainly represents space or air, symbolized by an ostrich feather; Tefnut represents moisture. From Shu and Tefnut were born Seb and Nut; and from them, in turn, the Osiride family, and mankind.

The heaven was regarded as an ocean parallel with that on earth. It was on the heavenly ocean that the sun, the moon, and the stars sailed in ships each day and night. To explain the sun's re-appearing in the morning, they supposed a nocturnal ocean beneath the world, on which the sun sailed as by day. The dead were, on this view, considered as joining the boat of Ra, and sailing, under his protection, through the hours of the night as well as of the day.

3. Theology.—The gods associated with creation are many. *Khnumu*, 'the Shaper,' who shapes living things on his potter's wheel, 'created all that is, he formed all that exists, he is the father of fathers, the mother of mothers . . . he fashioned men, he made the gods, he was father from the beginning . . . he is the creator of the heaven, the earth, the under world, the water, the mountains . . . he formed a male and a female of all birds, fishes, wild beasts, cattle, and of all worms' (Wiedemann, *HDB*, vol. v. p. 179[b]). He is figured always with the ram's head, to signify his creative power, and was worshipped at the source of the Nile—the cataract. *Ptah*, 'the Great Artificer,' the Demiurge, shapes the sun- and moon-eggs on his potter's wheel; he is the god of law and order who created all things by *Maat*, truth or exactness. *Osiris* 'formed with his hand the earth, its water, its air, its plants, all its cattle, all its birds, all its winged fowl, all its reptiles, all its quadrupeds.' This is the development of the primitive idea of Osiris as a god of vegetation. *Amon-Ra* also, on the growth of his worship when Thebes was the capital, became 'the father of the gods, the fashioner of men,' and all other things (see Wiedemann, *loc. cit.*). *Thoth*, according to Hermopolite legend, when in the chaos of Nun, created Seb and Nut by his word; and they were parted asunder at Hermopolis. This creation by the word was the highly spiritualized idea of later times, and is seen in the *Korē Kosmou* (500 B.C.), where Thoth-Hermes is first of the gods.

Other sky-gods are *Anher*, 'He who goes above,' god of Theni or Girgeh; and *Horus* as the sky, supported by four pillars who are the four sons of Horus. The mixtures of ideas in later times are so complex, and so combined with the theology, that we cannot touch on them here. Our object has been to show the primitive ideas, and the various nuclei of thought which were combined.

LITERATURE.—A. Wiedemann, *Relig. of the Anc. Egyptians*, Lond. 1897, also his art. in *HDB*, vol. v. pp. 176–197; G. Maspero, *Dawn of Civilization*, Eng. tr., Lond. 1894; A. Erman, *Handbook of Egyptian Religion*, Eng. tr., Lond. 1907.

W. M. FLINDERS PETRIE.

COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY (Greek).

—Since the word 'cosmogony' describes the origin of the universe by the figure of birth, it suggests to us in the first instance accounts of a mainly poetic and mythological kind. Yet science also has its fairy tales, and one who sought for information about Greek cosmogonies might not unreasonably look for some account of that, for example, which is contained in the *Timæus*. If this be introduced, so should those of one or two other philosophical systems. We propose, therefore, to deal first with what may be called the *poetic* cosmogonies, and afterwards with the *philosophical*. We shall devote rather more space to the former, as being probably less familiar to most readers. In the case of the latter, we shall take three typical examples, describe them briefly, and try to show the place of each in the history of Greek thought as to the relation between God and the world.

I. *POETICAL COSMOGONIES.*—**1. Homer.**—We find in Homer not a complete cosmogony, but ideas of a cosmogonical kind, or, rather, of a geogonical, as all he is concerned about is the world in which we live. In *Il.* xiv. 246, Oceanus is the father (γένεσις) of all the gods, and in xiv. 201 he is the father, and Tethys the mother. The latter name is usually derived (F. Lukas, *Kosmogonien*, p. 154 n.) from θῆσθαι, 'to suck' (τήθη = 'nurse'). Tethys will then symbolize the suckling mother, Earth. But behind these Nature-powers stands a third still more august, the goddess Night. In *Il.* xiv. 244, Zeus is referred to as younger, indeed, but more potent, than Oceanus; Night, on the other hand, even Zeus fears to offend (*ib.* 259 ff.). Lukas, therefore, follows Damascius (6th cent. A.D.), our chief authority on the first principles of the Greek cosmogonies, in supposing that, for Homer, Night was the supreme geogonical conception (Damasc. περὶ πρώτων ἀρχῶν, c. 124, ed. Kopp, 1826, p. 382).

2. Oldest Orphic cosmogony.—To this head Lukas refers those fundamental conceptions which in various fragmentary notices are directly ascribed to Orpheus. Not the least evidence of their antiquity is their practical identity with what we have found in Homer. Eudemus the Peripatetic declared, according to Damascius (*l.c.*), that Orpheus made his beginning with Night. John Lydus (6th cent. A.D.) stated that Orpheus' three first principles were: Night, Earth, Heaven (Lobeck, *Aglaoph.* 1829, i. 494). Plato, again, quotes a couplet as from Orpheus, describing Oceanus and Tethys as the first wedded pair (*Crat.* 402 B), while he informs us in the *Timæus* (41 A) that Oceanus and Tethys were the offspring of Earth and Heaven. As the former statement is expressly referred to Orpheus, we may be sure that he had the same

real or fancied authority for the latter. In this Orphic cosmogony, it will be seen, Oceanus and Tethys are a degree less venerable than in Homer; Earth and Heaven are the older pair. Yet the difference is insignificant, and here, as in Homer, Night is the supreme conception. According to Gruppe (*Griech. Culte*, etc., 1887, i. 613 f.), the cosmogony of *Il.* xiv. was borrowed from the Orphic. But the question of their relation is an extremely difficult one, which cannot be discussed here.

3. Hesiod.—In the introduction to his *Theogony*, Hesiod actually names Earth, Heaven, and Night—the reputed Orphic trinity—as the sources of the gods (verses 106–107); and one feels that, whatever its origin, he is using a familiar and probably already ancient formula. But, at the outset of the poem proper, he proceeds to give us what in fact, though not in name, is a cosmogony of his own (verses 116–136). Its outline is as follows: In the beginning was Chaos, after whom, on the one hand, came Gaia and Eros, and, on the other, Erebus and Night. Erebus and Night were the parents of Æther (or Light) and Day. Gaia of herself produced, first Uranus (Heaven), that he might be a cover to her round about, and that she might be a secure dwelling-place for the gods; and after him the mountains and seas. Lastly, mating with Uranus, she became mother of all the gods, except the few who sprang from Erebus and Night.

At the top, then, of Hesiod's cosmogony stands Chaos. Its meaning has been variously interpreted by ancient no less than by modern commentators. It has been taken for Water, Air, Fire, and Space (cf. for ref. Lukas, *op. cit.* p. 157 f.). Etymology has been appealed to in each case. But no derivation seems more probable than that from χα or χαν (the root of χαίνω, 'to gape,' χαῦνος, χάσμα, Lat. *hisco*, *hiatus*, etc.). Thus we get the meaning of Space, and this further accords with the manner in which Hesiod seems to have arrived at his first principle, viz. by *abstraction*. In pondering the origin of the universe, he thinks away one by one its various contents, until he reaches Space as the final presupposition of all things. As Time comes first in the Phœnician cosmogony given by Eudemus, and, as we shall see, in some Greek cosmogonies, so does Space in this of Hesiod. Zeller (*Pre-Socr. Phil.* i. 88 f.) agrees with Lukas that Space was Hesiod's first principle, and that he reached it by abstraction, but thinks that Hesiod pictured it 'as an immeasurable, waste, and formless mass,' while Lukas understands by it the mere unlimited void.

On the next cosmogonical stage we have two pairs, of which the first is Gaia and Eros. Gaia is Earth, not however as an element, but as a vaguely conceived mass. There is, at first sight, something detached about the appearance of Eros. He enters the stage with the others, but seems to perform no rôle. But the reason is that he is a potency rather than a person. He is the soul of all the unions here recorded. He is the Eros, not of art, but of early local cult like that at Thespiæ (Paus. ix. 27. 1), who was life and love in one, and was taken over by the Orphics (cf. Gomperz, *Gr. Thinkers*, i. 89, and, for the connexion of Eros with the Orphics, J. Harrison, *Proleg. to Gr. Relig.* ch. xii.). We are not told *how* Gaia and Eros came into being. They may symbolize matter and spirit, but they are not derived from Chaos as a higher principle. The ruling principle of the cosmogony is not that of cause and effect, but that of sequence in time. We only hear that Gaia and Eros came afterwards (ἔπειτα). And the same is doubtless true of the second pair, Erebus and Night. They are said to have come ἐκ Χάεος, but the ἐκ may be merely local (Space being referred to), or temporal, or both. Accordingly Gaia, Eros, Erebus, and Night occupy together the second cosmogonical stage.

A step further removed from Chaos are Æther and Day, who are children of Erebus and Night. So the unrelieved darkness gives place to the succession of night and day. Earth also at this stage gives birth to Heaven, that he may shield her with his vault, to the mountains also and the seas; and then, when all is ready for their reception, Earth and Heaven become the parents of the gods.

In Hesiod's cosmogony there is no real attempt to explain the *causes* of things. But it has, according to Lukas, two elements of speculative worth—the conception of *purpose* in creation (the provision of a safe home for the gods), and the far-reaching *abstraction* by which the poet goes back to Space, and then step by step reconstructs the world.

Passing by Acusilaus, a prose chronicler of the 6th cent., and, like Hesiod, a native of Bœotia, whose cosmogony, contained in Damascius, resembles Hesiod's, and has also a marked Orphic colouring (Lukas, *op. cit.* pp. 162–163), we come next to—

4. Pherecydes.—He was a native of Syros, but lived at Athens at the court of Pisistratus (6th cent. B.C.). At Athens 'he founded an Orphic community, though how far he was the disciple and prophet of the Orphic doctrines we are hardly able to say' (Gomperz, *op. cit.* i. 86). His own work has been lost, but numerous notices, which have come down to us from ancient times, and which relate to various parts of his cosmogony, enable us to form, though with reserve on some disputed points, a tolerably full as well as reliable estimate of his system. According to both Damascius (c. 124, ed. Kopp, p. 384) and Diog. Laert. (i. 119), Pherecydes derived the universe from three first principles—Zas (=Zeus), Chronos, and Chthonia (or Chthon). At the summit of the cosmogony, then, stands Zeus. He is probably best regarded as a purely spiritual principle (so, *e.g.*, Arist. *Met.* xiv. 4, 1091a, and many moderns, but cf. *e.g.* Zeller, *op. cit.* i. 91), so far as mind was consciously distinguished from matter at that early date. The spiritual interpretation is confirmed by the statement of Proclus (5th cent. A.D.)—which at the same time presents a new and interesting phase of the cosmogony—that the Zeus of Pherecydes changed himself into Eros when he meant to create the world (*Tim.* 155). Zeus as such, therefore, stands outside the world; he is the principle of supreme might. Chronos, the second member of the trinity, naturally denotes the Time, in which everything happens, and occupies an analogous position to Space in Hesiod's cosmogony. Lastly, Chthonia must be taken to mean either primary matter (Lukas, *op. cit.* p. 170) or the Earth-spirit (Gomperz, *op. cit.* i. 88).

Some of the ancients asserted that *water* was Pherecydes' first principle; but this conflicts not only with Diog. Laert. but with the more detailed account of the cosmogony given in Damascius. A full discussion of this obscure and difficult question will be found in Lukas, *op. cit.* pp. 168–170, or Zeller, *op. cit.* i. 93–94 n.

As regards the relation of the three principles to one another, Damascius implies that Zeus was in some sense first; but his exposition is purely Neo-Platonic. It is safer, therefore, to trust the more objective Diogenes, according to whom the three first principles of Pherecydes were alike eternal (ἦσαν ἀεί).

The cosmogony begins when Chronos produces from his seed Fire, Air, and Water, who then in turn beget the five families of the gods. Thus gods and elements alike are the offspring of Time. And now Zeus-Eros plans to create the world. But at this stage, according to Max. Tyrius (*Dissert.* xxix. p. 304, ed. Davis; cf. also Celsus *ap.* Origen *c. Cels.* vi. 42, *et al.*), a fearful conflict intervenes betwixt Cronos (not to be confused with Chronos) and the

dragon Ophioneus for the lordship of Nature. Only when Cronos wins and the dragon is cast into the sea can Zeus set about his creative task. The episode is not quite of a piece with the cosmogony, since Zeus is from eternity,—there is no Cronos before him. But there is no reason to doubt that Pherecydes employed the myth. Perhaps, as Philo of Byblus states (*ap.* Eus. *Præp. Ev.* i. 10, 33), he borrowed it from the Phœnicians. In any case the meaning is clear: before the ordered world, the κόσμος, can be established, a victory must be won over the forces of disorder.

The final stage is related by Clem. Alex. (*Strom.* vi. 621 A): 'Pherecydes the Syrian says: Zas makes a mantle, large and fair, and broiders on it earth and ocean and ocean's dwellings.' Again he speaks (*ib.* 642 A) of 'the winged oak and the embroidered mantle that rests upon it.' The 'winged oak' is no doubt 'the earth floating freely in space'—a conception lately introduced by Anaximander (Gomperz, *op. cit.* i. 89). The rest of the imagery explains itself.

Points of likeness between the cosmogonies of Pherecydes and Hesiod will readily occur to the reader. Here we only note points in which Pherecydes marks an advance. In the first place, Zeus, according to the interpretation here followed, and even on the lower, is a more spiritual conception than Chaos (Space). In the second, there is a certain suggestion of science in the cosmogony. The four elements are named before the formation of the world. So far, indeed, as our accounts go, Pherecydes does not work the suggestion out. On the other hand, he clearly treated Eros (Love) as a cosmical principle, and one cannot but suspect that, if his whole work had reached us, we should have found that Zeus-Eros used the elements as materials for his creative task.

Damascius (c. 124, ed. Kopp, p. 385) gives a fragment of a cosmogony by the Cretan Epimenides (*c.* 600 B.C.). In this cosmogony we meet for the first time among the Greeks the doctrine of the World-Egg. But it is little more than mentioned, and so we shall pass at once to give some account of the later Orphic cosmogonies, in which it plays a prominent part.

5. Later Orphic cosmogonies.—In a former section we dealt with certain thoughts about the origin of the world which were ascribed to Orpheus, but here we are dealing with entire systems. They are highly mystical and pantheistic, and, though fanciful and grotesque, are most naturally referred to a period of religious and philosophical syncretism. Hence some critics like Zeller (*op. cit.* i. 100 ff.) refuse to regard any of them as earlier than the 1st or 2nd cent. B.C. Others, however, assign a much earlier date to the one which Damascius tells us was contained in the current 'Rhapsodies,' and which he describes as the usual Orphic theology. Thus O. Gruppe (in Roscher, *s.v.* 'Orpheus') argues strongly, but cautiously, in favour of the view that it was formed in the 6th cent. B.C. on the basis of a still earlier Orphic myth. To this system we now turn our attention.

(1) *Rhapsodist cosmogony.*—This includes what the Orphics taught both about the Divine nature and about its relation to the world. The fullest account of the former is contained in Damascius (c. 123, ed. Kopp, p. 380). He must, indeed, be used with caution, owing to his Neo-Platonic bias. Lukas points this out, but thinks he may be trusted for the number, sequence, and names of his first principles. In this he seems to go too far, but, if we combine all that is essential in Damascius with what we learn from other sources, especially Orphic fragments (for which cf. Gruppe, *l.c.* p. 1139), we reach the following result, which will be found in essential agreement with what, for example, is contained in Zeller (*op. cit.* i. 104) or in Gruppe (in Roscher, *s.v.* 'Phanes'). At the summit of the system stands Chronos (Time). Next come Æther (bright, fiery substance, cf. 'Stoic cosmogony' below) and Chaos (Space). Lukas observes that, though Time is named before Space, it is not viewed as producing it, but merely as the active principle, while Space receives that which arises in Time (but cf. Zeller, *l.c.*). After Æther and Chaos comes the Egg, which is viewed sometimes as the offspring of Chronos and Æther (fr. 53), sometimes as that of Æther and Chaos (Proclus, *Tim.* i. 138). In either case it springs from Æther, and is thus, as Lukas calls it, an Egg of Light. Damascius elsewhere describes it as ἀργύφεον, 'silver-white.' And it deserves the name, not only because it was formed from the light of heaven, but because from it, as we shall see, Phanes, the light of the world, proceeded. Finally, there issues from the Egg the first Orphic god. Damascius, who favours trinities, calls him Phanes-Ericapæus-Metis, which is generally interpreted 'Light, Life-giver, Counsel.' But, above all, he is Phanes, 'Light,' who becomes at will the light of reason, the light of life, and—for he is also Eros—the light of love. As first-born of the gods he is Protogonos. There is something sublime in these conceptions. But Phanes was also 'polymorphic, a beast-mystery god,' a creature monstrous and grotesque, as in the fragment quoted by Proclus (*Tim.* ii. 130):

> 'Heads had he many,
> Head of a ram, a bull, a snake, and a bright-eyed lion'
> (J. Harrison, *op. cit.* p. 651).

Such was the Orphic doctrine of the Divine nature. It had one feature which, according to Lukas, gave speculative value to the Rhapsodist cosmogony. This is the effort to explain the origin of life. While many cosmogonies *begin* with a Divine being, the Orphic sees in his God the last stage in the evolution of life out of the lifeless.

We have next to consider Phanes' relation to the world. He had in him all the forces, or σπέρματα, out of which it sprang. Hence, though he was sometimes called its creator, he was generally thought of as having given it birth. The idea took the form of a theogony, in which the successive dynasties of gods represent the successive stages in the evolution of the world. In this process, part of the god became the world's life; with the other he withdrew as sun into the heavens, where only Night could look on him, while his splendour amazed the other gods. But when Zeus attained to sovereignty he devoured Phanes. Thus the old order was dissolved, but thus also Zeus became the sum of all things. He *became* Phanes (see next section), and from him a new race of gods, a new world, sprang. In his son, Dionysos, the god of the mysteries, Phanes was born again. Like Phanes, Zeus became the world—Ζεὺς κεφαλή, Ζεὺς μέσσα, Διὸς δ' ἐκ πάντα τέτυκται (fr. 123),—but, like Phanes also, he dwelt apart, for his mind was the ether (Gruppe, in Roscher, *s.v.* 'Orpheus' and 'Phanes'; Pauly-Wissowa, *s.v.* 'Orpheus'; Zeller, *op. cit.* p. 104 f.; J. Adam, *Relig. Teachers of Greece*, p. 95 f.; Lobeck, *Aglaoph.* 518 ff.; fr. 120 ff.).

The story of the swallowing of Phanes has usually been explained as a device to recover for Zeus his ancient dignity as source of life—for had he not long ago devoured Metis and borne Athene? This could be done by showing that he swallowed Phanes who was *also* Metis. But Gruppe sees in the story a different motive. It was to depict the periodical renewal of the universe, which he regards as the ground thought of the Rhapsodist cosmogony. This was a feature of Stoic cosmo-

gony (see below) to which the Orphic doctrine has other points of resemblance—especially its pantheistic materialism, and its view of Æther as the principle of Divine life. On the whole, it is difficult not to believe that there was a close connexion between the two cosmogonies, on whichever side the borrowing lies.

(2) *The cosmogony of Hieronymus and Hellanicus.*—From the Rhapsodist theogony, Damascius passes to one which he describes as ἡ κατὰ τὸν Ἱερώνυμον φερομένη καὶ Ἑλλάνικον. It is uncertain, and cannot be here discussed, whether it was known to Hellanicus of Lesbos in the 5th cent. B.C., or was published under his name by Hieronymus in one of the later pre-Christian centuries. It was generally Orphic in character, but differed, as Damascius indicates, from the current Orphic theology. We cannot, indeed, be sure as to its precise form. This is due chiefly to the fact that we find in Athenagoras (2nd cent. A.D.) what is evidently a different version of the same original doctrine. The differences will be afterwards mentioned. Meantime we shall notice briefly the main points in Damascius' version.

At the head of this cosmogony we find, not Chronos, as in the last, but—Water and Slime. Out of these springs Chronos. This does not mean that Time is not viewed as an active first principle, but only that it is more concrete. Here Time is viewed as force—force which presupposes matter to work on. The Orphic imagination runs riot in depicting this force. Chronos is a winged dragon with the heads of a bull and a lion, and betwixt them the face of a god. He is Chronos-Herakles-Ananke-Adrasteia. Herakles betokens his might, Ananke his necessity, Adrasteia his inevitability. Next, Chronos produces Æther, Chaos, and Erebus. We met Æther and Chaos in the Rhapsodist cosmogony, but here they follow after primary matter, and so Æther is more grossly conceived as *humid* (νότερος). In the same way Erebus is *misty* (ὀμιχλῶδες). Lastly, in the midst of the vaporous space, with its mingled light and gloom, Chronos produced an Egg (ᾠὸν ἐγέννησεν). This naturally implies that it partook of the substance with which space was filled. It was, therefore, formed out of grosser elements than the Egg of the Rhapsodist cosmogony. Thus also we are told that it had within it the seed of male and female, and likewise of all manner of things without life. For this very reason it better deserves to be called a World-Egg. But it is not an Egg of Light. And, lastly, we have the same contrast in the Divine Being, the Maker and Ruler of the world, who issues from the Egg. In his monstrous and grotesque form he resembles the first-born God of the other cosmogony. But he has lost his title of Phanes, the god of light, and appears as Protogonos-Zeus-Pan.

As compared with the current Orphic doctrine, that just examined is marked by a certain coarse realism. Both in form and spirit it is less distinctively Greek. In some points, indeed, it closely resembles the Phœnician cosmogony, and Zeller maintains that its author borrowed directly from that source (*op. cit.* i. 102–3 n.; but, on the other side, cf. Gruppe, in Roscher, *s.v.* 'Orpheus,' p. 1141).

In describing the Orphic doctrine, Athenagoras, who was a Christian, no doubt selected the cosmogony of Hellanicus and Hieronymus because he saw most in it to condemn. But what specially concerns us is the form in which he presented it. The series begins with Water and Slime, and out of these Chronos-Herakles is evolved. But here the resemblance to Damascius ceases. No mention is made of Æther, Chaos, and Erebus. Chronos-Herakles produces a gigantic egg, which breaks into halves, of which the upper forms the heaven, and the lower the earth. In this naive conception there is clearly no element of speculative value. The egg has no special significance beyond its shape. On the other hand, in the cosmogonies described by Damascius, the World-Egg is an expression of the profound thought that the universe is an organism, gradually formed from an original germ, in obedience to the same law which governs every living thing.

(3) Before leaving the Orphic cosmogonies proper, we may briefly notice three others of minor importance. (*a*) The first and the best known is that of *Apollonius Rhodius* (3rd cent. B.C.), who in the *Argonautica* (i. 494 ff.) puts into the mouth of Orpheus some verses describing the origin of the world. Here the separation of the four elements is ascribed to the action of Discord—an idea evidently borrowed from Empedocles. The legend of Ophioneus and Chronos, which was used by Pherecydes (see above), is introduced in a somewhat different and, judging by internal evidence, less authentic form (cf. Gomperz, *op. cit.* i. 91). (*b*) *Alexander of Aphrodisias* (3rd cent. A.D.) gives us the following series: Chaos, Oceanus, Night, Uranus, Zeus. This, it will be seen, resembles the older rather than the later form of Orphic cosmogonies. (*c*) Lastly, the author of the *Clementine Recognitions* (X. xvii.) gives a brief summary of Orphic doctrine. Some of the first principles, notably the Egg and Phanetas, remind us of the Rhapsodist cosmogony, but the account as a whole is less coherent, and strikes one as probably less accurate, than that of Damascius.

6. Aristophanes.—In one famous passage (*Av.* 693 ff.) Aristophanes depicts the origin of the universe. In the beginning were Chaos, Night, Erebus, and Tartarus. Into the bosom of Erebus, Night laid a wind-born egg (ὑπηνέμιον ᾠόν) from which, as the seasons rolled, Eros sprang, gleaming with golden wings. Eros blended all things together, and from their union Heaven, Ocean, Earth, and the race of the gods were born. J. Harrison (*op. cit.* p. 626) calls the passage about the birth of Love 'pure Orphism.' And, indeed, Gruppe (in Roscher, *s.v.* 'Orpheus,' p. 1121) maintains that the gold-winged Eros springing from the egg was part of the oldest Orphic doctrine. But some details in the passage remind us of other cosmogonies, especially that of Hesiod (cf. Lukas, *op. cit.* p. 196).

The 'theologians,' as Aristotle calls those whose doctrines we have been considering, represent a perfectly distinct phase of Greek thought. 'Their mind was less scientific than that of the "physiologists." They made a far keener demand for a vivid representation of the origin and development of the world' (Gomperz, *op. cit.* i. 85). Nor were they satisfied with the current mythology. Its tales were perhaps too immoral. Certainly its cosmogony was too vague. And so they sought to fill up its gaps partly from local legend, partly from the traditions of foreign peoples.

Gomperz has striven to show (*op. cit.* i. 92–97) that various features in the Greek cosmogonies—the World-Egg, the twofold nature of the Orphic godhead, in which the male and female attributes were united, and the important position occupied by Chronos as the Time-principle—were ultimately derived from Babylon, although the two former had probably their direct source in Egypt, but a discussion of this question would carry us beyond our present limits.

II. *PHILOSOPHICAL COSMOGONIES.*—The cosmogonies we have examined, though not without elements of speculative value, are essentially hypothetical in character; those to which we now turn represent the effort to explain the world on philosophical principles, and in each case from a distinct philosophical point of view. For this very reason, however, they cannot be properly understood or appreciated apart from the general movement of Greek thought. This, therefore, we must also try very briefly to indicate.

I. Early Ionian philosophers.—The earliest Greek philosophers were natives of Ionia in Asia Minor. Beginning with Thales, who flourished at Miletus about 600 B.C., they each sought to explain

the universe from a single, and that a material first principle. They discussed more or less fully the nature of the changes which the primary matter underwent, but the ultimate cause of the movement, by which the world in all its parts was formed out of material elements, was a subject on which Thales and his immediate successors had little or nothing to say. The reason was that they regarded the cause as inherent in the nature of matter itself (Gomperz, *op. cit.* i. 56). This was also true of Heraclitus of Ephesus (*c.* 500 B.C.): to him also matter was 'organically alive' (*ib.* p. 66). But a great step in the history of Greek speculation is marked by his doctrine of the *Logos*, by which he gave expression to the thought that the world-forming process must be guided by Intelligence. He taught, indeed, that all reality is material, and that the primary element is Fire; but, as he assigned to the latter the attribute of reason, he called it also the Logos. In other words, the Logos viewed on its corporeal side was Fire, and Fire viewed on its spiritual side was the Logos (J. Adam, *op. cit.* p. 224). Here, then, a first principle was postulated, which was at once material and rational, and it was on this basis that the Stoic cosmogony (see below) was afterwards reared. But before that time the great thinkers of Greece had sought to show that the world was framed by God as at once a rational and non-material Being, and Heraclitus at least paved the way for that conception when he endowed his First Cause with the attribute of reason.

2. The first Greek philosopher who traced the world to a non-material agency was **Empedocles** (*c.* 450 B.C.). He did this in his doctrine of the four elements, whose movements were determined by the twofold agency of Love and Discord (J. Adam, *op. cit.* p. 245). But a far more important step in the direction of idealism was taken by **Anaxagoras**, who, though born rather earlier than Empedocles, probably had the work of the latter before him when he wrote (*ib.* p. 254). According to Aristotle, it was Anaxagoras who first pointed to the real cause of the movement by which the world was formed. This cause he named Nous, or Reason, to which also he seems to have attributed a mainly, if not exclusively, transcendent existence (*ib.* p. 371).

3. **Plato.**—Though Anaxagoras did not make much use of his great conception, it led to far-reaching results. Especially it brought into clear view the opposition between matter and spirit. The opposition may not be absolute, but it was naturally the distinction between the two which first occupied the attention of philosophers. It was the chief problem of Plato's Dialectic. But it is with its cosmological aspect that we are here concerned. If the First Cause was purely immaterial, how could He act on matter at all so as to create the world? In this question and the answer to it lies the chief significance of the cosmogony which Plato has set before us in the *Timæus*:

Even apart from much that does not strictly belong to it, the cosmogony of the *Timæus* is intricate, but here it will be enough to consider its main ideas. For a fuller exposition and discussion the reader may be referred to Jowett's *Plato*, vol. iii., or to Adam, *op. cit.* p. 360 ff.

God formed the world out of a material so intractable that it could not be completely moulded to His will. But He introduced into the primary substance 'as many proportions *as it was possible* for it to receive' (*Tim.* 69 B). The stubborn power, which thus resists the Creator, Plato calls 'Necessity.' It is the root of evil in the world, and, as it will not wholly yield to God, 'the Creator in Plato is still subject to a remnant of Necessity which he cannot wholly overcome' (Jowett, *Plato*, iii. 391).

In forming the world, God gave it a Body and also a Soul. (1) *The body.* On certain portions of primary matter, which was formless and chaotic, God imprinted various mathematical 'forms' and 'numbers' (*Tim.* 53 B). Thus arose the four elements of which the body of the universe was composed. The idea of a Divine mathematician, in which Pythagorean influence is plainly visible, runs through the whole account of creation. According to Plutarch, Plato said that God is always playing the mathematician (θεὸς ἀεὶ γεωμετρεῖ). (2) *The soul.* Plato describes the elements of which the World-Soul was composed, but his account is highly metaphysical, and need not detain us here. It is enough to examine its attributes. Of these the first is Motion. It is manifested in the movements of the planets (*Tim.* 36 D), but it has other aspects, not directly referred to in the *Timæus*, which are important in estimating the nature of the World-Soul. According to the *Laws* (x. 896 A), the essential quality of soul is self-movement. Further, the Soul is the cause of movement in other things, and by movement (κίνησις) Plato understood every kind of change (*ib.*, *Phædrus*, 245 C). The World-Soul, therefore, is the cause, not only of locomotion, but also of 'separation and combination, growth, decay, and dissolution' (J. Adam, *op. cit.* p. 368). The second attribute is Intelligence. It is here to be taken in the widest sense, for we are given to understand that the World-Soul apprehends not only ideas, but sensible realities, and such as lie between the two (*ib.* p. 369 f.). On the other hand, 'the World-Soul, as described in the *Timæus*, has nothing analogous to the principles of anger and desire . . . which, according to Plato, constitute so large and turbulent a portion of the human soul' (*ib.* p. 370). Plato speaks of the World-Soul as *created.* In what sense he used the term he nowhere precisely explains, but there can be little doubt that he thought of an emanational process. Such is the view of the writer just quoted, who thus sums up the cosmogonical process: 'At the beginning of Time, God created the Universe. A spirit or soul went forth from him, and inhabited the body which he redeemed from chaos by imprinting mathematical forms on primordial matter' (*ib.* p. 373).

The universe, thus formed of body and soul, is described as εἰκὼν τοῦ ποιητοῦ, μονογενής, 'image of its Creator, only-begotten.' Thus it is related to Him as son to father. Further, it is itself a god, a θεὸς αἰσθητός, or 'perceivable god' (*Tim.* 92 C). On the other hand, the Creator is a Being mysteriously remote, 'hard to discover' (*ib.* 28 C), who, when He had made the world, 'abode in his own nature' (*ib.* 42 E).

We may now see how the Platonic cosmogony was an attempt to explain the world on dualistic principles. Since God as pure thought could have no contact with matter, Plato was obliged to assume for the work of creation some formative principle separate from God Himself. Hence the separate existence of the mathematical forms imprinted on matter, and especially of the World-Soul incorporated within it. It is from this point of view that Caird describes the World-Soul as 'a kind of bridge to connect two terms which it is impossible really to unite' (*Evolution of Theology in the Gr. Phil.* ii. 266).

4. Although Aristotle (*q.v.*) effectually criticized the theory of 'Ideas,' which Plato held to exist apart from matter, yet his own doctrine was fundamentally dualistic, as appears from his view of the Divine life as an energy of self-contemplation. But after his time Greek thought swung round to the opposite pole. Abandoning the dualism by which mind and matter, subject and object, were opposed to each other as mutually exclusive realities, it sought to explain the world by means of

a single principle. This men sought where they felt surest of finding it, in their own subjective experience. Thus they hoped for a certainty which they could never have about an object with whose appearances only they were acquainted. It may be added that the subjective trend in philosophy was part of a general movement affecting the last epoch of Greek national life, from Alexander the Great onwards (Schwegler, *Hist. of Phil.* pp. 120–122). Now, the subjective life itself has two sides, the one universal and spiritual, the other individual and material. It was on the latter view of man's nature that the Epicureans based both their ethical and their physical theories. The Stoics, on the other hand, appealed in their Ethics to man's rational nature, while in their Physics they derived the world from a material principle (for the reason of this apparent inconsistency, see Schwegler, *op. cit.* p. 125). It will be seen that in their use of a single principle the Stoics and Epicureans returned to the point from which philosophy had diverged after the time of Heraclitus, but, as R. D. Hicks remarks (art. 'Stoics,' in *EBr*[11]), 'until dualism had been thought out, as in the Peripatetic school, it was impossible that monism (or at any rate materialistic monism) should be definitely and consciously maintained.' Both the Epicureans and the Stoics had what may be called a materialistic cosmogony, but that of the Stoics is in several ways the more important, and to it therefore we now turn.

5. Stoic cosmogony.—The Stoic first principle was akin to the Fire of Heraclitus, but of a subtler nature—a fiery breath (*πνεῦμα*) or ether (*αἰθήρ*). But in a more important respect it differed from Heraclitus' first principle. For the Stoic primary substance was matter regarded in its distinctively active aspect as force. Viewed in relation to the actual world, it is thus described by R. D. Hicks (*loc. cit.*):

'Before there was heaven or earth, there was primitive substance or Pneuma, the everlasting presupposition of particular things. This is the totality of all existence; out of it the whole visible universe proceeds, hereafter to be again resolved into it. Not the less is it the creative force, or deity, which develops and shapes this universal order or cosmos.'

So far the Stoic theory reminds us of much that we have already met with in other systems. But the *mode* of the creative activity, as conceived by the Stoics, was altogether new. The Stoic primary substance, be it remembered, is matter and force in one (cf. Zeller, *Stoics*, etc., p. 148: 'the forming force . . . is in itself something material,' etc.). Its force is that of *tension*, the expansive and dispersive pressure due to heat, and the extremity of the tension is seen in the fact that all distinction of particular things, due to relative density, is lost within it. It cannot long withstand the intensity of this inward pressure. It sways to and fro, and this movement cools a little the glowing ether. Condensation begins, and with it the first distinction within the primal substance—the separation of force from matter. Matter is now the relatively passive; but, as first formed, it differs but little from the pure activity of the substance from which it sprang. It is the element of fire. But again, as condensation proceeds, fire produces air, and this in turn the grosser elements of water and earth. Throughout the process, however, the more active substance never quite surrenders its own nature. Thus only a portion of air becomes water or earth, and something of the pure *Pneuma* itself remains in the ether which stretches above and around the world. As already seen, the distinction of active and passive in the case of the four elements is only relative; and this appears still further in the blending of the elements with one another, and the formation of all particular things. In the universe thus formed the finer substances are those in which the tension of the primary substance is greatest, and the solid are those in which it is most relaxed, and in which matter appears most inert and passive. And, finally, all the shapes and other attributes of things are referred to the ethereal force. Here the need of a guiding Intelligence is most felt. And in fact the force moving in the world was to the Stoic the Soul of the World. Although material, it was, like the Fire of Heraclitus, also intelligent, even as the λόγοι σπερματικοί before the dawn of creation slumbered within it.

The Stoic cosmogony was the chief attempt made by the Greeks not merely to derive but to *explain* the origin of the world from a purely material first principle. It was ingenious, and its account of the manner in which force works in the material world contained elements of permanent value. But it went too far in treating force as a genetic first principle. For material energy is always relative to matter as passive and inert. Nor does it, indeed, appear that the Stoics conceived of force as anything else than the formative aspect of matter (cf. Zeller, *l.c.*). Nevertheless, by regarding it as a primary substance out of which the world was evolved, they *ipso facto* ascribed to it an independent reality. Hence the Stoic first principle was an abstraction which could explain nothing.

6. Neo-Platonic cosmogony.—Before leaving the Greek cosmogonies, we must notice briefly a second and very different attempt to explain the origin of the world from a monistic standpoint. We refer to the system of the Neo-Platonists, who belonged to the last period of Greek thought, when Stoicism and Epicureanism had run their course. The Neo-Platonists taught that the ultimate source of being was neither matter nor spirit, but a real unity transcending both. In this they might seem to quit the subjective standpoint of the later philosophical systems. Yet in reality theirs was the most subjective of all. They found the key to the Divine nature solely in the subjective side of human experience, in the unity given to outward impressions by the thinking subject. They taught also that the material is less real and perfect than the ideal world, that intellectual cognition is the pathway to truth and goodness, and that actual contact with these realities is attained only by means of an 'ecstasy,' in which the distinction between subject and object disappears.

The Neo-Platonists claimed that their doctrine was the direct outcome of Plato's teaching, but in this they did less than justice to the objective element in the latter. No doubt there were features in Plato, especially the terms in which he described the transcendence of God, which gave some support to this claim. But Neo-Platonism owed far more to Oriental influence, the causes of which we cannot stop to inquire (cf. Ueberweg, *Hist. of Philos.* i. 222 f.). It is, in fact, a blend of Greek and Oriental elements. It may be added that 'the religious philosophy of the Alexandrian Jews and the Gnosis of early Christianity are products of the same elements, but under an Oriental form' (*ib.* p. 223).

Plotinus (A.D. 204–269) is the most representative teacher of this school. Of his doctrine, contained in the six *Enneads*, which were published by his pupil Porphyry, a very brief summary must suffice:—The first principle, from which Plotinus derives the universe, is called by him the One, or the Good. This supreme essence is absolutely transcendent, and incognizable. It cannot be described as either Being or Intelligence, for either epithet would imply a limitation of its absolute unity. It is ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας and also ἐπέκεινα

νοήσεως. It is not however, irrational, but only supra-rational (*ὑπερβεβηκὸς τὴν νοῦ φύσιν*). Its title of 'the Good' immediately reminds us of the Supreme Being in Plato. But, in spite of the abstract manner in which 'the Good' or 'the Idea of the Good' is described in the *Republic*, it is clear that Plato ascribed to it both being and intelligence. (For the meaning of 'the Good' in Plato, and for a comparison with Plotinus, see J. Adam, *op. cit.* p. 446 f., and Ueberweg, *op. cit.* i. 122, 246 f.)

As the source of all things, the One produces first of all the highest kind of actual being, which is Mind (*νοῦς*), *i.e.* the Divine Mind (Ueberweg, *op. cit.* i. 248). In this Mind the Ideas (*νοητά*) are immanent. They are not, however, mere thoughts, but parts of the Mind's essence, and for this reason, on which Plotinus lays great stress, they are absolutely true objects of thought. Thus the Nous is at once the Subject and the Object of knowledge; in the first aspect Plotinus regards it as at rest, in the second as active. But *how* did the Nous originate from the One? Plotinus regards this as a problem so difficult that it must be approached with prayer (*Enn.* v. 1, 6). He finds an analogy in the idea of radiation (*περίλαμψις*). The Nous arises from the One like brightness from the sun (*ib.*). The great difficulty, of course, was to explain how actual Being could arise from a source to which the attribute of Being was denied. But he finds a solution 'in the transcending power of the One, which latter, as the superior, can send forth from the superabundance of its perfection the inferior, without having contained the latter, as such, in itself' (Ueberweg, *op. cit.* i. 247; *Enn.* v. 2, 1).

As the One produces Mind, so does Mind produce Soul (*ψυχὴν γεννᾷ νοῦς*, *Enn.* v. 1, 7). And, as Ideas appear along with Mind, so does Body along with Soul. As Plotinus expresses it, Soul, as it issues from Nous, extends itself into the corporeal, as the point extended becomes a line (*ib.* iv. 1). Plotinus says that the Soul has a divisible element, yet he also says that it is immaterial. He tries to reconcile the two statements as follows: 'The soul is *per se* indivisible, being divided only as related to the bodies into which it enters, since these could not receive it if it remained undivided' (*ib.* iv. 21; Ueberweg, *op. cit.* i. 249). The Soul in its entirety is present throughout the body, yet in all its faculties—reason, memory, perception, and even life-force—is absolutely separable from it. There is a plurality of souls. The highest of all is the Soul of the World, but other souls have also a separate existence of their own (*Enn.* iv. 3, 7, iv. 9).

Lastly, what is the Neo-Platonist view about the nature and origin of *matter*? In Plato, matter and mind remain as two ultimate facts. Plotinus, on the other hand, declares that the soul, in virtue of its mobility, *begets* matter (*ib.* iii. 7, 10, iv. 3, 9; Ueberweg, *loc. cit.* i. 249). Now, so far as the material is known to us, *i.e.* so far as it possesses form, it partakes of an ideal nature. But Plotinus recognizes that beneath that form there is a *substratum* (*ὑποκείμενον*), a something which is different from the form and which might take other forms. This *substratum* he calls the *βάθος*, or 'depth,' of each thing, and he says that it has no real existence; it is *μὴ ὄν*. He explains its nature partly by reference to the Ideas which are the objects of Nous. In its most general sense the term *ὕλη* ('matter') is also applied to these. And just because they are *objects* of thought, they also possess this quality of *βάθος*, or 'depth.' But they are nevertheless wholly real, like the Mind which knows them. And Plotinus says that the *substratum* of sensible things is only a shadow (*εἴδωλον*) of the *substratum*, as their form is but a shadow of the form pertaining to the Ideas.

The theory whose essential features we have thus tried to give represents the last important attempt made by Greek thought to explain the origin of the world. It fails mainly through the abstractness of its first principle—a Unity of which not even Being can be predicated.

In its mysticism the Neo-Platonic theory of the world reminds us not a little of the Orphic cosmogonies. It resembles them, indeed, both in form and in spirit, as might be inferred from the fact that the notices of the latter given by Damascius are interwoven with Neo-Platonic conceptions.

LITERATURE.—The following, though only a selection from an immense number of books dealing with various parts of the subject, will, together with their references, supply all needed help to those who wish to study it further: F. Lukas, *Die Grundbeg. in den Kosmog. der alten Volker*, Leipz., 1893, to whom the writer has been specially indebted in the first part of the subject; O. Gruppe, *Griechische Culte und Mythen*, i., Leipzig, 1887, and artt. 'Orpheus' and 'Phanes,' in Roscher; E. Abel, *Orphica*, Leipz. 1885; T. Gomperz, *Gr. Thinkers*, Eng. tr., vol. i., London, 1901; E. Zeller, *Stoics*, etc., new and rev. ed., do. 1892, *Pre-Socr. Phil.*, vol. i. do. 1881, *Outlines of Hist. of Gr. Phil.*^{2}, do. 1892, *Plato and the Older Acad.*, do. 1876; J. E. Harrison, *Proleg. to Study of Gr. Relig.*^{2}, Camb., 1908; J. Adam, *The Relig. Teachers of Greece*, Edinb., 1908; B. Jowett, *Dialogues of Plato*^{3}, vol. iii., Oxford, 1892: R. D. Hicks, art. 'Stoics,' in *EBr*^{11}, also *Stoic and Epicur.*, London, 1910; T. Whittaker, *The Neo-Platonists*, Camb. 1901; C. Bigg, *Neoplatonism*, Lond. 1895; E. Caird, *The Evol. of Theol. in the Gr. Philosophers*, Glasgow, 1904; J. Horowitz, *Philons u. Platons Lehre v. d. Weltschöpfung*, Marburg, 1900; R. Adamson, *Development of Gr. Philos.*, ed. W. R. Sorley and R. P. Hardie, London, 1908; A. Schwegler, *Handb. of the Hist. of Philos.*, Edin. 1885; F. Ueberweg, *Hist. of Philos.*, vol. i., London, 1872; J. E. Erdmann, *Hist. of Philos.*, do. 1898; A. Harnack, *Hist. of Dogma*, Eng. tr., do. 1894–1899.

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COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY (Hebrew).

—There are generally recognized in the Hebrew Scriptures two formal cosmogonies, the earlier of which is contained in Gn 2, beginning with v.^{4}, or rather v.^{5}.

1. Cosmogony of J.—This story, as we have it, belongs to the pre-exilic, historical, Prophetic narrative of the Judæan kingdom (J), which was in course of composition from about the time of Solomon until the middle of the 8th cent. B.C. The cosmogony, as much as we have of it in Gn 2, assumes the world as already existing, and deals only with its preparation for the use of man. With it is connected the story of the Garden of Eden, the Temptation, and the Fall and its consequences. The object is not so much to answer the question, How did the world come into existence? as the questions, Where did man come from? Why does man differ from the beasts? especially, Why does man have a sex consciousness and a sex shame, which the beasts do not have? and, Why must man, who is the crown of creation, toil and labour to get his bread, and to reproduce his kind, by the sweat of his brow and the agony of his body? So far as the nature of man is concerned, this cosmogony, while naively primitive, is full of a childlike wisdom and sweet spirituality, which has commended it to all succeeding ages, and which was doubtless the cause of this part of the J narrative being preserved at a time when the Pentateuch was cast into the present form and prefaced by the great cosmogony of the Priestly Code (Gn 1–2^{4}).

In the cosmogony of Gn 2, the earth is assumed as already in existence, a barren place on which there were no shrubs and no herbs, because Jahweh Elohim had not yet caused rain to fall on it, and because—a charming bucolic touch, characteristic of the anthropomorphism of the whole narrative—there were no men to till the ground. But a fountain[1] went up out of the

[1] אֵד, practically a *ἅπ. λεγ.* (the only other occurrence is Job 36^{27}), rendered in EV 'mist.' LXX has *πηγή*, which, practically, Gunkel follows. This accords with the following narrative, the reference being apparently to the great source out of which came all the rivers of the world. In this narrative the waters

earth and watered all the face of the ground (v.6). Then, out of the dust of the ground, moistened by this water, Jahweh Elohim, like a potter, made man, and, having made him, breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, whereupon man became a living creature. And, because he was made out of the ground (*'ădāmā*), therefore he was called 'man' (*'ādām*). Then Jahweh Elohim planted a garden in Eden, far away to the east, and caused all sorts of beautiful trees and goodly fruits to grow there, and the tree of life and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Through the garden, coming from the fountain which connected with the waters beneath the earth, flowed a great stream, watering the garden and dividing, as it left it, into the four great rivers of the world—Pishon, Gihon, Tigris, and Euphrates.

Jahweh Elohim put man in His garden to till it and guard it, and permitted him to eat of all the trees in the garden, except only of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Then, seeing that the man was alone, He planned to give him a helpmeet, and formed all the beasts and birds and brought them to man, who named them. But among them was found no mate for man. Then Jahweh Elohim caused man to fall into a profound sleep, and, taking one of his ribs, clothed it with flesh and made out of it woman; and her the man at once recognized as his mate, bone of his bone and flesh of his flesh. Woman (*'ishshā*) was she called, because derived from man (*'ish*); therefore a man leaves his father and his mother and cleaves to his wife, and they become (literally, by physical union) one flesh. And the two of them, the man and his wife, were naked, and were not ashamed.[1]

The story here told is in many of its particulars identical with the cosmogonies and cosmologies which we meet elsewhere. The thought is world thought, the out-thinking of primitive man almost anywhere. When he asks himself the question, Of what is man created? the natural answer is: Dead, he returns to dust; therefore, out of dust he came; and so, as the potter makes vessels out of clay (dust mixed with water), God made man. So breath, which is wind (a part of God's breath), is the element of life; for, if the wind or breath goes out of a man, he is dead. So, again, the relation of name to thing, which plays so important a part in this cosmogony, is not characteristic of any one people, but is a very wide-spread conception of primitive men. Name and thing are one. To know the name is to know the essence of the thing; and to know is to have power over—the utterance by Adam of the names of the beasts put those beasts in subjection to him who had given them their names. The serious plays upon words —*'ădāmā* and *'ādām*, *'ish* and *'ishshā*—are based upon the same theory of the identity of name and thing. Of course, this assumes that the primitive language was Hebrew, in accordance with the universal belief of primitive peoples that their own language was spoken by God Himself. The story of the origin of mankind, told in the person of a being bearing the name 'Man,' is common also to various national cosmological myths. The same is true of the relation of man and woman here described, and, to a considerable extent, of the garden of God in which man was placed.

But, while much in the story may be classed as universal primitive thought, there are also certain ear-marks which unmistakably indicate a Bab. connexion for at least some of the fundamental thoughts of our tale.

The park or garden which God plants, and in which He sets the man whom He creates, is far off, in some remote land away to the east. This is the case also with the Egyptian paradise; but, when we note the name Eden, apparently the Bab. *edinu*, 'plain,' for the garden, and the names of the rivers which have their source in it, we are obliged to recognize the influence of Bab. thought. The garden, it is true, is not in Babylonia, yet it lies in the region out of which the rivers of Babylonia take their origin. It is a plain on the top of the mysterious mountain of the north, where, in Bab. thought, the gods had their abode.[1] Probably also the fourfold number of the rivers connects itself with those representations which we find in early Bab. art of a four-divided stream, all the rivers of the earth pouring out from one great fountain connecting with the great deep, the waters beneath the earth. In the relation of man to the beasts, before woman was created, there is also at least a suggestion of resemblance to the story of the wild primitive man, Eabani, in the Bab. Gilgamesh legend. Eabani was made out of clay by the goddess Ishtar, in whom is the womb of life. At the outset he consorted with the beasts of the field. 'He ate grass with the gazelles, he drank water with the cattle of the field, he amused himself with the animals of the water.' Out of this condition he was raised to true manhood by entering into relation with a woman, a priestess of Ishtar, who came to entice him. It was by finding a mate in her that he developed out of a being like the beasts into civilizable man. So, apparently, in the thought of the Heb. story, Adam was at first like Eabani, but no true mate was found for him among the beasts of the field. His manhood required a helpmeet of his own kind, bone of his bone, flesh of his flesh. Perhaps another Bab. element is the eating of the tree of life, which appears in the sequel of this story, the Fall of Man (Gn 3). This bears a certain resemblance to the Adapa myth, of which a copy was found among the Tell el-Amarna tablets. The cherubim also which God placed eastward of the Garden of Eden, appear to be of Bab. origin. The peculiar emphasis laid upon Assyria in the geography of the Garden of Eden, and apparently on a very early Assyria, when Ashur, and not Calah or Nineveh, was the capital of Assyria, when, in fact, the city of Ashur was Assyria (for the Tigris is here made to flow to the east of Assyria), leads one to ask whether the Bab. elements in this story were not largely, or in some part, mediated through Upper Mesopotamia, with which the ancestry of Israel was connected by a very strong tradition. Cf., further, COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY (Bab.).

But while the cosmogony of this story has evident connexions with Bab. thought, such connexions are ancient and remote. The characteristic colouring is evidently Palestinian. It is the native of a *b^e'ûlāh* land, a land of the *ba'al*, like Palestine (where fertility comes directly from the rain sent down from heaven), not the native of a land like Babylonia (where fertility depends on the overflowing of the rivers), who gives us in Gn 2 the picture of the barrenness of the world before Jahweh Elohim sent rain and man tilled the ground. It is worthy of note that similarly, in the J version of the Flood story, the Flood was caused by the rain which Jahweh sent from heaven, not by the breaking out also of the waters of the abyss beneath.[2]

Another incidental evidence of the antiquity of the J cosmogony, in addition to the allusion to Assyria, is the relation of man to woman. It is not the woman who leaves father and mother to cleave to the man, but the man who leaves father and mother to cleave to his wife—an apparent survival of the old matriarchy, of which we also have an example in the Samson story, where the woman remains with her tribe or clan or family, and is visited by the man (Jg 15[1]).

In general, we may say of the cosmogony contained in Gn 2 that it is based upon a primitive folklore developed in Palestine, going back to a very great antiquity, into which have been absorbed, at some time or another, by an indirect process, some elements of Bab. myth and legend, possibly coming through the Mesopotamian region, with which, according to tradition, the Israelitic ancestors were closely connected. In the form in which it has come down to us, it has been thoroughly Hebraized, above all in the monotheism of its conceptions. The Creation is due to Jahweh only. There is no other God mentioned. He is Elohim (God), albeit He is conceived of in a most anthropomorphic fashion. Growing upon Canaanite soil, rooting in the remote past, utilizing in its composition Bab.

beneath the earth are assumed; it is only with the rain, which comes from above, from Jahweh Elohim, that we are concerned. Cf. Skinner, *ad loc.*

[1] This story is a man's story, *homo sexualis*. In general it is an interesting example of the methods of early thought. Man measures the universe by himself. He explains the relations of all about him by what he knows of himself. Woman depends upon man, and woman was made for man. She is a subordinate but very intimate part of himself. The rib is chosen for the material of her construction because ribs are relatively numerous, and therefore superfluous, in man's composition, while at the same time a rib belongs so much to the inward part of man, so to speak, as to establish by its use in the construction of woman the most intimate relation with himself.

[1] In the most original Heb. traditions the abode of God (Jahu) was in the south, in Sinai, or Horeb (cf. *e.g.* Jg 5[5], Ex 19[11]); but, by a borrowing apparently from Can. traditions (ultimately derived, probably, from Babylonia), it is also placed in the mountain of the north (cf. Ps 46, Ezk 1), as is the account of the Deluge (Gn 7 ff.).

[2] Cf., for the latter, the P version of the Flood story (Gn 7[11]).

material indirectly derived, it shows, in the last stages of its development, the high, spiritual thought of the Prophetic narrators of the 9th and 8th cent. B.C., who paved the way for the great writing prophets of the succeeding centuries.

The story was evidently popular among the Hebrews, not on the side of what may be properly called its cosmogony, but for its account of the Garden of God in Eden and the Fall of man, which we find particularly used in later literature in the Book of Ezekiel (cf., for instance, ch. 28, and the other chapters dealing with the fall of Tyre). It is this element also which has profoundly influenced Christian thought. The cosmogony proper is negligible in its influence on later thought, and is manifestly in itself very incomplete.

2. Cosmogonic myths in Hebrew literature.—A more complete and more systematic cosmogony is contained in Gn 1. The composition of this chapter dates probably from the early post-exilic period, but it is founded on old myths, which appear in much older passages, and which display a striking similarity to the cosmogonic myths of Babylonia. Some of these passages it is worth while to consider before we analyze the more systematic and elaborate cosmogony of Gn 1.

Ps 89^{7-14} is an old passage, of Galilæan origin (as is shown clearly by the use, in v.^{12}, of Tabor and Hermon as landmarks of north and south), now forming part of a later Psalm. This is one of those Psalms whose words imply a polytheistic conception: 'Who among the clouds is like unto Jahweh, is equal to Jahweh among the sons of the gods?' Jahweh is described as ruling the waves of the sea, stilling the tumult of its billows. He has smitten and contemptuously treated Rahab. With His strong arm He has scattered His foes. This is referred to as a part of the Creation work by which He founded the heavens and the earth, the world and its fullness, Creation being depicted as connected with a battle of Jahweh against some monster, here called Rahab, and its allies, who are foes of God or of the gods.

Ps 74^{12-17} is similarly an ancient passage, apparently of north Israelitic origin,[1] in a Psalm which, in its later form, is Maccabæan. Here God is described as having, in olden time, done wonderful works in the midst of the earth. He divided the sea by His strength, He smote the heads of dragons or sea-monsters on the waters, He crushed the heads of Leviathan and gave him for food to the jackals—a more specific note of that contemptuous treatment to which there is reference in Ps 89. That this is part of a Creation-myth is shown by the following description, where, as the result of this battle with the sea-dragons and Leviathan, God digs out the fountains and the valleys in which their waters run, dries up the primitive rivers, forms night and day, moon and sun, establishes the boundaries of the earth, etc.

The Book of Job, while itself of relatively late origin, is notably full of old traits. In it we find a number of references to mythical monsters, with whom God contended in connexion with the creation of the world. Of these the most noteworthy perhaps is Job $26^{12f.}$:

> 'With his strength he troubled the sea,
> And with his skill he pierced Rahab.
> His wind spread out heaven,
> His hand slew flying serpent.'

We have here two monsters—Rahab (connected with the sea) and flying serpent (connected with the heavens). The battle with the sea, indicated in the first line, is connected with the piercing of Rahab; and bound up with this is the spreading out of heaven by His wind, and the slaughter, apparently in heaven, of another monster.

Chapters 40 and 41 deal much more fully with two monsters, here, however, differently named—Behemoth, whose home is on the dry land, and the much more dreadful Leviathan, which inhabits the deep. These monsters were evidently well known in Heb. tradition of a later date. Thus, in 2 Es 6^{49-52} we have a description of two living creatures which God preserved on the fifth day of creation—Behemoth and Leviathan—to the former of whom He gave as his habitation a part of the dry land whereon are a thousand hills, while to the latter He gave that seventh part of the earth occupied by the sea. In Enoch 60^{7-9} we find the same two monsters, with the further note that Behemoth, who occupies the barren waste, is a male, while Leviathan, the monster of the abyss, over the source of the waters, is a female. Enoch 54^{8} corresponds somewhat more closely with the account of the two animals in Job, in that it describes the water which is above the heavens as male, and the water which is under the earth as female. In Job 7^{12} and 9^{13} we have incidental references to a sea-monster of the deep called in one place 'dragon,' תַּנִּין,[1] and in the other Rahab,[2] which, with its allies, has been overcome by God and imprisoned by Him. In ch. 38 there is no mention of the monsters, but of a struggle of God with the deep itself (v.$^{7f.}$): 'When the morning stars sang together, and all the sons of God shouted for joy: when God shut up the sea with doors, fastening it in with bars and gates.' According to the cosmogonic ideas of this book, 'God spread out the sky, strong as a molten mirror' (37^{18}); this rests upon pillars (26^{11}), and above it are the waters held up by the clouds (v.^{8}): the earth rests upon a chaos of waters or a great sea (v.^{7}); in the bowels of the earth is Sheol or Abaddon (v.^{6}). Waters are closely connected with darkness, and both those above and those below the earth form the habitation of monsters.

Abundant other references, early and late, show this to be certainly a very wide-spread view of the origin of the world among the Hebrews and later Jews. There are, however, slight variants of this general view, and the monsters of the deep are called by different names. The deep itself and the chaos to which the original deep belonged are designated sometimes merely by words expressing the sea, at other times by more technical titles; and the same is true of the monsters of chaos or the deep.

The ancient myth is applied also to historical events, very much as we may find parts of the *Nibelungenlied* mixed up with actual historical events of mediæval history, or in Babylonian literature events of the history of Erech combined with the Epic of Gilgamesh.[3] In Is 51^{9} the delivery from Egypt is described in terms of the old cosmogonic myth: 'The arm of Jahweh cut Rahab in pieces, pierced the dragon.' In Is 30^{7} Egypt is called Rahab because 'she helpeth in vain.' In Ps 87^{4} and elsewhere we find the same use. The myth is also applied eschatologically. As God once created the earth after destroying the monsters of chaos, so He shall again, out of a world reduced to chaos because of the wickedness of man, re-create a new earth and a new heaven

[1] Cf., among other things, the almost exclusive reference in the Asaph Psalter to Jacob, Joseph, and Benjamin, and the use of Elohim instead of Jahweh—differentiating this collection, or rather these collections, from the first book of Psalms, precisely as E is differentiated from J in the Pentateuch.

[1] See also Ezk 29^{3-6a}, Ps-Sol 2^{28b-34}. In Ezekiel the dragon-myth is used in describing the fate of Egypt, and in the Psalms of Solomon, of Pompey; but in both cases the ancient myth is clearly in mind.

[2] In Ps $40^{5[4]}$ the plural of this, *rᵉhābîm*, appears to mean 'false gods'; and *tōhû* is used in the same sense in 1 S 12^{21} and Is 41^{29}.

[3] Folk-lore frequently exhibits this phenomenon. So, for instance, in the Wendish Spreewald one finds old fairy tales, identical with those collected by Grimm, told about Frederick the Great, Ziethen, and others of the same period.

by the same means (cf. the late Isaianic Apocalypse, Is 24–27). Here, however, we have (27^{1}) three monsters: Leviathan the swift serpent or flying serpent (which appears to be alluded to in Job 3^{8}, inhabiting the waters above the firmament and causing the eclipse); Leviathan the crooked serpent, which is the sea encircling the earth; and the dragon in the depths of the sea, which is the serpent of Am 9^{3}.

In a somewhat similar picture of the reduction of the earth to chaos through the wrath of God, in Jer 4$^{23ff.}$, birds, men, and beasts are destroyed; mountains and hills lose their solidity and shake to and fro; the light of the heavens is turned into darkness; and the earth becomes waste and void—*tōhû* and *bōhû*—the technical words for 'chaos' used in Gn 1^{2}.

Out of these various references we may reconstruct the general cosmogonic conception of the Hebrews: first, a condition of chaos and darkness, a waste of waters, inhabited by monstrous and noxious forms; then a battle of Jahweh, with the approval and rejoicing of the gods (divine or semi-divine beings, stars, etc.), against the deep and the monsters of chaos, in which in some way He uses the wind. By means of this He spreads out a firmament above, resting upon pillars, provided with windows,[1] through which the waters above may be let down upon the earth. Beneath, upon the great void, He spreads the earth, a dwelling-place for living things, under which is the sea or abyss (*tehôm*).[2] In this abyss, as also in the heights above, still dwell great monsters, whom the Lord has preserved there, whom no other than He can control, and who are dangerous and noxious to men and to the works of men.

This was not only the cosmogonic thought of the Hebrews; it also constituted an element of their religion, and was represented in their ritual and religious paraphernalia. So, in the temple of Solomon was a great laver, the so-called 'sea,' representing the *t*ᵉ*hôm*;[3] and on the candlesticks of Herod's temple, as represented on Titus' Arch at Rome, are apparently pictured the monsters of that *t*ᵉ*hôm* which Jahweh had overcome.[4]

This cosmogony clearly is closely related to that of Babylonia, where we have the same contest of Marduk (acting for the other gods, whom he thereby largely supplants) with a great female monster, *Tiamāt*,[5] which is by root the same as the Heb. *t*ᵉ*hôm*. This monster he splits in two, after inflating her with a great wind. He reduces her various allies to submission, and, after treating her corpse with contumely, he divides it into two parts, out of one of which he makes the heaven, and out of the other the earth, the waters being thus separated into two great seas, the one above the firmament of heaven and the other beneath the earth.

3. Systematized cosmogony of the Priestly Code.—The Bab. cosmogony, as we know it in the cuneiform texts, is contained in seven tablets. Similarly the systematized cosmogony of the Heb. Priestly Code (Gn 1–2^{4}), which formulates and develops in a scientific and exact manner the popular belief, is divided into seven days.

This cosmogony commences with the description of a condition where the earth was *tōhû* and *bōhû* (*i.e.* chaos)—two words evidently handed down from antiquity. This chaotic condition is further described as 'darkness upon the face of *t*ᵉ*hôm*.' *T*ᵉ*hôm*, as already stated, is radically identical with the Bab. *Tiamāt* (here used without the article), and is evidently, like *tōhû* and *bōhû*, a technical term of the cosmogonic myth. Following this description of the condition of darkness, chaos, and enormity, the narrative proceeds: 'The wind of God was rushing upon the face of the waters.'[1] Here perhaps we have a remnant of the myth which represents Marduk using the wind as his weapon against Tiamāt.

Having thus condensed the mythical material, which bulks so largely in the Bab. story, and which evidently played an equally important part in the common Jewish cosmogony, and having altogether eliminated its polytheism, the Priestly narrator then proceeds on a higher plane to describe Creation as a result of seven utterances of God. The order of these creative utterances may be supposed to coincide in general with that of the Bab. seven tablets, although this cannot be stated certainly, owing to the fragmentary condition of those tablets.

First came light; second, the firmament in the midst of the waters, to divide the waters beneath from the waters above; third, the separation of dry land and the springing of verdure, trees, and the like upon the earth; fourth, the creation of sun, moon, and stars, which are set in the heavens, both to give light and to rule the day and the night—the latter, perhaps, containing a trace of the polytheistic conception of the old astral worship, which it is intended to correct by stating that these rulers of day and night are creations of God; fifth, the creatures of the sea and the birds of the air, both of them created out of water, among which it is noteworthy that the writer recognizes the continued existence of the great sea-monsters, dragons, serpents, etc., of the popular belief (v.^{21}), included in Job, Enoch, and Esdras, under the titles Behemoth and Leviathan. The sixth day covers the creation of the creatures of the earth and of man. In the note of the creation of man (v.^{26}) we have a remnant of the more primitive anthropomorphic conception of God, of which the writer could not readily divest himself, in the statement that man was made in the image of God; and perhaps also an echo of the earlier polytheism in the words put in the mouth of Elohim: 'Let *us* make man in *our* image.' Not that the writer means to speak of more than one God of Israel, but he cannot yet altogether divest himself of the thought of a plurality of gods in human shape. The resting of God on the seventh day, and the establishment in connexion with that of an eternal Sabbath, are peculiarly Hebrew; for, although a rudimentary Sabbath existed among the Babylonians, it played no important part in Bab. religion or mythology. The seventh tablet of the Babylonian Creation-series, with which in Hebrew corresponds the establishment of the Sabbath as a part of Creation itself, contains a hymn of praise to Marduk as the creator.

The question arises, To what extent was this cosmogony based on Bab. ideas? We have already seen that, in general, it is a statement, in precise, scientific, monotheistic, and unmythological form, of cosmogonic views prevailing among the people of Israel from an early period. Certain resemblances have also been pointed out between those cosmogonic myths and the cosmogonic myths of the Babylonians. It would seem that at some early period Bab. cosmogony became known to the people of Palestine. The general view at present is that, in some form, locally modified, the Bab. cosmogony became the common property of Palestine and surrounding regions during the centuries of predominating Bab. influence in the West (*c.* 2000 B.C.), and that the Hebrews adopted that cosmogony, in whole or in part, gradually modifying it to fit into their religion,[2] eliminating the polytheistic and grosser traits, and spiritualizing and rationalizing the residue. The cosmogonic myth, accordingly, pursued the same course

[1] Cf. Gn 7^{11}, 2 K 7$^{2.19}$, Ps 78^{23}.

[2] Gn 7^{11} 49^{25}, Dt 33^{13}, Ps 42^{7} 78^{15}, Pr 3^{20}.

[3] 1 K 7^{23}, interpreted by comparison with Bab. use.

[4] Cf. the similar use in Bab. temples.

[5] In the Bab. myth we have also *apsu*, 'sea,' as a technical term or name. At least once in Hebrew (Is 40^{17}) the corresponding root אפס has the same sense.

[1] Commonly rendered 'the spirit of God was brooding,' etc. This rendering of the Heb. מְרַחֶפֶת is suggested by a supposed connexion with an Aram. root. In Hebrew it occurs elsewhere only in Dt 32^{11}, in a description of the vulture teaching its young to fly, where it has been translated 'hovering.' This is manifestly incorrect (but see Skinner on Gn 1^{2}). The parent birds do not hover over the young when turning them out of the nest to fly for themselves, but make rushes at them, and away from them. The LXX has preserved the correct tr. of the word מְרַחֶפֶת of Gn 1^{2}, viz. ἐπεφέρετο, 'was rushing upon.' This agrees with other references in Heb. literature to the use by God of wind in creation (see above), and also agrees with the Bab. myth.

[2] Unfortunately we lack, up to the present time, a sufficient knowledge of Phœnician cosmogony and the cosmogony of other neighbouring peoples to prove or disprove this theory. True, certain fragments of Phœn. cosmogony have come down to us, claimed to be the relics of the writings of a certain Sanchuniathon; but, in the first place, it is very doubtful whether such a man ever existed, and, in the second place, what has been handed down has reached us in such a form that it is almost impossible to determine its origins and connexions. We do find, however, in Phœn. cosmogony, a creature, *Tauthe*, which is the same as *Tiamāt* and the Heb. *t*ᵉ*hôm*, and a *Bau*, which appears to be the Hebrew *bōhû*; to that extent Phœn. remains may be said to support this hypothesis.

as almost everything else in Hebrew ritual and religion. The cosmogony in Gn 1 represents the final stage of its development, when the effort was made to rid it altogether of its grosser and polytheistic elements, to spiritualize it, and to fit it into the new scheme of the purified and reformed religion of Israel, which the priestly schools of the Captivity sought to establish. The final author may possibly have been affected directly by Bab. models to the extent that he adopted from the seven tablets his arrangement by seven days; but even this seems improbable, for the seven-day system was already in existence in Israel, and constituted an integral part of its religion. The Bab. seven tablets of Creation were ancient. Their 'sevenness' is an element which would naturally have impressed any people, but especially one regarding the number seven as holy; and, while there is no other evidence in the Biblical passages, indicating acquaintance with the cosmogonic myth, of knowledge of this 'sevenness,' it nevertheless seems more probable that it formed part of the popular scheme of cosmogony,[1] even though the events of the days of Creation may not coincide altogether with the order of events in the Bab. tablets, than that it was borrowed by the Priestly Code from the Babylonians. The author of the Priestly Code cosmogony was concerned rather with those things which differentiate the Heb. from the Bab. versions of the cosmogony. And, indeed, the difference between the two is far more striking than the resemblance. It is wonderful how out of the fantastical, puerile, and gross fancies of the Bab. original there has been developed so sane, so lofty, and so spiritual a system of cosmogony as that contained in Gn 1–2^4.

4. Cosmogony of J compared with popular cosmogony and cosmogony of P.—How does it happen that two cosmogonies so radically different in conception continued to exist side by side? As already pointed out, ch. 2 deals, not with the creation of the world, but with the problems of man. It finds him on the barren hills of Judæa. It does not concern itself with their creation, but with the manner in which they are made habitable, and the problems of the men who inhabited them, who had been driven out, for their sins, from the beautiful Garden of God in the fertile far east, to live on, and to till, this land of thorns and thistles. Had the narrator been asked how the dry land, the heavens, etc., came into existence, he would doubtless, incompatible as the two things seem to us, have told of a contest of Jahweh with chaos and the monsters of the deep, and the formation of an earth resting on the great deep, with the solid firmament of heaven above, and the waters still above that—substantially the scheme described in Gn 1, though not in the same systematized and highly developed form. Theoretically he believed in a deep beneath the earth, as is shown in the fountain from which a stream came out and watered the Garden of God, being the source of all the rivers of the world. But practically this deep was negligible in Judæa, where one must look to Jahweh for water from heaven; and so even in the Flood-story of J the water comes down only from above.

5. The highest and final Hebrew thought concerning Creation.—The cosmogony of Gn 1–2^4, lofty as it is in its monotheistic conception of the power of God, did not reach the highest limits of Hebrew thought. Hampered by the old myths, it stood perilously near dualism in reckoning chaos, darkness, and the deep as existing, independently of God, from eternity. There were men of the same period, but of a different school of thought, with prophetic vision, and a higher, less hampered spirituality, who had perceived and were teaching a still higher thought, namely, that God was the Creator of darkness as well as of light, of chaos as well as of order, of evil as well as of good. Deutero-Isaiah was familiar, as we have seen, with the popular cosmogonic myths, and apparently also with the more formal cosmogony ultimately formulated in Gn 1–2^4; but its fundamental conception of the opposition of chaos, darkness, and the deep to God he utterly rejects. 'I am Jahweh, and there is none else, forming light and creating darkness, making prosperity and creating evil' (Is $45^{6f.}$). This is the highest expression of the creative thought in the Old Testament. In Pr 8^{23-31} Creation is an expression of the wisdom of God, which is almost hypostatized. In some of the late Psalms we have very beautiful and spiritual conceptions of Creation, especially in Ps 104,[1] but in principle these are only poetic liberties with the cosmogony of Gn 1. More and more this cosmogony became an essential part of the religion of the Jews, on which Judaism and Christianity, almost up to the present time, have founded literally their conception of the creation of the world. Along with this also some of the old mythological conceptions continued to linger on.[2] Indeed, there is nothing in Gn 1 to forbid them, and, as we have seen, the writer of v.[21] evidently himself believed in the existence of the mythical monsters of the deep. What part these played in later Judaism one may see from the Book of Esdras and from Enoch, which have already been quoted, and finally even from the Apocalypse in the New Testament, many of the images and concepts in which, particularly in chs. 12, 13, 17, 21, reflect the ancient mythology of the battle of the representative of the gods with the dragons and monsters of chaos and the deep.

LITERATURE.—The OT commentaries, especially those of Delitzsch (Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1888–89), Dillmann, (Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1897), Holzinger (Freiburg, 1898), Gunkel [2] (Göttingen, 1902), Driver [7] (London, 1909), Ayles (New York, 1904), and Skinner (Edinburgh, 1910), on *Genesis*; A. B. Davidson (London, 1862), Dillmann [4] (Leipzig, 1891), Budde (Göttingen, 1896), and Duhm (Freiburg, 1897), on *Job*; Cheyne [3] (London, 1886), Dillmann-Kittel (Leipzig, 1898), Marti (Tübingen, 1900), and Duhm [2] (Göttingen, 1902), on *Isaiah*; Bertholet (Freiburg, 1897) and Kraetzschmar (Göttingen, 1900), on *Ezekiel*. Cf. also artt. 'Cosmogony,' 'Rahab,' 'Sea-monster,' in *HDB*; 'Behemoth and Leviathan' and 'Dragon,' in *EBi*; H. Gunkel, *Schöpfung u. Chaos*, Gött. 1895, esp. pp. 29–99; F. Weber, *Jüd. Theol.*[2], Leipz. 1897, pp. 160, 202, 402, 404; K. Budde, *Bibl. Urgeschichte*, Giessen, 1883; W. Baudissin, *Stud. z. sem. Religionsgesch.*, Leipz. 1876–78; H. Gressmann, *Altorient. Texte u. Bilder z. AT*, Tüb. 1909; M. J. Lagrange, *Études sur les rel. sém.*[2], Paris, 1905; J. P. Peters, *Early Heb. Story*, London, 1904.

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COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY (Indian).—Cosmological speculations were, in India as elsewhere, the first manifestation of philosophical thought; they are already met with in the Rigveda, in single verses as well as in entire hymns. The basis of these speculations, in the Vedic period, was not a generally adopted theory or mythological conception as to the origin of the world; widely differing ideas about this problem seem to have been current, which the more philosophically minded poets developed and combined. There is a kind of progress from crude and unconnected notions to more refined ideas and broader views; but this development did not lead to a well-established cosmogony such as we find in the first chapter of Genesis. A similar variety of opinion prevailed also in the period of the Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads, though there is an apparent tendency towards closer agreement. Uniformity, however, was never

[1] Cf., for instance, the form of the Fourth Commandment in Ex 20, which, however far removed from the form of the original 'Word,' is at least much earlier than the Priestly Code.

[1] Cf. also Ps $33^{6f.}$.

[2] Ps 148^7.

achieved, even in the Purāṇas; for all statements, however contradictory, contained in the revealed literature were regarded as truth, and might be reproduced by later writers. Cosmography, on the other hand, had another fate. Different writers of the same period are much more nearly at one regarding the plan and structure of the Universe, at least in its main outlines, than regarding its origin and development; but it goes without saying that both sets of ideas—cosmogonic as well as cosmographic—are equally fanciful, and lack the basis of well-ascertained facts.

1. Vedic period.—The world, according to Vedic notions, consists of three parts—earth, air, and sky, or heaven. But, when the idea of 'Universe' is to be expressed, the phrase most commonly used is 'heaven and earth.' Both Heaven and Earth are regarded as gods and as the parents of gods (*deva-putra*), even although they are said to have been generated by gods. Sometimes one god,—Indra, or Agni, or Rudra, or Soma,—sometimes all the gods together, are said to have generated or created heaven and earth, the whole world; and the act of creating is metaphorically expressed as building, sacrificing, or weaving. That heaven and earth should be parents of the gods, and at the same time have been generated by them, is a downright self-contradiction; but it seems to have only enhanced the mystery of this conception without lessening its value, since it recurs even in advanced speculation. It is avoided in the declaration that mother Aditi is everything, and brings forth everything by and from herself, though in another place it is said that Aditi brought forth Dakṣa, and Dakṣa generated Aditi. Here Aditi is apparently a mythological expression for the female principle in creation, and Dakṣa for the male principle or creative force. The latter is more directly called Puruṣa, man or male spirit, and is conceived as the primeval male who is transformed, or who transforms himself, into the world. To him is dedicated the famous *Puruṣasūkta*, Rigveda, x. 90, which recurs, with variations, in the *Atharvaveda* (xix. 6), the *Vājasaneyi Saṁhitā* (xxxi.), and the *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* (iii. 12), and greatly influenced later theosophical speculation. As a specimen of Vedic cosmogony we subjoin Muir's translation of it (from *Orig. Skr. Texts*, v. 368 ff.), though it, or rather the original, contains many obscure points:

'Puruṣa has a thousand heads, a thousand eyes, and a thousand feet. On every side enveloping the earth, he transcended [it] by a space of ten fingers (1). Puruṣa himself is this whole [universe], whatever has been, and whatever shall be. He is also the lord of immortality, since through food he expands (2). Such is his greatness; and Puruṣa is superior to this. And existing things are a quarter (or foot) of him, and that which is immortal in the sky is three-quarters of him (3). With three-quarters Puruṣa mounted upwards. A quarter of him again was produced here below. He then became diffused everywhere among things animate and inanimate (4). From him Virāj was born, and from Virāj, Puruṣa. As soon as he was born, he extended beyond the earth, both behind and before (5). When the gods offered up Puruṣa as a sacrifice, the spring was its clarified butter, summer its fuel, and autumn the [accompanying] oblation (6). This victim, Puruṣa born in the beginning, they immolated on the sacrificial grass; with him as their offering, the gods, Sādhyas, and Riṣis sacrificed (7). From that universal oblation were produced curds and clarified butter. He (Puruṣa) formed those aerial creatures, and the animals, both wild and tame (8). From that universal sacrifice sprang the hymns called Rich and Sāman, the metres, and the Yajus (9). From it were produced horses, and all animals with two rows of teeth, cows, goats, and sheep (10). When they divided Puruṣa, into how many parts did they distribute him? What was his mouth? What were his arms? What were called his thighs and feet? (11). The Brāhmaṇa was his mouth; the Rājanya became his arms; the Vaiśya his thighs; the Śūdra sprang from his feet (12). The moon was produced from his soul; the sun from his eye; Indra and Agni from his mouth; and Vāyu from his breath (13). From his navel came the atmosphere; from his head arose the sky; from his feet came the earth; from his ear the four quarters; so they formed the worlds (14). When the gods, in performing their sacrifice, bound Puruṣa as a victim, there were seven pieces of wood laid for him round the fire, and thrice seven pieces of fuel employed (15). With sacrifice the gods worshipped the sacrifice. These were the first institutions. These great beings attained to the heaven where the gods, the ancient Sādhyas, reside (16).'

The unity of the Godhead as the cause of the world, which is recognized in the above hymn, is directly expressed in others where he is called the One, the Unborn, and placed above all gods. In two hymns (Rigveda, x. 81, 82) he is invoked under the name Viśvakarman, 'All-creator,' who in later mythology became the architect of the gods; in another remarkable hymn (x. 121) the poet inquires who is the first-born god that created the world and upholds it, and in the last verse he invokes him as Prajāpati, 'Lord of the creatures.' Prajāpati later became the current designation of the creator, and synonymous with Brahmā. In connexion with Viśvakarman and Prajāpati occurs what seems to be an ancient mythological conception: the highest god is said to have originated in the primeval waters as the Golden Germ (*Hiraṇyagarbha*) which contained all the gods and the world, or became the creator. This idea was afterwards developed to that of the world-egg, and of Hiraṇyagarbha = Brahmā.

An entirely different treatment of the cosmological problem is contained in the philosophical hymn, Rigveda, x. 129 (cf. *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa*, ii. 8, 9, 3–6), which, for depth of speculation, is one of the most admirable poems of the Rigveda. Notwithstanding the labour of many ingenious interpreters, the meaning of some passages still remains doubtful; yet a general idea of its contents may be got from the subjoined metrical translation of Muir (*op. cit.* v. 356, note 530):

'Then there was neither Aught nor Nought, no air nor sky, beyond.
What covered all? Where rested all? In watery gulf profound?
Nor death was then, nor deathlessness, nor change of night and day.
That One breathed calmly, self-sustained; nought else beyond It lay.
Gloom hid in gloom existed first—one sea, eluding view.
That One, a void in chaos wrapt, by inward fervour grew.
Within It first arose desire, the primal germ of mind,
Which Nothing with Existence links, as sages searching find.
The kindling ray that shot across the dark and drear abyss,—
Was it beneath? or high aloft? What bard can answer this?
There fecundating powers were found, and mighty forces strove,—
A self-supporting mass beneath, and energy above.
Who knows, who ever told, from whence this vast creation rose?
No gods had then been born,—who then can e'er the truth disclose?
Whence sprang this world, and whether framed by hand divine or no,—
Its lord in heaven alone can tell, if even he can show.'

In the *Atharvaveda* we meet with some cosmological hymns, chiefly of the Prajāpati type, in which the highest god and creator is conceived under other forms, and invoked under various names, such as Rohita (the red one), Anaḍvān (the ox), Vaśā (the cow), Kāla (time), Kāma (desire), etc.

LITERATURE.—J. Muir, *Orig. Sanskrit Texts*, London, 1858–72, iv. ch. 1, v. sect. xxi.; L. Scherman, *Philos. Hymnen aus der Rig- und Atharva-veda-Sanhitā*, Strassburg, 1887; P. Deussen, *Allgem. Gesch. der Philosophie*, i.^{2} 1 (Leipzig, 1906); K. F. Geldner, 'Zur Kosmogonie des Rigveda' (*Universitatsschrift zur feierlichen Einführung des Rektors*, Marburg, 1908).

2. Period of the Brāhmaṇas and the Upaniṣads.—The Brāhmaṇas contain many legends about Prajāpati's creating of the world. They usually open with some statement like the following: 'In the beginning was Prajāpati, nothing but Prajāpati; he desired, "May I become many"; he performed austerities, and thereby created these worlds' (either the living beings, or heaven, air, and earth). Besides Prajāpati, other names of the creator are met with: Svayaṁbhū Nārāyaṇa, Svayaṁbhū Brahman, and even Non-Being. The authors of the Brāhmaṇas, being wholly engrossed with liturgy and ceremonial, introduce these legends in order to explain some detail of ritual

or the like; and therefore, after a few general remarks on the creation of the world, they plunge again into ritualistic discussions (see the specimens given by Deussen, *op. cit.* p. 183 ff.). But the little information they give is sufficient to show what were in their time the popular opinions about the origin of the world. Besides the statement that Prajāpati was at the beginning of things, there are others, according to which the waters seem to have been believed to be coeval with him or to have preceded him. Thus it is said (*Taittirīya Saṁhitā*, v. 6, 4, 2, and similarly vii. 1, 5, 1) that in the beginning there was nothing but the waters, and Prajāpati, as wind, went over them or floated on a lotus leaf. Connected with this order of ideas is the now more fully developed conception of the world-egg in *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, xi. 1, 6, 1 ff., which runs thus in Muir's translation (iv. 25):

'In the beginning this universe was water, nothing but water. The waters desired, "How can we be reproduced?" So saying, they toiled, they performed austerity. While they were performing austerity, a golden egg came into existence. Being produced, it then became a year. Wherefore this golden egg floated about for the period of a year. From it in a year a male (*puruṣa*) came into existence, who was Prajāpati. . . . He divided this golden egg. . . . In a year he desired to speak. He uttered "*bhūr*," which became this earth; "*bhuvaḥ*," which became this firmament; and "*svar*," which became that sky. . . . He was born with a life of a thousand years. He perceived the further end of his life as one may perceive the opposite bank of a river. Desiring offspring, he went on worshipping and toiling. He conceived progeny in himself; with his mouth he created the gods,' etc.

We append, for the sake of comparison, another ancient account of the world-egg from the *Chhāndogya Upaniṣad*, iii. 19 (*SBE* i. 54 f.): 'In the beginning this was non-existent. It became existent, it grew. It turned into an egg. The egg lay for the time of a year. The egg broke open. The two halves were one of silver, the other of gold. The silver one became this earth, the golden one the sky, the thick membrane (of the white) the mountains, the thin membrane (of the yolk) the mist with the clouds, the small veins the rivers, the fluid the sea. And what was born from it was Āditya, the sun,' etc.

While the authors of the Brāhmaṇas treated cosmogonic myths from their liturgical point of view, the authors of the Upaniṣads used them in order to illustrate their great philosophical tenet of the transcendent oneness of Brahman and its presence in all created things. Accordingly, they frequently substitute for Prajāpati philosophical abstractions, *e.g.* Brahman, Ātman, Not-Being, or Being, and derive from this first principle the worlds, or the Vedas, or those cosmical and psychical agencies which chiefly engross their speculations. They develop and combine these notions in ever-varying ways; but it is to be understood, or it is expressly stated, that the first principle, after having created things, entered them, so that it is present in them, and, in a way, is identical with, and yet different from, them. It is impossible to reduce the variety of opinion on the origin of the world, contained in the Upaniṣads, to one general idea underlying them; we shall, therefore, illustrate them by some selected specimens.

In *Bṛhad Āraṇyaka*, i. 4, the creation is ascribed to Ātman in the shape of a man (*puruṣa*); as there was nothing but himself, he felt no delight, and therefore 'made this his Self to fall in two, and thence arose husband and wife.' He embraced her, and men were born. In the same way he created all beings that exist in pairs. Then he created other things, developed them by name and form, and 'entered thither, to the very tips of the finger-nails, as a razor might be fitted in a razor-case, or as fire in a fire-place' (*SBE* xv. 87). The account of the world-egg in the *Chhāndogya Upaniṣad* has already been quoted above. Of a less mythological and more speculative character is a passage in *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, ii. 1, according to which from this Self (Brahman) sprang space, from space wind, from wind fire, from fire water, from water earth, from earth food, from food seed, men, and all creatures. An older account in *Chhāndogya Upaniṣad*, vi. 2, 2 f., mentions only three elements; it runs thus (*SBE* i. 93 ff.):

(Uddālaka speaks to Śvetaketu): 'In the beginning, my dear, there was that only which is (τὸ ὄν), one only, without a second. Others say, in the beginning there was that only which is not (τὸ μὴ ὄν), one only, without a second; and from that which is not, that which is was born.' 'But how could it be thus, my dear?' the father continued. 'How could that which is, be born of that which is not? No, my dear, only that which is, was in the beginning, one only, without a second. It thought, "May I be many, may I grow forth." It sent forth fire. That fire thought, "May I be many, may I grow forth." It sent forth water. And therefore whenever anybody anywhere is hot and perspires, water is produced on him from fire alone. Water thought, "May I be many, may I grow forth." It sent forth earth (food). Therefore whenever it rains anywhere, most food is then produced. From water alone is eatable food produced. . . . That Being (*i.e.* that which had produced fire, water, and earth) thought, "Let me now enter those three beings (fire, water, earth) with this living Self (*jīva ātmā*), and let me then reveal (develop) names and forms." Then that Being, having said, "Let me make each of these three tripartite" (so that fire, water, and earth should each have itself for its principal ingredient, besides an admixture of the other two), entered into those three beings with this living self only, and revealed names and forms,' etc.

Here we have the first forerunner of Sāṅkhya ideas, which are more fully developed in the *Śvetāśvatara* and some later Upaniṣads which form the connecting link between this period and that of the Epics and Purāṇas. The genesis of the evolutionary theory of Sāṅkhya can be traced to these Upaniṣads (see Deussen, *op. cit.* i. 2, p. 216); but we pass this subject over here, as it will be treated in § 3.

The notions as to the *structure of the Universe* entertained by the Vedic poets continued to prevail in the period of the Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads, where frequently the Universe is spoken of as tripartite: earth, air, and sky, symbolized in the three 'great utterances' (*vyāhṛtis*), '*bhūr*,' '*bhuvaḥ*,' '*svar*.' In *Aitareya Āraṇyaka*, ii. 4, 1, however, it is said that in the beginning the Self sent forth the worlds of Ambhas, Marīchi, Mara, and Ap. 'That Ambhas (water) is above the heaven, and it is heaven, the support. The Marīchis (the lights) are the sky. The Mara (mortal) is the earth, and the waters under the earth are the Ap world.' Nine or ten worlds are enumerated in *Bṛhad Āraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, iii. 6, viz. the worlds of wind, air, Gandharvas, sun, moon, stars, gods, Indra, Prajāpati, and Brahman;[1] each of these worlds is woven into the next higher one, 'like warp and woof.' More importance is attached to a sevenfold division of the world. This was introduced by the augmentation of the *vyāhṛtis* from three, the usual number, to seven, which number first occurs in *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*, x. 27 f. There we find the following *vyāhṛtis*: '*bhūr*,' '*bhuvaḥ*,' '*svar*,' '*mahar*,' '*janas*,' '*tapas*,' and '*satyam*.' Now, as the three first, the original *vyāhṛtis* ('*bhūr*,' '*bhuvaḥ*,' '*svar*'), symbolically denoted the three worlds (earth, air, sky), so the four added *vyāhṛtis* ('*mahar*,' '*janas*,' '*tapas*,' '*satyam*') became names of still higher worlds. Thus, in some later Upaniṣads seven worlds are mentioned, and in the *Āruṇeya Upaniṣad* these seven worlds ('*bhūr*' . . . '*satyam*') are distinguished from seven nether worlds: Atala, Pātāla, Vitala, Sutala, Rasātala, Mahātala, and Talātala. This last conception of a twice sevenfold world was, in the next period, developed in detail.

3. Period of the Epics and the Purāṇas.—While in the preceding period cosmogonic myths are of an episodical character, the same subject is now treated more at length, and for its own sake. Its importance is fully recognized in the Purāṇas; for cosmogony and secondary creation—*i.e.* the successive destructions and renovations of the world—belong to the five characteristic topics (*pañchalakṣaṇa*) of the Purāṇas.

[1] In the cosmography of the *Yogabhāṣya*, which will be dealt with in § 3, the names of the highest celestial spheres are Māhendra, Prājāpatya, and Brahmā.

The variety of views as to the origin of the world which obtained in the preceding periods still continues; but there is a decided tendency towards introducing some order. The mythological elements of cosmogony are mostly adopted from Vedic literature, and further developed; some are of more modern origin; both elements are variously combined. These mythological elements are as follows: (1) the highest godhead, Brahman or Ātman, identified with Nārāyaṇa, Viṣṇu, Śambhu, etc., according to the sectarian tendency of the author; (2) the primeval waters or darkness; (3) the Puruṣa or Hiraṇyagarbha, who sprang up therein; (4) the world-egg, which brought forth Brahmā (or Prajāpati, Pitāmaha); (5) the lotus, from which sprang Brahmā; the lotus itself came forth either from the waters or from the navel of Viṣṇu; (6) the intermediate creators, or mental sons of Brahmā, numbering seven or eight, Marīchi, etc.; (7) the successive creations and destructions of the world. Though the last-mentioned conception can be traced to a greater antiquity,[1] it was only then developed into a gigantic chronology of the world which reckoned by *kalpas*, *manvantaras*, and *yugas* (see art. AGES OF THE WORLD [Indian]). This system was employed in order to reconcile conflicting views on the origin of the world by assigning some cosmogonic processes to primary, some to secondary, creation, and by distinguishing the several secondary creations. But all these attempts at systematic order resulted in greater confusion, for primary and secondary creations were inextricably mixed up with one another. The framers of cosmogonic systems in the *Mahābhārata* and the Purāṇas freely laid under contribution the Sāṅkhya philosophy; they took over from it the evolutionary theory as taught by Kapila, or they tried to improve on it. As it formed the theoretical foundation of cosmogony, a brief sketch of it must be given here.

According to Sāṅkhya philosophy, there are two principles, entirely independent of each other: (1) the souls, *Puruṣas*; and (2) *Prakṛti*, original nature, or *Pradhāna* (principle, viz. matter), which is made up of the three *guṇas* (secondary elements)—darkness (*tamas*), activity (*rajas*), and goodness (*sattva*)—in the state of equipoise. When this equilibrium is disturbed through the presence (or co-inexistence) of the *Puruṣa*, then from *Prakṛti* is developed *Mahān* or *Buddhi*, the thinking substance, which chiefly consists of *sattva*. From *Buddhi* is developed *Ahaṁkāra*, a substance the function of which is to produce the conceit of individuality. *Ahaṁkāra* produces the mind (*manas*), the five organs of sense (*buddhīndriya*), the five organs of action (*karmendriya*), and the five subtle elements (*tanmātrā*). The last, combining with one another, form the five gross elements (*mahābhūta*): space (or air), fire, wind, water, and earth. These are the twenty-five principles (*tattvas*) of Sāṅkhya. They and the order of their production have been adopted, and adapted to the order of ideas taught in the Upaniṣads, by the authors of those parts of the *Mahābhārata* which deal with the evolution of the world. In trying to reconcile Vedic cosmogony with the principles of Sāṅkhya philosophy, those didactic poets invented various changes of the latter or of their arrangement, though none of these attempts was generally adopted. We shall mention only two points in which the epic writers departed from the Sāṅkhya system and, at the same time, disagreed among themselves. (1) The established belief in a first cause, Brahman or Ātman, was radically opposed to the Sāṅkhya doctrine of two mutually independent principles, *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*; yet both views had to be harmonized somehow. No wonder that opinion differed widely on this head. For instance, Puruṣa is identified with *Pradhāna*, or Hiraṇyagarbha with *Buddhi*, or Brahmā with *Ahaṁkāra*, etc. (2) The Sāṅkhya doctrine, which derived the elements from *Ahaṁkāra* through the interposition of the transcendent *tanmātrās*, seems to have been thought unduly abstruse by those poets who preached to a mixed audience. They therefore usually omit the *tanmātrās*, and make the *mahābhūtas* the direct product of *Ahaṁkāra*, just as in the Upaniṣads the elements are said to have sprung directly from Brahman. It is needless for our purpose to multiply instances; for details the reader is referred to E. Washburn Hopkins' work, *The Great Epic of India*, New York, 1901, in which epic philosophy is exhaustively treated (p. 85 ff.). It must, however, be stated that some scholars, *e.g.* Dahlmann,[1] and Deussen,[2] are of the opinion that epic Sāṅkhya represents a preliminary state of speculation, from which systematic Sāṅkhya was developed.

The cosmological passages of the Great Epic belong to an age of transition, and none of them seems ever to have been generally accepted as an authoritative exposition of the subject. It is, however, different with another document which may roughly be assigned to the same period—the cosmogonic account in the *Laws of Manu*, i. 5 ff.; for it (or parts of it) is quoted in a great number of mediæval works, and it may therefore serve to illustrate the state of the views on cosmogony which prevailed before the time when the Purāṇas took their present form. We quote here Bühler's translation in *SBE* xxv. 2 ff.

'This (universe) existed in the shape of Darkness, unperceived, destitute of distinctive marks, unattainable by reasoning, unknowable, wholly immersed, as it were, in deep sleep (5). Then the divine Self-existent (Svayambhū, himself) indiscernible, (but) making (all) this, the great elements and the rest, discernible, appeared with irresistible (creative) power, dispelling the darkness (6). He who can be perceived by the internal organ (alone), who is subtile, indiscernible, and eternal, who contains all created beings and is inconceivable, shone forth of his own (will) (7). He, desiring to produce beings of many kinds from his own body, first with a thought created the waters, and placed his seed in them (8). That (seed) became a golden egg, in brilliancy equal to the sun; in that (egg) he himself was born as Brahman, the progenitor of the whole world (9). The waters are called *nārāḥ*, (for) the waters are, indeed, the offspring of Nara; as they were his first residence (*ayana*), he thence is named Nārāyaṇa (10). From that (first) cause, which is indiscernible, eternal, and both real and unreal, was produced that male (Puruṣa), who is famed in this world (under the appellation of) Brahman (11). The divine one resided in that egg during a whole year, then he himself by his thought (alone) divided it into two halves (12); and out of those two halves he formed heaven and earth, between them the middle sphere, the eight points of the horizon, and the eternal abode of the waters (13). From himself (*ātmanaḥ*) he also drew forth the mind, which is both real and unreal, likewise from the mind egoism, which possesses the function of self-consciousness (and is) lordly (14); moreover, the great one, the soul, and all (products) affected by the three qualities, and, in their order, the five organs which perceive the objects of sensation (15). But, joining minute particles even of those six, which possess measureless power, with particles of himself, he created all beings (16). Because those six (kinds of) minute particles, which form the (creator's) frame, enter (*ā-śri*) these (creatures), therefore the wise call his frame *śarira* (the body) (17). That the great elements enter, together with their functions and the mind, through its minute parts the framer of all beings, the imperishable one (18). But from minute body (-framing) particles of these seven very powerful Puruṣas springs this (world), the perishable from the imperishable (19). Among them, each (succeeding) element acquires the quality of the preceding one, and whatever place (in the sequence) each of them occupies, even so many qualities it is declared to possess (20). But in the beginning he assigned their several names, actions, and conditions to all (created beings), even according to the words of the Veda (21). He, the Lord, also created the class of the gods, who are endowed with life, and whose nature is action; and the subtile class of the Sādhyas, and the eternal sacrifice (22). But from fire, wind, and the sun he drew forth the threefold eternal Veda, called Rich, Yajus, and Sāman, for the due performance of the sacrifice (23). Time and the divisions of time,

[1] It is found as early as the *Śvetāśvatara and Maitrāyaṇa Upaniṣads*.

[1] *Mahābhārata-Studien*, ii. 'Die Sāṃkhya-Philosophie,' Berlin, 1902.

[2] *Op. cit.* i. 3, p. 18.

the lunar mansions and the planets, the rivers, the oceans, the mountains, plains, and uneven ground (24), austerity, speech, pleasure, desire, and anger, this whole creation he likewise produced, as he desired to call these beings into existence (25). Moreover, in order to distinguish actions, he separated merit from demerit, and he caused the creatures to be affected by the pairs (of opposites), such as pain and pleasure (26). But with the minute perishable particles of the five (elements) which have been mentioned, this whole (world) is framed in due order (27). . . . But for the sake of the prosperity of the worlds, he caused the Brāhmaṇa, the Kṣatriya, the Vaiśya, and the Sūdra to proceed from his mouth, his arms, his thighs, and his feet (31). Dividing his own body, the Lord became half male and half female; with that female he produced Virāj (32).' From Virāj sprang Manu Svāyaṁbhu, who, 'desiring to produce created beings, performed very difficult austerities, and (thereby) called into existence ten great sages, lords of created beings—Marichi, Atri, Aṅgiras, Pulastya, Pulaha, Kratu, Prachetas, Vasiṣṭha, Bhṛgu, and Nārada (34, 35).' These secondary Prajāpatis created the other Manus, gods, demons, men, animals, plants, etc. Next comes the account of the destructions and secondary creations of the world, the days and nights of Brahmā, the system of *yugas* and *manvantaras*, etc. (For details, see AGES OF THE WORLD [Indian].)

A very full discussion of the cosmogony in Manu and its relation to the accounts in other sources will be found in W. Jahn, *Über die kosmogon. Grundanschauungen im Mānava-dharma-śāstram*, Leipzig, 1904.

Cosmogony in the Purāṇas, in the form in which they have come down to us, is, on the whole, a later development of that which we have just described. Here, too, the evolutionary theory of Sāṅkhya has been so modified as to agree with the Vedāntic doctrine about the oneness of Brahman, by assuming that *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* are but two forms of the Supreme Deity, who is identified with one of the popular gods according to the sectarian character of the work. An abstract from the account of the creation in the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*[1] may serve to illustrate Paurānic cosmogony, if we keep in mind that the accounts in other Purāṇas are, on the whole, similar in tenor, though they may vary in details. According to the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, the self-existent Brahman is Vāsudeva; he is originally and essentially but one, still he exists in three successively proceeding forms: Puruṣa, Pradhāna (both unevolved and evolved), and Kāla (time), the latter acting as the bond connecting the former two. When the Supreme Deity enters Puruṣa and Pradhāna (the equilibrium of the three *guṇas*), then Pradhāna produces Mahān or Buddhi, which in its turn produces Ahaṁkāra; and so the five subtle elements, the gross elements, and the eleven organs are produced, much in the same way as is taught in Sāṅkhya philosophy. But the Purāṇas teach, in addition to the evolutionary theory, that each generating principle or element envelops the one generated by it. The gross elements combine into a compact mass, the world-egg (*brāhmāṇḍa*), which rests on the waters, and is surrounded by seven envelopes—water, wind, fire, air, Ahaṁkāra, Buddhi, and Pradhāna. In the world-egg the highest deity, invested with the *guṇa* activity, appeared in the form of Brahmā, and created all things. The same deity in the *guṇa* goodness preserves, as Viṣṇu, the Universe till the end of a *kalpa*, when the same god, in the awful form of Rudra, destroys it. The third chapter of the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* deals with time, the days and nights of Brahmā, the duration of his life, etc. (see AGES OF THE WORLD [Indian]). The next chapter describes how, in the beginning of a *kalpa*, Nārāyaṇa, in the shape of a boar, raised the earth from beneath the waters and created the four lower spheres—earth, sky, heaven, and Maharloka. In the fifth chapter occur some more speculations of Sāṅkhya character, and a description of nine creations:

'The first creation was that of Mahat, or Intellect, which is called the creation of Brahmā. The second was that of the rudimental principles (*tanmātrās*), thence termed elemental creation (*Bhūtasarga*). The third was the modified form of egotism, termed the organic creation or creation of the senses (*Aindriyika*). These three were the Prākṛta creations, the developments of indiscrete nature, preceded by the indiscrete principle. The fourth or fundamental creation (of perceptible things) was that of inanimate bodies. The fifth, the Tairyagyonya creation, was that of animals. The sixth was the Ūrdhvasrotas creation, or that of the divinities. The creation of the Arvāksrotas beings was the seventh, and was that of man. There is an eighth creation, termed Anugraha, which possesses both the qualities of goodness and darkness. Of these creations five are secondary, and three are primary. But there is a ninth, the Kaumāra creation, which is both primary and secondary. These are the nine creations of the great progenitor of all, and, both as primary and secondary, are the radical causes of the world, proceeding from the sovereign creator.'[1]

The seventh chapter relates how Brahmā after the creation of the world created 'other mind-born sons like himself'; about the number and names, however, of these Prajāpatis, or mental sons of Brahmā, the different Purāṇas do not agree.[2] Then Brahmā created Manu Svāyaṁbhuva, for the protection of created beings. Manu's daughter Prasūti was married to one of the Prajāpatis, Dakṣa, who thereby became the ancestor of a great number of divine beings, mostly of an allegorical character, as personified virtues and vices.

The preceding abstracts from the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* give some idea of the heterogeneous character of the cosmogonic theory which henceforth was generally adopted. Mythological and theosophic notions inherited from the Vedic period have been combined with notions of later origin—genealogic legends, the evolutionary system of Sāṅkhya, and the scheme of the Ages of the World—in order to give a rational theory of the origin and development of the world in harmony with the teachings of the Vedas. But the materials proved too refractory, or rather the authors were not bold enough in re-modelling the old traditions; hence their work leaves the impression of disparate parts, ill-combined or only formally united.

The authors of the Purāṇas succeeded better in delineating a plan of the Universe; for the cosmographic notions which are contained in the Vedas, and which have been sketched above under § 1, lent themselves readily to such an undertaking. The Great Epic added little to the old stock of cosmographic ideas, except a detailed description of the earth and some particulars about the hells. There was, indeed, the ancient belief in worlds of Indra, Varuṇa, Vāyu, Agni, Āditya, Yama, etc., but the notions as to the situation of these worlds (except those of Indra and Yama) seem always to have been rather vague, so that the authors of the Purāṇas were not over much prejudiced by tradition in their endeavours to devise a systematic cosmography. The system is practically the same in all Purāṇas; the following description of it is based on the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, while for the discrepancies in details the reader may be referred to Wilson's notes in his translation of the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*.

The whole system of the worlds contained in the world-egg may be divided into three parts in agreement with the current expressions *tribhuvana*, *trailokya*, etc., 'the three worlds.' The middle part, which is, however, many times nearer the base than the top, is formed by the earth, an enormous disk of five hundred millions of *yojanas* in extent; it is encircled by the Lokāloka mountain, and contains the continents and oceans. A description of the earth need not detain us here, as it will be given in the art. GEOGRAPHY (Mythical). Above the earth are the heavens, and below it the nether worlds, or *Pātāla*. But actually the Universe is divided into two parts; for it consists of seven upper regions, the lowest of which is the earth, and of the seven nether regions. Hence frequently fourteen worlds are spoken of. To these two divisions have been added the hells, somewhere in the lowest part of the Universe. The number of

[1] H. H. Wilson, *Vishṇu Purāṇa*, vol. i. (London, 1864).

[1] Wilson, *op. cit.* i. 74 ff.

[2] *Ib.* p. 100, note; cf. the passage from Manu quoted above, verse 34 f.

hells seems originally not to have been fixed (*Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, ii. 6), though Manu (iv. 87) gives their number as twenty-one.[1]

Omitting the hells, there are seven nether worlds (Atala, Vitala, Nitala, Gabhastimat, Mahātala, Sutala, and Pātāla),[2] and the seven upper worlds (Bhūr [the earth], Dyaus, Svar, Mahar, Janas, Tapas, and Satya). Pātāla—for this is also the collective name of the seven nether worlds—extends downwards 70,000 *yojanas* below the surface of the earth, each of its seven regions having a depth of 10,000 *yojanas*. Pātāla is the abode of Nāgas, Daityas, and Dānavas, and it equals the heavens in beauty and magnificence. Below Pātāla is the dragon Śeṣa, who 'bears the entire world like a diadem upon his head, and who is the foundation on which the seven Pātālas rest.' As said above, the hells, or *narakas*, are beneath Pātāla; but their exact situation cannot be made out, because some place them below, some above, the waters which encircle the Universe. The cause of this uncertainty with regard to the hells seems to have been that originally they were not distinguished from the nether worlds. For, as will be seen below (§ 4), the Jains have seven hells instead of seven Pātālas, and find room for the Asuras in caves below the earth and above the first hell, instead of seven Pātālas. The upper regions begin with the terrestrial sphere, *Bhūrloka*; the next is *Bhuvarloka*, or *Dyaus*, which reaches thence to the sun; while from the sun to the pole star extends the *Svarloka*, or the heaven of the gods. These three worlds are destroyed at the end of each *kalpa*. The next higher world, *Maharloka*, is not destroyed, but at the end of the *kalpa* its tenants repair to the next region, the *Janaloka*, the inhabitants of which are Sanandana and other sons of Brahmā. The sixth region is *Tapaloka*, peopled by the Vairāja gods; and above it is the highest region, *Satyaloka* or *Brahmaloka*, the inhabitants of which never know death. It must, however, be stated that the different Purāṇas do not agree regarding the inhabitants of the higher heavens. The distance of these regions from one another increases from below upwards: Maharloka is ten million *yojanas* above the pole star, Janaloka twenty, Tapaloka eighty, and Satyaloka a hundred and twenty, millions of *yojanas* above the next lower region.

A somewhat different description of the Universe is given by Vyāsa in the *Yogabhāṣya*, iii. 26. This account, which may be ascribed to the 7th cent. A.D., is much more detailed than that of the Purāṇas, with which, however, it agrees on the whole. But it has also some curious affinities with the Buddhist description of the world, in proper names as well as in the part played by contemplation. The entire Universe is contained in the world-egg, which is but an infinitesimally small particle of the Pradhāna. It consists of seven regions (*bhūmi*), one above the other. The lowest is *Bhūrloka*, which extends from the lowest hell to the top of mount Meru. The second region, *Antarikṣaloka*, reaches to the pole star. The third is termed *Svar-* or *Māhendraloka*; the fourth *Mahar-* or *Prājāpatyaloka*. The fifth, sixth, and seventh regions, called *Jana-*, *Tapa-*, and *Satyalokas*, form together the tripartite Brāhmaloka. Bhūrloka is subdivided into hells, Pātālas, and earth. At the bottom of Bhūrloka are the seven hells, one above the other. Their names are: Avīchi, Ghana, Salila, Anala, Anila, Ākāśa, and Tamaḥpratiṣṭha; with the exception of Avīchi, a popular name of hell, these hells seem to be identical with the envelopes of the world-egg in the Paurāṇic account. Probably for this reason these six hells each bear another name, as stated by Vyāsa, viz. Mahākāla, Ambarīṣa, Raurava, Mahāraurava, Kālasūtra, and Andhatāmisra. Above the hells are the seven Pātālas: Mahātala, Rasātala, Atala, Sutala, Vitala, Talātala, and Pātāla. Above these seven *bhūmis* is the eighth, the earth, *Vasumatī*, with the seven continents, etc., which may be passed over here.

As to the inhabitants of the seven regions of the Universe, the following notions are found. (1) In the Pātālas, in the oceans and on the mountains of the earth live the following classes of gods (*devanikāyas*): Asuras, Gandharvas, Kinnaras, Kimpuruṣas, Yakṣas, Rākṣasas, Bhūtas, Pretas, Apasmārakas, Apsaras, Brahmarākṣasas, Kūṣmāṇḍas, and Vināyakas; in the continents live gods and men, and on Meru are the parks and palaces of the gods. (2) Antarikṣaloka is the sphere of the celestial bodies. (3) In Māhendra are six classes of gods: Tridaśas, Agniṣvātas, Yāmyas, Tuṣitas, Aparinirmitavaśavartins, and Parinirmitavaśavartins. (4) In Prājāpatya there are five classes of gods: Kumudas, Ribhus, Pratardanas, Añjanābhas, and Prachitābhas. (5) In Janaloka there are four classes: Brahmapurohitas, Brahmakāyikas, Brahmamahākāyikas, and Amaras. (6) In Tapaloka there are three classes: Ābhāsvaras, Mahābhāsvaras, and Satyamahābhāsvaras. (7) In Satyaloka there are four classes: Achyutas, Suddhanivāsas, Satyābhas, and Saṁjñāsaṁjñins. The gods in the regions from Prājāpatya upwards live on contemplation (*dhyānāhāra*); their powers and the duration of their life increase by bounds from below upwards; the gods in Tapaloka are not reborn in a lower sphere, and the four classes of gods in Satyaloka realize the happiness of the four degrees of contemplation respectively—*savitarka*, *savichāra*, *ānandamātra*, and *asmitāmātra-dhyāna*. Cf. art. COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY (Buddhist).

The detailed knowledge of the structure of the Universe was generally believed to have been reached by contemplation; this is expressly stated by Patañjali in *Yogasūtra*, iii. 26, and by the Jain writer Umāsvāti in *Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra*, ix. 37. Notwithstanding, or rather because of, its visionary character, Paurāṇic cosmography became, as it were, an article of faith.[1] The general belief in it was not shaken even by the introduction of scientific astronomy, though the astronomers tried to remodel the traditional cosmography on the basis of their science. The result of this compromise may be seen in the following abstract from the *Sūrya Siddhānta*, xii. 29 ff.:[2]

'This Brahma-egg is hollow; within it is the universe, consisting of earth, sky, etc.; it has the form of a sphere, like a receptacle made of a pair of caldrons (29). A circle within the Brahma-egg is styled the orbit of the ether (*vyoman*); within that is the revolution of the asterisms (*bha*); and likewise, in order, one below the other (30) revolve Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, the sun, Venus, Mercury, and the moon; below, in succession, the Perfected (*siddha*), the Possessors of Knowledge (*vidyādhara*), and the clouds (31). . . . Seven cavities within it, the abodes of serpents (*nāga*) and demons (*asura*), endowed with the savour of heavenly plants, delightful, are the inter-terranean (*pātāla*) earths (35). A collection of manifold jewels, a mountain of gold, is Meru, passing through the middle of the earth-globe, and protruding on either side (36).'

Literature to §§ 2 and 3 has been indicated in the above.

4. Jain cosmography.—According to the Jains, the world is eternal, without beginning or end. They have therefore no cosmogony, but they have a cosmography of their own which differs widely from that of the Brāhmans, especially with regard to the upper spheres or heavens. The Universe takes up only that part of space which, from this

[1] For particulars, see Wilson, *op. cit.* ii. 215, and Hall's note to that passage.

[2] For variations in other Purāṇas, see Wilson, *op. cit.* i. 208.

[1] It is worthy of remark that in these cosmographic systems worlds are assigned to the more ancient gods, viz. Indra, the Prajāpatis, and Brahman, but not to Viṣṇu and Śiva; indeed Viṣṇu's heaven, Vaikuṇṭha, is wanting in those lists of heavens. Apparently the authors of cosmography had not come under the influence of popular Vaiṣṇavism or Śaivism.

[2] Burgess's tr. in *JAOS* vi. 245.

circumstance, is called Lokākāśa; the remaining part, Alokākāśa, is an absolute void and perfectly impenetrable to anything, either matter or souls. The Lokākāśa is coterminous with the two substances Dharma and Adharma, the substrata of motion and rest, which are, therefore, the indispensable conditions of the presence of all existing things. 'The world is figured by the Jainas as a spindle resting on half of another; or, as they describe it, three cups, of which the lowest is inverted; and the uppermost meets at its circumference the middle one. They also represent the world by comparison to a woman with her arms akimbo.'[1] Older, however, is the comparison with a man (*puruṣa*). The disk of the earth is in the lower part of the middle, and forms the waist of the *puruṣa*; below the earth are the hells, and above it the upper regions. The entire world rests on a big layer of 'thick water,' this on one of 'thick wind,' and this again on one of 'thin wind.' The last two layers measure innumerable thousands of *yojanas*. The seven lower regions (*bhūmis*), one below the other, are Ratnaprabhā, Śarkarāprabhā, Vālukāprabhā, Paṅkaprabhā, Dhūmaprabhā, Tamaḥprabhā, and Mahātamaḥprabhā. Another set of names for them is given by Umāsvāti: Dharmā, Vaṃśā, Sailā, Añjanā, Ariṣṭā, Mādhavyā, and Mādhavī (cf. the double set of names for the hells in the *Yogabhāṣya*, above, § 3). These regions contain the hells; the lowest one has but five, while the highest one, Ratnaprabhā, has three millions of hells. Their inhabitants are the damned, *nārakas*, whose stay in hell is not without end, but for fixed periods of time, varying from 10,000 years to 33 oceans of years, when they are re-born in other conditions of life. These regions are separated from each other by layers of 10,000 *yojanas* containing no hells; but in the layer separating Ratnaprabhā from the earth are the dwellings of the Bhavanāvāsin gods; these dwellings are apparently the Jain counterpart of the Brāhmanic Pātālas. Above the seven regions of the hells is the disk of the earth, with its numerous continents in concentric circles separated by rings of oceans (see art. GEOGRAPHY [Mythical]). In the middle of the earth towers Mount Meru, 100,000 *yojanas* high, round which revolve suns, moons, and stars, the Jyotiṣka-gods. Immediately above the top of Mount Meru begins the threefold series of heavenly regions styled Vimānas, and inhabited by the Vaimānika gods. These regions are as follows: (1) *the twelve kalpas*, Saudharma, Aiśāna, Sanatkumāra, Māhendra, Brahmaloka,[2] Lāntaka, Mahāśukra, Sahasrāra, Ānata, Prāṇata, Āraṇa, and Achyuta (the Digambaras add Brahmottara before Lāntaka; Kāpiṣṭha and Śukra after it, and Śatāra after Mahāśukra); (2) *the nine Graiveyakas* (these heavens form the neck [*grīva*] of the man figuring the world; hence their name); (3) *the five Anuttaras*, Vijaya, Vaijayanta, Jayanta, Aparājita, and Sarvārthasiddha. The gods in the Anuttara Vimānas will be re-born no more than twice. It is to be understood that all these twenty-six heavens are one above the other. Above Sarvārthasiddha, at the top of the Universe, is situated Īṣatprāgbhāra, the place where the souls resort on their liberation (*nirvāṇa*). The following description of it is given in the *Uttarādhyayana Sūtra*, xxxvi. 57 ff. (*SBE* xlv. 211 f.):

'Perfected souls are debarred from the non-world (Alōka); they reside on the top of the world; they leave their bodies here (below), and go there, on reaching perfection (57). Twelve *yojanas* above the (Vimāna) Sarvārtha is the place called Īṣatprāgbhāra, which has the form of an umbrella (58). It is forty-five hundred thousand *yojanas* long, and as many broad, and it is somewhat more than three times as many in circumference (59). Its thickness is eight *yojanas*; it is greatest in the middle, and decreases toward the margin, till it is thinner than the wing of a fly (60). This place, by nature pure, consisting of white gold, resembles in form an open umbrella, as has been said by the best of Jinas (61). (Above it) is a pure blessed place (called Sītā), which is white like a conch-shell, the *aṅka*-stone, and *kunda*-flowers; a *yojana* thence is the end of the world (62). The perfected souls penetrate the sixth part of the uppermost *krośa* of the (above-mentioned) *yojana* (63). There at the top of the world reside the blessed perfected souls, rid of all transmigration, and arrived at the excellent state of perfection (64).'

In concluding our exposition of Jain cosmography it may be remarked that the knowledge of it seems always to have been popular among the Jains, for the plan of the Universe as described above is always before the mind of Jain authors, and they presuppose an acquaintance with it on the part of their readers.

LITERATURE.—The above account of Jain cosmography is based chiefly on Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra* (tr. by the present writer in *ZDMG* lx. [Leipzig, 1906]).

H. JACOBI.

COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY (Iranian).—The chief Iranian texts on the creation of the world are *Vendīdād* i. and *Būndahiśn*. Of these the more elaborate is the latter, and according to it both Ormazd and Ahriman have existed from all eternity—a view which is as old as the Gāthās (cf. *Yasna* xxx. 3, which distinctly terms the two spirits 'twins'—*yēmā*—and xlv. 2). The pair are parted by the ether (*vāyu*), and Ormazd dwells in 'endless light,' while his opponent lurks in an abyss of infinite darkness. Ormazd, moreover, was aware, through his omniscience, of the existence of Ahriman, but the evil spirit was ignorant of the higher being until aroused to conflict with him by beholding light. Thereupon, as Ormazd created excellent lands, Ahriman sought to mar his work by bringing into being plagues, moral and physical. Herein the essential dualism of Zoroastrianism finds one of its most important illustrations.

Zoroastrian cosmogony covers a period of 12,000 years, which are divided into four ages of 3,000 years each. The first of these epochs is the age of the spiritual creation, in which the creations remained 'in a spiritual state, so that they were unthinking and unmoving, with intangible bodies' (*Būndahiśn* i. 8; *Selections of Zāṭ-sparam* i. 22). These spiritual creations bear a remarkable analogy to the Platonic 'Ideas,' and Darmesteter has sought (*Le Zend-Avesta* iii., Paris, 1893, pp. li–liii), although without success, to trace an actual connexion between the two. Meanwhile, Ahriman created demons for the overthrow of the creatures of Ormazd, and refused the peace which the celestial being offered him. Thereupon, they agreed to combat for nine thousand years, Ormazd foreknowing that for three thousand years all things would go according to his own will, while in the second three thousand years the two spirits should struggle in bitter conflict, and in the third Ahriman should be utterly put to rout. The second epoch of three thousand years was that of the material creation, the order being, after the Amesha Spentas (*q.v.*), heaven (including the heavenly bodies), water, earth, plants, animals, and man. The third period of three thousand years begins with the eruption of Ahriman into the good creation of Ormazd. The evil spirit spreads disease, devastations, and noxious creatures, throughout the world, harming and defiling water, earth, plants, and fire, in addition to slaying the primeval ox and the primeval man. Finally, however, the demoniac hosts are driven back to hell. The remainder of this period is concerned with the legendary history of the Iranian kings, so that

[1] Colebrooke, *Miscellaneous Essays*, London, 1837, ii. 198.

[2] About the Brahmaloka the following details are given: in it live the Lokāntika gods (who will reach *nirvāṇa* after one re-birth); and round it, in the cardinal and intermediate points of the compass, N.E., E. etc., are situated the Vimānas of the following eight classes of gods: Sārasvatas, Ādityas, Vahnis, Aruṇas, Gardatoyas, Tuṣitas, Avyābādhas, and Ariṣṭas.

neither it nor the final eschatologic period comes under consideration in an outline of the Persian cosmogony.

Throughout the Avesta the creation of all things is ascribed to Ahura Mazda (Ormazd), as in *Yasna* xvi. 1, although a certain amount of creative activity is also attributed to the Amshaspands (*Yasna* lxv. 12; *Visparad* xi. 12; *Yašt* xix. 18). In *Yasna* xxxvii. 1 occurs the striking passage: 'Here, then, we worship Ahura Mazda, who created both kine and holiness, and created water, created both good trees and light, both the earth and all good things' (cf. xliv. 3–5). That this belief was Iranian is shown by the recurrence of similar phraseology in the Old Persian inscriptions, as in NR. a, 1–8: 'A great god is Auramazda, who created this earth, who created yon heaven, who created man, who created peace for man, who made Darius king, the one king of many, the one ruler of many,' although similar phrases are not unknown in Assyrian inscriptions (Gray, *AJSL* xvii. 152).

The creation itself, according to the Parsi *Āfrīn Gahanbār* (tr. by Darmesteter, *op. cit.* pp. 180–187, and edited by him in *Études iran.*, Paris, 1883, ii. 318–333) and the *Būndahišn* xxv. 1 (cf. also the section of the *Great Būndahišn*, tr. by Blochet, *RHR* xxxii. 223), occupied a year. The tradition of a cosmic epoch of 12,000 years, although not mentioned in the extant Avesta, must be of considerable antiquity, for the historian Theopompus, an author of the 4th cent. B.C., says, in a fragment preserved by Plutarch (*de Iside et Osiride*, xlvii.): 'According to the Magi, one of the gods conquers and the other is conquered for three thousand years each; and for another three thousand years they fight and war, and one destroys the works of the other; but finally Hades loses, and mankind shall be blessed, neither needing nourishment nor casting shadows.'[1] The Iranian cosmogony seems to have been geocentric, and, according to *Dāṭistān-ī-Dēnīk* xxxvii. 24, 'the sky is in three thirds, of which the one at the top is joined to the endless light, in which is the constantly-beneficial space; the one at the bottom reached to the gloomy abyss, in which is the fiend full of evil; and one is between those two thirds which are below and above' (cf. *Yašt* xiii. 2). This has led some scholars, notably Spiegel, to seek to find the idea of the cosmic egg in Iran, but of this, as Casartelli has well pointed out, there seems to be little evidence. The question whether the Iranian cosmogony presupposes a creation *ex nihilo* has been much discussed, although it would seem from the phrase in the *Būndahišn* (xxx. 5), 'when they were formed, it was not forming the future out of the past,' that at least in the later development of the religion this doctrine was not unknown. The earlier texts, however, shed little light on this problem, nor do the verbs used of the creative activity of Ormazd (*dā*, 'establish,' *θwares*, 'cut'; *taš*, 'form,' cf. Gr. τέκτων) and Ahriman (*karat*, 'cut') give much aid, although *θwares*, *taš*, and *karat* seem to imply the elaboration of already existing material, while it may be urged that *dā* connotes, at least in some passages, actual creation *ex nihilo*. Equally dubious is the problem of the origin of the Iranian cosmogony. An elaborate comparison has been drawn by Spiegel (*Erânische Alterthumskunde*, i. 449–457) between the Iranian and the Semitic, particularly Hebrew, accounts of the creation of the world; but this is, to say the least, unproven. It is true that, both in Genesis and in the *Būndahišn*, creation occupies six periods, but in the former the epoch is a week of six days, and in the latter a year of six *gāhānbārs*, and the correspondence in the main between the order of the two accounts is a natural sequence of development, and not necessarily due to the borrowing of either from the other. It should also be noted that the Iranian account makes no allowance for the seventh day of the Biblical record, thus further increasing the improbability of borrowing from either side. On the other hand, the division of the earth into seven *karšvars*, or 'zones,' which is mentioned repeatedly in the Avesta (as in *Yasna* lxi. 5; *Yašt* xix. 82), and is as old as the Gāthās (*Yasna* xxxii. 3), is doubtless late Babylonian in origin, especially as the Semitic cosmogony likewise divided the earth into seven zones (*tubuqâti*). This origin of the Iranian *karšvars* seems more probable than the view which equates them with the *dvīpas* ('islands') of Hindu cosmogony, which usually number seven, although they are occasionally regarded as four or thirteen. They are not mentioned, however, before the *Mahābhārata* and the *Purāṇas*, and are thus probably too late to have influenced the Avesta (cf. Muir, *Original Sanskrit Texts*, i.[2] London, 1872, pp. 489–504; and, for the proof of Bab. influence, P. Jensen, *Kosmol. der Babylonier*, Strassburg, 1890, pp. 175–184).

The cosmogony of the Iranians, as outlined in the Avesta and the Pahlavi texts, underwent some slight changes in the course of time as a result of philosophic thought. The reduction of the dualism of the Gāthās—itself, no doubt, a reduction of an earlier polytheism—to a monotheism gave rise to the elaboration of the concept of 'Boundless Time' (*zrvan akarana*), which is hailed as a godling even in the so-called Younger Avesta (*Yasna* lxxii. 10; *Nyāiš* i. 8; *Vendīdād* xix. 13). The Zarvanite sect, which was an important factor in Parsiism as early as the 4th cent. A.D., derived both Ormazd and Ahriman from 'Boundless Time,' making the evil spirit born first in consequence of the doubt of 'Boundless Time,' while Ormazd did not come into being until later, and was long inferior in power to Ahriman. In somewhat similar fashion, the Kaiyomarthians, another Zoroastrian sect, held that Ahriman, the principle of evil, was sprung from Yazdān ('God,' *i.e.* Ormazd) because of his sinful thought, 'if I had an adversary, how would he be fashioned?' (Cf. the account of these sects by al-Shahrastani, tr. Haarbrücker, i., Halle, 1850, pp. 276–280; and see Spiegel, *Erân. Alterthumskunde*, ii. 175–189; Darmesteter, *Ormazd et Ahriman*, Paris, 1877, pp. 314–338.) This extreme unitarian tendency, however, by which evil itself was traced back ultimately to Ormazd, was always rejected by orthodox Zoroastrianism.

LITERATURE.—Spiegel, *Erân. Alterthumskunde*, ii. 141–151 (Leipzig, 1873); Jackson, 'Iran. Religion,' in Geiger-Kuhn's *Grundriss der iran. Philologie*, ii. 668–673 (Strassburg, 1904); Casartelli, *Philosophy of the Mazdayasnian Religion under the Sassanids* (Eng. tr. by Jamasp Asa, Bombay, 1889), pp. 94–128; Lukas, *Die Grundbegriffe in den Kosmogonien der alten Völker* (Leipzig, 1893), pp. 100–138; Söderblom, 'Theopompus and the Avestan Ages of the World,' in *Dastur Hoshang Memorial Vol.* pp. 228–230 (Bombay, 1911).

LOUIS H. GRAY.

COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY (Japanese).—The most ancient and most authentic account of Japanese cosmogony is found in the *Kojiki* ('Records of Ancient Matters,' A.D. 712). The following is the description of the genesis of the universe contained in this valuable text:

'The names of the Deities that became (*i.e.* that were born) in the Plain of High Heaven, when Heaven and Earth began, were Ame-no-mi-naka-nushi-no-kami (the Deity Master-of-the-August-Centre-of-Heaven), next Taka-mi-musu-bi-no-kami (the High-August-Producing-Wondrous-Deity), next Kami-musu-bi-no-kami (the Divine-Producing-Wondrous-Deity). These three Deities were all Deities born alone (*i.e.* spontaneously, without being procreated), and hid their persons (*i.e.* disappeared, by death or otherwise). The names of the Deities that were born next from a thing that sprouted up like unto a reed-shoot when

[1] For the Gr. text, see vol. i. p. 208a, where a different interpretation from the one here given (which agrees independently with that of Lagrange, *RB*, 1904, p. 35) may be found.

the country (*i.e.* the earth), young and like unto floating oil, drifted about medusa-like, were Umashi-ashi-kabi-hiko-ji-no-kami (the Pleasant-Reed-Shoot-Prince-Elder-Deity), next Ame-no-toko-tachi-no-kami (the Deity Standing-Eternally-in-Heaven). These two Deities were likewise born alone, and hid their persons. The five Deities in the above list are separate Heavenly Deities (*i.e.* were separate from those who came into existence afterwards).

'The names of the Deities that were born next were Kuni-no-toko-tachi-no-kami (the Deity Standing-Eternally-on-Earth), next Toyo-kumo-nu-no-kami (the Luxuriant-Integrating-Master-Deity). These two Deities were likewise Deities born alone, and hid their persons. The names of the Deities that were born next were U-hiji-ni-no-kami (the Deity Mud-Earth-Lord), next his younger sister (*i.e.* wife) Su-hiji-ni-no-kami (the Deity Mud-Earth-Lady); next Tsunu-guhi-no-kami (the Germ-Integrating-Deity), next his younger sister Iku-guhi-no-kami (the Life-Integrating-Deity); next Oho-to-no-ji-no-kami (the Deity Elder-of-the-Great-Place), next his younger sister Oho-to-no-be-no-kami (the Deity Elder-Lady-of-the-Great-Place); next Omo-daru-no-kami (the Deity Perfect-Exterior), next his younger sister Aya-kashiko-ne-no-kami (the Deity Oh-Awful-, or Venerable-, Lady); next Izana-gi-no-kami (the Deity the Male-Who-Invites), next his younger sister Izana-mi-no-kami (the Deity the Female-Who-Invites). From the Deity Standing-Eternally-in-Heaven down to the Deity the Female-Who-Invites in the foregoing list are what are termed the Seven Divine Generations. The two solitary Deities above-mentioned are each called one generation: of the succeeding ten Deities each pair of Deities is called a generation' (*Kojiki*, at the beginning of vol. i.; tr. B. H. Chamberlain, ed. 1906, p. 15 f.).

From these very first lines of the sacred account we have before us a genesis that is not lacking in grandeur. The world appears as a nebulous, moving chaos; Divine beings develop in it by spontaneous generation, some being born in the heart of space, others coming from a reed-shoot that has arisen from the mud; while others spring up, at first solitary, then in pairs, following a progress and bearing names that recall in a striking manner our theory of evolution. This rational explanation of the ancient national myth did not escape the Japanese commentators who elucidated these texts in the 18th and 19th centuries.

'The god U-hiji-ni and the goddess Su-hiji-ni,' says Hirata, 'are so called because they contained the germs from which the earth itself was to spring. The god Oho-to-no-ji and the goddess Oho-to-no-be are so called from the primitive appearance of this earth. The god Tsunu-guhi and the goddess Iku-guhi are so called from the common appearance of the earth and the deities when they sprang into existence. The god Omo-daru and the goddess Aya-kashiko-ne are so called from the perfect character of the august persons of these deities. Thus the names of all these gods were given them according to the gradual progress of the creation.'

And, indeed, it cannot be denied that the above-quoted myth conceals under the transparent symbolism of its Divine figures an intellectual effort to find a logical explanation of the genesis of the universe.

To this slender outline of the *Kojiki* we may now add the complementary picture supplied by the *Nihongi* ('Chronicles of Japan,' A.D. 720). This account is less simple, and is permeated by Chinese ideas, which must be eliminated; but, on the other hand, it is also richer in various developments borrowed from other indigenous sources.

'Of old, Heaven and Earth were not yet separated, and the In and Yô not yet divided. They formed a chaotic mass like an egg, which was of obscurely defined limits, and contained germs. The purer and clearer part was thinly diffused and formed Heaven, while the heavier and grosser element settled down and became Earth. The finer element easily became a united body, but the consolidation of the heavy and gross element was accomplished with difficulty. Heaven was therefore formed first, and Earth was established subsequently. Thereafter Divine Beings were produced between them. Hence it is said that, when the world began to be created, the soil of which lands were composed floated about in a manner which might be compared to the floating of a fish sporting on the surface of the water. At this time a certain thing was produced between Heaven and Earth. It was in form like a reed-shoot. Now this became transformed into a god, and was called Kuni-toko-tachi-no-mikoto (the August Standing-Eternally-on-Earth). Next there was Kuni-no-sa-tsuchi-no-mikoto (the August True-Soil-of-the-Country), and next Toyo-kumu-nu-no-mikoto (the August Luxuriant-Integrating-Master), in all three Deities. These were pure males spontaneously developed by the operation of the principle of Heaven.'

At this point the account breaks off, and the narrator gives us curious variants from the ancient manuscripts (now lost) that he had before him. Sometimes we have the original existence, in the midst of the Void (*sora*), of a 'thing whose form cannot be described,' and from which the first god is produced. Sometimes, again, we have the birth, 'at the time when the country was young and the earth was young, floating like floating oil,' within the country, of a 'thing in appearance like unto a reed-shoot when it shows itself above the ground.' Sometimes, again, all we are told is that, 'when the Heavens and the Earth were in a state of chaos, there was at the very outset a Divine man'; or, 'when the Heavens and the Earth began, there were Deities produced together.' Another version, which is more original, says: 'Before the Heavens and the Earth, there existed something which might be compared to a cloud floating on the sea, and having no means of support. In the midst of this was engendered a thing resembling a reed-shoot springing out of the mud; and this thing was immediately metamorphosed into human form.' A last variant shows us once more 'a thing produced in the midst of the Void, which resembled a reed-shoot and changed into a god'; then a 'thing produced in the midst of the Void, like floating oil, from which a god was developed.' After this we see unfolding again the series of the Seven Divine Generations (see the *Nihongi*, Shukai ed. i. 1–4; W. G. Aston's tr., Yokohama, 1896, i. 1 ff.).

All these texts are valuable from their very incoherence, which, like the incoherence of the Hindu myths on the same subject, proves their authenticity and affords all the more interest from the point of view of comparative mythology. In the first place, indeed, this abundance of versions enables us to trace in Japan the cosmogonic myths of many other races: *e.g.* the idea that gods and men were sprung from certain plants—an idea that we meet with from the time of the ancient Greeks, who believed that they had sprung from the earth like cabbages, were born from certain trees, or had risen out of a marsh, right down to the Amazulu, who make their Unkulunkulu come from a bed of reeds or even from a reed-shoot (which corresponds exactly with the Japanese idea). In the second place, by examining these most ancient texts in relation to each other, we can distinguish, as far as is possible, the true native Japanese conception from the Chinese notions added thereto. The idea of the separation of the Heavens and the Earth, with which the *Nihongi* begins, and which also exists in China (myth of P'an-ku), is found again in India, Greece (Kronos myth), and New Zealand (Rangi and Papa), and consequently it would be rash to affirm a simple Chinese imitation here. But the whole passage on the *In* and the *Yô* (the *Yin* and the *Yang*, the passive or female principle, and the active or male principle, which are the mainspring of Nature in Chinese philosophy) is clearly only a little dissertation of foreign metaphysics, preparing the way for the native tradition of Izanagi and Izanami, the creators of Japan. As regards the cosmic egg which appears next, although it is found among a great number of peoples, both ancient (Indians, Egyptians, Phœnicians, Greeks) and modern (Fijians, Finns, etc.), and may therefore have been one of the spontaneous hypotheses which struggled for mastery in the mind of the primitive Japanese, it seems more probable that it also was a product of the same Chinese inspiration, especially when we consider the fact that this idea of the egg is posterior to the indication of the male and female principles, and that it does not harmonize very well with the image of the fish employed immediately after. It is only at this point ('Hence it is said . . .') that the real national account, agreeing with that of the *Kojiki*, begins. Thus we see the

leading line of the purely Japanese myth disentangling itself, viz. the essential notion of a floating earth, from which springs a reed-shoot, which in turn engenders the human form. And in this way we have, along with the origin of the world, the origin of man himself: the cosmogony terminates in a mysterious theogony, in which the Divine and human elements are confused in an insensible transition.

At this stage the last couple born in the Plain of the High Heavens are commissioned by the other gods to 'make, consolidate, and give birth to this drifting land':

'Hereupon all the Heavenly Deities commanded the two Deities, His Augustness the Male-Who-Invites and Her Augustness the Female-Who-Invites, ordering them to "make, consolidate, and give birth to this drifting land." Granting to them a heavenly jewelled spear, they thus deigned to charge them. So the two Deities, standing upon the Floating Bridge of Heaven (most probably, the Rainbow), pushed down the jewelled spear and stirred with it, whereupon, when they had stirred the brine till it went curdle curdle, and drew the spear up, the brine that dripped down from the end of the spear was piled up and became an island. This is the Island of Onogoro (*i.e.* Self-Condensed)' (*Kojiki*, 19).

Izanagi and Izanami descend from Heaven to this island and celebrate their union. They give birth first to a weakly child, which they abandon in a reed-boat, and then to the islet of Awa (Foam), which also they refuse to acknowledge. But, on being told by the celestial gods that, if 'these children were not good,' it is 'because the woman spoke first' in the marriage-ceremony, they resume their work of creation under more favourable conditions, and give birth first to the island of Awaji (Foam-way), and then to the other islands of the archipelago. After this, they put into the world in the same manner a whole tribe of Nature-gods. Here, again, we observe the idea of evolution so familiar to Japanese thought.

The god of Fire, Kagu-tsuchi, Izanami's last-born, accidentally scorches his mother so badly that she dies in a terrible fever. Izanagi in despair drags himself round about the body groaning, and from his tears is born another god. He buries his wife on Mount Hiba, on the borders of the land of Izumo. Then, in the fury of his grief, he tears the matricide to pieces, the blood and scattered members also changing into new deities. He finally descends to Hades to recover his wife, and finds himself face to face with a mass of putrid matter. Horror-struck, he returns to the light of day, and proceeds to elaborate ablutions in a river of Kyūshū, in order to get rid of the uncleanness contracted in his sojourn with darkness and death. Twelve deities are at this time born from his staff, various parts of his clothing, and his bracelets, as he throws them on the ground; then fourteen others spring from the various processes of his ablutions, among these being three illustrious deities who are the last to appear, when he washes his left eye, his right eye, and his nose, viz. Ame-terasu-oho-mi-kami (the Heaven-Shining-Great-August-Deity), Tsuki-yomi-no kami (the Moon-Night-Deity), and Take-haya-susa-no-wo-no-mikoto (His Brave-Swift-Impetuous-Male-Augustness). To these three deities—the goddess of the Sun, the god of the Moon, and the god of the Ocean, soon transformed into the god of the Storm—Izanagi proceeds to give the investiture of the government of the universe:

'At this time His Augustness the Male-Who-Invites greatly rejoiced, saying: "I, begetting child after child, have at my final begetting gotten three illustrious children." At once jinglingly taking off and shaking the string of jewels forming his august necklace, he bestowed it on the Heaven-Shining-Great-August-Deity, saying: "Do Thine Augustness rule the Plain of High Heaven." With this charge he bestowed it on her. . . . Next he said to the Moon-Night Deity: "Do Thine Augustness rule the Dominion of the Night." Thus he charged him. Next he said to His Brave-Swift-Impetuous-Male Augustness: "Do Thine Augustness rule the Sea-Plain"' (*Kojiki*, 50).

So, then, is the universe organized in its essential elements. It still remains, however, to complete the construction of the earth. This is the task, after the death of Izanagi, of a descendant of Susa-no-wo in the sixth generation—the god Oho-kuni-nushi (Master-of-the-Great-Land, *i.e.* of Izumo), who is the hero of a new cycle of legends. He is assisted in his work first by a dwarf god, a sort of magician, from foreign parts, and then by a mysterious spirit, which reveals itself as one of the hero's own doubles. One might be tempted to think that here it is no longer a question of the task of the material construction of the world, but rather some political organization of the country by a powerful chief. But this is not so, as is shown by the following curious account taken by the author from an old document at the very heart of this legendary cycle, the *Izumo Fudoki* ('Topographical Description of Izumo,' A.D. 733):

'The august god declared: "The country of Izumo . . . is indeed a youthful country of narrow stuff. The original country is still very little. Therefore, I am going to sew a new piece of land to it." He spoke; and, as he looked towards the cape of Shiragi (a Korean kingdom) to see whether there was not an excess of land there, he said to himself: "There is an excess of land"; and with a mattock he hollowed out a cleft like that between a young maiden's breasts; he separated the part with blows, like those dealt on the gills of a large fish (to kill it); and cut it away . . .; and, fastening round it a thick three-strand rope, he drew it along, balanced, as if by tsuzura (*Pueraria Thunbergiana*) blackened by frost, and as smoothly as a boat on a river, saying: "Come, Land! Come, Land!" The piece of land thus sewed on is to be found between the extreme boundary of Kozu and the promontory of Kizuki, which has been formed eight times. The post arranged in this way is Mount Sahime, on the boundary between the country of Ihami and that of Izumo. Moreover, the rope with which he dragged the land along is the long beach of Sono. When he looked towards the country of Saki, at the gates of the North (*i.e.* in the North), to see whether there was not an excess of land there, he said: "There is an excess of land" [as above, down to "Come, Land!"]. The land thus brought and sewed on is the country of Sada, which extends from the very borders of Taku to here. When he looked towards the country of Sunami, at the gates of the North, to see whether there was not an excess of land there, he said: "There is an excess of land" [once more the same words, ending with "Come, Land!"]. The land thus brought and sewed on is the country of Kurami, extending from the borders of Taguhi to here. When he looked towards Cape Tsutsu, of Koshi, to see whether there was not an excess of land there, he said: "There is an excess of land" [always the same phrase]. The country thus brought and sewed on is Cape Miho. The rope with which it was brought is the island of Yomi (one of the place-names that are connected with the entrance to Hades, situated in Izumo). The post arranged in this way is Mount Oho-kami, in Habaki. "Now we have finished bringing land," he said. And, as he drove his august staff into the ground, in the wood of O-u, he cried: "O-we!" whence the name O-u' (*Izumo Fudoki*, ed. Ōbira, 1806, pp. 4-6).

This 'bringing of land' (*kuni-biki*), the naive account of which ends with an equally childish explanation of the name of the place, is a striking illustration of the material character of the task devolving upon Oho-kuni-nushi—the finishing of the work begun by the creator-couple, then continued by Izanagi on his being widowed, and finally interrupted by Izanagi's death. Only the method is different. A short passage in the *Nihongi* (ii. 366) shows the extent to which this putting together of the country seemed a natural work: one night, in A.D. 684, a noise was heard coming from the east like the rolling of drums; in the morning it was seen that an island had suddenly risen out of the waves; the conclusion was that the ominous noise was the din the gods made when building this island in the darkness. Without leaving Japan, we can trace the same idea of building in an Ainu myth. It is intended to explain why the west coast of Yezo ends in treacherous rocks, while the east slopes down gently to the sea. The explanation is that the island was built by a Divine couple, and the woman, who had charge of the west shore, neglected her task by speaking all the time.

In short, apart from spontaneous generation, which is freely admitted for the primordial gods, the creation of the world can be explained prin-

cipally either by a more or less precise normal generation or by a Divine construction. The idea of generation is the one that dominates the Japanese myths, and is seen in its most material form in the story of Izanagi and Izanami. Nothing could be more natural than this conception, for it is logical to think that things, just as organic beings, could not form themselves without connexion of male and female. Among some peoples, the primitive couple are placed at the very beginning of the evolution: *e.g.* in Nicaragua, a man and woman, Famagoztad and Zipaltonal, created the heavens, the earth, moon, stars, and human beings—the whole world; in Polynesia, Tangaloa and O-te-papa are the parents of the islands and their inhabitants. We have the same idea among the Japanese, except that, being more metaphysical, and wishing to find the cause of the first couple, they imagined vague terrestrial deities who had to precede the first couple, and then went still further back to far-off deities, some of whom are still attached to the earth, while others appeared spontaneously in Heaven. As to the idea of construction, it appears chiefly, as we have just seen, when the task of perfecting the work of creation comes into question. These are two conceptions which are likewise found among the ancient Greeks, and which were combined in the Pythagorean cosmogony.

We now pass from the formation of the world to the laws controlling it. We find among the ancient Japanese various attempts at explanations, which sometimes even form a rudimentary cosmology. What they wanted to explain first of all was the cause of the great physical phenomena, beginning with the phenomena of light, which are the most striking of all to the primitive man, as they are to the child. For instance, Why do the sun and moon not shine at the same time?—Because the goddess of the Sun, enraged by a crime committed by the god of the Moon, determined never to see him again:

'Now when Ama-terasu-no-oho-kami was already in Heaven, she said: "I hear that in the Central country of reed-plains there is the Deity Uke-mochi-no-kami (the goddess of Food). Do thou, Tsuki-yomi-no-mikoto, go and wait upon her." Tsuki-yomi-no-mikoto, on receiving this command, descended and went to the place where Uke-mochi-no-kami was. Thereupon Uke-mochi-no-kami turned her head towards the land, and forthwith from her mouth there came boiled rice: she faced the sea, and again there came from her mouth things broad of fin and things narrow of fin (*i.e.* fishes both great and small). She faced the mountains, and again there came from her mouth things rough of hair and things soft of hair (*i.e.* all kinds of game). These things were all prepared and set out on one hundred tables for his entertainment. Then Tsuki-yomi-no-mikoto became flushed with anger, and said: "Filthy! Nasty! That thou shouldst dare to feed me with things disgorged from thy mouth." So he drew his sword and slew her, and then returned and made his report, relating all the circumstances. Upon this Ama-terasu-no-oho-kami was exceedingly angry, and said: "Thou art a wicked Deity. I must not see thee face to face." So they were separated by one day and one night, and dwelt apart' (*Nihongi*, i. 32).

Similarly, How does it happen that the brightness of the Sun is one day totally obscured?—The same Sun-goddess, persecuted by her terrible brother, Susa-no-wo, and indignant at his wickedness, hides herself in a celestial cave; and, when the other gods make her come out by magic processes, the world is lit up again (*Kojiki*, 52–65). In the same way, again, Why, at a more recent time, did the heavens remain dark for whole days on end?—Because two priests were buried in the same tomb; on the separation of their coffins, the division of night from day re-appeared (*Nihongi*, i. 238).

In the first legend, we have to do with a fundamental law of the universe; in the second, with an unusual phenomenon of such a kind as to strike the imagination for a time; in the third, with a far less important occurrence in which we see hardly anything more than a portent. The first mystery is explained by an important act in the drama played by the gods; the second, by an analogous incident, in which, however, human intervention is already making itself more evident; the last, as the result of a simple mistake in ritual. But in all three cases one and the same psychological process appears—a process explaining the normal order and the exceptional disorders of light by the human passions of the Sun. And the story of the other gods would give us similar motives for all the physical phenomena which exercised primitive intelligence—from the stability of the solid sky, which the winds hold up like pillars (Ritual, no. iv.), to the instability of the soil, which the subterranean god shakes with earthquakes (*Nihongi*, ii. 124). Nor must we omit to note how the resentment of a sea-princess against a terrestrial god is offered as the explanation of the fact that 'there is no communication between the earth and the sea' (*Nihongi*, i. 107).

After these attempts to explain the greater aspects of Nature, the ancient Japanese turned their attention to lesser objects—stones, plants, animals. The thing which most impressed them about stone was the spark they could get from it, and this mysterious property the myths are quick to explain, solving at the same time the same question with regard to the fire-principle concealed in tree and plant. When a flint is rubbed, or two pieces of wood are rubbed together for a time, fire appears; it must therefore be concealed in these substances. In order to exist thus in a latent manner, it must have entered these substances. But how? It is here that the hypotheses differ more or less according to the various mythologies.

In New Zealand, Maui obtained from an old Divine grandmother, Mahu-Ika, one of her nails, which produced fire by friction; only he extinguished this fire at once, started off to renew his request, and continued until Mahu-Ika had to part with all her nails one by one; finally, she became enraged and pursued him with her flames, and was prevented from consuming him only by an opportune fall of rain; fortunately some sparks got lodged in certain trees, and from them they can be brought forth again. This is clearly the logical evolution of the production of fire, first by knocking a stone, then by rubbing certain hard woods. Alongside of this Maori Prometheus we may place the Prometheus of the Thlinkets, who fills the same civilizing rôle on the north-west coast of the Pacific: the hero Yehl, in the shape of a raven, stole the heavenly fire, carrying off a burning brand in his mouth; the fire fell upon stones and pieces of wood, and it is from these that it can be extracted again to-day. The same idea is found among the Eskimos, according to whom the rocks contain fire-spirits which are often seen in the form of will-o'-the-wisps; among the American Indians—*e.g.* the Sioux and Chippeways—who believe that flints are thrown down by thunderbolts; among the black races of Africa, who established the same connexion between heavenly fire and stones on earth; and among the ancient Hindus, who supposed that there were Agnis, apparently descended from Heaven, in stones, plants, and trees, just as they knew them to be present in the whole of Nature, in man, in the cloud, and even in the sea.

It is interesting to find this wide-spread myth in Japan. When the god of Fire was slain by his father, his blood leapt up in one place to the sky, and there, in the region of the Milky Way (*Nihongi*, i. 23, 29), it seems to have lit up certain stars which, like Sirius, appear pale to-day, but which, at the time when the Japanese myths were elaborated, certainly shone with a ruddy glow (cf. Hor. *Sat.* II. v. 39; Seneca, *Quæst. Nat.* bk. i.); in another place, this blood flowed over the ground, and infused the fire-principle into plants and trees, stones and rocks. One variant of the *Nihongi* (i. 29) is particularly clear on this point:

'At this time the blood from the wounds spurted out and stained the rocks, trees, and herbage. This is the reason that herbs, trees, and pebbles naturally contain the element of fire.'

These myths, touching sometimes upon cosmogony, sometimes upon cosmology, but always coming from the same desire to explain the most varied phenomena, had, of course, to attempt to account for all the strange things in the animal world. For example, why has the *bêche-de-mer* (trepang) a peculiar mouth? Because long ago its mouth was slit as a Divine punishment:

'Ame-no-uzume-no-mikoto (Her Augustness the Heavenly-Alarming-Female) drove together all the things broad of fin and the things narrow of fin, and asked them, saying: "Will ye respectfully serve the august son of the Heavenly Deities?" upon which all the fishes declared that they would respectfully serve him. Only the *bêche-de-mer* said nothing. Then Her Augustness the Heavenly-Alarming-Female spoke to the *bêche-de-mer*, saying: "Ah! This mouth is a mouth that gives no reply!" and slit the mouth with her small string-sword. So at the present day the *bêche-de-mer* has a slit mouth' (*Kojiki*, 139).

In the same way the Breton legend explains how the plaice, for making a grimace at the Holy Virgin, ever after had a crooked mouth; and an Oceanic legend tells how the sole refused to sing, and was trampled upon by the angered fishes, and was flat ever after. In Japan itself a popular tale, which is not in the sacred books, but which is nevertheless undoubtedly very ancient, tells us that the reason why the medusa has no bones to sustain her shapeless substance is that, for being stupid in the performance of a task entrusted to her by the god of the Seas, she was so mauled by blows that she was reduced to pulp. In all these stories, as in that of the Biblical serpent condemned to creep for ever (Gn 3[14]), the punishment continues in the descendants of the afflicted animal—a very natural conclusion, since the established form of the animal precisely constitutes the *raison d'être* of the myth.

We find myths of this kind to an even greater extent in relation to man himself, his physical nature, and, above all, his death, which shocks his instinct of preservation. Like all primitive peoples, the ancient Japanese see in death an abnormal phenomenon. Natural death does not exist: death must be the work of some supernatural agent. The fatal fever of Izanami must be a manifestation of the god of fire, and the last illness of the hero Yamato-dake, who was seized with a sudden chill in an icy shower, must be the effect of the vengeance of the god of the mountain when he lost his way. Speaking in a more general way, just as the majority of civilized races claim a spiritual immortality which they deny to animals, so primitive man liked to believe that physical immortality would have distinguished him from all other beings, if death had not been introduced into the world by some mistake or as a mysterious punishment. This conception is found equally among Hebrews and Greeks, Kafirs and Hottentots, Fijians, New Zealanders, etc. The punishment hypothesis is that of the Shinto myth:

'Ama-tsu-hi-daka-hiko-ho-no-ni-nigi-no-mikoto (His Augustness Heaven's-Sun-Height-Prince-Rice-ear-Ruddy-Plenty) met a beautiful person at the august Cape of Kasasa, and asked her whose daughter she was. She replied, saying: "I am a daughter of Oho-yama-tsu-mi-no-kami (the Deity Great-Mountain-Possessor), and my name is the Divine-Princess-of-Ata, another name by which I am called being Ko-no-hana-saku-ya-hime (the Princess Blossoming-Brilliantly-Like-the-Flowers-of-the-Trees)." Again he asked: "Hast thou any brethren?" She replied, saying: "There is my elder sister, Iha-naga-hime (the Princess Long-, *i.e.* Enduring-, as-the-Rocks)." Then he charged her, saying: "I wish to make thee my wife. How will this be?" She replied, saying: "I am not able to say. My father, the Deity Great-Mountain-Possessor, will say." So he sent a request to her father the Deity Great-Mountain-Possessor, who, greatly delighted, respectfully sent her off, joining to her her elder sister Princess Long-as-the-Rocks, and causing merchandise to be carried on tables holding an hundred. So then, owing to the elder sister being very hideous, His Augustness Prince Rice-ear-Ruddy-Plenty was alarmed at the sight of her, and sent her back, only keeping the younger sister Princess Blossoming-Brilliantly-Like-the-Flowers-of-the-Trees, whom he wedded for one night. Then the Deity Great-Mountain-Possessor was covered with shame at Princess Long-as-the-Rocks being sent back, and sent a message, saying: "My reason for respectfully presenting both my daughters together was that, by sending Princess Long-as-the-Rocks, the august offspring of the Heavenly Deity, though the snow fall and the wind blow, might live eternally immovable like unto the enduring rocks, and again that, by sending Princess Blossoming-Brilliantly-Like-the-Flowers-of-the-Trees, they might live flourishingly like unto the flowering of the blossoms of the trees: to ensure this, I offered them. But owing to thy thus sending back Princess Long-as-the-Rocks, and keeping only Princess Blossoming-Brilliantly-Like-the-Flowers-of-the-Trees, the august offspring of the Heavenly Deity shall be but as frail as the flowers of the trees." So it is for this reason that, down to the present day, the august lives of Their Augustnesses the Heavenly Sovereigns are not long' (*Kojiki*, 140–142).

This curse seems at first sight to apply only to the Imperial line, but there is no doubt whatever that, in primitive thought, it was meant to explain why all men are mortal. This is proved by the following variant of the *Nihongi* (i. 84):

'Iha-naga-hime, in her shame and resentment, spat and wept. She said: "The race of visible mankind shall change swiftly like the flowers of the trees, and shall decay and pass away." This is the reason why the life of man is so short.'

There is a rather striking resemblance to be seen between this myth and a legend of the North American Indians: the Pebble and the Bush were with child at the same time, but the children of the Bush were born first; that is why man is subject to death. Iha-naga-hime also recalls in a wonderful manner O-te-papa, the rock-wife of Tangaloa, in Polynesian myth.

Besides death, life also has its place, especially among a light-hearted people like the ancient Japanese, whom even Buddhism itself could not subdue. They sought to probe to the origin of death, but they understood none the less that this was not the only problem of their destiny. They admired life with its fertility; and another important myth proceeds to tell how, in spite of the calls of the region of darkness, humanity develops and triumphs in the immortality of its perpetual rejuvenation. Izanagi, the father of men and islands, fled from the subterranean kingdom, pursued by the Furies, the Thunderbolts, and all the horrible army of Hades.

'Last of all his younger sister Her Augustness the Princess-Who-Invites came out herself in pursuit. So he drew a thousand-draught rock, and blocked up the Even Pass of Hades (Yomo-tsu-hira-saka, forming the frontier-line between Hades and the World of the Living), and placed the rock in the middle; and they stood opposite to one another and exchanged leave-takings; and Her Augustness the Female-Who-Invites said: "My lovely elder brother, Thine Augustness! If thou do like this, I will in one day strangle to death a thousand of the folks of thy land." Then His Augustness the Male-Who-Invites replied: "My lovely younger sister, Thine Augustness! If thou do this, I will in one day set up a thousand and five hundred parturition-houses (the separate hut for a woman about to be delivered). In this manner each day a thousand people would surely die, and each day a thousand and five hundred people would surely be born."'

Izanami is thus conquered; Izanagi prevails; and in commemoration of his victory the Japanese thereafter called themselves Ame-no-masu-hito-ra, 'the heavenly surplus-population.'

All these stories—the common aim of which was to answer the innumerable questions of primitive curiosity regarding the affairs of Nature and of man, of physical phenomena and living beings, the origin of the world and its present appearance, in short, regarding everything that afterwards constituted the complicated object of the sciences—provide us with a mythology in which cosmogony holds the place of honour, and cosmology is only beginning to appear. The ancient Japanese felt themselves enveloped in mysteries which they would have been glad to solve; but, as the limited extent of their knowledge set strict bounds to their attempts, they soon tired of looking for these causes; they accordingly stopped short with infantile explanations which seemed satisfying to them, but which could scarcely approach a deep investigation of the laws that underlie the sensible world. It was only under Chinese influence that this type of investigation developed, and that the ancient mythology became complicated with abstract principles, as we have seen in the typical example of the story of the creation in the *Nihongi*. This desire to harmonize national tradition with the philosophical ideas of China, or even of Europe, was bound to end in the most ludicrous theories in the hands of the modern Shintoist theologians. Thus, *e.g.*, they attempted to explain the origin of the stars, sometimes by investigating whether they

might have sprung from the excess of material stirred up and scattered into space by Izanagi's spear, sometimes by supposing that the shell of the primitive egg got broken, and that the fragments were caught up by the rotatory motion of the sun and thus drawn into the astronomical whirl (Hirata, *Koshiden*, 1812, ii. 36, 38). But these apologist fantasies are clearly foreign to the simple cosmogony and embryonic cosmology of the ancient Japanese.

LITERATURE.—W. G. Aston, *Nihongi* (*Trans. of the Japan Society*, Supp. i.), London, 1896, and *Shinto, the Way of the Gods*, London, 1905; B. H. Chamberlain, *The Kojiki* (*TASJ*, vol. x., Supp.), reprinted, Tokyo, 1906; K. Florenz, *Nihongi, Zeitalter der Götter* (Supp. to *Mittheilungen der deutschen Gesellsch. für Natur- und Völkerkunde Ostasiens*), Tokyo, 1901; W. E. Griffis, *The Religions of Japan*, New York, 1896; M. Revon, *Le Shinntoïsme*, Paris, 1907, and *Anthologie de la littérature japonaise*, Paris, 1910; Ernest Satow, *The Revival of pure Shinto* (*TASJ*, vol. iii., appendix), reprinted, Tokyo, 1883.

MICHEL REVON.

COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY (Jewish).—Speaking generally, it may be said that speculation as to the origin of the world was not encouraged during the early Rabbinic period. Between Biblical times and the era of the Jewish philosophers, cosmology in the modern sense can scarcely be said to have flourished, and ultimately it is so closely connected with philosophy itself that separate treatment is scarcely possible. The well-known verses of Ben Sira (Sir $3^{21ff.}$),

> 'Search not the things that are too wonderful for thee;
> And seek not that which is hid from thee.
> . . . thou hast no business with the secret things'
> (tr. C. Taylor),

are quoted in Talmud and Midrash, and are applied to this form of investigation (see *JQR* iii. [1890–1] 690; Bab. *Ḥagiga*, 113*a*, etc.; Midr. *Bereshith Rabba*, ch. viii.; cf. also parallel passages quoted in *JQR* iii. 698). It may also be said that, in most cases where cosmological elements are found in Rabbinic sources, the scientific character is subordinated to the religious. Leaving the Biblical records, the following are the main groups of writings, during this intermediate period, which deal with the question of creation: (1) references in Talmud and Midrash (cited above); (2) special references to the 'Logos' as distinct from other means of creation; (3) Ḳabbalistic writings and references, such as the *Sepher Yĕṣira* and the *Zohar*, etc.

With regard to the first class, the verses of Ben Sira which have been cited are typical of the disapproval displayed by the Rabbis towards cosmological study. With them should be carefully compared the Gemara in the first Mishna of the second *pereq* of *Ḥagiga* (11*b*). This passage is the *locus classicus*, though scarcely less noteworthy are the beginnings of *Genesis Rabba* and *Tanḥuma*. It is evident that the dislike of the Rabbis to the study of cosmology was due to two causes—the fact that the material and method appeared to be Greek in origin, and the fact that such study sometimes led to atheism and apostasy. In support of this the famous story of Elisha b. Abuya (Aḥer) (cf. *Ḥagiga*, 15*b* foot, etc.) may be recalled. The study of Greek mythology and philosophy leads to Hellenization, and must be discouraged.[1] It would seem, however, that the ardour for these studies grew, in spite of checks from the Rabbis; and the latter seem to have abandoned a policy of resistance and adopted a new attitude—that the creation of the world must be shown to have depended entirely on the Divine power. Hence the early chapters of *Bereshith Rabba* are devoted to proving that God, and God alone, is the Creator. There are clear traces of replies, on the part of the Rabbis who are there quoted, to opponents, who seem to have been Gnostics and dualists, by whom the Biblical scheme of creation is rejected; in some cases it would seem as though we were face to face with Pantheistic ideas, but that would be difficult to establish. The *creatio ex nihilo* is frequently affirmed, but this question, as well as that of the 'eternity of matter,' belongs to Jewish philosophy rather than to cosmology; they cannot be considered without reference to later writers, *e.g.* Maimonides and Judah Hallēvi.

Each of the three great Semitic religions has had to face the problem of harmonizing a doctrine of pre-existence, in some shape or form, with a concurrent belief in the *creatio ex nihilo*. In the case of Christianity it is the Arian controversy. Among the Muslims, the question of the Qur'ān—whether it was created or eternal—was one of the points on which the Mu'tazilite heresy turned. But in Judaism, at least in the early period, the question of the pre-existence of the Torah was never a burning one. It was the application to the Torah of Pr 8^{22} that gave rise to this belief. Perhaps Gnostic ideas were originally responsible, but at all events it is certain that Jewish theology, whether private or official, was not seriously disturbed. Had this been the case, the doctrine must have been pushed to its logical conclusion, and it would have been alleged that the Torah had some share in the actual work of creation (contrast *B. Rabba*, ed. Theodor, p. 6). But, while the *Bereshith Rabba* compares the Torah to the parchment plans of an architect, the functions of the Divine Creator are not only never usurped, but, on the contrary, the supremacy of the Godhead in the work of creation is emphatically stated. From this it may be inferred that the belief was never reduced to definite form. The same may be said of the passages in the Midrash. Their purpose is homily, not science; their concern is to praise the works of the Deity rather than to investigate the ways of Nature or to explain the riddle of the universe. This is clear from the methods employed. A verse of Scripture is regularly interpreted by natural phenomena, and the functions of heaven and earth are derived philologically from the Bible. Had the objective of the Rabbis been practical, a different plan would have been adopted. As it is, arguments *post factum* are quite legitimate and in keeping with the purpose.

To imagine that the Rabbis would have been content with such methods of argument, or would have considered them adequate, is impossible for two reasons. (1) This would overlook the true character of Haggāda (*i.e.* allegoric homily); and (2) it would imply ignorance of the scientific capabilities of the Rabbis. It is only necessary to turn to astronomy, in order to see what they could achieve. Hence it is desirable, for cosmological purposes, to pass over *Bereshith Rabba* and most Talmudical passages. It is also fair to exclude the famous controversy of Hillel and Shammai as to the relative precedence of Heaven and Earth[1] in this category (*Ḥag.* 12*a*), because their objective also was religion, not science. On the whole, the dogma of the *creatio ex nihilo* was accepted, though not without reservations and even opposition. In 2 Mac 7^{28} the author speaks actually of a creation *ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων*, but Wis 11^{18} prefers the theory of re-arrangement of existing matter rather than creation.[2] Philo allegorizes: God gave the form, not the matter; though, of course, ultimately He is the Creator. According to the

[1] Cf. *Ḥagiga*, 11*b*, אֵין דּוֹרְשִׁין . . . בְּמַעֲשֵׂה בְרֵאשִׁית בִּשְׁנַיִם, 'Men are not to expound . . . the work of Creation with two (*sc.* disciples),' tr. Streane.

[1] This was one of the questions asked by Alexander of Macedon (see *Tamid*, 32*a*, and *B. Rabba*, ed. Theodor, p. 13).

[2] *ἡ παντοδύναμός σου χεὶρ κτίσασα τὸν κόσμον ἐξ ἀμόρφου ὕλης.*

beginning of *de Opific. Mundi*, the world was created for the תּוֹרָה; and with the תּוֹרָה all natural phenomena must be in harmony. This is perhaps an extension of the Midrashic thought that the world was created בִּיכוּת הַתּוֹרָה (*B. Rabba*, ed. Theodor, p. 9, line 9). Philo's Logos does not perform quite the same functions as the Mishnic or Targumic Logos or Memra—if such a term may be used. In *Aboth* (v. 1) we read that the world was created by ten מַאֲמָרוֹת, or sayings; that is to say, וַיֹּאמֶר, 'And God said,' occurs ten times with reference to the Creation. Now this theory has developed from what may briefly and conveniently be described as the Targumic attitude—the objection to anthropomorphism. The Maămār, or Memra, to some extent intervenes and becomes the mouthpiece or instrument of creation. This gives rise to theories of Mediators, whether in form of Demiurge or of Meṭaṭron, which are, however, often expressly repudiated: e.g. *Bereshith Rabba* (ed. Theodor, p. 5, l. 10, and p. 27, l. 3), where the date of the creation of angels is discussed. The question is in itself unimportant. Stress is laid on the fact that they could not have been created on the first day, lest any share in the work of the creation should be ascribed to them. Meṭaṭron (*μετὰ θρόνον* or *metator*?) is mentioned by name frequently (cf. *Sanhedrin*, 38*b*, which is a warning against ascribing Divine powers to Meṭaṭron). It may be doubted whether it was ever believed that the Maămārôth actually exercised functions; it is more probable that the idea was invented to account for the text, and repudiated when felt to be dangerous. At all events it cannot be included in true cosmology.

In considering the Ḳabbala, which, of course, belongs really to a later period, the same air of unreality is experienced. In the *Sepher Yĕṣîra* and similar works, permutations and arrangements of numbers and letters are the basis of argument, and this is typical of the whole mystical outlook of the Ḳabbala. A close relation is postulated between the real and the unseen, between the written word and the abstract idea of which it is the symbol; hence it was believed to be possible to extract the spiritual from the physical form, *i.e.* from the word in which it was confined. The deductions are, of course, ingenious, but they are reached by literary or quasi-philological arguments. It is obvious that either scientific investigation or carefully selected tradition must form the foundation of cosmology, and it cannot definitely be stated to what practical extent the authors of Ḳabbalistic reasoning desired their results to be taken. The truth is that between the period of the Bible and that of the mediæval Jewish philosophers there is no real cosmology. The Scriptures supplied the needs of all seekers, until Judaism was brought face to face with Aristotelianism and Neo-Platonism. Hitherto cosmology was not taken seriously in the scientific sense, it was mere homily; but henceforward it became an integral portion of the system of each thinker. It is impossible to discuss the theories of יֵשׁ מֵאַיִן, *creatio ex nihilo*, in mediæval times, apart from the rest of the philosophy which was established upon it.

LITERATURE.—There is a critical edition of the Midrash *Bereshith Rabba* by J. Theodor (Berlin, 1903). For those unacquainted with Hebrew the Talmudic references may be studied in M. L. Rodkinson's tr. (*Hagiga*=vol. vi.), New York, 1899, or preferably in L. Goldschmidt's Germ. tr. (Berlin, 1897 ff.). The treatise *Hagiga* was translated (with notes, etc.) by A. W. Streane, Cambridge, 1891. Some idea of the Midrash may be obtained from S. Rapaport's *Tales and Maxims from the Midrash* (London, 1907); see also *JE*, artt. 'Cosmology,' 'Creation.'

HERBERT LOEWE.

COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY (Mexican and South American).—**1. Mexico.**—On the origin and constitution of the universe the ancient Mexicans developed a number of complex and, in part, discordant myths. In the earliest times, according to Sahagun's version, the gods assembled in Teotihuacan for the purpose of debating who was to govern the world and who was to be the sun, for at that time there was no daylight. A deity named Tecuciztecatl offered to illuminate the world. His compeers asked who would act as his mate, but none of them could summon sufficient courage, each offering excuses. At last they delegated the task to Nanauatzin, who was afflicted with the pox (*buboso*), and he cheerfully acquiesced. The luminaries-elect then began a four days' penance. A fire was built, and both made their offerings. After the four days had elapsed, Tecuciztecatl and Nanauatzin received their ceremonial vestments. The gods ranged themselves in two rows, one on either side of the fire, and first called upon Tecuciztecatl to leap into the flames. The deity approached the blaze, but recoiled from its excessive heat. Four times he made the attempt, and four times he abandoned it. Then the gods ordered Nanauatzin to try. He mustered up all his courage, closed his eyes, and leapt into the flames. Immediately a crackling sound was heard. Then Tecuciztecatl followed suit. When the two deities had been completely consumed by the fire, the other gods seated themselves, expecting to see them rise. After a long period of waiting, the sky assumed a reddish aspect, and there appeared the light of dawn. The gods fell on their knees and turned hither and thither, not knowing from what quarter the sun would come, for the light of dawn was shining everywhere. At last it rose from the east, swaying to and fro, and dazzling the onlookers with its brilliancy. Presently the moon rose from the same cardinal direction. They appeared in the same order in which the two gods had entered the fire. At first sun and moon were equally brilliant. The other gods debated whether this was proper, and decided in the negative. Then one of them began to run, and struck Tecuciztecatl's face with a hare. Straightway it turned darker, lost its splendour, and assumed the present appearance of the moon. Though the sun and the moon had thus been created, they were still stationary. The gods asked one another: 'How could we live under these conditions? The sun does not move. Are we to spend all our life among unworthy mortals? Let us all die, so that our death may animate these luminaries.' The wind then offered to kill the gods, and did so. Still the sun did not begin to move. At last the wind blew so violently that he forced the sun to commence its journey, but the moon remained stationary for a while. Finally, it also began to move. Thus, sun and moon became separated and assumed the habit of rising at different hours of the day. Had Tecuciztecatl leapt into the fire before Nanauatzin, he would have been the sun.[1]

A somewhat similar version has been recorded by Mendieta. Citlalatonac and Citlalicue appear as the primeval deities. The latter bore a flint, which her enraged sons hurled to the earth. From the shattered stone there developed 1600 gods, who asked their mother for permission to create mankind. Citlalicue referred them to Mictlantecutli, who was to furnish them with the bones and ashes of the deceased. The messenger of the gods received the required objects from the lord of the under world, but, lest Mictlantecutli might recall his gift, he fled in haste, stumbled, and broke the bones. He quickly gathered the fragments and presented them to the gods, who enclosed them in

[1] Sahagun, *Hist. gén. des choses de la Nouvelle-Espagne* (Paris, 1880), 478–482.

a bag and bespattered them with their own blood. On the fourth day there issued forth a boy, and on the eighth a girl. These became the ancestors of mankind. The sun was not yet in existence. The gods assembled in Teotihuacan and announced that whosoever would jump into the fire should be transformed into the sun. One man ventured to leap in, and the spectators anxiously watched for the rising of the sun. In the meantime they laid a wager that the animals present would not be able to guess the place whence the sun would rise, and, as the animals actually failed to do so, they were all sacrificed. At last the sun appeared, but did not move. Angered by his immovability, Citli ('Hare') let fly three arrows at him, wounding him twice. The enraged solar deity hurled one arrow back at the enemy, piercing his forehead. The gods then recognized their relative inferiority, and consented to be sacrificed. Xolotl tore out their hearts, and himself committed suicide. Appeased by this sacrifice, the sun began his daily course.[1]

A rather different tale is narrated in the Zumarraga Codex. There dwelt originally in the thirteenth heaven a Divine couple, Tonacatecutli and Tonacacihuatl, who begat four sons, viz. Camaxtli, Yayauquitezcatlipuca, Quetzalcoatl, and Huitzilopochtli. After 600 years of inactivity these four created the world. Quetzalcoatl and Huitzilopochtli created fire and a half-sun, the first pair of human beings, the days, the denizens of infernal regions, the heavens beyond the thirteenth, and finally water and the monster Cipactli. In the further creation the entire quartet participated. They formed the sea-deities Tlalocatecutli and Chalchiuhtlicue, and then created out of Cipactli the earth and her deity Tlaltecutli. The first human pair, Oxomoco and Cipactonal, begat a son who married a woman shaped out of Xochiquetzal's hair. As the half-sun gave forth but little light, it was decided to perfect it, and accordingly Tezcatlipoca transformed himself into a real sun. Then the giants were created. After Tezcatlipoca had shone for 676 years (13 cycles), Quetzalcoatl hurled him into the water, himself assuming solar functions, while his enemy transformed himself into a tiger which devoured the giant race. In commemoration of this event, there developed the constellation of Charles's Wain, which represents Tezcatlipoca descending into the ocean. After Quetzalcoatl had served for an equal space of time, his rival hurled him headlong with a blow of his paws, causing a tempest that destroyed the majority of human beings. Then Tlalocatecutli reigned as the sun for 364 years (7 cycles), but Quetzalcoatl drove him away by means of a torrent of fire and installed Chalchiuhtlicue in his place. She served in this position for 312 years (6 cycles), then a deluge occurred, mankind were changed into fish, and the heavens fell down. The divine quartet next opened a passage under ground, and created four men. By the joint efforts of all of these the sky was raised to its present altitude. As a token of his gratitude, Tonacatecutli transferred to his sons the sovereignty of the stars, they settled in the heavens, and by their migrations they are smoothing the path known as the Milky Way. Two years later Tezcatlipoca first produced fire by friction, and, several years later still, a new race of man was created. After the lapse of five years, the gods decreed the formation of a new sun. War was waged in order to secure a sufficient number of human sacrifices for the sun, then the gods fasted, drew blood from their own bodies, and heaped up firewood. Into the blaze Quetzalcoatl cast his own son, who thus became the sun. Tlalocatecutli, however, threw *his* son into the ashes, thus making him rise as the moon, which continually follows the sun without ever overtaking it. Both luminaries wander through the air without ever reaching the heavens. The Codex Vaticanus mentions the bi-sexual deity Ometecutli as the creator of the universe. He creates the first human pair, Oxomoco and Cipactonal. These beget Tonacatecutli, to whom the later stages of creation are due.[1]

The modern Tarahumare believe that the present world was preceded by many others, all of which were destroyed. In these earlier periods all the watercourses flowed eastward, but now there are also some rivers that empty into the Pacific. Originally, the world was but a waste of sand, which the bears put into shape. The rocks were at first soft and small, but they grew to be large and hard. The people grew up from the soil, and the earth was quite level. At that time men lived to be only one year old, dying like the flowers. According to another tradition, they came from heaven with corn and potatoes in their ears, and were led by Tata Dios—a solar character designated by a Christian name—into the mountains, the middle of the world. In the beginning, the Morning Star was the only heavenly body to illuminate the earth, and the 600 Indians then in existence were greatly irritated by the surrounding darkness, for they were unable to do their work and were continually stumbling about. The sun and the moon were then children, dressed in palm-leaf garments and dwelling in a house thatched with palm leaves. The Indians at last dipped small crosses into *tesvino* (native beer) and with them touched the sun and the moon on the chest, on the head, and on the back. Then they began to shine.[2]

2. Maya.—The creation-myth of the ancient Quiché is the fullest cosmogony of the Maya stock now accessible to us. In the beginning there were heaven and water, but everything was stagnant and dark. Gucumatz, Tepeu, and Hurakan held a council and created the world, forming mountains, plains, and rivers. First there appeared the vegetable, and later the animal, kingdom. But the animals were unable to call by name or greet their creators, and were accordingly condemned to be killed and eaten. Next the gods created men out of clay; but, as this material lacked vitality, it dissolved in the water. Then the deities invoked the aid of Xpiyacoc and Xmucane, and created a man out of the wood of one tree and a woman from the sap of another. Both were able to move about and propagate their kind, but they lacked intelligence and lived like the brute creation. Accordingly the gods sent showers of pitch which caused a flood, and wild animals which destroyed the race. From the few survivors are descended the small monkeys dwelling in the forests. At last there were created four perfect men out of yellow and white maize: Balam Quitze, Balam Agab, Mahucutah, and Iquibalam. These were intelligent, and were able to perceive things far and near by the light of the morning star, and to penetrate the most recondite matters. Rejoicing in their powers, they thanked their creators. The latter, however, became envious of their creatures and blew a cloud over their eyes, so that they were able to see only what was near. While the men were asleep, the gods created four women for them. The race multiplied, but, as they lacked patron deities, they moved to Tulan Zuiva, where they acquired the necessary divinities.

[1] G. Brühl, *Die Culturvölker Alt-Amerikas* (New York, 1875–1887), 400.

[1] Brühl, *op. cit.* 398–401.

[2] Lumholtz, *Unknown Mexico* (New York, 1902, London, 1903), i. 296–298.

Tohil, one of these tutelary gods, gave fire to the people, but it was extinguished by rain and hail, and Tohil then created it anew by stamping his feet. Owing to the suffering undergone by the people in Tulan, they abandoned the place under Tohil's guidance, and, after long-continued migrations, reached Mt. Hacavitz. There sun, moon, and stars were called into being, though they did not then shine as brightly as they do now. The origin of these heavenly bodies, however, is differently accounted for in the myth of Hunahpu and Xbalanque, the miraculously born twin heroes of Quiché folklore. In order to avenge their father's death, the brothers descend to the infernal realm of Xibalba, and slay their parent's murderers. They cause their father and his brother to rise as the sun and moon respectively, while 400 youths who had been killed by the Xibalba monarch's son are transferred to the sky as stars.[1]

The Maya proper of the present day believe that the world is in the fourth period of its existence. In the first era there lived the Saiyamwinkoob ('Adjusters'), the mythical dwarfish aborigines of Yucatan, who are credited with the construction of the ruins before the appearance of the sun. As soon as the sun appeared, these people turned to stone. Figures found in the temples of Chichen Itza and other archæological sites are supposed to represent the Saiyamwinkoob. After a deluge, another race, the 'Offenders,' came into being, but again a flood destroyed the greater part of the world, and the Masehualli, or modern Maya, rose to power. Another deluge occurred and ushered in the present period, during which a mixture of all the previous inhabitants of Yucatan took place. The present natives of Yucatan distinguish seven heavens, each of which has a hole in the centre, one directly above the other. A giant tree (*Bombax ceiba*) sends its branches through these seven openings, and by means of it the spirits of the dead clamber up to their final place of repose. One version substitutes a ladder of vines for the tree. The *Gran Dios* of the white man is believed to reside in the uppermost heaven, while the lower heavens are peopled by the older deities of the natives, now degraded to the rank of subordinate spirits. Below the earth there is an under world. The spirits of the dead first descend to this region for a short space of time, but soon begin their ascent to the upper worlds. Men who have died in war and women who have died in childbirth are absolved from the obligation to visit the under world, and commence their ascent without delay.[2]

3. Chibcha.—The Chibcha philosophers postulated as the original substance *chiminigagua*—light enclosed in some undefined envelope. When the light freed itself from this covering, it created black birds which flew through the world, emitting radiant air from their beaks. Later it created all living things save men. Mankind traced their descent from a woman named Bachue (or Fuzachogue) and a boy, both of whom issued from a lagoon in the vicinity of Tunja. On reaching puberty, the boy married his companion, and their numerous progeny soon peopled the entire country. According to another myth, mankind was created by the *caciques* of Sogamozo and Ramiriqui—men out of yellow earth, and women out of hollow plant-stems. As darkness reigned over the earth, the *cacique* of Sogamozo bade his nephew, Ramiriqui, ascend to the sky and illuminate the world. Nevertheless, the night remained dark. Accordingly the *cacique* transformed himself into the moon. An interesting cosmological concept was connected with the myth of Chibchachum. This deity, angered by the inhabitants of Bogota, had afflicted them with an inundation of the Sopo and Tibito rivers. The Indians prayed to Bechica, who put a stop to the devastation of the country and punished Chibchachum by ordering him to support the earth, which hitherto had rested on wooden props. Earthquakes originated whenever the tired Atlas shifted his burden from one shoulder to the other.[1]

4. Peru.—A number of essentially different Peruvian cosmogonies are recorded in the earlier writings. According to one legend, Con, a boneless son of the sun and the moon, created the world and man, levelled mountains, and raised valleys by his supernatural powers. He is said to have come from the north. J. von Tschudi regards him as the deity of the Chimu, the natives of the north-western coast district. Con became displeased with the dwellers of the coast, and converted the region into a desert, though he mitigated this punishment by allowing some rivers to flow through the land so that the people might slake their thirst, and also provided his creatures with wild herbs and fruits. After him came Pachacamac, another son of the sun and the moon, and Con disappeared. Pachacamac transformed into birds, apes, pumas, and other animals the human race called into being by his brother. He then created the Indians of historical times, giving them for their occupation the cultivation of fields and the growing of fruit. Turruel's fuller account relates that in the beginning of the world Pachacamac created a man and a woman, without, however, supplying them with food. The man starved, but the woman prayed to the sun for relief, and the deity descended, comforted her, and impregnated her with his rays, so that she gave birth to a son four days later. Pachacamac, however, was angered at the thought that she had supplicated his father rather than himself, destroyed the infant, cut him in pieces, and sowed the dismembered parts of the child's body. From the teeth grew corn, from the bones yuccas, and from the flesh all the other fruits and vegetables. Thus, the Indians were indebted to Pachacamac for their food. The slain child's mother, however, clamoured for revenge. The sun again took pity on her, and created another son, Vichama, out of the murdered infant's umbilical cord. When grown to maturity, Vichama set out to journey all over the world. In the meantime Pachacamac killed his mother and caused birds of prey to devour her body, except the hair and bones, which he left near the shore. Then he created men and women, and appointed chiefs to rule over them. When Vichama learned of his mother's death, he restored her to life from her concealed hair and bones; then he set out to avenge her destruction. Pachacamac threw himself into the sea where afterwards stood the temple and city named after him. Vichama devastated the fields, and implored the sun to turn the people of Vegueta into stone, because, he alleged, they had participated in his mother's murder. Thus, all Pachacamac's creatures were transformed into stones. Repenting of their deed, the sun and Vichama transferred the former chiefs and nobles to the coast, setting them up there as *huacas* to be worshipped in the future. Then Vichama implored his father to create a new race. The sun gave him eggs of gold, silver, and copper, from which there developed the chiefs, their wives, and the common herd, respectively. Still another legend derives mankind from two male and two female stars sent down to earth by Pachacamac.[2]

[1] Brasseur de Bourbourg, *Popol Vuh* (Paris, 1861), 1–31, 187–193; Brühl, *op. cit.* 447 f.

[2] A. M. Tozzer, *A Comparative Study of the Mayas and Lacandones* (New York and London, 1907), 153–156.

[1] Brühl, *op. cit.* 461 f., 458.

[2] Uhle, *Pachacamac* (Philadelphia, 1903), 49 f.; Brühl, *op. cit.* 464 f.

On the shores of Lake Titicaca there developed variants of another myth. Before the reign of the Incas, the natives believed, there was no sun, and their ancestors prayed to the gods for light. Suddenly the sun rose radiant from the island of Titicaca. At the same time there appeared from the south a white man of slim figure, who levelled the mountains and caused springs to gush forth from the rocks. Hence he was regarded as the author of all things, the creator of the sun, mankind, and the brute creation. He travelled northward, and never retraced his steps. In the course of his journey he admonished the Indians to live in peace. The name by which he was commonly known was Ticiviracocha. Some time after his departure there appeared another man who cured the sick and wrought miracles. The inhabitants of Pueblo Cacha, however, rose against him, and were about to stone him to death; but he merely raised his hands, and flames darted from the sky, threatening to consume his assailants. Taking pity on the terrified Indians, he extinguished the fire, leaving only the burnt rocks as evidence of his power. He then wandered to the coast, spread his cloak over the waves, and vanished from sight. The name of this second wonder-worker was Viracocha. For a more substantial creation-tale we are indebted to Betanzos. Long ago, according to his narrative, there rose from a lake Con Tici Viracocha, who created heaven and earth and mankind, but did not supply them with light. Offended by man's ingratitude, he transformed the race into stones. He again rose out of the lake with several companions, created the sun in Tiahuanaco, and later the moon and the stars. Next, he re-peopled the earth in the following way: for every province he fashioned a number of stone images; then he sent all but two of his companions towards the east, where they called into being such people as their master had indicated in his stone effigies; finally, he dispatched, with similar powers, the two men that had remained with him, one to Condesuyo, and the other to Andesuyo, while he himself wandered to Cuzco, creating human beings as he passed along. In Pueblo Cacha he was attacked by the newly created Indians, but reduced them to submission, as in the version already quoted. In Cuzco he also created a tribe, and gave to the place its name. When he arrived at the seashore, he was joined by his associates, and they all walked across the sea as though it were solid earth. The full name given to this creator is Con Tici Viracocha Pachayachachic, while his assistants figure as 'viracochas' generically. In Molina's version, the two *viracochas* that remained with their master after the others had set out on their mission are called Ymaymana Viracocha, and Tocapo Viracocha. The former was credited with having named trees and plants, and with having instructed the Indians as to their nutritive and medicinal virtues. Tocapo, on the other hand, named the rivers, and taught the people about the fruits and flowers. According to the same variant of the myth, the sun, while rising from the Island of Titicaca in human shape, addressed the ancestors of the Incas, promising them that their descendants would rule the land and subject many tribes.[1]

5. Primitive tribes.—The *Arawak* of Guiana say that, before the existence of mankind, a being broke off twigs and pieces of bark from a silk-cotton tree and threw them broadcast around him. Some turned into birds; others fell into the water and became fish; still others fell on land and became beasts, reptiles, men, and women. The *Warrau* myth begins with a period when the ancestors of the Indians lived in the sky. There

[1] Brühl, *op. cit.* 464–472.

Okonorote', a great hunter, once pursued a bird for many days. At length he was able to shoot it, but his quarry fell into a deep pit and was lost to sight. Okonorote', however, saw daylight in the pit, and soon discovered a land down below, inhabited by many quadrupeds. He hung a long piece of bush-rope down towards the earth, and climbed down. After a successful chase, he returned home with some venison. The Warrau relished the food so much that they decided to emigrate to the earth. After many of them had climbed down, a woman of large proportions got stuck in the opening, and, though her fellow-tribesmen attempted to extricate her, it was found impossible. Accordingly, those Warrau who were already on the earth were obliged to remain in their new place of residence, while those who were still in the sky-land could not but stay in the upper regions. The same story, with trifling modifications, is told by the Carib Indians.[1]

The *Bakairi*, a Carib tribe living on the affluents of the upper Xingu river, regard the sun as a large ball made of the feathers of the red macaw and the toucan, and the moon as a corresponding ball of the tail feathers of the Cassicus. The sun is covered at night with a large pot, which is removed at daybreak. During the rainy season it is carried by a snail, during the dry season by the fast-flying humming-bird. The waning of the moon is due to the successive appearance of a lizard, an ordinary armadillo, and a giant armadillo, the last of which completely covers the feather-ball. Corresponding explanations are offered for solar and lunar eclipses. Orion is a frame for drying manioc, the larger stars form doorpost knobs, and Sirius constitutes a large cross-beam supporting the frame on the side. The Pleiades are simply a pile of flour-grains. The firmament shows merely a duplication of terrestrial affairs: the Indians find there manioc, cultivated soil, forests, etc. The Milky Way is a huge tomtom, near which the two culture-heroes, Keri and Kame, performed their deeds. Other heavenly phenomena are regarded as a jaguar, ant-eater, vulture, etc.

The place of a genuine cosmogony is taken by a number of myths, accounting not so much for the ultimate origin as for the more or less miraculous arrangement and regulation of observed phenomena through the power of the twin culture-heroes, Keri and Kame. Practically everything now existing in the universe is believed to have existed from the very beginning: there were even some Bakairi tribesmen and members of other tribes. Conditions, however, represented a sort of topsy-turvydom as compared with the present cosmos. In the beginning the earth was the sky. Earth and sky were in close proximity, so that it was possible to walk to and fro. Keri bade the sky shift its position, for his people were dying; but the sky refused to do so. Then Keri decided to depart. Accordingly, he and all his tribe went to the earth, and the sky rose to its present height. The sun was in the possession of the Urubú vulture; when the bird was away, darkness reigned supreme. Owing to this darkness, the tapir fell into a pit belonging to the Urubú. Keri saw him and entered one of his front feet; while Kame, who had entered a little yellow singing-bird, was to inform his brother of everything that was going on. When the vulture swooped down on his prey, Keri seized him and, on pain of death, ordered him to surrender the sun. The Urubú dispatched his brother to bring the sun, but his messenger only came back with the dawn. Sent back again, the vulture's brother offered Keri the moon, but the hero persisted in his demand until the sun was presented to him. Then he released the Urubú. The sun was shining continually, and Keri did not know what to do with it, though finally he covered it with a large pot, which was simply removed to make daylight. Thus, the latter-day distinction of day and night was first introduced. The moon was given to Kame. Another quasi-cosmogonic tale accounts for the origin of the Paranatinga and Ronuro-Kulisehu rivers. Keri and Kame were sent for water. They found three pots with water, but broke two of them, so that the water flowed down, forming the water-courses in question.

The remaining origin-tales of the Bakairi, though for the greater part belonging to the same cycle, are not cosmogonic at all, but merely narrate the heroes' exploits in acquiring fire, manioc, tobacco, the hammock, and other necessaries of life for the benefit of mankind.[2]

[1] E. F. Im Thurn, *Among the Indians of Guiana* (London, 1883), 376 f.

[2] K. von den Steinen, *Unter den Naturvölkern Zentral-Brasiliens* (Berlin, 1894), 357–386.

The *Paressi*, though members of the Nu-Arawak family, possess a number of cosmic notions akin to those of the Bakairi. They also believe the sun to be composed of red macaw feathers, which are hidden in a gourd at night and uncovered by their owner at daybreak. The moon consists of yellow 'mutung' feathers. The full moon begins to wane when a thin spider appears on its edge, and it is successively covered by four armadillos, the last being the giant armadillo, *Dasypus gigas*. The galaxy is dotted with countless yellow fruits, and of the stars many are recognized as an ostrich, jaguar, or some other animal. In the beginning there was a woman named Maisö. Neither earth nor water was in existence, and there was no light. She took a piece of wood and introduced it into her body, from which there then issued forth the Rio Cuyaba. Its muddy stream was soon followed by the limpid waters of the Rio Paressi. Maisö then placed land in the stream, and thus made the earth. Maisö also gave birth to many quasi-human beings of stone, first of all being Darukavaitere, who married Uarahiulu. This couple procreated the sun, the moon, and all the other celestial beings, and assigned to each its place in the firmament. Next, Darukavaitere begat parrots and snakes, until Maisö made his wife conceive Uazale, the ancestor of the Paressi and the first really human being.[1]

Of the *Weltanschauung* of the *Bororo* we have, unfortunately, but a meagre sketch. Like the Bakairi and Paressi, they regard the sun and moon as bunches of macaw feathers. Mankind are believed to dwell on a large island in a river. The sun and moon, or their owners, are on one side and pass through the river; when they meet, the moon passes by and becomes the new moon. The Pleiades are the blossoms of a tree, Orion is looked upon as a tortoise, and single stars are generally regarded as sand-fleas, Venus, for example, being characterized as 'the large sand-flea.' The rainbow is supposed to be a large shamanistic water-snake. A meteor that appeared during the second German Xingu expedition was regarded as the soul of a shaman bent on afflicting some Bororo with dysentery.[2]

The cosmogonic notions of the *Jibaro* of Ecuador are insufficiently known. According to one tale, the world was fashioned by a great spirit who amused himself with manufacturing clay objects. He constructed a large blue vessel, and placed it where the sky is nowadays seen.

A more detailed account is given of the deluge. A member of the Murato sub-tribe was fishing in a lagoon. A little crocodile swallowed his hook, and was killed by the Indian. The mother of the crocodiles was so incensed at this deed that she struck the water with her tail, and flooded all the country bordering on the lagoon. All the Indians perished, save a single individual who climbed a *pivai* palm, where he stayed many days in utter darkness. From time to time he dropped a *pivai* fruit, but he invariably heard it strike water. One day, however, the fruit appeared to strike the earth. The Murato climbed down, built a lodge, began to till the soil, and planted a piece of flesh from his own body. From this there grew up a woman, whom he married. A deluge-myth derived from the *Cañari*, but also attributed by Suarez to the Jibaro, records the escape of two brothers, who fled from the flood to the top of a mountain, which continued rising with the elevation of the waters. After the flood the two Indians went in quest of food, and on their return were astonished to find some dishes already prepared in the hut they had constructed. One of the brothers hid himself in order to fathom the mystery, and discovered two parrot-women, who set themselves to preparing the meal. Suddenly rushing from his hiding-place, he seized one of the bird-women and married her. The couple had three sons and three daughters, who became the ancestors of the Jibaro.[3]

The *Caraya* of the Araguayá River believe that their ancestor, Kaboi, and his people once lived in the under world, where the sun shone when the earth was dark, and *vice versa*. Hearing the call of a bird, Kaboi decided to follow it. He got to an opening leading to the earth, but, while his companions succeeded in passing through it, he himself proved too large and was able to get only his head above ground. The other Indians gathered many kinds of fruit, also honey and bees, as well as dead and dry wood, and brought their finds to the chief. Kaboi told them that, while the country seemed to be beautiful and fertile, its inhabitants, as indicated by the dry wood, could not live to the old age that fell to the lot of their own people, for in the under world the Indians attained a very great age, and died only when they were too old to move any part of their body. In spite of this warning, the people preferred to stay above ground. Accordingly, while their fellow-beings in the lower regions are still in the prime of life, the descendants of Kaboi's companions are destined to die. At an apparently later period, two powerful beings, Tenira and Sokroa, hurled all the Indians into a blazing fire and then destroyed each other in a trial of strength. Only two dwarf parrots and two belated youths, returning from the hunt after the destruction of their fellow-tribesmen, escaped. When the young men set out on the next day to hunt, they heard the pounding of mortars, and on their return discovered that their meals had been prepared by unknown hands. This was repeated on the next day. On the third day they discovered that the food had been cooked by the two parrot-women, married them, and thus became the ancestors of the modern Caraya.

Another tale recounts the destruction of the Indians by a flood. The Caraya were out hunting and drove their game into a pit. After taking out the captured animals, they dug up the magician named Anatiuä, and brought him to their village. Frightened by his strange antics and unintelligible gibberish, they fled from him, but Anatiuä pursued them. He had with him numerous calabashes filled with water. By breaking these, he made the river rise until he had caused a deluge. The Indians fled to the top of two mountain-peaks, but Anatiuä summoned to his aid several species of fish. Finally, one fish possessing a beak-like mouth ascended the peaks from the rear, pushed the people down, and thus drowned them. Only a few of them escaped. These descended to the valley when the waters had fallen again.[1]

The *Caingang* of the State of Paraná (Brazil) tell of a great flood which submerged the entire world inhabited by their ancestors, with the exception of a single mountain-peak. The Caingang, the Kadjurukre, and the Kame all swam towards this summit, carrying firesticks in their mouths, but only the Caingang and a small number of Kuruton Indians reached the goal, where they stayed without food for many days, some lying on the ground, while others, for lack of space, were obliged to cling to the branches of the trees. They were beginning to give up hope when they heard the singing of *saracura* (water-fowl), which were carrying hampers full of earth. By dropping this into the water, they caused the flood to recede. The Indians shouted to them to make haste, which they did, asking the ducks to aid them. In a short time they got to the summit of the mountain and formed a platform, on which the Caingang departed, those that had clung to the branches of the trees being transformed into Monito, and the Kuruton into Caraya, Indians. Because the *saracura* had begun their work in the east, all the watercourses of the land flow towards the west into the Paraná. After the flood the Caingang established themselves in the vicinity of the mountains. The Kadjurukre and Kame, whose souls had gone to dwell inside the sierra, began to cut roads, and finally succeeded in getting out in two opposite directions. The Kadjurukre entered a level country watered by a brook and without rocks, so that their feet remained small. The road of the Kame, however, led to a rocky region,

[1] Von den Steinen, *op. cit.* 435–439.
[2] *Ib.* 513–515.
[3] Rivet, *Les Indiens jibaros* (Paris, 1908), 91 f.

[1] P. Ehrenreich, 'Beiträge zur Völkerkunde Brasiliens,' *Veröffentlichungen aus dem königlichen Museum für Völkerkunde*, ii. (Berlin, 1891) 39–41.

where their feet were bruised and swelled up to their present size. As there was no spring there, they had to beg water of the Kadjurukre. On leaving the sierra, the Caingang ordered the Kuruton to look for the baskets and calabashes which they had abandoned below before the deluge. The Kuruton departed, but were too lazy to re-ascend the mountain, so they remained where they were and never joined the Caingang. During the night following their departure from the sierra, they built a fire, and a Kadjurukre made tigers out of the ashes and coals, bidding them devour the people and the game. As he had not enough coal left for painting the creatures he meant to fashion next, he made the tapirs, painting them with ashes and bidding them eat game. But, as they were hard of hearing, they asked him to tell them again what to do. Being already engaged in creating another species, the Kadjurukre answered gruffly, 'Eat leaves and the branches of trees!' Since then they have eaten only foliage and the branches or fruits of trees. The Kadjurukre was making another animal, which still lacked a tongue, teeth, and several claws, when the day began to break. As he was unable to complete the animal in the daylight, he quickly put a thin rod in its mouth and said, 'As you have no teeth, feed on ants!' Hence the imperfections of the ant-eater. The next night the Kadjurukre resumed his labours and created other animals and insects, among them the bees. In the meantime the Kame had created other animals to combat his rival's, such as the pumas, venomous snakes, and wasps. All the Indians marched on together. The young men of the Kadjurukre's band married the girls in the Kame's, and *vice versa*; and, as there were still left a great many young men, these married the Caingang women. For this reason the Kadjurukre, Caingang, and Kame consider themselves allies and relatives of one another.[1]

The *Tupi* derive their origin from Monan, the creator. Offended by his creatures, this deity caused a universal conflagration, which destroyed all human beings save Irinmage. Upon the solicitation of Irinmage, Monan extinguished the fire, and afterwards gave him a wife. From the descendants of this pair there issued Monan Maire, who acted as culture-hero, transforming men into animals and establishing the cultivation of plants. However, the Indians feared him for his magic, and forced him to commit suicide. One of his descendants, Maire Poxi, dwelt in insignificance among mankind, but finally ascended to heaven radiant with beauty. His son vainly attempted to follow, being transformed into stone. Another scion of the same line, Maire Ata, begat the twins Tamendnare and Arikute. The brothers went in search of their father, who resided in the east, and were subjected to a number of tests. They proved their miraculous powers by shooting an arrow into the sky and sending an arrow into its notch, continuing this process until the chain of arrows was complete. They further passed through clashing rocks ('symplegades') and descended to the under world. In the course of their wanderings Arikute attacked his brother, who caused a deluge, from which both were obliged to flee, seeking the shelter of trees. After the flood they re-peopled the earth, becoming the ancestors of two tribal divisions.[2]

The *Araucanians* worship as their supreme deity the representative of thunder, lightning, and fire, the latter being regarded as the origin of all life. This deity, Pillan, is believed to reside on the highest summits of the Andes, and definite localities are still named after him. At a later period there appeared Mapu, the creator of the earth, and Pillan became his enemy, gradually assuming the character of an evil being. His messengers and subordinate genii introduced disease among the Indians and their cattle, but could be driven away by means of burning branches. One of these supernatural beings, named Cherruve, took the form of comets and large meteors, and generally resided near the crater of volcanoes. Smaller meteorites were inhabited by another form of being with human head and serpentine body. The moon, Anchimalguen, was the wife of the sun, and was formerly regarded as a beneficent deity. More recently, she is described as an *ignis fatuus*, who frightens the traveller by throwing herself under his horse's body. When the rider attempts to lasso her, she flees and seeks refuge in the hut of a witch.[1]

RÉSUMÉ.—While the material available for comparison is far from complete, some interesting historical problems present themselves to the student of Central and South American myths. So far as homologies occur among neighbouring tribes, or tribes linguistically affiliated, the theory of dispersion from a common source of origin offers the readiest explanation of the similarities in question. Thus, there can be no doubt that the Warrau and Carib myths recorded by Im Thurn have a common prototype, and the conception of sun and moon as balls of feathers can hardly be supposed to have originated independently among the Bakairi, Paressi, and Bororo. The surreptitious preparation of food by bird-women constitutes so characteristic a motive that, though the Jibaro are far removed from the Caraya, we cannot assume that the incident developed twice, and we must depend on future research to indicate more clearly the path of transmission. It is far more difficult to apply this theory to the South American deluge-myths. While in the northern half of the New World the deluge-myth generally assumes a stereotyped form from the Atlantic to the Pacific, embodying highly characteristic elements, the South American narratives of floods do not seem to be united by any striking element of likeness. In the absence of such homologies the possibility of independent development cannot be denied, and we might suppose with Andree[2] that, so far as the myths are autochthonous, the flood motive has been suggested several times by local inundations. In view of the cultural affinity of North and South America, the question broached by Ehrenreich, whether this relationship is exemplified in the mythology of these continents, is of great significance. As Ehrenreich points out, the arrow-chain by which heroes ascend to an upper world in British Columbian mythology recurs among the Eastern Tupi, who are separated from their northern kinsmen by fifty degrees of latitude; and the blocking of a passageway to another world by a person of generous proportions is equally prominent in the Warrau, Caraya, and Mandan cosmogonies.[3] But, striking as are these resemblances, they are as yet suggestive rather than convincing, and it must devolve on future investigators to settle the problem of a pristine community of cosmogonic tales in the Western Hemisphere.

Psychologically, it is perhaps worth while to emphasize the essentially unphilosophical character of the South American cosmogonies. A certain degree of systematization is apparent in the Mexican, Mayan, and Peruvian myths; but the bulk of even these cosmogonic narratives is akin in spirit

[1] Lucien Adam, 'Le Parler des Caingangs,' *Congrès Internat. des Américanistes*, XIIe Session (Paris, 1902), 317–330.
[2] P. Ehrenreich, *Die Mythen u. Legenden der südamer. Urvölker und ihre Beziehungen zu denen Nordamerikas und der alten Welt* (Berlin, 1905), 30, 41, 49.

[1] O. Bürger, *Acht Lehr- und Wanderjahre in Chile* (Leipzig, 1909), 88.
[2] R. Andree, *Flutsagen* (Brunswick, 1891).
[3] Ehrenreich, *op. cit.* 50, 32.

and substance to the folk-tales current among their less civilized congeners in both Americas. The Quiché myth is probably fuller of abstract conceptions than any other Central and South American creation-story, yet these metaphysical portions of the *Popol Vuh* are relatively insignificant compared with the elaborate tale of the twin heroes, which has numerous parallels on both continents. Contrary to the traditional theory that folk-tales are degenerate myths, it might, therefore, be plausibly contended that myths are merely *Märchen* with a speculative gloss, or secondarily invested with a religious significance. This view, however, which has been urged by the present writer,[1] still awaits intensive discussion.

LITERATURE.—This is sufficiently indicated in the article.

ROBERT H. LOWIE.

COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY (Muhammadan).—The account in the Qur'ān of the creation of the universe is founded upon an imperfect version of the story in Genesis. In xli. 8 ff. it is written (Rodwell's tr.):

'Do ye indeed disbelieve in Him who in two days created the earth? . . . and He hath placed on the earth the firm mountains which tower above it, and He hath blessed it, and distributed its nourishments throughout it, for the cravings of all alike, in four days; then He applied Himself to the heaven, which was but smoke: and to it and to the earth He said: "Come ye, in obedience or against your will"; and they both said: "We come obedient." And He completed them as seven heavens in two days, and in each heaven made known its office; and He furnished the lower heaven with lights and guardian angels.' Other references are xv. 15 ff., xvi. 3 ff., xxxv. 12, etc.

The commentators Zamaḥsharī and Baiḍāwī, whose remarks are abstracted in the notes to Sale's *Koran* (Lond. 1734, p. 389), explain that the 'smoke' or 'darkness' of the heaven proceeded from the waters under the throne of God (which was created before the heavens and the earth), and rose above the water; and, the water being dried up, the earth was formed out of it; and the heavens out of the smoke which had mounted aloft. It is added that the heavens were created on Thursday; the sun, moon, and stars on Friday, in the evening of which Adam was made. The guardian angels were appointed to ward off prying devils (Baiḍāwī, *ib.* 211). The Traditions add little to this vague material:

'God was; but nothing was before Him, and His imperial throne was upon water. After that God created the regions and the earth; and wrote everything on the tablet of His own memory.' 'The angels were created from a bright gem, and the *jinn* from fire without smoke, and Adam from clay.' 'When God created Adam in paradise . . . the devil came and took a look at him, and, when he saw him with a body, he knew that God had created a creation which could not guard itself from hunger' (*Mishkāt al-Maṣābiḥ*, tr. Matthews, Calcutta, 1810, xxiv. i. 1).

Orthodox Muslim imagination has elaborated a fantastic idea of the Creation out of these scanty materials, aided by suggestions from foreign sources (such as the seven spheres and seven climates), but without allowing notions of science or philosophy to trench upon revelation. Thus the Qur'ān (ii. 20, lxxviii. 6) states that the earth was 'spread out as a bed,' or 'as a carpet'; so it manifestly must be a flat surface. The Muhammadans interpret the sayings of their Prophet literally, and believe that there are seven heavens, one above the other, and seven earths, one beneath the other; and they lay down the distances between them, and the diameter of each, and the substance of which each is constructed, with much precision. (These valueless speculations and opinions may be read in some detail in Lane, *1001 Nights*, London, 1859, Introd., note 2.) One account pretends that, the seven superimposed earths being unstable, God created a series of supports beneath them: first He ordered an immense angel to go beneath and hold the earth (or rather the seven earths) on his shoulders; and beneath his feet, to support him, God created a rock of ruby, with 7000 perforations, from each of which poured a sea. But the rock stood upon nothing, so God created a huge bull called Kuyūta, with 4000 eyes, and an equal number of other features, to bear it up on his back and horns. And under the bull God made Behemoth (Bahamūt), the giant fish, to lie; beneath which was placed water, and under the water darkness, 'and the knowledge of mankind fails as to what is under the darkness' (al-Damīrī, Ibn-al-Wardī, etc., *ap.* Lane, *op. cit.*); but the general belief is that there lies Hell with its seven stages, just as Paradise is supposed to be in the seventh heaven or above it. Muslim philosophers naturally did not always subscribe to such opinions, but, as their philosophy was wholly borrowed, their ideas of cosmogony possess no original value.

LITERATURE.—This is given in the article.

STANLEY LANE-POOLE.

COSMOGONY (Polynesian). — Throughout Polynesia the creation of the world is assigned to Tangaloa, the god of heaven, who is thus named in Tonga and Samoa, while in Tahiti, Raiatea, the Hervey Islands, and elsewhere he is called Taaroa, in New Zealand Tangaroa, and in Hawaii Kanaloa. He dwells in the highest heaven, and is often believed to have the form of a bird, this being his aspect as the celestial wind-god. The sun is his left eye, and he is likewise often the god of the sea, the mirror and the earthly representative of the blue sky. His wife is an enormous rock named O-te-papa, by whom he became the parent of the gods, the planets, the sea, and the winds. The gods, in their turn, were the parents of mankind, although, according to other accounts, Tangaloa himself formed man of red earth. Besides O-te-papa, Tangaloa had other wives, by one of whom, Hina, at once his daughter and his wife (as in many other cosmogonic myths), some legends made him the parent of heaven, earth, sea, and numerous gods. After man he created beasts, fowls, and fishes. Still other creation-myths ascribe the creation of the sky, clouds, stars, winds, beasts, fishes, sea, and the like to Raitubu, 'the maker of heaven,' a sort of demiurge and the son of Tangaloa. The earth is also explained, especially in the western Society Islands, as the exterior of Tangaloa's body, while in Raiatea he was believed to live in a sort of mussel, throwing away the shells from time to time, and thus enlarging the world. The myth of the cosmic egg was not unknown in Polynesia. A legend current in Hawaii, the Society Islands, and Tahiti, made Tangaloa, in his aspect as a bird, a prisoner for long ages in a gigantic egg. He finally broke this place of confinement, however, and the two halves of the shell formed the heaven and the earth, while the smaller fragments became the islands. Another tradition makes the islands bits broken from the cosmic rock O-te-papa, as she was dragged by her husband through the sea, or else pieces broken off from the mainland by angry gods. The myth of the cosmic egg recurs in New Zealand, where mankind were believed to be produced from an egg laid on the waters by a gigantic bird.

Tangaloa's exertions at the creation of the world were so great that, according to some cosmogonic legends of Polynesia, the salt sweat which streamed from him formed the ocean. From this ocean Tangaloa attempted to fish the earth; but, just as land was appearing above the surface of the water, his line broke, and the potential continent was dashed into a mass of small islands. A similar legend of Tangaloa fishing up the earth was found in Samoa, though the inchoate condition of Polynesian cosmogony is again exemplified by the existence in this island of divergent myths on this subject. Two islands, Savaii and Upolu, were

[1] Lowie, 'The Test-Theme in North American Mythology,' *JAFL* xxi. (1908) 97–148, xxii. (1909) 431 ff.

hurled from heaven by Tangaloa. He then sent his daughter, Turi or Tuli, to people this first land, and she, assuming the form of a snipe, settled down upon the islands, bearing with her a creeper which grew in the earth that formed beneath her feet. From the decaying leaves and tendrils of the creeper came worms, which Tuli pecked in two with her beak, thus forming human beings.

Both heaven and earth were regarded as impersonal in Samoa, Tahiti, and Rarotonga, and as being so close together that men could not stand upright, but were forced to crawl on the ground. The two were separated, according to the Samoan and Rarotongan versions of the myth, by a man who pressed them apart. In Tahiti, on the other hand, Ru, the sea-god, raised the sky to its present elevation. In Raiatea, a monstrous cuttle-fish held the earth and the heaven together, but he was killed by the sun-god Maui, whereupon the sky rose up to heaven. On the shoulders or the back of this god the earth rests; and, when he moves, the earth quakes. He is also confused with Tangaloa as the deity who fished the earth from the sea, while in other legends he takes the place of Tangaloa's daughter, Tuli, assumes the shape of a bird, and forms man by dividing a worm in two. In Tonga the earthquake is caused by the subterranean god Mafuike, who carries Samoa in his left arm. This same phenomenon is elsewhere ascribed to other gods, such as Maui himself in Tahiti.

Throughout this cycle of Polynesian cosmogonic myth one fact, not without parallel in other religions, is clear. O-te-papa, the primal barren earth or rock, represents the female principle, which is fructified and made to give birth to all things living, by the fertilizing rain which falls from the superincumbent male Tangaloa, the sky. In New Zealand the myth of the separation of earth and sky undergoes a curious modification.

Originally Rangi, the sky, who takes the place of the general Polynesian Tangaloa, who becomes a mere sea-god in this island, was closely united in nuptial embrace with Papa, the earth. From this union sprang countless children, but they were forced to dwell in utter darkness. In discomfort at this gloomy existence, the offspring of the pair sought to separate their parents. Tu-matauenga, the most cruel of all, urged that Rangi and Papa be killed; but Tane-mahuta, the god of trees, urged that the pair be parted. All assented, excepting Tawhiri-matea, the god of winds. The gods in turn now endeavoured to break the embrace of their parents—Ronga-ma-tane, the god of cultivated plants, Haumia-tikitiki, the god of wild plants, Tangaloa, the god of fishes and reptiles, and Tu-matauenga, the god of heroes. Finally, Tane-mahuta pressed his back against his mother and his feet against his father, thus parting Rangi from Papa. Tawhiri-matea, however, was angry with his brothers and followed his father, so that the wind and his children, the storm winds, still make war on the forests and the sea, and only man, the offspring of the terrible Tu-matauenga, is able to resist them. Strife also arose among the gods who had remained on earth, especially between the god of the sea and the god of the forest, since the latter gave Tu-matauenga wood for fishing-implements, wherefore the sea is angry with men and seeks to devour them. On the other hand, Ma-tauenga and his offspring, mankind, were able to conquer all the gods, with the exception of the wind which blows from heaven.

This version, although more detailed than any other Polynesian creation-myth, is obviously of much later origin than the legends current elsewhere in this part of Oceania.

LITERATURE.—Waitz-Gerland, *Anthropol. der Naturvölker* (Leipzig, 1872), vi. 232–239, 245–254; A. Bastian, *Die heilige Sage der Polynesier* (Leipzig, 1881). LOUIS H. GRAY.

COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY (Roman).—The only Roman cosmogonies which go beyond mere single statements about the origin of the world are found in the works of later writers. They belong, therefore, to a period when Roman culture was permeated with foreign, and especially Greek, elements. On the other hand, we meet with various cosmogonical ideas which may be referred without hesitation to the earliest Roman times. We shall, therefore, give some account of these, and afterwards inquire how far they enter into, and give a genuinely Roman character to, the cosmogonies of a later age.

1. **Early cosmogonical ideas.**—Nearly all the cosmogonical ideas of the Romans were connected with the god Janus, who is admittedly one of the very oldest Roman divinities (cf. *e.g.* Herodian, i. 16: *θεὸς ἀρχαιότατος τῆς Ἰταλίας ἐπιχώριος*). As F. Lukas (see Literature) puts it, he is related to Juppiter as the First is to the Highest. Accordingly, in the public worship of the Romans the first sacrifice was paid to Janus (Mart. *Epig.* x. 28. 2). As first in time he was naturally also regarded as the cause of all that followed after. So Festus, explaining why the first sacrifice was paid to Janus, adds: 'Jano primum fuisse supplicatum, quasi parenti, a quo rerum omnium factum putabant principium.' M. Val. Messala, the augur (50 B.C.), describes his cosmogonical character more fully: 'qui cuncta fingit eademque regit, aquae terraeque vim ac naturam gravem atque pronam in profundum dilabentem, ignis atque animae levem, in immensum in sublime fugientem, copulavit circumdato coelo,' etc. (Macr. *Sat.* i. 9). Martial (*Epig.* x. 28. 1) describes him as 'sator mundi.' As the author of organic life, he is described in a fragment of the Saliaric Hymn (Varro, *Ling. Lat.* 7, 26) as 'duonus cerus'—where 'duonus' = *bonus*, 'good,' and 'cerus' (or 'kerus,' connected with *creo*, Skr. *kar*, 'to make') means a creative spirit, and, as it is an older word for Genius, the creative deity of the family in particular (Lukas, p. 200). As the author of life, he was also invoked as Consivius (*a conserendo*, Macr. *Sat.* i. 9, 16).

It is clear, then, that Janus was a cosmogonic personage. But it is difficult to say what cosmic principle, if any, was originally represented by him. Here everything depends on the meaning of the name, about which opinions have varied greatly both in ancient and in modern times (cf. Roscher, *s.v.* 'Janus'). Of the ancient explanations, that which regarded Janus as a personification of the Sun (Nigid. Fig. in Macr. *Sat.* i. 9, 11, etc.) has been most generally adopted by recent writers, amongst whom we include those who think of the sun's light rather than the sun itself (cf. Roscher, *l.c.*; Lukas, p. 202, etc.). According to another and very similar ancient view, Janus represented the Heaven (Macr. *Sat.* i. 9, 11), and, further, we are informed by Varro that in this character he occupied a place of the highest honour among the Etruscans—*αὐτὸν παρὰ Θούσκοις οὐρανὸν λέγεσθαι καὶ ἔφορον πάσης πράξεως* (*ap.* J. Lydus, *De mens.* iv. 2). Now, there is a remarkable fragment of an Etruscan cosmogony in the oracle of Vegoia or Vegone (see *Gromat. Vet.* 350; cf. Müller-Deecke, *Die Etrusk.* ii. 30 ff., 165, 299, 312; Preller, *Röm. Mythol.* i. 172, 256), which begins: 'Scias mare ex aethere remotum. Cum autem Juppiter terram Etruriae sibi vindicavit,' etc. Here we have a Latin translation, probably of the 2nd or 3rd cent. B.C., of an ancient Etruscan oracle, which, according to Preller, represents ancient Italian popular belief. The oracle, which relates to the protection of landed property in Etruria, is thus prefaced by a priestly doctrine about the origin of the world: the Sea arose by separation out of primal Æther—and the same must also have been asserted in the original oracle about the Earth (Preller, i. 256 n.). But Æther is practically the same as Heaven (see art. ÆTHER in vol. i.; Roscher, *s.v.* 'Aither'), with which we are told that Janus was identified in Etruria, and it includes the notion of Light (see 'Greek' art. above; and Lukas, p. 208—'Aether = Licht des Himmels'), which others regarded as the essential attribute of Janus. Hence it is reasonable to suppose that the early Italians not only regarded Janus as creator of the world, but pictured his creative activity after the manner described

in the Etruscan oracle (Lukas, *loc. cit.*; Preller, p. 172).

2. Literary cosmogonies.—We are now in a position to inquire how far the cosmogonies of the later poets can be regarded as an independent product of Roman thought. We may fairly ascribe this character to any cosmogony which is based on the ideas already described. Franz Lukas has tried to show that this is the case with regard to the theory sketched by Ovid in the *Metam.* i. 5 ff., and *Fasti*, i. 103 ff. Ovid's is also, so far as we know, the only complete cosmogony whose dependence on primitive Roman ideas can be at all confidently asserted. To it, therefore, we shall now turn.

In the *Metamorphoses* we read that the world was preceded by Chaos. This was not, however, the empty void of the Hesiodic cosmogony, but the primary substance with which space was filled. It was a formless and confused mass—'rudis indigestaque moles'—the parts of which all struggled with one another, by reason of opposite qualities of moist and dry, hot and cold, etc. The process by which the world arose out of Chaos is attributed to what Ovid calls 'Deus et melior natura.' The 'melior natura' is evidently the material force by means of which order is brought out of chaos. Did it reside in matter from the first? The passage is not clear on this point (cf. Lukas, p. 208). But at least it implies that at some point of time the Deity either infused a higher nature into the primal substance, or gave effect to a higher power latent within it. Forthwith the diverse elements separated from each other, and united with their like, and the wholes thus formed took up a relative position in accordance with their several natures. Fire, the lightest element, flashed forth from the topmost arch of heaven; beneath it was the Air, and lower still the Earth, while Water, encircling the latter ('circumfluus humor'), still further compressed its solid mass. Next, the Deity moulded the Earth, which must here be taken as including the liquid element, into a sphere, and formed it in all its parts—seas, fountains, lakes, marshes, and rivers, plains, valleys, hills, and zones. He likewise completed the severance of the Æther from the Air, the region of cloud and storm. Then the constellations, erstwhile hidden in Chaos, glowed in the firmament. Life in all its grades appeared. The stars, as Divine Beings, dwelt in heaven; fish, bird, and beast tenanted their respective homes, and lastly Man was born.

The cosmogony of the *Fasti* is similar, but with some notable differences. There is nothing here about the 'Deus' or the 'melior natura.' The former is absent because the poet is concerned with the evolution of the four elements rather than with the formation of the world; and the latter, because here, whatever may be the case in the *Metam.*, the evolution of the primary matter is regarded as due to its own indwelling force. Another difference lies in the fact that the primary matter, which is again called Chaos, is here expressly identified with the god Janus. This brings us directly to the question whether the Ovidian cosmogony is to be regarded as essentially Roman. Now, the mere fact that Ovid equates Chaos with Janus counts for little, as the connexion of the names depends on a fantastic etymology (cf. Roscher, *s.v.* 'Janus,' pp. 35, 43). What is important is that the cosmogonical ideas contained in the *Fasti* are expressly associated with the old Roman god. The ground-thought of the passage is the separation of the elements from primal matter in obedience to the law of its own nature. The same thought is present in the *Metam.*, though there the evolutionary process is ascribed in part to a 'melior natura' working along with a separate Divine agency. We have seen, further, that the separation of the elements from the primal Æther (and that apparently without reference to an external agency) was an ancient Etruscan doctrine, and that in all probability Æther and Janus were equivalent terms. Still the connexion of the Etruscan doctrine with Janus rested on conjectural etymological grounds. But the fact that Ovid expressly associates the same ideas with Janus is strong evidence both that the former inference was correct, and that we have here a genuine Roman cosmogony. At the same time it is probable that in the working out of the fundamental idea Ovid was more or less indebted to Greek thought (cf. Lukas, p. 209).

The idea of a force inherent in primary matter, which forms the basis of Ovid's cosmogony, appears also in the representations which other poets give of Nature in general. As examples of these, Lukas refers to Virg. *Georg.* ii. 336 ff., and *Æn.* vi. 724 ff. In the former passage the poet ascribes the origin of the world to the same force which at each new spring-time clothes it with fresh life:

> 'Non alios prima crescentis origine mundi
> Illuxisse dies; aliumve habuisse tenorem
> Crediderim. Ver illud erat; ver magnus agebat
> Orbis, et hibernis parcebant flatibus Euri,
> Quum primae lucem pecudes hausere, virûmque
> Ferrea progenies duris caput extulit arvis,
> Immissaeque ferae silvis et sidera coelo.'

In the second passage he speaks of the Soul which animates the body of the world, which streams through every member, and from which every living creature sprang. In both these passages the poet, no doubt, borrowed freely from other writers, and especially from Lucretius (see Conington's *Virg.*). But he gives expression to the thought which we have seen reason to believe was familiar to the Romans from the earliest time—that, namely, of the evolutionary capacity of matter.

LITERATURE.—Roscher (see COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY [Gr.], 'Literature'), where readers will find a full account and criticism of views relating to Janus; F. Lukas, *Kosm.* (see *ib.*); *Gromat. Vet.*, ex rec. C. Lachmann, 2 vols., Berlin, 1848-57; K. O. Müller, *Die Etrusker*, new ed. by W. Deecke, 2 vols., Stuttgart, 1877; L. Preller, *Röm. Mythol.*, 2 vols., 3rd ed. by H. Jordan, Berlin, 1881-3.

I. F. BURNS.

COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY (Teutonic).

—The word 'Teutonic,' as we take it, is in its way descriptive of all peoples of Germanic origin, such as the Scandinavian, German, Dutch, and Anglo-Saxon. The word 'Teuton' first appears in the 4th cent. B.C., and is then applied to the Germanic tribe living around the mouth of the river Elbe. Modern ethnologists join in the common division of the Teutonic race, as yet existing, into three branches: (1) the Scandinavian, (2) the Low German, and (3) the High German. The Scandinavian branch includes the Icelanders, the Norwegians, the Swedes, and the Danes; the Low German branch includes the Frisians, the Dutch, the Low or Northern Germans, the Flemings, and the Anglo-Saxons; the High Germans are the Germans of Middle and Upper Germany, of Switzerland, and of Austria. For convenience' sake it is just as well, however, to speak only of the Scandinavian and the German branches, since this is both common and satisfactory.[1]

As Teutons, these two great branches had a common origin and a common faith in the supernatural. Thus their myths are also essentially identical, though the Scandinavian is much richer than the German. This is especially the case with reference to their cosmogony, for which we have to depend almost entirely upon Scandinavian sources. But whether the common stock of Teutonic belief

[1] Some divide the entire Teutonic race into the Eastern, Western, and Northern branches. Of these the Eastern, which once consisted of Ostrogoths, Visigoths, and Moesogoths, is now extinct; and the other two divisions are identical with the German and the Scandinavian branches.

is faithfully preserved in the Northern myths is a matter of much dispute. In reference to this problem, two different schools have developed—the conservative, and the critical—to which must be added a number of more or less independent investigators of a mediating type, leaning towards the one side or the other, though, of course, having much in common with both (cf. Literature at end of art.).

It is, however, safe to say that most modern scholars hold that Christianity in its earlier forms has, in a marked degree, influenced the old Norse poets, their songs, and their sagas, and consequently has made it very difficult to ascertain which elements in this mythology are genuinely Teutonic. The important poem *Völuspá* especially is viewed with much suspicion, as may be well noted, for instance, in E. H. Meyer's edition of it (*Völuspá, eine Untersuchung*, Berlin, 1889), in which he arrives at the conclusion that this great cosmogonic source is a mere Christian poem in a heathen disguise, composed in the 12th cent. by Saemund the Learned. Several later authors do not agree with this view, but rather consider it erroneous, though they allow that the great song has suffered from foreign influences, probably mostly Christian. Furthermore, it is generally held that the author of this poem, as well as of all the songs of the poetic Edda, is unknown, though the various lays were all collected in the 13th century.

From the German sources little can be learnt concerning the cosmogony of the old Teutons. Indeed, they tell us next to nothing of any of the beginnings, and they have no prophecies with reference to the future, while there is much of both kinds in the Scandinavian myths. Traces, indeed, have been found in Germany of a mythological belief similar to the Scandinavian, and even identical with it. Thus in Waitz's 'Merseburg MS' (probably from the 10th cent.) there are indications of a Balder as an originally Teutonic character; Odin is mentioned and Frija his wife, as is also a class of beings named Idisi, who perform the same services as the Valkyries of the Northern myths. These names occur in certain magic formulæ of undoubted heathen character, which are contained in the manuscript just mentioned. A similar source is the so-called 'Wessobrunn Prayer' from the 8th cent., in which, according to Müllenhoff and others, there are traces also of an original Teutonic cosmogony with the concept of a large void and yawning abyss, etc. But this may have been derived from Christian influences, as Waekernagel contends. Another source is found in Tacitus' works, in which he incidentally or otherwise touches upon the belief of the Teutons (cf. esp. *An.* xiii. 57; *Germ.* ii.). From these notices it seems that the old Teutons considered fire and water, and also salt, as original elements. Similar notions are to be found in Snorri Sturlason's *Gylfaginning*, chs. 5 and 6 (cf. below, p. 178, on the cow Audhumla licking salty stones in Ginnungagap). Finally, there exists at Mainz a letter of Daniel of Winchester (*Ep.* 15, Mon. Moguntina Coll.) to Boniface, the missionary to the Germans, written *c.* 720, which to some extent describes the cultus and beliefs of the ancient heathen. In it there are some references to the origin of the world and of the gods themselves.

These are really the only remains which we possess from the German branch of the Teutons as to the beginning of the world, except that in the idiom of the language itself and in certain remaining forms of magic there are some recollections of ideas once entertained by the original Teutons. But from all these remnants brought together there cannot be constructed anything like a Teutonic cosmogony. For such we have, as already indicated, to turn to the North.

The two main cosmogonic sources of the Scandinavian branch of the Teutons are Snorri Sturlason's *Gylfaginning* and the *Völuspá*. The former is, however, of less value as being very much a construction from the period of its composition, so that we shall have to draw mainly from the latter. According to it, the origin of the world, with its resultants, was as follows:

> 'There was, in times of old, where Ymir dwelt,
> nor land nor sea, nor gelid waves;
> earth existed not, nor heaven above;
> there was a chaotic chasm,
> and verdure nowhere.
>
> Before Bör's sons raised up heaven's vault,
> they who the noble Midhgardh shaped,
> the sun shone from the south
> on the structure's rocks;
> . . . . .
> there was the earth begrown
> with green herbage.
>
> The sun from the south, the moon's companion,
> her right hand cast round the heavenly horses;
> the sun knew not where it had a dwelling;
> the moon knew not what power it possessed;
> the stars knew not where they had station.
>
> The Aesir met on Idha's plain;
> they altar-steads and temples high constructed;
> their strength they proved, all things tried,
> furnaces established,
> precious things forged,
> formed tongs, and fabricated tools.
>
> At tables played at home; joyous they were;
> to them was not the want of gold,
> until there came Thurs-maidens three
> all powerful,
> from Jötunheim.
>
> Then went all the powers to their judgment-seats,
> the all-holy gods, and thereon held council
> who should the dwarfs' race create,
> from the sea-giant's blood
> and livid bones.
>
> Then was Môtsognir created,
> greatest of all the dwarfs,
> and Durin second;
> there in man's likeness
> they created many dwarfs from earth,
> as Durin said.'

Then follows a list of some fifty-five dwarfs, which the high gods created to be remembered as long as mortal men exist on earth. And, as in Genesis and most other cosmogonies, so in the Edda there is a story of a double creation, for now we are told that

> 'There came three mighty and benevolent Aesir
> to the world from their assembly.
> They found on earth nearly powerless
> Ask and Embla,
> void of destiny.
>
> Spirit they possessed not, sense they had not,
> nor blood, nor motive powers, nor goodly colour.
> Spirit gave Odin, sense gave Hoenir,
> blood gave Lódhur,
> and goodly colour.'

According to this description of the Creation, we find that before either heaven or earth was made there existed a chaotic state with a deep yawning chasm, later called Ginnungagap ('yawning gap'). This may be considered as the *terminus a quo* for the Teutonic idea of creation. In the *Völuspá* the story of the making of the world is given as here quoted, but it would hardly be fair to make this the only source of the cosmogony of the Teutons, as long as there is another, which proceeds to a much more detailed description. This is found in the prose Edda of Snorri Sturlason, and under the heading *Gylfaginning*, as before mentioned, but it is rather too extensive to quote. In the remaining literature of the Eddas there are also a few other references to the creation of the world and the

origin of things, and these, together with the two main sources just mentioned, offer the following composite view of the Teutonic cosmogony.

Ginnungagap was limited to the north by the cold and frosty region called Niflheim, and to the south by Múspellsheim, with its fire and burning heat. In Ginnungagap itself the cold from Niflheim, carried along by the twelve poisonous rivers, the Elivágar from the fountain Hvergelmir in the lowest deeps of the abyss, met the heat from Múspellsheim, resulting in the first development of life, which took form in a being similar to a man and called Ymir, who was of immense size and became the progenitor of the giants.

Along with Ymir there arose from the same union of cold and heat a monstrous cow called Audhumla—an original conception, it seems, and as such the fructifying power. With her milk she sustained Ymir, while she herself fed from the salty stones in Ginnungagap, which she licked. From her contact with the salty stones there grew forth another being called Buri, who united with Ymir's daughter Bestla, a sister of Mimir, the water-demon. By Bestla, Buri had a son Bör, who became the father of Odin, Vili, and Vé. Of these Odin was the greatest, and as such he is sometimes called the father of the gods. Odin and his brethren finally killed Ymir, drowning in his own blood his entire progeny, the giants, with the exception of Bergelmir, who escaped, and, in his turn, now became the father of a new race of giants. With Ymir's body the gods filled the awful and dark abyss, Ginnungagap, and there made the world. From Ymir's flesh they formed the earth; from his blood the rivers, lakes, and seas; from his teeth and smaller bones they made the rocks and pebbles; while from the larger bones they formed the mountains. With his eyebrows they surrounded this new-made earth, and called it Midhgardh, outside of which there was the ocean—the whole being now overtopped by heaven, which was made out of Ymir's skull and illuminated with sparks from Múspellsheim itself. From the giant's brains the gods made the flying clouds and the mists.

The next creative act of the Aesir, or high gods, was the making of man. Originally he was made into a pair from the mystic trees Ask and Embla, which the sons of Bör found on the seacoast, when one day they were walking there. To these new-made beings Odin himself gave life, Hoenir understanding, and Lódhur the blood and the lower senses, placing all this in a most beautiful form. Of man in his original state we noted the following from the *Völuspá*: 'Spirit they possessed not, sense they had not, nor blood, nor motive powers, nor goodly colour; spirit gave Odin, sense gave Hoenir, blood gave Lódhur, and goodly colour.' It should be remarked that Hoenir and Lódhur are identical with Vé and Vili.

As we have seen, the dwarfs made another class of beings with which men always had to contend, and who probably represent a later stage in the forming of the Teutonic myths, caused, perhaps, by the resistance of an earlier race to the coming invaders. These dwarfs constituted a hostile power of great number, and are mentioned at many places in the Eddas and in the earlier Icelandic literature.

From the account of the creation of man we have seen that trees have had a prominent place in the Teutonic mind from the very beginning. Most important of these trees was the great ash Yggdrasil, which was the life-tree, the tree of cosmic unity and of all existence, spreading its branches out over the whole world, and reaching with its top even to the abode of the gods, while sending its roots under the world in order to support it. Of these roots, one goes to Niflheim, where it is constantly gnawed by the subterranean serpent Nídhögg in order to destroy the tree and the world; the second root stretches to the region of the giants, where it enters the spring of Mimir, the great ruler of the nether world and the keeper of the tree itself. From this spring even Odin has to draw his wisdom. The third root reaches to the home of the gods themselves, from under which the sacred spring of Urd has its place, and whence the Norns, the sole arbiters of all human destinies, constantly scoop water to pour over the great ash, so as not to allow it to wither. But, notwithstanding all this care, there will come a time when the great tree will lose some of its leaves and branches, and then it will begin to groan. This will be the signal of Ragnarök, or the end of the present condition of the world. Now the final struggle between the gods and the giants, between good and evil, shall be fought, when evil will be for ever vanquished. After this the Yggdrasil will flourish as never before, and there shall be a new age, with a new earth, in which the hosts of the righteous shall dwell for ever in perfect bliss.

This is as nearly as possible an objective statement of the views of the early Teutons as regards the beginning of the world. But no one can tell whether these beliefs were not preceded by others of a more rude and simple character. This view seems probable to the present writer. But, as the examination of this hypothesis would lead us into the altogether uncertain, we shall have to rest satisfied with the matter we have in hand, and congratulate ourselves that we have so much. Perhaps its philosophy may be summed up as follows. The early Teutons believed in a pre-existing substance in a completely chaotic state, out of which, through the incompatible forces of cold and heat, there arose the primitive forms of life, endowed from the beginning with reproductive power. In this early state only the most monstrous beings were produced—beings like Ymir and his race, the giants. In the generating forces of the cow Audhumla, as well as in the two trees Ask and Embla, we meet new factors of organization, forming gods and men, which have a very near relationship. These are not generated outside of Nature, but within it, and are thus dependent upon it. Hence it follows that even the gods themselves are temporal *a parte ante*, and not eternal. Undoubtedly this was the early idea of the Teutonic race as regards the superior powers in which it believed. Furthermore, the gods are not real creators, but organizers forming the desirable objects out of pre-existing elements, which may have been considered as eternal. The gods may be said to have been generated from Nature, while man is the work of these gods through Nature, and they all in common have to conquer their baser instincts in order to remain free from trouble and curse. It is along these lines that the world itself, considered as a whole, will proceed until, after a final struggle, the new world, with its new conditions of happiness and bliss, shall be ushered in.

Such is the story of the cosmogony of the Teutons contained in some of the most sublime poetry of ancient literature. Few will doubt that it has, at least in a measure, been influenced by early mediæval Christianity, as Meyer and Bugge, together with many others, have proved; but none will deny that in these Icelandic lays we possess the essential strata of genuine Teutonic belief.

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de la Saussaye, *Rel. of the Teutons*, tr. Boston and London, 1902; S. Bugge, *Studier over de nordiske Gude- og Heltesagns Oprindelse*, i.–ii., Christiania, 1881–1889, Germ. tr. by O. Bremner, Munich, 1889 (Eng. tr. of vol. ii. under the title *The Home of the Eddic Poems*, London, 1899); J. Darmesteter, 'Les Cosmogonies aryennes,' in *Essais orientaux*, Paris, 1883; C. F. Keary, *Outlines of Primitive Belief*, London, 1882; A. V. Rydberg, *Fädernas gudasaga*², Stockholm, 1898, also *Germanisk Mythologi*, i.–ii., Stockholm, 1886–1889 (Eng. tr. of vol. ii. by R. B. Anderson for the Norroena Library, London, 1906 ff.); W. Golther, *German. Mythologie*, Leipzig, 1895, pp. 501–543; J. Grimm, *Deutsche Mythologie*⁴, Berlin, 1876; E. H. Meyer, *Voluspá*, Berlin, 1889 (this work has a good list of references to sources, literature, and commentaries), also *Die eddische Kosmogonie*, Freib. 1891; K. Müllenhoff, *Deutsche Altertumskunde*, vol. v. (by H. Gering, 'Die Edda,' Berlin, 1892); E. Mogk, *German. Mythologie*, Leipzig, 1906; H. Paul, *Grundriss d. germ. Phil.* iii.², Strassburg, 1896–1900; H. Petersen, *Om nordboernes gudedyrkelse*, Copenhagen, 1876; K. Simrock, *Handbuch d. deutschen Mythologie*⁶, Bonn, 1887, §§ 6–53; F. Kauffmann, *Deutsche Mythologie*², Leipzig, 1898; Paul Herrmann, *Nordische Mythologie*, Leipzig, 1903; H. Schück, 'Svensk gudatro under hednatiden,' *Finsk Tidskrift*, 1898; cf. also T. Möbius, *Catalogus Librorum*, Leipzig, 1856, also his *Verzeichniss*, Leipzig, 1880.

Darmesteter, Rydberg, and Grimm belong to the 'conservative' school, while Mogk and Meyer are very critical with reference to the contents in much of the Icelandic literature, particularly in *Völuspá* and the *Snorra Edda*; Golther occupies a sort of intermediate ground; Müllenhoff is generally considered a very safe guide and a good authority.

S. G. YOUNGERT.

COUNCILS AND SYNODS.

COUNCILS (Buddhist).—

Before giving a short survey of the traditions relative to the Buddhist Councils, it seems advisable to state what these Councils were. While it is impossible to accept the Buddhist opinion, which views them as ecumenical assemblies after the Nicene type, it is at the same time necessary to explain how Buddhist monastic life, without the help of such solemn assemblies, nevertheless resulted in a sort of 'catholicism,' and secured the redaction and the compilation of Canons of scriptures very like one another. The problem of the origin and character of the early sects cannot be evaded, for sectarianism is as old as catholicism in the Buddhist world; and Councils are said to have been held by the 'orthodox' to impugn sectarianism, and by the 'heterodox' to define their own peculiar tenets. As the history of the Canons and of the Sects will be dealt with elsewhere, we shall say here only what is necessary to avoid misleading ideas about the Councils, and to justify our half-conservative, half-critical position.

I. *COUNCILS, CANONS, AND SECTS.*—The professed dogma of the Buddhists of the post-canonic ages is that Councils were solemn synods of Saints, where *quasi*-omniscient and sinless old men (*arhats, sthaviras*) gathered in order to rehearse, to 'chant together' (*saṅgīti*), the Word of Buddha (First Council), or to re-state it against the heretical views of innovators (Second and Third Councils), or to approve the addition of new treatises to the sacred lore, or to give authoritativeness to some theory of exegesis (Third Council and Kaniṣka's Council).

It is hardly necessary to point out that, as regards the First Council, the ecclesiastical dogma is untenable. No European would admit the 'authenticity' of the whole Pāli scriptures; and —without troubling to refer to a number of specious arguments—in presence of such facts as are adduced by Rhys Davids (*Buddhist India*, London, 1903, p. 176) or R. O. Franke ('Buddhist Councils' in *JPTS*, 1908, p. 8), the relative lateness of a great or the greater part of the *Nikāyas* themselves is evident (see below, on the later Councils). But it is safe to believe with Kern, whose critical methods are by no means uncautious, that there have been 'synods' ('Qu'il y ait eu des synodes, personne ne le nie' [*Geschiedenis*, ii. 265]). Upaniṣads as well as Suttantas furnish many evidences of the habit of discussing doctrinal matters.[1] We shall venture to add (1) that Councils were sometimes legal sessions, of the type approved of in the Pāli *Vinaya*, held by the parochial or diocesan (or even polydiocesan) clergy, *i.e.* a *saṅgha*, in order to inquire into accusations brought against a monk or group of monks (First Council, ordeal of Ānanda [if it be historical], Second Council, on the ten extra-allowances of the monks of Vaiśālī); (2) that heretical views, no less than extra-legal practices, may have been a matter of scandal, of inquiry, of doctrinal appreciation by the *soi-disant* supporters of tradition (Council on the Five Points of Mahādeva?)—there was on some occasions at least more or less formal 'consensus' of the contending parties; (3) that, possibly—we dare not say probably, for no human being knows anything about it, and 'probably' would be misleading where no appreciation of probability is possible—immediately after the death of the Master, some of his disciples, headed by Upāli or Ānanda or Kāśyapa, tried to ascertain at least a list of his authentic sermons and teachings; they agreed, let us say, on the technical 'phrases' which are the oldest form of the *Prātimokṣa* (cf. *Mahāvyutpatti*, § 256 ff.), on the wording of the Benares sermon, etc.; (4) that kings of old concerned themselves with ecclesiastical affairs, as did kings of later times[1]—synods and doctrinal disputations, usual in the Middle Ages, as we are told in many sources,[2] may sometimes have acquired special importance, owing to royal intervention (Aśoka, Kaniṣka?); (5) that some monasteries (and in early times there were huge monasteries) were like permanent councils. Their 'living libraries' became Canons; for the canonic shape which the Word of Buddha (*buddhapravachana*) received at last, when Word became Scripture, had been for a very long time foreshadowed by the oral and mnemonic distribution of the Word into several Baskets (*Piṭakas*) and Collections (*Nikāyas*).[3]

Real synods, regional or local, would have furnished Buddhists with the idea of primitive and catholic Councils, if the immemorial custom of conversing on the Law had not early evolved this very idea, and if the sectarian spirit had not given to it a special importance: '*Our* Scriptures are the Word of Buddha, for they have been authenticated by sinless and divine-eyed witnesses.'

But, while acknowledging the possibility (even the probability) of synods, we are at no loss to point out more certain and farther reaching causes of the facts to be explained, viz. the formation of the body of the Scriptures, the general (if not strict) 'consensus' of the sects of the Hīnayāna as concerns Buddha's teaching, and, conversely, the splitting of the Order into sects.

If one excepts the division of the clergy named *āraṇyakas*, 'forest men,' or *pratyekabuddhas*, 'those who leave the world to live as the saints of old' (*ṛṣipravrajyā* [see Poussin, *Bouddhisme*, 1909, p. 355, and art. TANTRAS]), Buddhist monks have never been hermits, 'rhinoceros-like' solitaries. A novitiate so-called, and often prolonged apprenticeship, study, and service at the feet of the preceptor, fortnightly confession, cœnobitic life, and prolonged living together during the rainy season

[1] See, for instance, *Dīgha*, i. 178; Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, i., Oxford, 1899, p. 244, n. 2.

[1] We may cite Aśoka's Bhābrā Edict and Pillar inscription at Sārnāth (V. A. Smith, *Early History of India*², Oxford, 1908, p. 150); also (possibly) his Edict on the Quinquennial Assembly (Fourth Rock Edict [V. A. Smith, *Aśoka*, Oxford, 1901, p. 116; Kern, *Manual*, 101]); on the assemblies convoked by Harṣa, see V. A. Smith, *Early History*, p. 322; Kern, *loc. cit.*, and *Geschiedenis*, ii. 220.

[2] For instance, Tāranātha (*Geschichte des Buddhismus in Indien*, tr. Schiefner, 1869), Hiuen Tsiang (*Buddhist Records of the Western World*, tr. Beal, 1884).

[3] On the oral transmission of the *Vinayas*, see Fa-hien, xxxvi.

wers designed to prevent the admission of heterogeneous elements or to lead to their expulsion.[1] True Buddhist life was secured in every monastery, and the itinerant habits[2] which led the Brethren from their aboriginal country to the farthest monasteries of the 'Universal Church' established strong ties between the fraternities. Thus, the sons of Śākya constitute only one family 'held together (not) merely tbrough their common reverence for their master, and through a common spiritual aim,'[3] but by frequent intercourse and a common fear of deviating from Buddha's practice. Rival orders, whether Jain or Brahman, were a danger to orthodoxy, although they were also a cause of it.

There are no bishops in the Buddhist Order, nor even abbots in monasteries (*vihāras*); there was no monk entitled by the Buddha himself, or by the Church, or by 'Elders in number' (*sambahula*), to be the 'protection' (*paṭisaraṇa*) of his brothers.[4] Nevertheless, the present writer is now inclined to believe that Buddhism contains more of a hierarchy than Oldenberg (*Buddha*^{5}, p. 395 = *Bouddha*^{2}, p. 333) and he himself (*Bouddhisme*, Paris, 1909, p. 335) have hitherto been willing to admit.

The 'ecclesiastical age,' the number of years elapsed since the admission into the Order, and the 'sanctity' (arhat-ship), the number of years elapsed since the acquisition of the passionlessness of an arhat, are the principle of a hierarchy—not a constraining, but a very effectual one. The rule of addressing an 'elder in religious life' by a special title, *bhante*, 'venerable,' instead of using the primitive and levelling *āvuso*, 'friend,' is attributed to the dying Buddha; it was enforced at an early epoch, though not at the very beginning.[5] Arhats were jealous of their privileges; they regarded it as a very grave crime unduly to claim arhat-ship; they considered themselves as the spiritual aristocracy of the Church, the nniversal *saṅgha* (cf. the legend of the judgment of Ānanda).[1] There are not only Elders (*thera*), but 'Older Elders' (*theratara* = πρεσβύτερος, *therachirapabbajita*), and 'the oldest Elder on earth' (*pathavyā saṅghathera*);[2] and these old monks are styled 'Fathers of the Church,' 'Leaders of the Church' (*saṅghapitāro, saṅghapariṇāyaka*).[3]

Thus was evolved the idea of Patriarchs, *vinayapāmokkhas*, 'chiefs of discipline,' or *āchāryas*, 'Masters,' who are supposed by the Sinhalese and the Northern Buddhists to have successively controlled the universal Church. Oldenberg rightly observes that this idea of Patriarchs is foreign to the canonical literature; but we are told in *Dīgha*, ii. 124, that such and such a *saṅgha* possesses *theras* and *pāmokkhas*.[4]

The feeling of the unity of the Order, and the actual striving to promote or to restore this unity, assert themselves in the sermons of Buddha on 'schism' (*saṅghabheda*),[5] the most hateful crime, in punishment of which an eternity (*kappa*, 'age of the world') of suffering is hardly sufficient![6] In some cases Buddha goes so far as to forbid the re-ordination of monks who have turned away to schism (or who have followed schismatics).[7]

But we ought to be aware that these sermons contain a lesson to the 'rigorists,' or conservative party, as well as to fosterers of division.

The following is reported to Buddha: 'A certain monk, Lord, had committed an offence which he considered as an offence, while the other monks considered that offence as no offence. Afterwards he began to consider that offence as no offence, and the other monks began to consider that offence as an offence. . . . Then those monks . . . pronounced expulsion agaiost that monk for his refusal to see that offence. . . . Then that monk got his companions and friends among the monks on his side, and sent a messenger to his companions and friends among the monks of the whole country. . . . And the partisans of the expelled monk . . . persevered on the side of that expelled monk and followed him . . .' Buddha piteously exclaims: 'The *saṅgha* is divided! The *saṅgha* is divided!' but he has words of rebuke for the 'expellers': 'Do not think, O monks, that you are to pronounce expulsion against a monk for this or that, saying: "It occurs to us to do so."'[8]

One has to distingnish between what is really important and what is not worth disputing. *Pātimokkha*, the essential rule of the Order, and *Dhamma*, the essential doctrine leading to salvation

[1] As too often happens in such obscure fields, our documents are *double-edged*, and one can use them to demonstrate conflicting theories—original 'orthodoxy' as well as original 'anarchy.' For instance, we are told of monks 'who had no preceptors and received no exhortation or instruction,' wearing improper garments, eating improper food . . . (*Mahāvagga*, i. 25, in *SBE* xiii. ['Vinaya Texts,' pt. i.] 151); of 'a certain monk, who had formerly belonged to a non-Buddhist school, silencing his preceptor by reasoning, and going back to that same non-Buddhist school' (*ib.* i. 31. 8). Even old monks return to the world or go over to a (schismatic) faction (*ib.* i. 36. 1). There are monks who forbid novices the use of all food that is taken with the mouth (*ib.* i. 57. 3). Relations with non-Buddhist devotees are forbidden (*Pāch.* 41). The *jaṭilas*, or ascetics with matted hair, are said to have thrown their hair and their sacrificial utensils into the river when Buddha converted them; nevertheless, the phrase *natthi hutam*, 'oblations to fire are of no use,' is with the Buddhists a heretical tenet (*mithyādṛṣṭi*), just as it was probably with the *jaṭilas*. It is not held as absurd and impossible that a monk, when at the half month the *Pātimokkha* ('Book of Confession') is being recited, should say: 'Now for the first time do I notice that this rule, they say, is handed down in the Suttas . . .' (*Pāch.* 73). Nay, we find the case discussed of not a single monk, among all the Brethren dwelling in some particular place, knowing the *Pātimokkha* (*Mahāvagga*, ii. 17. 5 [*SBE* xiii. p. xxxiv]), but this would prove far too much. It sometimes happens that the sinful monks are strong, and the pious monks feeble; these last are dejected, forced to silence in the *saṅgha*, and go away to another country (*Aṅguttara*, i. 68).

All these testimonies, and many others, *e.g.* the dishonest method of securing concord and orthodoxy by manipulation of the votes (Oldenberg, *Buddha*^{5}, p. 398 = *Bouddha*^{2} [tr. Foucher], p. 336; *Chullavagga*, iv. 14, 26, in *SBE* xx. ['Vinaya Texts,' pt. iii.] 56), establish at the same time: (1) that there are germs of division, and no small danger of the Order's losing its originality; (2) that, conversely, there is a catholic and traditional spirit, asserting itself in the rules of excommunication, etc. That this spirit gained the upper hand is sufficiently proved by the history of the Church, the constitution of Canons, etc. But the same history (growth of Mahāsaṅgha, Lokottaravāda, Mahāyāna, Tantrayāna) confirms the view that there has always been a Buddhism *du dehors*, a heretical, popular Buddhism, which later gained the predominance.

[2] See Minayeff, *Recherches sur le bouddhisme*, ch. v., esp. p. 116 ff.; cf. S. Lévi, 'Saintes écritures du Bouddhisme,' *Conférences faites au Musée Guimet*, *AMG* Bibl. de vulgarisation, xxxi. (1909) 125.

[3] *SBE* xiii. p. xii; see Poussin, *Muséon*, 1905, p. 311.

[4] *Majjhima*, iii. 8; reference in Oldenberg, *Buddha*^{5}, p. 397 = *Bouddha*^{2}, p. 335.

[5] On this point, see R. O. Franke, *JPTS*, 1908, p. 18 f. His inquiry shows how much light can be derived from a careful comparison of texts. It establishes the fact that 'in the older canonical texts there appears a certain customary mode of address, different from that prescribed for the future by the Buddha.' Here, again, one may urge that the doctrine of the 'elderness' is not primitive.

[1] In Mahāyāna, *saṅgha* = *bodhisattvagaṇa*, 'the cohort of the celestial Bodhisattvas' (Śāntideva's *Bodhicharyāvatāra*, Com. ii. st. 1). In the later Hīnayāna, *saṅgha* = *chattāro purisayugā*, the four owners of, and the four candidates for, the fruits of *sotāpanna* . . . *arhat* (*Kathāvatthu*, Com. p. 32, *Madhyamakavṛtti*, p. 478). This idea that saints (or *quasi*-saints) only are real members of the *saṅgha* is visible in *Saṁyutta*, i. 233: *chattāro cha paṭipannā chattāro cha phale ṭhitā esa saṅgho ujubhūto*, and also in the history of Councils (*Chullavagga*, xi., xii.); see discussion in *Kathāvatthu*, xvii. 6.

[2] *Chullavagga*, xii.

[3] *Dīgha*, ii. 77 (= *SBE* xi. 6): 'So long as the brethren honour and esteem and revere and support the elders of experience and long standing, the fathers and leaders of the order, and hold it a point of duty to hearken to their words,' etc. (We have objections to the translation 'of the order,' and prefer 'of the fraternities, of the parishes.') Here, again, the text shows that disrespect towards Elders was not impossible. Cf. the Vaiśālī legend.

[4] See *Buddha*^{5}, 398 (= *Bouddha*^{2}, 336), reference to *Dīpavaṁśa*, v., *Parivāra*, 2; Kern, ii. 291; *Samantapāsādikā*, 292 (*Vinayapiṭakam*, vol. iii. [1881]). See also, on the 'Northern' Patriarchs, Kern, *Geschiedenis*, i. 215.

[5] There are a number of synonyms, or *quasi*-synonyms, which are translated as follows: 'altercations, contentions, discord, quarrels, divisions' among the *saṅgha* (*bheda*), disunion among the *saṅgha* (*vaji*), separations among the *saṅgha* (*vavatthāna*), schism among the *saṅgha* (*nānākaraṇa*; *SBE* xvii. 288). There is 'disunion,' when the number of disputing monks does not exceed eight; 'schism,' when they are nine or more (*Chullavagga*). It must be observed that the Vinaya has in view disputes in a parish; but it states that 'expelled' monks search for partisans 'in the whole country' (*janapada*), and that 'expellers' give notice abroad of the expulsion. The *Abhidharmakośa* distinguishes between common *saṅghabheda* and *chakrabheda* (?), which is the real *saṅghabheda*; it adds that *bheda* supposes in the 'schismatic' (*bhettar*) the folly of believing oneself a 'Master' (*śāstar*), like Buddha.

[6] *Itivuttaka*, § 18 = *Aṅguttara*, v. 76 = *Kathāvatthu*, xiii. 1 = *Parivāra*, xvii. 78 = *Chullavagga*, vii. 5. 4. [We are indebted for these references to Prof. R. O. Franke.]

[7] See *Chullavagga*, vii. 5. 4; but cf. the whole paragraph.

[8] *Mahāvagga*, x. 1; the translators of 'Vinaya Texts' (*SBE* xvii. 287) have: 'expulsion against a *bhikkhu* whatever be the facts of the case . . .' (*yasmiṃ vā tasmiṃ vā*).

—these are important; and happily 'there are not,' Ānanda says to Buddha, 'two monks who differ concerning the Eightfold Path, the Four Efforts,' etc.[1] There are also *Adhipātimokkha*, *Ajjhājīva*, and *Abhidhamma*, subtleties or refinements or niceties concerning monastic life and doctrine, but these are mere trifles.

When two monks differ (or believe that they differ) on *Abhidhamma*, one has to content oneself with the mere statement of facts: 'You differ concerning the meaning and the letter [of a Sūtra]; well, do acknowledge that you differ, and do not dispute thereof.'[2]

Again, 'orthodoxy' has two aspects: not to rest content with 'unreliable' evidences (see below), and not to impugn systematically received opinions: 'Whatsoever monk . . . shall speak thus: "I cannot submit myself to that precept, brother, until I shall have inquired touching it of another monk, an experienced master of the Discipline," that is a Pāchittiya, a fault requiring repentance' (*Pāch.* 71).

The principle of the *āchiṇṇa* at once occurs to us, according to which 'it is allowable to do a thing on the ground that "my preceptor, my teacher, has practised this or that"': this principle, acknowledged in Brāhman circles, was maintained by some Buddhists, the heretics of Vaiśāli (*Chullavagga*, xii. 2, 8); and it was to some extent agreed to by the orthodox, for we are told that, when the First Council was just concluded, there came a celebrated monk, Purāṇa, with his 500 disciples, who refused to adhere to the resolutions of the Council: 'The doctrine and the disciplinary rule have been well sung by the Elders; nevertheless, even in such manner as it has been heard by me, and received by me from the very mouth of the Blessed One, in that manner will I bear it in my memory.' Neither the Elders nor the pious writer have a word of rebuke for this individualism (*Chullavagga*, xi. 11).

There are, we say, evidences of a very tolerating tendency; in order to assure concord, the most reasonable are to yield, for discord is the greatest evil. The care to live 'well, without dispute,' and the care not to lose any word of Buddha, whencesoever it might come, were both commended.

It may even happen that laymen are the only supporters of some important texts: 'If he sends a messenger to the monks, saying, "Might their reverences come and learn this suttanta; otherwise this suttanta will fall into oblivion," . . . then you ought to go even during the rainy season' (*Mahāvagga*, iii. 5, 9 [*SBE* xiii. p. xxxiv]).

But the care to be 'orthodox,' and not to alter Buddha's practice (*Buddha-āchiṇṇa*) has not proved less effective. Not only irregular practices, but sinful theories (*pāpikā diṭṭhi*), must be abandoned.[3] The legend of the Vaiśālī Council relates the endeavours of the 'good ones' to enforce the old rules.[4] The *Mahāparinibbānasutta*, without mentioning Councils, points out that one ought not to rest content, in the matter of the orthodoxy of a theory or of a practice, merely with the testimony of a hearer of Buddha, of an Elder, of a (parish) *saṅgha*, or of many Elders, but that one must look at what we venture to style the original source: 'Without praise and without scorn every word and syllable[5] [of a hearer, of an Elder, etc.] should be carefully understood, and then one must go for them to the Sūtra, look for them in the Discipline. If they are not to be found in the Sūtra, if they are not to be seen in the Discipline, then you may come to the conclusion, "Verily, this is not the word of the Exalted One"' (*Dīgha*, ii. 124).[6]

[1] *Majjhima*, ii. 245; cf. iii. 128. But we are told by Buddhaghosa that these very lists were altered by heretics (see *Aṅguttara*, i. 1883 [not 1885], p. 98).

[2] *Majjhima*, ii. 238 (nos. 103 and 104).

[3] See *SBE* xiii. 226, note: 'Temporary expulsion . . . is pronounced against monks who refuse . . . to renounce a false doctrine.'

[4] See below, p. 183.

[5] Although Buddha said: 'Syllables are without any importance; you ought not to dispute on mere trifles' (*Majjhima*, ii. 240).

[6] See *SBE* xi. 67; *Dialogues*, ii. 133 (Rhys Davids' tr., from which we venture to differ somewhat in wording); cf. the Sanskrit rendering of these criteria of authenticity in Poussin, *Bouddhisme*, p. 141.

There is no reason to deny *a priori* that such a notion of the *Dhamma-Vinaya*, as being more authoritative than individual assertions or local traditions, is very old and even primitive. Without turning the early monachism into a catholicism, one may trace strong catholic tendencies in the 'universal fraternity' (*chāturdiśa saṅgha*). The order of the dying Buddha that, after his death, 'the "Law" is the recourse, the lamp, the island,' has been obeyed. From religious and intellectual needs has issued a system of rehearsing practical, legendary, and doctrinal lore—an ever-increasing and more or less organic growth of the primitive wisdom. The schools which style themselves *sthaviras* (*Thera*, *Theravādins*) wrongly believe that they maintain the doctrine ascertained in the Councils of the Elders; but the older and more 'historical' conception is very similar, viz. that there was a tradition, called the tradition of the Elders, because the Elders were in early times the authoritative witnesses of the Buddha's word.

To sum up: it is not to be believed that 'Canons' were *compiled* before a relatively late epoch, and additions were possible for a long time after the sacred lore had been converted into sacred books: the Pāli *Parivāra* and *Abhidhammas* may be quoted as evident additions. But already at the time of the compilation of the *Mahāparinibbānasutta*, the notion of an authentic tradition, whose claims are not to be overborne by isolated *theras* or by parish-clergy, had made its way. And, without admitting a solemn *consensus* of the universal Church, gathered in Nicene-like assemblies, one can understand how the cœnobitic and itinerant organization of the clergy produced this 'common patrimony' of all the sects—to use Cecil Bendall's phrase—which underlies the sectarian development of the Canons known to us.[1]

Whilst, in order to explain the 'splitting into sects' and the diversity of the Canons, a Buddhist would admit the *mūlasaṅgīti-bhraṁśa*, 'decay of the original chanting together of the Law,' 'rupture of the primitive consensus,' we shall rather look at the manifold and numerous variants in the wording, and not a few discrepancies in the *mise en œuvre* of the 'common patrimony,' as the natural result of a (doctrinally and locally) diversified work on the oral tradition. The Pāli Canon itself, with its 'polygeneous' *loci communes*, its repetitions, its parallel stories with interchangeable heroes, and its contradictions, furnishes us with the best idea of what this tradition was. Nay, it would not be impossible to extract from this Canon two or three Canons all complete, all like one another, and all conflicting.

If the above observations are correct, it is not impossible to work out a provisional theory concerning the origin and the character of sects.[2] The legend of Purāṇa and numerous evidences of every kind prove that a central authority was wanting, that the original precise dogmatism postulated by some modern historians is purely conjectural, that Buddhist monachism contained germs of 'localization' or division.[3] But all this is not inconsistent with a sort of 'catholicism' or 'orthodoxy' at least. Sects (*bhedas*) may arise and develop, without being the results or the causes of formal schisms or divisions of the Church (*saṅghabheda*), and without implying repudiation or the prohibition of 'eating together' or 'communicating together' with monks (*asambhogaṁ saṅghena*, [*Mahāvagga*, x. etc.])—a prohibition which is made known by the repudiating parish to the parishes in general. There may

[1] The consensus of the different sects as concerns the sacred character of many passages, in dogma or history, is not a proof that these passages were unanimously acknowledged before the splitting into sects. Mutual borrowing from sect to sect was by no means impossible; opposition between sects was, on the whole, restricted to a few rules of practice or a few doctrinal tenets; local traditions, or fresh acquisitions, by a particular sect, by some monastery or group of monasteries, were, we must admit, generally welcomed by the others. And it may be urged that a sect—possibly the Pāli-speaking one—which would surpass its fellow-sects in compiling an organized body of Scriptures (or, to be more precise, in designing a drawer-desk in which to put the Buddha's words) would exercise *ipso facto* a profound and decisive influence on the Buddhist Order at large. It does not follow that the traditions of this sect were the oldest, or genuine and free from borrowing, or that they have not been, since their earliest compilation, manipulated, developed, or adulterated in many ways.

[2] See art. Sects (Buddhist). We are not here concerned with the 'Great Vehicle' (*Mahāyāna*).

[3] 'Forest men' are allowed to observe ascetic practices that are more or less in contradiction to the principles of the 'middle way' between asceticism and laxity—a principle solemnly stated in the Benares Sermon.

be 'cantonments' without discord, 'diversities' without excommunication. It is, for instance, a fact that Buddhists used their own dialect[1]—Buddha himself is said to have allowed his disciples to do so; and diversity of language is more than sufficient to cause distinction and what we may call 'liturgical' opposition. Details concerning monastic life, robes, and food are also decisive in this regard: discrepancies could not but arise. The Pāli *Vinaya* states that extra allowances ought to be tolerated in some provinces (*Avanti*); four monks make a *saṅgha* in 'Bordering countries,' nine are necessary in 'middle countries' (*madhyameṣu*), etc.

As we know from later documents, such discrepancies did not lead to scandal or rupture. Of course, a monk ought to follow the rules to which he has subscribed as a novice; but he is not obliged to protest when he is the guest of monks who use food forbidden to him; conversely, his guests have no right to force their own rules upon him.[2] But, as it is said, 'the very water has taken fire' (*SBE* xx. 119), the very evidence to which we refer shows that intolerance, too, was by no means impossible in such cases.

Diocesan varieties, which we may consider as the usual origin of sectarian rivalries, did not prevent union and communion, and, therefore, did not prevent collaboration on the Canonical Literature. Anything that claimed to be 'Buddha's word' obtained, as a rule, adhesion. Sūtras attested by extraneous tradition (*parasamayatas*) were taken into consideration, for later doctrinal contradictions between schools depend upon exegesis rather than upon sources, and are more concerned with the meaning of the Sūtras than with their authenticity. Schools work on a common literary stock, made up from mutual borrowings, and they arrive at divergent conclusions, even when they do not start from divergent dogmatical tenets. As a rule, doctrinal contradictions do not disrupt the *saṅgha*. If the clergy of a diocese, through the action of a synod or otherwise, draw up a synthesis of the Law, the objection is ready at hand: 'You alter the Law' (*sāsanaṁ navakataṁ*).[3] 'No, we have not modified the cardinal principles, theological or moral,' is the answer. And this answer, be it right or wrong, is probably accepted. It may happen that a theory, for instance, the *pudgalavāda* ('doctrine of a permanent *ego*'), would lead some sectaries so far as to deny the authenticity of certain *sūtras*; or, conversely, it may be a question amongst the orthodox whether such sectaries have any right to style themselves Buddhists, and yet they are recognized as 'scions' of the tradition of the Elders.[4]

Thus, if we consider the mutual relations of sects and their legal position as branches of the universal *Saṅgha*—leaving out of account doctrinal divergences which are not, as such, of paramount importance—sects are not to be contrasted as hostile bodies, with closed traditions. The dream of Bimbisāra may be quoted as giving a true symbol of the Buddhist church:

King Bimbisāra once saw in a dream that a piece of cloth was torn, and a gold stick broken, both into eighteen fragments.[5] Being frightened, he asked the Buddha the reason. In reply, Buddha said: 'More than a hundred years after my attainment of *nirvāṇa*, there will arise a king, named Aśoka. . . . At that time, my teaching, *handed down* by several Bhikṣus, will be split into eighteen schools, all agreeing, however, in the end, that is to say, all attaining the goal of final liberation. The dream foretells this, O king, you need not be afraid.'[6]

II. *TRADITIONS CONCERNING THE COUNCILS.*—**1. First Council or Rājagṛha Council.**—The Pāli canonical narrative of the First Council (*Chullavagga*, xi. [*SBE* xx. 370]) may be summarized in the words of Kern:[7] 'After the demise of the Master, a certain Subhaddha said to his fellows: "Do not grieve! We are happily rid of the Great Ascetic. We used to be annoyed by being told, 'This beseems you, this beseems you not.' But now we shall be able to do what we like, and what we do not like we shall not have to do." In order to obviate the dangerous effects of such unseemly utterances, Kāśyapa the Great made the proposal that the Brethren should assemble to rehearse the Lord's precepts. The proposal was adopted, and Kāśyapa was now entreated to select 500 Arhats. This being done, it was decided that Rājagṛha should be the place of assembly. During a seven months' session the *Vinaya* ("Discipline") was fixed, with the assistance of Upāli; the *Dhamma* ("Law," doctrine), with the assistance of Ānanda.' There are added some details regarding certain errors or misdeeds of Ānanda, who had to make amends for them. Lastly, a celebrated monk, Purāṇa, arrives when the 'chanting together' of the Law is completed, and, although he admits that the Law has been well 'sung' by the Elders or Arhats, he prefers to 'bear' the Law as he has himself received it from the Master.

According to Oldenberg, 'what we have here before us is not history, but pure invention';[1] and every one will agree with him, as far as the 'chanting together' of the whole *Vinaya* and *Dharma* (=Sūtras) is concerned, although, in the words of Kern, 'it is by no means incredible that the disciples, after the death of the founder of their sect, came together to come to an agreement concerning the principal points of the creed and of the discipline.'[2] As concerns the minor details, whose unhistorical character is by no means evident (misdeeds of Ānanda, excommunication of Chhanna, etc.), Minayeff thinks that they are to some extent historical, and the present writer does not see how this opinion can be 'proved' to be either right or wrong.[3] He ventures to believe that it is *right*. The author of *Chullavagga*, xi., in order to embellish his history of the First Council (a legend or a *quasi*-legend, an 'ætiologic' or 'apologetic' construction which may cover some kernel of truth), has used traditional data, which are neither more nor less reliable than the whole of the ancient Buddhist Tradition contained in Vinayas or Sūtras. Moreover, it is not necessary to decide whether these data are true or false; in any case, they present us with useful evidence as to the early Church.

The narratives of several sects—Dharmaguptas, Mahīśāsakas, Sarvāstivādins, Mahāsāṅghikas—are parallel with the *Chullavagga*. Although there are manifold discrepancies, it is far from certain that they furnish us with independent traditions.[4] The *Chullavagga* looks older, for it does not contain any allusion to the rehearsing of the Abhidharma.

Much importance has been attributed by Oldenberg and Franke to the fact that the *Mahāparinibbānasutta*[5] altogether ignores the Council, although it tells of the indecent attitude of Subhaddha (which, according to the *Chullavagga*, was the occasion of the Council); while, on the other hand, the *Chullavagga* depends (or seems to depend) on the *Mahāparinibbāna*;[6] therefore, when the last text was compiled, the very idea of a primitive Council had not yet appeared. The present writer does not think that such weighty conclusions can be drawn from a mere literary comparison of the documents. The very argument would not have emerged if the Pāli *Mahāparinibbāna*, like some northern editions of the 'Last days of Buddha,' had been followed by the narrative of the Council; and it is not absurd to suppose that its redactor, for mere literary reasons, abstained from giving an account of the Council.[7]

1 *Chullavagga*, v. 33. 1: *sakā nirutti*, 'one's own language'—understood by the commentary as meaning 'Buddha's own language.' See Oldenberg, Introd. to *Vinaya Piṭakam* (1879), p. xlix; Minayeff, *Pāli Grammar* (Guyard's French tr., Paris, 1874), pp. xxxix, xlix, and *Pātimokkha* (1869), p. xliv.

2 I-tsing, *Religieux éminents*, tr. Ed. Chavannes (Paris, 1894), p. 48.

3 *Kathāvatthu*, xxi. 1; cf. *Majjhima*, ii. 245.

4 For more details, see art. SECTS (Buddhist).

5 This figure, 18, which does not agree with our lists of sects, possibly depends upon the 18 *bhedakaravatthus*, 'causes of division in the Church'—a fanciful list (*Chullavagga*, vii. 5. 2).

6 I-tsing, *A Record of the Buddhist Religion* (tr. Takakusu, Oxford, 1896), pp. 13-14; cf. and ct. Tāranātha, tr. von Schiefner, St. Petersburg, 1869, p. 274; and Watters, *On Yuan Chwang* (1904), i. 162 ff.: 'The tenets of the Schools keep these isolated, and controversy runs high; heresies on special doctrines lead many ways to the same end. . . .'

7 *Manual* (1896), p. 101 f. (with some omissions).

1 Introd. to *Vinaya Piṭakam*, p. xxvii.

2 Kern, *Manual*, p. 103. According to *Dīgha*, iii. 210, the divisions among the Jains at the death of the Jina caused Sāriputta to 'rehearse' the Law, to compile a mere numerical enumeration of the dogmatic topics. There is much truth in this information.

3 As is well said by Oldenberg, quoted in *IA*, 1908, p. 7.

4 See R. O. Franke, 'Buddhist Councils,' in *JPTS*, 1908, p. 75.

5 'The Book of the Great Decease,' the Pāli narrative of the last days and the funeral of Buddha, tr. Rhys Davids, *SBE* xi., and *Dialogues*, ii.

6 See *Dialogues*, ii. 70.

7 See *IA*, 1908, p. 8, note; also Nanjio, *Catalogue of the Chinese Transl. of the Bud. Tripitaka* (Oxford, 1883), no. 552, and *SBE* xi. p. xxxviii. [We are indebted for this reference and this argument to M. Louis Finot.] A typical instance of the complexity of these literary and historical problems is furnished by the various narratives of the episode of Purāṇa. This episode is more developed in some *Vinayas* than it is in the Pāli *Vinaya Chullavagga*. According to the *Vinaya* of the *Mahīśāsakas*, Purāṇa demanded the insertion of seven permissions (keeping food indoors, cooking indoors, etc.); according to the *Dharmaguptas*, of eight. Now the Pāli *Vinaya* (*Mahavagga*, vi. 17-19, 20. 4, 32) states that the problem of the 'eight

2. Council of Vaiśālī (Vesālī).—According to a tradition fully developed in *Chullavagga*, xii. (*SBE* xx. 386), and common at least to several sects, there was held, in the year 100 or 110 after the Nirvāṇa,[1] a Council to examine and condemn ten extra-legal practices of the monks of Vaiśālī. The inhabitants of Vaiśālī and surrounding country (Vraja, the modern Braj) are known as *Vṛjis* (Pāli *Vajjis*), and the heretic monks as *Vṛjiputrakas* (Pāli, *Vajjiputtakas*). The heretical practices were described, or technically pointed out, in short phrases—'two fingers,' 'another village,' 'dwelling-place,' etc.—some of which were no longer intelligible when *Chullavagga*, xii., and the other *Vinayas* alluded to were compiled, as is shown by the discrepancies in the interpretation of the 'phrases.'

We may safely acknowledge the historical character of a Vaiśalian controversy on ten points of monastic discipline, but it is as yet impossible to draw from our documents any conclusion regarding the importance or the date of the event, the development of the monastic institution at that time, or the date of the Pāli *Vinaya* as a whole. The present writer considers it a misleading opinion that the whole Pāli *Vinaya* was anterior to the Vaiśālī Council because it does not contain any allusion to the ten 'phrases.' Further, as is generally admitted, the figures 100 and 110 are round numbers.

Oldenberg's remarks on Vaiśālī (Introd. to *Vinaya Piṭakam*, and 'Buddh. Studien,' *ZDMG* xlii. 613) cannot be said to have settled the question in favour of the priority of the *Vinaya*. For a discussion of the arguments *pro* and *con* one may refer to *IA*, 1908, p. 81 ff.

R. O. Franke defends an altogether different estimate of the 'Vaiśalian' legend. His argument against Rājagṛha and Vaiśālī, is, in short, as follows: The author of *Chullavagga*, xi. (First Council), has turned into history the saying of Buddha that 'after my death, O monks, the Law ought to be your refuge.' Therefore, thought this ecclesiastical romancer, the Elders compiled the Law just after the Nirvāṇa; and, as there was no tradition whatever concerning this supposed Council, he employed all the 'evangelical' data which could be of use for an 'apostolic' history. Again, Buddha was said to have delivered many discourses (compiled in the Suttas or in the Vinaya) concerning heretics 'who proclaim and hold as right (*dhamma*) what is wrong (*adhamma*), as Discipline (*vinaya*) what is un-Discipline (*avinaya*)'; nay more, he predicted that the Vajjis would be destroyed owing to their disrespect for Arhats, their discords, etc. [Various misdeeds of the Vesālian Vajjiputtakas are also well known: during the lifetime of Buddha, they adhered to the 'five points' (ascetic exaggerations of Devadatta), *Chullavagga*, vii. 4. 1; or, on the contrary, they indulged in the most strange indulgences—eating, bathing, and sleeping as they pleased, and permitting themselves sexual intercourse (*Vinaya Piṭakam*, iii. 23; *Pār.* i. 7).] From these data, the ecclesiastical romancer has constructed a history of a schism (finally settled at Vaiśālī), parallel with his history of the compilation of the Law (First Council), and showing the same literary skill: '. . . The chronicle of the "Second Council" . . . is not only a merely literary construction; it does not even possess any relevant subject-matter. Whether such monkish steam as those ten puerilities was ever let off has little or no importance for the history of Buddhist literature.'[1]

3. The two Aśokas and their Councils.—

(1) The Pāli *Vinaya* (*Chullavagga*, xii.) states that the Vesālī Council was held in A.B. 100, but it does not name the reigning sovereign, and it contains no allusion to any later Council. Other sources (*Mahīśāsakas*, *Dharmaguptas*, and *Sarvāstivādins* [A.B. 110]) seem to be equally silent on these points.

(2) Pāli later sources (Sinhalese sources) know the name of the sovereign, Kālāśoka, and they add that the Vesālian schismatics (Vajjiputtakas) in their turn held a Council, the 'Great Assembly,' whence issued the sect Mahāsāṅghika, 'of the Great Assembly'—while the Mahāsāṅghikas are said by other sources to maintain that this 'Great Assembly' was held immediately after the Rājagṛha Council.

(3) Vasumitra, the author of a treatise on the sects, hitherto undated (see Minayeff, *Recherches*, p. 195), who seems to ignore Vaiśālī, tells us of a Council held in A.B. 100, at Pāṭaliputra, under Aśoka, concerning 'five points';[2] the Council resulted in the division between the Church and the Mahāsāṅghika sect.

(4) Bhavya, the author of another treatise on the sects, relates the tradition of the Sammitiyas that a Council was held in A.B. 137, at Pāṭaliputra, under the kings Nanda and Mahāpadma[3] [concerning 'five points'?].

(5) According to the same authority, the Sthaviras say that a Council was held in A.B. 160, at Pāṭaliputra, under Aśoka, concerning some controverted question, and that it resulted in the Mahāsāṅghika schism.

(6) According to Tāranātha (p. 44), during the lifetime of Aśoka, Vatsa, a Brahman from Kaśmir, a monk or even an elder (*sthavira*) preached to the common people the doctrine of the existence of a soul, and caused no little discussion among the clergy. The 'noble Black' (*ārya Kāla* or *Kṛṣṇa*), who had succeeded Dhītika in the 'protection of the Law,' assembled the whole body of clergy in the Puṣkariṇī-monastery, in Maru (Marwar), and after a session of three months the followers of Vatsa and Vatsa himself were converted.

This Council appears in an altogether different light, namely, as 'the collection of the Scriptures' through the elder Vatsīputra, in Tanjur, *Mdo*, 132, where it is dated A.B. 400, and in Bhavya, with the figure 200 or 400.[4] The sect of the Vātsī-

(or seven) points' was discussed during the lifetime of the Buddha, who, after having authorized the 'keeping of food indoors,' etc., withdrew this concession (see *IA*, 1908, p. 5). It is not easy to draw any conclusion from such coincidences. (1) One may say that the *Mahīśāsakas* and the *Dharmaguptas* have embellished the history of the Council through attributing to Purāṇa some opinions alluded to and condemned in the *Vinaya*; and this opinion is right enough, for Purāṇa seems not to have been a man to patronize extra allowances; and, from a merely literary point of view, the *Mahāvagga* (our Pāli recension, or some other edition of the subject-matter of the *Mahāvagga*) is the probable source of the *Mahīśāsaka* information. But (2) it is very probable, or rather certain, that the redactors of the *Vinaya* (*Pātimokkha*, *Mahāvagga*, etc.) have 'antedated' many prescriptions and many events, Buddha himself being said to have condemned practices or tenets which, in fact, appeared only after his death, and became occasions of disputes or schisms.

[1] The date 100 *anno nirvāṇi*, according to the *Chullavagga*, the *Mahīśāsakas* (Wassilieff, in Tāranātha, p. 291), the *Dharmaguptas* (Beal, *Four Lectures on Bud. Lit. in China* [London, 1882], p. 83, and Berlin Congress of Orientalists, Ostas. section, p. 33), and Fā-hien (xxv., at the end); the date 110, according to the Sarvāstivādins (Rockhill, *Life*, p. 171; *IA*, 1908, p. 104), Hiuen Tsiang (Watters, *On Yuan Chwang*, ii. 73 f., cf. p. 75, note). Tāranātha (p. 42) says that the figure 'in the Vinaya of other schools' is 210 and 220.

[1] To the present writer it appears that one might safely maintain the reverse. It is *a priori* probable that the discourses of Buddha on schisms, the prediction of the misfortune of the Vajjis, and the fanciful attribution to them of extra-legal practices, either ascetic or sinful, far from being the literary cause of the legend of a schism, are the consequence, the reflexion of some tradition relative to some historical events in which the Vajjis (or Vaiśalians) were concerned. And the dispute on the 'ten points' was probably such an event. We are greatly mistaken if a part of the *Vinaya*, nay, of the *Pātimokkha* itself, is not made up of new (we do not say modern) acquisitions of the earliest Buddhist discipline, acquisitions mainly due to the development of the Order and to the necessity of stating rules for new cases—acquisitions which were, of course, antedated and solemnly attributed to Buddha himself. For instance, when Buddha is said to have first authorized and finally withdrawn some allowance, have we not some right to suppose that the Church itself had modified its rules? We know little of this early history. Buddhist Vinaya and Sūtra may be compared with an apocryphal Gospel where the decisions of Nicæa and the Canons of Cluny may be found side by side with Apostolic traditions. We have only a few episodes which bear an appearance of truth, in so far at least that they are not piously antedated; but amongst them is the Council of Vaiśālī. The 'ten points' have not been 'concocted' from the data of the *Vinaya* by pseudo-historians, even if the narrative depends on the *Vinaya*, as R. O. Franke has proved it to do; on the contrary, it is not impossible that the *Vinaya* has been largely amplified owing to many Vaiśālī-like disputes.

[2] Five doctrines on Arhat-ship and the Path, the originator of which is named Mahādeva, and sometimes Bhadra (see below, p. 184[b], and *JRAS*, 1910, p. 413).

[3] The word 'king' (Tibet. *rgyal-po*) is in the singular (see Rockhill, *Life*, p. 186, note), but Nanda and Mahāpadma are two persons (cf. Tāranātha, p. 61; Wassilieff, p. 47 [51]). Nanda seems to have been the second or third successor of Aśoka (see V. A. Smith, *JRAS*, 1901, p. 851).

[4] See Bhavya *ap.* Rockhill's *Life*, p. 187. In the words of the latter, '. . . a Council held in the year A.B. 137 (see (4) above) . . . the monks continued to quarrel for sixty-three years afterwards, that is to say, till A.B. 200; and 102 years later (*i.e.* A.B. 302) the Sthavira and Vātsīputrīya schools verified the canon ["rightly collected the doctrine"].' The present writer holds against Rockhill, (1) that *gnas-brtan gnas maḥi bus* must be translated *Sthavira Vātsīputrīyeṇa* (or *°putreṇa*), that is to say, 'the Elder named Vatsīputra collected the doctrine'; (2) that the figure 102 is wrong; Bhavya's *brgya phrag gñis* may be or must be 200 (see Jäschke, *Tibet. Grammar*, Eng. tr., London, 1883, p. 31 n.), and Mañjughṣahāsavajra, quoting Bhavya, has *ñis brgya*, that is to say, 200. We have 137+63=A.B. 200. If we add 200, we have 400, the date of the Vātsīputrīya Council according to Tanjur, t. 132, fol. 32 (Tāranātha, p. 298). We prefer to take the figure 200 of Bhavya as the total 137+63, for the phrases *de-nas lo brgya phrag gnis ḥdas pai rjes la, de rjes lo ñis brgya ḥdaspar* may be translated: 'then (*tatas*) two hundred years being elapsed, then, after two hundred years' (cf. Tāranātha, p. 298, line 6 f.). [The dispute of 63 years, says Tāranātha (p. 61), lasted 100 years from its commencement till its final settlement.]

putriyas, 'adherents of Vatsiputra,' scions of the *sthaviras*, is well known for its theory of a soul (*pudgala*).[1]

(7) Sinhalese sources: a Council in A.B. 236, at Pāṭaliputra, under Aśoka (Dharmāśoka), which proclaimed the orthodoxy of the *Vibhajyavāda* ('doctrine of the distinction'), to which belongs the Pāli or Sinhalese Church, and authenticated the last of the Pāli Abhidharma treatises, the *Kathāvatthu*.

The obvious conclusions are as follows. (*a*) Nothing precise was known concerning the origin of the Mahāsāṅghikas. They claimed to be ancient and orthodox. Others styled them heretics and schismatics. The Sinhalese identified them with the Vesālian Vajjiputtakas, but there is no evidence in favour of this identification; some sects believed that they originated out of the dispute on the 'five points,' and it seems certain that they admitted the 'five points.' (*b*) There was a tradition of a Vesālian Council on 'ten points,' date uncertain, no mention of king; and (*c*) a tradition of a Council on 'some controverted question,' more precisely on 'five points'; date uncertain, and probably no mention of king. (*d*) The monks of Ceylon supposed that their *Kathāvatthu*, a catalogue of heresies, had been first preached mysteriously by Buddha; they were well aware that the book was 'modern,' nay, that it had been revealed by Tissa Moggaliputta, some centuries after the Nirvāṇa; and they had reasons to admit that their Scriptures, inclusive of the *Kathāvatthu*, had been rehearsed in a Council, which could not be the Vaiśālī Council, since the *Chullavagga* ignores Tissa and the *Kathāvatthu*.

It was reasonable to place all the important events in the history of the Church under Aśoka, a sovereign who had evidently been a second 'mover of the Wheel of the Law'; and this was done. [Note the exceptional mention of Nanda and Mahāpadma, above, p. 183.] Again, Pāṭaliputra was the evident seat of such meetings. Our Northern documents are scanty and conflicting, but they give the impression that there was no certain tradition of the date of Aśoka: 100, 110, 137, or 160 are figures out of which no chronology can be extracted ('no oil out of sand,' *na sikatābhyas tailaṁ*).

Sinhalese tradition places the Vaiśālī Council in 100 under Kālāśoka, and the Pāṭaliputra Council in 236 under Dharmāśoka. Besides the 'Northern' figures for Aśoka (100 [110], 137, 160), there was a fourth figure, A.B. 236 (17 or 19 years after his coronation in A.B. 217, 219). We are not concerned with the question whether these were fanciful or traditional computations. In fact, the authors of the ecclesiastical history 'concocted' in Ceylon admitted this figure, without troubling themselves very much to adjust it to some other chronological details of their own; and, as they maintained the canonic date of Vaiśālī, and were at a loss to name the sovereign reigning in A.B. 100, they imagined a 'black Aśoka,' *Kālāśoka*—a mere *idolum libri*.[2]

The Sinhalese narrative of the Third Council is open to serious objections as concerns the rehearsal of the Pāli Canon and of the *Kathāvatthu* as it stands now, and as regards the solemn declaration by the whole clergy that Buddha was a *Vibhajjavādin*, i.e. that he adhered to the tenets of the school of this name. But some details are historical, and the story itself rests on historical ground. Aśoka's inscriptions are explicit enough as to the king's intervention in clerical questions: we know that he decreed expulsion ('putting in white [*i.e.* layman's] garments') against [monks or] nuns. The Sinhalese tradition may be relied upon when it affirms that such rules were enforced against bad monks, 'pseudo-Buddhists';[3] but that 'heretics' were ill-treated by the king seems rather incredible. On the other hand, it is unfortunate that the inscriptions contain no allusion to a 'Council,' and some historians feel obliged to place the Council in the short time between the Pillar-inscriptions and the death of the king (see ii. 126). But the question is whether the Council was what it is said to have been, a 'Nicene' Assembly, and not rather a series of synods or dogmatic disputations.

Until the *Kathāvatthu* has been thoroughly studied and compared with 'Northern' documents, it will be impossible to describe the ancient doctrinal discussions; but we already possess a few hints which may prove useful.

(*a*) The name of Tissa Moggaliputta, the hero of the Third Council and the 'defender' of the Vibhajjavādin faith, is quoted in the books of a rival sect, the Sarvāstivādins. The *Vijñānakāya*, a treatise of this sect, 'is a tedious argumentative treatise combating the views of a Mogiilin who denied the reality of the Past and the Future . . .' (Watters, *On Yuan Chwang*, i. 374). This 'thesis of the omni-existence' (*sarvāstivāda*), which gave their name to the Sarvāstivādins, is discussed in the *Kathāvatthu* (i. 6–10). It is at least possible that a Moggaliputta maintained the system or method of distinction (*vibhajja*°) which already appears in the sermons of Buddha on *sabbaṁ atthi?* 'Does anything exist?' (*Saṁyutta*), and is employed in some places of the *Kathāvatthu*.

(*b*) It is an interesting fact that the 'five points'—the five theories attributed to a schismatic, Mahādeva by name, concerning the Arhat-ship and the Meditation—which, according to the 'northern' sources, were discussed under Aśoka and formed the origin of the Mahāsaṅghika schism,—are also discussed in the *Kathāvatthu* (ii. 1–6).[1]

(*c*) Further, the first heresy condemned in the *Kathāvatthu*—'Is there in the truest and highest sense a soul (*pudgala*)?'—is known from the Northern sources as the capital tenet of the Vātsīputrīyas (see above, p. 184); and we believe that the problem of the 'soul' aroused division in the earliest times. The second heresy—'Can an Arhat fall from Arhat-ship?'—is also very ancient, etc.

To sum up: it seems almost certain that a number of heresies discussed in the *Kathāvatthu* may have occasioned discussions, synods, and divisions in the days of Aśoka, and even before his time; that there was a *Kathāvatthuppakaraṇa*, a 'book on controversies,' which could be easily completed, and, in fact, has been enlarged through many and manifold additions. There is no reason to doubt that, in a primitive form, it was in some way connected with Tissa Moggaliputta.

4. Council of Kaniṣka.—The documents concerning this Council are late, 'more or less at variance, and, moreover, very vague.'[2]

It seems that this Assembly is, for the Sarvāstivādin School, what Moggaliputta's Council is for the Vibhajjavādin School of Ceylon—an apologetic *quasi*-invention. Like the Vibhajjavādins, the Sarvāstivādins possess treatises on Abhidharma,[3] and maintain that these are authoritative (word of the Buddha); their authenticity or authority was, they say, recognized at the Council held under Kaniṣka, and, moreover, a Commentary on the *Abhidharma*-treatises (*Vibhāṣā*) was compiled or written on this occasion. It must be observed that the *Abhidharmakośa*, while stating the conflicting theories of the Vaibhāṣikas (scions of the Sarvāstivādins, relying on the *Vibhāṣā*) and of the Sautrāntika (who consider the *Abhidharma*-treatises as 'human' works), does not mention, we think, Kaniṣka's Council; further, that all the Kāṣmīras (monks of Kaṣmīr, the stronghold of the Sarvāstivādins and Vaibhāṣikas) are not Vaibhāṣikas.

The narratives of this Council are to some extent dogmatic legends,[4] and seem only to bear witness to the literary activity of the Sarvāstivādins. As is well said by Takakusu, until the treatises of this school shall have been made accessible to scholars, it will be vain to argue about the Council or its proceedings (see artt. VAIBHĀṢIKAS, SARVĀSTIVĀDINS).

[1] *Vātsīputrīya*—the reading is certain—is translated *gnas-maḥi bu; Vatsa* is a conjecture of Schiefner for *gnas-pa; Vatsi-putra*, a conjecture of the present writer's for *gnas-maḥi bu*. Kern says that the Vātsiputriyas are 'evidently the same as the Vajjiputtakas of the [Sinhalese] Chronicles' (*Manual*, p. 111); that is to say, in their 'genealogy' of the sects the Sinhalese give to the Vātsiputrīyas the old name Vajjiputtakas. But there is only *quasi*-homophony between these two names.

[2] See V. A. Smith, *JRAS*, 1901, p. 855. We are much indebted to this authority.

[3] See Samantapāsādikā, *Vinaya*, iii. 312 [read line 19 *apapabbajesi*, 'forced to quit the order']; cf. *Śikṣāsamuchchaya*, p. 66 (which forbids such spiritual usurpation of the 'civil power'), and *Lotus of the Good Law*, *SBE* xxi. ch. xii. 17.

[1] See *JRAS*, 1910, p. 413.

[2] Kern, *Manual*, p. 121 (see also *Geschiedenis*, ii. 359). Kern gives a summary of the narratives of Fa-hien, Hiuen Tsiang, Tāranātha (*Tibet. Lebensbeschreibung Sakya Munis*, tr. von Schiefner, St. Petersburg, 1849). V. A. Smith (*Early History*, p. 249 ff.) adds new evidences, especially Takakusu's observations. The date of Kaniṣka, in the present writer's opinion, has not yet been ascertained; but there is nothing to prove that the Sarvāstivādins' books are either earlier or later than Kaniṣka (*q.v.*).

[3] It seems certain that the two Abhidharmic collections have nothing in common.

[4] The present writer cannot agree with Kern's opinion (*Manual*, p. 122) that, as a result of the Council, 'somehow an agreement, a *modus vivendi*, was hit upon on the base of the principal truths unassailed by any of the 18 sects.' Such an interpretation of the legends is opposed by the fact that the Sarvāstivādin character of the Council seems to be proved.

5. We must be content simply to note a tradition as to later Councils: A.B. 400—Vātsīputra's Council; A.B. 700—Mahāsammatīyas' Council; A.B. 800—a Council under Bhūtika and Buddhamitra (Wassilieff, *ap.* Tāranātha, p. 298).

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L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN.

COUNCILS (Christian: Early, to A.D. 870).—**1. The various kinds of Councils.**—The Councils of the early Church may be classified as follows: (1) Diocesan, being the assembly of a single diocese; (2) Provincial, being of all the dioceses comprised in an ecclesiastical province; (3) Councils of united provinces, being assemblies of several neighbouring provinces, sometimes called Plenary Councils (*concilia plenaria*); (4) Patriarchal, being of the provinces united in one patriarchate, sometimes called Plenary or Universal Councils (*concilia plenaria* or *concilia universalia*); (5) National, being of the provinces existing in a country, sometimes called Plenary or Universal Councils, frequently identical with Primatial and Patriarchal Councils; (6) General Councils of the East or of the West, being of all the provinces in the East or the West; (7) General Councils representing in their constitutions the whole Church; (8) Ecumenical Councils, being Councils whose decisions were accepted by the whole Church.[1] To these may be added (9) the Councils held at Constantinople in the 4th and following centuries, known as the Home Councils (σύνοδοι ἐνδημοῦσαι); and (10) the Mixed Councils (*concilia mixta*) of the 9th and following centuries, held in regard to matters of Church and State.

2. The constitution of Councils.—(1) A diocesan Council consisted normally of the presbyters of the diocese, meeting under the presidency of the bishop. The rule of the bishop was not regarded as being rightly exercised altogether independently of the presbyters, although he had the power and the responsibility of decisions.

In the letters of St. Ignatius of Antioch the authority of the bishop is constantly viewed as being exercised in connexion with the presbyters (see, *e.g.*, *ad Eph.* 20; *ad Magn.* 6, 7; *ad Trall.* 3). St. Cyprian (*Ep.* xiv. 4), writing to his presbyters and deacons, says: 'From the beginning of my episcopate I determined to do nothing separately of my own judgment, without your advice and without the assent of the laity.' The advice of clergy and laity was sought by the bishop in regard to those whom he ordained. St. Cyprian (*Ep.* xxxviii. 1) writes to his presbyters and deacons and laity: 'In the ordination of clergy it is our custom to consult you beforehand, and to consider in common counsel the character and deserts of individuals'; and a canon of the 6th cent. Gallican document, known as the canons of the 'Fourth Council of Carthage' (canon 22; see Hardouin, *Concilia*, i. 980), which passed into the general Western canon law (*Decret.* I. lxxiv. 6), enacted 'that a bishop is not to ordain clergy without the advice of his clergy, so that he may look for the assent and witness of the people.'

[1] The nomenclature is not uniform; but it prevents confusion to use 'General' for Councils representative of the whole Church in their constitution, and 'Ecumenical' for those whose decisions are accepted by the whole Church.

From this dependence of the bishop on the advice of those in his diocese the diocesan Councils had their origin. The normal constitution of such Councils was that they consisted of the bishop and presbyters of the diocese, though in important matters other bishops were sometimes associated with the Council.

For instance, a Carthaginian Council, probably earlier than A.D. 249, is described by St. Cyprian (*Ep.* i. 1) as composed of 'I and my fellow-bishops who were present, and our fellow-presbyters who sat with us.' At a Roman Council held a little later there were present, besides Cornelius the Bishop of Rome and the Roman presbyters, five bishops who happened to be at Rome at the time (Cornelius in Cypr. *Ep.* xlix. 2). About A.D. 320, Alexander, Bishop of Alexandria, summoned a Council of the presbyters, together with certain bishops who were then at Alexandria, to consider the case of Arius (see Epiph. *adv. Hær.* lxix. 3). A 6th cent. Gallican canon in the so-called 'Fourth Council of Carthage' (canon 23; see Hardouin, i. 980), which passed into the general Western canon law (*Decret.* II. xv. 7 [6]), enacted 'that a bishop is not to hear the case of any one without the presence of his clergy; and the judgment of the bishop shall be void if it is not confirmed by the presence of the clergy.'

By means of his diocesan Council the bishop had the advice of his presbyters and their assent to his decisions in the exercise of discipline and the selection of candidates for ordination, and, moreover, knew the mind of his diocese when he came to meet other bishops in the larger Councils.

(2) As the diocesan Councils arose from the relation of the bishop to the presbyters of his diocese, so the provincial and larger Councils had their origin from his relation to the other bishops of the province. The local Council concerning Arius, held at Alexandria by Bishop Alexander, mentioned above, led to that bishop convening a Council of many bishops (Socrates, *HE* i. 6). The still larger Council of Nicæa (A.D. 325) was also due to the controversy about Arius; and this Council formulated a specific provision for the holding of provincial Councils in order that the excommunications of individual bishops might be revised by the bishops of the province, and the danger of injustice consequently lessened.

'In regard to the excommunicated, whether of the clergy or of the laity, the sentence passed by the bishops of each province shall have the force of law in accordance with the canon which enacts that those who have been excommunicated by some bishops shall not be admitted by others. Inquiry must, however, be made to see that the bishop has not passed the sentences of excommunication from smallness of mind, or from love of strife, or from some such perversity. In order, then, that such an inquiry may be held, it has seemed good to decide that during each year, in each province, Councils be held twice in the year, that all the bishops of the province may meet together, and that such inquiries be made, and that thus those who have evidently offended against their bishop may be seen by all to have been reasonably excommunicated, until the assembly of the bishops may think well to pronounce a milder sentence in their case. The Councils are to be held, the one before Lent, in order that all smallness of mind may be put away, and that the gift may be offered to God in pureness, the other in the autumn' (canon 5; see Hardouin, i. 323–326).

This canon of Nicæa is of great importance as illustrating (*a*) the purpose of revising the acts of individual bishops by the holding of provincial Councils; and (*b*) the connexion between the exercise of the bishop's authority and his power of excommunication. Similarly, it was enacted by the Council of Antioch in 341 that,

'if any one be excommunicated by his own bishop, he may not be admitted by other bishops unless he has been restored by his own bishop, or unless a Council has been held and he has appeared before it and made his defence, and convinced the Council and obtained a new decision. This decree applies to laity and presbyters and deacons and all ecclesiastics' (canon 6; see Hardouin, i. 595).

Apart from exceptions at Rome at the end of the 5th cent., and in Spain in the 7th cent., to be mentioned later, the constituent members of provincial and larger Councils were bishops only, though presbyters and deacons and lay people were sometimes present. The earliest instances of Councils of a character to be reckoned with provincial or larger Councils are those held during

the 2nd cent. in Asia Minor concerning Montanism, and in many places concerning the date of Easter. Such scanty evidence as exists about these Councils indicates that the members of them were bishops only (see Euseb. *HE* v. 16, 23, 24; *Libellus Synodicus*, in Hardouin, v. 1493–1496; Salmon, in Smith-Wace, *DCB* iii. 938; Hefele-Leclercq, *Conciles*, i. 128–130, 151–153). At the African Councils held in the middle of the 3rd cent., presbyters and deacons and lay people were present (see Cypr. *Epp.* xvi. 4, xvii. 1, 3, xix. 2, xxx. 5, xxxi. 6, xxxiv. 4, lv. 5, lix. 15, lxiv. 1), and expressed their opinions, sometimes in opposition to that of their bishop (*ib.* xvii. 3, lix. 15); but the actual decisions were the work of the assembled bishops, who alone were the constituent members of the Councils. For instance, a Council summoned to discuss the question of the validity of baptism administered by schismatics was held at Carthage on 1st Sept. 256. Besides the eighty-seven bishops from proconsular Africa, Numidia, and Mauretania, who were the members of the Council, there were present presbyters and deacons, and a large number of lay people. That only the bishops were the constituent members of the Council is shown by the judicial pronouncements being their work alone (see 'Sententiæ Episcoporum,' in *S. Cypriani Opera*; cf. Cypr. *Epp.* i. 1, xix. 2, xliv., xlv. 2, 4, lix. 13, lxiv. 1, lxx. 1, lxxi. 1, lxxii. 1, lxxiii. 1). The Councils held at Antioch in 264 or 265, and 269, to consider the charges against Paul of Samosata, are described by Eusebius as consisting of bishops. Presbyters and deacons were present at Antioch in connexion with the Councils, and at one of them a presbyter took a prominent part in the discussions; but there is no reason to suppose that these Councils differed from those at Carthage, so as to include others besides bishops as constituent members possessing votes, though the letter written to announce the decision of the last Council of the series was in the name of 'bishops, presbyters, and deacons, and the Churches of God' (see Euseb. vii. 27–30). Similarly, the Arabian Councils about 244 consisted of bishops, though Origen, who was a presbyter, took part in a conference held in connexion with one of the Councils, and appears to have spoken in the actual proceedings of another Council, but on the invitation of the bishops, not as a member of the Council (see Euseb. vi. 33, 37). The constituent members of the Councils held in the 4th cent. were bishops, and any presbyters or deacons or ecclesiastics in minor orders who might be the representatives of absent bishops and empowered to vote on behalf of those whom they represented. Thus, at Elvira in 305, twenty-six or thirty-six presbyters were present, had seats, and signed the decrees in a group after the bishops; deacons were present standing; and lay people were present. But the decrees were described as the decisions of the bishops (see 'Acts of Elvira,' in Hardouin, i. 249, 250). In like manner, at Arles in 314 some presbyters and deacons and ecclesiastics in minor orders were present in attendance on bishops or as representatives of absent bishops; but the natural inference from all the evidence is that the only constituent members of the Council, that is, those with a right to be present and vote, were bishops and representatives of absent bishops (see 'Acts of Arles,' in Hardouin, i. 266–268; cf. Euseb. x. 5). So again, at Nicæa in 325, many presbyters, deacons, and acolytes were present as attendants of bishops; Athanasius, then an archdeacon in attendance on the Bishop of Alexandria, was prominent in discussions connected with the Council; laymen took part in conferences before its formal opening; and the Emperor Constantine, though still unbaptized, was present at some of the proceedings, as the head of the State. But the accounts of all the authorities show that bishops and representatives of absent bishops were the only constituent members of the Council (see Euseb. *Vit. Const.* iii. 6–14; Socrates, i. 8–14; Sozomen, i. 15–25; cf. Bright, *The Age of the Fathers*, 1903, i. 78).

Till nearly the end of the 5th cent. the evidence suggests the same conclusions as those which have been mentioned in regard to the Councils of the 2nd and 3rd and early 4th cents., namely, that at provincial and larger Councils bishops alone were entitled to be present and vote, or, if unable to attend the Council, to nominate representatives with power to vote in their absence; that they frequently brought with them to Councils presbyters or deacons in attendance on them and for purposes of consultation, but without votes; and that they often were careful to ascertain the mind of the lay people about the matters which it was the work of the Council to discuss and decide upon. In the series of Roman Councils held in the latter part of the 5th cent. and during the early years of the 6th cent., the constitution of some Councils was the same as already described; in other Councils of the series the presbyters and deacons, who were the precursors of the cardinals, appear to have held a position like that of the bishops. For instance, presbyters apparently shared in the authority of the bishops at the Council held in 495 (see the 'Acts,' in Hardouin, ii. 941–948); and both presbyters and deacons at that held in 499 (*ib.* ii. 959–963). A different instance of others than bishops being members of provincial or larger Councils is in the Spanish Councils of the 7th cent., which included abbots, as, for example, the Eighth Council of Toledo in 653 (*ib.* iii. 967).[1]

3. **The relation of the laity to Councils.**—It is important to distinguish two separate matters: the position of the Christian laity as such, that is, as members of the Christian society, the Church; and the position of the representatives of the State. (1) As already mentioned, Christian lay people—in earlier times probably a multitude who were allowed to come in, and probably including women as well as men,[2] and in later times selected representatives—were present at Councils. Neither in diocesan nor in larger Councils do they appear to have been members with votes. They were present in order that they might (*a*) express their opinions on matters under discussion; see, *e.g.*, Cypr. *Epp.* xvii. 3, lix. 15; (*b*) bring abuses to the knowledge of Councils; see, *e.g.*, canon 4 of Fourth Council of Toledo (633), in Hardouin, iii. 580; (*c*) know the decisions which the members of the Councils made; see, *e.g.*, the letter of Viventiolus, the Archbishop of Lyons, summoning the Council of Epaon (517), in Hardouin, ii. 1046. (2) As the friendship of the State towards the Church increased, and the relations between them became closer, the Emperors, or their representatives, and great men of the State were present at Councils. At Nicæa (325), Constantine, though unbaptized, and therefore in no sense a representative of the Christian laity, was present (see above); and the Emperors were represented, and were in some cases present, at four of the other six Ecumenical Councils (see below), namely at Ephesus (431), Chalcedon (451), Constantinople (680), and Nicæa (787); see 'Acts of Ephesus,' p. i. cap. xx.; 'Acts of Chalcedon,' Acts i., vi.; 'Acts of Constantinople,'

[1] The position of the presbyters in the Roman Councils and that of the abbots in the Spanish Councils mentioned above probably had much to do with the events through which the English provincial Councils in the 13th cent. included abbots and priors and representatives of cathedral and collegiate chapters and of beneficed parochial clergy. This, again, was one cause of the privileges of the Lower Houses of the Canterbury and York Convocations.

[2] Cf. Ac 1[14-26] for a parallel in Apostolic times.

Act i.; 'Acts of Nicæa,' Acts i., viii., in Hardouin, i. 1345–1348, ii. 53, 463–465, iii. 1056, iv. 33–40, 481–485. Instances of illustrious laymen, present at Councils of the Church as representatives of the State, are not infrequent in later times, particularly in Spanish and Anglo-Saxon Councils; see, *e.g.*, the Acts of the Roman Council of 495 (Hardouin, ii. 943); the Second Council of Orange in 529 (*ib.* 1102); eleven out of the series of sixteen Councils held at Toledo from 589 to 701, the laymen at which were in some cases chosen by the Council itself, and in other cases appointed by the king (*ib.* iii.); and the Councils at Cloveshoo in 747 and 822 (*ib.* iii. 1952, 1953, iv. 1245). Side by side with these Councils, to which lay representatives of the State were admitted, there were Councils restricted to bishops, as, *e.g.*, the Sixth and Seventh Councils of Toledo (638 and 646) and the Councils of Hertford (673) and Hatfield (680) (see Hardouin, iii. 608–610, 623–625; Bede, *HE* iv. 5, 17, 18; cf. Bright, *Chapters of Early Eng. Ch. Hist.*[3], 1897, pp. 276, 357, 358; Hunt, *The English Church from its Foundation to the Norman Conquest*, 1899, pp. 137, 151). Lay people were members of the mixed Councils held on matters of joint interest to Church and State; and these sometimes included women, as, *e.g.*, the abbess Hilda at Whitby (664), and the abbess Ælfleda at the Council on the Nidd in Northumberland (705) (see Hardouin, iii. 993, 1826; Haddan-Stubbs, *Councils and Ecclesiastical Documents*, 1869–1878, iii. 101, 266).

4. The convocation of Councils.—Diocesan and provincial Councils were convoked by the bishop of the diocese and the metropolitan of the province respectively. In regard to larger Councils it is necessary to consider the relation of (1) the Emperor, and (2) the Pope; and any initiative of the Pope in regard to local Councils may be discussed together with his relation to the larger Councils.

(1) Each of the seven Ecumenical Councils was summoned by an Emperor—Nicæa (325) by Constantine the Great (Euseb. *Vit. Const.* iii. 5, 6);[1] Constantinople (381) by Theodosius I. (Socrates, v. 8; Sozomen, vii. 7; Theodoret, *HE* v. 7); Ephesus (431) by Theodosius II. and Valentinian III. (see 'Acts of Ephesus,' p. i. cap. xix., xx., in Hardouin, i. 1343–1348); Chalcedon (451) by Marcian and Valentinian III. (see 'Acts of Chalcedon,' p. i. cap. xxx.–xxxvi., *ib.* ii. 45–52); Constantinople (553) by Justinian (see 'Acts of Constantinople,' Coll. i., *ib.* iii. 56); Constantinople (680–1) by Constantine II. (see 'Acts of Constantinople,' Act i., *ib.* iii. 1056); and Nicæa (787) by the Emperor Constantine VI. and the Empress Irene (see 'Acts of Nicæa,' 'Divalis sacra,' and Act i., *ib.* iv. 21–24, 36).

(2) Pope Victor I. appears to have given the initiative for the holding of local Councils to discuss the Paschal question in the 2nd century. Polycrates, Bishop of Ephesus, mentions that the Asiatic Council was summoned by him at the desire of Victor (see his letter in Euseb. *HE* v. 24). This makes it probable that the Councils held in other places at the same time on the same question were convoked because of a wish expressed by Victor. The relation of the Popes to the convoking of the seven Ecumenical Councils must be considered in some detail. (*a*) It came to be believed that Pope Sylvester I. had shared in, or agreed to, the summoning of the Council of Nicæa (325) by Constantine. In the address of the Sixth Ecumenical Council (Constantinople, 680) to Constantine IV. it is said that Constantine the Great and Sylvester, Bishop of Rome, summoned the Council of Nicæa (Hardouin, iii. 1417), and in the *Liber Pontificalis* (xxxiv.) it is said that this Council was held with his assent. If it is the case, as Rufinus (*HE* i. 1) says, that Constantine acted in accordance with the views of the bishops, there is strong probability that the Bishop of Rome would be one of those consulted. (*b*) The Second Ecumenical Council, held at Constantinople in 381, was summoned from the East only, and no Western bishop took part in it. There is no evidence[1] and no probability that the Pope had anything to do with the convocation of it. (*c*) Pope Celestine I. took no part in the summoning of the Third Ecumenical Council, held at Ephesus in 431. (*d*) The circumstances connected with the summoning of the Fourth Ecumenical Council, held at Chalcedon in 451, are complicated. They justify the words of Pope Leo I. himself, that the Council was held 'by the command of the Christian princes and by the consent of the Apostolic See' (St. Leo, *Ep.* cxiv. 1), and the courtly phrase of the Emperor Marcian, that the Council was to take place at the suggestion of the Pope (*Opera S. Leonis, Ep.* lxxiii.), if some latitude of interpretation is allowed to this phrase. They are inconsistent with the statement of the bishops of Mœsia in their letter to the Emperor Leo that the Council had been assembled 'by the order of Leo, the Roman pontiff, who is truly the head of the bishops, and of the venerable bishop Anatolius' ('Acts of Chalcedon,' cod. encyc. 12, 'Ep. Episc. Mœs. sec. ad Leonem Imper.,' in Hardouin, ii. 710). The facts are as follows. After the 'Robber-Synod' of Ephesus in 449, Pope Leo I. asked the Emperor Theodosius II. to summon a Council of bishops from all parts of the world to meet in Italy (*Ep.* xliv.).[2] He twice repeated the same request (*Epp.* liv., lxix.), though on the second occasion he said that the Council would be unnecessary if without it the bishops would subscribe an orthodox statement of the faith (*Ep.* lxix.). He also asked Valentinian III., the Western Emperor, and his mother and his wife, Galla Placidia and Licinia Eudoxia, to support this request to Theodosius (*Epp.* lv.–lviii.). Soon after St. Leo's third letter to Theodosius, that Emperor died. His successors, Pulcheria and Marcian, wrote to St. Leo that they were willing to convoke a Council, evidently intending that it should be held in the East (St. Leo, *Ep.* lxxxiv.), but circumstances had changed since St. Leo had expressed his wish for a Council, and he wrote two letters to Marcian and another to Pulcheria, dropping the wish for a Council, and in the second letter to Marcian urging that it would not now be advisable to hold one (*Epp.* lxxxii., lxxxiii., lxxxiv.). After the writing of the first of these letters, and before the second and third, the Emperor Marcian convoked the Fourth Ecumenical Council. When the Council had been summoned, St. Leo wrote two letters to Marcian. In the first of them, dated 24th June 451, he said that he had hoped for the postponement of the Council, but that, since the Emperor had determined on its being held, he would not offer any hindrance, and appointed representatives to be present at it (*Ep.* lxxxix. 1). In the second letter, dated 26th June 451, he wrote that, though he had requested the postponement of the Council, he would not oppose the Emperor's arrangements

[1] In connexion with his summoning of the Council as well as with his presence at it, there is need of remembering that Constantine was still unbaptized. He was baptized shortly before his death by Eusebius, Bishop of Nicomedia (see Euseb. *Vit. Const.* iv. 61, 62; Socrates, i. 39; Sozomen, ii. 34; Theodoret, *HE* i. 32; St. Ambrose, *de Obit. Theod.* 40; St. Jerome, *Chron.* sub anno 354. This evidence is too early and strong for it to be credible that Constantine was baptized at an earlier date by Sylvester, Bishop of Rome (see *Liber Pontificalis*, xxxiv.).

[1] The reference to the letters of Pope Damasus to Theodosius in the synodical letter preserved by Theodoret (*HE* v. 9) concerns the Council of 382, not that of 381; see v. 8.

[2] In making this request, St. Leo may possibly have been influenced by the appeals made to him by Flavian of Constantinople and Eusebius of Dorylæum: see G. Amelli, *S. Leone Magno e l'Oriente*, Rome, 1882, pp. 41–49; *Spicilegium Cassinense*, Monte Cassino, 1893, i. 132–137.

(*Ep.* xc. 1). (*c*) The attitude of Pope Vigilius towards the Fifth Ecumenical Council, held at Constantinople in 553, was in some respects the opposite of that of St. Leo towards the Council of Chalcedon. In his condemnation of Theodorus of Cæsarea, Pope Vigilius mentions that such a Council had been contemplated at a meeting at which were present, besides the Emperor and the civil officials, many bishops, including the Bishop of Constantinople and the Bishop of Milan (*Fragm. damn. Theod.*, in Hardouin, iii. 8). Vigilius himself more than once expressed a wish that the Council should be held ('Ep. ad univ. Eccl.' and 'Constitutum,' in Hardouin, iii. 3, 12, 13); but when it had been convoked by the Emperor and the time for holding it had arrived, he desired that it should be postponed, and held aloof from the proceedings of it ('Acts of Constantinople,' Coll. i., ii., in Hardouin, iii. 63–66). (*f*) Pope Agatho I. took no part in the summoning of the Sixth Ecumenical Council, held at Constantinople in 680–681. (*g*) It was stated by Pope Adrian I. that the Seventh Ecumenical Council, held at Nicæa in 787, was by his appointment ('Acts of Nicæa,' 'Hadriani Scriptum,' *ib.* iv. 818); but the Council was convoked by the Empress and the Emperor on the suggestion of Tarasius, the Bishop of Constantinople ('Acts of Nicæa,' 'Apol. ad pop. a Tarasio,' *ib.* iv. 24, 25), and the only fact to justify the Pope's statement appears to be the practical assent which he gave after receiving the letter from the Empress and the Emperor announcing their intention of convoking the Council ('Acts of Nicæa,' 'Divalis sacra ad Hadrianum,' *ib.* iv. 21–24).

5. **The presidents of Councils.**—The president of a diocesan Council was the bishop of the diocese, of a provincial Council the metropolitan of the province, and of a larger Council the chief bishop present, or a bishop locally eminent, or some bishop of special note. The presidents of the seven Ecumenical Councils were as follows. (*a*) At Nicæa (325), Hosius, the Bishop of Cordova, presided (see the list of signatures in Hardouin, i. 311, 312; cf. Socrates, i. 13). Possibly the reason why he held this position, notwithstanding the presence of Vito and Vincentius, the legates of Pope Sylvester I. (see Euseb. *Vit. Const.* iii. 7; Socrates, i. 13; Sozomen, i. 17; Theodoret, i. 7; signatures in Hardouin, i. 311, 312), and the fact that he was a Western bishop presiding in a Council held in the East, was that he was appointed by the Emperor Constantine, whose chief ecclesiastical adviser he was. Both St. Athanasius and Theodoret, however, speak as though his prominence at Councils was due to his personal eminence.

St. Athanasius writes: 'It is unnecessary that I should speak of the great Hosius, happy in his old age, a true confessor. . . . This aged man is not unknown, but of the greatest distinction. What Council has there been of which he was not the leader, and in which by his right words he did not convince all?' (*Apolog. de fuga*, 5). Theodoret, after quoting this passage, continues: 'Hosius was Bishop of Cordova, and was prominent at the Council of Nicæa, and took the first place among those who assembled at Sardica' (*HE* ii. 15).

It is unlikely that credit ought to be given to a statement of Gelasius of Cyzicus, a writer in the second half of the 5th cent., universally regarded as usually untrustworthy, that Hosius presided as the representative of the Pope (see his *Act. Conc. Nic.* ii. 5). (*b*) At Constantinople (381) the presidents were successively Meletius, Bishop of Antioch; Gregory of Nazianzus, Bishop of Constantinople; and Nectarius, Bishop of Constantinople. Neither the Pope nor any Papal representative was present. (*c*) At Ephesus (431), St. Cyril of Alexandria was president. The Acts of the Council say that he 'took the place of Celestine, the most holy and most sacred archbishop of the Romans' (see 'Acts of Ephesus,' in Hardouin, i. 1353, 1465, 1468, 1485, 1509, 1512, 1527, etc.). Pope Celestine I. sent as legates the bishops Arcadius and Projectus and the presbyter Philippus. (*d*) At Chalcedon (451) the Imperial commissioners (see 'Acts of Chalcedon,' in Hardouin, ii. 53, 65, 68, 69, 89, 93, 113, 272, 273, 308), and in the sixth session the Emperor Marcian (see 'Acts of Chalcedon,' Act vi., *ib.* ii. 485–489), acted as presidents; the chief place among the members of the Council was held by the legates of Pope Leo I.—Paschasinus, Lucentius, and Boniface (St. Leo, *Epp.* lxxxix., ciii.; cf. 'Ep. Syn. Chalc.,' in *Opera S. Leonis, Ep.* xcviii. 1; 'Acts of Chalcedon,' Acts i., iii., in Hardouin, ii. 53, 310, 365).[1] (*e*) At Constantinople (553), Eutychius, Bishop of Constantinople, was president (see 'Acts of Constantinople,' Coll. viii., in Hardouin, iii. 201); the Pope was neither present nor represented. (*f*) At Constantinople (680–681) the Emperor Constantine IV. presided ('Acts of Constantinople,' Act i., *ib.* iii. 1056); the legates of Pope Agatho I., the presbyters Theodore and George, and the deacon John held the first place among the members of the Council ('Acts of Constantinople,' *e.g.* Acts i., xviii., *ib.* iii. 1056, 1401). (*g*) At Nicæa (787) the legates of Pope Adrian I.—the archpresbyter Peter and the abbot Peter—presided ('Acts of Nicæa,' Acts i., vii., *ib.* iv. 28, 456).

6. **The ratification of Councils.**—(1) The decrees of the seven Ecumenical Councils received civil sanction from the Emperors: (*a*) in the case of Nicæa (325) by a letter from the Emperor Constantine (see Euseb. *Vit. Const.* iii. 17–20; Socrates, i. 9; Sozomen, i. 21; Gelasius of Cyzicus, *Act. Conc. Nic.* ii. 36); (*b*) in the case of Constantinople (381) by an edict of the Emperor Theodosius I. (see Socrates, v. 8; Sozomen, vii. 9); (*c*) in the case of Ephesus (431) in substance by letters and decrees of the Emperors Theodosius II. and Valentinian III. (see 'Acts of Ephesus,' in Hardouin, i. 1616, 1669, 1716); (*d*) in the case of Chalcedon (451) by the decrees and letters of the Emperors Valentinian III. and Marcian, and a letter of the Empress Pulcheria (see 'Acts of Chalcedon,' p. iii. cap. iii.–xiii., *ib.* ii. 660–688); (*e*) in the case of Constantinople (553) by an approbation of the Emperor Justinian, if we may trust the statement of Zonaras (*Ann.* xiv. 8), which in this matter has the support of strong general probability;[2] (*f*) in the case of Constantinople (680–681) by the signature and edict of the Emperor Constantine IV. (see 'Acts of Constantinople,' Act xviii., 'Edict. Const.,' in Hardouin, iii. 1436, 1445–1457, 1633–1639); (*g*) in the case of Nicæa (787) by the signing of the decrees of the Council by the Empress Irene and the Emperor Constantine VI. (see 'Acts of Nicæa,' Act viii., *ib.* iv. 485).[3]

(2) With the exception of the Second Council and the canons of the Fourth, the decrees of the seven Ecumenical Councils were (*a*) subscribed by the Papal legates, or (*b*) both so subscribed and subsequently approved by the Pope, or (*c*) eventually approved by the Pope. The decisions of Nicæa (325) were subscribed by the Papal legates (see 'Acts of Nicæa,' in Hardouin, i. 311–312); those of Ephesus (431) were subscribed by the Papal legates and referred to with approval in letters by Pope Sixtus III. (see 'Acts of Ephesus,' *ib.* i. 1527; 'Epp. Xysti III. ad Cyrillum,' in

[1] Julian, Bishop of Cos, and a presbyter Basil are also said to have been appointed as papal legates, but do not appear to have held the same position at the Council as the three mentioned above (see St. Leo, *Epp.* lxxxvi., xc., xcii., xciii.).

[2] The evidence afforded about this Council by Zonaras is not valuable; but there is no reason for doubting his statement referred to above.

[3] There is no record in this case of a formal edict after the Council; but the whole course of events after the Council shows that the decrees were regarded by the State authorities as being in force.

Coustant, *Epp. Rom. Pontif.* col. 1231–1240); those of Chalcedon (451) were subscribed by the Papal legates and accepted by Pope Leo I. (see 'Acts of Chalcedon,' in Hardouin, ii. 465–468; St. Leo, *Ep.* cxiv.); those of Constantinople (680–681) were subscribed by the Papal legates and accepted by Pope Leo II. (see 'Acts of Constantinople,' in Hardouin, iii. 1424, 1425, 1469–1478, 1729–1736); and those of Nicæa (787) were subscribed by the Papal legates and accepted by Pope Adrian I. (see 'Acts of Nicæa,' *ib.* iv. 456, 819). In the case of the Fifth Council, held at Constantinople in 553, Pope Vigilius at first dissented from the action of the Council (Vigilius, *Constitutum* of 553, *ib.* iii. 10–48), and the Council struck his name from the diptychs ('Acts of Constantinople,' Coll. vii., *ib.* iii. 186, 187); but he afterwards changed his mind and declared his approval of the decisions (Vigilius, *Ep. Decret.*; *Constitutum* of 554, in Hardouin, iii. 213–244).

7. The relation of the Emperor to Councils.—After the time of Constantine the Great, the close relations between Church and State led not only to the summoning of Councils and the ratification of their decrees by the Emperors, but also to an influence—sometimes greater, sometimes less—in many other ways. But, whatever the aggressiveness of certain Emperors and the sycophancy of prominent members of the Church at some times, the State recognized, and the Church maintained, that the work of ecclesiastical decisions and legislation belonged to the Church, not to the State. A few instances from Church and State may suffice to illustrate this fact. Both the Second and the Third Ecumenical Councils, in asking the Emperor Theodosius I. and the Emperors Theodosius and Valentinian III. respectively to ratify their decisions, spoke of the decisions themselves as wholly their own work, independently of the State (see 'Acts of Constantinople,' 381, and 'Acts of Ephesus,' Act v., in Hardouin, i. 808, 1501–1510). The Emperor Constantine the Great, in giving circulation to the decrees of the First Ecumenical Council, said: 'Whatever is determined in the holy assemblies of the bishops is to be regarded as showing the will of God' (Euseb. *Vit. Const.* iii. 20). The Emperors Theodosius II. and Valentinian III. wrote to the Third Ecumenical Council that they had sent Candidian to be their representative, 'to have no share in the discussions which may take place about doctrine; for it is unlawful that one who is not on the list of the holy bishops should mingle in the affairs of the Church' ('Acts of Ephesus,' p. i. cap. xx., in Hardouin, i. 1345). The Emperor Marcian addressed the Fourth Ecumenical Council: 'Our will to be present at the Council is that we may ratify those things which are done, not that we may exercise any power' ('Acts of Chalcedon,' Act vi., *ib.* ii. 465). The historian Theodoret records a dialogue between the Emperor Constantius II. and Pope Liberius, in which Liberius insisted, and incurred banishment for insisting, that St. Athanasius must not be condemned without a fair trial by ecclesiastical authorities and a sentence passed upon him after such a trial in accordance with the rules of the Church (see Theodoret, *HE* ii. 16). The same principle of the independence of the Church is emphatically declared in the letter written by Hosius, Bishop of Cordova, to the Emperor Constantius II., in which he said:

> 'Push not yourself into the affairs of the Church, neither give commands to us about them; but rather do you learn them from us. God has committed to your hands a kingdom. He has entrusted us with the affairs of the Church. And as he who should steal your rule would be resisting God who appointed it, so do you be afraid on your part to take upon yourself the affairs of the Church and become guilty of a great offence. It is written, "Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's." Therefore it is not lawful for us to bear rule upon the earth, and you, Sire, have not authority to burn incense. . . . This is my determination; I unite not with the Arians, but I anathematize their heresy. I subscribe not against Athanasius, whom we and the Church of the Romans and the whole council acquitted' (St. Athan. *Hist. Arian.* 44).

Such instances show that, while the Church acquiesced in the use of the most extravagant language to describe the Emperor, as when the Imperial commissioners and others called him 'the divine head,' 'the divine and immortal head,' 'our most divine lord,' or when a letter from him was styled a 'divine letter' (see, *e.g.*, 'Acts of Ephesus,' p. i. cap. 19, 20; 'Epp. Cath.' cap. 17, and 'Acts of Chalcedon,' p. i.; 'Epp.' 20, 36, Acts iv., xi., xiv. p. iii. cap. 5. 7, in Hardouin, i. 1344, 1345, 1616, ii. 36, 52, 413, 545, 572, 664, 668), it was not allowed that the Emperor had any right to dictate what the Councils should do.

8. The relation of the Pope to Councils.—The subject of the relation of the Popes to the convoking and confirming of Councils has been dealt with above. It is necessary to examine also the view of the Papal authority taken by the Councils. As of the Emperor, so of the Pope, language of a strong kind was used at and by the Councils. It must suffice to quote some of the most remarkable instances. At Ephesus (431) the Papal legate Philip described St. Peter as 'the prince and head of the Apostles, the pillar of the faith, and the foundation of the Catholic Church'; declared that he 'up to this time and always lives in his successors and gives judgment'; and in this context referred to Pope Celestine as the 'successor and representative' of St. Peter ('Acts of Ephesus,' in Hardouin, i. 1477, 1478); and the Fathers of the Council, in giving sentence against Nestorius, used the words, 'necessarily impelled by (ἀπό) the canons and by (ἐκ) the letter of our most holy Father and fellow-minister, Celestine, Bishop of the Roman Church' ('Acts of Ephesus,' Act i., *ib.* i. 1421, 1422). At Chalcedon (451) the Papal legate Paschasinus called the Pope the 'head of all the Churches' ('Acts of Chalcedon,' Act i., *ib.* ii. 67, 68); and the Fathers of the Council in their letter to the Emperor Marcian spoke of the Pope as the 'invulnerable champion' whom 'God provided,' and in their letter to Pope Leo described him as the 'head' of which they were the 'members,' and as him to whom 'was entrusted by the Saviour the guarding of the vine,' the Church ('Acts of Chalcedon,' p. iii. cap. 1, 2, *ib.* ii. 643, 644, 655, 656). At Constantinople (680–681) the Fathers of the Council wrote to Pope Agatho: 'We commit to thee, as the chief ruler of the universal Church standing on the firm rock of the faith, what is to be done,' to give effect to the decisions of the Council; and described the Pope's letter to the Emperor as 'uttered about divine truth by the chief head of the Apostles' ('Acts of Constantinople,' Act xviii., *ib.* iii. 1437–1440). Yet, notwithstanding all such statements, the Councils did not regard the Papal utterances as settling anything; they examined and tested the judgment of the Popes; they assented to these as conforming to orthodox standards; they did not shrink from declaring a Pope to be a heretic. At Ephesus (431) the condemnation of Nestorius was not passed until after the most elaborate consideration of his case, though the letter of Pope Celestine condemning him was before them ('Acts of Ephesus,' Act i., *ib.* i. 1353–1434). At Chalcedon (451) there was a like examination of the *Tome* of Pope Leo, and it was eventually approved as being 'consonant with the confession of great Peter' ('Acts of Chalcedon,' Act v., *ib.* ii. 455, 456). The Fifth Ecumenical Council, held at Constantinople in 553, insisted on condemning Theo-

dore of Mopsuestia and Theodoret, in spite of the resistance of Pope Vigilius ('Acts of Constantinople,' Coll. viii., *ib.* iii. 187–208). The Sixth Ecumenical Council, held at Constantinople in 680–681, anathematized Pope Honorius I. as a heretic; and with reference to the letters of Sergius and Honorius declared:

'We find that these documents are altogether alien from the doctrines of the Apostles and the decisions of the holy Councils and all the accepted holy Fathers, and that they follow the false teachings of the heretics. We entirely reject them, and we execrate them as destructive to the soul. Moreover, we have determined that the names of the very men whose doctrines we execrate as impious are to be cast out from the holy Church of God, namely Sergius. . . . And besides these, we have decided that Honorius, who was Pope of the elder Rome, is to be cast out of the holy Church of God and anathematized together with them. . . . To Theodore of Pharan, the heretic, anathema. To Sergius, the heretic, anathema. To Cyrus, the heretic, anathema. To Honorius, the heretic, anathema. To Pyrrhus, the heretic, anathema' ('Acts of Constantinople,' Acts xiii., xvi., in Hardouin, iii. 1332, 1333, 1385).

A comparison of the different parts of the evidence shows that, while the Pope was regarded as the chief bishop of Christendom, and while his authority and influence were great, the Councils held that it was for them and not for him to decide in matters of doctrine and discipline; and that, while the ordinary and normal desirable process was that Pope and Council should be in agreement, and that what the Council decided the Pope should accept and give effect to, a necessity might arise of a Council taking its own line in opposition to a Pope, and even of condemning him as heretical.

As regards the disciplinary power of the Pope, regulations of the Councils of Nicæa (325) and Sardica (343) are of special importance. Canon 6 of Nicæa assumes the possession by the Pope of a certain patriarchal authority in Italy, parallel with that of other patriarchs elsewhere, referred to as an illustration in a way which may imply a primacy on the part of Rome:

'The old customs in Egypt and Libya and Pentapolis are to be preserved so that the Bishop of Alexandria shall have authority over all these, since this is customary also in the case of the Bishop of Rome. In like manner, in Antioch and in the other provinces the rights are to be preserved to the Churches.'

Canons 3, 4, and 5 of Sardica provide for appeals to Rome in certain cases. They enact that, if a bishop has been deposed by the bishops of his province, there may be an appeal to the Bishop of Rome, who is to decide whether the appeal is to be allowed or not; if it is allowed, the Pope is to nominate bishops from the neighbourhood of the province in question to act as the court for the second hearing of the case; if the appellant can persuade the Pope to do so, the Pope may send presbyters of his own to act as his legates (*εἶναι ἐν τῇ ἐξουσίᾳ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἐπισκόπου . . . ἔχοντάς τε τὴν αὐθεντίαν τούτου παρ' οὗ ἀπεστάλησαν*) in the court thus formed.

9. The authority of Councils.—The degree of authority which a Council possessed varied greatly with its character. A local Council in itself could make no claim to acceptance wider than in the locality to which it belonged, and its decisions were always open to revision by a larger and more representative body. Thus, a diocesan Council had authority for its diocese, and a provincial Council for its province, but in each case this authority was subject to appeal from the diocese to the province, from the province to a union of provinces, and from any smaller Council to a Council of the whole Church; and as the Council was more fully representative, so its authority was greater. But a Council, however fully representative in constitution, was not finally authoritative simply because of that constitution. The ratification of its decrees by the Emperor gave civil sanction, and the assent to them by the Pope supplied a further ecclesiastical step (cf. the famous saying of St. Augustine, 'Iam enim de hac causa duo concilia missa sunt ad sedem apostolicam: inde etiam rescripta venerunt. Causa finita est: utinam aliquando finiatur error' [*Serm.* cxxxi. 10]). But the Council did not become Ecumenical, in the sense in which that word has been here used, and so completely binding on the whole body of the Church, without the general acceptance by the Church of its doctrinal decisions, since a Council, however representative in constitution, might fail to represent the real mind of the Church, just as a civil body of the most completely representative character, so far as constitution is concerned, might fail to represent the real wishes of the nation which elected it. This acceptance by the whole body of the Church was given to each of the seven Councils which have here been called 'Ecumenical.' In the case of these Councils the acceptance was not always easily or immediately received. For instance, the First Ecumenical Council, that of Nicæa (325), proved to be the occasion of controversy rather than the settlement of it, and did not receive universal acceptance for more than fifty years, until after the Second Ecumenical Council, that of Constantinople (381); and the decisions of the Seventh Ecumenical Council, that of Nicæa (787), were for a long time without acceptance in the West, were actually rejected by the Council of Frankfort (794) under a misunderstanding of their meaning,[1] and only gradually came to that recognition in the West which, added to the Eastern acceptance, constituted universal approbation. An instance of the way in which a Council not representative of the whole Church by its constitution may become Ecumenical through universal acceptance of its doctrinal teaching is in the Second Ecumenical Council, that of Constantinople (381), which was summoned from the East only, and which no Western bishop attended. The authority of the Ecumenical Councils is thus that of the whole Church. The idea of authority, whether as resident in the Church or as expressed by Councils, was based on the belief that the Church, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, was giving effect to the teaching of Holy Scripture and the deposit of faith committed by our Lord to His apostles. St. Athanasius described the work of the orthodox bishops at Nicæa (325) as having been 'to collect the sense (*διάνοια*) of the Scriptures' (*de Decr. Nic. Syn.* 20). The work done at Constantinople (381) was described by the bishops who met at Constantinople in the following year, who were almost the same as those of the Council of 381, in the words:

'We, whether we have endured persecutions or tribulations or the threats of monarchs or the cruelties of rulers or some other trial at the hands of the heretics, have borne these for the sake of the faith of the gospel which was ratified at Nicæa in Bithynia, by the three hundred and eighteen holy Fathers under the guidance of God. For this which we have been at pains to preserve ought to be sufficient for you and for us and for all who do not wrest the word of the true faith. It is the most ancient faith. It is in accordance with our baptism. It teaches us to believe in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, and consequently in one Godhead and Power and Essence of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, the dignity being equal and the majesty co-eternal; in three wholly perfect Subsistences or three perfect Persons. . . . We also preserve unperverted the doctrine of

[1] The Council of Nicæa (787) affirmed the lawfulness of 'reverence of honour' (*τιμητικὴ προσκύνησις*) addressed to the images of our Lord and the saints, but condemned any offering of 'real worship of adoration' (*ἀληθινὴ λατρεία*) to them ('Acts of Nicæa,' Act vii., in Hardouin, iv. 456). What the Council of Frankfort (794) rejected was the offering of adoration: 'Allata est in medium quaestio de nova Graecorum synodo quam de adorandis imaginibus Constantinopoli [obviously a blunder for Nicæa] fecerunt, in qua scriptum habebatur ut qui imaginibus sanctorum ita ut deificae Trinitati servitium aut adorationem non impenderent anathema iudicarentur. Qui supra sanctissimi patres nostri omnimodis adorationem et servitium renuentes contempserunt atque consentientes condemnaverunt' (canon 2 in Hardouin, iv. 904). This ascribes to the Nicene Council (787) exactly what that Council had rejected—the offering to images of the adoration due to the Holy Trinity.

the Incarnation of the Lord, receiving the tradition that the dispensation of the flesh is not without soul or without reason or imperfect, and being fully convinced that the Word of God was perfect before the ages and became perfect man in the last days for our salvation' (see Theodoret, *HE* v. 9).

At Ephesus (431) the bishops gave as their reason for the approval of the letters of St. Cyril that they 'were in no respect discordant with the Scriptures inspired by God or with the faith which has been handed down, which was set forth in the great Council by the holy Fathers who assembled at Nicæa,' and, as their reason for the condemnation of Nestorius, that his teaching was 'wholly alien from the faith of the Apostles and the gospel' ('Acts of Ephesus,' Act v., in Hardouin, i. 1505). At Chalcedon (451) the letter of St. Cyril of Alexandria to John of Antioch was read, containing the following passage:

'Concerning the Virgin Mother of God how we both think and say, and concerning the manner of the Incarnation of the Only-Begotten Son of God, we will speak briefly, necessarily, not by way of addition, but as a full completion, as we have received from the beginning from the divine Scriptures and from the tradition of the holy Fathers.'

The *Tome* of St. Leo, which also was read to the Council, appealed chiefly to the evidence of Holy Scripture, but likewise to the creed confessed by the whole body of Christians. After the *Tome* had been read, the bishops exclaimed:

'This is the faith of the Fathers. This is the faith of the Apostles. Thus do we all believe. Thus do the orthodox believe. Anathema to him who does not so believe. Peter has spoken thus through Leo. Thus did the Apostles teach. Piously and truly has Leo taught. Thus taught Cyril. Eternal be the memory of Cyril. Leo and Cyril taught alike. Thus taught Leo and Cyril. Anathema to him who does not so believe. This is the true faith. Thus are we, the orthodox, minded. This is the faith of the Fathers' ('Acts of Chalcedon,' Act i., ii., in Hardouin, ii. 121, 305).

At Constantinople (553) the bishops declared:

'Being gathered together, before all things we have briefly confessed that we hold that faith which our Lord Jesus Christ, true God, delivered to His holy Apostles, and through them to the holy Churches, and which the holy Fathers and doctors who succeeded them delivered to the peoples committed to their care'; and described themselves, in their condemnation of heresy, as lighting 'the light of knowledge from the divine Scriptures and the teaching of the Apostles' ('Acts of Constantinople,' 553, Coll. viii., in Hardouin, iii. 189, 194).

The bishops at Constantinople (680–681) stated:

'We have examined the synodical letter of Sophronius of holy memory, once patriarch of the holy city of Christ our God, Jerusalem; and, as we have found it to be in harmony with the true faith and in accordance with the teachings of the Apostles and the holy approved Fathers, we have judged it to be orthodox and have received it as profitable to the Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church'; described themselves as 'following the five holy Ecumenical Councils and the holy and approved Fathers,' and as defining the faith 'according as the prophets from the beginning have taught, and Jesus Christ Himself has instructed us, and the symbol of the holy Fathers has delivered to us'; and in their letter to Pope Agatho I. said of their work: 'On us shone the grace of the all-holy Spirit, bestowing His power through your continual prayer, so that we might root out every tare and every tree that bringeth not forth good fruit, and commanding that they should be consumed with fire. And, agreeing in heart and tongue and hand, we have put forth, by the assistance of the life-giving Spirit, a definition most free from error and most certain, not removing the ancient landmarks, as it is said, which God forbid, but abiding by the testimonies of the holy and approved Fathers' ('Acts of Constantinople,' 680–681, Acts xiii., xviii., in Hardouin, iii. 1333, 1400, 1440).

At Nicæa (787) the bishops defined their work:

'Thus the teaching of our holy Fathers is strengthened, that is, the tradition of the Catholic Church, which has received the Gospel from one end to the other. Thus we follow Paul, who spoke in Christ, and all the company of the divine Apostles and the holy Fathers, holding fast the traditions which we have received'; and wrote to the Empress Irene and to the Emperor Constantius VI.: 'Following the traditions of the Apostles and the Fathers, we are bold to speak, being of one mind in the concord given by the all-holy Spirit; and being all brought together in one, having the tradition of the Catholic Church in harmony with us, we are in accord with the agreeing voices set forth by the six Ecumenical Councils' ('Acts of Nicæa,' Act vii., in Hardouin, iv. 456, 473).

For their great doctrinal decisions the Ecumenical Councils thus possess the authority of the universal Church, and base their work on that tradition of the faith which goes back to and rests on the authority of our Lord Himself. A more difficult question arises as to the degree of their authority in certain other matters. Some disciplinary enactments obviously dealt with local and temporary circumstances, and therefore have only local and temporary force, as, *e.g.*, regulations about letters of commendation made at Chalcedon (451) in canon 11; but in other matters of discipline it is less easy to decide how far a principle is involved which may tend towards some degree of permanent authority.

An instance may show the complexity of the problem thus raised. The First Ecumenical Council, acting in accordance with the condemnation of 'usury' in canon 20 of the Council of Elvira (305), the excommunication of 'ministers who lend money for interest' in canon 12 of the Council of Arles (314), and the regulation in the forty-fourth *Apostolical Canon*, that 'a bishop, priest, or deacon, who seeks interest from those who owe him money must either cease from the practice or be deposed,' enacted that: 'Since many who are in the list of the clergy, moved by covetousness and the spirit of gain, have forgotten the divine word which says, "He hath not given his money upon interest," and lend and require one per cent per month, the holy and great Council declares that, if any one after this decree be found to be receiving interest . . . he shall be deposed from the clerical office and his name shall be struck off the list' (canon 17); and this canon passed into the ordinary law of both East and West, and became part of the *Corpus iuris canonici* (*Decretum*, I. xlvii. 2, II. xiv. 4 (8)). This canon differs markedly, on the one hand, from doctrinal decisions concerning central truth; and, on the other hand, from regulations of merely local and temporary import.

10. The work of the Seven Ecumenical Councils.—It has already been indicated that the Ecumenical Councils dealt with matters of very varying character and importance, some doctrinal, others disciplinary.

(1) Their great work was in regard to *the theology of the Incarnation*.—(*a*) By the acceptance of the Nicene Creed, and in particular of the phrase in it 'of the same essence as the Father' (ὁμοούσιος τῷ Πατρί), the FIRST COUNCIL OF NICÆA (325) affirmed the real Deity of Christ (see CONFESSIONS, in vol. iii. p. 836, and CREEDS [Ecumenical]). (*b*) The FIRST COUNCIL OF CONSTANTINOPLE (381) ratified the work of the Council of Nicæa (325) in regard to the Deity of Christ; and in particular, by its condemnation of Apollinarism—the heresy which maintained that our Lord did not possess a higher human soul or spirit—protected the completeness of Christ's manhood; see canon 1:

'The confession of faith of the three hundred and eighteen Fathers who were assembled at Nicæa in Bithynia shall not be abolished, but shall remain; and every heresy shall be anathematized, especially that of the Eunomians or Anomaeans, the Arians or Eudoxians, the semi-Arians or Pneumatomachians, the Sabellians, Marcellians, Photinians, and Apollinarians.'

It has been thought by some that this Council affirmed the longer form of the Nicene Creed, sometimes called the Constantinopolitan Creed (see CONFESSIONS, and CREEDS, *ut supra*). (*c*) The FIRST COUNCIL OF EPHESUS (431), by its approval of the letters of St. Cyril of Alexandria and its condemnation of Nestorius, affirmed the one Person of Christ, so that it is accurate to call the Blessed Virgin Mary 'the Mother of God' (θεοτόκος), and to say that 'God was born and died.' (*d*) The COUNCIL OF CHALCEDON (451) ratified the work of the three earlier Councils by its affirmation of the Deity, complete manhood, and one Person of Christ, and by its acceptance of the original Nicene Creed and the Constantinopolitan Creed (see CONFESSIONS, and CREEDS); and declared also the distinctness and permanent reality of Christ's two natures of Deity and manhood by accepting the *Tome* of St. Leo and by acknowledging

'two natures, without confusion, without change, without rending, without separation, while the distinction of the natures is in no way destroyed because of the union, but rather the peculiarity of each nature is preserved and concurs into one Person and one Hypostasis' (Act v., in Hardouin, ii. 453–456).

(*e*) The SECOND COUNCIL OF CONSTANTINOPLE (553), by its condemnation of the 'Three Chapters'—that is (1) the person and writings of Theodore

of Mopsuestia, (2) the writings of Theodoret in defence of Nestorius and against St. Cyril of Alexandria and the Council of Ephesus (431), and (3) the letter of Ibas to Maris—rejected anew the Nestorian heresy and affirmed the doctrine of the one Person of Christ. The words of the sentence of the Council are:

'We receive the four holy Councils, that is, of Nicæa, of Constantinople, the First of Ephesus, and of Chalcedon; and we have affirmed and do affirm those truths which they defined in defence of the one and the same faith. We declare those who do not receive these Councils to be apart from the Catholic Church. We condemn and anathematize, together with all other heretics who have been condemned and anathematized by the aforesaid four holy Councils and by the Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church, Theodore who was Bishop of Mopsuestia and his wicked writings, and the wicked writings of Theodoret against the right faith and against the twelve chapters of the holy Cyril and against the First Council of Ephesus, and his writings in defence of Theodore and Nestorius. Moreover, we anathematize also the wicked letter which Ibas is said to have written to Maris the Persian, which denies that God the Word was incarnate of the holy Mother of God and ever Virgin Mary, and so was made man' ('Acts of Constantinople,' 553, Coll. viii., in Hardouin, iii. 193, 194; cf. Evagrius, *HE* iv. 38).

(*f*) The THIRD COUNCIL OF CONSTANTINOPLE (680–681) condemned the Monothelite heresy, according to which there is only one will in Christ, and affirmed the reality of His human will as well as of His Divine will. After declaring their adherence to the Councils of Nicæa (325), Constantinople (381), Ephesus (431), Chalcedon (451), and Constantinople (553), and after reciting the original Nicene Creed and the enlarged Nicene or Constantinopolitan Creed (see CONFESSIONS, and CREEDS, *ut supra*), the bishops said:

'This holy and orthodox creed of the Divine grace was in itself enough for the complete knowledge and confirmation of the orthodox faith; but since the author of evil has never ceased to find a serpent to help him, and thereby to diffuse his deadly poison among the human race, and so to find fit instruments to accomplish his will—we mean Theodoret, who was Bishop of Pharan; Sergius, Pyrrhus, Paul, Peter, who were bishops of this royal city; also Honorius, who was Pope of old Rome; and Cyrus, who held the bishopric of Alexandria; also Macarius, who was recently in charge of Antioch, and his disciple, Stephen—he did not fail to bring through them scandalous errors on the whole Church by disseminating in new fashion among the orthodox people the heresy of the one will and one operation in the two natures of the one Christ our true God, one Person of the Holy Trinity, . . . the heresy which serves to take away the fulness of the Incarnation of the one Lord Jesus Christ our God by means of a crafty notion, and which impiously brings in the idea of His rationally quickened flesh as being without will and operation. . . . In like manner, following the teaching of the holy Fathers, we proclaim two natural wills (θελήσεις ἤτοι θελήματα) in Him, and two natural operations, without division, without change, without severance, without confusion, and two natural wills not opposed to one another—God forbid—as the wicked heretics said, but his human will following, and not resisting or opposing, but rather subject to His divine and almighty will' ('Acts of Constantinople,' 680–681, Act xviii., in Hardouin, iii. 1395–1400).

(*g*) The SECOND COUNCIL OF NICÆA (787) dealt with the contentions of the Iconoclasts that Christ might not be represented in a material form because of the infinity of the Godhead, or, as the more moderate members of the party taught, that the representations of Him might not be venerated. In view of these contentions, the Council affirmed the teaching of the six earlier Ecumenical Councils, and proceeded to declare that the material representations of our Lord were the visible signs of the reality of the Incarnation, and that the veneration of these and of the images of the saints—which was to be distinguished from the adoration due to God alone—lifted the thoughts of the worshippers to the realities which these visible things represented:

'We, holding fast in everything the decrees and acts of our divinely guided Fathers, proclaim them with one mouth and one heart, adding nothing to, taking nothing away from, the things which they delivered to us, but in these we are strong, in these we are established; we so confess, we so teach, as the six holy Ecumenical Councils have defined and determined. And we believe in one God, the Father Almighty, Maker of all things visible and invisible; and in one Lord Jesus Christ, His only-begotten Son and Word, through whom all things were made; and in the Holy Ghost, the Lord and Life-Giver, consubstantial and co-eternal with the Father and His co-eternal Son—the Trinity uncreated, undivided, incomprehensible, uncircumscribed, which wholly and alone is to be adored and venerated and worshipped, one Godhead, one Lordship, one Dominion, one Kingdom and Power, which without division is apportioned to the Persons, and without confusion is joined to the Essence. And we confess that One of the same holy and co-essential Trinity, our Lord Jesus Christ, the true God, in the last days for our salvation became flesh and was made Man, and by the saving dispensation of His passion and resurrection and ascension into heaven did save our race and set us free from idolatry. . . . The Lord of glory Himself, God who became Man, saved us and set us free from idolatry. To Him, therefore, be glory; to Him be grace; to Him be thanksgiving; to Him be praise; to Him be majesty. His is redemption and salvation. He alone is able to save to the uttermost. This is the work of no other men, who came from the dust. He Himself, through the dispensation of His incarnation, has fulfilled for us, on whom the ends of the world are come, the words foretold by the prophets. . . . And we greet the words of the Lord, and of the apostles, and of the prophets, by which we have been taught to honour and magnify, first her who is actually and really the Mother of God, who is above all the heavenly powers, and then the holy powers of the angels, the blessed and illustrious apostles, the glorious prophets, the victorious martyrs who fought for Christ, the holy and God-fearing doctors, and all the saints; and to seek for their intercessions, which are able to make us at home with God, the King of all, if we keep His commandments, and strive to live virtuously. We greet, moreover, the figure of the honourable and life-giving cross, and the holy relics of the saints; and we receive and greet and embrace the holy and venerable images, according to the primitive tradition of the Holy Catholic Church of God, that is, our Holy Fathers, who both received them and determined that they should be in all the holy churches of God, and in every place of His dominion. These honourable images, as has been said before, we honour and greet and honourably venerate, namely, the image of the Incarnation of our great God and Saviour Jesus Christ; and of our unstained Lady, the all-holy Mother of God, of whom He was pleased to become flesh, that He might save us and set us free from all wicked idolatry; and of the holy and bodiless angels, who appeared in the form of men to the righteous; and the figures and images of the divine and far-famed apostles, the God-speaking prophets, the triumphant martyrs, and the saints; so that, through their representations, we may be led to the recollection and memory of them who are represented, and may attain to some share in their holiness. . . . In proportion as the saints are beheld by their images, those who behold them are uplifted in memory and affection of those who are represented, so as to assign to these greeting and honourable veneration, not the real adoration which, according to our faith, is due to the nature of God only; but that to these, as to the figure of the honourable and life-giving cross, and to the holy Gospels, and to the other sacred objects, there should be brought incense and lights to do them honour, as has been the pious custom of men of old' ('Acts of Nicæa,' 787, Acts iv., vii., in Hardouin, iv. 264, 265, 456).

(2) Of the work done by the Ecumenical Councils in addition to the protection and development of the doctrine of the Incarnation, only a few representative instances can be given. The decision in regard to the schism caused by Meletius, Bishop of Lycopolis, intruding into other dioceses and ordaining in them; the decision about the dispute as to the right day for keeping Easter; the regulation that all were to pray standing on Sundays, at Nicæa (325); the assigning of the first place after the Bishop of Rome to the Bishop of Constantinople, at Constantinople (381); the prohibition of simony and the regulations about deaconesses, at Chalcedon (451)—show the wide scope of the disciplinary enactments of these councils.

II. Other important Councils.—Illustrations of Councils other than the Seven Ecumenical Councils may be placed in three groups.

(1) *The Councils held at Constantinople in 869 and 879.*—That in 869 was regarded in the West, and is still regarded by the Church of Rome, as the Eighth Ecumenical Council. Its chief work was the condemnation of Photius, one of the claimants to the See of Constantinople, who in 866 had issued an encyclical letter in which he attacked the Westerns for (*a*) keeping Saturday as a fast; (*b*) eating milk and cheese during part of Lent; (*c*) not allowing married men to be priests; (*d*) restricting confirmation to bishops; (*e*) teaching the double procession of the Holy Ghost (*Ep.* i. 13, in Migne, *PG* cii. 721–742); and who in 867 had presided at a Council at Constantinople which had anathematized the Pope ('Acts of Constan-

tinople,' 869, in Hardouin, v. 749-1196). The Council held in 879 is regarded in the East as the Eighth Ecumenical Council. It reversed the proceedings of the Council of 869 and acknowledged Photius. Legates of the Pope were present at it, and assented to its work; but it was eventually repudiated by the Pope. The absence of Eastern acceptance of the Council of 869 and of Western acceptance of the Council of 879 makes both these Councils to be without that universal acceptance which is a condition of ecumenicity.

(2) Between the Council of Nicæa (325) and the Council of Constantinople (381) *a series of Councils concerning the Arian controversy* were held. The most important of them were those at Antioch in 341, with supplementary assemblies later in the same year and in 344, which drew up five Creeds which in themselves were orthodox, but which played into the hands of the semi-Arians by the use of ambiguous expressions about the Deity of Christ; at Sardica in 343, which defended St. Athanasius; and the simultaneous Council at Philippopolis, which condemned him and accepted the fourth of the Antiochene Creeds; at Sirmium in 351, 357, and 358, which were favourable to the semi-Arians, and the third of which drew up a Creed of the same character as the Antiochene Creeds; at Ariminum in 359, which accepted a semi-Arian Creed; at Seleucia in 359, which accepted the same Creed as that adopted at Ariminum; and at Alexandria in 362, which, on the temporary return of St. Athanasius to his See, dealt with the various practical difficulties which had arisen through the dominance of the Arians during the reign of Constantius II.

(3) *Particular Councils of special importance.*—(*a*) The Councils of Laodicea, held between 341 and 381, of Carthage in 397 and 419, and the Quinisext, or Trullan, Council of Constantinople (692) made regulations in regard to the books which might be read in church.—(*b*) A series of Councils held in the 5th cent. in Africa and Palestine and Italy were concerned with the Pelagian heresy. With these must be placed the highly important Second Council of Orange (529), which condemned Semi-Pelagianism, and definitely asserted the need of Divine grace both to lead man to choose good and to enable him to give effect to his choice; but took pains to avoid exaggerations in the opposite direction, by adding to the canons the following statement:

'When grace has been received through baptism, all the baptized, by the help and co-operation of Christ, are able and ought to fulfil those things which pertain to the salvation of the soul, if they are willing to labour faithfully. That any are predestined to evil by the power of God, we not only do not believe, but also, if there are any who wish to believe so great an evil, we say anathema to them with all abhorrence. This also we healthfully confess and believe, that in every good work it is not we who begin and afterwards are aided by the mercy of God, but God Himself in the first instance inspires into us, without any good deserts of our own preceding, belief in Him and love for Him, so that we both faithfully seek for the sacrament of Baptism, and after Baptism are able with His help to fulfil those things which are pleasing to him' ('Acts of Orange,' 529, in Hardouin, ii. 1101, 1102).

These decisions at Orange were accepted as expressing the general mind of the Church (see PELAGIANISM, SEMI-PELAGIANISM).—(*c*) A Council was held at Constantinople in 543, to which the *Fifteen Anathematisms on Origen*, which are sometimes ascribed to the Fifth Ecumenical Council, probably belong. They include the anathema, 'If any one maintains the legendary pre-existence of souls and the monstrous idea of restitution which follows from it, let him be anathema' (see Hardouin, iii. 284).—(*d*) The Third Council of Toledo (589) was the occasion of the Spanish Church and nation repudiating their traditional Arianism, and accepting the Catholic faith as expressed by the orthodox Councils. It is of importance, in regard to the history of the Creeds and to controversies between the East and the West, that the clause in the enlarged form of the Nicene Creed was recited at this Council as 'ex Patre *et Filio* procedentem' (see Hardouin, iii. 472).—(*e*) The Quinisext, or Trullan, Council of Constantinople (692) reaffirmed the doctrinal declarations of the six Ecumenical Councils which had by that time been held, and added to them a series of disciplinary canons which became a recognized part of the Eastern canon law.—(*f*) The Council of Frankfort (794), expressing the general mind of the Church, condemned the heresy of Adoptianism, declaring that it 'ought to be utterly rooted out of the Church' (canon 1; see Hardouin, iv. 904, and cf. art. ADOPTIANISM). Under a misapprehension, it rejected the decisions of the Second Council of Nicæa about images (see above, p. 190[b] n.).

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COUNCILS (Christian: Mediæval, 870-1400).—The Councils of this protracted period were not important from a doctrinal standpoint, as compared with the Ecumenical Councils from 325 to 869, or as compared with the later Councils of Trent and the Vatican. The dogma of Transubstantiation is the only dogma which was defined (at the Fourth Lateran, 1215) that had not been defined by one of the first eight Ecumenical Councils. These Synods are, however, of unusual value for the light they throw upon the clerical manners of the period, and the advocacy they gave to some of the greater social and ecclesiastical movements of the Middle Ages. They legislated upon the relation of the Church to the Empire, upon the prerogatives and election of the Popes, upon Church reforms, especially against simony and priestly concubinage, upon heresy and its punishment, upon the details of the conduct of worship, priestly dress and manners, upon the crusades, upon the evils of feud (through the truce of God), and upon the tournaments. As regards locality, Rome was all through the period the chief centre of Church assemblies. Down to 1200, few Synods, of which any account is preserved, were held outside Germany, France, Italy, and England. The important Synod of Szoboles (1092) in Hungarian territory was one of the exceptions. After 1150 the Spanish Synods came into prominence on account of the regulations touching heresy and its extirpation. A notable feature is that not only the Synods in Rome, but many outside of it, were presided over by Popes in person or through their legates. Such were the Synods in France, Germany, and Italy, attended by Leo IX., Urban II., Innocent II., Alexander III., Lucius III. The presence of the supreme head of Christendom gave to the acts of such

Synods a semi-Ecumenical importance. The period witnessed seven Ecumenical Councils, the first in the West, and all called and presided over by Popes. The decrees of some of them are of less importance than the legislation of some of the local Synods, such as the Reform Synods held in Rome in 1049, 1059, etc., the Synod of Clermont (1095), which set the first crusade in motion, the Synod of Verona (1184), which took up heresy, and the Synod of Tours (1229), which, in addition to other important regulations aimed against heretics, forbade laymen to possess copies of the Scriptures. We shall treat the subject under five heads.

I. 870-900.—The Synods of this dark age, so far as they are known to us, were only of temporary and local importance. The subjects discussed were crimes against the clergy and their punishment, the payment of tithes, the rights of patrons over church livings, marriage and divorce. No new measures of Church reform or ecclesiastical polity were taken up. No new statements of doctrine were made. No Synod of importance was held at Rome. The Synod of Tribur, near Mainz (895), was one of the best of them (see Hefele, iv. 552 ff.). It was attended by the three great German archbishops, Hermann of Cologne, Haito of Mainz, and Rothod of Trèves, by 19 bishops, and many abbots. Twelve of its 58 canons concern marriage, which is declared valid only when the parties are equals. A man having a concubine was expressly permitted, in addition, to take a wife. A man committing adultery with another man's wife was forbidden to marry her, even if the husband died. The old Roman law evidently still had its influence, but the movement of the Church was in the right direction, and at the Roman Synod (1059) under Nicolas II. a layman was forbidden, under pain of excommunication, to have a wife and a concubine at the same time.

II. 900-1050.—The 10th cent. witnessed even fewer Synods than the 9th (Hefele, iv. 571), and this, according to the canonist Hergenröther, was a sign of the decay of Catholic discipline (*Kathol. Kirchenrecht*, 342). The Ottos and Henry III. had a taste for calling Synods, regarding themselves as the successors of Constantine, Theodosius, Marcian, and other Roman Emperors. After the year 1000 there is a very noticeable increase in the number of Synods. Here, again, no theological dogma is stated which had not already been defined. The prerogative of the Papal Chair, which was to form such a conspicuous subject of Conciliar discussion after 1050, was not touched upon, except incidentally at the Synod of St. Bâle, near Rheims (991), where Gerbert, afterwards Sylvester II., took a prominent part, and Archbishop Arnulf was deposed. Sylvester, on becoming Pope, restored him (Hefele, iv. 637 ff., 654; Loofs, *Dogmengesch.*[4], Halle, 1906, p. 249). A Synod of Rome under Sylvester (998), in the spirit of Nicolas I., imposed a penance of eight years upon Robert, king of France, for his marriage with his blood-relation, Bertha; and the Archbishop of Tours and other prelates, who had assented to the incestuous relationship, were suspended. Of the Synods which took up the cases of individual Popes, the Synod of Rome (963) deposed John XII. and elected Leo VIII.; the Roman Synod of 964 reinstated John XII.; and another Roman Synod (964) restored Leo VIII. Otto the Great called the last of these Synods. The most famous of them, the Synod of Sutri, has a permanent interest, as bearing upon the relation between a Council and the Papacy. It was controlled by Henry III., and disposed of three Popes and elected a fourth. Benedict IX. resigned, Sylvester III. was imprisoned, and Gregory VI. deposed himself, his resignation being accepted by the assembled Fathers. Descending from the throne, he implored forgiveness for having usurped the supreme seat of Christendom by simoniacal purchase. Clement II. was then seated.

The Synodical legislation of 1000–1050 shows a great revival of interest in ecclesiastical discipline and order, and is characterized by three notable features—a strong movement towards the moral reform of the clergy, the check put upon feuds and bloodshed, and the repression of heresy. The Synods of Pavia (1018), presided over by Benedict VIII., of Goslar (1019), Seligenstadt (1022), and Bourges (1031), busied themselves with questions of reform, especially with the incontinence of the clergy. The deposition of all clerics who had wives or concubines was decreed, from subdeacon to bishop. The Synod of Seligenstadt recognized the crying evil of excessive masses, when it limited a priest to three a day. The legislation against the deep-rooted evil of uninterrupted feud and blood-revenge begins with the Synod of Poitiers (1000). The Synod of Limoges (1031) threatened the interdict as punishment for such feud. The legislation which started in France was perfected there. The agreement of peace (*pax Dei*), dating from 1034, which required a cessation of warfare all the days of the week, was found impracticable, and (about 1040) Synods in Southern France established the *treuga Dei*, the peace or truce of God, whereby cessation from bloodshed was ordered from Wednesday evening to Monday at sunrise, thus including the sacred days of the Ascension, Passion, Burial, and Resurrection. Later Synods, as the Synod of Narbonne (1054) and the great Synod of Clermont (1095), under the presidency of Urban II., extended the limits of the truce to the Lenten period and other holy seasons of the Church year. This humane legislation was confirmed by the first three Ecumenical Councils of the West (1123, 1139, 1179); and, in putting a check upon the barbarism of mediæval society, it stood probably for a more remarkable measure than the principle of arbitration in international disputes which is now gaining recognition. The Synodal action on heresy opens with the Synod of Orleans (1022). There had been no call for repressive measures for hundreds of years, as heresy was practically unknown in Western Europe. It appeared again in Southern France and Northern Italy; and at Orleans, in the presence of Robert, king of France, and his consort, 13 persons were burned for erroneous teachings and practices. This legislation was taken up by the Synod of Arras, Southern France (1025), which condemned heretics who had emigrated from Italy and rejected baptism and the Lord's Supper, despised marriage, and 'annulled' the Church. Again, at the Synod of Rheims (1049), heretics were condemned. This legislation was renewed at a later time and elaborated by many Synods, culminating in the measure of the Inquisition laid down by Innocent III. at the Fourth Lateran, the rules of the Synod of Tours, and the decrees of Innocent's successors.

III. 1050-1122.—In this, the Hildebrandian period, Synods are numerous. They are a sign of a new age in Church history, and an indication of the administration of vigorous personalities. Their decisions had much influence on the permanent policy and practice of the Latin Church. Hildebrand (Gregory VII.), the most imposing figure of the period, lent the great weight of his presence at these Synods and his confirmation to their enactments. Other powerful Popes who did the same were Leo IX., Nicolas II., and Urban II. The chief subjects legislated upon were the Papal prerogative as involved in the

ceremony of investiture, clerical concubinage, ecclesiastical simony, the mode of electing the Pope, and the crusades. The so-called Reform Synods, assembling in Rome, which took up the first three questions, form an epoch in the history of the Western Church, and bear the same relation to the earlier periods of the Middle Ages that the reformatory Councils of Pisa, Constance, and Basel bear to their last period. The Lord's Supper was the only question of a doctrinal nature to be discussed, being taken up in connexion with the dynamic theory advocated by Berengar of Tours (d. 1088). The doctrine of the transmutation of the elements was assumed, the word 'transubstantiation' not being used. Through the influence of Lanfranc, Berengar's views were condemned in Rome (1050). He failed to appear at the Synod of Vercelli (1050), over which Leo IX. presided. His case was subsequently taken up at several Synods, notably at the Roman Synods (1059 and 1079). At both of these Synods he retracted his view, but afterwards recalled his denials, declaring that they had been made through fear. The 113 bishops present at the Synod of 1059 he called 'wild beasts.' The protection of Gregory VII. saved him. The famous law regulating Papal election and confining it to the cardinals was passed at the Roman Synod of 1059, under the presidency of Nicolas II. The law was elaborated by Alexander III. at the Ecumenical Council of 1179, and again at the second Ecumenical Council at Lyons (1274).

The Reform Synods began at the opening of the period in 1049. At the Roman Synod of 1047, Clement II. had already declared against simony, and punished some bishops who practised it. The Roman Synod of 1049, under Leo IX., declared war in earnest against the two evils of simony and clerical marriage, renewed the old laws on the subject, and forbade to clerics, from the sub-deacon up to the higher orders, the exercise of religious functions so long as they were married or kept concubines. This legislation was repeated the same year by Synods at Rheims and Mainz, both presided over by Leo. Vigorous laws were also passed by the Roman Synods of 1059 and 1061, under Nicolas II., and by the Synod of Melfi, near Monte Cassino (1059), presided over by the same Pontiff. The energy with which the canon of celibacy was pushed is shown by Nicolas' despatch of legates to propagate the Papal views, and the action of the Synods of Vienne and Tours (1060) along the same line. Gregory VII. won for himself a foremost place among Papal reformers by the boldness with which he advocated moral reforms, and the suffering he was ready to undergo in their interest. Simony, clerical concubinage, and lay investiture were the three evils against which he waged vigorous war. At the Lenten Synod in Rome (1074), the first of his pontificate, he ordered all holding ecclesiastical offices by purchase to relinquish them, and all guilty of the *crimen fornicationis*, that is, having a wife or a concubine, to desist from saying mass. To the resistance offered by localities and bishops to the latter decree was added the unfavourable action of the local Synods of Paris and Erfurt (1074). But such Synodal action was as a passing cloud. Other Synods came to Gregory's aid, and those held at Rome year by year renewed the war; and the legislation condemning the marriage of the clergy was repeated again and again, even in far-off England, as at the Synods of Winchester under Lanfranc (1076), at London under Anselm (1102, 1108), and at Westminster (1138), etc. These Synods extended the war to the sons of priests, who were excluded from succeeding to the benefices held by their fathers. The Roman Synod of 1083, the last under Gregory, placed in one and the same category the sons of priests, the sons of adulterers, and all other bastards, and pronounced them ineligible for ordination. The difficulty met with in putting a stop to the marriage of clerics is shown by the action of the Hungarian Synod of Szoboles (1092), which, for the sake of peace, granted priests already married the indulgence to keep their wives (see Hefele, v. 204 ff.).

A positive prohibition of lay investiture was laid down by Gregory in the Lenten Synod at Rome (1075). Henceforward the custom was illegal whereby the Emperor and princes had inducted bishops and abbots into their office by the gift of ring and staff. This right Gregory now reserved for the spiritual authorities, to whom it properly belonged. The principle was asserted at one Council after another, and thus the moral weight of Conciliar action was added to the heroic boldness of Gregory in his personal struggle with Henry IV., until the matter was finally settled by the Concordat of Worms (1122).

Synods undertook an easy task when they began to urge Western Christendom to endeavour to rescue Jerusalem and the other sacred sites from the grasp of the infidel. The spirit of chivalry, as well as the impulse of piety, was touched when the appeal was made to assert by arms the right of the Church to the localities where the Redeemer was born, had died, and lay in the grave for three days. The subject was first brought to the attention of a Council at the Synod of Piacenza (1095), when an embassy appeared from the Emperor Alexius calling for aid against the encroachments of the Turk upon the Eastern Empire. At the Council of Clermont (1095), presided over by Urban II., the first crusade was determined upon. Urban's address, picturing the distress of Jerusalem, fired the heart of the large assembly with such enthusiasm, that the cry arose, 'God wills it, God wills it,' and multitudes took the cross. More effective sermon was never preached, and at once throughout Central Europe was heard the noise of preparation for the main army which was to start under Godfrey, and the preliminary swarms under Peter the Hermit, Walter the Penniless, etc. See CRUSADES.

IV. **1122-1400** (the Ecumenical Councils).—This period of 280 years is marked by seven Ecumenical Councils, a great increase in the number of local Synods, and their spread over all Western Europe. They were called forth by the crusades, the spread of heresy, the conflicts of the Popes with the Emperors, the evils in the Church which called for reformation, and other considerations. The inclination of the Popes to strengthen their hands and carry out their plans through the action of Synods continued to be a marked feature of the Papal policy, as it had been in the Hildebrandian age. The greatest of the Popes—Alexander III., Innocent III., Gregory IX., and Innocent IV.—summoned Synods and laid their projects before them. The Ecumenical Councils were called by Popes, and the secular prince had nothing to do with their being summoned. Thus the theory of the ancient Church was set aside (see Döllinger-Friedrich, *Das Papstthum*, 88 ff.). The Papal ratification gave authority to their decrees, and the first canon of the First Lateran runs: 'Auctoritate sedis apost. prohibemus,' etc. It is true that the approbation of the assembled prelates is sometimes mentioned, and it was assumed that it was given. The formula ran: 'Sacro approbante concilio,' or 'Sacro praesente concilio.' So the Fourth Lateran. The seven General Councils were as follows:—

(1) *The First Lateran* (1123), so called from having met in the Lateran Church in Rome, was

—following the counting of the Latins—the 9th Ecumenical Council, or the next in the list after the Council of Constantinople (869). It was called by Calixtus II., and had for its principal object the ratification of the Concordat of Worms, known also as the *Pactum Calixtinum*. By that pact the Church reserved to itself the exclusive right of investing bishops with the ring and the crozier, and of inducting them into the spiritual functions of their sees, while the temporal prince retained the right of inducting them into the temporalities and of being present at the elections. Our reports of the First Lateran vary in giving the number of attending bishops and abbots as 300–997. It was the first Ecumenical Council to enjoin clerical celibacy. Following the example of Urban II. at Clermont, it granted indulgence of sins to all participating in the crusades, and, in addition, it took their relatives and their goods under the special protection of the Church.

(2) *The Second Lateran*, or 10th Ecumenical (1139), was opened with an address by Innocent II., witnessed the close of the disastrous Papal schism which had distracted the Church for nine years, and pronounced against the heresy of Arnold of Brescia (see Otto of Freising, *de gestis Frederici*, ii. 20). It also condemned simony, priestly concubinage, and the ministration of the sons of priests, and introduced a new element in forbidding, for a term of years, tournaments. Like the First Lateran and the Third Lateran, it enjoined the truce of God.

(3) *The Third Lateran*, or 11th Ecumenical (1179), was summoned and presided over by Alexander III. 287 or, according to other reports, 300 or 396 bishops were present, besides many abbots and other clergy. It celebrated the establishment of peace between the Papacy and Frederick Barbarossa. It made some additions to the rules for electing a Pope. Falling back on the 12th canon of the Second Lateran, it legislated against heretics, especially the Cathari and Patarini, and ordered separate burial-places and churches for lepers.

(4) *The Fourth Lateran*, or 12th Ecumenical (1215), was, with the Council of Constance, the most important ecclesiastical assembly of the Middle Ages, and one of the most eventful in all Church history. Its two chief acts were the declaration of Transubstantiation as a dogma of the Church, and the establishment of the Inquisition. The Council was called by Innocent III., and attended by 412 bishops, 800 abbots, the representatives of many absent prelates, also the representatives of the Emperor Frederick II., the Latin Emperor of Constantinople, the kings of England, France, Aragon, Hungary, and Jerusalem, and other crowned heads. The Latin patriarchs of the East were also there. The sessions were opened with a sermon by the Pope on Lk 22[15] 'With desire I have desired to eat this passover with you.' In his letter of convocation, Innocent had announced as the objects of the Council: measures for the re-conquest of Jerusalem and the betterment of the Church. The business was issued by the Pope, and free discussion in his Imperial presence was not to be thought of. The doctrine of the Eucharist was discussed for the first time at a General Council, and the assembly made the formal declaration that Christ's body and blood are truly contained in the Sacrament of the Altar under the forms of bread and wine, the bread being *transubstantiated* into the body and the wine into the blood (Mansi, xxii. 982; Mirbt, *Quellen*, 133). The formal adoption of the Inquisition by the Council introduced its harsh and un-Christian measures into the body of the discipline of the Latin Church. The Synods of Verona (1184), Avignon (1209), and Montpellier (1215) had already taken definite action, but these were local assemblies, although the first was under the presidency of a Pope. The Inquisition, thus established by the highest authority of the Church, —for both Pope and Ecumenical Council ratified it, —was intended to crush freedom of thought wherever the Catholic Church went, and deliberately commended those measures of the civil power which resulted in tens of thousands being brought to the stake for errors of opinion. The third canon calls heresy *heretica foeditas*, and not only summoned all bishops to search out and punish heretics with ecclesiastical penalties, but required rulers, upon pain of excommunication, to clear their realms of heresy by the use of the sword. More especially was the decree launched against the Albigenses; and the Catholics who girded themselves with the sword for the reduction of that people to the faith were promised the same indulgence that was offered to those who took part in the crusades against the Saracen (Mansi, xxii. 986 ff.; Mirbt, *Quellen*, 133 ff.). The Council also approved Innocent's proposed crusade, which was fixed to start in June 1217. The Pope promised as his own contribution a vessel for the crusaders from Rome and its vicinity, and £30,000 in money. The indulgence for sins was extended to those who contributed to the expenses of the enterprise, as well as to those who went to the East. The speedy death of Innocent deprived it of his powerful support, and, in spite of the efforts of his two successors, Honorius III. and Gregory IX., it was never realized, unless the bizarre expedition of Frederick II. in 1229 be regarded in that light. To these decisions of greater moment were added a series of acts of a moral and ecclesiastical nature, which would of themselves render the Fourth Lateran one of the notable Councils in the history of the Church. The further establishment of monastic orders was forbidden—a canon repeated with an important modification at the second General Council of Lyons (1274). The Jews and Saracens were ordered to wear a different dress from the Christians, lest unawares there might be carnal intercourse between them, and the Jews were forbidden to appear out of doors during Passion week, and excluded from public office. Tournaments were forbidden for three years, on the ground that they would interfere with the crusade. This rule was repeated at the Ecumenical Council of Lyons (1245).

(5) *The First Council of Lyons*, or the 13th Ecumenical (1245), was called by Innocent IV., who had fled from Rome to escape Frederick II. It took the place of the Council called by Gregory IX., whose assemblage had been prevented by the violent action of Frederick and his son Enzio. Innocent, in his opening address, called attention to five wounds of the Church, namely, the low estate of the clergy, the distressed condition of Jerusalem, the Greek schism, the menace of the Tatars in Eastern Europe, and the persecution of the Church by Frederick II. The last was the greatest and most painful wound of all, and itself justified the assembly. With the assent of the Council, Innocent formally deposed Frederick from his throne. No ecclesiastical Synod before or since has taken such ominous action against an exalted monarch. Frederick was unequal to the contest, and died, defeated (1250).

(6) *The Second Council of Lyons*, or the 14th Ecumenical (1274), was summoned by Gregory X., and attended by 500 bishops, 70 abbots, and 1000 other ecclesiastics. Gregory opened the proceedings with an address on Lk 22[15], the text which Innocent III. had used in 1215. The main topic was the re-union of Christendom. The Greek

Church was represented by Imperial delegates—Germanus, patriarch of Constantinople, the archbishop of Nicæa, and other bishops. The Emperor through his representatives announced his acceptance of the double procession of the Holy Spirit, and the primacy of the Apostolic see. The Apostles' Creed was sung in Latin, and then in Greek. A termination of the Schism seemed to be at hand, but the articles of agreement, when they became known in the East, were rejected, and the Council proved a failure at its historic point.

(7) *The Council of Vienne*, or the 15th Ecumenical (October 16, 1311–May 6, 1312), was called by Clement V., the first of the Avignon Popes, at the demand of Philip the Fair of France. The reports of the Council are unsatisfactory, but among the chief objects of business were the abolition of the order of the Knights Templar, the establishment of peace between the two contending wings in the Franciscan order, and the condemnation of Boniface VIII. as a heretic. The condemnation of Boniface, which Philip had strenuously demanded, was, after much discussion, set aside, in view, it is supposed, of Clement's concession to the French sovereign that the Templars should be destroyed.

V. **1122 - 1400** (important local Synods).—Speaking in a general way, the local Synods of this period derive their chief importance from their regulations concerning the detection and punishment of heresy. They throw much light upon the religious conditions and clerical manners of the period. After the Council of Vienne, and until the close of the 14th century, Synods no longer had the importance they had had before. This was due to the distracted condition of Western Christendom, resulting from the exile of the Papacy to Avignon, to the growing tendency to freedom of thought and expression, as manifested by Dante and by the publicists in the age of Boniface VIII., and the increasing tendency, since Boniface VIII., to autocratic Papal government through bulls. Among the more important of the local Synods were the following:—(1) *Toulouse* (1119), which passed important legislation against heretics. (2) *Tours* (1163), attended by 17 cardinals, 124 bishops, and 414 abbots. Alexander III. presided in person. Thomas à Becket, whose difficulties had begun, was present. The Synod's regulations against heresy are of historical importance. (3) *The Council of Clarendon* (1164), a mixed council of laymen and bishops, passed the famous Clarendon Constitutions, which struck at the root of ecclesiastical arrogance as represented by such prelates as Thomas à Becket, and led to his flight from England. (4) *Verona* (1164), presided over by Lucius III., passed a lengthy and notable decree concerning the trial and punishment of heretics. It makes the first Conciliar mention of the *pauperes de Lugduno*, or Waldenses. Walter Map, the English *littérateur*, was present, and has left us an interesting account of the examination and appearance of the humble Waldensian representatives. Impenitent heretics were turned over to the worldly authority, and magistrates and princes were ordered to aid bishops in spying out heretics and bringing them to trial, on pain of excommunication. (5) *The Synod of Trèves* (1227) has a place of importance on account of its canons which bear upon the administration of the sacraments (see Hefele, v. 944–55). (6) *Toulouse* (1229), presided over by the Papal legate, celebrated the close of the bloody crusades against the Albigenses, prescribed the final punishment of the house of Toulouse, and passed notable canons for the punishment of heretics, its 14th canon forbidding laymen to have in their possession the Old and New Testaments in the original or in translation. The laity—men and women—were ordered to attend the Communion three times a year, and to visit the confessional the same number of times, upon pain of being suspected of heresy. Toulouse was in the centre of the territory most infected with heresy. There the Papal inquisitors were most active in the 13th century, and many Synods in that region and in Spain—at Beziers, Tarragona, Narbonne, Albi, etc.—repeat the rules for the detection and punishment of the unfortunate victims of the Inquisition. When, in a later century, persecutions for witchcraft were carried on, it was a Papal bull—the bull of Innocent VIII.—and a book—the *Malleus maleficarum*—which encouraged that awful movement, rather than the acts of Synods.

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COUNCILS (Christian: Modern, 1400–1910).—It will be convenient to deal with the Councils of this period under four separate heads. Supremely important as were the dogmatic pronouncements both of Trent and of the Vatican, they were themselves the utterances of two dissimilar assemblies, deliberating under the stress of quite different combinations of circumstances, and animated by a notably different spirit. On the other hand, the ecclesiastico-political influences at work in the early part of the 15th cent., owing to the Great Schism, were absolutely unique in the history of Christianity, while, from the outset of this period, the high relief and importance given to General Councils (owing to the gravity of the crisis and the desperate nature of the evils, which only an Ecumenical assembly could remedy) tended to throw altogether into the background the decrees of diocesan and provincial Synods, and to rob them of all dogmatic character and influence. We have, then, for our four divisions:—(1) The Councils of Pisa, of Constance, and of Basel-Ferrara-Florence, all of which were held under the shadow of the religious anarchy created by the Great Schism of the West, and in all of which the position and power of a *concilium generale* in itself was a question of primary importance. (2) Trent, the great Reformation Council, in respect of which the Fifth Lateran may be regarded as an ineffective preliminary, overshadowed by the really important work which the Papal legates and the Fathers of Trent, in spite of disheartening political obstacles, carried steadfastly to a conclusion. (3) The Council of the Vatican, giving expression to that recognition of the Papal *magisterium* and that acquiescence in the policy of centralization which three centuries of peace, organization, and discipline had bred in the hearts of the more pious, if not always the more learned, representatives of the Roman obedience. (4) We also require to give some brief consideration to the local Synods which, in these last four centuries, have done little more than popularize the great principles of dogma and

discipline laid down at Trent. To the influence of these Synods as a whole is also largely due the extension of those anti-Gallican tendencies which eventually took formal and articulate shape in the definitions of the Vatican.

I. Councils of Pisa, Constance, Basel-Ferrara-Florence.—(1) *Council of Pisa.*—The one outstanding fact in the religious situation at the beginning of the 15th cent. was the division of Christendom owing to the Schism. All attempts to bring about an accommodation between the rival Popes, Gregory XII. and Benedict XIII., had hitherto proved abortive. The situation was intolerable, and patience was becoming exhausted. Finally, in July 1408, cardinals belonging to both Papal courts met at Livorno and proposed as a solution the *via concilii generalis utriusque obedientiæ*, appointing 25 March 1409 for the meeting of such an assembly. The appeal evoked considerable response. At its maximum the attendance numbered from 22 to 24 cardinals, 80 bishops, 87 abbots, etc., while 102 bishops unable to attend in person sent procurators. In its eighth session (18 May) the Council proclaimed itself ecumenical and canonically convoked. On 5 June it deposed both the reigning Popes as notoriously guilty of schism and heresy, and empowered the cardinals then at Pisa to elect a new Pope in their place. The choice fell upon Peter Philargi, Archbishop of Milan (Alexander V.). But, as neither Benedict XIII. nor Gregory XII. was willing to submit, the only immediate result was that there were now three claimants to the Papacy instead of two. As for the second avowed purpose of convening the assembly at Pisa (the *causa reformationis*), it was agreed that a more careful preparation of measures of reform was necessary than could then be attempted. Any such projects must, therefore, be left for the consideration of another Council to meet in three years' time. Accordingly, on 7 Aug. 1409, the new Pope dissolved the assembly.

It has been the custom to speak of the Council of Pisa with scant respect as a foolish expedient, foredoomed to failure, which only added to the divisions of Christendom. Moreover, on the ground that it was not summoned by a legitimate Pope, or by the whole Church, or generally acknowledged, it has not usually been allowed, except by avowed Gallicans, to rank among the Ecumenical Councils (cf. *e.g.* Hefele-Leclercq, *Conciles*, 1907 ff., i. 89); but a much more favourable view of its aims and its results has recently found acceptance (see esp. Bliemetzrieder, *Das Generalkonzil*, 306–339). In any case, the assembly at Pisa certainly did much to pave the way for the solution ultimately reached.

(2) *Council of Constance.*—Alexander V., the Pope elected at Pisa, died within a year of his election, when he was succeeded by John XXIII. (Baldassare Cossa), who, though not the monster of depravity his enemies have depicted, was certainly unworthy of his high position, and was himself the cause of scandal rather than a promoter of reform. Nothing in John's behaviour seemed to promise an end of the Schism, and so, after an abortive Council at Rome (1412), which mainly occupied itself with Wyclif's writings, Sigismund, king of the Romans, put pressure on John and forced him to summon a Council to meet at Constance on 1 Nov. 1414. Under Sigismund's patronage, a vast and rather motley assembly gathered there, with the triple object (1) of defining the true doctrine of the Church with regard to the teaching of Wyclif and Hus (*causa fidei*); (2) of putting an end to the Schism (*causa unionis*); and (3) of reforming the Church alike in its head and in its members (*causa reformationis*). In respect of the first object a long series of propositions was extracted from the writings of Wyclif and his Bohemian followers, and these were unanimously condemned. On the question of Communion in one kind the Council drafted a detailed decree, in which the custom of the Church was approved, that the Sacrament of the Eucharist 'should be received by those who consecrated it under both kinds, and by the laity only under one,' seeing that 'it must be most firmly held that the Body and Blood of Christ are contained entire both under the species of bread and under the species of wine.'

In the 15th session of the Council (6 July 1415), Hus, who, in spite of his safe-conduct from King Sigismund, had been kept in close confinement for several months previously, was, after his refusal to retract his errors, solemnly degraded from the priesthood and burnt at the stake. No special pleading can palliate this breach of faith, whether the main responsibility falls upon Sigismund personally or upon the ecclesiastics of the Council (see Wylie, *The Council of Constance to the Death of John Hus*).

Meanwhile, as regards the healing of the Schism, the path of the Council had not been so easy. In spite of John's favoured position as the convoker of the assembly under the protection of Sigismund, men were not slow to declare that a settlement could be reached only by the resignation of all three Popes. To destroy the numerical preponderance of the Italian bishops a plan was adopted of voting by nations (Italian, German, French, English, and, at a later date, also Spanish) to the exclusion, in the general sessions, of the system previously adhered to, which based the decision upon the simple majority of voices. The outcry against Pope John made itself more insistently heard, and on 20 March 1415 he fled from the city. Despite the desertion of its official president, the Council, at the instigation primarily of Zabarella, d'Ailly, and Gerson, passed the famous 'Decrees of Constance,' declaring itself to be ecumenical and lawfully convened; asserting the claim of a General Council, in so far as it holds its jurisdiction immediately from God, to the obedience of all men, even though of Papal dignity; and finally proclaiming that contumacious resistance to its authority was a crime legally deserving of punishment, and involving, it might be, the guilt of schism or heresy. The formal deposition of John, on the grounds of simony, immorality, and the fostering of schism, followed shortly afterwards. Gregory XII. resigned, and Benedict XIII., after he had been forsaken by the King of Arragon, was also deposed (26 July 1417). Finally, Odo Colonna (Martin V.) was elected Pope (11 Nov. 1417) by 23 cardinals and 30 deputies—six from each of the five nations—thus at last ending the Schism.

A few spasmodic attempts at reform were also made before the Council dispersed. Serious differences of opinion among the 'nations'—the Italian bishops, for example, favouring the Papal claim to Provisors—led to the decision that, while certain general decrees should be passed upon matters as to which all were agreed, the Pope should be left free on the contested points to arrange Concordats with the different nations separately. The periodical convening of General Councils was also determined upon, the first to be held at Pavia in 1423; and on 22 April 1418, Martin V. dissolved the assembly.

The ecumenicity of the Council of Constance is a subject of much debate. No one, practically speaking, denies that character to the Council after the election of Martin V. Again, the doctrinal decrees condemning Wyclif and Hus are certainly covered by the declaration of Martin V. in the last session, that he desired to maintain and to ratify the decrees, 'in matters of faith,' which had been determined by the assembled Fathers *conciliariter*. But the decrees maintaining the superiority of a General Council over the Pope were not, so it is held, arrived at *conciliariter* but rather *tumultuariter*. In any case, Martin's language obviously suggests that he did not approve the decrees of Constance *en bloc*, while, if he excepted anything from his sanction, it must have been the bold, and up to that time almost unheard of, pretension to exalt conciliar authority at the expense of the Papacy, which in 1682 became the founda-

tion of the famous Gallican Articles (see, *e.g.*, Hefele-Leclercq, *Conciles*, i. 69–72). By no Roman theologian of the present day is the ecumenicity of the Council of Constance admitted without reservation.

(3) *Council of Basel-Ferrara-Florence.*—In accordance with the provisions of Constance, Martin V. was bound to convoke a Council at Pavia in 1423; this was done, but the small attendance, the transference to Siena on account of plague, and other causes, furnished a reasonable pretext for dissolving the assembly altogether in May 1424. Deference, however, was still paid to the agreement arrived at in Constance regarding the periodical recurrence of Councils, and Basel was selected for the next meeting in 1431. Martin V. died before the day appointed, and Eugenius IV., who succeeded him, looking with apprehension at the spirit which had already manifested itself in the handful of delegates present at Basel—a spirit which still persisted in treating the Pope as only the *caput ministeriale ecclesiæ*—decided to dissolve the Council even before the end of 1431. A period of great distraction followed. Eugenius, who had to some extent been misinformed regarding the condition of affairs at Basel, and who was also, no doubt, honestly influenced by the desire to facilitate the re-union of the Greeks by summoning a Council in some, to them more accessible, town in Italy, was eventually constrained, by the determination of the prelates at Basel and the political support accorded them, to set aside his bull of dissolution and to suffer the Council to proceed. Meanwhile the assembly had explicitly renewed the decrees of Constance asserting the supremacy of a General Council over the Pope, and denying to the Pope the right of dissolution without the consent of the Council itself. Notwithstanding this, Eugenius found himself compelled to pronounce (*decernimus et declaramus*) the continuity of the Council of Basel as a legitimately constituted assembly from the beginning, to declare *pure et simpliciter* that it was in the enjoyment of his favour, and to annul (*cassamus, revocamus*, etc.) whatever he himself had attempted 'to its prejudice or against its authority.'

During the period which followed, beginning with the 16th session (5 Feb. 1434), the assembly passed many useful decrees of reformation, but, by its almost entire abolition of annates and reservations, it bore very hardly upon the financial resources of the Holy See.

With regard to some dogmatic points in the proposed re-union with the Greeks there was further friction between Pope and Council, and the unstable peace was at length entirely wrecked over the question of the locality to which the Orientals should be invited for the discussion of their differences. On this point Eugenius stood firm, and when, on 18 Sept. 1437, he convened a Re-union Council to meet at Ferrara, Christendom at large gave him its support in the long run. The remnant of the Basel assembly, after defining, on 17 Sept. 1439, the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin (Mansi, xxix. 184), proceeded, under the leadership of Card. Lewis Aleman, first to suspend and then to depose Eugenius; and on 5 Nov. 1439 they elected a new anti-Pope, Felix V. But the common sense of Europe revolted against this renewal of the Schism. The handful of prelates at Basel were gradually deserted by their supporters. In 1448 they were banished from the city, migrated to Lausanne, and eventually, in 1449, made their submission to Nicholas V.

Meanwhile, at Ferrara, whence in Jan. 1439 the assembly, for sanitary reasons, was transferred to Florence, a conspicuously representative deputation of the Greeks, headed by Joseph II., Patriarch of Constantinople, and the Emperor John Palæologus, had gathered for the Re-union Council, influenced mainly, no doubt, by the hope of inducing a united Christendom to make common cause in resisting the Turks. The path of conciliation was a very thorny one, but eventually the *Filioque* difficulty was broached, and in the end the Western doctrine was accepted by all the Greek representatives save Marcus Eugenicus of Ephesus. Agreement was also arrived at concerning the use of unleavened bread, the 'epiclesis' question in the liturgy, the doctrine of purgatory, and, with more difficulty, the Roman primacy. Most, but not quite all, of the matters discussed were enshrined in a Papal bull *Lætentur cœli* (6 July 1439), which informed the world that the decree of union had received the signature of the Greek representatives.

Though the main object of the Re-union Council had thus, for the time being, been attained, it continued to sit on, probably as a counterpoise to the schismatical assembly at Basel. Several other Eastern Churches—the Armenians (autumn of 1439), the Jacobites (1442), and, after the sessions of the Council had been transferred to the Lateran, the Syrian church of Mesopotamia (1444), and certain Maronites and Nestorian Chaldæans (1445)—sent in their submission. The conspectus of doctrine, however, in the respective decrees of union, notably the *decretum pro Armenis* and the *decretum pro Jacobitis* (Denzinger-Bannwart, *Enchiridion Symbolorum*[10], Freiburg, 1908, nos. 695–715), though very important as an indication of theological opinion, is not usually regarded as an infallible pronouncement, being considered as aiming rather at disciplinary instruction than at definition of dogma.

The question of the ecumenicity of the decrees of Basel-Ferrara-Florence has been much discussed, and the theologians of the extreme Gallican school in the 17th and 18th centuries habitually maintained that the anti-Papal edicts of Basel, like those of Constance, were to be regarded as the duly authorized expression of the voice of the Church assembled in General Council. At present the more received view asserts that, while the sessions at Ferrara-Florence may be regarded as ecumenical, those at Basel can claim ecumenicity only for the decrees passed before 1437 and concerned with the suppression of heresy, the peace of Christendom, and the reform of the Church. The Papal approval necessary for their validity cannot be considered to have extended to any other matter (see Hefele-Leclercq, *Conciles*, i. 80–86, and Baudrillart in *Dict. Théol. Cath.* ii. [1905] 125–128).

2. The Council of Reform (Council of Trent).—The extravagant pretensions of the Councils of Constance and Basel had had disastrous results. The hope of reform in the Church was almost crushed, for the very mention of the word 'Council' awakened resentment and mistrust. Still the energetic protests of such men as Savonarola and Geiler of Kaisersberg kept the idea alive, and, when the friction between Julius II. and Louis XII. induced the latter to threaten the Pope with a General Council and to organize the schismatical assembly at Pisa (1511), the need of reform was put forward as a rallying cry. Julius responded by anathematizing the *conciliabulum* and its authors, but at the same time he convoked a Council himself, the Fifth Lateran (1512), generally reckoned the 18th General Council. It was not numerously attended, and, though it was prolonged by Leo X. until 1517, the work of reform in the Church, with which it professed to identify itself, was taken in hand very half-heartedly. Some useful decrees were passed concerning Papal provisions to benefices, etc., but the chief work accomplished was the condemnation of the Pragmatic Sanction of Charles VII., for which was substituted a Concordat with Francis I. (18 Aug. 1516). This received the formal approval of the Council, 19 Dec. 1516; and in the bull *Pastor æternus*, issued with the approval of the assembled Fathers in the

same connexion, the Pope was declared to possess authority over General Councils, which he had also the right to convoke, transfer, and dissolve (Mansi, xxxii. 967). Indirectly the 'Gravamina' drafted by Wimpfeling in 1510, which in many respects were based on the Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges, received their answer in the same bull.

There was little, then, in the proceedings of the Fifth Lateran to still the clamour for the suppression of abuses, which made itself heard more and more insistently after the revolt of Luther in 1517. Soon the appeal came, in a form not to be ignored, from the great ruler and statesman who found himself called upon at the same time to maintain the peace of the German Empire and to uphold the ancient faith. The preliminaries of the Council which Charles V. aspired to control form a long and extraordinarily intricate history, the details of which have only recently been given to the world in such collections of original documents as the *Nuntiaturberichte aus Deutschland* and the *Concil. Trident. . . . nova collectio*, iv., edited for the Görres Gesellschaft by Ehses, or, again, the fifth volume of Pastor's *Gesch. der Päpste*. The Council was first to have met at Mantua on 23 May 1537 (Ehses, p. 3), but the unwillingness of the Protestants to take part in an assembly on Italian soil, together with the numberless political complications, as well as the disagreements between Pope and Emperor, caused many delays. In 1542, Paul III. summoned the Council to meet at Trent on 1 Nov. of that year, but the difficulties were such that a beginning was not made until 13 Dec. 1545. Three Roman cardinals presided as legates over its early sessions—del Monte (afterwards Julius III.), Cervini (afterwards Marcellus II.), and Reginald Pole. The city of Trent had been selected, as situated upon Imperial territory, though south of the Alps, and easily accessible both from Germany and Italy. In the 8th session (11 March 1547), on account of the appearance of the plague, the transference of the Council to Bologna was decided upon, in spite of the opposition of the Emperor. Still, as Charles's bishops remained at Trent and the numbers at Bologna were very small, no decrees were passed during the two sessions held there. To put an end to the impossible situation, Paul III. prorogued the Council on 17 Sept. 1549.

Julius III. again convoked the Fathers in 1551, and business was transacted in the 13th to 16th sessions (11 Oct. 1551–28 Apr. 1552); but, on the fresh outbreak of hostilities against the Emperor, when the troops of the Elector of Saxony seemed to threaten the safety of the Council, another prorogation took place.

Finally, Pius IV. (29 Nov. 1560) summoned the bishops to Trent for the third time. They should have met at Easter, but the work of the Council did not begin until Jan. 1562. The Pope's interest in the proceedings, which were pushed on with great energy, was manifested alike in the sending of five Cardinal legates to represent him, and in the voluminous correspondence maintained by the Pontiff's nephew and secretary, Card. Charles Borromeo, afterwards canonized (see Susta, *Die röm. Curie und d. Concil v. Tr. unter Pius IV.*). The 17th–22nd sessions were held between 15 Jan. and 17 Sept. 1562, after which followed a long period of stormy discussions which nearly brought about the abandonment of the Council; but, thanks to the tact of the Papal legates, two other public sessions were held in July and November. The 25th and concluding session took place under the presidency of Card. Morone, 3–4 Dec. 1563.

It should be noted, as regards the method of procedure, that by the word 'session,' which is always used in quoting the decrees of Trent (thus, for example, the famous ordinance for the founding of seminaries in every diocese is cited 'Conc. Trid. sess. xxiv. *de Reform.* cap. 14'), we must understand the public and solemn sittings in which the Fathers met to record, by an as nearly as possible unanimous vote, the acceptance of decrees already prepared and agreed to. No discussion took place at these sittings; the subjects pronounced upon had already been fully debated in preliminary 'general congregations.' Further, in anticipation of these general congregations, schedules of 'articles' were usually drafted by the legates, and then certain theologians (*theologi minores*), who themselves had no vote, were invited to express their opinion thereon before the assembled Fathers, to assist them in forming a judgment. At the same time it had been arranged, almost from the beginning of the Council, that doctrine and discipline should be discussed simultaneously. The Pope had wished the dogmatic questions at issue between the Catholics and the Protestants to be authoritatively defined before the Fathers turned their attention to reform within the Church. Charles V., on the other hand, had wished these delicate points of doctrine to be deferred, and he demanded precedence for the correction of abuses. The Council compromised by issuing, at each session productive of legislation, a body of ordinances *de Reformatione* together with a varying number of dogmatic decisions and canons. All questions were decided not by nations, but by a simple majority of voices. Practically speaking, only prelates of episcopal dignity and the generals of religious orders had votes, though Paul III., in the first period of the Council, allowed the procurators of certain German bishops to vote, on the plea that the state of that country rendered it difficult for bishops to quit their dioceses. The Italian sees had at all times a great numerical preponderance. France, owing to its rivalry with the Emperor, sent hardly any representatives except its ambassadors. No Protestants appeared in the first period of the Council, but in the second period, under Julius III., a body of Protestant divines—of course under a safe-conduct—attended the deliberations which preceded the 15th session, in view of the possibility of arriving at some compromise regarding the concession of the cup to the laity. They were not allowed a vote, being in that respect on the same footing as those Catholic divines who were not bishops. A safe-conduct was also offered to Protestants of all countries in the 18th session (4 March 1562), but none availed themselves of the invitation. For various causes several of the sessions were barren of all legislation. For a summary of the decrees and canons of the Council, see art. CONFESSIONS, vol. iii. pp. 839–841.

The publishing of a revised index of prohibited books, as well as of a Missal, a Breviary, and a doctrinal Catechism (the famous *Catechismus ad Parochos*), which last had already been set in hand, was left to the charge of the Holy See; and, with a recognition of the need of Papal confirmation for its decrees, the great Council concluded its work.

A convenient summary of the more noteworthy additions made by the Council of Trent to the body of doctrine previously defined is afforded by the *Professio Fidei Tridentina*, commonly known as the Creed of Pope Pius IV. Its Confessional importance is indicated by the fact that at the present day a convert joining the Church of Rome is required to make such a profession of faith in the same or equivalent terms. Formerly the Creed of Pope Pius itself was always used, but latterly the option has been given of employing a shorter form. *Per contra*, when in the year 1714

a *Form for admitting converts from the Church of Rome* was drawn up and approved by both Houses of the Convocation of Canterbury, the proselyte, if in holy orders, was to be asked: 'Dost thou in particular renounce the twelve last articles added in the confession commonly called "the Creed of Pope Pius IV.," after having read them and duly considered them?'—to which the proselyte was required to answer: 'I do upon mature deliberation reject them all, as founded upon no warrant of Scripture, but rather repugnant to the word of God' (see *The Month*, Jan. 1907, pp. 1-18). This Anglican form for the reception of a convert has of recent years been considerably modified.

Prof. Fid. Trid. is quoted in full in art. CONFESSIONS, vol. iii. p. 841 f.

3. **The Vatican Council.**—The first hint of Pope Pius IX.'s intention to convoke an Ecumenical Council seems to date from 6 Dec. 1864, and a little later all the Cardinals resident in Rome were invited to send in their written opinion upon the proposal. The majority favoured it, but a few feared political complications. Only two of the twenty-one, when speaking of the purposes to be served by such an assembly, made any reference to a definition of Papal infallibility (Granderath, *Gesch.* i. 44). The matter being further brought to the notice of a select number of bishops in all parts of Europe, together with certain Catholic Orientals, an almost unanimous reply was received in favour of the scheme. The motive principally insisted on was the dangerous and subversive nature of much modern religious teaching, which rendered it desirable to emphasize the powers inherent in the Holy See as against the Gallican and Erastian tendencies of the times. In 1868, accordingly, a bull was issued convoking the Council for 8 Dec. 1869. A special Congregation of Cardinals had already been appointed to prepare the topics to be discussed and pronounced upon, and, in subordination to this, five separate sub-committees, or 'commissions,' were created to deal with (i.) Doctrine, (ii.) Discipline, (iii.) the Regulars (*i.e.* Monks and Nuns), (iv.) the Oriental Churches and Foreign Missions, and (v.) Politico-ecclesiastical questions. Considerable uneasiness was aroused in circles of Gallican sympathy by the strong Ultramontane bias of many of the preliminary arrangements. The selection of consultors invited to sit on the commissions—a selection which excluded such scholars as Döllinger and von Schulte—evoked protest from many moderate men, *e.g.* from Cardinal von Schwartzenberg, Archbishop of Prague.

The endorsement by the *Civiltà Cattolica*, 6 Feb. 1868, of a wish, attributed to many influential French Catholics, that the definition of Papal infallibility might be carried by acclamation, was taken to indicate the mind, not only of the Jesuits, but of Pius IX. himself. The occasion was used by Döllinger to publish five articles anonymously in the *AZ* of Augsburg, in which the main purpose of the forthcoming Council was assumed to be the definition of the Pope's infallibility, and the doctrine was attacked on historical grounds. The articles were reprinted under the pseudonym of 'Janus,' and were widely read outside Germany. Other publications, deprecating a pronouncement in favour of infallibility, were issued by Mgr. Maret, titular Archbishop of Sura, and Mgr. Dupanloup, Bishop of Orleans.

The Papal constitution *Multiplices inter* of 27 Nov. 1869, determining the procedure of the Council and affirming the Pope's exclusive right to decide what matters should be submitted for discussion, also gave considerable dissatisfaction; and, when the known opponents of the proposed definition were systematically excluded from the 'deputations' and from other sub-committees appointed in the Council, it became clear that the infallibilists, secure in their overwhelming majority, intended to carry things with a high hand. They were, moreover, better organized, more nearly unanimous, and more energetic than their opponents, who, from the fact that the objection was, in the case of the greater number, one of expediency, not of principle, lacked cohesion, and were far from presenting a united front. Even those who most pressed the historical difficulty knew that it was largely founded on a series of highly debatable incidents about which we have no clear information. That the opponents of the definition were sincere when almost all described themselves as 'inopportunists' rather than anti-infallibilists may be inferred from their subsequent submission, and may be illustrated from the famous letter of Newman to the Bishop of Birmingham, which, made public through an indiscretion, showed upon the face of it that it was written to his bishop in absolute candour. Herein, at the very time that he describes the projected definition as the work of 'an aggressive insolent faction,' he remarks: 'When we are all at rest and have no doubts, and —at least practically, not to say doctrinally—hold the Holy Father to be infallible, suddenly there is thunder in the clear sky,' etc.; while, again, the conclusion of the letter makes it manifest that the writer had no intention of doing otherwise than loyally to accept the definition, if it were pronounced (see *Collectio Lacensis*, vii. 1513). On the other hand, Manning (not then a Cardinal) seems to have been the chief and most energetic of the organizers of the movement within the Council to press forward the definition as a matter of the utmost urgency(see Granderath, *Gesch.* ii. 69, 73), and he himself made no secret of the policy of the committee organized by him, to exclude from the *deputatio de fide* every name known to be adverse to the definition. This, however, was the work of a section, who were carrying through a plan of campaign on constitutional lines. It was not the work of the Pope or the Curia (cf. Friedrich, *Gesch.* iii. 175).

The first two public 'sessions' of the Vatican Council transacted only formal business (8 Dec. 1869, and 6 Jan. 1870); but previously to the third session, which took place on Low-Sunday (24 Apr.) 1870, a considerable amount of work was done, and the *Constitutio dogmatica de Fide Catholica* was then passed unanimously. It consists of a prologue and four chapters—(i.) of God the Creator of all things, (ii.) of Revelation, (iii.) of Faith, and (iv.) of Faith and Reason—followed by 18 canons which sum up the principal points defined, and subject the contrary propositions to anathema. The errors so condemned included some of the fundamental conceptions of Pantheism, Naturalism, and Rationalism; for example, canon 4 of (i.) runs thus:

> 'If any one shall say that finite things, both corporeal and spiritual, or at least spiritual, have emanated from the Divine substance, or that the Divine essence, by the manifestation or evolution of itself, becomes all things; or, lastly, that God is universal or indefinite being, which, by determining itself, constitutes the universality of things, distinct according to genus, species, and individuals: let him be anathema.'

Again, in ch. ii. the Council, developing somewhat the doctrine defined at Trent (sess. iv.), declares that:

> 'The books of the Old and New Testament [as enumerated by the Council of Trent] are to be received as sacred and canonical, in their integrity, with all their parts . . . not because, having been carefully composed by mere human industry, they were afterwards approved by her [the Church's] authority, or merely because they contain revelation, with no admixture of error; but because, having been written by the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, they have God for their author, and have been delivered as such to the Church herself.'

It is to be noted also that, contrary to the usage

of earlier General Councils, the Vatican decrees are formally issued, not in the name of the Ecumenical Synod, but 'in the name of the Supreme Pontiff, with the bishops of the whole world assembled round us and judging with us.' An amendment, proposing to add the word *definientibus* to the *sedentibus Nobiscum et judicantibus universi orbis episcopis* of the decree, was rejected after a somewhat heated discussion.

Twenty of the general congregations (10th to 29th) which preceded the third session were given up to questions of disciplinary reform, the most interesting of which was perhaps the proposal to draw up one form of elementary catechism, the use of which should be obligatory throughout the whole Church. But this, like other disciplinary schemes, came to nothing, owing to the premature termination of the Council. Much time was, however, wasted in debate, and the Papal ordinance of 20 Feb. 1870, for abbreviating the discussions and introducing a form of closure, despite the violent protests it elicited from the minority, was really a necessary measure.

By this time, however, the energetic agitation of Manning, Sénestrey, and other leading infallibilists, resulting, for example, in a petition for the definition, signed by 480 of the Fathers, had pushed matters so far that the subject could not be shelved. Originally the question of Papal infallibility had not formed part of the proposed decree 'on the Church of Christ' (see *Coll. Lacensis*, vii. 567–578), but it was later on added to the *schema*, and became the subject of the liveliest controversy. The Cardinal Presidents in the general congregations opposed rather than favoured the efforts to declare this discussion urgent, but they yielded eventually to the agitation headed by Manning and Sénestrey (Granderath, *Gesch.* iii. 270). Fourteen sittings were devoted to the infallibility question in general, and sixty-four speeches were delivered before the closure was applied. Thirteen other sittings and fifty-seven speeches were devoted to amendments. Finally, when the vote was taken (13 July 1870), of 601 Fathers present 450 voted *placet*, 88 *non placet*, and 62 *placet juxta modum*. Throughout the debate not more than three or four speakers had openly expressed disbelief in the doctrine itself; the minority, as a rule, contested only the opportuneness of defining it.

Before the public session, 18 July 1870, many of the minority left Rome. Of the 535 Fathers present only two voted *non placet*. The whole decree *de Ecclesia Christi*, like its predecessor, consists of four chapters. Ch. i. concerns the Apostolic primacy of St. Peter, ch. ii. the perpetuity of the primacy in the Roman pontiffs, ch. iii. the powers and nature of the primacy, and ch. iv. the infallible teaching of the Holy See. The kernel of the doctrine thus set forth is expressed in the terms quoted above, in art. CONFESSIONS, vol. iii. p. 628[a].

Owing to the heat of summer and the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War, fewer than 200 Fathers stayed on in Rome. Some further discussions on matters of discipline took place, but the occupation of Rome by the Piedmontese troops occurred soon afterwards, and on 20 Oct. 1870, Pope Pius IX. formally prorogued the assembly.

Severe criticisms have been directed by many Old Catholic and other writers (cf. *e.g.* Littledale, art. 'Vatican Council,' in *EBr*[9]) against the procedure followed in the Vatican Council, more especially with regard to the infallibility definition. It has been urged that the minority were coerced into a simulated acceptance of the decrees, that the assembly was not representative, that the majority was largely formed of Italian, missionary, or titular bishops, who came without mandate from any appreciable body of the faithful,[1] that free discussion was not permitted, etc. There is no doubt foundation for some of these objections, but the facts remain that, owing to the facility of locomotion, the assembly was not less, but immensely more, representative of the Catholic episcopate than any of its predecessors; that the vast majority were whole-hearted in favour of the definition; that in no Council of the Church has it ever been the custom to attach weight to the suffrages of the bishops in proportion to the population of the dioceses they represented; that the greater part of the opposition, whether sincerely or not, had from the beginning styled itself 'inopportunist,' not anti-infallibilist, and so forth. No special pleading can disguise the fact that the subsequent action of the faithful at large has as completely justified the Fathers of the Vatican as the subsequent action of the faithful justified the Fathers of Nicæa or Chalcedon. If the inopportunist bishops made their submission, as they all did without exception, we may assume that either they followed the dictates of their conscience in so doing, or else they were convinced that their flocks would not support them in any act of schism. Whether we hold that the ultimate appeal lies to the collective voice of the bishops or to the sense of the great body of the faithful, the definition in either case, from the point of view of the Roman Church, is fully justified. The sensitiveness to the rights of minorities displayed by the critics of the Council is, after all, a thing of modern growth. Any alleged high-handedness or irregularity of procedure at the Vatican could probably be paralleled many times over in the history of earlier Councils. No view of the Divine constitution of the Church has ever regarded the assistance of the Holy Spirit as promised only to the learned few in any episcopal assembly, while the plea that the minority had not been able to make their objections heard, after all the discussions on the spot, and after the sensation caused, long months before, by the writings of Döllinger, Dupanloup, and others, cannot be treated seriously.

4. **Councils other than Ecumenical.**—Upon the plenary Councils, provincial Councils, and diocesan Synods of this period, little need be said. Although elaborate disciplinary regulations aiming at the correction of abuses among both clergy and people were passed in such Councils as those of Mainz (1451), Sens, or, more correctly, Paris (1528), Cologne (1536 and 1549), and Augsburg (1548), still the political disturbances of the times, and the moral anarchy which almost necessarily follows in the wake of a fundamental change in religion, stood in the way of any lasting improvement. It was to the Council of Trent that men's eyes were turned (not altogether in vain) to inaugurate a new era, and the annual diocesan Synods and triennial provincial Councils, which in many places (*e.g.* at Milan under St. Charles Borromeo) were convoked in strict obedience to the Tridentine decrees (sess. xxiv. *de Reform.* cap. 2), undoubtedly helped greatly to turn the Council's measures of reform to practical account. But under Pope Sixtus V. the important Papal constitution *Immensa* (22 June 1589) profoundly modified the conditions which affected the legislation of these provincial Synods. It was now required that the decrees of provincial (though not diocesan) Synods must be submitted to a Roman Congregation, and could be promulgated only after correction, and subject to the modifications, or even the additions, of the congregation in question. This measure, which was made the ground of animated protest at the Vatican Council (see Granderath, ii. 179 ff.), has greatly furthered the centralizing tendencies at work in the Church of Rome during the last three centuries, but it has also much diminished the importance of provincial synods, now practically deprived of their independence. The same cause was probably not without its effect in bringing about the almost entire neglect of such Councils during the 17th and 18th centuries. In comparatively modern times—possibly as a result of the religious reaction which followed upon the French Revolution—a renewed energy began to make itself felt in convoking these assemblies. In France, for example, in the year 1849 Provincial Councils were

[1] It has been pointed out, for example, that Mgr. Darboy (inopportunist), Archbishop of Paris, represented 2,000,000 people, while 65 bishops came from the States of the Church with a population of less than 1,000,000. But statistics of this kind are plainly most fallacious. The 2,000,000 of the diocese of Paris include the hordes of the Commune who twelve months later became masters of the city, imprisoned the Archbishop, and condemned him to death. It would be as reasonable to argue that Manning represented the six millions of London and the adjacent counties comprised in his diocese.

held at Paris, Rheims, Tours, and Avignon; and in 1850 at Albi, Lyons, Rouen, Bordeaux, Sens, Aix, Toulouse, and Bourges. In Central Europe there were provincial Councils at Vienna (1858), Gran (1858), Cologne (1860), Prague (1860), Kalocsa (1863), etc. In the United States six bishops assisted at the first Provincial Council of Baltimore (1829), but at the first Plenary Council, which met at Baltimore in 1852, the presence of six archbishops and twenty-six bishops marked the developments of Roman Catholicism in the New World. In England four Provincial Councils have been held since the restoration of the hierarchy, viz. in 1852, 1853, 1859, and 1873.

Historically speaking, apart from the Vatican Council, interest during the last three hundred years has centred chiefly in conventions of a rather unorthodox character. Such, for example, was the Gallican Assembly of the clergy summoned by Louis XIV. (1681–1682), which drew up the famous four Gallican Articles: (1) denying any jurisdiction of the Pope over the royal authority in temporal matters; (2) declaring the Pope to be inferior to a General Council; (3) limiting the exercise of the Papal prerogative by the Conciliary decrees and by the customs of the Gallican Church; and (4) affirming that the Pope's definitions, even in matters of faith, become irreformable only when confirmed by the consent of the whole Church. Louis XIV. imposed the teaching of these Articles upon the clergy throughout his dominions; but, in the face of uncompromising Papal opposition, he eventually withdrew them in 1693.

Very similar was the spirit which, growing out of the 'Febronianism,' or 'Josephism,' current in Germany in the 18th cent., manifested itself at the so-called Synod of Pistoia (1786). The Synod was convened by Scipio Ricci, Bishop of Pistoia-Prato, at the instigation of Ludolph, Grand Duke of Tuscany; and it passed a long array of decrees on points of canon law, ceremonial, the rights of the secular authority in religious matters, etc. —all very Gallican and Jansenistic in spirit. Pius VI., in the bull *Auctorem fidei* (1794), condemned 85 propositions of the Synod of Pistoia; and Ricci, in 1799, and again in 1803, made humble submission to the censure thus passed.

LITERATURE.—i. *GENERAL.*—Most of the great collections of the Councils, *e.g.* those of Mansi, Hardouin, Labbe and Cossart, etc., have already been mentioned. It may be noticed, as the contrary has been implied in a printed advertisement emanating from the publisher himself, that at the date of writing (Oct. 1910), the volume of indexes long ago promised as vol. xxxvi. in the facsimile reprint of Mansi has not yet appeared. On the Canon Law of Councils, see Wernz, *Jus Decretalium*, Rome, 1906, ii. 22, 720 ff.; P. Hinschius, *System des kathol. Kirchenrechts*, Berlin, 1869, iii. 333 ff. Upon the relations between Pope and Council, see J. Turmel, *Hist. de la théol. positive du Concile de Trente au Concile du Vatican*, Paris, 1904, pp. 300–405.

ii. *FIFTEENTH CENTURY COUNCILS.*—Hefele-Hergenröther, *Conciliengesch.*, Freiburg im B. 1887–1890, vii. viii. ix.; Haller, and others, *Concil. Basiliense, Studien und Quellen*, vols. i.–v., Basel, 1896–1904; H. Finke, *Acta Concil. Constanc.*, Münster, 1896 (only one volume published); H. v. d. Hardt, *Magnum œcum. Constant. Concilium*, 6 vols., Frankfort and Leipzig, 1697–1700; *Monumenta Concil. General. Sæc. XV.*, published by the Vienna Academy, 3 vols., Vienna, 1857–1896; J. Haller, *Papsttum und Kirchenreform*, vol. i., Berlin, 1903; F. P. Bliemetzrieder, *Das Generalkonzil im grossen abendländ. Schisma*, Paderborn, 1904; L. Pastor, *Gesch. der Päpste*, vols. i. and ii.[4], Freiburg, 1904; M. Creighton, *History of the Papacy from the Great Schism*, i.–ii.[2], London, 1897; H. Finke, *Forsch. u. Quellen z. Gesch. d. Konst. Konzils*, Paderborn, 1889; L. Salembier, *Le grand schisme d'Occident*[2], Paris, 1900 (Eng. tr. 1908); N. Valois, *La France et le gr. schisme d'Occid.*, 4 vols., Paris, 1896–1902; V. Vannutelli, *Il Concilio di Firenze*, Florence, 1899; J. H. Wylie, *Council of Constance to the Death of John Hus*, London, 1900.

iii. *COUNCIL OF TRENT.*—F. Baguenault de Puchesse, *Hist. du Conc. de Trente*, Paris, 1870 [still the best general view in small compass]; A. Theiner, *Acta Genuina Conc. Trid.*, 2 vols., Zagrabiæ, 1874; *Conc. Trid. Diariorum, Actorum, Epistularum, Tractatuum nova collectio*, vol. i., ed. S. Merkle, Freiburg, 1901; vol. iv., ed. S. Ehses, Freiburg, 1904 (two other volumes of this great work, which appears under the auspices of the Görres Gesellschaft, are announced to be in the press; ten or twelve volumes are contemplated); J. Le Plat, *Monumentorum ad Hist. Conc. Trid. spectantium Collectio*, 7 vols., Louvain, 1781–1787; I. v. Döllinger, *Ungedruckte Berichte u. Tagebücher z. Gesch. d. Con. v. Tr.*, 2 vols., Nördlingen, 1876; A. v. Druffel-Brandi, *Monumenta Tridentina*, 4 vols., Munich, 1885–1897: J. Susta, *Die röm. Curie und das Con. v. Tr. unter Pius IV.*, 2 vols., Vienna, 1904–1909; T. v. Sickel, *Zur Gesch. des Concils v. Tr.*, Vienna, 1872; L. Maynier, *Étude histor. sur le Conc. de Trente*, Paris, 1874; O. Braunsberger, *Beati P. Canisii Epistulæ et Acta*, vol. iii., Freiburg, 1901; L. Pastor, *Gesch. der Päpste*, vol. v., Freiburg, 1909. The two standard histories are, of course, Sforza-Pallavicino, *Istoria del Conc. di Trento*, Rome, 1652 (3 vols., written, with access to the archives, from the official and Ultramontane standpoint); and 'Pietro Soave Polano' (Fra Paolo Sarpi), *Hist. del Conc. Trid.*[2], Venice, 1629 (conspicuously anti-Papal in tone, and often distorting facts in the interest of the writer's prejudices). J. A. Froude's *Lectures on the Council of Trent*, London, 1896, treats only of the first period of the Council, and is written without any reference to the abundant new material published within the last fifty years. *The Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent* have been translated into English by J. Waterworth, London, 1848.

iv. *THE VATICAN COUNCIL.*—The *Acta and Decreta* of the Vatican Council, with a very large number of documents bearing upon the preliminaries of the Council and the discussions to which it gave rise, have been printed in vol. vii. of the *Collectio Lacensis*, Freiburg, 1890. The chief Histories are those of E. Cecconi, *Storia del Conc. Ecum. Vaticano*, 3 vols., Rome, 1872–1879: J. Friedrich, *Gesch. d. Vat. Koncils*, 3 vols., Bonn, 1877–1887 (this is written from the Old Catholic standpoint); T. Granderath, *Gesch. d. Vat. Konzils*, 3 vols., Freiburg, 1903–1906 (in the preparation of this work the author was afforded every facility by the Roman authorities, and it may be regarded as in some sense the official history; a French tr. is in course of publication); H. E. Manning, *The True Story of the Vatican Council*, London, 1877; cf. also E. Ollivier, *L'Église et l'état au Concile du Vatican*, 2 vols., Paris, 1879; 'Quirinus' (I. v. Döllinger), *Römische Briefe*, Munich, 1870 (a collection of critical and denunciatory letters which appeared in the *Allgemeine Zeitung*: there is an Eng. tr., London, 1870).

v. *OTHER COUNCILS.*—The principal collection is *Acta et Decreta Sacrorum Conciliorum recentiorum*, 7 vols., Freiburg, 1869–1890, but the proceedings of many of the provincial and other Synods, *e.g.* those of Baltimore, Westminster, and Maynooth, are published separately. A very famous local collection is also the *Acta Ecclesiæ Mediolanensis*, 2 vols., Milan, 1599.

HERBERT THURSTON.

COUNSELS AND PRECEPTS.—According to the doctrine of the Catholic Church, 'precepts' are commands laid upon every Christian, obedience to which cannot be avoided without risking the loss of eternal salvation ('quae sunt necessaria ad consequendum finem aeternae beatitudinis,' Thomas Aquinas, *Summa*, II. i. qu. cviii. art. 4). 'Counsels' or 'counsels of perfection' are suggestions of very virtuous ways of living, by the following out of which a man may arrive more quickly and better at eternal life ('per quae melius et expeditius potest homo consequi finem praedictum,' *ib.*), but which he may yet refuse without incurring blame or imperilling the salvation of his soul ('consilium autem in optione ponitur ejus cui datur,' *ib.*). The 'precepts' are the new law of the gospel. 'Counsels' are something added to that law.

This formal doctrine is simply a statement of the judgment formed by the Church on Christian living—a reasonable account of certain plain phenomena which came within the view of all observers. It was obvious from the very earliest times that some men renounced more of the world's goods, honours, and pleasures than others did; accomplishing, as it seemed, a more complete dedication of their mental and bodily powers to the Lord. These were naturally thought of as living a fuller and higher kind of spiritual life. The judgment was in accord with that of St. Paul (1 Co $7^{25ff.}$), where the virgin state is reckoned superior to the married, although he that marries has not sinned.

The distinction between a higher and lower Christian life meets us in Hermas (ἐὰν δέ τι ἀγαθὸν ποιήσῃς ἐκτὸς τῆς ἐντολῆς τοῦ θεοῦ, σεαυτῷ περιποιήσῃ δόξαν περισσοτέραν καὶ ἔσῃ ἐνδοξότερος παρὰ τῷ θεῷ οὗ ἔμελλες εἶναι [*Sim.* v. 3. 3, cf. *Mand.* iv. 4. 2]); in Tertullian in greater detail (*ad Uxor.* i. 3, ii. 1, *adv. Marc.* i. 29, *de Monog.* i., *de Pudic.* 16); in Cyprian, who repeats almost the words of his 'master' ('nec hoc jubet Dominus sed hortatur; nec jugum necessitatis imponit, quando maneat voluntatis arbitrium liberum . . . carnis desideria castrantes majoris

gratiae praemium in coelestibus obtinetis' [*de Habit. Virg.* 23]); in Origen, where a new idea is introduced and a new passage of Scripture referred to ('Donec quis hoc facit tantum quod debet, id est ea quae praecepta sunt, inutilis servus est; si autem addas aliquid praeceptis, tunc jam non inutilis servus eris' [*ad Rom.* iii. 3]); in the pseudo-Clementine *Epistles to Virgins*, where there is a repetition of Hermas' teaching (*Ep. ad Virg.* i. 4); and in Methodius, who teaches, as Tertullian does, the lawfulness of marriage, but the superior sanctity of the virgin state (*Conviv.* iii. 13, 14).

The rise of Monasticism gave a new importance to the distinction between a higher and lower Christian life. Hitherto the contrast between the most obviously ascetic and the most naturally human kinds of life had been plain but less striking, less clamorous for reasoned expression, than it was when the whole Church became aware of the supreme self-denial of St. Anthony and his followers. The drift of crowds of nominal Christians into the Church, which followed the conversion of Constantine, tending, as it did, towards a relaxation of the earlier strictness and a lowering of the general standard of Christian living, still further emphasized the distinction, and made the formulating of a theory of Christian life which would cover all the observed facts an absolute necessity. It is noticeable that the early monks themselves neither elaborated nor seemed conscious of the theory that their lives were the following out of counsels of a higher way and transcended the obedience to the commands obligatory on all Christians. It was St. Ambrose who explained their position for them, and formulated more clearly than any of his predecessors the doctrine of 'counsels' and 'precepts':

'Officium autem omne aut medium aut perfectum est, quod aeque Scripturarum auctoritate probare possumus. Habemus etenim in Evangelio dixisse Dominum: Si vis in vitam aeternam venire, serva mandata. Dixit ille: quae?' etc., following Mt 19^{17-19}, adding 'Haec sunt media officia, quibus aliquid deest. Denique dicit illi adolescens: Omnia haec custodivi,' etc., following vv.[20, 21], adding, 'Hoc est igitur perfectum officium' (*de Offic. Min.* I. xi.). Here for the first time in this connexion the passage which afterwards became a standard proof of the doctrine is quoted from St. Matthew (see also, for St. Ambrose's statement of the doctrine, *de Vid.* xii.). The use of the expressions 'medium' and 'perfectum officium' suggests that St. Ambrose felt the influence of Stoic philosophy. St. Augustine, in his *Enchiridion* (121) and elsewhere, and St. Jerome (*adv. Jovin.* i. 12), teach as St. Ambrose does.

So far the doctrine of the distinction between 'counsels' and 'precepts' appears to have been quite a natural and probably an inevitable explanation of observed fact. The way of Christ was a way of renunciation. It is thus that He Himself sets it forth when He demands absolute poverty (Mt $19^{17ff.}$) and recognizes virginity persisted in for the Kingdom of Heaven's sake (v.[12]). It was obvious that some Christians accomplished a more complete renunciation than others. Yet the general conscience of the Church refused to count blameworthy those who renounced less. It followed that the life of more perfect renunciation was a higher kind of life voluntarily entered upon by those who were ambitious of perfection. It is probable that the doctrine thus enunciated by St. Ambrose and St. Augustine was wholesome for the Church. There was continually set before men a very lofty kind of life, and this was recognized as worthy of peculiar praise on earth and as inheriting a great reward in heaven.

The doctrine of 'counsels' and 'precepts' was worked out by the Schoolmen, and made to serve a purpose which was not conducive to spiritual life in the Church. As the power of the Church to remit the temporal and purgatorial punishments of sin came to be more and more insisted on, the need was felt of a theory which should justify the power claimed and ultimately make less hopelessly unintelligible the distribution of indulgences. The existence of a treasury of merits ('thesaurus meritorum' [Ps.-Clem. vi.; *Unigenitus Dei Filius*, 1343]) was supposed; and it was placed at the disposal of the head of the Church for distribution. This treasury was filled with the infinite merits of Christ and the superfluous merits of those who, by following the counsels of perfection, had done more than was required (*opera supererogationis*) for their own salvation. ('In operibus poenitentiae supererogaverunt ad mensuram debitorum suorum, et multi etiam tribulationes injustas sustinuerunt patienter, per quas multitudo poenarum poterat expiari si eis deberetur,' Thomas Aq. *Summa*, suppl. qu. xxv. art. 1). In the end the conscience of the Church was shocked, and the Reformation precipitated, by the shameless sale of these indulgences. Luther and his fellow-Reformers, in attacking the traffic, traced it back first to the theory of a 'treasury of merits' and then to the doctrine of 'counsels' and 'precepts' (Luther, *Werke*, Erlangen edition, 1826–57, lx. 256, v. 216, iv. 451; *Articuli Smalcaldici*, iii. 3, 39). It is plain, however, that, although the existence of the 'treasury of merits' was logically deducible from the doctrine of 'counsels' and 'precepts,' the deduction need never have been made. The Schoolmen might have stopped short of it; probably would never have thought of making it but for the necessity of completing and strengthening the doctrine of the remission of penalties. Also the Reformers might have recognized as justifiable and inevitable the original distinction between counsels of perfection and obligatory precepts. Their position probably would have been stronger if they had.

In another way also the doctrine of 'counsels' and 'precepts,' as elaborated by the Schoolmen, militated against spirituality, viz. by lowering the general tone of the Christian life. The harder sayings of our Lord, especially those in the Sermon on the Mount, came to be reckoned as 'counsels,' and so removed from the life ideals of ordinary men. Thus among the 'counsels,' ordinarily reckoned as twelve, are to be found: loving our enemies, giving alms not only from our superfluity, not swearing without necessity, and so on (see H. Lämmer, *Die vortrident. kath. Theol.*, Berl. 1858, p. 171 ff.). It is inevitable that at periods of low spiritual vitality there will be a tendency to transfer into the catalogue of counsels of perfection duties which make very high demands on devotion, in communities where the Catholic doctrine is fully accepted. This constitutes a serious danger and a real objection to the doctrine.

The Protestant theologians denied that there was any choice given to man between a higher and a lower kind of Christian life. The fundamental command to love the Lord with all the heart was binding upon all, and, as there was no possibility of doing more than this, so every failure to attain to the fullness of such love was sin (Luther, xiv. 35). Cases like that of the young man in the Gospel who was bidden to sell all and follow Christ (Mt $19^{17ff.}$) were met by the assumption that the command in such cases was to an individual, absolutely binding on that individual under pain of the sin of definite and deliberate disobedience; but, having nothing to do, either as a suggestion of higher perfection or as an example of eminent virtue, with those to whom such a personal command was not given. This was Wyclif's position ('omne consilium Christi obligat quemcunque ipso consultum'). It ignored the distinction (made, however, only in Mt., not in the parallel passages) between 'if thou wilt enter into life' and 'if thou wilt be perfect.' This theory that a 'counsel' was simply a precept given to an individual—according to Wyclif only to an 'heroic' individual—was modified by the later Reformers; and 'counsels' came to be considered as means suggested to certain individuals whereby they might fulfil the com-

mandments of which the 'counsels' seemed to be refinements. Sometimes for these particular individuals the 'counsel' was the *only* means by which the original commandment could be fulfilled at all. Luther, opposing Eck, says that 'counsels' are not 'supra' but 'infra praecepta'; because they are only means of conveniently fulfilling commandments. Thus virginity is not a counsel to be adopted at will or refused. It is a means, perhaps for some the only means, of fulfilling the law of chastity. To such individuals it is evident that to refrain from marriage is a precept, absolutely obligatory. To the others it is not a counsel of perfection, since, being able in the married state to observe the law of chastity, there is nothing to be gained by renouncing marriage (Luther, *de Votis Monasticis*, viii. 583, 30 ff.).

The result of the Protestant theory is a reversal of the previous judgment of the Christian conscience about those who follow the evangelic 'counsels.' A life of virginity or of voluntary poverty ought no longer to be considered a very eminent kind of devotion. It is a confession of weakness, an absolutely less perfect way of following Christ than that of the ordinary citizen of the world. In comparison with the old Catholic judgment that the way of greater renunciation is the way of nobler devotion, the Protestant view appears strained, and is not in accordance with the voice of the general conscience. It is not possible to alter the judgment of the common man's conscience so as to bring it into line with the deductions which theological thinkers make from the positions forced upon them by their polemics. In spite of their theory, Protestants still continue to regard as peculiarly admirable the lives of those who have sacrificed wealth, honour, or bodily desire for the sake of Christ (for full discussion of this fact see Append. III. of J. O. Hannay's *Spirit and Origin of Christian Monasticism*, 1903). It is, however, to be observed that the Protestant theologian's denial of special honour to lives of complete renunciation has had a certain effect. Protestantism is less rich than Catholicism in examples of heroic Christianity. The general tendency of Protestantism has been to raise to a high level the common Christian life and to develop certain virtues of a kind suitable to the lives of citizens. It has not made for, and, except in comparatively rare instances, has not achieved, the production of unique saints, like, for example, St. Francis of Assisi, whose devotion lays hold upon the popular imagination. This failure must be attributed to the denial of the doctrine of 'counsels' and 'precepts,' and the consequent unwillingness of Protestant teachers to hold up for admiration lives which must always be rare, and are never imitable except by those who realize the peculiar glory of very great kinds of renunciation.

Further, it has happened that certain evangelic sayings, regarded by the Schoolmen as counsels of perfection, have, in times of high religious vitality, laid hold of the consciences of earnest Protestants and compelled obedience. Thus, during the 17th cent. in England, our Lord's teaching about the non-resistance of evil fascinated the early Quakers. In a Catholic community their kind of life would have been recognized as a following of a counsel of perfection, and they might very well have become an Order within the Church. The refusal of Protestants to recognize the distinction between 'counsels' and 'precepts' had a double effect. It forced the Quakers, who in this matter thought as Protestants, to defend their literal obedience to the commands of Christ as the only way of following Christ. It obliged those Christians whose consciences did not forbid them to use force in self-protection or in the interests of society, to condemn the position of the Quakers as fantastic, exaggerated, and definitely wrong. The same sort of thing happened in Germany and Flanders at the time of the Anabaptist protest against the possession of private property; and less strikingly in other similar cases (see J. O. Hannay, *op. cit.* ch. i.). The greater and more fully organized Protestant Churches have thus been deprived of the services of many very enthusiastic men and women who might have been most valuable in deepening the spirituality of the general life; and the teachers of these Churches have been obliged to read glosses into certain passages of Scripture, notably certain passages of the Sermon on the Mount, in such a way as to obscure their plain meaning and weaken their original force.

It appears, therefore, that in formulating the doctrine of 'counsels' and 'precepts' the Catholic Church did no more than endorse and give scientific expression to the natural and obvious judgment of conscience which recognized in the life of great renunciation a peculiarly high kind of life; that by formulating the doctrine the Church ran the risk of deductions being made from it which would in the end outrage, and actually have outraged, the consciences of sincere believers; and the further risk of the list of 'counsels' being enlarged and that of 'precepts' diminished, until the common man's standard of life was seriously lowered. It appears also that Protestant theologians, in refusing to endorse the natural judgments of conscience, have not succeeded, in fact, in preventing such judgments being made by their followers, but have deprived Protestants of an incentive to a lofty kind of life; and have risked, and actually suffered, the loss to organized Protestant Churches of souls who have felt the need of heroic self-sacrifice for the sake of Christ.

LITERATURE.—Works cited in text, and J. Schwane, *De operibus supererogatoriis et consiliis Evangelicis*, Munst. 1868; K. Thieme, art. 'Consilia Evangelica,' in *PRE*³, vol. iv.; R. Rothe, *Theol. Ethik*², Wittenberg, 1869–70, vol. iii.; Newman Smyth, *Christian Ethics*², Edin. 1893; L. G. Smith, *The Characteristics of Christian Morality*, London, 1875.

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COURAGE.—Courage has figured as one of the prominent virtues in every ethical system. Yet it has from early times given trouble to scientific moralists, because it seems at first sight compatible with an utterly worthless or vicious character. This is, however, only the case where it is identified with fearlessness (*q.v.*). Absence of fear in physical danger may be the result of temperament and so contain no moral element at all, while a certain dread of moral evil is not exclusive of courage as usually understood. Thus the Greek philosophers discerned that, to gain an accurate notion of courage, it was necessary to define things worthy or unworthy of fear.

In some of Plato's Dialogues, notably the *Laches* and the *Protagoras*, we are made to see the difficulty of finding a place for courage in any system which recognizes the paramount position of wisdom or knowledge in moral life, since not only do brute beasts show spirit and endurance in combat, but the conduct of men in vigorous military efforts loses the merit of courage if prudence suggests that the forces are adequate to the occasion. In the *Republic*, however (bk. iv. 429 f.), Plato distinctly lays down the principle that the Guardians of the City (in whom the virtue of courage principally resides) must acquire that quality by a sound training in the nature of things to be feared and of things not to be feared.

Aristotle, in bk. iii. of the *Nic. Ethics*, submits the whole subject to a searching analysis. According to his principle of the Mean, courage lies between rashness on the one hand and cowardice on the other. As fear, the foreboding of evil, is not

altogether to be disparaged, Aristotle, like Plato, has to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate fears, and finds that courage exists where danger is despised from a noble motive—from preference of that which is most honourable. He subsequently distinguishes real courage from five spurious forms: (1) that which is induced by respect for authority, or for opinion; (2) that which comes from knowledge that the danger apprehended is not real; (3) courage arising solely from emotion—anger or vengeance—which man shares with some animals; (4) the courage of a hopeful temperament; (5) the courage of ignorance which cannot recognize danger. It may, perhaps, be said that this distinction between genuine and spurious courage corresponds for the most part to the modern distinction between moral courage and that which is purely physical.

Although Aristotle in his general treatment of courage seems somewhat nearer to the modern ideas than Plato, in one respect Plato would seem to us more satisfactory; he includes in courage the power and will to resist evil generally, or to bear calamity without flinching; whereas Aristotle would restrict the term to its primary military significance, regarding other meanings as derivative or metaphorical. Certainly it seems illogical to refuse the epithet of 'courageous' to a man who is not alarmed but stands to his duty in a shipwreck or an earthquake, while allowing it to one who behaves in like manner during the attack on a city.

Courage thus held its place with the three other virtues—wisdom, justice, temperance—in the system of Greece and Rome. These 'cardinal' virtues were combined with the three Christian graces of faith, hope, and charity, to form the seven virtues inculcated in the Christian morality of the Middle Ages. Yet in the new atmosphere, courage—or fortitude, as it is commonly called in this connexion—underwent some transmutation. St. Ambrose—who derived his ethical system from the Greeks *via* Cicero, and passed it on to St. Augustine, and through him to the Western world—would make fortitude include boldness in withstanding temptations to sin. To a certain extent, he agrees here with Plato. But he also dwells much on heroic endurance of physical suffering as shown by the Christian martyrs. It would seem probable that the martyr-cult must have tended in the direction of emphasizing the passive side of courage or fortitude, by which it is assimilated to patience or resignation.

The Christian idea of fortitude is expressed in many admirable works of mediæval art. Many readers will recall Ruskin's remarks on the Fortitude of Botticelli (*Mornings in Florence*, iii.):

> 'Botticelli's Fortitude is no match, it may be, for any that are coming. Worn, somewhat; and not a little weary, instead of standing ready for all comers, she is sitting, apparently in reverie, her fingers playing restlessly and idly—nay, I think, even nervously, about the hilt of her sword . . . and yet, how swiftly and gladly will they close on it, when the far-off trumpet blows, which she will hear through all her reverie.'

It may be noticed that by mediæval Christian moralists fortitude is regarded as the corrective of *accidie* (*q.v.*), the sin of gloom and inaction. It seems thus to contain necessarily an element of cheerfulness, a resolution to live in an atmosphere of hope.

Perhaps there are few virtues that have varied more than courage in their manifestations among different peoples and at different times. There is always an æsthetic as well as a purely moral element in the conception of courage, and human notions vary even more about the beautiful than about the good. Thus, during the age of chivalry in the West, the maturer civilization of the East looked on the aggressive, unreasoning courage of the Crusaders as crude and barbarous, while the knightly spirit of the Franks despised Eastern subtlety as mean and cowardly. Non-military times call for the exercise of patience more than for that of intrepidity,—though both are essential to the well-being of any people,—and there is occasionally cause for fear lest a comparative contempt for merely physical courage, or 'spirit,' may bring about general slackness of effort. On the whole, however, the actively combative powers are likely to retain their importance in popular esteem.

There is one kind of courage which seems especially to belong to a highly civilized society—intellectual courage. By this is to be understood the power and determination to follow loyally and reasonably one's own beliefs and principles, irrespective not only of the disapproval of neighbours, but also of painful disturbance in one's own mind. The abandonment of an intellectual position, which has been reached by honest effort, for fear of the further efforts which may be required to reconstitute one's theories in the light of new knowledge, is a cowardly proceeding, and ought to receive more reprobation than it commonly incurs.

Of cowardice (*ignavia*) as the opposite of courage, little need be said. It is commonly due to constitutional timidity not checked by habits of self-control, or to a selfish propensity to exaggerate the importance of personal dangers and risks; or, again, to a want of appreciation of ideals worthy of risk on the part of those who desire to attain them.

Literature.—Plato, *Laches*, *Protagoras*, *Republic*, *Laws*, etc.; Aristotle, *Nic. Eth.*; H. Sidgwick, *Hist. of Ethics*, London, 1886; R. Thamin, *St. Ambroise et la morale chrétienne*, Paris, 1895; Ambrose, *de Officiis Ministrorum*; F. Paget, *The Spirit of Discipline*[6], London, 1894 (introductory article on 'Accidie'); A. Neander, *Church History*[3], London, 1841, vol. viii.; also most ethical treatises.

Alice Gardner.

COURTESY.—See Civility.

COUVADE.—See Birth.

COVENANT.—I. **Introduction.**—A covenant is a bond or agreement entered into between two persons or groups of persons, or between a man or a group of men and a god or gods. The covenant thus entered upon may be for a specified time, or for all time; it may cover certain clearly-defined purposes, or it may be indefinite. The covenant state is usually produced, or—at a later time—symbolized, by artificial means: eating or drinking together; drinking, or being inoculated with, one another's blood; or by exchange of names or of articles belonging to the covenanting parties. The relation produced by the covenant, as well as the real intention of these ritual acts, is still in debate. According to some writers, the covenant produces kinship and introduces the stranger into the clan which now adopts him.

> 'He who has drunk a clansman's blood is no longer a stranger but a brother, and included in the mystic circle of those who have a share in the life-blood that is common to all the clan' (W. R. Smith, p. 315; cf. Hartland, *LP* ii. 237).

This is regarded as the primitive purpose of the covenant, and, moreover,

> 'if the individual kinsman made a blood-covenant with a stranger, the whole of each tribe was bound thereby,' while 'the original form of alliance . . . was always and necessarily between clans, not between individuals' (Jevons, *Introd. to Hist. of Religion*, 99, 142).

The actual evidence hardly supports these views, nor does the covenant producing kinship appear among the lowest races. Generally the covenant is an engagement between individuals, between representatives, or between tribes; but there is hardly ever produced kinship or blood-relationship. Hence another theory maintains that the covenant relationship is that of the identity of individuals, who are mutually inoculated by cer-

tain ritual actions of which the blood-covenant is a well-known, though probably a late, instance. There is produced identity of aims and interests, as well as mutual agreement and sympathy.

'Each has a part of the other in his keeping, and this part not only assimilates each to the other by transmission of properties, but is a pledge, deposit, and hostage. Thus identity of interests is secured, and the possibility of mutual treachery or wrong is prevented, not only by the fact that injury done to B by A is equivalent to injury done by A to himself, but also by the fact that, if B is wronged, he may work vengeance by injuring . . . the part of A which he possesses' (Crawley, *Mystic Rose*, 237).

Without laying too much stress on the latter part of this theory, it is certain that the covenant-relationship as one of identity fits the facts better than as one of kinship. Yet it may be observed that, if the covenant produces identity of aims and interests, since the aims and interests of the individual are largely those of his kin, the covenant state will so far produce a kinship relation. But, as a third theory, it is maintained that the ritual act (eating together, transfusion of blood, etc.), while it involves the parties to the covenant in certain duties to each other, 'serves as a conductor of conditional imprecations,' of potential punishments for the transgression of these duties (Westermarck, *Moral Ideas*, i. 590, ii. 208; art. CURSING AND BLESSING, p. 369[b], below).

Frequently the parties to a covenant take an oath to keep it, or execrate vengeance on each other if it is broken. And, as many examples show, the food, drink, blood, etc., is itself the oath or curse, or is the vehicle of either. Thus, in Madagascar, the oath-takers pray that the liquid may poison him who is faithless to the bond (Dumont d'Urville, *Voy. pittoresque autour du monde*, Paris, 1834–1835, i. 81). Or, as in Morocco, a compact of friendship is sealed by eating together at the tomb of a saint, and, according to the phrase used, 'the food will repay' him who breaks the compact (Westermarck, i. 587; cf. below, p. 369[b]).

Examples show now the working of the principle contained in one of these theories, now that involved in the others, but the kinship theory is seldom observed in the complete form which the theory itself presupposes. It is not impossible that the primitive covenant contained both the idea of mutual identity and that of a conditional curse, for the two are not mutually exclusive, as various examples suggest. But it should not be forgotten that the covenant frequently implies no more than faithfulness to the object of the covenant, without any thought of its producing identity of persons, of aims, or of interests, much less of kinship.

2. Covenants between men.—Of all the various outward signs of the covenant, that to which most attention has been drawn is that each party to it *drinks or is inoculated with the other's blood, or that they smear each other or some sacred object with it.* Where the parties to the covenant form two groups, selected individuals undergo the ceremony, which usually forms an indissoluble bond (see BLOOD; BROTHERHOOD [artificial], and works cited there). Probably the idea that kinship means blood-relationship—a relationship which can be produced by the blood-covenant—is not primitive. More primitive is the idea that contact, eating and drinking together, exchange of names, garments, weapons, and the like, will produce a close bond, whether involving identity or relationship, between two unrelated persons. Here the underlying ideas are that the whole adheres in the part, that whatever has been in contact with a person, whatever is his, is for all practical purposes himself; that for another to obtain possession of it brings the owner under his control; hence to offer it to another is in effect to offer oneself. Thus mutual eating, especially where the food is exchanged, or the mutual exchange of common possessions, makes men entirely dependent upon each other, makes their aims and interests the same, or produces identity or, according to the first theory, kinship. Here, primitively, the act of eating or exchange is itself the covenant, but the food or articles exchanged are also seen to be vehicles of conditional oaths or curses verbally pronounced. At the same time, witnesses human or Divine may be called to the compact which has been made. The purposes for which a covenant is entered upon are, *e.g.*, friendship and comradeship between individuals; the adoption of a stranger into a kin-group; mutual aid and protection—assistance in war, in revenge, or in some hostile purpose; peace between tribes after war; commercial purposes; union between the members of a society or association, usually at the time of initiation into it, etc. It is obvious that, since a covenant brings the parties to it into such close affinity, their responsibilities towards each other are great and must be accurately fulfilled, while also there are produced many mutual privileges.

Where *a common meal* is the chief feature of a covenant, there is the idea that what is partaken of in common establishes a bond of union or of identity, and this is still more marked where there is an exchange of food. It is possible that the covenant-meal may have been the earliest form of the covenant, and it should be observed that, quite apart from the theoretic view of the effects of mutual eating common among primitive peoples, there is a natural basis to it. For, wherever men eat and drink together, they tend to be friendly towards each other. But, where the theoretic view prevails, the eating together of unrelated persons produces automatically the covenant-state. The stranger who eats with the Arab is no longer a stranger; the two parties have entered upon a bond of friendship, with mutual obligations which are absolutely sacred. The same is true elsewhere, as among the Omaha Indians, with whom, if an enemy

'appear in the lodge, and receive a mouthful of food or water, or put the pipe in his mouth . . . he is bound for the time being by the ties of hospitality' (Dorsey, *3 RBEW*, 1884, p 271).

In general the stranger is regarded as a source of potential evil. Hence to give him food identifies him with his host, and probably at the same time makes him liable, should he do wrong, to a conditional curse swallowed with the food. We find also covenants of mutual friendship expressed by eating together, especially where there has hitherto been hostility between the parties. Thus in Morocco persons who wish to be reconciled join hands before a holy man or at a saint's tomb, usually after partaking of a common meal. This is the usual method of sealing a compact of friendship. If any party to the compact is guilty of a breach of faith, it is commonly said that 'God and the food will repay him,' the food being the vehicle of a conditional curse (Westermarck, ii. 623–624; cf. Gn 26^{28-31} 31^{44-46}; see also the article CURSING AND BLESSING, p. 373[b]). Between villages, clans, or tribes, which have been at war, on the cessation of hostilities the covenant of peace is almost invariably marked by a common meal or a species of sacrament. A typical instance is found among the Battas, who, on making peace and forming unions, divide the heart of a slain animal into as many pieces as there are chiefs present. Each chief roasts his piece, holds it up, and says:

'If I should ever violate my oath, I am willing to be slaughtered like the bleeding animal which lies before me, and to be devoured like the piece of heart I am about to eat' (Featherman, *Soc. Hist. of the Races of Mankind*, London, 1881–1891, ii. 333).

Among the Ceramese the covenant of peace between two villages is entered upon by the people of one village making a feast to which those of the other are invited. The chiefs drop some of their blood into a dish of food, and weapons are also dipped into it. The food is then eaten alternately. A similar feast is also held at the other village, and the covenant is complete. Here there is a combination (found elsewhere also) of the blood-covenant with the covenant-meal (Riedel, *De sluik- en kroesharige rassen*, The Hague, 1886, p. 128; cf., for a similar instance among the Nilotic Negroes, Johnston, *Uganda Protectorate*, London, 1902, ii. 795).

Drinking together is another common form of covenant ceremony, the draught being frequently accompanied by an oath, while, as many examples show, the liquid partaken of is regarded as the oath itself, which will harm the breaker of it. But there is also such a simple form of friendship covenant as that of the aborigines of Formosa, who put their arms round each other's necks and drink simultaneously a cup of wine (*L'Anthropologie*, v. [Paris, 1894] 352). Survivals of such a ceremony as this are well known. Nor is it improbable that drinking each other's blood at the making of a covenant was an extension of such a practice, while it is a common custom to mingle some blood with the liquid which is drunk.

As the basis of a covenant of friendship, the *exchange of names* is very frequent among savage tribes, the name being regarded as part of the personality, while the sacred nature of the act is seen in the fact that the name is usually not revealed, lest any one should do its owner harm by making use of it. In such a case the alliance is indissoluble, and forms one of the most sacred of bonds. Other exchanges of personal belongings—garments or weapons—form the basis of covenants of friendship, and will make lasting friends of men who have been enemies. A temporary exchange of wives is occasionally found as a means of sealing a compact, especially among Australian tribes, with whom also, on the occasion of making peace between tribes or certain other alliances, a general exchange of wives takes place for the time being. By this means the identity or union of the two parties is assured (cf. ADULTERY, vol. i. p. 125 (*b*); *JAI* xxiv. 169, 173).

Saliva is occasionally the vehicle of the covenant state. Thus, among the Orango in the Bissagos Archipelago the ceremony for sealing a friendship is to spit in each other's hands. The Masai spat at a man with whom they swore eternal friendship (Hinde, *Last of the Masai*, London, 1901, p. 47); and among the Somalis a stranger becomes a member of his host's family by the host spitting in his right hand and rubbing it on the stranger's forehead (Paulitschke, *Ethnogr. Nordost-Afrikas*, Berlin, 1893-1896, p. 246).

Opposite theories of the meaning of this rite are found. Mutual spitting is regarded as an interchange of life, since by many peoples saliva is held to contain the element of life (Crombie, *Trans. Inter. FL Cong.*, 1891, p. 249 ff.). Westermarck, on the other hand, is of the opinion that saliva is the vehicle of a conditional curse, since the Masai spit copiously when cursing (*op. cit.* ii. 209). Spitting among the Masai is also reported to be a sign of the greatest goodwill and a compliment (Johnston, *op. cit.* ii. 833).

Covenants of peace between tribes which have been at war are frequently sealed by a common meal (see above). In some cases the material of the covenant-meal is the flesh of *a human victim*. Thus, the people of Vate kill one or more of their number and send the flesh for consumption to the hostile tribe with whom they desire peace (Erskine, *Journal of a Cruise among the Islands of the W. Pacific*, London, 1853, p. 334). In other alliances the cannibal meal is found. Chiefs among the Bambala (a Bantu tribe), in making a covenant against future bloodshed, partake with their followers of the flesh of a slave fattened for the occasion. Any chief who kills a slave after such a covenant must pay a fine to every village which took part in the bond (*JAI* xxxv. 404, 409). This is equivalent to that form of the blood-covenant in which the blood of a slaughtered victim is drunk by all the parties to the compact (cf. Herod. iii. 11; and the case of Catiline and his fellow-conspirators, who drank the blood of a slave in wine).

A pleasanter practice, and one ultimately based on the fact that sensuous satisfaction tends to goodwill, is that of *smoking the calumet* among American Indian tribes which had been at war. It was also done at the ratification of treaties and as a symbol of hospitality, and was regarded as so sacred that to break the covenant thus made would have been followed automatically by fatal consequences.

Other ceremonies are used elsewhere, with the purpose of making a covenant of peace binding. In Tahiti a wreath was made of green boughs, to which each party contributed. Two young dogs were exchanged, and a band of cloth was made together. The wreath and the cloth were then offered to the gods, and imprecations were uttered on those who should break the covenant (Ellis, *Polynes. Researches*, London, 1829, i. 318; see other instances in Farrer, *Military Manners and Customs*, London, 1885, p. 162 ff.).

Where the bodies of the parties to a covenant are cut to obtain blood, the marks of the wounds serve as tokens of the covenant. Similarly the garments or weapons exchanged will be constant reminders of it. At other times a cairn is set up as a witness of the covenant state (cf. Gn 31[48]; Frazer, in *Anthrop. Essays presented to E. B. Tylor*, Oxford, 1907, p. 131 ff.).

In later times, and in more advanced civilizations, the covenant becomes simply a bond or oath for mutual support, or for amity between men more or less animated by a common purpose. Here there is little or no idea of kinship or identity, though some of the older ritual acts may survive, and the parties to such bonds recognize a brotherly feeling existing between themselves as a result of their bond and of their common purpose. In fact, the covenant at all times is intended to produce solidarity among those who are parties to it, though in these later covenants brotherhood is not actually and automatically produced. And, though the breaker of the covenant risks great dangers, these are not supposed to result automatically from the oath which he has taken, as in many instances from savage life.

3. Covenants between men and gods, etc.—The ceremonies and symbolism of covenants are even more important than the words of contract used, and, in fact, they constitute the covenant. Hence, in great measure, all religious ceremonial and worship is the expression of a covenant relationship between men and gods. For the worship paid, men expect the god to perform duties towards them, and this worship also tends to confirm that relationship. But there are certain ceremonies, especially those of a sacramental or sacrificial nature, in which the covenant relationship appears more emphatically. In all sacrifices in which the victim is, or represents, the god, and in which a sacramental meal is made of his flesh, the meal is the expression of a close union or a covenant between the god and the group of worshippers. This is seen in the fact that all the worshippers partake, while there are instances, as in Hawaii, where a refusal to eat would be followed by death (Bastian, *Der Mensch*, Leipzig, 1860, iii. 152). But, even where the slain animal is not the god,

the sacrifice or the meal which follows it marks a desire for union with the god, and is an expression of a covenant alliance with him. In this case, as in covenants between men, there is a common meal of which the two parties to the covenant partake —the god and the group of worshippers. In the OT, God is often represented as making a covenant with individuals and their descendants, or with Israel (Gn 9^{9} 15^{18}, Nu 25^{13}, Ex 6^{4} $24^{4ff.}$, Dt 5^{2}, Jer 34^{13}), and the probability is that sacrifice was the basis of all covenant rites between God and the individual or the people of Israel (cf. Ps 50^{5}, Jer 34^{18}). This is particularly noticeable in the case of the covenant with Abraham (Gn $15^{8ff.}$) and with Israel at Sinai (Ex $24^{4ff.}$). In the first case there is no mention of a sacrificial meal, and in the second the blood of the sacrifice is sprinkled on the altar and the people, thus uniting the covenanting parties, since the altar is the token of God's presence. This rite of sprinkling image or altar and worshippers, or the analogous custom of the worshipper shedding his blood or sprinkling it on the *sacra* (cf. 1 K 18^{28}), is widely spread, and constitutes a simple method of union with the god —in other words, of effecting or strengthening the covenant relation with him, or of reminding him of it. In other cases the covenant ritual consists in placing and leaving the worshipper's hair, clothing, etc., on the altar, but frequently in the OT the sacrificial meal may be regarded as the basis of the covenant—the god or his worshippers eating together and renewing their union with each other. Hence, according to one theory, the meal itself unites god and men in an act of communion (W. R. Smith, p. 271); or, according to another view, the food is here again the vehicle of conditional curses mutually transferred to god and worshipper (Westermarck, *op. cit.* ii. 623 ff.). Both purposes may, however, be served by the sacrificial meal. It is certainly the case that, in the view of the OT writers, breaking of the covenant by the individual or the nation was followed by punishment (Dt $17^{2ff.}$, Jos $7^{11ff.}$ 23^{16}, Jg 2^{20}, 2 K 18^{9-12}), while blessing followed its being observed (Ps 132^{12}). In any case, what holds true of these OT sacrifices is true of similar sacrifices elsewhere. Indeed, in some aspects the mere offering of sacrifice to a god, thus propitiating him, is the token of an alliance with him; hence the worshipper asks and expects help from the god to whom he, for his part, is faithful. The same is true of the vows made to a god by a worshipper, in which he promises certain things, usually a sacrifice, for some specified help given him by the god.

In the OT other things are found as signs of a Divine and human covenant, *e.g.* the rainbow in the case of Noah and his posterity (Gn 9^{16}), though here a covenant sacrifice appears also ($8^{20ff.}$); circumcision is the token of the covenant with Israel (Gn $17^{10f.}$), though it is to some extent a sacrificial rite; and in Ex 31^{16} the Sabbath is to be kept for a perpetual covenant. For marks or cuttings on the body as signs of a covenant, see BADGES.

Totemism, as 'an intimate relation which is supposed to exist between a group of kindred people on the one side and a species of natural or artificial objects on the other side, which objects are called the totems of the human group' (Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, London, 1910, iv. 1), is essentially a covenant relationship, since both parties have entered explicitly or implicitly into an alliance for mutual help and protection. This covenant state is generally furthered by various ritual acts, by which men assimilate themselves to their totem, these being analogous to the covenant rites between human beings. The group of men is, in effect, identified with the animal species which is their totem; the relation is one of identity. Similarly, in the rites used at puberty for obtaining an individual animal guardian or *manitou*, and in the relative positions in which the individual and his *manitou* stand to each other, there is the suggestion that this relation is essentially a covenant one. Blood-letting is the most significant of these rites. Thus, the Mosquito Indians are said to have sealed their compact with the *manitou* by drawing blood from different parts of their body (*NR* i. 740). Among the Indians of Honduras each youth formed a contract with his *nagual*, by offering some of his blood to it,

'whereupon such friendship was contracted between them that, when one of them died, the other did not survive' (Herrera, *General Hist. of . . . America*, 1740, iv. 138).

The American Indian youth generally killed the animal which was to be his *manitou*, and used its skin as a 'medicine-bag.' There was thus some kind of blood-covenant between the youth and his guardian, and, as in Omaha Indian belief there was a bond between them so close that the man acquired the properties of the animal, so generally it was held that the youth would not survive the death of his *nagual*; and there was a common idea of the identity of the two, or perhaps of an interchange of life between them.

The meal eaten by survivors at a death, and repeated on anniversary occasions, and of which the ghost is supposed to partake, has the intention of uniting the ghostly and human eaters, and of preserving the goodwill of the ghost by showing that he is not forgotten. It is thus a species of covenant with the dead. This is still more closely marked in cases where the mourners eat the dead man himself—perhaps the origin of the funeral feast. Other methods of this implicit covenant with the dead may be looked for in such rites as that of the mourners cutting themselves, letting the blood drop on the grave, making offerings of their hair, or anointing themselves with the fat or decomposed matter of the corpse. These are analogous to the similar rites in connexion with the cult of gods (see Hartland, *op. cit.* ii. 277 ff.; Jevons, *op. cit.* 41 ff.).

Various customs in human covenants—in which, *e.g.*, the parties hold an animal which is sacrificed, its blood being sometimes sprinkled on a sacred object, or are sprinkled with sacrificial blood or that of an animal not apparently sacrificial—are probably connected with that type of covenant sacrifice in which the parties are a god and a group of men. Here, perhaps, the sacred nature of the sacrifice makes it an important basis of the human covenant, while sacrifices are frequently the vehicles of a curse; or, again, the god to whom the sacrifice or the blood is offered is regarded as a third party to the covenant (for examples, see BROTHERHOOD [artificial], vol. ii. pp. 859[b], 870[a]; Wellhausen, *Reste arab. Heid.*[2], Berlin, 1897, p. 128; Lewin, *Wild Races of S.E. India*, London, 1870, p. 228). In many human covenants a god is expressly called upon as witness to the contract, as in the similar appeal in the case of an oath. The god is then expected to visit with his wrath the breaker of the covenant (cf. Herod. iii. 8; Tylor, *Prim. Cult.*[4], London, 1903, ii. 342; Wilson, *Western Africa*, 1856, pp. 210, 392).

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COVENANT (American).—The substitution of an artificial for a natural basis of subsistence had the effect in America, as elsewhere, of establishing

the gods as the principal members of the agricultural community. On their co-operation the maintenance of such a community depended. To some extent the obligation was mutual; for, while men reaped much benefit from the encouragement, advice, and practical assistance of the gods, they were beholden to men for the sustenance tendered through sacrifice. A definite and tacit, if unwritten, covenant thus came into being between gods and men, any human breach of which was visited with Divine punishment. The arrangement was purely one of self-interest on both sides. Man felt the necessity of placating the only beings from whom he could obtain foreknowledge of seasonal and other changes, and, deeply sensible of the value of supernatural assistance, he rewarded it as handsomely as he could—by gifts of such food, drink, and clothing as in his sight appeared most desirable.

Commencing this practice by an 'understanding' with the earlier tribal deities, he later extended it to the 'great gods' of the heavens and earth, whom from time to time he admitted into his pantheon. He felt that the wealth accruing from this co-operation with Divine beings should be fairly divided. This applied to the fruits of the earth produced under supernatural guidance, and to such live stock as had been raised under the same auspices. A step further, and we perceive that the logical outcome of such a policy was to set apart such fields and flocks as would satisfy the god, for his own special use—these to be worked and tended by (in all probability) the most skilful labourers. Thus, according to Gumilla (*Orinoco Illustrado*, Madrid, 1745, vol. ii. p. 278), a tribe of the Guayanos, in consternation at an eclipse of the moon, at once commenced work upon a plantation for the moon-spirit, considering the eclipse to be a sign of his displeasure at their failure to supply him with a separate field of maize. The gods of Peru had their own herds of llamas and pacos, the flesh of which was largely consumed on their altars, while the wool, woven into cloth, was burned to provide them with 'astral' clothing, or used in the provision of raiment for their images and attendants.

When mere animal sacrifice fails, either, as in Mexico, owing to the lack of large animals, or, perhaps, because of a more sanguinary popular temperament, the blood of human victims is supplied to the gods as nutriment. Thus the Mexican god Huitzilopochtli lived wholly upon human sacrifice, countless thousands of victims, for the most part members of hostile tribes, being slain annually upon his altar. The hunter, too, as well as the cultivator and herdsman, paid his debt to the gods, who assisted him to track his game in dreams. Thus the Nicaraguan tendered to his deer- and rabbit-gods clotted blood wrapped in a cloth, and the Otomi offered blood to the great Cloud-serpent, Mixcoatl. Dwellings, too, were supplied to the Divine beings.

The natural conclusion of the savage in these circumstances is that a breach of his covenant with the gods brings upon him calamities of every description. There is much temptation on the part of the cultivator to withhold a portion of the firstfruits or other sacrifice; and, should this temptation overcome him, he becomes an easy prey to the malevolence of the slighted deity. The Peruvians believed that in such a case the offended god sent an evil spirit to haunt the wrongdoer, and that it lay in wait for him in his habitual resorts. His crops failed, his health gave way under some terrible disease, his stock perished. Such were thought to be the consequences of *hucha*, or sin, in Peru; and, in the event of a national calamity, every member of the community was rigorously examined, until, the guilty one being discovered, restitution was forced from him. Throughout the two Americas the idea of the covenant with the gods was quite as current as elsewhere; and its inevitable workings have been observed in the economy of nearly every tribe.

LITERATURE.—B. Sahagun, *Hist. General de las Cosas de Nueva España*, Mexico, 1829-30; Bartolomeo de las Casas, *Apologetica Historia*, Seville, 1554; Pedro de Arriaga, *Extirpacion*, Madrid, 1620; Villa-Gomez, *Carta Pastoral contra los Idolatrios*, Lima, 1649. LEWIS SPENCE.

COVENANTERS.—The subscribers of the National Covenant and the Solemn League and Covenant rejected the theory of the Divine right of kings, and vigorously opposed the absolutism which crushed the liberties of the people. In the days of James VI., before the Covenants, the conflict was begun. George Buchanan in 1579 published his *De Jure Regni apud Scotos*, in which he taught that kings are chosen and continued in office by the people, and, in particular, that the Scots had always claimed and exercised the right to call wicked rulers to account. Two Scotsmen had already dealt with the old question of the right of kings. As early as 1521, John Major asserted in his *History* that the people first made kings, and could dethrone them; while Hector Boece in his *History*, published in 1527, assumed that the royal authority is derived from the people. In 1584, Buchanan's book was condemned by Act of Parliament, and in the same year were passed the 'Black Acts,' which declared, contrary to the teaching of Knox, that the king was head of the Church as of the State, that assemblies should not meet without his sanction, that there should be bishops who should be appointed by him, and that ministers should not discuss public affairs under pain of treason. When these statutes were framed, James's adviser was James Stuart, Earl of Arran, who had succeeded Esmé Stuart, Lord of Aubigny. Leaving the court of Henry III. of France, in which the doctrine of royal absolutism was cherished, D'Aubigny had proceeded to Scotland, on the mission of the Guises for the restoration of Mary Stuart and the Catholic religion, and there had taught the young king to be an autocrat. The Scots, however, feared a popish plot; and honestly or dishonestly he approved the drawing up of the Negative Confession, assailing Romanism, which in 1581 was signed by James and his courtiers. While D'Aubigny was directing the king, Andrew Melvill was leading the Church and inveighing against 'the bloodie guillie of absolute authority.' By his influence the Assembly of 1580 condemned Episcopacy; and in 1581 presbyteries were established with the king's consent, and the Assembly approved the Second Book of Discipline. The Raid of Ruthven, which was devised for the liberation of James from the hands of D'Aubigny, was successful; but it could not make the king forget the Frenchman's lessons in absolutism; and, when Arran was the chief counsellor, the Black Acts, with their assertion of the royal supremacy, were passed. Though Arran's rule terminated in 1585, James was able, two years later, to persuade the Parliament to declare that all ecclesiastical property belonged to the crown.

For a time, however, James did nothing for the bishops, and before and after his marriage seemed to favour Presbyterianism. In 1590 the Assembly ordained 'the subscription of the band of mainteaning religion and confession *de novo*,' and, in 1592, Presbyterianism received from Parliament its 'Magna Charta,' whereby the ecclesiastical courts were legalized, and the liberty of the Church was ratified by the abrogation of the Black Acts, so far as they interfered with its authority in matters

of religion. The royal favour to Presbyterianism was of short duration, and in 1596 Andrew Melvill told James that he was 'but God's sillie vassall,' and said:

> 'Sir, as diverse tymes before, so now again I must tell you, there are two kings and two kingdomes in Scotland; there is Christ Jesus and His kingdome the Kirk, whose subject King James the Sixth is, and of whose kingdome not a king, nor a head, nor a Lord, but a member.'

The words did not convince, and James, casting aside tradition, called by his own authority Assemblies, which yielded to his pressure. At last in 1610 an Assembly restored Episcopacy, and in 1612 the Estates ratified the new order of ecclesiastical government. In justification of his authority, James published, in 1598, *The True Law of Free Monarchies*, and set forth the Divine origin of the royal power.

> 'Monarchy,' he wrote, 'as resembling the Divinity, approacheth nearest to perfection, as all the learned and wise men from the beginning have agreed upon.' He declared that 'kings are called Gods by the prophetical King David, because they sit upon God his throne upon earth, and have the count of their ministration to give unto him.' Scripture texts were used to show that the people should pay obedience to the king 'as to God's lieutenant on earth, obeying his commandments in all things, except directly against God, as the commands of God's minister, acknowledging him a judge set by God over them, having power to judge them, but to be judged only by God, to whom only he must give account of his judgment.'

In the *Basilikon Doron*, published shortly after *The True Law of Free Monarchies*, James instructed his son to know and love God, who had made him 'a little God to sit on his throne, and rule over other men.'

True to his exalted notion of his office, James used his authority to change the government of the Church, and then turned to the customs and forms of worship. In the Assembly of 1616, called by him, and the first which met after 1610, a new Confession of Faith, Catechism, Liturgy, and Book of Canons were projected; and in an Assembly at Perth in 1618 royal coercion secured the passing of the famous Five Articles, which were startling innovations in the Scottish ritual. When the government of the Church had been changed and the ritual modified, the king was satisfied with the exercise and recognition of his supremacy; but, while by his actions and writings he showed his attachment to the theory of the Divine right of kings, he ruled in the Church through Assemblies, and, though these were coerced, he preserved the recognized forms of legislation.

Charles I. succeeded to his father's belief in his Divine right, and continued, but without tact or discretion, the assertion of royal absolutism. In May 1635 he signed the warrant for a Book of Canons, which in the following year was imposed upon the Scottish Church, without the sanction of either an Assembly or a Parliament. Reference was made in the Book itself to a Liturgy, afterwards known as Laud's Liturgy, which was ratified in 1636, and in 1637, on the sole authority of the king, was sent to Scotland. The Canons, as they made no outward change in the Church, did not stir the people, though they saw in them a violent exercise of royal power; but the Liturgy, also devised by the king as an autocrat, roused a popular clamour, and set the nation against him. The Liturgy met with instant opposition, and the riot which occurred in the church of St. Giles, Edinburgh, when it was first read, inaugurated a revolution which spread through the greater part of Scotland. The Scots, ever fond of legal bonds of association, prepared a document which is known as the 'National Covenant,' and multitudes signed it.

The document was prepared by Johnston of Warriston, one of the ablest of the lawyers, and the Rev. Alexander Henderson, minister of Leuchars, who was the ecclesiastical leader of the Presbyterians; and with them most probably was associated Hope, the king's advocate. It included the Negative Confession of 1581, which James VI. had signed; a list of the Acts of Parliament confirming the Confession; and the Covenant proper, by which the subscribers bound themselves to defend their religion and their king as guardian of it. The signing of the Covenant was begun on 28th Feb. 1638, in the Greyfriars churchyard, which contained the burial-place of George Buchanan, whose *De Jure* helped to drive James towards absolutism. If the first Covenanters, drawn from all classes and representing the greater part of the country, were rebels against the king's tyranny, their document infringed no law of the land. Yet it was the bond of a nation against the sovereign, and, with troubles in England, Charles was forced to yield. He appointed the Marquis of Hamilton as his commissioner, who tried to divide the Covenanters by means of a new Covenant, the King's Covenant, which included but did not enforce the Confession of 1581; and, when the project failed, Hamilton in his master's name promised a free Assembly, a Parliament, and the abolition of the Courts of High Commission which, with bishops among the judges, tried ecclesiastical cases. The Presbyterians did not admit that the royal assent was necessary for an Assembly, and accordingly they called one, which met on 21st November in Glasgow. The Marquis of Hamilton appeared as the king's representative, and the members chose Henderson as moderator and Johnston of Warriston as clerk.

Henderson and his associates had summoned the bishops, but these refused to recognize the authority of the Assembly; and, when their cases were considered, the commissioner declared the proceedings illegal, and dissolved the Assembly. The Presbyterians, however, were undaunted, and the business was continued, without and in spite of the king's representative. The bishops were deposed, and some of them excommunicated; the Book of Canons, the Liturgy, and the Five Articles of Perth were condemned, and the Courts of Commission abolished. Thus did the Covenanters in the Glasgow Assembly answer the king with his absolutism. The Earl of Argyle accepted the Covenant in Glasgow, and it had been signed by the Earl of Montrose in Edinburgh.

War was inevitable, and Charles devised schemes for which he had no money. He attempted, however, to irritate the English by representing that the Scots were preparing an invasion; and the Scots, in defence of their honesty, published 'An Information for all good Christians within the Kingdome of England.' Another document appeared, the 'Large Declaration,' which Dr. Balcanquhal wrote and Charles authorized. It was the king's version of his troubles with the Scots, and was not a contribution to truth. Something more than a distribution of pamphlets was required to settle the quarrel between the people and their king, and Charles mustered an army of 21,000 men at Berwick. The Scottish forces, numbering 20,000 men, were entrusted to Alexander Leslie, who had followed the profession of arms on the Continent. Marching southwards, he fixed his quarters at Dunse Law, twelve miles from Berwick. The First Bishops' War was a demonstration and not a battle, and on 18th June 1639 commissioners arranged the Pacification of Berwick, which secured their demands for the Covenanters.

By the Treaty an Assembly and a Parliament were to meet; and on 12th August the Assembly sanctioned the Acts of the Glasgow Assembly, that they might have undisputed legal validity. The members requested the Privy Council to require every one in the nation to sign the Covenant, and,

so doing, violated the rules of toleration. The Earl of Traquair, the king's commissioner, ratified the proceedings of the Assembly, though Charles indicated to Archbishop Spottiswoode that what had been done could be undone. Parliament approved the action of the Assembly in overthrowing Episcopacy; and, in spite of his action as commissioner to the Assembly, Traquair refused assent in the king's name, and against precedent dissolved the Parliament. War was once more inevitable, since the nation's demands, in spite of the Treaty of Berwick, had been refused. Charles summoned an English Parliament, known as the Short Parliament, and dismissed it when supplies for a war with Scotland were refused. He succeeded, however, in collecting a force at York on 22nd August 1640; and on the 20th of the same month Leslie entered England with an army of 20,000, and marched to Newcastle. The Second Bishops' War was no more romantic than the First; and commissioners were appointed to meet at Ripon, and to arrange terms of peace on the basis of the abolition of Episcopacy and the recognition of the Covenant. The troubles in England forced Charles again to yield to the Scots, though not till 10th August 1641 was an arrangement made with the Long Parliament, which had taken the business out of the hands of the king.

Hoping to create a party in his favour, Charles in 1641 visited Scotland, and remedied further abuses, especially in the Privy Council and Court of Session, which by his own act were filled with his partisans. He expected to strengthen the opponents of the Covenant, already represented by the Incendiaries and the Plotters or Banders. The Earl of Traquair and Sir Robert Spottiswoode, the archbishop's son, were the chief men among the Incendiaries, who had been the advisers of Charles from the time of the Covenant; while the Plotters were led by Montrose, who had passed to the side of the king, perhaps through jealousy of Argyle's prominence among the Covenanters. The affair known as 'The Incident,' whether it was a fact or merely a story, told against the king, and, when he departed from Scotland in October, he had neither weakened his enemies nor strengthened his own party.

In August 1642, Charles raised his standard at Nottingham, and the Civil War in England was begun. The king and the Parliament each sought the aid of the Scots, who, though themselves divided, were in great numbers favourable to the Parliamentary cause. The Parliament informed them that an Assembly at Westminster had been appointed to consider 'a reformation in church discipline and ceremonies'; and on 2nd Aug. 1643 the General Assembly, associated with the Convention of the Scottish Estates, put forward the Solemn League and Covenant, drafted by Alexander Henderson, as the condition of an alliance. The subscribers to the Covenant were to bind themselves to preserve the Reformed religion in Scotland, to secure in England and Ireland a reform in doctrine, worship, discipline, and government, according to the Word of God and the example of the best Reformed Churches; to seek the extirpation of Popery, prelacy, superstition, heresy, and schism; and to defend the privileges of the Parliament, and also the person and authority of the king. The English Parliament accepted the Covenant on 25th September, and in Jan. 1644, Leslie, who had been created Earl of Leven, led an army into England, which helped to secure the victory of Marston Moor. In his difficulties, Charles granted a commission to Montrose, and, after an arrangement with the Marquis of Antrim, sent him a wild horde of Irish and Scoto-Celts. Victory after victory in Scotland was gained by Montrose, though at the expense of horrible cruelties perpetrated by the savages of his army; and he did not know defeat till September 1645, when he met David Leslie, Leven's nephew, at Philiphaugh. The triumph of the Covenanters was secured, and was cruelly celebrated in the execution of Sir Robert Spottiswoode and other Malignants, as the Royalists were called.

In England, the Parliamentary party, after their victory at Naseby, had no further need of the Scots; and they, on the other hand, being opposed by the Independents, despaired of the success of the Solemn League and Covenant. Charles understood the situation, and in May 1646 threw himself into the hands of the Scots. Yet he would not accept their Covenants, and they would not support him. Had he agreed to their terms, they would have defended him; but they handed him over to the English Parliament, on condition that his life should be spared, and the money due to them be paid.

One last effort to save their king was to be made by some of the Scottish nobles. The Earls of Loudon, Lanark, and Lauderdale visited him at Carisbrooke Castle, and made a compact, known as 'The Engagement,' according to which they were to find an army for him, and he was to establish Presbyterianism in England for three years. In the Scottish Parliament, the nobles, barons, and commissioners from the large towns showed by a decided majority that they trusted the king, though the clergy, on the other hand, would not believe that he was sincere. Hamilton, however, raised an army of 10,000 men, who when they reached England were met by Cromwell and defeated.

Charles was executed on 30th Jan. 1649, and Covenanters and Royalists alike were horrified. Charles was the victim of his cherished principle of the Divine right of kings, which, bequeathed to him by his father, destroyed the peace of Scotland, turning a loyal people into rebels whom history has justified. James was a despot who knew the value of discretion; but Charles, with an erroneous doctrine of his personality and an archaic theory of his power, was destitute of tact, and the Scots strenuously opposed him in the defence of their liberties. Yet, though he was a tyrant in their eyes, they would have remembered that he was their king and would not have taken his life.

Six days after the execution at Whitehall, Charles II. was proclaimed king by the Scottish Estates, though he was to be acknowledged only on condition that he accepted the Covenants. The zeal of the Covenanters was not diminishing, and just before the death of the king they secured the Act of Classes, which excluded from civil and military posts all who were hostile to the Covenants. Montrose cared nothing for the Estates, and still dreamed that the country might be subdued. He failed, however, to gather the Royalist army of his visions, and yet would not cease from romantic expeditions and attacks. At last he was taken, and was beheaded on 21st May 1650 at the Market Cross of Edinburgh. Charles II. landed in Scotland in June, and, according to an agreement already made, accepted the Covenants. His presence was a menace to England, and on 22nd July, Cromwell crossed the Border. David Leslie was in command of the Scottish army, which in the rush of events was now gathered for the defence of the king, though many of the Covenanters, led by Johnston of Warriston and James Guthrie, minister of Stirling, did not put their trust in Charles. In their fanaticism they succeeded in banishing all Malignants from the army, and so interfered with Leslie that Cromwell secured a decisive victory at Dunbar. Immediately after the battle they prepared a Remonstrance against the government of Argyle

and his friends, and presented it to the Committee of Estates, with the declaration that they rejected Charles till he proved 'the reality of his profession.' Argyle was forced to choose an alliance with the Remonstrants or with the Malignants, and he gave his support to the friends of Charles. The Committee of the Estates accordingly passed a Resolution in condemnation of the Remonstrance, and the Estates abolished the Act of Classes. On 1st Jan. 1651, Charles was crowned at Scone, and Malignants and Resolutioners alike were satisfied. Cromwell, however, was still in the country, and once more David Leslie was placed in command of an army. In hope of a rising in favour of Charles, the Scots marched into England, but Cromwell followed and utterly defeated them at Worcester. Scotland was subjected to English rule; and, though toleration was enforced, Resolutioners and Remonstrants continued their quarrel, till in 1653 the General Assembly was closed and its meetings forbidden. Enthusiasm for the Covenants was no longer national but sectarian. The National Covenant had been the protest of a realm against the absolutism of the king, and the Solemn League and Covenant had been framed for the reformation of religion by those who believed that the true Church should be Presbyterian. In the events which followed the National Covenant, Charles had been compelled to submit to the Scots, and after his death the Covenanters, true to the Solemn League and Covenant, became the guardians of Presbyterianism. Fanaticism divided them, but the factions were none the less devoted to the Church which James and Charles I. had assailed, and to its worship and government which had been saved from the hands of the destroyers.

Scotland hailed the Restoration with joy, as the English rule was ended and the king was to reign who had been crowned at Scone. The Remonstrants or Protesters alone, in their anxiety for the Church, did not share in the joy, and soon it was seen that they were not foolish in their alarm. Charles nominated a Privy Council, without waiting for a Parliament to advise in the selection; and, while the members of the Council were with him in London, he entrusted the government to the Committee of the Estates, which had not acted after 1651. Remembering injuries and destitute of gratitude, he committed Argyle to the Tower, and then sent him to Scotland for trial, and at the same time issued an order for the seizure of Johnston of Warriston, who, however, escaped to France. The Committee of Estates, recognizing the attitude of the king to the Covenanters, broke up a meeting of Protesters, and seized among others James Guthrie, the minister of Stirling. In their eagerness to please they issued a proclamation against 'all unlawful and unwarrantable meetings and conventicles'; and, in decreeing that there should be no meetings 'without his Majesty's special authority,' showed how the men in the king's service no longer opposed the absolutism and supremacy which had been fatal to his father. It seemed at first that Charles, though ruthless towards the Remonstrants, would uphold the Church for the sake of the Resolutioners; and James Sharp, minister of Crail and professor in St. Andrews, whom the Resolutioners had sent to London, returned on the last day of August with a communication to the Presbytery of Edinburgh. 'We do resolve,' Charles wrote, 'to protect and preserve the government of the Church of Scotland as it is settled by law'; but, while he referred to the government as it existed, he soon afterwards put a strange interpretation on his words. On 1st Jan. 1661, a Parliament with carefully selected members met, and in its sessions passed a multitude of Acts. In an oath of allegiance, Charles was declared 'supreme Governor of this kingdom over all persons and in all causes'; and a Rescissory Act, which revoked the legislation of every Parliament after 1633, destroyed what the nation had built up in the struggle against royal absolutism. The Church 'settled by law,' to which Charles referred in his letter to the Edinburgh Presbytery, was no longer Presbyterian, and in a communication to the Privy Council he wrote: 'We have, after mature deliberation, declared to those of your Council here our firm resolution to interpose our royal authority for restoring of that Church to its right government by bishops, as it was by law before the late troubles, during the reigns of our royal father and grandfather of blessed memory, and as it now stands settled by law.' The Church was Episcopal, but only one of the bishops was alive; and four men, of whom were James Sharp and Robert Leighton, set out for London to receive episcopal consecration.

The second session of the 'Drunken Parliament,' as it was called, began on 8th May 1662, and, after an Act for 'the restitution and re-establishment of the ancient government of the Church by archbishops and bishops,' the prelates were admitted to the dignity of an Estate. Thereafter the Covenants were declared to be treasonable, and holders of offices of trust were required to abjure them. Another Act was tragic in its consequences. Patronage had been abolished in 1649, and the election of ministers had been entrusted to the kirk-sessions. The Parliament now decreed that every minister who had been ordained after 1649 should receive a presentation from the patron, and institution from the bishop. In the west and south nearly three hundred men refused to comply; and churches were closed till 'curates' were found for them. In the third session of the Parliament the Earl of Rothes took the place of the Earl of Middleton as the king's representative, though the Earl of Lauderdale was the real director of the business. Ecclesiastical affairs were in hopeless disorder. The churches from which the ministers had been excluded were almost empty, and the people flocked to private houses in which these men preached. The Parliament sought a remedy in an Act which required the 'outed' ministers to abstain from preaching, and the people to attend the churches. Fines were to be imposed on those who would not obey, and the Privy Council were to receive reports from the curates regarding offenders. Before the close of the Parliament, Johnston of Warriston, who had been apprehended in France, was sent to execution. Argyle and James Guthrie, and also a man named Govan, had been condemned; and Warriston followed them to the scaffold and to martyrdom for the Covenants. The victims of the king's wrath were few, and Argyle and Guthrie, conspicuous champions of the people's rights, might have satisfied his vengeance; but Warriston was pursued till his death was accomplished. Samuel Rutherfurd, the Principal of St. Mary's College, St. Andrews, was summoned to appear at Edinburgh, and died before he could answer. In his *Lex Rex* he had set forth the democratic principles which George Buchanan taught in the *De Jure*; and, when he could not be brought to sentence, his book was publicly burned by order of the Government.

Without consent of the Church, Charles II. changed its constitution, and the men who would not obey his orders were driven from their livings. James VI. had forced or corrupted Assemblies and Parliaments to be his agents, while Charles I. had imposed the Canons and Liturgy with neither Assembly nor Parliament. It is true that Charles II. acted through a Parliament and through his Privy Council, but the Parliament was not freely

elected, and the Church itself was not consulted. The 300 evicted ministers could urge the Presbyterian claim of free assembly. Their theory of the Divine origin of the Presbyterian polity might be denied, but they could point to Knox and Melvill as the upholders of the Church's freedom, and to the struggles and successes of the first Covenanters. Many of the ministers quietly accepted the Episcopacy ordained by the 'Drunken Parliament,' but the men who were ejected, and not the men who conformed, were obedient to the Presbyterian tradition, and as heirs of the Covenanters were entitled to their name. Opponents of the royal absolutism and advocates of ecclesiastical freedom, the second race of the Covenanters were destined to bear testimony through suffering to their devotion to the lost liberties of their Church.

Fines were imposed by the Privy Council on those who neglected the ministrations of the curates, and soldiers were quartered on offenders till these were paid. At Archbishop Sharp's suggestion the Court of High Commission was re-instituted to deal with breakers of the law, and the troubles increased when Covenanters, to whom an Act of Indemnity had not extended, were ordered by the Court to pay their fines. In the disaffected districts the people were galled by the tyranny of the Council in imposing fines, quartering soldiers, and breaking up conventicles (*q.v.*) for worship. Passive obedience was not a favourite custom of the Scots, and a rising of the oppressed was to be expected. Sir James Turner, the most zealous of the soldiers of the Government, was in Dumfries, and on 15th Nov. 1666 was attacked and taken prisoner by a company of men from Galloway, who had been stirred by a shameful tale of cruelty. From Dumfries they marched, 3000 in number but untrained, across the country to Lanark, where they renewed their adherence to the Covenant. Intending to pass to Edinburgh, they turned on their way to the city, as Sir Thomas Dalziel, a fanatic Royalist who had served in Muscovy, was on their track, and they reached Rullion Green, on the southern slopes of the Pentlands. Dalziel with his disciplined force routed them. Some were killed, many fled, and at least fifty were taken. Two of the leaders, John Neilson of Corsack and Hugh M'Kail, who was a preacher, were tortured with the boot in presence of the Council, that they might reveal a supposed league with the Dutch, and were afterwards sent to the scaffold. Ten men, and then five, were hanged in Edinburgh, and the work of execution was continued in Glasgow and Ayr. Many of those who had been engaged in the rising were fined and their lands and goods confiscated. To Dalziel was given the task of quieting the disturbed places, and with his ruthless severities he terrorized the people. In 1667, however, a respite was offered when Lauderdale, who had overthrown Rothes and Sharp in the Council, intimated an indemnity, under conditions, for the Pentland rising. While many accepted the terms, the sternest of the Presbyterians refused obedience to a Government which required conformity to an Episcopal Church and ignored the Covenant.

After the indemnity no further step towards conciliation was taken till 1669, when an Indulgence was offered. It was ordained that vacant parishes might be given to ministers who were willing to accept collation from the bishops; and those who would not take collation might have the manse and glebe, without the stipend, if they agreed, among other conditions, to administer the sacraments to their parishioners alone. Forty-two ministers, professing their adherence to Presbyterianism, were admitted; but the most zealous of the Covenanters inveighed against them, and extreme Episcopalians objected to the Indulgence as an Act of Erastianism. Lauderdale, though responsible for the Indulgence with any clemency involved in it, was an avowed supporter of the royal absolutism; and under him the Parliament of 1669 declared in the Assertory Act 'that his Majesty hath the supreme authority and supremacy over all persons, and in all causes ecclesiastical within this kingdom; and that, by virtue thereof, the ordering and disposal of the external government and policy of the Church doth properly belong to his Majesty and his successors, as an inherent right of the crown.'

Burnet, the Archbishop of Glasgow, was deposed for his opposition to the king's authority in the issue of the Indulgence, and Leighton, who succeeded him, proposed an 'accommodation' for peace between Presbyterians and Episcopalians. The scheme was futile, as compromise pleased no one, and Leighton, resigning the archbishopric, departed to England. The Indulgence did not remove the opposition of the Covenanters, and they flocked to the conventicles, carrying arms for safety in attack. The Government, on the other hand, showed no leniency. In 1670 an Act was passed which required any one on oath to give information regarding conventicles and the men who attended them; and another Act made death and confiscation of goods the penalty for preaching at conventicles. Not content with these severities, the Parliament decreed that punishment, even to exile, should be inflicted on those who had their children baptized by the non-conforming ministers, and also on those who for three successive Sundays absented themselves from the parish church. The conventicles, in spite of the Government, did not cease, and the Bass Rock was turned into a prison. In 1672 the Parliament declared the ordination of ministers by the Covenanters a crime, and decreed that parents should be punished who left their children unbaptized by the curates for more than thirty days. For some reason a second Indulgence was published. It was offered to eighty of the clergy, and some of them accepted it, but the Covenanters were not quieted. The Government in their straits decreed that magistrates for the burghs and landowners in respect of their estates were to be made responsible for conventicles, and householders were to answer for their families and servants. Another step was taken in 1675, when letters of intercommuning were issued against 100 persons, including men and women of social position, who were not to be harboured or fed or clothed by any one. Though landowners in 1674 had been made responsible for their tenants and servants, they were required in 1677 to take a bond for all persons on their lands. Many of these men in the disturbed counties, though friendly to the Government, would not sign such a bond; and in February 1678 a host of 6000 Highlanders with 3000 Lowlanders was sent to Ayrshire and let loose for plunder. The Duke of Hamilton and also the Earls of Atholl and Perth appeared with expostulations before the king, and, though Charles approved Lauderdale's actions, the Highlanders were withdrawn. The disorder increased, however, in spite of indulgences and coercive Acts; and the year 1679 witnessed among other tragedies the murder of Archbishop Sharp. From the day of his acceptance of the archbishopric there were few who even respected him, and the Covenanters hated him as their fiercest oppressor. Travelling to St. Andrews he was murdered at Magus Muir, three miles from the city, by a band of men who had been outlawed for attending conventicles. These men were not taken, though a proclamation was issued for their arrest; and another tragic event was to increase the troubles. On 27th May

—the anniversary of the Restoration—a company of eighty men gathered in Rutherglen, and, after extinguishing the bonfires, affixed to the market-cross a paper denouncing the Acts of Parliament against Presbyterianism. The same company, increased in numbers, held a conventicle on the Sunday which followed; and Graham of Claverhouse with a troop of soldiers was sent to disperse it and to seize the men who had appeared at Rutherglen. At Drumclog, two miles from Loudon Hill, where the conventicle had assembled, an engagement took place, and Claverhouse was defeated. The victors determined to form a camp, and many flocked to it. The Government, on the other hand, made ready an army, and the king sent the Duke of Monmouth to command it. The battle of Bothwell Bridge was fought on 22nd June with disastrous results to the Covenanters. They had enthusiasm; but, divided over the Indulgences, they quarrelled when they should have been drilling themselves for action, and there was no capable and trusted leader. While the number of the dead was not great, more than 1000 prisoners were taken and conveyed to Edinburgh. For months many of the wretched men were confined in the Greyfriars churchyard. Two of the ministers were hanged, and five men, who had not been involved in the death of the Archbishop, were sent for execution to Magus Muir, that the murder might be avenged. Many were allowed to leave their prison, after taking a bond not again to bear arms; and others, to the number of 250, were packed into a ship sailing to Barbados, that they might be sold into slavery. The ship, however, was wrecked on one of the Orkney Islands, and 200 of the unfortunate men, who were kept under the hatches, were drowned.

Thanks to Monmouth, an Act of Indemnity was passed for those who had been at Bothwell Bridge, and a third Indulgence for ministers was published. Conditions, however, were attached, and there were few who did not reject them. Clemency was accordingly thrown aside, and diligent search was made for those who had been at Bothwell. The thumbkins and lighted matches to the fingers were used by the savage soldiers of the Government to force unwilling informers to reveal their secrets. Oppression again had its natural consequences, and wild men were made wilder. The Presbyterians who still remained staunch to the Covenants separated from communion with those who had accepted the Indulgences, and deliberately threw off allegiance to the king. Two ministers, Richard Cameron and Donald Cargill, were the leaders, and they and their followers called themselves 'Society People,' and were known as Cameronians, Wanderers, Hillmen, or Whigs. On 22nd June 1680, Cameron and Cargill with some of their men, twenty-one in all, entered Sanquhar and affixed to the market-cross a declaration that they disowned Charles Stuart as king for 'his perjury and breach of covenant to God and His Kirk.' These men did at Sanquhar, in the time of Charles Stuart, what England and Scotland afterwards did when James Stuart was king. Cameron and Cargill were marked by the Government, and at Aird's Moss, on 20th July, Cameron was killed, when he and Hackston of Rathillet, with some of the Hillmen, were attacked by a company of dragoons. Hackston was executed at Edinburgh with a display of abominable cruelty, and Cargill, who was not at Aird's Moss, became the leader of the Covenanters. He appeared in October at Torwood, and in a great assemblage excommunicated the king, the Duke of York, the Duke of Lauderdale, and others; and, though the sentence was futile and the action altogether fanatical, the devotion to a cause consecrated in the tradition of the country made Cargill a hero in the eyes of the persecuted Whigs. He, too, was to die for the Covenant, and in 1681 was executed in Edinburgh.

In 1681 the Duke of York appeared in Scotland, and, in place of Lauderdale, acted as Royal Commissioner. After the Act for securing the Protestant religion, the Parliament, at his direction and to suit his purposes as a Catholic, passed an Act which declared that the kings of the realm derived their power from God, succeeding to it by lineal descent, and that the succession could not be changed. This declaration, in favour of the Divine right of the king, was followed by the Test Act, which required every holder of office to swear that he owned the Protestant religion as set forth in the Confession of 1567, acknowledged the supremacy of the king in all causes, would not consult about any State matter without royal licence or command, and would never endeavour to alter anything in the Government of the country. Never before had the Scottish Parliament displayed such abject subservience. Eighty of the ministers refused to take the test, and left their parishes; and in January 1682, fifty of the Covenanters published at Lanark a fresh declaration, and burned the Succession and Test Acts. The 'Society People' were counted rebels, as they were, and were treated with savage cruelty; Dalziel and Claverhouse, merciless leaders of the rudest soldiers, earned infamous reputations; and, when the troubles were at an end, men continued to talk of the 'Bloody Clavers,' while they spoke, too, of the 'Bloody Mackenzie,' the Lord Advocate, who was pitiless in his prosecutions. Their victims were fined or sent to slavery, and some were shot and some were hanged. In November 1684 the 'Society People' published their 'Apologetical Declaration,' drawn up by James Renwick, a young minister, which contained a warning to their persecutors that they counted them, and would punish them, as the enemies of God and His covenanted work; and they did not shrink from killing their foes. An oath of abjuration of the Apologetical Declaration was at once prepared by the Government, and he who did not take it might be shot without pretence of trial. John Brown of Priesthill, in whose house were found bullets and treasonable papers, refused to take the oath. 'Whereupon,' wrote Claverhouse, 'I caused shoot him dead, which he suffered very unconcernedly.' A few days later, though Claverhouse was not the perpetrator of the deed, an old woman and a girl were drowned at Wigton, as they would not abjure the Apologetical Declaration.

James II. ascended the throne in 1685, and the Estates expressed their gratitude for the blessings which they owed 'to the sacred race of their most glorious kings, and to the solid, absolute authority wherewith they were invested by the first and fundamental laws of the monarchy.' Acts were passed against the Covenanters, and in one it was declared that any person who preached at or attended a conventicle was to be punished with death and confiscation of goods. The accession of James marked no change of policy in the treatment of the Covenanters, and the first year was known as 'the black year, the killing time.' Argyle, in the plot with Monmouth for the removal of James from the throne, landed in Scotland in 1685; but he received no help from the Covenanters, whose cause, at an earlier time, he had forsaken. The plot ended in failure, and Argyle was taken and carried to Edinburgh, where he was beheaded. Before he arrived in the city, the Government resolved to make sure that their prisoners, who might be in sympathy with him, were securely warded. About 200 of the Covenanters were accordingly removed to Dunnottar Castle. Men

and women were thrown together into a vault, with but one window for air, and the space hardly gave them room to sit down. Days passed before any of them were removed, and then forty men were sent to another vault, where a break in the wall gave the only current of air. After two months those who were alive were taken to Leith; and, while a few promised allegiance, the majority were sent as slaves to the Plantations.

James was a Roman Catholic, and, whatever his schemes were for the return to Rome of the nations over which he was king, he determined to repeal the penal laws against the Roman Catholics. The Scottish Parliament, which again and again had admitted the royal absolutism, would not consent to more than a serious consideration of his communication regarding the repeal, and was dissolved. Thereafter the Privy Council received an intimation from him that his prerogative enabled him to dispense with all laws, and he charged the Council to rescind the penal laws. Even the most subservient Government could not ignore the fact that Scotland dreaded a return of Popery. James accordingly extended to the Presbyterians the toleration he desired for the Catholics, and they were allowed to meet in private houses or chapels, if no disloyal doctrines were preached. The 'Society People,' however, were excluded from the new Indulgences, as they had thrown off allegiance to the king, and they continued in their opposition and frequented their conventicles. Their leader was James Renwick, and in February 1688, having refused to acknowledge the Government, he was put to death, the last martyr for the Covenants. The year which witnessed the execution of the Covenanter in Edinburgh witnessed also the arrival in London of William of Orange and the flight of James.

In the period between the imposition of the Liturgy and the death of Charles I., and, again, in the period between the Restoration and the Revolution, the Covenanters were the guardians of freedom. After the Restoration the nobles and barons, as if there had been no Covenants, admitted with extraordinary servility the despotism of the kings; and even the Covenanters themselves were not united, since those who profited by the Indulgences submitted to the king, who was an ecclesiastical autocrat. The 'Society People' alone were faithful to the Covenants.

Recognizing Presbyterianism as Divinely instituted, and declaring, therefore, the rights of their Church to be those of the Redeemer, they fought for Christ and the Covenant; and at last threw off allegiance to the king as the enemy of their Lord. In Scotland throughout the 17th cent. the royal absolutism was displayed almost entirely in affairs of the Church, and there was no clear issue, without appeals to religion, between despotism and liberty. Yet in the sphere of the Church, where tyranny pressed, and where a contest alone was possible, the Covenanters asserted the rights of the people.

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COVENANT THEOLOGY.—1. Preliminary definition.—By this term is designated a type of theological thought which expresses the relations between God and man in the formula of a covenant or legal agreement, formally entered into by two contracting parties. It was specially common among the English Puritans, from whom it passed to their descendants in America. On the Continent it is first found among the German Reformed theologians in the second half of the 16th century. Its best known Continental representative is Cocceius (John Koch, 1603–69), who is often wrongly said to be its author.[1] Through him and his successors (Burmann, Witsius, and others) it received its most elaborate literary expression, and ever since has constituted one of the recognized types of Calvinistic or Reformed theology. It is the purpose of this article to explain the nature of this type, and to give some account of its origin and history.

2. Nature of the covenant theology.—(1) *The covenant idea and the covenant theology distinguished.*—At the outset it is necessary to distinguish between the covenant idea and the covenant theology. The covenant idea is common Christian property. It is an inheritance of Christianity from the OT, which frequently describes the relation between Jahweh and His people in terms of a covenant, entered into either with individual Israelites (*e.g.*, Noah, Abraham, Phinehas, David), or with the nation as a whole. The covenant theology describes a special type of Christian thought which gives this idea a central importance not elsewhere assigned to it, and uses it as the organizing principle of the entire theological system. According to this scheme, God at the Creation entered into an agreement with Adam as the federal head of the race, promising to him and to his descendants eternal life on condition of his obedience to the Divine command that he should not eat of the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and threatening him with eternal death for himself and his descendants in case of his disobedience. Adam having failed to stand the test, God entered into a second agreement with Christ as the second Adam, on behalf of the elect, promising them forgiveness and eternal life in consideration of Christ's perfect obedience and satisfaction imputed to them by faith, as well as all the gifts and graces which are necessary to the realization of this supreme blessing in experience. The covenant theology in its developed form is a scheme of doctrine in which the entire system of divinity is expressed in the terms of these two covenants, and man's assurance of salvation based upon the fact that he is included within the latter. In order to understand its origin and significance, it is necessary to consider the problem which it was designed to solve.

(2) *The covenant as a ground of assurance.*—This problem was, in a word, the reconciliation of the sovereignty of God with man's assurance of salvation. The federal theologians, as they are called, were Calvinists. Their major premiss was the absolute sovereignty of God. Man, in their view, had no independent right as against his Maker. Unquestioning submission to the Divine command was his duty. Perfect obedience, were such possible, carried with it no merit, and could guarantee no reward. If, then, man was to be admitted to the Divine fellowship or assured of the Divine favour, it could be only by some voluntary condescension on God's part, establishing by arbitrary enactment

[1] So by Strong (*Systematic Theology*⁷, Philad. 1907, p. 612 f.).

relations which had no necessary foundation in nature. The importance of the covenant for these theologians consisted in its assurance that such condescension had, as a matter of fact, taken place. By the covenant God not only bound Himself to a certain definite line of conduct, so far as man was concerned, and in so far restricted the freedom of His own choice,[1] but He made known in detail to His creature the nature and conditions of His gracious purpose, and so removed the uncertainty to which he would otherwise have been exposed.

'God,' says Thomas Shephard, in his preface to Bulkeley's *Gospel Covenant*,[2] 'might have done good to man before his fall, as also since his fall, without binding himselfe in the bond of Covenant . . . but the Lord's heart is so full of love (especially to his owne) that it cannot be contained so long within the bounds of secrecie, . . . but it must beforehand overflow and breake out into the many streames of a blessed Covenant.'

Arminian theologians also made use of the covenant idea.[3] But for them it had less importance, because their view of the relation between man and his Maker was founded on natural right. Thus, Arminius, while recognizing that God dealt with our first parents by way of covenant, distinguished between the law of nature, which God wrote on the heart of man, and the symbolical law, or law of precept, which deals with matters in themselves indifferent apart from the Divine command. While it is man's duty to obey in either case, the latter obedience is 'far inferior,' and 'is not so much obedience itself as the external profession of willingly yielding obedience' (*Works*, Eng. tr. ii. 370). To the Calvinistic theologians, on the other hand, the highest virtue consisted in submission to the will of God simply because it was God's will, and the covenants gained their great importance because they defined the specific form which, from age to age, that will assumed for man.

This precision of statement explains the prominence of the covenant idea in Puritanism. Puritanism, as is well known, is a type of thought which makes much of uniformity. The Puritan believed that God had not only revealed a way of salvation, but had established certain institutions and laid down certain laws, by means of which this salvation was to be mediated to those whom God had chosen to enjoy its blessings. He was a churchman as well as an individualist, and valued the covenant not only as the ground of personal assurance to the individual Christian, but as the charter which established the existence and defined the laws of the Christian society.

From this fact two further consequences follow which are necessary to the complete definition of the covenant theology: (*a*) the covenant furnished the framework for the treatment of Christian ethics; and (*b*) it gave the key to the Christian interpretation of history.

(3) *The covenant as the standard of Christian duty.*—The use of the covenant as a standard of duty, important as it later became, is derivative, not primary. The earlier theologians knew of but one covenant between God and man, namely, the covenant of grace. In this the Father, in consideration of Christ's promise of obedience even unto death, agreed to accept His satisfaction as an equivalent for the punishment due by guilty man, and to accept the persons of the elect as righteous for His sake. God's dealings with Adam in Paradise were not brought under the covenant idea except in so far as the promise to Eve that her seed should bruise the serpent's head (Gn 3^{15}) was regarded as an anticipation of the later covenant of grace. In the course of time, however, the idea was extended to include all God's dealings with man, before as well as after the Fall. Two covenants were distinguished — the covenant of works made in Paradise with Adam as the federal head of the race, and the covenant of grace made with Christ, the second Adam, or with the elect in Him as their representative. In the former, God reveals the substance of the moral law as the condition which He prescribes for the attainment of salvation. In the latter, He acquaints men with the machinery which He devised for the repair of Adam's fault. But the substitution of the second for the first covenant does not render the moral law obsolete; it only alters man's relation to that law. After as well as before the Fall perfect holiness is essential to salvation, and not the least of the blessings of the covenant of grace is its clear repetition of the substance of the law originally promulgated in Paradise. The covenant of grace differs from the covenant of works in the fact that it adds to the law the promise, *i.e.* the disclosure of the means through which Adam's original fault is to be repaired and the blessings of salvation won by Christ to be mediated to the elect. Accordingly, the covenant of grace includes, with the substance of the moral law, institutions of worship (*i.e.* sacraments and ceremonies) which, varying from age to age, typify Christ, and seal to believers the grace which He has merited for them.[1]

The literature of the covenant, therefore, is full of discussion as to the nature of the Church and of the sacraments. Since the sacraments are signs and seals of the covenant of grace, it is essential that they should be rightly administered, and that those only should be admitted to partake of them who are really entitled to the privilege. Here we find differences of opinion among those who were agreed as to the general significance of the covenant and were at one in their opposition to Arminianism. Some held that the regenerate only had any right to the privilege of the sacraments;[2] others were willing to take a Christian profession (*i.e.* a dogmatical, as distinct from a justifying, faith) as *prima facie* evidence of right of admission to the sacraments.[3] The controversy as to the half-way covenant, which agitated New England in the latter part of the 17th and in the 18th cent., is an echo of these earlier disputes.

There was also difference of opinion as to the extent to which the conditional language properly applicable to the covenant of works could be rightly employed of the covenant of grace. In the case of the covenant of works we have to do with a real condition. The whole significance of the agreement into which Adam entered with his Maker turned upon his possession of the freedom of contingency. But, in the case of Adam's descendants, such freedom is lacking. The contracting party in the second covenant is Christ, the second Adam; and one of the most important considerations in the compact into which He entered with the Father was that the Holy Spirit should

[1] Cf. John Preston (*The New Covenant, or the Saint's Portion*, London, 1629): 'These words contain a further and a greater favour expressed to Abraham than the former words do . . . that is, I will not only tell thee what I am able to doe, I will not only express to thee in generall that I will deale well with thee, etc. . . . but I am willing to enter into covenant with thee, that is, I will bind myself, I will ingage myself, I will enter into bond, as it were, I will not be at liberty any more, but I am willing to make a covenant, a compact and agreement with thee,' etc. (p. 70).

[2] *The Gospel Covenant, or the Covenant of Grace opened*, etc. . . . *preached in Concord in New England*, by Peter Bulkeley, London, 1646.

[3] Cf. Arminius, *Works*, Eng. tr. by Nichols, London, 1825 ff., ii. 369 ff., 389 ff.; Limborch, *Compleat System*, Eng. tr. by Jones, London, 1702, bk. iii. ch. i. § 7, p. 211 ff.

[1] The later Covenant theologians, interested in showing the uniformity of God's method with man, carry back the idea of the sacrament to Paradise, and associate it with the law as well as with the Gospel (cf. Thomas Blake, *The Covenant Sealed, or a Treatise of the Sacraments of both Covenants* . . . London, 1655, p. 9 ff.).

[2] *e.g.* Richard Baxter, *Plain Scripture Proof of Infants' Church-Membership and Baptism*[4] (London, 1656), p. 327, quoted by Blake, *op. cit.* p. 114.

[3] Thomas Blake, *op. cit.* p. 114.

be granted to the elect to make possible a faith of which they are incapable by nature. It would seem, then, an abuse of language to speak of any condition to be fulfilled on the part of the elect as distinct from Christ, and this was the position taken by some of the more rigorous Puritans. Christ, they held, was the sole party to the covenant of grace.[1] Others,[2] however, distinguished two covenants: the covenant of redemption entered into between the Father and the Son, and the covenant of grace made with the elect through Him. The covenant of grace, no less than that of works, they regarded as conditional, the difference being that in the former case the sole condition was faith in Christ, which faith was itself made possible through the gift of the Spirit.

But, whatever difference of opinion there may have been as to the conditionality of the covenant of grace, all agreed that no one could be saved whose life did not conform to the standard which it revealed. Of all heresies Antinomianism (*q.v.*) was most abhorrent to the Puritan, and many controversial tracts reveal the eagerness of the advocates of the covenant theology to clear their skirts from any imputation of sympathy with so abominable and dangerous an opinion. The assurance in which the Puritans rejoiced was indeed an assurance of salvation, but it was a salvation which included ultimate conformity to the Divine law.[3]

(4) *The covenant as a key to the Christian interpretation of history.*—Thus far we have considered the covenant theology primarily on its practical side, but it had an important theoretical significance as well, since it furnished the formula for the Christian interpretation of history. The Biblical writers speak of a number of different covenants entered into by God with different individuals at different times, and it was natural that the problem of the relation of these covenants one to another should engage the attention of Christian theologians. Protestants were agreed that God followed a uniform method in His treatment of men, and hence could not admit any essential difference in principle between the covenants; but they could not shut their eyes to the contrast between the covenant with Moses at Sinai and the new covenant foretold by Jeremiah and the prophets, which the Apostle Paul identifies with the Christian gospel; nor could they overlook the contrast drawn by Paul himself between the promise to Abraham and the law given by Moses. Thus, the relation between these different covenants constituted a problem, the solution of which furnished the nearest approach to a philosophy of history which the theology of the time possessed.

In general, it may be said that it was the disposition of the earlier Protestant theologians to minimize the difference between the Christian gospel and its preparation in the religion of Israel. All the Reformers recognize the contrast between the OT and the NT, and devote a section of their theology to a discussion of their differences. But they are agreed that these differences are superficial, and that, in substance, the two Testaments are the same. What the old dispensation shadows forth in types, the new fulfils in reality, but both alike, the OT and the NT, the law of Moses and the gospel of Christ, are to be regarded as different forms of the one covenant of grace (cf. the Westminster formula, 'one covenant under different administrations,' *Westm. Con.* vii. 5, 6).

[1] So John Saltmarsh, *Free Grace, or the Flowings of Christ's Blood freely to Sinners*[2], London, 1646, p. 125; Tobias Crisp (1600–1642), *Christ Alone Exalted*, 1643–6.

[2] *e.g.* Daniel Williams, *Gospel Truth Stated and Vindicated*, etc., London, 1692, a reply to Crisp.

[3] This consciousness of strict moral responsibility found expression in the National Covenants, to which reference will presently be made, as well as in the large space given to the exposition of the moral law in the Catechisms of Puritanism.

With the recognition of the twofold covenant a further distinction is introduced. We have now the contrast between the covenant of works entered into between God and Adam, the substance of whose requirement is repeated in the law given on Sinai, and the covenant of grace under its twofold administration, the OT and the NT. Another distinction meets us in William Ames (Amesius),[1] and was further developed by Cocceius and his successors in the early part of the 17th century. These theologians, while making use of the general formula already described, distinguished within the administration of the old dispensation various historic stages marked by characteristics of their own.[2] Thus, there are the periods (1) from Adam to Noah, (2) from Noah to Abraham, (3) from Abraham to Moses, (4) from Moses to David, (5) from David to Christ, each of which has its own institutions and sacraments. In like manner, the NT has its own divisions, *e.g.* (1) from the Advent to the Resurrection, (2) from the Resurrection to the Second Coming, and (3) the Final Consummation in the world to come. Such a treatment made it possible for those theologians to do more justice to the facts of Biblical history than was possible under the more rigorous scheme of their predecessors. Robertson Smith, speaking of the federal theology of Cocceius, says with justice that, 'with all its defects,' it 'is the most important attempt, in the older Protestant theology, to do justice to the historical development of revelation' (*Prophets of Israel*, Edin. 1882, p. 375).

Thus the covenant theology has a threefold significance. In the first place, it is a theory of salvation; in the second place, it is a programme for conduct; in the third place, it is a philosophy of history. The section that follows will attempt to show how the different interests cross and re-cross in the course of the history.

3. **History of the covenant theology.**—(1) *The antecedents.*—The Biblical basis for the covenant theology is found partly in the account given in the OT of various covenants made by Jahweh with Israel[3] or with representative Israelites,[4] partly in the Pauline identification of the Christian gospel with the new or spiritual covenant prophesied by Jeremiah and other prophets.

The Heb. word בְּרִית, tr. 'coveoant' in our versions, denotes either a treaty or alliance entered into between equals (*e.g.* between Abraham and the Amorites, Gn 14^{13}, AV and RV 'confederate'; Hiram and Solomon, 1 K 5^{12}, AV and RV 'league'), or a constitution or ordinance establishing the relation between a monarch and his subjects (*e.g.* David and the Israelites, 2 S 5^{3}; Zedekiah and his people, Jer 34^{8-18}). This difference of meaning is not without its bearing on the later history.

If we analyze the transactions described in the OT by the term 'covenant' (בְּרִית), we find that they fall into two classes—those in which Jahweh reveals to His servants a purpose which He has conceived independently of man, and whose execution is dependent upon no one but Himself, and those in which the conduct of the people with whom the covenant is made is a determining factor. Of the former class are the covenants with Noah and Abraham; to the latter belong the covenant at Sinai and the later covenants with Jehoiada (2 K 11^{17}), Hezekiah (2 Ch 29^{10}), and Josiah (2 K 23^{3}). The promise to Noah that day and night shall no more fail (Gn 8^{22}), or to

[1] (1576–1633) *Medulla S.S. Theologiæ*, Eng. tr. *The Marrow of Sacred Divinity*, 1642, chs. xxxviii., xxxix.

[2] Gass (*Gesch. der prot. Dogmatik*, Berlin, 1857, ii. 265), following Schweizer (*Reform. Glaubenslehre*, i. 103 ff.) and Schneckenburger (*Vergleichende Darstellung*, etc., ii. 146), regards this disposition to apply the covenant form to the different stages in the history of religion as characteristic of the Reformed theology from the first, and finds its beginnings in Bullinger and Leo Jud.

[3] *e.g.* at Sinai (Ex 19^{5} $24^{7f.}$ [E] $34^{10.27.28}$ [J] 31^{16}, Lv 2^{13} [P] 24^{8} $26^{9ff.}$, Dt 4^{13}); in the plain of Moab (Dt $29^{1.21}$).

[4] *e.g.* Noah (Gn 9^{9-17} [P], Is 54^{10}, Jer $33^{20.25}$); Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob (Gn 15^{18} [J] 17^{2-21}, Ex 2^{24} $6^{4f.}$, Lv 26^{42} [P], 2 K 13^{23}, 1 Ch $16^{15ff.}$, Ps $105^{8.10}$, Neh 9^{8}, Jer 34^{18}); Phinehas, (Nu $25^{12f.}$ [P]); Joshua and Israel (Jos 24^{25} [E]); David (Ps $89^{3.28.34.39}$ 132^{12}, Jer 33^{21}, cf. 2 S 7, 1 Ch 17); Jehoiada and the people (2 K 11^{17}, 2 Ch 23^{16}); Hezekiah (2 Ch 29^{10}); Josiah (2 K 23^{3}); and Ezra (Ezr 10^{3}).

Abraham that in his seed all nations shall be blessed (Gn 12^{3} etc.), is obviously not in the same class with the promises which accompanied the giving of the Law to Israel, which were, in the nature of the case, conditional upon the future conduct of the Israelites. Yet both alike are described by the same word.

Besides these covenants there is also frequent reference in the prophets to a new covenant which Jahweh is to establish with redeemed Israel in the future (Jer 31^{31-33}, cf. Is 42^{6} 49^{8} 55^{3} 59^{21} 61^{8}, Jer 32^{40} 50^{5}, Ezk $16^{60.\,63}$ 20^{37} 34^{25} 37^{26}, Hos 2^{18-20}). Unlike the old covenant, this is to be inward and spiritual, a law written on the hearts of the people (Jer 31^{33}), and will be of everlasting validity.

This new covenant the NT identifies with the Christian gospel, which is contrasted with the Mosaic law as the former or old covenant (Gal 4^{24}, He $9^{15.\,18}$, cf. 8^{9}, 2 Co 3^{6}). Like the latter, it was sealed with sacrifice—even the blood of Christ, who by His voluntary obedience and submission unto death has rendered the older sacrificial system superfluous and become the mediator of a new and better covenant (He 7^{22} 8^{6-9} 12^{24}), since it is an everlasting one (13^{20}). This new covenant is symbolized in the cup which Jesus gave to His disciples at the Last Supper (Mt 26^{28}, Mk 14^{24}, Lk 22^{20}, 1 Co 11^{25}). It has its anticipation in the covenant of promise made by Jahweh with Abraham (Gal 3^{17}, cf. Eph 2^{12}, Ac 3^{25}), which, being prior to the Law, could not be superseded by it.

We find thus in the NT the same double usage which we found in the OT, the word *διαθήκη* being used now to denote a free promise of God, as to Abraham and his seed, and later to Christian believers in the gospel, now of a series of precepts and orders given through Moses and his successors, and conditional in their effects upon the obedience of the people.

In He 9^{16} the idea of the covenant is interchanged with that of the testament, or will—a substitution which explains the uniform rendering of *διαθήκη* in the Vulgate by the Lat. *testamentum*, and its frequent translation in AV by the word 'testament' (*e.g.* Mt 26^{28}, Mk 14^{24}, Lk 22^{20}, 1 Co 11^{25}, 2 Co $3^{6.\,14}$, He 7^{22} $9^{15ff.}$).

In view of the emphasis laid by the Biblical writers upon the covenant idea, and their use of the conception to describe the different steps in the Divine training of mankind, it is surprising that it should so early and so completely have fallen into the background. Irenæus is the only early Christian writer who makes much use of it. He distinguishes several different covenants (*διαθήκη*, *testamentum*) into which God has entered with man, and regards the study of their nature and relations as a legitimate subject for Christian investigation.[1] His interest in the subject is, doubtless, due to the fact that, like St. Paul, he was chiefly concerned with the question of the nature of the difference between Judaism and Christianity—a difference which naturally expressed itself in the contrast between the old covenant and the new. When this question fell into the background, as it soon did, the covenant phraseology went out of use. Augustine makes no use of the idea in his *City of God*, and it plays no important part in the theology of Roman Catholicism. It was only when the rise of a new religious type, historically derived from Catholicism, but independent of it, brought the question of the distinctive nature of Christianity again into the foreground, that the subjects which engaged Irenæus' thought became again of general interest. This condition emerged at the Reformation, and one of its consequences was the revival of the covenant idea.

But, though Catholicism contributed little directly to the preparation for this type of theology, its indirect contribution was great. The conception of God as lawgiver and judge, the expression of Christ's work in terms of satisfaction and equivalence, the conception of the Christian Church as the inheritor of the rights and privileges of the Jewish Church, and the loss of St. Paul's sense of the novelty of Christianity as a historic religion, all helped to prepare the way for the use by Protestant theologians of OT legalistic phraseology to describe a type of religious experience whose characteristic feature was the denial of the possibility of salvation by works.

(2) *The beginnings of the covenant theology.*—In tracing the history of the covenant theology in Protestantism, we have to recall the distinction already made between the covenant idea and the covenant theology. The idea of the covenant or testament is used by all the Reformers to express God's gracious revelation to His people, both before and after Christ. Two such revelations were distinguished, the OT and the NT, agreeing in substance, but differing in administration, and the nature at once of the agreement and of the difference forms the subject of a special *locus* in the early Protestant dogmatics (*e.g.* on the Law and the Gospel; on the difference between the OT and the NT).[1] But the conception was not given the structural importance in the system which it later acquired, and which warrants us in speaking of a covenant theology as distinct from the covenant idea.

We may take Calvin as typical of all the Reformers. He distinguishes the Gospel not merely from the Law, but from earlier gracious revelations of God within the OT, yet he hastens to add that we must not imagine that the Gospel has

'succeeded the whole Law in such a sense as to introduce a different method of salvation. It rather confirms the Law, and proves that everything which it promised is fulfilled. What was shadow, it has made substance. When Christ says that the Law and the Prophets were until John, he does not consign the fathers to the curse, which, as the slaves of the Law, they could not escape. He intimates that they were only imbued with the rudiments, and remained far beneath the height of the Gospel doctrine. . . . Hence we infer that, when the whole Law is spoken of, the Gospel differs from it only in respect of clearness of manifestation' (*Institutes*, II. ix. 4).[2]

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[1] While in one passage (III. xi. 8) Irenæus distinguishes four distinct covenants (namely, those with Noah [so the Greek text; the Latin reads 'Adam,' and substitutes Noah for Abraham, omitting the latter], Abraham, Moses, and Christ), in general he recognizes only two, namely, the old covenant, or law, given through Moses, and the new, or gospel, given through Christ (III. xii. 11; IV. ix. 1, xxxii. 2). According to this division, God's dealing with man in the pre-Mosaic period is not to be conceived under the covenant relation, the reason being that law is not needed by those who are just (IV. xvi. 2). The Law, by which Irenæus means the Jewish ceremonial law, was added later because of sin, and was destined in time to be replaced by the Christian gospel, or new law of liberty (*lex vivificatrix*, IV. xxxiv. 4), as the means through which alone full righteousness and salvation are made possible.

We have thus in Irenæus three distinct stages in the process of the Divine training of man—the pre-Mosaic period, typified by Abraham, in which man works out his own salvation through obedience to the natural law written on the heart; the period from Moses to Christ, in which his salvation is conditioned upon fidelity to the Jewish ceremonial law; and the period of the gospel, in which the ceremonial law is abrogated, and salvation depends upon man's free fulfilment of the moral law, which Christ has reaffirmed and reinforced with new sanctions. While, in general, the covenant idea is applied to the two later of these periods only, in principle the three belong together, and, in one passage, the covenant idea is extended backwards to include the pre-Mosaic period. In this, as we shall see, Irenæus is typical of the development of the later covenant theology.

On the theology of Irenæus, cf. Werner, 'Der Paulinismus des Irenäus,' in *TU*, Leipzig, 1889, pp. 179–202. On the significance of Irenæus in early Christian theology, cf. W. A. Brown, *Essence of Christianity*, Edinburgh, 1903, p. 64 ff.

[1] Thus Calvin finds the agreement (1) in the common hope of immortality; (2) in the fact that both were established by the mercy of God; (3) in that 'they both had and knew Christ, the Mediator, by whom they were united to God and made capable of receiving his promises.' The difference consisted (1) in that in the old covenant the heavenly inheritance was exhibited under the form of temporal blessings, which was not the case in the new; (2) in that the OT typified Christ under ceremonies which exhibited 'only the image of truth, the shadow, not the substance,' whereas the NT gives us 'both the full truth and the entire body'; (3) in that the OT is literal, and the NT spiritual; (4) in that the OT is one of bondage, the NT one of liberty; and, finally, (5) in that the OT is for one people only, while the NT is for all. Cf. Brown, *Essence of Christianity*, p. 103 f.

[2] It is instructive to compare Calvin's view with that of Irenæus. He follows Irenæus in conceiving of two covenants or testaments, the Old and the New. He agrees with him further in that he does not apply the term 'covenant' to God's primitive revelation to Adam in Paradise. He differs from Irenæus in that he brings both covenants under the conception of grace rather than of law. Irenæus, like the early theologians in general, conceived salvation primarily in terms of the fulfilment of law. To Calvin, as to all the Reformers, salvation is a means of repairing the damage wrought by man's transgression of law. Like Irenæus, Calvin regards both covenants as expressions of a single principle. But, whereas Irenæus carries forward the idea of merit from the Law and applies it to the Gospel, Calvin carries back the idea of free grace into the Law, and interprets the latter by the

In thus emphasizing the essential unity of God's dealings with His people, Calvin is representative of all the Reformers. Luther[1] and Melanchthon[2] recognize no difference in principle between God's dealings with His people under the old dispensation and under the new. The first specific treatise on the covenant which the present writer has been able to discover is that of the Swiss reformer, Henry Bullinger, which bears date 1534, and has for its title *De Testamento sive fœdere Dei unico et æterno*. Bullinger, like his predecessors, recognizes only one covenant, namely, the covenant of grace.[3]

The beginnings of the covenant theology in a technical sense are to be found on German soil, and precede the more famous school of Cocceius by more than half a century. Its representatives were Reformed theologians who, under the influence of a warm and vital piety, had developed a theology which differed in several respects from the stricter predestinarianism of Switzerland and France. This theology had three main characteristics. In the first place, it used the conception of the Divine covenant, with its synonyms, the Church or the Kingdom, as a comprehensive theological idea to express the purpose at once of creation and of redemption, and to give unity to the rest of the system. In the second place, it associated this conception with the idea of the believer's mystic union with Christ; and, in the third place, it deduced from the combination of these two conceptions, rather than from the doctrine of predestination, its doctrine of the perseverance of the saints.[4] The two best known representatives of this theology were Caspar Olevianus and Zacharias Ursinus, the authors of the Heidelberg Catechism.[5]

Olevianus' most important dogmatic monograph, published anonymously in 1585, is entitled *De substantia fœderis gratuiti inter Deum et electos, itemque de mediis*, etc. This work, as the title indicates, discusses the nature of the free covenant between God and the elect, and the means through which its substance is communicated to us. The substance of the covenant consists in God's promise and oath that He will never be angry with His elect, but will receive them as sons of God and heirs of eternal life in Jesus Christ. This promise consists in the offering through the gospel of the Son of God, with the double benefit which He brings, namely, the remission of sins and renewal after the Divine image through the life-giving Spirit. These gifts are made known to us outwardly, by the word and by visible signs, as a testimony of agreement between God and ourselves, and are confirmed with inner efficacy by the free gift of faith through the infinite mercy of God to the elect. The work is introduced by a discussion of the following questions: (1) Who is God, the author of the covenant? (2) Who is man, with whom God establishes His covenant? (3) What is the nature of the covenant itself?

Even more striking in its historic significance is an earlier treatise of Olevianus, the *Expositio Symboli*,[1] in which the Apostles' Creed is interpreted under the form of an exposition of the covenant of grace, the articles of the Creed being regarded as a brief statement of the terms of the covenant. It is to be noted that the first book of the *De substantia fœderis* also takes the form of an exposition of the Apostles' Creed, the second book being given to the proofs of the covenant. Under this head Olevianus discusses the function of the Church, and more specifically the word and the sacraments. Here we see the covenant idea given structural significance and made a comprehensive conception under which the whole content of Christian faith and practice may be brought.[2]

Olevianus recognized in principle but a single covenant, namely, the covenant of grace. It was reserved for his successors (*e.g.* Raphael Eglin, and Matthias Martinius) to extend the covenant idea to the relation of man before the Fall and to distinguish two covenants—that of works and that of grace.[3] With this distinction the scheme of the covenant theology in its later form is complete.

(3) *The covenant theology in Puritanism.*—Parallel with the movement already described, we find another developing on the other side of the channel. In English Puritanism, as we have already seen, the covenant idea found congenial soil, and the later treatises of Cocceius and his school owe quite as much to the impulse gained from English writers[4] as to the German theologians already referred to.

former. We may say, indeed, that the characteristic feature of the Reformed theology is the attempt to use legal phraseology to express a gospel which is essentially anti-legal; and the reason why the covenant idea finds such favour with its representatives is the fact that the covenant expresses an obligation voluntarily assumed on either side, and hence not properly to be brought under the sphere of necessity.

[1] Cf. the references in Köstlin, *Luthers Theologie in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung und ihrem inneren Zusammenhange* [2], Stuttgart, 1883, 2 vols., esp. ii. 376 ff., Eng. tr. ii. 359 ff.

[2] Cf. his *Loci Communes*, ed. Kolde, 2nd ed., Leipzig, 1890, esp. p. 211 ff.

[3] The design of Bullinger's treatise is to show that the gospel is older than Judaism, Muhammadanism, and Catholicism; indeed, that it goes back to 'Noah, Enoch, Seth, Abel, Adam, who without circumcision pleased God through faith.' He holds that there is no Christian virtue commended in the NT which was not equally exemplified in the words and deeds of Abraham. Cf. the citations given by Rockwell, *Die Doppelehe des Landgrafen Philipp von Hessen*, Marburg, 1904, p. 223, note 2.

[4] So Heppe, *Dogmatik des deutschen Protestantismus im 16ten Jahrhundert*, Gotha, 1857, i. 143 ff. Heppe is the best authority on the German Reformed theology, and this work gives much information concerning works otherwise inaccessible to English readers. Cf. esp. pp. 139 ff., 188 ff.

[5] Besides Olevianus and Ursinus, Heppe mentions, as representatives of the covenant theology, Andrew Hyperius, Professor of Theology at Marburg from 1541 to 1564 (*Methodi theologiæ sive præcipuorum Christianæ religionis locorum communium*, Basel, 1566); Peter Boquinus, Professor of Theology at Heidelberg, died 1582 (*Exegesis divinæ atque humanæ κοινωνίας*, Heidelberg, 1561); Joachim Curæus (*Exegesis perspicua et ferme integra controversiæ de sacra cœna*, 1574, ed. Scheffer, Marburg, 1853); Sohnius ('Methodus theologiæ,' *Opp.* ed. 3, i. 234 ff.); Raphael Eglin, Professor of Theology in Marburg (*Diexodus theologica de magno illo insitionis nostræ in Christum mysterio Rom. 6; De fœdere gratiæ ex loco Rom.* 8[31], Marburg, 1613), and esp. the theologians of Bremen, Matthias Martinius (*Christianæ doctrinæ summa capita*, 1603), and Ludwig Crocius (*De perseverantia sanctorum libri septem dogmatici et apologetici*, Bremen, 1616).

[1] *Expositio Symboli Apostolici, sive articulorum fidei, in qua summa gratuiti fœderis æterni inter Deum et fideles breviter et perspicue tractatur*, Frankfort, 1576.

[2] While agreeing in substance with Olevianus, Ursinus does not give the covenant so important a place in the structure of his system. His views are set forth most fully in his Sum of the Christian Religion of 1598 (*Corpus doctrinæ christianæ ecclesiarum a papatu reformatarum, continens explicationes catecheticæ D. Zachariæ Ursini . . . studio Davidis Parei* . . .). This work was the outgrowth of Ursinus' lectures on the Heidelberg Catechism, first published in Geneva in 1584; afterwards in a fuller edition by David Pareus in 1591. Pareus' work was a revision and amplification based upon his own notes, and included much matter for which Ursinus was not responsible. This matter the later edition of 1598 omits, and it may be regarded as the most authoritative statement of Ursinus' views. It was often reprinted, and was translated into English under the title, *The Summe of Christian Religion*, by Dr. Henry Parry, London, 1645.

The discussion of the covenant is introduced by Ursinus between Questions 18 and 19, which deal with the mediatorship of Christ, and the gospel, and includes the following sub-heads: (1) What a covenant is; (2) Whether it can be made without a mediator; (3) Whether there be but one and the same covenant, or more; (4) In what the old and the new covenant agree, and in what they differ.

[3] Cf. Heppe, *op. cit.* p. 197. It is an interesting question when the idea of the covenant of God with Adam first makes its appearance. We find no trace of it in our canonical Scriptures. Schmidt (art. 'Covenant' in *EBi*) finds the first appearance of the idea in Sir 17^{12}, but the reference is not altogether clear, and other commentators refer the passage to Sinai.

[4] Among Cocceius' teachers, besides Martinius and Crocius, was the English Puritan, William Ames.

The covenant idea makes its earliest appearance in English history in practical rather than theoretical form, in the National Covenants entered into by the Scottish people and their rulers. These were solemn engagements, in which the nation as a whole pledged itself to be true to the revealed will of God as set forth in the Scriptures, and interpreted with the stern literalism of the Puritan conscience. Such a national covenant is the so-called *Second Scottish Confession*, a practical appendix to the early Confession of Knox (1560), to which the people publicly subscribed in the year 1581. It was frequently renewed in the course of the later history, and played a momentous part in the struggles of the Stuarts with their rebellious fellow-countrymen. It is not strange that an idea familiarized to the Scottish people in so dramatic a way should have received early literary expression. See art. COVENANTERS.

One of the earliest Scottish monographs on the covenant bears date 1596, and is by Robert Rollock (1555–1598), a distinguished Principal of the University of Edinburgh (*Quæstiones et Responsiones aliquot de fœdere Dei deque sacramento quod fœderis Dei sigillum est*). Here already there is emphasized the close connexion between the covenant and the sacrament which is characteristic of the later history.[1]

English monographs were frequent during the first half of the 17th century. An anonymous treatise, bearing date 1616, is dedicated to the mayor and magistrates of the town of Feversham in Kent.[2] Like Olevianus, its author uses the covenant idea as a framework for the exposition of the Creed. His practical interest is apparent in his emphasis upon the importance of renewing one's covenant made in baptism through 'a continual repeating' of it, which takes place in catechizing the children of the faithful (p. 63). Other treatises by John Preston (*The New Covenant, or the Saints' Portion*, London, 1629), and George Downame (*The Covenant of Grace, or an Exposition upon Lk* $1^{73. 74. 75}$, Dublin, 1631), are likewise practical in nature.

The theological significance of the idea is apparent in the place given to it in systematic treatises. William Ames (1576–1633) in his *Medulla S.S. Theologiæ* (Eng. tr. *Marrow of Sacred Divinity*, 1642)[3] distinguishes two covenants—the law or covenant of works given to Adam in Paradise, having as its symbols the two trees of the Garden (I. x. 33), and the covenant of grace made with the redeemed through Christ. Ames traces the various steps in the administration of the covenant of grace, distinguishing not only the periods before and after Christ (the OT and NT), but also, under the first, the periods from Adam to Abraham, from Abraham to Moses, from Moses to Christ; and, under the second, the period from Christ to the end of the world and the eternal reign of the saints in heaven (I. xxxviii. xxxix.). In this he anticipates the later teaching of his pupil Cocceius.

Even more detailed is the description of the covenant given by Ussher in his *Body of Divinity*.[4] Here the nature of the compact made by God with Adam is described in great detail, and man in the person of our first parent is declared to have promised 'by that power which he had received to keep the whole law, binding himself over to punishment in case he did not obey' (p. 126). On the other hand, the covenant of grace was made by 'God alone,' who, immediately after man's fall in Paradise, declared to Adam His gracious purpose to save the elect through Christ (p. 158).[1]

[1] Mitchell (*Westminster Assembly*, London, 1883, p. 377) cites Howie as another early Scottish representative of the covenant theology, but the present writer has not been able to verify the reference.

[2] *The covenant between God and man playnely declared in laying down the chiefest points of Christian religion*, London, 1616.

[3] Cf. also William Perkins, *A Golden Chain, or the description of theologie* (*Workes*, London, 1635, i. 70 f.); *An exposition of the symbole or Creede of the Apostles* (*ib.* p. 164 ff.); John Downame, *The Summe of Sacred Divinitie*, London, n.d., bk. i. ch. xvi., bk. ii. ch. i.

[4] *A Body of Divinitie, or the Summe and Substance of Christian Religion*, London, 1645.

Through Ussher the covenant idea received its first confessional expression in Puritanism. It appears in the 21st article of the *Irish Articles*, of which he was the author, and from them passed to the *Westminster Confession of Faith*, in which it forms the subject of a special chapter (vii.).[2]

The covenant was frequently discussed in the latter half of the 17th century. It appears not only in the works of the great Puritan theologians, Richard Baxter[3] (1615–1691), and John Owen[4] (1616–1683), but in many monographs by men less known to fame, *e.g.* John Saltmarsh,[5] Thomas Blake,[6] William Allen,[7] Edward Leigh,[8] and Daniel Williams.[9] It filled an important rôle in the controversies that divided the different parties in the Church, and a correct understanding of its nature and scope was regarded as one of the prime requisites of a sound orthodoxy.

Thus, as we have already seen, the stricter and the looser predestinarians were divided as to the conditionality of the covenant of grace. The stricter predestinarians denied that it was conditional at all. Like Ussher, they held that God alone was its author, or, at most, God and Christ. Representatives of this view were Saltmarsh and Crisp. Others, like Owen and Baxter himself, held to a true conditionality. They distinguished between the covenant of redemption, made between the Father and the Son, and the covenant of grace, made by the Father with the elect in Christ;[10] and, while they held that the redeemed were enabled to fulfil their part only through the grace which Christ had merited for them, yet they believed in preaching as though all depended upon

[1] Cf. also *The Marrow of Modern Divinity*, in two parts, 1645, 1649, by E. F., edited with Introduction, Notes, and an Appendix, Biographical and Bibliographical, by C. G. M'Crie, 1902. The sub-title of this 'epoch-marking, if not epoch-making,' work, as M'Crie calls it, reads: 'Touching both the Covenant of Works, and the Covenant of Grace: with their use and end, both in the time of the Old Testament and in the time of the New' (*Confessions of the Church of Scotland*, Edinburgh, 1907, p. 69).

[2] Even more prominent is the use made of the covenant idea in the *Sum of Saving Knowledge*, a brief compendium of doctrine which appeared in Scotland in 1650, and is bound up with the Confession and Catechisms in many of the later Scottish editions. Here the language of bargain and sale appears in its baldest form (*e.g.* Head II.: 'By virtue of the foresaid bargain, made before the world began, He, *i.e.* Christ, is, in all ages, since the fall of Adam, still upon the work of applying actually the purchased benefits unto the elect: and that He doth by way of entertaining a covenant of free grace and reconciliation with them through faith in Himself, by which covenant He makes over to every believer, a right and interest in Himself, and in all His blessings.'

[3] Cf. his *Plain Scripture Proof of Infants' Church-Membership and Baptism*[4], London, 1656 (pp. 100 ff., 112 ff., 223 ff., 326 ff.), as well as his Preface to Allen's *Discourse on the Nature, Ends, and Difference of the Two Covenants*, London, 1673.

[4] Cf. his *Doctrine of Justification by Faith*, chs. viii. xiii.; *Treatise on the Doctrine of Perseverance* (*Works*, ed. Goold, xi. 205), Edin. 1851–55, *Salus Electorum Sanguis Jesu, or the Death of Death in the Death of Christ* (Goold's ed., x. 168 ff.).

[5] *Free Grace, or the Flowings of Christ's Blood freely to Sinners*[2], London, 1646.

[6] *Vindiciæ Fœderis, or a Treatise of the Covenant of God, entered with mankinde*, etc., London, 1653, *The Covenant Sealed, or a Treatise of the Sacraments of both Covenants, polemicall and practicall, especially of the Sacraments of the Covenant of Grace*, London, 1655.

[7] *A Discourse of the Nature, Ends, and Difference of the Two Covenants*, London, 1673.

[8] *A Treatise of the Divine Promises, in five books. . . . In the foure last a declaration of the covenant itself, the bundle and body of all the Promises*, London, 1633.

[9] *Gospel Truth Stated and Vindicated, wherein some of Dr. Crisp's opinions are considered, and the opposite truths are plainly stated and confirmed*, London, 1692.

[10] Cf. Owen, *Doctrine of Justification by Faith*, ch. viii. (*Works*, ed. Goold, v. 191).

the action of the human will. The tract of Williams, already referred to, gives an interesting picture of the questions in controversy, and the extent to which the stricter party were willing to carry their logic.

That these controversies were not confined to Old England, but speedily found their way across the water, finds interesting confirmation in a treatise of Peter Bulkeley, which appeared in London in 1646, and is entitled *The Gospel Covenant, or the Covenant of Grace opened.* It gives the substance of sermons preached by its author in his parish in Concord, in New England. He speaks of great divisions which had arisen about the covenant, and some busybodies who called the preachers 'legall preachers,' and said that they were 'wholly ignorant of the covenant of grace, and . . . shut up under a covenant of workes.' The reference is evidently to the rising Antinomianism which is associated with the name of Anne Hutchinson, 'that wretched Jezabell,' as Bulkeley calls her (p. 293). Bulkeley, who himself seems to have been a man of moderate views, gives a list of the questions in dispute, *e.g.* (1) whether the covenant of grace was made between God and man, or only between God the Father and Christ; (2) what is the meaning of the reference to Abraham's seed in Gal 3[16]; (3) what the covenant of Sinai was, whether of works or of grace; (4) whether justification may be evidenced by sanctification; (5) whether the commandment commanding faith be a commandment of the law; (6) whether faith be a condition antecedent to justification or only consequent; and (7) whether the conditional promises be promises of free grace or no (Preface, p. 3).

The theoretical difference had its practical effect in the doctrine of the Church. The question here turned on how far it was possible to preserve the purity of the Church in the administration of the sacraments and ecclesiastical discipline. All but the Baptists agreed that the covenant of grace, like the Abrahamic covenant of the OT, included the children of believers, and therefore defended the practice of infant baptism. But this position raised perplexing questions as to the administration of the other sacraments. Since baptism could rightfully be administered to some who were not regenerate, why should the Lord's Supper be confined any more strictly? Why not recognize that the covenant conferred upon the children of believers certain ecclesiastical rights which extended beyond the circle of the elect, and be willing to accept a dogmatical, as distinct from a justifying, faith as the sufficient ground for admission to the Supper? This was the position taken by Blake in his interesting treatise entitled *The Covenant Sealed*—a position which brought him into a controversy with Baxter, in which it must be confessed that he puts that sturdy defender of the larger liberty to sore straits to defend his more exclusive position on this point.[1]

These practical controversies also had their echoes in America. The question as to those who could rightly be admitted to the Lord's Supper was one which agitated the New England churches for many years, and in the so-called half-way covenant the laxer practice advocated by Blake was long prevalent.[2]

A typical example of the Puritan treatment of the covenant is William Strong's posthumous *Discourse of the Two Covenants* (London, 1678), a voluminous treatise of 447 large quarto pages, the substance of which was originally delivered in the form of sermons. Comparing it with similar treatises by Continental writers, we notice its practical interest, which appears (1) in the constant application of the points made to the different classes of people living in Strong's own day; (2) in the emphasis laid upon the obligations created by the covenant as distinct from its benefits; and (3) in its full discussion of the covenant relation of the children of believers. On the last point he leans to the views of Blake rather than to the stricter views of Baxter. He claims federal holiness for the children of the righteous as distinct from the personal holiness of regeneration; but he does not specifically apply the principle involved to the question of the Lord's Supper.

(4) *Cocceius and his school.*—The most eminent representative of the covenant theology is undoubtedly John Koch, or, as he is better known by his Latin name, Cocceius. He was born in Bremen in 1603, studied Hebrew under Matthias Martinius, and theology under Ames and Crocius. He was Professor of Theology successively at Bremen, 1630–1636; at Franeker, 1636–1650, where he succeeded Ames; and at Leyden, 1650–1669, where he died. He became the leading opponent and reformer of the scholasticism of his day, and by his more historical treatment of theology prepared the way for the later discipline of Biblical Theology. In this attempt he found a fruitful clue in the covenant idea, which he used as the organizing principle of his system.

Cocceius' leading monograph is entitled *Summa doctrinæ de fœdere et testamento Dei*, and was published at Leyden in 1648.[1] After a discussion on the meaning of the word *fœdus*, or 'covenant,' he defines the covenant of God as nothing else 'than the Divine declaration of the method (*ratio*) of perceiving the love of God and of obtaining union and communion with him' (*Opera*, Amsterdam, 1673, i. 10). It differs from human covenants in the absence of the mutual feature. God alone initiates it, yet it becomes complete only when man by God's grace binds himself to accept its provisions.[2]

Cocceius, like earlier theologians, distinguishes two covenants, that of works and that of grace. The sum of the former is the law, both natural and written. It is made with Adam for himself and for all his descendants, except Christ. It was abrogated in a fivefold way: (1) so far as the possibility of its fulfilment is concerned, by sin; (2) so far as its condemnation is concerned, by Christ, as set forth in the promises and apprehended by faith; (3) so far as its terror is concerned, by the promulgation of the new covenant; (4) so far as the struggle with sin is concerned, by the death of the body; and (5) so far as all its effects are concerned, by the resurrection from the dead.

The new covenant is the agreement between the Father and Christ as the second Adam, wherein God declares His purpose, in consideration of Christ's atoning sacrifice, to save certain individuals by working in them faith through the word of promise and the gift of the Spirit, and to confirm the same by the institution of the Church, with its sacraments. This covenant is set forth in various ways, both before and after the coming of Christ. It was made known to Adam in Paradise through the institution of sacrifice, and renewed to Abel, Enoch, Noah, Abraham, and to all the people of Israel through Moses. But its most glorious promulgation was through the coming of Christ Himself in the flesh, and the full revelation of God's loving purpose which He made. In this connexion, Cocceius is led to treat at length of the difference between the economies of the OT and of the NT, and to indicate wherein the superior excellence of the NT consists.

The novelty of Cocceius' treatment consists not so much in the special ideas which he enunciates as in the detail in which they are carried out, and, above all, in the free use which he makes of the Biblical material. The idea of the twofold covenant,

[1] Cf. pp. 114, 189. Blake's argument with Baxter turns upon the question whether faith that is short of justifying entitles to baptism, but the principles involved apply with even greater force to the more radical position taken by Blake with reference to the Lord's Supper.

[2] Cf. F. H. Foster, *A Genetic History of the New England Theology*, Chicago, 1907, p. 81 ff.

[1] Later enlarged edd. 1654, 1660. The covenant is also treated at length in Cocceius' *Summa Theologiæ ex Sacris Scripturis repetita* (Leyden, 1662, Amsterdam and Geneva, 1665), of which the covenant of works forms the subject of the eighth *locus*, and the covenant of grace of the fourteenth and following *loci*.

[2] Cocceius distinguishes between that form of covenant in which no condition is required on man's part (*e.g.* the promise to Noah that day and night shall never fail) and the more usual form, which includes the stipulation of acceptance and obedience by man.

as we have seen, goes back to Cocceius' teacher, Matthias Martinius; the distinction of different periods within the OT dispensation is recognized by Ames, but there is a breath of freedom and of originality about Cocceius' treatment which gives it a distinction of its own. It broke away from the prevailing tradition of the contemporary scholasticism, and it called forth, as such innovations always do, bitter opposition on the part of those who sat in the seat of authority.[1] Cocceius, temperate and devout as he was, soon found himself the centre of a bitter controversy, and, what was probably the last thing in the world which he intended, the founder of a school.

Among the representatives of the school of Cocceius may be mentioned Wilhelm Momma,[2] Francis Burmann,[3] Johann Braun,[4] Johann van der Wayen,[5] and Hermann Witsius.[6] The treatise of Witsius on the economy of the covenants was early translated into English, and had many readers both in England and in America. It is one of the best sources for the knowledge of the covenant theology in its later and more developed form.[7]

After an initial discussion of the covenant in general, Witsius begins by describing the covenant of works. He takes up successively the contracting parties, the law or the condition, the promises by which it was accompanied, the penal sanction which was attached to it, and the sacraments by which it was sealed. He speaks of its violation by man's sin, and its consequent abrogation by God in favour of the new covenant of grace. Like Cocceius, Witsius distinguishes between the covenant of redemption, made by the Father with the Son, and the covenant of grace, made by God with the elect. The substance of this is set forth under the familiar theological heads of 'election,' 'effectual calling,' 'regeneration,' 'faith,' etc.; and then its different economies or dispensations in the OT and NT, with their several sacraments and ceremonies, are discussed at length.

With this treatment, the covenant theology reaches its final development. Those who come after add nothing in principle to that which has gone before.

(5) *The later history.*—It is not necessary to follow the later history in detail. Treatises on the covenant continued to be written both in England and on the Continent. Ezekiel Hopkins, Bishop of Londonderry, left the manuscript of a series of sermons on the doctrine of the two covenants, posthumously published in 1712, in which he declares that 'of all the mysterious depths in Christian religion, there is none more necessary for our information or more influential upon our practice than a right apprehension and a distinct knowledge of the doctrine of the covenants' (p. 2). Thomas Boston, a Scottish Presbyterian (1676–1732), wrote a treatise on the covenant of grace,[8] which was often republished both in England and in America, and had the rare compliment paid it of being embodied, with scarcely the change of a word, in a work written nearly a hundred years later (J. Colquhoun, *Treatise on the Covenant of Grace*)[1]—not, indeed, without handsome acknowledgment on the part of the borrower. On the Continent, Turretin[2] gave the covenant idea a large place in his theology, and with his system it passed to America, to reappear in the federalism of the Princeton theologians, Charles and A. A. Hodge.[3] It has continued down to our day to form one of the prominent tenets of evangelical Calvinism.[4]

On the other hand, Jonathan Edwards makes little use of the covenant idea. While the covenant is occasionally mentioned in his history of redemption, the reference is only incidental, and the idea exercises no formative influence upon the structure of the work. This is the more striking because of the extent to which Edwards holds fast to the main tenets of the older Calvinism. The reason is not far to seek. Edwards' primary interest was in the eternal law of things. Not will, but nature, was fundamental in his thought of God. To such a theology the covenant idea, born as it was of the effort to limit the Divine arbitrariness, was foreign. With the stricter predestinarians, like Crisp and Saltmarsh, the covenant idea had long been simply a form into which the wine of a very different gospel had been poured.[5] Edwards, before all things the original thinker, was not interested in preserving a form to which there was no content to correspond. To the federal theologians, on the other hand, the covenant idea answered a real need. Their conception of freedom involved power to the contrary, both in the case of man and of God. In the former case, it was the foundation of human responsibility, and the covenant of works was conceived as a real transaction between different individuals.[6] In the latter case, it gave free scope to the electing grace of God; and the covenant of grace, as we have already seen, had its significance as determining the channel within which God, in the exercise of His Divine sovereignty, had determined to confine the river of His grace. God might have acted otherwise, if He had chosen, so the argument ran, but He was pleased to do thus and so, and this sovereign pleasure He has made known to us through the gracious covenant into which He has entered with man through Christ.

It is, no doubt, the weakening of this conception of freedom in our day which explains the falling into the background of the covenant theology. Arbitrariness, whether on man's part or on God's, is no longer the prevailing danger against which theologians are concerned to guard, and, in a world of law, other terms than those of private agreement seem better fitted to express the profoundest and most abiding relationships between God and man. It would, however, be a mistake to minimize the services rendered by the covenant theology to Christian progress. Artificial in its account of the relation between God and man, it was in reality

1 Among the leaders in the attack upon Cocceius were Samuel Maresius, Professor of Theology at Groningen, and Gisbertus Voetius, Professor of Theology at Utrecht.

2 *De varia conditione et statu ecclesiæ Dei sub triplici œconomia patriarcharum ac Testamenti Veteris ac denique Novi*, Amsterdam, 1673, 2 vols., 4th ed., Basel, 1718.

3 *Synopsis Theologiæ et speciatim œconomiæ fœderum Dei ab initio sæculorum usque ad consummationem eorum*, Utrecht, 1671.

4 *Doctrina fœderum, sive systema theologiæ didacticæ et elencticæ*, Amsterdam, 1688.

5 *Summa theologiæ christianæ*, 1689.

6 *De œconomia fœderum Dei cum hominibus libri iv.*, 1677.

7 Others who were influenced by Cocceius were Abraham Heidanus (1597–1678; *Corpus theologiæ christianæ in xv. locos digestum*, 1686) and van Til (*Theologiæ utriusque compendium cum naturalis cum revelatæ*, Leyden, 1704), though in the case of both these writers the Cartesian influence is also apparent (cf. Gass, *op. cit.* ii. 300 ff. 321, note).

8 *A View of the Covenant of Grace, from the Sacred Records*, posthumously published by his son, Thomas Boston. Boston also left among his papers a similar treatise on the covenant of works, which was published in 1798, with a preface by Michael Boston.

1 Edinburgh, 1818. Among others to whom the author expresses his indebtedness are the following, not hitherto mentioned in this art.: Cloppenburg, Moor, Erskine, Brown, Hervey, Gib, Muirhead, and Gill.

2 Francis Turretin, *Institutio Theologiæ Elencticæ*, Geneva, 1679–85 (*Opera*, New York, 1847, i. 513 ff., Locus viii.; ii. 151 ff., Locus xii.).

3 Charles Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, New York, 1871–73, ii. 117 ff., 354 ff.; A. A. Hodge, *Outlines of Theology, rewritten and enlarged*, New York, 1879, pp. 309 ff., 367 ff.

4 Cf. the use of the covenant idea by Timothy Dwight, in his *Theology, Explained and Defended* (Middletown, 1818, i. 437, ii. 207 ff.).

5 Heppe (*op. cit.* i. 143 ff.) calls attention to the difference of interest which separated the early covenant theologians from the stricter predestinarians, with whose teaching their system had so much else in common.

6 This interest appears with special clearness in the American federalists. Cf. A. A. Hodge, *op. cit.* p. 310 f., Questions 5, 9.

designed as a protest against arbitrariness. Untrustworthy in its view of the development of the Biblical religion, it helped to prepare the way for a more scientific treatment of the Biblical history. To its more earnest advocates the covenant theology, as distinct from the type of thought which it opposed, expressed the difference between a God whose purpose was known and whose character could be trusted, and a God whose nature was mysterious and whose actions were unpredictable. Few terms were richer in experimental significance to those who had been trained to understand it than that which gives its title to this article, for none more fully revealed the heart of God. Writing to his son-in-law, Fleetwood, Cromwell sends the following message to his daughter: 'Bid her be cheerful, and rejoice in the Lord, once and again; if she knows the covenant, she cannot but do so.'[1] 'The covenant,' says Edward Leigh, in the title to his *Treatise of the Divine Promises*, Lond. 1633, 'is itself the bundle and body of all the promises.'

LITERATURE.—The more important works on the covenant have been cited in the article. On the Biblical usage, see **A. B. Davidson**, *Theol. of OT*, Edin. 1904, p. 239 ff., and his art. 'Covenant,' in *HDB*; art. 'Covenant,' in *EBi*; **R. Kraetzschmar**, *Die Bundesvorstellung im AT*, Marburg, 1896; **Valeton**, in *ZATW* xii. [1892] 1–22, 224–260, xiii. [1893] 245–279; **A. Bertholet**, *Die Stellung der Israeliten und der Juden zu den Fremden*, Freiburg, 1896, pp. 46, 87 ff., 176, 214; **W. Robertson Smith**, *Rel. Sem.*², London, 1894, pp. 269 ff., 312 ff., 479 ff.; **W. M. Ramsay**, art. 'Covenant,' in *Expositor*, 5th ser. viii. (Nov. 1898), 321–330.

On the history of the covenant theology in general, cf. **Diestel**, 'Studien zur Föderaltheologie,' *Jahrb. f. deutsch. Theol.* x. [Gotha, 1865] 209 ff.; **T. M. Lindsay**, art. 'Covenant Theology,' in the *Brit. and For. Evangel. Review*, July 1879, p. 521 ff.; **G. P. Fisher**, *Discussions in History and Theology*, N.Y., 1880, pp. 355–409; **M. Schneckenburger**, *Vergleichende Darstellung des luther. und reform. Lehrbegriffs*, Stuttgart, 1855, ii. 140 ff.; **J. H. A. Ebrard**, *Christl. Dogmatik*², Königsberg, 1863, i. 77 ff.; and the relevant sections in the histories of **W. Gass** (*Gesch. der prot. Dogmatik in ihrem Zusammenhange mit der Theol. überhaupt*, Berlin, 1857, ii. 234 ff.), and **A. Schweizer** (*Die Glaubenslehre der evangel.-reform. Kirche*, Zürich, 1844, i. 103 ff.). Cf. also **Emanuel Graf von Korff**, *Die Anfänge der Föderaltheologie und ihre erste Ausgestaltung in Zürich und Holland*, Bonn, 1908.

The most reliable account of the beginnings of the covenant theology in Germany is found in **H. Heppe**, *Dogmatik des deutschen Protestantismus im 16ten Jahrhundert*, Gotha, 1857, i. 139 ff., 188 ff., in which a full description is given of the content of many works otherwise inaccessible to English readers. The theology of Cocceius and his school is fully discussed in the works of Gass and of Diestel, already mentioned, where references to the literature may be found. On the covenant theology in Puritanism, cf. **C. G. M'Crie**, *The Confessions of the Church of Scotland*, Edinburgh, 1907, p. 66 ff.; **A. F. Mitchell**, *The Theology of the Reformed Church, with special reference to the Westminster Standards* (in Report of Proceedings of the Second General Council of the Presbyterian Churches, 1880, p. 477).

Besides the works cited in the text may be mentioned **F. Gomarus**, *De Fœdere Dei*, 1594; **Wendelin**, *Systema Majus*, 1656; **J. Ball**, *Treatise on the Covenant of Grace*, 1645; **Burgess**, *Vindiciæ Legis* (referred to by Blake, in his *Covenant Sealed*); **Cotton**, *The Covenant of God's Free Grace* (1645); and **S. Charnock**, *Discourse of God's being the Author of Reconciliation* (Nichol's ed. of the Puritans), iii. 371 ff. **H. Malcom**, in his *Theological Index* (references to the principal works in every department of religious literature), Boston, 1868), p. 130, gives the titles of a number of works not accessible to the present writer, but without exact description (*e.g.* **Hulsemann**, *De Pacto Dei*; **Musaeus**, *De Pactis Dei cum Hominibus*; **Bostock**, *On the Covenant of Grace*; **Bell**, *Covenant of Grace and of Works*; **Dixon**, *Nature of the Two Covenants*; **Taylor**, *On the Covenant of Grace*; **Kelley**, *The Divine Covenants*, etc.).

A good monograph on the history of the covenant theology is still a desideratum.

W. ADAMS BROWN.

[1] Letter 199, Carlyle's edition, quoted by Lindsay, in *Brit. and For. Evangel. Rev.*, July 1879, p. 521 ff.

COVETOUSNESS.—Covetousness in its most general meaning expresses an eager desire to gain some possession on which the heart is set. At first the desire, though strong, may be innocent and even commendable. Thus Caxton says (Geoffroy de la Tour-Landry, I. ii.): 'She ever coveyted the pees and love of her lord,' and Shakespeare represents the King in *Henry V.* (Act iv. Sc. 3) as saying:

> 'By Jove, I am not covetous for gold,
> Nor care I who doth feed upon my cost;
> It yearns me not if men my garments wear;
> Such outward things dwell not in my desires:
> But if it be a sin to covet honour,
> I am the most offending soul alive.'

In the AV of the Bible the word 'covet' is commonly of evil significance, but it is also used to translate words of good import. Thus in 1 Co 12³¹ we have St. Paul's exhortation, 'Covet [RV "Desire"] earnestly the best gifts.' Keen desire, however, was usually associated with unworthy objects, and Hobbes (*Leviathan*, I. vi. 26) went so far as to declare: 'Desire of Riches [is called] Covetousnesse: a name used alwayes in signification of blame.'

In distinction from avarice (*q.v.*), covetousness emphasizes the desire for things not possessed; avarice, the undue retention of actual possessions. Thus, in covetousness the very desire may constitute an evil, and possibly St. Paul, in his declaration of the way in which sin came home to him (Ro 7⁷ᶠᶠ·), dwells upon the part played by the Tenth Commandment in the process, because inordinate desires are there condemned. The possessions sought may not be an evil in themselves, but the heart's desire may be unduly set upon them. An all-absorbing passion for material possessions may be restrained by the experience of their inability to constitute real happiness in life, and by the knowledge that, sooner or later, all material things must be left behind at death; but this passion is effectively curbed only when a still more passionate desire for the nobler possessions of mind and spirit and life lays hold of the heart.

The evil in covetousness may be due, however, not merely to the strength of the desire, but to the fact that the object of desire is the possession of some one else. It may be noble to seek to possess the spiritual insight or the Christian grace of another, for the imparting of such a gift ennobles and enriches both giver and receiver; but to desire a neighbour's land or goods is to seek his impoverishment. When Ahab coveted Naboth's vineyard (1 K 21), and David coveted Uriah's wife (2 S 11), they fell into deadly sin, and similar desires bring shame and guilt on those who cherish them. When these desires are expressed in acts, they are condemned by the law as crimes. True restraint is exercised only when the rights of others are recognized and honoured.

The very spring of covetousness is found in the common experience that what is not possessed seems always most desirable. The virtues and defects of actual possessions are known by the owners, but the blessings that are beyond reach are painted by the imagination in glowing colours, and incite the heart to ardent desire. This tendency has led to some noble achievements, but it is also the source of amusing comedies, and of many of the deepest tragedies of life. The very opposite state of mind is happily represented in the reply that James Smetham gave to a friend when he was asked to go to Rome and Venice:

> 'I suppose I ought to wish to go with you to Rome and Venice. . . . Nothing but a sense of duty will ever drive me to Rome and Venice. My difficulty is to appreciate our little back-garden, our copper beech, our weeping ash, our little nailed-up rose tree, and twisting yellow creepers' (*Letters of James Smetham*, London, 1892, p. 86 f.).

LITERATURE.—**H. L. Martensen**, *Christian Ethics* (General), Edin. 1885, p. 106 ff.; **Newman Smyth**, *Christian Ethics*, Edin. 1902, p. 365; **J. Oswald Dykes**, *The Manifesto of the King*, London, 1887, p. 450.

D. MACRAE TOD.

COW (Hindu).[1]—The belief in the sanctity of the cow, which is a very prominent feature of Hinduism, seems to have been inherited by the Indians from pre-historic times, before they and

[1] For the place of the cow in other religions, see art. ANIMALS in vol. i. p. 506 ff.

the Iranians had separated. In the Avesta[1] we meet with a Divine being called *geus urvan* (or Goshurun), lit. 'the soul of the cow,' who is regarded as the personification and guardian of living beings. Similarly, in the Rigveda the mystical relation between the cow and the universe is several times alluded to.[2] It is further developed in the Atharvaveda, one hymn of which (x. 10) is addressed to Vaśā, the prototype of cows, and a kind of generating principle of the universe; and another (iv. 11) to Anaḍvān, the primeval ox, to whom a similar function is attributed. In Vedic times the word *go*, 'cow,' was used to express some other ideas, not merely in an allegorical way, but rather in a mystical sense so as to suggest a mysterious connexion between them and the cow. Thus in the *Naighaṇṭuka* (the ancient list of Vedic synonyms, on which Yāska commented in the *Nirukta*) the word *go*, which originally and usually denotes 'cow,' is given as a synonym of (1) earth, (2) heaven, (3) rays of light, (4) speech, and (5) singer.[3] The Earth especially was conceived under the figure of a cow, and is so represented in later mythology. This idea goes back to the Vedic *Saṁhitās*. In a hymn, or rather a prose piece, of the Atharvaveda (viii. 10), Virāj, who 'verily was this universe in the beginning,' is extolled, and she is said to have come to various classes of beings; in paragraphs 22–29 she comes to Divine beings and men, who milk from her things characteristic of their functions—the milker, the calf,[4] and the milking-vessel being stated in each case. Paragraph 24 runs thus:

'She ascended; she came to men; men called to her: "O rich in cheer, come!"; of her Manu son of Vivasvant was young [lit. "calf"]; earth was vessel; her Pṛthī son of Vena milked; from her he milked both cultivation and grain.'[5]

This passage contains the germ of a myth which has been fully developed in the Purāṇas.[6]

'Pṛthu, son of Vena, having been constituted universal monarch, desired to recover for his subjects edible plants, which, during the preceding period of anarchy, had all perished. He therefore assailed the Earth, which, assuming the form of a cow, fled from him and traversed all the heavenly regions. At last she yielded to him, and promised to fecundate the soil with her milk. Thereupon Pṛthu flattened the surface of the earth with his bow, uprooting and thrusting away hundreds and thousands of mountains. Having made Svāyambhuva Manu, the calf, he milked the Earth, and received the milk into his own hand, for the benefit of mankind. Thence proceeded all kinds of corn and vegetables upon which people subsist now and always. By granting life to the Earth, Pṛthu was as her father; and she thence derived the patronymic appellation *Pṛthivī* ("daughter of Pṛthu"). Then the gods, the sages, the demons, the Rākṣasas, the Gandharvas, Yakṣas, Pitṛs, serpents, mountains, and trees took a milking vessel suited to their kind, and milked the Earth of appropriate milk. And the milker and the calf were both peculiar to their own species.'

This story is most frequently alluded to in classical Sanskrit literature. In legends and popular stories the Earth is occasionally said to assume the figure of a cow, especially in times of distress, and to implore the gods for help, or to give advice to a king or queen, to whom she appears in a dream. Again, the mythical identification of the Earth with a cow furnishes the basis of many poetical conceits, *e.g.* that a king should milk the Earth tenderly in order to get plentiful revenue, etc. (see Böhtlingk-Roth, *Sanskrit-Wörterb.*, St. Petersburg, 1855–75, *s.v.* 'Go,' 12).

The identification of cow and speech has not given rise to popular myths, but, as speech is regarded as something Divine in origin and holy in character, it added to the sanctity of the cow, though this identification was perhaps due not so much to a popular association of ideas as to a chance similarity of sound between the two words *go*, 'cow,' and *gā*, 'to sing,' or perhaps *gir* 'speech.'

The sanctity of the cow, which has been shown to underlie certain ancient mythical conceptions, has a practical bearing on religion. It was considered a heinous sin to kill a cow or to eat her flesh. A well-known verse[1] says: 'All that kill, eat, and permit the slaughter of, cows, rot in hell for as many years as there are hairs on the body of the cow so slain.' The same feeling is already present, but not yet so strongly developed, in Vedic times. The *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, when prohibiting the eating of the flesh of the cow (iii. 1, 2, 21), adds the interesting statement: 'Yājñavalkya said: "I, for one, eat it, provided that it is tender."' And the *Gṛhya Sūtras* permit the slaughter of a cow on the arrival of a guest, especially at a wedding or a sacrifice. But this ancient practice was given up in later times, when substitutes for the flesh of a cow became the rule in the entertainment of guests.[2]

In the Great Epic the sacredness of the cow is a firmly established fact. Chapters 69–82 of the *Anuśāsana parvan* of the *Mahābhārata*,[3] which chiefly treat of the giving of cows and the merit acquired by it, contain much curious information about the religious ideas regarding the cow, which became deeply engrained in the Hindu mind through the superstitious veneration of the cow. The reason alleged for its sacredness is that cows are the essential requisites for sacrifice, and that 'with their milk and with the Havis manufactured therefrom they uphold all creatures of the universe' (81. 2); they are themselves sacred and capable of cleansing others. Not only are the cows themselves sacred, but the five products of the cow (*pañchagavya*)—milk, curds, ghi, dung, and urine—are means of purifying man, and are used in many ways for that purpose, some of which are rather disgusting. But the pious are told 'never to feel any repugnance for the urine and the dung of the cow' (*ib.* 78. 17). A curious myth relating to the latter item is told in the *Mahābhārata* (xiii. 82):

Śrī, the goddess of Fortune, who had left the demons for the gods, came to the cows, desiring to reside in them. They would, however, have nothing to do with that fickle deity, but in the end they were moved by her entreaties and consented to honour her: 'Do thou live in our urine and dung; both these are sacred, O auspicious goddess!'

Cows are the daughters of the heavenly Surabhi ('the fragrant one,' so called from the peculiar smell of cows), who was created by Prajāpati from his breath (*Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, vii. 5. 2, 6). This notion gives rise to the following myth:[4]

'Dakṣa the creator, for the sake of the beings he had created, drank a quantity of nectar. He became gratified with the nectar he had quaffed, and thereupon an eructation came out, diffusing an excellent perfume all round. As the result of that eructation, Dakṣa saw that it gave birth to a cow which he called Surabhi. This Surabhi was thus a daughter of his, which had sprung from his mouth. The cow called Surabhi brought forth a number of cows, which came to be regarded as the mothers of the world.'

1 *e.g.* *Yasna*, xxviii. 1, xxix. 5. 9 (for a complete list of references, see Bartholomae, *Altiran. Wörterb.* 1540 (Strassburg, 1901); cf. also the Pahlavi texts translated in *SBE* v. 20 f., 163, 402, xvii. 380, xxxvii. 237 ff.

2 *e.g.* i. 153. 3, viii. 90. 15, x. 11. 1. On the cow in the period of the Rigveda, see Macdonell, *Vedic Mythol.* (= *GIAP* iii. 1a), Strassburg, 1897, Index, *s.vv.* 'Cow,' 'Cows'; and Zimmer, *Altind. Leben*, Berlin, 1879, p. 221 ff.

3 *Naigh.* I. i. 4, 5, II. iii. 16. Classical lexicographers attribute still further meanings to the word *go*; *e.g.* Hemachandra in the *Anekārthasaṁgraha* (i. 6) enumerates the following meanings: sun, water, eye, heaven, heavenly quarter, kine, ray of light, thunderbolt, earth, arrow, and speech.

4 The Hindus suppose that a cow yields milk only in the presence of her calf.

5 Harvard Oriental Series, viii. 514.

6 The account in the text is from the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* (Wilson's tr., London, 1864–70, i. ch. xiii.). More details given in other Purāṇas are mentioned in Wilson, i. 188 ff.

1 *Mahābhārata*, xiii. 74. 4.

2 The ancient practice was noticed by a writer of the 7th cent., Bhavabhūti, in his dramatical play *Uttararāmacharita*, 4th Act; but, as the scene is laid in the remote past, we cannot draw any conclusion from it with regard to the usage at the time of the author.

3 We quote from Pratāpa Chandra Ray's translation (Calcutta, 1893).

4 *Mahābhārata*, xiii. 77.

There is also a cow-heaven, Goloka, the residence of Surabhi. Once the mother of cows practised austerities, and so pleased Brahmā by her freedom from cupidity that he granted her immortality and assigned her as residence a region above the three worlds, the famous Goloka, while her daughters live among men. In another account,[1] however, Surabhi is said to dwell in Rasātala, the lowest region in the nether world, and to have for daughters the Dikpālīs, or goddesses presiding over the heavenly quarters. The cow-heaven, Goloka, is frequently mentioned in the epics and the Purāṇas. It is described as a kind of paradise, a most beautiful place of the greatest splendour and happiness, which can be attained only by the most pious and virtuous, especially by givers of cows and by their worshippers. For the cow became the centre of a peculiar worship, with proper *mantras* (*Mahābhārata*, xiii. 80. 1-3, 78. 24 f.) and rites.[2] The devotees had to recite the names of the cows, and to bow their heads in reverence to them (*ib.* 78. 16), and they were enjoined to subsist on the five products of the cow, to bathe, using cow dung at the time, etc. For some religious purposes the devotee has to live and to sleep among cows in a cow-pen, or to follow a cow everywhere, as did Dilīpa in the story told in the second book of the *Raghuvaṁśa*.

Lastly, attention may be called to the story according to which Kṛṣṇa, one of the most popular gods of India, passed his youth among cowherds and became the lover of the *gopīs*, their daughters, especially of the lovely Rādhā. This fact illustrates the high reputation which resulted from the connexion with cows, since even herdsmen were thought the fit guardians and companions of the highest god.

Reverence for the cow has not diminished in modern times.[3] It is well known that the Hindus of the present day are filled with horror at the slaughter of the cow, which is therefore prohibited in native States under treaties with the English.

LITERATURE.—The literature is given in the article.

H. JACOBI.

COYOTEROS.—The Coyoteros are a tribal division of the Apaches (*q.v.*), said by Drake (*Indian Tribes of the United States*, Philadelphia, 1884, i. 424) to have been the largest and fiercest of all the Apache tribes, although, owing to the indiscriminate method in which tribal names have been applied, it is difficult to make certain that other tribes are not included in the estimate of its size. The original home of the Coyoteros was on the head-waters of the Gila, between that river and San Carlos; but they were of nomadic habits, and ranged through Arizona and western New Mexico. Geographically, they are divided into two groups—Pinal Coyoteros and White Mountain Coyoteros. The greater number of them are now located on the San Carlos reservation, with other tribes of the Apaches. They took a prominent part in the rebellion caused by the discontent which followed when the Apaches were moved from their tribal grounds to a reservation.

The Spanish name *Coyotero* is said to have been given them on account of the fact that they subsisted partly on the flesh of coyotes, or prairie wolves (Hardy, *Travels in the Interior of Mexico*, London, 1829, p. 430, quoted by Bancroft, *NR* i. 474). Ruxton (*Journ. Ethnol. Soc. Lond.*, 1st ser., ii. 95 [1850]) calls them *coyoteros*, or 'wolf-eaters.' It is suggested, however, that the name may have been derived from their roving and unsettled habits (Hodge, *Handbook*, p. 356). Among the Tonto Apaches they are known as *Paláwi* or *Pawilkna* (Gatschet, *Yuma-Spr.* i. [1883] 371, 411; *ZE* xv. 123), while the Navaho name for them was *Silká*, 'on the mountain' (ten Kate, *Synonymie*, Amsterdam, 1884, p. 6).

In culture they did not differ materially from the other Apaches. Among the Apache tribes themselves, distinctions were recognized in the character of the weapons, the distinguishing mark of the Coyoteros being the method of winging the arrows. These bore three feathers on the shaft, which was of reed, finished with hard wood and tipped with iron or flint (Cremony, *Life among the Apaches*[2], San Francisco, 1877, p. 103). Like other members of the Athapascan linguistic stock, they readily assimilated the culture of neighbouring tribes; and, just as the Lipan followed the Comanche, the Pinal Coyoteros showed traces of Pueblo customs. Their nomadic habits, as well as the character of the country, were unfavourable to any great advance in civilization, while their habitat in Sierra Blanca was peculiarly adapted to the raids by which, like other Apaches, they acquired food and wealth. Their captives were held as slaves until ransomed or sold. The Pinaleños earned an unenviable notoriety by their success in this tribal pursuit (see Bartlett, *Personal Narrative of Travels in New Mexico*, New York, 1854). Apaches are divided into clans, but these are not totemic. Their names are taken, not from animals, but from natural features of their locality. Affiliation of the clans in different tribes is recognized. Among the Coyoteros, clans have been recorded, counterparts of which have been found among other Apache divisions and also among the Navahos; while Bourke (*JAFL* iii. [1890] 112) records a number of identifications between the White Mountain Apaches and the Pinal Coyoteros.

The Apaches displayed little care in the disposal of their dead. The method followed by the Coyoteros is described by H. C. Yarrow ('A Further Contribution to the Study of the Mortuary Customs of the North American Indians,' *1 RBEW*, 1881, p. 111 f.), who says they take the least possible trouble. A hole in the ground made by a tree stump or a stone is found, and into this they cram the body, partially wrapped up. The stone or stump is then rolled back. They mourn for thirty days, uttering loud lamentations at intervals; but, he adds, unless they are reminded of it, this is frequently forgotten.

LITERATURE.—References to the Coyoteros are scattered through the literature dealing with the Apaches (see above, and at end of art. APACHES, in vol. i.); cf. also especially footnotes, *passim*, in Bancroft, *NR*; and F. W. Hodge, *Handbook of American Indians* (= *Bull. 30 BE*, Washington, 1907), pt. 1, under 'Apache' and 'Coyotero.'

E. N. FALLAIZE.

CREATION.—I. The conception in primitive heathenism.—The principle of causality is a necessary category of thought. The desire for knowledge of the nature and origin of things is inborn. It stimulates the eager wonder and prompts the clamorous questions of every child and savage. Primitive man is philosophical in so far as he does not take things as a matter of course, as he makes the phenomena around him objects of reflexion, as he is keen to understand how everything came about. He is mentally a child, with a child's vague fears of the unknown, a child's love of a thrilling tale, and a child's readiness to be satisfied with any explanation, however grotesque and absurd, of the things which arouse his interest. Curiosity and credulity are the characteristics of the primitive mind, and the roots of all mythology, which has not inaptly been called 'primitive metaphysics.' At the same time it has to be remembered that the childhood of the race included the maturity of the individual, and in not a few creation-myths

[1] *Mahābhārata*, iii. 102. For other references to Goloka, see Böhtlingk-Roth, *s.v.*

[2] Cf., further, Hillebrandt, *Rituallit.* (= *GIAP* iii. 2), Strassburg, 1897, p. 83.

[3] See the very full discussion of this subject in *PR* ii. 226 ff.

there are features which reflect the vices and passions of grown men as well as the simplicity of children. The theories of the savage are of necessity like their inventor, matching his barbaric manners and customs, his crude emotions and rude conduct. Primitive man stands helpless in the midst of a universe of which he knows not the laws, but he is of imagination all compact, and therefore never at a loss for an answer to the questions which are the subject-matter of science and philosophy. He can explain the phenomena of Nature, the making of the universe, the descent of man. The background of all myths is the experience of primitive man interpreted by himself. The tales he spins, the theories he invents, may be grave or gay, prosaic or poetical, attractive or repulsive, clever or absurd; enough if they satisfy him. He does not know how defective is his logic, how riotous his fancy. He is experimenting in thought as best he can, and 'the science of the modern *savant* has been evolved out of the errors of the simple savage' (Jevons, *Introd.* p. 9).

But the problem of origins has to be solved by religion as well as by philosophy, though it is approached from a different side and in a different spirit. Man has not only a speculative, but a religious instinct. Religion is one of his native vital forces, without which he would have what Schelling termed 'an original atheism of consciousness.' No one can manufacture his religion, which is a native personal datum; all that he requires is the due exercise and cultivation of Nature's supreme gift. It is this element in the common consciousness of all generations which makes the search for a Creator a continuous pursuit. The question whether 'the savage state . . . represents an early condition of mankind' (Tylor, *Prim. Cult.*[3] i. 32), or whether we might 'as well judge the wine by the dregs as primitive man by the savage' (Gwatkin, *Knowledge of God*, 1908, i. 253), may be left open. For in the genuine products of the religious sense, uncontaminated by the fancies of the mythopœic faculty, there seems to be no contrast of high and low. Increasing research into the mental habits of the least advanced races of mankind now living tends to demonstrate that, side by side with the most foolish, tedious, and often repulsive myths, there is almost invariably a high, if vague, conception of a good Being who is the Maker of all things, the undying Guardian of the moral life of men. The evidence is presented with adequate thoroughness and with literary charm in the writings of Andrew Lang and F. B. Jevons.

A. Lang stands in wonder before 'the high gods of low races' (*Making of Religion*[2], p. 173 ff.). He must needs smile at the opinion expressed by Flint in the earlier days of Comparative Religion (in *Faiths of the World*, Edin. 1882, p. 413), that 'at the bottom of the religious scale . . . it is always easy to see how wretchedly the divine is conceived of . . . how little conscious of his own true wants . . . is the poor worshipper' (*ib.* p. 253). He is convinced that the animistic theory of Spencer and Tylor does not fit the facts. 'The high gods of savages are not ghosts' (p. 250). 'It is a positive fact that among some of the lowest savages there exists, not a doctrinal and abstract Monotheism, but a belief in a moral, powerful, kindly creative Being, while this belief is found in juxtaposition with ghosts, totems, fetishes, and so on' (p. 254 f.). Lang presents 'an array of moral and august savage supreme Beings'; and he believes that 'an old, nay, an obsolete theory—that of degeneration in religion—has facts at its basis, which its very supporters have ignored, which orthodoxy has overlooked' (p. 252).

He finds that 'the belief in relatively pure creative beings, whether they are morally adored, without sacrifice, or merely neglected, is so widely diffused that Anthropology must ignore them, or account for them as "loan-gods," or—give up her theory' (*ib.* p. 229). He observes that the idea of a Good Maker, once reached, becomes 'the germ of future theism,' and he seeks the highest confirmation of his theory in the religion of Israel, which is 'probably a revival and purification of the old conception of a moral, beneficent creator, whose creed had been involved in sacrifice and anthropomorphic myth' (Lang, *Myth, Rit. and Rel.* i. 329).

Unfortunately this involution of religion in mythology is all but universal. When primitive man tries to explain *how* the world was made, his speculative faculty lands him in all kinds of error and confusion; his theories are incredibly childish and whimsical.

'Savages begin . . . by mythically regarding various animals, spiders, grasshoppers, ravens, eagles, cockatoos, as the creators or recoverers of the world. As civilization advances, those animals still perform their beneficent functions, but are looked on as gods in disguise' (*ib.* i. 241 f.).

Bunjil, the South Australian maker of men and things, is identified with the eagle-hawk; Cagn, the Bushman Creator, with the mantis-insect; and even Brahmā or Viṣṇu, with a boar, a fish, or a tortoise. Among the native tribes of America the hawk, the coyote, or the musk-rat is the demiurge; among others the crow, the raven, or the hare plays the chief rôle in the task of creation. If the Creator does not partake of the character of a totem or worshipful beast, he is identified with a wizard or medicine-man. Every race has had its legendary account of the origin of things, and, while creation-myths can never be far in advance of the ideas and sentiments of a people, they may, and often do, lag far behind. Religious conservatism makes adult nations slow to put away the childish things that faith has once consecrated. If a creation-legend has found its *vates sacer*, and been incorporated with the ritual of the altar, scarcely anything short of a miracle is strong enough to charm it from the popular mind.

2. The conception in civilized paganism.—All the early ideas of creation are, of course, geocentric. The 'earth' of which mythology offers an account may be but a circle of hills and valleys known to some wandering tribe. But the great phenomena of Nature—sun, moon, and stars, day and night, storm-wind and thunder-cloud, birds and beasts and men—are much the same everywhere, and they form the warp and woof of all cosmogonies. In spite of immense diversities of detail, there is a family likeness in the creation-myths of the world. Nothing is more striking than the parallelism between Hesiod's savage stories and those of the Maoris and Mangaians of to-day. The primitive mind, working on the same materials, seems everywhere to evolve the same crude and infantine speculations regarding the origin of things. Cf. the artt. on COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY.

(1) *Egypt.*—The religious history of Egypt, extending over many thousands of years, is the history of a theism almost choked by an animism which deified beasts and birds and trees. The priests of the temples, who were the advanced thinkers of the nation, endeavoured to be true to the high theistic tradition, and therefore chose to regard the innumerable popular gods as only various manifestations of the one Divine creative energy. Even the priests were henotheists rather than monotheists, worshipping one god as if there were no other, ascribing to him all the highest attributes of deity, but without any idea of logically denying the reality of other gods. Ptah, the chief god of Memphis, whom the Greeks identified with Hephæstus, was called by his priests the 'master-artisan,' *i.e.* the Creator. At Elephantinē, in the clay district beside the cataracts, Khnum was the demiurge, who moulded his creatures like a potter. At Hermopolis it was Thoth who made the world, speaking it into existence. 'That which flows from his mouth, happens, and that which he speaks, comes into being.'

The following hymns date from at least 2000 B.C. (1) To Amon-Ra: 'Hail to thee, maker of all things, lord of law, father of the gods; maker of men, creator of beasts. . . . The one without a second . . . king alone, single among the gods.' (2) To Ptah: 'To him is due the work of the hands, the walking of the feet, the sight of the eyes, the hearing of the ears, the breathing of the nostrils, the courage of the heart, the vigour of the hand, activity in body and in the mouth of all the gods

and men, and of all living animals: intelligence and speech, whatever is in the heart and whatever is on the tongue' (Renouf, *Orig. and Growth of Rel. of Anc. Egypt*, p. 220).

In a papyrus at Turin, the following words are put into the mouth of 'the almighty God, the self-existing': 'I am the maker of heaven and of the earth, I raise its mountains and the creatures which are upon it: I make the waters. . . . I am the maker of heaven, and of the mysteries of the twofold horizon. It is I who have given to all the gods the soul which is within them. When I open my eyes, there is light; when I close them, there is darkness. I make the hours, and the hours come into existence. I am Chepera in the morning, Rā at noon, Tmu in the evening' (*ib.* p. 221 f.). And the following is an extract from a hymn preserved in the museum at Bulak: 'Hail to thee, Amon-Rā . . . lord of all existences, the support of things, the support of all things. The One in his works, single among the gods . . . Lord of truth, father of the gods; maker of men, creator of beasts . . . Most glorious one, chief maker of the earth after his image, how great are his thoughts above every God! Atmu, maker of men . . . giving them life . . . listening to the poor who is in distress, gentle of heart when one cries unto him' (*ib.* 225).

In Egypt, however, as everywhere, the mythical mingled with the religious, the irrational with the rational. See COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY (Egyptian).

(2) *India.*—The problem of the origin of things naturally fascinated 'the brooding mind of India.' For ages the East was 'plunged in thought,' and brought up a few pearls, with many empty shells, from the depths. Some of the hymns of the Rig-veda are, if not monotheistic, at least henotheistic in their pure and lofty idea of creation. Varuṇa is praised as the maker of all things:

'Truly admirable for grandeur are the works of Him who has separated the two worlds and fixed their vast extent: of Him who has set in motion the high and sublime firmament, who has spread out the heavens above and the earth beneath. . . . This Asura [Lord], who is acquainted with all things, has propped up these heavens, he has fixed the boundaries of the earth. He is enthroned above all the worlds, universal king; all the laws of the world are the laws of Varuṇa. . . . Between this earth and the sublime heaven above, all things, O Varuṇa, are of thy creation' (Darmesteter, *Sel. Essays*, p. 284).

But in India, too, we see the inevitable conflict between religion and mythology, with religion often defeated and defiled. The gods of the Vedas are, on the whole, of the usual polytheistic type, and side by side with the majestic hymns of creation we find a crowd of fanciful, humorous, often obscene, myths of the making of the world, all in flagrant contradiction with every pure religious conception. See COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY (Indian).

The advanced thinkers of the *Vedānta* accepted a philosophy of idealism, and carried it so far as to affirm that the world of phenomena had no real existence; to the enlightened it was all illusion; only to the soul which was entangled in the deception of the senses did it still appear real. Instead of explaining the universe, they explained it away, and they did not deem it necessary to answer the question, 'Who created *maya*?'

(3) *Persia.*—The Avesta, the sacred book of the Persians, begins with the words, 'I proclaim and worship Ahura Mazda, the Creator.' The religious poetry of Persia does not stop short of monotheism, while its mythology and theology teach a dualism of the most pronounced type.

'It is through me,' says Ahura to his prophet, Zoroaster, 'that the firmament, with its distant boundaries . . . subsists without pillars to rest upon; it is through me that the earth, through me that the sun, the moon, and the stars take their radiant course through the atmosphere: it was I who formed the seeds in such a manner that, when sown in the earth, they should grow,' etc. (Darmesteter, *op. cit.* p. 288).

Much more poetical is the following piece, which in its eager questioning singularly resembles Job 38–39:

'Reveal to me the truth, O Ahura! What was the beginning of the good creation?
Who is the father, who, at the beginning of time, begat Order?
Who has traced for the sun and the stars the paths that they must follow?
Who makes the moon increase and decrease? . . .
Who has fixed the earth and the immovable stars to establish them firmly, so that they might not fall? Who has fixed the waters and the trees?
Who has directed the rapid course of the wind and of the clouds? What skilful artist has made the light and the darkness? . . .
Those are the things that I wish to ask Thee, O Mazda, O beneficent Spirit, O Creator of all things!' (*ib.* p. 290 f.).

The theology of Persia teaches that from the beginning the kingdoms of Ormuzd (Ahura Mazda, 'the Lord Wisdom') and Ahriman (Angra Mainyu, 'destructive spirit') were independent of each other. Ormuzd created this material world as a kind of rampart between the two invisible realms. Heaven and its lights were first made by his word; then, in succession, the waters, the solid land, the plants, the animals, and, lastly, man. But his rival tried to undo all the work, to spoil the fair creation. He confronted light with darkness, he pitted demons against angels, and to life, love, virtue, and truth he opposed error, vice, hatred, and death. Since then, the history of the world has been the history of the conflict between the two kingdoms of good and evil, wherein this earth is the broad field of battle. See, further, COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY (Iranian).

Lagarde and other scholars have strongly maintained that the Hebrew cosmogony in Gn 1 is in some respects dependent on the Persian creation-story, particularly as regards the order of events; but it is more probable that the Persian influence on Israel did not begin till after the time of the writing of the Priestly Document to which Gn 1 belongs. Be that as it may, the Persian dualism, with its eternally opposed principles of light and darkness, good and evil, had its obvious parallels in Greek thought, and was revived in Manichæism, while even shrewd thinkers like J. S. Mill have thought that the defects of the universe can be best explained by supposing the Creator hampered through the insufficiency and intractableness of the materials with which He had to work (J. S. Mill, *Three Essays on Religion*, Lond. ed. 1904, pp. 178, 186).

(5) *Greece.*—See COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY (Greek).

3. The Biblical conception.—The OT has three types of ideas regarding the Creation, embedded in three strata of its literature. (1) The first is found in Gn 2^{4b-25}. The narrative has all the fresh charm of the ancient writing (J) to which it belongs. It is full of naive anthropomorphisms, representing God as moulding, breathing, planting, walking, and it undoubtedly has a background of popular mythology. But the writer adorns whatever he touches, transfusing old legends with a new spirit, so that 'in depth of moral and religious insight the passage is unsurpassed in the OT' (Skinner, *Genesis*, 52). There is no attempt here to represent the creation of 'heaven and earth'; these are taken for granted; speculation is not yet advanced enough to grapple with such magnitudes. The whole interest centres in the making first of man, and then of a pleasant and fruitful place for his abode. See, further, COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY (Heb.).

(2) Another type of creation doctrine is found in the Deutero-Isaiah. It was the mission of this prophet to comfort Israel in her exile, and he fulfils it by giving her a lofty conception of God the Creator. He teaches that Jahweh is not merely the God of Israel, but the only God, who brought all things into being by a free act of creation. 'Who hath measured the waters in the hollow of his hand? . . . Lift up your eyes on high, and see who hath created these' (Is $40^{12.26}$). Jahweh is greater than the infinite sea and sky. It was this prophet who made the creatorship of Jahweh a fundamental Jewish belief, and it is to be noted that in his doctrine there is not the faintest echo of the old creation-legends, not the remotest suggestion of a primeval chaos, or of a conflict between light and darkness, to say nothing of a slaying of 'dragons of the prime.' As if to lay the ghosts of all such superstitions, he makes the God of creation say: 'I am Jahweh, and there is none else. I form the light, and create darkness; I make peace, and create evil: I am Jahweh, that doeth all these things' (Is $45^{6.7}$).

Pure religion has gained an absolute victory over mythology.

(3) The third type of cosmogony is found in Gn 1. This majestic prologue to the Bible belongs to those Priestly Writings (P) of the post-exilic period which form the greater part of the Hexateuch. Our interpretation of the opening sentences is affected by our solution of a difficult and delicate problem of syntax. Most scholars now read the passage thus:

'When God began to create the heaven and the earth—the earth being without form and void, and darkness being upon the face of the deep, and the spirit of God brooding upon the face of the waters—God said, Let there be light, and there was light.'

If this exegesis is correct, the writer teaches a dualism. He thinks of a dark watery chaos existing before the creation began, and gives it the mythical name *Tĕhōm* ('the Deep'), which is evidently the Heb. equivalent of the Bab. *Tiamāt*. This is the first of many parallels between the two famous Epics of creation. See, further, COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY (Heb.).

The doctrine of a creation out of nothing—*ex nihilo*—is nowhere expressly taught in Holy Scripture. The first near approach to it occurs in the words of the mother of the Maccabees: ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ἐποίησεν αὐτὰ ὁ θεός (2 Mac 7[28]), which are too definitely rendered by the Vulgate: *ex nihilo fecit illa Deus*. The *Wisdom of Solomon*, on the other hand, distinctly reproduces the Platonic doctrine of the creation of the world 'out of formless matter,' ἐξ ἀμόρφου ὕλης (11[17]). In the NT the Divine creation of the world is presupposed in many sayings of our Lord and His Apostles, as in those which mention the foundation of the world (Mt 25[34], Lk 11[50], Jn 17[24], Eph 1[4], He 4[3], 1 P 1[20]), the creation of man and woman (Mt 19[4-6], Ac 17[24-26], 1 Ti 2[13]); and those which represent Him as the Maker of heaven and earth (Mt 11[25], Lk 10[21], Ac 17[24]), the Source of all things (Ro 11[36], 1 Co 8[6], Eph 4[6]), the Father who through the Son made the world (Jn 1[3], Col 1[15-18], He 1[2]). Faith grasps the fact 'that the worlds have been framed by the word (ῥήματι) of God; so that what is seen hath not been made out of things which do appear' (μὴ ἐκ φαινομένων, He 11[3]).

4. The Greek conception.—While the old cosmogonic myths were fading in the light of the pure religion of Israel, the wise men of Greece were turning upon them the light of philosophy. The great decisive step which the Ionian cosmologists took once for all consisted, as Grote and Zeller have shown, in the substitution of impersonal causes acting according to law in place of personal causes acting arbitrarily. Burnet expresses the matter by simply saying that they 'left off telling tales.' This was the beginning of a new era in the evolution of thought, and 'history teaches that science has never existed except among those peoples which the Greeks have influenced' (*Early Greek Phil.*, 1892, pp. 8, 27). For details of Greek speculation, see COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY (Greek).

5. The dogmatic conception.—Till recent times the Church's doctrine of creation was based on the acceptance of Gn 1 as literal history, and particularly on an ungrammatical exegesis of the first three verses. Most of the Fathers, the scholastics, and the Protestant theologians believed that the world was miraculously created out of nothing, in six days, some six thousand years ago. This was a truth of revelation, which closed all questions. Luther comments on Gn 1, that 'Moses is writing history and reporting things that actually happened' ('*meldet geschehene Dinge*'). The matter therefore cannot be treated speculatively. To reason about it were profane. 'God was pleased,' says Calvin, 'that a history of the creation should exist,' and he repeats a story of Augustine's about 'a good old man, who, when some one pertly asked . . . what God did before the world was created, answered: He made a hell for the inquisitive' (*Instit.* I. xiv. 1). But the doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo* cannot be deduced from Gn 1[1-3], which rather, as we have seen, teaches a dualism. This was, indeed, the explicit doctrine of some of the early Fathers, who remained in closer touch with the Jews, and therefore correctly interpreted the passage in question. Justin Martyr, quoting Gn 1[1-3], says that Plato (whom he accuses of atticizing Moses) and his followers 'and we ourselves' have thence learned that 'through the Word of God the whole world came into existence out of things subjacent and before declared by Moses' (*Apol.* i. 59). Clement of Alexandria also maintained that Plato took from Moses his doctrine of a formless matter, expressly referring for the latter to Gn 1[2] (*Strom.* v. 14).

But Christian thought could not rest in a dualism, whether Mosaic or Platonic or Gnostic. The doctrine of an eternal matter was seen to be a dangerous rival to the doctrine of the eternal Logos, and almost with one accord the theologians of the East and West alike set themselves to demolish the pagan conception of an uncreated ὕλη. With the LXX or the Vulgate instead of the Hebrew text before them, they honestly counted Moses as a monist. But, though revelation thus seemed to be on their side, they still habitually based their doctrine upon reason. They were Christian philosophers meeting other philosophers on common ground. Their arguments have been restated in C. M. Walsh's recent book, *The Doctrine of Creation* (1910). 'God alone is without beginning' was the thesis they defended. If matter were uncreated, it would be equal with God—a second God. If there were two first principles, they would be incommunicable without a third, which would be the ultimate principle. Plainly the one must come from the other, and, yet more plainly, matter from God rather than the reverse. To be Lord of all, God must have created matter. If it were uncreated, the world could not be constructed out of it, for it could not be receptive of the qualities which God wished to impose upon it, unless God Himself had made it such as He wished it to be. That which is capable of being made into an artistic world must itself have had a wise and skilful Maker.

These arguments are certainly sufficient to prove the dependence of all things upon God, and the derivation of all things from God. But the affirmation of a time—or rather an eternity—in which God was not a Creator, in which the universe was non-existent, is another matter. Some of the greatest minds found it impossible to conceive such acosmism. Origen held that before the creation of our world God had created others, as He will create others after ours, without beginning or end; that matter, or the substance underlying all the successive worlds, is eternally created (*de Princip.* III. v. 3–4). Augustine had the deep and pregnant thought that the preservation of the world is a continuous creation (*de Civ. Dei*, xii. 25). Scotus Erigena, the profoundest thinker in the Middle Ages, taught that God's working is equally eternal with His being; that creation is involved in His essence; that He necessarily manifests Himself in the world; that He precedes it not in time but only in the idea, as its cause (*de Divisione Naturæ*, iii. 25). Thomas Aquinas confessed that reason could only be satisfied with the assumption that the world had no beginning; that, God being the *sufficiens causa mundi*, the cause must apparently always have its effect; and that the doctrine of a beginning, or the non-eternity of the world, is to be

received *sola fide*, by an act of pure faith, in deference to authority: '*Mundum incoepisse est credibile, non autem demonstrabile vel scibile*' (*c. Gent.* ii. 38; *Summa*, i. 46, 104). The *Theologia Germanica* has this profound passage: 'It belongeth unto the Will, and is its property, that it should will something. What else is it for? For it were vain, unless it had some work to do, and this it cannot have without the creature (or creation). Therefore there must be creatures, and God will have them, to the end that the Will may be put in exercise by their means, and work' (ch. 51). Jacob Boehme likewise saw that a hidden will, which did not become present to itself in the object of its creation, would not attain to manifestation for itself, and so would remain unconscious.

6. The philosophical conception. — Philosophy entered upon a new era when it first ventured to ignore and then to repudiate the orthodox doctrine of creation. For a time it claimed its independence very modestly and tentatively. It seemed still content to bend the knee to authority. Bacon made a distinction between 'one who philosophizes according to the sense alone,' and 'Sacred Writ'—the former representing matter as 'self-existing,' the latter as 'from God.' That 'matter was created from nothing, we know by faith,' as it is 'one to which those philosophies could not rise' (*Works*, ed. Spedding, v. 491). Descartes introduces his revolutionary ideas in the humblest tone. 'It may be believed, without discredit to the miracle of creation, that the nature of things purely material is much more easily conceived when they are beheld coming . . . gradually into existence, than when they are only considered as produced at once in a finished and perfect state' (*On Method*, v.). Locke did not feel justified in rejecting the doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo*. He maintained that the impossibility of conceiving the making of something of which no part existed before cannot be regarded as a reasonable criterion to set a limit to the operations of an infinite Mind. To him the existence of an extra-mundane Creator was capable of demonstration. Its evidence, if he was not mistaken, was equal to mathematical certainty (*Hum. Understanding*, iv. 10). Such demonstrations were numerous during the age of Natural Religion, and Coleridge, not without reason, complained that men had come to regard the relation of the Creator to the universe in the same light as that of a mason to his work. Such mechanical deism easily gave place to pure materialism. It was Spinoza who led philosophy into more fruitful fields. As opposed to those *mechanical* conceptions, 'the developed idea of God as the omnipresent Life of the world, constantly operating in and through natural laws, is common to educated theism with pantheism, and is what modern theism owes to pantheistic exaggeration' (Fraser, *Phil. of Theism*[2], p. 83). Spinoza regarded the traditional theory of creation as making the nature of God arbitrary and the existence of the world a matter of chance. He therefore entirely rejected it. For, though his *Natura naturans*, or Nature active, may in a manner be called the Creator of his *Natura naturata*, or Nature passive, these are consubstantial and co-eternal, neither before nor after the other. There is no beginning in the universe; there can be no end. The existing order of things is the only one possible, and in its involuntary evolution it flows from its cause, the one infinite reality, with the same mathematical necessity with which the angles of a triangle are derived from the triangle. Fichte follows Spinoza in emphatically repudiating the doctrine of creation, calling it 'the root error of all false metaphysics and dogmatics,' which perverts the idea of God from the outset, investing it with caprice, and changing thought into a dreaming play of fancy ('ein träumendes Phantasiren,' *Werke*, 1845, v. 479). Hegel accepts the category of creation, but fills it with a new content. 'God,' he says, 'is the Creator of the world; it belongs to His being, His essence, to be Creator; in so far as He is not this, He is imperfectly conceived. Creation is not an act undertaken once upon a time. What belongs to the Idea belongs to it as an eternal moment or determination' (*Werke*, 1832, xii. 157 f.). 'God does not create the world once; He is the eternal Creator. This eternal self-revelation, this *actus*, is His notion, His definition' (*ib.* p. 181). '*Ohne Welt ist Gott nicht Gott*' (xi. 122). Schleiermacher felt that the idea of a beginning of God's creative activity places Him as a temporal being in the domain of change. He regarded the work of God as Creator as one with His work as Preserver, and the two together as identical with the totality of causation in Nature (*Der christl. Glaube*, 1889, i. 294–297).

All the English Idealists agree in identifying the Creation with God's self-manifestation, which they regard as an eternally necessary moral act. 'It is of the very essence of mind or spirit,' says John Caird, 'that it contains in it the necessity of self-manifestation in objective form, and therefore that which we speak of as "the creation of the world" must be conceived as the expression not of arbitrary will, but of the very nature and being of God' (*Fund. Ideas of Christianity*, i. 84 f.). Green expressed the same profound thought more daringly by saying that the world is as necessary to God as God is to the world. The words of two leading German thinkers will show how the later philosophy and theology have welcomed the new conception:

'The will to create,' says Lotze, 'is an absolutely eternal predicate of God, and ought not to be used to designate a deed of His, so much as the absolute dependence of the world upon His will, in contradistinction to its voluntary emanation from His nature' (*Out. of Phil. of Rel.* 74). 'It is a sensuous representation,' says Lipsius, 'to trace creation back to a single act now lying in the past, or to speak of a first beginning of creation; rather is the whole world-development, so soon as it is viewed religiously, to be brought under the idea of creation, consequently to be regarded as without beginning or end' (*Dogmatik*, 293).

We cannot do better than close this section with the calm pronouncement of the Nestor of Scottish philosophy:

'I do not find,' says A. C. Fraser, 'that the presence of order and design within the cosmos means that the cosmos must have had a beginning. That the universe should exist without either a beginning or an end of its orderly metamorphoses, does not seem less consistent with the ideas of theism and providence, than the hypothesis of its sudden creation in time —whatever that may mean. . . . We seem to be born into an unbeginning and unending divinely natural evolution' (*Theism*[2], pp. 125, 133).

7. The scientific conception. — Science has widened man's cosmic view and increased his cosmic emotion. His doctrine of creation is transfigured in the light of astronomy and geology, biology and palæontology. His vision of the making of this world at a certain recent time, and of the rest of the universe with it, is replaced by a grander vision of the slow and progressive formation, by the action of physical forces, of a universe in which countless new worlds are being formed to-day just as this one—this satellite of the sun—was formed hundreds of millions of years ago. His idea of a primeval chaos, which found expression in all his antique cosmogonies (as in Gn 1[2]), is discarded for the conviction that, when he goes back as far as the wings of imagination can carry him, this universe, however changed in aspect, is still a cosmos. And his old belief that 'there are just as many species of plants and animals as there were different forms originally created by the Infinite Being; and that these different forms, according to the laws of reproduction imposed

upon them, produced others, but always forms like themselves' (Linnæus), has yielded to 'a view of life, with its several powers, having been originally breathed by the Creator into a few forms or into one; and, that, whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed law of gravity, from so simple a beginning endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been, and are being evolved' (Darwin, *Origin of Species*[6], p. 403).

'The progress of science,' as Driver frankly admits, 'has brought the Cosmogony of Genesis into sharp and undisguised antagonism with the Cosmogony of science, . . . and to expect to find in it supernatural information on points of scientific fact, is to mistake its entire purpose' (*Genesis*, p. 33). There is nothing, however, in the cosmogony of science that is in conflict with that conception of 'a great and good Maker of the world' which is found at the heart of so many primitive and savage religions; or with Isaiah's idea of a Creator who 'hath measured the waters in the hollow of his hand, and meted out heaven with the span, and comprehended the dust of the earth in a measure, and weighed the mountains in scales, and the hills in a balance'; or with the Platonic faith expressed in the *Timæus*: 'Let me tell you, then, why the Creator created and made the universe. He was good, and desired that all things should be as like Himself as possible' (Jowett, iii. 613).

The scientific conception of creation has important bearings upon religion. It has at once made God greater and brought Him nearer. It has not only immeasurably expanded the heavens which declare His glory, but it has substituted the action of an immanent for the action of a transcendent Creator. 'The general effect of the intellectual movement of modern times,' says J. Fiske, 'has been to discredit more than ever before the Latin idea of God as a power outside of nature and occasionally interfering with it' (*Through Nature to God*, 147). The 'Great Original' can no longer be conceived as a Demiurge or Master-builder, putting forth His power once and then staying His hand; His creative action is spread all along the line of gradual development, revealing itself in ever higher potencies. And in place of a God beyond the stars, who created the world once upon a time and then was content with 'seeing it go,' we have a Spirit who is 'closer than breathing, and nearer than hands and feet.'

Further research into the ultimate nature of matter seems destined to upset many hypotheses. 'There is nothing,' said Lord Kelvin, 'between absolute scientific belief in a Creative power, and the acceptance of the theory of a fortuitous concourse of atoms. . . . If you think strongly enough, you will be forced by science to the belief in God which is the foundation of all religion' (*Nineteenth Cent.*, June 1903). And now, even the atomic theory of the origin of things, after a vogue of more than 2000 years, is at length being set aside, for it is found, as Sir O. Lodge says, that the 'atoms of matter,' instead of being ultimate, 'are liable . . . to break up or explode, and so resolve themselves into simpler forms,' called electrons, which again are described as 'knots or twists or vortices, or some sort of either static or kinetic modification, of the ether of space' (*Life and Matter*, 28, 32). Ether 'is probably the fundamental substratum of the whole material world, underlying every kind of activity, and constituting the very atoms of which our own bodies are composed' (*The Substance of Faith*, 74). 'If any one thinks that ether, with all its massiveness and energy, has probably no psychical significance, I find myself unable to agree with him' (*The Ether of Space*, 1909, p. 114).

The scientific idea of creation as involution and evolution has thus brought us nearer than ever to 'the Mind which, like our own, must underlie the material fabric,' the Nous of Anaxagoras. 'The process of evolution can be regarded as the gradual unfolding of the Divine Thought, or *Logos*, throughout the universe, by the action of Spirit upon matter' (*Substance of Faith*, 59). There are some who 'recognise in this extraordinary development a contact between this material frame of things and a universe higher and other than anything known to our senses: . . . a universe capable of infinite development . . . long after this planet . . . shall have fulfilled its present spire of destiny, and retired cold and lifeless upon its endless way' (*Life and Matter*, 199 f.).

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J. STRACHAN.

CREEDS AND ARTICLES.

CREED (Bab.-Assyr.).—Though the religion of Babylonia and Assyria was practically homogeneous, there were probably nearly as many different beliefs as there were States or provinces; and the creed of the people became modified from time to time, either through the progress of thought or on account of political exigencies. These changes in the beliefs of the people, which sometimes bore upon the nature of the gods whom they worshipped, were in some cases such as to form either important variations in the original creeds, or transformations such as might have made a fresh statement of their position needful.

Notwithstanding that this was the case, it is not certain that in any of the centres of religious teaching the priests ever thought of putting forward anything in the nature of a creed, as we understand the word to-day; indeed, no document in which they have formulated the articles of their belief has yet come down to us, except the well-known legends of their gods (which, however, are more of the nature of sacred books), and certain introductions to incantations. That they should have formulated a statement of their religious beliefs, however, would not by any means have been either an impossible thing or against their ideas of religious propriety. Often enough, and seemingly at all periods, they declared their creeds in the names they bore. Thus, in the time of Lugal-anda and Uru-ka-gina (*c.* 4000 B.C.), we meet with names similar to the following: *(S)ur-Bau*, 'man of Bau'; *Ura-Dumuzi*, 'servant of Tammuz'; *Enim-Surupak*[1]*-zida*, 'the word of Surupak is true,' or the

[1] Or *Sukurra*. This was the god of Surippak, or Suruppak, now Fara, which was the city of Ut-napištim, the Babylonian Noah.

like; *Amar-Ašnan*, 'the corn-god's steer,' etc.; and names of the same character continued to be used all through the succeeding periods. During the early Semitic period (2000 B.C.) there occur names like *Šumma-îlu-lâ-îlia*, 'if God were not my god'; *Šumma-îlu-lâ-Šamaš*, 'if my god were not the sun-god'; *Sin-lâ-šanan*, 'Sin (the moon-god) has no equal'; *Zēr-panîtum-ummi*, 'Zērpanîtum is my mother'; *Yaum-îlu*, 'Jah is God'; *Nabium-îlu*, 'Nebo is god,' etc. In Assyrian literature we likewise find such names as *Aššur-taklak*, 'I trust in Aššur'; *Tukulti-Ninip*, 'my trust is Ninip,' with its synonym *Tukulti-âpil-êšarra* (Tiglath-pileser), 'my trust is the son of É-šarra'; *Uṣur-âmat-Êa*, 'keep the word (or command) of Ea'; *Sin-šadûa*, 'Sin is our mountain (of defence),' etc. Some names express belief as to the identity of divinities—possibly in opposition to those whose creed was different: for instance, *Nabû-yâ'u*, 'Nebo is Jah'; *Yâ-Dagunu*, 'Jah is Dagon'; and such names as *Yâ-âbîni*, 'Jah is our father,' form an interesting series. The Babylonians, like all the Semites, were intensely religious, and seldom objected to asserting their creed; indeed, some of the above names show that the Western Semites in general announced it boldly, and that what men called themselves became, as it were, a challenge to such as they regarded as heterodox.

Naturally, these are very short professions of faith, and it is doubtful whether longer ones are likely to be found. Sometimes, however, it seems to have been considered necessary to make some kind of a statement before beginning the utterance of an incantation. This took the form of a recital of some religious or mythological event, which justified the mystic words and the ceremonies which were to follow. Among these are the stories of the various evil spirits, the poetical description of the vine of Eridu, and the primitive account of the Creation prefixed to, and forming part of, the incantation to toothache. The composition most like a creed, however, is that known as the bilingual story of the Creation, which is prefixed to an incantation for purification:

Incantation.—The holy house, the house of the gods, in a holy place had not been made;
A plant had not been brought forth, a tree had not been created;
A brick had not been laid, a beam had not been shaped;
A house had not been built, a city had not been constructed;
A city had not been made, the inhabitants had not been installed (?);
Niffer had not been built, É-kura[1] had not been constructed;
Erech had not been built, É-anna[2] had not been constructed;
The Abyss had not been made, Eridu had not been constructed;
The holy house, the house of the gods—its seat had not been made;
The whole of the lands were sea.
When within the sea there was a stream,
In that day Eridu was made, É-sagila was constructed—
É-sagila, which the god Lugal-du-azaga had founded within the Abyss.
Babylon was built, É-sagila was completed;
He made the gods and the Anunnaki altogether,
The holy city, the seat of their hearts' joy, as supreme he proclaimed.
Marduk bound together a reed-bank before the waters,
He made earth, and poured it out against the bank,
To settle the gods in a seat of joy of heart.
He made mankind—
Aruru made the seed of mankind with him.
He made the beasts of the field and the living creatures in the desert;
He made the Tigris and the Euphrates, and set (them) there.
Well[3] proclaimed he their name.
Herb, the marsh-plant, the reed, and the thicket, he made;
He made the verdure of the plain;
The lands (and) the marshes were the reedy bank.
The cow, her young, the steer; the sheep, her young, the lamb of the fold;
Plantations and forests also.
The goat and the wild goat were dear (?) to him.
Lord Marduk made a bank on the sea-shore,
. . . . [whi]ch at first he made not,
. . . . he caused to be.
[He ma]de [the plant], he made the tree—
[Everything] he made there—
[He laid the brick], he made the beams;
[He constructed the house], he built the city;
[He built the city], he established the community;
[He built the city Niffer], he built É-kura the temple;
[He built the city Erech], he b[uilt É-a]na [the temple].

Here the obverse breaks off, and, where the text becomes legible again, on the reverse, it is an incantation for purification, similar to many others in Assyro-Babylonian literature.

It seems probable that the other centres of Divine worship in Babylonia had similar statements of the creed held in the place, and this presupposes theological schools and colleges for the priests. At present we do not know much, if anything, about them; but the temple-libraries may ultimately yield information upon the point, together with statements of their beliefs similar to that translated above.

Cf. also artt. BABYLONIANS AND ASSYRIANS, and COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY (Bab.).

LITERATURE.—M. Jastrow, *Rel. Bab. u. Assyr.*, Giessen, 1905 ff.; T. G. Pinches, 'Relig. Ideas of the Babylonians' (*Journ. of Vic. Inst.*, 1895), *Rel. of Bab. and Assyr.*, London, 1906, 'La Rel. des Babyloniens 2000 ans avant J.-C.' (*1st Congr. for Hist. of Religions*, Paris, 1900), 'Yâ and Yâwa' (*PSBA*, 1892), 'The Bab. Gods of War' (*ib.* 1906), 'The Legend of Merodach' (*ib.* 1908), 'The Goddess Ištar' (*ib.* 1909); F. Delitzsch, *Babel und Bibel*, Leipzig, 1905, p. 74, and *passim*.

T. G. PINCHES.

CREED (Buddhist).—Nearly six centuries before the birth of Christ, at a time when religious speculation in India was rife, Siddhārtha Gautama, the son of a Sākya chieftain, went forth from his home to 'seek after what was right.' Reverence and affection for the founder of one of the world's greatest religions have led his disciples, during many centuries, and in different Eastern countries, to embellish, in apocryphal literature, the story of Gautama's life and teaching. But it is beyond doubt that the scheme of life, religious faith, and moral standards attributed to the founder of Buddhism represents his actual teaching. In regard to this the greatest authorities on Buddhism are agreed.

'When it is recollected,' says Rhys Davids, 'that Gautama Buddha did not leave behind him a number of deeply simple sayings, from which his followers subsequently built up a system or systems of their own, but had himself thoroughly elaborated his doctrine, partly as to details, after, but in its fundamental points even before, his mission began; that, during his long career as teacher, he had ample time to repeat the principles and details of the system over and over again to his disciples, and to test their knowledge of it; and finally, that his leading disciples were, like himself, accustomed to the subtlest metaphysical distinctions, and trained to that wonderful command of memory which Indian ascetics then possessed; when these facts are recalled to mind, it will be seen that much more reliance may reasonably be placed upon the doctrinal parts of the Buddhist Scriptures than upon correspondingly late records of other religions' (*Buddhism*, p. 86 f.).

Oldenberg (*Buddha*, p. 206 f., Eng. tr.) speaks to the same general effect: 'On the whole we shall be authorized to refer to Buddha himself the most essential trains of thought which we find recorded in the sacred texts, and in many places it is probably not too much to believe that the very words in which the ascetic of the Sakya house couched his gospel of deliverance have come down to us as they fell from his lips. We find that, throughout the vast complex of ancient Buddhist literature which has been collected, certain mottoes and formulas, the expression of Buddhist convictions upon some of the weightiest problems of religious thought, are expressed over and over again in a standard form adopted once for all. Why may not these be words which have received their currency from the founder of Buddhism, which had been spoken by him hundreds and thousands of times throughout his long life, devoted to teaching?'

In the valley of the Ganges, the birthplace of Buddhism, there was, at the time when the new religion came into being, a maze of interacting ideas, which Rhys Davids (*Early Buddhism*, p. 23) has classified as follows: (1) The very wide and varied group of ideas about souls supposed to dwell within the bodies of men and animals, and to animate moving objects in Nature (trees and plants, rivers, planets, etc.). These may be summed under the convenient modern term of *Animism*. (2) We have later and more advanced

[1] The temple at Niffer. [2] The temple at Erech.
[3] Or, 'as (being) good.'

ideas about the souls supposed to animate the greater phenomena of Nature. These may be summed under the convenient modern term of *Polytheism*. (3) We have the still later idea of a unity lying behind all these phenomena, both of the first and of the second class—the hypothesis of a one First Cause on which the whole universe in its varied forms depends, in which it lives and moves, and which is the only reality. This may be summed under the convenient modern term of *Monism*. (4) We have the opposite view. In this the First Cause has either not been reached in thought, or it has been considered and deliberately rejected; but otherwise the whole soul-theory has been retained and amplified, and the hypothesis of the eternity of matter is held at the same time. This may be summed under the convenient modern term of *Dualism*.

'These modern Western terms, though useful for classification, never exactly fit the ancient Eastern thought. And we must never forget that the clear-cut distinctions we now use were then perceptible to only quite a few of the clearest thinkers. Most of the people held a strange jumble of many of the notions current around them. The enumeration here made is merely intended to show that, when Buddhism arose, the country was seething, very much as the Western world was at the same period, with a multitude of . . . theories on all sorts of questions—ethical, philosophical, and religious. There was much superstition, no doubt, and no little sophistry. But, owing partly to the easy economic conditions of those times, partly also to the mutual courtesy and intellectual alertness of the people, there was a very large proportion of them who were earnestly occupied in more or less successful attempts to solve the highest problems of thought and conduct' (*ib.* p. 24).

Traces of the influence of all these ideas upon his mind can be found in the teaching of Gautama, but the current beliefs satisfied neither his nature nor his aspirations. In two authoritative texts he reveals the reasons why prevailing beliefs were impotent to satisfy him, and why he set himself to endeavour to get to the fountain-head of truth. The first is as follows:

'An ordinary unscholared man, though himself subject to old age, not escaped beyond its power, when he beholds another man old, is hurt, ashamed, disgusted, overlooking the while his own condition. Thinking that that would be unsuitable to me, the infatuation of a youth in his youth departed utterly from me' (*Aṅguttara*, i. 146).

The other text says:

'Before the days of my enlightenment, when I was still only a Bodhisat, though myself subject to re-birth, old age, disease, and death, to sorrow and to evil, I sought after things subject also to them. Then methought: Why should I act thus? Let me, when subject to these things, seeing the danger therein, seek rather after that which is not subject thereto, even the supreme bliss and security of Nirvana' (*Majjhima*, i. 163).

After having followed, to no purpose, the paths of metaphysical speculation, of mental discipline, and of ascetic rigour, Gautama reaped on one memorable night the fruit of his prolonged spiritual effort, the truth of things being of a sudden so clearly revealed to him that thenceforth he never swerved for a moment from devotion to his creed and to the mission that it imposed upon him.

The enlightenment which Gautama received, and which was regarded by himself and his followers as a victory over all the powers of darkness, is uniformly described as

'a mental state of exaltation, bliss, insight, altruism. The different Suttas emphasize different phases, different facets, as it were, of this condition. But they regard it as one and the same upheaval of the whole mental and moral nature,—will, emotion, and intellect being equally concerned. Thus one Sutta (the Mahâ-saccaka) lays stress on the four Raptures, and the three forms of Knowledge; another (the Dvedhâ-vitakka) on the certainty, the absence of doubt; another (the Bhaya-bherava) on the conquest over fear and agitation; another (the Ariya-pariyesanâ) on the bliss and security of the Nirvana to which he then attained.'

In the first of these Suttas the recital ends:

'When this knowledge, this insight, had arisen within me, my heart was set free from the intoxication of lusts, set free from the intoxication of becomings, set free from the intoxication of ignorance. In me, thus emancipated, there arose the certainty of that emancipation. And I came to know: "Re-birth is at an end. The higher life has been fulfilled. What had to be done has been accomplished. After this present life there will be no beyond." This last insight did I attain to in the last watch of the night. Ignorance was beaten down, insight arose, darkness was destroyed, the light came, inasmuch as I was there strenuous, aglow, master of myself' (Rhys Davids, *Early Buddhism*, p. 35 f.).

Having received enlightenment, Buddha proceeded to Benares. There he met some of his former disciples, the five ascetics, and explained to them the fundamental truths of his religion—an exposition preserved in the *Dhammachakka-ppavattana Sutta*, the Sutta of the Foundation of the Kingdom of Righteousness.

'This expression is usually translated "Turning the wheel of the Law," which, while retaining the Buddhist figure of speech, fails to represent the idea the figure was meant to convey; the rendering in the text gives up the figure in order to retain the underlying meaning. The "*cakra*" (Pāli *cakka*) is no ordinary wheel; it is the sign of dominion; and a "*cakravarti*" is "he who makes the wheels of his chariots roll unopposed over all the world"—a universal monarch. *Dharma* (Pāli *Dhamma*) is not law, but that which underlies and includes the law,—a word often most difficult to translate, and best rendered here by truth or righteousness; whereas the word "law" suggests ceremonial observances, outward rules, which it was precisely the object of Gautama's teaching to do away with. *Pravartana* (Pāli *ppavattana*) is "setting in motion onwards," the commencement of an action which is to continue. The whole phrase means, therefore, "To set rolling the royal chariot-wheel of a universal empire of truth and righteousness"' (Rhys Davids, *Buddhism*, p. 45).

The full text of the Sutta is as follows:

'There are two extremes which he who has gone forth ought not to follow—habitual devotion, on the one hand, to the passions, to the pleasures of sensual things, a low and pagan way (of seeking satisfaction), ignoble, unprofitable, fit only for the worldly-minded; and habitual devotion, on the other hand, to self-mortification, which is painful, ignoble, unprofitable. There is a Middle Path discovered by the Tathâgata—a path which opens the eyes, and bestows understanding, which leads to peace, to insight, to the higher wisdom, to Nirvana. Verily! it is this Aryan Eight-fold Path; that is to say, Right Views, Right Aspirations, Right Speech, Right Conduct, Right Mode of Livelihood, Right Effort, Right Mindfulness, and Right Rapture.

Now this is the Noble Truth as to suffering. Birth is attended with pain, decay is painful, disease is painful, death is painful. Union with the unpleasant is painful, painful is separation from the pleasant; and any craving unsatisfied, that, too, is painful. In brief, the five aggregates of clinging (that is, the conditions of individuality) are painful.

Now this is the Noble Truth as to the origin of suffering. Verily! it is the craving thirst that causes the renewal of becomings, that is accompanied by sensual delights, and seeks satisfaction, now here, now there,—that is to say, the craving for the gratification of the senses, or the craving for a future life, or the craving for prosperity.

Now this is the Noble Truth as to the passing away of pain. Verily! it is the passing away so that no passion remains, the giving up, the getting rid of, the emancipation from, the harbouring no longer of, this craving thirst.

Now this is the Noble Truth as to the way that leads to the passing away of pain. Verily! it is this Aryan Eight-fold Path, that is to say, Right Views, Right Aspirations, Right Speech, Conduct, and Mode of Livelihood, Right Effort, Right Mindfulness, and Right Rapture' (Rhys Davids, *Early Buddhism*, p. 51 f.).

This concise statement contains all the essential elements of the Buddhist creed. The great deliverance, of which Gautama himself was conscious, and the means whereby he had attained it, formed the basis of all his subsequent teaching. It was this gospel of deliverance which won his earliest disciples, and which they in turn were commissioned by the Buddha to preach to suffering men. Sixty monks were soon enrolled as converts of the new faith, and they were sent forth as its first apostles. In sending them forth, Gautama thus addressed them:

'I am delivered from all fetters, human and divine. You, too, O monks, are freed from the same fetters. Go forth and wander everywhere, out of compassion for the world, and for the welfare of gods and men. Go forth, one by one, in different directions. Preach the doctrine, salutary in its beginning, middle, and end, in its spirit, and in its letter. Proclaim a life of perfect restraint, chastity, and celibacy. . . . I will go also to preach this doctrine' (*Mahāvagga*, i. 11. 1).

When the band of believers was increased to a thousand, Gautama preached his 'burning' fire-sermon, on a hill Gayāsīsa, near Gayā:

'Everything, O monks, is burning. . . . The eye is burning; visible things are burning. The sensation produced by contact with visible things is burning—burning with the fire of lust (desire), enmity, and delusion, with birth, decay, death, grief, lamentation, pain, dejection, and despair. The ear is burning, sounds are burning; the nose is burning, odours are burning; the tongue is burning, tastes are burning; the body is burning,

objects of sense are burning. The mind is burning, thoughts are burning. All are burning with the fire of passions and lusts. Observing this, O monks, a wise and noble disciple becomes weary of (or disgusted with) the eye, weary of visible things, weary of the ear, weary of sounds, weary of odours, weary of tastes, weary of the body, weary of the mind. Becoming weary, he frees himself from passions and lusts. When free, he realizes that his object is accomplished, that he has lived a life of restraint and chastity, that re-birth is ended' (*Mahāvagga*, i. 21. 2 ff.).

Shortly before his death the same teaching was again committed to the faithful Ānanda:

'O Ānanda, I am now grown old, and full of years, and my journey is drawing to its close; I have reached eighty years—my sum of days—and, just as a worn-out cart can only with much care be made to move along, so my body can only be kept going with difficulty. It is only when I become plunged in meditation that my body is at ease. In future be ye to yourselves your own light, your own refuge; seek no other refuge. Hold fast to the truth as your refuge; look not to any one but yourselves as a refuge' (*Mahā-parinibbāna-sutta*, ii. 32, 33).

Gautama afterwards delivered a summary of the duties of the monks who were to be the missionaries of his faith to the world:

'Which then, O monks, are the truths (the seven jewels) it behoves you to spread abroad, out of pity for the world, for the good of gods and men? They are: (1) the four earnest reflexions (*smṛiti, satipaṭṭhāna*; on the impurities of the body, on the impermanence of the sensations, of the thoughts, of the conditions of existence); (2) the four right exertions (*sammappadhāna*; viz. to prevent demerit from arising, get rid of it when arisen, produce merit, increase it); (3) the four paths to supernatural power (*iddhi-pāda*; viz. will, effort, thought, intense thought); (4) the five forces (*pañca-bala*; viz. faith, energy, recollection, self-concentration, reason); (5) the proper use of the five organs of sense; (6) the seven "limbs" of knowledge (*bodhy-aṅga*; viz. recollection, investigation, energy, joy, serenity, concentration of mind, equanimity); (7) the noble eight-fold path' (*Mahā-parinibbāna*, iii. 65).

In order to form an accurate judgment regarding the meaning of the teaching of Buddha as set forth in the *Dhammachakka-ppavattana Sutta*, it is necessary not only to explain the terms used in the Sutta, but also to understand the doctrines which it involves. In subsequent Suttas each word, each clause, and each idea in the Discourse is fully commented and enlarged upon. It is possible, in the light of these explanations, to arrive at a true conception of the meaning which the Discourses conveyed to early Buddhists. From the same sources a general idea of the underlying beliefs may be gained.

1. The Buddhist scheme of life.—In Buddhist thought man is not regarded as a soul residing in a physical body, or as possessing a soul which may be separated from the body and continue to exist. A belief in self or soul is regarded so distinctly as a heresy that two well-known words in Buddhist terminology have been coined on purpose to stigmatize it. The first of these is *sakkāya-diṭṭhi*, 'the heresy of individuality,' the name given to this belief as one of the three primary delusions (the others being doubt, and belief in the efficacy of rites and ceremonies) which must be abandoned at the very first stage of the Buddhist path of holiness. The other is *attavāda*, 'the doctrine of soul or self,' which is a name given to it as a part of the chain of causes which lead to the origin of evil. It is there classed—with sensuality, heresy (as to eternity and annihilation), and belief in the efficacy of rites and ceremonies—as one of the four *upādānas*, which are the immediate cause of birth, decay, death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair.

What then is man? He is an aggregate of different properties or qualities—called *skandhas*, or aggregates. These *skandhas* are as follows: (1) the material properties or attributes (*rūpa*); (2) the sensations (*vedanā*); (3) the abstract ideas (*sannā*): (4) the tendencies or potentialities (lit. 'confections,' *saṅkhārā*); and (5) thought, reason (*viññāṇa*).

It is distinctly laid down that none of these *skandhas* separately, nor the *skandhas* as a whole, is the soul.

'Therefore, O monks, whatever in the way of material form, sensations, perceptions, etc., respectively, has ever been, will be, or is, either in our case or in the outer world, or strong or weak, or low or high, or far or near, *it is not self*; this must he in truth perceive, who possesses real knowledge. Whosoever regards things in this light, O monks, being a wise and noble hearer of the word, turns himself from sensation and perception, from conformation and consciousness. When he turns therefrom, he becomes free from desire: by the cessation of desire he obtains deliverance; in the delivered there arises a consciousness of his deliverance: re-birth is extinct, holiness is completed, duty is accomplished; there is no more a return to this world, he knows' (*Mahāvagga*, i. 6. 44 ff.).

Gautama refused not only to give a definite answer to questions concerning the relation of the body to the soul, but even to discuss the matter. The question 'whether the soul is the same as the body, or different from it,' was one of the Indeterminates, prohibited questions.

It is the union of the *skandhas* which makes the individual:

'Every person, or thing, or god is therefore a putting together, a compound. And in each individual, without any exception, the relation of its component parts is ever changing, is never the same for two consecutive moments. It follows that no sooner has separateness, individuality, begun, than dissolution, disintegration, also begins. There can be no individuality without a putting together: there can be no putting together without a becoming; there can be no becoming without a becoming different: and there can be no becoming different without a dissolution, a passing away, which sooner or later will inevitably be complete' (Rhys Davids, *Early Buddhism*, p. 57).

The great fact of life is the 'Wheel of Life,' called *Paticca-Sammuppāda* (*i.e.* origination through dependence): (1) on account of Ignorance, the *sankhāras*; (2) on account of the *saṅkhāras*, Consciousness; (3) on account of Consciousness, Name and Form; (4) on account of Name and Form, the six Provinces (of the six senses); (5) on account of the six Provinces, Contact; (6) on account of Contact, Sensation; (7) on account of Sensation, Craving; (8) on account of Craving, Attachment; (9) on account of Attachment, Becoming; (10) on account of Becoming, Birth; (11) (12) on account of Birth, old age, and death, grief, lamentation, suffering, dejection, and despair.

Buddhism teaches that everything in life has a cause, and that the Wheel of Life *must* revolve, one cause leading to another, according to an irresistible law. But there is no attempt to explain the ultimate cause of all things. This Doctrine is embodied in the familiar stanza, which is engraved upon many an image of the Buddha, and impressed upon the moulded ashes of the dead:

'Of all the phenomena sprung from a cause
The Buddha the cause hath told,
And he tells, too, how each shall come to its end,
Such alone is the word of the Sage' (*Vinaya*, i. 40).

Death does not cause the Wheel of Life to cease to turn; it is only a link in the ceaseless chain of existence. At the moment of death a new life comes into being. The *skandhas* re-combine, under conditions determined by the amount of merit or demerit which their previous combination has accumulated. The man is the same as his predecessor in the chain of re-birth. And yet he is not the same; he is on a higher or a lower scale of existence, according as his previous life has been good or bad. This is *karma* (*q.v.*), the doctrine on which the whole of Buddhism turns.

Existence is conjoined with pain—pain to which there is no ending. The conditions which make an individual are the conditions that give rise to pain. Birth, death, disease, unions, separations, unsatisfied cravings, in fact all that goes to make individuality, are painful; existence, from beginning to end, is painful.

But why this pain of life, this life of pain? The second truth answers the question. Rhys Davids says that the last words in this Noble Truth might be rendered 'the lust of the flesh, the lust of life,

and the love of this present world' (*Early Buddhism*, p. 55). The author of *The Creed of Buddha* says (p. 80), with reference to this craving, or thirst, which Gautama affirmed to be the origin of suffering:

'Desire for the pleasures, or rather for the joys, that minister to the real self is wholly good. It is desire for the pleasures that minister to the lower self; it is the desire to affirm the lower self, to live in it, to cling to it, to rest in it; it is the desire to identify oneself with the individual self and the impermanent world which centres in it, instead of with the Universal Self and the eternal world of which it is at once the centre and the circumference:—it is this desire, taking a thousand forms, which is evil, and which proves itself to be evil by causing ceaseless suffering to mankind. If the self is to be delivered from suffering, desire for what is impermanent, changeable, and unreal must be extinguished; and the gradual extinction of unworthy desire must therefore be the central purpose of one's life.'

The question that Gautama set himself to solve was the cessation of the pain consequent upon and inherent in existence itself, and the answer to his search was the attainment of Nirvāṇa, by way of the Noble Eight-fold Path.

2. The Eight-fold Path.—The divisions of the path are, as already stated: Right Views, Right Aspirations, Right Speech, Right Conduct, Right Mode of Livelihood, Right Effort, Right Mindfulness, Right Rapture. The four stages of the path are: (1) The 'entering upon the stream,' *Conversion*; which follows on (*a*) companionship with the good, (*b*) hearing of the law, (*c*) enlightened reflexion, or (*d*) the practice of virtue. The unconverted man is unwise, under the influence of sin, enmity, and impurity; but if, by one or more of the means just mentioned, he has arrived at a perception of the 'four Noble Truths,' he has become converted, and has entered the first path. While in this path, he becomes free successively from the delusion of self, from doubt as to the Buddha and his doctrines, and from the belief in the efficacy of rites and ceremonies. 'Better than universal empire in this world, better than going to heaven, better than lordship over all worlds is (this three-fold) fruit of the first path' (*Dhammapāda*, verse 178). (2) The path of those who will only once return to this world. The converted man, free from doubt and the delusions of self and ritualism, succeeds in this path in reducing to a minimum lust, hatred, and delusion. (3) The path of those who will never return to this world; in which, the last remnants of sensuality and malevolence being destroyed, not the least low desire for oneself, or wrong feeling towards others, can arise in the heart. (4) The path of the holy ones; more exactly, worthy ones, *arahats*; in which the saint becomes free from desire for material, or immaterial, existence; from pride and self-righteousness, and ignorance (Rhys Davids, *Buddhism*, p. 108 f.).

Several words are used in this description of the Eight-fold Path which require explanation.

i. *Right Views.*—Right Views refer principally to the four truths, enunciated in the *Dhammachakka-ppavattana Sutta*, and the 'three signs,' which include (*a*) the first of the four truths, (*b*) impermanence, and (*c*) non-soul, *i.e.* the absence of a soul. Impermanence and non-soul are both declared to be the 'signs' of every individual, whether god, man, or animal.

ii. *Right Aspirations.*—The Buddhist faith does not teach the suppression of all desire, but the suppression of evil desires, low ideals, useless cravings, idle excitements, by the cultivation of the opposite—right desires and lofty aspirations. In the *Majjhima* (iii. 25) examples are given of right desire, *e.g.* the desire for emancipation from sensuality, aspirations after the attainment of love for others, the wish not to injure any living thing, the desire for the eradication of wrong, and for the promotion of right dispositions in the heart.

iii. *Right Speech.*—To shun the company of the witless; to hold communion with the wise; to give honour where honour is due: this is a great blessing (*Mahā-parinibbāna Sutta*, i. 31).

iv. *Right Conduct.*—The two most important features of this quality are love and joy. Love, in the Pāli, is *mettā*, and the *Mettā Sutta* (*Sutta Nipāta*, viii. 7–9) says:

'As a mother, even at the risk of her own life, protects her son, her only son, so let him cultivate love without measure towards all beings. Let him cultivate towards the whole world—above, below, around—a heart of love unstinted, unmixed with the sense of differing or opposing interests. Let a man maintain this mindfulness all the while he is awake, whether he be standing, walking, sitting, or lying down. This state of heart is the best in the world.'

Again, the *Majjhima* (i. 129):

'Our mind shall not waver. No evil speech will we utter. Tender and compassionate will we abide, loving in heart, void of malice within. And we will be ever suffusing such an one with the rays of our loving thought. And with that feeling as a basis we will ever be suffusing the whole world with the thought of love, far-reaching, grown great, beyond measure, void of anger or ill-will.'

And the *Itivuttaka* (xxvi.):

'All the means that can be used as bases for doing right are not worth the sixteenth part of the emancipation of heart through Love. That takes all those up into itself, outshining them in radiance and glory, just as whatsoever stars there be, their radiance avails not the sixteenth part of the radiance of the moon. That takes all those up into itself, outshining them in radiance and glory—just as in the last month of the rains, at harvest time, the sun, mounting up on high into the clear and cloudless sky, overwhelms all darkness in the realms of space, and shines forth in radiance and glory—just as in the night, when the dawn is breaking, the Morning Star shines out in radiance and glory—just so all the means that can be used as helps towards doing right avail not the sixteenth part of the emancipation of the heart through Love.'

The joy of the faith is referred to in the 'Dialogues of the Buddha':

'When these five Hindrances have been put away within him, he looks upon himself as freed from debt, rid of disease, out of jail, a free man, and secure. And gladness springs up within him on his realizing that, and joy arises to him thus gladdened, and so rejoicing all his frame becomes at ease, and being thus at ease he is pervaded with a sense of peace, and in that peace his heart is stayed' (Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, i. 84).

v. *Right Mode of Livelihood.*—'Whoso hurts and harms living creatures, destitute of sympathy for any living thing, let him be known as an outcaste' (*Vasala Sutta, Sutta Nipāta*, vii. 2).

vi. *Right Effort.*—This signifies 'a constant intellectual alertness.' The three cardinal sins of Buddhism are: sensuality (*dosa*), ill-will (*moha*), and stupidity or dullness (*rāga*); the last mentioned being regarded as the worst.

The 'Four Great Efforts' (*sammappadhānā*) are the effort or exertion (*a*) to prevent sinfulness arising, (*b*) to put away sinful states which have arisen, (*c*) to produce goodness not previously existing, and (*d*) to increase goodness where it does exist (*Mahā-parinibbāna-sutta*, *SBE* xi. 63 n.).

'The Four Roads to Saintship' (*iddhipādā*) are four means by which saintship is obtained, viz. (*a*) the will to acquire it, (*b*) the necessary exertion, (*c*) the necessary preparation of the heart, and (*d*) investigation (*SBE* xi. 63).

vii. *Right Mindfulness.*—This is closely connected with Right Effort. Dialogues in the *Dīgha* (ii. 290–315) and *Majjhima* (i. 55 f.) are devoted to the subject:

'The disciple, whatsoever he does, whether going forth or coming back, standing or walking, speaking or silent, eating or drinking, is to keep clearly in his mind all that it means, the temporary character of the act, its ethical significance, and that, above all, behind the act there is no actor (goer, seer, eater, speaker) that is an eternally persistent unity.'

viii. *Right Rapture.*—In the *Dhammapāda* (verses 197–200) this Right Rapture is thus described:

'It is in very bliss we dwell, we who hate not those who hate us;
Among men full of hate, we continue void of hate.
It is in very bliss we dwell, we in health among the ailing;
Among men weary and sick, we continue well.
It is in very bliss we dwell, free from care among the care-worn;

Among men full of worries, we continue calm.
It is in very bliss we dwell, we who have no hindrances;
We will become feeders on joy, like the gods in their shining splendour!'

In conformity with the Pāli text, all the divisions of the Eight-fold Path are described by a single word—'right.' This is, perhaps, the best translation of the original *sammā*. The word signifies 'going with'; used as an adjective, it is rendered 'general,' 'common,' or 'corresponding,' 'mutual'; as an adverb, 'commonly,' 'usually,' 'normally,' or 'fittingly,' 'properly,' 'correctly.' It is used, in a secondary sense, to mean round, fit and perfect, normal and complete. 'Right,' therefore, in the sense of 'correct' has to be understood, *i.e.* in agreement with the teaching of Gautama. The word is not used with a moral significance. The eight-fold description of the perfect life is of such vital importance for the correct understanding of the Buddhist creed that it may be convenient to summarize the meaning of each division of the path:

1. Right views; free from superstition or delusion.
2. Right aspirations; high and worthy of the intelligent man.
3. Right speech; kindly, open, truthful.
4. Right conduct; peaceful, honest, pure.
5. Right livelihood; bringing hurt or danger to no living thing.
6. Right effort; in self-training and self-control.
7. Right mindfulness; the active, watchful mind.
8. Right rapture; earnest thought on the deep mysteries of life.

Gogerly (*Journ. Ceylon As. Soc.*, 1865) gives a slightly different rendering:

1. Correct views (of truth).	Correct doctrines.
2. Correct thoughts.	A clear perception (of their nature).
3. Correct words.	Inflexible veracity.
4. Correct conduct.	Purity of conduct.
5. Correct (mode of obtaining a) livelihood.	A sinless occupation.
6. Correct efforts.	Perseverance in duty.
7. Correct meditation.	Holy meditation.
8. Correct tranquillity.	Mental tranquillity.

3. **The hindrances in the way.**—The hindrances in the way of treading the Eight-fold Path, and thus securing deliverance, are very clearly detailed. They are described under different headings—'the Five Hindrances,' 'the Ten Fetters,' and 'the Four Intoxications.'

(*a*) The Five Hindrances (*nivaranā*) are sensuality, ill-will, torpor of mind or body, worry, and wavering. These affect a man like debt, disease, imprisonment, slavery, and anxiety.—(*b*) The Ten Fetters (*sangyojanas*) are: (1) delusions about the soul (*sakkāya-diṭṭhi*), (2) doubt (*vicikicchā*), (3) reliance on ceremonies (*sīlabbata-parāmāsa*), (4) sensuality (*kāma*), (5) ill-will (*paṭigha*), (6) desire for re-birth on earth (*rūpa-rāga*), (7) desire for re-birth in heaven (*arūpa-rāga*), (8) pride (*māno*), (9) self-righteousness (*uddhacca*), (10) ignorance (*avijjā*).—(*c*) The Four Intoxications consist in the mental infatuation arising from sensual pleasures, from the pride of life, from ignorance, and from speculation.

4. **The ultimate aim—Nirvāṇa.**—When the traveller has resolutely trodden the Eight-fold Path, overcome the Hindrances, broken the Fetters, and resisted the Intoxications, he has reached the goal of all Buddhist ambition and effort—Nirvāṇa.

'To him who has finished the Path, and passed beyond sorrow, who has freed himself on all sides, and thrown away every fetter, there is no more fever of grief.' 'Him whose senses have become tranquil, like a horse well broken-in by the driver; who is free from pride and the lust of the flesh, and the lust of existence, and the defilement of ignorance—him even the gods envy. Such a one whose conduct is right, remains like the broad earth, unvexed; like the pillar of the city gate, unmoved; like a pellucid lake, unruffled. For such there are no more births. Tranquil is the mind, tranquil the words and deeds of him who is thus tranquillized, and made free by wisdom' (*Dhammapāda*, verses 90, 94-96).

'They who, by steadfast mind, have become exempt from evil desire, and well-trained in the teachings of Gautama; they, having obtained the fruit of the Fourth Path, and immersed themselves in that ambrosia, have received without price, and are in the enjoyment of, Nirvāṇa... Their old *karma* is exhausted, no new *karma* is being produced; their hearts are free from the longing after future life; the cause of their existence being destroyed, and no new yearnings springing up within them, they, the wise, are extinguished like this lamp' (*Ratana Sutta*, 7. 14). 'That mendicant conducts himself well who has conquered (sin) by means of holiness, from whose eyes the veil of error has been removed, who is well-trained in religion, and who, free from yearning, and skilled in the knowledge, has attained unto Nirvāṇa' (*Sammāparibbājaniya Sutta*, 14).

The word *Nibbāna* (Pāli for *Nirvāṇa*) occurs only infrequently in the Piṭakas. A few illustrations of its use in the *Dhammapāda* are given:

'These wise people [speaking of Arahats], meditative, persevering, ever full of strength, attain to Nirvāṇa, the highest bliss' (verse 23). 'The mendicant who delights in diligence, and looks with terror on sloth, cannot fall away,—he is in the very presence of Nirvāṇa' (verse 32). 'If thou keepest thyself as silent as a broken gong, thou hast attained Nirvāṇa; no angry clamour is found in thee' (verse 134). [The preceding verse condemns harsh speaking.] 'The Buddhas declare the best self-mortification to be patience, long-suffering; the best (thing of all) to be Nirvāṇa; for he is no (true) monk who strikes, no (true) mendicant who insults others' (verse 184) 'There is no fire like lust, there is no sin like hate, there is no misery like the *skandhas*, there is no happiness like peace. Hunger is the worst disease, the *sankāras* the worst suffering: knowing this as it really is, is Nirvāṇa, the highest bliss' (verse 202 f.). 'Those who are ever on the watch, who study day and night, whose heart is set on Nirvāṇa, their sinfulness dies away' [lit. 'their Āsavas go to an end'] (verse 226).

In the light of these passages, what is Nirvāṇa? In the original it means 'going out,' 'extinction.' It cannot mean the extinction of the soul.

'It is the extinction of that sinful, grasping condition of mind and heart, which would otherwise, according to the great mystery of Karma, be the cause of renewed individual existence. That extinction is to be brought about by, and runs parallel with, the growth of the opposite condition of mind and heart; and it is complete when that opposite condition is reached. Nirvāṇa is therefore the same thing as a sinless, calm state of mind; and, if translated at all, may best, perhaps, be rendered "holiness"—holiness, that is, in the Buddhist sense, perfect peace, goodness, and wisdom' (Rhys Davids, *Buddhism*, p. 111 f.). See, further, art. NIRVANA.

Describing Nirvāṇa, Rhys Davids says (*Early Buddhism*, p. 72 f.):

'One might fill columns with the praises, many of them among the most beautiful passages in Pali poetry and prose, lavished on this condition of mind, the state of the man made perfect according to the Buddhist faith. Many are the pet names, the poetic epithets, bestowed upon it, each of them—for they are not synonyms—emphasizing one or other phase of this many-sided conception—the harbour of refuge, the cool cave, the island amidst the floods, the place of bliss, emancipation, liberation, safety, the supreme, the transcendental, the uncreated, the tranquil, the home of ease, the calm, the end of suffering, the medicine for all evil, the unshaken, the ambrosia, the immaterial, the imperishable, the abiding, the further shore, the unending, the bliss of effort, the supreme joy, the ineffable, the detachment, the holy city, and many others. Perhaps the most frequent in the Buddhist texts is Arahatship, "the state of him who is worthy"; and the one exclusively used in Europe is Nirvana, the "dying out," that is, the dying out in the heart of the fell fire of the three cardinal sins—sensuality, ill-will, and stupidity' (*Saṁyutta*, iv. 251, 261).

Such, then, according to the authoritative Buddhist scriptures, is the creed of Buddhism. But is it the whole of the creed which Gautama preached to the world? Was this the faith by which Buddha won the 'deepest heart of the East'? The new religion was *materialistic*, i.e. Buddha denied the soul, or ego; *atheistic*, i.e. there was no place for God in his system of thought; *pessimistic*, i.e. he regarded all existence as intrinsically evil; *egoistic*, i.e. in his scheme of life he taught men to think of themselves and their personal welfare; *nihilistic*, i.e. he regarded Nothing as the supreme reality. Oldenberg says of the philosophy of Buddha: 'We have a fragment of a circle, to complete which, and to find the centre of which, is forbidden, for

it would involve an inquiry after things which do not contribute to deliverance and happiness' (*op. cit.* p. 208). Some writers have accepted this view, and have sought to complete the circle from its segment, and to find its centre, arguing that a creed involving materialism, atheism, pessimism, egoism, and nihilism could never have achieved the triumph which attended the propaganda of Buddhism; and therefore only a part, and not the whole, of Buddha's teaching has been handed down. It is claimed, for instance, that the central truth of Buddhism was 'the conception that the Universal Self is the true self of each one of us, and that to realize the true self is the destiny and the duty of man.' The early triumph of the faith may be difficult to understand, but there is no ground for assuming that the Buddhist scriptures contain an incomplete statement of the great, central, and essential truths preached by Gautama. Details of the teaching may be lacking, but we are in possession of its essence.

There can be no doubt that Gautama's scheme of life and religious teaching lost its charm over the minds of men in the course of a few centuries —among other reasons, on account of its negations, and the absence of an effective dynamic. Hence the rise of the Mahāyāna school of Buddhism, and its new doctrine, namely, (1) help from God to save oneself and others from suffering; (2) communion with God, which gave the highest ecstatic rest to the soul; and (3) the possibility of participation in the nature of God, so that mortals might become Divine and immortal.[1] One result quickly followed. The old Buddhists of the Hīnayāna school were unwilling that their teacher, Sākyamuni, should occupy a second place in the new creed, and so they deified him, and worshipped him exactly as the Mahāyāna school worshipped God. From the time of the deification of Buddha, Buddhism took a new lease of life, and became one of the world's greatest religions. Modern Buddhism presents to the world to-day a curious combination of the earliest teaching and its later developments.

Monier-Williams thus summarizes the achievements of the Buddhist faith in its earliest years in the land of its birth:

'What the Buddha then did was this: first he stretched out the hand of brotherhood to all mankind by inviting all, without exception, to join his fraternity of celibate monks, which he wished to be co-extensive with the world itself. Then he abolished the Brahminical "ways of salvation," *i.e.* Yajna "sacrifices," and Bhakti "devotion to personal gods," and substituted for these meditation and moral conduct as the only road to true knowledge and emancipation. And then, lastly, he threw open this highest way of true knowledge to all who wished to enter it, of whatever rank, or caste, or mental calibre they might be, not excepting the most degraded. Without doubt, the distinguishing feature in the Buddha's gospel was, that no living being, not even the lowest, was to be shut out from true enlightenment' (*Buddhism*, p. 96 f.).

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J. H. BATESON.

CREEDS (Ecumenical). — **I. The Apostles' Creed.**—Within two generations from the Apostles a catechist at Rome produced the famous form which lies at the root probably of all similar forms, certainly in the West, and reflects without question the recent teaching of the great Apostles Peter and Paul. Kattenbusch traces the Old Roman Creed back to the year ± 100 A.D., and finds in it the archetype of all other forms in both East and West. Other writers, notably Zahn and Sanday, conjecture an Eastern type, a sister form, which they trace back to Antioch, regarding the later legend of Apostolic authorship, taught, *e.g.*, by Rufinus (*c.* A.D. 400), as enshrining this modicum of truth —that the Apostles had agreed on such a form, which in the East and West passed through many modifications. It will be convenient to quote this Old Roman Creed:

OLD ROMAN CREED.

I. 1. I believe in God, (the)[1] Father Almighty;
II. 2. And in Christ Jesus, His only Son, our Lord,
3. Who was born of the Holy Ghost and the Virgin Mary,
4. crucified under Pontius Pilate and buried,
5. the third day He rose from the dead,
6. He ascended into heaven,
7. sitteth at the right hand of the Father,
8. thence He shall come to judge living and dead.
III. 9. And in the Holy Ghost,
10. (the) Holy Church,
11. (the) remission of sins,
12. (the) resurrection of the flesh.

At first we can trace only bare allusions, as in a passage of Marcion's revised New Testament where he speaks of the 'covenant which begets us in the Holy Church,' and implies that the words 'Holy Church' were contained in the Baptismal Creed which had been taught him in Rome before his breach with the Church in A.D. 145. So, again, in two passages of Tertullian:

de Virg. Vel. i.: 'The rule of faith, indeed, is one altogether . . . of believing in one God Almighty, Maker of the world, and in His Son Jesus Christ, born of Mary the Virgin, crucified under Pontius Pilate; the third day raised from the dead, received in the heavens, sitting now at the right hand of the Father, about to come to judge quick and dead, through the resurrection also of the flesh.'

de Præscr. xiii.: 'What the (Roman) Church has made a common token with the African Churches: has recognized one God, Creator of the universe, and Christ Jesus, of the Virgin Mary, Son of God, the Creator, and the resurrection of the flesh.'

With scanty references in Dionysius and Novatian, we pass on to the 4th cent., when Creeds come out to the light of day, and, greatly to our advantage, Marcellus, Bishop of Ancyra, who had been kindly received as an exile by Bishop Julius of Rome (*c.* A.D. 337), left on record his acceptance of the faith of the Roman Church. The accuracy of his quotation, recorded by Epiphanius, is confirmed by the testimony of Rufinus, priest of Aquileia, who (*c.* A.D. 400) wrote a commentary on this form, and compared with it the slightly different form of Aquileia. It is quite possible that Kattenbusch has minimized the evidence for the existence of similar Eastern forms of the 3rd century. He thinks that the Creeds of Cæsarea and Jerusalem, recovered from the pages of Athanasius and Cyril, were derived from the Roman Creed after the date when Paul of Samosata was deposed (*c.* A.D. 272); and that the Roman Creed was altered to meet the needs of the East, and became the parent of Creeds in Asia Minor and Egypt as well as in Palestine.

At present the theory of Kattenbusch still holds the field, and is supported by Harnack; but his critics are closing him in on every side. Kunze, working on the same lines as Zahn, reconstructs an Antiochene Creed of the 3rd cent., which he claims as an independent sister form:

CREED OF ANTIOCH.

I. 1. I believe in one and an only true God, Father Almighty, Maker of all things, visible and invisible.
II. 2. And in one Lord Jesus Christ, His Son, the only-begotten and firstborn of all creation, begotten of Him before all the ages, through whom also the ages were established, and all things came into existence.
3. Who, for our sakes, came down and was born of Mary the Virgin,
4. And crucified under Pontius Pilate, and buried,
5. And the third day rose according to the Scriptures,

[1] Hence, also, the evolution of the thought of a Divine Saviour in the person of Avalokiteśvara (*q.v.*), which was a purely metaphysical invention, and of Maitreya, the future Buddha.

[1] The definite article is enclosed in brackets when it is not found in the Greek text of Marcellus.

6. And ascended into heaven.
7.
8. And is coming again to judge quick and dead.

III. 9. [The beginning of the third article has not been recorded.]
10.
11. Remission of sins.
12. Resurrection of the dead, life everlasting.[1]

The Creed which Zahn has reconstructed from the *Didascalia*, a book written in the 3rd cent. not far from Antioch, affords an instructive contrast.

CREED OF THE DIDASCALIA.

I. 1. I believe in God Almighty.

II. 2. And in our Lord Jesus Christ (His Son?), who for us came and
3. was born of (Mary the?) a virgin,
4. and was crucified under Pontius Pilate and died,
5. the third day rose from (the?) dead,
6. and ascended into the heavens,
7. and sitteth on the right hand of God the Almighty,
8. and is coming with power and glory to judge dead and living.

III. 9. And in the Holy Ghost . . .
10. (a Holy Church?) . . .
12. resurrection of the dead.[2]

The uncertainties attending such reconstructions stand in marked contrast with the comparative certainty with which we can trace back the Old Roman Creed, the only really doubtful point about which is the question whether originally it did not read: 'I believe in one God, the Father Almighty,' which is suggested by the testimony of Tertullian. Tertullian, in his criticism of Praxeas, the first modalist Monarchian (that is to say, a theologian who confused the distinctions between the Divine Persons), says (*adv. Praxean*, i.): 'He routed the Paraclete, and crucified the Father.' Under these circumstances we can commend the prudence of the leaders of the Roman Church if they dropped the word 'one' as liable to misunderstanding. Zahn quotes a passage from Eusebius in which heretics are said to have accused the Roman Church of re-coining the truth like forgers, and makes the acute suggestion that the reference was to some change in the Baptismal Creed. We cannot suppose that the immutability of the Roman Creed praised by Rufinus would necessarily extend through all the past centuries.

Again, Loofs,[3] comparing 4th cent. Eastern Creeds, endeavours to prove the existence of an Eastern type which would include the word 'one' in Article I. with a reference to the Creator: 'crucified under Pontius Pilate'; and in the third division the words 'catholic' and 'eternal life.' But the resultant form would be on the same plane of development as the Roman, as compared with the theological Creeds of the 4th century. There is always the possibility that such a Creed may have been brought to the East from Rome in the 2nd century. Justin Martyr has close coincidences of language, which, in Kattenbusch's[4] opinion, prove his acquaintance with the Roman Creed, though Zahn[5] thinks that he is quoting his own Creed of Ephesus. The same may be said of Irenæus, whose writings must be searched in the light of these opposing theories before we can decide whether he brought his creed from Rome:

c. *Hær.* I. x. 1: 'The Church, though dispersed throughout the whole world, even to the ends of the earth, has received from the apostles and their disciples this faith: [She believes] in one God, the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth, and the sea and all things that are in them; and in one Christ Jesus the Son of God, who became incarnate for our salvation; and in the Holy Spirit, who proclaimed through the prophets the dispensations of God and the advents, and the birth from a virgin, and the passion, and the resurrection from the dead, and the ascension into heaven in the flesh of the beloved Christ Jesus, our Lord, and His [future] manifestation from heaven in the glory of the Father "to gather all things in one," and to raise up anew all flesh of the whole human race, in order that to Christ Jesus our Lord and God and Saviour and King, according to the will of the invisible Father, "every knee should bow, of things in heaven, and things in earth, and things under the earth, and that every tongue should confess to Him," and that He should execute just judgment towards all.'

While Irenæus has some phrases which remind us of the Roman Creed, the lack of any mention of the Holy Ghost at the end of this rule of faith makes it doubtful whether his personal creed was any more than a short Christological confession, the longer form quoted above representing a summary of his ordinary teaching on the lines laid down by tradition. Here is a problem which demands further investigation, and we must say the same of the very interesting researches of Connolly in the writings of Aphraates, from which he deduces the existence of an early Syriac Creed.[1] This includes mention of the Creation in Art. I.; confession of our Lord Jesus Christ as God, Son of God, Light from Light, who came and put on a body from Mary the Virgin of the seed of the house of David, from the Holy Spirit, and suffered (or was crucified), went down to the place of the dead, rose, ascended, sat on the right hand of the Father, is judge of the dead and of the living; confession of the Holy Spirit, followed by '[And I believe] in the coming to life of the dead; [and] in the mystery of Baptism (of the remission of sins).'

After all, it does not matter which way the question as to the form is answered ultimately, since the facts taught were the same in the East as in Rome.

The later history of the Creed is still at some points obscure. We know that it was used by the Abbot Pirminius, who founded monasteries at Reichenau and Hornbach. It is quoted in the *Codex Einsidlensis* 199 of the 8th cent., and the *Dicta Abbatis Pirminii*, which was written about A.D. 730. Probably it was brought into its present shape at Luxeuil or Bobbio. All the later additions, such as 'descended into hell' and 'communion of saints,' were in use in the Gallican Creeds of the 5th cent., with the exception of 'maker of heaven and earth.' This latest addition may have come in some way through the travels of Columban, who in Burgundy and Rhætia came across relics of the Old Latin Church of the Danube, and the stream of influence which had flowed from the East in earlier times.[2] Nicetas of Remesiana had both 'maker of heaven and earth' and 'communion of saints' in his Creed; and the *Faith of St. Jerome*, recently discovered by Morin, which is another connecting link between East and West, probably includes phrases which St. Jerome had learned in his native Pannonian Creed. Any way, we can make sure that it was from Rome that the Received Text was finally spread, since there are indications that Pirminius was quoting from a Roman source, and there would be every reason for the decision in favour of a revision of the Old Roman Creed in the light of experience which had found each of the added phrases useful. The desire of Charles the Great for uniformity, and his careful inquiries about the different uses in Gaul and in Rome, led to the triumph of this Revision throughout the Western Church, as the Creed of daily use, although the Baptismal Creed of the Church of England still retains certain Gallican peculiarities, 'only-begotten' (=*unigenitus*, not *unicus*), 'shall come *again at the end of the world*,' and 'everlasting life *after death*.'[3]

2. The Nicene Creed.—The history of the Nicene Creed begins with the Council of Nicæa, when the Creed presented by Eusebius of Cæsarea was deliberately revised to guard against the doctrines of Arianism. Whether he had composed it for the occasion, or had simply quoted verbatim

[1] *Theol. Litteraturblatt*, xxxiii. [1911] 19, 221.
[2] 'Neuere Beiträge zur Gesch. des apost. Symbolums,' in *N. Kirchl. Zeitschr.* vii. (1896) 23.
[3] *Symbolik*, Tübingen, 1902, i. 19.
[4] *Das apost. Symbol*, ii. 283.
[5] *Apost. Symb.* p. 37.

[1] *ZNTW*, 1906, p. 202.
[2] T. Barns, 'Some Creed Problems,' in *JThSt*, 1906, p. 501.
[3] Cf. A. E. Burn, *The Apostles' Creed*, London, 1906, p. 8 f.

the Creed of his Church, is uncertain. So far as it goes, it no doubt follows the lines of the Creed of Cæsarea, as his opening words imply; but he adds a free warning against Sabellianism, and a Baptismal Creed is not likely to have ended abruptly with mention of the Holy Ghost. But the Council was not satisfied. Prompted by Hosius, Bishop of Cordova, the Emperor Constantine himself proposed the insertion of the term *homoousios*, which guarded against all evasions of Scripture teaching. Other changes may be noted by comparing the two forms.

Creed of Eusebius.	Creed of Nicene Council.
We believe	We believe
I. 1. in one God, the Fathe Almighty, the maker of all things visible and invisible.	I. 1. in one God, the Father Almighty, maker of all things visible and invisible.
II. 2. And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Word of God, God of God, Light of Light, Life of Life, Son Only-hegotten, first born of every creature, before all the ages, begotten from the Father, by whom also all things were made;	II 2. And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, begotten of the Father, only-begotten, that is of the substance of the Father, God of God, Light of Light, very God of very God, begotten, not made, of one substance with the Father, by whom all things were made, both those in heaven and those on earth.
3. Who for our salvation was made flesh, and lived as a citizen among men,	3. Who for us men and for our salvation came down and was made flesh, and lived as Man among men,
4. And suffered	4. Suffered,
5. And rose again the third day,	5. And rose the third day.
6. And ascended to the Father.	6. Ascended into heaven.
7.	7.
8. And will come again in glory to judge the quick and the dead.	8. Is coming to judge the quick and dead.
III. 9. And we believe also in one Holy Ghost;	III. 9. And in the Holy Ghost.
Believing each of these to be and to exist, the Father truly Father, and the Son truly Son, and the Holy Ghost truly Holy Ghost, as also our Lord, sending forth His disciples for the preaching, said, 'Go teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.' Concerning whom we confidently affirm that so we hold, and so we think, and so we have held aforetime, and we maintain this faith unto the death, anathematizing every godless heresy.	But those who say 'Once He was not,' and 'Before He was begotten He was not,' and 'He came into existence out of what was not,' or 'That the Son of God was of a different essence (*hypostasis*) or being (*ousia*),' or 'That He was made,' or 'is changeable or mutable,' those the Catholic Church anathematizes.

As Gwatkin has shown so clearly, the victory of Nicæa was a surprise rather than a solid conquest—a revolution which a minority had forced through by sheer strength of clearer Christian thought.[1] Therefore a reaction was inevitable and a long controversy followed. It was not till A.D. 362 that all the scheming and creed-making on Arian lines came to an end, when the most influential of the semi-Arian leaders, who had consistently opposed the introduction of un-Scriptural words, such as *homoousios*, into Creeds, were won over to the orthodox side because they found that only thus could they guard the sense of Scripture.

About this time many local Creeds were revised by the insertion of Nicene terms. By far the most important was the revised Jerusalem Creed, which is found in a treatise of Epiphanius, Bishop of Salamis, called *The Anchored One*, written about A.D. 374. A French scholar of the 17th cent., Denys Petau, pointed out that this was the Creed afterwards ascribed to the Council of Constantinople. But it was Hort[2] who first pointed

[1] *Studies of Arianism*, Cambridge, 1882, p. 54.
[2] *Two Dissertations*, Cambridge, 1876.

out the importance of the argument which may be built up on the fact, and his theory connecting it with Cyril of Jerusalem has been accepted by most critics. He compared it with the form which Cyril taught his catechumens in his Catechetical Lectures (*c.* 347).[1]

Creed of Jerusalem.	Creed of Epiphanius.
I. 1. We believe in one God, the Father Almighty, maker of heaven and earth, and of all things visible and invisible.	I. 1. We believe in one God, the Father Almighty, maker of heaven and earth, and of all things *both* visible and invisible.
II. 2. And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son of God, begotten of His Father, very God, before all worlds, by whom all things were made,	II. 2. And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son of God, begotten of His Father before all worlds—*that is of the substance of the Father*,—Light of Light, very God of very God, begotten, not made, being of one substance with the Father, by whom all things were made, *both that are in heaven and that are in earth*; who for us men and for our salvation came down from heaven,
3. and was incarnate and was made man,	3. and was incarnate of the Holy Ghost and the Virgin Mary, and was made man,
4. was crucified and was buried,	4. and was crucified for us under Pontius Pilate, and suffered and was buried,
5. and rose again the third day,	5. and rose again the third day, according to the Scriptures.
6. and ascended into heaven,	6. and ascended into heaven,
7. and sat at the right hand of the Father,	7. and sitteth at the right hand of the Father,
8. and is coming in glory to judge the quick and the dead, whose kingdom shall have no end.	8. and is coming again with glory to judge the quick and the dead; whose kingdom shall have no end.
III. 9. And in one Holy Ghost, the Paraclete, who spake in the prophets,	III. 9. And in the Holy Ghost, the Lord and Giver of life, who proceedeth from the Father, who with the Father and the Son together is worshipped and glorified, who spake by the prophets:
11. and in one baptism of repentance for the remission of sins,	10. in one Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church.
10. and in one Holy Catholic Church,	11. We acknowledge one baptism for the remission of sins.
12. and in the resurrection of the flesh, and in the life eternal.	12. We look for the resurrection of the dead, and the life of the world to come.

Three important changes must be noted, which tend to prove that Cyril was the author of this revision, since they agree with the teaching in his lectures; (i.) Art. 7 from *sat* to *sitteth*;[2] (ii.) Art. 8 from *in glory* to *with glory*;[3] (iii.) Art. 12 from *resurrection of the flesh* to *resurrection of the dead*.[4] To these we add the skilful insertion of some of the Conciliar language, including the term *homoousios*, which marked the return to full communion with Athanasius and his allies. What could be more natural than that Cyril, after his return from exile in A.D. 362–364, should so revise his Creed? Epiphanius had connexions with Jerusalem and had lived in Palestine, so his acquaintance with the Creed is easily explained. The theory has been questioned by Lebedeff, who maintains that Epiphanius wrote down the original Nicene Creed, and that the revised Creed has been interpolated

[1] *Cat.* vi.–xviii.
[2] *Ib.* xi. 17, xiv. 17–30.
[3] *Ib.* xv. 3.
[4] *Ib.* xviii. 1–21.

by a copyist. He also maintains that the Jerusalem Creed reconstructed from the pages of Cyril is the invention of scholars.[1] Gibson also calls attention to the new material in the second division of the Creed 'new both to the Creed of Nicæa and to the Creed of Jerusalem, so that even if the Creed of Jerusalem lies at the basis of the Enlarged Creed, it has been revised by the help of other Creeds, as those of the *Apostolic Constitutions* and the Church of Antioch.'[2] This dependence had not escaped the notice of Hort, and the sources may be regarded as one, since the Seventh Book of the *Apostolic Constitutions* comes from Antioch, and was put together *c.* A.D. 375. Cyril's friendship with Meletius, Bishop of Antioch, is quite enough to explain why he should also make use of the Creed of Antioch.

We may regard the case for the opposition as 'not proven,' but it is clear that Hort's theory must be tested again in the light of all new evidence. He supposed that the subsequent connexion of the revised Creed with the Council of Constantinople in A.D. 381 could be explained by the suggestion that Cyril brought it to prove his orthodoxy. But, since Cyril's leader, Meletius, became first President of that Council, there could be no question about Cyril. A more probable theory has been suggested by Kunze. After the death of Meletius, and the resignation of Gregory of Nazianzus who succeeded him, the new Bishop of Constantinople was Nectarius, Prætor of the city, who at the time of his election was unbaptized. His name seems to have been suggested to the Emperor by Diodore of Tarsus. At the end of the Council of Chalcedon (A.D. 451) all the Bishops signed the decrees with little notes. One of them, Callinicus, Bishop of Apamea (=Myrlea) in Bithynia, referred to the Council of Constantinople as having been held at the ordination of the most pious Nectarius the Bishop, and Kunze suggests that there was some connexion in his mind between the Creed and the consecration of Nectarius. Probably the revised Creed was professed at his baptism, and became from that date the Baptismal Creed of the city. It would naturally be quoted in the Acts of the Council, now lost, from which it was cited at the Council of Chalcedon as the Creed of the 150 Fathers, the original Nicene Creed being accurately distinguished from it as the Creed of the 318 Fathers.

It is not easy to decide on the true form of the text cited at Constantinople, since the form quoted at the second Session varied from the form quoted at the sixth Session, and both from the form in Epiphanius. Copyists were continually at work assimilating the forms, and to them may be attributed the slight variations found in the pages of Epiphanius which are printed in italics. It is possible that the variations in the texts used at Chalcedon represent the already divergent texts used at Constantinople and Rome.[3]

The later history of the Creed is coming out into clear light. It is probable that the words 'and the Son' in the clause about the Procession of the Spirit were added not by the Council of Toledo in A.D. 589, when King Reccared accepted the Nicene Creed and abjured Arianism, but by later copyists. The Creed thus interpolated spread into Gaul. In A.D. 802, Charles the Great sent a deputation to consult Pope Leo on the text, controversy having already arisen in Palestine between representatives of the Eastern and Western Churches on the point. Leo freely admitted that it was quite orthodox to teach that the Spirit proceeded from the Father and the Son, but deprecated the insertion of the words in the Creed, the Roman Church agreeing with the Eastern theologians as to its form. He even advised the Emperor to give up singing it in his chapel, thus emphasizing the interpolation. But the use continued, and in A.D. 1014 the Emperor Henry II. prevailed on Benedict VIII. 'to chant the Symbol at the Holy Mysteries'; and thus came in the use of the interpolated Creed.

The Western theologians start from the point of view of the immanent Trinity, from meditation on the *coinherence* of the Divine Persons, while their Eastern brethren are willing to accept the phrase 'from the Father *through* the Son,' as guarding the truth that there is only one Fount of Deity. It is one of the saddest facts of history that a merely verbal difference should keep Churches apart, since frank explanation on both sides could clear up the theological as well as the historical question.[1]

3. **The 'Athanasian' Creed.**—The history of the so-called Athanasian Creed—more correctly designated, after the analogy of the *Te Deum*, by its first words, *Quicunque vult*—is still at some points obscure. But we are no longer in doubt as to the dates of the important MSS. With the help of photographs, palæographers are enabled to decide that some MSS belong to the 8th cent.; one, in the famous Ambrosian Library at Milan, may even be of the end of the 7th (*Cod. Ambrosianus*, O. 212 *sup.*).

The famous two-portion theory, put forward by Swainson and Lumby, has been shown to rest on precarious foundations, and may be dismissed without further notice. We have not yet reached ultimate certainty about small details in the text, the order of certain words, the use of the conjunction *et*, or the claim of the form *surrexit* against the reading *resurrexit*, but any polishing which the Creed had received in the course of its long history is of small account, now that we can say that it reaches us substantially as it was written. It belongs to the class of individual, private confessions of faith, and is, properly speaking, an instruction rather than a Creed, which may be offered as a substitute for the Apostles' Creed, or a canticle parallel to the *Te Deum*, with which it found its way into an appendix to the Psalter from the end of the 8th century.

There is little doubt that it can be identified with 'the Faith of the holy prelate Athanasius' commended by a Synod of Autun, which was presided over by Bishop Leodgar (*c.* A.D. 670), to be learnt by heart by all clergy.

Some forty years earlier, in A.D. 633, it had been quoted by the Fourth Council of Toledo together with the so-called Creed of Damasus. The clauses quoted were 4, 20, 21, 22, 28, 29, 31, 33, 35, 36, 37, (39), 40, so that it is evident that the Spanish theologians had the whole text before them.

We can also trace quotations with great probability in the sermons of Cæsarius of Arles, the great preacher of the 6th cent. (†543), as has been proved beyond question by Morin.[2]

Any doubts which may be felt about the authorship of the pseudo-Augustinian sermon 244 do not affect the general argument. Morin pointed out that the Creed reproduces both the qualities and the literary defects of Cæsarius. In his recent lectures at Oxford he was disposed to put the date later.[3]

The proof is not yet forthcoming that the *Quicunque* belongs to the time of Cæsarius, if it is not from his pen. The argument of Waterland,

[1] *Theological Messenger*, 1902 (a summary of his argument was published in *JThSt*, Jan. 1903, p. 285 ff.).
[2] *The Three Creeds*, p. 171.
[3] Cf. A. E. Burn, *Facsimiles of Creed Texts*, Camb. 1908, p. 16.

[1] Cf. A. E. Burn, *The Nicene Creed*, London, 1909, p. 40 ff.
[2] 'Le Symbole de S. Athanase et son premier témoin : Saint Césaire d'Arles,' in *Revue bénédictine*, xviii. (1900) 337 ff.
[3] *JThSt*, Jan. 1911, p. 161. His criticism of all current theories, including his own, is too sweeping, but deserves most careful study.

that it belongs to Apollinarian times, still carries much weight. The fact remains that the illustration from the constitution of man's nature in clause 35, though it had been used freely by St. Augustine, as before him by St. Ambrose, was misused by the Eutychians, who pleaded for one nature in Christ, as soul and body make one nature in man. After the rise of their heresy, Catholic writers shrank from using it, but there is no hint that the author of the *Quicunque* feared such doctrine, since he could easily have inserted teaching that Christ is consubstantial with us in the one nature as He is consubstantial with the Father in the other. Such phrases had been used in Gaul by Cassian before the rise of Eutychianism, and so were ready to hand.

Waterland points out that the Unity of Christ's Person is taught, but not as if it were endangered by Nestorian error. 'There is not a word of the Mother of God, or of one Son only, in opposition to two Sons, or of God's being born, suffering, dying—the kind of expressions of which the Creeds are full after Nestorius's times, and after the Council of Ephesus.'[1] Indeed, the parallels to clauses 32–35 in Vincentius and Faustus are, as it were, sharpened by subtle turns of phrase, just as we find Alcuin and Paulinus of Aquileia sharpening by slight changes their quotations from the *Quicunque*, against the revived Nestorianism of the Adoptianists of the 8th century.

Moreover, there is a new line of argument which was not open to Waterland. In the recently discovered writings of Priscillian we have trustworthy evidence of a heresy which spread from Spain to Gaul in the beginning of the 5th cent., and which called for close vigilance and reasoned arguments from Church teachers to counteract it. The *de Fide* of Bacchiarius is the apology of a monk who came from Spain into Gaul at that time, and was closely examined by the Gallican bishops as to his faith, and it is a significant fact that it has been preserved only in the Ambrosian MS of the *Quicunque*. The heresy of Priscillian was both Sabellian and Apollinarian. He confused the Persons of the Trinity, and denied that the Lord had a human soul, as the following passages may suffice to prove. In his *Blessing over the Faithful* he writes:

'For thou art God who . . . art believed as one God, invisible in the Father, visible in the Son, and art found as Holy Spirit united in the work of both';[2] and 'Finally our God assuming flesh, assigning to Himself the form of God and Man, that is, of Divine soul and human flesh' . . .[3]

When language so inaccurate was vehemently put forward as Catholic teaching, there was need of a summary of Catholic belief on the Trinity and the Incarnation, which should lay due stress on the responsibility of the intellect in matters of faith, and at the same time do justice to the moral aspect of these problems, and prove that faith worketh by love, that only they that have done good shall go into life eternal. The *Quicunque* exactly meets these requirements. May it not have been written for the purpose?[4]

This suggestion of the present writer has been warmly accepted by Künstle,[5] who has made a special study of Spanish canons and treatises against Priscillianism, though he vitiates the argument by assuming that all such writings against Priscillian must have a Spanish origin—for which there is no proof.

From the time of Antelmi the parallels in the *Commonitorium* of Vincentius of Lérins have been held to prove his acquaintance with the *Quicunque*, if not his authorship, which seemed probable to Ommanney (1897) as to Antelmi (1693). Perhaps it is rash to attempt to discover the author. Certainly Waterland's quotation from the funeral sermon which Hilary of Arles preached after the death of Honoratus, his predecessor both in the See of Arles and in the Abbey of Lérins, if it suggests acquaintance with the *Quicunque*, suggests also that Honoratus, rather than Hilary, was the author:

'A daily witness wast thou, moreover, in thy most sincere discourses of the confession of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit: nor surely has any one treated so emphatically, so clearly, of the Trinity of the Godhead, since thou didst distinguish the Persons therein and yet didst associate them in eternity and majesty of glory' (*Vita Honorati*, 38).

With this we may compare a quotation from a sermon on the same lines by Faustus, who, like Hilary, had been a loyal disciple of Honoratus:

'Therefore, beloved, that we may gain that which he has obtained, let us first follow that which he taught: and, first of all, let us hold the right faith: let us believe Father and Son and Holy Ghost (to be) one God. For, where there is unity, there cannot be inequality: and, since the Son, because He is God, is perfect, complete, and full, that fullness certainly cannot be described as "less"' (*in Depositione S. Honorati*).

Whatever may be thought about the praise here given to Honoratus as a teacher on the very lines of the *Quicunque*, there can be no question as to the ability and earnestness of the community which he had gathered round him during the years A.D. 420–430. In their happy island-home was focused all that the Gallican Church could show of learning and piety. Their age contrasts favourably with the following century, when Cæsarius represents the last hope of the ancient culture, and when the rising tide of barbarism was about to sweep away all its landmarks—a century in which the composition of the *Quicunque* would seem to be incredible.

The arguments of Brewer, that the *Quicunque* is a work of St. Ambrose, have not received any measure of support, and do not seem to be based on any fresh evidence; but they certainly strengthen the argument for a 5th cent. date, by proving, far more conclusively than any one has hitherto discovered, that St. Ambrose, no less than St. Augustine, came close to the very language of the Creed.

The early history of the Creed is, however, of less importance than the history of its use. The revived interest in Church music, which was fostered in the schools of Charles the Great, led to its use as a Canticle. Abbot Angilbert of St. Riquier (*c.* 814) records that it was sung in procession on Rogation Days, and before long it was so sung in the Office of Prime. But such was not the only use made of it, or, indeed, the most primitive, since the extremely interesting preface to the (so-called) Oratorian Commentary, possibly from the pen of Theodulf of Orleans, speaks of its use by clergy as a manual of Christian teaching, which reminds us of the Canon of Autun as well as of the use made of it by Cæsarius. Addressing a Synod, the writer says that he has carried out their instructions 'to provide an exposition of this work on the Faith, which is up and down recited in our churches and continually made the subject of meditation by our priests.' Similar use is directed in the 9th cent. by many prominent teachers—Hayto of Basel, Anskar of Bremen, and Hincmar of Rheims.

In the Middle Ages the use at Prime spread everywhere, and recent researches have proved that the whole service of Matins, including Lauds, Prime, and Terce, was most popular in England as a preparation for the Mass. William Langland, in 'Piers the Plowman,' at the end of the 14th cent., writes of the duty of all classes to cease from work on Sundays, 'God's service to hear, Both Matins and Mass.' But the fact remains that comparatively few of the people understood Latin, although the devout layman of the upper classes who could afford to possess a breviary would, of course, be able to read and follow it in

[1] *Critical History*, p. 149.
[2] Ed. Schepss, Vienna, 1889, p. 103.
[3] *Ib.*, *Tract.* vi. § 99.
[4] Cf. A. E. Burn, *Introd. to the Creeds*, p. 144.
[5] *Antipriscilliana*, p. 222.

the Office. There are several early translations into the vernacular, at one time Norman French, at another Old English; but there is no evidence of any wide-spread acquaintance with it in such translations. In the First Prayer Book of Edward VI. the English Reformers directed that the Athanasian Creed should be 'sung or said' after the Benedictus, at the greater Feasts. In the Second Prayer Book the number of Feasts was increased at which the use of it was obligatory, and only in 1662 was it substituted for the Apostles' Creed, which had hitherto followed it.

In the controversy of the present day no amended translation is likely to bring peace, such as the translation put forward by the Archbishop of Canterbury's Committee. The real crux lies in the difficulty which is felt about using the warning clauses in a mixed congregation on days when it is impossible to preach an explanatory sermon. A relaxation of the rule, such as permission to use it at the first evensong of the Festivals of Christmas, Easter, and Whitsunday (when the clergy, and presumably the instructed faithful, could well make it, as the author of the Oratorian Commentary suggests, 'a subject of meditation'), would meet the difficulties of wounded consciences on both sides. The Roman Catholic Church uses it still in Prime, chiefly in Advent and Lent. The Eastern Church has only put it in an Appendix to the Hour Offices, without any directions for use.

Conclusion.—Looking back over the history of the three great Creeds, one is amazed at the comparative simplicity of the great truths thus singled out by the common sense of the Church, through the centuries, as of primary importance. We are not concerned with the credibility of miracles as such, only with the evidence that the first witnesses believed that Christ rose from the dead and sent down His Spirit. The earliest forms of Creed present an Historic Faith which summed up their gratitude for the mystery at last revealed through the Spirit to the Church, with the assurance of forgiveness of sins and resurrection to a better life. The theological terms of the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds do not bring in metaphysics of set purpose, or condemn the Church to wander in a barren wilderness of controversy. Athanasius himself did not invent or suggest the use of the phrase '*of one substance*.' He was moulded by it. He found in it a bulwark of the ancient belief that the Son was one with the Father (Jn 10^{30}) and to be worshipped with Him. He had no word for 'Person.' It was reserved for the genius of Augustine to make that term current coin, even though he shrank from the boldness of his thought. Let us note that it was on psychological rather than metaphysical lines that he approached the problem, led on by deep musing on the mystery of his own personality to speculation on the deeper mystery of Divine Personality. And in the first part of the *Quicunque,* whether the author owed little or much to Augustine, it is by the measure of such musings that it must be valued. The very bravery of the antitheses ranging through the great series of Divine attributes—uncreated, infinite, eternal, almighty—shadows forth the truth of the equal glory and co-eternal majesty, and excludes every rationalistic explanation—Sabellian, Arian, or Priscillianist. But this is definitely the Creed of the Church teacher, face to face with errors which are common to the human mind in every age and everywhere. In the hour of death the words of the ancient Baptismal Creed suffice as 'an anchor of the soul . . . entering into that which is within the veil' (He 6^{19}).

See also CONFESSIONS.

LITERATURE.—H. Brewer, *Das sogenannte Athanas. Glaubensbekenntnis ein Werk des heiligen Ambrosius*, Paderborn, 1909; A. E. Burn, *Introd. to the Creeds*, London, 1899; E. C. S. Gibson, *The Three Creeds*, Lond. and N.Y. 1908; F. Kattenbusch, *Das apostol. Symbol*, Leipzig, 1900; K. Künstle, *Antipriscilliana*, Freiburg i. Br. 1905; J. Kunze, *Das nicän.-konstantinopol. Symbol*, Leipzig, 1898; C. H. Turner, *History and Use of Creeds and Anathemas*, London, 1908; D. Waterland, *A Critical History of the Athanasian Creed*, ed. J. R. King, Oxford, 1870; T. Zahn, *Das apostol. Symbolum*, Leipzig, 1893.

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CREED (Egyptian).—In seeking to arrive at a conception of the Egyptian creed, we are met by the fact that, generally speaking, the Egyptian never attempted to formulate or define a body of doctrine with regard to the multitude of gods worshipped in his land. This absence of any systematic theology is due mainly to the prevalence of the idea of the local god. The Egyptian State rose out of a number of small independent tribes, and, even after the unification of the kingdom at the beginning of the Dynastic period, the original subdivisions still existed in the shape of the 'nomes' or provinces, roughly 42 in number, into which the land was divided. Each original tribe possessed its own local god, supreme in his own district; and these gods continued to be worshipped as separate divinities, though they were, in many cases, mere duplicates of those existing in other localities. The Egyptian never attempted to bring any unity out of this confused mass of deities, to reduce to order the conceptions held with regard to them, or to discard their inconsistencies and contradictions. If, as frequently happened, one local god came to be acknowledged in another locality, his new worshippers simply took over his old titles and myths, regardless of the fact that thus they sometimes duplicated the legends of their own local god, and sometimes introduced contradictions to them. The extraordinary confusion of ideas thus produced is apparent everywhere, and can perhaps be seen most clearly in the different strata of beliefs with regard to the life after death which lay side by side in the Egyptian mind, apparently without its ever being perceived that they were inconsistent with one another, or at least without any attempt being made to remove their contradictions and to arrive at a coherent system of belief.

This statement has to be qualified to some extent by the fact that, at certain periods of Egyptian history, particular gods did rise to much more than merely local supremacy, and attained a more or less general acknowledgment. Thus from the time of the Vth dynasty the solar god Ra, who was looked upon as the founder of the reigning house, rose into prominence, and from that time onwards secured fairly general acknowledgment, the local gods being frequently identified with him. In the XVIIIth dynasty, again, Amen, the local god of Thebes, rose, with the rise of the Theban princes, to a position of supremacy which was not lost till far on in the decline of the Empire. And the worship of Osiris, the god of the dead and of the resurrection—probably one of the very oldest of Egyptian cults—was always more or less general, though he, too, had his local supremacy. In spite, however, of these exceptions, the local gods still continued to be worshipped side by side with the deity whose cult was for the time prevalent, and their myths were still accepted, regardless of the fact that they might be either identical with, or contradictory to, those of their brother god. It is evident, therefore, that we cannot expect to find any single and definite summary of doctrine which can be called the Egyptian 'creed.' All that can be done is to summarize the beliefs most generally accepted on certain aspects of religion.

1. Beliefs with regard to the Creation and the cosmic gods.—Various attempts were made to arrive at something like a systematic idea of the

cosmic gods and their relationship to the Creation. The most complete and popular of these was due to the priestly college of An, or Heliopolis (the Biblical On). The priests of the sun-god at this town—from the most ancient times the most noted theological centre of Egypt—elaborated at a very early period a scheme of the relationship of the various members of the cycle of cosmic gods to one another and to the universe, and their doctrine of the great Heliopolitan *ennead* gives us what was perhaps the prevailing belief in the land, though it was held with various modifications in different localities. In their scheme there existed in the beginning a primordial liquid element, the *Nun* or *Nu*, from which there emerged the sun-god Ra-Tum. Ra-Tum begat of himself, and produced the male and female divinities Shu and Tefnut, who may be regarded as representing air (or the firmament) and moisture. From Shu and Tefnut, or perhaps by a fresh procession from Ra, came Seb and Nut, the earth and the starry heaven, and from Seb and Nut came the two further pairs of gods, Osiris and Isis (the Nile and the fruitful ground [?]), and Set and Nephthys (the barren desert land and its animal life [?]). The Creation reached its present form by the interposition of Shu, the air-god, who came between Seb and Nut, the earth and the heavens, as they were locked in embrace, and lifted up Nut, who since his interposition stands arched over Seb, her hands and feet touching the earth at the cardinal points, and her body adorned with the stars.

The Heliopolitan ennead must have been formulated at a very early period of Egyptian history, for in the Pyramid texts the list of the nine gods is given as above. The popularity of this scheme gave rise to various imitations of it, and other towns and districts formed enneads of their own, sometimes displacing one of the nine gods of Heliopolis to make room for their own local god, sometimes adding him to the nine, careless of the fact that thus their ennead contained ten divinities. Even as thus modified to suit local preferences, however, the Heliopolitan scheme did not meet with universal acceptance, and side by side with its doctrine of creation there existed other beliefs quite inconsistent with it. At Memphis the fabrication of the world was attributed to Ptah, who carved the earth like a statue; at Elephantinē to Khnum, who fashioned the world-egg like a potter working with his wheel; and at Sais to Neith, who wove the universe as a weaver weaves a piece of cloth. In the Creation-story preserved in the famous legend of the destruction of mankind, the heavens are represented, not by the woman-goddess Nut, but by the celestial cow, across whose body the sun-god journeys in his barque. It is probable that this attempt at a scientific grouping of the gods and explanation of the Creation was not so much a popular doctrine as a cherished possession of the various priestly colleges, who elaborated it and modified it to suit their local tastes and rivalries. See Cosmogony and Cosmology (Egyp.).

2. Beliefs with regard to immortality and the life after death.—In dealing with these, we come into touch with what probably makes the nearest approach to a universally accepted body of doctrine to which the Egyptians ever attained. The idea of immortality has been nowhere more tenaciously held than in ancient Egypt, and the documents relating to it have an overwhelming preponderance in the religious literature of the nation. The most accepted form of belief is that associated with the cycle of Osiris legends. Osiris appears in the Heliopolitan ennead, though in a comparatively subordinate position; but as early as the period of the Pyramid texts he figures in a much more important rôle as the god of the dead and the source of immortal life to the blessed dead. The details of his myth do not concern us; but, briefly, the doctrine of the Egyptian religion taught that Osiris, a beneficent god and king, after being slain by the treachery of Set his malevolent antithesis, was restored to life again, justified before the gods against the accusations of Set, and made god and judge in the under world. Already by the time of the Vth dynasty the idea had been conceived that the story of Osiris was repeated in the case of each Pharaoh, and the conception gradually filtered down, until it was held that every man who was possessed of the necessary knowledge might after death become an Osiris, be restored to life, be justified before the gods, and enter into everlasting blessedness. Practically the Egyptian believed, from the earliest historical period, that, because Osiris died and rose again, and after being justified entered into everlasting life, therefore those who believed in him would share the same destiny. Ch. cliv. of the Book of the Dead makes the definite assertion of parallelism between the god and his worshipper:

'Homage to thee, O my divine father Osiris! Thou hast thy body with thy members. Thou didst not decay . . . thou didst not become corruption. I shall not decay . . . and I shall not see corruption . . . I shall have my being, I shall live, I shall germinate, I shall wake up in peace.'

It is impossible to say whether or not the Egyptian believed that Osiris suffered death on his behalf; certainly he believed that there was an essential connexion between the death and resurrection of Osiris and his own immortality. This belief is held, with no essential variations, throughout the whole historic period.

Definiteness ceases at once, however, when we pass from the fact of immortal life to the manner in which it is to be spent. Nowhere is the jumble of inconsistencies, which seemingly never worried the Egyptian mind, more hopeless than here. The prominent beliefs regarding the state and the abode of the blessed dead are at least four in number, each quite distinct from, and quite inconsistent with, all the others. The oldest and most wide-spread belief was that after death the deceased leads a second life under much the same conditions as those which ruled the first, dependent upon constant supplies of food and drink, and partaking in his new existence of joys similar to those of his former state. In this state the centre of the life after death is the tomb. Another very ancient idea places the abode of the dead in heaven, where they shine as stars in the firmament, and are privileged to take a place in the barque of the sun-god and to accompany him on his voyage through the heavens. A third conception assigns to the blessed dead a life of blissful labour and pleasure in the Egyptian Elysian Fields. The dead man flies up to heaven like a bird, or ascends a gigantic ladder, and, after passing through many difficulties, arrives at the *Sekhet-Aaru*, or 'Field of Bulrushes,' where he spends his time in the same agricultural pursuits and field-sports which had occupied him on earth.

Finally, another belief was that the souls of the departed dwell in the under world through which the sun passes during the hours of the night—a land that in the daytime is one of darkness and desolation. Only at night, as the sun in his barque passes through the twelve domains of the darkness, do the deceased experience something of joy and activity in the hour when he traverses the particular domain in which their lot is cast. Later the belief arose that the illuminated soul, if instructed in the proper formulæ, might share the voyage of the god through the *Duat*, or under world, instead of merely being gladdened by a passing glimpse of him. These various views co-existed with the Osirian doctrine, though they are essentially quite

independent of it, and, indeed, can be accommodated to it only with difficulty. The popularity of the last of them—the belief in the abode in the *Duat*, and the voyage of the sun-god there—was mainly confined to the period of the XIXth and XXth dynasties.

3. **Beliefs with regard to the nature and attributes of the gods.**—Discarding all that is of merely local significance in regard to the various divinities, it is possible to arrive at a fairly clear idea of what the Egyptian believed concerning the nature of the gods. The material is mainly to be found in the various hymns extant, and especially in those addressed to Ra, to Amen-Ra, to Osiris, and to the Aten, the god whom Amenhotep IV. (Akhenaten) attempted to make sole god of Egypt. In most of these hymns we are met by a great and almost meaningless accumulation of epithets which are applied indifferently to various gods in the most bewildering fashion. Setting these aside as mere formalities, we generally find a residuum of evidence as to the nature of the god who is being addressed. Thus, from a fine hymn to Amen at Cairo, we have the following:

'Sole form, producing all things, the one, the sole one, who creates all beings. All human beings have come from his eye, and the gods from the word of his mouth. He it is who makes pastures for the herds and fruit-trees for men; who creates that whereby fish live in the river and the birds under the heavens. . . .' Amen is thus the creator and sustainer of being. Further, he is a god of mercy and justice, 'listening to the poor who is in distress, gentle of heart when one cries unto him; deliverer of the timid man from the violent, judging the poor and the oppressed. . . . Lord of mercy most loving, at whose coming men live. . . . Maker of beings, Creator of existences, Sovereign of life, health, and strength, chief of the gods. We worship thy spirit, who alone hast made us, . . . we give thee praise on account of thy mercy to us.'

Again, from a hymn to Ra in the papyrus of Hu-nefer, we have a remarkably clear statement of the unity, the eternity, and the inscrutable nature of the god:

'Thou art unknown, and no tongue is worthy to declare thy likeness; only thou thyself. Thou art One. . . . Millions of years have gone over the world; I cannot tell the number of those through which thou hast passed. Thou dost travel through unknown spaces requiring millions and hundreds of thousands of years. . . . This thou doest in one little moment of time.'

Strangely enough, it is in the hymns to Osiris, otherwise 'the most human of all the gods,' that we find, on the whole, the most endless multiplication of ceremonial epithets, and the greatest dearth of statement as to his nature and attributes. There are, of course, in the hymns and other portions of the Book of the Dead frequent references to his functions as the bestower of immortality, and prayers that the deceased might share in everlasting life; beyond that there is little that distinguishes him from such gods as Amen and Ra. One of the best known of his hymns has the following:

'The circle of the solar disk is under his orders; winds, rivers, inundation, fruit-trees, as well as all the annual plants. . . . Every being invokes him, every man adores his beauties. Delightful for us is his love; his grace environs the heart.'

There is nothing here which might not be said of Ra, Amen, or any other of the great gods.

By far the most remarkable statement of belief in Egyptian religious literature is to be found in the hymns addressed to the Aten, or vital power of the solar disk, the god of the heretic king Akhenaten (XVIIIth dynasty). These hymns, the composition of which has been ascribed to the king himself, express the elements of that belief in a sole god, invisible, spiritual, and universal, which Akhenaten endeavoured to make the national religion. The longer of the hymns has been frequently translated, and its teaching may be summarized as follows:

To Aten is ascribed rule over the times of the day and the activities of men and animals. The strength in which men go forth to their labours comes from him, and all the blessings with which the creatures, even to the fishes in the river and the depths of the sea, are endowed are his gifts. He is confessed as the source of life, alike in man and in the smallest of created existences. 'Thou createst conception in women, making the issue of mankind . . . the small bird in the egg, chirping within the shell, thou givest it its breath within the egg.' Aten is omnipresent, and is the universal god of all mankind, appointing to men their different abodes, and their diversity of appearance and speech. 'In the hills from Syria to Kush, and in the plain of Egypt, thou givest to every one his place, thou framest their lives, to every one his belongings, reckoning his length of days. . . . As a divider thou dividest the strange peoples' (cf. Ac 17^{24-28}). Further, Aten is the source of all fertility in the world, the maker of that Nile in heaven which brings rain for the outlandish folk, and of the Nile from the nether world which fertilizes Egypt. 'Thou placest a Nile in heaven, that it may rain upon them. . . . O, Lord of Eternity, the Nile in heaven is for the strange people . . . the Nile that cometh from below the earth is for the land of Egypt, that it may nourish every field.' Finally, he is the creator of the seasons and the maker of the far-off heaven for his own abode. The hymn closes with a notable declaration of personal relationship to God: 'Thou art in my heart, there is none other that knoweth thee, save thy son Akhenaten. Thou hast made him wise in thy designs and thy might. . . . Thou hast raised them up for thy son, who came forth from thy limbs, the king living in Truth, the Lord of the Two Lands, Nefer-kheperu-ra-ua-en-ra.'

On the whole, while the hymn to Aten is immeasurably finer as a poetical composition than the hymns to the other gods, it can scarcely be said to present any very original thoughts, two points being excepted. All the statements about the creative and sustaining power of the Aten could be fairly matched in substance by phrases from hymns to Ra and Amen. The real distinctions of the poem are its acknowledgment of a god who is universal, whose providence and rule are not for Egypt alone, but for all lands; and its profession of a personal relationship of faith and inspiration between the royal psalmist and his divinity.

Summing up, we find that, in his best presentations of his faith, the Egyptian professed belief in a self-existent God who was the Creator and Preserver of all things, merciful and gentle, specially careful of the most helpless of His children, invisible and inscrutable, one alone, eternal, omniscient, and omnipresent; while the development of thought under Akhenaten gives the further conceptions of His spirituality, His universality, and His personal relationship to His adorer. All this was overlaid and confused by the chaos of merely local aspects of divinity which forms the surface of Egyptian religion; but still this was the nature of the God behind the gods of Egypt.

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JAMES BAIKIE.

CREED (Jewish).—Articles of creed in the modern sense were unknown in the earlier period of the post-Biblical Judaism. No necessity had been felt to express man's relation to God in other forms than those found in Dt 6^{4-6} 10^{12} and similar passages of the OT. The belief in God being based on the Biblical report of revelation to the patriarchs, and assuming the character of a postulate, obedience to His law was considered a mere logical consequence. The simplicity of this system contrasts strangely with the elaborate array of articles of faith adopted in later centuries. It is therefore desirable to examine the factors that bridged the gulf.

It was inevitable that Judaism should absorb a certain amount of the metaphysical speculations of the various Greek schools. The first outcome of this was Philo's theology. In the concluding chapter of his treatise on the 'Creation of the

World' (*de Opificio Mundi*, ch. lxi.) he gives the result of his investigations in the form of the following *five* 'lessons' taught by Moses:

(1) God has real existence; (2) God is one; (3) the world is created; (4) the world is one; (5) God's providence embraces the world.

The early Jewish Rabbis, however, being concerned with the practice of the Law rather than with speculations, sought to check their propagation among the people.

'The work of creation,' the Mishnā teaches, 'should not be studied by a company of two, and the Chariot not even in solitude, unless the student be sagacious and capable of drawing the right conclusions' (*Ḥagigā*, ii. 1).

The terms 'work of creation' and 'Chariot' stand for metaphysics in general. In an additional note the Mishnā says explicitly that for him who inquires into

'what is above and below, what was heretofore and will be hereafter, or deals lightly with the glory of his Maker, it would be better for him never to have been born.'

Moreover, Ben Sira (Sir $3^{21ff.}$) utters a solemn warning against the study of metaphysics, and several authorities of the Talmud (of the 4th cent. A.D.), commenting on the words both of the Mishnā and of Ben Sira, make no other concession than that of allowing the communication of the 'headings of the chapters' to scholars of ripened wisdom (*Ḥagīgā*, fol. 13). We find, however, in the Mishnā an attempt to formulate, in a negative way, something like a creed.

'The following,' we read (*Sanh.* x. 1), 'have no part in the future happiness: he who asserts that the resurrection of the dead is not intimated in the Tōrāh; that the Tōrāh is not of Divine origin; and the heretic.'

The passage thus enjoins, by way of climax, the belief in retribution after death, revelation, and the existence of God; and we shall see, later on, that the same passage was made the basis of real articles of creed. The authorities of the Talmud, however, proceeded in a different way. Instead of formally demanding theoretical belief, they selected from the moral code three of the most important prohibitions, viz. idolatry, incest, and murder, and laid down that death was to be chosen rather than transgression even under compulsion (*Sanh.* fol. 74). An enlarged list of laws was imposed upon mankind in general under the name of the 'Seven Noachian Laws,' forming the nucleus of a religious system. They comprised the command of jurisdiction, and the prohibitions of blasphemy, idolatry, murder, incest, robbery, and the eating of flesh from a living animal (*Sanh.* fol. 56). A kind of creed in epigrammatic form is Hillēl's famous recommendation to the heathen who desired to learn the essence of Judaism in a moment: 'What is hateful to thee, do not do to thy neighbour' (*Shabb.* fol. 31).

The first steps in the changing of this attitude were indirectly prompted by Muslim theologians, who created a speculative theology known by the name of *Kalām*. The Muhammadan criticism of the anthropomorphisms of the OT interfered with the Jewish antipathies to metaphysical research, and the struggle was carried right into the Jewish camp by the sect of the Karaites who, rejecting all Rabbinic tradition and attaching no value to the authority of Mishnā and Talmud, took up the method of the Mu'tazilite (dissenting) *Kalām* for their own needs. The consequence was that Rabbanite Jews were compelled to follow suit and to employ philosophic arguments for the defence of revealed religion. This marks the beginning of the religious philosophy of the Jews, and its oldest expounder was Sa'adyā of Fayyūm, who died in 942 at Sura, in Babylonia. In his work on 'Creeds and Beliefs' he set aside the warning of the Mishnā against metaphysical speculation, on the plea that the Sages did not forbid honest reflexion (*Amānāt*, ed. Landauer, p. 21). He was also the first to venture a definition of the idea of creed. 'Faith,' he says, 'is a notion arising in the soul with regard to a subject, the true nature of which has been recognized' (*ib.* 11). What he really means is conviction gained by one of the various processes of recognition, such as personal perception, truthful evidence, and logical conclusion. As none of these applies to the tenets of the Jewish religion, he adds, as a fourth source, 'reliable tradition based on revelation'—a phrase which marks the difference between the creed of Rabbanite Judaism on the one side, and Muhammadan as well as Karaite *Kalām* on the other. Beyond this first attempt, however, Sa'adyā has specified no real articles of faith, employing for the remainder of his theories the usual methods of the Mu'tazilite *Kalām*, which held sway among Jewish philosophers for two centuries afterwards.

The heterodox colouring of the *Kalām* in the writings of the famous Arab philosopher Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā), in connexion with the criticism of Muslim theologians and the growing pretensions of the Karaites, gradually brought about a reaction in favour of a more decided accentuation of the tenets of Rabbanite Jewish religion. As its doctors, however, had little practice in formulating articles of creed, they again turned to the Arabs, who employed the term '*aqīda* (plur. '*aqā'id*) for this purpose. The first Muslim who formulated articles of creed was the famous Abul-Laith Naṣr of Samarkand (†993), who laid down the tenets of his faith in a work entitled '*Aqīda* (Cod. Brit. Mus. Add. 19413), written in the form of a catechism. Of greater popularity, in fact the standard work on the subject, is the '*Aqā'id* of al-Nasafī (†1142), which, it is probable, served Jewish writers as a model for the formation of their articles of creeds. For it should be noted that the first Jewish work which contained something approaching axioms of faith did not see the light till that period. About 1140 the poet and philosopher Judah Hallēvi of Castile composed his famous work *al-Khazari* in defence of 'the despised faith.' The book (which is written in Arabic) is based on a narrative dealing with the search of the king of the Khazars for the right belief. Being dissatisfied with the doctrines offered to him by a philosopher of the Avicenna type, a Christian scholastic, and a Muslim doctor of the Mu'tazilite school, he finally asks a Jewish Rabbi for his creed. The last named, in contradistinction to his predecessors with their more or less speculative theories, answers:

'I believe in the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Israel, who led the children of Israel out of Egypt with signs and miracles . . . our belief is comprised in the Tōrāh' (*al-Khazari*, p. 44).

This formal confession is subsequently supplemented by the following sentence:

'To this [prayer] the believer attaches the following *articles of creed* ['*aqā'id*] which complete the Jewish belief, viz. (1) the recognition of God's sovereignty, (2) His eternity, (3) the providential care which He bestowed upon our forefathers, (4) that the Tōrāh emanated from Him, and (5) that the proof of all this is found in the delivery from Egypt' (*ib.* 154).

From these words we conclude that the notion of articles of creed was familiar to Judah Hallēvi, though he saw no necessity to formulate them for the benefit of his Jewish brethren. Sweeping away speculation of all kinds, he substitutes for it *a priori* belief, from which everything else follows as a necessary consequence (*ib.* 270). In order to show the contrast between his attitude and that of religious speculators, he reproduces in ten axioms the system of the Karaite *Kalām* (*ib.* 275-278). Judah Hallēvi's omission to condense the results of his investigations into a similar system is thus far quite consistent with his views. A more definite attempt to formulate axioms of belief on Arab-Aristotelian lines was made by Abraham b. David of Toledo (1161)—the author of a work (like-

wise written in Arabic) which bears the name *al-'Aqīda al-rafī'a* ('The Lofty Creed'). The first part is purely speculative, but the second consists of *six* somewhat crudely formed dogmas, viz.

(1) God's existence and incorporeality; (2) His unity or oneness; (3) His attributes; (4) His rule of the universe; (5) belief based on tradition and belief in prophecy; (6) metaphorical names of God, Divine Providence, and human free will.

This attempt was subsequently eclipsed by Abraham's contemporary Moses Maimonides, who supplied what he considered to be a want, being, no doubt, urged to take this step by the continued attacks of Muslim theologians, as well as by his inborn love of systematizing. It is to him that Judaism owes the famous 'Thirteen Articles of Creed,' which both in abridged Hebrew prose and in verse were introduced into the Jewish prayer-book, and which enjoy an unbounded popularity among Jews all over the world. It is doubtful, however, whether this was his aim. The Articles were originally composed in Arabic, and form part of his commentary on the Mishnā *Sanh.* x. 1 quoted above. A perusal of these Articles makes it clear that they were meant, in the first instance, as a protest against various Christian and Muhammadan statements: (1) that Biblical anthropomorphism was a departure from pure monotheism; (2) that Moses' prophetship was eclipsed by that of Muhammad; (3) that the Rabbis had altered the Tōrāh; (4) that the law of Moses had been abrogated by that of Muhammad; and (5) that the Messiah was still expected. The Hebrew version of these Articles by Samuel b. Tibbōn (*c.* 1200) is attached to the ordinary editions of the Talmud. For the purposes of this sketch the following short abstract of the Articles must suffice:

I. God exists, and is the cause of all existing beings.
II. God's unity is absolute, and is not to be compared with other units which are subject to division.
III. God is incorporeal and, therefore, exempt from any accidental attribute. The anthropomorphistic passages in the Bible must be taken metaphorically.
IV. God's unity is without beginning.
V. No other being besides God must be worshipped. This also holds good for angels, spheres, and elements.
VI. Prophecy is a distinction granted to human beings of superior degree, whose souls enter into intimate connexion with the Creative intellect.
VII. Moses is the father of all prophets both before and after him. He is distinguished from other prophets by *four* characteristics. (1) With no prophet did God hold direct intercourse as with Moses (Nu 12^{8}). (2) God did not appear to Moses in dreams, as to other prophets (v.^{6}). (3) Other prophets experienced in the hour of vision a weakening of their vital power, and a great fear (Dn $10^{8.16}$), which was not the case with Moses. (4) Other prophets were obliged to wait for revelations (2 K 3^{15}), whilst Moses was empowered to solicit them (Nu 9^{8}, Lv 16^{2}).
VIII. The Tōrāh is of Divine origin: 'It is incumbent to believe that the whole of this law, as it is in our hands this day, is the Tōrāh which was revealed to Moses. It is all Divine, which means that it reached him by what is metaphorically termed speech.'
IX. This law will not be abrogated, nor will there be any other law of Divine origin. Nothing will be added to, or taken away from, it.
X. God knows the actions of all mankind.
XI. God rewards those who obey the Law, and punishes its transgressors.
XII. The Messiah will arrive without fail, no matter how long he tarry.
XIII. Resurrection of the dead.

It can easily be seen that these thirteen Articles consist of three groups, viz. I.–V., VI.–IX., X.–XIII., reducing the whole system to the three fundamental principles of belief in God, Revelation, and Retribution after death. This reduction was, indeed, carried out and proved by Joseph Albo (first half of 15th cent.) in his work on 'Fundamental Principles' (Introd. and pt. i. ch. 4). It is impossible that Maimonides should not have been aware of this, but the anti-Muhammadan as well as anti-Christian tendencies of several of the paragraphs cannot be mistaken. The anonymous redactor of the most popular recension of these Articles for liturgical purposes prefaced each paragraph with the words 'I believe with perfect faith'—words which are absent from Maimonides' original. It was Samuel b. Tibbōn who placed the word להאמין ('to believe') at the head of several articles. Of the diverse attempts to reproduce these articles in poetic form the most popular is the Yigdal hymn by an unknown (but probably Spanish) author.[1] Those who followed Maimonides, writing on the same subject, as Ḥisdai Crescas († 1410) and Isaac Abravanel (1437–1508), have added nothing new, and need not, therefore, be further considered.

There now remains a word to be said on the tenets of the creed of the Karaites. By rejecting the Rabbinic method of interpreting the Bible, they avoided the Muhammadan charge of having altered the Tōrāh, and, being disciples of the Mu'tazilite school, they were under no suspicion regarding their conception of Biblical anthropomorphisms. They had, however, to defend their belief in (1) the prophetship of Moses and the other prophets; (2) the validity of the Tōrāh, and their own interpretation of it; and (3) the arrival of the Messiah. Now the ten axioms reproduced by Judah Hallēvi (see above) touch only the metaphysical side of the question, and it was left to others to supply the religious element. Judah b. Elijah Hadassi (1149) was the first to attempt this by grouping the Karaite laws round the Decalogue. Kāleb Afendopulo, who (in 1497) wrote an introduction to Hadassi's work, extracted from it the following ten Articles:

I. God is the creator of all creatures.
II. He is one and eternal.
III. Every [other] existing being is created.
IV. God sent Moses and all other prophets mentioned in the Bible.
V. The law of Moses is true.
VI. Believers must have knowledge of the Tōrāh and its interpretation.
VII. The Sanctuary [at Jerusalem] is the palace of the Most High King.
VIII. The resurrection of the dead [will take place] at the time of the arrival of the Messiah.
IX. There will be a final judgment.
X. Just retribution.

In view of the close relationship between the paragraphs I.–III., IV.–VIII., IX.–X., the artificiality of the number *ten* is conspicuous. Israel Haddāyyān of Alexandria, who (in 1257) composed a digest of the Karaite laws, condensed the Articles into the following six: (1) God; (2) the messengership of Moses; (3) the other prophets; (4) the Tōrāh revealed through Moses; (5) Jerusalem; and (6) the day of judgment.

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HARTWIG HIRSCHFELD.

CREED (Muhammadan).—The Muhammadan creed or profession of faith (*kalimat al-shahāda*, or, shortly, *kalima*) is the well-known formula, 'I testify that there is no god but God, and I testify that Muhammad is the apostle of God.' It is one of the articles (*'aqā'id*) of faith (*'imān*), and also one of the 'five pillars' of practical religion (*dīn*;

[1] According to Luzzatto (*Mebo*, Leghorn, 1856, p. 18) and Zunz (*Literaturgesch. der synagog. Poesie*, Berlin, 1865, p. 507), this hymn was completed in 1404 by Daniel ben Judah Dayyan of Rome.

see ISLĀM). The creed as a whole is not formulated in the Qur'ān; but the first article is enunciated in *Sūra* cxii.: 'Say, "He is One God; God the Eternal; He begetteth not, nor is begotten, nor is there one like unto Him."' The creed, however, occurs in a tradition of 'Omar, the second khalīf, who related that the Prophet, on being asked to define Islām, said: 'Islām is that thou bear witness that there is no god but God and that Muhammad is His messenger; and be steadfast in prayer, and charitable; and fast during the month of Ramadān; and make the pilgrimage to the Ka'ba if it is in thy power' (*Mishkāt al-Masābīh*, tr. Matthews, Calcutta, 1810, I. i. 1). According to the *Sharḥ al-Wiqāya* (*ap.* Hughes, *DI*, *s.v.* 'Creed'), the *kalima* is to be recited by every Muslim aloud and correctly, with full comprehension of its meaning and belief in his heart, at least once in his lifetime, and to be always professed without hesitation until his death.

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CREED (Parsi).—1. According to *Yas.* xxx. 2, man must make a choice between the two 'creeds' or 'confessions' (*āvarenō*). In the beginning the Holy Spirit said of himself and of his spiritual antagonist that their 'confessions' (*varanā*) did not agree (*Yas.* xlv. 2). The word translated 'confessions' implies a choice, and the corresponding verb is used in the middle voice with *fra-* as a technical term to express the profession of a religion, especially of the Mazdayasnian faith: *fravaretar*, 'confessor,' *frāvarānē*, 'I make my profession of faith,' etc. Although from the very beginning Zarathushtrian Mazdaism thus meant a sharp contrast with surrounding worship and practice (cf. *Vend.* xix. 6: Zarathushtra's mother had invoked the *Aṅra Mainyu*), neither proselytizing aims nor doctrinal discussions produced a creed in the same sense as in Christianity. The Zarathushtrian reform was of a moral, economic, and ritual kind, rather than intellectual. But the Avesta contains several formulæ, used on different occasions, *e.g.* in putting on the sacred cord, on rising in the morning, in the *nyāyishes* and other prayers, etc. These formulæ sum up the most peculiar tenets and practices of the Parsi religion. It may be that some of them originated during the Sasanian restoration, owing to the need of briefly distinguishing their own faith from Christianity and other rivals. We shall mention only the most important formulæ. In the post-Avestan time the Parsis who settled in India were required to present a summary of their beliefs and sacred customs to Indian rulers.

2. In its shortest form the *Fravarānē* (*Yas.* xi. 16, xii. 1, xxvii. 12; *Yt.* xiii. 89, etc.) contains four points: *Fravarānē Mazdayasnō, Zarathushtrish, Vīdaēvō, Ahuratkaēshō*; 'I profess myself a Mazda-worshipper, a Zarathushtrian, an anti-devil (enemy of the demons), a servant (or proclaimer) of the Lord.' That is, the believer declares himself (1) a monotheist; (2) a member of a historically founded religion; (3) a dualist. Or, to put it differently, (1) the revealed God is Ahura Mazda; (2) the revealer is Zarathushtra; (3) the peculiar higher form of life instituted by the revealer as the due service of God consists in the fight against the demons. Those points are co-ordinated in a way characteristic of revealed or founded religion (cf. *Transactions of the 3rd Int. Congr. for the Hist. of Rel.*, Oxford, 1908, ii. 403 ff.). (4) The last word seems to sum up comprehensively the whole faith, *yasnō* designating more particularly the Divine worship, and *ṭkaēshō* designating the doctrines and tenets of religion in general. Additions are sometimes made to the *Fravarānē*: homage to the genii of the *gāhs* (hours, watches), of the days, of the months, of the seasons, of the years (Introd. to the *Yasna*; *Yas.* xi. 16, xxiii. 5; esp. in the five *gāhs* recited at the five hours of prayer of the day and contained in the *Khordah Avesta* [the book of prayer], etc.); or—a more authentic addition—homage to the Amesha-Spentas (*Yas.* xii. 1), or other amplifications. A still shorter form (*Yas.* xii. 8) runs thus: 'I profess myself a Mazda-worshipper, a Zarathushtrian, having made both my avowal and my profession (of faith).' Another short formula in Pahlavi runs: 'I declare my adherence to the Mazda-worshipping religion, and renouncement of all evil beings and things' (E. S. Dadabhai Bharucha, *Khorda-avestā-arthah*, Bombay, 1906, p. 2).

3. A more explicit creed is formed by the *Hās* xii. and xiii. of the *Yasna*, designated, according to Anquetil Duperron, by the Parsis as *Fraoreti*, 'confession,' 'creed,' and called after the opening words *Frastuyē*, 'I praise' (*Yas.* xi. 17–xii. 7), and *Āstuyē*, 'I avow' (*Yas.* xii. 8–xiii., as divided by Darmesteter). *Āstuyē*, with the shortest *Fravarānē*, belongs, *e.g.*, to the prayer of the investiture with the *kosti*. *Frastuyē* is placed at the head of each *Yasht* and of each *Patēt*, and it occurs in a shorter and in a longer—evidently more original—form, which contains elements of really ancient aspect. It begins with the usual Avestan triad: 'I avow good thoughts, good words, good actions.' In the course of the confession, cattle-stealing and destruction of the villages of the Mazdayasnians are abjured; folk and cattle ought to live in peace. All communion with demons and their crew, with sorcerers and their crew, and with all kinds of adversaries and devilish, treacherous persons, is abjured. As Zarathushtra abjured the devils in his colloquies with Ahura Mazda, so the Mazdayasnian and Zarathushtrian gives up communion with them. In addition to the predominating fight against the devils, and in particular against savage disturbance of the regular cattle-breeding village-life ('the Mazda-worshipping religion suppresses battles and lays down arms'), two other features of this creed deserve attention: (*a*) the importance of tradition; this creed has been professed by the waters, by the plants, by the cattle, by the Creator, by the first man, by Zarathashtra, by Vishtāspa, by Frashaoshtra and Jāmāspa, by all the Saoshyants; (*b*) the excellence of intermarriage between the nearest relations, repudiated and interpreted in a different sense by later Parsiism. The *xvaētvadatha*, or next-of-kin-marriage, is also exalted by the *Āstuyē*.

4. Anquetil Duperron describes the ceremonies to be undertaken by an unbeliever desiring to join the Parsi faith. The Parsi creed belonging to that ritual and included by Spiegel in the Khordah Avesta is evidently much later than the Avestan formulæ. It runs: 'The good, pious, right religion, which the Lord of the created beings has sent, is the one brought by Zartūsht. The religion is the religion of Zartūsht, the religion of Ormazd, given to Zartūsht.' The reception of an outsider into the Parsi communion is, in fact, nowadays almost an unheard-of thing; such requests have been rejected lately.

5. The Mazdayasnian who confesses his sins and seeks absolution is, of course, in quite a different position from a proselyte not belonging to the sacred blood. The explicit formulæ of penance, *Patēts*, give a good idea of what was considered by later Mazdaism to be essential to the Parsi practice and faith. In the so-called Iranian *Patēt*,[1] after having enumerated at length the sins and wickednesses repented of, and having referred to the fact

[1] Translated by Spiegel, *Av. übersetzt*, Leipzig, 1852–63, iii. 219 ff., and Darmesteter, *Zend-Avesta*, Paris, 1892–93, iii. 167 ff.; ed. de Harlez, *Manuel de Pehlevi*, Paris, 1880, p. 144 ff. The Pāzand *Patēts* (cf. West, *GIrP* ii. 109 f.) are now accessible in Antia's *Pāzend Texts*, Bombay, 1909, pp. 118–152.

that the same faith had been professed by the men of the holy tradition, mentioned in the *Frastuyē*, and by Adarbād Mahraspand (4th cent. A.D.), the believer proclaims that neither happiness nor a longer life, power nor wealth, nor even the penalty of death, can separate him from the right religion, because he dreads hell and hopes for paradise.

6. On the arrival of the emigrating Parsis at Sanjan in A.D. 716, they presented to the Indian prince of Gujarāt a list of sixteen *ślokas*, composed by the most learned of their dasturs, and containing the principal rules and tenets of their religion, selected and stated in a way fitted to conciliate the ruler, without denying or concealing the real content of Mazdaism. The points were as follows: (1) the adoration of Ahura Mazda, of the Sun, and of the five elements; (2) silence during the bath, in reciting prayers, in presenting offerings to the fire, and in eating; (3) the use of incense, perfumes, and flowers in religious ceremonies; (4) the honour accorded to the cow; (5) the use of the sacred shirt, string, and cap; (6) singing and music at weddings; (7) the adornments and perfumes of ladies; (8) the precepts of generosity in giving alms, and of digging tanks and wells; (9) the precept to extend one's sympathies to all male and female beings; (10) the ablutions with *gomūtra* (euphemistically called 'one of the products of the cow'); (11) the wearing of the sacred cord in praying and in eating; (12) the sacred fire fed with incense; (13) the five devotions every day; (14) conjugal fidelity and purity; (15) the annual ceremonies in honour of the forefathers; (16) the precautions to be observed by women after child-birth and during menstruation. There exist different versions in Gujarati and Sanskrit.

LITERATURE.—D. Menant, 'Les Parsis,' *Bibl. d'études du Musée Guimet*, vii., Paris, 1898; Dosabhai Framji Karaka, *Hist. of the Parsis*, London, 1884.

NATHAN SÖDERBLOM.

CREEK INDIANS.—See MUSKHOGEANS.

CREMATION.—See DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD.

CRESCENT.—See SYMBOLS.

CRETE.—See ÆGEAN RELIGION.

CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS.

CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Primitive and Savage).—**1. Introduction.**—While *revenge* is the action of an individual against one who has done him wrong, *punishment* is the action taken by society against one who has transgressed its laws. Revenge may, however, be followed up by a group of persons in sympathy with the injured person, in this case passing over to the blood-feud (*q.v.*); and individual or collective revenge may be recognized by the society as the specific form of punishment to which it lends its sanction or its aid. Men seek revenge because they feel that their rights or interests have been encroached upon. The act of revenge is one strictly of self-defence, and is primarily a reflex action. It seeks to destroy or render powerless what constitutes a menace, but it contains a rough notion of justice, of the idea that no one can intrude upon the rights of another without suffering the consequences. The exercise of justice by a community or its representatives against an individual who is obnoxious to it, or to any of its members, is based primarily on the feeling which underlies revenge. Punishment is to some extent vengeance—the vengeance of society for its own preservation. The criminal must suffer, must expiate his crime, whatever other notions may in time enter into the idea of punishment. Private vengeance and public justice are thus so far similar in their point of view and in their action, save that the latter tends to be more discriminating and impartial. Not the individual sufferer himself, but others judge and condemn the guilty person. Public justice at lower stages is extremely limited, and side by side with it exists private or collective vengeance (*e.g.* the blood-feud). This is to some extent justice, since society recognizes the right to its execution. It has become a specific form of punishment because society has sanctioned it. Or public justice may, again, recognize private revenge by handing over the evil-doer to the injured person or his relatives, or by making him or them the executors of justice. Public justice, save in the case of a few crimes which more particularly menace the existence of society as a whole, has to content itself with regulating private revenge, or with suggesting a system of compensations. Finally, as it advances, often through the growing supremacy of chiefs, it eliminates private revenge more or less completely, though this can hardly be said to be true of any savage society.

The simplest form of regulated revenge is the duel—the right of the injured party to challenge the aggressor to single combat, or the case where the aggressor must stand up to the throwing of spears (as in some Australian instances), or must submit to the plundering of his house. Or, again, revenge is regulated by being limited to a cretain period or to certain offences. The blood-feud is the best example of regulated revenge (see Post, *Grundriss der ethnol. Jurisprudenz*, ii. 236 ff.; Westermarck, *Moral Ideas*, i. 498 ff.; see § 6, ii. (1) below).

In the earliest times, if men, like some of the higher apes, lived in separate families, the family would, when necessary, assist any individual member of it in following up an act of revenge, because they were bound to be in sympathy with him for the wrong done. Thus individual revenge easily passed over into collective revenge. It is out of this feeling of sympathy that justice, strictly so called, arises. Actions by which any individual feels aggrieved are generally those by which all individuals feel aggrieved when they are done to themselves; and the condemnation of such actions tends to formulate itself as a custom or law which cannot be transgressed without risk of incurring the hostility of the society or of individuals composing it. Custom is, in fact, a strong expression of savage man's sense of right and wrong, and it is the test by which actions are judged, although, indeed, some of the actions, from a strictly ethical point of view, may be indifferent. Hence, both collective revenge and public justice are the expression of moral indignation, though the latter expresses it more strongly. For, the more men realize their solidarity, the more is any ill done to one regarded with indignation by all, as a result of

the working of sympathetic emotion. And, as the ill done has transgressed that customary law,—the expression of what is right and what is wrong,—the punishment inflicted is an expression of moral indignation at the wrongdoer. It may be out of all proportion to the offence committed, and in such a case is on a level with mere unthinking revenge, but, generally speaking, at lower levels of savage society, punishment has some proportion to the offence. It is at higher levels, in barbaric and despotic societies, that punishment is most cruel and disproportionate to the offence.

The tendency of punishment to supplant mere revenge (which is occasionally regarded as wrong) is aided by the fact that the latter often causes great inconvenience to the society, and tends to multiply the revengeful actions. The society, by itself or by its heads, steps in, therefore, between the avenger and the wrongdoer, and decides upon the punishment, or restrains the amount of vengeful action. Thus the judgments of a central tribunal are gradually preferred to revengeful acts. Casalis says of the Basutos that the chief has been given powers over all the community because of the fear of anarchy arising out of private revenge (*The Basutos*, 1861, p. 225). The injurious results of the blood-feud are well recognized by savages, among whom the head-men or the chief will often interfere to stop its excesses; or it sometimes gives place to an appeal to them, or to the payment of a compensation by the offender, as a matter of private arrangement, or one suggested by them. This compensation generally tends to pass into a regular practice, with a graduated scale of payments according to the magnitude of the offence (§ 5). With the growth of the power of the chief, he not only advises or suggests, but determines and orders the carrying out of justice over a wider field. Moreover, where the injured person or his representatives are too weak to take revenge against a powerful tribesman, or, on the other hand, where revenge is out of proportion to the offence, the sympathetic emotions of the society, being aroused in the one case for the victim and in the other for the aggressor, gradually contribute to the formation of a tribunal in some shape or form, and to the cessation of private revenge.

Yet private revenge often exists side by side with punishment by a tribunal or a chief. This is natural when we consider what savage character is. But, on the whole, there is a tendency to make such revenge the expression of judicial action. Thus it may be recognized as the right way of punishing certain wrongdoers, provided that it does not exceed certain limits. This is particularly true where the husband is allowed to avenge himself on the adulterer. Or it may be permitted that the criminal caught red-handed in certain crimes, *e.g.* theft, should be slain at once. Or, again, the blood-feud may be the approved method of punishing the murderer. Or the aggrieved person or his relatives may be chosen as executioners of the sentence passed by the tribunal. Thus, among many of the Bantu tribes, a murderer proved guilty is given over to the relatives of his victim to deal with him as they choose (Macdonald, *JAI* xxii. 108). Many other instances might be cited. Private revenge sometimes continues alongside or in spite of established judicial tribunals in the case of large societies scattered over wide areas, and in which there is little feeling of homogeneity, and hence little prospect of general sympathetic action in favour of an aggrieved person. Revenge may also be pursued in all societies in matters not usually taken cognizance of by the laws.

2. Crime, morality, and religion.—Even in the earliest stages of human history man may have dimly felt it ethically wrong to murder, commit adultery, or steal, apart from the fact that the instinctive act of revenge brought it home to him that in committing such actions he was trespassing against the rights of another. These crimes are so universally condemned that there can have been no time when they were not regarded as deeds which it was wrong to commit. The sense of wrongness with regard to these and other acts was largely increased with the growth of society, of the group in which men lived, because such actions tended to destroy the unity of the group. Custom laid down that there were certain things which must not be done, and it was, therefore, highly immoral to do them. Nor is it improbable that, even at the very earliest stages of the growth of the ideas of right and wrong, man may have thought vaguely that in doing wrong to another he was incurring the anger of whatever worshipful being or beings he was aware of. This thought also would become more definite with the growth of society. Where a group of men living together worship a being whom they believe to be interested in the group, any transgression of custom will be regarded as transgression against him, because the customs would certainly be regarded as having been instituted by him. Whatever constituted a menace to the group or any of the individuals composing it was also an offence against the divinity, who naturally favoured the community and not him who menaced its existence. The god is apt to punish the group for the breach of custom, and hence the offender is made to suffer speedily for his evil-doing, in order to avert this. Some crimes are punished by the group as a whole. Others are not so punished, but the group approves of the act of revenge by which the offence is requited. Revenge or punishment is thus supposed to satisfy the anger of the god. Some support for the view here taken is found in the fact that the divinities of very primitive tribes are also to some extent moral governors, who are thought to dislike particular crimes and to punish them. Among savages at a higher level there is a certain amount of evidence proving that their gods take account of crime and are guardians of morality. Whether or not it be true that all morality from the first is connected with religion, it is at least certain that religion soon strengthened and assisted morality by its insistence on the fact that the god or gods of the group desired its welfare, and that all offences against that welfare were thus more than offences against laws imposed by men.

3. The administration of justice.—A regular organization for enforcing justice or maintaining custom hardly exists at the lowest levels of society, though its beginnings may be seen. Justice is a matter of individual action; and yet, as among the Yahgans of Tierra del Fuego, where the feeling of the community gives support to the existing customs, some help in avenging wrongs may always be looked for from relatives or neighbours (Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, i. 46, citing Hyades and Deniker, *Miss. scient. du Cap Horn*, Paris, 1891). This is an approach to collective revenge, and, as a rule, the greater the wrong, the more likelihood is there of the avenger being supported. But, wherever crime is regarded as a serious breach of tribal custom, the breaker of a custom is the breaker of a law, and his action arouses strong disapproval. Hence, society approves the action of the avenger, *e.g.*, in cases of murder or adultery; or it takes joint action against the wrongdoer. The latter course is most frequent in the case of crimes which are regarded as bringing the whole community into danger or subjecting it to Divine anger, *e.g.* sorcery and incest (breaches of exogamous custom). Or, again, a whole clan or tribe will put to death or banish a man who makes him-

self a nuisance to every one, as among the Eskimos, where a whole village has occasionally risen against and slain an atrocious murderer (Nansen, *Eskimo Life*, 1893, p. 163). Conjoint action by the community is found amongst the Mpongwe, who drown or burn the murderer (Burton, *Two Trips to Gorilla Land*, 1876, i. 105), and is common among Australian tribes, where the whole camp joins in punishing the ill-doer (Westermarck, *op. cit.* i. 171). But, even when such joint action occurs, individual revenge or blood-feud is commonly found, nor is it condemned by society. Indeed, it is usually the case that any one disregarding the duty of revenge is held in contempt, and this tends to show the general disapproval of crime by the whole group or tribe.

Where public justice is administered by certain individuals, it seldom ousts the practice of private revenge, and in general takes cognizance only of public offences (sorcery, incest), or of various petty crimes. But this 'court' may be effective in enforcing or in regulating private revenge, or in arranging compensation. A council of elder men is frequently found among Australian tribes, who try various offences and decide upon the punishment (Fraser, *Abor. of N.S. Wales*, Sydney, 1892, p. 39 ff.; Woods, *Native Tribes of S. Aust.*, Adelaide, 1879, p. 34 ff.). But it is probable that, as among the Central Australian tribes, these offences are breaches of the strict marriage laws (incest), and murder by sorcery. In such cases the elders arrange for an avenging party to go out and punish the offenders (Spencer-Gillen[a], pp. 15, 477; [b]25, 556 ff.). In some instances the council has nothing to do with cases of murder, adultery, etc.; and only those relating to property or to litigation are brought before it (Nagas [Stewart, *JRASBe* xxiv., 1855, p. 609], Kandhs [Dalton, *Eth. of Bengal*, Calc., 1872, p. 294], and Formosans [Letourneau, *L'Evol. juridique*, p. 94]). Or, as among some N. American tribes (Ojibwas, Wyandots, etc.), the avenger appears before a council, and, having obtained judgment in his favour, demands compensation. If this is not given, he falls back on revenge (Kohler, *ZVRW* xii. [1897] 407). In many cases, too, the council (as in the case of the chief) delegates the execution of justice to the person who would otherwise be the avenger. Sometimes the leading men of a group will intervene to prevent disputes or to arrange composition. Less usual are the instances where the decision of a council is taken as final in all private cases (Todas and other aboriginal Indian tribes [Shortt, *TES*, new ser. vii., 1868, p. 241; Forsyth, *Highlands of Cent. India*, 1871, p. 361], Tagbuana [Worcester, *Philippine Islands*, New York, 1898, p. 107], and a few others). Thus, generally speaking, the savage council seldom constitutes a court in the strict sense of the word.

With the advancing power of the chief, the administration of public justice passes largely into his hands; yet even here private revenge—the blood-feud, or the right of the husband to punish in cases of adultery—is still used and permitted, and often the chief's prerogative is exercised only when appeal has been made to him. But there now comes into great prominence, especially among higher savage tribes, a regular system of compensation or fines for various crimes, payable to the aggrieved person or his representatives, or, in some cases, to the chief. We find also in many places regular codes of laws, with punishments appointed for different offences. Sometimes the chief merely intervenes to prevent excessive revenge and to suggest compensation, as among many American Indian and African tribes; sometimes his power of intervention is limited to certain crimes, generally those of a public kind; or, again, he merely acts as arbiter or adviser rather than as judge. But, the more his power is established, and the more autocratic he is, so much the more do his functions as judge increase. This is especially true of many of the chiefs and petty monarchs of Africa, and in general of all tribes whose social organization is high. Frequently the chief may associate with himself a council of elders; or, again, as among the Kafirs, village chiefs judge lesser matters, while chiefs of clans hear appeals against their judgments and try all more serious crimes, aided by the advice of a council (Letourneau, p. 87). With few exceptions, where justice is administered by a chief he is careful to act in strict accordance with the established customs. There is, however, a tendency among chiefs to regard every real or imaginary offence against themselves as a serious crime, while, where their power is autocratic and fines are paid to themselves, or where they are naturally cruel, there is great danger of injustice and of atrocious punishments being meted out. But, with the decay of private revenge, the administration of justice becomes more definite and strict, especially as we advance from savage to barbarous societies. The court or chief maintains order, upholds the rights of every member of society, and punishes all crime. Generally speaking, wherever a tribunal exists, it is seen to be a guarantee, not found in the exercise of mere revenge, that all offenders shall suffer, and suffer proportionately to their offence.

Where cases are brought before a council or a chief, a palaver usually takes place, at which both parties are fully heard. Sometimes the method of the oath or ordeal is resorted to in order to discover the truth and to point out the guilty person. The oath is frequently in the form of a curse, and accompanies the drinking of a poison or of some liquid, which is supposed to act fatally upon the perjurer or the guilty. The oath is thus a species of ordeal. But the ordeal may occur by itself in various forms: the ordeal by fire, by red-hot metal, or by boiling oil or water, in which cases the innocent person is not burned, or his wound heals within a certain time; the ordeal by water—remaining under water for a certain time without drowning, or passing safely through water in which crocodiles lurk; the ordeal by poison (see OATH; ORDEAL; Post, ii. 459 ff.). The person who is proved to be guilty, if he has not already succumbed to the ordeal, is then punished according to the nature of his crime. Among savages, secret societies, such as the Duk-Duk of New Britain, supplement the action of private revenge or public justice where these are imperfect, and punish any one who commits crime.

4. Variety of crimes.—The idea of what constitutes crime in savage society is largely akin to that entertained in civilized societies. But there are important exceptions to this, bound up with the nature of savage society and belief, *e.g.* breach of tabu or religious custom, sorcery, and the like. Again—perhaps as a natural outcome of uncontrolled revenge operating in later times—there is the idea that accidental woundings or homicides are equally punishable with those committed intentionally, though in many cases there is an approach to the modern view of accident, and a distinction is made in the punishment inflicted, or no punishment follows (cf. Westermarck, i. 217; Post, ii. 214). Sometimes killing in self-defence is punishable, though not to the same extent as murder; and, frequently, there is a distinction between meditated crime and that committed in the heat of the moment. More serious is the view entertained by most savage tribes that, while to kill or to steal from a fellow-tribesman is wrong, these actions when committed against strangers or members of another tribe are not crimes, and are

even praiseworthy. They are apt to be considered wrong, however, if they are likely to bring the vengeance of the other tribe upon the tribe of the offender. With the dawn of a higher morality and a wider sense of responsibility this view tends to disappear. Again, we generally meet with the idea that the weight of the crime varies both according to the rank (and often the age and sex) of the offender and according to that of the victim. Chiefs or men of rank may commit crimes with impunity or with slight punishment, but crime committed against them is generally punished more severely than that against lesser men. This is especially seen where the system of composition for crime prevails, the blood-price or the fine varying strictly according to the rank of the victim, and often also according to the rank of the offender. These views continue to prevail in higher societies. Approximating to the custom of more advanced civilization, there is frequently a distinction made between a first crime and its repetition. A first offence may be punished comparatively lightly; a second or third will receive the utmost penalty—death or banishment.

Thus among the Bambara, for a first theft a hand is amputated; for a second the penalty is death (Letourneau, p. 78). The Aleuts punish a first theft with corporal punishment, a second with amputation of some fingers, a third with amputation of a hand and lips, a fourth with death (Petroff, 'Report on . . . Alaska,' *Tenth Census of the United States*, Washington, 1884, p. 152). Among the Wakamba, a first murder is punished by a fine, but on a second conviction the murderer is killed at once (Decle, *Three Years in Savage Africa*, 1898, p. 487).

In general, those crimes which may be considered public, inasmuch as they are committed against the customs, or to the danger, of the whole community, are sorcery (involving, according to current belief, all natural death), breaches of the customary marriage laws (incest), sacrilege (breaking of tabu), and treason. Private crimes—those committed against private persons—include murder, adultery, unchastity, theft, perjury, and the like. Some of the latter may be regarded as public crimes if they are committed against the chief, because of the relation in which he stands to the community. There are, of course, many lesser crimes, while, especially where chiefs have the power of making laws, there is a tendency to multiply offences. With the greater development of savage society, and with the gradual formation of a central administrative body taking the place of mere public opinion and custom, these private crimes are regarded less and less as offences against an individual, and more and more as breaches of law and transgressions against social order. But it is rather at the next higher stage, in barbaric and semi-civilized societies, that a real approximation to this view is found.

5. Punishments.—Punishment administered by public justice in savage society has generally the intention of making the offender suffer pain, and is thus analogous to punishment inflicted as an act of private revenge. The *lex talionis*, or principle of equivalence in punishment, is perhaps originally connected with the reflex and instinctive movements of the person who is hurt, and who attempts to make the aggressor suffer a similar hurt by a natural process of imitation. There must be blow for blow. At the same time this movement is one of self-preservation, and this also is an element of all punishment. Such instinctive resentment is, however, indiscriminate in the amount of vengeance which it employs, and this primitive instinct of blow for blow, whilst suggesting the *lex talionis*, is not sufficient as an explanation of it. We may, therefore, with Westermarck (i. 179), look for a further explanation of it in the feeling of self-regarding pride which desires to bring the aggressor to the same level as the sufferer, and in the social feeling that members of the same society have equal rights, and hence, if one makes another suffer, he must suffer in a similar way and to the same extent.

The simplest form of the *lex talionis* is found in the idea of life for life, wound for wound, eye for eye, tooth for tooth. But it also assumes some curious forms; for example, especially in the case of the blood-feud, there is often the desire that the vengeance should fall on one of the same rank, or the same sex, or the same age, as the victim—the real aggressor thus escaping. Again, the vengeance is exacted with the same kind of weapon, and in the same manner. Or, where a system of compensations and fines exists, these are in due proportion to the amount of pain caused. Or it is seen working in still another way: the thief is deprived of sight, of an arm or hand; the perjurer loses his tongue; the adulterer or ravisher is castrated; or, again, the thief must not only restore the goods stolen, but must submit to be pillaged to the same extent (see Post, ii. 238 ff.; Hobhouse, i. 84, 91).

But, while the *lex talionis* is found as an underlying principle both in savage and in more advanced systems (cf. *e.g.* the OT and the Bab. *Code of Ḥammurabi*), there is often a disposition to exceed it, so that methods of private revenge as well as public punishments are often out of all proportion to the crime committed, especially in places where the people are naturally cruel, where a despotic chief rules, or where it is held that a Divine as well as a human law is transgressed. In the last case, as well as in cases where the chief is regarded as Divine or as having Divine authority, any transgression of law is apt to involve the whole society in Divine vengeance. Hence the punishment is swift and proportionately severe (cf. Durkheim, 'Deux lois de l'évolution pénale,' *ASoc* iv. 64 ff.). Savage acts of revenge, unregulated or regulated, as well as methods of punishment, are also often excessive, since they involve the punishment of an innocent person in place of the real offender (in many instances of the blood-feud or of the *lex talionis*), or that of innocent persons in addition to the real offender (his wife and children, especially in cases of sorcery, and these as well as fellow-clansmen in some instances of the blood-feud), as a result of the idea of solidarity and collective responsibility—a principle lingering on in more advanced societies.

In a few cases capital punishment seldom or never occurs. But, as a rule, it is meted out in most tribes for one or other of such crimes as sorcery, murder, incest, treason, sacrilege, adultery, and theft. Some tribes punish capitally only for sorcery and murder, or for sorcery and adultery (especially with the wives of chiefs); but not uncommonly all these offences are liable to the punishment of death. Further, in such despotic kingdoms as Ashanti or other regions of Africa, as well as sporadically elsewhere, even small offences are punishable with death, at the capricious will of the chief (Ellis, *Tshi-speaking Peoples*, 1887, p. 166; Kollmann, *Victoria Nyanza*, Berlin, 1899, p. 170 f.).

The methods of death vary; they include decapitation, strangulation, hanging, stabbing or spearing, cudgelling or flagellation, empalement, crucifixion, drowning, burning, flaying alive, burying alive, throwing from a height, stoning, sending the criminal to sea in a leaky canoe, cutting in two, lopping off the limbs. In some cases, where the crime is believed to be particularly offensive to the gods, the criminal is offered in sacrifice, while this is not an unusual way of obtaining victims where human sacrifice prevails (Melanesia [Codrington, *Melanesians*, 1891, p. 135], Sandwich Islands [von Kotzebue, *Voy. of Discov. into the S. Sea*, 1821, iii. 248], Tahiti [Ellis, *Polynes. Res.*, 1829, i. 346]; cf. Cæsar, vi. 16 [Gauls]; Grimm, *Teut. Myth.*, 1882, i. 45 [Teutons]). In certain regions where cannibalism prevails, criminals are killed and eaten, probably as an extreme form of gratifying revenge and showing contempt

(cf. CANNIBALISM, § ii. 15; Codrington, p. 344; von Martius, *Travels in Brazil*, 1824, i. 88).

Of all these methods the most cruel are found in Africa, where also mutilation before death, as well as other tortures, is practised (cf. Letourneau, pp. 71, 81, 82, 88; Post, ii. 274; Westermarck, i. 195).

Other punishments consist of various bodily mutilations—cutting off legs or arms, hands or feet (or parts of these), nose, ears, lips; castration; and plucking out the eyes. All these are found commonly in Africa, among Amer. Indian tribes, in the South Sea Islands, and occasionally elsewhere. Flogging or beating with various instruments on various parts of the body—back, hips, shoulders, legs, stomach—is also used (in S. America, among the Mongols, in Africa). Enslavement is found as an occasional punishment for crime or for debt (commonly in Africa and in the Malay Archipelago, and sporadically elsewhere); or, where the criminal has failed to pay the due compensation, he is often enslaved, or the usual punishment is inflicted upon him. He becomes the slave of his victim or of the latter's family, or of the chief, or he may be sold. Confiscation of goods, in whole or in part, is a frequent punishment in cases of theft. Banishment occurs here and there (New Zealand, Mongols, some African tribes) as a punishment for certain crimes, but it is often the result of general bad or unruly behaviour threatening the peace of the tribe (see Westermarck, i. 172; Steinmetz, *Ethnol. Stud. zur ersten Entwick. der Strafe*, vol. ii. ch. 5). Lack of filial duty among the Kafirs, and lying among the Bannavs of Cambodia, are punished with banishment (Lichtenstein, *Travels in S. Africa*, 1812–15, i. 265; Mouhot, *Trav. in Central Parts of Indo-China*, 1864, ii. 27). Other punishments are various forms of dishonour—cutting off the hair, insulting exhibition or parade of the culprit, dressing in women's clothes. Imprisonment as a punishment is rarely found among savages, but instances are noted in various parts of Africa (Krapf, *Travels . . . in E. Africa*, 1860, p. 58; Letourneau, pp. 80, 84; Post, *Afr. Jur.* ii. 51).

There is also a wide-spread system of compensation or fine for certain offences. This method of indemnifying the victim or his relatives is itself a species of punishment, though, where the aggressor is wealthy, it is easy for him to pay for his crimes. The system probably originated in the custom of paying blood-money to the relatives of a murdered man. The aggressor, to avoid a blood-feud, would offer presents to the relatives to appease their anger, while at the same time appealing to their love of gain. This, defective as it may be from the point of view of justice, was soon seen to have the good effect of staying the excesses of the blood-feud, and would be encouraged by the community or the chief. Similarly, compensation for theft may also have been suggested by the custom of subjecting the chief to pillage of his goods. The system of compensation was largely adopted, and passed over into the administration of public justice as a method of assessing criminal actions. But it was far from being universally accepted either in systems of private revenge or in public punishment, and, even where it prevails, certain crimes cannot be compensated for, *e.g.* sorcery and deliberate murder. It has a wide-spread vogue, however, as a regular custom, or as an alternative to punishment in cases of murder, adultery, seduction, theft, etc. (cf. Post, ii. 256 ff., for a list of peoples among whom it is found). Where it prevails, a regular system of payments is fixed according to the injury done, according to the rank or sex of the victim, and sometimes according to the rank of the aggressor.

In many instances—in such serious crimes as sorcery, murder, or crimes committed against a chief or his household—the wife and children of the aggressor suffer with him, or are sold as slaves. Or, where compensation has not been paid, wife and children may be taken with the defaulting criminal and enslaved; or he himself may sell them in order to obtain the wherewithal to pay the compensation. In the first two instances the savage doctrine of human solidarity is seen at work—a principle emphasized in the blood-feud, where the murderer's family or clan is often held responsible for his act and the members are liable to be slain for it.

As a further form of indignity and punishment, the body of a criminal is often left unburied, or is thrown into the forest to be devoured by wild beasts (African tribes [Post, *Afr. Jur.* i. 46]; Eskimos [Rink, *Tales and Trad. of the Eskimo*, 1875, p. 54]; Cent. America [Preuss, *Die Begräb. der Amer.*, Königsberg, 1894, p. 301]).

6. As has already been said, a distinction is drawn even by the most backward peoples between public and private crimes. Some examples of both will now be discussed, showing the attitude of the savage with regard to them and the punishments meted out to the aggressors.

i. *PUBLIC CRIMES.*—As examples of public crimes may be taken sorcery, incest, and sacrilege.

(1) *Sorcery.*—As distinct from *magic*, which is authorized for the public good, sorcery, though its methods may often be similar, is almost universally punished by the common action of a tribe or by the central authority acting in its name. The sorcerer is employing unlawful means for anti-social ends, especially to bring about the sickness or death of his neighbours, or to cause sterility in field or fold. Further, inasmuch as the crime is an anti-social one, it is for that very reason a crime against the divinity of the social group, its guardian or tutelary spirit. As among the Eskimos, it is adverse to the interests of the community and to the supreme rule of things in which the people believe (Rink, *op. cit.* p. 41). Further, where spirits invoked in magic are evil and maleficent, they are such as are opposed to the rule of the benevolent spirit or divinity, according to the usual dualism which prevails in savage religion. Thus, sorcery is condemned on religious as well as on social or moral grounds, and those who are most active in pursuing it are generally the approved fetish-men or priests. Moreover, the divinities are sometimes said to abhor witchcraft and to punish it in the future life (Rink, p. 41; Parker, *Euahlayi Tribe*, 1905, p. 79; Codrington, p. 274). As it is a wide-spread belief that all sickness or death is due to unnatural causes, one of which is sorcery, there is a wide field for the exercise of public justice against the sorcerer, who is generally regarded as a murderer of a particularly offensive type. Hence, not only in the lower culture, but at higher levels, law, and custom condemn him. He is a danger to society; he offends against its gods; and, because of the solidarity of the society, it may be visited by them for his offence. Therefore he is almost invariably punished with death. Sorcery is sometimes the only crime which is so punished, while the method of death is often very cruel. In most cases the authorized magician, medicine-man, fetish-man, priest, or witch-doctor, takes steps to discover the sorcerer. When he is found, he is often subjected to an ordeal, *e.g.* by poison. If this does not kill him but proves him guilty, he is then publicly put to death. The ordeal is thus equivalent to the trial of the suspected person.

Among Australian tribes, with whom all natural death is attributed to sorcery, death is the invariable punishment. The medicine-man identifies the guilty person, an avenging party

is arranged by the council of old men, and the culprit is followed up and slain (Spencer-Gillen[a], pp. 461., 477; [b]25, 556). With the Eskimos, the *angekuts* are hostile to sorcerers and cause them to be put to death (Rink, pp. 34, 41; Petroff, *op. cit.* p. 152). The punishment of death was generally meted out to sorcerers, who were much feared among the American Indian tribes of all degrees of culture, from the lowest tribes up to the Aztecs, the method of death being often cruel—*e.g.* burning (Wyandots, Guatemalans) and cudgelling (Vera Paz). With the Aztecs the victim was sacrificed to the gods (*NR* ii. 462; cf. Post, ii. 395; Kohler, *ZVRW* xii. [1897] 412–416; Waitz, *Anthropologie*, Leipzig, 1859–1872, iii. 128). Among the Nufors of New Guinea sorcerers are stabbed and thrown into the sea (*ZE* viii. [1888] 193), and the punishment of death is usual in N. Guinea and among the peoples of the Malay peninsula (Wilken, 'Het stafr. bij de volken van het mal. ras,' in *Bijdragen tot de taal-, land-, en volkenkunde van Ned.-Indie*, The Hague, 1883, p. 21). In Fiji, where witchcraft exerted the strongest influence on the minds of the people, the person detected in using it was slain (Williams, *Fiji*, 1870, i. 248). In New Caledonia, old women are often put to death as sorceresses, and men who are suspected of causing death by sorcery are formally condemned and forced to jump over the rocks into the sea (Turner, *Samoa*, 1884, p. 342). In W. Africa, any one may kill the sorcerer; but generally after detection by the witch-doctor an ordeal is necessary, and the spirit of the ordeal sometimes kills the sorcerer. Otherwise he is put to death, and his private property is often confiscated (cf. Nassau, *Fetichism in W. Afr.*, 1904, p. 123; Kingsley, *W. Afr. Studies*[2], 1901, p. 159 ff.; Letourneau, p. 68; Post, *Afr. Jur.* ii. 66–67). Among the Lendu, a forest tribe of Uganda, the sorcerer is executed, and his body is thrown into the bush (Johnston, *Uganda Protectorate*, 1902, ii. 554 f.). In E. Cent. Africa, when the suspected sorcerer has been discovered before the assembled community by the witch-finder, he must drink a poisoned cup. If his stomach rejects it, he is acquitted; if it causes his death, this proves him guilty. In some cases he is burned alive (Macdonald, *Africana*, 1882, i. 43, 206 ff.; Letourneau, p. 69). In S. Africa, witch-doctors discover sorcerers, who are thought to be very numerous and powerful. When discovered, they are put to death (Casalis, *The Basutos*, p. 229; Decle, *op. cit.* p. 75; Maclean, *Kafir Laws and Customs*, 1838, p. 35 ff.).

Where the punishment of death is not inflicted, the sorcerer may be sold as a slave (some African tribes [Post, *Afr. Jur.* ii. 66–67]); and occasionally a fine is all that is demanded, but this is very rare (Bondei natives [*JAI* xxv. 227]).

Not infrequently the punishment is visited on the relatives of the sorcerer and upon his goods. Sometimes all these are destroyed (Decle, p. 153 [Matabele]; Post, *Afr. Jur.* ii. 66–67, 149 [Zulus and other African tribes]). In Bali, the parents, children, and grandchildren are put to death, and the property is confiscated (Crawfurd, *Ind. Archip.*, Edinb. 1820, iii. 138). In the Babar Archipelago, the sorcerer and all his adult blood-relations are slain, and the children given to the relatives of his victim to sell as slaves (Riedel, *De sluik- en kroeshar. Rassen*, The Hague, 1886, p. 346). Among many W. African tribes, while the sorcerer is executed, his family are sold as slaves (Post, ii. 67, 154).

(2) *Incest.*—While the civilized man's horror of incest is usually confined to cases of marriage or sexual relations between parents and children or brothers and sisters, among primitive and savage peoples the bars to marriage, while generally including these, usually extend much further. Where the classificatory system prevails, the society is divided into classes, from certain of which a man must not choose a wife. Or, again, he may not marry within his totem, his clan, his village, or even his tribe. Again, marriage may be probibited within the kindred absolutely, or within the kindred on the mother's side, where mother-right prevails (generally a totemic prohibition). In the last case a man might marry his wife's daughter, or his brother's daughter; or a brother might marry a sister by a different mother, since they would be of different totems. But, as a rule, these unions are also looked upon with abhorrence. Thus, while in savage life consanguineous unions are, with certain exceptions, regarded as incestuous, the prohibitions have usually a much wider range, and all breaches of exogamous law are equally regarded as incestuous. While adultery is mainly punished as a private offence, incest is an offence against the whole group, and is often considered to bring ill-luck and Divine punishment upon the group, who are collectively responsible. It is, therefore, punished as a public offence. Usually it is looked upon with so much horror that it is unheard of; but, where it does occur, death to both offenders is the usual punishment, though lighter punishments are occasionally found. With rare exceptions, the prohibition extends also to all sexual relations outside marriage between persons belonging to exogamous groups. (For various theories of the prohibition of marriage, of exogamy, and of the horror of incest, see Westermarck, *Marriage*, 1894, p. 310 ff.; Lang, *Social Origins*, 1903; Durkheim, 'La Prohib. de l'inceste et ses origines,' *ASoc* i. [1898] 64.)

Some examples of the belief that incest brings ill-luck or is obnoxious to the gods may be cited. Ruin to the crops, continuous drought, continuous rains, are the result of incest, according to the Dayaks, the Battas, the Galelareese (who also attribute earthquakes and eruptions to the same crime), and other tribes (Frazer, *GB*[2], 1900, ii. 212–213; Post, ii. 388). They must be atoned for usually by a sacrifice, and the criminals are punished. Or, as in Kafir and Aleut belief, the offspring of incestuous unions are monsters, the Kafirs believing this to be brought about by an ancestral spirit (Shooter, *Kafirs of Natal*, 1857, p. 45; Petroff, *op. cit.* p. 155). The Samoans regard it as a crime abhorred by the gods (Turner, p. 92), and the Pasemah believe that those committing it are annihilated by the gods (Post, i. 41). As in many cases both adultery and unchastity are supposed to bring general misfortune, or to be abhorrent to the gods, it is possible that with such peoples the marriage-laws are believed to have been ordained by the deities.

Among the Australian tribes, the usual punishment for breaches of the exogamous customs was death, occasionally cutting and burning. As among the Central Australian tribes, the punishment is determined by the head-men, who organize a party to carry out the sentence (Westermarck, *Marr.* p. 299 f.; Spencer-Gillen[a], pp. 15, 100, 495; [b]136, 140). The Veddas, often wrongfully accused of practising brother-sister unions, abhor incest, and punish it with death (Nevill, in *The Taprobanian*, Bombay, n.d., i. 178). The same punishment is usually inflicted throughout Melanesia (*JAI* xviii. 282; Macdonald, *Oceania*, 1889, p. 181). The Kandhs, Gonds, and other aboriginal tribes in India also punish incest (marriage within the same tribe, *gens*, etc.) with death (Percival, *Land of the Veda*, 1854, p. 345; Kohler, *ZVRW* viii. [1888] 145). Among the Bhils it is punished with banishment (Kohler, *ib.* x. [1892] 68). Throughout the Malay Archipelago the death punishment was often of a very cruel kind—committing to sea in a leaky vessel, drowning, or throwing into a volcano, burying alive, killing and eating (Wilken, *Globus*, lix. [1891] 22; Frazer, *GB*[2], ii. 213–214; Riedel, *op. cit.* pp. 195, 232, 460). Similarly, among the American Indians, death was the usual punishment (Kohler, *ZVRW* xii. [1897] 412–416; *NR* ii. 466, 659; Frazer, *Totemism*, 1887, p. 59).

Possibly in some of these cases the victims were regarded as expiatory sacrifices offered to the gods or spirits. In some instances of supposed incest, animal sacrifices are offered, or the blood is sprinkled on the ground to avert drought and sterility (Frazer, *GB*[2], ii. 212–213; Post, ii. 389). The death of the criminals or of the animal victims averts danger and a curse from the community.

As opposed to exogamy, most peoples have endogamous rules forbidding marriage outside a certain circle, narrower or wider as the case may be—the family, clan, caste, tribe, etc. Such a marriage is regarded as disgraceful, and in some cases as a crime which may be punished in various ways. But these rules have a different origin from those of exogamy, and result mainly from pride, antipathy, or prejudice (see Westermarck, *Marr.* p. 363 ff.; Post, i. 32 ff.).

(3) *Sacrilege.*—Of all forms of sacrilege in savage life, that which concerns breach of tabu is the most general. Tabu is an interdiction upon doing or saying some particular thing, an embargo placed on some thing or some person or persons, the infraction of which is frequently supposed to carry its own punishment automatically, preconceptions about tabu bringing about the fatal result through auto-suggestion. But, as the person who breaks the tabu is supposed to spread the danger by a species of contagion, and as breach of tabu frequently brings disaster to the tribe or its land, even where the automatic punishment may be looked for, he is often punished by society as a

whole, because he has sinned against the gods, or has committed a breach of social order involving supernatural results. He is put to death, for such a dangerous person is safer out of the way. Tabu need be considered here only in so far as it illustrates the savage view of public crime. Many irrational tabus have probably been imposed at one time by public opinion for some definite reason arising out of experience, real or imaginary. If something is conceived to be dangerous for any reason, *e.g.* on account of its connexion with spirits or gods, then it is wise to avoid it. The avoidance constitutes a tabu, and it becomes sacrilege to break it. Other tabus, those on food-stuffs or animals at certain seasons, have been imposed as a wise precaution, or in the interests of a class or sex. Many others are wilfully imposed by chiefs or priests. Generally all tabus have a supernatural sanction, and the automatic punishment is regarded as the working of the Divine anger. Tabus are sometimes of a private sort (tabus on property), but more often they have a public character—protective (as in the cases of food-supply, interdiction of places, etc.), political, sexual (as in the case of incest), or more purely religious. Tabu has to some extent subserved the growth of the idea that crime is wrong. Thus, where a tabu is placed on private property and the thief is believed to suffer automatically for his theft (cf. Turner, p. 185 f.), it is obvious that this belief would foster the idea that theft is wrong. On the other hand, many breaches of tabu, though crime in the eyes of the savage, have nothing inherently immoral in them.

Where society imposes a punishment for breach of tabu, that punishment is generally death. In Polynesia, where the institution was most fully developed, every infraction of tabu, or even the merest suspicion of it, was visited with death, the victim being usually sacrificed to appease the gods, since all diseases and calamities were public manifestations of their wrath at breach of tabu (Letourneau, p. 61). But in some other cases it is the violation of conspicuous tabus which is regarded as sacrilege meriting death.

Thus, with most savage tribes the fruits of the harvest cannot be partaken of until the firstfruits have been offered to a god or eaten sacramentally by selected individuals—chief or priest—or by all the people. In many cases to eat them before this solemn ceremony would be visited with Divine anger—madness (Fiji [*JAI* xiv. 27]), or death (Tahiti [Ellis, *op. cit.* i. 350]). But, even where death is thus held to follow automatically the act of sacrilege, detection carries with it a public punishment, as among the Zulus (death or confiscation of all the man's cattle [Frazer, *GB*[2] ii. 326]) and Polynesians (Moerenhout, *Voy. aux Îles du Grand Océan*, Paris, 1837, i. 531). An analogous crime is that of boiling milk among the pastoral Masai. This is believed to cause cows to go dry, and is punished as an insult to the sacred cattle, with death or a very heavy fine (Johnston, *Kilima-njaro Expedition*, 1886, p. 425).

A more obvious form of sacrilege is the viewing of various *sacra* by those to whom they are interdicted, *e.g.* women and children; or the communication of initiation secrets to the uninitiated; or intrusion upon sacred mysteries—those of men by women, those of women by men. Among the Australians, no woman may look upon the sacred mysteries of the men on pain of death, and the *tundun*, or bull-roarer, must never be shown to a woman or child. If it is, the woman and the man who shows it (and sometimes his mother and sisters) are put to death. Death is also the punishment to women who look upon the sacred totemic drawings, or (among the Arunta) intrude upon the place where the sacred objects are kept. Generally the danger of revealing these things is told to boys at initiation (see *JAI* ii. 271, xiii. 448, xxv. 311; Howitt and Fison, *Kamilaroi and Kurnai*, 1880, p. 268; Spencer-Gillen[a], pp. 11, 132, [b] 500; also above, vol. ii. p. 889). The same is true of the natives of the Papuan Gulf (*JAI* xxxii. 425). Among the Indians of Brazil, women are warned off the mysteries by the playing of the *jurupari* pipes, the mere chance sight of which is punished with death (Wallace, *Amazon*, 1895, p. 349). Death is also the penalty for infringing the initiation rules among the Torres Straits tribes (Haddon, *JAI* xix. 335). The initiation rites of girls are also tabu to men in most districts, generally under pain of death, inflicted by the women (Reade, *Savage Africa*, 1863, p. 246; Crawley, *Mystic Rose*, 1902, p. 297). Intruders on the mysteries of the Porro fraternity in the Timni district of W. Africa are put to death or sold as slaves, and this is generally true of all savage 'mysteries' practised by men; while, as in some African mysteries, any infraction of oaths and covenants by their members is believed to be punished by the god (Réville, *Rel. des peuples non civilisés*, Paris, 1883, i. 110; *CF*, p. 317). Similarly, as in the case of the female Njembe society in W. Africa, the mysteries of women must not be looked on by men under pain of death (Nassau, *op. cit.* p. 261; *CF*, p. 318). In some cases, religious rites as well as sacred places are tabu to women, as in the Marquesas Islands, where a woman is put to death if she touches the sacred ground where festivals are held (Melville, *Marquesas Islands*, 1846, p. 100).

Examples of the dangerous results of tabu-breaking by the automatic working of suggestion, even in cases where the breach has been unconscious, and has been made known to the breaker sometimes only after a long lapse of time, will be found in Dennett, *Folk-Lore of the Fjort*, 1898, pp. xxvi, xxix; *Old New Zealand*, by a Pakeha Maori, London, 1863, p. 96; *JAI* ix. 458. Suggestion also produces similar automatic results where magic, ghostly warnings, etc., are believed in, and where a man thinks that he is a victim of these (see Erskine, *W. Pacific*, 1853, p. 169; Howitt and Fison, *op. cit. passim*; Thomson, *Savage Island*, 1902, p. 98).

It should be observed that, where there are definite laws against the marriage of certain persons, the breach of which would be incest, these persons are generally tabu and must not speak to each other. Similarly, as a precaution against adultery, men's wives are tabu to other men, who must not even speak to or touch them (cf. Bastian, *Loango-Küste*, Jena, 1874–76, i. 168, 244).

ii. *PRIVATE CRIMES.*—Among private crimes, those of murder, adultery, unchastity, and theft may be examined here in detail. Some of these, *e.g.* adultery and unchastity, tend to become public crimes, since they are sometimes believed to produce evil results upon the whole tribe or upon its land—a visitation by the offended spirits.

(1) *Murder.*—Tylor has pointed out that 'no known tribe, however low and ferocious, has ever admitted that men may kill one another indiscriminately' (*CR* xxi. 714). This statement is supported by the express ideas of the horror of murder entertained by many even of the lowest savages. In many tribes, murders are extremely rare, and are felt to be wrong. But generally the feeling of abhorrence is restricted, and it is considered a harmless or even praiseworthy action to kill outside the limits of the clan or tribe. But the limits of the restriction vary considerably among different peoples. Blood-revenge for murder is a duty or a custom insisted upon by public opinion in most savage societies, and often legally permitted, while it is probably a survival of the time when no supreme authority existed for the execution of justice. Though in many cases the relatives of the murderer or any members of his clan or tribe are slain in revenge, because of savage man's idea of human solidarity and of the collective guilt of the murderer's family, clan, tribe, or more specifically because of the working of the *lex talionis* (son for son, daughter for daughter, etc.), and, though the custom often gives rise to tribal wars, yet the evidence shows that the revenge is directed in the first place most frequently upon the murderer himself. Often his death satisfies the desire for vengeance, and it is only where it has been found impossible to lay hands on him that the vengeance falls on another. In the insistence upon blood-revenge as a sacred and moral duty, which it is disgraceful and irreligious to avoid (sometimes because the dead man's ghost finds no rest till the vengeance falls), and in its falling first upon the murderer, we see exemplified the general savage view of justice.[1] Where a local tribunal exists, it may arrange the blood-feud and set the machinery in motion, or it may go further and, after hearing the respective sides, give judgment in favour of the avenger, and appoint execution to be done, sometimes by him; or it may try to arrange a compensation. But only where it is strong enough will its decisions be enforced or its suggestions be heeded. This action of the local tribunal may be regarded in the light of a compromise, where the custom of

[1] Other occasional causes of a blood-feud are wounding, adultery, seduction, rape, and kidnapping (cf. Post, i. 239).

blood-feud continues after the rise of such tribunals. It is thus a step towards justice being done in the case of private wrongs. The progress to true justice is further seen where the central authority steps in to forbid revenge, to decide guilt, and to award punishment. Frequently the practice of compensation, the *wergeld*, takes the place of the blood-feud or is even obligatory, the relatives being satisfied with the payment of a heavy fine, fixed according to rank, sex, age, etc. (cf. Post, i. 249 ff.). Where the acceptance of compensation was seen to lessen the protracted hostilities in the case of the blood-feud, it would be fostered by custom and authority; and in many cases, though not all, its existence may be traced to the intervention of the central authority, the elders of the tribe, or the chief (see BLOOD-FEUD).

It should be noted that, though there are marked exceptions to the rule, infanticide is very widespread and meets with little or no disapproval, while the killing of the sick and aged, not out of wantonness but for certain definite reasons, is not uncommon in many parts of the world. Similarly, though by no means generally, it is often the case that a master has the right to kill his slave (Post, i. 373). In a few cases infanticide is punished with death or in some other way, or is regarded as wrong and liable to bring misfortune; and, where the killing of aged parents for the specific reasons referred to is not customary, parricide, when it does occur, is regarded with abhorrence, and is at once punished (cf. Westermarck, i. 402 ff., 386; Steinmetz, *op. cit.* ii. 153 ff.).

Where blood-revenge does not exist, as well as in many cases where it does, the murderer is punished by the community, or by some special authority, though it is not always easy to distinguish, from the statements made, between true blood-revenge and the administration of justice. In most cases the punishment is death.

Among the Fuegians, the murderer is placed under a ban, and perishes of hunger, or death is inflicted by his fellows (Hyades-Deniker, *Mission scient. du Cap Horn*, viii. 374, 243). Among some Australian tribes, as has been seen, the council of elders arranges the avenging party in cases of murder by sorcery. But, as among the tribes of N.W. Central Queensland, the camp or a council of the camp punishes the murderer (Roth, *Ethnol. Studies among the N.W.C. Queensland Abor.*, 1897, pp. 139, 141). With some tribes a ceremony of spear-throwing at an offender appears to take the place of the blood-feud proper (Westermarck, i. 171). The Eskimos and Aleuts occasionally make common cause against a murderer and put him to death (Nansen, *op. cit.* p. 162; cf. Petroff, *op. cit.* p. 152). With many N. American Indian tribes the murderer had to appear before the chiefs for trial, but he was often handed over to the relatives of his victim for punishment (Cooper, *Mishmee Hills*, 1873, p. 238; Morgan, *League of the Iroquois*, Rochester, 1851, p. 330; Schoolcraft, *Ind. Tribes*, Philadelphia, 1851–60, i. 277; Adair, *Hist. of Amer. Ind.*, 1775, p. 150). Many African tribes also inflict capital punishment on the murderer, the chief frequently deciding his guilt and enforcing the sentence (Westermarck, i. 189; Letourneau, pp. 80, 83–84; Johnston, *op. cit.* ii. 882 [murderer executed by warriors among the Mutei]), or, as among the Mpongwe, the community burn or drown him (Burton, *Two Trips to Gorilla Land*, i. 105). Capital punishment for murder is also found in Polynesia and New Guinea (Turner, *Samoa*, pp. 178, 295, 334; Thomson, *JAI* xxxi. 143; Chalmers, *Pioneering in N.G.*, 1887, p. 179). In other cases, banishment, usually followed by death, is found, or, as among the Omahas, a species of boycotting and penitential expiation in the case of a murderer whose life has been spared (Dorsey, in *3 RBEW*, 1884, p. 369). Or, in some instances, as in the commutation of blood-revenge, a fine is all that is insisted on for murder (Shooter, *Kafirs of Natal*, p. 103; Casalis, *op. cit.* p. 228; Griffith, *JRASBe* vi. [1837] 332 [Mishmis, offender cut to pieces if fine is not paid]; Johnston, *op. cit.* ii. 882 [Kamasias, confiscation of goods of murderer and his relatives]). This fine is not seldom a real commutation of blood-revenge, and the composition is often recommended or expressly insisted on by the central authority. If it is not paid, the murderer is generally put to death (cf. Letourneau, pp. 72, 80, 89, 95; Elphinstone, *Kingdom of Caubul*, 1839, ii. 105; Von Martius, *Beit. zur Ethnog. Amer.*, Leipzig, 1867, i. 130).

The vengeance of the society upon the murderer is in part due to the belief that he is a source of danger to the group. He is infected with the uncleanness of death, or is surrounded by spirits, especially that of his victim, who will afflict not only him but others. Hence he is tabu, and, if he is not put to death, he must undergo ceremonies of purification, or be isolated from his fellows, as in the case of the Omahas (see above, and cf. Kohler, *ZVRW* xii. [1897] 408; Frazer, *GB*[2] i. 331 ff.). These ceremonies, or the period of isolation, are then a species of punishment.

In some cases it is expressly said that murder is punished because it is hated by a Divine being, or is a breach of his law. This is the case among the Omahas (Dorsey, *loc. cit.*), while in other instances murderers are believed to be punished after death (Australians by Baiame [Parker, *op. cit.* p. 79], Andaman Islanders [Man, *JAI* xii. 161–2], Melanesians [Codrington, p. 273 ff.], New Hebrides [Turner, *Samoa*, p. 326], Awemba [Sheane, *JAI*, xxxvi. 150 ff.], American Ind. [above, vol. ii. p. 685[a]]).

(2) *Adultery.*—Since in all savage societies the wife is regarded as the property of her husband, adultery is generally a serious crime. Before betrothal or marriage the woman may dispose of herself as she chooses, though here the father or guardian has sometimes the right of controlling her action, but after marriage her husband has entire right over her. Adultery is therefore regarded as an infringement of the husband's proprietary right, and is frequently a serious form of theft. Add to this the working of jealousy, and it is easy to understand why to the savage mind adultery is so serious an offence and often a capital crime. In many instances, even where there is a regular tribunal, the husband and those whose duty it is to help him have the right of dealing as he pleases with the culprits, especially if he catches them *in flagrante delicto*. The local tribunal and, in any case, custom and opinion justify his action, and often, indeed, expect him to avenge himself. He may, however, in such a case be liable to hostilities from the relatives of the wife or her paramour; and in a few cases, where the established tribunal is jealous of all such personal action, he may be punished by it, especially when he has put the woman to death instead of inflicting a lighter punishment. Or he may appeal to the tribunal, with confidence that due punishment will be visited upon the offenders, the execution of this punishment being occasionally allotted to him.

The punishment of death not only for adultery but, in some cases, for slight indiscretions or even for touching a wife, especially the wife of a chief (Bastian, *op. cit.* i. 244; Post, ii. 358; MacLennan, *Studies in Anc. Hist.*, 2nd ser., 1896, p. 412), is visited upon the offending wife or the paramour or both, either by the husband or by a legal tribunal, among a large number of peoples (see ADULTERY [Primitive and Savage]; Westermarck, i. 290; Post, ii. 362, 371); and in some cases adultery is the only crime which is capitally punished (Mishmis [*JRASBe* vi. [1837] 332]). Occasionally the punishment is meted out to the wife only after repeated offences (Macdonald, *Africana*, i. 140). In other cases the seducer has to suffer slavery, mutilation, emasculation, beating, or some other bodily indignity; he must submit to his wife's being outraged; or he must pay compensation, usually equal to the value of the woman, to the injured husband (Post, ii. 366–9, 373; Letourneau, pp. 20, 43, 65–66, 78, 83, 95). Similarly, where the unfaithful wife is not put to death, she is mutilated, disfigured, beaten and ill-treated, enslaved, repudiated, divorced, or prostituted (Post, ii. 364–5; Letourneau, pp. 37, 65, 66). In a few exceptional cases the wife is not punished (Westermarck, *Marr.* p. 122; Post, ii. 370). These various punishments are usually inflicted by the husband, but occasionally by a tribunal or by the chief. Adultery is occasionally the cause of a blood-feud or of a species of blood-revenge (du Chaillu, *Equat. Africa*, 1861, p. 51; Letourneau, p. 96).

The punishment of adultery is sometimes in proportion to the rank of the offenders or of the husband; or, where a system of fines is in use, the fine is similarly proportioned (Post, *Afr. Jur.* ii. 82–83; Letourneau, pp. 65–68; Johnston, *op. cit.* ii. 590, 689; Ellis, *Ewe-speaking Peoples*, 1890, p. 202). Generally, too, adultery with a chief wife is more severely punished than with a lesser wife or concubine (see CONCUBINAGE).

As a general rule, in savage societies the wife can obtain no redress for the husband's adultery; but there are occasionally exceptions to this even at low levels (*e.g.* with some Australian tribes), and the husband is punished more or less severely, or

his adultery (or even bringing a second wife or concubine to the house) is a ground for the wife's divorcing him (see ADULTERY [Primitive and Savage], § 6; Westermarck, ii. 432; Post, *Afr. Jur.* i. 465, ii. 72).

There is a certain amount of evidence that among savage tribes adultery is regarded as a grave moral offence, which may bring general calamity, or must be expiated, or which is offensive to the gods, or will be punished in the next world (see art. ADULTERY, § 8; Crawley, *op. cit.* p. 143 f.; Mason, *JRASBe* xxxvii. [1868] pt. 2, 147 ff. [Karens]; Westermarck, ii. 675; Perham, *JRAS* Straits branch, no. 8, p. 150 [Sea Dayaks]; Man, *JAI* xii. 157 [Andaman Islanders]; Sheane, *JAI* xxxvi. 150 ff. [Awemba]; Codrington, *Melanesians*, p. 273 ff.; Jones, *Ojebway Ind.*, 1861, p. 104).

(3) *Unchastity.*—Unchastity before marriage is variously regarded among savage peoples. In some instances a girl is allowed the utmost licence, but in many quarters unchastity is reprobated more or less severely. The difference in attitude doubtless involves differing moral conceptions, but there can be little doubt that much is due to the question of the girl's position. If she has been betrothed in early years to a prospective husband, she is expected to remain chaste, or she may be repudiated. Or, again, unchastity is held to lower her value in her father's or guardian's opinion, because a smaller bride-price will be obtainable for her. But, as the severity of the punishments shows, unchastity is frequently regarded as a moral offence even among some very low tribes (see Westermarck, *Marr.* p. 61 ff.), and it is sometimes thought to be offensive to the higher powers, or to bring misfortune on the tribe or the crops. Hence it must be expiated in one way or another, as well as punished (St. John, *Forests of Far East*, 1863, i. 63, 69 [Dayaks]; Mason, *JASB* xxxvii. 2 [1868], 147 [Karens]; Frazer, *GB*[2] ii. 212 [Battas]; Bastian, *Indonesien*, Berlin, 1884–99, i. 144 [Ceram]; Reclus, *Prim. Folk*, London, 1891, p. 52; Post, *Afr. Jur.* i. 460; Westermarck, *Marr.* p. 61 [Loango]; Casalis, *Basutos*, p. 267).

The punishments are various, and may be inflicted by the house-father, the tribunal, or the chief. Sometimes both seducer and seduced are put to death (Post, *Afr. Jur.* ii. 70 [Marea, Beni-Amer]; Cunningham, *Uganda*, 1905, p. 290 [Baziba]; Johnston, *op. cit.* ii. 747 [Kavirondo]; Dawson, *Aust. Abor.*, Melbourne, 1881, p. 23 [W. Victoria]; Post, ii. 375 [Nias]). In other cases the girl is put to death (Post, ii. 375 [some Igorrote tribes]), or she is banished or enslaved (Westermarck, *Marr.* p. 66 ff.; Post, *Afr. Jur.* ii. 72; Cunningham, *op. cit.* p. 102 [Bakoki]; Chanler, *Through Jungle and Desert*, 1896, p. 317 [Rendile of E. Africa]; Post, ii. 380 [some Malay tribes]), or she is scourged (Post, *Afr. Jur.* ii. 71–72), or has to pay a fine to the chief (Post, ii. 380). In some of these cases the seducer shares the punishment, but generally he has to pay compensation or a fine, usually equivalent to the value of the girl (her bride-price or blood-price), and sometimes much heavier (Post, ii. 375–6; Westermarck, ii. 425–6, 436). In some instances he must also marry the girl, and often, if the fine is not forthcoming, he is enslaved. Seduction may at one time have been a common cause of a blood-feud, later compensated for by fine, but occasionally it still leads to a feud (Post, *Afr. Jur.* i. 81).

(4) *Theft.*—Proprietary rights are recognized by all savage tribes, most of whom condemn or abhor theft, while all of them punish it in one way or another. The thief is frequently punished by the owner of the stolen property (more especially when he is taken red-handed); and in such cases the latter may even have the right to kill him or enslave him. Or he may force him to restore the stolen goods or their value, and sometimes two, three, or more times their value, or may subject his belongings to pillage. Here, generally, custom has arranged a system of regulated composition. In other cases the thief is punished by the tribunal, or the chief, with death, enslavement, banishment, mutilation, or beating; or he is forced to pay a fine, or to restore the goods or their value. In general, the higher the value of the goods stolen, the heavier the punishment. Stealing such things as any tribe sets much store by—cattle, products of the field, weapons, and the like—is usually severely punished. Sometimes the punishment depends upon the place from which the theft is made (field, garden, or house), the time at which it occurs (night or day), or whether the thief is taken in the act, and also upon the social position of the person robbed or of the thief. Usually, too, the punishment increases when acts of theft are repeated, a notorious thief being usually put to death. Where a system of fines exists, there is generally found a regular scale of values for different things. And, when a fine or composition is not paid, the thief is often killed, enslaved, or punished in some other way. But, before undergoing punishment, the prisoner's guilt or innocence may be attested by oath or ordeal. In many cases property is protected by tabus involving the thief in an automatic punishment or in the results of a curse. Or, again, when a thief cannot be found, resort is often had to cursing him, a god being invoked to punish him (see Westermarck, ii. 63 ff.). In some instances the gods are said to abhor and punish theft either in this world or the next (Andaman Islanders [Man, *JAI* xii. 161]; some Polynesian and Melanesian tribes [Turner, *Samoa*, pp. 301, 326; Codrington, *op. cit.* p. 274; Macdonald, *Oceania*, p. 208]; some American Indian tribes [above, vol. ii. p. 685[a]; Bossu, *Trav. through Louisiana*, 1771, i. 256]; Dayaks [Brooke, *Ten Years in Sarawak*, 1866, i. 55; Perham, *op. cit.* p. 149]).

The thief is killed when taken in the act, by the Fuegians (King and Fitzroy, *Voyages*, 1839, ii. 180), peoples of the Malay Archipelago (Westermarck, ii. 8), Maoris (Moerenhout, *op. cit.* ii. 181), some African tribes (Westermarck, i. 289, ii. 13; Johnston, ii. 591; Post, *Afr. Jur.* ii. 92–3); or he is enslaved (Post, *ib.* ii. 93). Among peoples with whom capital punishment for various kinds of theft exists are some Australian tribes (Letourneau, p. 28); tribes of the Malay Archipelago (Javanese, Alfurs, Bataks, Achinese, etc. [Post, ii. 434; Westermarck, ii. 8]); the Shans (*JAI* xxvi. 21); American Indian tribes (Post, ii. 434; *NR* ii. 658; Petroff, *op. cit.* p. 152; Harmon, *Voyages*, Andover, 1820, p. 348; Von Martius, *op. cit.* i. 88); Polynesian and Melanesian tribes (Westermarck, ii. 9; Post, *Anfänge des Staats- und Rechtslebens*, Oldenburg, 1878, p. 224; Letourneau, p. 54 f.); African tribes (Letourneau, pp. 64, 67; Westermarck, ii. 12; Post, ii. 88 f.). Enslaving or banishment (especially in cases of repeated theft) is the punishment among the Fantis, Yolofs, Diagara, and other African tribes (Post, ii. 87; Letourneau, p. 64), the Karens (habitual thieves [Mason, *JASB* xxxvii. 2, 146]), tribes of the Malay Archipelago (Westermarck, ii. 8), Maoris (Post, *Anfänge*, p. 224), some Amer. Ind. tribes (*NR* ii. 658; Dodge, *Our Wild Indians*, Hartford, 1882, pp. 64, 79; Dall, *Alaska*, 1870, p. 382), Mongols (Post, *op. cit.* p. 224). Mutilations of various kinds as an application of the *lex talionis* (cutting off fingers, hands, arms, feet, or legs, plucking out the eyes, or even cutting off nose or ears, and castration) are found among several African tribes (Post, *Afr. Jur.* ii. 81, 88, 90–92; Westermarck, ii. 12), peoples of the Malay Archipelago (Westermarck, ii. 8; Post, *Anfänge*, p. 223; Riedel, *op. cit.* p. 232), Ainus (Batchelor, *Ainu and their Folklore*, 1901, p. 285), various Mongol tribes (Post, *op. cit.* 223), Kamchadales, some Amer. Ind. tribes (Letourneau, p. 19; Post, *op. cit.* p. 223), and in Fiji (Williams, *Fiji*, p. 23). Beating or flogging occurs among the Brazilian Indians (Post, *op. cit.* p. 222), Kalmuks (*ib.* p. 222), and some African tribes (Post, *Afr. Jur.* ii. 88, 91 f.).

Probably the earliest form of revenge for theft, apart from death, was retaliation in kind. The victim of the theft would either pillage the thief or seek to recover his property. Acts of pillage are found sporadically sanctioned by public opinion (Maoris [Ellis, iii. 126]; in Malaysia [Letourneau, p. 75]); but, where these occur, they may be in default of restitution. Sometimes simple restitution of goods suffices, but more frequently this accompanies another punishment or the enforcing of a twofold or manifold restitution (Indians of Brazil [Von Martius, i. 88]; Amer. Ind. tribes—Wyandots twofold [*1 RBEW*, 1881, p. 66]; Mayas [*NR* ii. 658]; Kirghiz ninefold [Georgi, *Russia*, 1780–83, iii. 337]; Malay Archipelago twofold or more, sometimes a fine [Westermarck, ii. 8; Post, *Anfänge*, p. 218]; African tribes, twice to ten times the value [Westermarck, ii. 12; Post, *Afr. Jur.* ii. 84, 86]). Sometimes confiscation of a thief's whole property occurs (Cunningham, *Uganda*, p. 304; Johnston, ii. 882; Post, ii. 439). Such forms of compensation may be regarded in the light of a fine, greater or less, according to the magnitude of the theft, or the general feeling with regard to its wickedness. Sometimes also severe punishments —death, mutilation, etc.—may be expiated by a fine. Among Australian tribes a not uncommon method is that the thief is challenged to single combat by his victim.

An especially vile form of theft, always severely punished when it occurred, and perhaps to be regarded as a form of sacrilege, is that of stealing offerings, etc., from a grave (Westermarck, ii. 518–9).

7. At those festivals which mark the beginning of a new year or the offering of firstfruits among savages, and which are usually accompanied by ceremonial confession of wrongdoing and by ritual purifications and riddance of the contagion of wrong, very frequently there is considerable licence, and such crimes as may be then committed are not afterwards punished. At such festivals there is great excitement, with much drinking, dancing, etc. Crimes would then be readily committed, but had not to be accounted for, because they occurred during a sacred season, while their contagion had already prospectively been got rid of, or would shortly be got rid of, by the ceremonial purifications usual at such periods.

Among most savage tribes the right of asylum or sanctuary for the criminal is clearly recognized, the sanctuary being generally a place sacred to gods or spirits, or the abode of sacred persons (priest or chief), in which it would be dangerous for the avenger or the executioner of justice to shed the blood even of a criminal (see art. ASYLUM; Post, ii. 252 ff.).

SUMMARY.—The execution of justice among savage tribes is, on the whole, an extremely rough and ready process. Where the practice of private revenge is common, it militates against the independent and impartial weighing of the evidence by a disinterested tribunal. And, even where there exists a recognized tribunal, it generally lacks the most elementary requirements for the discovery of truth as found in a civilized court of justice. Impartiality is seldom found, the weighing of evidence and the reliance upon it alone being practically unknown; the common resort to ordeals is an extremely defective method of arriving at the truth; in many cases not only does the guilty escape, but, where he is punished, the innocent often share his punishment. Punishments, too, are often extremely severe. On the other hand, the evidence seems to show that there is a general hatred of crime among savages, and that it is probably of comparatively rare occurrence among many tribes.

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CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Assyro-Babylonian).

—These are revealed to us mainly by the Bab. codes of laws, of which three have been found—the first and the last, fragments only; the second—that of Ḫammurabi—nearly complete.

1. The first (the earliest known) are the Sumerian laws, of which examples occur in the 7th tablet of the *Ulutinābi-šu* ('punctually') series. This work contains specimen-phrases for students of Sumero-Akkadian, the laws being among the legal and other phrases which the student had to learn. Though the tablet dates from the time of Ashurbanipal (*c.* 650 B.C.), there is no doubt as to the period during which these laws and their penalties were in force; their reproduction in the contract-tablets of the time of the dynasty to which Ḫammurabi belonged indicates that the code of which they formed part originated previous to *c.* 2000 B.C. The language in which they are written (Sumerian) shows that they were drawn up during the Sumerian period, and they may, therefore, date from 3500 B.C., or even earlier. The crimes or misdemeanours referred to therein are not serious, and belong rather to the class of offences against morals than to really criminal acts. Nevertheless, they are exceedingly interesting, and are of considerable importance in that they contain the earliest ordinances in existence concerning punishment for wrongdoing:

'If a son say to his father, "Thou art not my father," they may shave him, put him in fetters, and sell him for silver.'

'If a son say to his mother, "Thou art not my mother," they may shave his forehead, lead him round the city, and drive him forth from the house.'

'If a wife hate her husband, and say to him, "Thou art not my husband," they may throw her into the river.'

'If a husband say to his wife, "Thou art not my wife," he shall pay her half a mana of silver.'

'If a man hire a slave, and he dies, is lost, runs away, gets locked up, falls ill, he shall pay as his hire every day half a measure of grain.'

Though the above laws refer only to adopted sons, the respect for foster-parents which the punishments for denial of them imply shows how strong the feeling of the Sumerians was in this matter. The adopted son might be sold as a slave, and it may be supposed that a real son would have been treated with even greater severity. The denial of a foster-mother brought upon the culprit all the disadvantages of slavery, as is implied by the shaving of his forehead. His being taken round in the city was probably for the purpose of making his misdemeanour known; and driving him forth from the house implied his being either left in utter destitution, or relegated to the position of a slave.

Inequality in the status of the husband and the wife is implied by the differing punishments for the same or similar offences. Divorcing a husband was punishable with death, but the divorcing of a wife only incurred the fine of half a mana of silver. There is no doubt that women had fewer rights than men in ancient Babylonia, but it must be admitted that they are not altogether their equals even now.

The last law of the five shows the respect paid to property. The penalties inflicted are rather hard upon the hirer, who is responsible for a slave whom he has hired, even if a misfortune befalling him is not due in any way to the fault of the hirer. Perhaps it was necessary—the Sumerians may have been (criminally) careless of other people's property delivered into their hands; in any case, if the hirer thought the conditions too severe, he could easily stipulate, on hiring, that he should not be visited with the full rigours of the law in the case of an accident happening.

2. The next laws in chronological order with which we come into contact are those drawn up by the great Babylonian legislator, Ḫammurabi, whose code is now preserved in the Louvre at Paris. Here we have a list of crimes and punishments far more complete than any which the ancient nations of the East preceding the Jews have ever handed down.

How far these laws were regarded as binding is doubtful—the conditions of life probably changed from time to time; and it is unlikely that the same ideas regarding penalties and punishments for breaches of the law prevailed in Assyria as in Babylonia, notwithstanding that the Assyrians studied those old Bab. laws. Perhaps the tablets of the *Ulutinābi-šu* series, like many another ancient composition, and the laws of Ḫammurabi himself, were kept in the libraries at Nineveh, simply because they were ancient and venerable works, useful to the law-student. Upon this point, however, we shall be better able to judge later on.

In considering such a matter as that of crimes and punishments, it will probably be admitted that the Babylonian mind was not trained in so severe a school as that of the Roman or the modern legist. Moreover, the difference in the manners and customs of the East and the West, to say nothing of the question of period, must be taken into consideration. Thus, many offences against morality and decency were probably not thought worthy of punishment by the Babylonians, notwithstanding that they may have been regarded as most reprehensible. Bigamy was not a punishable offence, and the game-laws were probably merely rudimentary. Bribery was not punishable, except when it was intended thereby to pervert the ends of justice.

Nothing is said, moreover, concerning bestiality, blasphemy, breach of ritual, drunkenness (except, perhaps, in the case of priestesses and devotees), lying (though we know, from certain texts—see Conscience [Bab.], above, p. 33—that this was a thing unpleasing to the deity), malice, prophesying falsely, the desecration of holy days, speaking evil of rulers (*lèse majesté*), uncleanness, usury, and many other things which are not only regarded as crimes or misdemeanours among the European nations, but also appear as such with the ancient Hebrews. Idolatry, magic, sorcery, intercourse with demons and spirits, and prostitution were naturally not counted as crimes; though blasphemy, sacrilege, and similar offences against the gods were probably severely punished—certainly the latter (sacrilege). Whether blasphemy was a crime or not probably depended upon the place and the deity, for none would speak slightingly of a deity in the place where he was worshipped, except a fanatic.[1] It is to be noted, however, that nothing certain can be stated with regard to many acts which modern Europeans would consider as crimes in law, for the simple reason that we have only one code in any sense complete, namely, that of Ḫammurabi (*c.* 2000 B.C.), and even that has gaps.

The death penalty.—In the Code of Ḫammurabi, as is fitting, respect for what is just holds the first place, and the penalty for false accusation of killing is death (§ 1). In the case of a (false) accusation of sorcery, the accused person had to dive into the river, and, if the river refused to drown him, the accuser suffered the penalty of death, and the accused took the house of his dead defamer. Death, in fact, was the penalty of any false accusation in which a life was involved. In all other cases, a false witness bore the cost of the action (§§ 2–4).

Next to the safety and integrity of the person, that of the property of a man was held to be the most sacred. Theft was not generally punished with death, unless the property stolen belonged to a temple or to the palace (of the king), in which case the receiver suffered the same punishment (§ 6). In later times, the penalty for sacrilegious theft (with the damage inflicted upon the images of deities by stripping them) seems to have been death by fire (Pinches, *The OT in the Light*, etc.[3], p. 561).

Strange, however, is the severity of the law (§ 7) ordaining death for buying the property of a man, either from his own hands or from those of his slave, without witnesses or contracts; or for receiving such property on deposit. Probably possession of a man's property without justifying documents suggested receiving it on false pretences, which the laws of the Babylonians evidently wished to discourage, the more especially as it presupposed the neglect of those legal forms to which the people seem to have paid special attention.

Though theft did not entail the death-penalty, the neglect or failure to pay fines and make restitution transformed it into a capital offence (§ 8). There were probably two reasons for this—the sacredness of property-rights, and respect for the law. Theft, with the sale of the stolen object, was even more severely punished, as the penalty was not only death, but the restitution of the property, in addition, to both parties (the owner, and the person to whom the property had been sold), the purchase-money being returned in full (§ 9). It seems not improbable that a purchaser of property sometimes found himself in serious difficulty, for, if he could not produce the seller or witnesses, he was regarded as a thief, and was executed accordingly (§ 10). This law naturally presupposes that he had no documentary evidence of the purchase. A claimant of lost property had likewise to be careful, as absence of witnesses was regarded as proving him to be a rogue; and the penalty in that case, again, was death, because he had falsely accused the person claimed from (§ 11).

Housebreaking, too, entailed the death-penalty, probably because theft was regarded as being in contemplation, though the damage to the house was naturally taken into consideration. The housebreaker was killed and buried in front of the breach (§ 21)—an undesirable position in any country where the dead were regarded as returning to visit the living. Brigandage was also punished with death (§ 22). Theft at a house where a fire had broken out, under the pretence of entering to extinguish it, entailed being thrown into the flames (§ 25). One is left to surmise that the thief got out if he could.

Offences against the person were likewise punished severely. Kidnapping a freeborn child was a capital offence (§ 14). Negligence which proved fatal to any person was punished with death; and such would be the penalty if a badly built house fell on the occupier and killed him; the builder had constructed a defective dwelling, possibly from motives of cupidity. In the case of the dependants of the owner, the *lex talionis* seems to have been applied, for the death of the owner's son was punished by the death of the builder's son (§§ 229, 230).

The position of slaves as a man's property probably had greater importance than any respect that may have been regarded as due to their persons, and the death-penalty was therefore applied in the following cases: allowing a palace slave or serf to escape, or sheltering him (§§ 15, 16); or detaining an escaped slave (§ 19). Evidently it was regarded as the duty of a citizen to restore a slave to his owner, especially if that slave belonged to the palace. Getting a barber to mark a slave wrongfully was, it seems, equivalent to stealing him (§ 227), and was punished with death and burial in his (the wrongdoer's) own gate. It was likewise a serious offence if a soldier (*rêdû*) hired a substitute; and, besides the death-penalty being enforced, the substitute might take the soldier's house (§ 26)—apparently the dwelling allotted to him by the State. In the same manner, a highly-placed official could neither himself hire a substitute, nor accept a mercenary as substitute (for another), and incorporate him, the penalty being death in both cases.

The duties of a 'wine-woman' (meaning, evidently, a woman keeping a public-house) included assisting the government by capturing criminals; and, if she failed in this, she also met with the penalty of death (§ 109).

[1] In all probability the word *sillatu*, when applied to something spoken against a deity, corresponded with 'blasphemy,' as we understand it. The followers of Šamaš-šum-ukîn (Saosduchinos), Ashurbanipal's brother, who uttered *sillatu* against the god Aššur, were put to death after their lips (*var.* tongues) had been torn away (Aššur-bani-âpli, cyl. A, col. iv. 66 ff.). In another passage, referring to chiefs of Gamhulu, the culprits were flayed after the tearing out of their tongues (G. Smith, *Assurbanipal*, London, 1871, pp. 137, 74 ff.).

The real nature of these wine-houses, which were kept by the wine-women, has yet to be discovered. That they were places of evil repute seems certain, and a devotee not dwelling in a cloister who opened a wine-house, or who entered a wine-house for drink, was burned to death[1] (§ 110). It seems to have been the duty of wine-women to accept payment for their drink in kind; and any such woman refusing to do this, or accepting a low tariff, might be thrown into the river (§ 108), she having thereby contravened the law.

Infidelity and incest were also under the pain of capital punishment. An adulterous woman and her paramour were to be tied together and thrown into the water, unless pardoned (apparently), the former by her husband, and the latter by the king (§ 129). Violation of a virgin-wife dwelling with her father entailed death to the man, but exile (?) to the woman (§ 130). A thriftless woman making her poverty an excuse for marrying again during her husband's absence, was condemned to be thrown into the water (§ 133)—the punishment meted out to a disreputable woman who repudiated her husband (§ 143). In the law reports (see Ungnad, *Hammurabi's Gesetz*, iii. nos. 1, 8 ; iv. 776), a rebellious or faithless wife was thrown down from the tower, or sold into slavery (no. 7); and slavery (as a milk-maid ?) in the palace was the punishment meted out in such a case, in a text from the Khabur (Johns, in *PSBA* xxix. 177; Ungnad, *op. cit.* no. 5). For incest with a son's bride the penalty was drowning (§ 155); and for incest with a mother,[2] death by fire for both (§ 157).

Mutilation.—This penalty was not uncommon, and in some cases roughly indicated the crime by destroying that which was regarded as the offending member. Thus, if the son of a chamberlain (palace-favourite) or of a public woman denied his foster-parents, his tongue, the organ with which the denial was made, was cut out (§ 192). In the case of an adopted son learning who his real father was, despising in consequence his foster-parents, who had brought him up, and returning to his father's house, the punishment was loss of an eye (§ 193).[3] A nurse substituting, without the knowledge of the father and mother, another child for one who had died whilst in her care, was punished by the cutting off of her breasts, thus ensuring, as in most punishments of this nature, that the offence should not occur again (§ 194). A son striking his father was punished by the loss of a hand—the limb with which the offence had been committed (§ 195). A slave striking a freeman's son received the same punishment as a slave denying his master,[4] namely, the loss of an ear—probably as a mark that he was a criminal, and a warning that he was untrustworthy (§§ 205, 282). As we have seen above (p. 258[a]), defamation, when it was a question of a life, was a capital offence, but in other cases a less severe punishment was decreed—thus, if a man 'raised the finger' against (accused of unchastity) a priestess or a married woman, the punishment was the shaving of the forehead—a proclamation to the world that a misdemeanour had been committed. Priests alone, in all probability, shaved the whole of the head, so that there was no danger of the obliteration of the distinguishing mark, whilst it lasted.

[1] The severity of the penalty would seem to imply that unchastity was presumed in such a case.

[2] 'After the father,' apparently = 'after the father's death.' But perhaps 'step-mother' is meant, in which case 'after the consummation of the marriage' may be intended.

[3] According to the tablets (Ungnad, *op. cit.* iv. nos. 14, 19), an adopted child who was rebellious was sent away, or, as in the Sumerian laws (see p. 257[b]), sold into slavery. Ill-treatment of an adopted child entailed loss of property to his benefit (*ib.* nos. 14, 16).

[4] A slave-wife denying her husband's mother was marked (by a tonsure) and sold.

Exceedingly interesting, and among the laws which have attracted the most attention, are those ordaining retaliation. Injury involving the loss of an eye entailed the loss of an eye to the person who had inflicted the injury, and it was the same for the other members of the body—bone for bone (*i.e.* broken limb for broken limb), teeth for teeth (§§ 196, 197, 200).

Fines, with alternatives (mutilations, etc.).—Whether these punishments could be compensated for by a money-payment, or in any other way, is not stated. In each case, however, they refer to a freeman injuring a person of his own rank; but a freeman committing the same offence against a man of inferior rank got off by paying a fine (1 mana for the limb or the eye of a serf; and ⅓ mana for the teeth, with lesser indemnities in the case of a slave). For striking a man of equal rank on the head, also, the *lex talionis* did not apply, but a fine of 1 mana of silver was inflicted. If the man struck was of superior rank, the striker received 60 lashes 'in the assembly' with an ox-hide whip (§ 202). A serf striking a serf paid 10 shekels of silver (§ 204), but a slave striking the head of a freeman lost his ear (§ 205). Thus were intentional injuries atoned for.

For unintentional injury, even in a quarrel, things were different. In such a case, a freeman hurting another had only to swear that he had not struck him knowingly, and was then responsible only for the physician's fees (§ 206); and, if death ensued, he made amends by paying ½ mana of silver, and for the son of a serf ⅓ only (§§ 207, 208). Striking a freeman's daughter, so that she lost her expected offspring, entailed a fine of only 10 shekels of silver (§ 209), and, if the woman died, they killed the smiter's daughter. The punishment of the culprit was in such a case a sore affliction, calculated to sadden him for the rest of his days, but here, as in other cases, the innocent suffered for the guilty simply because the Babylonians would not admit that a woman was the equal of a man, and said that, whatever the sex, the penalty must be 'a life for a life.' Striking a slave-woman with the same serious result entailed a fine of 2 shekels of silver, and, if she died, ⅓ mana (§§ 213, 214). In this case it was not 'slave for slave,' probably because the expected offspring had to be allowed for, the fine, it appears, being more than the value of a slave.

Among the worst examples of the mutilation-penalty, however, are those quoted by Ungnad (*op. cit.* iv. 63, no. 1049), where, if certain people bring action against each other, their noses are to be pierced and their hands dislocated, and in this condition they are to go to the market-place at Sippar. In another case (*ib.* no. 1051) the hair of the forehead was to be shaved on account of bringing an action, the alternative being a fine (no. 1050). An attempt to rescind, by legal action, the gift of the king, entailed a fine of 10 shekels of silver, and covering the claimant's head with hot (?) bitumen (*ib.* vol. iii. no. 458). This last text comes from the independent State of Ḫana (Thureau-Dangin, *RA* iv. 17). The punishment for false witness was a fine of 2 shekels of silver (Ungnad, iii. no. 699), and shaving of the forehead (*ib.* 707).

The *lex talionis* also existed for injuries inflicted unintentionally in the course of professional (surgical) attendance. For death or loss of sight after an operation for a grave injury or for a cataract (?), the penalty was loss of the hands—the same as for a son striking his father, the object in both cases being the same, namely, to prevent a repetition of the misfortune (§ 218). A serf's slave having been treated for a grave injury, and dying under the operation, the penalty was restitution ('slave like slave') (§ 219). If the slave lost an eye

after an operation, the physician had to pay the owner half his value in silver. A veterinary surgeon who had operated upon an ox or an ass, which had died thereafter, paid to the owner a quarter of its value (§ 225). The 'crime,' in these cases, was want of skill or judgment, and the penalties were probably as near as the framers of the Code could get to the 'just mean' in each case, for the slave or the animal might have been of greater or less value, taking the injury into consideration, but the penalty was the same.[1] In the case of a man hiring an ox, and causing its death by negligence or by blows, the penalty was ox for ox (§ 245), and the same penalty was imposed if he had broken its foot or cut its nape, thus rendering the animal useless (§ 246). Destroying the eye of a hired ox entailed an indemnity of half its value in silver (§ 247); and breaking off its horn, cutting off its tail, or piercing its nostril was made good only by paying a quarter of the animal's value (§ 248). 'Act of God' left the hirer free from obligation (§ 249).

Though not a crime, an accident which brought an owner within the purview of the law arose from injury by a mad bull. On the first occasion, in which the bull's viciousness could not be known, there was no penalty (§ 250); but the death of a man by a known vicious bull, horned and at large, entailed a penalty of ½ mana of silver (§ 251), and ⅓ mana if the person killed was a slave (§ 152).

In certain cases (see above, p. 258[b]) the punishment for theft or dishonest dealing was death, but the case of an employé differed. Thus, if a man hired to do the work of a farm stole the wheat and the vegetables, and these things were found in his hands, his hands were cut off (§ 253). Here again, we seem to have an instance of vengeance against the offending members; for he who, instead of working for the benefit of his employer, used his hands to rob him, was accounted worthy of this mutilation. In one case not very clear in the Code, the person who took away necessary things and weakened the oxen had to make up the damage he had caused (§ 254); and in another, if he lent out the oxen or stole the grain, so that he was unable to cultivate it, he had to pay 60 *gur* for every *gan* of ground left uncultivated (§ 255). It seems strange that a thief, in such a case as this, should be let off so easily, but it was the same for other things—a man stealing a watering-machine paid 5 shekels of silver, and the theft of a shadouf or a plough entailed an indemnity of 3 shekels (§§ 259, 260). The question naturally arises whether, in this inscription, the verb *šarāqu* has always the meaning of 'to steal.' A herdsman was under the same liability as the farmer—if a man, duly in receipt of a salary, reduced the oxen or the sheep, or their natural increase, he had to make up the amount (§ 264); and, if he changed their natural increase, or sold it, the penalty was that he made up the amount to the owner tenfold (§ 265).

Deprivation of office.—Apparently only one kind of misdeed entailing this is referred to in Ḫammurabi's Code, and, as is fitting, it bears upon the administration of justice. If a judge changed a sentence, thus making it to be of no effect, he was punished with twelvefold restitution of the sum involved in the lawsuit.[2] In addition to this, he was dismissed from the justice-seat, never to return; nor was he to sit with other judges when trying a case (§ 5).

Imprisonment.—It is noteworthy that, in all the enactments of the Code of Ḫammurabi, there is no mention of imprisonment. The Babylonians, however, certainly had prisons, as the expressions *bît ṣibitti* and *bît kili*, and the fact that arrests were ordered by the king, show.[1] In all probability, however, they were not houses of detention as a punishment, but simply places where an accused person or a criminal could be confined until tried or punished. An interesting text referring to this is printed in *Cun. Texts*, vi. pl. 8 (Ungnad, *op cit.* iii. no. 743), in which a man speaks of being placed in *bît ârarri* by his judges, whose names he gives. He states that he was not to be released until he had fulfilled a certain order—probably the delivery of a document, but the details are not clear.

Possibly imprisonment was more common in later times than at the early period of Ḫammurabi's dynasty. A letter published in *Recueil des Travaux*, xix. 107–108 (82-3-23, 845), asks: 'Why takest thou my child and placest him in the prison-house (*bît kili*)? None shall take him, and thou must bring him forth (again). Send my son quickly.' Confinement was also effected in a man's own house: 'Shut up Arad-Bau (who sits in the city-gate of Hadad) in his own house with the men' (Pinches, *Outline of Assyr. Gram.*, 1910, p. ii). The reason of this order is not stated, but something of the nature of a revolt or conspiracy may be suggested.

Resistance to Assyrian dominion entailed all kinds of horrors, and, though the Assyrian king may have regarded such resistance as among the worst of misdeeds, and worthy of all the pains and tortures which he inflicted, it hardly comes within the scope of the present article. Nevertheless, there is one noteworthy instance of punishment for what might be described as a crime, though those who suffered for it were only obeying their king's orders. Certain Elamite magnates had been sent by Te-umman, the king, to Ashurbanipal, king of Assyria, asking for the delivery of certain fugitives. The message was an insolent[2] one (*šipir meriḫti*), and the Assyrian king had the ambassadors detained. It seems not improbable that Te-umman made preparations to invade Assyria before the return of his ambassadors on the occasion of their final visit to Assyria; so, after the defeat and decapitation of Te-umman, they were shown his cut-off head, the sight of which is said to have driven them mad. The success of the Assyrian arms had such an effect on Rusâ, king of Ararat, that he sent ambassadors to Arbela to greet Ashurbanipal, who showed them the bodies of the Elamite ambassadors with the 'insolent message' which they had brought.

LITERATURE.—V. Scheil, 'Code des lois de Hammourabi,' in *Mém. de la délégation en Perse*, iv., Paris, 1902; R. F. Harper, *The Code of Hammurabi*, Chicago, 1904; Pinches, *The OT in the Light*, etc.[3], London, 1908, pp. 174, 175–177, 185, 488–525, 561; and, esp. Peiser, Kohler, and Ungnad, *Hammurabi's Gesetz*, Leipzig, 1904–1910.

T. G. PINCHES.

CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Buddhist).—Crimes are for the most part committed by irreligious people; and the punishments are determined upon and carried out (even under hierarchies like Rome and Tibet) from political

[1] Such are the disadvantages of the cut-and-dried legislation of a code.

[2] Twelvefold restitution is frequently referred to in contracts of late date, but this is for changing the record, and is not confined to the judges.

[1] The British Museum tablet D.T. 1, generally called 'Warnings to kings against injustice' (*WAI* iv.[2] pl. 48), which refers to certain penalties, is rather a tablet of rewards and punishments, mostly referring to the rulers of the land; but it is unfortunately not clear in every part. Among other maxims given it is stated that a king's ill-favour towards his princes or his burghers was likely to entail in the one case an untimely end, and in the other rebellion. It is interesting, however, on account of its references to imprisonment: 'The son of Nippur, Sippar, Babylon, committing wrong, is caused to enter the prison-house—where the wrong has been done, the town shall pour out (? supply provisions) to the fortress (?).' 'The sons of Sippar, Nippur, and Babylon, giving their provisions to the stallions, ate the stallions for their provisions—they were delivered into the custody of the foe,' etc.

[2] 'Treacherous' seems also to be a possible rendering.

or legal, rather than from religious, motives. It is, therefore, a complicated problem to decide how far a religion, dominant at any time in a country, is or is not an important factor either in deciding what acts shall be called crimes, or in determining the punishments for them. This is so even when the facts are known and classified; and no attempt has yet been made to write the history either of crime or of its punishment in any Buddhist country. The following remarks must, therefore, be tentative and imperfect. It will be convenient to discuss the subject (1) as regards the Order, and (2) as regards the laity.

1. The Order.—The standard text-book of Canon Law consists of the ancient Rules of the Order, as current in the time of the Buddha (see 'Pātimokkha,' in art. LITERATURE [Buddh.]), edited, about fifty years after his death, with notes and a commentary, and accompanied by twenty supplementary chapters. These additions by the editors show the development that had taken place, during that interval, in the interpretation of the Rules themselves as well as in the method of enforcing them. Of the 227 Rules, more than 200 relate to matters of deportment, to the common property of the Order and the proportion allowed to each member, to the time and manner of taking food, and so on. The penalty for any infraction of these minor regulations was repentance; that is, the offender had to confess his fault to a brother *bhikkhu*, and promise not to repeat it. This penalty involved forfeiture of any property held contrary to the regulations.

The major offences were divided into two classes —*pārājika* and *saṁghādisesa*. The former class comprised four crimes—the sexual act, theft, murder, and putting forward a false claim to religious insight. The penalty was expulsion from the Order, or, to use the words of the Rules, 'he has fallen into defeat, he is no longer in communion.'[1] The notes and supplements discuss cases raising the point whether some act does or does not amount to an infringement of one or other of these four Rules. The cases put are ingenious, and the decisions harmonize in a remarkable way with the equitable views of modern writers on criminal law.

The second of the above two classes comprises five offences depending on or inciting to sensual impurity; two connected with building a residence without obtaining the approval of the Order; two with slander; two with stirring up discord in the Order; one with intractability; and one with general evil life (being a disorderly person). The penalty for these offences was suspension for as many days as had elapsed between the offence and its confession. A suspended member of the Order is under disability in regard to 94 privileges of an ordinary member—he is to take the worst seat or sleeping-place, cannot sit on a Chapter, cannot travel without restriction, and so on.[2] When the fixed number of days has passed, the suspended *bhikkhu* may be rehabilitated. Both suspension and rehabilitation can be carried out only at a formal Chapter, where not fewer than twenty regular *bhikkhus* must be present. There are somewhat complicated rules to ensure the regularity of the proceedings, the equity of the decision, and opportunity for the putting forward of the defence. These are too long even to summarize. We must be content to note that, for instance, the rules as to the constitution of the court are given in *Vinaya Texts*, ii. 263 ff., iii. 46; those as to the accusation being invalid, unless brought forward under the right heading, in ii. 276 ff.; those as to both parties being present, in iii. 47. Every member of the Order resident in the locality had the right to attend such a Chapter; and, if the matter were too complicated to be adequately considered in so large a meeting, it could be referred to a committee of arbitrators chosen by the Chapter (*ib.* iii. 49 ff.).

[1] *Vinaya Texts*, i. 4 f.

[2] The whole of the 94 are given in *Vinaya Texts*, ii. 386 ff.

The above are rules and practices evolved by the early Buddhists, for use among themselves only; they do not give, or pretend to give, any adequate treatment of the question of crimes, or of that of punishments, but they show that the early Buddhists had a very fair grasp of the general principles underlying the equitable administration of criminal law, and that in the matter of punishment they took, as might be expected, a lenient view. They show also that, at the time when Buddhism arose, such crimes as murder and theft were no longer looked upon as offences against individuals only, but had already come to be considered as offences against the community, as moral offences in themselves—in other words, that this step forward in the treatment of crime was not in any way due to Buddhism, but was the outcome of Indian civilization.

2. Laity.—The Buddhist scriptures frequently refer to their ideal of a perfect king, a righteous king who rules in righteousness, without punishment, and without a sword (*adaṇḍena asatthena*). In the *Kūṭadanta*,[1] King Wide-realm's country is harassed by dacoits, who pillage the villages and townships and make the roads unsafe. He thinks to suppress the evil by degradation, banishment, fines, bonds, and death, but his Buddhist adviser tells him that there is only one method of putting an end to the disorder, that is, by providing farmers with food and seed-corn, traders with capital, and government officials with good wages. If this method be adopted, 'the king's revenue will go up; the country will be quiet and at peace; and the people, pleased with one another and happy, dancing their children in their arms, will dwell with open doors.' In the legend the plan succeeds; and it represents, no doubt, fairly accurately, the Buddhist vague ideal of the right theory of crime and punishment. In the Buddhist historical chronicles we have no instance of its having been realized. Crime and its punishment have been dealt with according to the views current at each time and place, and it would be impossible, with our present evidences, to attempt any statement as to whether, and in what degree, those views have been modified by the Buddhist ideal.

LITERATURE.—*Vinaya*, ed. H. Oldenberg, London, 1879-83; Rhys Davids and H. Oldenberg, *Vinaya Texts* (*SBE*, vols. xii., xvii., xx.), Oxford, 1881-85; Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, Oxford, 1899. T. W. RHYS DAVIDS.

CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Celtic).—

1. The treatment of crime and of criminals among the ancient Celts is wrapped in great obscurity. Cæsar (*de Bell. Gall.* vi. 13) informs us that the Druids of Gaul were judges in both public and private disputes, and that they awarded damages and penalties; and we are told (*ib.* vi. 16) that, when human sacrifices were offered, criminals were sacrificed in the first instance, before recourse was had to innocent victims. It is not improbable, therefore, that among the Celts, as among the Greeks, Romans, and other races, the idea prevailed that certain forms of conduct were displeasing to the gods, and that, in consequence, communion with deity could not be re-established without the purification of society by the death or expulsion of the persons who were guilty of such conduct (see COMMUNION WITH DEITY [Celtic], vol. iii. p. 749). In this treatment of its un-

[1] *Dīgha*, i. 135; tr. in the present writer's *Dialogues of the Buddha*, i. 175 f.

desirable members by the community it is probable that attention was paid to the general type of character no less than to specific acts of wrong conduct, just as, in the process of compurgation by oath in Welsh law (see below), the witnesses who were called to testify on oath gave evidence quite as much to the general character of the accused as to his non-performance of a particular act. The types of character which are always abhorred by communities where custom rules, as it did among the Celts, are those which are indifferent to the observance of customary prohibitions (in Homeric language those of men lacking in *αἰδώς*), such being conspicuous by their want of scruple and by the quality of *ὕβρις*. One of the Celtic roots for 'good' (Ir. *dech*, Welsh *de* [now obsolete], cognate with Gr. *δέχομαι*), meant 'acceptable'; and the other Celtic terms relating to character show the prevalence among the Celts of the same moral conceptions as among other men of Indo-European speech. The idea of a defilement attaching to crime is found in a statement made in the *Ancient Laws of Ireland* (iii. 97), that body and soul are both defiled by committing crimes.

2. Side by side with the penalty of sacrifice, and probably connected with it, was that of exclusion from participation in religious rites. Cæsar (vi. 13) tells us that any contumacy with respect to the judgments of the Druids was punished by exclusion from the ritual of sacrifice; and this sentence, he says, was the severest among the Gauls, since the men so punished were treated as outlaws, and were cut off from all the rights and privileges of human society. In Gaul there appears to have been a measure of centralization in the administration of justice, since the assembly of the Druids, meeting, according to Cæsar, in the territory of the Carnutes, held a court for the trial of cases brought from every district around. In the case of the Druids it is clear that the decision was in the hands of the religious leaders of the community; and this suggests that among the Celts, as in other early communities, the ethical and the religious aspects of crimes and their punishments were not very clearly distinguished. The conception of outlawry, or the loss of civil status, was a marked feature of the Celtic treatment of wrongdoers in the historical period, but this form of punishment was resorted to only in extreme cases. In Irish law, and to a somewhat less extent in Welsh law, recourse appears to have been had with extreme reluctance to the punishments of death and outlawry.

3. In Irish law, also, it is remarkable that imprisonment and all forms of corporal punishment, whether by mutilation, beating, or torture, are conspicuous by their absence, and mutilation and imprisonment are rarely alluded to in the Welsh laws. It is not impossible that ordinary crime was almost as rare in Ireland and Wales in ancient times as it is to-day, and that the communities in question seldom found it necessary to have recourse to very extreme punishments.

4. Another feature of Celtic law, which links it to certain ancient forms of social organization, is the emphasis laid by it upon the responsibility of the family group for the conduct of its members, as is seen especially in the case of the crime of homicide (see, further, art. BLOOD-FEUD [Celtic]).[1] Both in Ireland and in Wales the family group of the slayer had to pay compensation to the family group of the slain for the loss of one of their number. This collective aspect of criminal jurisprudence is one of the chief differences between the older Celtic point of view and that of the more individualistic jurisprudence of the present day; but even in Ireland (*Anc. Laws of Ireland*, iii. 245) the penalties for all crimes except killing fell on the offender, provided he had the means of paying.

[1] In Ireland the family groups in question were known as the *geilfine*, *derbfine*, *iarfine*, and *indfine*.

5. Sources of information.—In the case of Ireland there is a large body of knowledge relating to crimes and punishments, as well as to other branches of law, contained in the *Ancient Laws of Ireland* (Rolls Series, 1869–73). This work comprises various legal treatises, such as the *Senchus Mór*, the *Corus Bescna*, the *Book of Aicill*, etc. These treatises are the work of the Brehons (the hereditary lawyers of Ireland), who decided the cases that were brought to them. The body of law in question retained its authority among the Irish until the beginning of the 17th century. The law of England, which was introduced into Ireland by Henry II., was for a long time hardly followed except within the English pale, which consisted of Louth, Meath, Westmeath, Kildare, Dublin, and Wicklow. A statute of Henry VIII. (Stat. 13, c. 3), promulgated in 1522, mentions that English law was not observed beyond the counties named. The main body of Irish law is called the *Cáin*; local modifications of general laws were called *urradhus*, and inter-territorial regulations *cairde*.

6. In the case of Wales there is abundant information concerning criminal procedure in the *Ancient Laws of Wales*, published under the editorship of Aneurin Owen in the Rolls Series (London, 1841). There is also a very convenient edition of the so-called *Gwentian Code*, published by A. W. Wade-Evans, under the title *Welsh Medieval Law*, from a Harleian MS (Brit. Mus. 4353) of the 13th cent. (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1909), to which references will be made in this article. The Welsh laws consist partly of a Code, issued under the royal sanction and authority of Hywel Dda, and partly of a collection of legal maxims arranged in groups of three, or triads. The Welsh laws are based on a recension of existing customs by the prince Hywel Dda ('Howel the Good') (*c.* 930), and vary somewhat for the different regions of the Principality. The oldest MS is the *Black Book of Chirk*, now in the National Library of Wales, Aberystwyth (12th cent.), which appears to have been a form of the code of Gwynedd (N.W. Wales); hence its usual name, the *Venedotian Code*. Another form of the Code is known as the *Dimetian*, or the Code of Dyfed (S.W. Wales), perhaps better regarded as that of the larger area known as Deheubarth (the Southern region), while another form is usually known as the *Gwentian*, from its supposed association with the district of Gwent (S.E. Wales). It is probable, however, that this Code, as Wade-Evans has shown, was that of Powys (Mid-Wales). The Code of Hywel is found in a Latin as well as a Welsh form, but the precise relation of these two forms is uncertain.

7. Attitude of the community to crime.—Among the Celts the community recognized the right of vengeance (Ir. *digal*, Welsh *dial*), whereby the individual or his family might themselves obtain satisfaction or compensation for a wrong done to them. This right, however, was one that was greatly restricted in practice, and was not to be put into operation except when other remedies failed. Ancient Irish law, and probably at one time Welsh law, made no distinction between crimes and torts (though originally some offences may have been viewed as offences against religion), and dealt with them alike as cases for compensation through payment. Whereas in modern communities crime is regarded mainly as an offence against the State, though individuals may be

wronged thereby, Irish legal practice, which was in the hands of a hereditary caste of arbitrators called Brehons, developed to an unusual degree the remedial aspect of compensation for wrong to the sufferers—an aspect which in the English law of crime has sunk largely into the background. In Welsh law there are abundant traces of an earlier state of things resembling that of Ireland, but there are also signs of the growth of a point of view resembling that of modern States.

8. In Ireland, if the guilty party did not pay the amount which the Brehons awarded, the party that was aggrieved was allowed to exercise his right of vengeance by means of reprisals or private war. In Wales, the latter process was called *myned ar herw* ('to go on a plundering expedition'), and the regular term in Welsh for plunder was *anrhaith* ('absence of law'). The aggressor, if his family cared to support him, might offer resistance, or might become an outlaw, and, in that case, the avengers, if they chose, might put him to death. There are indications, however, that this power was restricted in Irish law by making the right purely personal, to be exercised only by the person who had been specially wronged. The Welsh legal triads state (Wade-Evans, *Welsh Medieval Law*, p. 264) that there are three legal periods for avenging a dead body:

'Between two kindreds who do not originate from the same *gwlad* ("a district under one rule"), commencing a claim on the first day of the week following that wherein the dead was murdered; if there comes no answer by the end of a fortnight, the law makes vengeance free. The second is, if the two kindreds are in the same *cantrev* ("hundred"), commencing a claim on the third day after the dead is slain; if there comes no answer by the end of the ninth day, the law makes vengeance free. The third is, if the two kindreds are in the same *cymwd* ("commot"), commencing a claim on the third day after the dead is murdered; if there comes no answer by the end of the sixth day, the law makes vengeance free.'

In three MSS of the Welsh laws (X211b, W99b, and U55a; see *Anc. Laws of Wales*, i. 778, and Wade-Evans, *op. cit.* p. 306) there is found the following statement:

'There are three incitements to revenge; one of them, the shrieking of female relations. The second is, seeing the bier of the relative going to the graveyard. The third is, seeing the grave of their relative without enjoying satisfaction.'

The Welsh laws make the following exceptions as to the persons who could take part in a blood-feud (Wade-Evans, *op. cit.* p. 187):

'And if there be any one of the kindred of the murderer or the murdered who is an ecclesiastic in holy orders or a religious or leprous or dumb or an idiot, he neither pays nor receives any of the *galanas* ("blood-fine"). They are not to take vengeance for a person murdered, nor is vengeance to be taken on them; and it is impossible to compel such by any law to pay anything, nor are they to receive.'

9. **Family champion.**—In Ireland (see *Anc. Laws of Ireland*, iii. 83, note) there existed the institution of family champion, whose place it was to avenge family quarrels. The championship in question formed one of the seven grades of a territory. The Welsh laws contain no reference to this institution.

10. **Outlawry.**—In the *Book of Aicill*—the most important treatise on Irish criminal law (*Anc. Laws of Ireland*, iii. 381)—the question is asked, What is it that makes a stranger of a native freeman and a native freeman of a stranger? The answer is as follows:

'That is, an outlawed stranger: he is defined to be a person who frequently commits crimes, and his family cannot exonerate themselves from his crimes by suing him for them, until they pay a price for exonerating themselves from his crimes, *i.e.* seven *cumhals* (a *cumhal* = 3 cows) to the chief; and seven *cumhals* for his seven years of penance are paid to the Church, and his two *cumhals* for *cairde*-relations are paid to each of the four parties with whom he had mutual *cairde*-relations; and when they (the family) shall have given in this way, they shall be exempt from his crimes until one of them gives him the use of a knife, or a handful of grain; or until he unyokes his horses in the land of a kinsman out of family-friendship. And, if they give him these, they shall not be exempt from his crimes, until they pay the same amount again for exonerating themselves from his crimes' (*ib.* p. 385). 'The son whom he had begotten before he had been made an outlaw is to be like every other lawful man of the family. As to the son whom he may have begotten after he had been made an outlaw, his liabilities shall be on the family of his mother, *i.e.* they pay the full debt of a stranger out of their own rightful *séds* ("legal units of value") for his liabilities, and they obtain his body-fine. . . . The case in which a man may be killed with impunity—*i.e.* every man is exempt from liability for killing him—is when these things before mentioned were given for him, and the king has not neglected to restrain him, and he is not on the land of any particular person, and there is no particular person who feeds him. But, if the king has neglected to restrain him, and if he is not in the employment or hire of any particular person in the territory, he (the king) shall pay for his crime; and, if he be killed, the body-fine of a stranger who has a *bescna*- ("modus vivendi") compact shall be paid for him. Neglect of restraint on the part of the king means that he did not restrain him to the employment of a particular person, or did not have him living on a particular land, or fed by a particular person.'

This passage is of interest as being one of the few passages in the *Ancient Laws of Ireland* which refer to the royal power or responsibility. The reference is important, inasmuch as it shows that, even in Ireland, the king had a clear place in the legal system of the community, though the Brehons made little mention of it. In Wales the term *direit*, though not used in the Laws, meant originally a person who was outside the social order.

11. In the *Anc. Laws of Ireland* (iii. 463) the text of the *Book of Aicill* says, 'The life of every law-breaker is fully forfeited,' but this is explained in the commentary as follows:

'That is, it is lawful to kill the thief without name, who is not known, when there is no power at the time of committing the trespass; and he (the slayer) is exempt on account of every person killed in his (the thief's) guise.'

The various cases that might arise under this head are then considered, and it is said (*op. cit.* p. 469):

'The person who is exempt from liability for killing the thief is he from whom he came to thieve, or who is entitled to *éric*-fine for the theft. If he (the slayer) be the person to whom *éric*-fine is not due for the theft, full body-fine is due from him for killing him, whether there was or was not power to arrest him. Or, according to others, it may be lawful for any person to kill him, whether the person to whom he came to thieve, or the person to whom he did not come to thieve.' 'It is then there is no exemption for killing a person in the guise of the thief, when he is seen stealing the *séds* ("chattels"), or when the track of any particular thing stolen was found after him. If he was not seen stealing the *séds*, or if the track of the particular thing stolen was not found after him, there shall be paid full body-fine for killing him, whether there was or was not power to arrest him. The person who came to inflict a wound upon the body may be safely killed when unknown and without a name, and when there was not power to arrest him at the time of committing the trespass, and there is exemption for every one killed in his guise.'

12. **Administration of justice.**—In Ireland the picture presented by the Brehon legal treatises is that of a community without an official magistracy or police, where the remedy in the case of any wrong done (whether a crime or a tort) was in the form of damages assessed by an arbitrator possessing hereditary expert knowledge of Irish custom, the main problem for the arbitrator being in each case the accurate assessment of damages, which varied with the status of the person wronged, with the act committed, and with other circumstances. Allusions to the king's power or laws are very rare in these legal treatises. In *Anc. Laws of Ireland* (iii. 409) we are told that the crimes of the man who violated the king's laws were adjudged on the seven houses in which he got beds, that the penalty for violating the king's laws varied according to the nature of the tenancy and local laws, and that there was a penalty for supplying lodging to the violators of the king's laws, and similarly for the violation of a king's inter-territorial law; but it is clear that the idea of a crime in its relation to the community as a whole was in Ireland more implicit than explicit. In Wales the Laws refer to *brawdwyr* ('judges'), who had a recognized status in the community, but whose payment appears to have come mainly from the parties to the action.

13. Effect of intention.—The distinction between criminal and non-criminal injuries was recognized in Irish law, though without altering the type of compensation required. Whenever a wrong action was shown to be due to malice aforethought, the fines on account of it had to be doubled. Intention had always (see *Anc. Laws of Ireland*, iii. 469, 471) to be taken into account in the case of theft, wounding, and homicide. In *op. cit.* iii. 139 there is a minute discussion of the fine due for the intention to wound, when the attempt to wound was not successful. The Welsh process of *galanas* ('recovery of compensation for murder') was always combined with the recovery of the fine for *sarhad* ('insult')—a combination which shows that, in historic times at any rate, intention was clearly recognized. It is said, for example (Wade-Evans, *op. cit.* p. 255), that an unintentional blow is not *sarhad.*

14. Responsibility.—In Irish law (*Anc. Laws of Ireland*, ii. 45) it is recognized that certain persons could not be considered responsible for their actions, and the rule is laid down that

'a fool, a madman, a male idiot, a female idiot, and a dumb person shall not be distrained: their adult guardians who bear their crimes and get their wages shall be distrained.'

In *op. cit.* iii. 157, it is said:

'The man who incites a fool is he who pays for his crime, in which case the man who commits the crime, *i.e.* the fool, is exempt; for this is the instance in which fines of design are paid, another man who paid had not designs.'

In some cases (see *op. cit.* iii. 159) there was a difference of opinion, and we read:

'When a fool has committed a furious assault alone, of his own accord, without cause, without enmity, it is then lawful to give every fool up for his crime; or, according to others, compensation must be paid on his account by his family or the person with whom he is. If there be enmity, each of them pays compensation.'

In *op. cit.* iii. 501 it is stated that neglect on the part of the sane in not looking after the insane would have to be compensated for; and, according to *op. cit.* iii. 507, damages would have to be paid for leaving an epileptic lunatic unguarded. The same conception underlies *op. cit.* i. 157, 161, where it is stated that a person is liable to distress for the crimes of his messenger and of his hired woman, and a man is also liable to a fine for the crime of his jester.

In Welsh law (Wade-Evans, *op. cit.* p. 255) it is stated that

'a free man is to answer for his *alltud* ("foreign servant") in every claim for which he is not to lose the tongue, and life, and limbs; for no one is to lose tongue and life and limbs by the tongue of another person.' It is further stated (*ib.* p. 259), that no one is to make answer or satisfaction for an act of his bondman, except for theft.'

The extent to which children could be held responsible was carefully considered in Irish law, and the *Anc. Laws of Ireland* (ii. 66) discuss minutely the question of their responsibility at various ages, as well as that of their parents and foster-parents. In *op. cit.* v. 151, it is stated:

'Little boys are safe in all the rights of lawful sports, until they have come to the age of having to pay damage of *dire* ("restitution-fine") for violence.'

Women, in respect of their first and second crimes, were placed on the same footing as boys.

15. Advocacy.—The Irish treatises make no mention of advocacy, but the Welsh legal triads contain the following statement:

'Three persons who are entitled to an advocate for them in court: a woman, and one with a natural impediment in speech, and an alien of foreign speech.'

16. Crimes in Irish law.—The forms of what would now be called crimes, or serious wrongs, with which Irish law deals, are homicide, wounding and mutilation, criminal assault, theft, assault, perjury, insult, libel, slander, using charms, trespass, damage to property (both living and dead), gross negligence, absconding and harbouring a fugitive, abduction, stripping of the dead, and disturbance of the peace.

17. Crimes in Welsh law.—The above were crimes or serious wrongs also in Welsh law, with the omission of the using of charms, and the addition of arson, waylaying, indecent assault, and treason.

18. Penalties in Irish law.—The normal penalties of Irish law consisted in the payment of certain fines, which were assessed by the Brehons (see above). The principle underlying these fines was that they were viewed as the equivalents of the amount of vengeance which the person or persons aggrieved would be justified in exacting in a particular case. Hence an important consideration which entered into the assessment of every fine was the value and status of the person injured. Irish law (as well as that of Wales) was based upon the principle that each person and thing in the community had a definite legal worth. In the case of persons, various considerations entered into the calculation both of a person's *dire-fine* ('honour-price') and of his *éric-fine* ('body-price'). In the *Anc. Laws of Ireland* (v. 97) it is asked what it is that gives *díre* ('honour-price') to a person, and the reply is 'desert and worth and purity.' Of desert it is further explained that it refers to property, of worth that it refers to the person's word, and of purity that it refers to his deed. In the matter of rank as conferring status, there were in Ireland two chief grades: (1) the *saer-nemed*, and (2) the *daer-nemed.* In *op. cit.* v. 15, the former are said to consist of 'churches, chiefs, poets, and *féine*' (free tenants), while the latter consist of the practisers of every art in general. A passage from one of these grades into the other (with a consequent change in honour-price) was possible. A *saer* ('free')-man might become a *daer* ('unfree')-man by selling his land or his property or his body into servitude, while a *daer*-man might become a *saer*-man by purchasing land or law or freedom by his act or by his husbandry, or 'by his talent which God bestowed upon him.' A loss of 'honour-price' might result from a defect of character. In *op. cit.* i. 55 it is said:

'There are four dignitaries of a territory who may be degraded: a false-judging king, a stumbling bishop, a fraudulent poet, an unworthy chieftain who does not fulfil his duties.'

Again, in *op. cit.* p. 57:

'False judgment and false witness and false testimony and fraudulent security and fraudulent pledging and false proof and false information and false character-giving and bad word and bad story, and lying in general, whether in the case of the Church or the laity,—every one of these deprives the man who is guilty of such of half his honour-price up to the third time, but it does not deprive him with regard to every one of them until the third time.'

The Irish law-treatise referred to enters minutely into the question of the loss of full and half honour-price in the case of kings, bishops, chieftains, poets, and others; and it is of interest to note the importance attached in Irish law to character and right conduct.

It was not character alone, however, that determined honour-price, and Irish law reflects differences of opinion as to the extent to which it depended upon a man's profession, his separable property, or the rank of the chief under whom he served.

Apart from the cases already mentioned, where it is stated that under certain circumstances a wrongdoer might be put to death (see above), there is no reference to the death-penalty in Irish law, nor is there any reference to imprisonment. The king appears to have had power to assign a wrongdoer to the service of a particular person, but no mention is made of imprisonment as a form of punishment. The only reference to castigation as a form of punishment is in the case of a child under seven, who could be chastised only by its parent. In certain cases other fines called *airer* ('redemption') and *smacht* ('discipline') were ex-

acted, and there are occasional references to penance.

19. **Penalties in Welsh law.**—Welsh, like Irish, law was based upon a consideration of the status of the individual, and upon the determination of the legal worth of every person and object (living or dead). These ideas enter prominently into the questions of *sarhad* and *galanas*, the former being compensation for insult, and the latter compensation for homicide. Thus the same dominant conceptions govern Welsh and Irish law, and they clearly go back to a similar stratum of ideas. In Welsh law, however, the central power of the king in each territory had attained greater prominence than in Ireland, with the result that the fines called *dirwy* and *camlwrw* for various offences were not paid to the individuals wronged, but usually to the king; and the same rule governed a third of each *galanas* ('body-fine'), while *sarhad* was paid to the person or persons wronged. In certain cases a part of the *camlwrw* was payable to persons other than the king, and in the case of a religious community the whole of the *camlwrw* appears to have been paid over to the abbot and the lay impropriators. The *dirwy* was a larger fine, paid directly to the king (according to a Latin text of the Laws written about 1250), for fighting, theft, and criminal assault. The penalty of emasculation was imposed upon a ravisher who could not pay the fine, and a bondman striking a freeman was liable to have his right hand cut off.

Though there is no allusion in the Welsh laws to imprisonment as a penalty for any specific offence, yet the fact of imprisonment is implied in more than one passage. For example, in Wade-Evans (*op. cit.* p. 177) we read that the smith of the court was to receive four pence from every prisoner off whom he should remove irons. Again, of the court-porter it is said that he is to get four pence from every prisoner who shall be lawfully imprisoned in the court. One MS (U45a) gives imprisonment as one of the lawful excuses for neglecting a summons. The Welsh word *carchar* ('prison') is derived from the Latin *carcer*, and is a term used in Welsh for the fetter placed on an animal to prevent it from straying. It is therefore probable that liberty was impeded, whenever necessary, more by the use of chains and fetters than by confinement in a building.

Though Irish law contains no reference to a death penalty, Welsh law has a few allusions to the penalty of hanging. This was in Wales the recognized punishment for theft (as is stated in the *Mabinogi* of Manawyddan fab Llyr). In Wade-Evans (*op. cit.* p. 213) we read:

'One person escapes from an admitted theft with flesh and skin on his back [viz.] a necessitous *alltud* ("alien") who shall have been three nights and three days without alms, without relief, and who shall have traversed three *trevs* ("townships") daily, with nine houses in every *trev*; and then, owing to hunger, shall commit theft, and then shall be caught with flesh and skin on his back. He is to be let free without gallows and without payment.'

Similarly, if a thief was found burning a house stealthily, and was caught, his life would be forfeited. In the case of a thief the Welsh laws recognize the penalty of sale.

Among the fines mentioned in the Welsh laws is that of *dilysdod* ('acquittance'), which was enforced as a payment to a woman by her ravisher. This was probably meant as a payment to guarantee her status as a virgin in the eyes of the law. There was also a similar payment called *gwaddol*, payable by a man who failed to rebut a charge of criminal assault upon a woman walking alone.

20. **Medium of payment of fines.**—In Irish law the terms used in estimating fines are *cumhal* and *séd*. By a *cumhal* was originally meant 'a female bond-slave,' but, in course of time, the word came to mean the equivalent in value of three cows. The method of payment of fines was in a fixed proportion of certain goods. When half a *cumhal* had to be paid, it had to be in one species of goods; when one *cumhal* was required, it had to be in two species; and, when three or upwards of three *cumhals* were required, they had to be in three species. In that case one-third would have to be in cows, one-third in horses, and one-third in silver. Of the cattle one-third had to be male, one-third of the horses had to be mares, and one-third of the silver by weight might be copper alloy. A *séd* was defined as follows (*Anc. Laws of Ireland*, iii. 463):

'A common easily divisible *séd* means two live chattels or dead chattels, or one dead chattel the value of which is not lessened by its being divided.'

Of *séds* the most prized was a milch cow. In Welsh law the fine called *camlwrw* consisted of three kine, paid as a rule directly to the king, and sometimes doubled. The fine called *dirwy* consisted of twelve kine, paid directly to the king, and was also sometimes doubled. *Sarhad* and *galanas* were paid in various ways, as directed in the Laws. The coins mentioned in the Welsh laws are: (1) *keinhawc kyfreith*, 'a legal penny' (see Wade-Evans, *op. cit.* p. 330); (2) *keinhawc cota*, 'a curt penny' (*ib.*); (3) *dimei*, 'a half-penny'; and (4) *punt*, 'a pound.'

21. **Initiation of legal process.**—In Ireland the aggrieved party compelled the aggressor to submit the case to arbitrators, by levying distress (Ir. *athgabhail*) upon the latter. In its most solemn form the levying of distress required that the person aggrieved should 'fast against' the aggressor (see ASCETICISM [Celtic], vol. ii. p. 72[b]), that is, call Heaven to witness that he would starve to death if his opponent did not submit the case to a Brehon. The consideration of questions connected with distress is one of the most elaborate sections of Irish law. In Wales, in keeping with the greater development of the central power, a man could be called to appear in answer to a *gwys* ('summons'). The legal method of accusing for theft is described in Wade-Evans (*op. cit.* p. 245). Even in Ireland certain people (*Anc. Laws of Ireland*, i. 105, 107) might be arrested for their liabilities, instead of being distrained upon, and the circumstances under which this process might take place are fully considered.

In Irish law a pledge had to be given (*op. cit.* i. 277) to stop the process of fasting, especially in judgments of theft, robbery, and violation; and the contingencies arising from the giving of the pledge and its possible loss form an important section of the *Law of Distress*. In Wales, the term *mach* ('pledge') was used in the Laws only in connexion with civil matters. In criminal procedure the accused person had to obtain a *gorvodog*, i.e. a personal surety, for one who was charged with crime (see Wade-Evans, *op. cit.* pp. 258 f., 312). In the Irish legal treatises the question of evidence is not discussed to the same extent as it is in the Welsh laws, and it is noticeable that the latter assign considerable prominence to the oath, both of the accused and of his compurgators, as a means of clearing his character. The Welsh term for this process was to put a person upon his *rhaith* (a word cognate in formation with Lat. *rectus*), and, in this process, he had to bring forward a certain number of persons to swear on his behalf to the justice of his claim or defence as a whole.

22. **Penalties for particular crimes.**—(1) *Homicide.*—(*a*) In Ireland homicide was divided into intentional and unintentional. The fine for the former was double that of the latter. The account given in the *Senchus Mór* suggests that there was some difference of opinion as to whether homicide

should in all cases be treated as a matter for compensation through payment, but the customary law with its *éric* ('body-fine') appears to have prevailed. In the case of secret homicide the concealment was regarded as a separate act, and compensation had to be paid for it accordingly. When a freeman was slain by a freeman, the slayer had to pay the amount of his own honour-price, together with a fine of seven *cumhals*, as compensation for the death. For concealment the slayer paid honour-price, together with seven *cumhals*. If the body was found, the fine for concealment was remitted. Looking on at a murder was a wrong which was liable to a fine. Whenever a person found a dead body, he had to give information at once; otherwise, he was liable to the fine of a looker-on, or, according to others, of an accomplice. The *Anc. Laws of Ireland* (iii. 101, etc.) consider with great fullness the various cases that might arise in connexion with homicide.

As illustrating the growth of a different mental attitude from the preceding, it may be stated that the commentator to the *Corus Bescna* treats homicide, and all other wrongs done with malice aforethought, as being in the nature of exceptions to the ordinary law, and holds that the slayer should be given up, with all his property, to the family of the slain man.

(*b*) In Wales the term for a 'murder-fine' was *galanas*, and, along with the murder-fine, in every case of homicide *sarhad* ('compensation for insult') had to be paid. The amount of the murder-fine varied with the status of the person murdered. The murderer was helped to pay by his kinsmen, to the fifth cousin, and the liabilities of these were fixed by law. According to the Welsh law (Wade-Evans, *op. cit.* p. 193), a third of every *galanas* was paid to the king, and also whatever of the murderer's chattels was from time to time obtainable. The reason given is that it is for the king to enforce where it is not possible for a kindred to do so. The murder-fine of a king was three times the amount of his *sarhad* with three augmentations; the amount of his *sarhad* being as follows:

'a hundred kine for every *cantrev* ("hundred") in his kingdom, and a silver rod which shall reach from the ground to the king's pate, when he shall sit in his chair, as thick as his ring finger, with three knobs at the top and three at the bottom as thick as the rod; and a golden cup which shall hold the king's full draught, as thick as the nail of a ploughman who shall have ploughed for seven years, and a golden cover thereon as thick as the cup, as broad as the king's face.'

There was a similar murder-fine for the heir-apparent. The *galanas* of a chief of the household was a third of the king's, 'without privileged gold and silver.' A steward, a judge of a court, a falconer, a chief huntsman, a chief groom, and a page of the chamber all had the same *galanas*, consisting of 'nine kine and nine score kine with three augmentations.' For the *galanas* of the other officers, except the chief of the household and the priest of the household, six kine and six score kine 'with three augmentations' had to be paid. In the case of the priest of the household the murderer had to submit 'to the law of the Synod.' The laws fix the *galanas* of various other persons, but it is sufficient to mention that the *galanas* of a free Welshman of pure descent consisted of 'three kine and three score kine with three augmentations.' This was also the amount of the *galanas* of a king's serf, while the *galanas* of a nobleman's serf was half of this amount. For a thief there was no *galanas*. (For various questions connected with homicide, see Wade-Evans, *op. cit.* pp. 236, 248, 252 f., 264, 294, 299 f., 320.) In the case of a fratricide the kindred were not to pay *galanas* with the murderer.

(2) *Wounding and mutilating.*—(*a*) In the *Anc. Laws of Ireland* (iii. 349, etc.) there is a very full discussion of the penalties due for wounding and mutilating, and the various wounds and losses that might be inflicted are considered in great detail. For a foot, a hand, an eye, or a tongue, half the *éric*-fine of every person was to be paid, and in the opinion of some the full *éric*-fine should be paid for the mouth, the nose, and the tongue. According to *op. cit.* iii. 472, the sick maintenance of a wounded person had to be compensated for, and a substitute had also to be provided. Among the wrongs requiring compensation was that of shaving bare the beard or the whiskers.

(*b*) In Welsh law there is an assessment of the worth of each part of a person's body (see Wade-Evans, *op. cit.* p. 190 f.). The following quotation will suffice to illustrate the list of values:

'All a person's members when reckoned together are eight and four score pounds in value. A person's finger is a cow and a score of silver in value. The worth of the thumb is two kine and two score of silver. A person's nail is thirty pence in value.'

With reference to a serf's limbs there is a passage in MS U27a which reads as follows:

'The worth of the serf's limbs by law is as much as the worth of the king's limbs according to worth. The *galanas* and the *sarhad*, however, of every one are paid according to his status when a limb shall be broken.'

(3) *Arson.*—The Welsh laws alone deal with this offence, and refer to the necessity of compurgation to meet it:

'If an accusation of the crime of burning stealthily be brought against a person, the oaths of fifty men will be necessary for him. If he obtain his *rhaith* ("acquittance"), it will be sufficient for him; if he obtain it not, he becomes a saleable thief. A saleable thief is worth seven pounds.'

The case of attempted arson by a thief has been mentioned above.

(4) *Waylaying.*—This crime is also specifically mentioned only in Welsh law, as follows:

'Whoever shall waylay pays twofold, because it is a violence against a person to kill him, and a theft to conceal; and that is the one place in law where violence and theft become connected. And it is to be thus denied; the oaths of fifty men to deny wood and field, and three of them under vow to abstain from flesh and woman and horse-riding.'

This offence was punished by hanging and confiscation.

(5) *Criminal assault.*—(*a*) Irish law required the payment of a heavy fine for attempting to violate a person's wife, and a still heavier fine for actual violation (see *Anc. Laws of Ireland*, i. 163, 167, 177, 181). In *op. cit.* ii. 405, we read as follows:

'If the girl has been defiled within the age of seven years, full body-fine shall be paid for her, and honour-price in right of God; full body-fine also till she reaches the age of ten, and half the honour-price of her father; two-thirds of body-fine for her from the age of ten forth till she reaches fourteen, and half the honour-price of her father; and there is no division of the body-fine from that forth.'

(*b*) Welsh law punished criminal assault, according to one account, as follows:

'Whoever shall commit a rape on a woman, let him pay her *gobr* ("maiden fee") to her lord; and her *dirwy* ("fine") and her *dilysdod* ("acquittance") and her *agweddi* ("dowry") and her *sarhad* ("fine for insult") he pays to the woman; and, if she be a maid, let him pay her *cowyll* (a gift payable by the husband to the wife on the morning after the marriage).'

Some texts add: 'and a silver rod to the king in the manner he is entitled; and, if the man cannot pay, his testicles shall be taken.' (For the oath of the woman and the oaths of fifty men required for compurgation, see Wade-Evans, *op. cit.* p. 237 f.)

In Wade-Evans, *op. cit.* p. 240, the case of assault by two men upon two women is considered as follows:

'If two women shall be journeying through any place and there be no one with them, and two men meet them and violate them, they are not to be compensated. If, however, there be one person with them, although ever so little, unless he be a carried child, they lose none of their right.'

In MS U42a the following is added:

'A woman who shall be violated, if she know not who has violated her, is not to pay *amobr* ("maiden fee"); since the king preserved her not from violation, he loses her *amobr*; and, if the woman be doubted in that respect, let her give her oath that she knows not who violated her, and that she was violated as aforesaid.'

One legal triad speaks of the violation of a woman as 'one of the three disgraces of a kindred.'

(6) *Indecent assault.*—In the Welsh laws (Wade-

Evans, *op. cit.* p. 270) the following statement occurs:

'Three *sarhads* of a woman there are, one of which is augmented, and one diminished, and one is a complete *sarhad*. When a kiss is given her against her will, a third of her *sarhad* is wanting to her then. The second is feeling her with the hand, and that is a full *sarhad* to her. The third is being connected with her against her will, and that is augmented by the third.'

(7) *Theft.*—(*a*) Irish law deals very fully with the various fines which have to be paid in the case of theft, the amount of compensation varying chiefly with the nature of the object stolen. Among such objects are land, cattle, grass, rushes, turf, fruit, fish, boards, firewood, wattles, etc.; and among the special cases considered are that of stealing from a house and from a hunter's cooking-tent, and that of stealing a smith's tools. According to the *Anc. Laws of Ireland* (iii. 463), it was lawful to kill the unknown or nameless thief, but this right was personal only (*op. cit.* iii. 469). There was a further rule that no one was to trade with a thief.

(*b*) Welsh law dealt severely with thieving, and punished it (probably when habitual) with execution by hanging. In Wade-Evans (*op. cit.* p. 188) there is a list of *naw affeith lledrat* ('the nine accessaries of theft'), which are given as follows:

'The first of the nine accessaries of theft is devising deceit and seeking an accomplice. The second is agreeing concerning the theft. The third is giving provision. The fourth is carrying the food while accompanying him (the thief). The fifth is tearing down the cattle-yard, or breaking the house. The sixth is moving what is stolen from its place, and walking day or night with it. The seventh is knowing and informing as to the theft. The eighth is sharing with the thieves. The ninth is seeing the theft and concealing it for reward, or buying it for worth. Whoever shall deny one of these accessaries, let him give the oaths of fifty men without bondman and without alien.'

There is a reference to the death-penalty for stealing in the following statement, where it is said (*ib.* p. 189) that one of the nine persons who are to be believed in giving their testimony, each one of them separately on his oath, is

'a thief without hope of mercy concerning his fellow-thief, when brought to the gallows; because credible is his word concerning his companions and the chattels they thieved, without a relic; and his companion is not to be destroyed on his word, but is to be a thief for sale.'

In the case of the stealing of goods entrusted to a guardian, if the keys are safely in his custody and a breach has been made into the house,

'the *Book of Cynog* (a text of the Laws) says it is easier to believe him if there be chattels of his own taken together with the other chattels which were taken by stealth from him. He is, however, to swear conjointly with all the persons in the house as to his being clear as to those chattels. If the soil, however, be excavated under the house, after he has carried out the law that he is clear, the king owns the soil, and there is to be no guardian answerable for it. Every chattel which a guardian asserts to have been brought to him to be kept, let him make good, except the chattels conveyed through the soil.'

The case of theft by a necessitous alien has been already mentioned. The theft of a king's cat had to be made good as follows:

'Whoever shall kill a cat which guards a barn of a king, or shall take it stealthily, its head is to be held downwards on a clean level floor, and its tail is to be held upwards; and after that wheat is to be poured about it until the tip of the tail be hidden, and that is its worth. Another cat is four legal pence in value.'

A dog, on the other hand, might, according to some MSS, be stolen with impunity:

'There is no *dirwy* for a dog, although it be taken stealthily, nor *camlwrw*. The oath of one man is sufficient to disown a dog, for it is a back-burden of an unclean animal.'

The triads in the *Dimetian Code*, however, say that a dog-stealer should pay a *camlwrw*. Regulations as to the manner of bringing a charge of theft legally and of compurgation in the face of a charge are given in Wade-Evans, *op. cit.* p. 244 f.

A thief might be punished by being sold, and the value assigned to 'a saleable thief' is seven pounds. In Wade-Evans (*op. cit.* p. 259) are found the following further provisions as to theft:

'A thief who shall be placed upon sureties is not to be destroyed. No one is to make satisfaction or answer for an act of his bondman saving for theft.'

(8) *Assault.*—(*a*) Irish law dealt with assault under the same section as wounding and mutilating, and drew a distinction between a 'red wound' (with bloodshed) and a 'white wound' (without bloodshed). In the *Anc. Laws of Ireland* (iii. 352 n.) a 'lump-blow' is defined. For a clean lump-blow two cows were an adequate compensation, while for the foul lump-blow *aircr*-fine (one of the lesser fines of Irish law) was exacted.

(*b*) Welsh law (Wade-Evans, *op. cit.* p. 193) punishes assault as follows:

'Whoever shall strike a person, let him pay his *sarhad*, first because attack and onset constitute a *sarhad* to every person; and a penny for every hair pulled out from his head by the root; and a penny for every finger which shall touch the head; and twenty-four pence for the front hair.'

Again,

'if a person strike a bondman, let him pay him twelve pence; . . . if a bondman strike a free man, it is just to cut off his right hand, or let the bondman's lord pay the person's *sarhad*' (*ib.* p. 194).

It is clearly stated (*ib.* p. 259) that a blow received unintentionally is not *sarhad*, and the following three buffets did not need expiation:

'one by the lord on his man in ordering him in the day of battle and fighting; and one by a father on his son to punish him; and one by a chief of kindred on his relative in order to counsel him.'

(9) *Treason.*—Irish law, though severe upon lying, treachery, and all forms of deceit, does not deal specifically with treason, but in Welsh law the following passage occurs (*ib.* p. 202):

'Whoever shall commit treason against a lord or waylay, is to forfeit his father's *trev*; and, if he be caught, he is liable to be executed. If he be not caught and he will to be reconciled to his lord and kindred, a twofold payment of *dirwy* and *galanas* is to be levied on him; and, if he repair to the court of the Pope and return with the Pope's letter with him, and show that he is absolved by the Pope, he has his father's *trev* ("homestead").'

In Ireland, treachery deprived a person of his full honour-price.

(10) *Perjury.*—(*a*) Irish law dealt with false swearing, more especially in the case of contracts, and visited it with a fine (*Anc. Laws of Ireland*, iii. 397). False witness also lowered a man's honour-price.

(*b*) Welsh law deals chiefly with perjury (*anudon*) in relation to suspected testimony (see Wade-Evans, *op. cit.* p. 260 f.), but denial of suretyship and contract is also discussed (*ib.* p. 230).

(11) *Insult.*—(*a*) In Irish law the maintenance of a man's honour was a primary consideration, and certain fines in addition to the *dire-fine* ('honour-price') appear to have been specially instituted for the defence of personal honour. Among these are the *cnech-gris* ('blush-fine'), the *enech-ruice* ('defamation'), and the *cnech-lann* ('reparation of honour'). To ask a question with a view to exposing a blemish (*Anc. Laws of Ireland*, iii. 347), and to give a person a nickname, rendered the offender liable to a fine (*op. cit.* iii. 93), while one form of insult specifically mentioned (*op. cit.* iii. 409) was that of opposing a bishop on a 'hill of meeting.'

(*b*) Welsh law attached the utmost importance to the maintenance of a person's dignity, and compensation for *sarhad* ('insult') plays a prominent part therein. The violation of a person's protection constituted one specified form of insult.

(12) *Libel.*—(*a*) In Ireland the fort of a man who tolerated satire or satires (*Anc. Laws of Ireland*, v. 169) lost its *dire*, or honour-price, but in another passage (*op. cit.* i. 59) it is stated that satirizing, though done intentionally, did not cause loss of the full honour-price until a person evaded the law with respect to it. Satirizing a dead person was also liable to fine (*op. cit.* i. 185, 189).

(*b*) There is no specific mention of libel or satire

in Welsh law, and, in view of the practice of the Welsh poets, at any rate after 1300, it would appear that satirizing on their part was tolerated. At an earlier date, libel was probably counted under *sarhad*.

(13) *Slander.*—(*a*) In Ireland the *Ancient Laws* (i. 175, 177) specifically mention a fine for slander. A fine was also obtainable for circulating a calumnious story (*op. cit.* i. 195, 199), or for wrongfully questioning a person's legitimacy (i. 185, 193).

(*b*) The Welsh laws make no specific mention of slander (*enllib*) other than slander against women (Wade-Evans, *op. cit.* p. 238), or against an innocent man for murder, and probably included other slander, along with libel, under *sarhad*.

(14) *Using charms.*—There is no reference to this offence in the Welsh laws, but in Ireland the person committing it was liable to a fine, whether it was committed against a human being or against a dog (see *Anc. Laws of Ireland*, i. 177, 181).

(15) *Trespass.*—(*a*) Irish law in several passages defines the compensation required for various forms of trespass, such as 'dirtying a road' (*op. cit.* iii. 76 n.), bringing a horse into the narrow part of a road (*ib.*), the digging of a churchyard, and the removal of bones from a churchyard. The type of fine called the *smacht*-fine was levied chiefly in the case of trespass by men or animals (see *Anc. Laws of Ireland*, iv. 83, 87, 89, 93, 95, 107, 109, 111, 115, 117, 119, 121, 123, 141, 145, 153).

(*b*) The forms of trespass which are specifically mentioned in the Welsh laws are: excavating the land of another to hide anything therein, making a snare, digging a kiln-pit, or building a house on another person's land. The fine inflicted was four legal pence, with certain additions in particular cases.

(16) *Damage to property.*—(*a*) Irish law had much to say regarding offences arising under this head (*Anc. Laws of Ireland*, i. 167, 169, 171, 175, 185, 189, 233, 235, 237). The *Book of Aicill* (*op. cit.* iii. 357, 358) deals very fully and humanely with the maiming, mutilation, and over-working of animals.

(*b*) In Wales all damage to property, whether living or dead, had to be compensated for in accordance with a scale of legal worth laid down in the laws.

(17) *Gross negligence.*—(*a*) In Irish law cases of the kind are, for the most part, dealt with under other heads, such as trespass and damage to property; but the expression 'trespass of viciousness with neglect' is used for the offence of bringing a horse into the narrow part of a street. A fine was also inflicted for neglect of fencing. Attendants, too, were punishable for not guarding the houses of persons of dignity (*op. cit.* iii. 511), and a similar penalty was inflicted for neglect in not guarding a captive (iii. 499 f.). A judge who was negligent was liable to a fine (iii. 305), and so were sane adults for not guarding the insane. The Irish believed that blotches arose on the cheeks of judges who pronounced false judgment.

(*b*) The two instances of punishable neglect mentioned in Welsh law are the following (Wade-Evans, *op. cit.* 258, 268):

(1) If two persons shall be walking through a wood, and the one in front let a bough strike the one in the rear so that he loses an eye, he is to pay the worth of an eye to the other.

(2) If a spear were not so placed as to prevent its point from accidentally killing a person, its owner, in case of such a death, had to pay a third of the slain person's *galanas*.

(18) *Absconding and harbouring a fugitive.*—(*a*) It was an offence in Irish law to entertain a fugitive who was known, and there was also a penalty for supporting and advising the women and children of foreigners, as well as for feeding or sheltering a stranger generally (*Anc. Laws of Ireland*, iii. 385, 387, 389). In the same manner a person feeding a houseless person was liable to a fine, the intention in all these cases doubtless being to make it difficult for persons to escape from justice.

(*b*) In Wales the law (see above, p. 265[a]) appears to have been a little more sympathetic towards necessitous aliens, and Welsh law also provided that an alien of foreign speech should have an advocate.

(19) *Abduction.*—(*a*) Irish law (*op. cit.* iii. 403, 541, 543, 545) deals very fully with the question of abduction in its effects upon family life. The children of the abducted woman belonged to her mother's family, and might be sold by them, but the father was bound to buy them if they were sold, and if he got them gratis he was bound to educate them.

(*b*) Abduction was a punishable offence in Welsh law, and the various contingencies which arose in connexion therewith are fully dealt with in the Laws (see *Anc. Laws of Wales*, pp. 86, 88, 92, 204; and Wade-Evans, *op. cit.* pp. 237, 238, 239).

(20) *Stripping of the dead.*—In Ireland there was a fine for stripping the dead in general, and the slain in battle in particular (see *Anc. Laws of Ireland*, i. 175, 177); and a Welsh legal triad speaks of the 'three disgraces of a dead body'—when it is slain, when it is stripped, and when it is left lying.

(21) *Breach of the peace.*—The Welsh laws contain no explicit references to offences under this head; but Irish law (*op. cit.* i. 231, 235) required a fine for quarrelling in an ale-house, and also for disturbing a fair.

(22) *Adultery.*—It is probable that in Irish law adultery should be counted with the above offences, but the absence of a clear distinction in Irish law between crimes and torts makes it difficult to class adultery with crimes, as was done in some countries. In its effect upon the honour-price of a person, adultery, according to the *Anc. Laws of Ireland* (i. 57–61), was more disastrous for ecclesiastics than for laymen; but, in the case of all alike, adultery and cohabiting with a kinswoman had the same effect upon the honour-price as unfaithfulness in word (*op. cit.* i. 59). In the case of adultery by a married man the Welsh laws require (Wade-Evans, *op. cit.* p. 239) that he should pay six score pence to his lawful wife as her *wynebwerth* ('compensation for insult'). When a wife committed adultery, her husband was entitled to thrice the sum of his *sarhad* (*ib.* p. 242), and it is further stated (*ib.* p. 244) that she loses her *agweddi* ('dowry'), while her chattels are brought by her kindred to her husband. One of the three disgraces of a kindred, according to a Welsh legal triad, is to bring another woman to the house, supplanting the wife and driving her forth.

In the present article Celtic crimes and punishments have been considered chiefly with reference to Ireland and Wales, owing to the fact that it is only for these countries that legal treatises of the type here considered are obtainable. In Celtic Scotland the law was based upon a development of the same ideas as those which are embodied in the law of Ireland. The legal practice of Brittany and Cornwall, too, doubtless closely resembled that of Wales; but it would be highly interesting, if it were possible, to know what modifications of the Irish system were developed in Scotland, and, similarly, what local variations of the British system arose in Cornwall and Brittany. In the absence of legal treatises such an inquiry would have to be based mainly on historical and linguistic evidence.

LITERATURE.—*Ancient Laws and Institutes of Wales*, ed. Aneurin Owen (Rolls Series, London, 1841); Wade-Evans, *Welsh Medieval Law* (Oxford, 1909); *The Ancient Laws of Ireland* (Rolls Series, London, 1869–1873); W. F. Skene, *Celtic Scotland*[2] (Edinburgh, 1890).

E. ANWYL.

CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Chinese).—The Chinese character for 'crime' is significant of the attitude of the nation towards the infraction of law, being composed of the radical for 'failure,' under that for 'net,' representing the net of the law descending upon the offender; in other words, 'crime' or 'sin' (for the terms are used interchangeably) is regarded as consisting not so much in the commission of a condemnable act as in the discovery of the fact and the infliction of penal consequences. For this reason the term is an unfortunate one when applied by Christian missionaries to a Chinese audience, for the majority of those thus addressed would strongly object to be denominated 'criminals,' although the intention in the mind of the speaker is merely to bring home to them a sense of sin.

1. Early enactments.—The Chinese penal code is based upon enactments for which a remote antiquity is claimed, and the earliest system of punishments is ascribed to the 'Emperor' Shun (2255 B.C.), who is said to have established the 'Five Punishments' which were in vogue to the end of the Chow dynasty (255 B.C.), viz. (1) branding on the forehead, (2) cutting off the nose, (3) maiming, (4) castration, and (5) death.

The founder of the Han dynasty (202 B.C.) enacted the 'Three Penal Sentences,' viz. (1) life shall be given for life, (2) compensation for wounds, and (3) imprisonment for robbery.

The first regular code of penal laws is represented as being brought into operation in the Ts'in dynasty (249 B.C.), comprehended under six heads, the 5th of which, represented by 11 vols., is occupied with criminal laws concerning treason, robbery, theft, homicide, criminal intercourse, disturbing graves, quarrelling and fighting, and incendiarism; and, though each succeeding dynasty has contributed some modification or addition to the original enactments, the ultimate source of inspiration may still be traced even in the existing legislation.

The laws of the present Manchu dynasty, which in China bears the name of the *Ta Ts'ing*, or 'Great Pure Dynasty,' may be grouped as follows:—(1) The *Ta Ts'ing Lu Li*, or 'Penal Code of the Ta Ts'ing dynasty,' which is subject to revision every 5 years. The sections included under the first term, *Lu*, may be described as the original laws or statutes; and those under the second head, *Li*, as the supplementary clauses, or common law, established by precedent or usage. (2) The *Ta Ts'ing Hui Tien*, or 'Regulations of the Ta Ts'ing dynasty.' (3) The edicts and decrees issued by Emperors and high provincial officials. (4) Customary law.

The first of these, the *Lu Li*, is comprehended in 2906 octavo pages, the criminal laws being enumerated in the 6th division, arranged under the following heads: (1) robbery and theft, (2) homicide, (3) quarrelling and fighting, (4) abusive language, (5) indictments and informations, (6) bribery and corruption, (7) forgeries and frauds, (8) incest and adultery, (9) miscellaneous offences, (10) arrests and escapes, and (11) imprisonment, judgment, and execution.

2. Punishments.—The modes of punishment which are recognized by the code are five:

(1) Flogging on the thighs with a light bamboo cane, about 3 ft. 6 in. long by ⅝ in. wide, and $\frac{1}{16}$ in. thick at the end. The punishment admits of 5 degrees of severity, nominally from 10 to 50 blows; but in actual practice only 4, 5, 10, 15, and 20 blows respectively are administered.

(2) Flogging with a heavier cane of bamboo, about 3 ft. 6 in. by 1½ in. by ¼ in., in cases of greater gravity, the number of blows ranging from 60 to 100 nominally, but reduced in universal practice to 20, 25, 30, 35, and 40 respectively. Manchu subjects, or 'Bannermen,' are punished with a whip instead of the bamboo.

In administering the punishment the lictors are so expert that they can apply 1000 sounding blows to the bare flesh without raising a blister, or draw blood if required with three strokes, and actually make the flesh fly if they set themselves seriously to work. (This is done by the 'dragging' stroke, which is different from the usual up-and-down method; the cane when it reaches the flesh is drawn back along the surface, and in a short time the skin is literally torn off in strips.) This skill in applying the bamboo is said to be attained by long practice on a block of bean-curd, a substance resembling a stiff custard, the beaters kneeling face to face, and striking alternately on the bean-curd which is placed on the ground between them. When they have learned to strike the substance a great many times, producing an appreciable 'note' each time, without breaking the delicate surface of the 'custard,' they are supposed to be proficient, and are allowed to exercise their art on the unfortunate human beings who may be surrendered to them. Another power which they must cultivate is that of counting alternate numbers at a great rate whilst administering the strokes; the man kneeling on one knee at one side of the victim calls out the odd numbers, whilst the other counts the even numbers, and this requires long and frequent rehearsal; it also presents an opportunity for 'sharp practice,' for the number called does not necessarily correspond with the blows struck; and it is very easy for skilful performers to run up a very large total of figures without applying an equal number of strokes. Thus a man condemned to receive 1000 strokes may be let off with 700 or so if he has a proper understanding with the lictors, though the full number is reported by them *viva voce* at the time of imposition. The rod is steeped for some months in a saline bath before it is considered fit for use, as this is said to ensure that mortification will not set in when the flesh is lacerated; it no doubt also increases the sufferings of the victim.

(3) Banishment, for a limited period, to a distance not exceeding 500 *li* (= 170 miles). Here again 5 degrees are admitted, viz. 1 year and 60 blows, 1½ years and 70 blows, 2 years and 80 blows, 2½ years and 90 blows, 3 years and 100 blows.

(4) Transportation, for life, to any distance varying from 2000 to 3000 *li* (= 1000 miles), with 100 blows; in extraordinary cases the distance is increased to 4000 *li*, or the criminals are condemned to reside in malarious or savage districts. The exiles are nominally required to render military service, but are usually permitted to engage in humble occupations, such as the managing of inferior pawn-shops, etc. The wives of criminals are expected to accompany their husbands into exile, and their children and other relatives may do so if willing. Bannermen are subjected to the 'cangue' (see below) in lieu of banishment.

(5) Death by strangulation, decapitation, or the so-called 'lingering-process.' The death sentence is usually confirmed by the Emperor; but in cases of murder, piracy or highway robbery, rebellion, uttering false coin, forging official seals, arson, robbery with violence, criminal assault on girls under 12 years of age, fraudulent methods at public examinations, or smuggling salt, the local authority is empowered to put the sentence into execution at once, unless extenuating circumstances can be urged for delay. In cases of piracy,

highway robbery, etc., the criminals are decapitated, and their heads exposed over the city gates as a warning to all.

(*a*) *Strangulation.*—The penalty of strangulation is inflicted in the cases of murder of a stepson by a stepmother, abuse of parents or paternal grandparents, abuse of husbands' parents or grandparents; also in certain cases of homicide where premeditation is not alleged, or where death is brought about by indirect means; also in cases of opening coffins and rifling the dead, refusing to pay tribute, or inciting to riot. In extreme cases the process is aggravated by the method known as 'three strangulations and three recoveries,' which means that the victim is throttled into unconsciousness three times, and restored to animation before the final garrotting takes place. In some instances high officials who have offended are presented by the Emperor with a silken scarf, with which they are expected to strangle themselves in lieu of the heavier and more disgraceful punishment of decollation.

(*b*) *Decapitation.*—Decapitation is the penalty inflicted in the case of a large number of offences, especially those of a treasonable nature—a classification which includes: (1) rebellion, (2) disloyalty (as, *e.g.*, destroying or attacking the Imperial tombs, palaces, etc.), (3) desertion, (4) parricide, (5) massacre (*i.e.* where three or more persons are killed), (6) sacrilege, (7) impiety, (8) discord, and (9) insubordination. The treasonable character of these offences consists in their being hurtful to the Sovereign either in his person, his property, or his honour, or the persons and property of his subjects. The principal offenders are sometimes sentenced to the *ling ch'i*.

(*c*) *The ling ch'i.*—The third form of capital punishment, *i.e.* the *ling ch'i*, or 'lingering process,' which is popularly supposed to consist in an indefinite number of cuts inflicted on the victim's body, before the administration of the *coup de grâce*, does not amount, in ordinary cases, to more than a few slashes on the face and body before the final blow is struck. It is intended to make the death process more lingering and shameful, as the words *ling ch'i* mean; but the degree of aggravation of the penalty is left very much in the hands of the executioner. The lingering process is ordered in the case of treason against the Imperial person, palaces, or tombs, no distinction being made between principal and accessaries; also in the case of parricide, murder of a husband, etc.

(*d*) *The death cage.*—Another form of capital punishment is the 'standing cage,' which consists of a tall frame or coop, in which the victim is placed, the floor being a foot or so from the ground. His neck is enclosed by the bars which form the top or lid of the cage. In this position he is unable to touch the floor with his feet, but a number of bricks are inserted upon which he is permitted to stand, and these are gradually removed until at last he is practically suspended by the neck, unless death intervenes, as generally happens, the process being hastened by the administration of an opiate supplied by a relative or friend. Victims of this form of punishment have been known to survive four days of torture, even when exposed to the burning rays of the summer sun.

(6) The cangue. A minor form of punishment which is recognized by the *Li*, or 'supplementary laws,' is that of the 'great collar,' or 'wooden neck-tie,' as it is nicknamed, generally known amongst Europeans as the 'cangue' (from the Portuguese *canga* = yoke). It consists of a heavy wooden framework in two parts, through which the head of the victim is introduced by means of a scallop on the inner edges of each; the two parts are then brought together and fastened in position upon the wearer's shoulders, and an inscription is added stating the nature of the crime committed, etc. The weight of the cangue is generally from 20 to 30 lbs., but larger frames are sometimes used, in which as many as five men can be secured. In some cases the hands of the sufferer are also inserted in smaller holes as in a pillory. In either instance it is impossible to reach the mouth with the hands, and the prisoner has to be fed by others. The cangue is generally exhibited in the daytime at the spot where the offence was committed, and at night the bearer of it is removed to the prison, where, in the majority of cases, he is relieved of his burden until the next day. The imposition of the cangue may cover a period of a few days or may continue for three months, and is ordered in cases of stealing, gambling, damage, extortion, etc.

(7) Branding is also in vogue in cases of stealing, and the designation of the crime is indelibly stamped upon the forearm, *e.g.* 'Stealer of grain,' 'stores,' or 'silver,' as the case may be.

3. **Methods of Chinese thieves.**—Chinese thieves are divided into various classes, whose methods differ very considerably; for instance, in order to obtain entrance to a building, some elect to prise open the window or doors, or lift them off the hooks which do duty for hinges, while others prefer to throw a rope, with grapplers attached, to the balcony or roof, and climb up hand over hand; others drill holes in doors with the usual carpenters' instruments, or burn out a piece of the woodwork by means of a blow-pipe and a brazier of lighted charcoal, so as to insert the hand and withdraw bolts and fastenings; others, again, employ a bamboo pole for vaulting or scaling walls; anæsthetics are used by some thieves for rendering the occupants of a house unconscious; holes are also bored in walls, or subterranean tunnels are made by experts in these departments.

The 'swift-horse,' or constable (see below), being himself an ex-thief, is familiar with the methods of the several classes, and the individuals composing them; and can always diagnose with accuracy the cases which are submitted to him.

4. **Punishment of women.**—Special punishments are reserved for women, such as piercing the breast with a hot iron, in the case of attempts on the life of a husband, assaulting a mother-in-law, etc. When the bamboo is ordered, the blows are usually inflicted on the mouth or hands, in order to avoid exposure of the body.

5. **Martial law.**—Martial law is particularly severe, and summary punishment is meted out to offending soldiers by their officers. In ancient days the penalty of tearing asunder by five horses was exacted in certain cases; even now the death penalty is prescribed for such offences as circulating false rumours, attempted rape, etc.

6. **Character of enactments.**—The punishments above enumerated may seem to be exceedingly severe, but it must be remembered that, until quite recent years, there was no police force of any kind in China, the only substitute being the local beadle, or *tipao*, in each district or division, with his subordinates, including the 'swift-horse,' or thief-catcher; and the result of long experience was the conviction that severity, at all events in the promulgation of the law, was necessary, though its application might be tempered with mercy; and the Chinese penal code, though it may not satisfy the high ideals of 20th century Christianity on the score of justice and equity, 'for the repression of disorder, and the gentle coercion of a vast population, appears to be equally mild and efficacious' (G. T. Staunton, *The Ta Tsing Leu Lee*).

7. **The conduct of law.**—The almost total absence

of legal machinery is another feature which is worthy of notice. There is no such thing as the empanelling of a jury; no assistance of counsel for the prosecution or the defence; no association of judges on the bench; no demand for asseveration upon oath. The magistrate sits alone to try the case, unless he decides upon inviting another magistrate to assist him. The cases for and against are prepared by self-constituted lawyers, a somewhat degraded class of literary men, who do not appear in person before the court. The magistrate is furnished by his secretaries with whatever information he may require as to law or precedent, and decision is given, ordinarily, without long delay. The accused cannot be punished until he confesses his crime; and, should he hesitate to do so, the means are available by which such confession may be elicited. Some of these methods have the sanction of law, whilst others are enforced without such authority. The legal instruments of torture consist of wooden presses for squeezing the ankles or fingers, and the bastinado; in addition to these, however, there are many others which have been in force until quite recently, but which have now been nominally abolished—such as forcing the victim to kneel upon hot bricks, iron chains, powdered glass, sand, or salt; twisting the ears; suspending the body by the thumbs or fingers; tying the hands to a bar placed under the knees, so as to bend the body forward in a kneeling posture, etc.

8. Popular courts.—So great is the terror inspired by the law-courts and the 'pens' which do duty for prisons (the Chinese word for prison means originally a 'corral,' or stable for cattle), that many people prefer to settle their cases out of court, by resorting to the 'tea-houses,' which are the equivalents of our public-houses, and submitting the question to the arbitration of those present—the nearest approach to trial by jury; and the practice has become so well established that these tea-houses are often called 'Little Halls of Justice.'

9. Standard of guilt.—An interesting feature of the Chinese enactments is that the standard of punishment, in many cases, is not measured by the character of the offence, but by the amount of profit secured by the offender; the penalty, for instance, of stealing 120 oz. or more of silver is out of all proportion to that which is incurred by stealing 1 oz.; it is assessed on a scale indeed which would seem to place the act in an entirely different category of crime, for the latter is punished by 60 blows, the former by strangulation.

10. Treason.—The punishment of treason is particularly severe, and the list of crimes which are classified as treasonable is very comprehensive. The penalty of making even an attempt against the persons, palaces, or tombs of the Imperial house is execution by the lingering process, and no distinction is made between principals and accessaries (though in ordinary cases of crime a careful discrimination is made, and accessaries before the fact are punished one degree less severely than the principals). All male relatives of the condemned, in the first degree, *i.e.* father, grandfather, sons, grandsons, paternal uncles and their sons of the age of 15 or older, are sentenced to decapitation, together with all other male relatives, within the same limit of age, who may be living with the offender at the time. Male relatives of the first degree under the age of 15, and all females similarly related, are distributed as slaves amongst the great officials. The property of the condemned is confiscated by the State. All who renounce country and allegiance are liable to decapitation.

11. Homicide.—The definition of homicide is also very comprehensive, no fewer than 10 possible cases being included under the term, viz. (1) killing with deliberate intent, the penalty of which is decapitation; (2) killing in an affray, where perhaps no special individual is singled out for slaughter (the punishment in these cases is strangulation); (3) killing by depriving of food or clothing, by the removal of the ladder by which the victim has reached an inaccessible position and is unable to return, by taking the bridle from a rider's horse so that he cannot continue his journey and is stranded in the wilds, by the administration of noxious substances to the mouth, eyes, ears, etc. (in such cases strangulation is decreed); (4) killing by means of dangerous weapons, such as fire-arms, etc., though used only in play; by luring a person into danger by false representations, *e.g.* leading a man to walk into deep water, assuring him that it is shallow and fordable (strangulation is the penalty in these cases also); (5) killing a person by mistake when intending to kill some one else (the penalty for this offence is beheading); (6) killing accidentally when using legitimate instruments or weapons (compensation is deemed sufficient in such cases); (7) killing through carelessness (punished by beheading); (8) killing by the administration of improper medicines (punishable by beheading, but, if inadvertence can be urged in defence, compensation and retirement from medical practice are ordered); (9) killing by means of traps and snares (punishable by blows and banishment); (10) killing by the utterance of threats which lead to suicide on the part of the threatened person (punished by strangulation).

The removal of a body from the spot where the murder has been committed is treated as a capital offence. In cases of injury produced in fighting and quarrelling, a careful assessment is made of the amount of damage done; *e.g.*, the tearing away of one inch of the opponent's hair is punishable by 50 blows, the breaking of one tooth by 100 blows, of two teeth by 60 blows and a year's imprisonment. Causing a person to be incapable of becoming a parent is punished by 100 blows and banishment to a distance of 3000 *li*, and, in the case of male offenders, with forfeiture of estates.

12. Privileged classes.—There are no fewer than ten instances where privilege is claimed, as in the case of those enjoying hereditary rank, or high office, or relationship to the reigning dynasty. These classes are excepted from the ordinary processes of law, and the Imperial sanction must be obtained before the law can be put into operation against them. No privilege, however, of whatever kind can avail in a case of treason. The circumstances of the accused, in ordinary cases, are taken into account: as, *e.g.*, extreme youth, *i.e.* under the age of 15 years; or extreme age, *i.e.* 70 years and upwards; infirmity, too, is recognized as an occasion for the exercise of lenity and the relaxation of the heavier penalties, with exemption from torture. The condition of the parents of the accused is also taken into account, and an erring son is mercifully dealt with if it be shown that his parents depend upon him for support; even the death penalty may be remitted in the case of an only son, lest his parents should be deprived of the worship which is expected from him after their decease.

13. Favourable treatment of women.—Women are seldom imprisoned, except on capital charges, or for adultery, but are placed in the custody of their nearest relatives; and, if they are arrested when in a pregnant condition, the full penalty of the law is not exacted until 100 days have passed after parturition. Injured husbands are permitted to kill, out of hand, the guilty wife and her paramour, if discovered *in flagrante delicto*; but, if the parties have already left the apartment where the

act was committed, or surrender themselves to the husband, or some little time has elapsed since the event, the husband is not justified by law in exacting the extreme penalty. A master who is accused of killing a slave is not regarded as guilty of a capital offence, but a slave who murders his master is sentenced to *ling ch'i* as guilty of petty treason.

14. **Patria potestas.**—The *patria potestas* is still in force in China, and the slaughter of one's offspring is dealt with as a minor offence, or indeed as no offence at all, if, for instance, a parent has been struck by a son or daughter. The law decrees that the penalty for striking or cursing a parent is death, as was the case with the Hebrews.

15. **Professional bullies.**—The killing of a professional pugilist, or 'strong man,' is not regarded as murder, on the ground that such persons voluntarily subject themselves to danger and death, and must be prepared to take the consequences of their rashness.

16. **The law of debt.**—In cases of debt a stated period is allowed by law for repayment, viz. three months after the expiry of the time stipulated in the original arrangement between the parties. In the event of this period of grace being allowed to elapse, the debtor is liable to the bastinado. In some cases the creditor will take up his quarters at the house of the debtor, and continue to live at his expense until the debt is discharged. The fear of being unable to meet one's obligations before the Chinese New Year causes many suicides to take place at that season.

17. **Bad company.**—Amongst miscellaneous enactments it is worthy of notice that the sons of families enjoying hereditary rank, and officers of government, are prohibited from associating with prostitutes and actors, under penalty of 60 blows.

18. **Treatment of domestic animals.**—Special laws are enacted with a view to the proper treatment of domestic animals; *e.g.*, when draught animals are improperly harnessed, and sores are thus produced on the back or withers, the penalty of such carelessness is 20 to 50 blows. Similar penalties are imposed in cases of insufficient feeding, etc.

19. **Care of the young.**—Amongst the laws relating to the care of the young, it may be noted that the 'age of consent' in China is 12 years in the case of both boys and girls, and that a recent edict decreed that smoking on the part of boys under 18 was a punishable offence.

20. **Improper conduct.**—The comprehensiveness of the Chinese penal code is remarkable; there is hardly a circumstance connected with law and its infraction for which provision is not made; and a large liberty is extended to judges in the treatment of what is described as 'improper conduct'—an expression which is interpreted to mean offences against the spirit of the laws, though not necessarily involving an actual breach of the letter thereof.

21. **Lynch law.**—In addition to the ordinary legislation there are many unorthodox methods in practice amongst the people in country districts. Lynch law is very common, and the treatment of crime by the people themselves often induces cruelties which fully deserve the designation of 'savage.' Theft is severely punished, as are also fraudulent practices in connexion with marriage negotiations. A favourite method is the suspension of the culprit by his thumbs and great toes to a horizontal branch, so that the body is arched like a bow; sometimes a large stone is placed in the middle of his back to increase his sufferings. In extreme cases, where death is decreed by the village tribunal, a fiendish ingenuity is exhibited in the invention of new methods of torture. In the case of village feuds 'a life for a life' is the universal standard of justice; annual outbreaks of a kind of vendetta are common in some districts, and continue until the blood-feud is settled by the slaughter of an equal number of persons on both sides.

22. **Reform.**—The revision of the penal code, so as to bring it into conformity with Western models, is at present under consideration; and a number of Chinese commissioners visited Europe last year [1910] for the purpose of studying Western prison methods, with a view to a reform of the Chinese houses of detention.

LITERATURE.—G. T. Staunton, *The Ta Tsing Leu Lee*, London, 1810; A. Lind, *A Chapter of the Chinese Penal Code*, Leyden, 1887; J. Dyer Ball, *Things Chinese*[4], Shanghai, 1903; Herbert A. Giles, *A Glossary of Reference*, Shanghai, 1900; W. Gilbert Walshe, *Ways that are Dark*, Shanghai, 1906.

W. GILBERT WALSHE.

CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Egyptian).—There is no reliable record of the principles which guided the Egyptian judge in the punishment of crime. There may have been much that was arbitrary in the administration of justice, even in the best bureaucratic period of the New Empire, but that rules dating from a remote age, and attributed to the god Thoth, were appealed to is certain. A charge given by the king to his newly appointed vizier is preserved, but scarcely touches this question.

The Negative Confession in the Book of the Dead (see CONFESSION [Egyptian]) contains a long list of moral and religious obliquities, including adultery, falsification of measures and weights, and cursing the king. More to our purpose is a list of charges brought against a shipmaster at Elephantinē, preserved in a papyrus at Turin; amongst his offences are breaking into stores and stealing the grain, embezzling corn put in his charge, extorting corn from the people, burning a boat and concealing the fact, also adultery, and apparently the misuse of cattle bred by the sacred Mnevis sire. There is no record whether the charges were proved, or of the punishment. A decree of King Horemheb to repress military exactions and oppression in Egypt imposes a severe penalty on the unauthorized commandeering of boats; the offender loses his nose and ears, and is transported to the frontier city of Zaru (agreeing with Diodorus' account of the city of Rhinocolura); and soldiers who stole hides were to be beaten with 100 lashes so as to open five wounds, and to restore the property to its owners. Other documents indicate Ethiopia as the place of banishment, where perhaps convicts were forced to toil in the gold mines. The condition of suspected persons after examination 'by beating on their hands and feet' must have been miserable in the extreme, but probably the law contrived to make it still worse for the convicted criminal in the end. Accounts of several criminal trials are preserved—of robbers of the royal tombs (in Breasted, *Anc. Records*, London, 1906–1907, iv. 499–556), and of a conspiracy in the harem against the life of the king (*ib.* pp. 416–456). The punishment of the men and women condemned for participation in, or guilty knowledge of, the conspiracy is not specified, but it was evidently death in some form, and many seem to have been permitted to commit suicide. Two of the judges and two custodians who had misconducted themselves with female criminals during the time of the trial were condemned to lose their noses and ears; one of these committed suicide, while a fifth was perhaps let off with a severe reprimand.

From the end of the Middle Kingdom there is a decree of a King Antef deposing a nomarch (?) and high official of the temple of Coptos, apparently for harbouring the king's enemies. He and all his descendants were deprived for ever of the power

to hold the office. The consequences of desertion to another country are hinted at in the story of the fugitive Sinuhe, who was plainly in peril of death (Maspero, *Contes populaires*[3], Paris, 1906, p. 62). In the treaty between the Hittite king and Ramses II. restoration of deserters and free pardon for them are stipulated for on both sides.

F. LL. GRIFFITH.

CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Greek).—1. A crime may be considered as an act of disobedience to a Divine command, and, as such, punishable, if at all, by Divine retribution; or else, in its stricter sense, as an offence against the ethical sense of the community, for which a definite punishment is prescribed by law. But it is only gradually that the latter notion has been evolved. In the Greek States, none of which succeeded in working out a scientific system of jurisprudence comparable with that of Rome, many crimes continued to be treated, as in primitive communities, as wrongful acts done to an individual, for which he was entitled to claim compensation in a court of law (see Maine, *Ancient Law*[10], ed. Pollock, London, 1907, p. 379). Although the familiar distinction between a crime and a tort was increasingly recognized with the progress of time, acts definitely criminal in character (as being injurious to the community, such as homicide and theft under certain conditions) were technically made the subject of a civil action (δίκη) rather than of an indictment (γραφή). Even in the latter the State was only indirectly concerned; for a further distinction was made between a private and a public prosecution, and in private prosecutions, which formed by far the more numerous class, the prosecutor was regarded as acting for his own satisfaction rather than as fulfilling a public duty (see Demosthenes, xxi. 25).

It would be impossible, within the limits of an article like the present, even if the material existed, to describe in detail, or even satisfactorily to summarize, the progressive development in the establishment of legal penalties for crime by the various divisions of the Hellenic race, from the dawn of history down to the time when their independence was finally lost. All that we shall attempt is a short survey of the general ideas relating to the subject of crimes and punishments which prevailed from time to time according to the most important literary records, together with some account of the particular remedies provided by the Athenian law-courts, in the period for which our information is most abundant, namely, the 5th and 4th cents. B.C. For States other than Athens the necessary evidence is almost entirely wanting, and there is not much advantage in recording such scraps as have come down to us, when it is impossible to present them in their proper setting, or to make a trustworthy estimate of their value. There is the less inconvenience in taking this course, inasmuch as the pre-eminence of the Athenian judicial system is reflected in the remark that the Athenians invented the regular administration of justice (Ælian, *Var. Hist.* iii. 38). Still, it would be a mistake to suppose that the Athenian courts were a unique product of Hellenic civilization. Of the better-known Greek States it seems probable that Sparta was the most backward; and the existence of an elaborate judicial organization in remote and semi-barbarous communities such as Gortyn and Western Locris leads to the conclusion that great commercial cities like Ægina, Megara, and Corinth had a legal system as highly developed, if not so famous, as that of Athens herself (L. Whibley, *Greek Oligarchies*, London, 1896, p. 177).

2. With crime in the wider sense, as a breach of religious obligation, and the Divine punishment which it thereby merits, we do not propose here to deal, since they will be sufficiently discussed elsewhere (*e.g.* ERINYS, ESCHATOLOGY [Greek]). Nevertheless, the gradual growth of a system of jurisprudence was so largely conditioned by religious belief that we cannot entirely put out of view the religious as distinct from the legal aspect (see, generally, Maine, p. 381). Their connexion is most strongly marked in the case of the most important of all crimes, that of homicide. In the primitive age, for which our authority is to be found not only in the Homeric poems, but also in the writings of the Tragedians, so far as they reproduce the old legends, beliefs, and customs prevalent in the Epics now lost, it was universally believed that the shedder of blood was pursued and punished by the avengers (Ἐρινύες) of the slain man (Æsch. *Cho.* 401; Soph. *El.* 113). These supernatural visitants may be regarded as the embodiment of the curse pronounced by the injured victim against the wrongdoer (Æsch. *Theb.* 70), or even as the punishment itself (Ποιναί). In Homer, however, they never appear as punishing murder, but rather as protectors of parents against wrongs done to them by their children, and as guardians of the sanctities of family life. The mother of Meleager cursed her son for slaying her brother, and prayed for his death; her prayer was heard by the Erinys that walks in darkness (*Il.* ix. 571). Similarly, we find Œdipus visited by the curse of Iocasta (*Od.* xi. 280); the Erinyes were summoned to avenge the dishonour done by Phœnix to his father Amyntor (*Il.* ix. 454); and, so far as can be seen, they were ready to visit every crime committed against the ties of family or society (Ameis-Hentze on *Od.* ii. 135). There is nothing in Homer to show that the Erinyes did not punish homicide in a proper case; and, inasmuch as they avenged wrongs done to kindred, they might well have been found harassing Orestes for the murder of his mother, if Homer had narrated this version of the story (T. D. Seymour, *Life in the Homeric Age*, New York and London, 1907, p. 89). The subjects handled by the Tragic poets, being more nearly concerned with the ideas of crime and punishment, regularly present the Erinyes as the avengers of bloodshed, and more particularly of the murder of kinsfolk. Their victim, driven from place to place, in his vain effort to escape (Æsch. *Eum.* 210), was attacked by madness (Eur. *Iph. Taur.* 1481) or wasting sickness (*Or.* 398 ff.), until he either was released by death or effected a reconciliation with those whom he had wronged; such was the fate of the matricides Orestes and Alcmæon.

3. Again, in primitive times punishment was believed to be exacted in this life (*Il.* iii. 278 is exceptional), and the vigilance of the retributory power to be as unvarying as it was relentless. And, when experience seemed to show that the offender often escaped with impunity, it was easy to reply that vengeance was certain, even if it was slow to come (Æsch. *Ag.* 58, ὑστερόποινον Ἐρινύν; Soph. *Ant.* 1074; Jebb on *Œd. Col.* 1536); and that retribution would visit his descendants, even if the original offender was allowed to escape (*Il.* iv. 160; Solon, frag. 4. 27 ff.; Rohde, *Psyche*[4], ii. 228). Until a comparatively late date this was one of the excuses alleged by the Stoics, who were hard put to it to reconcile the existence of moral evil with their doctrine of Providence (Cic. *Nat. Deor.* iii. 90). But these crude notions failed to satisfy the curious inquirer or the ardent champion of Divine justice. Æschylus, a profound religious thinker, attempted to justify the gods by the assertion that the sin of the ancestor begets a tendency to sin in his descendants (*Ag.* 755–766), so that the actual sufferer is punished, not directly for his ancestor's guilt, but because he himself has yielded to temptation. But popular superstition required a less subtle solution. Even if the innocent must suffer for the guilty, it could not be supposed that the guilty themselves escape altogether. Hence came the belief in punishment after death, which may properly be called post-Homeric, though it appears in an isolated passage of the Νεκυία (*Od.* xi. 576–600; see Seymour, p. 468). It was a leading tenet in the creed of the devotees of Orphism (Plat. *Rep.* 364 E; Rohde, *Psyche*[4], ii. 128). The same doctrine took firm root in the convictions of the initiated, who had availed themselves of the reward offered to the partici-

pators in the Eleusinian mysteries, that they, and they alone, could look forward to a blessed existence after death (Soph. frag. 753); though how far it is correct to speak of the 'symbolism' of the mysteries themselves is a difficult and doubtful question (Rohde, i. 294 ff.). From such sources the doctrine spread even to philosophic circles, where it provided the material for several of the myths in the writings of Plato (*Phædo*, 110 B, *Rep.* 614 B, *Gorg.* 523 A), as well as for those of his imitator Plutarch (*Sera Num. Vind.* p. 563 ff.; *Gen. Socr.* p. 590), and was countenanced by the Stoics in their efforts to make common cause with the upholders of the popular religion (A. C. Pearson, *Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes*, Cambridge, 1891, p. 146).

4. The belief in the power of the spirit of the murdered man to exact vengeance persisted throughout the historical age, but the practical consequences to the murderer in the attitude of his fellows were widely different in Homeric society from those which prevailed at a later time. The homicide in Homer was under no disability, so long as he kept outside the range of the influence exercised by the clan among whom the murder was committed; but within those limits his life was forfeit to the kinsmen of the murdered man (*Od.* xv. 271 ff.). So long as the murderer remained at home, the kinsmen were bound to exact the blood-penalty, if they themselves wished to avoid the wrath of the dead man's ghost; only by permanent exile, by renouncing for ever the ties of home and country, could even one who had accidentally caused the death of another escape from the vengeance of the blood-feud. Such is the inference to be drawn from the fate of Patroclus (*Il.* xi. 769 ff., xxiii. 85 ff.). But once he reached a new country, no moral disgrace and no religious tabu attached to the person of the fugitive murderer, although his act was deliberate. Even assassination seems to excite no moral disapprobation (*Od.* xiii. 267). Exile, however, was not always inevitable. If the relatives were willing to accept a fine, the murderer might by a payment acceptable to them compound for his life, and remain at home (*Il.* ix. 628-632). There is nothing here of ceremonial uncleanness, or of the propitiation of an offended deity (Rohde, i. 271); a murder is a wrong done to the family which has lost a member, and it is for them to exact a suitable expiation. The only reference to judicial proceedings in connexion with homicide is in the description of the shield of Achilles (*Il.* xviii. 497-508). Unfortunately, however, critics are not agreed on the nature of the trial scene; and the question is still open whether the issue to be tried before the elders was one of fact—had the blood-price been paid or not?—or whether the community had undertaken to decide the question of right, when a blood-price had been offered and refused. (See, on the one hand, Seymour, p. 89, and Lipsius, *Das attische Recht*, p. 4; and, on the other, Leaf, *in loc.*, and Maine, p. 406.)

5. When we pass to historical times, we find an entirely different state of affairs. The only adequate explanation of the change seems to be that in the interval a new religious influence had grown up, strong enough to modify completely the Greek conception of murder. This was the Delphic cult of Apollo, which at one and the same time emphasized the moral guilt of the shedder of blood, and by its ceremonies of purification opened the means of escape from the need for a blood-requital. But it is not easy to understand why the possibility of compounding by a money fine, which the Homeric poems attest, should have given way to a stricter estimate of guilt (Rohde, i. 267; Demosthenes, xxiii. 28, 33), which appears to be a reversion to the primitive rule that every murder must be expiated by blood (Æsch. *Cho.* 311). It has usually been inferred that the practice of Homeric society was a temporary deviation due to special conditions, which suspended the normal development of Greek ethics (T. Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, Eng. tr., 1901, ii. 4).

6. **The Athenian criminal code.**—However this may be, when we at length reach the system administered by the Athenian courts, we find that the punishment no longer depends upon the choice of the individual avenger, but is prescribed by the State (Demosth. xxiii. 69), although the kinsman is still required to appear as the instrument which sets the law in motion, unless the murderer has been forgiven by his victim before his death (*ib.* xxxvii. 59). The circumstances and motive of the homicide are no longer regarded as indifferent, but the various grades of guilt are distinguished with precision. Thus (1) the supreme court of the Areopagus, instituted, according to the legend, on the occasion of the trial of Orestes, had jurisdiction in cases of wilful homicide (φόνος ἑκούσιος). The judges were the Council of the Areopagus, a body recruited from those who had served the office of *archon* and had passed a subsequent scrutiny, under the presidency of the 'king' *archon*, who, as exercising the priestly functions of the old kings, testified by his presence to the religious character of a trial for blood-guiltiness. The penalties of death and confiscation of goods followed a conviction (Demosth. xxi. 43). The Areopagus also had jurisdiction over cases of wounding with malicious intent (τραῦμα ἐκ προνοίας), of arson (πυρκαϊά), and of poisoning (φαρμάκων ἐάν τις ἀποκτείνῃ δούς). The penalty for wounding and for poisoning, if death did not result, was banishment and confiscation of property; if the poisoning was followed by death, it was punished in the same manner as murder committed by violent methods.

(2) The second of the courts dealing with homicide sat at the Palladion, a sanctuary of Pallas, outside the walls, on the east side of Athens. Here were tried cases of involuntary homicide, and of conspiracy against the life of another (βούλευσις: Arist. *Resp. Ath.* 57. 3), as well as those relating to the killing of a slave, a resident alien, or a foreigner. The sentence on a person found guilty of involuntary homicide required him to remain in exile until he had appeased the relatives of the deceased, or, if he failed to do so, for a definite (but not ascertained) period. The death of a non-citizen seems also to have been punishable with banishment.

(3) Not far from the Palladion was the Delphinion, or Temple of Apollo Delphinios, where all were tried who alleged that the homicide committed was justifiable or excusable. The examples given are the slaying of an adulterer taken in the act, death on the battle-field in consequence of mistaken identity, and the fatal result of an athletic contest.

(4) Of minor importance was the court in the precinct of the hero Phreatus (Lipsius, p. 130), on the Piræus peninsula, where any person was tried who, while in exile for involuntary homicide, was accused of murder or malicious wounding committed before he went into exile. In such circumstances the accused pleaded his case from a boat moored off the coast.

The judges in the three courts last-mentioned were a body known as the ἐφέται, 51 in number, about whose qualifications and mode of appointment there is no information except the vague statement that they were chosen from among the well-born citizens. Their number may be explained by the 'king' *archon* being counted as one of them, or may be due to the same principle as prevailed in the jury-courts—the necessity of an odd number in

order to secure the decision of a majority (Lipsius, p. 18; otherwise Gilbert, *Handbuch d. gr. Staatsalterthümer*², p. 136). This system seems to have lasted from the time of Draco until about the year 400 B.C., when, in place of the *ephetæ*, a panel of ordinary jurymen (ἡλιασταί) was substituted (Lipsius, p. 41). The president in these courts was always the 'king' *archon*.

(5) Lastly, there is the court of the Prytaneum, composed of the four tribal 'kings' (φυλοβασιλεῖς) together with the 'king' *archon*, who, when the actual criminal could not be discovered, conducted a ceremonial trial of the weapon or of any other inanimate object, such as a stone or a piece of timber, by means of which a death had been caused. At the conclusion of the trial the inanimate instrument of death was cast beyond the boundaries of the State. A similar proceeding took place if the death was due to an animal (Arist. *Resp. Ath.* 57. 4). Here we have obviously the survival of a custom which went back to a remote antiquity.

In regard to trials for **homicide**, the following points of interest may be noted. (*a*) The connexion of the trial with the primitive blood-feud is preserved in the requirement that the prosecution must be undertaken by the nearest relatives of the deceased. (*b*) The trial always took place in the open air, in order to avoid any possible pollution to those present from being under the same roof with the accused. (*c*) The fact that the place of trial was always a temple is derived from the time when the slayer was protected by the right of asylum, until he had agreed with his adversaries on the amount of the blood-price. (*d*) The accused could withdraw himself from the trial not later than the conclusion of his opening speech (Demosth. xxiii. 69), and, so long as he remained abroad, his life was protected; but, if he returned to Athens, he could be put to death with impunity. (*e*) Ceremonial purification was required before even an involuntary homicide could be restored to his full rights. (*f*) The court of the Areopagus was closely associated with the cult of the Erinyes, who appear as the accusers of Orestes not only in Æschylus, but in the account preserved in Demosth. xxiii. 66 (Rohde, p. 269).

At Sparta, cases of homicide were tried before the council of elders (γερουσία), where other public proceedings also took place (Arist. *Pol.* iii. 1, 1275b, 10). From a case in which permanent exile was the penalty for an act of involuntary homicide committed in childhood (Xen. *Anab.* IV. viii. 25), it has been inferred that the rule of primitive society had received hardly any modification. For offences punishable with death the Spartans adopted the curious rule that, if a man was once acquitted, he remained still liable to stand a second trial (Gilbert, p. 89). The death penalty was carried out by night; and the condemned man was either strangled in prison or thrown from a height into a hollow called καιάδας (Plut. *Ages.* 19; Thuc. i. 134). We hear also of banishment, disfranchisement, and money fines being inflicted as punishments; but our information is so meagre that we can seldom distinguish the various crimes to which they were assigned; it appears, however, that cowardice in battle was punishable with exile (Thuc. v. 72), and παιδεραστία with permanent disfranchisement (Plut. *Mor.* p. 237 C). In Bœotia murder trials took place before the council (Xen. *Hell.* VII. iii. 5).

To return to Athens: it is desirable, before proceeding further, to mention certain salient characteristics of the administration of the Athenian criminal law which distinguish it from the system established in Great Britain. Every criminal proceeding was assigned to the office of a magistrate or board, who took charge of the necessary documents, heard all the preliminary applications, and presided at the actual trial. But these officials were very far from exercising the functions of a modern judge. They had no legal training or experience, but were simply laymen holding office for a year, a few being chosen by election, but the majority owing their position to the chance of the lot. Their duties were for the most part ministerial, and at the trial they exercised no control over the jury, who were supreme as representing the sovereign people. These latter—in criminal trials a panel, generally 501 in number and often far larger, chosen by an elaborate system from a body of 6000 dicasts annually enrolled—were little apt to stop an irrelevant argument, if it appealed to their fancy, or to require every statement of an advocate to be proved by strict evidence (Mahaffy, *Social Life in Greece*³, London, 1877, p. 387 ff.). Their freedom from responsibility tempted them to decide according to the caprice of the moment, and their ignorance enabled advocates to misrepresent the law without any check but the speech of the other side. Moreover, they were often swayed by political prejudice and passion, and even, as we are credibly informed, were prepared to swell the State revenues by confiscation of the goods of the accused in order to improve the security for the jurymen's pay (Aristoph. *Eq.* 1359 f.; Lysias, xxvii. 1). They voted by ballot, and a simple majority prevailed. In many cases the sentence was fixed by law (ἀγὼν ἀτίμητος); but, where it was left to the discretion of the court (ἀγὼν τιμητός), the jurors had only a choice between two alternatives, as presented to them by the contending parties. It is obvious that any wider liberty would have been attended with serious practical difficulties.

If the crime of **treason** (προδοσία) was not precisely defined in their code, it was not because the Athenians cared little about the security of their constitutional liberty. On the contrary, the names of Harmodius and Aristogiton were always cherished, and special privileges granted to their descendants, in order that the Athenians might never forget the dangers from which their ancestors had been liberated. Charges against the oligarchical party of conspiring against the democracy (Aristoph. *Eq.* 236), or against some popular leader as aiming at a tyranny, were freely bandied to and fro during the troublous times of the Peloponnesian War: 'Aye "conspiracy" and "tyrant," these with you are all in all, | Whatsoe'er is brought before you, be the matter great or small' (Aristoph. *Vesp.* 488 f., tr. Rogers). The importance attached to the safety of the democracy is attested by the provision of a special process (εἰσαγγελία) for the impeachment of traitors. Historically, indeed, it may be regarded as a survival of the only form of criminal procedure known to the primitive State, in which there is no distinction between a criminal trial and an act of legislation (Maine, pp. 383, 393). But in practice this solemn proceeding was reserved for the trial and punishment of serious public offences which do not admit of delay (Harpocr. *s.v.* εἰσαγγελία). A law of Solon entrusted the Areopagus with the trial of those who conspired to overthrow the democracy (Arist. *Resp. Ath.* 8. 4); but it was at a later date—which has been fixed as either about the middle of the 4th century (Lipsius, p. 192), or soon after the fall of the Four Hundred (Thalheim, in *Hermes*, xxxvii. [1902] 342 ff.)—that a comprehensive enactment enumerating and defining various treasonable acts (νόμος εἰσαγγελτικός) was passed into law. The offences comprised in it may be divided roughly into four classes: (1) attempts to overthrow the constitution, either actual or constructive; (2) the treacherous surrender of a fortified place or of a military or naval force; (3) desertion to the enemy, or assistance given to,

or bribes received from, them;[1] (4) corrupt advice given by a speech in the assembly (Hyperid. iii. 22). Either as included in the scope of this enactment or as authorized by earlier or separate legislation, we find provision made for proceeding by impeachment against those who made deceitful promises to the people, and against ambassadors who were false to their duty (Demosth. xix. 277, xx. 135). The procedure, as might have been expected, was entirely different from that of an ordinary criminal indictment. An impeachment might be either instituted before the Council of the Five Hundred or brought direct to the Assembly. In the former event, if the Council approved the prosecution, the accused was forthwith arrested (or held to bail in a case of lesser importance), and the θεσμοθέται were authorized to bring the matter before the Assembly. If the matter came in the first instance before the people, it was customary to direct a preliminary investigation by the Council; and from that point the procedure was the same as if it had been initiated before the Council. The trial was either held in the Assembly, or, according to the more usual practice, remitted to one of the ordinary law-courts. If the trial took place in a law-court, the number of dicasts was at least 1000, and we read of as many as 2500 being empanelled (Dinarch. i. 52). The penalty was usually death and confiscation of goods, and invariably so after about the middle of the 4th cent.; but there are grounds for thinking that before this time it was subject to assessment, or was sometimes fixed beforehand by the people, conditionally upon conviction. As an additional penalty, in order to mark the enormity of the crime, the body of a traitor was refused burial in Attica (Hyperid. ii. 20).[2] In early times, in order to encourage prosecutors to undertake proceedings, it was provided that any one who failed to obtain a fifth part of the votes should not be liable to the usual fine of 1000 drachmæ; but in the year 330, when the facilities thus given were abused, the privilege had been withdrawn (Demosth. xviii. 250).

The remedy of εἰσαγγελία was also prescribed for certain offences of a less serious character, such as **official maladministration**, particularly in the office of an arbitrator or in the dockyards; and also to rectify wrongs committed against those who were in a dependent position, or had special claims to protection, such as orphans or heiresses. In the latter case the process, though called by the same name, was altogether different, but was distinguished from the ordinary indictment in various respects, to the advantage of the prosecution. Thus the prosecutor (1) was not restricted in point of time, but was allowed to speak as long as he wished; (2) was subject to no penalty, if he failed to secure a fifth part of the votes; and (3) was not required to make use of a writ of summons (πρόσκλησις) when laying his plaint (Wyse on Isæus, iii. 46). But, instead of going to the Council or to the Assembly, the prosecutor made his 'denunciation' to the chief *archon* (ἐπώνυμος), who exercised a criminal jurisdiction in this matter corresponding to his official superintendence of inheritance cases. The chief *archon* was, in fact, in a position similar to that of an English Lord Chancellor, who, as represented nowadays by the judges of the Chancery Division, has full jurisdiction over the persons and properties of his wards, and can punish for contempt of Court those who offend against his decrees (cf. Demosth. xliii. 75). But, whereas the English judge exercises plenary powers, the Athenian *archon*, apart from a limited power of imposing a fine, only conducted the interlocutory proceedings and prepared the case for the decision of the dicasts. In this connexion we are informed that the analogous offence of injuring parents included, besides corporal injury, refusal of food and lodging, and neglect in performing the customary rites at the tomb. A son convicted of maltreatment of parents was punished with complete disfranchisement (ἀτιμία), but the procedure in his case was by way of an ordinary indictment before the *archon* (Lipsius, p. 351). Whether there was any other penalty is unknown; but, even apart from a prosecution, candidates for office were liable to be rejected on the scrutiny (δοκιμασία), and speakers in the Assembly ran a similar risk, if it could be shown that they were guilty of undutiful conduct. Proceedings for injury done to orphans and heiresses (ἐπίκληροι) might be taken against their guardians, and in the latter case also against their husbands, or their nearest male relatives, if these attempted to avoid the obligation imposed upon them either to marry the heiress or to furnish her with a suitable dowry. The penalty was assessable by the court; but, though Isæus (iii. 47) speaks of the extreme punishment as applicable to such cases, it is unlikely that the offence usually entailed more than a heavy fine together with disfranchisement. There was also the offence of injuring an orphan's estate (οἴκου ὀρφανικοῦ κακώσεως), which appears to include misappropriation or unlawful retention, as well as fraudulent or negligent mismanagement. As another parallel to the Lord Chancellor's powers, it may be mentioned that the chief *archon* had jurisdiction in lunacy; for to him was preferred an indictment by the relatives, when it was alleged that any one had become incapable of managing his private affairs (Arist. *Resp. Ath.* 56. 6).[1] The chief *archon* had also jurisdiction in the indictment for **idleness** (ἀργίας γραφή), generally supposed to have been capable of enforcement against a man who had no property and refused to exert himself in order to obtain an honest living. Unfortunately, the information respecting it is scanty, but it has recently been suggested (Lipsius, p. 340) that its real purpose was not so much educational as to vindicate the concern of the State for the due preservation of family property, and to punish the dissipation or improper alienation of an inheritance. Draco is said to have made death the penalty (Plut. *Sol.* 17), but Solon (or Pisistratus) substituted a fine of 100 drachmæ on the first and second conviction, and complete disfranchisement on the third (Poll. viii. 89).

The 'king' *archon*, whom we have already met in connexion with murder trials, was the presiding magistrate in prosecutions for **impiety** (ἀσέβεια). This offence had a wide ambit, ranging from acts of sacrilege to the expression of speculative opinions on the origin and government of the universe. It corresponds, therefore, in part to blasphemy, which is still an indictable offence in England, although prosecutions are nowadays practically unknown. A prosecution for impiety was a convenient weapon in the hands of the obscurantists, if they desired to check the growth of revolutionary opinion, or to interfere with the teaching of a successful opponent. Thus it was used against Diagoras of Melos and Theodorus the Cyrenaic, for publishing atheistic doctrine (schol. on Aristoph. *Ran.* 323; Diog. Laert. ii. 101); against Anaxagoras for calling the sun a fiery mass (Diels, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, i.[2] [Berlin, 1906] 294); against Pro-

[1] A famous instance of a trial of this kind was the prosecution instituted by Lycurgus against Leocrates, who was alleged to have abandoned his country after the fatal battle of Chæronea.

[2] It is interesting to find that the last-named provision was a traditional usage of immemorial antiquity, since it is implied in the story of the burial of Polynices by his sister Antigone (see Eur. *Phœn.* 1630).

[1] The best-known instance is that of Sophocles, against whom proceedings of this kind are said to have been taken by his son Iophon (*Vit. Soph.*; Plut. *Mor.* p. 785 A)—although the story may well have arisen from the malicious gibe of a comic poet (Lipsius, p. 356).

tagoras for opening his treatise on the gods with a profession of inability to say whether they existed or not, or what they were (Diels, ii.[2] [1907] 525); and against Socrates, whose indictment charged him with corrupting the young men by introducing the worship of deities other than those recognized by the State (Plato, *Apol.* 24 B). On the other hand, Alcibiades was impeached (εἰσηγγέλθη) on the delation (μήνυσις) of an informer for holding a mock celebration of the Eleusinian mysteries in his own house (Plut. *Alcib.* 22); and an information (ἔνδειξις) was laid against Andocides for taking part in a sacrificial act, while under a disability previously imposed (Andoc. i. 71). The sacrilegious robbery of sacred property from a temple was treated as a distinct crime, and was punishable with death, deprivation of the right of burial, and confiscation of goods, on an indictment preferred before the *thesmothetæ* (γραφὴ ἱεροσυλίας). Thus various forms of procedure may have been open to the accuser, as Demosthenes (xxii. 27) takes occasion to remark; but, so far as our information goes, the trial always took place before a heliastic court. A single exception, known to us from the 7th speech of Lysias, relates to the charge of uprooting the stump (σηκός) of a sacred olive-tree. Here the cause was pleaded before the Council of the Areopagus, under whose supervision these olive-trees had been placed. In this case the punishment was fixed by law—death for destroying a tree, and banishment for removing a stump. For impiety in general, however, the penalty—death, banishment, confiscation of goods, or money fine—was left to the assessment of the jury, as is known from the celebrated trial of Socrates.

Adultery (μοιχεία) was treated at Athens as a criminal offence, and was punished with severity, as was natural in a society which tolerated concubinage. The adulterer might be prosecuted on an indictment laid before the *thesmothetæ* (Arist. *Resp. Ath.* 59. 3), and the sentence was probably left to the decision of the court (Lipsius, p. 432). But the injured husband could also take the law into his own hands. He might either kill the adulterer, and plead justifiable homicide in answer to any proceedings taken against him; or he might detain or exact sureties from him, until he was satisfied by a money payment. In the latter case, however, the alleged adulterer could maintain an action for false imprisonment (ἀδίκως εἰρχθῆναι ὡς μοιχόν) against the husband, and, if successful, was released from any undertaking he had given under duress. If the husband continued to live with a declared adulteress, he suffered disfranchisement; and the adulteress herself was forbidden to enter the temples or to wear the customary ornaments of free women. If she infringed these restrictions, she might be subjected with impunity to any injury short of death ([Dem.] lix. 87). Stringent penalties were in force against those who procured youths or girls for immoral purposes (προαγωγείας), and a total disability was imposed automatically upon those who had prostituted themselves, so that, if they exercised any civil right, they became liable to an indictment (γραφὴ ἑταιρήσεως), and, if convicted, to be sentenced to death. Cf. also art. ADULTERY (Greek).

In dealing with other crimes of **violence against persons or property**, we have to take into account a large variety of procedure. Thus Demosthenes (xxii. 25 ff.), having occasion to point out that Solon, in providing different remedies for single crimes, intended to ensure that no law-breaker should go free by reason of the poverty or incapacity of his accuser, illustrated his remarks by the example of theft, in which the injured party might proceed either by way of arrest (ἀπαγωγή), by leading the magistrates themselves to the spot where the culprit was to be found and requiring them to seize him (ἐφήγησις), by an ordinary indictment (γραφή), or, lastly, by a civil action (δίκη). Similarly, he thinks it difficult to imagine that any one who was proved to have committed assault and battery could escape punishment at Athens (liv. 17). For, in the first place, an action for slander (κακηγορίας δίκη) had been devised to prevent the commission of the offence at all, or at least to minimize its occurrence; and, if it was committed, in addition to the ordinary indictment for assault (γραφὴ ὕβρεως), there was an action for battery (δίκη αἰκίας), or, if the offence was so grave as to require it, a prosecution for unlawful wounding (τραύματος) before the Areopagus (see above). In certain circumstances there was still another remedy. When Demosthenes, acting as *choregus* at the Dionysia, was grossly assaulted by Midias, instead of contenting himself with a personal suit, he made a public complaint (προβολή) before the Assembly in order to obtain the authorization of the people for the institution of proceedings. The object, of course, was to make full use of the prejudice which would be excited against the defendant by a decree of the people; and perhaps, in the case of an aspiring politician, it might be more advantageous to obtain the advertisement of a public debate on his wrongs than to rest content with the satisfaction to be gained from a heliastic court alone. But the προβολή had only a limited range, being confined, according to our authorities, as now interpreted (Lipsius, p. 214 f.), to charges against sycophants, *i.e.* false accusers, or those who had made use of legal proceedings in order to extort money, or for some fraudulent purpose, but only when their false professions had misled the people; and against those who committed an outrage during the progress of certain religious festivals, such as the Dionysia or Eleusinia. If a vote was given against the accused (καταχειροτονία), the prosecutor proceeded to lay his complaint before the *thesmothetæ* (Arist. *Resp. Ath.* 59. 2), and the trial proceeded in the ordinary way. There was, however, one peculiarity which, according to a recent view, attached to the trial of a προβολή as distinguished from all other prosecutions in which the punishment was assessable by the court. In ordinary cases, as we have already seen, the judges were compelled to select one of two alternatives; but, in the speech against Midias, Demosthenes invites the jury to assess any penalty which they think adequate, and implies that this may range from death or confiscation of goods to a paltry fine (§§ 21, 151, 152). (See Goodwin's *Demosthenes against Midias*, Cambridge, 1906, p. 161; otherwise, Lipsius, p. 218.)

Of the other processes mentioned above, the most important was the *arrest*, which was applicable to certain classes of offenders, when openly detected in crime. These were known comprehensively as malefactors (κακοῦργοι), and specifically as thieves (κλέπται, a term not including every offender of this kind, but only such as stole by night or in a gymnasium, or, if the theft took place by day and under other conditions, stole property of the value of more than fifty drachmæ, or, if the crime was committed in the harbours, of more than ten drachmæ [Demosth. xxiv. 113]), kidnappers (ἀνδραποδισταί), highwaymen (λωποδύται), burglars (τοιχωρύχοι), and pickpockets (βαλλαντιοτόμοι). Such cases came under the jurisdiction of the police magistrates known as the Eleven, and the punishment was death. If the crime was admitted, punishment followed at once; but, if it was denied, the culprit was kept in durance until trial (Arist. *Resp. Ath.* 52. 1), unless he was bailed out by three citizens (Antiph. v. 17). The process of arrest

seems gradually to have been extended, so that it was sometimes employed against murderers, as in the speech of Antiphon, *de cæde Herodis*, and in that of Lysias against Agoratus. An entirely distinct application of the process must be recognized when it was directed against those who, while under disability (ἄτιμοι), had usurped the privileges which they had forfeited, and against exiles who had returned home. In the last-mentioned cases the penalty was assessable, except for those who were already under ban of death. If the intending prosecutor had not sufficient strength or courage to arrest the felon himself, he could fetch a magistrate to the spot and get him to act (ἐφήγησις). It is probable that this proceeding was the complement of arrest, and applicable to the same crimes; but the evidence is scanty, and touches only the cases of theft (Demosth. xxii. 26), the harbouring of fugitives, and the secret retention of State property (Suid. *s.v.*).

There is often mentioned, in conjunction with arrest, the process of *information* (ἔνδειξις). This answers to the second kind of arrest mentioned above, and was employed against State-debtors, returned exiles, murderers, and generally all who, being under disability, frequented places or performed acts from which they were excluded by law. In the case of State-debtors the presiding officers were the *thesmothetæ* (Demosth. xxiv. 22); in other cases the Eleven (Arist. *Resp. Ath.* 52. 1). The penalty naturally varied according to the gravity of the offence, and was often assessable, as in the case of a disqualified dicast assuming to act as such (Arist. *Resp. Ath.* 63. 3); but, if a State-debtor usurped the functions of a public official, he was liable to the death-penalty (Demosth. xx. 156).

If a man whose goods had been stolen was either unable or unwilling to use the process of arrest, he might proceed by way of indictment for theft (γραφὴ κλοπῆς) before the *thesmothetæ*, as an alternative to the civil action for the same delict. Draco's code had made death the sole penalty for theft (Plut. *Sol.* 17), but later legislation allowed the court to fix the penalty. Imprisonment might be inflicted in addition to the main penalty, and disfranchisement followed a conviction.

For personal injury resulting from an assault, or for acts of shameful and indecent insult to the person of child, woman, freeborn man, or slave, the appropriate remedy was an indictment for wanton assault (ὕβρεως γραφή), before the *thesmothetæ*. The essence of the offence, as distinguished from the battery which might be made the foundation of a civil action (αἰκίας δίκη), lay in the motive which prompted the outward act. A mere blow, according to Aristotle (*Rhet.* i. 13. 1374a, 13), is not necessarily a sign of wantonness, but only when the object to be attained is the disgrace of the sufferer or the pleasure of the striker. The penalty was assessable, and might amount to death in serious cases; but it was subject to the peculiar provision that the vote was taken immediately after the verdict on the main issue, without the usual opportunity being given to the parties to recommend their respective assessments (Lipsius, p. 428 f.).

We must next consider offences connected with the **unlawful assumption or fraudulent exercise of civil privileges.** Pericles had carried a law that an Athenian citizen must be the offspring of a father and mother who were both Athenians (Arist. *Resp. Ath.* 26. 4); and it was re-enacted in the archonship of Euclides, with a saving clause to guard existing rights. Any one who exercised the rights of a citizen without being entitled to them was liable to indictment by a common informer as an alien (ξενίας γραφή), and, if convicted, was sentenced to be sold as a slave. Further, if such a person procured his acquittal by bribery or collusion, he was amenable to the same penalty (δωροξενίας γραφή). Similarly, a resident alien (μέτοικος), who neglected to enroll himself under a patron, could be indicted (ἀπροστασίου γραφή) before the third *archon*, known as the 'polemarch,' who exercised over μέτοικοι the same jurisdiction which belonged to the chief *archon* in regard to full citizens.

It is obvious that the existence of such proceedings opened a favourable field for the crime of malicious prosecution, and helped to swell the class of persons who made their living by preying on the fears of their fellow-citizens. The plays of Aristophanes are full of references to the contemptible class of sycophants which flourished during the latter part of the 5th cent., and, in order to protect society against their depredations, the fullest opportunity was given to proceed against them by indictment or otherwise (Isocr. xv. 313 ff.), and the assessment of the penalty was in the discretion of the court.

It is remarkable that the offence of **perjury**—the only crime which Homer (*Il.* iii. 278) mentions as visited with punishment after death—was considered, if committed by a witness in the course of a trial, to demand nothing more than a civil remedy (ψευδομαρτυρίων δίκη); although disfranchisement was one of the consequences which might result if the defendant lost such an action (Isæus, v. 17); and it followed automatically if he was convicted three times. On the other hand, falsely to swear to the service of a summons rendered the perjurer liable to criminal proceedings (ψευδοκλητείας γραφή), in which he might even be punished with death (Demosth. liii. 18). A triple conviction led to the same result as the similar conviction of a perjured witness.

An indictment for **bribery** (δώρων) might be laid not only against officials, but against all others who received, or gave, or promised a bribe, with the object of conferring or procuring an advantage to the detriment of the State or of any individual citizen. Moreover, a magistrate who, at the expiration of his term of office, was convicted, at the scrutiny conducted by the λογισταί, of having embezzled or taken bribes, was fined ten times the amount in question (Arist. *Resp. Ath.* 54. 2). The penalty of tenfold compensation also attached to a conviction on the general indictment, and was exacted from any official convicted of the embezzlement of public funds, on an indictment before the *thesmothetæ* (κλοπὴ δημοσίων, or ἱερῶν, χρημάτων). A separate indictment (δεκασμοῦ) existed to meet the case of bribes given to, or received by, a member of the Assembly, the Council, or the jury-panel, or an advocate (συνήγορος), for the purpose of influencing a decision by any of the bodies concerned. The only penalty mentioned is that of death (Isocr. viii. 50).

The earliest recorded instance of the bribery of a jury is that of Anytus, afterwards notorious as the accuser of Socrates, who succeeded by this means in escaping an adverse verdict after the failure of the expedition to Pylos in 409 (Arist. *Resp. Ath.* 27). Demosthenes is said to have been ordered to pay a fine of fifty talents in connexion with the affair of Harpalus (Plut. *Dem.* 26); but neither from this not entirely credible statement, nor from the mention by Dinarchus of the death-penalty (i. 60), can any inference be drawn as to the penalties incident to an ordinary prosecution for bribery.

Debasing the coinage was a crime punishable with death (Demosth. xx. 167, xxiv. 212).

Military offences were tried before the generals, with a jury composed of the comrades of the offender. Our authorities distinguish refusal to join when summoned (ἀστρατείας), cowardice in the ranks (λιποταξίου), loss of the shield in flight, and corresponding delinquencies in the naval service (ἀναυμαχίου, λιποναυτίου). Conviction was followed by loss of civic rights, but not by confiscation of property.

If a State-debtor procured the erasure of his name from the register without liquidating the debt, both he and the official by whose neglect or fraud the State had been prejudiced were liable to

indictment before the *thesmothetæ* (ἀγραφίου); and any one whose name was wrongly inserted could take similar proceedings against the wrongdoer (ψευδεγγραφῆς), or if the proper officer did not erase his name after he had paid (βουλεύσεως).

The general formula defining grades of punishment distinguishes *bodily suffering* and *money payment* (ὅ,τι χρὴ παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτεῖσαι). Death, as we have seen, was not infrequently imposed by law; but, on the whole, the temper of the administration was lenient, and a death sentence was less frequent in practice than might have been expected from the place which it occupies in the code. A striking testimony to the humanity of the Athenians is the abhorrence excited by any punishment involving torture or mutilation; and penal acts of this kind are hardly ever mentioned in literature except as characterizing the excesses of tyrants or the savagery of barbarians (see esp. Æsch. *Eum.* 186 ff.). Imprisonment is rarely mentioned as a penalty (Lys. vi. 22; Plat. *Apol.* 37 C); and it might be said that, where we immure the criminal for the benefit of society, the Athenian code secured the same end by disfranchisement (ἀτιμία). This requires a few words of explanation. For the members of a modern State, who are more conscious of the burdens attaching to citizenship than of its privileges, an effort of imagination is needed in order to realize what complete disfranchisement meant to an Athenian. Athens was a comparatively small city, as measured by the standards of to-day, with a proletariat slave-class, and a considerable number of resident aliens; and yet at the same time an imperial city, proud of its past and with a world-wide reputation. An Athenian citizen valued his civic privileges as highly as his life. To be excluded from holding any office or exercising any public function in a community where all citizens aspired to share in the government, and to be forbidden to appear in the market-place or to take part in any public festival where every one lived in the open air, and where the frequently recurring festivals were the chief enjoyments of life, placed a ban upon the convicted man which made him an outcast from all his fellows. Thus we find disfranchisement, with or without confiscation of goods, as a normal punishment for all kinds of serious offences, such as sacrilege, treason, bribery, embezzlement, and injury to parents (Andoc. i. 74). In these cases the disability was permanent; but it was also adopted against State-debtors as a means of enforcing payment, and was removed as soon as the liability was discharged. There were also cases of partial disability, as when a man was forbidden to speak in the Assembly, or to become a member of the Council (Andoc. i. 75). So, if the prosecutor in a public indictment threw up his case, or failed to obtain a fifth part of the votes, he lost the right of again instituting another proceeding of the same kind (Demosth. xxi. 103). Cf. also art. ATIMIA.

Lastly, it remains to notice *the formalities attending the execution of the sentence.* If the sentence was one of death, or if imprisonment was involved in it, the convicted person passed under the charge of the Eleven, who had control over the State prisons. Common criminals, known as malefactors (κακοῦργοι), were fastened in a frame and cudgelled to death (ἀποτυμπανισμός) by the executioner (δήμιος). The same official undertook the duty of 'throwing into the pit' (εἰς τὸ βάραθρον ἐμβαλεῖν)—a form of execution which was at one time employed for traitors (Plut. *Aristid.* 3; Xen. *Hell.* I. vii. 20). The more familiar penalty, however, which is mentioned for the first time during the domination of the Thirty (Lipsius, p. 77), was to give to the condemned criminal a cup of hemlock-juice (κώνειον), which was administered by an official acting under the orders of the Eleven.[1] If the accused was condemned to be sold as a slave, he was handed over to the πωληταί, who sold him to the highest bidder. Confiscated goods were sold by the same board, and, in order to prevent concealment, a common informer was permitted to make a schedule (ἀπογραφή) of any property which he alleged to be liable to confiscation, and, if he succeeded on the trial of the issue, he was entitled to retain for himself three-quarters of the value (Demosth. liii. 2). Sometimes, in important cases, a special body of commissioners (ζητηταί) was appointed to make an investigation of the property liable to seizure. Fines imposed by the court were collected by the πράκτορες, who handed the money over to the treasury officials (ἀποδέκται). The enforcement of the negative penalty of disfranchisement was secured by the severe punishment provided for those who ventured to infringe the limitations imposed upon them by their sentence.

7. Such, in rough outline, was the criminal code which was administered in the Athenian law-courts at the height of their power. That a legal system so searching and comprehensive should have come into existence within so comparatively short a time is remarkable enough; but the spirit of humanity and enlightenment which it displays, the variety of procedure, the minuteness of subdivision designed to meet every possible manifestation of crime, and the securities taken against every form of personal violence, alike show that, in the province of law, Greek civilization did not fall far short of the eminence which it attained in art and literature. The defects of the system, as has already been indicated, were due to its faulty administration by the juries, to the absence of a trained legal profession, and to the non-existence of records to secure continuity of decision.

8. **Views of Plato and Aristotle.**—The laws of Athens were the expression of the best opinion of an unusually intelligent community, and even the most advanced thinkers, who were ready enough to criticize defects in the constitution, found but little to improve upon in the criminal code. When Plato set out, in the 9th book of the *Laws*, to provide the citizens of his pattern State with a revised series of statutes, the amendments which he advocated were made, not so much from dissatisfaction with the Athenian code, as from a desire to preserve intact the essential features of his reformed community. Thus, he objected to the punishment of disfranchisement, and to that of perpetual banishment, because they would interfere with the permanent occupation of the lots which were assigned to the citizens (855 B, C). For similar reasons, fines were to be inflicted more sparingly than was usual at Athens; and a more frequent resort to flogging and the pillory—forms of punishment odious to the Athenian mind, however familiar at Sparta (Grote, *Plato*, London, 1865, iii. 433)—was recommended. The motive which prompted these changes, and which informs the whole body of his legislation, is derived from his conception of the real nature of crime and the object which punishment should seek. It should, however, be remembered that, as his citizens were a carefully selected and highly educated body, he anticipated that crime would be a rare occurrence, and that legislation was needed only by way of precaution against the perversity of human nature (853 C–E). Now, Socrates had taught that virtue is fundamentally a matter of knowledge, and that

[1] There are occasional references in Greek literature to stoning as a traditional mode of execution for heinous offences; but it was rather a survival of the custom of human sacrifice than the enactment of a legal code. See J. G. Frazer, *Pausanias*, London, 1898, iii. 417; Verrall on Æsch. *Ag.* 1107.

wrongful action necessarily proceeds from ignorance. Hence the paradox that no one is willingly unjust; for, if a man knows the good, he will follow it. To this doctrine Plato consistently adhered in his latest work (860 D, E), and it is obvious that it cuts at the root of the common distinction of jurisprudence between voluntary and involuntary wrongs. But Plato did not deny the existence of injustice or of voluntary wrong (*ἑκούσια ἁμαρτήματα*); only he gave a new connotation to these terms, based upon the principles of his own psychology. Thus, injustice is due to the dominance in the soul of unreasoning emotion—either anger or desire, the stimulus of pain or of pleasure; but if, on the other hand, the emotions are controlled by the reason, it is no longer possible for a man to commit an unjust act, although his actions may be misguided and harmful to others. For, though the reason may be strong to master the lower impulses, yet its successful operation may be impeded by ignorance or prejudice; and in this manner voluntary error is possible (Grote, iii. 399). It follows that the chief aims of the law-giver will be at once by education to subdue the passions, by compensation to make amends to the sufferer, by prescribed penalties to deter, and by enforced penalties to chasten and reform.[1] Above all, the spirit of his laws must be such as to strengthen and guide the rational faculty by prescribing such beliefs as are agreeable to absolute reason. It is only when the evil is recognized as incurable that death is a suitable penalty, best for the criminal himself, and useful as an example to others.

Plato recognized two aspects of punishment, the corrective (Adam on *Rep.* 380 B) and the preventive, both of which are to be distinguished from a purely vindictive exercise of authority (*Gorg.* 525 A; *Prot.* 324 A; *Legg.* 854 B, 934 A). In the same way Aristotle distinguished vengeance, the object of which is the satisfaction of the inflicter, from chastisement directed to the good of the criminal (*Rhet.* i. 10, 1369b, 13; *Eth. Nic.* ii. 3, 1104b, 16); and, in entire agreement with Plato, he held that, whereas good men may be admonished, others, whose vice is incurable, must be cast out (*ib.* x. 9, 1180a, 9). Elsewhere he speaks of corrective justice (*διορθωτικὸν δίκαιον*) as proceeding by arithmetical proportion, indemnifying the injured party by subtracting from the gain of the wrongdoer an amount equivalent to the loss of his victim (*ib.* v. 4, 1132a, 10), as distinguished from distributive justice, which seeks to establish a geometrical proportion according to the respective merits of the individuals concerned; but in the *Politics*, where we might have looked for a reasoned treatment of punishments, nothing of the kind is to be found.

It is unnecessary to detail the provisions which Plato recommended for the punishment of sacrilege, homicide, and wounding; but it deserves to be remarked, as showing that he was alive to the defects of the Athenian jury-courts, that he refrained from drawing up precise enactments to fit every possible contingency, because he trusted largely to the discretion of his select and well-trained court, which was established to take the place of the Council of the Areopagus (876 B–E). It should further be noticed that, while generally adopting, with slight alterations, the provisions of the Athenian code, in dealing with the offence of battery he left the beaten person to defend himself as best he might, unless he happened to be twenty years older than his assailant (879 C). In thus training the young to endure blows, and in inculcating reverence for old age, Plato was showing his preference for the methods of Spartan discipline. But the most extraordinary of all Plato's legislative experiments was the intolerant enactment against religious heresy. He distinguished three classes of heretics: (1) those who do not believe in gods at all; (2) those who believe that gods exist, but do not concern themselves with human affairs; (3) those who believe that the gods may be propitiated by prayers or sacrifice (885 B). Of these classes the third is the most pernicious; but any one who was found guilty of impiety as falling under any of the three classes, even if his conduct was otherwise free from blame, was to be imprisoned for five years; and, if at the end of that time he was still unrepentant, he must be put to death (909 A). Further, if the offence of heresy was found aggravated by bad conduct, the offender must be kept in solitary confinement until he died, and, after death, refused the rites of burial.

[1] Similarly the Stoics, as reported by Seneca, *de Clem.* i. 22. 1. As practical reformers they were very far from carrying to its logical conclusion the doctrine that all crimes are equal, notwithstanding the banter of Horace (*Sat.* i. 3. 121) and Cicero (*pro Mur.* 61).

LITERATURE.—The chief authority on Athenian jurisprudence is **J. H. Lipsius**, *Das attische Recht und Rechtsverfahren*, pt. i., Leipzig, 1905, pt. ii., 1908; but, as the work is not yet complete, it is still necessary to refer to the same writer's revised edition of **Meier-Schömann**, *Der attische Process*, Berlin, 1883–1887. See also **C. F. Hermann**, *Lehrbuch der griech. Rechtsalterthümer*, ed. Thalheim, Freiburg, 1884; **G. F. Schömann**, *Lehrbuch der griech. Alterthümer*⁴, ed. Lipsius, Berlin, 1897, esp. vol. i. pp. 506–537; **G. Gilbert**, *Handbuch der griech. Staatsalterthümer*², Leipzig, 1893, esp. vol. i. pp. 421–467. There are also numerous articles bearing on the subject by **T. Thalheim**, in Pauly-Wissowa. For the primitive beliefs connected with the blood-feud, see **E. Rohde**, *Psyche*⁴, Tubingen, 1907, i. 259–277.

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CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Hebrew).—Crime, strictly speaking, is an offence against the law of a State, which the State punishes, as distinguished from sin against God, and other wrongdoing of which the State takes no cognizance. This idea had not been formulated by the Israelites, and there is no Heb. word exactly equivalent to our 'crime.' A crime was a form of 'evil' (רַע, *ra'*). In the same way there was no one general term for 'punishment'; it might be denoted by גְּמוּל (*gᵉmûl*) and other words for 'recompense'; or by עָוֹן (*'āwôn*) and other words for 'sin' or 'iniquity' (punishment being regarded as an effect of sin), or by forms of the root פקד (*pqd*), 'visit.' The crimes and punishments recognized by the Israelites may be classified thus (only the more common Heb. words are given):

I. *CRIMES*: **1. Religious offences**: *blasphemy* (derivatives of ברך *brk*, גדף *gdp*, נאץ *n'ṣ*, Lv 24^{10-16}); *breaches of ritual*, as to food (Lv 7^{25}), uncleanness (7^{20}), sacrifice and offerings (19^{8} etc.); *idolatry*, or the worship of false gods (Dt 13); *illegitimate assumption of the priestly or prophetic office* (Nu 16. 17, Dt 18^{20}); *magic, divination, sorcery, and witchcraft* (Dt 18^{9-14}); *Sabbath-breaking* (Nu $15^{32ff.}$); *perjury* (Ex 20^{16}); *war against Israel on the part of idolatrous nations*, which was regarded as an offence against Jahweh (cf. II. 1).—**2. Offences against the State**: *treason* (1 K 21^{13}, 2 K 14^{5}); *bribery and oppression* (Ex 23^{1-9}).—**3. Sexual offences**: *bestiality* (Ex 22^{19}, Lv 18^{23}); *prostitution* (Lv 19^{29}); *incest* (Lv $18^{6ff.}$); *sodomy* (Lv 18^{22}).—**4. Offences against property**: *adultery* (derivatives of נאף, *n'p*, Ex 20^{14}); *kidnapping* (Ex 21^{16}); *leaving pit uncovered, or otherwise causing damage through carelessness* (Ex 21^{28-36} 22^{6-15}); *theft* (Ex 22^{1-5}); *usury* (Ex 22^{25}); *seduction or rape of daughter* (Ex $22^{16f.}$, Dt 22^{23-29}).—**5. Offences against the person**: *murder* (Ex 20^{13}); *injuries* (Ex 21^{18-27}).—**6. Offences against the family**: *cursing parents* (Ex 21^{17}).

II. *PUNISHMENTS*: **1. Religious penalties.**—Many ritual offences might be atoned for by *sacrifices, seclusion, washings, and other rites*: *e.g.* touching an unclean thing was atoned for by

sacrifice (Lv 5^{1-13}); eating flesh of an animal not properly killed was atoned for by washing one's clothes and person, and remaining unclean until the evening (Lv 17^{15}). Sacrifices seem to be required in connexion with all sins which could be forgiven. A person in a state of uncleanness could not be present at the Temple services, or partake of the Passover.

Excommunication was practised in later Judaism, but it is doubtful how far it had any equivalent in ancient Israel. The Priestly Code prescribes the penalty of 'cutting off from the people' for numerous offences, mostly against the ritual laws, but sometimes for gross forms of immorality. A comparison of parallel passages shows that in some cases offences punished in one chapter by 'cutting off' are punished in another by 'death' (cf. Lv 18. 20). On the other hand, some offences punished by 'cutting off' seem to us trivial, *e.g.* omitting, without valid excuse, to observe the Passover (Nu 9^{13}), but such matters might not seem trivial to the Israelites. It is practically certain that death was never regularly inflicted for the various offences which were to be punished by 'cutting off.' The difficulty is explained by the history of the Priestly Code; it was compiled by Babylonian Jews; its authors had no experience in inflicting death penalties, and no immediate prospect of such experience. They indulged in a theoretical severity, untempered by practical necessities; they used the term 'cutting off,' because it would also serve to describe excommunication from social fellowship and religious privilege—a penalty within the power of the exiles to inflict.

Heathen nations stubbornly fighting against Israel were to be subjected to the *ban* (חֵרֶם, *ḥērem*), *i.e.* to be massacred in honour of Jahweh, according to certain texts (*e.g.* Dt 7^{2}). The leading instance is Jericho (Jos 6^{21}). In later Judaism, excommunication of varying degrees of severity was inflicted for ecclesiastical and other offences; and the ancient name *ḥērem* was used for the severest form.

Some laws and historical precedents show that God Himself was held to inflict punishment on certain occasions by direct intervention—*Divine visitation*. Thus (Lv $10^{1f.}$) Nadab and Abihu are struck dead by Jahweh for offering the wrong sort of incense; and the adulteress who has denied her guilt and submitted herself to the *trial by ordeal* by drinking 'the bitter water which causeth a curse' is smitten by God with disease—'her belly shall swell, and her thigh shall rot' (Nu 5^{27}). No instance is recorded.

2. Secular penalties.—(*a*) *Death.*—This penalty is often prescribed without specifying how it is to be inflicted. In many instances the culprit was slain with sword, spear, or dagger, according to the convenience or choice of the executioner (*e.g.* Elijah and the prophets of Baal, 1 K 19^{1}). There is no clear case of beheading in the OT, though the head was often severed from a dead body (*e.g.* Goliath, 1 S 17^{51}). In the NT, John the Baptist (Mk 6^{27}) was beheaded, and James (Ac 12^{2}) 'slain with the sword.' 'Hanging' is referred to in Dt 21^{22}, but what is in view is probably exposure after execution (cf. Gn 40^{22}, Pharaoh's chief baker; Jos 8^{29}, the king of Ai). Stoning seems to have been the most usual mode of capital punishment, and burning to death was inflicted for some offences (see below).

The Bible and the Apocrypha refer to other forms of execution practised by heathen nations. Thus 2 Mac, in describing the Syrian persecution, mentions throwing down from the wall of a city (6^{10}), beating to death on a wheel or drum (τύμπανον, $6^{19.\ 28}$), and torturing to death with fire (7^{5}). Crucifixion, a common Roman punishment, was used in the case of our Lord; and He 11^{37} speaks of martyrs being sawn asunder. Daniel and his accusers were thrown to the lions (Dn 6). The severity of the death penalty was sometimes enhanced by refusing to allow the relatives of the culprit to bury the corpse (2 S 21^{10}).

The following is a list of the crimes for which death was inflicted; the mode of execution is given in square brackets; where nothing is stated on this point, we have no information:

Various forms of homicide: murder (Ex 21^{12}, Lv 24^{17}); child-sacrifice (Lv 20^{2} [stoning]); manslaughter, if the avenger of blood caught the slayer outside the city of refuge (Nu 35^{27}); keeping an ox known to be dangerous, if the ox killed a human being (Ex 21^{29}).

Bearing false witness on a capital charge (Dt 19^{18-21}).

Kidnapping (Ex 21^{16}).

Insult or injury to parents (Lv 20^{9}, Ex $21^{15.\ 17}$, Dt 21^{21} [stoning]).

Various forms of sexual immorality: incest (Lv 20^{14} [burning]); unchastity (Dt $22^{21.\ 24}$ [stoning]); adultery or unnatural vices (Lv $20^{10\ 16}$); fornication on the part of a priest's daughter (Lv 21^{9} [burning]); fornication on the part of a betrothed woman (Dt $22^{22ff.}$ [stoning], Gn 38^{24} [burning]).

Various religious and ritual offences: witchcraft, magic, etc. (Ex 22^{18}, Lv $20^{6.\ 27}$ [stoning]); idolatry (Ex 22^{20}, Dt 13^{10} [stoning]); blasphemy (Lv 24^{10-23} [stoning]); false claim to be a prophet (Dt $13^{5.\ 10}$ [stoning]); intrusion of alien into sacred place or office (Nu 1^{51} $3^{10.\ 38}$ 18^{7}); Sabbath-breaking (Ex 31^{14}).

According to Lv $27^{28f.}$, human beings may be made *ḥērem* ('devoted') to Jahweh; and, if so devoted, must be put to death. Probably only criminals or heathen enemies (cf. above) were subject to such treatment.

(*b*) *Mutilation* is involved in the principle 'an eye for an eye,' etc. (Ex $21^{24f.}$). No instance is mentioned of the application of this law, but we may compare the cutting off of the thumbs and great toes of Adonibezek (Jg $1^{6.\ 7}$). Mutilation is mentioned in 2 Mac 7^{4}, and blinding in the cases of Samson (Jg 16^{21}) and Zedekiah (2 K 25^{7}).

(*c*) *Flogging*, limited to a maximum of forty stripes (Dt 25^{3}), was inflicted on a betrothed slave-girl guilty of fornication, and on her partner in the offence (Lv 19^{20}),[1] and for other minor offences. The references in Proverbs imply a large use of this punishment, especially for children; and in the NT it is spoken of as used in the synagogues for religious offences (2 Co 11^{24}). The actual practice in ancient Israel was much more severe than the prescription of the Deuteronomic and Priestly laws. Ex $21^{20f.}$ deals with cases in which a master flogs a male or female slave to death, and decides that he is not to be punished unless the victim actually dies under his hand (cf. Jg 8^{7}, 1 K 12^{11}). The Roman scourging, the Egyptian bastinado, and the various forms of flogging amongst heathen peoples, were much more severe than the Jewish 'forty stripes save one.'

(*d*) *Exposure of the person.*—The figurative description of the punishment of Jerusalem in Ezk 16^{39} may imply that this punishment was inflicted on adulteresses in Israel; but, as these chapters were written in Babylonia, the imagery may have been suggested by heathen practices.

(*e*) *Stocks* (*e.g.* Jer 20^{2} מַהְפֶּכֶת, *mahpeketh*; Ac 16^{24} τὸ ξύλον).

(*f*) *Slavery*, for theft (Ex 22^{3}), or as a result of debt (2 K 4^{1}, Neh 5^{5}).

(*g*) *Imprisonment* is not appointed in the Law as a punishment. It was used for the detention of offenders before trial, or pending execution, as well as in cases where it was desired to keep a dangerous or obnoxious person under restraint, or to secure the persons of slaves and captives. There is no evidence that terms of imprisonment were appointed expressly as a punishment, except in Ezr 7^{26}.

(*h*) *Exile* is not appointed in the Law; the fugitive from justice might exile himself (Absalom, 2 S 13^{37}). Exile is mentioned as a penalty inflicted by the Persians (Ezr 7^{26}).[2]

(*i*) *Childlessness* for immorality is probably a Divine visitation (Lv 20^{20}).

(*j*) *Penalties in money and goods.*—Compensation is required for theft, and in cases where person or property has been injured through carelessness or malice. In cases of mere carelessness an equivalent

[1] The Hebrew (בִּקֹּרֶת תִּהְיֶה, *biqqōreth tihyeh*) means literally 'there shall be an examination' (RV 'they shall be punished'). The interpretation given in the text is commonly adopted, and is probably correct. Cf. the use of the term 'examine' for 'torture.'

[2] The Aram. שְׁרֹשׁוּ, *sherōshû* (Kethîb), or שְׁרֹשִׁי, *sherōshî* (Qerê; AVm and RVm 'rooting out'), is interpreted in this sense by RV, etc.

compensation was required (Ex 22[5]); but, where there was moral guilt, the compensation was heavier, *e.g.* for theft the thief must restore fourfold, fivefold (Ex 22[1]), or sevenfold (Pr 6[31]). Compensation for the killing of a slave by an ox known to be dangerous is fixed at thirty shekels (Ex 21[32]); for the seduction of a daughter at fifty shekels, the seducer to marry her (Dt 22[29]); for a false accusation of unchastity against a newly married wife, one hundred shekels, to be paid to her father (Dt 22[19]). In some cases fines might be accepted in place of capital punishment (cf. below, III. 5). See also Ezr 7[26].

(*k*) *Unspecified penalties.*—Numerous acts are enjoined or forbidden without any penalty being attached to the breach of the law; *e.g.* hybrids must not be bred (Lv 19[19]).

III. *MORAL AND RELIGIOUS SIGNIFICANCE.*—

1. Progress.—We may distinguish, on the one hand, the practice of the Israelite monarchy, and, on the other, the system of law embodied in the Deuteronomic and Priestly Codes. The practice of the monarchy is shown in the Book of the Covenant (Ex 21[1]–23[19] [E]) and in the references in the narratives. This practice was a development from earlier times; changes must have come about as the Israelites passed from the nomad period to that of the Judges, and again to the monarchy; but our information is not sufficiently full to enable us to trace this development. Even for the monarchy our data are meagre; our extant narratives were intended to edify later generations, and references to objectionable features in early practice have probably been largely omitted, especially when they were connected with David and others who were regarded as representatives of true piety. Moreover, the Deuteronomic and Priestly Codes never had a fair trial as the working laws of an independent State; they always remained more or less religious ideals. Such theoretical codes may be both higher in some respects and lower in others than the actual practice of their own time. For instance, provisions that call for large sacrifices on the part of the powerful and wealthy in the interests of the poor are easy to prescribe on parchment, but difficult to enforce in real life. On the other hand, the cruel penalties by which enthusiasts seek to promote and safeguard religion are mitigated in their practical application by considerations of humanity. A Deuteronomic scribe in the quiet seclusion of his study, or whatever corresponded to a study in those days, might enjoin wholesale massacres without compunction; but he might have shrunk from putting into force his own laws on real living men, women, and children.

At the same time, the available evidence makes it probable that, if Judah had continued an independent State, the development of its legal system would have been in the direction of humanity and righteousness, under the influence of the prophets of the school of Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel, and of the priests who shared their views. For instance, according to ancient law, if a man were guilty of a heinous offence, his family might share his punishment (*e.g.* Achan, Jos 7[24f.], and the kinsfolk of Saul, 2 S 21[1-9]). But Dt 24[16] forbids the practice. Again, marriage with a half-sister was regarded as lawful for Abraham (Gn 20[12] [E]) and for Amnon (2 S 13[13]), but is forbidden by Lv 18[9].

On the other hand, the later legislation shows a tendency to religious fanaticism, and towards the subordination of public welfare to the material interests of the priesthood; and probably this tendency would not have been altogether defeated if Judah had remained an independent State.

The final redactors of the Torah combined the various earlier and later codes, without attempting to reconcile or co-ordinate them; equal sanction was given to inconsistent laws; crude, primitive customs were placed on the same level as the more humane enactments of later times. Obviously this happened because these Babylonian Jews were compiling a record, and not providing for practical needs.

2. Classification.—There is no formal classification, but certain principles are implied. The inclusion of secular laws in the Torah indicates that all crime was regarded as sin against God, and that the administration of justice rested on Divine authority. This is an axiom of all religions as to the ideal State; but it was more emphasized in ancient times than it is now, because religion and the State were more intimately associated. Ḥammurabi, for instance, receives his laws from the sun-god, Shamash. Ezk 20[25] is a striking illustration of the way in which the actual legal system of Israel was regarded as a Divine institution; even iniquitous laws are imposed by God as a punishment: 'Moreover also I gave them statutes that were not good, and judgments wherein they should not live.' On the other hand, the protests of the pre-exilic prophets against the corruptions of their times involve a distinction between secular and Divine law; the two might clash.

The modern recognition of purely religious offences, with which the State does not deal, is not found in the OT. As in mediæval Christendom, such offences might incur secular as well as religious penalties; the idolater was to be put to death. Again, the Law does not clearly distinguish between human punishment and Divine visitation; the penalties of similar offences may include both; *e.g.* in Lv 20 some forms of sexual immorality are to be punished with death; in other cases it is said that the culprits will die childless. The prominence given to Divine visitation suggests a distinction between crimes which can be detected and punished by men and those hidden from men, but known to God, and dealt with directly by Him. The imposition of a fine for such offences as homicide and seduction (II. 2. (*j*)) shows that these were regarded partly as offences against property.

There is a distinction drawn between wrongs done to a free Israelite, to a slave, and to foreigners respectively; *e.g.* the slaying of a free man is severely punished, but a slave may be beaten to death provided he does not actually die under the rod (Ex 21[20f.]); if an ox known to be dangerous kills a free man, the owner may be put to death (Ex 21[29]); but, if the victim is a slave, thirty shekels are paid to his master (v.[32]). 'The stranger within thy gates' (the *gêr*, or 'resident alien') enjoyed the protection of the law, and alliances were maintained with some neighbouring States; otherwise history suggests that might was mostly right along the borders; cf. David's doings in the Negeb (1 S 27[8f.]), the Danite conquest of Laish (Jg 18), and the exploits of Samson (Jg 14 f.).

3. Range of offences.—The list of omissions and commissions recognized as crimes indicates a high moral standard. The wrongfulness of ritual irregularities is, indeed, exaggerated by treating them as sins and crimes. On the other hand, the Pentateuch strives to promote social righteousness in many matters which modern law does not venture to deal with; *e.g.* Dt 24[15] enjoins the prompt payment of wages, and Lv 19[11] forbids lying. But the difference is only apparent; the Pentateuch combines moral admonition with legislation, and draws no hard and fast line between the two. Again, the comparatively low stage of social development reached by the Israelites excuses such blots as the toleration of polygamy and slavery, and the absence of any full recognition of international morality.

4. Subjects of punishment.—In some cases

animals were put to death; *e.g.* an ox that had gored a man or woman was to be stoned, and its flesh might not be eaten (Ex $21^{28.29.32}$, cf. Lv $20^{15f.}$). Animals and even goods which could be burnt might be destroyed in the *ḥērem*, or ban (Jos 7^{24}). In earlier times the family might be put to death for a crime committed by its head (cf. III. 1), but the practice is forbidden, as already noted, in Dt 24^{16}.

There is nothing to show at what age young persons became legally responsible for their actions. The census in Nu 1^3 included all males from twenty years old; and the age at which Levites began their service is variously given as twenty-five (Nu 8^{24}), or thirty (4^{35}), although responsibility must have begun earlier. Nothing is said as to exemption from punishment on account of mental weakness.

Naturally the legal codes did not recognize the principle that the powerful and wealthy might commit crimes with impunity; but they often enjoyed much licence in practice, as is shown by the narratives of Micah and the Danites; of David and Uriah; Amnon, Tamar, and Absalom; and the frequent protests of the prophets.

5. Humanity: adjustment of severity of punishment to heinousness of crime.—The legal codes were evidently anxious that the punishment should be justly proportioned to the offence, hence the obvious principle of equal retaliation, found in the codes of many peoples, of an 'eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth,' and the laws providing for compensation for injury to property or person.

The list of capital offences (II. 2. (*a*)) is a little long, and includes some which, according to modern ideas, do not permit so severe a punishment, *e.g.* insult to parents, Sabbath-breaking, etc. But, as we have said, it is doubtful whether death was ever regularly inflicted for ritual offences; and, at any rate, the laws are due to an exaggerated sense of the wickedness of such acts rather than to reckless severity. The use of barbarous punishments—burning alive, mutilation, and flogging—is strictly limited; and there is no trace, either in the Law or in the history, of the torturing of witnesses or accused persons in order to obtain evidence.

The principle of blood-money is recognized only to a very limited extent: Ex 21^{28-32} provides that, if an ox known to be dangerous kill any one, the owner shall be put to death, but that 'if there be laid upon him a ransom, then he shall give for the redemption of his life whatsoever is laid upon him'—in the case of a slave thirty shekels to the slave's owner. Similarly, any one flogging his slave to death, without the slave actually dying under the rod, is sufficiently punished by the loss of his slave (Ex $21^{20f.}$); and in the case of injury to slaves the *lex talionis* is not to be enforced, any mutilation of slaves being atoned for by emancipation (Ex $21^{26f.}$). So, too, Ex $21^{18.19}$ permits compensation for bodily injury to a free man. On the other hand, Nu $35^{31.32}$ (P) prohibits the acceptance of blood-money for intentional murder, or even the release of a man who has committed unintentional homicide from the obligation of remaining in a city of refuge till the death of the high priest.

6. Connexion with methods of administration of justice in other nations.—Israel was always part of the international system which comprised Western Asia and Egypt; and there was a constant action and reaction between the various members of this system. At the outset, Israel was a group of nomad tribes, and the original basis of its Law was the tribal custom of the Bedawīn. The position of the *gō'ēl*, the next-of-kin, the avenger of blood, goes back to this source. The settlement in Canaan must have led to the adoption of many Canaanite laws. Now, Canaan and all Western Asia were, from a very early period, dominated by Babylonia; the conquests of Sargon I. of Akkad (*c.* 2700 B.C.) extended to the Mediterranean, so that the institutions of Canaan were partly shaped by Babylonian influence. But, again, both the Canaanites and the Babylonians probably sprang originally from Arabia; so that Israel, Canaan, and Babylon all drew from an original common stock of tribal customs; and it is very difficult to determine whether a law is a purely Israelite survival from this common stock, or has been derived through Canaan or Babylon. Moreover, during long periods the Egyptian kings exercised a suzerainty over Syria; and Egypt had its share in moulding the life of Canaan (cf. the Amarna tablets, *c.* 1400 B.C.). Something, too, may perhaps be due to the 'bondage' in Egypt; but not much, for the Israelite tribes for the most part lived a nomad life in the border provinces.

The recently discovered Code of Ḫammurabi (king of Babylon, *c.* 2100 B.C.) shows how much the Israelite institutions had in common with those of Babylon. There are numerous parallels between this Code and the Pentateuch, especially the ancient Book of the Covenant, Ex 20^{22}–23. Both, for instance, lay down the principle of an 'eye for an eye,' etc.; both prescribe the punishment of death for kidnapping; and both direct that if a man is in charge of some one else's cattle he may clear himself by an oath and need not make compensation. As the Code of Ḫammurabi was certainly known in Babylonia and Assyria as late as the Exile, Israelite legislation may have been influenced by it at any time; but the parallels may be largely due to common dependence on the primitive tradition of Arabia.

In comparing the ethical and religious value of Israelite justice with that of other nations, we have to distinguish the practice of the monarchy and earlier times, as depicted in the history and Ex 20^{22}–23, from the ideal set forth in Deuteronomy and the Priestly laws. It will have been seen that our knowledge of the early practice is fragmentary. It is possible, too, that the redactors of the literature suppressed evidence that was discreditable to Israel, though it is not likely that this has been done to any great extent. But, as far as our information goes, it does not appear that the administration of justice in ancient Israel differed conspicuously from that of neighbouring Semitic nations in the same period, as illustrated, for instance, by the Code of Ḫammurabi. And in such matters Israel would compare favourably with Greece, or Rome, or China, or with most Christian nations before the close of the 18th cent. A.D.

The Deuteronomic and Priestly ideal aims at a level of social righteousness which has never been attained in practice, and ranks with the Utopias of modern social reformers. The Priestly legislation is, indeed, disfigured by an undue care for the material interests of the sacerdotal caste; but neither the practice nor the theory of the religious law of Israel includes anything like the Inquisition and similar systems instituted by the Christian Church.

LITERATURE.—Art. 'Crimes and Punishments,' in *HDB*; artt. 'Law and Justice,' in *EBi*, and 'Gericht und Recht bei den Hebräern,' in *PRE*³ (by Benzinger); the relevant sections of the OT *Archæologies* of Ewald, Benzinger, and Nowack; and the standard commentaries on the Pentateuch and other Biblical passages. For the Code of Ḫammurabi, see the art. on that subject by C. H. W. Johns in *HDB*, vol. v. p. 584, and S. A. Cook, *The Laws of Moses and the Code of Ḫammurabi*, London, 1903.

W. H. BENNETT.

CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Hindu).

—1. Most of the terms designating 'crime' or 'offence' in Sanskrit are essentially religious in their nature, and no strict line between sins and punishable offences has ever been drawn. The *Dharmaśāstras* (law-books) contain long lists of the

various degrees of crime or guilt—from mortal sins, such as sexual intercourse with one's mother, daughter, or daughter-in-law, down to crimes merely rendering the perpetrator unworthy to receive alms, such as receiving gifts from a despicable person, subsisting by money-lending, telling lies, serving a Śūdra, or to crimes causing defilement, such as killing birds, amphibious and aquatic animals, worms or insects, and eating nutmegs and the like. Analogous lists of sins may be found in the ancient religious literature of the Buddhists of India. Many of these sins recur among the offences mentioned in the secular laws of the Brahmans. Thus the killing of a cow, the sacred animal of the Hindus, is a punishable offence as well as a crime. The commission of a heavy sexual offence is to be visited with punishment by the king, and at the same time the stain caused by such sin is to be removed by religious atonement. Killing a Brahman, or depriving him of his gold, is a crime deserving capital punishment of an aggravated form, no doubt because the religious law affords special protection to the sacred person of a Brahman. Many eccentricities of the criminal law are due to the religious element entering largely into it. Thus the sacredness ascribed to the Vedas comes out in the following rules: a Śūdra listening intentionally to a recitation of the Veda shall have his ears filled with molten tin or lac; if he recites Vedic texts, his tongue shall be cut out; if he remembers them, his body shall be split in twain. The sanctity with which Brahmans are invested has led to establishing the principle that no corporal punishment shall ever be resorted to in the case of a criminal of the Brahman caste. Nor could the banishment of a Brahman be connected with the confiscation of his property, the ordinary consequence of banishment. The Śūdras, on the other hand, were treated very badly, because they were considered to have no share in the re-birth caused for the higher castes by their initiation with a sacred prayer from the Vedas. Thus, *e.g.*, a Brahman who abuses a Śūdra is condemned to pay no fine. A Śūdra, on the contrary, undergoes corporal punishment, if he only assumes a position equal to a member of a high caste, in sitting, in lying down, in conversation, or on a road. Money-lending is viewed as an unholy act; Brahmans are, therefore, forbidden to practise usury. Certain kinds of interest on loans are entirely prohibited. Among sexual crimes, intercourse with the wife of a spiritual teacher is looked upon as a very heavy offence, equal to incest, and so is intercourse with a Buddhist nun. Gambling is stigmatized as a sinful practice, though some legislators do not object to gambling in a public gaming-house, where the king may raise a certain percentage on the stakes. False witnesses are designated as thieves of words. Heaven is the reward of a witness who speaks truth; in the contrary case, hell will be his portion. Other crimes of the Brahmanical law savour of Oriental despotism, as, *e.g.*, when the forgery of a royal document is visited with capital punishment. The caste system becomes visible in the gradation of crimes and punishments according to the caste of the offender, as will be shown below.

2. 'Punishment' (*danda*) in the Code of Manu (vii. 14 ff.) is personified as a god with a black hue and red eyes, created by the Lord of the World as his son, and as an incarnation of Law, formed of Brahman's glory. Punishment is declared to keep the whole world in order, since without it the stronger would oppress the weaker and roast them, like fish on a spit; the crow would eat the consecrated rice; the dog would lick the burnt oblation; ownership would not remain with any one; and all barriers would be broken through. Punishment is declared to be in truth the king and ruler, although it has to be inflicted by the king on those who deserve it. The king in person should every day decide causes in the court when brought before him, or else he should send a Brahman acting as his deputy. A king when punishing the wicked is comparable to the god Varuṇa, who binds a sinner with ropes. If a king does not strike a thief who approaches him, holding a club in his hand and proclaiming his deed, the guilt falls on the king; the thief, whether he be slain or pardoned, is purified of his guilt. The king should first punish by admonition, afterwards by reproof, thirdly by a fine, after that by corporal chastisement (Manu, viii. 129). As a matter of fact, fines are by far the most common kind of punishment in the criminal code of the Sanskrit law-books, and they were equally common, shortly before the times of British rule, in the Hindu kingdoms of Rājputāna (Tod), Mysore (Dubois), and others. The fines might extend to confiscation of the entire property of a criminal; but in such cases, according to Nārada (xviii. 10 f.), the tools of workmen, the weapons of soldiers, and other necessary implements are to be exempt from confiscation. Capital punishment, in various aggravated forms, such as impaling on a stake, trampling to death by an elephant, burning, roasting, cutting to pieces, devouring by dogs, and mutilations, are also frequently inflicted, even for comparatively light offences. The *jus talionis*, which is so universally represented in archaic legislations, becomes especially conspicuous in these punishments. Thus a criminal is condemned to lose whatever limb he has used in insulting or attacking another. The thievish fingers of a cutpurse, and the evil tongue of a calumniator, are to be cut off. A Śūdra using insulting language is to have a red-hot iron thrust into his mouth, or boiling oil dropped into his mouth and ears. The breaker of a dike shall be drowned. The killer of a Brahman shall be branded with the figure of a headless corpse, a drunkard with the flag of a distillery shop. Banishment, public disgrace, imprisonment, fetters, forced labour, beating, and other forms of chastisement are also mentioned. Brahmans, however, are not to be subject to corporal punishment. Nor is this the only privilege enjoyed by Brahmans, who are allowed special indulgences in almost every case, the reduction of punishment in consideration of the rank of the person being one of the most salient features of the ancient legislation of India. Thus a Kṣatriya insulting a Brahman must be fined 100 paṇas; a Vaiśya doing the same, 150 or 200 paṇas; a Śūdra doing the same must receive corporal punishment. On the other hand, a Brahman shall pay only 50 paṇas for insulting a Kṣatriya, 25 paṇas for insulting a Vaiśya, and nothing at all for insulting a Śūdra. A similar gradation of fines may be observed in the punishment of adultery and many other crimes. If a man insults a Brahman by offering him forbidden food, he shall be amerced in a heavy fine; and, if he gives him spirituous liquor to drink, he shall be put to death. Another characteristic feature of the Indian criminal code is the infliction of worldly punishments for violations of the religious law, as, *e.g.*, when an apostate from religious mendicity is doomed to become the king's slave. King Aśoka, as early as the 3rd cent. B.C., appointed censors who were charged to enforce the regulations concerning the sanctity of animal life, and the observance of filial piety. King Harṣa, in the 7th cent. A.D., inflicted capital punishment on all who ventured to slay any living creature. King Kumārapāla of Gujarāt, in the 12th cent., is said to have confiscated the entire property of a merchant who had committed the atrocious crime of cracking a louse. A Hindu Rājā of Kolhapur, in

A.D. 1716, issued a rescript ordaining due punishment for all those who should be discovered to entertain heretical opinions in his kingdom. This union of Church and State was specially marked under the rule of the Marāthā kings; but even in 1875, when Dr. Bühler visited Kashmir, he found the Mahārājā eagerly intent on looking after the due performance of the *prāyaśchittas*, or penances prescribed for breaches of the commandments of the *Smṛti*. The enforcement of these religious punishments otherwise rests with the caste, which levies fines for every breach of the caste rules, and, in serious cases, excludes the offender. (See EXPIATION AND ATONEMENT [Hindu].)

LITERATURE.—G. Bühler's and J. Jolly's translations of Sanskrit law-books, *SBE*, vols. ii. vii. xiv. xxv. xxxiii.; J. Tod, *Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan*, revised ed., Calcutta, 1894; J. A. Dubois, *Hindu Manners, Customs, and Ceremonies*, tr. by Beauchamp, 2nd ed., Oxford, 1899; Sir R. West, 'The Criminal Law and Procedure of the Ancient Hindus,' *Indian Magazine*, 1893; V. A. Smith, *The Early History of India*², Oxford, 1908; K. T. Telang, 'Gleanings from Marāthā Chronicles,' *Trans. 9th Congr. of Orientalists*, London, 1893; A. Steele, *The Law and Custom of Hindoo Castes*, new ed., London, 1868; J. Jolly, *Recht und Sitte*, Strassburg, 1896, pp. 115–448 (=*GIAP* ii. 8).

J. JOLLY.

CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Japanese).—Long before the dawn of Japanese history, Chinese travellers to Japan brought back accounts of that country which contain our earliest information on this subject, dating from the later Han dynasty (A.D. 25–220). One of these notices says: 'There is no theft, and litigation is unfrequent. The wives and children of those who break the laws are confiscated [sold as slaves], and for grave crimes the offender's family is extirpated.' Another account says: 'The laws and customs are strict.' There is not much to be learned about crimes and punishments from the mixture of myth, legend, and chronicle which takes the place of history in Japan for a thousand years previous to the 7th cent. A.D., though we hear of a staff or gild of executioners, and of capital punishment by decapitation; and a punishment by fine had its origin at this time, but it was only for such offences—comparatively few in number—as involved ritual uncleanness according to Shinto. An ordinance, enacted in 801, regularized what was, no doubt, an old practice, by which neglect in connexion with the *ohonihe*, or coronation ceremony, the eating of flesh, visiting the sick, being concerned in any way with capital sentences, or touching anything impure during the month of special avoidance of impurity, subjected the culprit to an *ohoharahi* ('greater purification'), *i.e.* he was obliged to provide the materials for the ceremony of his own purgation. This eventually became simply a fine. Other ritual offences which required purgation were incest, wounds given or received, bestiality, and leprosy. Homicide had to be atoned for in the same way, but the ritual character of the offence appears from the circumstance that even justifiable homicide caused uncleanness.

Weipert thinks that in these fines for ceremonial purification we have 'the first source of Japanese criminal law' (quoted by Florenz in *TASJ* xxvii. [1899] 57); but, in the opinion of the present writer, the evidence hardly bears out this conclusion. Weipert's theory does not account for the gravest of all punishments, that of death, nor does it apply to robbery, rebellion, adultery, arson, and other grave offences. Moreover, the absolution ceremony was seldom performed for individual offences. The Mikado twice a year celebrated a 'great purification' of the offences of the nation, and similar minor celebrations were usual before all the great ceremonies of Shinto. In such cases, of course, the idea of a fine was out of the question. There is abundant evidence that a criminal law existed from very ancient times which had nothing to do with the purgation of ritual offences.

Eventually the fines for ceremonial offences fell into abeyance, owing to a strong current of Chinese influence which set in during the 6th and 7th cents., and which led in 702 to the enactment of the code of civil and criminal law known as the *Taihōriō*. It was based on the laws of the Tang dynasty of China, though modified somewhat in accordance with Japanese usages. The penalties prescribed were five, viz. capital punishment, exile, penal servitude, beating (with a stick), and scourging (with a whip). These are simply copied from the Chinese code. Of the older five punishments of China—branding on the forehead, cutting off the nose, maiming, castration, and death—only the first and last were ever practised in Japan. A *History of Japan*, published by order of the Japanese Government (1893), mentions 'treason, contumely (slander [?]), unfilial conduct, immorality, and so forth' [*sic*], as the eight great crimes of the *Taihōriō*. Perhaps the excuse for this very unsatisfactory enumeration is the circumstance that a very substantial part of this code has not come down to us. It is the basis of all subsequent legislation. When the Taikō Hideyoshi came into power, in the latter part of the 16th cent., he contemplated its re-enactment for the whole country, but he died before giving any practical effect to his intention.

At first the Tokugawa Shoguns (1600–1868) followed the old method of making the laws known to those only who were required to enforce them. But this rule was subsequently modified. New laws were read to the people, and inscribed on notice-boards set up in conspicuous places. Towards the end of the Tokugawa period, a reaction to the former policy took place. The authorities considered it expedient to keep the people in ignorance of all but the most general principles of criminal law, thinking that the unknown would inspire greater terror. Such meagre information as they vouchsafed to the people was contained in a few brief edicts inscribed on notice-boards at the *Nihonbashi* in Yedo and other conspicuous places throughout the Empire, prohibiting the evil sect called Christian, conspiracy, insurrection, plotting to leave the village to which one belonged, murder, arson, and robbery. That was all. This system left room for much that was arbitrary in the administration of the law, which varied considerably in different parts of the Empire. The judicial officials did very much as they pleased.

A Japanese servant of a member of H.M.'s Legation stole a few dollars, and was handed over to justice. Three months later, a visit was received from an official, who gave his master the option of having him released—there was no room for him, it was explained, in the prison—or decapitated. Needless to say, the former alternative was accepted.

One of the worst features of the early Tokugawa legislation was the implication of the offender's family in the crimes of its head.

'If a man or woman, sentenced to be crucified or burned, had male children above 15 years of age, they were similarly executed, and younger children were placed in charge of a relative until they reached that age, when they were banished. Even when a parent suffered the ordinary capital punishment of beheading or hanging, it was within the discretion of the judge to execute or exile the male children. Wives and daughters were exempted from the rule of implication, though they might be reduced to the ranks of slaves' (Brinkley, *Japan*, iv. 56).

Thunberg (*Travels in Europe, Africa, Asia*, Eng. tr. 1795-96) says that, in the towns, a whole street was often made to suffer for the malpractices of a single individual, the master of a house for the faults of his domestics, and parents for those of their children. These cruel provisions were greatly modified in 1721, but the more lenient rules were not applicable to the *samurai* class. Theft was severely punished, usually with death, which was the penalty also for swindling or attempted extortion by force. Pickpockets, however, were let off with branding, or rather tatuing, though a repetition of the offence involved death. Not before the close of the 18th cent. was the execution of a pregnant woman deferred until after her delivery.

The law up to the close of the Tokugawa period required that an accused person must be induced to confess before his guilt was finally determined.

The result was that, in many cases, torture was freely applied. The commonest device was to bind a man with ropes in some constrained position, or to make him kneel upon a grating of wooden bars placed edge upwards, and then to pile weights on his knees. On the whole, the tortures employed judicially in Japan were not so cruel as those used in mediæval Europe. A *samurai* was not sent to prison. If his offence was not grave enough to call for immediate suicide, exile, or decapitation, he was ordered to go into confinement in his own house. There were different degrees of this kind of imprisonment, the most severe of which involved a complete cessation of egress and ingress for himself and his family.

Siebold, writing early in the 19th cent., gives a description of the penal code of Japan at that time, which was similar in all essential respects to the *Taihōriō*, introduced from China 1100 years before. He draws a broad distinction between the punishments of the *samurai* and those of the common people. In the latter case, the culprit might be simply cut down by the man of higher rank whom he might have insulted or injured, or if he had been caught in the act of committing a grave offence. Decapitation was more usual. Crucifixion, burning, and sawing off the head with a bamboo saw were also practised. There were two kinds of crucifixion. In one the criminal was lashed—not nailed—upside down to a cross which had two bars, one at the head and one at the feet, between the two being a small seat upon which the weight of the victim rested. At a given command an expert spearsman stood on each side, and the two drove their spears simultaneously so that they passed crosswise through the vital organs. Death was instantaneous. Burning was a matter of form. The culprit was tied to a stake and strangled before the fire was lit. Sawing off the head was of rare occurrence, and was limited to such heinous crimes as chief- or parent-murder. The name and offence of the criminal were usually inscribed on a board which was set up close to the place of execution. Sometimes the offender was mounted on a sorry nag and led round the city, with a similar placard fastened to his breast. The head might be set on a post, and allowed to remain from five to ten days. Sometimes the body was hacked to pieces, or made a subject on which the *samurai* might test their skill and the temper of their swords. In later times it might be handed over for dissection. Among minor punishments at this period were branding, the pillory, and degradation to the *hinin*, or pariah caste. For political offences by men of the *samurai* class, banishment to an island was the usual form of punishment; and there is an ancient instance of a Mikado being so punished. The term was commonly for life, though there was a minimum limit of five years. A milder form was an injunction to live under supervision at a distance from the capital. Whilst his case was under trial, the accused was confined to his own house, with the same forms as if he were in mourning. When the offence was committed unintentionally, a partial or complete confiscation of his property might be the consequence. Deprivation of office or incapacity for holding office was not unusual. Occasionally the offender was allowed to become a monk of a certain order, known as *komusō*, who wore a baskethat with a small grating in front, completely concealing his face. This was never removed, and practically he was a beggar who roamed the highways, playing on a flute in order to attract the attention of the charitably disposed.

Harakiri.—This well-known institution is of considerable antiquity. It is of purely Japanese origin, and consists in making a cruciform incision on the belly, whence its name, which means 'belly-cut.' The 'happy dispatch' of some writers is only a joke. Sometimes a determined man succeeded in ending his life in this way, or he might complete the act of suicide by stabbing himself in the throat with the same instrument—a short sword or dagger with a blade nine inches in length. *Harakiri* might be simply a form of suicide, or it might be the duty of a man of the *samurai* class under various circumstances, such as hopeless family troubles or loyalty to a dead superior, or as a protest against the wrongful conduct of a superior. For example, when the Japanese Government yielded to the demands of France, Russia, and Germany for the retrocession of Liaotung, forty military men emphasized their protest by committing suicide in the time-honoured fashion. A common motive was to free from punishment the family and relatives of the person involved, who would otherwise, under the old law, have shared his guilt. Very frequently, however, *harakiri* was no more than an honourable form of execution. It was carried out with great ceremony, the incision being only for form's sake, and the real execution consisting in decapitation by a friend. In 1869, a motion was brought forward in the Japanese Parliament in favour of the abolition of *harakiri*, and 200 members out of a house of 209 voted against this proposal. *Harakiri* is no longer recognized by law, though it cannot be said to be extinct.

Vendetta.—A Japanese *samurai* was permitted by law to avenge the murder of a parent or chief; but, before exercising this right, he was bound to give notice to the authorities, and, when cutting down his enemy, to repeat some such formula as this: 'I am A. B. You are X. Y., who murdered my father at such a time in such a place. Therefore do I now slay you.' In justification of this law, an ancient Chinese saying is often quoted to the effect that 'a man must not allow the same heaven to cover himself and his father's enemy.' It is now abrogated, but was in vogue up to the Restoration of 1868. A teacher of the present writer was a victim. It is to be observed that fines have no place in the pre-Restoration legislation—a circumstance which is adverse to Weipert's view that Japanese criminal law had its origin in the imposition of fines on offenders against the ritual law of the older Shinto. Kaempfer (*History of Japan*, Glasgow, 1906, ii. 114) notices this feature of the former Japanese law.

Extra-territoriality.—When the treaties were negotiated which opened Japan to foreign trade in 1859, the criminal code was in a very unsatisfactory condition. It was scarcely known to the people, and was administered in a most irregular, arbitrary, and often cruel fashion. It was quite out of the question to ask foreign Powers to make their subjects amenable to it, and, indeed, the Japanese were probably not sorry to be relieved of such responsibilities. Hence arose the so-called 'extraterritorial jurisdiction,' by which the Japanese Government transferred to foreign Powers the jurisdiction over their subjects when the latter were defendants in a civil case, or the accused under a criminal charge. When in 1868 the Mikado resumed the reins of authority, it was felt that such an arrangement was contrary to the dignity of the Japanese nation, and in any case a radical reform was a palpable necessity of the situation in the interests of humanity and good government. A code was, therefore, drawn up and promulgated in 1871. It was simply a selection from the codes of the two Chinese dynasties—Ming and Ts'ing—modifications being introduced into the amount and nature of the punishments prescribed for different offences. Barbarous modes of execution were eliminated, the death-penalty was greatly circumscribed, merciless and excessive

whippings were abolished, and the punishment of imprisonment with corrective labour was introduced for the first time. A second code was notified in 1873, by which many new and more humane provisions were added. By these codes, an offender who has been sentenced to a term of penal servitude is placed in the penitentiary of the district in which he has been tried and sentenced, and work suited to his age, physical condition, and acquirements is allotted to him, so that 'by toil and labour he may be gradually brought to repent of his past misdeeds and be restored to virtue.' The punishment of death was by hanging or decapitation, the latter form being considered more severe owing to the prejudice entertained by most Japanese against any mutilation of the body. In certain cases, the pillory in iron stocks within the prison yard was substituted for imprisonment, and fines might be permitted in the case of offences by officials, persons inadvertently implicated, aged people, infants, maimed or deformed persons, or females.

But these codes still preserved an essentially Chinese character, and they contained many provisions which unduly favoured officials and the *samurai* class. A husband was permitted to kill the lover of his wife or concubine along with the woman herself, if caught in the act; but, if a certain time had elapsed, the punishment was penal servitude for one year, while under the older law the husband could, in this case, only recover a penalty of no great amount. If a woman who had been guilty of adultery or incest was, on the discovery of her guilt, driven by shame to commit suicide, the punishment of the male offender was increased one degree, even though he might have had no knowledge of the woman's intention to do so. Masters and parents were punished with much less severity for offences against their servants and children than in the contrary case. Abusive language to an official entailed penal servitude for one year if the person insulted was of the highest rank; for ninety or sixty days if of lower grades. In Jan. 1879, the practice of using torture to compel confession—rendered necessary by the old principle that confession must precede condemnation—was abolished, and it was enacted that the evidence of witnesses, documents, or circumstances, or the admissions of accused persons, should alone be taken as bases for determining guilt.

It will be seen that, although these codes marked a considerable advance on the Tokugawa system, they still left much to be desired, when viewed from the more enlightened standpoint of Europe. New legislation was therefore initiated, after a thorough study of the various systems of European law, with the assistance mainly of French jurists. Distinguished service was rendered by G. Boissonade in framing the new codes, which, after arduous labour and repeated revision, came into operation from 1st Jan. 1882. They have an essentially French character. A further revision of the Code of Criminal Procedure was effected in 1890. B. H. Chamberlain, in his *Things Japanese*[2], gives the following account of the present system:

'Crimes are of three kinds: (1) against the State or the Imperial Family, and in violation of the public credit, peace, and health, etc.; (2) crimes against person and property; and (3) police offences. There is a sub-division of (1) and (2) into major and minor crimes. The punishments for major crimes are: (1) death by hanging; (2) deportation, with or without hard labour, for life or for a term of years; (3) imprisonment, with or without hard labour, for life or for a term of years. The punishments for minor crimes include confinement, with or without hard labour, and fines. The punishments for police offences are detention for from one to ten days without hard labour, and fines varying from 5 *sen* to 1·95 *yen*. The court which tries persons accused of major crimes consists of three judges; that for minor crimes, of one judge or three, according to the gravity of the charge; and that for police offences, of one *juge de paix*. Contrary to Western usage, an appeal is allowed, in the case of major crimes, for a trial of facts. Criminals condemned to deportation are generally sent to the island of Yezo, where they sometimes work in the mines. A person who has suffered injury by crime lodges his complaint at the police office, or with the procurator of any court having jurisdiction over the crime in question. Policemen can arrest an offender whose crime was committed in their presence, or which the complainant avers to have seen actually committed. In all other cases they can arrest by warrant only. Bail is allowed at the discretion of the judge. Accused persons are often kept in prison for a considerable time before trial, and no lawyer is allowed to be present at the preliminary examination. The conducting of criminal cases, from the very beginning down to the execution of the criminal, if he be condemned to suffer death, rests with the procurator, who unites in his own person the functions of public prosecutor and grand jury.'

The reforms of 1882 extended to the judiciary, which was now separated from the executive. Judges, procurators, barristers, notaries, and a new system of police, as well as law-schools, were established. Under the new régime there are far fewer capital punishments. In Tokugawa times the number of persons consigned to jail in Yedo was about 7000 annually, and of these over 3000 were executed. At present the yearly number of capital punishments for the whole Empire averages above eighty.

It is claimed that, on the whole, the new legislation has resulted in a body of law in unison with the most advanced principles and the most approved procedure of Western jurisprudence—all punishments not recognized as consonant with modern civilization being abolished, due provision being made for adapting penalties to degrees of crime (the previous legislation left the judge too little discretion), the rights of suspects and criminals being guarded, and the privilege of appeal guaranteed. This contention is substantially correct, though traces of old usage remain. All men are not equal before the law, the military retaining some special privileges. Robbery with violence is still punishable with death, and a man does not render himself liable to any penalty for beating his servant, unless death ensues. The preliminary examination of prisoners is secret, the assistance of counsel not being allowed. This last feature will soon be modified. Trial by jury is unknown.

In 1899, after protracted negotiations, treaties were concluded with foreign Powers, by which the extra-territorial jurisdiction was abolished, and all foreigners became subject to Japanese law.

Prisons.—Under the old régime, imprisonment was not one of the recognized forms of punishment, though it was necessary to provide some places of detention for prisoners who were awaiting their trial, sometimes for long periods. The inmates suffered very great hardship. The cells were wooden cages open to the four winds, and the arrangements for sanitation, food, and clothing were of the most wretched kind. The internal discipline was entrusted to the elder prisoners—generally hardened criminals—with results which may be imagined. Soon after the restoration of the Mikado's authority in 1868, a commission was sent to visit a number of foreign prisons and make a report, and ultimately a complete change was effected. Sir Henry Norman, who recently visited the convict prison of Tokio, says (*Real Japan*, 1892):

'The dormitories are enormous cages formed of bars as thick as one's arm. There is not a particle of furniture. Thick quilts, or *futon* (the Japanese bed), are provided. Each dormitory holds 96 prisoners. The sanitary arrangements could not well be improved. No vermin could harbour anywhere. It was almost an ideal prison structure. The punishment cells were hardly ever occupied. There was no flogging. Two hundred prisoners were employed making machinery and steam boilers, working nine hours a day. Wood-carving, weaving, pottery-making, and paper- and cloisonné-making are also among their occupations. Only a few are so clumsy or stupid as to be employed in pounding rice or breaking stones.'

LITERATURE.—The present writer's acknowledgments are due to F. Brinkley, *Japan and China*, London, 1904, vol. iv.; P. F. von Siebold, *Nippon*[2], Leipzig, 1897, vol. i.; and Longford, 'Summary of the Japanese Penal Codes,' in *TASJ*, vol. v. (1877) pt. ii. Consult also B. H. Chamberlain, *Things Japanese*[2], London, 1891; G. Bousquet, *Le Japon*,

Paris, 1877, vol. ii.; W. G. Aston, *Shinto*, London, 1905; A. von Siebold, *Der Eintritt Japans in das europ. Völkerrecht*, Berlin, 1900; *History of the Empire of Japan*, 1893, published by the order of the Department of Education, Tokio; G. Boissonade, *Projet de code de procédure criminelle pour l'empire du Japon*, Paris, 1883, also *Projet revisé du code pénal pour l'empire du Japon*, Paris, 1886; A. B. Mitford, *Tales of Old Japan*^{2}, London, 1874 (for *harakiri*); Friedrichs, 'Zum japan. Recht,' in *ZVRW* x. (1892) 351-375; Kohler, 'Studien aus dem japan. Recht,' *ib.* x. 376-449.

W. G. ASTON.

CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Jewish).—The transition from the Biblical to the Mishnic period is marked by external and internal limitations in the functions of the Jewish tribunals. Externally, the Jewish courts of justice lost the power of inflicting capital and other punishments,—a power exercised by the Roman procurators and officials,—and in the course of time the limits to the jurisdiction of the *Bêth Dîn* were still further narrowed. Internally, we note a growing tendency towards the restriction of certain forms of punishment, by making it a matter of difficulty to secure a conviction. In practice, capital punishment was obsolete long before the fall of the Jewish State, and, in all probability, long before the courts were deprived of the legal power of inflicting it. This is clearly shown by such NT passages as Jn 18^{31}, and the Talmud. Thus, in Jerus. *Sanh.* 18*a* (p. 228 of M. Schwab's tr., Paris, 1888) it is stated that this right was suspended some forty years before the fall of the Temple, and that the right of giving decisions in questions involving financial matters had been already abolished in the time of R. Simon b. Sheṭaḥ, that is to say, during the reign of Alexander Jannæus (d. 76 B.C.). Bab. *Sanh.* 41*a* brings out this fact even more emphatically. Nor may the trial and crucifixion of Jesus be cited as an instance to the contrary. It is now the generally accepted opinion, among both Jewish and Christian scholars, that the trial of Jesus was not carried out in accordance with Jewish law, and that His execution was an act in which Pharisaic Judaism had neither initiative nor share.

Thus Robertson Smith (*EBr*^{9} xxii. 812, at end of art. 'Synhedrium') writes: 'The meeting in the palace of the high priest which condemned our Lord was exceptional. The proceedings also on this occasion were highly irregular, if measured by the rules of procedure which, according to Jewish tradition, were laid down to secure order and a fair trial for the accused.' So also Montefiore (*Synoptic Gospels*, i. [London, 1909] 345 f.): 'The trial of Jesus—if trial it can be called—. . . violates that [Rabbinic] law in almost every particular. . . . It does not follow because the trial of Jesus . . . violates Jewish law in many important points, that therefore the account given of it cannot be true. There have been illegal trials at all times, and even the flimsiest legal forms have sufficed to get rid of an enemy. . . . That there was any meeting of the full Sanhedrin is most doubtful; doubtful also is the part played by the "Scribes" and Pharisees; but that the Sadducean priesthood was at the bottom of the arrest and of the "trial" . . . cannot reasonably be doubted.'

In the passage from the Jerus. Talmud mentioned above, R. Simon b. Yoḥai, a *tanna* of the 2nd cent., expresses his gratitude for escaping the responsibility of condemning a human being to death. Other passages, of a similar character, in the Talmud and Rabbinic writings point to the same conclusion—that the Romans took away from the *Bêth Dîn* the right to inflict capital punishment.

In addition to these restrictions imposed from without, the sentences of Jewish tribunals were mitigated by various internal and voluntary limitations. It may perhaps be that, in proportion to the severity with which Rome exercised the power removed from the local courts, these felt themselves drawn to the side of leniency in other directions. But this tendency to leniency was originally spontaneous, however much it may have developed afterwards in consequence of external harshness; it began while the Sanhedrin still held the power of life and death. An exact date cannot be given; it is difficult to tell whether and when punishments enacted in the Pentateuchal legislation were carried out in all literalness, and to what extent and with what frequency. Does that legislation represent primitive practice, or did the mitigating force of the Mishnic recensions of these laws at all times modify their execution? The orthodox Jewish belief, which regards the Oral Law as a contemporary concomitant of the Written Law and of equal force, would take the latter view, namely, that the traditions embodied in the Mishna accompanied the practice of all Mosaic enactments. It is, however, held by many that the Tannaitic law was new and original; that in early Mishnic times it was felt that the Pentateuch demanded the death sentence too readily, and that the Rabbis took steps to prevent such sentences from being carried out. This subject need not be discussed here; it is sufficient to show that the death penalty was almost abandoned, without entering into the question of whether this was brought about by new prescriptions or not.

The infliction of death was surrounded by many preliminaries and obstacles. The law demanded not only the presence of two satisfactory eye-witnesses, whose testimony must support vigorous scrutiny (see Mishn. *Sanh.* iv. v., ed. Strack, from which all quotations are taken), but also, before committing the crime, the accused must have received formal warning from the bystanders as to the consequences of his act (הַתְרָאָה, *ib.* v. 1; Bab. *Sanh.* 8*b*, 80*b*; Tos. *Sanh.* xi. 1, ed. Zuckermandel, Pasewalk, 1880, p. 431). No circumstantial evidence whatever was admissible, nor could the accused be convicted on his own confession. The stringency in examining and in challenging witnesses, the necessity of proving *hathrā'ah*, the elaborate aids given to the accused—all tend to show that the infliction of capital punishment must have been practically impossible; and this seems to have been the precise aim which the Rabbis had in view. *Makkoth* 7*a* records the dictum that a Sanhedrin which condemned a prisoner to death once in seven years earned the reputation of 'destructive' (חַבְלָנִית): according to R. Eliezer b. 'Azarya, once in seventy years sufficed; while R. Tryphon and R. 'Aqiba state that, had they been present, they would always have succeeded in advancing some plea to invalidate the proceedings in favour of the prisoner. Nor was this tendency limited to cases of capital punishment alone; it was extended to other branches of criminal law, *e.g.* to the *lex talionis*. The eighth chapter of *Baba Qamma* shows quite clearly that even in early days this command could not have been intended to receive literal interpretation, for a man who had lost his eye could receive no compensation through a similar injury being done to his assailant. Compensation could consist only in the worth of the eye being restored to the loser, and this was estimated by assessing the value of the injured party, if sold as a slave, before and after the accident, the difference representing the amount of the damages (incidentally, cf. Rashi on Ex 21^{24}).

Even when a capital sentence had been pronounced and was about to be carried into execution, every chance of proving his innocence at the eleventh hour was accorded to the accused. The court remained sitting all day in order to receive appeals, and an elaborate system of signals was devised to stay the execution in the event of any unexpected piece of evidence becoming known (Mishn. *Sanh.* vi.). Punishment was to be so arranged as to prevent the repetition of the offence by other parties, in other words, to act as a deterrent, and to secure the extinction of the crime itself and of its consequences: 'Thou shalt put away the wrong from thy midst'; 'and all Israel shall hear and shall sin no more.' Care had to be taken that no additional suffering or humiliation was incurred

by the guilty party. Any dishonour to the body resulting from the punishment was to be avoided, in so far as it was not expressly provided by the sentence. In executions and in flagellations, particular caution had to be exercised in this respect.

Capital punishment as ordered by the *Bêth Dîn* could be effected by lapidation (סְקִילָה), burning (שְׂרֵפָה), decapitation (הֶרֶג), or strangling (חֶנֶק) (see Mishn. *Sanh.* vii. 1: אַרְבַּע מִיתוֹת נִמְסְרוּ לְבֵית דִּין; and Singer's *Prayer Book*, London, 1900, p. 262). Crucifixion, as a means of death, was a Roman form. The last two methods are not mentioned in the Pentateuch, where, in fact, stoning is most usual. There seems no reason to doubt that *sᵉqîlā* and *sᵉrêphā* in the Pentateuch mean what is commonly known as stoning and burning; but the provisions of the Mishna show a great alteration in the manner of the execution. In the case of burning (Mishn. *Sanh.* vii. 2), the criminal was firmly fixed in pitch, up to his knees. A strong cloth, covered with a soft wrapping, was twisted round his neck, and its two ends were pulled by officials. The soft cloth was added to avoid unnecessary pain and in order to prevent death by strangulation. The criminal was thus forced to open his mouth, into which there was poured a stream of molten lead which instantly consumed his vitals, death being speedy and merciful. The Parthians treated the body of the Roman general Crassus in a similar manner after Carrhæ (53 B.C.). R. Eliezer b. Ṣadoq, a *tanna* of the 1st cent., relates that once he saw the daughter of a priest who had committed unchastity (Lv 21⁹) bound in vine tendrils and burnt (*Sanh.* vii. 2; *Tos.* ix. 11, etc. Contrast the burning of R. 'Aqiba, in A.D. 135, after the Bar Cochba revolt, when 'sponges of wet wool' [ספוֹגִין שֶׁל צֶמֶר] were placed round his heart to prolong the agony). In Bab. *Sanh.* 52*b*, R. Ḥama b. Tobia ordered Imarta, a priest's daughter who had lived unchastely, to be wrapped in vine tendrils and burnt. Both these cases are distinctly reprobated. In the former, the Sanhedrin which could have permitted such a method is said not to have been competent (*bâqî*). In the latter instance it is suggested that the *Bêth Din* may have been Sadducean, or that the narrator was too young to remember details. Any departure from the procedure described above is stated to be illegal.

In the case of stoning also, modifications were adopted with a view to hastening death. Mishn. *Sanh.* vi. 4 states:

'The height of the place of stoning was twice a man's length. One of the witnesses pushed (דּוֹחֲפוֹ) the criminal on the loins so that he fell down (forward) on to his breast, and the witness immediately turned the body over on to its back. If the criminal was already dead, then the duty was accomplished, but, if he still lived, then the second witness took a stone and cast it on to his heart.'

If necessary, all the bystanders followed suit until death intervened. According to the Pentateuch, the witnesses had to cast the first stone, since it was through their testimony that the execution took place (Dt 17⁷). With the hurling down of the criminal may be compared the procedure with the scape-goat in Mishn. *Yoma*, vi. 5. The official pushed (דְּחָפוֹ) the goat backwards, so that it rolled down and immediately became dismembered. In some cases the body was hanged, or rather crucified, after execution, for a limited period (Mishn. *Sanh.* vi. 4).

Decapitation (Mishn. *Sanh.* vii. 3; Bab. *Sanh.* 52*b*) was practised with a sword, in the same way as with the Romans; but R. Judah b. Elai, a *tanna* of the 2nd cent., objected on the ground that it involved degradation. To strike off the head of a man who was standing caused the body to fall down, and for this additional humiliation there was no authorization, consequently R. Judah describes a different method, viz. beheading with an axe (קוֹפִּיס, κοπίς) on a block. The other Rabbis considered this method even more humiliating, and rejected it. It seems that the criminal was tied to a post, in order that the body should remain upright. Finally, strangulation (*ib.*) was carried out as in the preliminary process of burning, only that the two ends of the cloth were pulled so hard that they caused death.

The object of these modifications was, in the first place, to mitigate the horrors of death. On this account a cup of drugged wine and incense (קוֹרֶט שֶׁל לְבוֹנָה בְּכוֹס שֶׁל יַיִן) was given to the criminal in order to produce insensibility (*e.g.* Bab. *Sanh.* 43*a*, Mk 15²³, and other references). The second motive was to avoid desecrating the body beyond the necessities of the death penalty. The pursuit of both these aims caused a great internal restriction of the functions of the Jewish tribunal.

The various crimes for which the penalty was death are enumerated in Mishn. *Sanh.* vii.–xi. Lapidation is the punishment for eighteen offences—including incest, sodomy, bestiality, blasphemy, idolatry, the giving of one's children to Molech, necromancy, sorcery, Sabbath-breaking, the cursing of parents, criminal intercourse with a betrothed virgin, the inviting of others to idolatry, the perverting of a whole city, the practice of magic, and for the stubborn and rebellious son. Burning was reserved for a priest's daughter who violated her chastity, and for nine forms of incest—only, however, when committed during the life of the legal wife. Murderers and the inhabitants of an apostate city (Dt 13¹³) were beheaded, and the following were strangled: one who beat a parent (cf. Vergil, *Aen.* vi. 609), one who kidnapped a Jew for slavery, a sage who opposed his superior authorities, a false prophet, one who prophesied in the name of false gods, the adulterer, and one who bore false witness against a priest's daughter.

The number of crimes for which stripes could be inflicted was very large (*Makkoth*, iii. etc.). This penalty could, with certain restrictions, be imposed by the judges at their discretion, unless the Scripture demanded a specified punishment for some particular sin. In no case could the stripes exceed thirty-nine, and, whenever possible, fewer were given. The presence of the judges was obligatory. (For full details, see Mishn. *Sanh.* xiv. =*Makkoth*, iii.; also Abrahams, *Jewish Life*.) The Mishna (*Makkoth*) enumerates fifty transgressions punishable by flagellation. Maimonides, in the *Yadh hā-Ḥazaqa*, gives a far longer and more comprehensive catalogue. A culprit who received stripes was *ipso facto* freed from excision (כָּרֵת), and recovered all those rights from which his crime might have debarred him (Mishn. *Sanh.* xiv. 15).

The principle of making the punishment as lenient as possible, *suaviter in re*, operated also in respect of those sins the punishment of which was reserved for the future life. The famous tenth chapter of *Sanhedrin* gives a list of those who have no share in the world to come, but every endeavour is made to make the list short. The principle is that all Israel are entitled to a share (כָּל יִשְׂרָאֵל יֵשׁ לָהֶם חֵלֶק לְעוֹלָם הַבָּא) unless they forfeit it.

'He who says that the doctrine of the resurrection is not contained in the Pentateuch (according to other readings, 'he who denies the doctrine of resurrection'); he who denies the inspiration of Scripture; the Epicurean; according to R. 'Aqiba, he who reads external (*i.e.* uncanonical) books; he who utters enchantment over a wound . . . ; Abba Saul says, whoso pronounces the Tetragrammaton.' In all these cases reference should be made to the commentary of Maimonides (ed. Holzer).

Seven persons—three kings (Jeroboam, Ahab, and Manasseh) and four private individuals (Balaam, Doeg, Ahithophel, and Gehazi)—are deprived of their future life, but in each case the Rabbis sought for extenuating circumstances in order to find a

loophole from perpetual doom. Similarly, excuses are made for the generation of the Flood, and for the generation of the Wilderness.

Excommunication could, according to Bab. *Berakh.* 19*a*, be imposed for a variety of offences, all of a less heinous nature than those punishable by stripes. It consisted of three grades of separation: (1) *nᵉzîfā*, (2) *niddui*, and (3) *ḥērem*. The period of *nᵉzîfā* was one day, of *niddui* seven days, while *ḥērem* could be indefinite. One who died impenitent under *niddui* was not buried with the usual ceremonies, and the force of *ḥērem* was very severe. In the Middle Ages the power of *ḥērem* was great owing to the institution of the Ghetto, but it was always felt to be a terrible weapon, *e.g.* in the cases of Uriel Acosta and Spinoza. The very gravity of *ḥērem* caused great reluctance to inflict it, and it was very sparingly employed (see Abrahams, *Jewish Life*, pp. 52, 292). Cf. art. BLASPHEMY (Jewish).

The penalty of excision (כָּרֵת) prescribed by the Pentateuch was not carried out by human agency, except in so far as guilty parties were scourged; hence this mode of punishment scarcely calls for consideration in this article. But, just as in the case of exclusion from a share in the future life,—a fate which also could not be determined by human agency,—so, too, in the case of excision, the Rabbis attempted to find pleas for the wicked. In Mishn. *Sanh.* xiv. 15 it is stated that all those condemned to excision find immediate pardon after receiving their scourging, if they are penitent. This conclusion is illustrated by a play on the words of the text (Dt 25³), 'Lest thy brother be brought to dishonour in thy sight' (וְנִקְלָה). R. Ḥananya b. Gamaliel says: 'as soon as he is scourged (מִשֶּׁלָּקָה) he becomes thy brother in thy sight.' Fines were imposed by the Bible for breaches of moral conduct in sexual matters (Dt 22, Ex 22), and for allowing a dangerous ox so much freedom that it killed a slave. In other cases the Mishna knows nothing of this means of punishment. In the Middle Ages fines were sometimes paid to the general funds of the community by persons liable to be scourged for a breach of Pentateuchal legislation.

Imprisonment, though known in the Bible (*e.g.* Joseph and Jeremiah), was not frequently practised in Mishnic times. As a means of punishment, it was employed in what may be described as indirect crimes, that is to say, for the contumacious and for the suborner. It could be imposed if conclusive evidence was not forthcoming though there was a strong presumption of guilt, or if a person punished twice by flagellation had committed the offence a third time. These cases are dealt with in Mishn. *Sanh.* ix. 5, and Bab. *Sanh.* 81*b*.

'He who has been scourged, and has repeated the offence, is sent by the *Bêth Dîn* to a dungeon, and fed with barley bread until his belly bursts. One who slays another without witnesses is sent to a dungeon and fed on scanty prison fare (לֶחֶם צַר וּמַיִם לַחַץ).'

The Gemara explains that the scourging refers to the stripes which always accompanied the penalty of excision; the difference in the two expressions for food is also explained. According to R. Shesheth, the method is the same, only in each instance different stages are quoted: the prisoner was in each case first given very scanty fare until his belly contracted, then barley was given to him so that it caused him to burst. The impractical nature of the treatment is clear proof that no Rabbi had ever heard of a case of its application. Such a rare situation as the Mishna presupposes makes it plain that the penalty of imprisonment could scarcely ever have been inflicted.

It must be remembered that, in the time of which the Mishna speaks, most of the decisions were theoretical (see Strack's introduction to his edition of Mishn. *Sanhedrin-Makkoth*, p. 5*); consequently we have there recorded the practice of an earlier period. In the Middle Ages there was a great revival of Jewish jurisdiction (see Abrahams, *Jewish Life*, p. 49, etc.). In Spain (*ib.*), up to 1379, Jewish courts could impose punishments and even pronounce a death sentence, which was carried out by the civil courts. Imprisonment was a form of punishment adopted by Jews, though it seems probable that they made use of the ordinary prison—or some separate portion of it—for their own offenders. The institution of the Jewish Quarter gave the *Bêth Dîn* greater powers and fostered the growth of two principles: (1) that it was unpatriotic for a Jew to cite another Jew before the civil courts; and (2) that no mercy was to be shown to the informer. The activity of the Jewish tribunal in secular matters can scarcely be said to have survived the breakdown of the Ghetto, though in religious questions its authority remained unshaken. In many instances, plaintiff and defendant have, of their own accord, agreed voluntarily to submit their differences to the arbitration of the *Bêth Dîn* rather than to the civil judge—a system at present in great vogue in the East End of London. By this means many disputes are settled without taking up the time of the magistrate. But this does not belong to the domain of criminal cases. Here the jurisdiction of Jewish courts has long ceased.

LITERATURE.—The Mishna, Gemara (Pal. and Bab.), and Tosephta of *Sanhedrin-Makkoth* should be carefully studied. For the Mishna there are critical editions: (1) with vocab., notes, and trans., by H. L. Strack, Leipzig, 1910; (2) by Samuel Krauss, Leyden, 1909, with introduction, notes, and glossary; (3) for those who are ignorant of Hebrew, a tr., with notes, etc., has been prepared by Hölscher (Fiebig's Series), Tübingen, 1910, with special reference to NT questions; Maimonides' comm. is edited by J. Holzer, Berlin, 1901. The Jerus. Talm. is translated by M. Schwab, Paris, 1888. The best edition of the Tosephta is that of Zuckermandel, Pasewalk, 1880. See articles in *EBr*⁹ on 'Synhedrium,' in *JE* on 'Capital Punishment,' 'Stripes,' 'Excommunication,' 'Crime,' 'Punishment,' 'Hatra'ah,' 'Admission in Evidence,' etc.; in the present work, see ADULTERY (Jewish), BLASPHEMY (Jewish); cf. I. Abrahams, *Jewish Life in Middle Ages*, London, 1896; A. Büchler, 'Das Synhedrion in Jerusalem und die Todesstrafen der Bibel und der jüd.-nachbiblischen Zeit,' in *MGWJ*, 1906; see also bibliographies in *JE* iii. 558, iv. 359.

HERBERT LOEWE.

CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Muhammadan).—**I. Introduction.**—In Ancient Arabia, crime was often regarded as impurity, and punishment as purification. In Muslim tradition also it is mentioned that a certain adulterer who desired to do penance for his sin said to the Prophet, *ṭahhirnī* ('purify me'), whereupon he was stoned to death.[1]

In the heathen period, manslaughter and other crimes often gave rise to bloody feuds among the Arab tribes. The revenge of the injured party or of the members of his family or tribe extended not only to the guilty person who had killed or injured any one, but also to all who belonged to the same family or tribe. It is true that by this solidarity of family and tribe the public safety was in some respects benefited; but, on the other hand, there was the disadvantage that many innocent persons had to suffer for the sins of their relatives, and that long-continued blood-feuds often arose from insignificant beginnings. Usually on both sides an attempt was made to put to death as great a number as possible of enemies of high rank in return for each fallen tribesman; for many regarded as insufficient mere retaliation (*qiṣāṣ*), by which no greater injury was done to the other party than had actually been suffered. Blood-guiltiness was sometimes bought off by means of a great number of camels, but the acceptance of such a price of

[1] See I. Goldziher, 'Das Strafrecht im Islam' (*loc. cit. infra*, pp. 101, 104 n. 2), and *Muhamm. Studien*, 1889–90, i. 27 n.

blood (*'aql* or *diya*) was often regarded as a humiliation. See, further, BLOOD-FEUD (Muslim).

The blood-feud was so deeply rooted in the customs of the Ancient Arabians that it was impossible for the Prophet completely to forbid it. In Islām, therefore, retaliation remained permissible, though with important restrictions. Not long after the Hijra, circumstances at Medīna compelled the Prophet to issue regulations as to this matter, in order to prevent the old blood-feud from continuing even among the Muslims; he therefore strictly forbade a Muslim to revenge himself on a fellow-believer for blood-guiltiness dating from the heathen period. If, however, a Muslim were attacked unjustly by a fellow-believer, he retained the right of retaliation; and, if he were killed, his heirs had also this right, but the question must henceforth be properly investigated, and only the guilty person himself might be punished after his guilt had been proved. It was, moreover, established that for Muslims only the *qiṣāṣ*, i.e. the *talio* in the most restricted sense of the word, was permissible; the attacked party must not do any greater injury to the attacking than he had himself suffered. Redemption of the blood-feud was permitted for Muslims, but the acceptance of the price of blood instead of retaliation was not expressly made a religious duty.

See Qur'ān, ii. 173–174: 'If any one gains forgiveness from his neighbour, [the one party] must conduct his case [concerning the price of blood] with moderation, and [the other party] must pay the price of blood willingly. That is a mitigation from your Lord.'

If the guilty person had acted deliberately, he must in future pay the price of blood himself, as a personal punishment; only if he had killed or wounded some one accidentally did his relatives remain obliged to support him in the payment of the price of blood.

For other crimes not consisting of killing or wounding, the Prophet did not in general issue express regulations. Only in consequence of special circumstances he prescribed a *ḥadd* ('fixed penalty') for some misdemeanours. The best-known instance is described in art. ADULTERY (Muslim). When Muhammad's wife 'Ā'isha was accused of adultery, it was prescribed in Qur'ān, xxiv. 1–5, that a person who was guilty of fornication (*zinā*) should be henceforth punished with 100 stripes of the whip, but that they who accused an honourable woman of that crime unjustly must be punished with 80 stripes (see, further, art. ADULTERY [Muslim]). Other instances of fixed penalties are the *ḥadd* for theft, which is prescribed in Qur'ān, v. 42–43, and the *ḥadd* for highway-robbery (*ib.* v. 37–38). In other cases, when no special punishment is prescribed, the judge is entitled to inflict such punishment on the culprit as seems to be the most suitable in view of the circumstances. This form of punishment is called *ta'zīr* ('correction').

Muslim canon law thus distinguishes three categories of crimes and punishments: (1) the so-called *jināyāt*, i.e. misdemeanours consisting of killing or wounding, which must be punished either with retaliation (*qiṣāṣ*) or with payment of the *diya* ('price of blood') or other damages; (2) adultery, robbery, and other crimes, which must be punished with a fixed penalty (*ḥadd*); and (3) all other kinds of transgressions, which must be punished with *ta'zīr* ('correction').

According to Muslim canon law, the punishment must be regarded in some cases as a *ḥaqq Allāh* ('right of Allāh'), in other cases as a *ḥaqq ādamī* ('human right'). When, for instance, a Muslim has the right to exact retaliation or the payment of the price of blood, such a case concerns *ḥaqq ādamī*, just as when he reclaims stolen or loaned property, or demands the payment of a sale price. In these cases the injured person (or his heir) may also give up his right and forgive the injurer.

In cases in which the judge has to decide as to a 'right of Allāh,' certain special principles apply. In many traditions it is expressly put in the foreground that God will base His relation to man, above everything else, on compassion and forgiveness; that He is, therefore, always ready so far as is possible to cover the sins of His servants with the cloak of love, but only on condition that they also act in this way and cover both their own sins and those of their fellow-men.

On the ground of these traditions, the judge, the witnesses, and the culprit must all do their best to prevent the infliction of punishment, if it is a *ḥaqq Allāh*. The culprit is then not bound to acknowledge his guilt if he is accused; he may even revoke his confession before the judge; for the witnesses it is not regarded as meritorious to give evidence against the culprit; the judge must expressly point out to the accused the means by which he may escape punishment; and he may not condemn him before his guilt has been proved, according to the demands of the canon law, even though he personally knows with complete certainty that the crime has actually been committed.

In practice, the crimes which must be punished with *ḥadd* can hardly ever be proved except by the voluntary confession of the culprit, because the legal proof is too difficult. To prove fornication, for instance, it must be possible to call four witnesses who have all observed the act (see ADULTERY [Muslim]). If the guilty person does not desire to do penance for his crime, and in this way to purify himself from his sin, it is therefore usually impossible to punish him. If, however, his guilt is formally certain, the judge is obliged to inflict the *ḥadd* precisely according to the regulations of the canon law.

2. Retaliation (*qiṣāṣ*).—According to the Muslim law-books, retaliation is still permitted in only two cases: (1) when any one has deliberately[1] and unjustly[2] killed another, the heirs of the latter have the right to kill the murderer; (2) if any one is deliberately and unjustly wounded or mutilated, he has the right to revenge himself on his injurer, if it is possible to make him suffer precisely the same wounding or mutilation. According to Muslim lawyers, this is in general possible only when a hand, foot, arm, leg, ear, finger, nose, toe, tongue, eye, or tooth, or other part of the body, has been cut off or destroyed. Moreover, retaliation is in both these cases permissible only (1) if the guilty person was of full age when his crime was committed, and in the full possession of his intellectual powers; (2) if the injured party is at the same time an equal of the guilty person. According to the majority of Muslim lawyers, a slave is not the equal of a free man; only the Ḥanafites hold that the rules of retaliation are applicable also to a free man who has killed or wounded the slave of another. If an unbeliever is killed by a Muslim, it is not, as a rule, permissible to take vengeance for blood on the latter unless the deceased unbeliever had been expressly promised protection of his life by a Muslim. Also the father may not be put to death when he has killed his son.

Those who have the right to demand revenge for blood are the heirs belonging to the first and second classes, the *'aṣabāt* and the *dhawu'l farā'iḍ*

[1] According to Muslim canon law, the question whether the culprit acted deliberately or not depends on the sort of weapon with which his act was accomplished. The opinions of the various *fiqh*-schools differ as to the details.

[2] The *qiṣāṣ* is not applicable to one who has killed or wounded another if he had a right to do so. He, for instance, who finds a thief in his house, or any one outraging his wife, may immediately kill him without incurring penalty—not only in self-defence, but also in vengeance on the offender.

(see art. LAW [Muhammadan]); according to the Mālikites, however, wives cannot exercise any *qiṣāṣ*. If the heirs give up their right to *qiṣāṣ*, the guilty person is obliged to pay the price of blood (*diya*); according to the Ḥanafites, however, the *diya* cannot be demanded in this case, if the guilty person does not himself agree to it. If the deceased has left various heirs, and some of them are willing to spare the guilty, no vengeance for blood may be exacted, but only the *diya*.

Vengeance for blood is carried out personally, under the supervision of the judge, by those who have instituted the proceedings against the guilty person. If there are several who demand it, one of them is appointed to carry out the punishment.

3. **The price of blood for manslaughter** (*diya*).—The price of blood for manslaughter may be demanded: (1) when any one has been killed deliberately and unjustly, and his heirs give up their right to exact the *qiṣāṣ*; (2) when any one has been killed unintentionally.[1] In both cases the *diya* consists of 100 camels, or 1000 *dīnār* of gold, or 12,000 *dirhams* of silver (according to the Ḥanafites, however, 10,000 *dirhams* of silver). But in the first case the so-called 'heavy,' and in the second case the 'light,' price of blood is incurred. In the *fiqh* it is accurately decided what sorts of camels must be given in each of these cases. If gold or silver is paid in place of camels, according to some Muslim lawyers a greater sum may be demanded for the 'heavy' *diya* than for the 'light'; but according to others it is not so; and, according to the later opinion of Shāfi'ī, no fixed payment of gold or silver is due, but the worth of the 100 camels. The 'light' price of blood must be paid within a period of three years by the so-called *'āqila*, i.e. by those who pay the *'aql* ('price of blood'). To these *'āqila* belong, according to the Ḥanafites and Mālikites, all *'aṣabāt* (*i.e.* the male relations on the paternal side) of the culprit, and according to them he must also himself pay part of the sum incurred; according to the Shāfi'ites, on the other hand, neither the culprit himself nor his blood-relations in the direct line belong to the *'āqila*.

When the Muslims after the great conquests established themselves in Egypt, Syria, Persia, and other lands, the Old Arabian family-organization partially lost its importance, and there arose a new grouping of persons who had the same interests to defend. According to the Ḥanafites, the same rules concerning the payment of the price of blood are applicable to these new groups as to the blood-relations of the guilty person; according to them, therefore, all persons belong to the *'āqila* who are bound to give their mutual support to each other (among others, neighbours, those who practise the same profession, those who belong to the same army-corps). The 'heavy' price of blood, on the other hand, may be demanded only from the culprit himself; and, according to most *faqīhs*, he has no right to postpone payment. According to the Ḥanafites, however, he also is only obliged to pay the sum within a period of three years.

(3) Besides the cases in which any one is killed either intentionally or accidentally, Muslim lawyers distinguish yet a third case in which the culprit did, indeed, attack the deceased intentionally, but without meaning to kill him. In that case the *'āqila* must pay the so-called 'heavy' *diya*. They are also obliged to do this, according to some Muslim lawyers, if he has killed another accidentally, either in the sacred territory of Mecca or during one of the four sacred months (Muḥarram, Rajab, Dhu'l-qa'da, Dhu'l-ḥijja); further, if the deceased was a *maḥram* (*i.e.* a relation whom it is forbidden to marry) of the culprit; according to others, however, they are in this case liable only to the 'light' *diya*.

For the death of a woman only half the price of blood can be demanded; for the death of a Christian or a Jew, according to the Mālikites, also only half the *diya*, according to the Shāfi'ites only one third, but, according to the Ḥanafites, the full price of blood. If any one kills the slave of another, according to most Muslim lawyers he must himself make good to the owner the full value, even though this cost more than the *diya* for a free man; according to the Ḥanafites, however, the owner has never a claim to more than the value of 100 camels decreased by one *dīnār*. If the culprit was under age or mad, the price of blood must be paid out of his property by the guardian or curator; if the culprit was a slave, his master is responsible, but he can free himself from all further obligation by giving up the slave.

In addition to the *qiṣāṣ* or the *diya*, manslaughter demands a *kaffāra* ('atoning sacrifice'); and, according to Qur'ān, iv. 94, this must consist in the setting free of a Muslim slave, or, if this cannot be done, in fasting for two months. The feeding of 60 poor persons, which in some other cases of *kaffāra* may take the place of fasting, is in this case, according to most *faqīhs*, insufficient. According to the Ḥanafites and Mālikites, this *kaffāra* is incurred only when any one has been put to death accidentally (on the ground of the words of Qur'ān, iv. 94); but, according to the Shāfi'ites, also if the culprit has acted intentionally.

4. **The diya and other damages for wounding.**—The wounded person, as has already been noted, if he gives up his right to *qiṣāṣ*, claims the *diya* in place of it (according to the Ḥanafites, only if the guilty person agrees). The full *diya* is incurred when, because of the wound, a part of the body is lost (*e.g.* the nose) of which a man has only one; he who loses a part of the body of which men have two (*e.g.* an eye, ear, hand, or foot) may claim the half of the *diya* as damages; in the same way ¼ of the full price of blood is incurred for an eyelid, $\frac{1}{10}$ for a finger, and for a joint of a finger $\frac{1}{30}$ of the *diya*. The rules and distinctions concerning the *diya* for manslaughter apply also to the *diya* for lost parts of the body.

Damages are incurred also for wounds for which no *qiṣāṣ* can be demanded, as, for instance, those which are caused by stabbing or cutting the body. In the Muslim law-books, regulations concerning the various sorts of these wounds are worked out in detail. Ten of them (all wounds caused by cutting on the head or the face) are known as the *shijāj*; the *mūḍiḥa* is a wound which has cut to the bone, etc. The damages which the culprit must pay depend in some cases on an express regulation of the law-books, and are then called *arsh*; in other cases they must be fixed by a legal sentence (*ḥukūma*), according to the loss suffered by the injured. An expert has then to estimate what value the body of the wounded person would have had before and after the wound, if he was a slave. If it appears that the value of his body was diminished by, for instance, $\frac{1}{10}$, the judge sentences the culprit to pay $\frac{1}{10}$ of the full *diya*. If any one has been wounded simultaneously in several places, he may claim damages for each wound separately, and therefore in some cases may receive even more than the *diya* for manslaughter.

5. **Misdeeds which must be punished with a ḥadd.**—For the *ḥadd* in consequence of *zinā*, see art. ADULTERY (Muslim). The punishment for apostasy from Islām, which is regarded by some Muslim jurists as a *ḥadd*, is treated in art.

[1] It must be noticed that, according to Muslim lawyers, any one who has accidentally killed another is punishable even if no fault attached to him in so doing. The price of blood may even be demanded if, for instance, any one has fallen from the roof and in his fall has killed another.

APOSTASY (Muhammadan). We have therefore here to treat only of the other fixed penalties, viz. those for *qadhf*, wine-drinking, theft, and highway robbery.

(1) *Qadhf.*—By this the Muslim canon law understands only such slander as is meant in Qur'ān, xxiv. 4. Since only slander of 'honourable' women is mentioned there, the crime of *qadhf* consists, according to Muslim lawyers, of the accusation of fornication brought against a *muḥṣan* (i.e. an 'honourable' person, who is, moreover, a free Muslim of full age, in the full possession of intellectual power) without its being possible to adduce proof by four male witnesses. He who is guilty of this crime must be punished with 80 stripes if he is a free man, and with 40 if he is a slave. This *ḥadd* is not enforced if he is under age, or insane, or if he is the husband of the slandered woman and swears that she is guilty, invoking Allāh by means of the so-called *li'ān* (see art. LAW [Muhammadan]). According to some Muslim lawyers, the slandered person has the right of excusing the punishment of the guilty, but not according to others; there is also a difference of opinion as to whether the heirs of the slandered person have the right of exacting this *ḥadd*.

(2) The *ḥadd* for the drinking of wine and other strong drinks consists of a certain number of stripes, on the ground of the tradition as to the way in which the Prophet punished drunkards in Medīna. As to the number of stripes, there is a difference of opinion: according to the Shāfi'ites, the punishment consists of 40, according to the other *fiqh*-schools, of 80 stripes for a free man, and the half of that number for slaves. The guilt of him who is accused of this crime can, according to canon law, be proved only by two male witnesses, or by the confession of the guilty. Moreover, the punishment is not applicable to minors, insane persons, and unbelievers.

(3) The *ḥadd* for theft depends on the command given in Qur'ān, v. 42, 43, 'From the man thief and woman thief cut off the hands, as a warning example from God.' According to the Shāfi'ite and the Mālikite doctrine, a thief after his first theft must lose the right hand, after the second the left foot, after the third the left hand, after the fourth the right foot, and after the fifth and following thefts he must be punished by *ta'zīr*. According to the Ḥanafites, however, the thief must never lose more than the right hand and the left foot; if he continues to steal after his second offence, he must be kept in prison until he is reformed.

Theft is, however, punished with this *ḥadd* only when the stolen article had been put away in a proper manner, and, moreover, had a certain value (the so-called *niṣāb*). According to the Shāfi'ites, the *ḥadd* is applicable only if the value of that which is stolen is at least ¼ of a *dīnār* (about 3 shillings); according to the Ḥanafites, only if the worth was at least one *dīnār*, or 10 *dirhams*; according to the Mālikites, ¼ of a *dīnār*, or 3 *dirhams*.

The *ḥadd* for theft is also not applied if the thief was under age or insane, or if he could make good a certain claim to the stolen property. The last is the case if one of those who have taken part in a battle steals something from the booty before it has been divided among the troops, or if a Muslim steals from that which was intended for the general use of Muslims. If one of a married couple steals something to the injury of the other, according to some Muslim lawyers the culprit must be punished with *ḥadd*, but not according to the opinion of others.

The person whose property was stolen has the right to reclaim the stolen article; and, if this has been lost, the thief must pay damages in its place. According to the Ḥanafite doctrine, however, the thief is not obliged to make such payment of damages if the *ḥadd* for theft has been applied to him.

(4) The *ḥadd* for highway-robbery is deduced from Qur'ān, v. 37, 38:

> 'The punishment for those who fight against Allāh and his apostle, and pass through the land spreading disaster, shall be that they shall be slain or crucified, or have their hands and feet cut off cross-ways, or that they be banished from the land . . . unless they reform before they fall into your hands. God is forgiving and compassionate.'

Since, therefore, this *ḥadd* was not accurately defined, there arose much difference of opinion among Muslim lawyers as to the punishment of highway-robbers. The various opinions cannot all be mentioned here in detail. According to the Shāfi'ite doctrine, four cases must be distinguished: (1) if the culprit has only made the road unsafe, he must be banished; (2) if he has also practised robbery (namely, in the sense that he would incur the *ḥadd* for theft if he were not a highwayman), his right hand and left foot are cut off (in the case of a repetition of the offence, the left hand and right foot as well); (3) if he has deliberately murdered any one, he must be put to death, even though the heirs of the murdered person were willing to content themselves with the *diya*; (4) if he has as a highway-robber robbed and killed, not only is he punished with death, but his corpse is exhibited for a time on a cross. According to the other *madhhabs*, regulations obtain which are partially different.

When the robber repents before he has been captured, the special *ḥadd* for highway-robbery is no longer applicable to him, but he remains, for instance, obliged to restore that which has been stolen; and, if he has killed any one, the heirs of the latter have, just as in other cases, the right of exacting the *qiṣāṣ* or *diya*.

6. Ta'zīr ('correction').—When no special punishment is prescribed, the judge, as has already been noted, must condemn the culprit to the punishment which seems to him to be the most suitable in view of the circumstances. He may, for instance, send him to prison, exile him, or sentence him to be publicly put to shame or scourged, etc. According to the Mālikite doctrine, he is even entitled in this case to condemn him to as many stripes as are prescribed in the case of *ḥadd*, or even more; according to the other *fiqh*-schools, however, this is not permissible. According to them, the *ta'zīr* must always be less severe than a *ḥadd*. The *ta'zīr* is, among other things, applicable to a thief when the stolen property has not so much value that the culprit must be condemned to the *ḥadd*; furthermore, in general, to all kinds of transgressions for which no other kind of punishment or any special atoning sacrifice (*kaffāra*) is prescribed.

The judge is not always obliged to apply the *ta'zīr*; according to the Shāfi'ites, only when the injured person expressly requires him to punish the culprit; and, according to the Ḥanafites and Mālikites, also when he is convinced that the latter will not reform without punishment. A *ḥadd*, on the other hand, must always be inflicted when the guilt of the culprit has been proved, because this punishment is expressly prescribed in the canon law.

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CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Parsi).—From the list of the contents of the original twenty-one *nasks* of the Zoroastrian canon, the bulk of which is irretrievably lost, we find that seven of them consisted of the *dātīk*, or 'legal' literature (*Dīnkarṭ*, viii. 1, 11). Of these the *Vendīdād*, 'the Leviticus of the Iranians,' is preserved in its entirety, and this work, with some other portions of the extant Avesta and Pahlavi books, forms the chief source of our information on the criminal law of the ancient Persians.

Offenders against law are punished, first, in this world, according to the penalties laid down for various crimes; and, secondly, in the next world. The usual form of corporal punishment is the prescription of a certain number of stripes (*upāzana*) with the two implements *aspa-aštrā* ('horse-goad') and *sraošō-caranā* ('scourge'). The number of such stripes prescribed for different crimes ranges between five and ten thousand. The extravagant number of strokes and the physical impossibility of a human being enduring this torture have led scholars to think, with Spiegel, Geiger, and Darmesteter, that the stripes were not actually meant to be laid on the culprits, but that the number of strokes either meant that the sinner should kill so many noxious creatures, or that they were so many strokes inflicted upon the realm of darkness, or that they were only meant to impress on men the gravity of the crimes. For instance, it is prescribed that a woman who has been delivered of a still-born child shall refrain from drinking water for the good of her own health for some time (*Vend.* vii. 60–72). The violation of this precept is punishable with two hundred stripes. Now this would be brutal, and the later writer of the *Rivāyat* states that in such a case, if she should thus drink water to avert serious illness, it would be sufficient for her husband to atone for her fault before a Dastur by *patet*, or 'penitence' (*Old Rivāyat*, p. 98*b*, quoted by Darmesteter in *SBE* iv. 92, n. 5, *Le Zend-Avesta*, ii. 112, n. 88). In the later Pahlavi period, these stripes are converted into money value, and certain fines are laid down for the various number of stripes. Very often the word *margarzān*, 'worthy of death,' is loosely employed to denote the hideousness of a crime. Some offences are termed *anāperetha*, 'unatonable.' The chief among them are the burying, burning, and eating of dead matter, and sodomy.

The characteristic feature of the Mazdayasnian law is that it prescribes very rigorous punishment for the violation of the rules of sanitation and hygiene; for it is said that the man who violates these rules imports or furthers epidemic, and endangers human life. The punishment for the ill-treatment of the various classes of dogs is exorbitant, and is calculated to ensure good treatment of this faithful animal, who as a sentinel guards the flocks of the faithful, and protects them from the attacks of wolves and other wild beasts, as also from the depredations of thieves and bandits. Any wilful harm done to so useful an animal is believed to deprive the community of his services, and to expose life and property to danger.

Capital punishment is prescribed for the man who carries a dead body alone, and for the man who falsely undertakes to cleanse one defiled with dead matter. Strange as it may seem, only ninety stripes are prescribed for one who commits murder. Instances are found in Persian history in which capital punishment is meted out to manslayers. When the Sasanian king Ardashir discovers the plot of his queen to poison him, he consults the Dastur as to what should be done in the matter. The high priest thereupon replies that one who attempts to take the life of another deserves death (*Kārnāmak-i Artakhshīr-Pāpakān*, ix. 16–17). The cruel punishment of cutting off the hands, ears, and other parts of the body, is not unknown. Darius orders the nose, ears, and tongue of his rebel victim to be cut off, and his eyes to be put out (*Old Pers. Inscriptions on Mount Behistan*, ii. 74, 89; see F. H. Weissbach and W. Bang, *Die altpersischen Keilinschriften*, Leipzig, 1893, i. 21).

1. Assaults.—There are seven kinds of outrages, which are called in Pahlavi *pāyak vinās*, and in Sanskrit *padāni pāpāni*, meaning 'chief crimes' (*Shāyast lā-Shāyast*, i. 1; *Patet Pashimānī*, iii.). These are (1) *āgcrepta*, 'stroke': when a man lifts his hand and wields a weapon with the intention to strike a blow, he becomes guilty of this crime (*Vendīdād*, iv. 17). The punishment for the first offence is five stripes with the *aspa-aštrā* and five with the *sraošō-caranā*. The penalty increases proportionately with the repetition of the crime, until, on the eighth committal of the same, the man is termed a *pešōtanu*, 'of sinful body,' and is to be punished with two hundred stripes (*ib.* 18–21). (2) *avaoirišta*, 'blow.' This is the name of the assault wherein a man brandishes a weapon (*Vend.* iv. 17). He receives ten stripes for the first crime, and the maximum penalty of two hundred stripes is prescribed in his case if, without atoning for his previous crimes, he repeats it seven times (*ib.* 22–25). (3) *areduš*, 'wound.' The penalty for this crime begins with fifteen stripes, and makes the culprit liable to two hundred stripes on the repetition of the same for the sixth time (*ib.* 26–29). (4) *xvara*, 'sore wound.' This is punishable with thirty stripes for the first crime, and two hundred for the fifth repetition (*ib.* 30–33). (5) *tacaṭ-vohunī*, 'bloody wound.' The penalty is fifty stripes for the first offence, and the fourth committal of the same raises the punishment to two hundred stripes (*ib.* 34–36). (6) *astō-bid*, 'bone-breaking,' begins with the punishment of seventy stripes for the first offence, and closes with that of two hundred stripes for its third repetition (*ib.* 37–39). (7) *frazā-baodhah*, 'rendering unconscious or causing death.' The punishment for this crime is ninety stripes for the first offence, and two hundred for the second (*ib.* 40–42).

The Pahlavi *Shāyast lā-Shāyast* variously speaks of eight or nine classes of crimes (i. 1, xi. 1). The *farmān* and *sraošō-caranā* are the additional sins mentioned here. Certain degrees are assigned to the various crimes, and the bodily punishment is converted into fines. Thus the degree of the smallest crime, *farmān*, is estimated at four *stars* (a *star* being equivalent to four *dirhams*). The degrees of the crimes rise in proportion to the gravity of the offences, until the *tanāfur* sin is estimated at three hundred *stars* (i. 2, xi. 2, xvi. 2–5).

2. Theft.—The *tāyu*, 'thief,' and *hazanha*, 'robber,' 'bandit,' who rob the faithful of their cattle and property, are severely punished. According to the Mazdayasnian declaration of faith, a true Zoroastrian undertakes to put down these crimes (*Yasna*, xii. 2). Haoma is invoked to warn the faithful of the cunning movements of the thieves (*ib.* ix. 21), and Rashnu, the angel presiding over truth, is spoken of as the best killer, smiter, and destroyer of the thieves and bandits (*Yasht*, xii. 7 f.). The sacrifices offered to Khurshēd, asking him to help the pious to withstand these evil

forces, is said to be equivalent to offering the same to Ormazd (*Yt.* vi. 4; *Nyāish*, i. 14), and Ardvīsūra is invoked to pour down her waters as a source of torment to the brigands (*Ys.* lxv. 8). The routing of the thieves and robbers is eagerly prayed for (*Ys.* lxi. 3). The man who takes a loan from another, with the evil intention of not returning it, is a thief; and the commentator explains that, if he bluntly refuses to restore it, he becomes a robber (*Vend.* iv. 1).

The culprits had either to pay fines, or their ears and hands were cut off, or they were imprisoned. If a man stole a *dirham* (about 7d.), he had to pay two *dirhams*, one of his ears was cut off, ten blows with a stick were inflicted upon him, and he was imprisoned for some time (*Ṣad Dar*, lxiv. 2–3). If he stole another *dirham*, four *dirhams* formed his fine, he had to forfeit his other ear, to receive twenty blows, and to be imprisoned for a period twice the length of that inflicted at the time of his first crime (*ib.* lxiv. 4). The third repetition of the crime was punishable by cutting off his right hand (*ib.* 5), and if, persisting in his evil work, he finally stole five hundred *dirhams*, he was to be hanged (*ib.* 6). The bandit who had robbed a person of something by violence, had to restore to the owner four times as much as he had taken, or he was to be killed if public safety required it (*ib.* 11; cf., further, on theft, *Dīnkarṭ*, viii. 20. 123, 21. 1–14).

3. Breach of contract.—The man who lies to Mithra is guilty of *Mithrō-druj*, and brings death to the whole country (*Yt.* x. 2). The faithful are exhorted not to violate contracts entered into with any one. The six important forms of contract are: (1) word-contract, (2) hand-contract, (3) the contract to the value of a sheep, (4) the contract to the value of an ox, (5) the contract to the value of a man, and (6) the contract amounting to the value of a field (*Vend.* iv. 2). The penalty for breaking these contracts begins with three hundred stripes with *aspa-aštrā* and an equal number with *sraošō-caranā*, for the violation of the first class of contract, and rises to the maximum punishment of a thousand stripes each in case of the breach of the final contract, namely, the field-contract (*ib.* 11–16).

4. Crimes connected with the defilement caused by corpses and dead matter.—The earth, being one of the sacred elements of nature, is to be kept pure from defilement. Ahriman created the sin of interring corpses in the earth, for which there is no atonement (*Vend.* i. 13, iii. 39), and it is therefore the sacred duty of the faithful to disinter the dead bodies, wherever possible. If a man lets a corpse remain buried, and neglects his duty to dig it out within six months, his punishment is five hundred stripes with each of the two punishing rods. The penalty is doubled in the case of a corpse remaining buried for a period of one year, and if it is not disinterred within a period of two years, it makes the man guilty of *anāperetha*, for which there is no atonement (*ib.* iii. 36–39).

Under no circumstances is a corpse to be carried by a single person, lest he should be defiled. Capital punishment is meted out to him who violates this precept. The culprit is to be removed to a barren place, and to be kept there until he grows old, after which his head is to be cut off (*ib.* 15–21). The man who does not properly observe the rules of removing the corpse to the top of a mountain, and fastening the body with brass or stones by the feet or hair, to prevent the dogs and birds from carrying the dead matter to water and trees, is to be punished with two hundred stripes (*ib.* vi. 47 f.). If a man, happening to touch a corpse in the wilderness, approaches water and trees without cleansing himself, he receives four hundred stripes with each of the two instruments (*ib.* viii. 104–106). Wilful carrying of the dead matter to water or fire makes one worthy of death (*Ṣad Dar*, lxxii. 1). Unnecessary waste of anything is deprecated, and a man who throws more cloth on the corpse than is essential has to suffer the punishment of four hundred stripes, rising to one thousand stripes with both the whips, in proportion to the quantity thus wasted (*Vend.* viii. 23–25).

Among the worst crimes created by Ahriman is that of cooking corpses, for which there is no atonement, and of which the penalty is death (*Vend.* i. 17, viii. 73 f.; Strabo, p. 732). The eating of the carcass of a dog or the corpse of a man makes one unclean for ever, and it is prescribed that the heart of the man guilty of this crime shall be torn out, and his eyes put out (*Vend.* vii. 23; *Ṣad Dar*, lxxi. 2; *Grand Rivāyat*, p. 123).

The ground on which a dog or man has died is not to be tilled for a period of one year. The man who does not observe this rule is punishable with two hundred stripes. The man who tills the ground without cleansing it of the bones, hair, urine, and blood lying on it becomes a *pešōtanu*, and receives two hundred stripes with the two instruments of punishment as a penalty (*Vend.* vi. 8 f.). It is sinful to throw bones of a dead dog or a dead man on the ground, as the marrow flowing from them pollutes the ground. The penalty of throwing a bone of the size of the top-joint of the little finger is thirty stripes, and rises proportionately, to the maximum penalty of one thousand stripes when the body of a dead dog or a dead man is thrown on the ground (*ib.* vi. 10–25). Bringing back fire into a house in which a man has died, within nine nights in winter and a month in summer, is punishable with two hundred stripes with the *aspa-aštrā*, and two hundred with the *sraošō-caranā* (*ib.* v. 43 f.).

5. The crime of ill-treating the dog.—The Iranians held the dog as the sacred animal created by Ormazd, and rigorous punishments are prescribed for his ill-treatment. The giving of bad food to various classes of dogs is punishable with fifty to two hundred stripes, in accordance with the importance of the class of dogs (*Vend.* xiii. 24–27). Seven hundred stripes with each of the two implements are prescribed for him who smites a bitch that is with young (*ib.* xv. 50). Five hundred to one thousand stripes are the lot of those who kill various kinds of dogs (*ib.* xiii. 4, 12–15). The murder of a water-dog is to be atoned for by ten thousand stripes, or by carrying ten thousand loads of sweet-scented wood to the fire, or an equal number of *barsom* twigs, or by carrying the same number of *zaothra* libations to the waters, or by killing as many snakes and other noxious creatures, or by helping to contract marriage between the faithful, and by doing various similar redeeming works (*ib.* xiv. 1–18).

6. Crimes relating to women in menses.—Elaborate rules are laid down for the period of menstruation, during which a woman remains in seclusion, the violation of which is generally punishable in the next world. Intercourse with a woman during this period amounts to wilful murder, burning of the life-giving seed, and is punished with thirty stripes for the first offence, and rises to a penalty of ninety stripes in case of its repetition (*Vend.* xvi. 14–16). The penalty rises to one thousand stripes when the offending parties wilfully and knowingly indulge in the crime, and the man has to atone for his sin by an additional performance of meritorious deeds, as those of killing about nine thousand noxious creatures such as snakes, frogs, and ants (*ib.* xviii. 67–74). If the woman who has brought forth a still-born child drinks water for the good of her own health, she

becomes a *pešōtanu*—her offence is punishable with two hundred stripes (*ib.* vii. 70–72).

7. **Crimes regarding the purificatory rites.**—Capital punishment is meted out to him who officiates as a cleanser without himself being well versed in the rites of cleansing. His hands are to be bound, his head is to be cut off, and his body is to be thrown to the vultures (*Vend.* ix. 47–49). A later work prescribes that he shall be nailed with four nails, his skin taken off, and his head cut off (*Frascr Rivāyat*, p. 398, as quoted by Darmesteter in *SBE* iv. 135, n. 1, *Le Zend-Avesta*, ii. 170, n. 55).

8. **Unnatural crime.**—Zoroaster denounces this deed as the worst crime against morality (*Ys.* li. 12). Ahriman is its creator (*Vend.* i. 12). There is no sin greater than this, and the man practising it becomes worthy of death (*Ṣad Dar*, ix. 2). This is the only crime which entitles any one to take the law into his own hands, and to cut off the heads of the sodomites and to rip up their bellies (*ib.* ix. 3 f.). The *Dātistān-ī Dēnīk* (lxxvi. 3) modifies this, and states that, before taking the law into one's own hands, one should try to impress the heinousness of the crime on the minds of the wicked sinners, but, if that is of no avail, one may kill them on the spot. The sodomite is called a demon, a worshipper of demons, a male paramour of demons, a female paramour of demons, a wife of demons, as wicked as a demon; he is a demon in his whole being while he lives, and remains so after death (*Vend.* viii. 32). The faithful should not have any intercourse with such a man, except by way of attempting to reclaim him from this inexpiable crime (*Dātistān-ī Dēnīk*, lxxii. 10). The crime puts one on a par with Ahriman, Afrāsiyāb, Zohak, and other wicked ones (*Ṣad Dar*, ix. 5), and greatly increases the joy of the Evil Spirit (*ib.* 6). Eight hundred stripes with each of the two rods is the penalty for him who has been forced by violence to this crime, but there is no atonement for him who voluntarily submits to it (*Vend.* viii. 26 f.). The same crime committed with a woman is equally heinous (*Ṣad Dar*, ix. 7).

9. **Adultery and abortion.**—See ADULTERY (Parsi) in vol. i. p. 133 f., and FETICIDE.

LITERATURE.—J. Darmesteter, *Le Zend-Avesta*, Paris, 1892, ii., Introd. pp. xv–xxiv, *SBE* iv., Introd. lxxxii–lxxxvii; W. Geiger, *Ostirān. Kultur im Altertum*, Erlangen, 1882, pp. 453–460 (Eng. tr. by Darab, *Civilisation of the Eastern Iranians* London, 1885–1886, ii. 35–43); M. Fluegel, *The Zend-Avesta and Eastern Religions*, Baltimore, 1898, pp. 199–204; V. Henry, *Le Parsisme*, Paris, 1905, pp. 120–126; Christensen, *L'Empire des Sassanides*, Copenhagen, 1907, pp. 68–74; P. K. Motiwala, 'The Criminal Law of Ancient Iran,' in *Cama Memorial Volume*, Bombay, 1900, pp. 183–199; A. K. Vesavevala, 'The Signification of the Words "Upāzananām Upāzōit,"' in *Spiegel Memorial Volume*, Bombay, 1908, pp. 125–129. On punishments (often little else than barbarous caprice) in the Persian Empire, see especially B. Brisson, *De regio Persarum principatu*, ed. Lederlein, Strassburg, 1710, pp. 182 ff., 566 ff., 769; G. Rawlinson, *Fifth Oriental Monarchy*, London, 1867, ch. iii. *sub fin.*

MANECKJI NUSSERVANJI DHALLA.

CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Roman).—Roman law never acquired on its criminal side the clearness and precision which characterized its civil applications, in an ever increasing degree, until the collapse of the Empire came. Among the many causes for the imperfect development of criminal law, the most important is the comparatively large influence which political conditions exercised upon the definition and punishment of crime. Under the democratic system, when the assembled citizens were in theory sovereign, evolution was slow; with the advent of autocratic rulers—Sulla, Julius Cæsar, and the Emperors—change proceeded apace, and criminal administration was made more systematic. For the purposes of our brief exposition, three sections of the subject may be distinguished. The first comprises the notions attached to crime, the gradual abridgment of the gulf between criminal law and morality, and the widening jurisdiction of the State over offences. The second branch concerns the procedure leading up to punishment; the third, the nature of the punishments inflicted. Needless to say, the boundaries between these three divisions cannot be precisely drawn.

In the earliest days of the Roman community, most functions of the State were rudimentary, and there was little scope for the public punishment of actions committed by citizens, even when they shocked the moral sense. Much was left to the vengeance of heaven, and in some cases any citizen could make himself the champion of the offended gods. The close-knit organization of the family (*familia*) and the clan (*gens*) also greatly restricted the scope of criminal law; and, though the framework of the *gens* early fell to pieces, that of the *familia* retained many of its primitive elements until Roman civilization succumbed. Survivals in the historical period clearly show that the head of the family (*paterfamilias*) once possessed uncontrolled authority (*imperium*) over the lives of all who were in his power. The wife, the child (born in the family or brought into it by adoption from without), and the slave were in this respect all on the same level. Of course ancestral custom (*mos maiorum*), powerful in every age of Rome, restricted in practice the exercise of this authority, though in principle it was absolute, and required it to be used with a certain formality and reasonableness. The law stepped in later and protected to an increasing extent the freeborn members of the family. New forms of marriage enabled the wife to escape from the absolute *imperium* of her husband. Examples of the execution of women by family decree are found in the 2nd cent. B.C., and of men in the 1st; but the bare right of the head of the family to put to death those subjected to him was only removed by Constantine, and the cruel exposure of newly-born children was permitted long after his time. Even the slave was protected by the Imperial legislation. See art. CONSTANTINE, above, p. 80.

In so far as the State corrected crime, the supreme magistrate, whether known as *rex*, *dictator*, *consul*, or *prætor*, was, in the remoter age, in the same position as the *paterfamilias*, that is to say, his *imperium* was, within its own sphere, in principle unlimited, though he would often have to submit, in the case of citizens, to the *force majeure* of custom, and in the case of aliens to that of treaty obligations. The Republic introduced, as one of its few fundamental innovations, the right of appeal (*provocatio*), which entitled every citizen to a trial by his fellow-burgesses in all weightier matters. Only in special circumstances, which will be described later, was he subjected to arbitrary treatment during the Republican age. The protection afforded by the *provocatio* was at first valid only against magistrates who acted within the city and a thousand paces outside, but it was gradually extended to Italy and even to the provinces. The changes which were brought about by the Empire were profound. As in other departments of government, so in criminal administration, the Emperor became supreme. From the first his autocracy was practical, and in the end it was undisguised.

Apart from the traces of primitive practice preserved in later institutions, the first glimpse afforded to us of the criminal side of Roman law is given by the fragments of the Twelve Tables. Punishment of individuals by special enactment (*privilegium*), *i.e.* by an act of attainder, is forbidden. The State recognizes as offences against itself only a few acts—treason (*perduellio*), aggravated murder (*parricidium*), arson, theft of grain from the soil, lampooning, and possibly false witness.

The definition of crimes was vague, especially (as was natural) in the case of treason, but later legislation gave more precision to the legal view of crime, and extended the range of criminal inquiry. Sulla carried out a great codification of criminal law, and grouped crimes under eight or nine heads. To each group a separate court (*quæstio*) was assigned, each with a fundamental law, dealing carefully with the substance and the forms of its jurisdiction, and Sulla's regulations were further elaborated by Julius Cæsar and Augustus. The courts set up by Sulla dealt with the following crimes: (1) extortion by officials in the provinces (*repetundæ*); (2) theft to the detriment of the gods (*sacrilegium*), or of the State (*peculatus*); (3) murder and offences akin to it—brigandage, misuse of criminal procedure in capital cases, poison, magic, arson, and wrecking; (4) public bribery (*ambitus*); (5) treason (now termed *maiestas*); (6) forgery (*falsum*); (7) the infliction of bodily damage (*iniuria*); (8) public violence (*vis*); and (9) kidnapping (*plagium*). The crimes mentioned are only the principal ones which came before these courts, for they also dealt with many other outrages (such as sexual offences) by direction of particular statutes, under conditions which are difficult to determine. Augustus established separate courts to deal with (1) adultery, which had not been previously treated as a public crime; and (2) usury, against which many Republican statutes had been directed (mostly in vain), and the offence of artificially raising the price of corn. Later on, many forms of wrongdoing, *e.g.* *delatio* (the trade of the informer), received special attention from the government. Thus, by the time of the early Empire, a multitude of deeds, not formerly punishable, or punishable only by fine, came to be included in the category of crimes, while others that had been vaguely classed together as criminal were separated and precisely defined. As will be explained later, many acts which did not come before criminal courts properly so called were subject to punishment in other ways. The repression and prevention of crime were much more rigorously carried out by the Empire than by the Republic. For instance, Augustus first effectively suppressed brigandage in Italy and piracy on the high seas. The range of private vengeance, which was wide in the early age, was now narrowed almost to vanishing point, and only violent attacks against which there was no defence but violence excused homicide. The Twelve Tables permitted the nocturnal thief to be killed unconditionally, but later the killer had to prove urgent need for his action.

One department of crime needs special comment—that of treason, the treatment of which is vital in Roman history at every period. The old name *perduellio* indicates by its derivation that treachery in connexion with war was solely or chiefly viewed as treason in the early days; but soon the name was made to cover any act which the assembly of citizens could be induced to regard as a deadly injury done to the community at large. In the later age of the Republic, the offence was called *maiestas*, which is an abbreviation for *crimen maiestatis imminutæ*, a charge of impairing the greatness of the country. The range of acts which might come under this description was wide, so that many breaches of a citizen's or a magistrate's duty, besides those closely connected with war, belonged to this category. With the establishment of the Empire, treasonable actions came to be viewed as directed against the Emperor alone. This was the natural ultimate development of the Republican idea that insults to the higher magistrates were treasonable. One of the most interesting Roman applications of the doctrine of treason, and one somewhat remote from modern ideas, made it cover disrespect for, or attacks on, the recognized religion of the State. Regard for religion was a matter of civic duty, though the State did not force religious observances on the citizen as such until the conflict between Christianity and the Empire became acute in the 3rd century. Till then, a Christian's religion would rarely bring him into antagonism with the government, unless some public function, such as that of magistrate or soldier, required him to join in heathen ceremonies. The deification of the Emperors provided for the first time a cult which was common to the whole Empire, and rendered the position of the Christians more difficult. But the persecutions which they suffered were due mainly to local fanaticism, and were seldom enjoined or favoured by the central administration. When Christianity became the Imperial religion, both heathenism and heresy were treated as public offences.

As has been stated, the absolute control of the chief magistrate over punishment was abolished on the foundation of the Republic. The right of appeal (*provocatio*) entitled the citizen to a trial by his fellow-burgesses, and the magistrate who set the right at naught was himself subject to penalty. But limits were imposed on the *provocatio*, sometimes by law, sometimes by custom. At first the dictator was not bound to grant an appeal, but he was placed in the same position as other magistrates by a *lex Valeria*, enacted in 301 B.C. Military rule naturally excluded the *provocatio*. The idea that a *lex Porcia*, passed before 108 B.C., withdrew from the commander in the field the right to impose the death penalty, rests on a wrong inference from a passage in Sallust (*Jug.* 59). The statutes which conferred power on Sulla, and on the Triumvirs in 43 B.C., established naked autocracies, and legalized the proscriptions. The Senate from time to time claimed the right to authorize the magistrates to inquire into offences and to punish them without regard to the assembly. The earliest recorded example of this usurpation is afforded by the suppression of the so-called Bacchanalian conspiracy in 186 B.C., when, in a time of panic, many citizens, as well as members of allied communities, were arbitrarily executed. This was done in the interest of religion, over which the Senate exercised an unquestioned supervision, but later the special criminal commission was used as a political engine. After the deaths of the Gracchi many of their supporters suffered in this way, though the younger brother was the author of laws which were designed to put an end to such proceedings. The decree of the Senate, commonly known as *senatus consultum ultimum*, which empowered magistrates to attack by force and slay men whom the senators chose to regard as rebels, was a device which belonged to the decadence of the Republic. It was first put into force against the younger Gracchus and his followers; the slaughter of the elder with his partisans was not even covered by this form. The decree was repeatedly passed and acted on afterwards, though its legality was fiercely contested by the democrats. Apart from the special criminal commissions issued by the Senate, and the *senatus consultum ultimum*, some cases existed in which custom sanctioned the summary punishment of a wrongdoer. Thus erring Vestals were sentenced to death by the Pontifex Maximus, though in the later Republican age they were sometimes arraigned before the assembly. A citizen who transgressed against the rights of a foreign people could be surrendered to that people. One who did not appear when summoned to military service could be sold into slavery, and so might the burgess who disregarded the call of the censors at the periodical registration of

citizens and their property. In these instances the citizens were deemed to have passed judgment on themselves by their absence (Cic. *pro Cæc.* § 99). It may be added that, in the last century of the Republic, the tribunes of the plebs sometimes asserted, though they were not allowed to exercise, the privilege of putting to death summarily any one who insulted them. This was assumed to be in accordance with the provisions of the ancient *leges sacratæ*, which rendered the persons of the tribunes inviolable. These laws, like others of an early date, merely decreed against the offender the vague condemnation contained in the words *sacer esto* ('let him be accursed'). The scholars of the later Republic, and the tribunes along with them, held that the clause deprived the guilty man of all legal protection, gave every citizen the right to decide upon his criminality, and allowed his blood to be shed without blame, though, from the earliest days of Roman civilization, some public control must have existed over such executions.

The establishment of the plebeian tribunate (494 B.C.), the enactment of the code of the Decemvirs known as the 'Twelve Tables' (450 B.C.), and the laws which were adopted when the Decemvirs were overthrown (449 B.C.) had a profound effect upon the course of criminal justice. The right of appeal was strongly confirmed. Arbitrary punishments of individuals by the assemblies, apart from the provisions of general statutes, were forbidden. Such resolutions of the assemblies were called *privilegia*. Cicero rightly contended that his banishment in 58 B.C., by an act of the *comitia centuriata*, was unconstitutional. The Twelve Tables also prescribed that no citizen's *caput*, that is to say, his life or his status as a burgess, should be placed in peril except before the 'greatest assembly' (*comitatu maximo*), by which we must understand the *comitia centuriata*. As the principal State crime in the earliest days was *perduellio*, or treason connected with war, it was natural that the assembly which comprised the warriors, past and present, of the nation should constitute the highest criminal court. On the other hand, a man's property could be assailed in either of the two other assemblies, the *comitia tributa*, which met under the presidency of a magistrate invested with the *imperium*, or the *concilium plebis*, which was summoned by the plebeian tribunes, and was organized, like the *comitia tributa*, on the basis of the local tribes. An old statute permitted all magistrates to impose fines without appeal, up to a definite amount; beyond the limit, one of the two assemblies had to decide. No motion in a criminal trial was constitutional which invited the citizens to combine a personal punishment (*pœna*) with a fine (*multa*).

The inconvenience of using as courts of justice the legislative assemblies, at which hundreds of thousands of citizens had the right to be present, was very great. The criminal trial, for the more important offences, required four meetings at stated intervals before the final verdict could be given; but it may be inferred from a line in Plautus, which describes the burgesses as making a pastime of their duties as judges (*Captivi*, 475), that there was little ceremony about cases of less consequence. All acts of assemblies were in theory subject to the elaborate rules of veto on which the whole Republican government was based; but custom seems to have restricted within narrow bounds their application to criminal affairs. The tribunes of the plebs acquired a prominent position as prosecutors for high crimes and misdemeanours, though at Rome no burgess was ever in theory debarred from entering on a criminal prosecution, unless he had forfeited the right by some misconduct of his own. The difficulties attendant on the comitial system led to a new arrangement, and in 149 B.C. the epoch-making *lex Calpurnia repetundarum* established a special court (*quæstio*), with delegated authority to try governors who were charged with robbing the provincial subjects of Rome. As has been stated above, Sulla placed all recognized crimes under the sway of such standing courts, and, though recourse to the more cumbrous process before the *comitia* was still possible, it was rarely attempted. The *quæstiones* were exempted by law from the operation of the magistrates' veto (*intercessio*). Occasionally temporary courts were established to deal with particular offences. In this way the men who had trafficked with Jugurtha were punished, and Clodius was tried and acquitted by special judges. The jurors were originally drawn from the Senate, for which Gaius Gracchus substituted the equestrian order. Sulla reinstated the Senators, but after 70 B.C. the two bodies shared the privilege with men of a somewhat lower station. Both qualifications and procedure were varied from time to time by legislation. The *quæstiones* continued to exist till the 3rd cent. A.D., but the parallel jurisdictions which the Empire introduced continually impaired their authority until they were extinguished.

There were modes of punishment which did not depend on an arraignment before a criminal tribunal, properly so called. The censors in the time of the Republic could penalize the citizens in many ways, degrading their status, and even inflicting on them pecuniary loss. They were not bound by the criminal statutes, and took cognizance of moral and social offences which were outside the purview of the laws. But succeeding censors were not tied to the decisions of their predecessors. The forms of civil law were employed to vindicate some breaches of public order, and also to provide redress for certain forms of fraud which could not be adequately punished by exactions in money. Not only in Rome, but in every municipal community, there were fines which were recoverable by civil process, on the public behalf. In some private suits, the defendant, if condemned, incurred additional penalties which were not pecuniary. The judgment inflicted on him a stigma (*ignominia* or *infamia*) which impaired the value of his citizenship and left him under many disqualifications for public life. The circumstances were such that the losing litigant was held to have been specially bound to honourable action, as when one partner in business had cheated another, or a guardian defrauded his ward. Theft, when practised by one citizen against another, without violence, was technically not a crime, but condemnation in a suit for damages in pursuance of theft carried ignominy with it. The same stigma rested *ipso facto* upon men engaged in occupations regarded as degrading, that of an actor, for instance, or a public auctioneer (*præco*), or a gladiator.

Roman jurisdiction over offences was exercised at first only as far as the *Romanus ager* extended, that is to say, in the regions of Italy possessed of burgess rights. Outside this pale foreign law prevailed. After the Social War (90–89 B.C.), Italy was parcelled out among Roman municipalities, and there had to be a division between the local jurisdiction and the central courts in Rome. Little is known of the principles on which the discrimination was based, but we read with some surprise that the statute of Sulla relating to murder restricted the court at the capital to cases arising in Rome. Before the end of the Republican period, the rule was established that a Roman citizen outside Italy could claim to be tried in Italy for any serious offence, and in the provinces the authority of the provincial governor in matters

of jurisdiction tended perpetually to encroach upon the autonomy of the municipalities and peoples. As is well known, the Roman government granted special privileges to the Jewish communities.

The advent of the Empire brought about a great transformation in the criminal law of Rome, as in all other parts of Roman polity. The paramount authority of the Emperor, and, in particular, his power of pardoning, led ultimately to a complete recasting of criminal procedure both in Rome and outside it. At Rome new officials, especially the *præfectus urbi* and the *præfectus prætorio*, gradually acquired a large jurisdiction; and, in the end, practically all important charges came to be tried by officers who were Imperial nominees. As the world became Romanized, local diversities in privilege disappeared, until the celebrated decree of Caracalla was passed (A.D. 212), which conferred the franchise on the whole Empire, and led to uniform, or nearly uniform, legal practice all over the Roman dominions. In the early days of the Empire every citizen had a right of appeal to the Emperor, as is exemplified by the case of St. Paul (Ac 25[12]), but by the 3rd cent. each provincial governor received from the Emperor the 'right of the sword' (*ius gladii*), which enabled him to dispose of the lives of provincial citizens, except in the case of Roman senators and members of the municipal senates (*decuriones*). After the accession of Augustus to power, the Roman Senate became a high court of justice, trying for the most part senators who were charged with the more serious crimes. But, just as the *quæstiones* were ultimately destroyed by the dominance of the Emperor, so the jurisdiction of the Senate was reduced to municipal proportions under the monarchy established by Diocletian and Constantine.

As in Italy, so in the provinces, the extent of local autonomy possessed by the different cities and peoples who were subject to Rome varied greatly while the great process of assimilation was being carried out. The tendency, however, to increase the authority of the Roman governors was strong from the first, and in the end nothing but a limited control in matters of police, and in other minor affairs, was left to the municipal courts, Italy being placed in this respect on the same footing as the provinces. The history of police jurisdiction, at all periods of Roman history, is obscure. During the Republican period, citizens of the criminal class at Rome seem to have been dealt with severely, little regard being paid to their right of appeal. Indeed, the value of the *provocatio* greatly depended on the willingness of the magistrates—in the last resort, of the tribunes—to secure it to the burgess, while to the red-handed assassin or the thief taken in the act the *leges Valeriæ* and *Porciæ* were of little avail.

The nature of the punishments inflicted by the Roman State varied greatly in the course of its history. We can clearly discern a time when the community, if it interfered at all, inflicted the penalty of death and no other. Under the system of trial before the *comitia*, this was the only punishment which the chief assembly, the *comitia centuriata*, could assign. But the custom was early established whereby the culprit, before the final verdict was given, could shake the dust of his country from off his feet and go into exile. In this case, at the final hearing the plea was put in that 'he had changed his soil with a view to exile' (*solum vertisse exilii causa*), whereupon the assembly passed a resolution known as *interdictio aqua et igni* (in the full form *tecto* was added), refusing the offender (now no longer a Roman) the right to receive the chief necessaries of life—shelter, water, and fire—within Roman territory, as technically defined by the phrase *Romanus ager*, which for this purpose was never deemed to extend beyond Italy. The *quæstiones*, in the case of the more serious offences, followed the earlier practice of the centuries. Exile was such a common incident in the early civic community that many treaties made between Rome and other States included a clause binding the contracting parties to give harbourage to outlaws. Until the time of the Social War, which led to the enfranchisement of Italy, a Roman could find a refuge no further away than Tibur (Tivoli); but Milo, condemned for the murder of Clodius in 52 B.C., had to place himself beyond the bounds of the peninsula, at Massilia. Aliens within the *Romanus ager* could be warned to quit it by the magistrates, unless international agreement stood in the way. This form of removal was called *relegatio*. But after the Hannibalic War the government readily disregarded treaty obligation, and the repeated indiscriminate expulsion from Rome of Latins and other Italian allies did much to bring on the great Social War. This form of banishment was extended to Roman citizens in the Imperial period. The *relegatus* was merely ordered to live in a particular place during the Emperor's pleasure. This was the only restriction on the person's privileges as a citizen, and Ovid, banished to Tomi, was careful to insist that he was only *relegatus*, not *exul*.

Cicero laid it down in the year 66 B.C. (*pro Cæc.* § 101) that *exilium* was not a punishment known to Roman law, but a means of escape from punishment; yet he himself broke through this technical principle three years later, when, as consul, he passed a law to check public bribery. Thereafter *exilium* was freely used as a penalty, and new forms of it were devised in the Imperial age. The old *interdictio aqua et igni* tended to fall out of use, and for it was substituted the *deportatio in insulam*, rendered familiar to us by Tacitus and Juvenal, who describe the islets of the Ægean as crammed with exiles.

The death penalty, except in the military sphere, was, as we have seen, hardly ever exacted in the Republican age, but in the more important cases it could not be so escaped under the Empire. Probably nothing else so fostered the bitterness entertained by the nobles against the Imperial system on its first institution. Yet the infliction of death was exceptional in the first two centuries, and was confined chiefly to the more important crimes which came before the Senate and the Emperor. Both these authorities were, practically, law-making powers, and were not bound by statute, as were the regular courts. From the accession of the Severi (A.D. 193), capital punishment became more and more common, and the number of offences to which it was allotted was continually increased. In the end not only treason and murder, but arson, magic, coining, kidnapping, aggravated violence, and a number of other wrongful acts might be treated capitally. The forms of execution were also changed and extended. Originally, as a rule, the offender was tied to a stake and flogged, then released and beheaded. This was symbolized by the bundles of rods (*fasces*), each containing an axe (*securis*), which were carried by lictors in front of a magistrate invested with the unimpaired *imperium*. In the city the axe was laid aside. Beheading by the axe was common in the earlier Imperial age (cf. Rev 20[4]), but was forbidden later, when the sword was substituted. The old formulæ connected with the passing of a death sentence by the *comitia centuriata* show that, before the time when escape into exile was permitted, the condemned criminal was sometimes flogged and crucified. The practice was revived by the Empire, 'according to the custom of our ancestors' (*more maiorum*), as the saying

went. During the main part of the Republican period, crucifixion was restricted to slaves, except in rare instances, such as the case of men convicted of misconduct with Vestals. A quaint early method of disposing of one who had slain a near kinsman (*parricida*) was to sew him up in a sack with a cock, an ape, and a serpent, and then to drown him. The Vestal was walled up, and died of starvation. In both these cases the sentence had originally a domestic character, and we have in them strong evidence of the primitive objection to the shedding of blood within the domestic circle. The Vestals were the daughters of the great State family, and were condemned by the Pontifex Maximus, who stood to them in the relation of *paterfamilias*. Something of a religious character attached to the spilling of the criminal's blood by the community. But the gods of the family could receive no such offering. Later, when the *paterfamilias* executed a member of his family, he was regarded as the deputy of the magistrate. The cross was used against free men without scruple by the Imperial administrators, until its employment was abolished by Constantine on religious grounds. The equally cruel death by burning was also familiar to the Empire. It was applied, by a crude sort of homœopathic retaliation, in the age of the Twelve Tables, to the citizen guilty of arson, and, later, it was occasionally a form of vengeance for military crime. The killing by fire of the Christian martyrs was technically a consequence of treason. Before the establishment of the Empire, the exposure of offenders to death in the arena, by wild beasts, was rare, though we hear of it as inflicted on slaves, deserters, or prisoners of war. But later it became one of the commonest forms of execution, and it lasted into the Christian period, being still in use in the time of Justinian. Malefactors who were executed in prison, like the Catilinarian conspirators, were usually strangled by the *carnifex*, or public executioner, under orders from the city commissioners of police, the *tresviri capitales*. We hear also, in Republican Rome, of wrongdoers being hurled from the Tarpeian rock on the Capitoline hill; and the same thing happened occasionally later, by order of the Senate; while the Twelve Tables prescribed this form of punishment for bearing false witness. The application of it in the age of the Empire seems to have been restricted to no particular offences, and to have been irregular. Penal servitude was a novelty introduced by the Empire. Criminals were often condemned to work in the mines, which were mostly the property of the government, or to do other menial services, sometimes in chains, slaves and the lowest class of freemen chiefly being exposed to this kind of suffering. Another kind of penal slavery was enforced enlistment among the gladiators. While the Republic lasted, citizen rights were completely lost only as a secondary consequence of condemnation for serious wrongdoing, but such loss was later on bound up directly with *deportatio* and the more severe forms of penal servitude. In all ages, some particular privileges of the citizen might be taken away while others were left. Imprisonment was not regularly inflicted on criminals either by the early or by the later Roman law. Incarceration was temporary, for purposes of inquiry, or for safe custody, till a sentence was carried out, although, on the other hand, the condemned debtor could be held in bondage by his creditor. Bodily chastisements were seldom imposed in the Republican epoch, excepting in the camp, where mutilation and scourging occurred, until the latter was forbidden by a *lex Porcia*. In the 2nd cent. B.C. earlier *leges Porciæ* had protected citizens in their civil capacity against stripes. Yet we know that St. Paul suffered the punishment (2 Co 11[25]) though he was 'born free' (Ac 22[28]). The so-called *lex talionis*—'an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth'—seems to have been sanctioned, probably with an order of a court, by the Twelve Tables. Under the absolute monarchy, after Diocletian came to the throne, mutilation of various kinds was permitted for a number of offences, and we often hear that Christian martyrs were subjected to it, and so, a little later, were heretics and worshippers of the old gods. The subjection of free men to torture during judicial inquiry crept in soon after the foundation of the Empire, and in the end became regular in certain cases.

As has been mentioned above, public fines were in early days partly inflicted by the magistrates without appeal, partly ordered by the *comitia* or *quæstio* after appeal, and partly recoverable by civil process. Although the legislation which ensued on the fall of the Decemvirs rendered it illegal for a prosecutor to propose a personal penalty along with a pecuniary fine, yet in cases of *perduellio* the condemned man's property was forfeited to the exchequer. When the *quæstio* was substituted for the comitial trial, this penalty ceased. The confiscation of Cicero's property was by special legislative act, and was irregular, but Cæsar introduced forfeiture for aggravated murder (*parricidium*), and Augustus for treason (*maiestas*); and, later, it usually followed upon *relegatio* and *deportatio*. In the case of other offences there was, under the Empire, as a rule, partial confiscation. The oppressive regulations connected with the Imperial *fiscus*, and the *lex Papia Poppæa*, which penalized celibacy, led to frequent and extensive deprivations of property.

It only remains to note that, while the Republic, in theory at least, treated all citizens as equal before the criminal law, the later Empire frankly respected persons. Subjects were divided into two classes, the 'more honourable' (*honestiores*), and the 'more humble' (*humiliores*) or plebeians (*plebeii*). The higher class consisted of national and provincial senators, knights (*equites*), veteran soldiers, and certain grades of Imperial officials. These were exempt from crucifixion, from death in the arena, from penal servitude, and from scourging and torture; and it was a privilege even of a local senator (*decurio*), after the 2nd cent., that the governor of the province could not put him to death without a confirmation of the sentence by the Emperor. The regular Imperial courts took a more extensive cognizance of crimes committed by slaves than was the case earlier.

LITERATURE.—The whole criminal law of Rome has been exhaustively treated by T. Mommsen in his *Röm. Strafrecht* (Leipzig, 1899), by which earlier works on the subject are, in the main, superseded. For the judicial system of the later Empire, with its complicated arrangements, the work of O. Karlowa, *Röm. Rechtsgesch.* (Leipzig, 1885) is most valuable. A brief summary will be found in the art. 'Judicium,' in Smith's *Dict. of Antiquities*³, 1890–1891; more information in the artt. 'Judicium' and 'Præfectus,' in Daremberg-Saglio, *Dict. des antiquités*³, 1886 ff.

J. S. REID.

CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Teutonic and Slavic).—**I. General conceptions of crime and punishment.**—(I) *Teutonic.*—We learn from Tacitus that the practice of blood-revenge was an important element in the legislation of the Teutonic peoples of his time.[1] The word used to express the execution of such revenge appears in nearly all the Teutonic languages: thus, Goth. *wrikan*, *gawrikan*, A.S. *wrëcan* (Eng. 'wreak'), O.H.G. *rehhan* (Germ. *rachen*), 'avenge,' 'persecute,' 'punish.' The possibility of commuting blood-revenge to wergeld and fine is also mentioned by

[1] *Germ.* 21: 'Suscipere tam inimicitias seu patris seu propinqui quam amicitias necesse est.'

Tacitus,[1] and, as may be inferred from the affinity of A.S. *wēre*, M.H.G. *were*, 'wergeld,' with Skr. *vaira* (cf. BLOOD-FEUD [Aryan], vol. ii. p. 724[b]), it goes back to the primitive history of the Teutonic race. From that remote age come also the terms O.H.G. *buoza*, O.Sax. *bōta*, O.Norse *bót*, 'fine,' which are cognate with Goth. *batiza*, *batists*, 'better,' 'best,' and originally signified 'repair of damage'; likewise Goth. *skuldō*, *skula*, 'debt,' 'debtor,' O.H.G. *sculd*, *sculda*, A.S. *scyld*, which are all derived from Goth. *skal*, *skulum*, 'to be owing,' and mean literally 'the obligation to pay' (wergeld or fine), and then, figuratively, guilt in general, whether before God or man (cf. art. ARYAN RELIGION, vol. ii. p. 49[b]). For the Goth. *dulgs*, 'guilt,' etc., see below.

Even by the time of Tacitus, however, blood-revenge and its remission by wergeld and fine were treated as something more than the private affairs of the families concerned. The injured group, instead of exacting blood-revenge, might, as is implied in Tacitus,[2] refer its 'cause' (*Sache*; Goth. *sakjō*, O.H.G. *sahha*, A.S. *sacu* [Eng. 'sake'], O.Norse, *sok*) to the public assembly. The compensation fixed by this tribunal was regarded as in some sense a penalty, and the amount was shared between the injured party (or his relations) on the one hand, and the chief or (in republican States) the community on the other.[3]

If we regard the intervention of the public assembly as involving no more than an attempt on the part of the tribe to bring about a peaceful settlement of such feuds as were especially dangerous to the common weal,[4] then the germs of the procedure among the Teutons may be referred to a very remote age. In the main, however, the offences dealt with by the assembly (Goth. *maþl*, A.S. *mæðel*, O.H.G. *mahal*, O.Norse, *mál*) in its judicial capacity would be, alike in antiquity and in the time of Tacitus, those which are included under a term common to Greek and Sanskrit, viz. ἄγος = *āgas*, expressing an idea that must go back to the dawn of Aryan history (cf. art. ARYAN RELIGION, vol. ii. p. 50[a]).

Of the primitive Teutonic terms applied to crimes against the community or its tutelary deities, and punishable by the community, special account must be taken of the following three: (1) O.Sax. *sundea*, 'misdeed,' O.Fris. *sinne*, 'crime,' A.S. *synn*, 'transgression,' 'wrong,' 'enmity' (Eng. 'sin'), O.H.G. *suntea*, 'sin'; (2) Goth. *frawaúrhts*, A.S. *forwyrht*, O.Sax. *farwurht*, 'sin,' O.H.G. *farworaht*, 'sinful'; (3) Goth. *faírina*, 'ground of accusation,' O.Norse *firn*, A.S. *firen*, O.H.G. *firina*, 'crime,' 'sin.' Of these the nearest equivalent to Gr. ἄγος = Skr. *āgas* are the first series (O.Sax. *sundea*, etc., probably related to Lat. *sons*, 'guilty'), and the second (Goth. *frawaúrhts* originally signifying 'being liable'; cf. Germ. *eine Strafe verwirken*, 'to incur a punishment'). In seeking to render the primitive connotation of these words, we must, of course, guard against introducing Christian ideas; yet the fact that the Church selected precisely these terms to express the conception of sin, *i.e.* transgression against God, shows that even in heathen antiquity they must have implied some notion of trespass against the gods. The third series (Goth. *faírina*, etc.) has not as yet been satisfactorily explained. Some connect it with Lat. *per* in *periuro*, *perperam*, Gr. πέραν, and interpret it as 'a deed that goes beyond,' *i.e.* beyond the crimes usually entailing blood-revenge; others connect it with Goth. *fērja*, 'snarer,' O.H.G. *fāra*, A.S. *fær*, 'snaring,' and regard it as signifying an offence involving the element of secrecy. It is in any case certain, as appears also from the language of Tacitus,[1] that the Teutons had at an early period drawn relatively fine distinctions within the general idea of wrongdoing. Among the various groups of words thus employed are the forms with the prefixes *mein-* (esp. O.Norse *mein-eiðr*, A.S. *mán-āþ* [cf. O.Eng. '*manswear*'], O.H.G. *mein-eit* [Germ. *Meineid*, 'perjury']) and *missa-* (Goth. *missadēþs*, O.H.G. *missitāt*, 'misdeed'), implying respectively the attributes of *deceitfulness* and *perversity* in conduct. This deepened conception of wrongdoing is also indicated by the words Goth. *skanda* = O.H.G. *scanta*, 'disgrace'; O.H.G. *scama*, 'sense of shame,' and O.H.G. *lastar*, O.Norse *lostr*, 'error,' 'vice,' 'disgrace,' from *lahan*, 'to blame' (cf. also O.Irish *locht*, 'error').

The primitive Teutonic word for 'punishment' is found in the series: O.Norse *viti*, A.S. *wite* (M. Eng. and Scots *wite*), O.H.G. *wīzzi*; it is related to Goth. *fraweitan*, 'avenge,' O.H.G. *wīzan*, 'punish,' and *far-wīzan*, 'punish,' 'banish,' and, as connected with the root *vid* (Lat. *video*), seems to be equivalent to the Lat. *animadvertere in aliquem*, 'to proceed against one.' A form peculiar to the Western Teutonic dialects is O.H.G. *haramscara*, A.S. *hearmsceare*, *i.e.* something imposed as a disgrace (O.H.G. *haram*, A.S. *hearm* = O.Slav. *sramŭ*, Russ. *soromŭ*, 'disgrace'). The O.H.G. *antōn*, *anadōn*, 'punish,' 'blame' (cf. O.H.G. *anto*, *anado*, 'indictable offence') is exclusively German, as are also the much later and still etymologically obscure words M.H.G. *strafe*, 'punishment,' and *veime*, 'vehme.'

(2) *Slavic*.—Turning next to the Slavs, we note that, apart from the treaties of Prince Oleg (A.D. 912; Jireček, no. 1) and Prince Igor (A.D. 945; Jireček, no. 2) with the Greeks, the earliest Russian document of a legal character is the collection of ancient prescriptive laws, decrees of princes, and Christian-Byzantine enactments, known as the *Russkaja Pravda*. This has been handed down in two forms, a shorter and a longer, and its original draft is attributed to Jaroslav (1019–54), by whose sons it was brought to completion (Jireček, nos. 3 and 4). We have, accordingly, no direct information regarding the legislation of the earlier centuries, and must fall back upon *a posteriori* arguments and philological data. From the records of the ancient annalists we infer that in the period before the migration, *i.e.* in the early centuries of the Christian era, the social fabric of the Slavs was of a character which may be outlined as follows. The Slavic people were a congeries of clans and tribes, each group resting upon a basis of kinship.[2] At the head of each group stood the 'elders' (*starešina*), who are called *zupani* (from *župa*, 'domicile') by some foreign writers,[3] and ῥῆγες by others.[4] In the early centuries of our era the Slavs had borrowed their word *kŭnezĭ*, 'prince,' from the Teutons (O.H.G. *kuning*, 'king,' etc.). The form of government was purely democratic, and the decision of all questions rested with the public assembly.[5]

[1] *Germ.* 21: 'nec implacabiles durant [inimicitiae]; luitur enim etiam homicidium certo armentorum ac pecorum numero.'
[2] Germ. 12: 'Licet apud concilium accusare quoque et discrimen capitis intendere.'
[3] *Ib.*: 'equorum pecorumque numero convicti mulctantur: pars mulctae regi vel civitati, pars ipsi qui vindicatur, vel propinquis eius, exsolvitur.'
[4] Germ. 21: 'periculosiores sunt inimicitiae juxta libertatem.'

[1] *Germ.* 12: 'Distinctio poenarum ex delicto . . . Diversitas supplicii illuc respicit, tamquam *scelera* ostendi oporteat, dum puniuntur, *flagitia* abscondi.'
[2] Nestor, *Chronicle*, xii.: 'They lived each with his kindred (*rodŭ*), and upon his own territory, every one ruling over his own kindred.'
[3] Constantinus Porphyrogenitus, cap. 29: 'Principes hi populi habent nullos praeter zupanos, senes, seniores, maiores natu.'
[4] Maurikios, *Ars militaris*, xii. (ed. Scheffer, Upsala, 1664, p. 281): πολλοὶ ῥῆγες καὶ ἀσυμφώνως ἔχοντες πρὸς ἀλλήλους.
[5] Procopius, *de Bello Gothico*, iii. 14: τὰ γὰρ ἔθνη ταῦτα, Σκλαβηνοί τε καὶ Ἄνται, οὐκ ἄρχονται πρὸς ἀνδρὸς ἑνός, ἀλλ' ἐν

As among the Germans, the legal relation of the various clans to one another was based upon the laws of blood-revenge, of which the primitive Slavic designations are found in O.Slav. *mĭstĭ*, Russ. *mestĭ*, 'revenge,' and O.Russ. *vraždda*, Pol. *wrožda*, etc., lit. 'enmity.' That the practice of blood-revenge persisted among the Slavic peoples until the dawn of historical tradition, and among the Southern Slavs, indeed, until recent times, has been shown in BLOOD-FEUD (Slavonic), vol. ii. p. 733 ff. There is no doubt, moreover, that in very ancient times the blood-revenge could be adjusted by means of the wergeld, and this holds good whether the Russ. term for wergeld, viz. *vira*, is of cognate origin with the above-mentioned Skr. *vaira* and A.S. *wēre*, or was borrowed from one of the Teutonic dialects. If the latter alternative is the right one, the original Slavic term must be looked for in such words as Czech *hlava* (Russ. *golova*, 'head'), Pol. *wrožda*, or Serv. *krv* (Russ. *krovĭ*, 'blood'), all of which mean both 'homicide' and the 'compensation' paid therefor.

In process of time blood-revenge was gradually abolished, and superseded by ransom (Russ. *vykupŭ*). The *Russkaja Pravda*, which in its older form sanctions blood-revenge only in cases of murder or serious bodily injury, and confines it within certain degrees of kinship, brings us to this stage, as in other cases it substitutes for blood-revenge the *prodaža*, 'compensation,' 'money-payment for an offence,' lit. 'sale' (of vengeance?). The *prodaža* either fell to the chief alone, or was shared between him and the injured party. That for which compensation was paid was usually called *za obidu*, but it should be noted that *obida* is the common term for ἀδικία, and is not limited to its modern sense of 'insult.' The classical tongues were then drawn upon for words to express the idea of compensation; thus we find Gr. *epitimia*, originally 'penance imposed by the Church,' then 'compensation for any offence,' while from the sphere of Latin culture comes *penja* (Lat. *pœna*).

The question arises, however, whether in the case of the Slavs, as in that of the Teutons, the conceptions of crime and punishment in general did not spring from the narrower ground of transgression against the community and its tutelary deities. Of Slavic terms for 'crime' there is only one which is represented in all the various dialects, viz. O.Slav. *grěchŭ*, 'sin,' a word etymologically obscure (cf. Berneker, *Slav. etym. Wörterb.*, Heidelberg, 1908 ff., p. 350 f.). It is certainly the case that this word, as used in a literary tradition under Christian influence from the first, is, in general, practically equivalent to 'sin against God,' precisely like the O.H.G. *suntea* and Goth. *frawaúrhts* (see above); it always signifies a transgression in the ecclesiastical sense, while a civil offence is called *prestuplénie*. It should be borne in mind, however, that, as *grěchŭ* is found in all the Slavic dialects, it must go back to heathen times; and it is natural, therefore, to see in this word the Slavic (as in *suntea* or *frawaúrhts* the Teutonic) equivalent of the Gr. ἄγος = Skr. *āgas*. And since, as we saw above, all matters were referred for decision to the public assembly, and as there is also evidence for a primitive Slavic word signifying 'tribunal' (O.Slav. *sadŭ*), it will hardly be counted rash, the present writer thinks, to assume that here too, as among the Teutons (for the *concilium*, see above), and also the Macedonians,[1] the tribal assembly was a court which might deal *inter alia* with offences (*grěchŭ*) against the community and its gods. That such infringements of the public interest are not mentioned in the *Russkaja Pravda* is explained by the fact that the latter is not, and does not purport to be, a complete legislative code.

In the Slavic languages there are two distinct groups of words signifying 'punish,' 'punishment': (1) the derivatives of a root *kar-* (O.Slav. and O.Russ. *karati*, Czech *kárati*, Pol. *karać*, 'punish'); and (2) those of a root *kaz-* (cf. Russ. *nakazáti*, 'punish,' *kaznĭ*, 'heavy civil penalty,' *kázniti*, 'punish,' Czech *kázati*, *kazniti*, etc.). The fundamental meaning of the latter seems to be something like 'banish,' perhaps in the sense of Gr. δίκη, δείκνυμι, 'law,' 'punish' (cf. Russ. *pokazáti*). The first-named group goes back to a primitive form **kara*, which is found, with or without derivatives, in many Aryan languages, and means 'army' and 'war' (O.Pers. *kāra*, 'army,' Lith. *kāras*, *karé*, 'war' and 'army,' Goth. *harjis*, O.Pruss. *karjis*, Irish *cuire*, 'army'). If this series be correctly interpreted as originally denoting 'the national army drawn up for war' (O. Schrader, *Reallexicon*, Strassburg, 1901, p. 349 f.), one is tempted to take the further step of connecting *karati*, 'punish,' with the *judicial* functions which we have conjecturally ascribed to the Slavic 'assembly' (cf. also κάρνη = ζημία in Hesychius).

2. Particular crimes and punishments.—As it cannot be expected that the present article should deal with the entire criminal law of the ancient Teutons and Slavs, the writer proposes simply to emphasize such aspects of the subject as may be judged of special importance for the readers of this work.

A. *CRIMES.*—Here it will be the writer's special object to determine which of these first developed a definite terminology. There is, unfortunately, a great lack of preparatory works in this field, particularly on the Slavic side,[1] so that only a few of the more important points can be referred to.

We saw above that the Teutonic and Slavic races from the very first drew a distinction between those offences which, as directed against the community, had to be punished by the community (*i.e.* the public assembly, and subsequently the State), and those which, bearing merely on the individual, were subject to the laws of blood-revenge or the private feud. Even at a very early period, however, we find that penal offences coming under the latter category, such as murder or flagrant theft, were really assigned to the former, so that it is impossible to make the distinction in question the principle of an exact classification of crimes. But we can hardly doubt that the species of crime referred to by Tacitus (*Germ.* 12), viz. cowardice in war and treason,[2] was always clearly discriminated from that which embraced personal assault, ordinary homicide, robbery, etc. The original Teutonic word for 'cowardice' would seem to be found in the O.Norse *argr*, A.S. *earh*, Lombard *arga* (a term of abuse), O.H.G. *arag*, 'cowardly'; while an old term for 'treason' appears in O.H.G. *herisliz*, 'desertion from the army.' An O.Russ. term for a related crime was *perevětŭ* (cf. Russ. *otvětŭ*, 'answer,' O.Russ. *věče*, 'public assembly,' O.Pruss. *waitiāt*, 'speak'), 'secret treasonable communication of intelligence,' for which, of course, as for the crimes mentioned by Tacitus, the penalty was death (*Pskovskaja Gramota*, Jireček, ix. 14).

We shall, therefore, treat of the various offences, apart from those against honour, under the follow-

δημοκρατίᾳ ἐκ παλαιοῦ βιοτεύουσι· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο αὐτοῖς τῶν πραγμάτων ἀεὶ τά τε ξύμφορα καὶ τὰ δύσκολα ἐς κοινὸν (public assembly) ἄγεται.

1 Curtius, VI. viii. 25: 'De capitalibus rebus vetusto Macedonum modo inquirebat exercitus, in pace erat vulgi.' Cf., further, O. Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* (Göttingen, 1906), p. 21.

1 For the Teutons, Grimm, *Deutsche Rechtsaltertümer*, p. 623 ff., is still the best work available.

2 'Ignavi et imbelles, proditores et transfugae

ing heads: (1) crimes against the person, (2) crimes against property, and (3) crimes against morality.

(1) *Crimes against the person.*—It is creditable to the Teutons that they discriminated between killing in general and murder, *i.e.* (according to the ancient point of view) the wilful and secret (or, at least, stealthy) taking of human life—a crime denoted by the following series of words: Goth. *maúrþr*, O.Norse *morð*, O.H.G. *mord*, cognate with the Lat. *mors, mortis*, 'death,' though it should be observed that Ulfilas (Mk 15[7]) uses the term in connexion with Barabbas, who is said to have committed a *maúrþr* (φόνος) in the insurrection (ἐν τῇ στάσει), and, therefore, not in secret. The idea of secrecy receives its first distinct expression in the exclusively German forms compounded with *mūhh*, viz. *mūhhilswert, mūhhilāri, meuchelmord*; cf. O.Irish *formúigthe*, 'absconditus.' A somewhat different shade of meaning appears in the Slav. *razboj*, which is the usual word for 'murder' in several of the Slavic languages, and which in Old Russian means both 'highway robbery' and 'ambuscade.' According to the *Russkaja Pravda* (Jirecek, iv. 4 and 5), one who kills another openly in a quarrel or at a feast may be absolved by money, but, 'if one sets out to commit *razboj* without any quarrel, the people shall not pay a fine for the *razbojnikŭ*, but shall surrender him absolutely, with wife and child, to the *potokŭ* and the *razgrablenie*' (for these punishments, see below). Of the numerous Teutonic terms for the infliction of bodily injury only the Frisian *dolch* need be referred to here. In the *Lex Frisionum* it is the most comprehensive term for wounding of all kinds. A familiar phrase is *dath und dolch*, 'killing and wounding'; cf. also the O.H.G. *noch tolk noch tôt*. *Dolch* comes from Goth. *dulgs*, 'debt,' related to O.Slav. *dlŭgŭ*, 'debt,' and O.Irish *dliged*, 'duty,' 'law,' 'right.' There was thus a term signifying 'debt,' 'obligation,' common to all the languages of Northern Europe, and this acquired the special meaning of 'obligation to pay compensation for bodily injury,' and eventually that of the 'injury' itself. Beyond this, however, no rigid distinction was made between homicide and wounding, and O.Norse words like *víg, sár*, and *drep* may signify either. In the *Russkaja Pravda* the only difference is that the fine for homicide is termed *vira*, while that for wounding is termed *prodaža* (see above): 'Should any one strike with the sword, but not cause death, he shall pay [to the prince] three *grivennicks*, and to the person injured one *grivennick*, and money for the doctor; but, if he does cause death, the *vira* must be paid' (Jirecek, iv. 24).

(2) *Crimes against property.*—Of all crimes the first to acquire a precise terminology was theft; this takes us back to primitive Aryan times—cf. Skr. *stená-* and *tāyú-*, 'thief,' O.Iran. *tāya-*, 'theft,' O.Slav. *tatĭ*, O.Irish *táid*, 'thief,' and also Gr. κλέπτω, Lat. *clepere*, Goth. *hlifan*, and Gr. φώρ, Lat. *fur*. A form common to all the Teutonic dialects is represented by Goth. *stilan*, while all the Slavic languages have terms corresponding to O.Slav. *krada, krásti*, 'steal.' The fact that in all these languages the words connoting secrecy are related to the terms for 'thief,' 'theft,' 'steal' (*e.g.* Skr. *stāyát-*, 'secret,' to *stená-*; O.Slav. *taj* to *tatĭ*; O.Pruss. *auklìptas*, 'concealed,' to Goth. *hlifan*, etc.) clearly shows that it was the element of concealment which distinguished theft from open robbery (Goth. *biraubōn*, A.S. *réafian*, O.H.G. *roubōn*; and O.Slav. *grabla*, Russ. *grábliu*, Pol. *grabić*, etc.). As robbery, however, was not in primitive times counted dishonourable (cf. Schrader, *Reallex. s.v.* 'Raub'), and as, even in historic times, theft was often punished more severely than robbery, it is obvious that the ethical ideas of later ages must have undergone a complete transformation. The horse-thief was punished with signal severity by Teutons and Slavs alike. It is recorded, *e.g.*, in the *Vita Ludgeri*, i. 26 (ed. Broner), that by order of Duke Wittekind of Saxony a horse-thief was put to death by stoning, while the above-cited passage of the *Pskovskaja Gramota* puts the horse-thief (*konevoy tatĭ*) and the incendiary (*zažigalnikŭ*, cf. O.Fris. *morthbrond*) on a level with the *perevětnikŭ* (see above): they are all liable to the penalty of death. In the ancient Teutonic codes the general term 'theft' comprises a large number of subordinate species with distinct names, for which, so far as the present writer is aware, the Slavic codes furnish no equivalents. Thus we have O.H.G. *walaroupa*, A.S. *wælreáf*, 'stripping of corpses,' and O.H.G. *herireita*, etc., 'ravaging,' *i.e.* 'the perpetration of crime—especially robbery—in bands.' Closely allied to this is *Heimsuchung* (O.Fris. *hemseke*; in Scots Law, *hamesucken*), 'domus invasio in aliquam familiam,' which, however, may be committed by a single person, and in that case resembles the modern *Hausfriedensbruch* (Lombard 'curtis ruptura, quod est *oberos* facere').

(3) *Crimes against morality.*—In marked contrast to the class of crimes against property, the class embracing what would now be reckoned crimes against morality has a singularly meagre vocabulary. This is, of course, explained by the great change that has taken place in men's ideas regarding sexual morality (see also art. CHASTITY [Teut. and Balto-Slav.])—a change for which, alike in Teutonic and in Slavic countries, the way was prepared by the Christian Church. With reference, first of all, to *incest*, the Teutonic family of languages, so far as the present writer knows, has but one specific term applicable to this crime, viz. A.S. *sib-leger*, 'lying (*i.e.* cohabitation) within the family,' which points unmistakably to family exogamy. In Anglo-Saxon glosses the Lat. *incestum* is rendered *hæmed*, which, however, means *coitus* simply—lawful or unlawful, or even adulterous. No O.Russ. term for 'incest' (modern Russ. *krovomešenie*, 'blood-mixing') is known to the writer. Any such term would, of course, bear the stamp of the Church. We find, for instance, that the metropolitan Johannes II. imposed penance upon marriages between persons as far apart as the fourth degree. In northern Europe, however, even in pre-Christian times, marriage within the family-group would doubtless be prohibited on economic grounds, although a moral repugnance to consanguineous unions would not then exist.

The crime of *adultery*, as was shown in art. CHASTITY (Teut. and Balto-Slav.), vol. iii. pp. 499–503, could be committed only by a wife, a married man being held culpable only in case of intercourse with the wife of another. The terms applied to this offence are of very general connotation; *e.g.* O.H.G. *huor*, O.Norse and A.S. *hór*, signify any kind of illicit intercourse; similarly O.H.G. *ubarligida*, 'adulterium.' A higher degree of precision belongs to A.S. *forliges*, 'adulteress,' lit. 'she who lies amiss.' The oldest Russian designations are *smilĭnoje, zastavanie, liobodějanie*, etc.—all, of course, of ecclesiastical origin. The vernacular name is *izmena*, 'treason,' 'unfaithfulness.' The punishment of this offence among the Russian peasantry—the primitive *vyvodŭ*—is described in art. CHASTITY (Teut. and Balto-Slav.), vol. iii. p. 501; it is identical with that inflicted by peasant criminal law upon the female thief.

Finally, *rape* was in all probability regarded originally as a species of robbery—of the abduction of women. In the glosses to the *Lex Salica* the phrase *per virtutem moechari*, 'to violate by force,'

is rendered by *thiuuerōfen*, *theorōfa*, 'women-stealing'; cf. also O.H.G. *nōtzogōn*, 'to abduct forcibly,' *nōtnumft*, *nōtnēman*, A.S. *nydnæme*, O.Norse *nothtekt* (*nōt* is lit. 'force'). In Old Russian the term *nasilie*, 'violence,' is also used for the crime of rape.

It would be interesting to know the Teutonic name for the *corpore infames*, who, according to Tac. (*Germ.* 12), were punished by being submerged in a marsh. It seems probable that the reference is to sodomy (O.Norse *sorðinn*, *strōðinn*, 'muliebria passus'). There seems to be no recorded evidence regarding the Slavic practice in this respect.

B. *PARTICULAR PUNISHMENTS.*—Here we distinguish (1) capital punishment and outlawry, (2) corporal punishment, and (3) abridgment of personal freedom.

(1) *Capital punishment and outlawry* (banishment).—That the penalty of death, as decreed by the public assembly, was known to the Teutons is shown by Tac. (*Germ.* 12).[1] The commonest form of execution was hanging, and the root-word denoting this penalty is common to all the Teutonic languages: Goth. *galga*, O.Norse *galge*, A.S. *gealga* (Eng. 'gallows'), O.H.G. *galgo*. In ancient Russia likewise, according to the passage already cited from the *Pskovskaja Gramota*, the perpetrators of more atrocious crimes were executed by order of the public assembly (*věče*) or of the chief, and in this case also resort was usually had to the gallows (Sreznevskij, *s.v.* 'Pověšenije, Pověšati se').

Among the Teutons, 'outlawry' (banishment, exile), *i.e.* expulsion from the tribe, was in its effects practically equivalent to capital punishment. The most ancient word applied to a person so proscribed is retained in the *Lex Salica* as *wargus*, 'hoc est *expulsus de eodem pago*' (cf. Goth. *gawargjan dáuþau*, 'to condemn to death,' O.Norse *vargr*, 'wolf' and 'outlaw,' A.S. *wearg*, 'the malefactor sentenced to the gallows or to outlawry,' etc.). He was altogether outside the law (O.Norse *útlagr*, A.S. *útlagh*), and any one who met him might kill him, and was, indeed, bound to do so. This penalty was often combined with 'laying waste' (O.H.G. *wuostan*); *i.e.* the members of the judicial community assembled together in order to burn or demolish the criminal's house and property. The term 'outlawry,' supplemented thus by the idea of ravage, corresponds with the *potoku* or *potokŭ* and *razgrablenie* of the oldest Russian legal documents. The latter word means 'plundering'; the former should possibly be translated 'expulsion,' 'banishment' (Russ. *tociti*, lit. 'to cause to flow,' *tekŭ*, 'flow'). The penalty affected not only the criminal, but his wife and children also, and was inflicted for murder with robbery, horse-stealing, arson (see above, p. 303ᵇ, and Sreznevskij, *s.v.* 'Potokŭ'), and similar grave crimes.

For the special objects of this article it is a question of great importance whether the execution of criminals among the Teutons was—as the foregoing observations regarding their conceptions of crime suggest—a religious ceremony, *i.e.* whether at bottom it was designed to operate like a sacrifice in appeasing the wrath of the gods. The affirmative has the support of such distinguished writers on the history of law as H. Brunner (*Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte*, i.²) and R. Schröder (*Lehrb. d. deutschen Rechtsgeschichte*⁵), though E. Mogk (*ASG* xxvii. [Leipzig, 1909] 17) has recently called in question the practice of human sacrifice among the Teutons. In any case there is the evidence of a passage in the *Vita Wulframi*[1] to show that among the Frisians executions were performed at the festivals of the gods (cf. Müllenhoff, *Deutsche Altertumskunde*, Berlin, 1870–1900, iv. 244). As regards the Slavic practice the present writer has no evidence to offer.

(2) *Corporal punishment.*—Punishments involving mutilation of the body—cutting off the nose or ears, severing the hands or feet, blinding the eyes, or even severe flogging—in so far as they were not simply preliminary to the death penalty, were in all likelihood introduced at a relatively late period. In primitive times, among Slavs and Teutons alike, even the infliction of bodily injuries was dealt with by private revenge, and the practice survived till the time of the *Russkaja Pravda* (cf. Jirecek, iii. 2: 'or if he has been beaten till blood comes or till he is blue, it is not necessary for him—this man—to seek an eye-witness. . . . If he cannot avenge himself [*mĭstiti*], he shall receive for the crime [*za obidu*; see above] three *grivennicks*, but the doctor [receives] the wages'). Such vengeance would, of course, be carried out according to the principles of the *lex talionis*, and cannot, therefore, be regarded as punishment in the technical sense. In course of time private revenge for wounding was superseded, both among the Teutons and among the Slavs, and partly in consequence of their mutual relations, by a regular system of fines.

A more difficult question to decide is when and how corporal punishment found its way into the ancient codes. On the one hand, such penalties were probably first of all inflicted upon slaves and serfs, who, of course, could not pay the regular fine. The *Lex Frisionum*,[2] for instance, recognizes corporal punishment only in two cases, viz. (*a*) as merely antecedent to the penalty of death, for those who had been taken in the act of robbing a temple (cutting off the ears and castration), and (*b*) as meted out to a delinquent serf whose master refused to pay the fine. Similarly the *Russkaja Pravda* (Jirecek, iii. 16): 'if a serf (*cholopŭ*) strikes a free man, but takes refuge in the house, and his master refuses to give him up, then let a[nother] serf be taken, and the master shall pay twelve *grivennicks* for him. But if afterwards the man who was struck finds him, he shall beat him' (*da bĭjutĭ ego*). So far as the present writer knows, this is the earliest record of beating as a legal penalty in Russia. On the other hand, the credit of introducing corporal punishment must be assigned to the clergy, as is proved with special clearness in regard to Russia. In point of fact, the clergy suffused the conception of punishment with new ideas, such as, *e.g.*, that it amends the evil will, deters others, and the like. For the attainment of these ends they believed—after the example of the Byzantine legislation, which had elaborated this system with great fullness—that such bodily penalties as blinding, severance of hands, etc. (many of them on the Mosaic principle of 'an eye for an eye'), and flogging formed the appropriate means. According to Jaroslav's *Ustavŭ*,—the ecclesiastical counterpart to the *Russkaja Pravda*,—a sorceress, *e.g.*, must be punished (*kazniti*) after conviction, and she must further pay a fine (*penja*) of six *grivennicks* to the metropolitan. The nature of the *kazniti* appears from a warrant of the Russian metropolitan Johannes II. (1080–89), according to which the officers shall 'smartly chastise' (*jaro kazniti*), *i.e.* flog her, 'but

[1] 'Proditores et transfugas arboribus suspendunt, ignavos et imbelles et corpore infames coeno ac palude, iniecta insuper crate, mergunt.'

[1] 'Mos erat . . . ut corpora hominum damnatorum in suorum solemniis deorum . . . saepissime diversis litaret modis: quosdam videlicet gladiatorum animadversionibus interimens, alios patibulis appendens, aliis laqueis acerbissime vitam extorquens, praeterea et alios marinorum sive aquarum fluctibus submergebat.'

[2] Cf. R. His, *Das Strafrecht d. Friesen im Mittelalter*, Leipzig, 1901, p. 199.

not to death, nor cut off her limbs.' It is a well-known fact that under the power of the clergy, the Czars, and the serf-holders, flogging became the recognized mode of punishment in Russia, and it is curious to note how a punishment so degrading, and, originally, quite unknown, should in time come to be practically a public requirement.

Less than a generation ago a Russian village would furnish a scene like this: a sedate and well-to-do peasant, the head of a house and the father of a grown-up family, unshrinkingly lays himself on the ground in order to receive his tale of lashes, and when the business is over, he trudges homewards, conversing upon trifles with his companions in punishment (of whom there might be thirty on a court day) and smoking cigarettes (cf. Glehŭ Uspenskij, *Vlasti zemli*, 1882, p. 50 ff.). It is also recorded that a Russian peasant actually asked for twenty-five strokes of the rod, and that, when he had got them, he said: 'Thank you, that did me good. I was drunk yesterday, fooled away fourteen roubles—all I had—in the *kabak*, and ill-used my wife. I have now got my deserts' (V. Hehn, *De moribus Ruthenorum*, 1892, p. 214). Another, who had just been beaten and was asked why, answered: 'For a good reason, *bátjuška*. A man is not punished for trifles in our place. No such thing occurs here—no, Heaven forbid! We have not a master of that kind. We have a *master*. Such another master is not to be found in all the district.' 'Old Russia!' comments Turgeniev, who relates the incident (*Zapiski*, 1898, xiii.).

(3) *Punishment by abridgment of personal freedom.*—The law-breaker might have his liberty restricted either by enslavement or by confinement. The former method was resorted to at an early date, but for the most part only as the concomitant or sequel of other penalties, and need not, therefore, be further considered here. Imprisonment, on the other hand, alike in the Teutonic and in the Slavic area, is of relatively late origin, as is evident from the fact that Goth. *karkara*, O.H.G. *charchāri*, A.S. *carcern*, are derived from Lat. *carcer*, and the Russ. *tjurĭma*, 'prison,' from Germ. *Turm*. In Russia the introduction of penalties involving the abridgment of personal freedom was likewise due to the influence of the Church. The most ancient mode of restraint was 'putting in the stocks'; cf. the Russ. *kolódka*, denoting two boards with a hole for the foot; *kolódnikŭ*, 'convict,' and Pol., Russ., and Little Russ. *duby*, 'shackles for the feet,' from *dubŭ*, 'oak,' 'oak-log.'

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O. SCHRADER.

CRIMINOLOGY.—1. Penal codes.—The actual extent to which any penal code may be made to contribute to the repression of crime depends much more on the justice and equity of the principles on which it is founded, and the firmness with which it is administered, than on the severity of its provisions. Those who are familiar with the history of crime in Great Britain will remember that in the 18th cent., when capital punishment could be inflicted for a hundred offences other than murder, crime flourished exceedingly. Similarly, in the early part of the 19th cent. crime was rampant, and a further impetus was given to its growth by the uncertainty of the death penalty. Thousands of death sentences were passed, but only a small proportion of them were carried out, so that offenders came to regard the sentence with contemptuous indifference. Again, in the latter half of the century the long and severe sentences of penal servitude, which seemed to prisoners themselves, as well as to many others, vindictive in aim and effect, had no repressive influence on crime, the numbers of those in penal servitude at that time being more than three times as great as in 1910. No real and steady fall in crime took place till in 1879 the Summary Jurisdiction Act put an end to these long sentences. Almost simultaneously a uniform system of prison administration and treatment was inaugurated, and all local prisons were handed over to the State. The coincident fall in crime which began then, and has steadily gone on since, may fairly be ascribed, to a large extent, to these two reforms, which may be said to combine mitigation of penalties with uniformity and certainty of application. From time to time the penal treatment of offenders oscillated between extreme severity and extreme laxity; but, when both these principles were in force at the same time—denoting instability of administration—the very worst results ensued. About the year 1830, when capital sentences were freely passed and not inflicted, the convict population of Great Britain, with its population of 15 millions, consisted of no fewer than 50,000 persons, some in hulks and prisons at home, others in penal settlements and Colonies. The cost of maintenance, which was enormous, was surpassed only by the futility of the system of punishment. Subsequently the Penal Servitude Act of 1853, and the refusal on the part of our Colonies to receive convicts, put an end in Great Britain to transportation. The number of convicts meanwhile declined, till in 1852 it was 17,000; and in 1878, when the local prisons were handed over to the State, it amounted only to 10,000. At present (1910) the number is about 3000.

Recrudescence of severity in punishment occurred now and then, as, for instance, when flogging was freely resorted to in order to put down garrotting; but on the whole the tendency of our criminal law, since the Prison Act of 1865 at all events, has been in the direction of leniency in prison treatment; and the results have been satisfactory. To a large extent this spirit of leniency may be regarded as in itself a reflexion of the improvement in the character and conduct of our people, which, again, depends largely on the general advance in civilization, together with the spread of education, intelligence, temperance, and other influences designed to elevate the people. Such influences have a much larger share in *preventing* crime than any punitive measures can have in repressing it; nevertheless, a penal code of some kind is an unhappy necessity for every civilized State. Imprisonment in some form, therefore, appears to be the only means at our disposal, short of capital punishment, for the punishment or restraint of those persons whose conduct renders them a danger to society.

2. Foreign penal systems.—A glance at the penal systems in other countries—that of our own being reserved for consideration later on—is of interest in connexion with the subject. England, to her shame, too long neglected the warnings of the far-seeing John Howard. The overcrowding of her gaols, the indiscriminate herding together of criminals of both sexes, and of all ages and varieties, and the total neglect of the authorities to bring any religious or moral influences to bear on the unhappy inmates, produced an inevitable crop of profligacy, moral and physical corruption, wide-spread disease, and death. When at last she woke up, and found that proper sanitary buildings and separation of prisoners were essential to reform, and when Pentonville Prison was built in 1842, an impetus was at once given to sane administration. Since then England has been amongst the foremost of

the nations in the search for some equitable, moral, and scientific scheme of prison treatment calculated to reconcile the rights of society with the rehabilitation of the criminal so as to enable him to return to a law-abiding life. It is, however, to the United States that the palm must be given for progressive experiments in this direction. No methods of reform and no social experiments appear too costly or troublesome to the indefatigable philanthropists of America who take up this subject, if only they are reasonably likely to reclaim criminals. Starting with the root-idea, which may be over-sanguine, that no one is absolutely irreclaimable, they have established at Elmira, and other prisons, or 'State Reformatories,' a system based on *the indeterminate sentence*, combined with conditional liberation on parole when the prisoner gives satisfactory evidence of reform. A somewhat strict discipline, with drill of a military character; instruction in skilled industries; moral, religious, and secular education, united with various kinds of amusement, are expected to alter character, and turn the subjects into good citizens. Further, every one is enabled to profit pecuniarily by his own work, and is expected to demonstrate his fitness for discharge; but he must first find employment. Probation officers supervise and help those on parole, and misconduct leads to forfeiture of licence.

From this sketch of the system, which is a type of others, it will be seen that Elmira is practically a reformatory for adults, who are received up to the age of thirty. All are known as 'inmates,' not prisoners, though they are under sentences of from one to a possible twenty years. Considerable success is claimed for the Elmira system, but statistics are not convincing as to the number of reclaimed cases, originally alleged to be 80 per cent. According to a report of the New York Prison Association, which recently analyzed the cases on parole from Elmira, 'probably not over 70 per cent of men paroled can be classed as reformed,' while some other authorities put the percentage at 50. 'Society is best protected,' they say, 'by the reform of the criminal.' One point emerges, however — the actuality of the *incorrigible*, of whose too frequent appearance at Elmira they make complaint. The tracing and following up of the reclaimed is difficult in so vast a country, with unlimited facility for travel.

But, if the United States has some of the best and most progressive prisons, it has also many of the worst in Christendom. Race prejudice against the negro, who is held to be either irreclaimable or not worth reclaiming; Labour Laws which, in many of the States, either prohibit altogether or restrict the sale of prison-made goods, and so keep prisoners idle, or employed in unproductive work; constant changes of the wardens or governors as political parties come and go; public apathy and parsimony in regard to prisoners; and a general desire to make prisons pay their way— these are the conditions which make the state of most of the county and city gaols fall very far short of modern ideals. The late Secretary of the Howard Association, Mr. Edward Grubb, made a tour of some of these prisons in 1904, and found them very unsatisfactory, and in startling contrast to the State Prisons and Reformatories. He says:

'These institutions (county and city gaols), designed for the most part for prisoners awaiting trial, and for the serving of short sentences by misdemeanants, are, with little exception, far from satisfactory, even in the Northern States. The best I saw was at Boston. At Indianapolis, and at Cleveland and Mansfield (Ohio), to say nothing of the South, the gaols were, for the most part, far from clean, and the prisoners were shut up together, with full opportunity to corrupt each other. Either they had no occupation (at Mansfield they were engaged in playing at cards), or, if employed (as at the House of Correction at Cleveland), they were working in a very half-hearted manner.' He describes the state of the convict camps as teeming with abuses—indiscriminate association, negro women 'constantly having babies,' 'terrible cruelties and even murders,' and bad sanitary conditions (see the pamphlet published by the Howard Association).

Even in the better class prisons, many of the privileges extended to prisoners seem to breathe a freedom which would probably be unsuitable for our class of habitual. Buying and selling, the free use of tobacco for smoking and chewing, card-playing, cinematograph exhibitions of prize-fights, and so on, are too advanced expedients for moral improvement to appeal to British sentiment.

Like everything else in the United States, crime is on an immense scale. A country so huge in itself, containing such a varied population, black and white, and receiving every year hosts of immigrants from everywhere, is, in the nature of things, a hunting-ground for criminals. Further, it has almost as many penal systems as it has States, so that it is difficult to estimate the general effect on crime of any special penal measures. The Americans themselves, however, are drawing public attention to the appalling list of murders committed—not only to the large proportion that go unpunished, but also to the small percentage of cases in which the death penalty is inflicted after a conviction has been obtained. They are also holding an inquiry into their methods of administering the criminal law, which hitherto have been so slow and uncertain as to lead to the belief that crime is getting out of hand. They seem to be already on the way to find out that a firm administration of criminal law is essential to the repression of crime.

The penal systems in force in Continental countries differ very widely from one another. Several, like Russia, France, and Portugal, adhere to transportation as a punishment for the more serious kinds of crime, although Great Britain discarded this penalty as costly and ineffective more than half a century ago. The principle of cellular confinement on the separate system, which was established by law in England in 1865, finds favour with all European nations, as it does with all British Colonies, and with progressive Japan; but in practice it is by no means universally adopted. The magnificent modern prison built by France at Fresnes has been designed for *separation*, but there is considerable scope for association also, in order to prevent overcrowding. It may be said generally that all the European nations which have built prisons in recent years have designed them with a view to carrying out separation. In Belgium, where much public attention has been given to prison treatment and the repression of crime, cellular confinement has been carried to its utmost limits. Prisoners have been kept in solitude compulsorily for ten years, after which they have been offered a modified form of association, which many are said to have refused, so that instances are on record of over twenty years of this kind of seclusion. Of late there has been a revulsion of feeling on this question, and the new school of penologists are now working for drastic reform. Russia, too, carries out the Belgian system in several of her prisons. Austria-Hungary was said to have had only 15 per cent of her prisoners under the separate system a few years ago, although approving of that system in theory. Many of the new prisons are of a palatial character, but none of them surpasses our own in sanitation, and we possess an undoubted advantage in having the whole prison system of the country under the single control of the State—an advantage which has been found very difficult of attainment in the other countries of Europe, and practically impossible in America.

The results of the various systems are very difficult to disentangle from the official statistics

supplied by each country. For purposes of comparison with our own results it has been found impossible to arrive at any definite or valuable conclusions. If murders only were reckoned as a test of the amount of crime, Great Britain would certainly rank high; but this would give a false idea of the extent to which other serious crime prevails. Offences against the person are much more common in some countries than in others, while offences against property form the bulk (as in our own country) of the crime in others. There is, however, one conclusion which can be drawn from the general survey. Recidivism is rampant everywhere. In France it has been specially prevalent, and the recrudescence of crime, particularly amongst the Apaches, or hooligan class of youths, who commit murderous assaults on police and others, is of sinister omen, and has already led to a revival of capital punishment. Whether or not these phenomena are to be regarded as only temporary manifestations of a prevailing state of general social unrest, of which we have had recent examples in the strike-riots in France, Germany, and Wales, it is certain that a heavy responsibility rests on those who preach anarchy. It is well they should remember that crime is a much worse social evil than discontent, and that they are probably stimulating the one by encouraging the other.

3. No universal system of punishment practicable.—Although the study of crime has already attained to the doubtful dignity of an 'ology,' and learned experts of most of the civilized nations have been laying their heads together in congress for several years with a view to investigating its causes and devising remedies for an evil from which they all suffer alike, it cannot be said that criminology is yet by any means to be reckoned amongst the exact sciences. Human nature with its faults and foibles may be the same all the world over, but the different phases of criminality, the different moral standards, and the different national temperaments which characterize various races, all tend to modify our pre-conceived ideas as to the possibility of repressing crime, as a general evil affecting the world at large, by any remedy, or by any set of remedies, whether preventive, reformatory, or punitive in intention, which can be held to be of universal application. It is well to understand that there is no royal road to the solution of complicated problems of this kind. We are in the habit, from time to time, of instituting more or less disparaging comparisons between our own methods and those of our neighbours in matters of social reform. Introspection of this kind is undoubtedly a national characteristic that is highly advantageous, tending, as it does, to check complacency and stimulate progress; but we must not lose sight of the fact that many features of the judicial procedure and the penal systems in force amongst Continental nations are utterly foreign to our ideals, and ill-adapted to our use. The well-known practice, for instance, of 'interrogating' accused persons which, in our eyes, amounts to heckling of a particularly cruel and vindictive type, is so foreign to the basic principle of our criminal law, which holds every man innocent until his guilt is proved, that we could not, if we would, fit so incongruous a practice into our scheme of things. In the same way, the life-long periods of solitude and seclusion in vogue with some Continental nations, by the side of which our brief terms of mitigated separate confinement seem unheroic and contemptible, are so repugnant to our national sentiments of justice and humanity that we decline even to look at them.

It has been said that every country has the government it deserves. The dictum applies with equal cogency to its laws, to its administrative machinery, and to the penal and disciplinary measures which it deems necessary for the guidance and control of its citizens. We may assume, in fact, that every country knows best the main lines on which its subjects can be kept in order; and it will be found that national habits and customs, national sentiment, and national temperament are factors which have much more to do with the shaping of penal systems and codes of moral discipline for peoples than the degree of civilization to which these peoples have attained. We find, accordingly, that the civilized countries generally differ very widely from one another in the matter of criminal law administration, that the range of variation is almost as great as that which distinguishes civilized from uncivilized methods, and that each country seemingly adopts the practice which to a large extent may be said to reflect the genius and character of its people, just as it selects the guillotine, the electrocution chair, or the rope for the infliction of the death penalty. It is probably for these reasons that International Prison Congresses do not waste their time and energies in the fruitless search for an ideal and universal penal system; but seek rather to improve existing systems, or to discover some general principles, or some details in working, that may be adapted to those which are already in force, and which are presumably suited, in their main outlines at all events, to the countries in which they have had their origin and development —all due weight being given, on the other hand, to the consideration that indigenous plants do not always thrive in foreign soil.

It would appear, then, that very little is to be gained by comparing or contrasting one penal system with another when they are not really parallel, and much less by trying to glorify one at the expense of another. We may feel convinced that our own system, which has been evolved from our experience by steps so deliberate that they never can be said to approach rashness, is fairly adapted to our present-day requirements; but it is very doubtful whether it would meet the wants of different states of society in other countries, or even in our own under the social conditions that prevailed half a century ago. The criminals of that period would undoubtedly have been attracted, rather than repelled, by the comparative amenities of life in a modern prison. Hosts of them would have taken a long-wished-for rest in so comfortable a retreat, seeking compensation, in a restoration of their health and energies, for any inconvenience or boredom they might have had to put up with while undergoing moral repairs. It must seem strange to those who are unfamiliar with our British moods of self-depreciation and pessimism that the very confident theorists who are never tired of reminding us that we are on an entirely wrong track, and that our system is a fiasco, should practically all be found in our own camp. Outsiders take by no means so disparaging a view. Recognizing, as they do, the enormous reduction that has taken place in recent years in our number of criminals, they look somewhat askance at the rhetorical explanation, which is frequently resorted to in similar cases, that improvement has come 'in spite of the system'; they regard the system, as a matter of fact, with a much more favouring eye. Further, it is a matter of some significance that, after due allowance has been made for the effects of family tradition, our progressive and up-to-date younger brothers in Australia, who are neither visionaries nor dreamers of dreams, follow very closely our procedure and practice. The fashionable outcry against modern penal treatment is really traceable to the fluent pens and forensic accomplishments of ex-criminals, who by their

ex parte allegations seem to have captured the greater part of the press and a considerable portion of the general public.

In *Crime and Criminals* (1910) the present writer made an effort to stem the tide of delusion and misrepresentation on the subject, but it still advances. The basis of this pessimistic outcry is a complete fallacy. Prison treatment, we are told, is a failure because 'it neither deters nor reforms the habitual criminal.' But all the authorities are agreed that the distinguishing characteristic of the habitual criminal is that he actually prefers his vocation to the humdrum alternative of a steady and active working life. The writer's own intimate and first-hand acquaintance with the living type enables him emphatically to confirm this discouraging conclusion. Whether the habitual criminal's vicious propensities are innate or acquired, it is certain that his habits, when he reaches maturity as we find him in prison, are practically incradicable. The spirit of the road seems to be in him, and his predatory instincts have already developed into fixed habits, so that he is, to all intents and purposes, a hopeless incorrigible. Here lies the difficulty. No system yet invented can fairly be expected to alter a person of this type. To correct the incorrigible appears to be a feat analogous, both in sound and sense, to squaring the circle. We are not, however, without some means for dealing with him. If methods of cure are not feasible, prevention and restraint are still open to us. The *Borstal system* of treatment for the incipient habitual, and *preventive detention* for the veteran, typify these two modern prison expedients respectively. For the present, however, the writer is more concerned to point out the fallacious reasoning on which the theory of failure is based. No notice whatever is taken of the important fact that the number of habitual criminals at present *in business* has been brought within such manageable proportions that it may quite reasonably be said that we have them in a ring fence. The same set pass in and out of prison with apparently unvarying regularity, and, for the most part, for the same kinds of offences. Specialization in crime, indeed, has become so marked in our time that the police authorities of Scotland Yard claim that they can, in most instances, tell, from the manner in which a clever burglary or robbery has been planned, the name of the expert who committed it. One might fairly expect that the reduction of a standing convict population of 10,000 persons in 1880 to 3000 persons in 1910 would be considered a respectable achievement under any system, and would give rise to some doubt, if not disbelief, in the minds of thinking people, as to the truth of the failure theory. The current of general opinion, however, if we are to judge from the press, sets in quite the opposite direction; and we are led to believe that we are going from bad to worse because habituals and incorrigibles, although they decrease steadily enough in numbers, decline to amend their ways, or to vanish *en masse* into the obscurity of some honest calling. It is well we should cherish no illusions on this subject. Our repressive measures stand in constant need of tightening up for this intractable class of criminal, and our reformatory methods in like manner need constant widening in scope, if we are to arrive at *better* results; but no conceivable combination of them will ever succeed in totally eliminating those obnoxious persons from the community. In regard to the system itself, it is not claimed that the mere absence of failure denotes the presence of perfection. It is quite conceivable, and perhaps even probable, that more good might be accomplished in other countries by a different set of principles and machinery; but it *is* claimed that our own system has produced fair practical results, and that it is better suited to our national requirements than any exotic system with which we are acquainted.

4. Theories of punishment.—But, if public opinion is unsound in regard to the treatment of the criminal, public sentiment is maudlin and unhealthy on the theory of punishment. A general tendency to minimize almost to vanishing point individual and personal responsibility, and to set up in its stead the fantastic substitute of a collective and huge unlimited liability company, comprising the whole body politic, is a pernicious feature of our time. Surely a more demoralizing doctrine, destitute alike of the sanction of religion, morality, law, and common sense, has never been promulgated for the edification and guidance of a free and self-respecting people. Those who aspire to regenerate society by this egregious piece of social philosophy are hugging a very vain delusion. It abolishes at a stroke the exercise of free will, without which society could not hold together, and it is quite outside the realm of logic. If any sane individual in the community be permitted, even in the name of philosophy, to divest himself of his social and moral responsibility by the simple process of becoming a criminal, it is obviously open to any, or all, of the other individuals of whom society is composed to claim a similar privilege. A premium is thereby placed on evil-doing, and every man is tempted to become a law unto himself. The practical result of such a relaxation of our moral code would undoubtedly be that the maintenance of social order would be rendered difficult, if not impossible; we should find ourselves retracing our steps in the direction of barbarism; and, incidentally, we should find the world a distinctly unpleasant place to live in.

It is not to be supposed, however, that the theory of personal responsibility is to be applied ruthlessly to those who are, from mental deficiency, actually incapable of fully appreciating the significance of their offences, and who are, to this extent, not answerable for unsocial conduct. It should be the aim of any humane system to apply disciplinary methods very sparingly, if at all, to this unhappy class, who at present amount to 3 or 4 per cent of our prison population. Hitherto these hapless offenders—'weak-minded, but not insane,' in the language of the Courts—have been a source of much anxiety to the magistrates who have had to deal with them, as well as to prison authorities who are constantly receiving them on short and useless sentences. In prison they have been treated under a very modified form of discipline, and efforts have been made to improve their conduct and condition. Medical protection has shielded them from actual physical detriment, but the atmosphere of a penal institution is by no means conducive to their moral improvement, nor is it one in which they should be compelled to live even for short periods. The Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the Feeble-Minded has fully recognized this weak spot, and legislation is now urgently needed to carry out their recommendations.

It will be seen from the foregoing that the principle of vicarious responsibility, if applied in practice, would not tend to the repression of crime. Nevertheless, it is vehemently insisted on at street corners, in the pulpit, and in the press, while the dramatic possibilities of impulsive criminality and temporary irresponsibility are exploited in sensational drama. Many good and benevolently-minded people seem to get periodically conscience-stricken on behalf of the criminal as a victim of circumstances. Not only are they willing to bear the burden of their own small vices, but also, in their emotional fervour, to take up his larger ones,

and condone his crimes, however heinous. They almost apologize to him for his existence as being a victim of heredity, and palliate his misdeeds on the grounds of his bringing up, so that every vulgar felon comes to think he is in reality a very ill-used person. Criminals are consequently quite ready to adopt the extenuations and excuses which are urged in their behalf, not only by their legal advocates, but also by theorists in criminology. In the writer's recollection, twenty or thirty years ago, 'poverty' and 'drink' were the two main causes given by prisoners for their downfall; but now these pleas have gone out of fashion, in favour of unemployment, parental neglect, slum-life, and financial embarrassment. That such social evils exist to a deplorable extent at present—although twenty years ago they were much worse and much more common—no candid inquirer can deny; but that they have had any material influence on the manufacture of the *professional* criminal who selects his own calling, or, as he himself might put it, 'chooses his own pitch,' is a very doubtful proposition. A prolonged study of the actual living specimen has led the writer to the conclusion that the professional criminal is possessed of qualities which would enable him to emerge with ease and credit from any, or all, of these alleged social disadvantages, if only he had the will to make the attempt. The inexperienced, occasional offender is much more handicapped by those conditions, and he is not generally gifted with the staying or enterprising characteristics of the old hand. It is much more probable that the genesis and development of the latter type are traceable to a gambling spirit which characterizes his class. In his spells of freedom the race-course is the special scene of his recreation. Familiarity with risks breeds contempt, and he gambles with liberty much more light-heartedly than others do with stocks and shares. But the cure of social evils which are so wide-spread is of necessity a very slow process. Their total extinction, if such a thing were possible, would unquestionably tend to the *prevention* of much crime and human suffering; but there would still be left a substantial residue of crime unconnected with these social evils, and society would be compelled to protect itself from this by the infliction of some kind of punishment. Even in the ideal Socialist community of the future, when it gets into working order, this problem is not unlikely to crop up, and compel attention; but *meantime* what are we to do with the persistent offender?

Another strange theory which is promulgated by the apologists of the criminal, and which bears on the ethics of punishment, has a somewhat captivating effect on short-sighted reformers. There is, we are told, something immoral, or unfair, or at least pusillanimous, in inflicting punishment on a guilty person in order to deter others from crime. Except on the grounds that the guilty person is punished with excessive severity, or beyond his deserts, this specious theory cannot be sustained. If we beg this part of the question, as is generally done for the purposes of the argument, the immoral and unjustifiable nature of the proceeding is clear enough. Otherwise the practice is both rational and equitable. The actual criminal suffers no *wrong*, the strictly non-criminal person is totally unaffected, while the person with dormant criminal proclivities, who is tottering on the verge of criminality, is provided with a strong and valuable incentive to virtue. 'Encouraging the others' cannot be considered an immoral expedient in dealing with crime. The deterrent principle, which has always been recognized by law, is in reality a double-edged weapon of the highest value. Its effect on the actual offender may be, and often is, absolutely negative; but on others its force is incalculable, and invariably many times greater and more far-reaching than on the individual. This fact is too often ignored by those who criticize and under-rate the deterrent effects of penal measures and systems which do not absolutely disclose superficially the indirect effects which they really produce. Statistics show clearly enough that our penal system deters occasional and first offenders, though it has very little deterrent effect on habituals. Present-day conditions of imprisonment are not *real punishment* to this latter class at all, but merely a form of restraint which removes them from temptation for the time being. The most recent device, therefore, which has been adopted for dealing with them in the Prevention of Crime Act of 1908—that is to say, preventive detention for long periods—is really a measure of inhibition and restraint, adopted primarily in the interests of society, although the extension of time that will be at the disposal of the authorities for effecting moral improvement in the prisoners themselves is also expected to yield more encouraging results. In regard to the principle of determent, the only profitable use to which the habitual can be put, until he renders himself more amenable to reformatory influence, would appear to be to make him a warning to other people for whom prison has more terrors. This, after all, is a trifling reparation for him to make to a community on which he persistently preys for a living, whether he be in or out of prison.

But these various doctrines which tend to the extenuation, or, it might be said not unfairly, to the encouragement, of crime are quite overshadowed by the much wider and more comprehensive one that we have no right to punish, and no moral justification for punishing, our fellow-creatures at all. Count Tolstoi was the leading exponent in recent years of this impossible creed, and he gained many disciples, who have been attracted, apparently, by the magnetism of his genius. In his novel *Resurrection* he makes his hero Nehludof, who is really a replica of himself and his own theories, ask the question, 'By what right do some people punish others? Why, and by what right, do some people lock up, torment, exile, flog, and kill others, while they are themselves just like those whom they torment, flog, and kill?' It is obvious to plain people that the latter part of this question embodies the underlying fallacy of the whole theory. The greater part of society is law-abiding, or at all events non-criminal in conduct. If an individual member is permitted to torment, flog, or kill another individual member with impunity, why should society collectively be denied the same right? Every State or community has an inherent moral right to make laws and regulations for the maintenance of social order. If social laws are merely optional in character, and no penalties are attached to their violation, they cease to have any force outside Utopia, so that every man's hand is against his neighbour. The mind of this gifted philosopher in his latter years seems to reflect the state of chaos and anarchy to which his teaching led him, so that at the last he was utterly weary of the world and its problems. Theories denying the right of society to punish, which have no foundation whatever in the Moral Law (on which the regulations of all civilized States ultimately rest), have no more than an academic interest for practical rulers. However suitable they may be for the land of dreams in which Tolstoi's spirit seemed to dwell, they are quite unfit for a practical world, in which a mere touch of the actual suffices to shatter them to pieces.

It may be regarded, then, as axiomatic that punishment in some form is essential for the cor-

rection of persons who inflict wrong on society; that the right to punish is in no sense immoral; and that every system of correction should have in it a penal element. It is true that these principles are strenuously denied by theorists who hold that prison treatment should be purely reformatory; but no one pretends to have devised a working scheme for carrying out this beneficent intention with full-grown criminals. All prison treatment must be, in the nature of things, to some extent penal, since it deprives persons of their liberty. Even Elmira imposes this restraint. To a large number of criminals, moreover, deprivation of drink is penal, while others find regular work a kind of punishment. It cannot be contemplated that the ideal prison is to abolish these restrictions on liberty under any coming régime. It is already on record that a prison without work existed some years ago under a local authority, and the results were found to be neither reformatory nor deterrent. It came to be known as a 'Reading-Reading-Reading Gaol,' and one prisoner explained his return to it by saying he had come back to finish his book. Many sanguine persons are too ready to assume in this connexion that a kind of 'Free-Library' treatment, combined with musical entertainments, will alter the nature and habits of even hardened criminals; but those who live outside doctrinaire circles know that much deeper moral and spiritual influences are needed for those who persistently covet and desire other men's goods. At the present time it is the fashion to decry, or to ignore, much of the silent work of prison chaplains. This work is very often carried on under the most disheartening of conditions, especially amongst the habituals. The writer knows, however, that prisoners themselves, who show any wish to do better, get an enormous amount of encouragement, guidance, and help from the chaplain; and that they appreciate the unadvertised work of his department much more highly than do the general public, or those who write on prison reform.

5. Penalties a necessity.—Although reformatory treatment is an essential element of every good prison system, it is nevertheless lacking in two important respects. It is inapplicable in practice to the prisoners with very short sentences, who constitute the bulk of the whole prison population; and it embodies none of that deterrent principle which is necessary not only for the repression, but also for the *prevention*, of crime. It is obvious, therefore, that pains and penalties of some kind must be resorted to in order to check or restrain habits of crime; and it is very important that these penalties should bear some proper and adequate relation to the nature of the offence, the character of the offender, and the general sense of public justice as between injurer and injured. No longer is it necessary to brand, or mutilate, or inflict permanent injury on those whom it is our interest to cure. Society has, however, the right to seek *redress* (not revenge) at the hands of wrongdoers, and it is compelled to take this course if it would prevent the substitution of private vengeance for public justice. Now, the only medium through which this redress can be exacted at present is the purse or the person of the offender, so that in the last resort we are driven either to the infliction of capital punishment or to some form of imprisonment. The offender, in fact, is confronted with the footpad's usual alternative, 'Your money or your life,' or at least a part of it. If any one could invent a less objectionable form of punishment which would restrain the criminal, and at the same time reform him, and deter him and others from the committing of crime, he would merit public gratitude, and lay our penal code less open to even a suspicion of inhumanity. But, as this is merely a visionary possibility, we can only look meantime for such a mitigation of the conditions under which these two measures are ordered, or carried out, as will meet with the approval of a humane and just public. Much has already been done in this direction. Capital punishment is now practically reserved for the worst cases of wilful murder, though it is still on the code for a few other offences, such as treason, setting fire to public arsenals, etc.

6. Capital punishment.—Without entering into the merits or demerits of capital punishment, we shall note some facts in connexion with the subject which tend to justify us in the use of it. A return laid before the House of Commons in 1907 shows that most of the chief European States, and most of the States in America, retain the death penalty in their codes, though many of them use it sparingly. Baron Garofalo, the President of the Appeal Court at Naples, in his book on Criminology (see Lit. at end of art.) tells us that in Italy, where, since 1876, there have been no executions except under military law, homicides average 3814 a year, compared with about 300 in England. He notes similar results in Belgium and Prussia, where few executions take place. In Switzerland, when the death penalty was abolished, murders increased 75 per cent in five years, so that several Cantons re-introduced the penalty. In France, in 1824, juries were allowed by law to add 'extenuating circumstances' to their verdicts, with the result that the annual average of executions fell to 1·8 in 1901–1905. Homicide was meantime increasing, but in 1906 Government brought in a Bill for abolition. Soon after a brutal murder occurred—'l'affaire Soleilland'—and public feeling was so stirred that the Bill was dropped; so that, instead of the death penalty being abolished, it became much more common. In America, Mr. Hugh C. Weir tells us (in *The World To-Day*, in regard to a recent census of American crime) that 'in only 1·3 per cent of our homicides do we secure a conviction.' Further, he states that Chicago averages 118 murders a year. London, which has four times the population of Chicago, has only 20. It is notorious that the death penalty is seldom carried out in the United States by law, though lynching is often practised mercilessly. Since 1868, abolition has been discussed eight times in the House of Commons, and negatived on each occasion by large majorities. Several committees and commissions have decided in the same sense. The opinion of the Scottish Judges at one of the Inquiries was:

'It would not be for the interests of humanity that the well-conducted and useful members of the community should be more exposed to deprivation of life by murder in order that the lives of the murderers may be saved.'

A French Professor of Law put the same idea pithily, when he said that if abolition were sanctioned it should be announced that—'henceforth the law in France will guarantee the lives of none but murderers.'

An incidental justification of the death penalty would seem to be that, under it, the newspaper hero of a sensational crime passes quickly into oblivion; whereas, if he is left in prison, his career furnishes endless opportunities for the dissemination of unauthentic, unwholesome, and demoralizing gossip in the press, which makes a direct appeal to the perverse imitative faculty of other criminals. Lastly, it is the opinion of Lacassagne, and many other observers, that the English statistics of crime are probably the most satisfactory in Europe.

With a view to securing a fair trial, and to preventing mistakes in capital cases, both law and custom in England provide elaborate safeguards. An accused person, after having the charge against

him investigated successively by coroner, magistrate, and Grand Jury, is tried by Judge and Jury, when he has the option of giving evidence in his own behalf. After conviction he can take his case to the Court of Criminal Appeal. If unsuccessful there, he can lay before the Home Secretary, either in petition or through his legal advisers, any additional evidence that may not have been forthcoming at his trial. Every scrap of evidence in his favour is most carefully examined, and, if there is the slightest suspicion of any mental deficiency, medical experts in criminal lunacy examine him, and report to the Secretary of State before a final decision is made to carry out the sentence of the law.

7. **Penal servitude.**—Criminal offenders, other than those who pay the penalty of death, are sentenced in this country either to 'penal servitude,' which is mainly served in convict prisons, the sentences ranging from three years to life; or to 'imprisonment,' which is carried out in local prisons only, the sentences ranging from three days to two years. Death sentences are carried out at local prisons. Convicts—that is to say, those sentenced to penal servitude—generally undergo the first part of their sentences in local prisons in *separate* confinement: the remainder is served in a convict prison, where they work in *association*, for the most part out of doors, though some work in shops. The length of the period of separation varies at present from three months to one, according to the antecedents of the convict. This part of the sentence is most criticized by reformers, as being inhumane and likely to lead to mental troubles, morbid introspection, irritation, and misconduct. As a matter of fact, results do not bear out this *a priori* reasoning, nor is the treatment as severe as is commonly supposed. The Stage is responsible for a good deal of misconception on the subject. Although 'separate' confinement is, for controversial purposes, called 'solitary,' the two are quite different. Solitary, or, as it is called legally, 'close confinement,' is never resorted to except as a punishment for offences committed in prison, and it is ordered solely by the Governor or superior authority. Under separate confinement a man works in his cell for the greater part of the day, but he gets many reliefs. He is allowed at least one hour's exercise daily, attendance at one chapel service on week days, and generally two on Sundays; he is also unlocked for various sanitary services, and sometimes for school; and he is frequently visited during the day by officials—governor, chief warder, officers serving him with work, meals, etc. Further, he is under careful medical supervision with a view to preventing mental or physical injury. The period of separate confinement, nevertheless, is one of the vexed questions of prison treatment at present. Its effect is penal, in so far as the average convict dislikes it; on the other hand, it does not seem to be without advantages in the direction of reformation of character for those who wish to profit by them. Introspection is not necessarily all morbid, and a period of seclusion gives time for reflexion and for a kind of moral readjustment, while it affords many opportunities to the chaplain for influencing the mind of the prisoner, away from the distractions of association with fellow-prisoners who too often urge him in wrong directions.

When this part of his sentence is over, a convict is drafted to a convict prison, where he works on the land—at reclaiming, tilling, gardening, quarrying, etc.; or at building, with allied industries; or in shops—at tailoring, shoemaking, carpentering, printing, book-binding, moulding, fitting, or other useful employments. He sleeps and takes his meals in a separate cell, which is well warmed, lighted, and ventilated. He is warmly clad, and has a very good and ample plain diet, without any canteen privileges. His working hours are much shorter than those of outside labourers, and the work, which is not laborious, is very carefully graduated to his physical capacity, while at the same time it is chosen, as far as possible, with a view to utilize any skill he may have, so as to fit him for honest employment on discharge. His education, both religious and secular, is carried on by the chaplains and schoolmasters, and he has an excellent supply of instructive and interesting books to read. By way of stimulating self-help, he is made to pass through successive grades or classes, by earning marks for industry and good conduct. Each step gained entitles him to additional prison privileges, as well as to a considerable money gratuity on discharge, and to a remission of sentence up to one fourth for men and one third for women. On release, he can avail himself of the help of a Discharged Prisoners' Aid Society to get work. He is, of course, kept under close supervision and strict discipline; but no bullying is allowed. Conversation is prohibited except as a special privilege at stated times for exemplary conduct; but under the conditions of associated out-door labour a good deal of talking is carried on, which, though not recognized, is inevitable. Misconduct of any kind renders him liable to forfeiture of the privileges which he may have already gained.

From this necessarily brief sketch it will be seen that the scheme is undoubtedly punitive in effect, but it is also reformatory in intention. Strict discipline conduces to self-control, steady and regular employment to the work-habit, the system of progressive privileges to industry, good conduct, and self-help; while the moral and educational training tends to strengthen character; and the whole scheme is designed to fit the prisoner for earning an honest living on his release.

The latest device of our penal system for dealing with the habitual criminal is *preventive detention*. The Prevention of Crime Act (1908) gives power to declare a man who has been leading a persistently criminal life to be an 'habitual criminal.' Such a person is to be sent in the first instance to penal servitude for not less than three years, and he may be kept for a further period of not less than five, or more than ten, years in a state of preventive detention by order of the Court. A special place of detention is to be provided, in which more indulgences and privileges can be granted than in a convict prison, so as to make the general conditions of life less onerous, and to foster habits of industry and self-control in the inmates, and fit them for *conditional licence*. This new plan for dealing with recidivism is, in fact, a modification of the indeterminate sentence. So much attention has been given in vain to the reclamation of the professional criminal that the step is taken mainly for the protection of society, though hopes are entertained that he, too, may benefit under the new conditions, with more time available for effecting cures. Preventive detention does not come actually into force till 1911, but responsible authorities expect good results from it, since they have advocated for years some means of imposing a more permanent kind of restraint on this intractable class of offender. In the United States the indeterminate sentence and the release on parole are worked on such liberal lines that many thoughtful Americans say serious crime is trifled with, under the guise of reclamation; while our Legislature hesitates to entrust the liberty of the subject, even though he be a confirmed criminal, to the discretion of prison authorities, who might keep him for life. Mr. Grubb tells us that the average term of actual detention at Elmira is about one and a half years.

It certainly seems strange to us that a dangerous burglar, or a coiner, or even a murderer of 30 years of age should be set free, cured in so short a time, when we require a year, or two years, to cure Borstal youths of 16 to 21 years of age under a system very similar to that of Elmira. If such things can be done in America, we must either have much to learn from them, or their reputed success must be doubtful, or the subject must be a very different one from the British specimen. Unfortunately, the statistics on the question are not capable of verification, although undoubtedly good results are obtained in many cases. Meantime we adopt such parts of the American system as seem suited to our national requirements.

8. Imprisonment.—In regard to punishment by 'imprisonment,' as distinguished from penal servitude, local prisoners now enjoy many more advantages in the matter of associated labour than they did when the 'separate' system was established by law in 1865. Associated work in shops or working parties, under strict supervision, is now carried out at all local prisons, but out-door employment, except in the grounds, or at officers' quarters, is limited, as the situation of the prisons in or near large towns does not give much scope for actual labour on the land. The term of separate confinement for local prisoners, which had been fixed at three months by the Prison Act of 1865, was limited by the Act of 1877 to one month, and is now commonly reduced to a still shorter period. Very large numbers of local prisoners are unskilled workers, and are under such short sentences that cell employment of some kind is necessary, unless they are to be kept in idleness, which is utterly demoralizing. The last Report of the Prison Commissioners shows that 61 per cent of males and 62 per cent of females were sentenced to two weeks or less; 93 per cent of males and 97 per cent of females to three months or less; and only 5·62 per cent of males and 1·91 per cent of females to six months and over. For prisoners with short sentences the effect of imprisonment is probably penal and deterrent rather than reformatory, since little in the way of training can be accomplished in short periods. The low diet of the short sentence has a like effect, the object being to make the lesson for a petty or occasional offender short and sharp, so that he may not come back. A spell of brief seclusion for this class is surely a salutary provision. Local prisoners are housed in comfortable and sanitary cells of 700 to 900 cubic feet, kept at a proper temperature, and well lighted and ventilated. Daily exercise and chapel service relieve the monotony of the cells. Diet, which is not on so liberal a scale as that of convicts, is graduated according to length of sentence, and is carefully adjusted to the physical requirements of the prisoners, while medical officers have a free hand in ordering extra food in special cases. Like the convict, the local prisoner works his way through the stages of a progressive system, earning privileges for industry and good conduct, and forfeiting any he may have already obtained if he is idle or breaks the rules. He can also earn remission of a part of his sentence if it is more than a month; but this, too, is liable to forfeiture. Secular instruction is given him under the direction of the chaplains; and religious ministration is provided for by them and by the clergy of the different denominations to which the prisoners belong. All these regulations are subject, in their working, to medical safeguards and restrictions; and they are carried out generally on liberal lines, so as not to cause individual hardship. There is a gradual relaxation of conditions for the well-conducted as their sentences proceed. Those convicts who reach the Long Sentence Division at the end of ten years are allowed to purchase out of their gratuity some approved articles of extra diet, but not alcohol or tobacco.

9. Borstal treatment.—The tendency of recent legislation has been towards a lenient treatment, especially of the young and of first offenders. The Probation of Offenders Act gives power to the Courts to release the latter, and order them to come up for judgment if called upon. The Children Act prohibits *all* children under 14, and practically all young persons under 16, from being sent to prison at all; and the Prevention of Crime Act establishes a new form of sentence and a new type of Institution for offenders between the ages of 16 and 21. The sentence is detention under penal discipline in a Borstal Institution for not less than one and not more than three years. This is intended for those whom, by reason of criminal habit or tendency, it is expedient to detain for long periods under such instruction and discipline as appear most conducive to reformation and the repression of crime. The treatment adopted in these Borstal Institutions closely resembles that of Elmira, already described. It is based on a well-devised scheme of moral, mental, and physical training, combined with specific instruction in some trade or skilled industry designed to fit the inmates for honest living. Rewards are given for industry and good conduct; penalties are inflicted chiefly by forfeiture of privileges; conditional licence is extended to those who are deserving; and work is also found for them on discharge; while an After-Care Association of benevolent workers supervises them, and gives not only encouragement, but moral and material help, so as to enable them to lead useful lives. Over 500 youths are now under training; and the land, buildings, and training-ship of Feltham Industrial School have been purchased from the London County Council for their accommodation. A scheme on similar lines has also been established for girls; also a modified Borstal treatment for youths in prison whose sentences are too short to let them have a full course. Splendid results have already been obtained, and still better are expected when the Institutions become firmly established.

10. Habituals and vagrants.—From the outline given of our penal system, as bearing on the general subject of crime and its punishment, candid readers will see that it is not unjust or unmerciful, and that it does not sacrifice the interests of the criminal to those of the community. The general principles on which it is based would seem to be that it should be penal without being vindictive, reformatory without being demoralizing, and deterrent without being inhumane. Administrators who keep a watchful eye on statistics are quite alive to its weak points, in so far as it fails to reform or deter certain classes of prisoners. It is notorious that it does not reform *individual* professional criminals, who come back time after time to prison, though it reduces the numbers of this *class* very considerably by cutting off the recruits. It is idle to expect that they will ever be totally eliminated; but it is highly probable that the new remedy of preventive detention will considerably limit their depredations, and deter many from entering their ranks. The system, again, seems to be ineffective with vagrants, who have been increasing lately at the rate of 4000 a year. Prison life sits lightly on an idle class, and measures of indulgence in the nature of physical comfort, dictated by an exaggerated sentimentality, are not likely to check idle habits. Unfortunately, much of our social teaching at present tends to encourage this evil. 'To labour truly to get one's own living' has become for many persons a very disagreeable obligation; and State Aid, which is a popular panacea for social evils, is

too often invoked where energy and self-reliance would be the more manly remedy; while Society is too often called upon to saddle itself with the vices and follies of individuals. To a large extent these doctrines would seem to be responsible for an idle spirit in our lower ranks. According to the last official returns, no fewer than 33,766 persons found their way to prison in 1910 for offences against the Vagrancy Acts. When it is borne in mind that several more thousands of this idle class are in workhouses and at large, it will be obvious that the question of dealing with them is becoming very urgent. No economic remedy for mere unemployment will meet their case, since the work-habit in practically all of them has been lost. A Committee appointed in 1905 to investigate the subject made recommendations that such persons should be dealt with otherwise than under the Vagrancy Acts—that they should be treated, not as criminals, but as persons requiring detention on account of their mode of life. The object aimed at is to train and compel them to do some kind of work, so as to aid the solution of the problem which they themselves present. Legislation is now urgently wanted to carry these recommendations into effect.

11. **General results of our penal system.**—Recent enactments in reference to inebriates, first offenders, habituals, and youthful delinquents, together with the recommendations of committees for further legislation for weak-minded prisoners and vagrants, suffice to show that our penal system has by no means reached perfection or finality. But how far has it served its purpose in the repression of crime? Some general considerations have to be taken into account in deciding this question. We have no trustworthy data for estimating with any approach to accuracy the sum total of crime committed in the country. Undetected and unproved crime still flourishes, and we can judge the proportion it bears to detected crime only by general indications. We know, however, that our methods of detection and identification of criminals have improved, so that it is at least probable that less crime goes undetected now than in former years. Further, we know that life and property are as secure with us as elsewhere, and that respect for human life is certainly greater in this country than in most civilized countries. But, although we can base no conclusions on figures representing the total criminality of our population, we have, in the daily average population of our prisons, a statistical basis for estimating *comparative* progress or retrogression. The figures are simple; they have been arranged on the same lines since the local prisons were handed over to the State in 1878; and they include all the *proved* crime of the country, both minor and grave. If, then, we compare the daily average population of the prisons of England and Wales in 1880 with that in 1910, we get the following results:

[England and Wales.]

Year.	Daily Average Population.		Population of Country.
	Convicts.	Local Prisoners.	
1880 . .	10,299	19,835	25,708,666
1910 . .	3,189	18,521	35,756,615

The outstanding feature of these statistics is the very conspicuous decrease in *serious* crime indicated by the fall in the convict population, in the proportion of ten to three, during the last thirty years. The general shortening of sentences, which followed on the passing of the Summary Jurisdiction Act in 1879, accounts for a certain proportion of this decrease, but cannot altogether explain it away, since the missing convicts are not found in the local prison population, which has also declined considerably, despite the addition of many minor offences to the statute book since 1880. If we take the two sets of figures—those of convicts and local prisoners—together, and place beside them the increase of ten millions in the general population, it will be seen that the criminality of the country must have declined very substantially to show these results; and, although we look for still better things in the future, it must be admitted that our penal system has, on the whole, served us well. It would, however, be very erroneous to infer that the decrease of crime is due solely to our methods of punishment, although it is also very doubtful whether such marked decrease could take place under an inefficient penal system. Social progress, of course, accounts for much of it. The training and discipline of the schools are conducive to moral improvement, self-control, and law-abiding habits; while the steady progress of temperance is probably one of the most important factors of all. Bank holidays have long ceased to be carnivals of drunkenness, and the statistics of crime show a steady decline in this offence.

12. **Drink.**—The latest returns show that in 1910 the total number of prisoners, male and female, received in the prisons for drunkenness had been less than the total of 1909 by 5852 cases. These figures are satisfactory as showing progress, but there is still room for much improvement in a list which reaches the enormous total of 57,418. Without any desire to minimize these figures, which represent an appalling amount of human misery and degradation, we would point out that much misconception prevails as to the actual connexion between drink and crime. Exaggerated statements that 80 or 90 per cent of crime is caused by drink depend to a large extent on the statistics of minor crime, which do not justify such sweeping conclusions. Many thousands of offences tried summarily have no connexion with drink. It should be remembered that the relation of cause and effect existing between drink and the major kind of crime, which entails a long sentence, is by no means so direct or clear as it is in the case of minor crime, since drunkenness is in itself one of the minor crimes, and one which figures most prominently in the statistics, and is also the exciting cause of several such offences. The commission of serious crime, on the other hand, is very often inconsistent with drunken habits, which are by no means so constantly found amongst professional criminals as amongst minor offenders. None the less, drink is, without doubt, both a direct and an indirect cause of all kinds of crime, and the spread of temperance is the most hopeful means we can employ for limiting its perils. Although the drink evil is pre-eminently one which is best dealt with at its source, and before it attains large dimensions, supplementary measures, both curative and penal, are also necessary at the later stages. Here our system has been somewhat weak and ineffective. Abuse of alcohol is certainly the most potent factor known to us in the production of crime, and yet the steps we have hitherto taken to suppress this predominant cause of criminality have been slow, unscientific, and uncertain. Up till 1898, when the Inebriates Act was passed, our measures for dealing with drunkenness were for the most part penal, and the penalties were much the same as they had been for fifty years previously. Fines and short imprisonments were the stock remedies, although they had long been known to be practically useless. Occasional drunkards were regarded too

much in the light of social 'sports,' instead of anti-social offenders and public nuisances. An attempt was made by the Inebriates Act to stem the evil by applying curative treatment to cases of inebriety, and placing them under control and medical care for prolonged periods. The intention of the Act was good, and it was based on scientific teaching, but, unfortunately, it did not work well in practice. No legal obligation had been placed on the local authorities, who were expected to co-operate in the scheme, to provide accommodation and maintenance for patients, and the Courts were reluctant to deprive of liberty, for the long periods necessary for cure, any persons except the most confirmed inebriates. These, as might have been expected, quickly relapsed into their former habits on discharge, and the Act was thereby discredited. For those who were less confirmed in drinking habits, and who might have gained benefit from the Act, it became a dead letter. The liberty of the subject in their case amounted to liberty to ruin themselves, and to inflict trouble, anxiety, and expense on their friends. Further, disputes arose between the local authorities and the Treasury as to the cost of maintaining the Homes, which led to further deadlock. A Committee of Inquiry has already recommended that, in order to meet these difficulties, the State should take over the control of the Homes. Whether or not this proposal be carried out, the Act requires stiffening in some way, if it is to fulfil its object. The occasional drunkard also needs more attention. If he is to be restrained from drifting into the habitual class before his will-power disappears under continued indulgence, cumulative penalties must be dealt out to him more freely, and the risk of becoming an inebriate under the Act must be constantly kept before his eyes.

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R. F. QUINTON.

CRIOBOLIUM.—Like the *taurobolium* (wh. see) the *criobolium* was a sacrifice performed in connexion with the worship of the Great Mother of the Gods and Attis, with the difference that the victim was a ram instead of a bull, and was slain in honour of Attis. When the *criobolium* was given in conjunction with the *taurobolium*, the altar was, with rare exceptions, inscribed to both deities; whereas, when the *taurobolium* alone was given, the inscription was usually to the Mother only, though symbolic decorations on the altar even then often indicated the participation of Attis.

Unlike the *taurobolium*, which, if not an original feature of the worship of the Great Mother in Asia, was borrowed by her priesthood at Rome from the Cappadocian religions which were brought there in the early 2nd cent. A.D., the *criobolium* seems to have been a special sacrifice instituted after the rise, and on the analogy, of the *taurobolium*, for the purpose of giving fuller recognition to the duality of the Great Mother and Attis, which had recently become more prominent through the rise of Attis to greater importance. There is nothing to indicate its existence either in Asia or in Italy before its first celebration in honour of the Mother and Attis.

In the absence of direct evidence, we may suppose the *criobolium* to have been similar to the *taurobolium* both in details of ceremony and in spiritual effect. Its celebration was wide-spread, and its importance such that it could be an alternative to the *taurobolium* (*CIL* vi. 505, 506), though the latter was held in greater esteem. It was inevitable that the ancients should draw a comparison between the pagan doctrine of purification and regeneration through the *taurobolium* and *criobolium* and the Christian doctrine of redemption through the blood of the Lamb (Firmicus Maternus, *de Error.* 27–28).

LITERATURE.—See references under TAUROBOLIUM.

GRANT SHOWERMAN.

CRITICISM (Old Test.).—Criticism is the art of estimating the qualities of literary or artistic work. M. Arnold defined it as 'a disinterested endeavour to learn and propagate the best that is known and thought in the world' (*Ess. Crit.* i. 38). It is not to be mistaken for censure or dispraise—the expression of hostile or unfavourable opinions. Realizing that the word verges on this adverse significance, Pater and others have preferred to speak of literary 'appreciations'; and certainly the true Bible critic desires chiefly to share his admiration with his reader. But 'criticism' and the allied terms should be used without prejudice, to signify the effort of the mind to see things as they are, to appraise literature at its true worth, to judge the records of men's thoughts and deeds impartially, without obtrusion of personal likes or dislikes. In distinction from 'lower' (a term seldom used), or textual, criticism, which aims at ascertaining the genuine text and meaning of an author, 'higher' (a term apparently first used by Eichhorn), or historical, criticism seeks to answer a series of questions affecting the composition, editing, and collection of the Sacred Books. The higher critic's task is to show how the ideas of any particular writing are related to the environment in which they grew, to the spirit of the age, to the life of the people, to the march of events, and to the kindred literary productions of other times or, it may be, of other lands. It is a scientific method of 'searching the Scriptures.' It substitutes the inductive for the *a priori* mode of inquiry, observation and experiment for tradition and dogma. It is a new application of the Socratic principle that an unexamined life—of man or book—is not worth living.

The critical movement, which has shed a flood of light on the OT, and given the Church a new and more human conception of the mode of revelation, did not begin till the middle of the 18th century. The traditional view of the composition of the Sacred Scriptures was a bequest from the Jewish to the Christian Church, which no one ever thought of closely examining. There were, indeed, a few sporadic attempts at literary criticism, which ran counter to the received opinion. **Theodore of Mopsuestia** relegated some of the 'Psalms of David'—such as the 51st, 65th, and 127th—to the period of the Exile. **Ibn Ezra**, the acutest Jewish scholar of the Middle Ages (1070–1138), detected a number of anachronisms in the Pentateuch, but advised the reader who understood these things to be discreet and hold his tongue. **Luther** was a fearless critic of both the OT and the NT. He asked what it would matter if Moses was not the author of the Pentateuch; he saw that the Book of Kings was more credible than that of Chronicles; he surmised that some of the Prophetic books received their final form from redactors; and he would have preferred if the First Book of Maccabees instead of Esther had been included in the Canon. **Spinoza's**

philosophical acumen anticipated not a few of the modern critical results. 'Ex his omnibus,' he says, 'luce meridiana clarius apparet, Pentateuchum non a Mose, sed ab alio et qui a Mose multis post saeculis vixit, scriptum fuisse' (*Tract. theol.-polit.* vii.). **Richard Simon**, the French Oratorian, observed some double accounts of events in the Pentateuch, and suggested a diversity of authorship. But the critical opinions of these and other individual writers were mere *obiter dicta*, which made little impression upon the mind of the Church, and never disturbed her dogmatic slumber. They inaugurated no critical movement.

It was reserved for one who was neither a scholar nor a theologian, but a man of science, the Frenchman and court-physician **Jean Astruc**, to discover the critical secret, and to forge the *novum organum* which was 'to destroy and to overthrow, to build and to plant.' His study of the Pentateuch was the *parergon* of a busy life chiefly devoted to the writing of books in his own special department, and his supreme merit was that he brought to the search of the Scriptures a mind thoroughly trained in the methods of science. In this pioneer work he left a perfect example for the imitation of all his followers. As a devout Catholic believer—he takes his readers into his confidence in a beautiful preface—he refrained for a while from publishing his book, fearing that he might, much against his will, put a weapon into the hands of the freethinkers—*les esprits forts*—of his time. He could not doubt, however, that his discovery would serve to remove some serious difficulties from the pages of Scripture, and in his seventieth year he was constrained to give his book to the world (1753). The very title of the work at once gave expression to the characteristic modesty of a true seeker after truth. He merely offered *Conjectures sur les mémoires originaux dont il paroit que Moyse s'est servi pour composer le livre de la Genèse.* He did not know whether they would be accepted or rejected, but in either case nothing could ever alter his 'love of Truth and of Religion.' It is worth while to state his argument in his own words—here slightly abridged.

'In the Hebrew text of Genesis, God is designated by two different names. The first is Elohim, for, while this name has other meanings in Hebrew, it is especially applied to the Supreme Being. The other is Jehovah, יהוה, the great name of God, expressing his essence. Now one might suppose that the two names were used indiscriminately as synonymous terms, merely to lend variety to the style. This, however, would be an error. The names are never intermixed; there are whole chapters, or large parts of chapters, in which God is always called Elohim, and others, at least as numerous, in which he is always named Jehovah. If Moses were the author of Genesis, we should have to ascribe this strange and harsh variation to himself. But can we conceive such negligence in the composition of so short a book as Genesis? Shall we impute to Moses a fault such as no other writer has committed? Is it not more natural to explain this variation by supposing that Genesis was composed of two or three memoirs, the authors of which gave different names to God, one using that of Elohim, another that of Jehovah or Jehovah Elohim?'

That Astruc was conscious of leading the students of Scripture into untrodden paths is proved by the motto from Lucretius (i. 926 f.), which he put on his title-page:

'Avia Pieridum peragro loca, nullius ante
Trita solo.'

In the 500 pages of his book he carried his critical analysis through the whole of Genesis and the beginning of Exodus, as far as the point where the distinction of Divine names appears to cease (Ex 6). He discovered some passages which he could not attribute either to the Elohist or the Jahwist. He displayed his results by arranging the whole text in four parallel columns. His attempt had the inevitable defects of all pioneer work, and he was far from dogmatizing as to the details of his criticism. But, with a true scientist's confidence at once in the precision of his methods and in the general accuracy of his conclusions, he wrote at the end of his prefatory exposition:

'So we must either renounce all pretence of ever proving anything in any critical question, or else agree that the proof which the combination of these facts affords amounts to a complete demonstration of the theory of the composition of Genesis which I have propounded.'

Astruc's *Conjectures* received but a cold welcome in his own Catholic communion. No single compatriot of his inherited the critical mantle, and it was destined to be the work of a long succession of patient German scientific theologians to continue and complete the process of literary analysis which the brilliant Frenchman had begun. The great Hebraist **Eichhorn** came to know Astruc's theory at second-hand, and deliberately refrained from reading the book till he had independently, and still more thoroughly, gone over the same ground, with the same general results. He had no difficulty in finding a good many criteria besides the Divine names to differentiate the original documents, and, instead of pausing at the beginning of Exodus, he carried his investigations to the end of the Pentateuch, expressing the opinion—long since antiquated—that the last four books were compiled from separate writings of Moses and some of his contemporaries. Eichhorn's results were published in an *Einleit. in das AT* (1783), and, as he had some of his friend Herder's gift of style and love of the Bible as literature, his book made almost as profound an impression on his age as Wellhausen's *Prolegomena* has made on ours.

The only contribution which Britain offered to the solution of the critical problem in its earliest phase was the work of **Alexander Geddes**, a Scottish priest, educated in Paris, where he had had the privilege of studying Hebrew at the Sorbonne. His *Holy Bible faithfully translated from corrected Texts of the Originals, with Various Readings, Explanatory Notes, and Critical Remarks* (1792), followed by a separate work entitled *Critical Remarks on the Hebrew Scriptures* (1800), gives vigorous expression to his views. He was a remarkable man and no mean scholar, who certainly deserves to be remembered among the pioneers of criticism; but by excess of zeal—the *perfervidum ingenium Scotorum*—he led criticism astray, and tended on the whole to discredit the movement. Scorning the timid theory of Astruc and Eichhorn,—that Moses used only two fundamental documents in the composition of Genesis,—he launched the hypothesis that the whole Pentateuch was nothing but a collection of loose scraps, of various age and worth, probably compiled in the time of Solomon. He had no difficulty in pointing out an immense number of these originally independent fragments, in the conjunction of which he saw no orderly plan or leading motive. He thus became the author of the 'Fragment Hypothesis,' which was introduced into Germany by **Vater**, who translated or paraphrased a large part of Geddes's *Critical Remarks.* Vater thought the Book of Genesis was composed of thirty-nine fragments. The theory made much noise for a time, but received its death-blow at the hands of the greatest OT scholar of last century, Heinrich Ewald of Göttingen, in his *Die Composition der Genesis kritisch untersucht*, which he wrote when he was a youth of nineteen (1823). Geddes's opinions cost him his priestly office. Aberdeen consoled him with a doctorate of laws.

Meanwhile a real and important advance, from which there have been *nulla vestigia retrorsum*, was made by **Ilgen**, Eichhorn's successor at Jena. This fine scholar—who afterwards acquired a scholastic fame similar to that of Arnold of Rugby—detected the presence of *two* writers in Genesis, each with an unmistakable style of his own, who habitually use the Divine name *Elohim.* This discovery did not receive much attention at the

time of its publication (1798), and it was not till it was independently made again by Hupfeld, more than half a century afterwards, that its significance was recognized by the foremost scholars of Germany. It is now accepted as one of the assured results of criticism. As the second Elohist is devoted to the ideas and institutions of the Levitical system, he is usually known as the 'Priestly Writer,' while the name 'Elohist' is reserved for the earlier author, who, like the Jahwist, is more akin to the prophets.

Still another step in advance was taken at Jena, this time by one of Ilgen's most brilliant pupils. As a candidate for the doctor's degree (in 1805), **de Wette** presented a *Dissertatio Critica* on the Book of Deuteronomy, which proved to be epoch-making. He argued, from the individual qualities of style and the definite circle of ideas which he observed in this book, that it stands by itself, distinct in origin and purpose from the rest of the Pentateuch; and he identified it with the law-book which was at once the manifesto and the programme of the reforming party in the reign of Josiah (621 B.C.). This brilliant theory brought the critical movement for the first time into direct contact with Israel's national history. It shed an intense light upon the record of a great spiritual crisis. Criticism thus ceased to be merely literary, and became the handmaid of the history of religion. De Wette's hypothesis has now been tested by the scholarship of a century, and Deuteronomy is universally regarded as the key to the interpretation of the spiritual evolution of Israel.

Attention was next directed to the Book of Joshua, which the Jewish canon sharply separates from the Pentateuch and places at the head of the 'Former Prophets.' Already, in 1792, Geddes had joined it to the Pentateuch, regarding it as 'compiled by the same author.' Careful and minute investigation convinced de Wette and **Bleek** that this procedure was correct. The real affinities of Joshua are with the writings which precede, not with those which follow, it. Of the 'Five Books of Moses' it forms the necessary continuation and completion, taking up the various threads of the narrative and recording how the promises were fulfilled and the laws enforced. Subsequent criticism has confirmed this view, by proving that each of the Pentateuchal documents, with its favourite phrases and formulæ, reappears in the Book of Joshua. Hence it is now the established practice to speak and write of the *Hexateuch*, or 'Six Books' (τεῦχος, 'a weapon,' being post-Alexandrian Greek for a book), instead of the Pentateuch.

For the next half century there was one inspiring name which dominated the study of the OT. Wellhausen, who dedicated his *Prolegomena* 'to my unforgotten teacher, **Heinrich Ewald**, with gratitude and honour,' was one out of many who felt the spell of this scholar's genius. It must be admitted, however, that Ewald lent his authority to a hypothesis which for a considerable time retarded rather than furthered the progress of criticism. He began where Astruc and Eichhorn left off, and neglected Ilgen's discovery of the two Elohists. Regarding an undivided Elohist document, which he called the 'Book of Origins,' as the 'groundwork' of the Hexateuch, and finding its unmistakable ideals and formulæ giving order and unity to the whole structure, he maintained that the Jahwist sections were merely added to supplement the work of the Elohist. This was the famous 'Supplement Hypothesis.' Defended by Bleek, Schrader, and many other scholars, it was viewed for long as the citadel of criticism; but it could not permanently stand the cross-fire to which it was subjected, and it has now no more than a historical interest.

In 1834, **Eduard Reuss** was lecturing on OT theology at Strassburg, and applying his strong, keen intelligence to the critical problem, which he approached from the historical rather than from the literary side. He found it psychologically inconceivable that a nation should begin its history with a fully developed code of laws. He thought it inexplicable that a whole succession of prophets should ignore their country's laws, which they of all men ought to have reverenced. How was he to solve the enigma? The critical movement, at the point which it had then reached, did not help him much, for Deuteronomy was the only book of the OT, apart from the Prophets, which had yet been replaced in the historical environment out of which it grew. Reuss's problem was to determine the age and origin of the 'Law of Moses' and the 'Psalms of David.' The answer came to him, as he told long afterwards, rather as an intuition than as the result of a careful and exhaustive investigation. It was this—that in the true historical sequence the Prophets are earlier than the Law, and the Psalms later than both. In the following year (1835) practically the same theory was independently propounded by **Vatke** in his *Bibl. Theol. wissenschaftlich dargestellt*, and by **George** in his *Die älteren jüd. Feste*. If neither of these books commanded any great attention, the reason was that they were too theoretical. They did not present a thorough analysis of the language and ideas of the Books of Scripture. Vatke's work was, indeed, a very remarkable instance of the successful application of Hegelian principles to the study of a national and literary development. But it was intended only for the initiated, who were sealed of the tribe of Hegel. The author warned off the very threshold of his book all who did not understand the master's terminology. Reuss, who tried to read it and failed, deferred the publication of his own conclusions for nearly half a century. His *L'Histoire sainte et la loi* appeared only in 1879, and his *Geschichte der Schriften des AT* in 1881. One of his most brilliant pupils, **K. H. Graf**, professor at Leipzig, had forestalled him by a dozen years in his *Geschichtl. Bücher des AT* (1866), and consequently the theory is known to all the world as the 'Grafian Hypothesis.'

Hupfeld, one of the eminent Hebraists of Halle, where he was the successor of Gesenius, brought a fresh mind to the problem of the literary composition of Genesis, and was rewarded with more success than almost any previous scholar. Indeed, it was he who most nearly read the riddle of the sphinx, and it is a remarkable fact that his book, *Die Quellen der Genesis* (1853), was published exactly a century after the famous *Conjectures* of Astruc. Having shaken off the obsession of Ewald's 'Supplement Hypothesis,' he had the good fortune to repeat Ilgen's almost forgotten discovery of the two distinct Elohist writers in the Pentateuch. He laid bare the work of the Priestly Writer (the second Elohist). He demonstrated the close affinity of the first Elohist to the Jahwist, and the wide difference between both and the writer of the *Grundschrift*. Under his spell each of these ancient writers seemed to come forth a living personality, with a style which revealed the man. He showed that the additions by which J was alleged to have supplemented P were often entirely out of harmony with the latter's circle of ideas. His own theory was that the productions of three originally independent writers (now known as J, E, and P) were at length combined by an editor, who—fortunately for us—left his sources much as he found them, being content to establish a merely superficial unity.

The literary problem of the authorship of the Hexateuch was thus solved. But the vitally im-

portant *historical* question of the date of the several writers, and of their relations to the other authors of the OT, still left much work to do. Graf, as we have seen, was inspired by the teaching of Reuss, and developed his master's theory (*op. cit. supra*). Taking the date of the publication of Deuteronomy (621 B.C.) as his first starting-point, he worked backwards and forwards from it. By careful comparisons he proved that D is, on the one hand, much more fully developed than the law-book—small in size but great in value—known as the 'Book of the Covenant' (Ex 20^{22}–23), and, on the other hand, much less fully developed than the Priestly Code. The inference was inevitable that these three strata of legislation belong to three widely separated ages. The Priestly Code, however, is partly historical, partly legal, and Graf felt constrained to divorce these two elements, ascribing the historical to a pre-exilic, and the legal to a post-exilic date, with some centuries between them. But this part of his theory commended itself neither to the right nor to the left wing. As the Priestly Code is a compact and indivisible whole, and as the style of its narrative portions differs in no way from the style of its legal sections, it must as a whole be either pre-exilic or post-exilic. Now, this was one important question as to which the most eminent critics remained for a while divided among themselves. Nöldeke, Riehm, and Dillmann were on the one side; Reuss, Kayser, and ultimately Graf himself, on the other. Then came a new generation of scholars, with Duhm, Kuenen, and Wellhausen at their head, who vigorously attacked the problem once more, and almost unanimously declared in favour of the post-exilic theory, thereupon proceeding to adjust their conceptions of the whole OT literature and history to this revolutionary conclusion.

Duhm in his *Theol. der Propheten* (1875) chose a new point of view. The work of the prophets gave him the sure historical vantage-ground from which he could look both before and after, and a keen scrutiny of all the conditions of the problem convinced him that the phenomenon of prophecy is independent of every Mosaic law but the moral law written in the heart. To him the great prophets are not the children of the Law, but the inspired creators of the religion of Israel. Prophecy is the supreme initial fact which transcends explanation. The Levitical system, which gave the death-blow to prophecy in the post-exilic age, could never have been its nursing-mother in earlier times. The inner expansion of the prophetic spirit nowhere requires the Law for its explanation or illustration. The traditional succession—Mosaism, Prophecy, Judaism—cannot, therefore, be maintained. Judaism is not a mere revival of antiquity; it is a new fact. The post-exilic poems sung in fervent praise of the Law have a freshness of feeling which betokens something other than an artificial restoration. On the assumption that Ezra, working on the basis of Ezekiel, was the real creator of Judaism, everything becomes clear. While the whole previous history of Israel, internal and external, can be traced out independently of the Priestly legislation, the whole subsequent history is just the history of the Law. The study of the Prophets thus proves that the Grafian hypothesis is both psychologically and historically superior to the traditional one. For it is less likely, as Kuenen says, 'that the so-called "Grundschrift" dropped from the sky some few centuries before any one wanted it . . . than that it grew up in its own historical environment when its hour had come' (*Histor.-Crit. Inquiry*, etc., Eng. tr. 1886, p. xxxvii f.).

Wellhausen's *Gesch. Israels* appeared in 1878, and of its reception in Germany Pfleiderer says:

'The arguments for the new hypothesis, derived from the parallel development of law, ritual, and literature, were exhibited with such cogency that the impression produced on German theologians (especially of the younger generation) was almost irresistible. . . . It was a special merit in Wellhausen's book to have excited interest in these questions outside the narrow circle of specialists by its skilful handling of the materials and its almost perfect combination of wide historical considerations with the careful investigation of details, and to have thus removed OT criticism from the rank of a subordinate question to the centre of theological discussion' (*Development of Theology*, Eng. tr. 1890, p. 259).

Kuenen was perhaps justified in regarding the publication of Wellhausen's book 'as the "crowning fight" in the long campaign' (*op. cit.* p. xxxix). The work of criticism was not yet ended. But, at any rate, its methods were vindicated, and its main results assured. The subsequent history of the critical movement is, therefore, outward rather than inward, supplying matter for an interesting chapter of general Church History, a record of the spread of criticism to one country after another, of the opening of the doors of colleges and schools to critical teaching, and of the gradual leavening of the modern mind with a new conception of the Bible and of revelation. Of the direction of the current of educated opinion there cannot be any doubt.

'For, while the tired waves, vainly breaking,
Seem here no painful inch to gain,
Far back, through creeks and inlets making,
Comes silent, flooding in, the main' (A. H. Clough).

It would be strange if traditionalism did not make a brave fight for life, and the battle has often waxed hot. Critical freedom has sometimes been purchased at a great price. Those who are born free have a sacred heritage. The cause of the scientific study of the OT has been championed and won for England by Colenso and Stanley, Cheyne and Driver; for Scotland by Davidson, Robertson Smith, and G. A. Smith; for America by Briggs and Harper, Toy and Brown—to name in each instance but a few scholars out of many. Criticism is represented in modern Judaism by Montefiore, and the writers of the *JE*; in the Rom. Cath. Church by the Abbé Loisy, Baron von Hügel, Père Lagrange, and Salvatore Minocchi. It has become, as Sanday says, international and inter-confessional. And, since all light and truth are of God, Biblical science can bring to Churches and nations nothing but good. It is inevitable that the art of criticism should sometimes be practised by men of little faith, or of no faith, and that in their case the critical spirit should be captious rather than sympathetic, the critical weapon destructive rather than constructive. The fault is not in the instrument but in the user. Of two scientists who study the open book of Nature, one sees only a strange adjustment of the atoms of dead matter, while the other has a vision of the living garment of God. And of two critics of the Bible, which is 'literature and not dogma,' the one is merely conscious of the pathetic upward strivings of the human spirit, while the other bows in reverence before a revelation of the immanent God of truth and love.

Appeal is often made from criticism to archæology. Exploration is called to be the handmaid of revelation. The spade is taken to confirm the pen. Many confident statements have been circulated in the name of this romantic young science, which is bringing so many old things to light. 'Wherever archæology has been able to test the negative conclusions of criticism, they have dissolved like a bubble into the air' (Sayce, *Monument Facts and Higher Critical Fancies*, p. 25). Assyriology 'has for ever shattered the "critical" theory which would put the Prophets before the Law' (p. 87). From buried palaces, from monuments, from long-lost libraries, 'a voice has gone up rebuking the scorner' (J. Orr, *The Bible under Trial*, p. 121). But is criticism really opposed by the facts of the monuments, or only by illegitimate inferences deduced from these facts? On many points archæology is certainly quite neutral, and on many others it is in perfect accord with the views of the critics. While it has to some extent confirmed the Bible statements regarding Shishak, Omri, Ahab, Jehu, Sargon, and Sennacherib; while it has proved that the art of writing was wide-spread in the East long before the Hebrew invasion of

Canaan; while it has found in Hammurabi a law-giver far older than Moses; it has not hitherto appreciably affected a single critical conclusion as to Israel's historical and literary development. 'Archæology has refuted only the argument which Prof. Sayce has imaginatively attributed to critics: the arguments which they really use, with, of course, the entire position which depends upon them, it has left absolutely untouched' (Driver, *LOT*[8], p. xx). Sayce, Hommel, and Winckler have rendered splendid service as archæological specialists, and every discovery they have made has been welcomed; but science would prefer to receive their facts neat, instead of having them diluted with cheap anti-criticism. Prof. Orr is the ablest opponent of criticism in this country, but he has personally accepted a good many of its results; and, when he still contrasts the traditional with the modern position by saying that 'the one scheme is naturalistic; the other is positively Christian: there must in the long run be a more decisive choice between them (*ExpT* xviii. [1907] 125), he is needlessly confusing the issue.

The progress of criticism has been slow. The labour has been spread over a century and a half. Every critical theory that had ever been advanced has been severely tested and strenuously contested. Criticism is bound to be self-critical, proving all things and holding fast that which is good. It is not to be imagined that finality has been reached on every minor detail of criticism. All along the line there are matters that still await adjustment. In the improvements which it is receiving at the hands of a new generation, the Grafian theory resembles the Darwinian.

Allusion can be made to only a very few points. (1) The Jahwist and Elohist have often been called 'prophetic' writers, as if they had come under the influence of Amos and Hosea; but Gunkel has made it appear very probable that the stories of J and E, which in his view represent the work of schools rather than of individuals, had taken shape in all essentials by 1200 B.C. While, on the one hand, 'we must assume their existence in order to account for the appearance of the Prophets,' they have, on the other hand, 'much that must needs have been exceedingly offensive to the Prophets' (H. Gunkel, *The Legends of Genesis*, Eng. tr. 1901, p. 149 f.). (2) While scholars like Baudissin and Kittel hold that the Law of Holiness (Lv 17–26) precedes Deut., and Driver and Ryle that it is later than Deut., but prior to Ezekiel, Addis has argued very ably for placing it after both these writings (*Heb. Rel.* p. 241 ff.). (3) The division of Isaiah into two parts at ch. 40 is indisputable, but in both parts there are sections that require to be removed into different historical settings, and in nearly all the Prophets some later additions and redactions have been discovered. (4) The Psalter as a whole is probably post-exilic, but it is in the nature of things scarcely possible to determine the precise environment into which each poem should be fitted, and the theory that many of the Psalms reflect Maccabæan and Ptolemaic conditions has not met with much acceptance. (5) The Wisdom literature and the relation of its later developments to Greek thought still need much attention. While Job is recognized as post-exilic, and Ecclesiastes may be little older than Daniel (which belongs to the great field of Apocalyptic literature), it still remains probable that the kernel of the Book of Proverbs represents the oral wisdom of Israel in the time of the monarchy.

Some gains obtained by the criticism of the Old Testament may be mentioned. It has established the broad principles that 'God never spoke a word to any soul that was not exactly fitted to the occasion and the man'; and that 'separate . . . from this context, . . . it is no longer the same perfect Word' (Robertson Smith, *OTJC*[2], 1892, p. 10 f.). It has reconstructed the history of Israel in the light of that other modern principle—'there is no history but critical history.' For the incredible dogmas of verbal inspiration and the equal divinity of all parts of Scripture, it has substituted a credible conception of the Bible as the sublime record of the Divine education of the human race. It has traced the development of the religious conceptions and institutions of Israel in a rational order. Moving the OT's centre of gravity from the Law to the Prophets, it has proved that the history of Israel is fundamentally and essentially the history of Prophecy. It has made a sharp and clear distinction between historical and imaginative writing in the OT, and so enhanced the real value of both. It has appreciated the simple idylls of Israel's folklore, pervaded and purified as they are by the spirit of the earliest prophets, and used by them to transfuse the devotion of a higher faith into the veins of the people. It has thrown light—as Astruc saw that it would—on the many duplicate, and even contradictory, accounts of the same events that are found in close juxtaposition. It has explained the moral and theological crudities of the Bible as the early phases of a gradual religious evolution. It has denuded the desert pilgrimage of literary glory, only in order to enrich the Exile. For the 'Psalms of David' it has substituted the 'Hymn-book of the Second Temple,' into which are garnered the fruits of the religious thought and feeling of centuries. To the legendary wisdom of one crowned head it has preferred the popular philosophy of many generations. For a religious history which looked like an inverted pyramid, it has given us one which is comparable to an ever-broadening stream—the record of a winding but unwavering progress in the moral and religious consciousness of a people. Instead of crowding the most complex institutions and ideals into the infancy of the nation, it has followed the order of nature—'first the blade, then the ear, then the full corn in the ear.'

Prof. B. D. Eerdmans, Kuenen's pupil and successor, is regarded as the leader of a reaction. He begins his *Alttest. Studien* (Giessen, 3 parts, 1908–10) by announcing that he has quitted the Graf-Wellhausen-Kuenen School. Criticism has been wrong from the outset. 'Astruc led her into false tracks' (p. iv). 'The theory which uses the Divine names as a guide through the labyrinth of the traditions is an error, and must be set aside' (p. 94). Instead of taking these names as literary criteria, let us have an historical-religious investigation of their meaning. In the 'Book of the Covenant' (Ex 20[22]–23[33]), 'Elohim' cannot refer to the God of Israel. It is a real plural. The 'judges' (Ex 21[6] 22[8. 9]) are gods. This is the key with which the new critical school opens the door. Polytheism is to be found not only in the 'Book of the Covenant,' but in the narratives of Genesis. 'For the knowledge of the history of Israel it is of great importance to see clearly that the legends which have been gradually collected in Genesis have received but a faint monotheistic colouring.' Round the figures of the patriarchs have gathered (1) stories in which the polytheism is undisturbed, (2) others which recognize Jahweh as one of the gods, and (3) others in which the polytheism has been adapted to monotheistic faith. Some parts of P—which to Eerdmans is 'a fiction'—are much older than the Exile, and round all the ancient legends there have gradually accumulated many additions and redactions, dating from the earliest to the latest times.

Eerdmans has failed to take account of the fact that for the recognition of J and E in the Hexateuch there are many other important criteria—language, style, point of view, religious tendency—besides the Divine names. It will be found that the difference between him and his master is after all not very great. His vigorous and suggestive criticism is a trumpet-call to all OT scholars to re-examine their position, and they are cheerfully responding; but it does not appear that the solid walls of P have been shaken.

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J. STRACHAN.

CRITICISM (New Test.).—The criticism of the NT may be treated in two divisions—that of the Gospels and Acts, and that of the remaining books. In the Gospels and Acts we are dealing with narrative material, which may, therefore, be approached from the standpoints and methods of (*a*) literary, (*b*) historical, criticism. But in the Epistles and the Apocalypse we have to do with books where the historical element is subordinate and the literary predominant. Consequently, literary methods of criticism will find further scope than historical methods, and there is likely to be less divergence of opinion on the results obtained.

I. *CRITICISM OF THE GOSPELS AND ACTS.*—To the dispassionate inquirer the present state of this department of investigation must be strangely bewildering. This is not due to variation of opinion in the region of literary criticism, for there it has long been seen that the possibility of obtaining sure results is very limited in scope, and agreement has been largely reached on all points where agreement is possible. But, in the region of historical inquiry, results are surprisingly contradictory, and there seems at present to be no likelihood of agreement being reached.

1. Literary criticism.—So far as the Synoptic Gospels are concerned, important results have been reached by the methods of literary criticism. These may be briefly summarized as follows. (*a*) It has been shown that the Second Gospel was used in the compilation of the First and Third Gospels.[1] (*b*) It has been further shown that behind the First and Third Gospels lies a compilation of the Lord's Sayings (=Q) which directly, or after passing through intermediate stages, was used by the editors of these later Gospels.[2] (*c*) It has also been made probable that the editor of the Third Gospel used, in addition to Mark and Q, at least a third written source; but no agreement has been reached as to its scope.[3] (*d*) Some recent attempts to analyze the Second Gospel into two or more documents which were originally distinct rely more upon historical considerations than upon purely literary methods, and are too recent to have been fully considered.[4]

In the Fourth Gospel literary critical methods have recently found much play. Wellhausen[5] has attempted to find traces of composite authorship, and he has been followed by Spitta,[6] who endeavours to distinguish between a *Grundschrift*, to which he assigns a very high historical value, and a *Bearbeitung*. But it may be questioned whether the unity of the book is not too apparent to be lightly shaken.[7]

The attempt to analyze the Acts into its original sources finds ever new disciples. The latest is Harnack,[8] who finds in Ac 2–15 a compilation of three documents. But the grounds alleged do not seem adequate to support the conclusions.[9] On the other hand, the identity of the editor of the Acts with the writer of the 'We' sections and with the editor of the Third Gospel has received the weighty support of Harnack himself, and on purely literary grounds is hardly deniable.[1] Those who dislike this conclusion have to fall back upon historical considerations.

So far we have been dealing with literary criticism in its efforts to determine or to detect underlying sources in the narrative literature of the NT. It will be seen that the most important and assured results have been reached in those cases where the data are the fullest. The use of Mark in Matthew and Luke has been rather observed than discovered; and, if Mark did not exist, literary analysis certainly could not reconstruct it out of the later Gospels. For that very reason, attempts to reconstruct Q can be at the best but tentative. The attempted analysis of these books into sources which are not now extant is a matter of great difficulty, arising from the fact that the writers have so re-cast any sources which they may have used that reconstruction of them is now almost impossible. It is for that reason that attempts on purely literary grounds to re-discover sources used in the Acts are little likely to succeed.

2. Historical criticism.—It is, however, in the region of historical criticism that the variety of opinion spoken of above chiefly exists. And the reason of it is not far to seek. Inquirers into the Gospels and Acts are divided, broadly speaking, into two classes, guided by different conceptions as to the right method of approaching the narratives, and consequently employing different standards or criteria in estimating their value as historical material.

(1) Investigators of the first class start from the assumption that the facts of history which lie behind the narratives are purely natural facts, similar in nature to other facts known to us. In particular, they take it for granted that Jesus was a man, whose personality underwent the normal process of gradual development, so that the growth of His intellectual conceptions can be traced on psychological lines. Inquirers who are guided by principles like these are, of course, bound to apply to the material before them such criteria as the following. (*a*) Does a writer state as fact an event which lies outside the range of the known laws of Nature? Then, not only did the alleged event not happen, but some account must be given of the nature of the process which enabled the writer to state as fact what is incredible. Under this head the whole of the so-called miraculous element in the Gospels and Acts is removed from the sphere of history, and translated into the realm of myth, legend, popular exaggeration, symbolism, allegory, or transference of the miraculous from other departments of tradition into the life of Jesus. In the early days of criticism this generally led to the transference of the Gospels into the 2nd cent.,[2] in order to allow time for the growth of legend round the few traditional facts of the life of Jesus. More recently it has been argued that such growth may have been very rapid, and is consistent with a 1st cent. date for the Gospels.[3] (*b*) The mental development of Jesus must be similar to our own, and it

[1] *Studies in the Synoptic Problem*, ed. Sanday, 1911.

[2] For recent attempts to reconstruct Q, see A. Harnack, *Sayings of Jesus*, Eng. tr., Lond. 1908; B. Weiss, 'Die Quellen der synopt. Überlieferung' (*TU* xxxii. 3 [1908]); and *Studies in the Synoptic Problem* (*ut supra*).

[3] Weiss, *op. cit.*

[4] Wendling, *Die Entstehung des Marcus-Evangeliums*, Tübingen, 1908; Bacon, *The Beginnings of Gospel Story*, New Haven, 1909. See 'Survey of Recent Literature on Synoptic Gospels,' in *Review of Theology and Philosophy*, July 1909; and Williams, in *Studies in the Synoptic Problem*.

[5] *Das Evangelium Johannis*, Berlin, 1908.

[6] *Das Johannes-Evangelium als Quelle der Geschichte Jesu*, Göttingen, 1910.

[7] See in criticism of Wellhausen, Gregory, *Wellhausen und Johannes*, Leipzig, 1910; for earlier 'Partition Theories,' Sanday, *Criticism of the Fourth Gospel*, Oxford, 1905; and, for recent literature, *Review of Theol. and Phil.*, Feb. 1911, and Bacon, *The Fourth Gospel in Research and Debate*, New York, 1910.

[8] *The Acts of the Apostles*, Eng. tr., Lond. 1909.

[9] See Clemen, in the *Hibbert Journal*, July 1910, p. 780 ff.

[1] *Luke the Physician*, Eng. tr., Lond. 1907; see also J. C. Hawkins, *Horæ Synopticæ*, Lond. 1899.

[2] The Second Gospel is now most generally assigned to A.D. 60–70, the Third to *c.* A.D. 80, and the First to varying dates between the publication of Mark and the end of the century. The tendency nowadays is to push the Synoptic Gospels and the Acts backwards rather than forwards. This is illustrated by Harnack's admission that the Acts may have been written 'so early as the beginning of the seventh decade of the first century' (*Acts*, p. 297).

[3] Harnack now (*Neue Untersuch. zur Apostelgeschichte*, Leipzig, 1911) places Acts before the death of St. Paul, St. Mark and St. Luke earlier, and St. Matthew shortly before or after A.D. 70. The present writer has argued for a date about A.D. 50 for St. Matthew (*ExpT*, July 1910).

is not possible that He could have taught doctrines which appear to us to be logically inconsistent. This has been applied in particular, in recent times, to the problem of the eschatological teaching in the Gospels as compared with the moral teaching of Christ. Christ, it is argued, cannot have been both the same unclouded thinker of the moral sayings and the apocalyptic fanatic of the eschatological passages. We must, therefore, give up one of the two as historical, and the teaching generally chosen as most conveniently to be got rid of is the eschatological,[1] which is then regarded as an intrusion into Christ's teaching of elements derived from Jewish Apocalyptic writings, remoulded in Christian circles. Of course, on lines like these the task of criticism is very largely one of explaining away the evidence which, at first sight, the Gospels set before us as to the facts of Christ's life.

It would be impossible to give here an exhaustive list of all the ways in which criticism attempts to do this, but the following are some of them :—

Adaptation of Christ's life to the narrative and prophecies of the OT. (This would account in part for the narrative of the Virginal conception, the stories of the Magi, and of the flight into Egypt, etc.) Adaptation to His life of heathen mythology (the Virgin birth). Adaptation to His life of the current Jewish doctrine of the Messiah. The attribution to Him of sayings prophetic of later events, *e.g.*, the manner of His death, or the fall of Jerusalem. The hardening into narratives of fact of words spoken by Him in allegory or metaphor.

The main difficulties which many will feel with criticism of this kind are these :—

(*a*) It starts from presuppositions with which the evidence of the narratives immediately conflicts. (*b*) Its methods of explaining the origin and genesis of much of the evidence are conjectural and fanciful—not the application of scientific principle, but an appeal to any or every supposed cause that might have given rise to the creation of the evidence. (*c*) Its results are hopelessly precarious. The Jesus who emerges from its labours is sometimes a simple-minded lover of God, who is crushed between the political and theological wheels of His day ; sometimes an ethical teacher of high value ; sometimes a dreamy enthusiast, who died because He deluded Himself into the belief that He was the Messianic King. The Gospels, as manipulated by the uncertain methods of this sort of criticism, seem capable of yielding a picture of any sort of Jesus that the critic desires.

(2) Investigators of the second class approach the subject from a very much wider and more liberal historical background. They argue that a cursory reading of the Gospels gives us at once a consistent picture of One whose personality, whilst truly human, yet transcends the limits of human personality as elsewhere known to us. They, further, argue that the same kind of evidence which is given to us in the Gospels is also given, without break of continuity, in the history of the Christian Church ; so that the Gospels are only a first stage in a continuous stream of evidence to a Person, dead yet living, human yet more than human. In view of this deepest and most profound fact of human experience, we cannot, they urge, apply to the Gospel evidence those rough and ready tests of the historical which critics of the first class are so eager to use. Christ is reported to have worked a miracle. The critics of the first class say at once : (*a*) 'The miracle did not happen' ; therefore (*b*) 'the narrative is very late,' or (*c*) 'it is to be explained as due to one of the causes summarized above,' and (*d*) 'it is worthless as evidence of historical fact.' Christ is reported to have worked a miracle. The critic of the second class will say at once, 'Why not?' 'What does this mean save that from the inexhaustible treasure-house of the Personality of Jesus flowed some influence or power which so dazzled the minds of the witnesses that they recorded their impression in the simple words that have come down to us?' Or, again : Christ is reported as having taught moral principles which presuppose the continuance of human society, and as having spoken about the Kingdom of heaven as something which was to leaven human society. He is also reported as having announced the near approach of the Kingdom, and His own 'Coming' to inaugurate it, as the 'Son of Man' coming 'on the clouds of heaven.' Critics of the first class say at once : 'Christ cannot have spoken these two divergent lines of teaching. We must choose between them.' Critics of the second class will rather argue that we are dealing with two types of teaching which are ultimately harmonious ; that difficulties arise if we unduly press, or too literally interpret, sayings of the one or the other type ; and, in particular, that underlying the apocalyptic utterances are statements of profound truth as to the future of the world, and of the relation of Christ to humanity, which are essential for a right understanding of His being.

So long as NT critics start from different assumptions, and employ different methods, it is obvious that they will arrive at different conclusions. It is clear that sooner or later some agreement must be reached, if possible, as to the truly scientific method of approaching the Gospels and Acts, and as to the principles or criteria by which we are to test their historical value. In other words, are we or are we not to look upon them as isolated records which can be examined in and for themselves, regardless of the continual corroboration in history of the more than human Personality to which they bear witness? Or, is the representation of Jesus as given in the Gospels as a whole one which the experience of the Christian Church in later history has proved to be substantially true? If the latter be the truer alternative, we shall be bound to approach the Gospel with some such canons of criticism as these:—(*a*) We are dealing with a record of One whose personality and force of character transcend, as is proved by the witness of history, all human knowledge. We cannot, therefore, rule out as evidence statements which ascribe to Him power and influence which are not found in normal experience of life. (*b*) There is, therefore, a general probability in favour of the credibility of the Gospel narratives. The area of uncertainty arises later in the attempt to reconstruct from them the original facts as they occurred. For instance, the narrative of the raising of Jairus' daughter will leave us with the certainty that an impression was made on the minds of the witnesses of that event that a dead person had been brought back again to life. What 'death' and 'life' here involve can never be known to us. The substantial fact is that the force and power of the Personality of Jesus effected this astonishing thing that the girl, who otherwise would have been numbered with the dead, took her place, through His influence, once more in the world of living men and women.

The question of the necessity of approaching the Gospels as historical witnesses, with some sort of presuppositions in favour of, or against, their testimony, has not yet been treated in a serious scientific manner. Yet nothing is more certain than the fact that historians approach all ancient documents with certain presuppositions. These are, in large part, inferences drawn from our experience of life treated as a whole. The question concerning the Gospels takes the form whether there is in our experience any element which should influence us in the case of these books which is absent when we are dealing with other ancient literature. The historian who answers No will necessarily approach the Gospels with a presupposition against their evidence. And this presupposition seems to be due to a denial on his part of an element in life which

[1] But see A. Schweitzer (*The Quest of the Historical Jesus*, Eng. tr., Lond. 1910), who rightly refuses to eliminate the eschatological element from the life of Christ, but over-emphasizes it.

others affirm, and which causes them to say Yes. This element is the sustained witness of the Christian consciousness to a Personality now acting upon human life, of which they find the first account in the Gospel history. It has always claimed to be not merely witness to the powerful influence exerted by the life of Jesus as recorded in the Gospels, but witness to the influence of Jesus Himself, exerted on individuals, not merely through the record of His life, as the memory of a dead friend may influence one living, but immediately as living Spirit upon living spirit. This sustained witness is a psychological fact which is deserving of more serious treatment than has hitherto been accorded to it. If it is in any sense true as a phenomenon of consciousness, then it necessarily becomes a presupposition with which the inquirer must approach the Gospel evidence. If the Personality of Jesus acts upon consciousness through the whole period of history since His death in a way in which no other personality known to us has ever acted, then it will be clearly unscientific to apply to the record of His life the same axiomatic rules, as to what is or is not probable, that we are tempted to apply to the evidence as to the personality of ordinary individuals. This does not make any investigation into the life of Jesus useless, or lead us to accept as literally true anything or everything that has been recorded about Him. The ordinary rules of historical investigation will apply in large part to the Gospels as to other ancient literature. But it will cause us to exercise caution in ruling out evidence which points to the presence in Him of resources of power over psychical and natural phenomena which we should reject in other cases.

What has been said above applies mainly to the Gospels, yet it also concerns the Acts. For there, too, the same question arises. When we read anything that is of a non-natural kind, are we on that ground to relegate it to a position of late date and historical valuelessness? This is what Harnack does, *e.g.*, with Ac 1. He speaks of the narrative of the Ascension which it contains as probably the latest tradition in the Book.[1] The only reason apparently for that judgment is the nature of the event recorded. But what if behind the narrative lies a historical fact, the precise nature of which can only be dimly surmised behind the strong colours in which it has been painted? Christ had left the disciples finally: that they knew. No more would He appear to them as at the Galilæan Lake. He was henceforth to be with them in another sense. And He was to come again. What if some strange experience of fact lies behind this narrative? Need it then be so late in date? What prevents it from being one of the earliest traditions of the Christian Church? St. Paul is witness to such a tradition.

Criticism of the Gospels and Acts which is based on quite unscientific presuppositions—that is the point—introduces hopeless confusion into NT criticism. It condemns offhand certain narratives as fictitious, and then invents the most improbable causes to account for their genesis and growth. This is not criticism based on principle, but arbitrary and captious rejection of evidence. We want, if possible, some sort of scientific method or principle, and this can be reached only by a preliminary investigation of all the facts. Christ as presented in the Gospels, Christ as experienced in history, Christ as experienced in modern life,—is this all of a piece, one long consecutive witness to a supernatural Christ? If so, whatever other method may be wrong, nothing can be more fundamentally unsound than the attempt to go to the Gospels and from the first to eliminate that element to which Gospels, history, modern consciousness, all alike bear testimony.

The above considerations apply also to the Fourth Gospel. But here the further question arises, Is the Christ here presented the same as the Jesus of the Synoptic Gospels? Is there, in other words, behind the Fourth Gospel a substantial basis of historical fact, due allowance being made for the translation of this into the language and thought of the period of the writer or writers who composed the book half a century or more after Christ's life? To that question different answers will probably always be given by people who approach the Gospel with different presuppositions. Interest has recently been directed in particular to the narrative of the raising of Lazarus. On the one hand, it is contended that, in view of the importance which attaches to it in the Fourth Gospel, it could not have been omitted in the Synoptic Gospels if it was a fact of history with which the writers of those Gospels were acquainted.[1] On the other hand, it is urged that the narrative does not receive the emphasis which some modern critics assign to it,[2] and that the argument from the silence of St. Mark and the other Synoptic writers is hopelessly precarious.[3] In the debate about the authorship of the Fourth Gospel interest has centred largely in the theory of Schwartz[4] (based upon an alleged statement of Papias that James and John were killed by the Jews) that John died too early to admit of his being the author of the Gospel.[5]

Quite recently the whole Johannine question has been raised into a new atmosphere by a new discovery. The old axiom of critical writers who denied the Johannine authorship of the Fourth Gospel was that the book is thoroughly Alexandrian in spirit and phraseology. Some writers have always urged that, in spite of apparent parallels with Alexandrian terminology, it is thoroughly Hebraic. This has recently received striking confirmation from an unexpected quarter. In 1909, Rendel Harris published from a Syriac MS a volume to which he gave the title *Odes and Psalms of Solomon*. He argued that these Odes were not Gnostic, but Christian, and that they date from the last quarter of the 1st century. Harnack[6] believes them to be of Jewish origin, edited by a Christian. If he is right, it follows that a large part of the supposed Alexandrian element in the Fourth Gospel is really Jewish. And Harnack draws the conclusion that 'in the Johannine theology, apart from the Prologue, there is nothing essentially Hellenic' (p. 119). If this is true, and if the date assigned to the Odes is right, a great many arguments for a 2nd cent. date for the Fourth Gospel, and a large number of objections to the Johannine authorship, cease to have any validity. It is possible that the 'Odes of Solomon' will prove as epoch-making for the Johannine question as was the publication of the Book of Enoch for the Synoptic Gospels.[7]

[1] Harnack actually makes the presence in the Acts of the narrative of the Ascension an argument against ascribing the book to a date before A.D. 78, though on other grounds he inclines to an earlier date (p. 291). But see now his more recent treatment of the date of Acts (cf. p. 319[b], note 3, above).

[1] F. C. Burkitt, *The Gospel History and its Transmission*, Edin. 1906, p. 221 ff.

[2] J. Armitage Robinson, *The Historical Character of St. John's Gospel*, Lond. 1908, p. 34 ff.

[3] W. Sanday, *The Criticism of the Fourth Gospel*, Oxf. 1905, p. 170 f.

[4] 'Über den Tod der Söhne Zebedäi,' in *Abhandl. d. königl. Gesellsch. d. Wissensch. zu Gottingen*, Phil.-hist. Klasse, new ser., vii. 5.

[5] See against this Sanday, p. 103 ff.; Armitage Robinson, p. 64 ff. Cf. also Spitta's examination of Schwartz's theory in *ZNTW* xi. [1910] 39 ff., and Schwartz's reply, *ib.* p. 89 ff.

[6] 'Ein jüd.-christliches Psalmbuch aus dem ersten Jahrhundert' (*TU* III. v. [1910] 4, published separately, Leipzig, 1910).

[7] See, on the Odes, Strachan, in *ExpT*, Oct. 1910; Bernard, in *JThSt*, Oct. 1910 [holds the Odes to be Christian Baptismal

II. *Criticism of the Epistles and Apocalypse.*—1. **The Pauline Epistles.**—The movement of criticism in recent years with regard to the Pauline Epistles has been in the direction of a return to tradition. With few exceptions, critical writers are disposed to admit as Pauline 1 and 2 Thess., Gal., 1 and 2 Cor., Romans, Philippians, and Philemon. Of these, 2 Thess. is the most doubted. It is argued that, viewed as literature, it reads like an imitation of the First Epistle, whilst from a theological point of view the second chapter presents us with an eschatology different from that found elsewhere in St. Paul. Harnack[1] has recently attempted to meet this second objection, and to preserve the letter for St. Paul by the novel argument that the First Epistle was written to the Gentile converts at Thessalonica, whilst the Second was written for the Jewish converts there.

The Epistle to the Galatians has been the subject of much controversy with respect to the date of writing and the people addressed. The theory revived and advocated by Ramsay, that the Churches addressed are to be found in the southern part of the Roman province of Galatia, would make it possible to date the letter at any time after St. Paul's visit to these Churches on his second journey. Thus Zahn[2] dates it from Corinth on the second journey. Ramsay[3] himself prefers a somewhat later date, from Antioch, between the second and third journeys. Against this it may be urged that St. Paul would probably have preferred to make a personal visit from a place so near to Southern Galatia as Antioch, instead of writing a letter. Others still prefer the older chronology, which placed the letter in close connexion with 1 and 2 Cor. and Romans. A comparison of Ac 16^{8} with 18^{23} favours the view that the editor of the Acts believed that St. Paul visited the old kingdom of Galatia; but that does not, of course, settle the question of the locality of the churches to which the letter was written. The strongest argument in favour of the later date is the close resemblance in tone between Galatians and Romans.

The return to a traditional position spoken of above is illustrated by the present state of critical opinion with regard to the Epistle to the Colossians. A generation ago it was assigned to the 2nd cent. by a majority of critical writers, the arguments alleged being that the Epistle contained a Christology too developed for the age of St. Paul, and that the false teaching was a 2nd cent. form of Gnosticism. But, although some of the more advanced critical writers still believe it to be post-Pauline, the view is gaining ground[4] that the Christology is not necessarily un-Pauline, and that the teaching, if in any sense Gnostic, is an early form of Gnosticism, which there is no reason to place outside the life of St. Paul.

Denial of the authenticity of Ephesians is more wide-spread. Its theology is said to be too advanced for St. Paul, especially in respect of the Person of Christ, and the doctrine of the Church; whilst the difficulty of reconciling the address to Ephesus with the entire lack of local colour has never been quite satisfactorily explained. But, if Colossians be admitted to be Panline, these arguments lose their force. In view of the fact that all the elements of the Christology of these letters can be found in St. Paul's undoubted Epistles, it is quite arbitrary to argue that he would not have written them, if the circumstances necessary to the development of his thought on these lines had arisen. And to argue that they could not have arisen is mere dogmatism about the unknown.[1]

The Pastoral Epistles are regarded as post-Pauline by a number of critical writers, on the following grounds:

(1) The style and language are not those of St. Paul. This is true if stated in the form that style and language differ from those of the other Epistles. But, if genuine at all, the letters clearly date from a later period of St. Paul's life than any other of his extant writings. And it is not at all clear why changed circumstances should not have caused a corresponding change in the Apostle's expression of his thought.

(2) The nature of the false teaching combated is said to be that of a period which lies outside the probable limits of St. Paul's life. This is pure conjecture. There can be no evidence that teaching of the kind presupposed, whether it be an early form of Gnosticism or a debased Judaism, had not begun to affect the Churches at a very early date.

(3) The Church, as described in these letters, has a developed organization. The main point here is the status of the ἐπίσκοπος. If, as seems probable, this term is here synonymous with πρεσβύτερος, the Epistle must not be brought down too late—not, that is to say, into the 2nd cent.—and would suit a date at the end of St. Paul's life.

(4) There is a lack of other testimony to support the evidence of these letters that St. Paul was released from his imprisonment at Rome. There are, however, hints elsewhere in the NT that the Apostle was so released. Cf. Ph 2^{24}, Philem ^{22}, and Ac 28^{30}, which, as Harnack[2] has recently urged, implies that St. Luke was acquainted with the fact that St. Paul was released. If the evidence of the Pastoral Epistles on that point be admitted as historical, the other objections to their authenticity lose much of their weight. For it is not difficult to suppose that the Apostle, feeling that his departure could not be long delayed, might well see the necessity of making provision for the future organization of the Churches, which were soon to be deprived of his guidance. In any case it is difficult to believe that any one but St. Paul could have written 2 Timothy.[3]

In the case of the last Epistle ascribed by tradition to St. Paul, the Epistle to the Hebrews, modern critics are almost unanimous in their verdict that the letter cannot be Pauline. But none of the ancient or modern conjectures as to the authorship is more than a shrewd guess. Tertullian thought of Barnabas;[4] Luther, of Apollos;[5] Harnack,[6] followed by Rendel Harris[7] and Peake,[8] favours Priscilla and Aquila; Ramsay[9] and Canon (now Bishop) Hicks[10] prefer Philip the Evangelist.

2. **The Catholic Epistles.**—Here, too, opinion is divided into two main classes. On the one hand are the writers who defend the traditional authorship of most of these documents, on the ground that they can find no reason for rejecting it. On the other are the critics who seem to be possessed at the outset by the feeling that it would be treasonable to admit that tradition can ever be right in its ascription of these writings to Apostolic authors. And yet, how little probable it is that none of the earliest Apostles except St. Paul should have left behind them any written record! How very probable it is that others besides St. Paul should have written letters! How improbable it

Hymns dating from the time of Justin Martyr]; Menzies, *Interpreter*, Oct. 1910 [the Odes regarded as written by Gentiles impressed with the truth of the Jewish religion]; Spitta, in *ZNTW* xi. (1910) 193 ff. and 250 ff. [holds strongly to Jewish character]; Gunkel, *ib.* p. 291 ff. [maintains Gnostic origin].

[1] *Das Problem des zweiten Thessalonicherbriefs*, 1910 (=*Sitzungsberichte der königl. preuss. Akad. der Wissensch.* xxxi. 1910).

[2] *Introd. to the NT*, Eng. tr.[3], Edin. 1909, i. 199.

[3] *Historical Com. on Galatians*, Lond. 1899, p. 242.

[4] The Epistle is regarded as Pauline by Harnack, Jülicher, Clemen, von Soden, von Wrede, Abbott, Peake, and Moffatt.

[1] The authenticity of Ephesians is denied by the majority of German writers and by Moffatt, but is asserted by Abbott and Peake; Harnack and Jülicher think the question an open one.

[2] *Acts*, p. 40.

[3] An intermediate position is taken by those who believe that genuine Pauline fragments have been worked into these Epistles by a later writer. So Harnack, McGiffert, Moffatt, Knoke, Peake.

[4] *de Pudicitia*, 20. So recently Weiss, Bartlet, Ayles, and Dibelius (*Der Verfasser des Hebräerbriefes*, Strassburg, 1910), who regards Hebrews as originally a Sermon, not an Epistle.

[5] *Enarr. in Gen.* 48. 20.

[6] *ZNTW* i. [1900] 16–41.

[7] *Side Lights on NT Research*, Lond. 1908.

[8] *Com. on Hebrews* (Century Bible), Edin. 1902.

[9] *Luke the Physician*, Lond. 1908, p. 304. Philip is regarded as representing the Cæsarean Church.

[10] *Interpreter*, Apr. 1909.

is that the Church should have failed to preserve some such writings, and should rather have let them slip into oblivion, and preserved instead 2nd cent. writings which went by false names! There is an *a priori* probability in favour of the traditional authorship, and something approaching to overwhelming proof of its impossibility is required before it can be set aside. From the perusal of the objections repeated, with as much certainty as though they were axioms of Euclid, by successive critics of the advanced type, the candid reader rises with the feeling that they are forced conclusions from evidence which is capable of more than one interpretation. 'If there were no tradition as to authorship,' he will say, 'I could only conclude that these writings were composed within the first 150 years of the existence of the Christian Church. But within that period I find no reason why some of these writings should not have been written by the men to whom tradition assigns them. On the other hand, I do see reason to suppose that the early Church would have preferred to preserve Apostolic rather than later documents.'

Apart from 2 Peter, where the argument from literary dependence on Jude seems fatal to the Petrine authorship, the arguments against the authenticity of the other members of this group seem insufficient to outweigh the tradition in their favour. They are of the following nature:

(*a*) *Against James.*[1]—The writer is arguing against St. Paul's teaching about Justification by Faith, or against a corrupt form of it; the Greek of the letter is too good for St. James; the writer does not refer to early controversies such as that about the admission of Gentiles into the Church; he makes no reference to, or use of, cardinal doctrines of the primitive Church, such as the Messiahship of Jesus, His death and resurrection; the reference to healing through the 'elders' is a mark of late date; the condition of the Christians addressed is that of a late and decayed Christianity.

(*b*) *Against Peter.*—The chief question here has turned on the nature of the persecution implied in the letter and the bearing of that upon the date of the authorship. Ramsay[2] has tried to show that the references to persecution imply a date about A.D. 80. Others prefer the reign of Trajan[3] (on the ground that the references to persecution in the Epistle accord well with the account given by Pliny to Trajan) or of Domitian.[4] But there is really no ground for so pressing the language of the letter as to make it impossible to suppose that it was written during the Neronian persecution.[5] Then, as afterwards, there may have been reason to urge Christian converts to let it be known that they were suffering as Christians, and not for moral offences which would have been inconsistent with their profession. The other main ground for rejecting the Petrine authorship of the letter is its alleged Paulinism. But we may admit a certain amount of Pauline influence upon the writer without necessarily denying that St. Peter can have been the author. Arguments against the authenticity on this and other grounds seem to be captious and arbitrary, such as 'This is unlikely,' or 'That is improbable in the case of St. Peter.' After all, how very little we know of the Apostle's life after A.D. 44! And how are we to determine what he may or may not have written, or how much or how little he may have seen of St. Paul in the later years of his life?

(*c*) *Against 2 Peter.*—The dependence of the writer upon Jude is really fatal to the authenticity of the letter. The case is parallel with that of the First Gospel. The composer of that book has carefully worked over the Second Gospel in such a way that it is little likely that Matthew or any other Apostle can have written it. So in the case of 2 Peter; if it is dependent on Jude, it is improbable that Peter or any Apostle can have penned it. (Attempts have been made to save the rest of the letter by supposing ch. 2 to be an interpolation dependent on Jude.) Further arguments against the authenticity of the Epistle are found in its late attestation, and in its reference to St. Paul's Epistles (3[16]).

(*d*) *Against Jude.*—The reference to the Apostles; the reference to 'the Faith'; the supposed similarity between the teaching combated and the teaching of the 2nd cent. Carpocratians.

(*e*) The question of the authorship of *the Johannine Epistles* is so closely connected with the complicated question of the authorship of the Fourth Gospel that it is best to pass them over in a cursory survey of NT criticism like the present. They are widely regarded as by the same writer as the Fourth Gospel, though some would separate the Second and Third Epistles from the First, and attribute them to a different author.

These arguments may be divided into two classes: (1) literary, and (2) those which rest upon the supposed background of ideas and of ecclesiastical development suggested by the writings in question. The arguments of the first class are the most likely to lead to positive conclusions, and in one case they do so, as is recognized by most critical writers, including some who in other respects come to conservative conclusions. It is generally admitted that the literary dependence of 2 Peter on Jude rules out the Apostolic authorship of the former. Here, then, we have one case where the Church has admitted into its Canon a writing of a later date, because it bore an Apostolic name. But how does it stand with the other writings? Here the literary argument leads to no such positive result. 1 Peter may depend on Romans and Ephesians, but St. Peter may have written it nevertheless. Jude shows acquaintance with St. Paul's Epistles, but why may not the Jude to whom the letter has generally been assigned have been so acquainted? When we turn to the arguments of the other class, they fail to carry conviction to minds which are not prepossessed with the conception that none of these writings can be Apostolic.

3. The Apocalypse.—Modern investigation has done much, and will do more, to rescue this book from the fetters of traditional lines of interpretation, and to reconstruct the atmosphere in which it was written, and in which therefore it ought to be read and interpreted. The following are the main points at issue:—

(1) *The authorship.* It is now very widely held that Apocalypse and Fourth Gospel cannot be by the same author. This is, of course, not a new, but an ancient critical inference (cf. Dionysius of Alexandria, *ap.* Eus. *HE* vii. 25. 15). (2) *The date.* Was the book written in the reign of Nero, or of Domitian? The majority of recent writers favour the later date.[1] (3) *Dependence upon earlier literature.* Attempts have been made to show that the book in its present form is a Jewish Apocalypse re-edited by a Christian, or a composite work into which fragments of Jewish Apocalypses have been loosely incorporated. These attempts at analysis of the structure of the book may be said to have failed. The unity of purpose and idea is too obvious. No doubt, the writer was deeply read in the OT, and very probably also in current Jewish Apocalyptic literature. But the book is no mere compilation of fragments of earlier writings.[2] In another form, however, attempts to prove dependence of the writer upon the past have met with success. Since the publication of Gunkel's *Schöpfung und Chaos* (1895) it has become increasingly clear that the writer has made very large use of ancient myth, and of language and symbol long current in Apocalyptic writings. Not, of course, that such borrowing is peculiar to him. The long stream of Prophetic and Apocalyptic speakers and writers from Isaiah downwards, not excluding our Lord Himself, have this in common, that they do not entirely create a new language as the vehicle of their teaching, but largely adopt and borrow the words and symbols of an earlier age. To take a simple example, the writer of the Apocalypse, like all the writers of the NT where they are dealing with the future, borrows very largely

[1] The latest commentator, Oesterley (*Expositor's Gr. Test.* iv. [1910]), thinks that the arguments for and against an early date are equally balanced. He suggests that the Epistle may have been written by St. James, but that it was originally a great deal shorter than it now is.

[2] *Church in the Roman Empire*[5], Lond. 1897, p. 282.

[3] So Pfleiderer, Jülicher, Cone, and others.

[4] So von Soden, Harnack, and recently Gunkel (*Die Schriften des NT*, 1909).

[5] So the most recent commentator, Hart, in *Expositor's Gr. Test.* v. (1910).

[1] So Swete, *The Apocalypse of St. John*[2], Lond. 1907; and the latest commentator, Moffatt, in *Expositor's Gr. Test.* v. (1910).

[2] That the author may have employed and worked into the scheme of his book portions of earlier writings is, of course, quite probable, but difficult to prove.

from Daniel. That, of course, will be readily admitted. But modern investigation has penetrated behind this simple handing on of phrase and symbol from writer to writer, and has sought to show that much of the common symbolism so transmitted goes back to a primitive mythology, the origin of which is hidden in the speculation of peoples whose history lies on the border line where history fades into the obscurity of legend. This is, no doubt, largely true, and, if true, is of great importance for the right interpretation of the Apocalypse. If the author is making use of an ancient myth, which has passed through a long course of transmission, it is probable that much of the detail which forms part of it will be repeated by him because it is already there, and therefore it has no particular significance for him. We shall, therefore, look for the outstanding ideas behind his pictures, and not seek to press a historical allusion, or a forecast of some detail of future history, out of every phrase and symbol.

Summary.—If we turn now from this survey to a forecast of the future, there is reason to think that the NT criticism of the days to come will, if we may judge from the general tendency of the more recent writings, more and more emancipate itself from those prejudices which have made it a byword in the past. There is much that is hopeful. On the one hand, there is a readiness to admit that the larger part of the NT writings have quite correctly been assigned by tradition to the 1st century. On the other, there is not the same eagerness to maintain the correctness of tradition in all its details that once inspired writers of the conservative school. Such a popular *Introduction* as that of Peake (1909) may be taken as a good example of the newer spirit, which is anxious neither to affirm nor to deny traditional positions, but only to come to the conclusions to which the evidence points, and to keep an open mind where the evidence is inconclusive. Of course, prejudices die hard, and the determination to keep the Catholic Epistles out of the 1st cent. has still much life in it in Germany. But, speaking generally, there seems to be growing up a school of critical writers who are freeing themselves from the axiomatic dogmatism, whether theological or anti-traditional, of the past century. As this school increases, it may be hoped that, even with regard to the Gospels, something like a really scientific method of inquiry may be reached. At present it must sadly be confessed that the Prolegomena for such an inquiry have yet to be written.

LITERATURE.—This is given in the footnotes. J. Moffatt's *Introduction to the Literature of the New Testament* (Edinburgh, 1911), which appeared too late to be used in this article, should be specially referred to, as the most complete survey of the field of NT criticism. See also reviews of the book by the present writer in *ExpT*, May and June, 1911.

W. C. ALLEN.

CROMLECH.—See DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD (European).

CROSS.—The cross (Lat. *crux*) is the figure produced by two lines intersecting one another, usually at right angles. This figure gives rise to numerous varieties according to the direction of the limbs and the form of their extremities. W. Berry in his *Encyclopædia Heraldica* mentions no fewer than 385 different crosses, but the greater number have scarcely any interest except for decorative art and the science of heraldry. From the point of view of religious symbolism the only important types are the following: the equilateral cross, called also the Greek cross (*a* in illustration); the so-called Latin cross (*crux immissa* or *capitata*), in which the lower limb is longer than the three others (*b*); the Tau-shaped (*potencée* or *commissa*) cross (*c*); the *crux ansata* or handled cross (*d*); the *crux decussata* or St. Andrew's cross (*e*); the gammate cross (*f*); the Maltese or rayed cross (*g*); the Lorraine cross, with double or triple traverse (*h*); the cross *perronnée*, that is to say, mounted on steps (*i*).




FIG. 1.

I. **Non-Christian crosses.**—1. *The equilateral cross.*—The equilateral cross, like the straight line, the curve, the circle, the crescent, the triangle, etc., forms so simple and natural a geometrical figure that in many instances it could not fail to present itself spontaneously to the imagination in quest of a sign to indicate anything that extends in the principal directions of space—the sky, the earth, rays of light, the wind-rose, etc.—and, by an extension of meaning, to stand for the abstract notion of space itself. It is easy to understand how, in the symbolism of some peoples, the cross may have served as a conventional representation of certain material objects whose contour it suggests—birds on the wing, men with outstretched arms, a double-headed hammer, the bow and drill apparatus for producing fire, etc. But, everywhere, it may be said to have been used, above all, to represent *radiation* or *space*.[1]

Thus we find that the equilateral cross was




FIG. 2.[2]

adopted by the Chaldæo-Assyrians as the symbol of the sky and of its god Anu (see fig. 2, *a*). The



FIG. 3.[3]

same peoples represented the sun and its eight regions by a circle from which eight rays proceeded (2, *b*). By coupling these rays in pairs there was produced the radiated cross which the king of




FIG. 4.[4]

[1] At the same time it must not be forgotten that the cross, like the triangle and other geometric figures, is sometimes merely ornamental in origin, with no symbolic significance whatever.

[2] See Rawlinson, *WAI*, vol. ii. pl. 48.

[3] See Perrot-Chipiez, i. 308; cf. Layard, *Monuments of Nineveh*, 1849–53, pl. iv.

[4] See Schliemann, *Ilios*, Paris, 1885, No. 1959.

Assyria wore suspended round his neck, like the cross worn by a Commander in our orders of knighthood (see fig. 3).

Schliemann has noted the presence of the cross upon the pottery and the whorls of the Troad. The solar meaning of this symbol is attested by its alternating with the rayed disk. At times the two emblems appear in juxtaposition (see fig. 4, *a*).

Among the Greeks the sceptre of Apollo assumes at times the form of a cross (cf. coin of Gallienus reproduced in Victor Duruy's *Hist. des Romains*, Paris, 1885, vol. viii. p. 42), fig. 4, *b*. The cross is associated with the representation of Castor and Pollux, perhaps in order to emphasize their stellar character (so on coin of Caracalla).

In India likewise the equilateral cross alternates with the rayed disk. On an ancient coin reproduced by General Cunningham (*Bhilsa Topes*, 1854, pl. xxxi.) the branches of the cross terminate in arrow-heads (see fig. 5).



Fig. 5.

Among the Gauls, as well as among the peoples belonging to the Bronze period, the cross appears frequently on pottery, jewels, and coins (see G. de Mortillet, *Le Signe de la croix avant le christianisme*, Paris, 1866, p. 44 ff.). Here again the emblem is clearly solar (see fig. 6). On the



Fig. 6.[1]

statuette of a Gaulish deity, discovered in France in the department of Côte d'Or, we see the tunic covered all over with crosses. The god, who is Sucellus (on whom cf. Renel, *Religions de la Gaule avant le christianisme*, Paris, 1906, pp. 252–257), holds in one hand the mallet which symbolizes the thunderbolt, and in the other a jar or *olla* (see fig. 7).



Fig. 7.[2]

The cross is found in like manner in Mexico, in Peru, and above all in Central America, where its

[1] See Flouest, *Deux stèles de laraire*, Paris, 1885, pl. xvii.
[2] See *Revue Celtique*, 1870, p. 2.

presence upon religious monuments did not fail to astonish the companions and the successors of Columbus, who saw in it a trace of a visit paid by St. Thomas, the apostle of the Indies (see *Congrès internat. des Americanistes*, vol. i., Brussels, 1879, p. 501 ff.). We know nowadays that these crosses are designed in allusion to the four quarters from which rain comes, and consequently to the winds that blow from the four cardinal points (see G. Mallery, in *10 RBEW*, 1893). The cross of pre-Columban America is a veritable 'wind-rose,' and we can perceive how it thus became, among the Toltecs, the symbol of the god who dispenses the celestial waters, Tlaloc (see A. Réville, *Religions du Mexique*, Paris, 1885, p. 91 [also in Eng. tr.]). According to Réville, the Mexican cross was called the 'tree of fecundity' or the 'tree of life.' There has been found in the ruins of Palenqué a bas-relief representing persons in the act of adoration before a cross, on which rests a fantastic bird, more or less resembling a parrot. Perhaps this was the symbol of the god Quetzalcoatl (the feathered serpent), who himself also, according to Réville, stands for a god of the wind (*op. cit.* p. 82; see also Thomas Wilson, *The Swastika*, 1896, p. 933 ff.). For a cross, representing the four winds, as thought of by the Dakotas, see fig. 8.



Fig. 8.[1]

The arrow at the top of this cross marks the piercing blast of the north wind. Once the north wind is located at the head of the cross, the east wind will be symbolized by the heart, which in the human body is placed under the left arm. The south wind is pictured by the sun, as it shines from the region of light and warmth, and the west wind by a star, as it blows from the region of the night.

But the American cross may have assumed also a solar or stellar character, if one may judge from




Fig. 9.[2]

the above figure (9), which has been met with on shells found in the mounds of New Mexico; and




Fig. 10.[3]

from those, not less significant (10), which have been found among the Dakota pictographs. See, further, following article.

[1] See *10 RBEW*, fig. 1225.
[2] See Holmes, in *2 RBEW*, p. 282.
[3] See Garrick Mallery, in *10 RBEW*, figs. 1118–1126.

Among the Chinese, the equilateral cross inscribed within a square, ⊞, stands for the earth. According to Samuel Beal (*Indian Antiquary*, 1880, p. 67) there is found in China even the dictum 'God fashioned the earth in the form of a cross.' It is curious to meet with an analogous symbolism in a Church Father. 'The aspect of the cross,' writes Jerome (*Com. in Marcum*), 'what is it but the form of the world in its four directions? [*Ipsa species crucis, quid est nisi forma quadrata mundi?*]. The east is represented by the top, the north by the right limb (looking *from* the cross), the south by the left, the west by the lower portion.'

2. *The handled cross and the cross potencée.*—The *potencée* form **T**, produced by suppressing the upper limb of the Latin cross, is called also the Tau cross, because it reproduces the form of the Greek letter *Tau*. The magical virtue which down to our own day has been attributed to this sign owes its origin unquestionably to the veneration paid by the Egyptians from their pre-historic days to the handled cross, or *key of life*, represented by a cross *potencée* surmounted by a handle (see fig. 11). This cross, which is met with on the




FIG. 11.

most ancient monuments of the Egyptian monarchy, is frequently to be seen in the hand of a god, a priest, or a king. Archæologists have maintained by turns that it represents a Nilometer (Plucke), the key of a canal-lock (Zoega), a jar upon an altar (Ungarelli), a degenerate form of the winged globe (Layard), a phallus (Jablonski), the loin-cloth worn by the Egyptians (Sayce). In the paintings on the tombs it appears to be employed by the divinities to awaken the dead to a new life. The following inscription may be read upon a bas-relief of the 12th dynasty, where the goddess Anukit is seen holding the extremity of the handled cross to the nostrils of the king Usertesen III.: 'I give thee life, stability, purity, like Ra, eternally.' Elsewhere the ideogram formed by the handled cross in the hieroglyphic script, ☥ (pronounced *ankh*), signifies 'life,' 'living' (E. M. Coemans, *Manuel de langue égyptienne*, Ghent, 1887, pt. 1, p. 46). Whatever may be the material object of which the handled cross is the representation, its abstract sense is not doubtful: it is a symbol of life, of the vital germ, and it is not without reason that it has been called the *key of life.*[1]




a[2] *b*[3] *c*[4] *c*[4]

FIG. 12.

From Egypt the *key of life*, now become a magical and propitiatory sign, spread to the Phœnicians and then to the whole Semitic world. Its presence has been noted on bas-reliefs, tombs, pottery, jewels, coins, from Sardinia to Susiana, along the shore of Africa, in Phrygia, Palestine, and Mesopotamia. Upon monuments of Phœnician or Hittite origin it is held in the hands of kings or priests, as with the Egyptians, and is associated with the tree of life and the lotus flower. Its extreme symbolical importance led the peoples who borrowed it from the Egyptians to combine it with such emblems of their own as presented an analogous form or suggested a cognate idea. Thus the Phœnicians derived from it a mixed emblem, in which the handled cross is grafted upon the cone representing the goddess Astarte or Tanit, 'she who gives life' (see fig. 12).

The Greeks anthropomorphosed it so as to reproduce the features of their goddesses of life—Aphrodite, Harmonia, Artemis of Ephesus, etc. (see fig. 13).



a[1] *b*[2]

FIG. 13.

With the Gauls the **T** comes to stand for the hammer of Thor, which was regarded not only as an engine of destruction, but also, after the manner of the storm, as an instrument of life and fecundity. Even with the Egyptians the two-headed mallet, , became in the hieroglyphs a Latin cross, †, with the meaning of 'crusher,' 'avenger' (de Harlez, 'Le Culte de la croix avant le christianisme' in *La Science catholique*, 15th Feb. 1890, p. 163).

In Egypt there have been found a whole series of signs which mark the transition from a handled cross, or cross *ansata*, to the *chi-rho*, or monogram of Christ (see fig. 14).



FIG. 14.[3]

The handled cross or a similar sign is met with also in India (see fig. 15), and in America, where



FIG. 15.[4]

it is found engraved on monuments in the ruins of Palenqué, as well as on the pieces of pottery recovered from the mounds.

[1] See, however, Wiedemann, *Religion der alten Ägypter*, Münster, 1890, p. 157 f., who maintains that the *ankh* connotes merely a band or fillet, and is only homonymous with *ankh*, 'life,' so that 'it has nothing to do with a cross.'

[2] From a coin of Paphos (*CIS*, vol. i. fasc. i. p. 6).

[3] From a coin of Carthage (Barclay V. Head, *Coins in the British Museum*, London, 1881, pl. xxxv., No. 38).

[4] From intaglios of Sardinia (J. Menant, *Pierres gravées de la Haute Asie*, Paris, 1883–85, vol. ii. pp. 256, 258).

[1] Lenormant, in *GA*, 1876, p. 68.

[2] P. Decharme, *Mythologie de la Grèce antique*, 1879, fig. 145.

[3] Chi-rhos of Philæ (Letronne, 'La Croix ansée a-t-elle été employée pour exprimer le monogramme du Christ?' in *MAIBL*, vol. xvi. pl. i. figs. 47, 48, 49).

[4] On a silver ingot (Edw. B. Thomas, in the *Numismatic Chronicle*, vol. iv., new series, pl. xi.).

In a Maya manuscript two persons appear to be in the act of adoration before a tree which affects the form **T**, and where a parrot-like bird has taken the place of the upper arm of the cross (see fig. 16).



FIG. 16.[1]

3. *The gammate cross, or gammadion.* — This cross derives its name from the fact that it can be resolved into four *gammas* joined at right angles (see fig. 17). In spite of its apparently

a *b*



FIG. 17.




FIG. 18.

complicated structure, it is, next to the equilateral cross, the form most widely diffused throughout all antiquity. It has been met with on terra-cotta articles at Hissarlik, from the time of the second or burnt city. In Greece proper and the islands of the Archipelago it makes its appearance first upon articles of pottery with geometrical ornaments, which form the second period of Greek ceramics. It is frequent upon the ancient vases of Cyprus, Rhodes, and Athens. Upon an Athenian vase, in a burial scene, it appears thrice repeated before the funeral car. Upon a vase of Thera it accompanies the image of the Persian Artemis. Elsewhere it adorns the *vulva* of an Asiatic goddess. Upon a vase now at Vienna it appears as an ornament on the breast of an Apollo standing upon a *quadriga* (cf. Goblet d'Alviella, *The Migration of Symbols*, London, 1894, pl. i.). It became a favourite symbol on coins, and passed along with the other monetary symbols of the Greeks into the numismatic art of all the Mediterranean peoples.

This cross is also found engraved upon those hut-shaped funeral urns which have been dug up in the *terramares* of N. Italy. It likewise appears on the jewels and the weapons, not only of Gallic, but also of German and Scandinavian peoples.[2] In company with the wheel and the thunderbolt, it adorns the votive altars of the Gallico-Roman period, from Aquitaine to Great Britain. In the Caucasus it has been noted upon weapons and jewels which go back to the Bronze period. In Lycaonia, on a Hittite monument, it is introduced as an ornament on the border of the robe of a person engaged in offering sacrifice.

In India, where it bears the name of *swastika* (from *su*, 'well,' and *asti*, 'it is') when the limbs are bent towards the right (fig. 17, *a*), and *sauvastika* when they are turned to the left (fig. 17, *b*), it is already found upon the domino-shaped ingots of silver which preceded the use of coins, and then upon the coins themselves. The Buddhists employed it largely. A notable instance of its use, along with other symbols, is in the classical representation of the *Buddhapāda*, or footprint of Buddha (see fig. 19), among the bas-reliefs of the




FIG. 19.

famous *stūpa* of Amarāvatī. It passed, no doubt, along with Buddhism, into the iconography of China and Japan, where it occupies a pre-eminent place on the pedestal of Buddhist statues, and even at times adorns the breast of Buddha and the Bodhisattvas.[1] In China, moreover, the *swastika* found a place among the written characters, where it conveys the notion of 'plurality,' and, by extension, of 'abundance,' 'prosperity,' 'long life' (Thomas Wilson, *The Swastika*, p. 799). The same is the case in Japan, where, according to de Milloué, it represents the number 10,000, and consequently the idea of abundance and prosperity [*BSAL*, 1881, p. 191]). The Empress Wu (684–704) of the Tang dynasty decreed that it should be used as a sign for the sun (Yang y Yu, in Wilson's *Swastika*, pl. 2).

Even at the present day the Hindus make frequent use of this figure, which they may trace in their account books and, on certain occasions, on the threshold of their houses. According to Sir George Birdwood,[2] they distinguish clearly between the *swastika* and the *sauvastika*, the first representing the male principle and the god Ganeśa, the second the female principle and the goddess Kālī. In an extended sense, the first stands for the sun in his diurnal course, or for light and life; the second for night and destruction. The sect of the Jains in India has chosen the *swastika* as the emblem of the seventh of their twenty-four saints, or Tīrthaṅkaras (Colebrooke, 'On the Jainas,' in *Asiatic Researches*, Calcutta, 1788–1836, p. 308).

The gammate cross has been met with sporadically also on bronze articles among the Ashantis of Africa; and also on native implements from Paraguay, Costa Rica, and Yucatan. In the ancient Maya city of Mayapan it adorned a stone slab which bore also the image of the solar disk, exactly as in Gaul, Italy, Asia Minor, East India. In N. America it is seen among the crosses engraved on shell and copper ornaments from the mounds, and the Pueblo Indians still use it to decorate their trinkets, bead necklaces, baskets, and rugs.[3]

From the circumstances in which the gammate cross has been traced or employed, it follows that, in every instance in which a symbolical meaning has been attributed to it, it is a sign of good omen,

[1] See *3 RBEW*, 1884, p. 32.
[2] In the north it has received the name *fylfot* ('many-footed'), but the assimilation implied in this name is very uncertain. See, further, Renel, *op. cit.* pp. 217–220.

[1] The Buddha Amitābha (Musée Guimet); also in Wilson's *Swastika*, pl. i.
[2] *Old Records of the India Office*, London, 1891, p. xi.
[3] See d'Alviella, *À travers le Far West*, Brussels, 1906, p. 160.

of propitiation and benediction, an emblem of prosperity, of life, of safety [the *sauvastika*, where a distinction is drawn between the two forms of the gammate cross, is an exception which proves the rule]. But whence comes this general function of luck-bringer and talisman? There is scarcely a symbol which has given rise to such diverse interpretations. Men have seen in it, *e.g.*, running water (Waring), the air or the god of the air (R. P. Greg), fire or the bow and drill apparatus for producing fire (Emile Burnouf), the lightning (W. Schwartz), the female sex (George Birdwood), the union of the two sexes (J. Hoffman), a Pāli monogram (General Cunningham), the reunion of the four castes of India (Fred. Pincott), the nautilus [Gr. πολύπους, cf. the *fylfot*] (Frederick Houssay), cranes flying (Karl von den Steinen), the primitive god of the Indo-Europeans (de Zmigrodzki), the sun in his course round the heavens (Ludwig Müller, Percy Gardner, Edw. B. Thomas, Max Müller, Henri Gaidoz, Goblet d'Alviella).

It might even be maintained, on the strength of the monuments, that, after having served as a symbol of the sun in motion, the gammate cross came to symbolize astronomical motion in general, and thus to be applied to the moon, the stars, the sky itself, and to everything that appears to move of itself—water, wind, lightning, fire, etc. In this way it would readily become a symbol of prosperity, fertility, blessing, or the appurtenance of such deities as secured the development of man and of Nature (see figs. 20, 21).



Solar gammadion.[1]
FIG. 20.



Lunar gammadion.[2]
FIG. 21.

The question may be asked whether the gammate cross can be assigned to a single birthplace. Its two most ancient known *habitats* are: the one in the burnt city of the ruins at Hissarlik, the other among the *terramares* of N. Italy. It is possible that both of these districts borrowed it from the valley of the Danube during the Bronze age. From these two centres it may have spread—while retaining its double significance as a solar symbol and as a sign of life or of blessing—on the one hand, towards the west, to the extremities of the Celtic and German world; on the other, towards the east, by way of the Caucasus, India, China, and Japan.

Again, has the gammate cross of the New World an independent origin? The supposition is by no means inadmissible that it arose spontaneously. But the answer to this question depends in some measure upon whether infiltrations of Asiatic iconography did not make their way across the ocean during the era of pre-Columban civilization. And this is a problem which appears to be yet far from being solved.

II. The Christian cross.—The cross in the Christian sense is the σταυρός or *lignum infelix*, a wooden post surmounted by a cross-beam, to which the Romans, following the example of the Greeks and the Easterns, nailed or attached certain classes of condemned criminals till they died. The fact that Jesus suffered death on the cross has converted this infamous figure into a symbol of resurrection and salvation. 'I determined to know among you nothing save Jesus Christ and him crucified,' writes St. Paul (1 Co 2^2). The early Christians saw the cross in all the intersecting lines which presented themselves to their view in ordinary life, in art, in Nature. The 'sign of the cross' was their favourite symbol. 'At every step, at every movement, at every coming in and going out,' wrote Tertullian at the beginning of the 3rd cent. (*de Corona*, 3), 'in putting on our clothes and our shoes, in the bath, at table in the evening, lying down or sitting, whatever attitude we assume, we mark our foreheads with a little sign of the cross.' Moreover, Christians had to defend themselves against the charge of pagans that they paid adoration to the cross like an idol. '*Cruces non colimus nec optamus*,' wrote Minucius Felix.[1] But it is plain that the great mass of Christians attached a magical value to this sign. At all events they used it as a form of exorcism, a means of warding off unclean spirits. One of the most ancient portable crosses, found in a Christian tomb at Rome, bears the inscription: '*Crux est vita mihi; mors, inimice, tibi*' ('The cross is life to me; death, O enemy [the devil], to thee'). Soon the cross came to work miracles of itself. People went the length of marking cattle with it to protect them from disease.[2]

The cross, according to a Roman Catholic archæologist, P. Didron, is more than a figure of Christ; it is in iconography Christ Himself or His symbol. 'Thus a legend has been created around it as if it were a living being; thus it has been made the hero of an epopee germinating in the Apocrypha; growing in the Golden Legend; unfolding and completing itself in the works of sculpture and painting from the 14th to the 16th century.'[3] This is an allusion to the celebrated mystical poem of Giacomo da Varaggio (13th century), where it is related how, after the death of Adam, Seth planted upon his tomb a branch taken from the tree of life. When the slip had grown into a tree, Moses obtained from it his magic rod. Solomon took from it the wood for his temple. Finally, the executioners of Jesus cut from it the materials for fashioning the cross. This cross, buried upon Golgotha, was disinterred in the time of the empress Helena; and the Church commemorated its discovery by appointing the 3rd of May (13th Sept. in the Eastern Church) as the annual festival of the *Inventio Crucis*. Carried off by Chosroës, it was miraculously recovered by Heraclius fourteen years later, in honour of which event the Church instituted another annual festival on the 14th of Sept., the *Exaltatio Crucis*. Lost once more after the Muslim invasion, it is to reappear finally in the sky at the end of the world.

The Holy Cross had its special churches as it had its festivals; not a few cities even were named in its honour. Thus Roman Catholic writers admit that the cross has become the object of a veritable cult. 'The cross,' writes Didron (*loc. cit.*), 'has received a worship similar, if not equal, to that of Christ; this sacred wood is adored almost equally with God Himself.' Many churches possess, amongst their miraculous relics, alleged fragments of the cross. A legend, intended to explain their abundance, relates that these fragments had the miraculous prerogative not only of healing diseases, but even of reproducing and multiplying themselves indefinitely.

Strangely enough, the early Christians, in spite of the importance they attached to the cross, refrained from reproducing it in their iconography.

[1] From a Gallo-Belgic coin (E. F. F. Hucher, *L'Art gaulois*, Paris, 1865, p. 169).
[2] From a Cretan coin (*Numismatic Chronicle*, vol. xx. [No. 3] pl. ii. fig. 7).

[1] Migne, *PL* iii. 346.
[2] de Rossi, *Bulletino di Arch. Cristiana*, 1873, p. 138; see, further, art. CHARMS AND AMULETS (Chr.), vol. iii. p. 426.
[3] P. Didron, *Histoire de Dieu*, 1843, p. 351.

During the first three centuries (with possibly a single exception, that of the equilateral cross cut on a sepulchral inscription, which de Rossi believes may be assigned to the end of the 2nd or the beginning of the 3rd cent.) the cross of Christ is invariably dissimulated under the form of an object which recalls its image: a trident, an anchor (see figs. 22, 23), a ship with rigging; or under the forms of the cross already employed by other cults. the cross *potencée* and the gammate



FIGS. 22, 23.[1]

cross. The cross *potencée*, according to certain archæologists, is, by the way, the form which most accurately recalls the instrument of crucifixion employed by the Romans.

At the close of the 3rd cent. the Christians designated Jesus Christ by a monogram composed of the first two letters of Ἰησοῦς Χριστός, ✳, or of ΧΡιστός, ☧. The addition of a transverse bar, ✳ or ☧, exhibits the cross or, better still, Christ upon the cross, especially when, by an after process of simplification, the *chi-rho* becomes † or †. Further, the Latin cross already appears upon certain coins of Constantine, although this emperor, true to his policy of religious eclecticism, shows no scruple about introducing on the same coins representations of Mars or Apollo as gods. Julian, of course, suppressed both cross and *chi-rho*. But, after his time, the cross finally takes its place upon coins and even upon the Imperial diadem. At the same time it asserts itself under its proper form in funeral inscriptions, upon altars, reliquaries, lamps, jewels, and even upon the façades of houses and the tops of *basilicas*, where it takes the place of the monogram; and before long it may be seen furnishing the ground plan of churches. In the 5th cent. the employment of the cross *potencée* becomes rare except in Celtic countries, where it continues to show itself in inscriptions. In like manner the gammate cross now appears only sporadically, in the west and the north of Europe, upon tombstones and sacerdotal vestments.

The so-called Latin cross and the equilateral cross were at first employed without discrimination. Only gradually did the equilateral come to be the specialty of the East, and the form with unequal limbs that of the West.

As to the *crucifix*, i.e. a cross with the body of Jesus nailed to it, this representation does not make its appearance till the 7th century. The art of the Middle Ages was not slow to heighten its realism still more. But at the same time a distinction was drawn between the cross of the Passion, which is accompanied by all the implements of crucifixion, and the cross of the Resurrection, with which Jesus ascends to heaven. The first is painted sometimes green, because it was cut from a tree; sometimes red, because it was stained with the blood of Christ. The second is painted sometimes blue, the colour of the sky; sometimes white, as symbolizing the invisible Divinity. It is this last which is carried at the head of processions.

The cross became a hierarchical symbol in the Church. Thus the Pope has the privilege of having carried before him a cross with three bars, while cardinals and archbishops have to be content with two, and bishops with one.

Finally, the cross served also in the prime of the Middle Ages as a symbol of certain popular rights. Such were the market crosses in Germany, which implied the municipal jurisdiction; the *perrons*, or crosses mounted upon a column, which in certain towns of Belgium and Germany were regarded as an emblem of jurisdiction, and even as the palladium of local liberties. When Charles the Bold wished to punish the inhabitants of Liège, he carried away their *perron* and set it up for six years at Bruges.

For a number of centuries the phrase 'to take the cross' meant to devote oneself to fight the infidels. Hence the orders of knighthood and the crosses of honour, the bestowal of which has now nothing to do with religion.

After all that we have said, it is needless to stop to examine theories, ancient or modern, which seek to claim a pagan origin for the Christian cross, on the ground that earlier cults had cruciform signs among their symbolism, while others would discover in pre-Christian crosses prefigurations of the Crucifixion. We must content ourselves with referring the reader to the respective supporters of these theories (*e.g.* Emile Burnouf, Gabriel de Mortillet, Mourant Brock, Abbé Ansault, etc.).

LITERATURE.—i. *GENERAL.*—J. A. Martigny, *Dictionnaire des antiquités chrétiennes*, Paris, 1865, *s.v.* 'Croix'; Gabriel de Mortillet, *Le Signe de la croix avant le christianisme*, Paris, 1866; E. Bunsen, *Das Symbol des Kreuzes bei allen Nationen*, Berlin, 1876; E. Burnouf, *La Science des religions*, Paris, 1876; Mourant Brock, *The Cross, Heathen and Christian*, London, 1879; W. H. Holmes, 'The Cross used as a Symbol by the ancient Americans,' in *Trans. of the Anthropological Society of America*, Washington, 1883, vol. ii.; Hocbart, 'Le Symbole de la croix,' in *Annales de la Faculté des Lettres de Bordeaux*, 1886, no. 1; W. Wilson Blake, *The Cross, Ancient and Modern*, New York, 1888; Ansault, 'Le Culte de la croix avant Jésus-Christ,' in the French review, *Le Correspondant*, 25th Oct. 1889, p. 163 f.; C. de Harlez, 'Le Culte de la croix avant le christianisme,' in the French review, *La Science catholique*, 15th Feb. 1890; F. Cabrol, art. 'Cross and Crucifix,' in *Catholic Encyclopædia*, New York, vol. iv.; J. Romilly Allen, *Early Christian Symbolism in Great Britain and Ireland*, London, 1887.

ii. *ON THE GAMMADION OR SWASTIKA.*—L. Müller, *Det saakaldte Hagekors*, Copenhagen, 1877; E. Thomas, 'The Indian Swastika and its Western Counterpart,' in *Numismatic Chronicle*, 1880; R. P. Greg, 'The Fylfot and Swastika,' in *Archæologia*, 1885, p. 293 ff.; G. Dumoutier, 'Le Swastika et la roue solaire en Chine,' in *Revue d'ethnographie*, Paris, 1885, vol. iv. p. 327 f.; Goblet d'Alviella, 'De la croix gammée ou swastika,' in *Bulletins de l'Académie royale de Belgique*, 1889; D. G. Brinton, 'The Ka-ti, the Swastika, and the Cross in America,' in *Proceedings of the Amer. Philosophical Society*, vol. xxvi., 1889, p. 177 ff. M. de Zmigrodzki has collected, in various publications, all the known instances of the gammadion (see his *Geschichte der Swastika*, Brunswick, 1890, and his *Przeglad archeoloji*, Krakow, 1902). As for the literature on the subject, Thomas Wilson mentions in the Appendix to his work *The Swastika* (Washington, 1896), 114 books and articles, besides his own, dealing with the gammate cross.

GOBLET D'ALVIELLA.

CROSS (American).—The appearance of the cross symbol among the semi-civilized and savage peoples of America in all probability admits of a genuine two-fold interpretation. It amalgamates in all likelihood two cognate ideas: (1) that of the cross as a symbol of the four winds belonging to or emanating from the four cardinal points; (2) that of the 'world tree,' 'tree of life,' or 'tree of our flesh' (Mexican *Tonacaquahuitl*), analogous in some ways to the Scandinavian *Yggdrasil*, or cosmic tree, whose roots surrounded the universe. The first, in its pictorial and mural form, was probably evolved from the second as an art convention. There can be no question of the genuine aboriginal character of the cross symbol as found in America. Its origin appears to have been analogous to that of the symbol in use in the Old World—evolution from a symbol of the four cardinal points; but any hypothesis of its importation from Europe

[1] See T. Roller, *Les Catacombes de Rome*, Paris, 1881, vol. i. pl. xix. nos. 8 and 11.

or Asia would require much weightier proof of European or Asiatic colonization than has yet been advanced, and is easily discounted by the unquestionable signs of its wide-spread aboriginal use throughout the American continent.

On the discovery of Yucatan, where the lieutenants of Cortes found crosses at Cozumel and elsewhere, the wildest theories were propounded to account for their appearance in the New World. These crosses were about 3 ft. in height, and were usually found in an enclosure called *teopan*, or the buildings surrounding a temple. The Spanish missionaries believed that they had been introduced by the apostle St. Thomas, or that early Spanish colonists, driven out by the Moors, had sought refuge in America, and had brought with them the sacred symbol. The missionaries then proceeded to inquire after representations of the Crucifixion itself, and it was discovered that one had existed in pictorial form on a manuscript which had been buried to prevent its destruction by the invaders, but which had subsequently rotted underground. This figure undoubtedly represented a human sacrifice to the Sun, always intended in Mexico when the word 'God' (*Teotl*) was employed, as in the present instance, without any indication of the particular deity which the figure was meant to represent.

1. As a symbol of the four winds.—As a symbol of the four cardinal points from which the winds, and therefore the rains, came, the cross was well entitled to the designation of 'tree of our life' in the arid climate of Yucatan. To each quarter of the heavens a quarter of the ritual year belonged. The Aztec goddess of rains, Chalchihuitlicue, bore a cross in her hand, as most of the principal deities of Egyptian mythology carry a cognate symbol, the *ankh*, or 'key of life'; and, in the feast celebrated in her honour in the early spring, victims were nailed to a cross and shot with arrows. Quetzalcoatl, as god of the winds, is represented as carrying a species of cross, and his robes were decorated with cruciform symbols. The form which we find, for example, in the famous bas-relief of Palenqué, and which was also discovered upon the temple walls of Cozumel, Popayan, Cundinamarca, and elsewhere, was undoubtedly a conventional form evolved from that of a tree, consisting of the lower part of the trunk and two cross-branches. The Mayan designation of the cross was indeed *Vahom che*, 'the tree erected *or* set up.' In the Palenqué cross, at the ends of the branches knobs appear, which are probably intended to indicate leaves or fruit. On the summit is perched a bird, probably a turkey, decked out in the brilliant plumage of more brightly-feathered fowl. The cross in question was probably regarded as in some measure the pedestal of the living turkey-fetish. The flesh of the turkey was a staple of Mexican diet, and in this way, it may be, the bird had become associated with the idea of subsistence and the 'tree of life' itself. In any case the cross of Palenqué was known as *Quetzalhuexoloquahuitl*, or 'tree of the plumed turkey.' A priest stands on the proper right of the bas-relief, offering as a sacrifice a small human figure made from maize paste, and not a newly-born child, as some authorities state. On the proper left stands an acolyte, offering up a stalk of maize. At the roots of the cross a hideous head appears. It is that of *Cihuacohuatl* (female serpent), or *Tonantzin* (our Mother), to give her her Mexican designation—the earth-goddess, the most bloodthirsty of the Central American deities in her lust for human flesh, and the one from whom the 'tree of life' has its being and nourishment.

Many American peoples believe in the efficacy of the cross as a symbol whereby rain may be obtained. The rain-makers of the Lenni Lenape draw the figure of a cross upon the ground, with its extremities towards the cardinal points, and on this they place a gourd, some tobacco, and a piece of red material, afterwards invoking the rain-spirit. The Creeks, at the ceremony of 'the Busk,' celebrated to the four winds, dispose four logs in the shape of a cross, the ends of which are set to the cardinal points, and in the centre of these they kindle the New Year's fire. The Blackfeet used to arrange large boulders in the form of a cross, on the prairies, in honour of Natose, 'the old man who sends the winds.' The Muyscas of Bogota, in order to sacrifice to the goddess of waters, extended ropes across a lake, thus forming a gigantic cross, at the point of intersection of which they cast in offerings of precious stones, gold, and odoriferous oils. In the State of Wisconsin many low cruciform mounds are found, exactly orientated. These were probably altars to the four winds. In the mythology of the Dakotas the winds were always conceived as birds; and the name of the cross in the Dakotan language signifies 'the mosquito-hawk spread out.'

2. As the 'world tree.'—In those Mexican and Mayan pictures which deal with cosmology the world tree is depicted as standing in the centre of the universe, its roots deep in the waste of waters, its branches among the clouds, as if in search of rain. The Mexicans worshipped the tree as *Tota* (our Father), whom they further described as 'god of the waters and of vegetation,' although he also appears to have some connexion with fire. Among the Kiche (or Quiché) of Guatemala, women desirous of children sought out a tree overhanging a pool, to which they prayed as the emblem of fertility; and this indicates the possible phallic origin of the tree of life. The *vax che*, or ceiba tree, is still an object of veneration in many hamlets of Central America. The sacred pole of the Omahas typifies the cosmic tree, the centre of the four winds, and the dwelling of the thunder-bird; and tree-burial among the western tribes of North America probably bore some mythical relation to placing the dead in the tree of life. The Mbocobis of Paraguay believe in a tree by which the dead once climbed to Paradise, and the Yurucares of Bolivia in one whence mankind originally emerged. The sacred tree also appears symbolically throughout America in the form of the poles and stakes which surround the prayer-houses and *kivas* of many American tribes.

LITERATURE.—Ixtlilxochitl, *Historia Chichimeca* (ed. A. Chavero), Mexico, 1891–92; Las Casas, *Hist. Apologetica*, Seville, 1552; Sahagun, *Hist. gen. de . . . Nueva España*, lib. i. cap. ii., Mexico, 1829–30; Garcia, *Origen de los Indios*, lib. iii. cap. vi., Madrid, 1729; Cogolludo, *Hist. de Yucathan*, lib. iv. cap. ix., Madrid, 1688; de Charencey, *Le Mythe de Votan*, Alençon, 1871; W. H. Holmes, *2 RBEW*, 1883, p. 270 f.; art. 'Cross' in *Handbook of American Indians* (= *30 Bull. BE*), i. 366 f., and the literature there cited.

LEWIS SPENCE.

CROSS-ROADS.—Cross-roads are very generally regarded as the dwelling-place or resort of evil spirits, ghosts, etc., and hence are considered unlucky or even dangerous, while various expedients are resorted to in order to ward off their dangers. On the other hand, they are sometimes associated with a divinity—probably, in the first instance, because images of the divinity were placed there to counteract the powers of evil, and a cult of the divinity was observed at the cross-ways. Or they may be regarded as sacred in themselves. Thus in the Avesta a formula runs: 'We sacrifice . . . to the forkings of the highways and to the meeting of the roads' (*SBE* xxxi. [1887] 291). In ancient India they were not to be defiled or obstructed (*ib.* xxii. [1884] 182, xxxiii. [1889] 158). But the reverence for such a divinity of cross-roads was soon mingled with the fear of the demoniac in-

fluences, and we find the divinity often regarded as sharing in the characteristic evil and horrible traits of the very demoniac beings which he or she was supposed to hold at bay. The association of evil beings or of a divinity with cross-roads is an extension of their association with roads in general, and is already found among some lower tribes in connexion with the rough paths leading through forest or jungle, and with their intersections.

1. **Burial at cross-roads.**—(*a*) There is evidence that the dead were sometimes buried at cross-roads, and this would be one reason for their being regarded as particularly ghost-haunted places—a belief which is certainly very remote and wide-spread. Among the ancient Hindus there was a practice of erecting a *dāgoba* or *stūpa* (a mound in which the bones and ashes were placed) at cross-roads. These were to be erected there in honour of a king of kings or a *Tathāgata* (*Mahāparinibbāna Sutta*, v. 26, vi. 33=*SBE* xi. [1881] 93, 125; cf. Oldenberg's remarks, *Rel. des Veda*, Berlin, 1894, p. 562). In Slavic lands, cairns and tumuli are often found at cross-roads, and the older literature sometimes refers to a cult of the dead there (Grimm, *Kleinere Schriften*, Berlin, 1865, ii. 288). Other instances are reported among the Greeks, Germans, etc. (Lippert, *Rel. der europ. Culturvölker*, Berlin, 1881, p. 310; Wuttke, *Deutsche Volksabergl. der Gegenwart*, Berlin, 1900, § 108; Winternitz, *Denkschr. der kais. Akad. der Wissensch.*, Vienna, xi. [1892] 68). In Hungary, persons believed to have succumbed to the malice of a witch or demon were sometimes buried at cross-roads, to deliver them from this influence, as witches had no power there—an unusual belief (*FLJ* ii. [1884] 101). This is an instance of the riddance of evil at cross-roads (see § 5). It is not impossible that one reason for honourable burial at cross-roads was the desire for re-incarnation. Among the Mongols, among many N. American tribes, and in W. Africa, children are often buried by the side of a path or road, in order that the ghost may have an opportunity of entering some woman passing that way, and so being re-born of her (Letourneau, *Sociology*, 1893, p. 239; Owen, *Folk-lore of the Musquakie Ind.*, 1902, pp. 22–23, 86; Dorman, *Prim. Superstitions*, Philadelphia, 1881, p. 35; Kingsley, *Travels in W. Africa*, 1897, p. 478). As more women are likely to pass a cross-way than on any single path, the chances of re-incarnation would be greater there.

(*b*) But in the case of persons whose ghosts are regarded as dangerous, another reason for burial at cross-roads must be sought. Among such persons are those who have committed suicide, and occasionally murder. Custom and law in England prescribed that the suicide should be buried at a cross-road, with a stake driven through his body. A stone was also placed over the face (Stephen, *Hist. of Crim. Law*, 1883, iii. 105; *FL* viii. [1897] 199. The custom was abolished in 1823). Criminals also were executed at cross-roads, *e.g.* Tyburn, the meeting-place of the London, Oxford, and Edgeware roads. Stake and stone were intended to prevent the restless ghost from wandering and troubling the neighbourhood. It has also been suggested that the constant traffic over the grave would help to keep the ghost down, or that the number of roads would confuse it, and so prevent its finding its way home, or that the cross would act as a disperser of the evil energy concentrated in the body or the ghost, or that sacrificial victims (these being frequently criminals) were formerly slain on the altars at cross-roads, which were therefore regarded as fitting places for the execution and burial of criminals, after the introduction of Christianity (*FL* viii. 264; Westermarck, *MI*, 1908, ii. 256; *EBr*[11] vii. 510). To this it should be added that suicides were generally buried in out-of-the-way places; and the cross-roads, being a place of evil repute, would naturally be selected for the grave. The underlying thought is that of riddance of the contagion of evil, and in no better place could this be effected than at the cross-roads (see § 5). A parallel custom of burying at the cross-roads the bodies of children still-born or born feet-foremost (a mode considered unlucky) is found in Uganda, where also the bodies of suicides, with the tree on which they hanged themselves or the hut in which they took their lives, were burned at cross-roads. And it is noticeable that women who pass that way throw a few blades of grass, or sticks, or stones, on the grave to prevent the spirits from entering them and being re-born (Roscoe, 'Manners and Customs of the Baganda,' *JAI* xxxii. [1902] 30, and Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, 1910, ii. 507, iii. 152). In Greece, persons who murdered father, mother, brother, or child were slain at a place outside the walls where three roads met, and their bodies were exposed naked (Plato, *Leg.* ix. 873).

2. **Ghosts, spirits, and demons at cross-roads.**—Cross-roads are universally believed to be the common resort of evil spirits. As places of burial, cross-roads would naturally be haunted by the ghosts of the dead; but also, as ghosts would be often passing along the roads from other places of burial to their former homes, they would be more numerous at cross-roads. The ghostly train is often seen on roads, but more particularly at their intersections; hence, to see them one would naturally go there, as in the Abruzzi, where, at the festival of the dead, the thronging ghosts can be seen at the cross-ways by any one standing there with his chin resting on a forked stick (Finamore, *Credenze, usi, e costumi abruzzesi*, Palermo, 1890, pp. 180–2). But, besides ghosts, all kinds of evil powers frequent the cross-ways. This is a wide-spread belief in India, one particular class of demoniac beings—*bhuts*—being usually found at cross-roads, while other 'waylayers' lurk there also (Oldenberg, 267; Crooke, *PR* i. 290; *FL* viii. 330; *SBE* xxx. [1892] 49). Among the Muhammadan peoples, cross-roads are one of the numerous resorts of the *jinn* (Lane, *Arabian Society*, 1883, p. 37). In Russia, vampires are thought to lurk by night at cross-roads, ready to attack the belated traveller (Ralston, *Russ. Folk-Tales*, 1873, p. 311). In Europe generally, witches were associated with the cross-ways. There they gathered up money scattered by the devil; there, too, they met, and, in some cases, the Sabbat was held at the junction of roads, especially on Walpurgis night, when they might be seen by him who put on his clothes inside out and crept backwards to the place; while the ringing of consecrated bells on that night hindered their dancing with the devil at cross-roads (Grimm, *Teut. Myth.* [Eng. tr. 1880–8], 1074, 1115, 1799, 1803, 1824; Stewart, *Superstitions of Witchcraft*, 1865, p. 128). On the other hand, witches are occasionally regarded as having no power at cross-roads. In Naples it is held that they must go round them on their way to a meeting, as they cannot pass them; and in Hungary cross-roads are believed to neutralize their evil powers (*FL* viii. 3; *FLJ* ii. 101). Here, probably, the form of the cross acts as a prophylactic. Sprites, kobolds, and fairies are also sporadically associated with cross-roads (Grimm, 838, 1115; Goethe, *Faust*, III. i. 40). In mediæval superstition there was no better place than a cross-road for the purpose of evoking evil spirits, especially the devil, and making a compact with them. The magical treatises then current explicitly set this forth; thus the *Clavicula Solomonis* says: 'For magical operations a secret, remote, deserted, and uninhabited place is necessary, but best of all are the cross-ways.'

This notion is found in the 6th cent. story of Theophilus, and in the old tradition it was at a cross-road near Wittenberg that Faust sold himself to the devil. The custom was to go to the cross-way by night, and there make a magic circle in which cabalistic signs were inscribed, and then to call up the devil. Similarly, witches made their compact with Satan at cross-ways. In the case of the Swedish witches in the 17th cent., they first put on a garment over their heads and danced near a cross-road. Then, going to the cross-road, they thrice called on the devil to come and carry them to the meeting-ground. When he appeared they promised to serve him body and soul, and he then conveyed them to the Sabbat (Grimm, 1074; Baring-Gould, *Curious Myths*, 1888, p. 630; *Hist. . . . de Jean Fauste*, Amsterdam, 1674; Görres, *Die christl. Mystik*, Regensburg, 1842, bk. vi. ch. 16; Wright, *Narratives of Sorcery and Magic*, 1851, i. 134, ii. 249 f.).

For these reasons, wayfarers took precautions at the cross-ways. In India, *mantras* must be said; *e.g.* at a bridal procession the bridegroom had to say, 'May no waylayers meet us!' They should not be stopped at, and the traveller should pass with his right hand turned to them (*SBE* ii. 226, vii. 200, xxv. 135, 150, xxx. 49). Similarly, in Sweden, no bridegroom will stand near a cross-road on his wedding-day—a precaution against 'envy and malice' (Chambers, *Book of Days*, 1863, i. 45). See also § 5.

The origin of the belief in the presence of evil agencies at cross-roads may be found in the simple fact that, as people were more numerous at cross-roads, so naturally would all evil powers be, such at least as were so often associated with roads or paths. Men always fear demons and spirits which they believe lurk on the edge of the forest path or rude roadway, ready to pounce upon the belated traveller, and in many cases roads are believed to be infested by them (Monier-Williams, *Rel. Thought and Life in India*, 1883, p. 216; Maspero, *Dawn of Civilization*, 1894, pp. 632, 636). Hence they would be regarded as lurking at the intersections of roads, especially by night, when wayfarers were uncertain of the direction in which they ought to go (cf. Ovid, *Fasti*, v. 3). A further reason may be sought in the fact that paths and roads often form boundaries, as is shown by the fact that images and altars of boundary-gods often stood on roadways (MacPherson, *Khonds*, 1865, p. 67; cf. § 3). Rites of riddance and aversion intended to drive evil powers off the fields or tribal lands would, in common belief, have the tendency to force them on to the boundaries—a kind of neutral ground (for such rites, see Frazer, *GB*², 1900, iii. ch. 3, §§ 13, 14, 15, *passim*; Ralston, *Songs of the Russian People*, 1872, pp. 211, 396). And, as boundary so frequently signified road, or was marked by a pathway (as in Samoa [Brown, *Melanesians and Polynesians*, 1910, p. 339]; see other examples in this art.), there would here be another reason for evil spirits haunting roads. Hence the cross-ways, where boundaries or paths met, for the reason given above, would again be more open to their presence and influence. Evil powers associated with cross-roads are, in fact, often stated to be also found on roads and boundaries, or a boundary-stone is found at cross-ways (cf. Grimm, 1051, 1113, 1804, 1821; Crooke, *PR* i. 290). Hence magical rites which are effective on roads are still more effective at cross-roads, as many instances of their use in both cases show.

3. Divinities at cross-roads.—Divinities are frequently associated with cross-roads. This is sometimes with the intention of repelling those evil powers which otherwise would throng them, though, as examples show, there is a tendency for the protective divinity to take on some of the aspects of those evil powers, as in the case of Hecate. Or again, since evil powers are connected with cross-roads, divinities whose character is evil rather than good are often worshipped or propitiated there.

In India, from early times, the cross-ways were the abode of sinister gods, especially of Rudra, lord of ghosts and of evil powers generally, who was propitiated at the yearly festival of the dead by a sacrifice of cakes—the offering to Rudra Tryambaka, for the deliverance of descendants from his power, and for the securing of his beneficent action. This was offered at cross-roads, because Rudra roves on the roads, and 'the cross-road is known to be his favourite haunt' (*Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa*, *SBE* xii. [1882] 408, 438 f.). The cross-road is also the halting-place of the Agnis (*ib.* 439, n. 1). Travellers addressed both paths and cross-roads with *mantras*: 'Adoration to Rudra, who dwells on paths; adoration to R., who dwells at cross-roads' (*ib.* xxix. 366, xxx. 180). In the yearly ritual the connexion of ghosts with the cross-ways is also apparent. Lesser evil divinities also had their cult at cross-ways, but usually for specific purposes—the repelling of disease or demoniac influence, or the contagion of evil. To get rid of disease, one should go by night, naked, to a cross-way, and there make an offering of rice with a *mantra*, returning in silence without looking back. This must be repeated until the evil spirit (Piśācha) appears and says, 'I will end your ailment' (*Kathā-sarit-sāgara*, Tawney's ed., 1895, i. 256). The sacred writings also ordain that a student who has broken a vow of chastity must offer an ass to Nirriti, goddess of destruction, at a cross-way, then put on the skin and proclaim his sin (*SBE* ii. [1897] 289; cf. xxix. 361). Elsewhere he is directed to light a fire at the cross-ways, and to offer an ass to the Rākṣasas and an oblation of rice to Nirriti (*ib.* xiv. [1882] 117 ff.).

In Japan, phallic symbols, *chimata-no-kami*, or 'road-fork gods,' were set up on roads, and worshipped at cross-roads and waysides, as protectors of travellers. They were said to have been produced from the articles thrown down by Izanagi in his flight from Hades, or at his purification (see vol. ii. p. 700ᵇ). Their festivals were held at cross-roads outside the capital, or at the frontier, at the end of the 6th and 12th months, or in time of pestilence, while offerings took place at other times. Other phallic symbols, *sahi-no-kami*, or 'preventive deities,' were also worshipped at roads and cross-roads, and hence came to be regarded as guides and friends of wayfarers. Their cult was popular, they were inquired of in divination, or prayed to before a journey; or an offering was made to them by travellers on their journey. Accidents on a journey were the result of neglecting them. But the primitive function of all these deities seems to have been that for which they are still addressed in the liturgies, viz. protection against the unfriendly beings and evil spirits of pestilence from Hades.

'Whenever from the Root-country, the Bottom-country [= Hades], there may come savage and unfriendly beings, consort not and parley not with them, but, if they go below, keep watch below; if they go above, keep watch above, protecting us against pollution with a night guarding and with a day guarding.'

Three of these are mentioned in one *norito*—Yachimata-hiko, the Eight-road-fork prince, Yachimata-hime, the Eight-road-fork princess, and Kunado, whose name, 'Come-not place,' is suggestive of his functions as a repeller of evil beings. The first two are represented as male and female figures with sexual organs, the last as a simple phallus. Another phallic god, Saruta-hiko, dwells at the eight cross-ways of Heaven, and is said to have acted as guide to Ninighi on his coming to earth. He is also called Dosojin, or 'Road-ancestor deity,' and is found at cross-ways in the form of a phallic boulder, over which is stretched a rope supported by bamboos. Jizo, the Buddhist children's god, now occupies his place at cross-ways (Aston, *Shinto*, 1905, pp. 306, 187, 189, 191, 197, 340).

The phallic origin of these gods, in accordance with the well-known property ascribed to the sexual organs as warders off of evil spirits, their protective powers against demoniac and pestilential influences, and their ultimate position as gods of travellers recall the position of the Greek Hermes and the Hermæ (cf. p. 333ᵇ).

Among the Teutonic peoples occurred a yearly procession of the image of a god or goddess (Frey,

Nerthus, Holda, Berchta, etc.) round each district, for the purpose of promoting fertility (Tac. *Germ.* 40; Grimm, 213, 251, 268, 275). In later tradition the remembrance of this procession was mingled with the myth of the Furious Host or the witches' jaunt, headed by one of those divinities—a myth which in pagan times told of an aerial course of the god or goddess with their subordinates, corresponding to the course of their images followed by the jubilant crowd on earth. It was connected with the latter, and perhaps in part originated from it, as an ætiological myth (cf. Grimm, 1055–56). These processions, doubtless, went round the boundaries, and the divinity would then be associated with boundaries, and so with roads and cross-ways. In some of the later traditions, cross-roads appear to be unlucky to these wandering hosts, now become demoniac and associated with sorcery, with the devil and witches. Berchta's waggon breaks down at the cross-roads, so also does that of Frau Gauden, and the help of a mortal is necessary to repair it (see the traditional tales in Grimm, 275, 926). Perhaps there is here a distorted reminiscence of a halting of the procession of the image and waggon at cross-roads, either for a sacrifice to the divinity, or for the performance of some rite by which his or her protection would be secured against the evil powers of the cross-roads. Later, when the divinity became a more or less demoniac being, the folk-memory of the halting of the waggon produced the story that the waggon broke down. The divinity no longer repelled evil influences at cross-roads, but was now subject to these influences, cross-roads being unlucky to him or her, as in the case of witches (cf. § 2). On the other hand, it is not impossible that offerings were laid at cross-roads for the divinities to partake of in their aerial wanderings, as in the case of Hecate. As her images stood there, so probably images of some of these Teutonic divinities may have been set up at cross-roads. This is suggested by traces of a cult to gods or ghosts of the dead at cross-roads (the haunt of souls), anathematized by the Church. Prayers, offerings, and the consumption of such offerings, votive offerings (*vota; pedum similitudines quas per bivia ponunt*), and the ritual lighting of candles and torches at cross-ways (*bivia, trivia*) are all forbidden, and the prohibitions probably apply to Celtic as well as to Teutonic custom (S. Eligius and Burchard, in Grimm, 1738, 1744; de la Saussaye, *Religion of the Teutons*, Boston, 1902, p. 290; Grimm, *Kleinere Schr.* ii. 288). Sitting on a bull's hide at cross-ways in order to consult the future is also forbidden. The hide was probably that of an animal sacrificed there (Grimm, 1744, and cf. his comment, 1115, and the common ritual use of the skins of sacrificial victims elsewhere). Divinities were also sometimes seen at cross-roads by their worshippers (Grimm, 1202). The cult of divinities, Teutonic and Celtic, at cross-roads is further borne witness to in the occasional references in witch-trials to ghastly offerings made to demoniac powers (their successors) at cross-roads, as in the trial of Alice Kyteler and her accomplices at Ossory in the 14th cent., in which there is reference to a sacrifice of living animals torn limb from limb and scattered at cross-roads, or of nine red cocks and nine peacocks' eyes (Wright, i. 28, 30).

Among the Greeks, Hecate, a goddess whose cult was probably introduced from the north, and who had several varying aspects, was associated with cross-roads as Hecate τριοδῖτις. Her primitive connexion with these and also with roads and doorways was probably that of an averter of ill. Her images or symbolic figures stood before doors and at cross-ways, to keep out ghosts and to counteract the gloomy influences prevailing at cross-ways. In both cases the chief evil influence to be averted was that of the ghosts of the dead. These images were called ἑκάταια, and frequently represented her in triple form. Through her connexion with roads and cross-roads, she, as Hecate ἐνοδία, was the helper and guide of travellers who sought her aid (schol. ad Theocr. ii. 12). But she was also regarded in a more sinister light. As an infernal goddess, she was ruler of ghosts, phantoms, and demons, causing them to appear on earth to frighten travellers, associated with sorcery, and seen often on moonlight nights with her ghostly train and baying hounds, like the Teutonic Holda. In this character she was more particularly Hecate τρίμορφος, of a malicious and dangerous nature. Hence she had to be invoked and propitiated, lest she should send harm on men. The triple form of the goddess has been variously explained, but, in all probability, it arose from the fact that her images at cross-ways had faces looking down the converging roads, so as to watch over each. In her we see a goddess who, at first regarded as an averter of ills, is later associated with those very ills which she averts. She can keep them at bay, or she can cause them to appear, and she herself is imaged in their sinister forms. Offerings were made to Hecate at cross-roads, and her images there were consulted for divination. Monthly offerings were made to her at cross-roads by rich people, in order to get rid of evil influences and to render her favourable. These were called Ἑκάτης δεῖπνα, or 'suppers of Hecate,' and included cakes set round with candles, fish, eggs, cheese, honey, etc. These dishes of food were often consumed by the poor. They were connected with the rites of riddance performed in her name. Houses were swept and fumigated, and the sweepings taken away in a potsherd to a cross-road, and there thrown down, the bearer going away without looking back. It would be natural also to get rid of the food remaining in the house before the purification. Thus the evils, or the ghosts which had infested the house, were sent away, and the ceremony may only accidentally have been connected with the goddess of cross-roads. It resembles other rites of riddance at cross-roads, primitive in character, and usually unconnected with a divinity (see § 5). These purifications were called ὀξυθύμια (see Harpocrat. and Suidas, *s.v.*; schol. on Æsch. *Choeph.* v. 96; Plut. *Quæst. Rom.* iii., *Quæst. Conv.* 708 F; schol. on Arist. *Plut.* 594; Lucian, *Dial. Mort.* i. 1; Athenæus, vii. 125, 127, viii. 57, xiv. 53; Porph. *de Abstin.* ii. 28). Travellers also deposited offerings at cross-roads. An ætiological myth told how Hecate, as a newly born infant, was exposed at a cross-way, but rescued and brought up by shepherds (schol. on Lycophron, 1180). This probably points to an actual custom of exposure at cross-roads (found also in Chaldæa), made use of to explain Hecate's connexion with them.

Hermes, as god of roads and boundaries, and of travellers, was also associated with the cross-ways as an averter of ills. On roads and boundaries, but especially at cross-roads, stood a heap of stones with a pillar, later rudely shaped in human form. The passer-by added a stone to the heap, as a rite of riddance and in order to avert the evil influences associated with the place. These became the more shapely Hermæ of later times, used as boundary and mile and direction posts, and placed at cross-roads as well as on streets, roads, and at doors. The phallus was a prominent object upon them (Herod. ii. 51), in accordance with the belief in phallic emblems as averters of ill. As in the case of the Hekataia, these Hermæ had often several heads, and for the same reason. Offerings were made to them, and were sometimes eaten by hungry wayfarers. Theophrastus in his *Characters* describes the pious man pouring oil on the sacred stones (Hermæ) at cross-roads, falling on

his knees and saying a prayer before passing on his way. Cf. ARYAN RELIGION, vol. ii. p. 36 f.

Christianity replaced the divine images at cross-ways by crucifixes or images and shrines of the Madonna. At the latter, especially, flowers and candles are offered and prayers said, exactly as in the case of the Hermæ and Hekataia (Trede, *Das Heidenthum in der röm. Kirche*, Gotha, 1891, iv. 205, 208).

An example of a cult of a divinity at cross-roads from a lower level of civilization is found among the Yaos of the Shire Highlands who, when on a journey, offer a little flour to the god Mulungu at a place where two ways meet, exactly as in the case of Greek and Roman travellers, to Hecate, Hermes, or the Lares (see vol. ii. p. 358[a]).

4. Omens at cross-roads.—The connexion of supernatural beings, divine or demoniac, with cross-roads caused these to be regarded as places where omens might be sought. In East Central Africa a traveller who comes to a cross-way lays two roots, carried for the purpose of divination, against the blade of a knife laid horizontally. He points to one road saying, 'Shall I take this one?' If the roots remain still, he takes it. If they fall, he takes the other (Macdonald, *Africana*, 1882, i. 215). This resembles the rite used by the king of Babylon, probably to discover whether he should proceed on the way to Jerusalem to attack it. He 'stood at the parting of the way, at the head of the two ways, to use divination: he shook the arrows to and fro, he consulted the teraphim, he looked in the liver' (Ezk 21[21]). In Germany it was a custom to listen at a cross-way on Christmas or New-Year at mid-night. In this way the seeker heard or saw what would befall him during the year. Or, if he heard horses neigh or swords rattle, there would be war (Grimm, 1113, 1812, 1819). The listening was intended to catch what the spirits were saying as to coming events. In Japan a method of cross-road divination (*tsuji-ura*), used by women and lovers, is to place a stick representing the god Kunado at a cross-way at dusk, and to interpret the words spoken by passers-by as an answer to the question put by the inquirer. Another method is to sound a comb three times at a cross-road by drawing the finger along it, then, worshipping the *sahi-no-kami*, to say thrice, 'O thou god of the cross-roads-divination, grant me a true response.' The answer is found in the words spoken by the next or the third passer-by (Aston, 340). With this may be compared a Persian custom of sitting at cross-ways by night and applying to oneself as an omen of good or evil all that is said by passers (J. Atkinson, *Women of Persia*, 1832, p. 11). In Germany a girl went to a cross-road to discover whether she would be married during the year, or she shook out a table-cloth there. Then a man appeared and saluted her. The future husband would be of the same height and appearance (Grimm, 1115, 1797). An old Hindu custom for a man to discover whether a girl will make a good wife is to let her choose one of several clods taken from lucky and unlucky places, one of the latter being a cross-road (Oldenberg, 510). In India the balance for ordeals was erected at a temple or in a cross-road—a favourite abode of Dharmarāja, the god of justice, when he appears on earth (*SBE* xxxiii. [1889] 104).

5. Magical rites at cross-roads.—The sinister character of cross-roads made them particularly efficacious as places to perform charms and magical rites, especially of aversion or riddance of demoniac influences (cf. p. 331[b], bottom: 'best of all are the cross-ways').[1] Evil powers, or perhaps the divinities whose images stood there, lent their influence to the success of the rite. A few examples of general magical rites may be cited first. Sitting out or working spells at cross-ways was used among the Teutons as an evil kind of magic, for raising tempests, etc. The details are not known (Vigfusson-Powell, *Corpus Poet. Boreale*, Oxford, 1883, i. 413). In the Hindu *Gṛhya Sūtra*, visiting a cross-road at twilight, lighting a fire there, offering rice and repeating charms, together with other ritual observances, is recommended to those who desire gold, or companions, or a long life, or who wish to be rulers, etc. (*SBE* xxix. 431, xxx. 119, 124, 125). A charm for recovering lost property is addressed to Pūshan, the sun, who watches over the ways, and the rite includes placing 21 pebbles at a cross-way. They are symbolic of the lost property, and counteract its lost condition (Atharva-Veda [*SBE* xlii. 159, 542]). In Kumaon, to cause rain to cease, a harrow is fixed perpendicularly at a cross-way. The god of rain, seeing it in this unusual condition at such a place, learns that injustice is being done, and makes the rain cease. Or sugar, rice, and other objects used in ritual are placed at a cross-way and defiled, till the rain is ashamed to fall on them (*PR* i. 76–77). At Naples, to detach a husband from his mistress, a wife goes barefoot and with unbound hair to a cross-way. There she takes a pebble, places it under her left armpit, and repeats an incantation. This is done at a second cross-way, with the pebble under the right arm, and at a third, having it between the chin and breast. Returning home, she throws it into a cesspool (Andrews, *FL* viii. 7). This is an example of the belief that all things at cross-ways are charged with the magic or evil energy concentrated there, or are unlucky. Plants growing on boundaries or on cross-ways are believed to possess magical power (see Reiss, 'Aberglaube,' in Pauly-Wissowa, i. 47). In Bombay a charm against the evil eye is to carry seven pebbles picked up at the meeting of three ways (Campbell, *Spirit Basis of Belief and Custom*, Bombay, 1885, p. 208).

In the case of rites of riddance and aversion the underlying idea is that the evil powers lurking at the cross-ways are compelled to take over the evil (disease, ill-luck, etc.) which is of demoniac origin, or is impure and a source of danger. In some of these cases the powers of the cross-way are propitiated by an offering. Or the rite takes place there, because the place is one where the contagion of evil is more likely to be got rid of or transferred to another, while Oldenberg suggests (p. 287) that the cross-way was used because, after the rite, the performer would go one way, the evil or unlucky influence the other. A simple example of riddance of fatigue is found among the Guatemalan Indians, who, on passing the usual pile of stones at a cross-way, gather grass, rub their legs with it, spit on it, and then lay it with a stone on the pile, thus recovering their strength (Frazer, *GB*[2] iii. 4). Rites for riddance of disease at cross-ways are wide-spread. To rid themselves of any disease of demoniac origin, hill-natives of N. India plant a stake in the ground at a cross-way and bury some rice below it. The rice (prob. the vehicle of transference) is disinterred and eaten by crows (*PR* i. 290). In Bihār, during sickness, certain articles are placed in a saucer and set at a cross-road (Grierson, *Bihār Peasant Life*, Calcutta, 1885, p. 407). Similarly, in ancient India, such rites were commonly performed at cross-ways, as specific instances in the sacred books show. A patient possessed by demons was to be anointed with the

[1] Kozma is of the opinion that the use of the sign of the cross in charms has no reference to Christianity, but to the form of the cross-ways (*FLJ* ii. 101). It would thus be used as an act of imitative magic, producing the effect obtained by the cross-way itself.

remains of a sacrifice of ghī and fragrant substances (probably because the latter are obnoxious to demons[1]) and placed on a cross-road. A wicker basket with a coal-pan was set on his head, and some of the sacrifice was sprinkled on the coals (Ath.-Veda [*SBE* xlii. 32, 519]). In another charm for riddance from hereditary disease, the patient is set on a cross-road, and there washed and sprinkled. The charm includes the words, 'May the four quarters of heaven be auspicious to thee!' (*ib.* 292). In other cases not only riddance but the transference of disease to another person is effected. Thus an ancient Hindu charm to avert evil runs: 'If, O evil, thou dost not abandon us, then do we abandon thee at the fork of the road. May evil follow after another (man)!' The commentary explains this as a charm to remove all diseases, and the rite includes the throwing of three rice-puddings at the cross-road (*ib.* 163, 473). In modern India, to get rid of smallpox, some of the scales from the patient's body are placed in a pile of earth decked with flowers at a cross-way. The disease may then be transferred to some passer, the original patient recovering (*PR* i. 165). Or, at an outbreak of smallpox, a pot of wine, bangles, money, cakes, incense, and a cloth with the image of the goddess of smallpox, are offered to her, and then left outside the village at a cross-road. Any one touching these or meeting the priest who carries them out will take the disease and die at once. The goddess receiving the offering passes on to the next village. Here offering and vehicle of aversion are combined, and the articles are called *nikasi*, 'averters.' Probably the poor, in eating Ἑκάτης δεῖπνον,—at once an offering and a vehicle of aversion,—ran the risk of transference of evil to themselves rather than starve. In Bohemia, to get rid of fever, an empty pot was carried by the patient to a cross-road, and thrown down. He then fled. The first passer who kicked it would get the fever, and the patient would be cured (*GB*[2] iii. 22). In Suffolk a cure for ague is to go by night to a cross-way, turn round thrice as the clock strikes twelve, drive a tenpenny nail up to the head in the ground, and then retire backwards before the clock is done striking. The next person passing over the nail will get the ague (*County Folk-lore of Suffolk*, 1895, p. 14). For other European instances, see Wuttke, *op. cit. passim.*

Lustral rites of riddance at cross-ways are also common. In India one who had committed a crime had, after other rites, to go to a cross-way and repeat the formula, *Simhe me manyuḥ*. Then he was free from all crime (*SBE* xiv. 330). In E. Africa, when a child is able to speak, it is taken to a cross-way, washed and rubbed with oil, and given to the father, who may then, but not till then, cohabit with his wife, else the child will die (*FLR* [1882] v. 168). Riddance of the contagion of death is also effected at cross-roads, by carrying there the thing or things which have suffered impurity. In India, at a death, the fire became impure, and with the receptacle was carried out and placed on a cross-way with the words, 'I send far away the flesh-devouring Agni.' The bearer then walked round it three times, keeping his left side towards it, beating his left thigh with his left hand, and returning home without looking back (*SBE* xxix. 247). In the orthodox death-rites of modern Brahmans, lamps are set at cross-ways (Colebrooke, *Life and Essays*, 1873, iii. 180). All over E. Africa, at a death, the water used in washing the body, the ashes of the fire, the thatch of the hut, and the remains of the dead man's food, are buried at a cross-way (*malekano*), or deposited there with broken pots, egg-shells, etc. (Macdonald, *Africana*, i. 109; *FLR* v. 168). Other rites of riddance or aversion also occur at cross-ways. In Nijegorod, the Siberian plague is kept off by stakes driven into the ground at a cross-way (Ralston, *Songs*, 395). In Bali, at the periodical expulsion of devils, offerings of food are placed at a cross-road for the demons, who are summoned to partake of them and then go out of the houses to this feast (*GB*[2] iii. 80). In Bohemia, in order to get rid of witches, youths meet on Walpurgis night at a cross-way and crack whips in unison. The witches are thus driven off (*ib.* iii. 92). With the monthly purifications in Greece (§ 3) may be compared a custom in Gujarāt of sweeping houses and laying the refuse at a cross-road as a rite of riddance of evil (Campbell, 329). For other rites at birth among the Chams, see vol. iii. 347[a], 350[a].

The custom of burying suicides at a cross-way has thus in all probability some connexion with rites of riddance at cross-roads. The danger brought about to the community was in this way got rid of. Images of diseased limbs hung at cross-ways were perhaps less votive offerings than magical means of ridding the limb of the disease by transferring it to the spirits of the cross-way or to a passer-by.

6. Cross-roads and the four quarters.—Not improbably the sacredness of cross-roads may be connected in some cases with that of the four winds, coming from the four quarters of the heavens or the four corners of the earth, which were worshipped as gods and creators, and gave a sanctity to the cross (*q.v.*) among pre-Christian races, especially in North America (see art. AIR). Hence ceremonies for scaring evil spirits were efficacious at cross-ways, because they looked approximately to the four sacred quarters. Thus, in the Gujarāt marriage-ritual of the Bharvāds, balls of flour are flung to the four quarters as a charm to frighten off evil spirits (*BG* ix. [1901] 1. 280). In Peru a yearly rite of riddance in connexion with the four quarters took place at the square of each town, out of which ran four roads leading to the four cardinal points. Four Incas of the blood royal, with lance and girded mantle, stood in the great square, till another ran down from the temple of the Sun, carrying a message that the Sun bade them as his messengers drive all evils from the city. They separated and ran down the four roads to the four quarters of the world. Relays of runners received the lances from them, and finally set them up at a boundary, which the evils might not pass (Garc. de la Vega, *Royal Comment.*, 1869–71, ii. 228; *Rites and Laws of the Yncas*, Hakluyt Soc., 1873, p. 20 ff.; cf. vol. iii. p. 308[b]). The Yorubas have a cult of the four winds, and a figure with four heads called Olori merin is usually found on a mound near the centre of the town, so that each head faces one of the four points. Thus he protects the town, and no pestilence brought by the four winds or hostile force arriving by the four roads can attack it. Formerly these roads passed out of the city by the four chief gates on each side (Dennett, *Nigerian Studies*, 1910, pp. 70, 85). This connexion of cross-ways with the four quarters does not universally hold good, more especially in the case of the meeting of three roads, and only forms one of many reasons for the superstitious connexion with cross-roads.

LITERATURE.—This is mentioned throughout the article. There is no special work on the subject.

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CROSS-ROADS (Roman).—It was a custom of the Roman peasant, in order to ensure the prosperity of his crops, to make a procession round the marches of his land, praying the while to Mars for protection against visible and invisible disease, ravage, and storm (Cato, *de Agricult.* 141). In ancient times these various evils were regarded as

[1] Cf. D. W. Bousset, *Hauptprobleme der Gnosis*, Göttingen, 1907, p. 301 f.

demons who gloated over suffering, and this explains why Fever (*Febris*) was worshipped in Rome as a goddess (G. Wissowa, *Rel. u. Kult. der Römer*, Munich, 1902, p. 197). But, if such noxious spirits were prevented by the invocation of Mars from intruding upon the tilled land, they would tend to haunt the boundaries; and, as the latter were often formed by roads, it came to be believed that the roads were traversed by demons as well as by human beings. Now, the place where several roads converged—whether by the bifurcation of one thoroughfare (*ambivium, bivium*), or by the intersection of two (*quadrivium* or *trivium*, according as the way by which the traveller approaches is counted or not; see H. Usener, 'Dreiheit,' in *Rhein. Mus.* lviii. [1903] 339)—was naturally a focus of human intercourse; as every one must pass the *trivium*, *trivialis* came to mean 'common,' 'known to all.' For corresponding reasons, cross-roads were regarded as the special resorts of demons. The Romans believed that things connected with the cross-ways had magical powers, and this superstition doubtless rests upon the idea that demons haunted the spot, and infected the surroundings with their supernatural influence. Thus, for instance, frogs boiled at the cross-way were a cure for fever (Pliny, *HN* xxxii. 113); a person who by night sets his foot upon filth at the cross-way is thereby bewitched (Petronius, 134); while the perplexity and anxiety which fall upon the traveller in a strange district as he comes to the cross-roads, and hesitates as to the way he should take (Ovid, *Fasti*, v. 3; Minucius Felix, *Octavius*, xvi. 3), would be ascribed to the haunting demons, as would also the actual choice of the wrong way (Roscher, vol. i. p. 1890). Again, the cross-way was occasionally the site of the special object revered by the fetish-worshipper (Tibullus, I. i. 11 f.: 'habet . . . vetus in trivio florida serta lapis'). The fetish was decorated with wreaths; and by such homage, as also by prayers and votive offerings, it was hoped that the demonic powers would be induced to refrain from injuring their devotees, and to act as the dispensers of grace and sure guidance.

Anthropomorphic deities of this character had likewise a place in the Roman religion, but the cult was not indigenous. Some of the deities were simply taken over from foreign religions; others, while of native origin, became the tutelary spirits of cross-roads only at a later period. To the former group belongs the goddess Trivia, who, from the time of Ennius (*Scen.* 121 [Vahlen]), is often mentioned in Latin poetry, and sometimes, though more rarely, in inscriptions (*CIL* x. 3795 [Capua]: 'Dianae Tifatinae Triviae sacrum'). She was in reality the Hecate Trioditis of Greek mythology, and, like the *trivium*, was of triple form (Usener, *loc. cit.* pp. 167 f., 338 f.). Hecate was a gloomy and malicious goddess, and, in order to propitiate her, recourse was had *Græco ritu* to every possible expedient, such as loud nocturnal invocations (Virgil, *Æn.* iv. 609: 'nocturnisque Hecate triviis ululata') and offerings of food at the cross-roads. The latter fact explains why the *trivium* was a resort of dogs (Ovid, *Fasti*, v. 140) and famished people (Tibullus, I. v. 56, with the comments of Dissen). In the Imperial period we find quite a system of goddesses of the cross-way, all of non-Roman origin, and for the most part linked together in groups as Biviæ, Triviæ, or Quadriviæ, especially in Upper Germany. They were apparently indigenous to that region, and their cult forced its way thence into Lower Germany and the countries about the Danube (M. Ihm, in Roscher, iv. 1 ff.). In some districts we find also male deities of the cross-way (*CIL* xii. 5621 [Gaul]: '(de)is dea(bus) Bivis Trivis Quadrivis'; vii. 163 [Britain]: 'Deo Trivii Bellicus donavit aram').

Our knowledge of these deities is derived from votive offerings, principally small altars with inscriptions, which throw no light, however, upon the character of the associated cult. In many cases the dedication was made in fulfilment of a vow, and the donors were mostly soldiers. The vow would, no doubt, be made for the purpose of winning the protection of the deity during a journey or throughout a campaign, and so ensuring a safe return therefrom; for by this time such deities were regarded, not merely as local guardians of particular cross-ways, but as divine patrons of all roads.

Similar ideas were current regarding the genuinely Roman deities to whom was latterly assigned the tutelage of the cross-roads. These were known as the 'Lares compitales,' and were worshipped mainly at the place 'ubi viae competunt' (Varro, *de Ling. Lat.* vi. 25; G. Wissowa, in Pauly-Wissowa, iv. 792 ff.), *i.e.* the cross-way. But the word *compitum* must have had a further meaning, for Cicero (*de Lege Agr.* i. 7) explicitly distinguishes between it and *trivium*; as is rightly observed by Wissowa (*Rel. u. Kult. d. Römer*, p. 148 f.), it also signified the point at which the boundaries of the fields converged. The worship offered to the Lares at the *compita* was an expression of the belief that they were the guardians of the soil (Tibullus, I. i. 19 f.: 'agri custodes'). Originally, therefore, the Lares were invoked as patrons of field-boundaries, while their association with cross-roads was a later development, due to the circumstance that boundary and path frequently coincided. In this acquired character they are known to us from such dedications as are found in *CIL* xi. 3079 (Falerii): 'Laribus compitalibus vialibus semitalibus,' and xiii. 6731 (Mainz): 'Laribus compitalibus sive quadrivialibus sacrum.' The next stage was that the Lares became the gods of roads in general, as likewise of travellers, who therefore made to them the same kind of dedications as were offered *Deabus Quadriviis.* The dedicated objects were placed in shrines, and, as these shrines of the Lares were set up at the cross-roads, they too bore the name *Compita* (Persius, iv. 28).

We must not confound such erections *at* the cross-way with fabrics reared *over* the cross-way. The rectangular towers which we find surmounting two passages intersecting at right angles suggest the thought that they were originally built over cross-ways. Of such towers, nine in all are known (Baumeister, *Denkmäler d. klass. Altertums*, iii. [Munich, 1889] 1867). The most famous of them is the Janus Quadrifrons in the Forum Boarium, dating from the 4th cent. A.D. (H. Jordan, *Topographie der Stadt Rom im Altertum*, I. ii. [Berlin, 1885] 471); but its original purpose was that of a monument of honour, and it is impossible to say whether the ancient Roman ideas regarding cross-roads were present to the minds of its builders. In any case, these ideas were by no means extinct at that time, for, even as late as the Middle Ages, it was still frequently necessary for the preacher to castigate the practice of lighting candles and offering sacrifices at the cross-roads (see, *e.g.*, C. P. Caspari, *Kirchenhist. Anecdota*, Christiania, 1883, i. 172, 175, 199)—a practice which is undoubtedly a vestige of heathen, in some cases perhaps of Roman, ritual. Even at the present day, in Italy, the cross-way is the favourite site for the chapels of patron saints (Th. Trede, *Das Heidenthum in der römischen Kirche*, Gotha, 1891, iv. 205).

LITERATURE.—This has been given throughout the article.

R. WÜNSCH.

CROWN.—As a preliminary to this article it may be advisable to cite Selden's words distinguishing between 'diadem' and 'crown':

'However those names have been from antient times confounded, yet the diadem strictly was a very different thing from

what a crown now is or was; and it was no other than only a fillet of silk, linen, or some such thing. Nor appears it that any other kind of crown was used as a royal ensign, except only in some kingdoms of Asia, but this kind of fillet, until the beginning of Christianity in the Roman Empire' (*Titles of Honor*[3], 1672, c. 8, § 2).

The Gr. διάδημα, Lat. *diadema*, was a fillet of linen or silk, sometimes adorned with precious stones, or occasionally a flexible band of gold. This was the true emblem of royalty, the βασιλείας γνώρισμα (Lucian, *Pisc.* 35), or *insigne regium* (Tac. *Ann.* xv. 29). On the other hand, the Gr. στέφανος, Lat. *corona*, a wreath or garland of real or artificial (usually gold) leaves, was not a distinctive royal emblem, and was applied to the victor's, the bridal, the festal 'crown' (see also Trench, *Synonyms of the NT*, s.v. στέφανος, διάδημα). The same distinction occurs in other languages, *e.g.* German *Krone*, the royal crown, *Kranz*, a garland. The English word 'crown' comprehends all kinds of coronal head-dresses, royal and other.

1. Coronal head-dresses.—A distinctive head-dress of persons of high degree, but especially of kings and princes, originated from the custom of wearing various kinds of head-dresses, coronal, etc., on festal or other occasions, or by particular classes of people—men as contrasted with women, or, *vice versa*, rich as contrasted with poor, chiefs, medicine-men, members of a mystery society, and the like—or at festival dances such as are found among savages and European peasants (cf. Abbott, *Macedonian Folklore*, Camb. 1903, p. 31), or, again, from royal personages wearing a more ornate and valuable form of the customary head-dress. The crown, as a distinctive head-dress, may thus be traced back to very early times. Following upon elaborate methods of dressing the hair, such as are found among Polynesian and African tribes, the next step is to decorate the hair with bones, teeth, shells, feathers, leaves, flowers (see § 2), or other ornaments. Or a band or fillet of fibre, skin, leather, ivory, or metal serves to prevent the hair from falling over the face. This is found among the lowest tribes (Andamanese, Australians, Bushmen, Fuegians, etc.), but, from being merely useful, it soon becomes also ornamental or has ornaments of various kinds affixed to it—tufts of feathers, fur, or wood shavings, teeth, shells, etc.; or it may be worn only on special occasions, like the coils of wire bound round the forehead and nape of the neck by Mukamba youths at dances (*JAI* xxxiv. [1904] 139). The fillet, thus widely worn, would have a distinctive character, or would be more decorative or formed of more precious material, when worn by persons of higher rank; and it is a direct forerunner of the royal fillet or diadem worn by kings as an emblem of sovereignty, either with or without some other distinctive head-dress. The gold *lunulæ* with the characteristic chevron decoration of the Bronze Age, found in the Celtic area, may be classed with ornaments of this kind, and were perhaps worn by chiefs (Déchelette, *Man. d'arch. pré-hist. celt.*, Paris, 1910, p. 353; Romilly Allen, *Celtic Art*, Lond. 1904, p. 39 f.). More elaborate crowns are derived from the simple fillet or diadem by the addition of decorations around its circumference, as, *e.g.*, by fixing upright feathers in it (Fuegians, American Indians). Other elaborate head-dresses, combining the fillet and crown, or evolved from the former, are often worn by special classes or at special times.

Thus a Tibetan female head-dress (chief's wife) consists of a crown of large amber disks, in each of which is a coral bead, with similar ornaments on satin bands, holding the hair plaits together (Rockhill, *Land of the Lamas*, 1891, p. 184). Among the Kabyles rich women wear a coronal head-dress of highly ornamental open metal work, with numerous pendent ornaments and chains; and a female head-dress in Java consists of a richly adorned head-band with star-like ornaments stuck round the upper edge (Hutchinson, *Living Races of Mankind*, n.d. i. 78, ii. 393-4, 399). A circle of jewelled gold, the upper edge heightened to four or more points, surrounding a jewelled cap, was formerly worn by Arab ladies of high rank (Lane, *Arab. Society*, 1883, p. 218). A Samoan head-dress worn by chiefs, and by girls at certain dances, consists of a triple band of teeth or shells on the forehead surmounted by an imposing head-dress (*ib.* i. 12; Brown, *Melanesians and Polynesians*, 1910, p. 58). Among the natives of Torres Straits are found head-dresses of feathers, of fish teeth, or dog's teeth coronets, or the *dri*, a fan-shaped arrangement of white feathers of the egret (*JAI* xix. [1890] 369). Among the tribes of Brazil the men at feasts wear a coronet of bright red and yellow toucan's feathers, disposed in regular rows and attached to a circlet of plaited straw. These feathers, being specially prepared, are very rare, and the coronets are never parted with (Wallace, *Amazon*, 1895, pp. 194, 202). Chiefs in Haiti wore a gold circlet similarly decorated (Stoll, *Geschlechtsleben in der Völkerpsych.*, Leipzig, 1908, p. 457; and, for a similar head-dress worn by chiefs among the Lacandones, *NR* i. 702).

As an emblem of royalty such a crown was worn by the Incas of Peru. It consisted of a turban with a tasselled fringe, in which were set upright two feathers of a very rare bird, the peculiar emblems of the Inca, which no one else might wear. This head-dress was buried with him, and two new feathers had to be procured for each coronation. The heir-apparent wore a similar fillet or fringe of a yellow colour as his insignia (Prescott, *Peru*, 1890, p. 11 f.; Stoll, 457). Among the Mayas the king's crown was a golden diadem wider in front, surmounted by a plume of feathers which no one else might wear under pain of death (*NR* ii. 635). Mexican kings were crowned by the kings of Tezcuco with a diadem higher in front and running up there to a point, and adorned with beautiful feathers. The diadem was made of thin gold plates or woven of gold thread, and it hung down behind over the neck. Noble Aztec warriors wore head-dresses of feathers set in gold fillets (*ib.* ii. 148, 375-6, 405, 441). All such crowns have followed the line of development which has produced the European crown from the diadem (§ 8). For savage head-dresses, see Spencer-Gillen[b], 687; E. Grosse, *Anfänge der Kunst*, Freiburg, 1894, ch. 5; Stoll, 119; Johnston, *Uganda Protectorate*, 1902, pp. 729, 787, 843, 868, 880; Deniker, *Races of Man*, 1900, pp. 178, 371, 502, 522; Mary Kingsley, *Travels in W. Africa*, 1897, p. 224; and for the head-dresses peculiar to the higher classes in Bab., Assyria, and Persia, see Rawlinson, *Anc. Monarchies*, 1862, i. 133, ii. 199, iv. 191, 333.

The huge or elaborate masks and head-dresses worn at the performance of totemic or tribal ceremonies or in mystery-dances by Australians, Melanesians, Africans, etc., sometimes assuming a form more or less coronal, need only be referred to here as decorations reserved for certain persons, and worn only on specific occasions and at no other time. They are insignia of office, or form part of the necessary costume, sometimes symbolic or representative (see Spencer-Gillen[a, b] *passim*; Kingsley, 483; Deniker, 179; Brown, 60 ff.; *JAI* xix. [1889-90] 364).

2. Chaplets.—From the custom of decorating the hair with flowers on festal occasions as a method of betokening joy, arose the use of chaplets or wreaths (στέφανοι, *coronæ*), though these may be also connected with the simple fillet or hair-band into which flowers are sometimes stuck. Among savages, it is with the Polynesians and occasionally the Melanesians that the general wearing of flowers or regular chaplets is found most extensively. Among the former, women at dances wore wreaths interwoven with their hair, and garlands and wreaths on forehead and breast. This custom has been largely given up since the introduction of Christianity (Ellis, *Polynes. Researches*, 1831, i. 134, 216; cf. also Brown, 317; Hutchinson, i. 6, 9, 11, 17, 18; and, for a similar practice of wearing wreaths of grass and leaves among the Sakais, *ib.* i. 90). The custom was sporadic in America; thus the Nahuas wore garlands at banquets and dances (*NR* ii. 284, 290). Among peoples of antiquity the wearing of wreaths on festive occasions was wide-spread. From an early time in Egypt chaplets (*meh*) of lotus, myrtle, etc., were worn by the guests at banquets (Wilkinson, ii. 38, 330), and the custom was also in use among the Greeks and Romans. Perhaps under the influence of Greek usage it spread to the Hebrews, and is often referred to as a common practice at times of rejoicing, especially in the Apocryphal books (Wis 2^8 'Let us crown ourselves with rosebuds'; Ezk 23^{42}, Ca 3^{11}, Jth 15^{13}, Sir 32^2, 2 Mac 6^7, 3 Mac 4^8 7^{16}; cf. *Acts of Thomas*, crowns of myrtle and other flowers at a banquet, in W. Wright, *Apoc. Acts*, Lond. 1871, ii. 149).

Wreaths and crowns were also worn ritually at festivals of the gods and at sacrifices (see next art.; cf. Ac 14^{13}, 2 Mac 6^7). Tertullian writes that, besides the wreaths offered to the gods or their

images, 'the very doors, victims, altars, servants, and priests are crowned' (*de Cor.* 10). The sacrificer wore them (cf. the wreaths worn by Persians over their tiaras at sacrifices [Herod. i. 132]), and they were placed on the heads of the victims (Teutons [de la Saussaye, *Rel. of the Teutons*, Boston, 1902, pp. 368, 377], Hindus [Monier-Williams, *Rel. Thought and Life*, 1883, p. 247], Mexicans [*NR* iii. 359]; for other instances, see Tert. *de Cor.*, Pausan. ed. Frazer, v. 7. 7, vii. 20. 1, viii. 48. 2, x. 7. 8, and notes; Granger, *Worship of the Romans*, 1895, pp. 287, 306). Animals were adorned with them on festal occasions (Celts [Arrian, *Cyneg.* 34. 1], Persians [the crown royal on the horse's head, Est 6^{8}]). Garlands and crowns are also worn at sacred dances (Mexico [*NR* iii. 392], Melanesia [Haddon, *Head-Hunters*, 1901, pp. 113, 187]; see also above). They were placed on city gates (Jos. *BJ* IV. iv. 4), on temples (crowns of gold on the Jewish temple, 1 Mac 4^{57}), or were worn by conquering armies (Jth 3^{7} 15^{13}), or given as much coveted prizes at the games. In the last instance, from the myths associated with the origin of the custom and from the ritual used in the making of the wreaths, their religious aspect is evident. Crowns were also worn by the pilgrims to the temple of the Syrian goddess at Hierapolis (Lucian, *de Dea Syria*). In the Taurobolium the candidate was crowned with gold and wreathed with fillets before undergoing the baptism of blood (Frazer, *Adonis*^{2}, 1907, p. 229); and in the Mithraic initiations one of the rites was the presenting of a crown on the point of a sword to the candidate, who put it on his head and then transferred it to his shoulder with the words, 'Mithras is my crown' (Tert. *de Cor.* 15, *de Præsc. Hær.* 40). Wreaths were also worn by those initiated into the mysteries of Isis (Apul. *Metam.* xi. 24). In the baptismal ceremonies of the Mandæans a crown was used (W. Brandt, *Die mandäische Religion*, Leipzig, 1889, pp. 108, 113).

Wreaths are also worn at the end of harvest in European folk-custom. They are made of the last ears of corn, sometimes with the addition of flowers and tinsel, and are worn often by the person who has cut them. He or she represents the corn-divinity, and is drenched with water as a fertility charm. In this case the wreath is the direct link between the corn and the human representative of the divinity of the corn (Frazer, *Adonis*^{2}, 195 f.; Ralston, *Songs of the Russ. People*, 1872, p. 250). At the Jewish feast of Tabernacles—a festival of ingathering of fruits—it was customary for the Jews to sit in booths with wreaths on their heads (Jub. 14^{30}). Booths and wreaths suggest a former cult of vegetation. Hence also divinities associated with fertility or with the crops wore wreaths of corn: *e.g.* Isis, who was said to have discovered corn (Tert. *de Cor.* 7; Aug. *de Civ. Dei*, viii. 27; cf. also the wreaths of corn worn by the children sacrificed to Artemis [Pausan. vii. 20. 1]). In European May-day customs, besides the hoops covered with garlands and carried in procession, girls wear chaplets, as do also the May or Whitsuntide queen, and the May king or Jack-in-the-Green, besides being dressed in or adorned with leaves. These chaplets are an important part of the symbolic dress of a former anthropomorphic representative of the vegetation spirit (*FL* xi. [1900] 210; Wilde, *Anc. Cures, Charms*, etc., 1890, p. 101 f.; Frazer, *GB*^{2} i. 196 ff., 213 ff., *Early Hist. of the Kingship*, 1905, p. 166 f.).

3. **Bridal chaplets and crowns.**—These are already found in antiquity worn by the bride or bridegroom, or by both (Tert. *de Cor.* 13). They marked an occasion of joy, but may in some cases have had a magical purpose, in warding off evils from the head. Being used by pagans, they were at first rejected by the Church, as it rejected generally all wearing of flowers on the head. But the custom was already found among the Jews, the bridegroom wearing a garland or crown (Is 61^{10}, Ca 3^{11}), the bride a 'beautiful crown' (Ezk 16^{12}). The custom was in abeyance from the time of Vespasian, but was resumed later. Among Christians also it became usual, the bridegroom wearing a garland of myrtle, the bride of verbena (Sid. Apoll. *Carm. 2*, 'ad Anthem.'); and it was regarded as improper for the unchaste to wear them (Chrysos. *Hom. 9 in 1 Tim.*). The wearing of bridal garlands and crowns is still customary over a great part of Europe—Switzerland, Germany, Rumania, and in the north.

In the Greek Church ritual of marriage the bridegroom crowns the bride *in Nomine*, and the bride the bridegroom, while the priest blesses them and says, 'O Lord, crown them with glory and honour.' The service is hence called ἀκολουθία τοῦ στεφανώματος. In Macedonia the bridal wreaths are made of real or artificial flowers, or are silver garlands belonging to the church (τὰ στέφανα). They are exchanged in church at the crowning ceremony στεφάνωμα—applied to the whole wedding rite (Abbott, *op. cit.* pp. 168, 173). Ralston (*op. cit.* p. 279) describes a local ceremony in Russia. In church, over the heads of the bridal pair the groomsmen hold crowns, and must press them on the heads, but not hurriedly, else ill-luck and misfortune would follow. The rite is called *vyenchanie*, 'crowning.' In Servia, when a youth dies, a girl representing a bride comes to the grave carrying two crowns. One is thrown to the corpse, the other she keeps for some time. This is part of the old ritual of the 'death-wedding' (Ralston, 310; see O. Schrader, *Totenhochzeit*, Jena, 1904, and ARYAN RELIGION, vol. ii. p. 22 f.). In Germany and Switzerland the bridal wreath of myrtle is made by the bridesmaids, but occasionally elsewhere more elaborate crowns are worn, formed, *e.g.*, of a series of diminishing circlets, one above the other, to which are fixed flowers, beads, figures in metal, some of which are probably intended as amulets. They are not worn by girls known to be already *enceinte* (see Stoll, 455 f., 459; Kossmann-Weiss, *Mann und Weib*, Stuttgart, 1890, ii. 184, 188). Among the Letts the bride wears a crown of gold paper and silk, on a framework of wire and pasteboard. She receives it from an honourable matron, who keeps it for the use of the brides of the district (*ib.* ii. 190). The elaborate Norwegian bridal crown is banded down as an heirloom in well-to-do families, but in each village it, as well as a set of bridal ornaments, is kept for the poor bride's temporary use (Chambers, *Book of Days*, 1863, i. 720–721; Hutchinson, ii. 427).

Among the Hindus, from Vedic times, the custom of wearing garlands or crowns of precious metal or tinsel at marriage has been common, and they are believed to have a protective efficacy against evil spirits which might enter by the head. They are worn both by Hindus and Muhammadans (Crooke, *PR* i. 239; Kossmann-Weiss, ii. 164, 167; *ERE* iii. 443^{b}). Among the Muhammadans of Egypt the bride wears a pasteboard cap or crown under the veil which covers the head and face, and to which ornaments of value are attached externally (Lane, *Mod. Egyptians*, 1846, i. 220, *Arab. Soc.* 234). Among the Nahuas, bride and bridegroom were crowned with garlands (*NR* ii. 257). For Chinese bridal crowns, see Hutchinson, i. 140; and for Polynesian and Fijian bridal wreaths, *ib.* i. 19, and Letourneau, *Evol. of Marr.*, 1907, p. 124.

4. **Funeral chaplets and crowns.**—Among the Greeks and Romans the dead were crowned with chaplets, or these were placed as offerings on tombs (Lucian, *de Luctu*, 11; Tert. *de Cor.* 10; see next art. § 2). In Egypt it was customary to place chaplets of flowers or leaves on the head of the mummy at the funeral ceremony, and these sometimes remained on the head in the coffin. They were called 'the crown of the true voice,' and assured to the deceased, through the power of Thoth, the right intonation, without which the magic formulæ were useless, or perhaps signified that he would be crowned triumphant and justified in the other world. Special gardens were set apart for the flowers used in making these wreaths. The statue which represented the mummy was also crowned with flowers, and the funeral ritual concluded with a prayer in which it was said of the deceased, 'Thou wearest the crown among the gods.' Part of the ritual also consisted of brandishing the *oirhikau* over the statue, and repeating a formula, part of which ran: 'Nut has raised thy head, Horus has taken his diadem and his powers, Set has taken his diadem and his powers, then the diadem has come out of thy head and has brought

the gods to thee.' This referred to the myth of Nut raising the head of Osiris, and the gods Horus and Set placing the crowns of the north and the south upon it. This would be done to the dead, and the magic virtue in these crowns, or in the *uræus* which adorned them, would bring the gods into his power. Garlands and wreaths decked the tombs, just as the tomb of Osiris was said to have been crowned with flowers; and wreaths were also worn by guests at feasts in honour of the dead before the final burial (Maspero, *Études de myth. et d'arch. ég.*, Paris, 1893, i. 218, 306, 316, 318, 358 f.; Pleyte, 'La Couronne de Justification,' *Actes du 6me Cong. intern. des Orient.*, Leyden, 1884, pt. vi. 1–30; Wilkinson, i. 403, iii. 396, 430, 432; Plut. *de Isid.* 21; see CHARMS AND AMULETS [Egyp.], vol. iii. p. 431ᵇ, on models of diadems of Osiris buried with the dead, who, assimilated to the god, would wear those crowns in the other world). Flowers and garlands are also carried to the graves in modern Egypt.

In the Brāhmanic funeral ritual the bodies of the dead are decked with wreaths and flowers. Wreaths are also offered in the funeral rites and given to Brāhmans (Colebrooke, *Life and Essays*, 1873, ii. 173, 175, 178, 193; cf. *SBE* i. [1900] 137, xi. [1900] 93, 122–3). Among the Nahuas, a statue was placed beside the body of a dead king, with a garland of heron's feathers on its head (*NR* ii. 606). Wreaths and garlands were also used in Polynesia and Melanesia to decorate the dead, or the altars in the houses used as depositories of their bodies (Brown, 387; Ellis, i. 404). The early Christians refused to make any use of funeral chaplets (Tert. *de Cor.* 10; Min. Felix, 12, 37; Clem. Alex. *Pæd.* ii. 8), but it was not long before the prejudice against them was overcome. As a symbol of the martyr's death a crown is found among the emblems on tombs, and chaplets or wreaths became a common adjunct of Christian funerals. In modern Greece dead maidens and children even are crowned with flowers (Abbott, 193).

5. Crowns and chaplets as offerings.—Crowns and garlands being so intimately associated with cult, they are a common species of sacrificial offering, besides being placed on the heads of victims (see next art.; Pausan. ii. 17. 6, v. 12. 8; Lucian, *de Dea Syria*). At the feast of Ceres women presented corn-wreaths as an offering of firstfruits to her (Ovid, *Met.* x. 431 ff.). In India, wreaths, garlands, and flowers are frequent objects in most sacrifices. The Egyptians offered chaplets and wreaths to the gods and laid them on the altars, and presented golden diadems with the *uræus* at the shrine of the statue of a king (Wilkinson, iii. 356, 417). Of great interest are the votive crowns of early mediæval times. These were offered by monarchs to shrines or churches, and dedicated by them to God on some particular occasion. There is no doubt that, besides imitation crowns, the actual crowns were often dedicated in this way and occasionally used for coronations. They were suspended by chains over the altar, and from the inner side usually hung a richly-jewelled cross. Other ornaments were suspended from the lower edge, or the dedicatory inscription was sometimes formed of separate letters depending from it, *e.g.* in the crowns of Svintilla and Reccesvinthus the pensile letters form the inscriptions, 'Svintilla Rex offert' and 'Reccesvinthus Rex offeret.' Besides the cross a lamp often depended from these crowns, and from them the pensile *coronæ lucis* of churches have originated.

Examples of such votive crowns are numerous. The iron crown of Lombardy is a band of iron (said to have been hammered out of a nail of the cross) enshrined in a circlet made of six gold plates, richly enamelled and jewelled, and hinged together. This crown is known to have been used at the coronation of Agilulfus in 591, and it was in all probability a votive crown (Fontanini, *de Cor. ferrea*, 1717; Labarte, *Arts indust. au moyen âge*, Paris, 1872–5, ii. 56 f.; Chambers, *Book of Days*, i. 673). Eight magnificent votive crowns of Reccesvinthus, king of the Spanish Visigoths, his queen, and family, dating from the 7th cent., were found in 1858 at La Fuente de Guarraz near Toledo (Labarte, i. 499; F. Lasteyrie, *Descr. du trésor de Guarrazar*, Paris, 1860; Chambers, ii. 659). Another beautiful specimen is that of Svintilla, king of the Visigoths (621–631), now at Madrid. On the whole subject, see the works cited, and Way, *Arch. Journ.* xvi. 253 ff.; *DCA* i. 460, 506.

Crowns or wreaths of gold formed a species of tribute presented by subject peoples to kings, an example being found in the tribute of crowns commuted to a money payment, the crown-tax paid by the Jews to Demetrius and Antiochus (1 Mac 10^{29} 11^{35} 13^{37-39}, 2 Mac 14^{4}; Josephus, *Ant.* XII. iii. 3).

6. Priestly crowns.—The practice of special head-dresses being used to mark off certain classes led to the use of these by medicine-men or priests, and not infrequently they took a coronal form, or, as in Greek and Roman ritual, chaplets were worn by priests.

Among the Buriats the shaman formerly wore a crown consisting of an iron ring with two iron convex arches crossing it at right angles—an elaboration of the simple fillet or band (*ERE* iii. 16ᵇ). In Mexico the chief priest of the great temple wore a crown of green and yellow feathers, his assistants merely having their hair plaited and bound with leathern thongs. The priest of Tlaloc at the festival of the god wore a crown of basket-work closely fitting below and spreading out above, with many plumes rising from the middle of it. The Toci priest, in offering sacrifice to the Mother-goddess, had a square crown, wide above, with banners at the corners and in the middle (*NR* ii. 307, iii. 341, 356). In Japan part of the distinctive dress of the Shinto priest is a black cap (*eboshi*) bound round the head with a broad white fillet (Aston, *Shinto*, 1905, p. 204). Among the Teutons the Gothic priests belonged to the nobility, the *pileati*, those wearing a cap, as compared with the common people, the *capillati*, with flowing hair; garlands were also worn (de la Saussaye, 366; Grimm, *Teut. Myth.*, 1880–81, pp. 91, 909). Tibetan priests at their ceremonies wear a species of helmet mitre, fitting over the back and crown of the head, and of a red or yellow colour, according as the wearer belongs to the one or the other great Buddhist sect (Rockhill, *op. cit.* p. 85 f.). Sculptures in Cappadocia show the ancient priest or priest-king of that region wearing a high round head-dress encircled with fillets and ornamented in front with a rosette or bunch of jewels; the god beside him wears a high pointed head-dress (Frazer, *Adonis*², 101 ff.). The priests of Sandan (Heracles) at Tarsus were called 'crown-wearers,' and elected to that office. One of them, Lysias, wore a golden laurel wreath (Athen. v. 54; Frazer, 111). The high-priest of the Syrian goddess at Hierapolis wore a golden tiara, the lesser priests a hat (πῖλος, Lucian, *de Dea Syria*, 42). The ancient Parsi priests wore high conical head-dresses (Stoll, 463), and Assyrian priests a kind of high truncated cone or mitre of imposing appearance, or sometimes a richly ornamented fillet (Rawlinson, ii. 199, 275, 278). Babylonian priests wore an elaborate mitre, assigned also to the gods, or a second kind of mitre, or occasionally a horned cap. The head is usually represented covered in sacrifices and other rites (*ib.* iii. 434). Among the Hebrews the priests' mitre or head-dress, מִגְבָּעֹת plur. (κίδαρις, AV 'bonnet,' RV 'head-tire,' Ex 28^{40} 29^{9} 39^{28}, Lv 8^{13}), was made of swathes of linen covered with a piece of fine linen hiding the seams of the swathes and reaching to the forehead. Possibly it resembled the Assyr. and Bab. conical cap, truncated (cf. Jos. *Ant.* III. vii. 3, 'not brought to a conical form'). Josephus says it resembled a crown. The high-priest's mitre or turban (Ex $28^{4.39}$), מִצְנֶפֶת (a word applied by Jos. *Ant.* III. vii. 3 to the priests' mitre also), probably differed in shape from the former. In addition a plate of gold, צִיץ (πέταλον), was fastened on blue lace and affixed to the front of the mitre or on the forehead. It bore the words 'Holy to Jahweh.' The plate is also called נֵזֶר, 'diadem' or 'mark of separation' (Ex 29^{6}, cf. 39^{30-31} 'the plate of the holy crown of pure gold'), and is on the mitre. This suggests a fillet rather than a plate, worn round the mitre (cf. Sir 45^{12} 'gold crowns,' and I Mac 10^{20}, where Alexander sends to Jonathan 'a crown [στέφανος] of gold.' In Is 28^{1} the צִיץ is parallel to עֲטָרָה, 'diadem'). If the צִיץ was a fillet of gold, there would then be a close correspondence to what Josephus (*BJ* v. v. 7) says of the golden crown or fillet (στέφανος) with the sacred characters, which surrounded the mitre of fine linen, encompassed by a blue ribbon. The descriptions suggest a head-dress like the royal Persian *khshatram*, a cap swelling out to the top, and surrounded by a fillet or diadem (see § 8).

Josephus gives a different description of the high-priest's mitre in *Ant.* v. vii. 6, which is not reconcilable with the description in the other passage, and which is far from clear (see *HDB* and *EBi*, s.v. 'Mitre').

Occasional references are made in early ecclesiastical writings to a head-dress worn by the clergy during service. The mitre of a bishop, a head-dress cloven above into two erect tongue-shaped parts,

was at first an Eastern head-dress, especially characteristic of Phrygia, and hence formerly called 'Phrygium.' It is rarely alluded to before A.D. 1000, but in 1049 Leo IX. placed a mitre on the head of Eberhard, Abp. of Trèves (*PL* cxliii. 595). From this time the references become much more common, showing that the use was spreading. The mitre is usually made of fine or rich material, embroidered, and often studded with gems. From the back depend two fringed bands hanging over the nape of the neck. It is unknown in the Eastern Church, but is worn by all Roman Catholic bishops and by abbots exempt from Episcopal jurisdiction and others privileged to wear it. Its use was discontinued after the Reformation in the Anglican Church, but it is now commonly worn by bishops, and has always been a symbol of their office (see W. H. Marriott, *Vestiarium Christianum*, Lond. 1868, p. 220 ff.; Hefele, 'Inful, Mitra, und Tiara,' *Beitr. z. Kirchengesch.*, Tüb. 1864, ii. 223 f.; *DCA*, s.v. 'Mitre'). In the earlier centuries, virgins assuming the veil wore a head-dress called a mitre (Bingham, *Ant.* VII. iv. 6; Isidore, *de Eccl. offic.* II. xviii. 11). The Papal tiara (a word of Persian origin, signifying a high head-dress) is a swelling pointed and closed head-dress, which has varied much in shape (in the 14th cent. it was dome-shaped and oval). To this was added, at some date unknown, a single crown (symbolizing the temporal sovereignty of the Popes) encircling the lower part, and, probably in the 12th cent., a second crown was set above this. The third crown was added by Urban V. (1362-70). At the top is fixed a small ball and cross of gold, and, as in the case of a mitre, two bands hang down behind (Hefele, *op. cit.*).

7. Divine crowns and chaplets.—As various plants were sacred to the gods, chaplets of such plants were often associated with them. Tertullian (*de Cor.* 7) cites a work on crowns by Claudius Saturninus, which described how every flower, branch, or shoot was dedicated to the head of some divinity. Hence the custom of offering chaplets to the gods, of crowning their images with them, or of representing them wearing chaplets. They also wear crowns (Pausan. ii. 17. 4, 6, v. 11. 1; Granger, 251, 305; see next art.). In many cases the crowns with which images are represented are replicas of the kingly crown, or, where a king was held to be divine, he often wore the head-dress peculiar to the god with whom he was identified. The god was naturally regarded as a heavenly king who wore the royal insignia; and, contrariwise, the divine king wore the insignia of the god.

In Mexico, at the festival of Huitzilopochtli his image was crowned with a paper crown, wide at the top and set with plumes. Many other Mexican images wore crowns, or were adorned with them at festivals, and crowns were also worn by their human representatives (*NR* ii. 322, 337, iii. 344, 352, 369, 385, etc.). The images of the snake-goddess found in the Ægean area wear a high tiara, over which a snake rears its head (see fig. in vol. i. p. 143). On the head of the god sculptured on the rocks at Ibreez is a high pointed cap adorned with a fillet and several pairs of horns, and the goddess of the Hittite sculptures at Boghaz-Keui wears a flat-topped head-dress with ribbed sides; this is also worn by her female worshippers (Frazer, *Adonis*[2], 100, 105). The goddess Cybele wore a turreted crown, and so also did the Syrian goddess, Atargatis (Lucr. ii. 606; Lucian, *de Dea Syr.* 31). Persian divinities wear a tiara like that of the kings or that worn by court officials (Rawlinson, iv. 338), and on the monuments of the Mithraic cult the god is frequently represented wearing an Oriental tiara (Toutain, 'La Légende de M.,' *Études de la myth.*, 1909, p. 231 ff.). The crown of gold and precious stones which David captured and placed on his head belonged to an image of the Ammonites (2 S 12[30]). Bab. and Assyr. divinities are usually represented wearing the characteristic head-dress of the monarchs—a rounded cap with parallel horns encircling it from behind, and curving upward towards the front without meeting. This head-dress sometimes symbolizes the divinity on the astrological tablets (Rawlinson, ii. 244, iv. 334; Maspero, *Dawn of Civilization*, 1894, p. 655). Bab. divinities are also said to have been crowned with golden crowns (Ep. Jer.[9]). In the *Descent of Ištar*, at the first gate of Hades the keeper deprives Ištar of 'the mighty crown of her head.' In Egypt the statues of the gods were often crowned with chaplets and wreaths, but, besides this, they are usually represented with some symbolic head-dress—the sun, and horns, or plumes, or the *uræus* and disk, etc. But they frequently wear the crowns characteristic of the kings—the high white crown of the south, or the red crown of the north, or both together, enclosed or side by side, just as the kings wore their emblems; *e.g.* the king as Ammon wore the tall hat, with long plumes, of the god. Osiris is frequently represented, *e.g.* in the small golden images of the god as a mummy used in the festival of the month Choiak, or in the judgment scenes, wearing the white crown flanked by two plumes, or with the *uræus*, worn also on the crown of the sun-god. The *atef* crown is also worn by some gods (Wilkinson, iii. ch. 13; Budge, *Gods of the Egyptians*, 1903, *passim*; *Book of the Dead*, cvii.-cxxii.). Images and pictures of Hindu divinities usually show them wearing simple or elaborate crowns or tiaras, sometimes with a nimbus. Or separate crowns form part of the decoration and dress of an image. These are often of great value, and are encrusted with precious gems—diamonds, pearls, rubies, etc. The myths and sacred books occasionally refer to the crowns of the gods (Wilkins, *Hindu Myth.*[2], Calcutta, 1882; Monier-Williams, 219, 449). In Buddhism the figures of Buddha, of Bodhisattvas, and (in Tibet) of the divinities of the Buddhist pantheon are frequently represented with crowns or coronal head-dresses or tiara-like structures (Wilkins, 225; Rockhill, 103, 131, 293; Grünwedel, *Buddh. Kunst*, Berlin, 1900; Stoll, 692).

In later Christian art, God the Father is represented with the current regal or imperial crowns, or with the Papal tiara encircled, according to the period, with one, two, or three crowns, but also sometimes, as if to show His superiority to the Pope, with five crowns. In earlier art, Christ is sometimes represented with the brow encircled by a diadem, and later with the regal or imperial crown or the Papal tiara; to this is sometimes added the crown of thorns, which, by itself, is figured in many other representations, especially of the Crucifixion. Where the Trinity is represented as one Person with three faces, the head is often adorned with a single crown or tiara (A. N. Didron, *Chr. Iconography*, Lond. 1886, *passim*). The Virgin is also represented with a crown, or is depicted in the act of being crowned by the Father or the Son or the Trinity with the crown of a queen or empress, reference being made to the texts Ps 21[3] 8[5], as in the case of the crowning of the Son by the Father after the Ascension. This was in accordance with the legend of the Virgin's coronation in heaven after her Assumption. Angels and Christian virtues, and even the figure of Death, are often represented with a crown (Didron, *passim*). Some of the Gnostics crowned their sacred images (the Carpocratians [Iren. *adv. Hær.* i. 25. 6]), and from this or from the similar pagan practice the custom passed into the Christian Church, and images or pictures were crowned with special ceremonies when they were dedicated (Trede, *Das Heidenthum in der röm. Kirche*, Gotha, 1891, i. 104, 283, ii. 343 ff., iv. 245-48, etc.; for the modern Roman usage, see *Cath. Encyc.* vii. 670). Images of the Madonna on waysides are also crowned with chaplets (Trede, iv. 208).

8. Royal crowns.—We have seen (§ 1) that the royal crown originated from the wearing of a special head-dress by special classes, or it is a specialized form of the ordinary head-dress. Among the higher savages, some such head-dress is worn by chiefs, like the band of cloth worn round the temples as a kind of crown by some chiefs in E. Africa, or the frontlet or crown with a wig of woman's hair worn by chiefs in Samoa (Macdonald, *Africana*, i. 16; Brown, 316; cf. also the other instances in § 1). We turn now to the higher nations of antiquity.

In Assyria the royal crown consisted of a head-dress of felt or cloth, shaped as a cone rising in a gracefully curved line, and truncated at the apex. The upper part receded into the lower, so that the top alone was visible and projected above the former. It was ornamented with red and white bands with embroidery or plates of gold. Round the lower edge was a band or diadem rising in front with a large rosette, with the ends hanging down behind the ears to the shoulders. Sometimes such

a fillet, higher in front or uniform in width, is worn alone, and in the earlier sculptures the tiara is lower than in the later. The queen wore a diadem with turrets like the crown of Cybele (Rawlinson, ii. 100, 108; Stoll, 210, 459, 463). In Babylon the kings wore the horned cap, the symbol of divinity —a kind of rounded cone with a double pair of horns surrounding the sides and front, or a tower-shaped head-dress with or without these horns, terminating in a coronet of feathers. The lower space was decorated with rosettes, etc. It was made of richly coloured felt or cloth. The higher classes, both in Assyria and in Babylonia, wore a distinctive head-dress (Rawlinson, i. 133, iii. 433; Maspero, 719; Stoll, 459). The royal crown of Persia, the *khshatram*, was a high cap of bright coloured felt or cloth, swelling out slightly towards the flat top, and terminating in a projecting ring. Round the bottom ran a fillet or 'band of blue' spotted with white—the diadem strictly so called. It was adopted by Alexander and his successors. In some cases the kings are represented wearing more or less ornamental diadems or radiated crowns, or a head-dress resembling that of the Medes—a high-crowned hat, with ribbed sides, called *tiara* or *kidaris* (= *khshatram*), the latter word being applied to the royal tiara (Rawlinson, iii. 86, iv. 155). In Egypt, diadems were worn by princely personages, but that peculiarly symbolic of royal authority was the *uræus*-serpent, of metal or gilded wood, the coiled body forming the diadem, and the head poised above the forehead of the monarch. It was also affixed to other head-dresses worn by the king in common with the gods.

Of these the most important were the white crown of Upper Egypt, a tall conical head-dress swelling out slightly in front and terminating in a rounded knob; and the red crown of Lower Egypt, cylindrical in form but widening out upwards, and with the back part carried higher than the front. The combination of the two crowns, the white worn within the red, was called *pshent*. They were put on at the coronation; and on bas-reliefs, female figures symbolic of the two Egypts, each crowned with the respective crown of her district, stand on either side of a king wearing the *pshent*. In other cases, Nubti or Set and Horus crown the king, and goddesses invest the queen with her insignia—two long feathers and the globe and horns of Hathor. These crowns were also worn in battle and on other occasions, and they, with other forms, were common to gods and kings. Thus the king is described as 'son of the Sun, decked with the solar crowns' (Wilkinson, ii. 327, iii. 361; Maspero, 265; M. Brimmer, *Egypt*, Camb. U.S.A., 1892, p. 12; A. Moret, *Du Caractère rel. de la royauté pharaonique*, Paris, 1902, p. 310).

In religious ceremonies the king wore a striped linen head-dress, descending in front over the breast, and terminating in a queue fastened by a ribbon. Fillets of gold and, occasionally, radiated crowns were worn by the Ptolemys. Among the Hebrews a common word for crown is נֵזֶר, which signifies 'consecration' or 'mark of separation,' and is applied both to the gold plate or fillet of the high priest's mitre (Ex 29^{6} 39^{30}), and to the royal diadem or fillet, which may have been of gold or of embroidered silk decorated with jewels (2 S 1^{10}, 2 K 11^{12}—the only reference to coronation; cf. Zec 9^{16} 'the stones of a crown'). Another word, עֲטָרָה, is also used, both for the royal crown and for the crown in a symbolic sense (2 S 12^{30}, Ezk 21^{26}, Is 28^{1}, Job 19^{9}, Pr 4^{9} etc.). This word may signify a diadem, since in Ca 3^{11} it is applied to the bridegroom's garland, but in Job 31^{36} the עֲטָרָה can be bound to the head. This may refer to a head-dress of a turban form. Possibly the diadem proper surrounded another head-dress of a turban shape, or like the Persian or Assyrian examples.

The crown of a conquered monarch was sometimes set on the head along with the conqueror's own diadem. In 1 Mac 11^{13}, Ptolemy set the crowns of Egypt and Asia on his head when entering Antioch in triumph (cf. Diod. Sic. i. 47; Rev 19^{12}).

The early Christian emperors wore fillets or diadems of gold adorned with jewels, or of rich silk (the latter finally disappearing in the time of Justinian [Labarte, ii. 39]). The diadem is sometimes worn alone, or it surrounds a cupola or jewelled cap, the combination of cap or tiara and diadem resembling that of the Persian kings. In antiquity the fillet or diadem easily passed over into a crown by the addition of a row of ornaments or symbols to the upper edge of the circumference of a metal diadem. This is already seen in the *corona muralis, navalis, vallaris*, etc., or in the radiate crowns of the Persian kings, the Ptolemys, and Nero and later Roman emperors. The form of these radiate crowns is also connected probably with the radiate nimbus with which kings were often represented, and which was the adornment of the sun-god as well as of other divinities in art. Such crowns were thus a symbol of the monarch's divinity (Dieterich, *Nekyia*, Leipzig, 1893, p. 419; Didron, i. 34 ff.). Crowns, as distinct from diadems, appear in early mediæval Europe. In England the diadem soon gave place to the crown. William the Conqueror and other Norman kings wore diadems ornamented on the upper edge with trefoil uprights, and the crown form soon became more elaborate. The first English example of an arched crown dates from the reign of Henry IV. The coronets of English peers are circlets of gold, variously ornamented according to rank (like the crowns of Continental nobles), and enclosing a crimson velvet cap edged with ermine. The earliest is the ducal coronet, 1362; the latest that of barons, 1660 (see Legge, *English Coronation Records*, 1901).

9. Sacred and magical aspects of the crown.— We find, sporadically, medical or magical virtues ascribed to wreaths and chaplets (Athen. xv. 16, and cf. the magical efficacy attributed to bridal and to funeral wreaths in Egypt, §§ 3, 4). This would be a natural result where garlands were made of the flowers or leaves of sacred plants or trees. Wherever the king is honoured as divine, the crown, as the peculiar symbol of royalty, will have a magical character, more particularly as it is so frequently worn also by the gods.

The golden wreaths and chaplets of oak leaves worn by early Greek and Italian kings, as well as by other persons in later times, are supposed to have originally marked the wearer as vicegerent of a god of whom the oak was the sacred tree, and in which as well as in the wearer of the wreath he was supposed to be incarnate (Cook, *FL* xvii. [1906] 315; Frazer, *Kingship*, 198 ff.). While this is not impossible, and while, generally speaking, wreaths of leaves or flowers may denote a connexion with divinities, it is probable that the diadem of a monarch did not necessarily denote his divinity, though, as representing the highest sovereignty, it was natural that gods should also be represented with it. The god was represented under the highest forms known to men, and these were generally royal.

The regalia of kings tend always to be regarded as peculiarly sacred. In some quarters possession of them 'carries with it the right to the throne,' and they have wonder-working properties, as among the Malays (Frazer, *Kingship*, 121, 124; Skeat, *Malay Magic*, 1900, pp. 23, 59). Generally speaking, the word 'crown' comes to be used figuratively for all that the monarchy implies. In Egypt the *uræus* diadem, emblem of sovereignty, had a magical power, and could execute the king's secret purposes or inflict vengeance. It is said to 'burn his enemies with its flames'; it threw itself upon those who approached it, and choked them in its coils. The supernatural virtues thus communicated to the crown gave it an irresistible force, and the royal crown was also regarded as having divine power (Erman, *Die ägyptische Rel.*, Berlin, 1905, p. 40; Maspero, 265, *Études*, i. 78–79; cf. also *Études*, ii. 134, for other magical crowns; and for the magical powers of the crowns of the dead, see § 4). Crowns may have been occasionally used as instruments of divination, *e.g.* in the choice of a king. In a Transylvanian folk-tale the crown is

laid before the assembly on a hillock. It rises, floats in the air, and lights on the head of the destined king (J. Haltrich, *Deutsche Volksmärchen*[4], Vienna, 1885, p. 195). The Yorubas of W. Africa look upon the royal crown as possessing magical powers, and sheep are occasionally sacrificed to it by the king himself (MacGregor, *Jour. Afr. Soc.*, no. 12 [1904], p. 472). Crowns are sometimes mythically said to have descended from heaven upon the king's head (Bousset, *Gnosis*, Göttingen, 1907, p. 147). There may also have been current an idea that the life of a king depended on the safety of his crown. In the Mandæan myths of the conquest of the dark powers Ur and Ruhâ by Mandâ d'Hajjê and by Hibil Ziwâ, Ur is deprived by both heroes of his crown 'of living fire,' in which his strength lies, and in this way he loses all his might (W. Brandt, *Mandäische Schriften*, Göttingen, 1893, pp. 131, 175, 178). These myths are certainly based on some current belief in the magical virtue of the crown.

10. The crown in early Christian thought.—In the NT the victor's crown at the games (στέφανος) is used symbolically of the reward of a faithful Christian course, the incorruptible στέφανος being contrasted with the corruptible (1 Co 9[25]; cf. 2 Ti 2[5]). It is a 'crown of righteousness' (2 Ti 4[8]), the 'immortal crown of glory' (ὁ ἀμαράντινος τῆς δόξης στέφανος, 1 P 5[4]), the 'crown of life' (Ja 1[12], Rev 2[10]; cf. 3[11]). Hence in visions of heaven the crowns are prominent. The elders in Rev 4[4] wear crowns (στέφανοι) of gold; in the *Ascension of Isaiah* the prophet sees crowns laid up in the highest heaven for the saints; in *Barlaam and Josaphat*, Josaphat sees the people of the heavenly city with crowns in their hands (J. F. Boissonade, *Anec. Græca*, Paris, 1829-31, iv. 360). Christ has on His head 'many diadems' (διαδήματα πολλά, Rev 19[12]), one fillet bound above the other, signifying different sovereignties (cf. 13[1], where the dragon has ten diadems). This conception is already found in later Judaism; the faithful receive crowns and palms (2 Es 2[43. 45]). The wearing of garlands and crowns on earth being obnoxious to the early Christians on account of pagan associations, stress was therefore laid on the worth of the symbolic heavenly garland (στέφανος), and especially the immortal crown of martyrdom (*Mart. of S. Polycarp*, 17; Tert. *de Cor.* 15, 'Why do you condemn to a little chaplet, or a twined head-band, the brow destined for a diadem?'). Lactantius (*de Mort. Pers.* 16) describes the martyr's garland of victory as 'an unfading crown laid up in the kingdom of the Lord.' In Hermas (*Sim.* viii. 2) the angel commands garlands of palms to be brought out for those in whose rods he found branches with fruit (cf. also Euseb. *HE* v. 1 [Letter of the Churches of Vienne and Lyons]). Such references to the crown of immortality or joy or to the martyr's crown are copious in early Christian literature, and the symbol of the crown also appears in Christian archæology. Hands stretched from heaven present crowns to the martyrs, or angels descend and crown them (Didron, i. 95). The crown by itself, or with a palm branch or other symbols, is also symbolic of the eternal reward in heaven offered to the victor.

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CROWN (Greek and Roman).—The words στέφανος, *corona*, and their variants are used by Greeks and Romans of circular ornaments that could be placed on the head, carried in the hand, or hung on a support as offering or decoration, either made of, or artificially representing, or by their decoration more or less remotely suggesting, flowers, leaves, or fruits of the field. The origin of the custom of wearing such ornaments lay probably in the mere instinct of decoration rather than in any notion of a symbolical significance in the plants used. Such decorations are a natural expression of *a joyful state of mind*, and, as the primitive worshipper attributes to his deity feelings like his own, they would be considered acceptable to the gods. As expressing joyfulness, they would in time become customary or *de rigueur* on all festal occasions, whether sacred or profane.

1. The use of crowns for religious purposes is not mentioned in Homer; nevertheless the use of sprays of foliage for *dedicatory purposes* seems to have prevailed very early in the Ægean; at Cnossus was found a spray of foliage made of thin gold plate and wire in a flat bowl (*BSA* viii. [1901-02] 25), and the employment of natural sprays probably preceded that of metal imitations by long ages. Now the most convenient and decorative way of carrying such sprays, or of attaching them to cultus-figures, was to twine them into wreaths, which could be worn on the head of the worshipper or placed on the figure of the deity.

As early as the 7th cent. such garlands were essential in practically all sacrifices (Sappho, quoted by Athen. xv. 674*e*). In Aristophanes (*Thesm.* 446 ff.) a widow who had supported her five children by making wreaths complains that more than half her business has gone since Euripides persuaded people that there are no gods.

Being part of the furniture of cultus, the wreath imparted sacredness to the wearer for the time being; the slave in Aristophanes considers that, while wearing a wreath, he cannot be beaten by his master (*Plut.* 20 f.).

2. The essentially joyful associations of the wreath are proved by the fact that *mourners did not wear them at funerals.* Xenophon, while sacrificing, heard of the death of his son; in sign of mourning he took off the crown that he was wearing. But when he heard that his son had died like a brave man, he resumed his crown and proceeded with the sacrifice (Val. Max. v. 10). At mournful ceremonies, such as the Spartan Hyacinthia (Athen. iv. 139), the crown was not worn; the Sicyonians used flowers only, instead of wreaths, in sacrificing to the Eumenides at Titane (Paus. II. xi. 4). Where we see wreaths, fillets, etc., deposited at a tomb, these are brought as offerings to the spirit of the deceased, not as tokens of mourning. Such wreaths the Christians regarded as essentially offerings to a deity, and therefore to be condemned (cf. Justin Mart. *Apol.* i. 24: 'The Christians do not worship the same gods as the heathen, or offer up libations or incense, or bring them crowns or sacrifices'; so, too, Minucius Felix, p. 43, ed. Ouzel, 1652, 'nec mortuos coronamus'). Typical of the Greek custom is the beautiful Attic *lekythos* (*JHS* xix. [1899] pl. 2), showing a *tænia* tied round the tombstone, oil-flasks and wine-jugs, some with wreaths laid over them, ranged on the steps, and a woman bringing a tray full of wreaths and *tæniæ*. Sometimes tombstones were made with a receptacle suited for holding a crown of leaves (*Arch. Zeit.* 1871, pl. 42). The dead body itself was crowned (καταστέφειν τὸν νεκρόν, Eur. *Phœn.* 1632), as part of the last honours, in keeping with the washing and anointing of it, and dressing it for its last journey (Lucian, *de Luctu*, 11). Members of some associations, such as the Iobacchi, were entitled to a crown at their death, provided out of the common funds (E. S. Roberts, *Introd. to Gr. Epigr.* ii. Cambridge, 1905, pp. 91, 160). Inscriptions of the Phrygian Hierapolis often mention the στεφανωτικόν, a sum left by the deceased, the interest on which was devoted to the annual renewal of wreaths on his tomb (Humann, etc., *Altertümer v. Hierapolis*, Berlin, 1898, p. 129). At a Roman funeral there

were carried not merely crowns offered by the mourners, but such as the dead might have won by his own deeds. In later times, the idea of the propitiation of the dead gradually dying out, the wreath came to be laid on the tomb merely as a mark of honour; but it would be hard to say where the primitive significance of the usage merged into the modern. By far the greater number of the crowns actually preserved come from tombs; but this is only because the conditions in tombs are more favourable than elsewhere for the preservation of them, as of other antiquities.

3. In ritual the use of wreaths was manifold. They might be used, as *tæniæ* were used, to decorate the image of the god (see Schreiber-Anderson, *Atlas of Classical Antiquities*, London, 1894, xiv. 3). They could be worn by those who performed the sacrifice. They could be offered up (Daremberg-Saglio, fig. 1984). They could be used to decorate the victims (Lucian, *de Sacr.* 12); thus was Iphigenia decorated (Eur. *Iph. in Aul.* 1477). The garlands brought by the priest of Zeus at Lystra to Barnabas and Paul (Ac 14[13]) were either offerings to them or decorations for the oxen which he proposed to sacrifice. Garlands were used to decorate the shrine, the altar, sacred trees, and all sorts of instruments and vessels employed. The whole scene was thus made at once cheerful and solemn, the objects so adorned being brought into intimate relation with the god. Woollen fillets served the same purpose, whether made up into circular form, or merely hung on the victim or object, or used to attach it to the figure of the deity.

The lover's practice of hanging garlands on the door of the object of his affections is explained by Athenæus (xv. 670*d*) as inspired by his desire either to honour the beloved one (just as the doors of temples were garlanded), or to honour Eros (the beloved being regarded as his image, and the house therefore as his temple), or, having been robbed of the ornament of his soul, to give to the robber his body's ornament in addition. In speculations such as these we see the idea that these garlands were, at any rate, a semi-religious kind of offering.

Probably the most important crowns from a ritual point of view were the 'priestly coronets' (cf. above, p. 339[b]) worn by the officiating persons, whether professional priests or not. When the crowns were made of flowers or leaves, these were usually of the kind sacred to the deity served, although in a very great number of cases the plant used seems to have been laurel. This may have been owing to its purifying property, although in many monuments the appearance of laurel may be due to defective representation. The wreaths worn by priests were sometimes, especially in later days, decorated with medallions appropriate to the cult. A priest of Cybele (relief in Capitoline Museum [Baumeister, *Denkm.*, Munich, 1885-88, p. 801]) wears on a laurel wreath three medallions representing the Idæan Zeus, Attis, and another deity. Domitian, when presiding at the Capitoline Games, wore a crown decorated with images of the Capitoline triad—Juppiter, Juno, and Minerva; the *flamen dialis* and the high priest of the Flavian dynasty, who supported him, had crowns also containing the image of the Emperor himself (Sueton. *Domit.* 4). Recent discoveries have further illustrated this practice. The crowns worn by high priests of the Imperial cultus were not merely of bronze but of even more precious metal, elaborately decorated with busts of the Emperors. In Epictetus (i. 19) the prospective priest of the Augustan cult says, 'I shall wear a golden crown'; and Tertullian speaks of the golden crowns of the provincial priests (*de Idol.* 18, with Oehler's note). Busts of such priests, and an actual bronze crown from Ephesus, as well as representations of such crowns on coins of Tarsus, make this clear, and throw light on such a title as ἱερεὺς τῶν Σεβαστῶν καὶ στεφανηφόρος τοῦ σύμπαντος αὐτῶν οἴκου (*Jahreshefte d. Oest. Arch. Inst.* ii. 245 f.). Another peculiar form of ritual crown is the 'archieratic' crown shown on certain coins of Syrian Antioch (*Brit. Mus. Catal. Coins*, 'Galatia,' etc., p. 167).

So essential was the crown in the cult that λαβεῖν (ἀναδέξασθαι, etc.) τὸν τοῦ θεοῦ στέφανον is equivalent to assuming the priesthood (Dittenberger, *Orientis Græci Inscriptiones Selectæ*, vol. ii., Leipzig, 1905, no. 767, note 14), and στεφανηφόροι include all professional priests and all magistrates who in virtue of their office take part in public rites (*ib.* 332, note 24). The right to wear a crown at all public festivals is expressly included in the privileges of the priest of Poseidon Heliconius at Sinope (στέφανος ἐν ἀπᾶσι τοῖς ἀγῶσιν [Michel, *Recueil*, Brussels, 1896-1900, p. 734]). Such official crowns are to be distinguished from those awarded to priestly officials by their grateful fellow-citizens on their retirement from office or even after their death (Dittenberger, *op. cit.* 470). These are analogous to the crowns awarded to other officials.

4. The *wearing of crowns by deities* is closely connected, as we have seen, with the custom of offering crowns to them at sacrifices. When special plants were associated with certain deities, a wreath of such a plant was a natural attribute and a convenient means of identification, although the latter feature would appeal less to the ancient worshipper than to the modern archæologist. The associations of vegetable crowns are in many cases quite clear. Demeter and Persephone wear barley; the Dodonæan Zeus wears oak; Apollo has laurel; Athene, olive (which she wears as a rule round her helmet); Aphrodite, myrtle; Heracles, poplar or styrax; Dionysus and his train wear ivy (seldom, if ever, vine-leaves); Poseidon on coins struck by Antigonus Gonatas or Doson, and on a rare coin of Aradus of 174 B.C. (*Brit. Mus. Catal. Coins*, 'Phœnicia,' pl. iii. 18), has a curious marine plant (*Fucus vesiculosus?*); a bust from Puteoli representing a local water-deity is crowned with grapes and vine-leaves (Roscher, *Lex.* i. 1686). But these appropriations are not exclusive: Zeus, for instance, is usually laureate; as we have already seen, the laurel seems to have been the plant most commonly used for wreaths. Various deities are represented in Greek art wearing crowns of a more elaborate kind. That of the Hera of Polycleitus at Argos was decorated with figures of the Graces and Seasons, probably in high relief; and on coins (of Argos, Elis, Croton, etc.) and other works of art Hera is usually shown wearing a somewhat elaborate crown with floral designs in relief. On coins of Mallus, Cronus wears a metal diadem; and Cybele is commonly represented as City-goddess wearing a walled crown (see CITY). The Cyprian Aphrodite, in statues, terra-cottas, and coins of Cyprus, wears a richly decorated crown, obviously meant to be of metal; on some coins of Salamis and on a stone head from Dali she has a peculiar crown made of semicircular plates (*Brit. Mus. Catal. Coins*, 'Cyprus,' p. cxi). Often she seems to be identified with the City (*ib.*). At Paphos she wears a combination of the Oriental *polos*, decorated with palmettes, and the walled crown (*ib.* pl. xxii. 10). On some Cypriote terra-cottas we also find a decoration of palmettes or sphinxes (*Brit. Mus. Catal.*, 'Terra-cottas,' A 275). These rich crowns are characteristic of the Oriental element in her cult; nevertheless the ordinary Greek Aphrodite often wears an elaborate metal crown, and sometimes, 'though descended from the early *polos* of the queen-goddesses, it is in form curiously like a modern royal crown' (*JHS* xxv. [1905] 78). A variety of the metal στέφανος worn by various goddesses is known as the στεφάνη; it rises to a point in front, and narrows as it passes to the back of the head, which it does not completely

surround. One of the most widely distributed forms of crown in art is the crown of rays, which, like the nimbus, represents the divine light emanating from the persons of deities or heroes. But such a halo was probably not represented by a concrete crown until comparatively late times.

5. The giving of crowns as *prizes* probably had a religious origin. The material rewards offered in heroic times seem to have been replaced at a fairly early date—in the 6th cent. at latest—by crowns of leaves, etc. (Paus. X. vii. 3, of the Pythia; *Marm. Par.* 38=588 B.C.; note that the palm, being unsuitable for a crown, was carried as a branch). The festivals at which crowns were given were under the special patronage of the local deity, and the material for the crown would be gathered from the local sacred enclosure, although in the case of the Pythia the laurel was brought all the way from Tempe (Frazer on Paus. X. vii. 8). It was only in later days that the crown of foliage—olive, laurel, pine, etc.—was replaced by a metal crown, so that in the 2nd and 3rd cents. of our era the decoration carried by the victorious athlete was an elaborate structure more like an urn without a bottom than anything else (Dressel in *CIL* xv. 2, no. 7045). The crowns thus won were often dedicated in the temple; in the case of a tie, which was for this reason called ἱερά, the crown remained the property of the god (*JHS* xxv. 17 f.). But the rewards might also be carried away by the winners, and the entry of such a winner into his native city was a solemn function, as when Pausimachus brought home to the Carian Antioch the crown of the Delphic Soteria (Dittenberger, *Or. Gr. Inscr.* 234. 31). At Elæa in Asia Minor, when Attalus III. (138–133 B.C.) was received in state by the citizens, he was met by all the state officials and by the winners in sacred festivals carrying their crowns with them (*ib.* 332. 34).

6. From the use of crowns as rewards in actual athletic and other contests, such as musical or literary (an ordinary term for being victorious with a tragedy is στεφανοῦσθαι, cf. Bacchylides, frag. 33, Jebb), is probably derived their use as *marks of honour generally.* They could be given as rewards for good service to the community; and decrees of Greek communities rewarding their officials or private members are among the commonest of extant official documents.

Thus the Athenian council and people in 151 B.C. vote a laurel crown to Protagoras the priest of Asklepios for his services to the shrine (Michel, 689); at Lissa in Asia Minor in the 3rd cent. B.C. a similar crown is voted to Menekrates for his general good services to the community (Dittenberger, 57); at Ptolemais in Egypt the artists of the gild of Dionysus and the Brother Gods grant a crown of ivy, to be given at the *Dionysia*, to their life-president Dionysius, son of Musæus (*ib.* 50). At Delphi services to the shrine and State are rewarded with 'a crown of laurel from the god's grove, according to the traditional Delphic custom' (*ib.* 345; *Sylloge*[2], Leipz. 1898, p. 215). An Athenian decree of 100 B.C. records the crowns conferred on the *ephebi* and their *kosmetes* by the Council and Assembly, and by the Salaminian *demos*, and on their *kosmetes* by the *ephebi* (Roberts, *Epigr.* ii. 65). A list of the eighteen crowns (of gold or laurel) conferred on Cassander, son of Meneatheus, was inscribed on a marble slab in the temple of Apollo Smintheus in the Troad (Michel, *Rec.* 1312).

Such honorific crowns were presented not merely to individuals or associations, but to a whole people or their official representatives; thus the Athenian people received crowns from various States, such as Paros, Andros, Cnossus, etc. (*IG* ii. 700, 701). The mural, rostral, and civic crowns of the Romans were special developments of the crown as reward for services to the State.

7. From employing the crown as a reward, it was but a step to presenting it as *tribute*, often with a sense of favours to come.

Strato, son of Gerostratus, king of the Phœnician Arvad, went to meet Alexander the Great and crowned him with a golden crown, at the same time laying his father's dominions at the conqueror's feet (Arr. *Anab.* ii. 13. 8). Machares, son of Mithradates, offered a crown to Lucullus worth 1000 gold pieces, begging for an alliance with Rome (Plut. *Lucull.* 24). Simon the Hasmonæan sent a golden crown and palm as tribute to Demetrius of Syria (1 Mac 13[37]). Plutarch (*Æm. Paul.* 34) says that at the triumph of Æmilius Paullus were carried 400 golden crowns which the conquered States had sent to him as the prize of his victory.

Thus the crown became the symbol of victory, even more than the palm-branch. It is the most common attribute of Victory in art; and Christianity, in spite of certain protests (cf. Tert. *de Cor.*), adopted it whole-heartedly as a symbol of spiritual victory.

8. The crowns received as civic rewards or honours were, like athletic decorations, frequently dedicated at shrines (Rouse, *Gr. Vot. Offerings*, Camb. 1902, p. 266). At Athens those conferred by a foreign State had to be dedicated in the Parthenon, perhaps to prevent ὕβρις (Æschin. *in Ctes.* 46). Crowns of less importance were usually kept by the recipients. When the semi-barbarian princes Spartocus and Pærisades of Bosporus were voted golden crowns by the Athenians, the decree laid down the very form of words which was to be inscribed on the crown when dedicated (Hicks, *Gr. Hist. Inscr.*[2], Oxf. 1901, p. 140). To judge by the lists in inscriptions, vast quantities of such crowns must have been in the temples. Sometimes the lists record the terms of the dedication; *e.g.* from the Delian treasure-list (Dittenberger, *Syll.*[2] 588. 102) a golden laurel-crown bearing the inscription 'Publius son of Publius Cornelius consul of the Romans' (*i.e.* Scipio Africanus, who probably made the dedication in 194 B.C.).

9. The crown, being part of the apparatus of religious service, was worn not only at sacrifices, but also at other ceremonies, such as musical or literary contests, which were under the patronage of a deity. Such were the sacred contests at which Pliny says it was originally the custom to wear crowns of natural leaves (*HN* xxi. 4), the use of crowns variegated with flowers being later, and the use of artificial crowns later still. Demosthenes (*in Mid.* 16) describes golden crowns among the 'sacred vestments' worn by the chorus which he provided at the *Dionysia*. Musicians are often represented wearing crowns (Schreiber-Anderson, *Atlas*, vii. 9, lxxviii. 7; Baumeister, *Denkm.*, fig. 591). The use of crowns at bridals was undoubtedly religious, and therefore condemned by Tertullian (*de Cor.* 13). It is the bridal crown that is carried or worn by Eros and Hymenæus. Religious also must have been the origin of the decoration hung outside the house-door at Athens after the birth of a child: an olive-wreath for a boy, a woollen fillet for a girl. On the other hand, we may well hesitate to see any direct religious significance in the use of crowns at banquets. They were connected especially with drinking, and were probably first used to promote cheerfulness. It may be doubted whether the theory that they mitigated headache (an ancient theory mentioned by Aristotle *ap.* Athen. xv. 674) was more than make-believe. Whatever may have been the original significance of the use of crowns on such occasions, it was doubtless included in the general condemnation of the custom of wearing crowns on the head which was uttered by more than one Christian apologist (Minucius Felix, Tertullian). The Christians used flowers both loose and in garlands, but not on their heads, doubtless because the wearing of them was so intimately associated with pagan cultus.

10. The diadem worn by monarchs, though possibly its resemblance to the *tænia* with which the heads of deities were often adorned may have given it a suggestion of Divine significance, was probably not religious in origin. In any case it was adopted by Alexander the Great from the Persian king, so that its original significance must

be sought in the East. The plain round decoration seen, *e.g.*, on the portrait-head in the Louvre called Antiochus the Great (Bevan, *House of Seleucus*, Lond. 1902, frontisp.), or on heads of Seleucus and Philetærus on early Pergamene coins, is probably not a diadem, but a sacred fillet. The laurel crown is rarely, if ever, represented on the portraits of living Greek kings. It is worn by the dead and divinized Philetærus, sometimes intertwined with a diadem, on coins of Pergamum. It was worn by Julius Cæsar and by practically all the Emperors from Augustus onwards, while, until the time of Constantine, they eschewed the royal diadem. It was a symbol, despite its origin, of honour, but not of divinity. Even the crown that is being placed on the head of Augustus by a female figure, herself wearing a walled crown and veil, on the famous Vienna cameo (A. Furtwängler, *Ant. Gemmen*, 1900, pl. 56) representing the Emperor's apotheosis, is a sign of honour merely, not of divinization. This crown is of oak leaves. When the early Emperors wished to express divinity by a crown, it took the radiate form. The same thing could be expressed by placing a star over the Emperor's head. On coins struck after his death, Divus Augustus is frequently represented wearing a crown of rays. The use by a king of this radiate crown, properly the head-dress of the sun-god, is found on coins representing Ptolemy III. of Egypt (247–222 B.C.). In Syria it appears first on coins struck by Antiochus Epiphanes (175–164 B.C.), who expressed his godhead thus, as well as by placing a star over his head. It may be doubted whether this radiation, so far, represents any concrete crown, and not merely an imaginary halo. Nero was the first living Roman Emperor to wear it, so far as the evidence of coins goes. But it was not until the time of Caracalla, who introduced a silver coin called the *antoninianus*, on which the Emperor's head is radiate, that the radiate crown became common in representations of monarchs. It was apparently not worn by the Emperors after Constantine the Great, obviously because of its religious significance.

LITERATURE.—Pliny, *HN* xxi. 1 ff.; Athenæus, xv. 671 ff.; Tertullian, *de Corona Militis*; Stephani, 'Nimbus u. Strahlenkranz,' in *Mém. de l'Acad. des Sciences de St.-Pétersbourg*, 6th ser. vol. ix. (1859); Egger-Fournier, art. 'Corona,' in Daremberg-Saglio's *Dict. des antiquités*, Paris, 1886–90; Saglio, art. 'Diadema,' *ib.*; Mau, art. 'Diadema,' in Pauly-Wissowa's *RE* v. 303 f.; Stengel and Oehmichen, 'Die griech. Kultusaltertümer'[2], in Iwan v. Müller's *Handbuch*, v. 3 (Munich, 1890), p. 98; Hill, 'Priesterdiademe,' in *Jahreshefte des Oesterr. Arch. Inst.* ii. (Vienna, 1900) 245 ff.

G. F. HILL.

CRUCIFIX.—See SYMBOLS.

CRUCIFIXION.—See CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS.

CRUELTY.—See HUMANITARIANISM.

CRUSADES.—I. *CAUSES OF THE CRUSADES.*—The Crusades may be defined as the technical name given to certain special events in the long struggle between the Muslim and the Christian. For the immediate or special causes of any particular Crusade, see below. Of general causes, whether political or religious and ethical, the following may be noted.

1. The decay of the Eastern Empire.—The reader even of liberal culture is often ignorant of the fortunes of the great Empire that continued at Constantinople the name and authority of Rome. He fails, therefore, to recognize the debt which the common civilization and Christianity of Europe owe to it (cf. F. Harrison, *Meaning of History*, 1894, chs. 11 and 12). Charles Martel saved the West at Tours (Oct. 732) from the Saracen invaders, but his efforts would have been fruitless had not Constantinople for centuries presented a secure barrier against all attacks from the side of Asia. The first shock of Muslim conquest had found her unprepared (first Saracen siege of Constantinople, 674–6; 2nd siege, 716–8; deliverance chiefly through 'Greek fire'); but under the great Emperor Leo the Syrian (718, often mistakenly called the Isaurian) and his son Constantine V. (740), the Eastern Empire recovered her strength (J. B. Bury, *Later Roman Empire*, London, 1889, vol. ii. bk. 6). As part of his general programme for driving back the Saracens, Leo endeavoured to abolish the 'eikons,' and tried to develop a strong yeomanry by reforming the land laws and emancipating the serfs. As a result, the Basilian dynasty (867–1057) regained much lost territory in both Asia and Europe, through the conquests especially of John Zimisces (963–75; Antioch recovered, 969).

But, with the close of the 11th cent., the powers of resistance of the Eastern Empire were becoming exhausted. The Iconoclastic controversy and, above all, centuries of pernicious land laws had sapped her vitality. The provinces of Asia Minor consisted of vast domains cultivated by serfs under absentee landlords at Constantinople, or belonging to ecclesiastical corporations exempt from military burdens. The result was inevitable. One by one the provinces which had hitherto stood out against the Muslim succumbed. The respite which Constantinople had provided had been invaluable. The Greek Empire had saved Europe in her hour of weakness. But now missionaries had subdued the barbarians, and under Charles the Great had welded Europe, in idea at least, into one great Christian commonwealth, under one leader of the faithful at Rome (Xmas Day, 800). Whatever its internal weakness, the idea of the Holy Roman Empire was of tremendous power for dealing with a non-Christian foe. The conflict between Crescent and Cross was bound to be renewed under a new form, with a new champion of Christendom, and in a wider arena, no longer as a frontier war, but one of inter-continental character. Thus the Crusades (upon the seven or nine divisions of which stress should not be laid) must be regarded as a new form of the old struggle. A clear recognition of this fact, and not the belief once fashionable that the Crusades were a sort of 12th cent. outbreak of madness or chivalry, lies at the root of a right understanding of history.

2. The rise of the Seljūḳ Turks.—In the 9th and 10th cents. the powers of resistance of Constantinople had been assisted by the disunion of the Muslim. There were rival Khalifates of East and West (Western Khalifate inaugurated by 'Abd al-Raḥmān III. in 929); the struggles of Sunnites and Shi'ites (*qq.v.*), and of the dynasties and sub-dynasties of Umayyads, 'Abbāsids, Fāṭimids, Idrīsids, etc. (see, for complete lists, S. Lane-Poole, *Mahommedan Dynasties*, 1894); and the revolt of the 'Carmaṭians' (*q.v.*) at Kūfa under Ḥamdān ibn Ashaṭ or Qarmaṭ, and the pillage of Mecca by these Mahdists in 929. But, with the rapid rise of the Seljūḳ Turks, all this was changed, and Constantinople was separated from the Muslim merely by the Dardanelles, and threatened by a Turkish fleet constructed by Greek captives. So, in the spring of 1088, Alexius Comnenus in a letter (*Recueil*, iv. 131 ff.; or, better, Hagenmeyer, *Kreuzzugsbriefe*, Innsbruck, 1901, p. 12) to Robert of Flanders besought the aid of the Latins.[1]

In 1039 the Turkomans defeated Mas'ūd, the Ghaznavid, at Damghan, subdued Persia, and elected as their head Abū-Ṭālib-Ṭughril Beg, the grandson of Seljūḳ b. Yakāk of Samarqand

[1] For the controversies over the genuineness of this letter, see Bury's Gibbon, vi. 251 n., or, more fully, Hagenmeyer, *op. cit.* pp. 10–44. The date is from Hagenmeyer, whose defence of its genuineness (against P. E. D. Riant, *Alex. Com. Ep. Spuria*, Geneva, 1879) may be accepted.

(a pervert, possibly, from Christianity to Islām). In 1055, through his deliverance of Baghdad from the Buyids, Ṭughril was constituted 'sultan' or captain of the bodyguard of the 'Abbāsid Khalīfs. His son Alp Arslān (1063–72) conquered and ruined the Nestorian kingdom of Armenia (1064) and Georgia, and after three campaigns defeated and captured the Greek Emperor Romanus Diogenes, at Manzikert near Lake Van (26th Aug. 1071);[1] and, as a result of the consequent weakness and dissensions, the Seljūḳ Sulaimān won Anatolia and Antioch, the seat of the Seljukian dynasty of Rūm being established at Nicæa (1077–1300). Moreover, in 1070–1, Jerusalem had been taken by a lieutenant of Malik Shah, Atsiz ibn Auk the Khwārizmian, from the mild rule of the Fāṭimid Khalīfs of Egypt, and its Government handed over to the exactions of the Turkoman Ortuk b. Aksab (see below).[2] The Ortukids were expelled 26th Aug. 1098 by the Fāṭimids, and retired to Edessa.[3]

3. The pilgrims and the Holy Places.—The influence of the Holy Places upon the Middle Ages was not due to historic—the historic sense was not yet born—but to religious and psychological sentiment. The Middle Ages were powerless to realize an idea without turning it into the concrete. Of Christ and His saints men must have visible images. By a sort of logical inversion they went one step further. Where the image was, there was the spirit. Thus the image, or material realization, became the vehicle of grace, possessing not only sanctity but life, while the spiritual was constantly assuming form and colour. Hence, to the mediæval mind the Holy Places were far more than religious or historical memorials. They were themselves sacramental—an essential part of the spiritual provision of the age. The early origin of pilgrimages to Jerusalem is seen in the journey of Helena in 326, the foundation by her son Constantine of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre (Socrates, *HE* i. 17; Euseb. *Vit. Const.* iii. 30, 34–40), and the record in 333 of the Bordeaux pilgrim (see *Itin. Anon. Burdigalense*, in *CSEL* xxxix. 1 ff.; Eng. tr., A. Stewart [London, 1887]). On the conquest of Jerusalem by Omar (638), the Christians had been assured of their religion; a quarter was assigned to the patriarch and his people; and the Holy Places were left in their hands. The 'Abbāsid Khalīf Hārūn al-Rashid even presented Charles the Great (23rd Dec. 800) with the keys of the Sepulchre (Eginhard, *de Vita Carol. Mag.* ch. 16). On Jerusalem lapsing to the Fāṭimid Khalīfs of Egypt (969–1076), special concessions were granted to the republic of Amalfi for the transport of pilgrims. But the era of tolerance was changed when the famous Ḥākim (al-Ḥākim Abū-'Alī al-Manṣūr), the Fāṭimid Khalīf (996–1020), burnt the Church of the Resurrection and destroyed the Holy Sepulchre (27th Sept. 1010; for date, see Röhricht, *op. cit.* 9 n.). On his assumption of divinity (1017), in his new hatred of the Muslim, al-Ḥākim once more granted toleration, and the pilgrimages recommenced, greatly stimulated by the new outburst of piety in Europe which marked the 11th cent., and by the re-opening (see Röhricht, in *Hist. Taschenbuch*, Leipzig, 1875, v. 5), through the conversion of Stephen of Hungary (997–1038), of the old land-route which was followed as early as 333 by the Bordeaux pilgrim. But under the rule of Ortuk the cruelties inflicted upon, and the exactions from, pilgrims, hitherto fixed at two gold pieces a head, became excessive (William of Tyre, *Hist.* i. ch. 10; Urban II. at Clermont in Guibert, *Gesta Dei per Francos*, ii. 4 [*Recueil*, iv. 140]). Either a way of redress must be found, or the pilgrimages must cease.[4]

4. The new Europe.—The wrongs of previous ages, including the desecration by al-Ḥākim, had appealed to a distracted Europe in vain. But, by the close of the 11th cent., a new Europe had arisen, instinct with religious chivalry, conscious of its spiritual unity, no longer distracted by heathen Huns and Northmen. By the recital of the wrongs of the pilgrims 'a nerve was touched of exquisite feeling; and the sensation vibrated to the heart of Europe' (Gibbon, vi. 258). Politically Europe was ready. Gregory VII., as part of his immense plans, first conceived (Dec. 1074) the idea of arming Europe against Asia (*Epp.* ii. 31),[1] and the two expeditions of his Norman ally and protector, Robert Wiscard—who had already conquered Sicily from the Saracens—into Greece (1081–2, 1084) might have established as a preliminary step the Normans at Constantinople, and the Papal supremacy over the Eastern Church, but for the death of Robert at Bundicia in Epirus (17th July 1085), leaving his Eastern dreams to his son Bohemond. The diversion of these into the Crusade was easy and natural, while in the Fourth Crusade we see the reversion to Robert's original plan. Nor must we forget that, in addition to the religious motives—to the strength of which the utmost importance should be attached—the East was to the 11th and 12th cents. what the New World was to the Elizabethan sailors. Motives of commerce, wealth, adventure, and religion were united (cf. the six camel-loads of Tancred's spoils [Alb. Aq. vi. 23; *Recueil*, iv. 479], or the letter of Hugh de Reitaste [*i.e.* Rethel] boasting of the 1500 marks rental he had won [in Guibert, *Gesta Dei per Francos*, vii. 38; *Recueil*, iv. 254]).

The drift of the times is clearly seen in the popularity of the romance *Vita Caroli Magni et Rolandi* (ed. Ciampi, Florence, 1822), assigned to John Tilpinus or Turpinus, Archbishop of Rheims, 773. In this romance, which was accepted everywhere as history, Charles achieves the conquest of the Holy Land. Gaston Paris, *s.v.* 'De Pseudo-Turpino' (in *Hist. Poet. de Charl.*, Paris, 1865; or enlarged, 1905), shows that the first part was composed in the 11th cent. by a Spaniard; the second part *c.* 1110 by a monk of Vienne. There is an Eng. metrical tr. by T. Rodd, 2 vols., 1812.

5. The system of Penance.—A powerful motive both to the pilgrimages to the Holy Places and to the consequent Crusades may be traced in the current Penitential system of Europe. In the 11th and 12th cents. this system was in full operation. We see the effect when Urban II. at Clermont proclaimed a plenary indulgence to all who enlisted for the Crusade (Mansi, xx. 827; cf. Girald. Camb. *de Princip. Instruct.* 238 [ed. G. F. Warner, in Rolls Series, 1891]; see also Röhricht, *Erst. Kreuz.* 21, n. 5). To this should be added the temporal advantages. The *cruce signati* were freed from arrest for debt, and from usury; they were guaranteed justice; the Pope was the guardian of their wives, families, etc. In consequence the crusaders were a mixed company, debtors and criminals abounding.

II. *HISTORY OF THE SEVEN CRUSADES.*[2]—I. **First Crusade.**—To the general causes already detailed no special cause need be added save—though very doubtfully—the preaching of Peter the Hermit.

Peter (b. 1053) of Amiens (Guibert, *Gesta Dei per Francos*, ii. 8), stirred by the wrongs he witnessed in 1090 and 1094 at Jerusalem (Alb. Aq. *Hist.* i. 2-4), on his return to Europe is said, according to the well-known story, to have addressed the Council of Bari and aroused Urban II. to a sense of the need of a Crusade. The last part of this story, to the doubtful character of which von Sybel first drew attention, appears in Albert of Aachen (*Hist.* i. 5; cf. Anna Comnena, *Alex.* x. 284), and is otherwise unknown (cf. Bernard's contemptuous reference, *Ep.* 363. 8). Thence it was copied into the *Chanson d'Antioche* of the pilgrim Richard (a romance without historical value, written *c.* 1145; first ed. by A. P. Paris, 2 vols., 1848, tr.

[1] For the battle, see Finlay, *Hist. Greece*, iii. 32–4; Oman, *Hist. of the Art of War*, 217–9.

[2] For date, see Röhricht, *Erst. Kreuz.*, 233 n., from Mujir-al-Din's *Hist. de Jérusalem*, tr. Suvaire, 1870, p. 69 f.

[3] For date, see Röhricht, *l.c.*

[4] There is a comprehensive study of the German pilgrims in R. Rohricht, *Beiträge z. Gesch. d. Kreuz.* vol. ii.; cf. also P. E. D. Riant, *Expéditions et pèlerinages des Scandinaves en Terre Sainte*, Paris, 1865–9, and H. Raynaud, *Itinéraires à Jérusalem*, Paris, 1877.

[1] Cf. the letter of Sylvester II., May 984 (*Epistolæ Gerberti* [ed. J. Havet, Paris, 1889], p. 22), which is, however, of very doubtful value and authenticity.

[2] Divisions into seven or nine of what was in reality a continuous struggle are arbitrary but useful.

1852). Peter is not mentioned by Guibert or others as present at Clermont. Of Peter's preaching in Picardy and Berry after Clermont there is, however, little doubt (see Guibert, *op. cit.* ii. 8; Anna Comn. *l.c.*), but Urban II., a disciple of Gregory VII., would use rather than follow his preaching. For Peter, see the critical monograph of Hagenmeyer, *Peter der Eremite* (Leipzig, 1879), which traces the genesis of the myth.

At the Council of Placentia (7th March 1095) the ambassador of Alexius Comnenus pleaded the peril of Constantinople (Mansi, xx. 802; Guibert, *op. cit.* ii. 1), but Urban II. postponed the decision until after a second Council at Clermont (18th–27th Nov. 1095; Mansi, xx. 821 ff.). There, amid cries of 'Deus vult,' the undertaking was commenced, a red cross (hence the title 'Crusade') being sewn on the breast or shoulders.[1] So far as the Muslim world was concerned, the times were opportune, the great Seljūḳ Empire of Malik Shāh having broken up, at his death (1092), into four warring portions. Egypt had recovered its possessions, and in 1096 the Fāṭimid vizier Aphdal conquered Jerusalem from Ortuk. While the main expedition was preparing, a vast mob, chiefly from the Rhine districts, under Peter, Walter the Penniless, and Walter de Poissy, with a goose at their head (Alb. Aq. i. 30; Guibert, *op. cit.*; *Recueil*, iv. 251), after massacring (May 1096) the Jews in Spires and Worms (Salomo bar Simeon, in Neubauer and Stern's *Quellen zur Gesch. der Juden in Deutsch.*, Berlin, 1892), crossed Hungary, and, with thinned numbers, arrived at Constantinople (30th July 1096). On crossing into Asia, they were overwhelmed (21st Oct. 1096), near the river Dracon and at Civitot, by Kilij Arslān, the son and successor (1092–1106) of Sulaimān (Anna Comn. *Alex.* x. 274; there is an excellent account of this Crusade in Röhricht, *Erst. Kreuz.* chs. 2, 3, or in Hagenmeyer, *Peter d. Eremite*, chs. 4–6).

The main Crusade was under Godfrey of Bouillon, Hugh of Vermandois, Robert of Normandy, Robert of Flanders, Raymond of St. Gilles and Toulouse, Bohemond, and his nephew Tancred (see lists in Alb. Aq. ii. 22. 3), with a vast host of barons, etc. Marching through Hungary, the various forces converged on Constantinople (Godfrey, 23rd Dec. 1097; Bohemond, *c.* 10th April 1097), and were carried over the Bosporus by the anxious Greeks. After Alexius had secured their homage (Alb. Aq. ii. 16–18, 28) and reviewed the hosts (of whom Fulcher of Chartres enumerates nineteen nations, or about 60,000 armed horsemen [see Alb. Aq. ii. 41] plus a vast mob of pilgrims and camp followers), they captured Nicæa, the capital of Rūm (19th June 1097), defeated the Turks at Dorylæum (Eski-Shehr, 1st July 1097), crossed the desert in a burning summer, captured Antioch after an exhausting siege of nine months (21st Oct. 1097–3rd June 1098), during the dire famine of which many deserted for home (Alb. Aq. iii. 50–52, iv. 34) until stopped by the discovery of a Holy Lance,[2] and defeated the vast relief forces of Kerbugha of Mosul (28th June). After ten months' delay, the remnant of the crusaders, reduced now to less than 40,000 all told (Röhricht, *op. cit.* 183 n.), disdaining the proffered terms of the Egyptians, marched on Jerusalem (13th May–6th June 1099), the capture of which (15th July 1099) was followed by the massacre of 70,000 Muslims and Jews, women and children included (Alb. Aq. vi. 20–23). Eight days later Godfrey was elected king (real title, 'advocate of the Holy Sepulchre') of Jerusalem (22nd July 1099; William of Tyre, *op. cit.* ix. chs. 1–12). His overthrow of the Egyptians at Ascalon (12th Aug. 1099) was followed by the disaster of his death (18th July 1100). The two Baldwins, his brother and cousin, who succeeded him, slowly extended the limits of the kingdom (Tripoli, 1109; Tyre, 1124), which began to decline after 1143.

[1] For critical examination of this Council, see Röhricht, *Erst. Kreuz.* 235-9. For Urban's other Councils after Clermont, at which also he preached the Crusade, see *ib.* 22.

[2] On this incident, see Raymund of Agiles, 'Hist. Francorum,' in *Recueil*, iii.

At its widest extent, the four fiefs of the kingdom of Jerusalem were: (1) the principality of Jerusalem; (2) the county of Edessa, which fell to Baldwin the brother of Godfrey, who had detached himself from the main host for the purpose in 1097; (3) the principality of Antioch claimed by Bohemond, and always inclined to independence;[1] (4) the county of Tripoli.[2] The settlement of the kingdom on a feudal basis was marked by the gradual compilation (see Bury's Gibbon, vi. App. 16; Stubbs, *Itin. Reg. Ricard.*, Introd. p. xc) of that most interesting code of feudal customs, etc., the 'Assize of Jerusalem,'[3] as also by the foundation, for its defence, of the various orders of military knights (see below, p. 351).

LITERATURE.—The original sources for the First Crusade are to be found for the most part in the ponderous though incomplete *Recueil des historiens des croisades* [*Hist. occident.*], 5 vols. (Paris, 1844–95)—a collection which supersedes that of J. Bongars, *Gesta Dei per Francos* (Hanover, 1611), used by Gibbon. In vol. i. (1) there is a good Itinerary of the various Crusades, by S. Jacobs. Of the sources the following are the most important: (1) *Gesta Francorum*, by an unknown S. Italian knight who took part in the First Crusade. He deposited his book at Jerusalem, possibly in the Holy Sepulchre, where it was frequently consulted by other writers, of several of whom it forms the basis.[4] (2) **Guibert of Nogent** (b. 1053), *Gesta Dei per Francos*; almost entirely dependent on (1). Guibert was present at Clermont, and writes down to 1104.[5] (3) **Raymund of Agiles**, *Hist. Francorum qui ceperunt Jerusalem*; also dependent on (1): a narrative by a Provençal eyewitness.[6] (4) **Fulcher of Chartres**, *Hist. Hierosolymitana*; the only eye-witness of the events in Edessa; continues down to 1127; also depends on (1).[7] (5) **Baldric, Archbishop of Dol**, *Hist. Hierosolymitana*, written in 1108; entirely founded on (1).[8] (6) **Albert of Aachen**, *Hist. Hierosolymitana*—a vivid narrative of the First Crusade, written after 1120; really copied from an unknown crusader from Lorraine, together with use of (1).[9] (7) **Ralph of Caen**, *Gesta Tancredi*; a friend of Tancred, for whose exploits he is of great value.[10] (8) **Ekkehard of Aura**, near Kissingen (d. 1125), *Hierosolymita*. He went to Palestine in 1101, and was there about six weeks.[11] (9) **Cafaro di Caschifelone**, *de Liberatione civitatum Orientis*. The writer (b. 1080) went out in Aug. 1100, returning in July 1101 (see *Recueil*, v., Introd. p. xvii). It is of special value for Genoese matters up to 1109.[12] Other minor sources of no great historical value, including the poem of Gilo of Toucy and Foulk, *Viæ Ierosolymitanæ* (written *c.* 1125 [see *Recueil*, v., Introd. cxlv]) are ed. in *Recueil*, vol. v. (10) Of Greek writers, **Anna Comnena** (b. 1083), owing to her position as daughter of the Emperor Alexius, cannot be neglected, due account being paid to her bias.[13]

Of modern works dealing with the First Crusade (see also below) the first critical study was **H. v. Sybel**, *Gesch. des ersten Kreuzzugs*², Düsseldorf, 1881. Two German historians have since spent a lifetime in the preparation of a series of important monographs: **H. Hagenmeyer**, *Peter der Eremite*, Leipzig, 1879 (for First Crusade, see chs. 5 and 6), with a good 'Chronology' (1094-1100) in Appendix, and his *Die Kreuzzugs-*

[1] For its history, see E. G. Rey, 'Résumé chron. de la hist. d'Antioche,' in *Revue de l'orient latin*, iv. 321 ff., 1896.

[2] On the limits of these fiefs, see Jacobs, in *Recueil*, i. [1] Introd. ch. 2; or Lane-Poole, *Saladin*, New York, 1898, p. 26 f. For tables of kings, dynasties, rulers, etc., see Lane-Poole, *op. cit.*

[3] Best ed. by de Beugnot, 2 vols., 1841 and 1843; for a critique, see Gaston Dodu, *Hist. des institutions monarchiques dans le royaume latin de Jérusalem*, Paris, 1894.

[4] Best ed. by H. Hagenmeyer, Heidelberg, 1890, with introduction and notes; also in *Recueil*, iii. 121 ff.

[5] In *Recueil*, iv. 113–263.

[6] See C. Klein, *Raimund v. Aguilers* (Berlin, 1892), and v. Sybel, *Erst. Kreuz.* 15 ff. In *Recueil*, iii. 231–310; Migne, *PL* clv. 591–666.

[7] See v. Sybel, *op. cit.* 46 ff.; Hagenmeyer, *Gesta Franc.* p. 58 ff.; *Recueil*, iii. 311 ff., or Migne, *PL* clv. 826–942.

[8] See v. Sybel, *op. cit.* 35 ff.; *Recueil*, iv. 1–111.

[9] See Hagenmeyer, *op. cit.* 62–68, or B. Kugler, *Albert v. Aachen*, Stuttgart, 1885, who maintains his value as against v. Sybel's doubts; *Recueil*, iv. 265–713.

[10] *Recueil*, iii. 587–716; Migne, *PL* clv. 489–590, or Muratori, *Script. rer. Ital.* v. 285–333. On Ralph, see v. Sybel, *op. cit.* 54; Hagenmeyer, *op. cit.* 69.

[11] Best ed. by P. E. D. Riant, in *Recueil*, v. [1895] 1–40, or, separately, by H. Hagenmeyer (Tübingen, 1877), with valuable introduction. The ed. in Martène (*Ampliss. Collect.*, 1729, vol. v. coll. 513–35) is very defective, and that in Pertz by Waitz (*MGH* vi. 265 ff.) is scarcely complete. For many events Ekkehard is our only source (see *Recueil*, v., Pref. p. vii).

[12] *Recueil*, v. 48–73; or Pertz, *MGH* xviii. 40–8; or, separately, ed. by L. T. Belgrano, Rome, 1890.

[13] Of her *Alexias* (complete ed. in Migne, *PG* cxxxi.; or 2 vols. in *Corpus script. hist. Byz.* [Bonn, 1828–97]; or ed. Reifferscheid [Teubner], 1884), the books dealing with the First Crusade (x.–xiv.) are in the *Recueil des historiens des croisades* [*Historiens grecs*], i. 1–204 (2 vols., Paris, 1875, 1881, with Lat. paraphrase; the 2nd vol. contains annotations only).

briefe (1088–1100), Innsbruck, 1901, with complete bibliography of all minor sources, magazines, etc.; R. Röhricht, *Gesch. des erst. Kreuz.*, Innsbruck, 1901 (perhaps the best single work), and *Beiträge z. Gesch. d. Kreuz.*, 2 vols., Berlin, 1874, 1878. **P. E. D.** Riant must not be overlooked among those who have done good work (cf. *Recueil*, v.). His *Invent. crit. des lettres (768–1100)*, Paris, 1880, is of value for advanced work.

2. Second Crusade.—For many years the Latin kingdom had been threatened by the growing power of the Atabeg amir of Mosul, 'Imād-al-Dīn Zengi, or Zanghis, twisted by the Latins into *Sanguineus* (1127–14th Sept. 1146),[1] to whom must be attributed the first stemming of the tide of Latin conquest. His capture and massacre of Edessa (25th Dec. 1144)[2] was followed by the successes of his great son, Nūr-al-Dīn Maḥmūd. The fall of Edessa aroused the West, chiefly through the preaching of St. Bernard (see art. BERNARD, vol. ii. p. 530), first at Vézelay before Louis VII. (31st March 1146), then later in the Rhine valley,[3] where the persecution of the Jews which usually attended a Crusade had broken out. As a result of his meeting with Bernard at Spires (27th Dec. 1146), the Emperor Conrad III., with reluctance, took the cross (E. Vacandard, *S. Bernard*, Paris, 1895, ii. 288 ff.). Conrad started from Bamberg (May 1147) by the overland route, with about 100,000 followers, including many women, and, after a disorderly journey, reached Constantinople, followed closely by Louis, who set out from Metz (11th June 1147). An attempt of Conrad to push on was followed by the loss of 30,000 Germans, and he was forced back upon Nicæa to await Louis. From there the armies marched, though in two divisions, to Ephesus, whence the wounded Conrad returned, after Christmas, to winter at Constantinople. Louis, however, and a part of the Germans under Otto of Freising, continued their march. Otto's force was cut to pieces near Laodicea, and Louis was disastrously defeated in the defiles of Phrygia (Odo, *op. cit.* vi.: a remarkable story), but managed with diminished forces to reach Antioch (19th March 1148). Meanwhile Conrad set sail from Constantinople (10th March 1148), and reached Acre in April. The two armies mustered at Palma, near Acre (24th June 1148). But the attack on Damascus failed (Bernhardi, *op. cit.* 563–78), and Conrad sailed home (8th Sept. 1148), followed by Louis (Easter, 1149). Bernard and Suger thereupon planned a second expedition, and at a Council at Chartres (7th May 1150)[4] Bernard was actually elected commander-in-chief—an office which he refused (Bernard, *Ep.* 256). The miserable termination of the crusade led to a reaction of anger against St. Bernard (*de Consid.* ii. 1). As an important episode in the Crusade we may note the undesigned conquest, by an English fleet, of Lisbon from the Moors (Bernhardi, *op. cit.* 579–90).

LITERATURE.—For the Second Crusade the chief sources, in addition to William of Tyre (see below), are Odo de Diogilo (Deuil), *de Profectione Lud. VII.* (in Migne, *PL* clxxxv. 1205 ff.), and two anonymous writers, *Gesta Lud. VII.* and the *Hist. gloriosi Lud.*[5] For Conrad, see Otto of Freising, *de Gest. Frid.* i. 34–39, 43–45, 58–59 [in Pertz, *MGH* xx.]. Of Greek writers, Nicetas Acominatos continues the work of Anna Comnena from 1118–1206 with more fairness (see *Recueil* [*Hist. grecs*], Paris, 1875). Of modern works, B. Kugler, *Analekten z. Gesch. des zweit. Kreuz.*, Tübingen, 1878, 1885, and *Neue Analekten*, Tübingen, 1885; **W. Bernhardi**, *Conrad III.*, 2 vols., Leipzig, 1883 (esp. pp. 561–684).

3. Third Crusade.—In 1164 and 1167 the Turkish amir Shiracouah (Asad al-Dīn Abū-l-Ḥārith Shīrkūh) attacked the Fāṭimids of Egypt and their Frank allies. But the treacherous designs of the advisers of Amalric of Jerusalem (1162–73) to seize Egypt led the Fāṭimids to turn to the Turks for help. After the burning of Cairo (*i.e.* Fustat, 12th Nov. 1168), Amalric was forced to return; but Saladin, at the command of Nūr-al-Dīn, destroyed the Fāṭimid dynasty (Sept. 1171), restoring Egypt to the allegiance of the 'Abbāsid Khalifs of Baghdad (William of Tyre, xix. 5–7, 12–31, xx. 5–12). On the death of Shiracouah (23rd March 1169), his nephew the Kurd Saladin (Salāh-al-Dīn: b. 1137) without delay (26th March) was recognized as his successor as vizier of Egypt. The disunion due to the death of the Sultan Nūr-al-Dīn (15th May 1174) was not taken advantage of by the Latins, who allowed Saladin to extend and consolidate his dominions (Syria, 1174–6). The inglorious expedition of Philip of Flanders (Aug. 1177–Easter 1178), and the great defeat of Saladin at Ramleh by 375 knights under Reginald of Châtillon (25th Nov. 1177), led in 1180 to a truce for two years. The violation of the truce by Reginald of Châtillon's seizure of Karak, and subsequent plunder of Arab caravans (1179, 1182, 1186), and the rapid decay of the kingdom of Jerusalem through dissensions, finally issued in a determined attack by Saladin, whose soldiers were now trained in Frank methods. His great victory at Tiberias or Hattîn (4th July 1187) was followed by the siege (20th Sept.) and capitulation of Jerusalem on 2nd Oct. 1187.[1] Saladin's siege of Tyre (Nov. and Dec. 1187) was thwarted by Conrad of Montferrat, but the rest of the country was overrun, and a conditional promise was made of the surrender of Antioch if not relieved within seven months.

Meanwhile Europe once more armed, being terrified by the tidings which reached it (end of Oct. 1187 [Girald. Camb. *de Princ. Instr.* 239]) of the loss of Jerusalem. The first to move was the great Emperor, Frederick Barbarossa, who as a young man had taken part in the Second Crusade. Starting from Regensburg (11th May 1189), Frederick crossed Hungary and Bulgaria, and wintered at Adrianople, sore harassed, as usual, by the treachery of the Greeks. Soon after Easter 1190 he crossed the Bosporus, avoiding Constantinople, and struggled through the deserts of Cilicia. On the death, by drowning, of the great Emperor (10th June 1190) in the Saleph (Geuk Su or Calycadnus, *Itin. Ric.* 55), the Germans made their way, in part, to Antioch (June 21st), in part to Tripoli.

LITERATURE.—For this expedition we have the narrative of two spectators: Tageno of Passau, *Descript. Expedit. Frid. I.* (in M. Freher, *Germ. Rer. Script.* i. 406–16, ed. Struv, Strassburg, 1717), and the anonymous *Exped. Asiatica Frid. I.* (in Canisius, *Lect. Antiq.* iii. (2) pp. 498–526, ed. J. Basnage [Amsterdam, 1725]). For modern works, see **A. Chroust**, *Tageno, Ansbert, und d. Hist. Peregrinorum*, Graz, 1892.

Richard of England (Nov. 1187) and Philip Augustus of France (Jan. 1188) had been the first to take the cross. But, owing to their quarrels, they did not start from Vézelay until June 1190. They journeyed together to Marseilles, and by separate fleets (Genoese and English) to Messina (23rd Sept.), where they wintered. Sailing in the spring, and on the way conquering Cyprus in a fortnight (*Itin. Ric.* 183 ff.), Richard arrived at Acre (8th June 1191), which Guy de Lusignan had sat down to besiege (28th Aug. 1189) and Saladin to defend, both sides passing through the extremes of pestilence and famine. Richard had been preceded by Philip (20th Apr.), and on 3rd July a united assault was made on the town, which surrendered on the 12th of the same month. The quarrels of Philip and Richard were, however,

[1] For life, see Lane-Poole, *Saladin*, chs. 3 and 4, and J. F. Michaud, *Bib. des croisades* (Paris, 1829), iv. 78 ff.

[2] For date, see Bernhardi, *Conrad III.* 513 n.; William of Tyre, *op. cit.* xvi. 4.

[3] Odo of Deuil, *op. cit.* i. 1; Bouquet, *Recueil*, xii. 91.

[4] For this Council, which Mabillon, Baronius, and others put in 1146, thus leading to grave error, repeated in most writers, see E. Vacandard, *S. Bernard*, ii. 430 ff.

[5] A. Duchesne, *Hist. Franc. Script.*, Paris, 1641, iv. 390 ff.; or, better, ed. by A. Molinier, under the title *Vie de Louis le Gros*, Paris, 1887 (written 1153 and 1172).

[1] See Ernoul, in *L'Estoire de Eracles*, xxiii. 55 ff. (*Recueil*, ii. 82 ff.), for interesting narration. For the events of the years 1187–9, see R. Röhricht, *Beiträge z. Gesch. d. Kreuz.* i. 115–208.

disastrous, and, on 31st July, Philip set sail home. Richard with 100,000 men marched down the coast to Jaffa, protected by his fleet, and on 7th Sept. inflicted at Arsuf a great defeat upon Saladin (good narrative in *Itin. Ric.* p. 259). After six weeks' delay in re-fortifying Jaffa, Richard twice marched within sight of Jerusalem (Jan. and June 1192), but was forced to fall back on Ascalon. Dissensions, treason, luxury, and immorality (cf. *Itin. Ric.* pp. 284–5) among the crusaders, and trouble at home (*ib.* p. 334), led Richard to come to terms with Saladin (2nd Sept.). The Christians were to retain the coast from Tyre to Jaffa, and to have free access to the Holy Sepulchre. On 9th Oct. 1192, Richard left Palestine. Such small successes as this Crusade had accomplished were wholly due to his marvellous skill and daring (of the latter the most remarkable illustration is in Ralph Coggeshall, *Chron.*, Rolls Ser. 1875, pp. 41–51). On the death of Saladin at Damascus (4th March 1193) his dominions were divided, and the Christians obtained a respite, a great victory being won by German crusaders in 1197, which led to the recovery of the coast towns.

LITERATURE.—For Richard's Crusade the following are the chief sources. (1) The anonymous *Itin. Regis Ricardi* (ed. by W. Stubbs, with valuable Introd. in Rolls Ser. 1864). The old ascription (due to Gale's ed. 1687) to Geoffrey Vinsauf is incorrect. Stubbs (Introd. *op. cit.* xli ff.) advocates the authorship of Richard, a canon of the Holy Trinity in Aldgate, by whom it was published 1200–20 (*ib.* p. lxx). It is now generally agreed (in spite of Stubbs, *l.c.* p. lviii) that it is a free Latin translation of a French poem of a Norman knight called Ambroise, the minstrel of Richard (ed. by F. Liebermann and R. Pauli in Pertz, *MGH* xxvii. [1885] 532 ff., also ed. Gaston Paris, *L'Estoire de la guerre sainte*, 1897; the poem was discovered in 1873). (2) Sundry references in the *Chronicles* of Roger Hoveden (ed. Stubbs, in Rolls Ser., 4 vols. 1868–71);[1] Matthew of Paris (ed. H. R. Luard in Rolls Ser., 7 vols. 1872–83); and Ralph de Diceto (ed. Stubbs in Rolls Ser., 2 vols. 1876).[1] (3) Two contemporary narratives: the anonymous *Libellus de expugnatione Terræ Sanctæ* (printed, with the *Chronicle* of Ralph Coggeshall, in Rolls Ser., ed. J. Stevenson, 1875, p. 209 ff.; also in Martène (*Ampliss. Coll.* v. 544, 1729),[1] and the crusader's journal (Stubbs, *Itin. Ric.*, Introd. p. xxxviii) in Benedict of Peterborough's *Gesta Henrici II. et Ric. I.*[1] (ed. Stubbs, in Rolls Ser. 1867).[2] (4) The great Arabic work of Bohadin (Bahā-al-Dīn, b. 1145, d. 1234), the friend of Saladin (ed. with French tr. under title 'La Vie du Sultan Youssof' (*i.e.* Saladin), in *Recueil des hist. des croisades* [*Hist. orient.*] iii. [Paris, 1884]; also ed. Schultens, Leyden, 1732). The tr. of C. W. Wilson, published by the Palestine Pilgrims Text Society (London, 1897), is said by Lane-Poole to be unscholarly.[3] Of modern works, S. Lane-Poole, *Saladin*, New York, 1898, is of special value. Lane-Poole speaks in high terms of F. L. C. Marin's *Hist. de Saladin*, 2 vols., Paris, 1758. G. L. Schlumberger, *Renaud de Châtillon*, Paris, 1898, may also be consulted.

4. Fourth Crusade.—As the so-called Fourth Crusade, in spite of Innocent III.'s intention, never became a Crusade at all, but simply a successful attempt by the Latins to seize Constantinople and the Eastern Empire, for our present purpose it may be dismissed. Note should, however, be taken of the ancient hatred thus accentuated between Greek and Latin; of the evidence the Crusade affords of the fatal dissension between the Eastern and Western Churches, the existence of which was one great cause of the failure of the Crusades (cf. below, p. 350b); of the indifference of the great trading towns of Italy, especially Venice, to all motives except gain; and of the terrible weakening in powers of defence of Constantinople which the Latin conquest and pillage (12th–13th Apr. 1204) and subsequent Latin rule (1204–61) produced.

From the first, the Crusade, which Innocent III. had preached immediately on his accession, was betrayed by Venice, which had agreed to provide sea-power (March 1201). The ostensible object was Egypt, the centre of Muslim power; but, while the crusaders were assembling at Venice, the Republic concluded a treaty with the Sultan of Egypt (13th May 1202)[1] to divert the Crusade, in return for valuable commercial privileges in Alexandria and Jerusalem (see Bury's Gibbon, vi. 385 n., 528). The price the Republic wrung out of the crusaders was four marks a horse, two per man, or £180,000 (Pears, *Fall of Constantinople*, p. 234). As they had nothing wherewith to pay, the crusaders were then disgracefully used by the doge Henry Dandolo, and Boniface of Montferrat, for their own purposes. Until recent investigations, historians, including Gibbon, were successfully misled by the official narrative of Villehardouin, who seems himself to have been in the plot.

LITERATURE.—Of G. de Villehardouin, *Conquête de Constant.*, the best editions are by N. de Wailly, 3rd ed. (1882), who still maintains V.'s candour, and E. Bouchet, 2 vols., Paris, 1891. Other sources are (1) Gunther's *Historia* (ed. P. E. D. Riant, 1875; also in Canisius, *Antiq. Lect.* iv.); (2) the eye-witness Robert de Clary, *Li estoires de chiaus qui conq. Const.* (MS privately published by P. E. D. Riant in 1868; ed. by Ch. Hopf, *Chron. græco-rom.*, Berlin, 1873, p. 1 ff.); (3) the anonymous *Devastatio Constant.* (another recent discovery; ed. in Pertz, *MGH* xvi., and, better, in Hopf, *op. cit.* p. 86 ff.). Of modern writers, E. Pears, *Fall of Constantinople*, London, 1885, should be specially studied for its clear survey; see also G. Finlay, *History of Greece from its Conquest by the Crusaders*, etc., Edinburgh, 1851.

5. Fifth Crusade.—At the Lateran Council (Nov. 1215), Innocent III. unfolded his plans for a new Crusade. The cross was taken, among others, by Andrew II. of Hungary, who arrived at Acre (1217), but accomplished nothing. In May 1218 some Northern crusaders under John de Brienne sailed from Acre to Damietta. After a siege of seventeen months, Damietta was captured (5th Nov. 1219); but, owing to discord, was lost again (8th Sept. 1221).

At his coronation in Rome (Dec. 1220), and on his marriage with Yolande of Jerusalem (Nov. 1225), Frederick II., 'the wonder of the world,' had taken the crusaders' oath. Finally, after excommunication for delay by Gregory IX., Frederick landed at Acre with only 600 knights (7th Sept. 1228); but, owing to his excommunication, the Military Orders refused to serve under him. By treaty, however, with the Sultan al-Kāmil Muhammad (1218–38), but chiefly through the dissensions of the Turks, Frederick obtained (24th Feb. 1229) the cession of Jerusalem (save the Temple), Bethlehem, and Nazareth; and on 18th March 1229 crowned himself in Jerusalem. Hearing that in his absence Gregory IX. had instituted a Crusade against him, Frederick returned from Acre and landed at Brindisi (10th June 1229).

In August 1239, on the appeal of Gregory IX., an abortive French Crusade, under Theobald, king of Navarre, set sail from Marseilles; followed (June 1240) by Richard, earl of Cornwall, who had taken the cross at Winchester (June 1236), and Simon de Montfort. Richard reached Acre on 11th Oct. (Matt. Paris, iv. 71), and by purchase secured the release of many captives (*ib.* iv. 141–3). Nothing, however, was accomplished, and on 3rd May 1241 he returned home (*ib.* iv. 144). In 1243, by negotiation, Jerusalem was once more restored. But the calling in of the Charismians (an Eastern tribe driven from their homes by Genghis Khan) as allies by the Sultan of Egypt led to the annihilation of the Templars and Hospitallers at Gaza (14th Oct. 1244), the sack of Jerusalem, and the massacre of 30,000 of its inhabitants.

LITERATURE.—For the Fifth Crusade, in addition to Ernoul, we have as special sources: (1) James of Vitry, *Hist. Hierosolymitana* (in Bongars, *Gesta Dei*, i. 1047 ff.),[2] who was an eye-witness of the siege of Damietta (see his *Epistola de capta Damiata* [ed. J. Gretser in his *Hortus S. Crucis*, Ingolstadt,

[1] For the Crusades these works can also be read in the convenient ed. by F. Liebermann and R. Pauli, in Pertz, *MGH* xxvii. (1885).

[2] The above have been extracted and translated by T. A. Archer, *Crusade of Richard I.*, London, 1888 (in 'Eng. Hist. by Contemp. Writers' series).

[3] Bohadin's panegyric can be corrected by the works of Ibn-al-Athir (1160–1233), *History of the Atabegs* (the enemies of Saladin) and *Al-Kāmil, or the Perfection of History* (both in *Recueil* [*Hist. orient.*], vols. i. ii., Paris, 1872–87).

[1] The treaty is hinted at by Ernoul (*Recueil*, ii. 250).

[2] There is an Eng. tr. by A. Stewart, London, 1896.

1610, or in his *Op. Omn.*, vol. 3, Regensburg, 1734]); and the continuation of William of Tyre by Bernard the Treasurer (see below, p. 351b). (2) *The Gesta obsidionis Damiatæ* (Muratori, *Rerum Ital. Script.* viii. 1084 f.). (3) *de Quinto bello Sacro Testimonia Minora* (ed. R. Rohricht, Geneva, 1882, for Soc. de l'orient lat.). This work contains a most useful collection of all the smaller Belgian, English, French (including Ernoul), German, Italian, Scandinavian, and Spanish sources; also *Quinti belli Sacri Script. Min.* (ed. R. Röhricht, Geneva, 1879–82, for the same Society). (4) For Frederick II. we have Richard de S. Germano, *Chron.* (1189–1243), in Muratori, *op. cit.* vii. 1002–13; Pertz, *MGH* xix. 323 ff. Of modern writers, for the Crusade of Andrew and the capture of Damietta, see R. Röhricht, *Studien zur Gesch. d. fünften Kreuz.*, Innsbruck, 1891, ch. 2. For Frederick II., Röhricht, *Die Kreuzfahrt Fr. II.*, Berlin, 1872 (printed also in his *Beiträge z. Gesch. d. Kreuz.*, 1874).

6. Sixth Crusade.—The fall of Jerusalem before the Charismians led St. Louis IX. to take the cross. He sailed from Aigues-Mortes (25th Aug. 1248) with 1800 ships and at least 50,000 men, wintered in Cyprus, and reached (5th June) Damietta, which the Saracens abandoned. After six months' delay the French pushed on towards Cairo, but were almost annihilated (8th Feb. 1250) at Mansurah (see Oman, *op. cit.* 338–50). Compelled to retreat, Louis was captured (15th Apr.–6th May 1250), but secured his freedom from the Mamluks by a ransom of 400,000 livres and the surrender of Damietta. After four years in Palestine, spent in the fortification of the seaports, Louis departed without having reached Jerusalem, arriving home 11th July 1154.

LITERATURE.—For this Crusade, see the narrative of the eye-witness J. de Joinville, *Hist. de S. Louys IX.* (most convenient ed. is that of Natalis de Wailly with Fr. tr. [1868, 1874], or the Paris ed. of 1761); E. J. Davis, *Invasion of Egypt in 1247* (1897), is a good modern account.

7. Seventh Crusade.—In 1263 the sultan Bibars (Baybars al-Bundukdārī) of Egypt began the systematic conquest of Palestine (Arsuf [1265], Safed [1266], Jaffa [1268], and Antioch [12th June 1268]). In July 1270, Louis IX., provoked by the loss of Antioch, set off from Aigues-Mortes with 36,000 troops, but was induced to turn aside to Tunis, in the siege of which he died (25th Aug. 1270). Edward of England (afterwards Edward I.) reached Tunis (9th Oct.), and, after wintering there, reached Acre (9th May 1271) just in time to save the city from the Muslims. Owing to his father's failing health, Edward was driven to patch up a ten years' truce, and return (14th Sept. 1272). Throughout his life he, however, cherished the hope of further Crusades. Meanwhile the growing quarrels of the Military Orders, and the rivalry of Genoese, Venetians, and Pisans, led to renewed disasters, in the strip of the Latin kingdom still left—by the capture of Tripoli (1289), and finally of Acre (18th May 1291), when the massacre of 60,000 Christians closed 'the World's Debate.'

In a sense the Crusades, as the struggle of Muslim and Christian, may be said to have been continued by the slow conquest of Spain from the Moors, by the war of Sigismund with the Turks (1396), by Muhammad II.'s capture of Constantinople (1453), by the great naval victory of Don John at Lepanto (1571), and that of John Sobieski at Vienna (Sept. 1683). But all motive of rescue of the Holy Sepulchre, etc., was now lost, and the sole idea was political—to roll back the invasion of the Turks from Europe.

LITERATURE.—For the Seventh Crusade, the expedition of St. Louis is in William de Nangis (ed. H. Géraud, 2 vols., Paris, 1843). For Edward we have T. Wykes in *Annales Monastici* ([Rolls Ser.] ed. Luard, vol. iv., 1869); and the *Chronicon* of Walter Gisburn or Hemingburgh (ed. H. C. Hamilton, 1848, vol. i. pp. 329–37). For the final siege of Acre the anonymous *de Excidio urbis Acconis*, in Martène, *Ampliss. Collect.* v. 757–84; and Abū-l-Fidā's account in *Recueil* [*Hist. or.*] vol. i.

III. *CAUSES OF FAILURE OF THE CRUSADES.*—**1. Lack of sea-power.**—This applied especially to the early Crusades. The long march overland from Germany or France through Hungary, the Eastern Empire, then across the deserts and mountains of Asia Minor, would have tried the ability of Alexander or Napoleon at the head of their seasoned legions. It was fatal to Godfrey of Bouillon and Louis VII. and, of course, to the undisciplined thousands who followed Walter the Penniless.[1] With sea-power, Barbarossa might have won. On the field of battle the crusaders were irresistible. But entangled among mountains and deserts their numbers became their ruin. The lack of sea-power, the possession of which would have led to success, was the effect of a still deeper cause. Sea-power in the Mediterranean was in the hands of the Greeks, or of the cities of Italy—Venice, Genoa, and Pisa. Of these, Venice, once the subject, was now the ally of Constantinople (see Bury's note, Gibbon, vi. 381), and Genoa was chiefly intent on guarding its trade with the Crimea. The sea-power of England and North Europe was used advantageously at Jaffa in 1102 and 1107, but was not available for the transport of the Continental crusaders. After the First Crusade the West woke up to the advantage of a sea-power. But the Greek Empire had now become bitterly antagonistic to all Crusades (see below, § 2), and so sea-power was denied by the Greeks and Venetians, except on exorbitant terms (cf. above, 'Fourth Crusade').

2. The division of Christendom.—But the chief cause of failure was undoubtedly the disunion of the crusaders, and the deep hatred between the Greek and Latin Churches. A united Christendom would have been invincible: it recoiled broken and dispirited by its own divisions. The disunion was of a double nature—national and religious. Of the national dissensions the Third Crusade will serve as an example; or, better, the fact that at Acre, when it fell, there were no fewer than seventeen independent commands. From the first the Crusades were a French rather than a German movement; and the Germans—the Empire, in fact—in consequence did little. Of the religious dissensions—largely also national—the antagonism between the Greek and Latin Churches and Empires was even more fatal. The Greeks after the First Crusade rarely did anything to assist the Crusaders, and often secretly thwarted them.

3. The bad organization of the Latin kingdom.—The conquests achieved by the First Crusade were organized on a feudal basis. Latin in character, by over-taxation and intolerance it hopelessly estranged the natives (H. G. Prutz, *Kulturgesch. d. Kreuzzüge*, p. 167), especially the native Churches (Nestorians, etc.). There is some evidence that Jerusalem was betrayed to Saladin by Christian Melchites (*Recueil*, ii. 85 n.). One result of the feudal system, when worked in connexion with a country of enervating climate and constant warfare, was the number of heiresses, and, in consequence, of disputed and changing successions.[2] The only sound element in the country in this matter was the organization of the Military Orders, with their constant succession of new blood from Europe.

IV. *RESULTS OF THE CRUSADES.*—**1. Political.**—The immediate political effects have been dealt with under the several Crusades. Other consequences were:

(1) *Increased importance of the Papacy*, as the embodiment of the unity of Christendom, and the leader in the call to war, in spite of the fact that Urban II. in his summons left out those great ideas of military method and politico-ecclesiastical conquest upon which Gregory had impressed the stamp of his character. But the crusaders were the soldiers of the Pope, who alone could remit their vows. By the 'Saladin tax' a tenth of the revenues of the clergy were poured into the Papal coffers. The increased importance attached to

[1] Oman (*op. cit.* 233) points out the geographical ignorance shown in these land routes.

[2] See Stubbs, *Itin. Reg. Ric.*, Introd. pp. lxxxix–cxi, for a brilliant analysis of the causes of the fall of the Latin kingdom, and consequent failure of the Crusades.

indulgences through the Crusades, and the effect on the Papacy, must not be overlooked. How completely the Papacy was identified with the conception of Crusades is seen in the disastrous extension of the idea to all the wars engineered or encouraged by the Papacy against its enemies, *e.g.* the Albigenses; against Frederick II. and Manfred; or against the Hussites. In the long run this power of inaugurating a Crusade told by its misuse against the Papacy, and was one cause of its fall.

(2) *Weakness of the Eastern Empire.*—Unfortunately, one result of the Crusades, especially of the Third Crusade, was the weakening of Constantinople,—this altogether apart from the fatal Fourth Crusade,—and thus of the barrier of Europe against the Muslim (see Pears, *op. cit.* ch. 5). This result—the exact opposite of the intention—was the direct outcome of the religious feud between the Greek and Roman Churches.

(3) *Rise of the Military Orders.*—An important consequence was the foundation of the various Orders of military monks, whose influence and history overleap the narrow limits of the Crusades (see also HOSPITALITY [Christian], MONASTICISM). (*a*) Of these the oldest, the *Hospital of St. John of Jerusalem*, was in existence as a hospital for pilgrims at an early but unknown date.[1] On the institution of the Templars the hospital was turned into a Military Order. (*b*) The famous *Order of the Temple* was instituted about 1118. But its real start was not until Bernard at the Synod of Troyes (Jan. 1128) lent it his advocacy. To Bernard was assigned the composition of its Rule, the greater part of which, however, is by a later hand.[2] (*c*) The *Teutonic Order of Knights* was founded in 1190 at the siege of Acre. Its vast importance for European history by its conquest of Prussia from the heathen must not be forgotten. (*d*) There was a fourth Order, *Knights of St. Thomas of Acre*, of interest as almost purely English.[3]

2. Commercial and social.—(1) *Growth of liberty.*—The expenses of the crusaders led to the sale of estates, advowsons, town-rights, manorial rights, etc., to merchants, burgesses, and others; and so, to the growth of liberty. The sales to the Jews led by reaction to an outbreak against them (W. Cunningham, *Growth of Eng. Industry and Commerce*, vol. i. [5th ed., Cambridge, 1910] p. 205). In commerce we see the opening up of the East to the West (H. G. Prutz, *Kulturgesch. d. Kreuz.*), especially to Venice and Genoa (Cunningham, *op. cit.* 147, 198). As the monks did not go on crusade, the sales of estates ministered much to their wealth, and to that of the Church generally.

(2) *Introduction of Aristotle to Europe.*—The contact of East and West led James of Venice to bring back and translate (1124) the books of Aristotle, including the Physical Works, previously known only in imperfect translations. The effect of this was one of the causes of the rise of Scholasticism (see H. B. Workman, *Christian Thought to the Reformation*, London, 1911, ch. 9).[4]

3. Theological.—Through the realization of the sufferings of the Saviour—powerfully aided by the Crusades (cf. the Crusaders' Hymn, 'Salve, caput cruentatum')—the idea of the historical but dying Jesus was formed side by side with the growing mediæval conception of the sacramental and eternal Christ. 'The primitive Christian intuitions were restored. The sacred places stirred the imagination, and led it to the Christ of the Gospels' (Harnack, *Hist. Dogma*, Eng. tr. vi. [1899] 9).

[1] See Röhricht, *Erst. Kreuz.* 11 n. *Recueil*, v., Pref. cix., dates about 1060, from William of Tyre, xviii. 4 and 5. W. Heyd, *Gesch. d. Levantehandels im Mittelalter* (2 vols., Stuttgart, 1870, French tr. by F. M. Raynaud, Paris, 1885, i. 103–6), argues against the accepted view that it was founded by merchants of Amalfi (*Recueil*, v. 401).

[2] See Bouquet, *Recueil*, xiv. 232; Labbe, *Conc.* xxi. 360; *Op. Bernard.* ii. 543, in *PL* clxxxii. 919.

[3] For its history, see Stubbs, *Itin. Ric.*, Introd. p. cxii n.

[4] The influence of the Arab philosophers upon Western thought must not be put down to the Crusades, as it came through Spain.

LITERATURE.—*ORIGINAL SOURCES.*—The particular sources for the several Crusades have already been noted under each. It remains to add the more general works. The best work covering the whole period is William of Tyre (b. 1127), whose intimate acquaintance with Palestine was supplemented by a knowledge of Arabic. His *Hist. rerum in partibus transmarinis gestarum* (*Recueil* [*Hist. occid.*], i. [1844]) is one of the great works of mediæval history, and should be studied even by those who cannot afford time for research. Until recent years it was the basis of all histories dealing with the Crusades. Books i.–xv. (to 1144) are indebted to earlier writers, esp. Albert of Aachen; xvi.–xxiii. (to 1184) to his own observation. It was continued in French by Ernoul, who was present at the battle of Hattin and the capitulation of Jerusalem, down to 1229; by Bernard the Treasurer, down to 1231; and by anonymous writers, down to 1277 (see J. M. de Mas Latrie, *Chronique d'Ernoul et de Bernard le Trésorier* [Paris, 1871]; or A. P. Paris, *G. de Tyre et ses continuateurs*, 2 vols. [Paris, 1879–80]). The whole was translated into French before the publication of the continuation (de Beugnot, *Recueil* [*Hist. occid.*], i. pref. p. xxv) under the absurd title of *L'Estoire de Eracles Empereur* (*i.e.* Heraclius), the opening words of the *Historia*; in *Recueil*, vols. i. and ii. For the charters, etc., of the kingdom of Jerusalem, see R. Röhricht, *Regesta regni Hierosolymitani*, Innsbruck, 1893, 1904. Of the general Oriental sources, 'Ali-Ibn-al-Athir's (b. 1160) history from 1098–1190 will be found in *Recueil* [*Hist. or.*], i. 189 ff.

MODERN AUTHORITIES.—Special monographs, including the valuable works of Hagenmeyer and Röhricht, have been indicated under the several Crusades. Of general Histories the following may be noted: E. Gibbon (ed. Bury [new ed. in prep. 1911], with appendixes, corrections, and notes by S. Lane-Poole) is valuable for the First Crusade, poor for the others, and misleading for the Fourth, on which, however, when the main idea is corrected, he is full and good. The best summary for the general reader is T. A. Archer and C. L. Kingsford, *The Crusades*, London, 1894, but without notes. Complete surveys are found in Bernard Kugler, *Gesch. der Kreuzzüge*, Berlin, 1880, and L. Bréhier, *L'Eglise et l'orient au moyen âge*, Paris, 1907. The older F. Wilken, *Gesch. d. Kreuzzüge*, 7 vols., Leipzig, 1807–32, and J. F. Michaud, *Hist. des croisades*, 5 or 6 vols. (Paris, 1812–17, 1825–9: also new ed. Brussels, 1857, Eng. tr. in 3 vols. by W. Robson [1852]), may be neglected without much loss. For the kingdom of Jerusalem the most accurate account is in R. Röhricht, *Gesch. d. Konigreichs Jerus.*, Innsbruck, 1898. The reader may also consult C. R. Conder, *The Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem*, London, 1897; E. G. Rey, *Les Colonies franques de Syrie*, Paris, 1883 (social history, etc.). Military matters are dealt with in C. W. Oman, *Hist. of the Art of War*, London, 1898, bks. iv. and v.; the Greek view in G. Finlay, *Hist. of Greece*, 7 vols., ed. H. F. Tozer, Oxford, 1877, vols. ii.–iv. Guy le Strange, *Palestine under the Moslems*, London, 1890; S. Lane-Poole, *Moors in Spain*, London, 1897; H. G. Prutz, *Kulturgesch. d. Kreuzzüge*, Berlin, 1883 (in many points exaggerated), deal with important side-matters. For the Children's Crusade of 1212, reference may be made to G. Z. Gray, *Children's Crusade*, New York, 1898.

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CRYSTAL-GAZING.—'Crystal-gazing' is the current name for the attempt to provoke the appearance of visions by concentrating the gaze on any clear depth—a crystal, a glass ball, water in a vessel, water in a pond, a mirror, a piece of polished basalt, or anything of the kind. With certain subjects it suffices to stare into the darkness of a funnel; in fact, granting the faculty for being hallucinated in the course of gazing fixedly,—say at ink in the palm of the hand, or at ink in an ordinary inkstand—the details are unimportant. In practice the easiest method is to look steadily, for perhaps five minutes, at a glass or crystal ball laid on any dark surface, at the distance from the eyes of a book which the experimenter might be reading. If the gazer has the faculty, he usually sees a kind of mist or a milky obscurity cover the ball, which then seems to become clear and black; pictures then emerge. Sometimes the ball ceases to be present to the consciousness of the gazer, who feels as if he were beholding an actual scene. An Arabian author of the 14th cent., Ibn Khaldūn, describes the experience in similar terms.[1]

Any one who is fortunate enough to have the command of leisure and solitude for ten minutes on four or five occasions can discover whether or

[1] *Notices et Extraits des MSS de la Bibl. Nat.* xix. 221 f.; cf. A. Lang, *The Making of Religion*, Lond. 1898, p. 368 f.

not he or she has the faculty of seeing 'crystal visions.' The gaze should not be prolonged when the eyes begin to feel fatigued, or if a sense of somnolence appears to be approaching. Solitude is here recommended, because the mind, though it may follow any train of thought, is not the better, in the experiment, for the irresponsible chatter of the frivolous and talkative. In actual life, in the present writer's experience, it is very rare to find any person who has the leisure and the resolution to make *solitary* experiments of the duration of ten minutes on four or five occasions. None the less, in spite of the scarcity of time and the insistent demands of society, it is now admitted, even by a number of orthodox students of experimental psychology, that hallucinations of sight really are provoked in some sane and honourable and educated persons, by gazing into a clear depth. These people see 'crystal visions' representing persons, events, and places, known or unknown, familiar or unfamiliar, to the gazer, and not summoned up by any conscious attempt to 'visualize.'

This set of facts is quite as certainly authentic as the coloured visions of arithmetical figures, which, as Sir F. Galton has convinced science, arise before the 'mind's eye' of many persons on the mention of numbers. In both cases, so far, the 'visions' are attested only by the numbers and personal character of the 'seers.'

A third kind of visionary experience is perhaps less common than we might suppose. Many persons are unacquainted with *illusions hypnagogiques*—the bright and distinct views of faces, places, persons, and landscapes, usually unfamiliar, which flit before the closed eyes in moments between sleeping and waking. These pictures, like those of crystal vision, come unsummoned, and often represent persons or places which we do not remember ever to have seen. People who have no experience of those illusions are apt to disbelieve that other people have it. In short, all kinds of experiences—visions of numerals in the mind's eye, *illusions hypnagogiques*, and crystal visions—are 'automatisms,' and are not produced by the action of the conscious intelligence.

Before the experiments of the Society for Psychical Research, in the matter of crystal-gazing, were made (1890–1910), most persons of sense believed that the faculty for seeing such hallucinations was a mere fable of romance-writers, or a delusion of peasants. But, when many experiments had made it certain that the faculty is far from being very rare among members of both sexes, young or old, in all ranks and all degrees of education, attention was drawn to the use of crystal-gazing in many ages and lands as a form of divination. It was found that the pictures seen by the 'scryer,' or gazer, were supposed to be sent by spirits, and to indicate events distant in space or destined to occur in the future; or they revealed persons guilty of theft or other crimes. Thus crystal-gazing got a bad name, and was associated with invocation of evil spirits, and even now the average man or woman thinks crystal-gazing synonymous with divination. 'Tell me what horse will win the Derby,' says the average man, 'and if you succeed I'll believe that there is something in it.' Another criticism is, 'What is the use of it?' Savage peoples, almost everywhere, and the people of Greece, Rome, Egypt, the subjects of the Incas in South America, and the magicians of the Middle Ages and later thought they found 'the use of it' to be the gaining of knowledge not accessible by any normal means.

Thus, in Polynesia, when any object has been stolen, the priest, after praying, has a hole dug in the floor of the house and filled with water. Then he gazes into the water, over which the god is supposed to place the spirit of the thief. 'The image of the spirit . . . was, according to their account, reflected in the water, and being perceived by the priest, he named the individual, or the parties, who had committed the theft.'[1] Père Lejeune, S.J., found that among the American Indians of his flock (about 1660), the medicine-men made their patients gaze into deep water, and, if they saw in it visions of anything edible or medicinal, it was 'exhibited' and was supposed to do them good. Captain Bourke of the U.S. cavalry discovered that among the Apache Indians the medicine-men used quartz crystals, by looking into which they could see everything they wanted to see.[2] Among the Iroquois the phantasm of the person who has bewitched another is looked for in a gourd full of water, in which a crystal is placed.[3] The Huilleche of South America gaze 'into a smooth slab of black stone.'[4] In the 17th cent. the people of Madagascar divined by gazing on crystals, and according to de Flacourt divined successfully.[5] The Zulus and the shamans of Siberia gaze into vessels full of water.[6] The Inca king Yupanqui used a crystal.[7] Australian savages use crystals or polished stones.[8] The Romans used water in a vessel of glass.[9] In Egypt and in India ink is used, whether in a black spot on a piece of paper or in a drop in the palm of the hand. Examples of mediæval and modern practice are collected by 'Miss X.' (Miss Goodrich Freer) in *Proc. of Soc. for Psychical Research*, v. 486.

It is manifest, then, that the production of visual hallucinations by various modes of crystal-gazing is of world-wide diffusion and unknown antiquity; and that the 'use' of the practice has been the discovery of knowledge not otherwise accessible, though knowledge of the future has not perhaps been much sought in this fashion, except in modern Europe, and in a well-known anecdote of the Régent d'Orléans told by Saint Simon.

Miss Goodrich Freer, in her essay already cited, was (after W. Gregory [*Animal Magnetism*, London, 1851], and H. Mayo [*Truths in Popular Superstitions*, Frankfort, 1849]) the first author to examine seriously the question of crystal-gazing. She herself possesses the faculty, and she analyzed the phenomena in her own experience. She found that the visions represented (1) lost memories which thus arose into her upper consciousness; (2) ideas or images which might or might not be present to her normal consciousness; (3) visions, possibly telepathic or clairvoyant, implying acquisition of knowledge 'by supernatural means.' The examples of this last class which the author gave were not very striking; but the present writer has known her to be much more successful.

It has been the writer's fortune to meet a large number of very normal persons of both sexes, and often of high intelligence and education, who, on making experiments in a subject entirely new to them, exhibited the faculty in various degrees. In its lowest form figures of persons and objects were seen in black and white; not in the colours of nature. Letters in the printed Roman alphabet were also seen. A higher form of the faculty is the beholding of figures in the costumes of various nations, engaged in various ways, some of them romantic; in other cases they appear to represent some unknown incident in history. Personages known or unknown to the gazer very frequently occur. The figures, wearing the colours of nature, move about in a free natural way, and often remain long in view, even when the crystal, after being laid down, has been taken up again. In some well-attested cases two persons see the same crystal vision simultaneously, or one after the other. But, in the second category, the writer has only once known the vision—novel to the gazer—to be fitted later with a real objective counterpart, discovered

1 W. Ellis, *Polynesian Researches*, London, 1830, ii. 240.
2 J. G. Bourke, 'Medicine-men of the Apache,' *9 RBEW* (1892), p. 461.
3 E. A. Smith, 'Myths of the Iroquois,' *2 RBEW* (1883), p. 68 f.
4 R. Fitzroy, *Narrative of Voyages of H.M.S. Adventure*, London, 1839, ii. 384.
5 E. de Flacourt, *Hist. de Madagascar*, Paris, 1661, ch. 76.
6 H. Callaway, *Religious System of the Amazulu*, London, 1868, p. 341; *JAI* xxiv. (1894) 155, citing Rychkov, *Zhurnal*, p. 86.
7 Cristoval de Molina, *Rites and Laws of the Yncas*, ed. and tr. Markham, Hakluyt Soc. 1873, p. 12.
8 A. Lang, *The Making of Religion*, p. 90; K. Langloh Parker, *The Euahlayi Tribe*, London, 1905.
9 Varro, in Aug. *de Civ. Dei*, vii. 35.

accidentally. What he saw actually existed in all its details, unknown to him and to the writer, who was looking on at the experiment, made in his smoking-room. In 1897, the writer met at St. Andrews a young lady who was visiting the place for the first time and who had never heard of crystal-gazing. Being presented with a glass ball, she made a number of experiments. The method was that any one who pleased (and all were but very recent acquaintances of the gazer) thought of anything or anybody that he or she chose. The lady then looked into the glass ball and described what she saw. A dozen cases of her success (which included seeing persons unheard of by her, in places unknown to her, persons dressed and occupied as inquiry proved that they had been clad and engaged at, or shortly before, the hour of the experiments) are published in the writer's *The Making of Religion*, pp. 90–112, from signed and attested records. Many other successful cases are known to the writer, and, during the course of the experiments already mentioned, it very rarely occurred that the gazer saw nothing, or something not consciously present either to the sitter's mind, or—what is more curious—to the mind of a sceptical looker-on, not the sitter. If telepathy be the cause of such occurrences, they illustrate the casual and incalculable quality of that agency. For example, in some experiments a lady in the south of England was to try to send impressions to a gazer, who had never heard of her, in the north of Scotland. The message, of a very simple kind, did not arrive; what arrived was a vivid picture of certain singular incidents of a private nature which had much impressed the distant communicator, but which she had no intention of transmitting. As fortuitous coincidence could not explain so many successes in the experiments of 1897—the crystal pictures being full of minute details—the writer was reduced to supposing that some unascertained cause, going sometimes beyond telepathy as usually defined, was at work. Many other curious examples of the possession of the faculty, apparently accompanied by telepathy, have occurred in experiments by friends and kinsfolk of the writer—healthy, normal men and women. The gazers have never shown any traces of drowsiness or dissociation, or even any tendency to form theories about their experiences, except in one instance, when experiment destroyed the theory.

In the writer's opinion experiments of the kind described are more trustworthy than investigations into the hallucinations of professional and trained female hysterical patients in French hospitals. Pierre Janet has published such experiments with professional neurotics at the Salpêtrière in his *Névroses et idées fixes* (Paris, 1898). His account of the experiences of Miss Goodrich Freer in her paper, already cited, is of the most fantastic character, as becomes manifest when her narrative is compared with the document which, in addition to his own imagination, is his source. In affairs of this sort few people who have not personal experience of unaccountable successes can be expected to believe in them; while few who have been present at such successes, and have had their own thoughts read (of course without physical contact —'muscle-reading'—between the sitter and the crystal-gazer), can persist in scepticism. It is plain that in most countries and ages crystal-gazing in one form or another has been practised, and successes would greatly increase the hold of priest, or witch, or medicine-man, over his patrons. Fraud would doubtless be used wherever it was possible; knowledge normally acquired would be presented as of supernatural origin. When fraud is excluded, successful crystal-gazing offers a problem even more difficult than success with other automatisms such as the so-called 'divining-rod' and the tilting table. These automatisms appear to present to the normal consciousness knowledge within the range of the sub-conscious mind, though we cannot tell how the sub-conscious mind in many cases obtains its information.

LITERATURE.—As this subject has attracted attention only in recent years, the literature of it is very scanty, and most of it has been cited by Miss Goodrich Freer (as 'Miss X.') in *Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research*, vol. v. pp. 486, 521, vol. viii. pp. 458–535, 259, 276; reference should also be made to A. Lang, *The Making of Religion*, London, 1908, and later editions, pp. 90–113; N. W. Thomas, *Crystal Gazing, its History and Practice*, London, 1905; E. W. Lane, *Modern Egyptians*[5], London, 1860; *Quarterly Review*, vol. lix.; L. de Laborde, *Commentaire*, Paris, 1841; F. W. H. Myers, *Human Personality*, London, 1903.

ANDREW LANG.

CÚCHULAINN CYCLE.—1. Cúchulainn, the chief hero of the Ulster cycle of romance, is regarded as a re-incarnation, or *avatār*, of Lug Lamhfada, 'the long-handed,' the solar deity of the ancient Irish; he is considered in his birth-stories sometimes as son of Lug, sometimes as Lug himself re-born. His mother was Dechtire, sister of king Conor (Conchobhar) of Ulster; she and fifty young maidens, her companions, were transformed into a flock of birds who disappeared for three years from the king's court, and were found in the neighbourhood of Brugh on the Boyne, where are tumuli traditionally believed to be the burial-places of the Tuatha Dé Danann deities. Here Dechtire gave birth to a babe; in one version of the tale it is revealed to Dechtire by Lug that he himself is her little child (*i.e.* that the child is a re-incarnation of himself); in another, Lug is the noble young warrior whom she has espoused.

The idea of re-incarnation is not unfamiliar in Irish literature. In the tale called 'The Wooing of Emer' it is stated that the men of Ulster wished to provide a wife for Cúchulainn, 'knowing that his re-birth would be of himself,' *i.e.* that only from himself could another such as he have origin; and in the tale of 'The Generation of the Swineherds,' which explains the origin of the Bulls who take part in the great mythological warfare of the *Táin Bó Cúalnge*, we find that these prodigious kine have gone through a series of incarnations before their final appearance as bulls.

Throughout his career, Cúchulainn is watched over by his divine kinsman, Lug, and he points proudly to his connexion with Lug when questioned as to his origin. He has also a father, Sualtach or Sualtam (variously spelt Soaltainn, Soalta, etc.), to whom, according to one of the birth-stories, Dechtire is married by king Conor after her connexion with Lug. The stories are much confused, and there are suggestions in one of them of an incestuous connexion between Dechtire and her brother the king himself. The child is named Setanta by Lug's command. Little is known of Sualtach; though usually regarded as a human being, he is more than once called in Old Irish literature Sualtach *sídhe* or Sualtach *sídhech*, i.e. 'Sualtach of the fairy haunts'; and he is spoken of as possessing through his mother, who was an elf woman, 'the magical might of an elf' (cf. *Book of Leinster* [*LL*], 58*a*, 24; Cóir Anmann, *Ir. Texte*, iii. sect. 282). Like all the personages of the cycle, he is clearly regarded as a mythological being. His name has become curiously mixed up with the genealogies of Fionn mac Cumhall (cf. Brit. Mus. MS Egerton, 1782, in which he appears as Fionn's grandfather). In the *Táin Bó Cúalnge* he comes to his son's aid when he is exhausted by the labours of the war, and arouses the hosts of Ulster to his assistance. He is there called 'Sualtach *or* Sualtam, son of Becaltach (Becfoltach) mac Moraltach, father of Cúchulainn mac Sualtach' (*LL* 93*a*). He was killed by falling accidentally upon the rim of his own shield.

Although Cúchulainn is the prime hero of Ulster, and his feats of heroism are performed and his wars undertaken in defence of that province, he is

nevertheless said (in MS Harl. 5280, fol. 53 B, Brit. Mus.) not to 'belong to Ulster'; and, when the whole of the male inhabitants of that province were overtaken by the physical weakness which recurred among them at intervals, and which seems to have been the result of some sort of *geis*, or 'tabu,' Cúchulainn and his father Sualtach were exempt and able to fight. Though usually and officially described as of splendid appearance and with ruddy and golden hair, Cúchulainn is sometimes spoken of as 'a dark sad man' ('Wooing of Emer' [*Arch. Rev.* i. 72]), or a 'little black-browed man' (*Mesca Ulad*, p. 29), which would not suggest descent from the Ultonians; in connexion with Cúchulainn's original name, Setanta, Rhys points out that there was a district between the Mersey and Morecambe Bay once inhabited by a people called Setantii, and refers to Ptolemy's mention (II. iii. 2) of a harbour of the Setantii, the position of which corresponds with the mouth of the Ribble (*Celt. Heath.* 455 and note). An obscure Irish poem relating to Cúchulainn alludes to a Setantian stream (*curoch fri sruth Setinti*, 'a coracle against the stream of Setanta') (*Leabhar na hUidhre* [*LU*] 125*b*).

2. Cúchulainn's precocity is abnormal; already at the age of seven years he performs his first feats, and can fight with and destroy warriors of renown; his lengthened war of the Táin Bó Cúalnge, sustained single-handed in defence of Ulster against the combined forces of Munster, Leinster, and Connaught, and continued during an entire winter, from before *Samhain*, or Hallowe'en (Oct. 31st), till after St. Bridget's Festival (Feb. 1), is represented as having taken place when the hero was only seventeen and still a beardless youth; and he is said to have died at the age of twenty-seven (*Ann. Tighernach*). Among his feats performed when he was a mere child is that from which he received his heroic title of Cúchulainn. *Cú* (gen. *Con*), 'hound,' was a title often bestowed to denote a hero of renown, in reference to the use of large hounds in battle and the bravery shown by them. Cúchulainn says of himself:

'I was a hound strong for combat,
I was a hound who visited the troops,
I was a hound to guard Emania.'

He received this name from his combat with a fierce dog, said to have been brought from Spain (gloss in *LU*), which guarded the fort of Culann, a smith of Ulster, and which was slain by the boy when he was scarcely six years old. The child himself took the office of the watch-dog until one of the dog's whelps was sufficiently grown to replace him. Henceforth the name *Cú Chulainn*, 'Hound of Culann,' clung to him.

It is said in *Mesca Ulad* that a district extending from Usnech in Meath northward along the coast to Dún Dalgan (Dundalk), and called Conaille Muirthemne and Cúalnge, belonged personally to Cúchulainn (Todd Lecture Series, 1889, i. 2). It embraced the present county of Louth and parts of Meath and Westmeath. At that time the province of Meath, with its over-kingship of Tara, had not come into existence, and Ulster extended southward to the Boyne, touching the provinces of Leinster and Munster at the Hill of Usnech in Westmeath. This district seems to have been bestowed on the hero by king Conor, and was not his by inheritance. Cúchulainn's own fort was Dún Dalgan (now Dundalk).

His wife was Emer, daughter to Forgall the Wily, a landowner near Lusk, in the present county of Dublin. A special tale relates his wooing of Emer. Though she appears to have been his only real wife, she had numerous rivals, of whom the most formidable was Fand, wife of Manánnan mac Ler, a goddess who enticed him away for a time into fairy-land.

3. **The Red Branch.**—Cúchulainn is the central figure of a group of champions commonly known as 'the Champions of the Red Branch,' so called from one of the three halls in the kingly palace of Emain Macha or Emania (now Navan Fort, S.W. of Armagh, where raths remain to the present day). The history and feats of these heroes are described in a series of over a hundred distinct tales. There are, besides these longer tales, numerous detached episodes which fill up gaps, so that the career of each hero of importance can be traced from birth to death in a very complete manner. They form a connected whole in the mind of the story-teller and reader, much as the originally isolated tales referring to Arthurian knights ultimately came to be formed into a complete cycle of stories. The three most prominent champions, who are frequently exposed to tests of strength or prowess against each other, are Conall *cernach*, 'the Victorious,' Læghaire *búadach*, 'the Triumphant,' and Cúchulainn; but Cúchulainn invariably proves himself to be the greatest hero of the three.

These tales seem to have originated in, and deal largely with, that eastern portion of Ulster which lies between the R. Bann and Lough Neagh on the west and the sea on the east. The capital was Emain Macha, and within this area lay the forts and dwelling-places of most of the chief heroes of the Ulster cycle. The king, who appears in the tales as ruling from Emain Macha, is named Conor (Conchobhar), and his death is synchronized with that of our Lord in Jerusalem. The reign of Conor and the exploits of the heroes are thus traditionally laid in the first century. Though king Conor and all the champions are accepted by R. O'Flaherty (*Ogygia*, Dublin, 1793, pt. iii. c. xlvi.-xlviii.) as historical personages, there is no place found for them in the Annals, though Conor is said, in some versions, to be the son of Fachtna *fathach*, 'the Wise,' who, according to the Annals of the Four Masters, ascended the throne of Ulster in the year of the world 5042 (152 B.C.).

The entry runs:—'A.M. 5042. The first year of Fachtna *fathach* in the sovereignty of Ireland'; and fifteen years later we have the entry of his death: 'A.M. 5057. Fachtna *fathach*, son of Rossa, son of Rudhraigh, after having been sixteen years in the sovereignty of Ireland, was slain by Eochaid *feidhleach* (*i.e.* the constant sighing).'

But this attempt to connect king Conor with a king of all Ireland was evidently a late one, and is the less to be taken into account as there is no sign in these tales that the central province of Meath, with its capital at Tara, had at this time been erected into a separate division, or that any over-king (called in Ireland *Ard-Rí*, or 'High King') as yet reigned over Ireland. Ulster is represented as haughtily independent, and each of the other provinces had its own king, who acted with perfect freedom independently of any central authority. The provinces, or 'Four Great Fifths,' of Ireland were, at the time of which we speak, Ulster, Leinster, Connaught, and East and West Munster. Meath, the future central royal province, created for the support of the High Kings of Ireland who ruled from Tara, did not then exist. Nor, considering that Fachtna died 137 B.C., could he have been father to Conor, who reigned in the beginning of the 1st century. Another and probably older version makes king Conor son to the druid and poet Cathbad, by Nessa his wife, a woman warrior.

Though Conor's death is synchronized with the moment of our Lord's crucifixion, the Annals of Tighernach date his death at 48 B.C. O'Flaherty, probably observing some of these inconsistencies, says that 'the king came near committing suicide, but lived fifteen years after.'

We may regard these attempts to fit the career of king Conor and of the Champions of the Red Branch cycle into the actual history of Ireland in much the same light as the connexion of the heroes of the *Nibelungen* with the early history of the Teutonic peoples or of king Arthur's knights with the history of Britain. The tales sprang up at a time when the power of eastern Ulster was still a living tradition among the literary class in Ireland. The raths at many of the sites of the traditional forts, such as Emain Macha (Navan Fort), the king's dwelling in Ulster, and Rath Cruachan or Rathcrogan (Co. Roscommon), the fortress of Queen

Meave of Connaught, show that the legends were connected with known historical sites, but it is unnecessary on that account to consider the actual personages of the cycle or their careers as historical. They are plainly regarded as mythological, and the chief events and wars in which they were engaged bear a mythological interpretation.

The tales have a close relationship to the legends of the race of gods known as the Tuatha Dé Danann; a few of them, indeed, both in style and subject, belong equally to both cycles. Such are 'The Wooing of Etain' and 'The Dispute of the Swineherds.' The pedigrees of the heroes of the Red Branch are all traced up to the Tuatha Dé Danann, although, according to the Annals, there is a lapse of 1500 years between the two epochs. Rudhraigh, or Rury, is the head of the house, and from him and from the goddess Maga, daughter of Angus na Brugh, by her marriages with Ross *ruadh*, 'the Red,' and Cathbad the druid, all the chief heroes are descended (see genealogies in E. Hull's *Cuchullin Saga*, Introd. p. lv). The extraordinary feats and prowess of the champions are supposed to be accounted for by their divine origin. According to this descent, Cúchulainn is grandson of Maga, who is mother to Dechtire, which brings him within the kingly line of Ulster, and denies the statement that he 'was not of Ulster' (see above). Probably that statement was merely an effort of the story-tellers to explain what they could not otherwise understand, viz. why Cúchulainn and his mortal father Sualtach or Sualtam were exempt from the curse which prostrated the whole male population of Ulster in sickness at a critical moment in the history of their province.

4. Cúchulainn as a sun-hero.—Cúchulainn was therefore, on the one side, directly connected with Lug, the sun-god, and, on the maternal side, with Maga, a Tuatha Dé Danann goddess. King Conor also is called a *día talmaide*, or terrestrial god, in *LU* 101*b*; and Dechtire, his sister, the mother of Cúchulainn, is called a goddess: Cúchulainn *mac dea Dechtire*, 'the son of the goddess Dechtire' (*LL* 123*b*).

The two marvellous Bulls for the possession of which the great war of the Táin Bó Cúalnge was undertaken were of supernatural origin, and had existed under many different forms before they were re-born as bulls; they had been first swineherds of the gods of the under world, then ravens, warriors, sea-monsters, and insects. Under each of these forms they had lived through vast periods of time; out of them they had come after a terrific struggle which shook the borders of Ireland, only to pass again through some new transformation (*Irische Texte*, III. i. 230–278). These struggles proved to be preludes to the war of the Táin, in which all Ireland was destined to engage, and to the gigantic struggle at its close between the two Bulls themselves, in which both were torn to pieces. The mythological warfare of these Bulls, the *Finn bennach*, or 'White horned,' and the *Donn*, or 'Dark' or 'Brown' Bull, belonging respectively to the East and West of Ireland (Cúalnge in Co. Down, and Rath Cruachan in Connaught), seems to symbolize the struggle between summer and winter or the struggle between day and night. The *Donn* is a terrific creature in strength and in size. On his back fifty little boys could play their games. He moves about accompanied by fifteen (or fifty) heifers. His ferocity and violence are so great that, when he is driven into a narrow pass, he revenges himself by trampling his keeper to death and treading his body thirty feet into the earth. His bellowings strike terror into all who hear him, and those who meet him after his final conflict with the *Finn bennach* are trampled and gored to death. This conflict, which lasted a day and a night, and during which the Bulls traversed the whole of Ireland, was ended by the *Donn* tearing his adversary to pieces and returning, head in air, to his native home in Cúalnge, where, in the madness of his frenzy, he placed his back to a hillock and 'vomited his heart up through his mouth with black mountains of dark-red gore,' and so expired. In like manner Cúchulainn is in every way abnormal. His rapid development and his prodigious strength and powers are everywhere insisted upon. When he is about to perform any special prodigy of valour, his whole person expands and undergoes an extraordinary change; he grows monstrous, terrific, so that his own friends cannot recognize him; he is known as 'The Distorted' (*riastartha*), or 'The Madman' from Emain Macha. When he puts forth his strength, his appearance is so terrific that none can stand before him; his very look destroys his foes, not by twos or threes but by hundreds; a stream like dusky blood, representing his energy, rises upward from his forehead, and over his head his 'bird of valour' hovers (cf. the light over the head of Achilles caused by Athene, *Il.* xviii. 205 [Butcher-Lang's tr. p. 372 f.]). His body gives off a heat which melts the snow around him, or raises to boiling-point three vats of water in which he is successively immersed. Yet this formidable personage is frequently derided by his enemies for the boyishness and insignificance of his usual appearance. Prime heroes, until they experience his hidden powers, refuse to fight with him; Queen Meave is visibly disappointed when she first comes face to face with the champion who has been holding her forces at bay through weeks of combat, and killing them by the hundred merely by his look; on one occasion he has to blacken a moustache with blackberry juice in order to present a more manly appearance.

If we regard Cúchulainn as the sun-hero, these indications of his unimposing appearance at ordinary times, succeeded on occasions by strange distortions and manifestations, seem aptly to represent the impression which might be produced on the savage mind by the contrast between the orb of the sun on ordinary occasions and its appearance in eclipse. Again, the fine poetic simile of the threefold hues of his hair, and the account of his splendour when he appears before the forces of Meave to display his person in its natural beauty, seem designed to illustrate the glory of the full sunshine of summer; so, too, do the heat generated in his person, the energy of his movements, his wandering habits, and the destructive power of his look. We may also note that 'blindness befell all women who loved him'—which may possibly have reference to the difficulty of gazing directly on the sun. It is possible that Cúchulainn's fight, from which he so hardly escaped, with the twenty-seven sons of Calatín, hideous and crooked beings, who formed armies out of puff-balls and out of the foliage of the oak, and came furiously riding on the 'wind's swift clouds,' may symbolize the hiding of the sun's face before the 'armies of the storm,' *i.e.* the massive clouds, formed, as it might seem, almost out of nothing. (Cf. a similar sort of incantation in 'The Death of Muirchertach mac Erca,' *RCel* xxiii. [1902]; the 'Battle of Kat Goden,' Skene, *Four Anc. Books of Wales*, i. 277 f., ii. 138; and 'The Mabinogion of Math, son of Mathonwy,' Lady C. Guest's *Mab.*, Lond. 1877, p. 416.) A remarkable 'tabu,' or *geis*, of Cúchulainn' was to 'see the horses of Manánnan mac Ler' (*i.e.* the billows of the ocean-god), which might be a reference to the apparent extinction of the sun's rays when he sinks down at night beneath the ocean waves.

Cúchulainn possesses two magic steeds which rise out of the Grey Loch of Slieve Fuaid and Loch Dubh Sainglenn respectively, and which he tames by springing unawares upon their backs and wrestling with them. For a whole day they career around the circuit of Ireland, the horses endeavouring in vain to throw their rider. Henceforth they are his obedient chariot-horses, a grey and a black, possibly symbolizing day and night. After his death they return into their respective lakes again (G. Henderson, *Feast of Bricriu*, London, 1899, sec. 31, p. 39 f.).

5. The stories relating to Cúchulainn are of different ages, and often vary in different versions, the long tale of the Táin Bó Cúalnge, in particular, having come down to us in two (some critics would say three) main recensions, with considerable variations in arrangement, detail, and literary style. *Táins*, or 'cattle-raids,' form the subject of a number of romances, which arose naturally out of conditions of life in which wealth consisted in the possession, not of land or money, but of flocks and herds, the acquisition of which, by fair means or foul, formed one of the chief objects of every chief or person of position. The long central tale of the *Táin Bó Cúalnge*, or Cattle Spoil of Cúalnge (pron. Cooley), *i.e.* of Cúchulainn's country in Co. Louth and Down, is preceded by a number of lesser *táins* and short stories describing the efforts of Queen Meave of Connaught to collect cattle and other provisions for her army, or otherwise elucidating special points in the main epic. A brief outline of this composite tale is as follows:

The war was undertaken by the united provinces of Ireland, under the leadership of the Amazonian Queen Meave (Medb) of Connaught, and the guidance of Fergus mac Roy (or Roich), a former king of Ulster, who had been deposed in favour of king Conor, and had gone into exile into Connaught. He consented, out of revenge, to lead the foe against his own people.

The main object of the war was the capture of the *Donn*, or Brown Bull of Cúalnge, which Meave desired to possess, but which had been refused her. The romance takes the form of a number of separate episodes—usually combats undertaken by warriors from Meave's army contending with Cúchulainn, who, alone and single-handed, guards the borders of Ulster during the entire winter. The warriors and men of Ulster are all disabled from fight through a mysterious sickness brought upon them by the curse of Macha, one of the goddesses of war; and it is not until the close of the *Táin* that they arise from their lethargy and come down in force to fight the final battle. Meave is finally defeated and forced to fly in rout across the Shannon at Athlone; but the Bull, though captured by her and driven westward, ends its career by fighting with and killing Meave's own Bull, the *Finn bennach*, and finally returns to its own country, where it dies by its own ferocious energy.

The combat of Cúchulainn and Ferdiad at the ford of Ath Ferdiad (Ardee) forms a long episode in the story, and is probably in its expanded (*LL*) form a late introduction.

There are a large number of poems in this episode; others are found occasionally in the remaining portions of the *Táin*. Some of the Ulster prose romances contain poems; others do not.

6. Among the more important of the stories relating especially to the career and deeds of the hero Cúchulainn are the following:

(1) *Cúchulainn's Birth Stories.*—Two chief variants exist, contained in *LU* (1100 A.D.) and in Egerton, 1782 B.M. (15th cent.). Considerable differences appear not only in the details of these stories, but in their general meaning. In *LU* a wonderful troop of birds comes one day to devastate the plains of Emain Macha. King Conor (Conchobhar) mounts his chariot with his sister Dechtire to hunt them. They pursue them till nightfall in a storm of snow, and arrive at an isolated house, inhabited by a man and woman. The woman gives birth to a son, who is carried by Dechtire to Emain Macha. The child dies, and in a vision by night Lug mac Ethlenn appears to Dechtire and tells her the child who had died was himself, that it was he who had arranged all that had happened to her, that she will bear a child by him, and that he will be himself her son. Conor bids her marry Sualtam; she becomes whole and well again, and obeys his behest. She then bears a child, Setanta, afterwards called Cúchulainn. In a discussion which follows, the babe is formally handed over to the charge of the chief bard and warriors of Ulster to rear, and to Finnchoem, Dechtire's sister, to foster.

In the other chief version, Dechtire has disappeared for three years with fifty maidens; they return as birds to devastate the plain of Emain Macha. Conor and his warriors follow them. They reach a hut, which expands into a noble house, inhabited by a princely young man and woman. They learn that it is the house of Dechtire, whom they do not recognize. (The young man is evidently Lug.) In the night Dechtire gives birth to a boy resembling Conor. He is called Setanta. The house seems to represent one of the tumuli on the Boyne, thought of by the people as fairy haunts or dwellings of the gods. It is in this direction that the birds take flight (Windisch, *Ir. Texte*, i. 134–145, text only; Summary in Nutt, *Voyage of Bran*, ii. 72–74).

(2) *The Courtship of Emer* describes Cúchulainn's wooing of his future wife, and his long apprenticeship to arms under Scathach, the Amazon of Alba or Britain (other versions say 'Scythia, east of the Alps'; Kuno Meyer, *RCel* xi. 442–453, and *Arch. Rev.* i. [1888], revised for E. Hull's *Cuchullin Saga*, pp. 56–84). There exist separate versions of Cúchulainn's education with Scathach (cf. Whitley Stokes, *RCel* xxix. 1908).

(3) *The Tragical Death of Conlaech* relates Cúchulainn's mortal combat with his own son Conlaech, or Conla, born of Aiffé in Alba after Cúchulainn's return to Ireland. He had left a ring with Aiffé for the boy, with a proviso that he was never to reveal his name to any stranger. He learns only when the youth is dying that it is his own son whom he has killed. The story has a strong resemblance to the Persian tale of Suhrāb and Rustam (*Ériu*, vol. i. pt. i. p. 113; C. Brooke, *Reliques of Irish Poetry*, Dublin, 1816, p. 363, metrical version).

(4) *The Sickbed or Wasting Away of Cúchulainn.*—Cúchulainn deserts Emer for Fand, wife of Manánnan, who in a series of beautiful poems describes the glories of Magh Mell, 'Plain of Happiness,' the invisible Irish Elysium, and woos him thither. A dramatic episode at the close of the tale describes Emer's attempted revenge and the contest between the two women for his affection. The tone is lofty (Windisch, *Ir. Texte*, i. 197–234 [text only]; O'Curry in *Atlantis*, vols. i. and ii.; Leahy, *Old Irish Romances*, i. 51 [Eng. tr.]; Thurneysen, *Sagen aus dem alten Irland*, 81).

(5) *Bricriu's Feast.*—This is a long rambling tale founded on the *motif* of a contest for priority and for the carving of the 'Champion's Bit' (ed. George Henderson, for Irish Texts Soc., vol. ii., 1899; Windisch, *Ir. Texte*, i. 254–303).

Tales connected with the death of Cúchulainn and the events immediately preceding and succeeding it are: the Great Rout of Magh Muirthemne (S. H. O'Grady in E. Hull's *Cuchullin Saga*), Cúchulainn's Death (Whitley Stokes, *RCel* iii. 175–185), the Red Rout of Conall Cernach, the Lay of the Heads, and Emer's Death. The events leading to his death form the subject of the long tale entitled the 'Battle of Rossnaree' (Edmund Hogan, *Roy. Ir. Acad.*, Todd Lectures, vol. iv., 1892).

All accounts agree in making Cúchulainn die young. The *Ann. Tigh.* place his age at 17,—the usual account,—but MS H. 3,17, in the Library of Trin. Coll. Dubl., says: 'The year of the Táin was the 59th of Cúchulainn's age from the night of his birth to the night of his death.' The actual beheading of Cúchulainn is variously ascribed to Lugaid, son of Cúroi, whose father Cúchulainn had slain by treachery, with the aid of Cúroi's adulterous wife Blathnait, and to Erc, son of Cairpre, or Cairbre *niafer*, who had been slain in the battle of Rossnaree. In a poem by Cinaeth O'Hartigan (ob. 975), in the Book of Ballymote, we read: 'Erc's mount, whence is its name?—Erc was son of Cairpre *niafer*, son of Ros *ruadh*, king of Laighen (Leinster). It was Erc who cut his head off Cúchulainn.' In revenge for this deed, Conall *cernach* killed Erc, and brought his head to Tara. It is said that his sister Acaill, who came out of Ulster to lament her brother, grieved so sorely for his death that her heart burst within her. A pathetic lament for her is cited by O'Curry (*MS Mat.*, Appendix, p. 514). The battle of Muirthemne, in which Cúchulainn fell, was inspired by revenge for the deaths of Calatín, Cúroi mac Daire, king of Munster, and Cairpre. It was led by the sons of the slaughtered men.

The Phantom Chariot of Cúchulainn.—This is a curious piece, in which the old hero is summoned from the dead to testify to the truth of St. Patrick's teaching before Leary, king of Ireland. He appears before the king in his old form and splendour, performing his 'champion feats,' and beseeching the king to receive Christianity (O'Beirne Crowe, *Journ. of the Kilkenny Arch. Soc.*, 4th series, 1870–71).

Among other tales relating directly to Cúchulainn are the following:

(1) *Táin Bó Regamna*, or appearance of the Morrigu, the Irish goddess of war, to the hero before the war of the Táin, to foretell her own intention to take part against him (ed. Windisch, *Ir. Texte*, II. ii. 241–254 [with tr.]).

(2) *Siege of Howth*, relating the extortions and cruelties practised by Athairne, chief bard of Ulster, on the Leinster men, and the revenge taken by Leinster in shutting up the defeated remnant of the Ulster warriors on the hill of Howth (ed. Whitley Stokes, in *RCel* viii. 49–63).

(3) *The Intoxication of the Ultonians*, describing a night-raid made by the warriors of Ulster when in a state of intoxication, right across Ireland, into the territory of their enemy Cúroi mac Daire of Tara-Luachra in Kerry, [and the efforts of Cúroi to

destroy them by persuading them to enter an iron house encased in wood, which had beneath it a subterranean chamber fitted with inflammable materials (cf. Branwen, daughter of Llyr, in the *Mabinogion*, and 'the Destruction of Dind Righ' [ed. Whitley Stokes in *ZCP* iii.]). The warriors escape by Cúchulainn's immense strength; he breaks through the walls and lets them out (*Mesca Ulad*, ed. W. M. Hennessy, *Roy. Ir. Acad.*, Todd Lecture Series, i., London, 1889).

See, further, artt. CELTS and ETHICS (Celtic).

LITERATURE.—A large number of the tales will be found with text and Eng. or Germ. tr. in Windisch-Stokes, *Irische Texte*, Leipzig, 1880 ff.; the numbers of the *RCel*; *Atlantis* (ed. by O'Curry), and *Kilkenny Archæol. Journ.* (which contains some tales edited by O'Beirne Crowe); *Proc. Royal Ir. Acad.*, Irish MSS Series, and Todd Lecture Series; the *ZCP*; *Ériu*, the Journal of the Irish School of Learning; Irish Texts Soc. vol. ii.; *Archæological Review*, vol. i.; Ossianic Soc. vol. v.; *Anec. Oxon.*, Mediæval and Mod. Series, etc. The *Táin Bó Cúalnge* has been published from the Book of Leinster version by E. Windisch, with Germ. tr., Leipzig, 1905; text (only) of version from the *Yellow Bk. of Lecan* and *Leabhar na hUidhre*, in *Ériu*, vol. i. pts. 2 and 3, ed. by Strachan and O'Keeffe, Dublin, 1904, etc.; tr. (only) from same MSS by L. Winifred Faraday, *The Cattle Raid of Cualgne*, London, 1904; Eng. trs. from Add. MS 18748, Brit. Mus., by S. H. O'Grady in Eleanor Hull's *The Cuchullin Saga*, London, 1898, pp. 110–227.

English trs. of a large number of complete romances will be found in E. Hull's *Cuchullin Saga*, with chart of the tales and references; also A. H. Leahy, *Heroic Romances of Ireland*, 2 vols., 1905, and *The Courtship of Ferb*, London, 1902; German trs. in R. Thurneysen, *Sagen aus dem alten Irland*, Berlin, 1901; French trs. in H. d'Arbois de Jubainville, *Epopée celtique en Irlande*, Paris, 1892. Portions of tales in E. O'Curry, *MS Mat. of anc. Irish History*, Dublin, 1861, and *Manners and Customs of the Ancient Irish*, 3 vols., London, 1873; J. Rhys, *Celtic Heathendom* (Hib. Lect.), London, 1886; Nutt-Meyer, *Voyage of Bran*, 2 vols., London, 1895–97. Lady Gregory gives a free rendering of the stories in her *Cuchulain of Muirthemne*; see also D. Hyde, *The Story of Early Gaelic Lit.*, London, 1895, and *Lit. Hist. of Ireland*, London, 1899; E. Hull, *Text-book of Irish Literature*, 2 vols., Dublin and London, 1906–1908. For manners and customs, see P. W. Joyce, *Social History of Ancient Ireland*, 2 vols., London, 1903, and O'Curry, *Manners and Customs* (as above).

ELEANOR HULL.

CULDEES.—The Culdees belong to the later history of the ancient British Church (see art. CHURCH [British], vol. iii. p. 631), more especially in Ireland and Scotland. The mystery in which they were enveloped has been to a great degree removed through the researches of Dr. William Reeves, published as an essay 'On the Céle dé, commonly called Culdees' (*Trans. Roy. Ir. Acad.* xxiv. [1873]). The term 'Culdee' has grown out of the form *Culdeus*, first coined by Hector Boece in his *Scotorum Historiæ*, 1526 (for word 'Culdee,' see *OED*, *s.v.*). The Irish name *céle dé* (mod. Ir. *céile dé*) corresponds with the probably Irish origin of the Culdees. The primary meaning of the common word *céle* is 'companion,' from which secondary meanings are derived, such as 'husband,' 'servant.' *Céle Conchobair*, *céle Concùlaind*, found in the texts of the old heroic tales of Ireland, mean 'faithful follower *or* personal attendant of Conchobhar, *or* Cúchulainn' (see H. Zimmer, *Celtic Church*, Eng. tr., London, 1902, p. 98 ff.). *Céle dé*, therefore, will mean 'companion *or* faithful servant of God.' The special difficulty is to account for the restriction of a term having this meaning, and obviously applicable to all monks and anchorites as servants of God, to the comparatively few cases in which it is found.[1]

There is no mention of the *céle dé* in the historians Adamnan, Cumin, Eddi, or Bede; and the inference is that the use of the term was unknown to them. Reeves says we may safely regard *céle dé* as the Irish translation of *servus Dei*, which came to be an ordinary term in Church writers for monks, and became known to the Irish through the writings of Gregory the Great, who was a favourite author in Ireland. Skene (*Celtic Scotland*², 1887, ii. 226 ff.) endeavours to prove that *Deicola* had the express meaning of 'anchorite,' that the *céle dé* were anchorites, and consequently that the Irish name was the direct derivation of *Deicolae* or *Colidei*. The objection to both of these theories is the specialized use of the term *céle dé*; had it been applicable to monks and anchorites in general, why is it not found in the pages of the 8th cent. historians, whose concern was with a monastic Church?

There is no contemporary account preserved of the rise of the Culdees; our sources are incidental and of late date.[1] According to the Books of Leinster and Lismore, St. Moling, who founded the monastery of Tech Moling in County Carlow, entered a society of Culdees. He died *c.* A.D. 700; and, if he was a Culdee, he is, along with St. Mochuda, among the earliest whose names are on record. In the manner of the Iro-Scottish Church, the Culdee societies were often composed of thirteen members—the Prior, or Head (*Cenn*), or Abbot, with twelve others, on the analogy of Christ and His disciples. In very late times we find in Armagh a Prior and *five*[2] brethren (probably a diminution in number, due to hostile pressure).

The Culdees, throughout their history, are connected with a few definite localities, although in some cases the evidence is the mere mention of the name in the chartulary of a monastery. At first having the marks of anchorites, they gradually take on the appearance of secular canons. The Rule of Maelruan (died *c.* 791) bears the description 'Here begins the Rule of the Céle dé.' It is preserved in the *Leabhar Breac*. As it stands, its orthography and grammar prove it to be centuries later than the 8th cent., but its original may go back to Maelruan. During Maelruan's lifetime (in A.D. 747), Chrodegang composed at Metz the Rule which formed his clergy into canons; and this Rule may have been brought into Ireland from Irish establishments on the Continent, such as Honau in Elsass. The Culdees certainly develop the appearance of secular canons; we find them filling a subordinate 'Levitical' position in cathedral establishments, chiefly engaged in the choral parts of the worship; they became especially associated also with charitable care of the sick and poor, and the distribution of alms. The latter seems to have been one of their earliest and most characteristic traits.[3] The endowments for these purposes may have proved a means of their later corruption. Their affinity with the regular canons enabled the latter, with the support of powerful patrons, to oust them from their positions. Finally, they disappeared; in St. Andrews, *e.g.*, they are named for the last time in 1332.

The only mention of the Culdees in England is in connexion with Athelstan's visit to York in A.D. 936 (*Colidei*); there is also a possible reference in the *cultores clerici* of a Privilege by King Ethelred granted to Canterbury (Cotton MSS). In Wales they, presumably, appear once in a reference by Giraldus Cambrensis to the 'Coelibes vel Colideos' of the Isle of Bardsey in the 12th cent. (Gir. Camb. vol. vi. p. 124, Rolls Series).

Reeves sees in the Culdees the disappearing Celtic Church; the Culdees are the drooping remnant in which that ancient Church finally succumbs. The present writer prefers to see in them not an inert residue, but a recrudescence, a burst into flame of the old Celtic religion, stimu-

[1] A striking parallel in Welsh to *céle dé* is the common word for 'hermit'—*meudwy*. *Meu* is from the root *mag*, which appears in Cornish as *maw*, 'boy'; *-dwy* is for the older *duiu*, genitive of *diu*, modern Welsh *duw*, 'God.'

[1] The earliest known instance of the combination *céle dé* (though not in its technical sense of 'Culdee') is in the gloss to the commentary on the Psalms ascribed to Columba of Bobbio, preserved in the Old Irish Cod. Mediolanensis (about 850 A.D.; ed. Ascoli, *Codice irlandese dell' Ambrosiana*, Rome, 1878, fol. 30 c, 3). Here the Vulg. *cuius* (*Dei*) *iste est* is first explained as equivalent to 'iste ad illum pertinet,' and is then glossed: *amal asmberar is cele dǽ infer hisin*, 'as it is said, "This man is a servant of God."'

[2] Von Pflugk-Hartung ('Die Kuldeer' in *Ztschr. f. Kirchengesch.* xiv. [1894]) erroneously says *fifteen*.

[3] As to this point, see especially Grant, 'The Culdees,' *Scottish Review*, 1888, p. 217 ff.

lated perhaps by conflict with the rival Roman institution. The honourable title *céle dé* comes from the people, as its native form shows; and it must have been elicited at the sight of special devotion and piety. A revival of religion at some given period, and not decay, is implied.

LITERATURE.—This is sufficiently indicated throughout the article. T. JONES PARRY.

CULT, CULTUS.—See RELIGION, WORSHIP.

CULTURE.

CULTURE.—To Bacon the world is indebted for the term, as well as for the philosophy of, culture (*Adv. of Learning*, 1605, II. xix. 2). While of itself the notion of culture may be broad enough to express all forms of spiritual life in man,—intellectual, religious, ethical,—it is best understood intensively as humanity's effort to assert its inner and independent being. This effort is observed in a series of contrasts, due to the division of man's functions into intellectual and activistic. The most general contrast is that between nature and spirit, with its dualism of animality and humanity. With the ideal of culture, man is led to live a life of contemplation rather than one of conquest, while his attention is directed towards the remote rather than towards the immediate. Viewed socially, culture is contrasted with industrial occupation, the two differing in their valuation of work. From the social standpoint, again, the culturist inclines towards egoism, as in a 'culte du moi' (Maurice Barrès), instead of towards altruism. In estimating the value of culture, the standard is usually the eudæmonistic one: it is asked whether the life of thinking or the life of doing is better calculated to give man happiness, or to satisfy the desires of the soul. The treatment of the culture-problem is to be conducted in connexion with the culture-consciousness of an individual or a nation, rather than by means of any objective memorial, like an order of architecture, a type of sculpture, or a school of poetry or painting. Such an introverting method is qualified to express the essence of Classicism and Romanticism,—the two types of Western culture-activity,—just as it is sufficient to discern the culture-motive in a man of genius, like Michelangelo or Goethe. That which culture seeks is an acquaintance with the strivings and ideals of a favoured nation and a gifted soul.

1. *HISTORY OF CULTURE-CONSCIOUSNESS.*—Not until the dawn of modern times was the supremacy of intellectualism called in question, or the problem of culture raised. Brāhmanism postulated enlightenment as the means of salvation; Paganism looked to the intellect to give man happiness; Scholasticism pledged its belief in conceptual doctrines. It is true that the Preacher of the Old Testament bewailed much study and the endless making of books, in the fear that the increase of knowledge was the increase of sorrow (Ec 1[18]), while Stoicism sought to turn from dialectics to ethics; nevertheless, humanity waited until the coming of modern times before it directly repudiated its intellectual life. Although the term *modernus* was introduced in the 6th cent. by Cassiodorus (*Variarum*, iv. 51), and used effectively by Roger Bacon (Eucken, *Gesch. der philosoph. Terminologie*, Leipzig, 1879, p. 169), modernness in the form of culture-consciousness was not expressed until Francis Bacon inquired concerning the nature and advantages of letters. His professed aim in the *Advancement of Learning* being to fashion a perfect 'globe of knowledge' (II. xxv.), he prepared the way for this by arguments drawn from sources sacred and secular.

Biblical tradition informs us that the day on which God rested and 'contemplated his own works' was blessed above the six days of labour, while the primary work of man in the Garden of Eden was intellectual, in that it consisted in viewing and naming God's creatures. Moses was praised for his Egyptian learning; Solomon for his wisdom; while the advent of the Saviour witnessed the subduing of ignorance among the doctors of the law; and the descent of the Spirit was expressed by the gift of tongues, 'which are but *vehicula scientiae.*' With Apostles and Fathers the same intellectualism prevailed (*ib.* I. vi.). As to human proofs, mythology shows how founders of States were but demi-gods, while inventors of new arts were among the gods themselves; moreover, ancient history reveals the superiority of such thinkers as Socrates, Aristotle, Cicero, over their contemporaries Xenophon, Alexander, Cæsar (*ib.* vii.).

Bacon's own estimate of culture, while often expressed so as to show the greater 'dignity' of thought, seems to consist of eudæmonism, inasmuch as it extols learning for its power to please—to promote, indeed, the interests of the *suavissima vita* (*ib.* viii. 2, etc.). The *Novum Organum* (1620) asserts, not 'Knowledge is pleasure,' but 'Scientia est potentia'; its aim was to indicate man's ability to rule by means of knowledge, so that, instead of emphasizing the æsthetical in culture, it tended to surrender the latter to industrialism. With such a presentation of the culture-problem, and the accompanying emphasis upon the 'work of contemplation,' Bacon, who was a Renaissance thinker, made possible the three-fold development of modern intellectual life in the ages of *Enlightenment* (1625–1789), of *Romanticism* (1781–1857), of *Realism* (1857–present day).

I. **The Enlightenment.**—On the æsthetic side, the Enlightenment fostered Classicism, although its own rationalistic spirit, political earnestness, and relentless criticism of religion removed it from the influences of the Graces. In its own way, the Enlightenment developed a static system of natural religion (Herbert), of natural rights (Grotius), as also a naturalistic system of ethics (Hobbes) and of knowledge (Locke). Spinoza expressed the spirit of the age when he declared the highest motive in man to be rational and disinterested love of God ('amor Dei intellectualis' [*Ethica*, 1677, V. xxxii.]).

This blind rationalism, however, was destined to undergo repudiation, and in the Counter-Enlightenment of Rousseau, Vico, Lessing, and Herder the culture-problem was rehabilitated. Where Bacon had had behind him the free æstheticism of the Renaissance, Rousseau was confronted by the formal culture of Classicism, whose *raffinements* he felt called upon to denounce. Taking a stand at once eudæmonistic and socialistic, he declared that unhappiness and injustice were attributable to man's departure from nature. This was the theme of his *Discours sur les sciences et les arts* (1750), where he discussed the question whether the establishment of culture had been for man's well-being—only to conclude negatively, on the ground that art and science weaken the original virtues of humanity. In his *Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité parmi les hommes* (1753), his view is social rather than eudæmonistic, inasmuch as he attributes injustice to the intellectualistic programme, which, involving the more rapid advance of some beyond others, had brought about inequality even where it had furthered the progress of impersonal science and art. Hence the maxim, 'Retournons à la nature.' *La nouvelle Héloïse* (1761) breathes a yearning for the idyllic condition of man's nature-life, while *Émile* (1762) deduces a system of education which, recognizing that man cannot return to nature and abide there, advises a natural method of mental development, a restoration of nature to man rather than a return of man to nature.

Where Bacon and Rousseau had considered the practical worth of culture for individual happiness and social well-being, Vico and Herder sought to show how essential to humanity is an ever-enlarging mental life which, if based upon nature,

advances beyond it. Vico's *Scienza nuova* (1725)—a work at least half a century in advance of its age—postulated the ideal of a unified humanity, whose organic nature, as conceived by Vico, contrasted strikingly and pleasantly with the mechanical views of society peculiar to the Enlightenment. Vico, who discovered that primitive language and literature are poetical, describes the developing culture-consciousness of the race by distinguishing three periods—mythological, heroic, human—wherein are found three kinds of language, as also three ideals of social life.

Lessing, who barely escaped the rationalism of the Enlightenment, relaxed sufficiently to produce his booklet, *Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts* (1780, tr. Robertson[4], 1896), wherein the religious consciousness is conceived of as a Divine revelation, unfolding its intellectual nature in such a way as to evince the ideas of God as a unity, and the soul as immortal. While Lessing carries on his discussion in a humanistic fashion, he does not fail to emphasize the rationalistic element embodied in the revelation of God and the soul as *ideas*. Herder's *Ideen zur Philos. der Gesch. der Menschheit* (1790–1792) involves Lessing's ideas of progress and Vico's ideal of humanity as one, while itself isolating the idea of *Humanitäts-Bildung*. The peculiarity of Herder's work is that in it the culture-concept operates in a naturalistic manner, involving the notion of a continuity of, rather than a conflict between, the natural below and the spiritual above, whereby the inner life of humanity is developed from the outer order of things. Herder introduces certain stages of development from nature-peoples to culture-peoples, and thus tends to make his plan more plausible.

The rationalism that had marked the early Enlightenment was reproduced in the ideals of Classicism, although the organization of æsthetical science by Burke and Baumgarten tended to soften its conceptualism. The significance of Classicism was apprehended by Winckelmann, who found in it the exaltation of reason and the idealization of beauty; and, in his mind, classic consciousness expressed the free rather than the characteristic, the static rather than the dynamic. In this spirit, he frames his memorable definition of beauty: 'According to this notion, beauty should be like the purest water, which, the less taste it has, is regarded as the most healthful because it is free from foreign elements' (*Werke*, Dresden, 1808–25, bk. iv. ch. ii. § 23). Winckelmann thus seeks to express the classic ideal as a purely intellectual and formal one, which will appear in connexion with two other utterances almost as famous as the above appreciation of the classic. In the one he praises the simplicity of classic beauty as a rare wine drunk from a transparent glass (*ib.* § 19); in the other he likens the antique ideal of beauty to a spirit drawn from the material order as by fire (*ib.* § 22). Lessing's *Laokoon* (1766)—its very title pledging it to Classicism—exalts the ideal of Apollo by limiting art and culture to the beautiful. This æsthetic reason is given to explain why Laokoon does not scream, although Lessing, in styling his work 'an essay on the limits of poetry and painting,' was aware that in plastic the idea of the temporal and changing is out of place. With the appearance of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781) and the French Revolution (1789), the Enlightenment was virtually ended, although its effect did not at once pass away.

2. Romanticism.—The age of culture began as Kant emerged from rationalism, and by means of philosophic criticism transcended the conceptual views of the Enlightenment. In the *Critique*, Kant used the term 'culture' when he said: 'Metaphysics is the completion of the whole *culture* of reason' (Müller's tr.[2], New York, 1896, p. 730); yet it was the *Critique of Judgment* (1790) which, by means of its new æsthetic norms, was destined to take its place in the history of culture. Kant's theory of beauty and taste, as 'that which pleases universally without requiring a concept' (Bernard's tr. 1892, p. 67), expresses the nature of culture as the intellectual life of man apprehended intuitively. Kant's intellectualism, far more original and valuable than his moralism, is thus expressed in a system of transcendentalism; and it was this transcendental element that affected the romantic school of philosophy and poetry.

Schiller, alive to the intellectualistic in Kant, was not unaffected by his heroic and relentless moralism, which he glorified in his essay *Ueber Anmuth u. Würde* (1793), although here he seeks to transcend both Goethean grace of sense and Kantian dignity of ethics, by means of the ideal of humanity as the 'Zusammenstimmung zwischen dem Sittlichen und Sinnlichen' (*Werke*, ed. Hempel, 1868–74, xv. 213). Schiller's use of the term 'Kultur' is confined almost exclusively to the *Briefe über die aesthet. Erziehung des Menschen* (1795), where he comments on the harmonious culture of the Greeks (Let. vi.), distinguishes theoretical, practical, and æsthetical forms (Lett. ix.–x.), and discusses the practical value of culture (Let. xxi.). Believing that the end of human existence is to be conceived ethically, and yet realizing that man is by nature a creature of sense, Schiller seeks to account for the culture, or æsthetic education, of mankind by distinguishing three stages—physical, æsthetical, and moral (Let. xxiv.). Thus, in achieving his moral destiny, man uses the æsthetical as the mean and mediator between the extremes of the physical and the ethical, urges Schiller, just as Lessing had sought to account for the rational education of man by means of religion. Schiller's confidence in culture, as expressed in the *Aesthet. Bildung*, seems to abate somewhat in his Essay *Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung* (1796), where, like Rousseau, whom he mentions approvingly (*Werke*, xv. 506), he signalizes a return to nature, or the naive—a term of special significance with the French (*ib.* 487). 'Sentimental' is borrowed from the English of Sterne, whom also Schiller does not fail to mention (*ib.* 480). The evils, rather than the benefits, of culture are discussed in this study of culture-types (*ib.* 483), and the whole essay, praising antiquity for its objective *naïveté*, values the sentimental only as it sincerely seeks nature. The distinction between naive and sentimental forms of culture is based upon nature; hence Schiller says: 'The poet either *is* nature or he *seeks* her. One makes a naive poet, the other a sentimental one' (*ib.* 492). Genius consists in *naïveté*, and only as the genius is naive can he exist (*ib.* 479). Homer among the ancients and Shakespeare among moderns are esteemed naive poets, because they apprehended nature immediately (*ib.* 488). Upon the cultural basis of naive and sentimental, Schiller distinguishes three forms of poetry—idyllic, satirical, and elegiac. Idyllic poetry is of the naive order, because it expresses the immediate sense of nature in the feeling of joy. 'The poet is satirical when he takes as his subject the alienation of man from nature, and the contradiction between the real and ideal' (*ib.* 497). Where satire is sharp, elegiac poetry is sad, being the poet's lament over the loss of nature in an age of culture. While Schiller seems to condemn culture and modernness, while he appears to postulate paganism as the true life of humanity, he is careful to express the thought that above both naive and sentimental there is a third form of intellectual life to be viewed as ideal culture, which

shall have power to restore to humanity its lost unity (*ib.* 492 f.).

As prophet of the Romantic School, Friedrich Schlegel felt the force of Kant's transcendentalism, but was more inclined to base his culture upon the Ego of Fichte, and, while he appreciated Schiller's æsthetics of the naive, he himself showed a disposition to adopt the sentimental, or romantic, culture of the infinite. In Schlegel's mind, Goethe's *Wilhelm Meister*, the French Revolution, and Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre* were the three greatest tendencies of the age (*Jugendschriften*, ed. J. Minor, 1882; *Athenæum*, § 216); from them may be traced a triple *Romantik*—poetical, political, philosophical, in form. Fichte himself was an ardent believer in culture; coming after the French Revolution and postulating constructive material culture, he contrasts strikingly with Rousseau. In his *Beiträge zur Berichtigung über die französ. Revolution*, 1793, the term 'Cultur' is of frequent occurrence; it is identified with the inner freedom and rationality of Kantianism. No human sensation or impulse, no action or passion, is esteemed of value unless it makes for culture, or the exercise of all man's powers towards complete freedom as a goal (*Werke*, Leipzig, 1846–47, vi. 86). In the State, the culture of freedom should be the aim, declares Fichte (*ib.* 101), while the true fatherland is that State which is the most highly cultured (*ib.* vii. 212). Such was Fichte's own culture-philosophy. Yet the Fichtean element that appealed to the Romanticist was the Ego, whose free activity was for Fichte the leading principle of all culture. Schlegel, however, develops romantic culture by emphasizing the æsthetical activity of the Ego, whence he derives his doctrine of *Ironie*, the watchword of Romanticism. In essence, *Ironic* consists in a work of self-creation and self-destruction, due to the Ego's striving after an impossible ideal (*Athenæum*, § 51). In poetry, this subjectivism is called transcendental where it begins as satire with its contrast between ideal and real, changes to the sadness of elegy, and ends as an idyll which identifies the two (*ib.* § 228). Where Schiller used 'sentimental,' Schlegel employs 'transcendental,' of which style he considers Dante the prophet, Shakespeare the centre, and Goethe the climax—'der grosse Dreiklang der modernen Poesie' (*ib.* § 247). In thus styling Shakespeare transcendental, Schlegel invests Schiller's 'naive' and 'sentimental' with the historical sense of ancient and modern—an idea carried out systematically in *Die Griechen und Römer* (1797). Grecian poetry, declares Schlegel, begins with nature and aims to reach beauty through culture (p. 10); modern poetry aims at subjective æsthetical power rather than objective beauty (p. 79), whence arises a striving after the poetical as something transcendental, a 'Sehnsucht' which is destined to remain unsatisfied (p. 103). This type of poetry contrasts strikingly with the compact culture-consciousness of Classicism, wherein 'Kunstpoesie' and 'Naturpoesie' are in complete harmony (*Athenæum*, § 252). Thus, as the culture-consciousness of the Enlightenment had arisen in England, that of Romanticism has been seen to have originated in Germany. There was, of course, a French Classicism and a French Romanticism, but perhaps the most direct contribution to culture that France was to make is found in the third period—that of Realism.

3. Realism.—The inception of the Realistic, or Naturalistic, movement may be noted as early as 1831, when Henri Beyle (de Stendhal) produced his *Le Rouge et le noir*. This Naturalism, or 'Beylisme,' as its author styled it, involved a direct egoism and an indirect nihilism, destined to open the modern mind to new views and values in the intellectual world. Beyle was analyzed and classified by the aid of Taine in 1857, Zola in 1880, and Paul Bourget in 1883 (Huneker, *Egoists*, 1909, p. 4 f.). Another root of this realism is found in Flaubert, whose *Madame Bovary* (1857) resulted in a culture-philosophy called 'Bovaryisme,' or Illusionism, hardly in keeping with the acknowledged realism of Flaubert. Another frank attempt to be realistic appeared with Baudelaire's *Fleurs du mal* (1857) under the head of 'Satanisme.' These three tendencies re-appear in the rhapsodies of the German 'superman,' Nietzsche, who was probably affected no less thoroughly by Max Stirner's *The Ego and his Own* (1845), which delivers its author from both pagan Classicism and Christian Romanticism, while it rivals the early Christians' 'contemptus mundi' by its contempt for spirit and truth (see pp. 464, 478, 484). This egoistic nihilism and activism, involving the transmutation of individualistic and social standards of value, was originally pursued by Nietzsche in the milder form of Romanticism, due to the influence of Wagner's music, which Nietzsche employs to explain the origin of Greek tragedy. Where both Classicism and Romanticism had agreed in regarding Grecian culture in the form of Apollonian calmness, Nietzsche, who was guided by the dynamic ideal of musical art, and who had profited by Schopenhauer's distinction between intellect and will, introduced the idea of a Dionysiac element, in accordance with which the intellectual realm of culture and refinement was set off against the voluntaristic one of barbarism and passion. Nietzsche had carefully noted Schiller's use of 'naive,' and had also appreciated its significance in the psychology of Classicism; nevertheless, he was anxious to show that the Greeks had achieved the naive of Apollo only by a mighty conquest over the barbaric and titanic of Dionysus (*Die Geburt der Tragödie*, 1886, § 3). To Schiller's naive poets, Homer and Shakespeare, he adds the name of the artist Raphael, whose 'Transfiguration' reveals, in art-symbolism, the eternal sorrow and contradiction of the world, expressed as it is on the lower and darker half of the canvas, which portrays the struggles of the possessed, and the vision of peace and intelligence shining in the transfiguration above (*ib.* § 4). But, with his desire to conceive of culture in the activistic fashion peculiar to the art of music, he seems to have approved of the Dionysiac and to have welcomed its entrance into modern culture (*ib.* § 19). Following Nietzsche, Sudermann has elaborated a kind of culture-philosophy which, while attracted by the Grecian sense of harmony, agrees with Schiller in its Apollonian view (see, *e.g.*, *The Joy of Living*, tr. Wharton, 1907, Act i.), but which is perhaps more ready to assert that, after all, the will is so superior to the intellect that the passions are destined to triumph over the spirit in man. This supremacy of the Dionysiac seems to explain the sensuality and irrationalism of man, who accounts for his viciousness by saying, 'Es ist das Heidenthum in uns' (cf. Axelrod, *H. Sudermann, eine Studie*, 1907, p. 63).

The realistic culture that signified a kind of Dionysiac revolt against conventionality was accompanied by the criticism of various nationalities by cultured patriots. In Russia, Turgenieff made ideal war upon society under the romantic banner of 'Nihilism' (*Fathers and Children*, 1861, tr. Hapgood, 1907, ch. v.), and repudiated his country for its lack of ideas:

'Our dear mother,' says he, 'Orthodox Russia, might sink down to the nethermost hell, and not a single tack, not a single pin would be disturbed, . . . because even the samovar, linden-bast slippers, shaft-arch, and the knout—these renowned products of ours—were not invented by us' (*Smoke*, tr. Hapgood, 1907, ch. xiv.).

In Norway, Ibsen used egoism and nihilism to

arouse his country to a sense of intellectual self-respect. In *Brand* (1865) he idealizes the Norwegian; in *Peer Gynt* (1867) he satirizes him; while in *Emperor and Galilean* (1873) he seeks to indicate the coming of a 'third empire' of selfhood, destined to supersede the 'Christian empire of the spirit,' as that had overcome the 'pagan empire of the flesh' (Pt. ii. Act iii. Sc. iv.). In America, where the national consciousness was absorbed by activity and weighed down by Puritanism and Philistinism, the call to culture was sounded long ago by the free spirit of Emerson. His address, *The American Scholar* (1837), contains an ideal programme for the promotion of national culture; and in a spirit at once Athenian and American, he discusses the influences of nature, literature, and activity, which promote the culture of 'Man Thinking,' while he also emphasizes the scholar's duty toward his age, which, in Emerson's mind, was no longer the classic or romantic, but the philosophical one. In far different manner from the Apollonian and Socratic serenity of Emerson, Poe emphasized the Dionysiac in the form of the morbid and mysterious with their inherent sense of contradiction. The significance of Poe was really that of the decadence that later was to repudiate Realism. This was to come about through Baudelaire, but was not to become effectual until the end of the 19th century, with Verlaine, Mallarmé, Villiers de l'Isle-Adam, Huysmans, and Maeterlinck, as well as Swinburne. The culture-consciousness of the decadence, dissatisfied with the limitations of Realism, made use of the morbid, the vicious, and the mysterious in order to sound anew the depths of the soul. By means of symbolism, it sought to find something objective to express the psychological profundity that it affected. In the north, this symbolism was developed systematically by Ibsen.

But by far the most systematic culturist critique of national life was carried on by Matthew Arnold, who was sufficiently nihilistic and egoistic in spirit to entitle his work *Culture and Anarchy* (1869), and who was sufficiently radical to direct it against Protestantism and 'Hebraism.' Arnold's method was that of a free Socratism, in the course of whose application he finds it expedient to praise Plato and St. Paul for their intellectualism (ch. iv.), and Lessing and Herder for their spirit of national culture. Calling himself a 'man without a philosophy,' Arnold was possessed of sufficient conceptualism to treat culture to an analysis of its four-fold root, whence he regards it: (1) as an internal condition of humanity rather than animality; (2) as a growing and becoming rather than a resting and a having; (3) while it was so general as to advance mankind rather than the mere individual, within whom (4) it consisted of an expansion of all his powers, instead of some one in particular, as the religious (ch. i.). This broad humanistic culture Arnold identifies with something suggestive of Schiller's 'grace and dignity,' by calling it 'sweetness and light'—an expression which he borrows from Swift, as Schiller had borrowed from Sterne. In contrast with his nation's 'faith in machinery,' Arnold exercises a faith in culture, by means of which he is led to say that the England of his own day was little in comparison with the England of Elizabeth (*ib.*). This æsthetical reflexion upon the industrial age of coal was accompanied by a critique of the moralistic, or Puritanical, carried on in connexion with the distinction between Hellenism, with its 'spontaneity of consciousness,' and Hebraism, with its 'strictness of conscience'—one the principle of thinking, the other of doing (ch. iv.). Arnold's philosophy of history, observing that Europe has been subjected to a double treatment of culture and civilization, places Hellenism at the head of spiritual development in the West, while it accounts for its failure to rule by calling it 'premature,' whence Hebraism was enabled to govern the world. With the supremacy of Hebraism, which Arnold treats more kindly than Nietzsche treated Christianity when he saw its 'transvaluation of pagan values,' there comes a Renaissance revival of Hellenism, which, like original Hellenism, so suffered from lax morals that Hebraism, in the form of Puritanism, was again called upon to rule by means of strict obedience (*ib.*). Believing that Hellenic sweetness and light is the one thing needful, Arnold believes also that it may further the cause of Hebraism, which can only gain from an infusion of Socrates' 'disinterested play of consciousness' (ch. v.). Indeed, Hebraism seems never to have relinquished its hold upon Arnold, who, in *Literature and Dogma* (1875), esteemed 'conduct as three-fourths of human life'; hence we may speak of his Hellenizing culture as 'morality touched with sweetness and light.' Without appreciating the strength of Arnold's sentiments, popular culture is now busy with the more entertaining features of science, art, and philosophy, its devotees being organized into groups not without resemblance to the *Précieuses Ridicules* and the *Femmes Savantes* of three hundred years ago.

II. *THE PROBLEM OF CULTURE.*—As the definition of culture has implied, the contrast between nature and spirit, animality and humanity, activity and contemplation, inner and outer, immediate and remote, contains a problem for the human species which belongs to nature, but which, nevertheless, contemplates a trans-natural or spiritual goal for humanity. The most essential element in the psychology of culture is that which relates to the intellect and the will, with the accompanying contrast between the life of culture and that of activity. With the question presented upon the intellectualistico-voluntaristic basis, the two remaining problems of humanity and happiness will follow in a natural order.

1. **Culture and activity.**—When contrasted with the outer life of activism, the interior and contemplative character of culture assumes the form of an intense problem of values, especially in an age where naturalism is exalted by science and where industrialism deafens the ear to the 'Know thyself' of intellectualism. Hence society has scruples against culture, which, it is urged, unfits man for life in the outer world among men and things. The antinomy between intellect and will has long afflicted the Indo-Germanic consciousness, and as far back as the days of Vedānta philosophy it had sought to reconcile the conflicting claims of the Sāṅkhya of thought and the Yoga of action by declaring that the pursuit of knowledge and the performance of work were both necessary to bring man to the highest spiritual state of workless contemplation (*Bhagavad-Gītā*, ch. v.). With the Greeks, who were both Apollonian and Dionysiac, the ascendant principle was the intellectualistic one; for, while Aristotle based life upon ἐνέργεια, he found εὐδαιμονία to consist in an energy tempered by moderation and perfected by contemplation (*Nic. Eth.* x. 7). It was in this spirit that Bacon exalted the 'work of contemplation.' Voltaire's attack upon culture was carried on in the same eudæmonistic manner; accordingly his pessimistic *Candide* (1758) urges man to work without thinking, as the only means of rendering life bearable, whence follows, at the conclusion, the familiar maxim, 'Il faut cultiver notre jardin.' In the history of French scepticism, the same advice had been given by Montaigne, who also counsels one to assume the consciousness of a dumb animal in order to find wisdom—'Il nous faut abestir pour

nous assagir' ('Apologie de Raymond Sebond,' *Essais*, Lyons, 1595, bk. ii. ch. xii.).

But the classic example of the genius who sought peace by harmonizing inner with outer life is Goethe, with his *Torquato Tasso* (1789) and *Faust*. Developed in Italy, where Goethe came into living contact with Hellenism, *Tasso* was submitted to the classic form of treatment, which was hardly fitted for the strivings of the unhappy hero with his Werther temperament. The display of soul-stuff, with its conflict between intellectualism and activism, is carried on in the comparison between Tasso and Antonio, the man of affairs; for, even when crowned with the wreath taken from the bust of Virgil, as a sign of his success in completing his *Jerusalem Delivered*, the poet is envious of the practical man, who has just returned from an important mission. In the course of this drama of the inner culture-consciousness, Goethe takes the opportunity of introducing certain maxims which have become famous. Thus in his jealousy of Antonio, Tasso exclaims, 'I feel myself more than ever of double soul' (Act ii. Sc. i.), referring to the duality of soul embodied in *Faust* (i. 759). The poet's incompleteness is celebrated in the words, 'Talent is formed in solitude, character in the stream of the world' (Act i. Sc. ii.); while it is declared that self-knowledge comes not from within, but rather out in the world among men (Act ii. Sc. iii.). Where the Princess celebrates the poet's sorrow by calling it 'charming' (Act i. Sc. i.), Tasso at last confesses the profundity of his inner contemplative consciousness, in the memorable Goetheanism, 'Some god gave me power to tell how I suffer' (Act v. Sc. v.). This Goethean nostalgia for activity has recently received brilliant recognition in Paul Bourget's *Le Disciple* (1889). Faust's sense of two souls within expresses the conflict more profoundly, while it solves the problem more decisively as the victory of the active altruist over the thinking egoist, or the merging of the two in the unity of life, the consciousness of which leads Faust to bid the holy moment stay: 'Verweile doch, du bist so schön' (ii. 6953).

The culturist, however, will object to this activistic treatment of the problem, and persist in his contemplation, however painful it may be for him. Moreover, intellectualism claims that action stands in need of the thought-principle, inasmuch as the will comes to consciousness only in ideation, as was confessed by the arch-voluntarist, Schopenhauer, when he made the will-to-live objectify itself as Platonic ideas (*World as Will and Idea*, tr. Haldane and Kemp, 1883-6, § 25). Apart from thought, activity defeats its own humanistic aims, for, 'where there is no vision, the people perish' (Pr 29[18]). The recent egoistic movement in literature reacts favourably upon culture, which is so interior in its nature as to make most difficult any social interpretation of the contemplative. Thus Maurice Barrès stands for a 'culte du moi' in the 'tour d'ivoire' of selfhood (cf. Huneker, *Egoists, in loc.*). In the same spirit, Anatole France, although apparently a believer in collectivism, is not without egoistic and intellectualistic traits. These appear brilliantly in *The Red Lily*, where Paul Vence's opinion of Napoleon seems to express the author's view of activists in general:

'A poet, he knew no poetry but that of action. His great dream of life was earth-bound. . . . His youth, or rather his sublime adolescence, endured to the end, because all the days of his life were powerless to form in him a conscious maturity. Such is the abnormal condition of all men of action. They live entirely for the moment, and their genius is concentrated on one single point. They do not grow. The hours of their lives are not bound together by any chain of grave disinterested reflexion. They do not develop; one condition merely succeeds another in a series of deeds. Thus they have no inner life. The absence of any inner life is particularly noticeable in Napoleon. . . . He lived outside himself' (Stephen's tr., 1908, ch. iii. p. 46 f.).

Where the culturist grants the validity of activism, he yet sees its limits, if not its dangers; or, as Bergson, a pronounced activist, has expressed it: 'It is presumable that, without language, intelligence would have been riveted to material objects that its interests led it to consider. It would have lived in a state of somnambulism, exterior to itself, hypnotized by its work' (*L'Evolution créatrice*[6], 1910, p. 172). Such a condition of exteriority, observed by both France and Bergson, would seem to be the unhappy state of mankind, apart from the intellectual deliverance that comes through culture; the man of genius, raised above nature, is enabled to transform the energy of action into the work of contemplation, as Flaubert's principle of violence in art resulted in rhetoric.

2. **Culture and humanity.**—While it goes without saying that man was meant for humanity, or for the perfection that belongs to the species, it does not follow that this perfection must be intellectualistic. For Bacon it was easy to identify *veritas* with *bonitas* (*Adv. of Learn.* I. viii. 2); but the modern notion of humanity's realization of the good is often elaborated in defiance of the intellectually true. In ancient thought, Plato's *Republic* banished poetry and the drama from the State; but this drastic measure was in the interest of truth as man's chief good (bk. x. 595-605). In modern times, Tolstoi has opposed decadent culture, because, like Rousseau, he thinks that progress in intellectualism has brought about inequality, as also for Plato's reason that art does not yield truth. Tolstoi opposes the notion that art belongs to superior souls alone (*What is Art?* tr. Maude, 1889, ch. viii.). 'Art,' says Tolstoi, 'should unite men with God and with one another'; whence he arraigns, as inimical to this religion of humanity, all art that is superstitious, patriotic, and sensual (*ib.* ch. xvii.). With a condemnation of modern art almost universal, Tolstoi surrenders to the *genre* and sympathistic, as represented by Dickens, Hugo, Dostoievsky, Millet, Breton, etc. His attack upon Shakespeare was provoked by the perception that the poet slighted the labouring classes. Ernest Crosby having made such a socialistic criticism of Shakespeare, Tolstoi proceeded to criticize his dramas, upon æsthetic and philosophic grounds (*A Critical Essay on Shakespeare*, tr. Tchertkoff, 1906, pt. ii., Crosby's article). In addition to this social scruple against culture, there is also an ethical detent, based upon the thought that intellectual superiority in a nation seems to involve a pyramidal arrangement of the social order, where the enlightened few are supported by the mass of labouring people, whereby injustice arises. The failure of the æsthetical to redeem mankind urged Schopenhauer to put ethics in its place, with the idea that, since not all can be artists, they should all be moralists, and that even in the cultured person the æsthetic moment is so transitory that it necessitates the permanent moral treatment of life in the complete denial of the will-to-live (*World as Will and Idea*, tr. Haldane and Kemp, 1896, §§ 27, 52; also bks. iii. iv.); culture, however desirable, does not seem to be imperative like morality, activity, and the like; but the argument involved is not really one of physical necessity, but of spiritual value; for, inasmuch as 'the earth is the planet of hunger, or the planet where one eats' (A. France), it might be argued that through necessity food is as important as virtue, and the economic the equal of the ethical. The question is one of values, as also one of psychological fitness; whence the culturist concludes that morality and social life stand in need of the enlightenment and evaluation that can come only when truth and beauty are pursued for their own sake. The most perfect conception of social life seems to have found ex-

pression in ancient times, when it was said, 'Many shall run to and fro, and knowledge shall be increased' (Dn 12[4]). In the endeavour to promote the interests of an enlightened State, it is not out of place to commend culture and foster genius, for it must not be forgotten that humanity is in part to be conceived in humanistic fashion, which involves the exaltation of letters and arts, or the 'humanities.'

3. Culture and happiness.—Where culture is challenged by activism and socialism, it is finally criticized by eudæmonism, on the ground that it fails to satisfy the soul. Here re-appears the contention of activist and socialist, who will assert that the disinterestedness demanded by culture can result only in diverting man's attention from immediate necessities, which, like eating, drinking, clothing, shelter, are imperative for the 'Sons of Martha' to consider. Both nature and natural society point to the place man is supposed to occupy in the actual world; hence the interior life of culture can only unfit him for his vocation as a living being, so great is the preoccupation which culture demands. Hence, with the physical and social struggle for existence, the contemplator is likely to be left stranded in the onward flux of events, so that all that makes for culture threatens the well-being of man. Modern educational systems have long been realizing this utilitarian principle, with the result that 'humanity' now, instead of connoting culture, stands for social efficiency; while 'culture courses' in the curriculum are included among the non-essentials. To this argument against disinterested enlightenment, the culturist may reply by noting that these practical interests will take care of themselves in connexion with man's instinctive life, just as they will ever assert themselves in human education as demands made by the inquiring interested mind. But the cultural interest in remote ideals may safely be furthered in the life and education of man, who is necessarily predisposed in favour of the immediately useful.

With regard to culture as a means of promoting happiness, the central question is one of the possession or pursuit of knowledge. Classicism, which had culture without the culture-problem, upheld the possession of knowledge as affording the highest enjoyment; hence Aristotle said: 'It is reasonable to suppose that the employment (of wisdom) is more pleasant to those who have mastered it than to those who are yet seeking' (*Nic. Eth.* x. vi.). Mediæval Romanticism relaxed somewhat from this identification of knower and knowledge, as when the Troubadour, or Trouvère (finder), suggested that the search after that which could be found constituted our true happiness. The culture of Modernism is not wanting in instances of representative individuals who have protested that the search after truth is more satisfying than the securing of knowledge itself. Thus it was that the Cartesian, Père Malebranche, said: 'If I held truth captive in the hand, I would open it in order to pursue it again' (Mazure, *Cours de la philosophie*, ii. 20); while Butler declared: 'Knowledge is not our proper happiness . . . it is the gaining, not the having, of it, which is the entertainment of the mind' (*Sermons*, xv.). More brilliantly and more forcefully Lessing said:

'If God were to hold in His right hand all truth, and in His left the single, ever-living impulse to seek for truth, though coupled with the condition of eternal error, and should say to me, "Choose!" I would humbly fall before His left hand, and say, "Father, give! Pure truth is, after all, for Thee alone!"' (Rolleston, *Life of Lessing*, 1889, ch. xvii.).

While significant of the remoteness inherent in the culture-ideal, such utterances are not normal expressions of the culture-motive, which is more like the Troubadour, or finding, instinct in the human mind. Finally, our modern psychology, like that of Wundt, by showing how similar are intellect and volition, tends to do away with the conflict between the idealistic and activistic methods of promoting human happiness, and to postulate a unity of thinking and doing, of inner life and outer existence.

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CUMBERLAND PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH.—See CONFESSIONS, PRESBYTERIANISM.

CUP- AND RING-MARKINGS.—1. Description.—The name 'cup- and ring-markings' is given to certain signs—they cannot be called drawings or sculptures—which are found on rock-surfaces and articles of use in all parts of the world, from pre-historic times down to the primitive peoples of the present day. Wherever found, they are distinguished by the same characteristics with great variety in details. In all cases there is the central cup, hollow, or depression, surrounded by one or more concentric circles or rings. These rings take many varying forms. Sometimes they are complete circles; sometimes they are only semi-circles at the top or bottom of the cup; sometimes they take the form of spirals. At times—and this is very usual when they are found in any number—sets of cup- and ring-markings are united by lines or ducts making a variety of figures; and again, at times, the outermost circle has a number of rays issuing from it and converging towards the central depression or cup. Wherever they have been observed, they are the work of peoples in the Neolithic stage of culture, whether in the actual Neolithic Age of the pre-historic past, or among peoples who at the present time exist at that stage of culture.

The localities where archaic cup- and ring-markings are now known to exist are world-wide. Some of the finest examples are in the British Islands. It was in the year 1859 that Sir J. Gardner Wilkinson first called attention to them in a paper in the *Journal of the British Archæological Association*, in the course of which he refers to cup- and ring-markings on the rocks in Northumberland, and claims to have been the first to note such markings as far back as 1835. In 1867, Sir James Simpson published his book entitled *Archaic Sculpturings of Cups, Circles, etc., on Rocks*, in which he described all those that were then known in Scotland, Northumberland, Cumberland, and Yorkshire, and in a series of beautiful plates he illustrated every variety of form which they exhibit.

It is now known that archaic cup- and ring-markings exist in all parts of our own country, not only on scarps of rock, but on the stones of so-called 'Druid' circles, from Inverness-shire to Lancashire, Cumberland, and the Isle of Man; on great stones forming avenues; on cromlechs; on the stones of chambered *tumuli* in Yorkshire; on stone cists or coffins in Scotland, Ireland, and Dorset; on pre-historic obelisks, or solitary 'standing-stones' in Argyll; on walls in subterranean 'Picts' houses' in the Orkneys and Forfarshire; in pre-historic Scottish forts; near old camps; and

on isolated rocks, scarps, and stones. They are found in the Cheviot Hills, on the moor near Chatton Park in Northumberland; there engraved on the boulders may be seen central cup-like depressions surrounded by incised concentric circles. Some of the finest examples in the British Islands are at or near Ilkley in Yorkshire. In Ireland precisely analogous markings, or 'rock-scribings,' as Wakeman calls them, are found at Mevagh, Co. Donegal, on the sides of Knockmore Cave, near Derrygonnelly, Co. Fermanagh, as well as the magnificent series of double spirals at Newgrange, Dowth, and Lough Crew, Co. Meath, which belong to a somewhat later stage of culture.

Outside the British Islands, other archaic examples, besides those in the Morbihan, may be noted at Malta, where, in the spring of 1910, the writer saw the very fine series—painted, not incised—in the hypogeum at Hal-Saflieni. They also occur incised at Hagiar Kim and Mnaidra, in Malta, and in the Giganteja at Gozo; on the rock on which the great Cathedral of Seville is built; on the steps of the Forum at Rome; on the pedestal of a statue from Athens; in Scandinavia, in China, in India, and in North and South America.

Present-day instances in which a precisely similar scheme of ornamentation may be observed are found among the natives of Central Australia (which will be more particularly described when we come to discuss the meaning to be assigned to them), in Fiji, in Easter Island, and other parts of the Pacific Ocean, as well as in certain parts of Africa. Further, among races who tatu, particularly the Maoris of New Zealand, a very similar set of designs may be observed.

2. Theories as to significance.—It is an axiom of Anthropology that primitive man never gave, nor does he give, himself trouble merely for an æsthetic purpose, but always had some practical object in view. Hence the theories proposed in explanation of cup- and ring-markings fall into two groups. The first would explain them by (*a*) religion, or (*b*) magic; the second, as (*a*) primitive star-maps, or (*b*) rude maps of the neighbourhood, showing the position of hut-circles, or (*c*) a primitive method of writing, or at least of communicating ideas.

i. (*a*) *Religion.*—Sir James Simpson, after mentioning, only to reject, the Swedish archæologist Nilsson's conjecture that these markings were Phœnician in their origin, came to the conclusion that 'they are archæological enigmata,' but he went on to suggest that they were 'probably ornamental and possibly religious,' adding that, 'though in the first instance probably decorative,' they were also 'emblems or symbols, connected in some way with the religious thought and doctrines of those who carved them' (*op. cit.* pp. 92, 115, 117).

In 1872, Phené, in a paper read before the British Archæological Association, argued that the purpose of cup- and ring-markings was a religious one, and that it was connected with sun-worship.

In 1878, Romilly Allen, an acknowledged authority in all that pertains to early Christian art, read before the British Archæological Association an exhaustive paper on the remarkable series of 'Pre-historic Rock-sculptures at Ilkley.' After giving a list of all the localities in which pre-historic rock-sculptures were then known to exist, followed by a detailed account of those at Ilkley, he proceeded to notice various theories as to their origin and meaning. It may be observed that among the markings at Ilkley there is one set of cups and lines arranged in the form of the *swastika*, a pattern of universal prevalence from the Mycenæan age onwards, which is noted by Schliemann to have been found on a very large number of spindle-whorls discovered at Troy, and is found in India as a religious symbol, and survives among ourselves as the arms of the Isle of Man. Its occurrence here would seem to carry back its use as a symbol of some sort to pre-historic times. Allen's own theory is that cup- and ring-markings were most probably used as religious symbols, and were connected, as Nilsson suggested, with sun- and Baal-worship. He also thinks, with Nilsson, that the pre-historic sculptures belong to the Bronze Age.

In the following year C. W. Dymond read an interesting paper before the same Association on some rock-markings in the same neighbourhood, with copious reference to Schliemann's discoveries at Troy and Mycenæ. In this he makes a special point of that discoverer's theory that the cups surrounded by complete circles represent the sun, and those surrounded by incomplete or semi-circles, with or without rays, *i.e.* ducts, represent the rising or setting sun. In this connexion it may be noted that among the rock-paintings of the native Australians described by R. H. Mathews (in *JAI* xxv. [1896] 145) is one which almost certainly represents, along with a figure of two hands joined at the wrist, the sun rising or setting. The significance of this will appear later (see below, p. 366[a]). Dymond also notes one stone containing a most remarkable arrangement of markings, which he says he at first took for a rude representation of the planetary system, but which he afterwards thought might be an allegorical or symbolical representation of a goose (*Journ. Brit. Arch. Assoc.* xxxvii. 86).

As recently as 1900, H. G. M. Murray-Aynsley, in her book on *Symbolism of the East and West*, describes the cup- and ring-markings which she had observed in the course of her travels in India, and compares them with those known in Europe; and as to their significance she assigns all alike to sun- and star-worship.

In his recent book *Ancient Britain and the Invasions of Julius Cæsar* (London, 1907), Rice Holmes ranges himself with those who would see in these markings some religious significance, though he is hopelessly wrong in assigning them, as he does, to the Bronze Age.

Still keeping to the theory of their religious significance, it may be noted that Col. Rivett-Carnac, who has made a special study of the archaic rock-markings of India, particularly as they occur among the Kumaun Hills, suggested that they are connected with *liṅgam*-worship; the central mark or cup representing the *liṅgam*, the circle the *yoni*. The rich, he supposed, put up a monument, the poor merely carved a symbol.

In his *Pre-historic Times*[6], 1900, Lord Avebury comes to the conclusion that 'we have as yet no satisfactory clue to the meaning of these engravings' (p. 158), and he assigns the ruder, and therefore evidently more primitive, engravings, *i.e.* the simple cup- and ring-marks in all their variety, to the Neolithic Age, or, as we prefer to say, at any rate to the Neolithic stage of culture. As regards the meaning to be attached to the symbols, R. Munro says:

> 'Although much has been written on the subject, none of the theories advanced to explain their meaning has met with general acceptance. That they had a symbolic meaning in the religious conceptions of the people is evident from the frequency with which they are found on sepulchral monuments, but any interpretation hitherto advanced on the subject, beyond the general religious idea, seems to be pure conjecture' (*Prehistoric Scotland*, p. 217 f.).

(*b*) *Magic.*—In 1892, and again in 1896, Miss Russell propounded, with a wealth of argument and illustration, before the same Association, the theory that simple cups and circles are intended to represent *eyes*, and that those having a line or duct through them represent eyes transfixed with a

javelin, and that accordingly the solution of the problem as to the meaning of these signs is to be found in regarding them as charms against the Evil Eye. The prevalence of this superstition among primitive races the world over is unquestionable, and it survives to-day, with more intensity than anywhere else among civilized peoples, in Italy, as Elworthy has conclusively shown in his books, *The Evil Eye* (London, 1895), and *Horns of Honour* (London, 1900), so that, had it not been for later discoveries, this might have stood as a good working hypothesis; and it may even be held to have some share in the meaning which we shall assign to them. Magic is not only the science, but it lies at the very root of the religion and social arrangements, of primitive folk, and it may well have its part in the explanation to be advanced for the universal prevalence of these mysterious signs.

ii. (*a*) It has been held that cup- and ring-markings were connected with astrology and intended for rude *maps or plans of the stellar and planetary heavens.* This theory need not detain us, as it could not by any possibility apply except to a very few cases, in which the designs may seem to be arranged in some sort of definite order having some resemblance to the position of the constellations in the sky, or some appearance of being intended to represent the sun, moon, and planets.

(*b*) There is the view that they were intended for *maps of the locality,* marking the position of the neighbouring raths, or *oppida,* for the benefit of wayfarers, whether the inhabitants themselves or strangers. This theory is associated with the names of Greenwell and Wilkinson in England, and of Graves in Ireland, and was definitely applied by the latter to the Irish examples.

(*c*) There is also the view that they were *a primitive mode of writing, or at least of communicating ideas.* This theory was propounded by Rivett-Carnac as an appendage or alternative to his theory that they were connected with *liṅgam*-worship. In 1903 he read a paper before the Royal Asiatic Society entitled 'Cup-marks as an archaic Form of Inscription,' in which he suggested that they were 'a very ancient form of writing.'

In discussing our own theory we shall see how these two ideas may be combined, by a reference not only to the evidence from Australia, but also to the 'painted pebbles,' with alphabetiform signs, which Piette discovered in the cave of Mas d'Azil in the Pyrenees, and which belong to the Palæolithic Age, and to the similar signs found on and in dolmens in Portugal in the same year, down to the signs which distinguish the work turned out by modern potteries in civilized lands. It may be noted here that Wood-Martin also had already suggested that cup- and ring-markings 'might be the first step made by primitive man towards writing' (*Pagan Ireland*, p. 571). E. Cartailhac had made the same suggestion in 1889 in his *La France préhistorique d'après les sépultures et les monuments* (p. 247).

3. Cup- and ring-markings, in the light thrown upon them by recent research and discoveries among the native races of Northern and Central Australia.—In the year 1899, Spencer-Gillen's epoch-making book on *The Native Tribes of Central Australia* was published. It was followed in 1904 by the same authors' *Northern Tribes of Central Australia,* and in the same year A. W. Howitt's *Native Tribes of South-East Australia* was published. These, with K. Langloh Parker's *The Euahlayi Tribe* (London, 1905), and the researches of R. H. Mathews and other travellers and observers, are our authorities on the tribal and social arrangements and customs of the Australian aborigines.

The characteristic feature of all these tribes is that society is organized on a basis of totemism (*q.v.*), in relation to which cup- and ring-markings are found to have a living and definite significance.

Some few years ago the theory now under consideration might have been included under those which would give a *religious* significance to cup- and ring-markings, but recent research has made that impossible.

J. G. Frazer, in his great work on *Totemism and Exogamy* (4 vols., London, 1910), has proved that totemism does not belong to the category of religion, but is altogether of social significance, and this was the opinion of many students before the publication of his book settled the matter for all time. Totemism is not religion, because religion implies reverence and worship, and the totem is never worshipped, though it is treated with respect. It is the brother, never the god, of its human relations.

Before we can exhibit the relationship between cup- and ring-marking and totemism, however, we must first deal, as briefly as possible, with totemism as it exists in Australia, especially among the Arunta.

The Arunta reckon by male descent, but their totemism is special and peculiar in that it is reckoned by locality and not by parentage at all, *i.e.* every child, no matter what the totem of its parents may be, belongs to the totem of the district in which it may happen to be born. The Arunta system is based on the following beliefs. They hold that each living Arunta is descended from, or rather is the re-incarnation of, an ancestor who lived in what are known as the 'Alcheringa' (*q.v.*) times. Each of these Alcheringa ancestors is represented as carrying about with him or her one of the sacred stones or sticks, which are called by the Arunta *churinga.* Each of these *churinga* is closely associated with the spirit part of some individual. In the place where they originated or stayed, as in the case of some of the Witchetty Grub people, or where they camped in their wanderings, there were found what the natives call *oknanikilla, i.e.* local totem centres. At each of these spots a certain number of the Alcheringa ancestors went into the ground, each carrying his *churinga* with him. His body died, but some natural feature, such as a tree or rock, rose to mark the spot, while his spirit part remained in the *churinga.* Thus the country is dotted over with these *oknanikilla,* each one connected with one totem. The rock or the tree marking the spirit's abode is known as the spirit's *nanja,* and it is this idea of spirit individuals associated with the *churinga,* and resident in certain definite spots, which is at the root of the totemic system of the Arunta tribe. These spirits are ever waiting to be re-born, and consequently they are ever on the look-out for likely women through whom they may receive re-incarnation. Hence arises the most curious feature of Arunta beliefs, and the most marked characteristic of their life. They are entirely ignorant of the meaning and effect of sexual intercourse. According to their belief, it has nothing to do with the actual production of offspring; at best it only prepares the woman for the entry of the spirit-child. Consequently a woman never knows when a spirit-child may enter her womb, and, as a result, wherever she may become aware that she has conceived a child it belongs to the totem of that locality irrespective of the totem to which she or her husband may belong. Hence, among the Arunta the exogamous classes are totally distinct from the totemic clans. The child inherits the *churinga nanja* of his ancestral spirit, and consequently belongs to his own ancestral totem. In some localities the spirits are particularly active, in others they are more otiose, but the result is the same in all cases—when the spirit-child enters a woman, the *churinga* is dropped. When the child is born, the mother tells the father the position of the tree or rock near to which she supposes the child to have entered her, and he and his friends then search for the dropped *churinga.* This is usually, but not always, supposed to be a stone one marked with the device peculiar to the totem of the spot, and therefore of the new-born child. If it should not be found, as is sometimes the case, a wooden one is made from the tree nearest to the *nanja,* and the device peculiar to the totem is carved upon it.

In each *oknanikilla,* or local totem centre, there is a spot known as the *ertnatulunga.* This is the sacred storehouse, usually some cave or crevice in some unfrequented spot among the hills carefully concealed. In it are numbers of the *churinga,* often carefully tied up in bundles. (With this custom and the ideas connected with it, Frazer ['Folklore in the Old Testament,' in *Anthropological Essays presented to E. B. Tylor*, Oxf. 1907] compares the phrase used in 1 S 25[29].) The name *churinga,* it should be noted, means a sacred and secret emblem. No woman, under pain of death, may ever pry into the secrets of the *ertnatulunga*; boys on initiation at puberty are allowed to see and handle their *churinga nanja*; it is part of the ceremony of admission to the mysteries of the tribe—but only a part. Another and very important part is the painting on face and body of the youth who has successfully passed through the ceremonies of initiation, and is considered worthy of the honour, with the device peculiar to his totem, and he is then taken to the *ertnatulunga.* The old women know that he has been there, though they know nothing of the ceremonies. To the younger women it is a matter of the deepest mystery, for no woman dare approach the gap in which is *the sacred rock-painting,* and near to which lies the *ertnatulunga.*

The above description of the beliefs and ceremonies of the Arunta was necessary to the full

understanding of our subject, and it has brought us at last to rock-paintings. These are not peculiar to the Arunta; they have been noted all over Australia. But those previously described are not of the special type which concerns our purpose, which are found among the Arunta. These rock-paintings fall into two groups: (*a*) ordinary rock-drawings similar to those already known, and corresponding with the drawings of the Palæolithic cave-people, the primitive Egyptians, Italians, and others, in many parts of the world, and the Bushmen among modern savages; and (*b*) certain other drawings which belong to a class of designs called *churinga ilkinia*, and regarded as sacred, or secret, mysteries, because they are associated with the totems. Each local totemic group has certain of these belonging to the group, and preserved on rock surfaces which are strictly tabu to the women, children, and uninitiated men. The designs on these *churinga ilkinia*, as on the *churinga nanja*, are each distinctive of some special totem, and are so understood by the initiated natives. Now these special totemic designs of the Arunta consist of precisely the same patterns as the rock-sculpturings or paintings which are the subject of this article. They may all be classed as cup- and ring-markings. There is the central dot corresponding to the cup, surrounded by concentric circles or semi-circles, and arranged in varying patterns, sometimes joined by lines which run through and connect them, exactly as the ducts do in the sculpturings,[1] and each varying pattern has its own distinctive meaning which the native at once recognizes. One pattern belongs to the Witchetty Grub totem, while others belong to the Emu, Kangaroo, Plum-tree, Snake, Sun, Moon, etc., totems, as the case may be.

Considering, then, that primitive man may be held to have everywhere, though with local modifications, passed through the same or similar stages in his evolution from the lower to the higher plane of social organization, we may hold that we are justified in assuming that in these Arunta drawings and designs, with their well-known and recognized significance, we have, as Wood-Martin suggested (*Pagan Ireland*, p. 47, note), the solution of our problem, and may with confidence assert that the basal meaning of cup- and ring-markings, wherever found, whether belonging to pre-historic primitive man in Europe or Asia, or to modern primitive man in Australia, is not religious, but social; that, wherever found, they were totemic in their origin, and are connected with magic but not with religion.

Thus these mysterious signs may with justice be said to constitute the 'heraldry of primitive man,' and they would be known and understood by all whom it might concern, even as the Arunta understand them to-day, just as the followers of a mediæval knight, his squires and men-at-arms, recognized the blazon on the shield of their lord, or the crest on his helmet in battle or joust, or the pennon fluttering from his castle keep, and as the flag is recognized among civilized nations at the present day.

It would take us too far to trace the possible connexion between the now discovered totemic significance of cup- and ring-markings and the *liṅgam*-cult or Nature-worship of a later stage of culture, but we may note the primitive phase of this idea in the Arunta theory of the spirit-child conceived beside some sacred rock or tree. A similar notion meets us, as Rivett-Carnac points out, in Switzerland and Italy, and probably further research would find it elsewhere also. The spirit-child belongs to the totem of the locality in which it is conceived, and the *churinga*—both the *nanja*, the portable stone or stick, and the *ilkinia*, the rock-drawing, each sacred and secret—is the totem-badge, bearing the special design peculiar to that totem. Here we have its living and present significance. Ancient rocks and stones inscribed with cup- and ring-markings are in many parts of Europe associated with ideas belonging to the worship of the generative powers. Menhirs and monoliths not only have those marks, but are themselves symbolic of the mystery of the reproduction of life. In Switzerland they are still known as 'the babies' stone,' and, bearing this primitive notion in mind, we may see a justification for describing simple cup-markings on standing stones as representing inverted female breasts, as is done in art. CANAANITES (vol. iii. p. 178[a]). With the same association of ideas in Brittany and other Celtic districts, childless women bring offerings to the menhir, and more than one standing-stone has been christianized by the placing of a cross upon its summit.

Finally, it is quite possible that in cup- and ring-markings we also behold one of the earliest efforts of mankind to convey ideas by means of signs, and that in this sense therefore they are a form of writing. The Arunta read their meaning both in the rock-paintings, the *churinga ilkinia*, and upon the sacred sticks or stones, the *churinga nanja*, and indeed have been known on occasion to employ the latter as 'message-sticks or stones,' although in their case the *churinga* is more in the nature of a safe-conduct, rendering the bearer tabu, than an actual means of conveying ideas. Other tribes, as the Itchimundi, employ real message-sticks, but they are merely a kind of tally to mark the heads of the message, and the markings have no special meaning as conventional signs to convey a definite announcement. Still these signs, and such as the Palæolithic folk inscribed on the pebbles at Mas d'Azil, or such as are found on Neolithic dolmens in Portugal and in certain parts of Scotland, may lie at the root of the alphabets of the Ægean, and form the germ of our European alphabets. But, if cup- and ring-markings are to be taken at all as a method of conveying ideas, *i.e.* as a method of writing, it can only be of the very rudest, compared with which oghams and runes are finished alphabets. It is better to take them simply as totemic signs, having regard to their Arunta affinity, and to relate them to heraldic tokens and modern potters' marks as being tribal and family badges and marks of ownership.

LITERATURE.—There is a succession of articles in *Journ. Brit. Archæol. Assoc.*, in the following order: vol. xvi. (1860), **Sir J. Gardner Wilkinson**, 'On the Rock-basins of Dartmoor'; xxix. (1873); **J. S. Phené**, 'On the Uniformity of Design and Purpose in the Works and Customs of the earliest Settlers in Britain'; xxxv. (1879), **J. Romilly Allen**, 'Pre-historic Rock-sculptures at Ilkley'; xxxvi. (1879), **C. W. Dymond**, 'Cup-Markings on Burley Moor'; xlviii. (1892), **Helen J. M. Russell**, 'A recent Discovery at Rome in Connection with Mythology and Symbolism in Britain,' also lii. (1896), 'Some Rock-cuttings in Northumberland'; lvi. (1900), lvii. (1901), lix. (1903), and lx. (1904), a series of articles by the present writer leading up to the conclusions arrived at in this article. The classical book on the subject, for its date, is, of course, **Sir J. Y. Simpson**, *Archaic Sculpturings of Cups, Circles, etc., upon Stones and Rocks*, Edinburgh, 1867. As regards the Arunta and other Australian natives, **Spencer-Gillen**[a] (1899), [b] (1904), and **Howitt** (1904) are the authorities. See also **E. S. Rivett-Carnac**, 'Cup-marks as an archaic Form of Inscription,' *Journ. R. Asiatic Soc.* 1903; **Andrew Lang**, *Magic and Religion*, London, 1901, with a chapter on '"Cup and Ring": An old Problem solved,' suggesting a very similar solution to that here put forward, and *The Secret of the Totem*, London, 1905, by the same author; **Lord Avebury**, *Pre-historic Times*[6], London, 1900; **R. Munro**, *Prehistoric Scotland*, Edinburgh, 1899; **W. Crooke**, *PR*[2], Westminster, 1896; **M. Hoernes**, *Urgesch. der bildenden Kunst in Europa*, Vienna, 1898, also *Der diluviale Mensch in Europa*, Brunswick, 1903; **E. B. Tylor**, *Prim. Cult.*[4], London, 1903; **J. Cooke**, *Wakeman's Handbook of Ir. Ant.*, London, 1903; **W. G. Wood-Martin**, *Pagan Ireland*, London, 1895; **S. R.**

[1] Munro (*op. cit.* p. 219) says, 'The cup-and-ring with gutter channels has not been found outside the British Isles,' but in Australia the line represents the 'gutter channel.'

Driver, *Modern Research as illustrating the Bible* (Schweich Lect.), London, 1909; R. A. S. Macalister, *Bible Side-lights from Gezer*, London, 1906; G. Schumacher, *Tell el-Mutesellim*, Leipzig, 1908. References to many additional sources of information are given in Lord Avebury's *Pre-historic Times*, and R. Munro's *Prehistoric Scotland*.

H. J. DUKINFIELD ASTLEY.

CURSING AND BLESSING.—1. Introductory.—Cursing and blessing are perfect opposites, and are therefore appropriately taken together for analysis and description. The preponderance of evil-wishing over good-wishing is obvious, but deserves consideration. Like the preponderance of evil spirits over good spirits in early religions, it points to absence of harmony or failure of adaptation in the relations of man to Nature and of man to man. But this very defect may be a condition of progress, a mark of the struggle.

The habit, in its twofold or polar aspect, is universal both in ordinary social life and in religion, organized and unorganized. It transcends all distinctions of race, and is, in fact, a permanent outcome of the working together of language and thought; for by this double mechanism are expressed wish and will, desire and determination, in that form which is, as it were, midway between psychosis and action. This does not imply that verbal utterance is a stage preceding action; we describe it as intermediate, just because cursing and blessing in their earlier forms have the appearance of being based on an unconscious theory that the word is nearer the end than is the wish, and that the act alone reaches, or rather is, the end. It follows that, in the fluid state of categorical thought which we assume for early culture, it would be both easy and natural to *assimilate* the spoken wish to the realized fact, by any appropriate means. Such artificial actualizing of the blessing or the curse is typical of all except the higher stages of the evolution. It will be illustrated later on. In passing, we may note that to describe such assimilation as a 'material' or 'concrete' tendency, or to describe the primitive mind as being essentially 'materialistic,' is to draw a false distinction. In view of the very rudimentary analysis of natural laws and of mental categories arrived at by early man, it is better to describe his mental operations by some such term as *holopsychosis*, or 'whole-thinking,' just as his language has been described as *holophrastic*. All the components are there, but they have not yet been resolved. The examples cited below will illustrate this also, besides serving to indicate that some of the earliest cases of human 'expression' are actually less material and less concrete than the latest.

The curse and the blessing are an excellent example of a product of the two powers—thought and word (or *logos*)—and of the inhibition of such a product from becoming fact. The reasons for the inhibition need no description; they are, however, the defining conditions of the curse or blessing as such, though these conditions are always, as it were, about to be transcended. This result is most conspicuous at the highest point of the curve traced by the general habit, and corresponding to a stage when words, as such, possess more *moment* than they do either before or after. As distinguished from desire on the one hand and from actualization (in artificial embodiment) on the other, the curse or the blessing *is* the spoken word. We may well suppose that the ascription to words of such super-verbal potency as a typical curse involves coincides with a period of mental evolution, and of linguistic evolution, when man became at last completely *conscious* of the 'power of speech,' of the faculty which he had so laboriously acquired. Then the word was *res*, not *nomen*. The arrival at such a point of realization amounts to a crystallizing out of at least one important category from the primal fluid of nervous life. It will be noticed that, if terms like 'concrete' and 'material' are employed, we must admit that the half-civilized and highly organized Moor is more 'primitive' than the lowest savage.

It also seems to the writer an unnecessary and illegitimate proceeding to draw a sharp division between the magical and the religious blessing or curse, or to assign priority to the former type. A savage Australian may curse his fellow mentally or verbally, in a form as far removed from magic as profane swearing among civilized men is from religion. Or, again, if he has a god, he may invoke him to execute his spoken wish. On the other hand, we find the higher religions frequently adopting a magical form; and we can sometimes trace the religious form passing into the magical. The distinction, in fact, between magic and religion, as the *form* of man's relation to his environment, seems to be a matter of temperament rather than of time. Two types certainly exist for cursing and blessing, and they will be fully discussed below; here it is premised that we have no right to assume the priority of the magical type, or even its exclusion, simultaneously, of the religious. There are, moreover, many neutral cases.

2. General character.—A curse or blessing is a wish, expressed in words, that evil or good may befall a certain person. The wish may be expressed by a god or spirit, in which case it is a *fiat*, and is wish, will, and fact in one. It may be expressed for the speaker's own good or ill. It may be, again, a mere wish or will; or an appeal to another (usually a supernatural) person to execute it; or accompanied by, or embodied in, a material object. This may be an image of the result desired; a vehicle of transmission; an object representing the curse or the blessing; or a physical action by the speaker to or towards the intended person.

For the uttered wish without condition, reference, or assimilative action, we may compare the case vividly described by Turner. The Samoan has a system of organized cursing, but at times he resorts to the natural method, and curses on his own responsibility. Discovering a theft from his garden, he shouts in a loud voice, 'May fire blast the eyes of the person who has stolen my bananas!' The cry 'rang throughout the adjacent plantations, and made the thief tremble. They dreaded such uttered imprecations.'[1] In Luang-Sermata, usual curses are: 'Evil shall devour you! Lightning shall strike you!' and so on.[2] Such is the type of the simple curse or blessing found in all races, and surviving belief in magic and in supernatural sanctions among the unthinking members of the highest civilization.

When accompanied by a material vehicle or embodiment or action, assimilative or assisting or symbolic, the adhesions of the wish become innumerable, for it links itself to the phenomena of every form of tabu, magic, and symbolism. At the back of all these there is the primary connexion with neuro-muscular discharge. Here the wish may be simultaneous with, or subsequent to, the impulsive action, just as will may be not prior to, but accompanying or following, an action of which it is the cerebral echo.

In Melanesia the act of blessing involves the bestowal of *mana* by physical contact. A man will give a boy a start in the world by placing his hand on the boy's head, thus imparting to him a portion of his own mysterious power.[3] In the Solomon Islands, inland people are supposed to have more *mana* than coast people. When they go down to the coast, they considerately avoid spreading out their fingers, for to point the fingers at a man is to shoot him with a 'charm.'[4] Blessing among the Masai consisted of spitting upon the recipient.[5] Far more common is the use of this vehicle for the curse, or as a symbol of contempt or insult.[6] So the Masai spat while cursing. 'If a man while cursing spits in his enemy's eyes, blindness is supposed to follow.'[7] The Sakai are believed to be able to do

[1] G. Turner, *Samoa*, Lond. 1884, p. 184.
[2] J. G. F. Riedel, *De sluik- en kroesharige rassen*, Hague, 1886, p. 317.
[3] R. H. Codrington, *JAI* x. [1881] 285.
[4] *Ib.* 303.
[5] J. Thomson, *Through Masai Land*, Lond. 1887, p. 165 ff.
[6] Riedel, 259, 295, 406.
[7] S. L. and H. Hinde, *Last of the Masai*, 1901, p. 48.

injury by 'sendings' and 'pointings.'[1] Among the Fiort of West Africa, a sale of property becomes complete when the seller has 'blessed' the article sold. He raises his hands to his arm-pits, and throws them out towards the buyer. Then he breathes or blows over the article. This ceremony is called *ku vana mula*, 'giving the breath,' and is equivalent, says Dennett, to a 'God bless thee.'[2] It seems rather to be a personal imposition of the speaker's good-will upon both buyer and thing bought, without any supernatural reference. There is here as yet no symbolism; the intention is immediate. Examples of symbolism might be multiplied indefinitely. The shaking off of the dust of the feet is a familiar case. In Morocco a suppliant at the *siyid* of a saint will call down misfortune upon an enemy by sweeping the floor with his cloak, praying that the enemy may be swept likewise.[3] It is hardly necessary to point out that mere impulsive action, deliberate magic, and symbolism shade into each other continually.

Among the Hebrews, a blessing was imparted by the imposition of hands.[4] In blessing a multitude, the hands were uplifted.[5] Refinements are inevitable: thus, in the Greek Church the gesture of benediction is made with the right hand, the thumb touching the tip of the ring-finger, the other fingers being erected. In the Latin use, the thumb, fore, and middle fingers are erected, the others being doubled on the palm of the hand. In the Rabbinical blessing, the priest places the fingers of both hands in pairs—the forefinger with the middle, the ring with the little finger, the tips of the thumbs, and the tips of the forefingers, respectively touching one another: thus the ten fingers are in six divisions.

Other components of the wish, as it becomes a rite, may also undergo differentiation. Thus the Talmud holds that the mere power of the spoken word is efficacious.[6] The priest pronounces the blessing in a loud voice. So, in Islām, an important detail is the audibleness of the benediction. The Talmud also speaks of cursing by an angry look. This needs to be fixed. Such a curse has been described as a 'mental curse.'[7] The *Yašts* have a remarkable dualistic personification—'the cursing Thought' of the Law of Mazda; the 'strong cursing thought of the wise man, opposing foes in the shape of a boar, a sharp-toothed he-boar, a sharp-jawed boar, that kills at one stroke, pursuing, wrathful, with a dripping face, strong and swift to run, and rushing all around.' On the other hand is the personification of 'the pious and good Blessing.' This Blessing (*āfriti*) is twofold—by thought and by words. It is notable that the blessing by words is the more powerful; but the curse (*upamana*) by thought is more powerful than that by words.[8]

The indeterminate character of primitive thought makes interchange easy between thought, idea, word, and act, and also between mechanical, psychical, and verbal force. Thus a curse or blessing may be regarded now as a spirit, now as a thing, now as a word, but in each case it is charged with energy. Or, again, it may be regarded as travelling along a material or psychical conductor, or as embodied in a material object, its energy then being potential, ready to become kinetic when discharged. It is important to note that these early views are held in comparatively late culture, especially in religion, and there show every sign of being living beliefs, not survivals.

When we remember the emphasis laid in all but the latest culture on words and names, we can appreciate the confusion, or rather the shifting, between the material and the verbal notion of a curse or blessing. Thus, in whatever form it is expressed, the curse or blessing, like all expressions of an idea enforced by strong emotion, has a dynamical certainty. Irish folklore has it that a curse once uttered must alight on something; it will float in the air seven years, and may descend any moment on the party it was aimed at; if his guardian angel but forsake him, it takes forthwith the shape of some misfortune, sickness, or temptation, and strikes his devoted head.[9]

'Curses' in old Teutonic proverbs 'operate quickly'; they are 'not to be turned aside.'[10] What Grimm describes as the 'savage heartiness' of the curses which he records is the emotional force which has so much to do with making an impression,

[1] Skeat and Blagden, *Pagan Races of the Malay Peninsula*, Lond. 1900, ii. 199.
[2] R. E. Dennett, *At the Back of the Black Man's Mind*, Lond. 1906, p. 48.
[3] Westermarck, 'L'Âr, or the Transference of Conditional Curses in Morocco,' *Anthropological Essays presented to E. B. Tylor*, Oxford, 1907, p. 371.
[4] Gn 48^{17}, Mt 19^{13}.
[5] Lv 9^{22}, Lk 24^{50}.
[6] *Ber.* 19*a*, 50*a*.
[7] C. Levias, in *JE*, *s.v.* 'Cursing.'
[8] *SBE* xxiii. ('Zend-Avesta,' ii.) 12, 153.
[9] Wood-Martin, *Elder Faiths of Ireland*, Lond. 1902, ii. 57 f.
[10] Grimm, *Teut. Myth.* (Eng. ed., Lond. 1888) iv. 1690.

whether in the direction of 'suggestion' to the victim or, generally, of the ascription of 'power' to the word or act. Emotional force as a factor in the making both of magic and of religion deserves recognition. It is well illustrated by blessings and cursings in their growth; when their forms are fixed, naturally the form is everything, and a curse uttered casually and without heat may still be efficacious. To the priestly blessing in the synagogue magical powers were ascribed, and the OT states that the word once pronounced is irrevocable.[1] The Talmud warns against looking at the priest while he is pronouncing the blessing, for 'the glory of God is on him.' It is a natural process of suggestion working through strength of emotion, fear of ill-will and enmity, and reinforced by a complex of associated ideas relating to the essence of words and the energy of souls, that gives to the curse or blessing its independent 'power.' As it is put by Westermarck, this

'purely magical power, independent of any superhuman will . . . is rooted in the close association between the wish, more particularly the spoken wish, and the idea of its fulfilment. The wish is looked upon in the light of energy which may be transferred—by material contact, or by the eye, or by means of speech—to the person concerned, and then becomes a fact. This process, however, is not taken quite as a matter of course; there is always some mystery about it.'[2]

Just as sin 'is looked upon as a substance charged with injurious energy,' so the curse is 'a baneful substance,'[3] like the materially conceived *badi* of the Malays, and the *l-bas* of the Moors. Good and evil in all but the higher stages of thought are constantly 'embodied,' either by analogy, personification, or the much more normal and prevalent mode of mere mental objectification. To illustrate this last we may compare the precisely identical method, used in science, of *conceiving* of a force as a graphic straight line.

This conception is characteristic of the curse and blessing in their social and religions history.

Arabs when being cursed will lie on the ground that the curse may fly over them.[4] Among the Nandi, 'if a son refuses to obey his father in any serious matter, the father solemnly strikes the son with his fur mantle. This is equivalent to a most serious curse, and is supposed to be fatal to the son unless he obtains forgiveness, which he can only do by sacrificing a goat before his father.'[5] Berbers strip before taking an oath, to prevent it from clinging to their clothes.[6] Plato speaks of being 'tainted by a curse.'[7] Arabs fear 'the magical nature' of an oath.[8] The 'water of jealousy' was believed by the Hebrews, as causing a curse, to go into the bowels, to make the belly to swell, and the thigh to rot.[9] The Kachinzes 'bless' their huts by sprinkling them with milk.[10] The Nubians, before eating the tongue of an animal, cut off the tip, believing that 'here is the seat of all curses and evil wishes.'[11] Among the islanders of Leti, Moa, and Lakor, a man who has quarrelled with a woman is afraid to go to war lest her curses may bring death.[12]

Hence the recipient of a curse is anxious to neutralize or divert it. In the last case cited the man is at pains to secure forgiveness by making presents to the woman. In Melanesia the curse is an engine of authority. A chief will curse a man by way of a legal 'injunction'; the matter is put right by the method of *toto*, the offering of a gift. On receiving this, the chief sacrifices to the spirit, *lio'a*, on whose power his curse rested.[13] In Samoa there is the same system, particularly for the enforcement of the rights of property. In a case of theft, the injured party gives the priest a fee of mats. The priest curses the thief; the latter, to avoid the otherwise inevitable result of sickness or death, deposits at the door of the priest an equivalent for the stolen property. Then the priest prays over 'the death bowl' that the curse may be 'reversed.'[14] The Maoris employed an elaborate ritual for cursing and its reversal. The latter was *whakahokitu*; the *tohunga* employed to counteract the curse chanted a *karakia* containing such words as these:

'Great curse, long curse,
Great curse, binding curse,
Come hither, sacred spell!
Cause the curser to lie low
In gloomy night!'[15]

[1] Gn 27^{35}.
[2] Westermarck, *MI*, 1906, i. 563.
[3] *Ib.* i. 55, 57.
[4] I. Goldziher, *Arab. Philol.*, Leyden, 1896, i. 29.
[5] Johnston, *Uganda Protectorate*, Lond. 1902, ii. 879.
[6] Westermarck, *MI*, i. 59.
[7] *Laws*, ix. 881.
[8] J. L. Burckhardt, *Bedouins and Wahábys*, Lond. 1830, p. 73.
[9] Nu $5^{11ff.}$
[10] J. G. Georgi, *Russia*, ed. 1780–3, iii. 275.
[11] G. Schweinfurth, *The Heart of Africa*, Lond. 1873, ii. 326 f.
[12] Riedel, 387.
[13] Codrington, *The Melanesians*, Oxf. 1891, p. 216.
[14] Turner, 30.
[15] E. Shortland, *Maori Religion*, Lond. 1882, p. 35.

The Todas have a curious ceremony for anticipating mischief to the sacred cattle. The point of the rite is that the assistant in the dairy, the *kaltmokh*, is cursed and then the curse is at once removed. The dairy-priest, the *palol*, pours milk and clarified butter into the outstretched hands of the *kaltmokh*, who rubs it over his head and whole body. The *palol* chants a curse: 'Die may he; tiger catch him; snake bite him; steep hill fall down on him; river fall on him; wild boar bite him!' etc. Rivers infers 'that the *kaltmokh* is being made responsible for any offence which may have been committed against the dairies. . . . The *kaltmokh* having been cursed, and so made responsible, the curse is then removed in order to avoid the evil consequences which would befall the boy if this were not done.'[1] Toda sorcerers impose diseases by cursing-spells, and remove them with some such formula as, 'May this be well; disease leave!'[2] Thus a blessing may neutralize a curse. Micah's mother cursed her son for his theft; when he confessed, she rendered the curse ineffective by a blessing.[3]

Blessings and curses are capable both of descent and of ascent, genealogically. Thus, we find it stated in Sir 23[11] that 'the scourge shall not depart from his house'; and in Pr 20[7] 'a just man that walketh in his integrity, blessed are his children after him.'

The Basutos appear to have the belief in the descent of the curse; Casalis compares it with the case of Noah and Ham.[4] The Greek conception of the Erinyes laid stress on this; a curse might work down to the grandchildren, and even utterly extirpate a race.[5] Among the Maoris, 'to bid you go and cook your father would be a great curse, but to tell a person to go and cook his great-grandfather would be far worse, because it included every individual who has sprung from him.'[6]

The energy of a curse may spread. As Irish folklore puts it, it 'must alight on something.' Plato speaks of it tainting everything with which it comes in contact.

The Bedawin will not take an oath within or near the camp, 'because the magical nature of the oath might prove pernicious to the general body of Arabs, were it to take place in their vicinity.'[7] The Moors hold that it is 'bad even to be present when an oath is taken.'[8]

A remarkable detail is very commonly found, namely, that a curse may return to the man who uttered it. 'Curses, like chickens, come home to roost'; 'they turn home as birds to their nest.'[9] The Karens have a story to the following effect:

'There was a man who had ten children, and he cursed one of his brethren, who had done him no injury; but the curse did the man no harm, and he did not die. Then the curse returned to the man who sent it, and all his ten children died.'[10]

Here there is a moral valuation, but the earlier non-moral conception of the intrinsic energy of the curse constitutes the point of the story. With it may be compared the Roman notion that certain imprecations were so awful that even the utterer suffered as well as his victim.[11]

As with the force of tabu and similar conceptions, physical contact is the most efficacious means of 'transmission.' If we regard the curse or blessing as being the mental idea of a desired material result, then, like all ideas in an impulsive brain, it produces motor energy in the form both of words and of action. Thus, besides the uttered form, we have, by association, paths of realization by means of sympathetic or symbolic action. Examples have been cited of such 'assisting' of the wish, by gestures, direct or indirect. We have also, by association, the more highly differentiated method of sympathetic or symbolic creation. A material model or symbol of the result is desiderated as a pre-embodiment of it; later this becomes a cause and a guarantee of the result. The simplest form of this method is the use of the 'wax image.' In this, model and symbol shade into one another. The image represents the recipient, and the utterer of the wish either utters it over the image, or works upon the image the material result wished for.

[1] Rivers, *The Todas*, 1906, p. 138 ff.
[2] *Ib.* 260.
[3] Jg 17[2].
[4] *Basutos*, 1861, p. 305.
[5] Æschylus, *Eumenides*, 934 ff.; Herod. vi. 86 (the case of Glaucus and family).
[6] Taylor, *Te Ika a Maui*[2], 1870, p. 94.
[7] Burckhardt, p. 73.
[8] Westermarck, *MI* i. 59.
[9] Grimm, iv. 1690.
[10] Mason, in *JAS Bengal*, xxxvii. [1868] 137.
[11] Plutarch, *Vita Crassi*, 16.

So far, we have cases in which the curse or blessing preserves its mental or verbal character, 'mental' being taken to include artistic materialization, as in sympathetic magic. For the curse or blessing, as such, is distinguished from physical injury or physical benefit precisely because it stops short of physical action by the subject upon the object. But the two were bound to be combined; the mixed type of curse and blessing is as common as the pure, and in certain stages of culture is considered to be the more efficacious. The bestowal of a blessing is more efficacious when the man who confers it touches the man who receives it. When dealing with 'vehicles' and 'media' of curses and blessings, we are not entitled to suppose that even in their highest development the mind is conscious of a process of 'conduction.' To us it appears obvious that, when a suppliant holds one end of a string to the other end of which is attached his protector, each should regard the string as a bridge or a wire for transmission. But it would be more logical to credit them with a correct, than an incorrect, application of a physical law, and to argue that they consider will to be conducted by any part of the ether rather than by the wire. It seems more consistent with the evidence to regard these 'conductors' as being merely the nearest thing to physical contact. The sense of touch is bound up with all direct physical action upon an object, well-doing and ill-doing, and colours all ideas of it. Similarly, when we read of curses acting at a distance—in the case of the Australian sorcerer at a hundred miles—we are not entitled to credit the belief with a reasoned or even unconscious substratum of a quasi-scientific theory of the velocity and displacement of an imprecatory particle. It is quite possible that in the case of 'conductors' of various magical 'forces,' such as food and drink, we have to deal as much with the associational idea of *property* as with that of kinship, or of contagion. With this proviso, such metaphors may be employed. Westermarck writes:

'The efficacy of a wish or a curse depends not only upon the potency which it possesses from the beginning, owing to certain qualities in the person from whom it originates, but also on the vehicle by which it is conducted—just as the strength of an electric shock depends both on the original intensity of the current and on the condition of the conductor. As particularly efficient conductors are regarded blood, bodily contact, food, and drink.'[1]

As early types of the ideas, referred to above, which are connected with that of the fulfilment of a wish, we may cite the following:

A Maori would say to a stone: 'If this were your (his enemy's) brain, how very sweet would be my eating of it. Or he might call any object by the name of his enemy, and then proceed to strike or insult it. This process was a 'curse,' *tapa tapa*, or *tuku tuku*.[2] Here is the material for the development of the image-method and the symbol-method. In the Toda curse the recipient apparently has it rubbed into his body with milk and butter. It is quite legitimate to regard this as a case where the sound and the breath 'touch' the food, and hence the recipient. The Moor transmits his 'conditional curse' to the man appealed to for protection by grasping him with his hands, or by touching him with his turban or a fold of his dress, even by grasping his child or his horse. 'In short, he establishes some kind of contact with the other person.'[3] Psychologically it is a case of prolepsis rather than the conduction of a curse whose fulfilment is only contingent. Similarly the Moorish suppliant may slay an animal at the door of the man. If the latter steps over the blood, or merely sees it, he incurs a conditional curse. Such a curse may be involved in the food eaten at a meal to seal a compact. The phrase runs that 'the food will repay' him who breaks it. The eaten food 'embodies a conditional curse.'[4] Conversely, for, as Westermarck puts it, 'the magic wire may conduct imprecations in either direction,' if a Moor gives food or drink to another, 'it is considered dangerous, not only for the recipient to receive it without saying "In the name of God," but also for the giver to give it without uttering the same formula by way of precaution.'[5] In the case of a stranger receiving milk, it is held that, should he misbehave, 'the drink would cause his knees to swell.'[6]

[1] *MI* i. 586.
[2] Taylor, 94
[3] Westermarck, i. 586.
[4] *Ib.* 587.
[5] *Ib.* i. 590.
[6] *Ib.*

On similar principles a curse may be applied to something that has belonged to the recipient, or to something that may come in his way.

The aborigines of Victoria 'believe that if an enemy gets possession of anything that has belonged to them, even such things as bones of animals which they have eaten, broken weapons, feathers, portions of dress, pieces of skin, or refuse of any kind, he can employ it as a charm to produce illness in the person to whom it belonged. They are, therefore, very careful to burn up all rubbish or uncleanness before leaving a camping-place. Should anything belonging to an unfriendly tribe be found at any time, it is given to the chief, who preserves it as a means of injuring the enemy. This *wuulon* is lent to any one of the tribe who wishes to vent his spite against any-one belonging to the unfriendly tribe. When used as a charm, the *wuulon* is rubbed over with emu fat, mixed with red clay, and tied to the point of a spear-thrower, which is stuck upright in the ground before the camp-fire. The company sit round watching it, but at such a distance that their shadows cannot fall on it. They keep chanting imprecations on the enemy till the spear-thrower turns round and falls in his direction.'[1]

This example contains in solution a good many of the principles connected with cursing. There is also the buried curse.

In Tenimber one can make a man ill by burying in his path such objects as sharp stones or thorns, uttering a curse during the burial. These articles are extracted later from the victim's body by the surgeon.[2] In the neighbouring islands of Leti, Moa, and Lakor, the buried articles are pieces of *sirih* from the victim's own box, or a scrap of his hair. The cursing accompanies the burial, but there is no need to place the 'embodied curse' in the man's path. Burial is enough, for here the object buried is a part of the man.[3]

Thus we come back to the symbolized result. Again, in connexion with *tabu* upon property, Codrington observes that in Melanesia

'a *tambu* approaches to a curse, when it is a prohibition resting on the invocation of an unseen power,' that, namely, of the *tindalo*.[4] In Ceram a trespasser incurs the sickness wished or determined by the owner who embodied it in a tabu-mark.[5] In Samoa the 'silent hieroglyphic taboo,' or *tapui*, contains a curse; thus, the white shark tabu, a coco-palm leaf cut to represent a shark, contains the wish, 'May the thief be eaten by a white shark!'[6]

Even before the ethical stage of the curse or blessing is reached, their force varies, chiefly according to the character of the wisher. There is, of course, to begin with, the mere 'power of the word' or of the wish; and the curse of any one, 'however ignorant' he may be, is not to be disregarded.[7] But, as a rule, superiority of personal power or position increases the power of the blessing or the curse.

Among the Tongans the curses of a superior possessed great efficacy; 'if the party who curses is considerably lower in rank than the party cursed,' the curse had no effect.[8] 'Without any dispute the less is blessed of the better.'[9] The principle of the *whakahokitu* ceremony of the Maoris is that a curse will yield to the *mana* of a man who can summon a more powerful *atua* than that of the original curser.[10]

The importance and influence of parents, especially of the father, have an enormous effect.

The Nandi regard a father's curse as being 'most serious.'[11] Among the Mpongwe 'there is nothing which a young person so much deprecates as the curse of an aged person, and especially that of a revered father.'[12] The Moorish proverb has it that 'if the saints curse you the parents will cure you, but if the parents curse you the saints will not cure you.'[13] The Hebrew belief in the inevitable efficacy of a father's blessing or curse was remarkable. The blessing was regarded as an invaluable heritage. 'In deed and word honour thy father, that a blessing may come upon thee from him. For the blessing of the father establisheth the houses of children; but the curse of the mother rooteth out the foundations.'[14] From this passage it has been suggested that 'the reward which in the Fifth Commandment is held out to respectful children was originally a result of parental blessings.'[15] The Scots proverb is similar:

'A faither's blessin' bigs the toun;
A mither's curse can ding it doun.'[16]

In Greece such beliefs were no less strong. Plato puts it that 'the curses of parents are, as they ought to be, mighty against their children, as no others are.' And he instances the cursing of their sons by Œdipus, Amyntor, and Theseus. The man who assaulted his parent was polluted by a curse.[1] According to the Koreans, 'curses and disgrace in this life and the hottest hell in the world hereafter are the penalties of the disobedient or neglectful child.'[2]

The last two cases show the automatic production of a curse by the sin itself—a notion distinctly tending towards the ethical development of these relations.

The Barea and Kunáma believe that the blessing of the old people is necessary for the success of any undertaking, and that their curse is inevitably efficacious.[3] Even elder brothers and sisters among the Greeks had the preponderance in this respect over the younger; 'the Erinyes always follow the elder-born.'[4]

The curse or blessing of the dying is particularly strong.[5]

The Ova-Herero chief, when about to die, 'gives them his benediction,' a wish for 'an abundance of the good things of this world.'[6] Similarly among the Hebrews and the Arabs.[7] Among the Bogos the blessing of a father or a master is essential before taking up an employment or relinquishing it, engaging in a business, or contracting a marriage.[8] The Moors say that 'the curse of a husband is as potent as that of a father.'[9] Westermarck points out that 'where the father was invested with sacerdotal functions—as was the case among the ancient nations of culture—his blessings and curses would for that reason also be efficacious in an exceptional degree.'[10]

Obviously the wishes of one who is professionally in touch with the magical or the supernatural are more efficacious than those of ordinary men.

'The anathema of a priest,' say the Maoris, is 'a thunderbolt that an enemy cannot escape.'[11] A Brāhman 'may punish his foes by his own power alone,' viz. by his words.[12] A Rājput rāja, being cursed by Brāhmans, was 'under a ban of excommunication' even among his friends.[13] There is a story that the curse of a Brāhman girl brought a series of disasters on a rāja and his kindred.[14] According to the Talmud, the curse of a scholar never fails.[15] The Gallas dread the dying curse of a priest or wizard.[16] In Muhammadan countries the curses of saints or sharifs are particularly feared.[17]

The belief in the power of curses and blessings has a striking and widely extended application in the relations of the well-to-do with the poor and needy, and of the host with the guest. In the former case the idea that the blessing of those who have nothing else to give, or the curse of those who have no other remedy, is therefore efficacious, may have some connexion with the belief and practice. In the latter case may perhaps be seen a naturally regardful attitude towards the unknown and therefore mysterious.

'He that giveth unto the poor shall not lack; but he that hideth his eyes shall have many a curse.'[18] 'Turn not away thine eyes from one that asketh of thee, and give none occasion to a man to curse thee; for if he curse thee in the bitterness of his soul, he that made him will hear his supplication.'[19] The Greek beggar had his Erinys.[20] The Damaras 'would not think of eating in the presence of any of their tribe without sharing their meal with all comers, for fear of being visited by a curse from their *Omu-kuru* (or deity) and becoming impoverished.'[21] In Morocco, itinerant scribes go from house to house, 'receiving presents and invoking blessings' upon the donors. For the latter it is 'a profitable bargain, since they would be tenfold repaid for their gifts through the blessings of the scribes.' A Moor starting on a journey gives a coin to a beggar at the gate 'so as to receive his blessings.'[22] The Nayādis of Malabar invoke, in their prayers, blessings upon the higher castes who give them alms.[23] Among the Ova-Herero 'no curse is regarded as heavier than that which one who has been inhospitably treated would hurl at those who have driven him from the hearth.'[24] An offended guest 'might burn the house with the flames of his anger.'[25] Guests and suppliants had their Erinyes.[26] To

1 J. Dawson, *Australian Aborigines*, Melbourne, 1881, p. 54.
2 Riedel, 304.
3 *Ib.* 377.
4 *The Melanesians*, 216.
5 Riedel, 140.
6 Turner, 185.
7 *Megilla*, 15*a*.
8 Mariner, *Tonga Islands*, 1817, ii. 238.
9 He 77.
10 Shortland, 75.
11 Johnston, ii. 879.
12 J. L. Wilson, *Western Africa*, 1856, p. 393.
13 Westermarck, i. 622.
14 Sir 3[8f].
15 Westermarck, i. 022.
16 Grimm, iv. 1690.

1 *Laws*, ix. 881.
2 Griffis, *Corea*, 1882, p. 236.
3 Munzinger, *Ostafr. Studien*, Schaffhausen, 1864, p. 475.
4 Homer, *Il.* xv. 204.
5 Grimm, *l.c.*
6 Andersson, *Lake Ngami*, 1856, p. 228.
7 Cheyne, *EBi* i. 592; Wellhausen, *Reste*[2], 1897, pp. 139, 191.
8 Munzinger, *Sitten u. Recht der Bogos*, Winterthur, 1859, p. 90.
9 *MI* i. 626.
10 *Ib.* i. 627.
11 Polack, *New Zealanders*, 1840, i. 248 f.
12 Manu, xi. 32 f.
13 Chevers, *Medical Jurisprudence for India*, Calcutta, 1870, p. 659.
14 Crooke, *PR*, 1896, i. 193.
15 *Makkoth*, 11*a*.
16 Harris, *Highlands of Ethiopia*, 1844, iii. 50.
17 Westermarck, i. 563.
18 Pr 28[27].
19 Sir 4[5f].
20 Homer, *Od.* xvii. 475.
21 Chapman, *South Africa*, 1868, i. 341.
22 Westermarck, i. 562.
23 Iyer, *Madras Mus. Bulletin*, iv. [1894] 72.
24 Ratzel, *Hist. of Mankind*, 1896–98, ii. 480.
25 *Āpastamba*, ii. 3. 3 (*SBE* ii. 114).
26 Plato, *Epp.* viii. 357.

the case of hospitality Westermarck applies the principle of the 'conditional curse,'[1] which will be discussed below.

Parallel with the case of the poor and needy is that of the servant and the wife.

In West Africa 'the authority which a master exercises over a slave is very much modified by his constitutional dread of witchcraft.'[2] 'Slander not a servant unto his master, lest he curse thee.'[3] 'Thou shalt not command [thy man-servant or thy maid-servant] with bitterness of spirit; lest they groan against thee, and wrath be upon thee from God.'[4] 'In Morocco it is considered even a greater calamity to be cursed by a Shereefa, or female descendant of the Prophet, than to be cursed by a Shereef.'[5] 'The houses,' says Manu, 'on which female relations, not being duly honoured, pronounce a curse, perish completely, as if destroyed by magic.'[6]

3. **Special applications.**—The circumstances in which blessings or curses are uttered, and the persons upon whom they are directed, are obviously both numerous and varied. A few special cases may be cited, which have a bearing upon the nature of the uttered wish. Children, in particular, are the recipients of the blessings of parents.[7]

The blessing of Ephraim and Manasseh by Jacob became among the Jews the regular formula by which parents blessed their children. Among the Malagasy, at a circumcision, the guests present honey and water to the children, and pronounce blessings upon them, such as 'May they prosper!'[8] Among the Maoris, when a child was a month old, the ceremony of *tua* was celebrated, in which the *tohunga* pronounced a *karakia* of blessing: 'Breathe quick, thy lung,' etc.[9] Jewish teachers to-day bless their pupils. In Fiji all prayer was concluded with malignant requests against the enemy: 'Let us live, and let our enemies perish!'[10]

The curse is particularly the weapon of the wronged and oppressed against their more powerful enemies, and of zealots against their bigoted opponents. In the Bible it is especially forbidden to curse God, parents, authorities, and the helpless deaf.[11] To bless God is to praise Him. Yet Orientals have a tendency to curse God, even on the slightest provocation in daily life.[12] Blessing the king is implied or explicit in ceremonies of coronation, and on solemn occasions.

The gods of Egypt bestowed a blessing on the Pharaoh, when they presented him with the symbol of life.[13] The *abhiṣeka* of the rāja included a blessing, embodied in the consecrated water: 'O water, thou art naturally a giver of kingdoms, grant a kingdom to my Yajamāna'; 'O honeyed and divine ones, mix with each other for the strength and vigour of our Yajamāna.'[14] The ceremonies of anointing and the like often involve a blessing.[15] In the last example, the vehicle is personified. A Jewish author records a Roman custom of gagging prisoners, when condemned to death, to prevent them from cursing the king.[16]

The connexion of food with the practice is remarkable. The blessing of food came in later Judaism to be a giving of thanks, and the idea was that food received gratefully acts as a blessing.[17] The *bismillah* of Islām has a similar principle behind its use in this connexion. At an earlier stage, no doubt, the blessing, if used, was either positive or negative, removing injurious properties, but in either case simply magical.[18]

In the Banks Islands an 'invocation of the dead,' the *tataro*, is celebrated. Food is thrown for the souls of the dead with such words as these: 'They who have charmed your food, have clubbed you . . . drag them away to hell, let them be dead.' In connexion with this is a practice of cursing a man's 'eating'; if an accident befalls the recipient of such a curse, the utterer says: 'My curse in eating has worked upon him, he is dead.'[19] Among the Maoris, what was almost a sense of modesty and a principle of honour grew up about the ideas of food and its preparation. A typical formula for the counter-curse is:

'Let the head of the curser
Be baked in the oven,
Served up for food for me,
Dead, and gone to Night!'[20]

To curse, *kanga*, was in effect to apply to another man any word which 'had reference to food.' It is recorded that a young man, seeing a chief in a copious perspiration, remarked that 'the vapour rose from his head like steam from an oven,' and that this remark caused a tribal war.[1] The regular term for food, *kai*, was discontinued at Rotorua, because it happened to be the name of a chief. To use the term *kai* would in that case have been equivalent to a serious curse against the chief.[2]

Down to a late period in the history of Christianity, marriage was a personal 'arrangement'; the Church only stepped in to pronounce its blessing upon the union. The Hebrews had a benediction both for betrothal and for marriage.[3] The old Roman marriage by *confarreatio* included a *benedictio*, formulæ for which are extant. When St. Ambrose says that 'marriage is sanctified by the benediction,' he refers to one case only of a general practice, lasting through the Middle Ages, of concluding all private arrangements with a blessing. Thus all sales of goods and property were blessed.

The application of the curse as a protection of property and as a method of punishing theft has been incidentally noted. The early Arabs cursed the thief in order to recover the stolen goods.[4] The method is conspicuous in Samoa. Tabu is 'a prohibition with a curse expressed or implied.'[5] The embodiment of the wish in leaf or wooden images is termed in Polynesia *rahui* or *raui*, but we cannot always infer even the implied wish in prohibitory *tabu*.[6] Allied principles inevitably shade into each other. The ancient Babylonian landmarks appear to have been inscribed with curses, such as: 'Upon this man may the great gods Anu, Bêl, Ea, and Nusku look wrathfully, uproot his foundation, and destroy his offspring.'[7] The same practice was followed by the Greeks.[8] Deuteronomy refers to the Semitic practice: 'Cursed be he that removeth his neighbour's landmark.'[9] Taken over by Christianity, the practice survived, for example, in the English custom of 'beating the bounds,' in which the priest invoked curses on him who transgressed, and blessings on him who regarded the landmarks.[10]

Some details may be put together which illustrate adhesions and developments. In Melanesia cursing by way of asseveration is common: a man will deny an accusation 'by' his forbidden food, or 'by' a *tindalo*.[11] The self-invoked curse, which we shall discuss below, passes in civilization into a conditional blessing, as in the English oath, 'So help me, God.' In practical ethics 'profane swearing' is originally sinful, because of the irresponsible and unofficial use of the Divine name; later its sinfulness is limited to the spirit of resentment with which it is charged. In Melanesia, the practice of *vivnag*, or 'sending off,' is instructive for comparison with that found in civilization. A man will say, with a gesture towards a tree, *vawo aru!*—which is equivalent to telling his enemy to be hanged thereon.[12]

The limits of the blessing are well preserved in the Catholic distinctions between *panis benedictus* and *panis consecratus*, and between *benedictio vocativa* and *benedictio constitutiva*. The earlier principle, as we have seen, was to connect blessing and consecration, cursing and execration. It is in accordance with the extension of this principle that the curse is embodied in the 'accursed thing,' and that the transgressor of the

1 *Essays to E. B. Tylor*, 361 ff.; *MI* i. 586, ii. 584 f.
2 Wilson, 271, 179.
3 Pr 30[10].
4 *Apost. Const.* vii. 13.
5 Westermarck, *MI* i. 668.
6 Manu, iii. 58.
7 Gn 9[26] 24[60] 27[27-38].
8 Ellis, *Hist. of Madagascar*, 1838, p. 183.
9 Shortland, 40.
10 L. Fison, in Codrington, 147.
11 Ex 22[28] 21[17], Lv 20[9] 19[14] 24[15], Ec 10[20].
12 C. Levias, in *JE*, *s.v.* 'Cursing.'
13 Wilkinson, *Anc. Egyptians* (1878 ed.), i. 276.
14 Rājendralāla Mitra, *Indo-Aryans*, Calcutta, 1881, ii. 3, 37 ff., 46 ff.
15 See art. ANOINTING, vol. i. p. 549.
16 Levias, *l.c.* 390.
17 Adeney, in *HDB*, *s.v.* 'Blessing.'
18 Crawley, *Mystic Rose*, 1902, p. 149.
19 Codrington, 147.
20 Shortland, 33.

1 Taylor, 94.
2 *Ib.* 95.
3 Selden, *Uxor Hebraica*, 1726, i. 12; To 7[13f.].
4 Wellhausen, *Reste*[2], 192.
5 Codrington, 215.
6 White, *Journ. Polyn. Soc.* i. [1892] 275.
7 Trumbull, *Threshold Covenant*, 1896, p. 166 ff. (quoting Hilprecht).
8 Plato, *Laws*, viii. 843; Hermann, *De terminis apud Græcos*, Göttingen, 1846, p. 11.
9 Dt 27[17].
10 Dibbs, in *Chambers's Journal*, xx. (1853) 49 ff.
11 Codrington, 217.
12 *Ib.* 217.

prohibition himself becomes the 'accursed thing' or the curse. This was the case with Achan, and with enemies 'devoted' to destruction.[1] On the same principle a blessed man is a 'blessing.'[2]

In the OT 'accursed' (AV), *ḥērem*, should be 'devoted' (RV)—devoted to God, not accursed from God.[3] Similarly with the Greek translation *ἀνάθεμα*. Such a thing is withdrawn from common use, either as 'vowed' to God, or as put under a ban, in which case it has a species of 'holiness.'[4] As a rule, a thing devoted to destruction is under a curse. In Canon Law the development of *anathema* into excommunication is complete.

Here we arrive at the cursings and blessings of the community. In early culture a headman or body of 'old men' may represent the community in this function.

The State officials of Athens prayed for 'the health and safety of the people.' Greek State-liturgies included a 'commination service,' in which curses were invoked upon offenders.[5] Mediæval and modern Christianity combine a service of commination with the Lenten penance. This has historical connexion with the early Hebrew rite, celebrated on Ebal and Gerizim. Six tribes stood on Mount Ebal to curse those who disobeyed the Law, and six stood on Mount Gerizim to pronounce the corresponding blessings upon those who kept it. The priests and Levites stood in the valley between, and on turning their faces to Gerizim pronounced a blessing, and on turning them to Ebal pronounced a curse.[6] The Talmudic idea that a curse has especial efficacy when pronounced three hours after sunrise is noteworthy in connexion with such formulated conditions as 'in the sight of God and of this congregation.'[7]

Throughout their history, private cursing and blessing preponderate over public, and unofficial over official. As the moralized stage in religion supersedes the magical, the 'mere power of the word' is confined to private practice, and perhaps becomes more sinister with secrecy. The enormous collections of private *diræ* and *imprecationes* which have survived from Greek and Roman times, chiefly in the form of leaden tablets or symbolic nails, inscribed with curses consigning an enemy to the infernal powers, testify to the hold retained by the primitive theory of the curse, just as the prevalence of profane swearing in modern civilization shows the convenience of the mere form, emptied of all content except vague resentment, for the satisfaction of a particular emotion. The hold exerted by the simple mystery of magic upon the popular imagination is echoed in literature, and the motive of the efficacious curse is still employed in narrative fiction.

Nothing perhaps more strikingly illustrates the extent of Divine resentment than the cursing of the ground for the sins of man (Gn $3^{17f.}$), or the extent of human resentment than the action of a curse beyond the grave.

The Maoris took precautions to prevent enemies from getting possession of their dead relatives' bones, lest they should 'dreadfully desecrate and ill-use them, with many bitter jeers and curses.'[8] The Banks Islanders watch the grave 'lest some man wronged by him [the dead man] should come at night and beat with a stone upon the grave, cursing him.' Also, 'when a great man died, his friends would not make it known, lest those whom he had oppressed should come and spit at him after his death, or *govgov* him, stand bickering at him with crooked fingers and drawing in the lips, by way of curse.'[9] The Greek Erinyes complete in the world beyond the grave the punishment which they began on earth.[10] The Arabs of Southern Morocco 'maintain that there are three classes of persons who are infallibly doomed to hell, namely, those who have been cursed by their parents, those who have been guilty of unlawful homicide, and those who have burned corn. They say that every grain curses him who burns it.'[11]

The connexion between curses and the belief in punishments after death has been drawn out by Westermarck.[12]

1 Jos 6^{18}, Dt 7^{26}. 2 Gn 12^{3}.

3 *HDB*, *s.v.* 'Curse'; cf. Driver on Dt 7^{2}.

4 Cf. Lv $27^{28f.}$, Ac 23^{12}; for the transition between the earlier idea and excommunication, see Ezr 10^{8}.

5 See L. R. Farnell, *Evolution of Religion*, 1905, pp. 196. 200.

6 Dt 11^{29} 27^{13}, Jos 8^{33}; *Soṭa* 35*a*, 36*a*; Broydé, in *JE*, *s.v.* 'Gerizim.'

7 Levias, *l.c.* 8 Colenso, *Maori Races*, 1865, p. 28.

9 Codrington, 269. 10 Æsch. *Eumen.*, *passim*.

11 *MI* ii. 716 n. 12 *Ib.* chs. l. li.

In what may be called the lighter side of cursing, there is a curious set of customs connected with ideas of luck, and perhaps based on the notion that material injury may be discounted or diverted by a verbal or make-believe injury; in other cases, on a notion that the spirits may be stimulated by scolding and abuse; in others, again, it is perhaps evil and obstructive spirits that are being driven away.

Thus the Greek farmer, when sowing cummin, would curse and swear all the time, else the crop would not prosper.[1] Esthenian fishermen believe that good luck will attend their fishing if beforehand they are cursed. A fisherman will accordingly play some practical joke on a friend in order to receive his resentment in words. The more he storms and curses, the better the other is pleased; every curse brings at least three fish into his net.[2] To obviate punishment for ritual sin, or to 'procure absolution,' a Behari man will throw stones into a neighbour's house. The result is the reception of abuse, or even of personal violence.[3]

4. Conditional cursing and blessing.—What Westermarck terms the 'conditional curse,' which he was the first student to remark, is an important development of the principle of cursing and blessing, and has had considerable influence in the making of morality, especially in the sphere of good faith, honesty, and truthfulness. Put in its lowest terms, the energy of a conditional curse is the supernatural energy of an ordinary curse or of its embodiment, in a latent state. This is discharged by the act, if or when it takes place, against which the curse is directed. The principle applies also to blessings, but this application is less frequent.[4]

'The term *l-'âr*,' Westermarck writes, 'is applied by the Moors to a compulsory relation of a peculiar kind in which one person stands to another. The common expression, *Âna f'âr allâh u 'ârak*, "I am in God's *'âr* and your *'âr*," implies that a man is bound to help me, or, generally, to grant my request, whatever it may be, as also that if he does not do so his own welfare is at stake. The phrase "In God's *'âr*" only serves to give solemnity to the appeal: "I am under the protection of God, and for his sake you are obliged to help me." But the word *l-'âr* is also used to denote the act by means of which a person places himself in the said relationship to another. *Hâd l-'âr 'âlik*, "This is *'âr* on you," is the phrase in common use when an act of this kind is performed. If the person so appealed to is unwilling to grant the request, he answers, *Hâd l-'âr yiḥrûż fik*, "May this *'âr* recoil upon you." The constraining character of *l-'âr* is due to the fact that it implies the transference of a conditional curse:—If you do not do what I wish you to do, then may you die, or may your children die, or may some other evil happen to you. That *l-'âr* implicitly contains a conditional curse is expressly stated by the people themselves, although in some cases this notion may be somewhat vague, or possibly have almost faded away.'[5]

The various acts which establish *l-'âr* all serve as 'outward conductors of conditional curses.' *'Âr* may be made by taking the son and giving him to the father, saying, 'This is *'âr* for you.' Another method is to present food. If the man accepts, he is bound to do what is asked of him. Refugees enter a tent or merely grasp the tent-pole, saying, 'I am in God's *'âr* and your *'âr*.'[6] An injured husband may put *'âr* upon the governor, to get redress, by going to him with a piece of his tent-cloth over his head; or he may leave seven tufts of hair on his head, and appeal to another tribe. 'The conditional curse is obviously supposed to be seated in' the tent-cloth or tufts of hair, and 'from there to be transferred to the person' invoked. *'Âr* may be made by piling stones. Two men making an appointment, and one failing to appear, the other makes a cairn at the spot, and takes the breaker of faith to it. The latter is then obliged to 'give him a nice entertainment.' Similarly, with ordinary curses the cairn may be used. If a muleteer buys a new mule, his comrades ask him to treat them. If he refuses, they

1 Theophrastus, *Hist. Plant.* viii. 3.

2 Boecler-Kreutzwald, *Der Ehsten abergläubische Gebrauche*, 1854, p. 90 f., quoted by Frazer, *GB*[2] i. 97.

3 *JASB* ii. [1892] 598; *JRAS* xxix. [1897] 482.

4 Westermarck, 'L'Âr,' *passim*, also 'The Influence of Magic on Social Relationships,' in *Sociological Papers* (1905), *MI* i. 586 ff., ii. 584 ff., and *passim*.

5 'L-'Âr,' 361. 6 *Ib.* 362.

make a cairn, asking God to send misfortune on the mule. By way of revenge upon a niggardly man, scribes make a cairn, and each takes a stone therefrom, and, as he throws it away, says: 'As we dispersed this heap of stones, so may God disperse for him that which makes him happy.' The sacrifice of an animal on the threshold is the most powerful method of making *'âr*. To see the blood is sufficient. Over such an animal the *bismillāh*, 'In the name of God,' is not pronounced; and it cannot be eaten by the sacrificer or the person invoked, but only by the poor.[1] The practice

'is resorted to for a variety of purposes: to obtain pardon from the government; or to induce the relatives of a person who has been killed to abstain from taking revenge; or to secure assistance against an enemy or mediation in the case of trouble.' It 'plays a very important part in the social life of the people.'[2]

It is also employed to put pressure upon *jinn* and dead saints—usually to restrain the former, and compel the assistance of the latter. Making cairns, or tying rags, near a *sîyid* is *'âr* upon the saint. The rag is knotted, and the man says: 'I promised thee an offering, and I will not release thee until thou attendest to my business.'[3] Here we approach the conditional 'blessing.' Again, a man, invoking revenge, strews burnt corn on the floor of the *sîyid*, saying: 'I threw, O saint, So-and-so as I threw this corn.' 'This is *'âr* on the saint,' as Westermarck points out, 'but at the same time it is an act of symbolic magic.'[4]

Forms of ordeal, and the whole theory of the oath, as well as its practice up to the latest stages of civilization, depend on the principle of the conditional curse, often embodied in symbolic action.

The curse as an engine of law is well exemplified in Samoa. A theft has taken place; the injured party pays the 'priest' to curse the thief and make him sick. If the thief falls ill, he restores the stolen property, and the 'priest' prays for a reversal of the curse. Again, suspected parties are summoned by the chief. Grass is laid on the sacred stone, the village-god, and each person places his hand thereon, saying: 'I lay hand on the stone. If I stole the thing, may I speedily die!' The use of grass is said to refer to the implied curse: 'May grass grow over my house and family!' So, in ordinary disputes, a man will say: 'Touch your eyes if what you say is true.'[5] In the same way, European boys 'touch wood' as a guarantee of truth.

An oath may be regarded as 'essentially a conditional self-imprecation, a curse by which a person calls down upon himself some evil in the event of what he says not being true.'[6] All the resources of symbolic magic are drawn upon in the multitudinous examples of this principle.

In Tenimber the swearer prays for his own death if what he says is false, and then drinks his own blood, in which a sword has been dipped.[7] The Malay drinks water in which daggers, spears, or bullets have been dipped, saying: 'If I turn traitor, may I be eaten up by this dagger or spear!'[8] The Sumatran oath is still more explicit: 'If what I now declare is truly and really so, may I be freed and cleared from my oath; if what I assert is wittingly false, may my oath be the cause of my destruction!'[9] The Greek ὅρκος was, at an early period, the object sworn 'by.' The Ostyaks swear on the nose of a bear, which animal is held to have supernatural power.[10] Hindus swear on the Sanskrit *Harivaṁśa*, or on water of the Ganges, or touch the legs of a Brāhman; Muhammadans, on the Qur'ān; Christians, on the Bible.[11]

The accused person in Calabar drinks a ju-ju drink called *mbiam*, and repeats these words: 'If I have been guilty of this crime . . . then, Mbiam, *Thou* deal with me!'[12] 'Eating the fetish' and 'drinking the water of cursing' are prominent forms of the ordeal in Africa and elsewhere. The Hindu *śapatha* denotes both oath and ordeal. The mediæval 'trial by combat' was preceded by an oath, and thus defeat was tantamount to perjury.[13] The formula of the ordeal of the Eucharist ran: 'Et si aliter est quam dixi et juravi, tunc hoc Domini nostri Jesu Christi corpus non pertranseat guttur meum, sed haereat in faucibus meis, strangulet me suffocet me ac interficiat me statim in momento.'[1]

In the contract and covenant a mutual conditional curse is largely used.

Thus the *'ahd* of the Moors is the mutual form of *'âr*. Chiefs exchange cloaks or turbans; and 'it is believed that, if any of them should break the covenant, he would be punished with some grave misfortune.'[2] Reconciliation is effected, among the same people, by joining right hands; the holy man who superintends wraps the hands in his cloak, saying: 'This is *'ahd* between you.'[3] A common meal also ratifies a covenant. If one party breaks faith, it is said: 'God and the food will repay him.'[4] In the *pela* rite of Ceram, celebrated to settle a quarrel or to make peace, both parties attend a feast, and eat food into which drops of their blood are let fall and swords dipped. This they alternately eat.[5] Reconciliation of two men in the islands of Leti, Moa, and Lakor, one man having cursed the other, is effected by the men eating together.[6] To ratify a bond of fraternity in Madagascar between two parties, a fowl has its head cut off, and is left bleeding during the rite. The parties pronounce a long mutual imprecation over the blood: 'O this miserable fowl weltering in its blood! Thy liver do we eat. . . . Should either of us retract from the terms of this oath, let him instantly become a fool, let him instantly become blind, let this covenant prove a curse to him.'[7]

The mutual conditional curse, it must be noticed, allows the curse proper to be more or less lost in the material symbolism of union. Since, moreover, all these analogous principles pass into one another so inevitably and gradually, we do not seem entitled to press the principle of the curse too far. In reconciliatory ceremonies, for instance, it is possible that the idea of union is sufficient; the idea of the curse may adhere to it, but not essentially.

The oath carries with it the punishment for perjury. According to Roman legal theory, the *sanctio* of a statute is the penalty attached for breaking it. But in ancient States all laws were accompanied by a curse upon the transgressor.[8] True to its mission of serving where other methods fail, the curse receded as police efficiency increased. In the earliest culture, however, as that of the Australians, the personal efforts of the rulers work together with the impersonal energy of the supernatural engines they employ.

5. The blessing and the curse as invocations.—The distinction between the 'magical' and the 'religious' curse or blessing is not to be overemphasized. The two forms merge into one another, and either is as 'magical' or 'religious' as the other, while neither is the more efficacious. A god draws together in his own person the various threads of supernatural force. Among these are cursings and blessings. Their inherent mystery of power still depends on the will of the utterer. His invocation of the god to execute for him his heart's expressed desire is rather a long circuiting than a guarantee of the result. The independent force of the wish, in fact, tends to remain even when the wish is merged in prayer. The personal quality of the utterer is still the characteristic of his wish. Psychologically, it is difficult to limit a desire by making it an invocation; to divide the attention between the object of the desire and the expression of the desire on the one hand, and an intervening divinity on the other, is a matter of training. Thus it is rarely the case that, when a man says 'God bless you!' he is conscious of the reference to God, any more than when he says 'Bless you!'

Further, there is the tendency for the principle of the curse, if not of the blessing, to become itself personified. This result is found as far back as the stage of culture represented by the Maoris. The 'cursing thought' is personified in the Avesta; so is the 'pious and good blessing.' The Greeks personified the curse as Erinys. Behind this there may be the notion 'of a persecuting ghost, whose

1 Westermarck, 'L-'Âr,' 363 ff. 2 *Ib.* 366.
3 *Ib.* 369. 4 *Ib.* 371. 5 Turner, 30, 184.
6 Westermarck, *MI* ii. 118. 7 Riedel, 284.
8 W. W. Skeat, *Malay Magic*, 1900, p. 525.
9 W. Marsden, *Sumatra*, 1811, p. 238.
10 Castrén, quoted by Westermarck, *MI* ii. 119.
11 Westermarck, ii. 120 (quoting authorities).
12 M. H. Kingsley, *West Africa*, 1897, p. 465.
13 Westermarck, i. 505, ii. 689 (with authorities).

1 Dahn, *Bausteine*, Berlin, 1879, ii. 16.
2 Westermarck, ii. 623. 3 *Ib.*
4 'L-'Âr,' 373. 5 Riedel, 128 f.
6 *Ib.* 342. See, on the whole subject, Crawley, *Mystic Rose*, chs. v. xi.
7 Ellis, i. 187 ff. 8 Schrader, *KB* ii. iii.

anger or curses in later times were personified as an independent spirit.'[1] Allegorical figures of curses were included by painters in pictures of the wicked in hell.[2] Subsequently the Erinyes became the ministers of Zeus.[3] The steps by which a curse or blessing becomes an appeal to a god, a prayer that he will injure or benefit the person intended, are not indistinct. The Melanesian curses in the name of a *lio'a*, a powerful spirit. His connexion with the *lio'a* gives or adds efficacy to his curse.[4] The efficacy of the mere word naturally is increased, not by the will of the spirit invoked, but by the use of his power. The Talmud and the OT supply examples of 'the ancient idea that the name of the Lord might be used with advantage in any curse.'[5] Among the Hebrews the 'Name' had peculiar importance. In the next place, the appeal may take the form of a conditional blessing upon the god. In the Yajur Veda we read the formula, addressed to Sūrya: 'Smite such a one, and I will give you an offering.'[6] This method is clearly more efficacious. *Vagona* in the Banks Islands is the most serious of curses. It consists in procuring the *intervention* of a supernatural power.[7] The story of Balaam (Nu 22–24) includes a belief that the Divine power can be moved to effect the injury desired. A further step is taken when the moving is in the form of compulsion. As curses may develop into prayers, so prayers may develop into spells or curses. *Brahma* is the energy of the gods, but it is also the prayer, and 'governs them.'[8] *ἀρά* is both 'prayer' and 'curse'; so is the Manx word *gwce*.[9] Prayer is often possessed of magical power, just as a Toda spell is in the form of a prayer.[10] Even in Greek religion the deity is constrained to effect a curse or a blessing;[11] even the personified curse, the Erinys, works by a spell-song which binds the victim.[12] Thus the phrases, 'by,' 'for the sake of,' and the like, are but vague expressions of the actual relation between the invoker and the invoked.

In the Banks Islands, cursing by way of asseveration is described in English terms as swearing 'by' a forbidden food, or 'by' some powerful *tindalo*.[13] The Toda *palol* prays with a gurgling utterance in the throat: 'May it be well!' or 'May it be blessed . . . with the buffaloes and calves; may there be no disease; . . . may clouds rise, may grass flourish, may water spring . . . for the sake of' certain 'objects of reverence.' This term, *idith*, is used in special connexion with the name of a god, and involves the idea of supplication; it is also employed in sorcery.[14]

A modern Christian prayer for a blessing 'for Christ's sake' is thus widely different, in the condition appended, from the Toda or Melanesian type. Magic, so to say, has given place to emotion, though itself originating in emotion, of another kind.

6. Connexion with morality.—Law gradually takes over the function of the curse, as a form of retribution; while prayer may still retain its use in cases where human intervention fails, or even as a spiritual replica of human intervention. The moralizing of the curse and the blessing within these limits follows the course of ethical evolution. In the OT the undeserved curse has no effect, or may be turned by God into a blessing.[15] The justice of the wish is left to the decision of God; while it follows that an unjust curse or blessing is a sin against the All-Just. The Greeks modified their theory of the hereditary transmission of a curse by arguing that each generation commits new sins.[1] At one end of the process we have an invocation to the gods, as in the *Šurpu* of the Chaldæans, asking for relief from the effects of a curse, not for forgiveness;[2] or 'the thief invokes God while he breaks into the house,' the bandit the Virgin.[3] At the other, the god rewards or punishes independently of human invocation, and with absolute justice. According to Aquinas,[4] a *maledictio* is efficacious only when made by God. In the mouth of man, however uttered or however deserved, it is *per se* inefficacious. But, when this stage is reached, cursing or blessing has become a contradiction in terms.

LITERATURE.—The literature has been given fully in the footnotes.

A. E. CRAWLEY.

1 Westermarck, i. 379.
2 Demosthenes, *Aristogiton*, i. 52.
3 Westermarck, *l.c.* (with authorities).
4 Codrington, 51.
5 Westermarck, i. 564 (with authorities).
6 *Taittirīya Saṁhita*, vi. 4 ff.
7 Codrington, 217.
8 *Rig-Veda*, vi. 51. 8.
9 Rhys, *Celtic Folklore*, Oxford, 1901, i. 349.
10 Rivers, 450, 453.
11 Farnell, 196.
12 Æsch. *Eumen.* 332.
13 Codrington, 217.
14 Rivers, 214 f., 230.
15 Pr 22[23] 26[2], Dt 23[5]; *Apost. Const.* iv. 6; Cheyne, art. 'Blessings and Cursings,' in *EBi* i. 592.

1 Farnell, *CGS* i. (1896) 77.
2 Zimmern, *Beiträge zur Kenntnis der bab. Rel.*, Leipzig, 1896, pp. 3, 7, 23.
3 Westermarck, ii. 733.
4 *Summa* II. 2. xxvi.

CUSTOM

CUSTOM.—In the course of his discussion on 'Custom and the Moral Life,' Wundt writes as follows (*Ethics*, Eng. tr., i. 131 f., 151: for an unfavourable criticism, see Ladd, *Philosophy of Conduct*, New York, 1902, p. 27 f.):

'A custom is any norm of *voluntary* action that has been developed in a national or tribal community. However rigorously individual conduct may be prescribed by custom, one is still left free to obey or disobey, as one chooses. . . . And it is custom, too, that transfers the principle of freedom, which in the animal consciousness does not extend beyond the realm of habit, to the general consciousness of society. . . . In custom the settled habits of the human race and of its subdivisions still retain the character of consciously operative motives. Instinct is habitual conduct that has become *mechanical*; custom, habitual conduct that has become *generic*. . . . It is true that custom finds its own means of compulsion. But these, like custom itself, are never of the *obligatory* kind. They consist neither in subjective commandments like the moral laws, nor in objective menaces like the laws of the state.'

Custom is closely connected both with habit and with usage, the distinction of each from the other being thus well set forth by Wundt (*op. cit.* p. 156 f.):

'Habit covers all and every form of voluntary action that, for whatever reason, we have made our own. . . . Habit is an *individual* rule of conduct.[5] If the acts of the individual accord with the habitual action of the community to which he belongs, habit becomes *usage*. . . . Custom forms a smaller circle within this general field of usage. Custom is habit: it is marked by the regular recurrence of voluntary actions. Custom is usage: it is always the custom of some community. But it has, further, what usage lacks—a *normative* character. Conformity to custom is not, like conformity to usage, a matter of individual choice; custom has the sanction of a *moral* constraint, which the individual cannot disregard without personal disadvantage. . . . While, therefore, individual habit is left absolutely and entirely to choice, provided only that it does not conflict with the more comprehensive rules of social conduct, usage exercises a *practical* compulsion through the example that it sets, and custom raises this compulsion to the dignity of a constraining norm.'

On the other hand, custom, with its social basis, tends to become habit in the individual, producing, it may be, an impression of oddity when he moves in a circle where the custom is different, so that in countless cases custom and habit may stand in sharp antithesis. But if custom, in the main, produces habit, habit in its turn, if the individual possessing it, whether as a result of previous environment or in virtue of personal idiosyncrasy, be strong enough to impress his own particular habit on his fellows, may influence custom, or even give rise to a new custom of greater or less extent (for some interesting specific instances, see *JE* iv. 396; *e.g.* 'it was the custom of R. Judah b. 'Ilai to bathe his face, hands, and feet in warm water before Sabbath began. This also was adopted by the Jewish community'). This, by the very nature of every social organism, is comparatively rare, and, if custom is thus to arise, it must meet a real, even though perhaps hitherto unfelt, need of society, either in whole or in part. Otherwise we have, not custom in its true sense, but the more

5 If, then, 'custom' is used of individual habit, as in EV of Lk 4[10] (where Gr. has τὸ εἰωθὸς αὐτῷ), it is, strictly speaking, inaccurate.

evanescent 'fashion' or 'vogue.' For custom is concerned with the constant needs of society, and is

'subject to change only with change in conditions of life or theories of living; and, as this change is reflected in the forms of custom, custom is as truly a picture of the moral consciousness of the community as a man's habits are the expression of his individual character. Habits can constantly be formed anew, because new individuals, whose habits they are, are constantly coming into existence. But custom, national habit, endures while the nation endures' (Wundt, *op. cit.* p. 164).

We have seen that custom and habit are mutually interactive. Under conditions now prevailing, even amongst primitive peoples, custom is by far the more potent factor, and yet it would seem that this was not always the case. There must have been a time when no form of organized society existed, and when men were so widely scattered because of the fewness of their numbers that individualism must have prevailed far more than it now does. Then it was that habit, not custom, was the dominant factor; and it would seem that, as individual habit met individual habit, each modifying and being modified by the other, the composite resultant was crystallized as custom; while custom meeting with custom—perhaps even affected now and again by the individual habit of some specially strong individuality—was in its turn blended into an amalgam of custom of wider scope and influence, until at last there was evolved one of the great determinants of society as a whole.[1] At the same time it must be borne in mind that such a reconstruction is entirely hypothetical and incapable of historical proof. Custom is already existent at the earliest historical time and in the most primitive modern social conditions of which we have any knowledge, and, in view of the fact that all members of any primitive society are, and doubtless always were, on approximately the same mental scale, it would seem that, as Wundt says (*op. cit.* p. 161),

'one man may contribute one thing to a custom, and another another; but the custom as a whole is a common creation, which cannot be analyzed into individual elements, for the simple reason that the various individual factors are all operative at one and the same time, and that it is consequently impossible for the individual to separate his own particular contribution from the contributions made by others' (cf. Wundt's criticism of this entire scheme of reconstruction, p. 159 ff., summarized thus [p. 164]: 'Custom has, so far as we know, but one course of development, and that is from preceding customs of kindred contents. Usage, fashion, and habits, on the other hand, constitute a mixed medley of new forms and relics of a long dead past. Transformation and new formation are here often enough difficult of discrimination; but there is no such thing as an entirely new custom').

To primitive man, however, the problem of the origin of custom seldom arises. For him it is enough that such and such a custom exists; and his sole explanation, if one be sought from him, is that, as the Kafirs say (Leslie, *Among the Zulus and Amatongas*, Edin. 1875, p. 146), 'it was so done by my fathers,' or, as the Narrinyeri have it, that it was so commanded by Narundere, the 'All-father' (Taplin, in Woods, *Nat. Tribes of S. Australia*, Adelaide, 1879, p. 55). In this connexion it must not be forgotten that a custom may persist after its original cause has ceased to be operative, and that in such a case it may have an entirely different reason and motive assigned it (cf. Wundt, *op. cit.* p. 139 ff.). At the same time, for specially important or striking customs, or for particularly remarkable natural phenomena, ætiological myths may be invented with the most honest intentions imaginable, so that custom comes to be one of the factors, as Lang well points out in his *Custom and Myth*, in the genesis of the myth.

In view of the homogeneity and lack of sharp distinction which characterize the more primitive stages of the human race, custom may be said there to permeate and to control well-nigh every phase of man's mental and moral activity; and, although impaired in part by the rise (or is it rather the recrudescence?) of individualism, it still exercises this potent power to a very great extent over the most highly civilized peoples. In the domain of religion it is custom which has largely influenced ritual and been in part responsible for the rise of myth; it is custom, in the last resort, that is the chief factor in the evolution of law, which, to primitive man, is inextricably interwoven with, and inseparable from, religion; custom conditions the entire existence of almost every individual, even in the most highly civilized communities, from the hour of his birth to that of his death. Indeed, the most daring radicalism and the most pronounced individualism have their own customs; for without custom there can be no type of human thought or of human activity.

Such being the case, it is but natural that in the earlier stages of civilization custom should be held to be Divinely sanctioned, and that any breach of it should of itself constitute a serious crime, so that the Khonds of India, the Kamchatkans, and the pagan Greenlanders hold the breaking of an old custom to be one of the greatest of sins (Hopkins, *Religions of India*, London, 1895, p. 531; Steller, *Beschreibung von dem Lande Kamtschatka*, Frankfort, 1774, p. 274; Rink, *Tales and Traditions of the Eskimo*, London, 1875, p. 201 f.); while violation of custom provokes the wrath of the deified ancestors amongst the Basuto (Casalis, *Basutos*, London, 1861, p. 254); disaster and harm follow such infringement amongst the Ewe and Aleuts (Ellis, *Ewe-speaking Peoples*, London, 1890, p. 263; Elliot, *Alaska and the Seal Islands*, New York, 1886, p. 170); and the Ainu, in such an event, fear the wrath of the gods (Batchelor, *Ainu of Japan*, London, 1892, p. 243 f.). Whether, however, Wundt is right in saying (*op. cit.* p. 134) that 'custom was at first an act of *worship*' seems open to question.

With the evolution of a specific concept of law, a distinction may be drawn between law and custom, as when Plautus (*Trin.* 1033, 1037) makes Stasimus say:

'Ambitio iam more sanctast, liberast a legibus, . . .
Mores leges perduxerunt iam in potestatem suam';

and a few lines further on he utters the profound truth, valid even when taken in the cynical spirit of its speaker:

'Leges mori serviunt'[1]—

a phrase which, like the Talmudic maxim, 'Custom always precedes law' (*Soferim*, xiv. 18), might well serve as the motto for almost any treatise on the origin of law; while in like manner Justinian expressly says that 'long prevailing customs, being sanctioned by the consent of those who use them, assume the nature of laws' (*Instit.* I. ii. 9).

When it becomes possible to draw such a distinction between custom and law, infringement of the former, unless distinctly coincident with and protected by law, no longer constitutes an offence of which legal cognizance must be taken, although even so advanced a code as the Jerusalem Talmud (*Pesaḥim*, iv. 3) authorized the courts to punish transgressors of custom equally with transgressors of law—a survival of some such stage as that of the African Wanika, amongst whom, 'if a man dares to improve the style of his hut, to make a larger doorway than is customary; if he should wear a finer or different style of dress to that of his

[1] The theory of Herbert Spencer (*Principles of Sociology*[3], 1893, §§ 529, 693), that custom originated in ancestor-worship, is too biased and one-sided to deserve serious consideration.

[1] The strictly legal distinction between *lex*, *mos*, and *consuetudo* is thus summarized by Isidore of Seville (*Etymol.* v. iii. 2 f.): 'Lex est constitutio scripta. Mos est vetustate probata consuetudo, sive lex non scripta. . . . Consuetudo autem est ius quoddam moribus institutum, quod pro lege suscipitur, cum deficit lex; nec differt scriptura an ratione consistat quando et legem ratio commendat.'

fellows, he is instantly fined' (C. New, *Life, Wanderings, and Labours in E. Africa*, London, 1873, p. 110). Yet this failure of modern law normally to give legal protection to custom does not mean that non-observance of custom, whether such infringement be careless, indifferent, unwitting, compulsory, or deliberately intentional, goes scot-free. Any such violation may, and often does, lead to social ostracism of greater or less extent, even when the infringed custom in question may be ethically indifferent.

And yet, the separation between custom and law is by no means complete, even from the legal point of view; for it is custom, as is well known, that forms the basis of the vast body of common law in England, whence it was adopted in N. America.[1] Into the details of the common law distinctions between general and particular customs—the latter category applying only to particular districts or to those engaged in particular occupations, and not recognized, except in a few States, by the common law of the United States—it is unnecessary to enter here. Suffice it to say that a custom, to be enforceable at common law, must be both definite and reasonable, and that it must have been used uninterruptedly and undisputedly 'so long that the memory of man runneth not to the contrary,' this latter phrase being understood to mean from the accession of Richard I. in 1189 (whence the rejection of particular customs in the United States, since none such could there possibly date from such 'time immemorial').

Law, being normally derived from custom, is for the most part in harmony with it; so that in practically every affair of everyday life one avoids all conflict with law if one simply follows custom. At the same time, just as custom may be in sharp contrast with habit, such may be its relation to law. In this case the law in question—whether as being due to the caprice of the ruler or to the more advanced ideas of the governing classes—is not, as is usually the state of affairs, derived from custom, but from the weaker source of individual, class, or other minority requirements. Under these conditions law usually succumbs to custom and remains a dead letter, so that, for instance, 'under the Hindu system of law, clear proof of usage will outweigh the written text of the law' (Mayne, *Treatise on Hindu Law and Usage*, Madras, 1878, p. 41); while the Roman jurists (*Instit.* I. ii. 11; *Digesta*, I. iii. 32) laid down the maxim that a law may be abrogated by desuetude or by contrary usage. Nay, law being even more conservative than custom, the change of custom may be such that a law—even one which initially may have been far in advance of custom—may come to be so much behind and below the altered custom that it is resolved, for this very reason, into a mere dead letter, and must either fall into oblivion or be amended to meet the changed conditions of the social organism. In general it may be postulated that no law can be enforced against the prevailing custom; even chiefs and kings, with the apparently despotic powers that attach to them in primitive society, prove unequal to the task (cf. the examples quoted by Westermarck, *MI* i. 162); and the lamentable failure of many laws designed for the highest benefit to society and drafted by men of unimpeachable ethical character proves—were proof necessary—that custom is really supreme over law in the highest as well as in the lowest stages of civilization.

As has already been noted, custom is subject to the most complete transformations, both in motive and in manifestation. Before the average man has read many pages of a book dealing, say, with the peoples of Africa or of Polynesia, he will find mention of customs that seem to him ridiculous, disgusting, or immoral—all of which judgments, from the point of view of his own civilization, may be perfectly true. And yet, in the words of Wundt (*op. cit.* p. 264),

'the moral value of the personality is relative; it varies with the stage of development to which moral ideas have attained. . . . Judgment of the moral value, whether of the individual or of society, depends not upon the absolute value of their disposition and action, but upon the relation of these to the stage of moral evolution already achieved.

It is doubtful whether any custom whatever, no matter how repugnant to our present æsthetic or moral sense it may be, can ever have arisen without some reason which—immoral or foolish though such reason may seem to us—commended itself to the people adopting it as subserving some highly desirable social end. Thus, the killing of an aged parent is rightly a crime of unmitigated turpitude to us, yet from the point of view of many primitive peoples (see artt. ABANDONMENT AND EXPOSURE and OLD AGE; cf. also Westermarck, *op. cit.* p. 386 ff.) there is much to be said in its favour; and in many other cases what seems to us a most immoral act is really due to sentiments which we can only regard as praiseworthy and, in the best sense of the term, as moral. On the other hand, there are to be found amongst every people, side by side with customs regarded as moral (*i.e.* commending themselves to the best ethical judgment of the highest thinkers of the people in question), customs deemed immoral—in other words, detrimental to the best interests of the society under consideration. All this merely means that, as society develops to a higher and higher ethical stage, customs once justified by specific conditions then existing have no longer such justification, so that they survive only by force of inertia or as pandering to the baser side and the lower strata of a society which, as a whole, has taken a marked step in advance.

Midway between the moral and the immoral custom stands what we may call the *un*moral or indifferent custom—one whose observance or non-observance is a matter of ethical unconcern and indifference; but it must be noted that the unmoral custom is likely, in course of time, to be regarded as immoral or wrong (although, of course, the reverse frequently happens, so that the custom once held to be unmoral and indifferent evolves into a custom deemed moral and ethically imperative). In point of fact, most unmoral customs have doubtless passed through the moral stage; but custom *qua* custom is, like law, neither moral, immoral, nor unmoral. Nor should it be forgotten that a custom once held to be moral may come to be viewed as unmoral or even immoral, and that still later, with further changes in the status of society, such a custom may again develop, usually through the unmoral stage, into a moral rule. But, though the ultimate basis of every custom is moral and religious, a custom once firmly established tends to become more and more divorced from true ethical and religious considerations and questions, until at last even those most strenuously adhering to a custom may be, as has already been noted, entirely unaware of its real provenance.

A custom almost universally regarded as moral by a given society may be held by some of its members to be immoral, or at best indifferent. Here, as in the case of law, there emerges a marked characteristic of all custom, when once it has gained sway. This characteristic is thus summarized by Westermarck (*op. cit.* p. 160):

'Custom regulates external conduct only. It tolerates all kinds of volitions and opinions if not openly expressed. It does not condemn the heretical mind, but the heretical act. It demands that under certain circumstances certain actions

[1] A similar system of common law formerly prevailed in France, as in the custom of Normandy, of Paris, etc., and the same was true of Germany almost until the close of the Middle Ages.

shall be either performed or omitted, and, provided that this demand is fulfilled, it takes no notice of the motive of the agent or omitter. Again, in case the course of conduct prescribed by custom is not observed, the mental facts connected with the transgression, if regarded at all, are dealt with in a rough and ready manner, according to general rules which hardly admit of individualisation.'

This brings up the difficult problem of how far one ought to conform to a custom which he deems not merely unmoral and indifferent, but immoral and wrong. To an indifferent custom no one, unless he be finically hyper-ethical or—as is here more usually the case—wantonly iconoclastic (*i.e.* delighting in flouting custom as custom), should object to accord obedience, at least externally, if for no other reason than merely to avoid disturbing social amenities or to avert unfavourable comment on the score of oddity and 'crankiness.' 'If,' writes the great Apostle of the Gentiles, 'meat maketh my brother to stumble, I will eat no flesh for evermore, that I make not my brother to stumble' (1 Co 8^{13}; cf. St. Paul's admirable discussion of the entire question of the unmoral custom in Ro 14). The case is far different, of course, with regard to customs that are felt to be positively immoral and wrong. This question is more fully discussed in art. CONFORMITY. Here it may be sufficient to point out that the presumption is always that any custom is felt to be moral by the community or social organism within which it prevails. The 'burden of proof' must rest on him who ignores or wilfully violates the custom in question. In any final judgment as to obedience or disobedience to a custom, account must be taken of the history and meaning of the particular custom under consideration, and there must be full appreciation of the ethical implications of compliance with or violation of the custom as regards the moral effect of such action both upon self and upon others. Above all, the individual, if he is to be sane in his judgment, must be constantly on his guard against personal idiosyncrasies and the excessive individualism of modern times—the 'right of private judgment' run mad.

LITERATURE.—Wundt, *Ethics*, Eng. tr., London, 1897 ff. (esp. vol. i. ch. 3, 'Custom and the Moral Life'); Westermarck, *MI*, London, 1906–8 (esp. vol. i. ch. 7, 'Customs and Laws as Expressions of Moral Ideas'); Lubbock, *Origin of Civilisation*, London, 1889, p. 448 ff.; Lang, *Custom and Myth*², London, 1885; Greenstone, 'Custom,' in *JE* iv. 395–398; Holdsworth, *Hist. of Eng. Law*, ii.–iii., London, 1909; Bauduin, *De consuetudine in iure canonico*, Louvain, 1888; Fanning, 'Custom,' in *Cath. Encyc.* iv. 576 f.

LOUIS H. GRAY.

CUSTOM (Hindu).—The Sanskrit word is *āchāra*, 'religious custom,' 'established usage.' The binding force of custom is fully recognized in the Sanskrit lawbooks. Thus it is stated in the Code of Manu (i. 108) that *āchāra* is transcendent law, and that, therefore, a twice-born (*i.e.* high-caste) man should always be careful to follow it. The whole body of the sacred law (*dharma*), according to a favourite scheme, is divided into the three parts—*āchāra* (rules of conduct), *vyavahāra* (rules of government and judicature), and *prāyaśchhitta* (penance and expiation). The well-known Code of Yājñavalkya comprises the following subjects under the head of *āchāra*: purificatory rites (*saṃskāra*); rules of conduct for young students of the Veda; marriage and duties of women; the four principal classes and the mixed castes; duties of a Brāhman householder; miscellaneous rules for one who has completed his period of studentship; rules of lawful and forbidden diet; religious purification of things; *śrāddhas*, or oblations to the manes; worship of the deity Gaṇapati; propitiatory rites for planets; duties of a king. See DHARMA and LAW (Hindu).

J. JOLLY.

CUSTOM (Muslim).—See LAW (Muslim).

CUTTING.—See MUTILATION.

CYBELE (Κυβέλη).—The great Mother Deity of the Phrygians, known also, and especially in the cult language of the Romans, as the Great Mother of the Gods, or the Great Idæan Mother of the Gods (*Magna Deum Mater, Mater Deum Magna Idaea*). Her worship had its origin in Asia Minor in pre-historic times, possibly prior to the advent of the Phrygians, which is placed at about 900 B.C.; became prominent in early historic times in Galatia, Lydia, and Phrygia, where the various forms of the Cybele legend agree in localizing the origin of her cult; and was most strongly centralized in Phrygia. Its most sacred seat in the East was at Pessinus, a Galatian city near the borders of Phrygia, but once a part of the great Phrygian Empire, where the symbol of the goddess, a small meteoric stone, was preserved. From Asia Minor the cult spread to Thrace and the islands, and finally to Greece, though it never became popular there owing to its un-Hellenic nature. In 204 B.C., in response to an oracle to the effect that Hannibal could be driven from Italy if the Idæan Mother were brought from Pessinus, the sacred stone was transferred to Rome, and the cult was adopted by the State and located on the Palatine (Livy, xxix. 10–14). It first became of great importance in the Roman world under the Empire, when it spread from Rome as a centre to all the provinces. Like the cults of Mithra and Isis, it was one of the most obstinate antagonists of Christianity, and disappeared only after the long struggle between the two religions which culminated in the victory of Theodosius over Eugenius in A.D. 394.

As the cult of Cybele probably suffered little modification in Greece and Italy, the original character of the goddess may be inferred from what is known of her in Greek and Roman times. She was identified by the Greeks with Rhea, Ge, and Demeter, and by the Romans with Tellus, Ceres, Ops, and Maia. She was known as the universal mother—of gods and men, as well as of the lower creation—though her character as the mother of wild Nature was especially prominent, as was manifested by the orgiastic wildness of her worship, her sanctuaries on the wooded mountains, and her fondness for lions, which are frequently associated with her in art and literature. Her early attendants in legend, the *Korybantes*, Idæan *Daktyloi*, and sometimes *Kuretes*, were wild demonic beings, probably ithyphallic (Georg Kaibel, *GGN*, 1901, p. 488 ff.).

The priests of Cybele in historic times were eunuchs called *Galloi*, who first appear in Alexandrian literature about the 3rd cent. B.C. Clad in female garb, they wore their hair long and fragrant with ointment, and celebrated rites to the accompaniment of flutes, cymbals, tambourines, and castanets, yelling and dancing themselves into a frenzy until their excitement culminated in self-scourging, self-laceration, and exhaustion. Their consecration to the service of the goddess sometimes consisted in self-emasculation. Priestesses also took part in the cult.

Like Venus and Adonis, Isis and Osiris, etc., Cybele and Attis were usually associated in worship, and formed a duality symbolizing the relations of Mother Earth to her fruitage. The birth, growth, self-castration, and death of Attis, the son and lover of Cybele, signified the springing, growth, and death of plant life (see ATTIS). A celebration corresponding to the annual spring festival at Rome, which extended over the period March 15–27, thus including the equinox, consisted in a kind of sacred drama of Cybele and Attis, and no doubt existed in Phrygia also.

Cybele usually appears in art seated on a throne, draped, with mural crown and veil, accompanied by lions. The tympanum, cymbals, patera, sceptre, garlands, and fruits, and Attis with his attributes, the Phrygian cap, pedum, syrinx, and the pine, also appear with her. The so-called Niobe on Mount Sipylus is a Cybele, and the Cybele of Formiæ, now in Copenhagen, is one of the best sculptural representations of her. She inspired no piece of art of the first class. In literature no important work except *Catullus* lxiii. is devoted to her, though she is frequently mentioned in the literature of the Empire. Her religious importance lay in her mysticism and in the closeness of her contact with the common people, and was very great in spite of the gross practices which grew up around her cult.

LITERATURE.—See references under artt. GREAT MOTHER and ATTIS.

GRANT SHOWERMAN.

CYCLE.—See CALENDAR, ARTHUR, CUCHULAINN CYCLE, etc.

CYCLOPS.—See GIANTS.

CYNICS.—The name is derived from κύων, 'dog,' with which it was connected in several ways. (*a*) To the east of Athens, beyond the Diomean gate, on a spur of Lycabettus, was a gymnasium known as the *Cynosarges*. Unlike the Academy and Lyceum (schools for youth of free Athenian parentage), it was provided for children of mixed blood. Antisthenes, son of an Athenian of this name by a Thracian slave woman, taught his disciples here after the death of Socrates, his second master. Κυνόσαργες is compounded of κύων and ἀργός, lit. 'white dog.' The story ran that the gymnasium stood on or near the site of an ancient sanctuary of Hercules (the Cynic tutelary, cf. Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, *Euripides' Herakles*², Berlin, 1885, i. 102 f., 130), and that, on the first occasion of sacrifice to the hero, a dog rushed in and seized a portion of the offering. The designation refers, possibly, not to the colour of the dog, but to the flash-like effect of its speed upon the spectator. (*b*) The epithet 'dog' was soon adopted by Cynic teachers—Antisthenes, the 'downright dog,' Diogenes, the 'royal dog'—doubtless as a symbol of their return to the 'simplicity' of animal nature and habits, or of endurance and hardihood (cf. Plato, *Rep.* ii. 375 f., v. 415 f.); it was also applied to them by their opponents for less flattering reasons, connected with displays of audacity, coarseness, and immodesty (cf. Winckelmann, *Antisth. Frag.*, 1842, p. 8 f.). (*c*) Eventually the epithet became so associated with the sect in the popular mind that the Corinthians placed a marble dog upon the pillar erected by them over the grave of Diogenes.

1. History.—(*a*) *Personal.*—The Cynics flourished prosperously for about a century after the death of Socrates (399–299 B.C.). As their teaching contemplated a way of life rather than a philosophical system, and as their works are lost, or known only in fragments and by late reports at second-hand, we are not informed in detail about the history of the sect. Indeed, Antisthenes, Diogenes, and Crates excepted, many representatives are little more than names to us.

Antisthenes of Athens (*c.* 444–374 B.C.), at first a pupil of Gorgias the Sophist, and a 'late learner' (cf. Plato, *Soph.* 251) with Socrates,—Plato implies one too old to learn,—founded the movement. Diogenes of Sinope (*c.* 412–323) was his most notable, notorious, and popular follower. He appears to have won many disciples, probably at Corinth principally, where he was sold as a slave to Xeniades, whose sons he taught. Among them were Monimus, a slave from Syracuse, an admirer of Crates; Onesicritus of Ægina (fl. *c.* 327), an officer who went to Hindustan with Alexander the Great, and interested himself in a comparative study of the Indian Gymnosophists and the Cynics (cf. G. Grote, *Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates*², 1885, i. 158 f.); his sons, Philiscus and Androsthenes; Menander Drymus, and Hegesæus Clocus of Sinope. More distinguished associates, eminent for other reasons than their mere connexion with Cynicism, were, possibly, Phocion the 'Good' (*c.* 402–317), the Athenian statesman whom Demosthenes feared, Anaximenes the rhetorician, and, certainly, Stilpo (fl. *c.* 310), the influential Megarian (see MEGARIANS), whose combination of Cynic moralism with genuine devotion to metaphysics paved the way for Stoicism (*q.v.*). Finally, we have Crates of Thebes (fl. *c.* 320), the third leader of the Cynics, who, unlike his predecessors, was a man of some position and wealth. Perhaps Bryson, the Achæan, taught him (cf. Diog. Laert. vi. 85). Crates counted among his followers his wife Hipparchia of Maronea, a woman of good family, whose incurable infatuation for the wandering philosopher overcame the opposition of her parents to the unpropitious union; her brother, Metrocles, whose social standing seems to have lent him weight; and his initiates, Theomentus, Cleomenes, Demetrius of Alexandria, Timarchus of Alexandria, Menippus of Sinope (fl. *c.* 273), a satirist who influenced Varro (82–37), the Roman poet (see NEO-CYNICS); and Meleager of Gadara (cf. Diog. Laert. vi. 99), who may be classed with Menippus. The Ephesian Echecles was also of the Crates-Metrocles circle, and he taught Menedemus, a furious ranter, once the pupil of the Epicurean Colotes of Lampsacus; Menedemus seems to have been the last of the regular Cynic succession. Thrasylus (*c.* 306) is reported as a Cynic acquaintance of Antigonus Cyclops (cf. Plutarch, *de Vitios. Pud.* 531 [ed. Bernardakis, vol. iii. p. 376]; *Reg. et imp. apoph.*; *Ant.* 182 (15) [ed. Bernardakis, vol. ii. p. 29]). Diodorus of Aspendus (fl. *c.* 300), a belated Pythagorean, who adopted Cynic asceticism, may be placed on the fringes of the sect; he is said to have conventionalized the garb of the mendicant Cynic. Theodorus of Cyrene (fl. *c.* 300), called the 'atheist,' emphasized the 'theological' radicalism of the later Cynics, while Sodates may have represented the movement under one of the earlier Ptolemys (322–247?). Later we find his pupil, the facile witty exhorter, Bion of Borysthenes in Pamphylia (fl. *c.* 250), who boxed the compass of the rival schools, and furnished ammunition to Horace (cf. R. Heinze, *de Horatio Bionis imitatore*, Bonn, 1889); and Teles (fl. *c.* 250), the Cynic-Stoic contemporary of Chrysippus, a spouter of hortatory harangues on ἀδιάφορα (cf. Wilamowitz-Mollendorff, *Philol. Untersuch.* iv. [1882] 292 f.).

Running over the names, one is compelled to notice the large proportion of Cynics who came from the outskirts of Hellenic culture—Pontus, Thrace, Syria, Pamphylia, Egypt, for example; they were not nurtured in the pure Greek tradition. By the time of Menippus, the Syrian satirist (*c.* 280–65 B.C.), Cynicism had gone to seed in mere antinomianism and quixotry; not seldom, perhaps, in even less reputable manifestations. Its significant doctrines passed over into Stoicism through Zeno of Citium (336–264), the pupil of Crates; even the attempt of Aristo of Chios (fl. *c.* 260), Zeno's disciple, to revive the Cynic contempt for science and liberal culture within Stoicism failed, although he taught his famous pupil, Eratosthenes of Cyrene and Alexandria (276–196), the cosmopolitan humanitarianism of Diogenes. No doubt, Cynicism survived sporadically, almost as a 'mendicant order' in all likelihood,—often of sorry scoundrels,—till its re-appearance, in Roman Imperial times (cf. J. Bernays, *Lukian u. d. Kyniker*, Berlin, 1879), with Demetrius, the contemporary of Seneca, and others (see NEO-CYNICS). But its essential contribution had been absorbed into Stoicism, which always retained traces of Cynic tendencies, as may be noted even so late as Epictetus (cf. *Diss.* iii. 19–22; R. D. Hicks, *Stoic and Epicurean*, London, 1910, p. 95 f.).

(*b*) *Socio-philosophical origins.*—Greek reflexion originated in the desire to know for the sake of knowledge; and, in this sense, philosophy became a life. Thus, the problems of knowledge and of conduct never lay far apart. But, as aspects of one whole, they struggled for mastery, with varying fortune. The Cynics represent an extreme phase, in which science and culture had ceased to be held as of any value that was not pragmatic, and 'philosophy' had been reduced to the most beggarly elements of paradoxical utilitarian practice. This issue was one natural result of the historical antecedents of the Greek municipal societies, and of the reaction upon their conventions after the displacements due to the Persian war

(490–45 B.C.). The difficulty was to adjust the πολιτεία to empire, the particularism of the Greek citizen to the universalism of mankind; and it took shape in the lengthy controversy about νόμος and φύσις (see CASUISTRY), in which the Cynics played the most partisan rôle (cf. Dewey-Tufts, *Ethics*, 1908, pt. i. ch. vii.). Very briefly, the development of the Hellenic municipal societies had been as follows. The corporate family was an outgrowth of ancient religion, and appealed to religious sanctions (cf. Solon, frag. 12). Thus, domestic law and the rule of the family-group were integral parts of the 'Divine favouring fate' within a man (cf. Pindar, *Ol.* ii. 94, ix. 28, 100, 110, xiii. 13; *Nem.* vii. 30, viii. 35). The wider civic law and municipal government were evolved gradually on this basis (cf. Fustel de Coulanges, *La Cité antique*[14], Paris, 1895, bk. iii. ch. xviii.; bk. v. ch. i.). Local customs, conventions, and laws thus acquired great authority, and overflowed private life to such an extent that it hardly existed in the modern sense. The State claimed the citizen's time, intelligence, service,—his whole life even,—in return for the inestimable advantages bestowed, inestimable because only when endowed with them could a man enjoy a worthy human career (cf. S. H. Butcher, *Some Aspects of the Greek Genius*[3], 1904, p. 47 f.). Accordingly, individual independence did not flourish—the man had not emerged from the citizen. So the opposition between old norms and new experiences remained latent, more or less, till the Sophists (*q.v.*) broached it with their pupils, and Aristophanes and Euripides, each in his characteristic way, ventilated it before the public at large. The theoretical side of the controversy most probably reached the Cynics through the influence of Gorgias upon Antisthenes; the practical or social deductions through Socrates, to whom, in his last years, Antisthenes resorted. But the Cynics were 'imperfect' Socratics, who interpreted the Athenian sage in a fashion of their own, and it must be confessed that Socratic 'irony' and contemporary socio-political changes gave colour to their anarchism.

The social conditions are perplexing, because they oscillated in a twofold movement. On the one hand, and *negatively*, the decay of age-old beliefs (cf. Aristophanes, *Nub.* 396 f., 1060 f., 1420 f.; Plato, *Rep.* ii. 358–65) sapped confidence in the adequacy of national institutions. Could the State justify its pervasive interference with the individual, by rendering sufficient return? This question—its terms becoming clearer gradually—provoked inquiry; the sequel was reflective ethics. And, as reflexion bodes search for a stable principle, the possibility that this had not been found was implied. Hence a critical movement in theory. The Peloponnesian War (431–405) forced similar issues upon the average man in daily life (cf. Thucyd. iii. 40–44, 82, v. 89). The generous assurance of high vocation that nurtured Pindar, Themistocles, Æschylus, Sophocles, Pericles, and, as a glorious consummation, Plato, beat feebler and feebler. On the other hand, and *positively*, new men broke into the ancient State, bringing new associations. Traditional civic usages bore less meaning for them, because they did not share the compensation to the full. Necessarily, they felt other aspirations, and gravitated towards other standards. The straits of war drove the rural population upon Athens, just as, during prosperous peace, strangers had flocked to her gates. Inaction and demoralization bred a proletariat, neither citizen nor slave, which strained the ordinary resources of government. In addition, the marvellous instances of individual development, the glory of the Periclean epoch, set a potent example. And the energies and personalized aims here manifested had to find fresh channels. Pericles could say: 'We [Athenians] alone regard a man who takes no interest in public affairs, not as a harmless, but as a useless, member of society' (Thucyd. ii. 40). But, political autonomy shrunk or gone, this socialized unity lost its power to charm. Accordingly, what more natural than that 'social reform' should attract many? What more natural than that they should concentrate upon the personal ideal, αὐτάρκεια (cf. Gomperz, *Gr. Denker*, 1903 [Eng. tr. 1905], vol. ii. bk. iv. chs. i.–iii.)? 'The honest man is Nature's noble' (Eurip. frag. 336). But, what may 'honest' mean? The Cynics were to extract their answer from Socrates (*q.v.*).

Plato makes Socrates speak as follows, in his famous speech of defence:

> 'If you say to me, "Socrates, this time . . . we will let you off, but upon one condition, that you are not to inquire and speculate in this way any more." . . . I should reply: "Men of Athens, I honour and love you; but I shall obey God rather than you, and, while I have life and strength, I shall never cease from the practice and teaching of philosophy, exhorting any one whom I meet after my manner, and convincing him, saying: "O my friend, why do you, who are a citizen of the great and mighty and wise city of Athens, care so much about laying up the greatest amount of money and honour and reputation, and so little about wisdom and truth and the greatest improvement of the soul, which you never regard or heed at all? Are you not ashamed of this?"' (*Apol.* 29).

This represents the Socratic spirit admirably. But Socrates left no methodical system, nor did he prescribe specifics for social ills. Devotion to the Athenian State, and respect for the higher personal life, were the poles of his character and teaching. He could say of the State:

> 'Our country is . . . higher and holier far than mother or father. . . . When we are punished by her . . . the punishment is to be endured in silence. . . . Whether in battle or in a court of law, or in any other place, he [the citizen] must do what his city and his country order him. . . . This is the voice which I seem to hear murmuring in my ears, like the sound of the flute in the ears of the mystic' (Plato, *Crito*, 51, 54; cf. J. Adam, *Crito*, 1888, Introd. p. xiv f.).

That is, Socrates preserved intact the old Greek consecration to the ἦθος of the City-State, with its subordination of the individual to the community as the will of the gods, and as the most valuable (useful) relation for the citizen. In practice, he identified himself completely with Athens, whose vicinity he seldom left (cf. Plato, *Crito*, 52). But, at the same time, touched by the ampler experience of the new age, he strove to universalize the individual. 'Whether the individual is a part of a wider teleological system or no, becomes thus for Socrates a secondary question; and what he is mainly interested to maintain is that each man for himself should work out such a system in his own life' (E. Caird, *Evolution of Theology in the Gr. Philosophers*, 1904, i. 70). Socrates could, therefore, declare to Antiphon: 'To have no wants at all is, to my mind, an attribute of godhead; to have as few wants as possible, the nearest approach to godhead' (Xenoph. *Mem.* i. 6). That is, his asceticism was no end in itself, but accessary to the desire to secure due scope for the higher activities of manhood. The positive purpose thus involved a negative element. Now Socrates lived all this, but left no authoritative exposition of it. Accordingly, his 'imperfect' followers seized upon one or other aspect of his personality, and pushed it, to the exclusion of the compensating factors. 'The Cynics so enforced this negative moment that they placed freedom in actual renunciation of so-called superfluities' (Hegel, *Werke*, 1842, xiv. 139, Eng. tr. *Hist. of Phil.*, 1892, i. 480–81). Historical circumstances occasioned their revolt from the communal ideas of the City-State. The 'wise man' will not govern himself according to enacted laws, but by the law of virtue (Antisthenes, *ap.* Diog. Laert. vi. 11). The sole authentic citizenship is citizenship of the world (Diogenes, *ib.* vi.

63). In short, under stress of social exigency, the Cynics abstracted Socratic independence from the conditions whence it drew its strength and relevance, and identified virtue with unbridled protest against social relations. 'Bury me on my face,' said Diogenes to Xeniades, 'for, ere long, everything will be turned upside down' (Diog. Laert. vi. 31-32). The Cynics lost recollection that the Socratic dialectic was an incidental means to disclosure of the fundamental principles of morality. They could 'think only of the barefooted old man, indefatigably disputing in the open streets, and setting himself against society' (Grant, *Ethics of Aristotle*[3], 1874, i. 171). Thus minded, they turned upon contemporary norms and, holding nothing holy, flouted human ties scornfully, violently, and coarsely.

2. Teaching.—(*a*) *Theoretical.*—Avowedly, the Cynics were bent upon a practical end. Indeed, it is often asserted that they repudiated scientific training and mental culture, with no little ostentation. This is probably an over-statement. It would be nearer the mark to say that they subordinated scientific inquiries to the attainment of virtue, regarding intellectual discipline as indifferent in itself. Thus, while they combated men of the Plato type, and held aloof from the constructive schools, they could not, and did not, escape the theoretical problems of their age. Logic and epistemology, it is true, had not reached clear definition; this had to await Aristotle. Nevertheless, with the Sophists, if not earlier, the question of the relation between language and thought had asserted itself, sometimes in logomachies that seem trifling to us. And, in this connexion, a distinct negative or critical movement became manifest. The contemporary Megarians, for example (cf. K. Prantl, *Gesch. d. Logik*, Leipzig, 1855, i. 33 f.; G. Grote, *op. cit.* i. 122 f.), with whom the Cynics had some affiliations, revelled in 'eristic' gymnastics. The Cynic leaders, Antisthenes and, probably, Diogenes, evinced kindred tendencies, as their fragmentary remains, scattered references in Plato and Aristotle, and the reports of later writers indicate. Possibly the same was true of Crates, Monimus, and their followers. In other words, ere the ethico-political doctrines of the sect had sunk to the level of a social mannerism,

> 'Whose dog-like carriage and effrontery,
> Despising infamy, outfac'd disgrace,'

the Cynics partook in theoretical discussions of the day, occupying a position akin, apparently, to that of the Megarians (*q.v.*), and one not far removed, in ultimate principle, at least, from the Cyrenaics (*q.v.*).

Thus, Epictetus (*Diss.* i. 17, 12) attributes to Antisthenes the saying, 'The examination of terms is the beginning of education.' Similarly, Plato (*Euthyd.* 277 E, cf. *Crat.* 384) records that, according to Prodicus, 'a right use of terms is the beginning of knowledge' (cf. *Protag.* 337). Unfortunately, owing to the loss of Antisthenes' treatise *On Words*, we are unaware how these statements should be interpreted. Conceivably, they imply no more than Plato (*Theæt.* 201 E) and Aristotle (*Met.* viii. 3) assert. On the other hand, it is certain that, through the peculiar notions about evidence entertained in their law-courts, committees of the popular assembly (cf. R. J. Bonner, *Evidence in Athenian Courts*, Chicago, 1905), the Athenians had long been familiar with forensic dialectic, as Æschylus' *Orestes* (458 B.C.) suffices to show. Furthermore, at the time when the other Greek arts reached their zenith (*c.* 440 B.C.), rhetoric, the τέχνη of words, had flourished for a generation in Sicily, under Corax of Syracuse (*c.* 465 B.C.); and Gorgias, accompanied by one of its chief exponents, Tisias, had impressed the Athenians with it, on the occasion of the Leontine embassy (427 B.C.), when Antisthenes was a lad of seventeen. The future Cynic leader became a pupil of Gorgias, and then taught rhetoric before joining the Socratic circle. And, while it is likely that the epideictic 'display,' entitled the *Controversy between Ajax and Odysseus for the Arms of Achilles*, belongs to a later period, the list of the writings of Antisthenes preserved by Diog. Laert. (vi. 15 f.) proves that he was a practitioner, not only of rhetoric, but also of dialectic, with its more or less subtle and verbal treatment of terms. In addition, one must recall that Greek oratory as a practical art, employing both rhetoric and dialectic, dates from Gorgias (cf. F. Blass, *Die attische Beredsamkeit v. Gorgias bis zu Lysias*, Leipzig, 1868, p. 1 f.), and that, as a result of the development of their polity, which made him who 'is master of the stone on the Pnyx' master of Athens (cf. E. A. Freeman, *Historical Essays*, 2nd series, 1873, p. 128 f.), rhetoric and dialectic came to be of extreme utilitarian consequence to the Athenians (cf. Isocrates' review of his life-work, *Or.* xv. 295 f.). Language was now a potent weapon, and the study of terms indispensable. Accordingly, we are forced to conclude that, whatever slight Antisthenes and his fellows may have put upon 'science,' 'learning,' and 'culture' at a later time, when engaged upon their ethical 'mission,' the founder of the Cynic movement was educated in a 'scientific' atmosphere, and knew the necessity for *technical* discipline in the 'art of words.' No doubt, the studies of Protagoras, Prodicus, and Hippias, in etymology, synonymy, and the like, were little more than beginnings in the abstractions of grammar; and, obviously, the science of Logic was even less advanced, the nature of negative propositions especially offering insoluble problems, whence the vogue of the Sophistic *elenchus*. Yet the Sophistic influence upon the 'imperfect' Socratics is so pervasive that, before he repaired to Socrates at last, Antisthenes must have been carried away by it. The jibes of Plato (*Phædo*, 101 D f. (?); *Rep.* ii. 372 D, v. 454 A (?); *Theæt.* 155 E; *Soph.* 251 B, 230 D; *Phileb.* 14 D (?)), Aristotle (*Met.* iii. 2 (?), iv. 29, vii. 3; *Top.* i. 11), and others (*e.g.* Cicero, *ad Attic.* xii. 38) would seem to indicate that Antisthenes and the rest either relapsed into 'sophistical' quibbling in theory, or failed to keep step with the contemporary advance of scientific inquiry. For, even if Xenophon's testimony to the acquirements of Antisthenes (*Symp.* iv. 41 f.) be suspect on account of his evident Cynic leanings, the references of Plato (*Cratyl.* 389 f. (?); *Phileb.* 44 C; cf. K. Barlen, *Antisthenes u. Platon*, 1881; K. Urban, *Ueber d. Erwähnungen d. Philos. d. Antisthenes in d. platon. Schriften*, 1882; F. Dümmler, *Akademika*, Giessen, 1889, p. 148 f.), the partial admission of Aristotle (*Met.* v. 29), his serious refutations (*de Soph. El.* xx.; *Rhet.* ii. 24), and the remark of Cicero (*de Nat. Deor.* i. 13) warrant the probable inference that, while Antisthenes had once known better, and still posed as a disciple of Socrates (this would be Plato's view), he had reverted to the empiricism of Gorgias, and had fallen thence into theoretical scepticism, regarding 'science' as negligible except for purposes of direct utility, as with Hippias—had become, in short, a 'barbarian.' In a word, although they started from the Socratic insistence upon definition, the Cynics never reached theoretical solutions; in fact, they regarded them as impossible, perhaps even as worthless.

Remembering, then, that Logic had no independent existence, the little that we know of Cynic logic may be traced to Socrates for its primary impulse, and to the Sophists, especially Gorgias and Hippias, for its content. The effort of Socrates

to define the ideal Good, to replace a physical or cosmological by a logical φύσις, had not reached complete success (cf. Xenoph. *Mem.* iii. 9. 14, iii. 8. 3, i. 3. 2). It was an aspiration rather than a final achievement. The problems therefore were: (1) to formulate a definition carrying universal validity; (2) to state its content; (3) to explain how man might realize it in life. Such fragments of Cynic logic as we have are remnants of a theoretical effort connected with the *first* problem; Cynic ethics, a practical reply to the *second* and *third*. The former represents a reversion to the Sophists; the latter follows mainly from undue emphasis upon, and isolation of, one aspect of the person of Socrates, filled out probably, as regards its inconsistent universalism (cosmopolitanism), by elements drawn chiefly from the teaching of Hippias.

Turning to the logical side, then, we find that for Antisthenes a satisfactory definition must be the statement of the essence of a thing. But, seeing that things consist of parts, the only definition practicable would be a description of these parts as actual components of a whole (cf. Plato, *Soph.* 251 f.). Accordingly, the thing itself, being simple, is indefinable; it may be named, but the name tells nothing of the essential reality (cf. Aristotle, *Met.* i. 3). Diogenes is reported to have said, when Plato was talking to him about 'ideas' and using the terms 'tableness' and 'cupness,' 'I see *a* table and *a* cup, but I see no "tableness" or "cupness"' (Diog. Laert. vi. 55; cf. Plato, *Parmen.* 132 B). That is, according to Cynic epistemology, general ideas exist solely in the mind, individual things alone are real. This is the earliest distinct expression of Nominalism. Logically, it results in the conclusion that no judgments are permissible except judgments of identity. 'Man' and 'good' are different from one another. You cannot predicate 'good' of 'man'; you can say merely, 'man is man,' 'good is good' (cf. Plato [?], *Hipp. Maj.* 304 A; Grote, *op. cit.* ii. 47). This led immediately to the assertion, put into the mouth of Dionysodorus by Plato (*Euthyd.* 286 B), that contradiction (or error) cannot occur. If so, the paradox issues that false and contradictory propositions are impossible, which implies, in turn, that all propositions are equally true. As the question of logical 'form,' to which such reasoning might apply, in the sense that 'form' does not guarantee truth, had not yet been considered independently, the Cynics meant, probably, that predicates, because applicable to many subjects, could not be attached more exclusively to one than to another. But we are able only to conjecture as to this (cf. Plutarch, *adv. Colot.* 1119 C f. [ed. Bernardakis, vol. v. p. 45 f.]; Plato, *Parmen.* 130 f.). In any event, however, it is evident that the conclusion of the matter is in the Sophistic vein. Objects, when 'composed' of single factors, may be defined. Simple objects ('ultimates'), being perceptible only to sense, are susceptible of nomenclature, but are unknowable as such. The distinction here raised—really between percepts and concepts—is valid enough. But the inference of Verbalism, instead of carrying out a logical and epistemological analysis, leads back to Sophistic scepticism which, once more, is hardly distinguishable from Sensationalism (cf. Aristotle, *Met.* iii. 5). The Cynics thus seize the negative element in the Socratic dialectic process towards definition, but omit the positive. As a consequence, they entangle themselves in a paradoxical inquiry such as that typified by Alfred de Musset's question—'Le cœur humain de qui, le cœur humain de quoi?' (cf. A. Ed. Chaignet, *Hist. de la psych. des Grecs*, i., Paris, 1887, p. 189 f., note 4; Grote, *op. cit.* i. 168 f., note 1).

(*b*) *Practical.*—The ethical doctrines of the Cynics may be traced to the coalescence of several elements; and very probably this is more evident now than it was to the Cynics themselves in their period of transition. But the numerous stories related about their leaders (for the sake of the story), and the scantiness of the documentary evidence, render a dispassionate account very difficult. Still the following constituent factors, at least, can be traced with some certainty: (1) Socrates, the plain, 'common' man, sturdy and independent; (2) the Eleaticism of Antisthenes' teacher, Gorgias; (3) the 'return to nature' of Hippias and Euripides; and (4) the momentary exigencies of daily life in Athens and in Hellas.

(1) The Cynics descend from the Xenophontic, not the Platonic, Socrates (cf. S. Ribbing, *Ueber d. Verhältnis zwischen d. Xenoph. u. Platon. Berichten üb. d. Persönlichkeit u. d. Lehre d. Sokrates*, Upsala, 1870; F. Dümmler, *loc. cit.*, and *Antisthenica*, Halle, 1882). This is the Socrates who, as we saw above, made independence an attribute of godhead (cf. Xenoph. *Mem.* i. 6). Yet, for him, asceticism was a means to an end (cf. Xenoph. *Cyn.* xiii.), not an end in itself, as it became with the Cynics. The endurance which he praised was no unusual or new thing; it related to ordinary life, and, naturally, had been accentuated by the early 'proverbial' moralists (*e.g.* Hesiod, *Opp. Di.* 287 f., 411 f.). Quickened by moral sincerity, Socrates protested against the indignity put on labour; as a 'friend of the common folk' (Xenoph. *Mem.* i. 2), he held work to be more honourable than idleness (*ib.* iii. 8. 9, 10). It was this side of his character that attracted Antisthenes, and produced in the disciple a parody of the master's temperate protest against the enervating habits of the luxurious city.

(2) But, alongside of this moralized 'common sense,' a distinct theoretical element operated, of which the Cynics were, in a way, unconscious. Socrates had taught that virtue is a 'science' (Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* iii. 8. 6), meaning thereby that virtue was communicable. Now, although Gorgias dismissed metaphysical speculations about Being, and thus showed that the 'science' could not be concerned with 'nature,' he hinted, by implication, at an internal (rational) One. That is, his *argumenta ad hominem* emphasized the *homo*. Accordingly, although he denied what he held to be an unconditional object out of relation to self, he still left self as the One, even the unexplored One. This survival of Eleatic doctrine reappeared in the Cynic interpretation of the *positive* side of Socratic teaching: courage, justice, wisdom are identical—they are knowledge; or, as Antisthenes put it theologically, the gods are many κατὰ νόμον, they are One κατὰ φύσιν. Reason, the organ of this knowledge, is the prerogative, not of *men*, but of *mankind* (cf. Diog. Laert. vi. 105; Xenoph. *Mem.* i. 2. 19; Plato, *Meno*, 71; Aristotle, *Pol.* I. xiii. 10). Reason bestows the power ἑαυτῷ ὁμιλεῖν. If incommunicable theoretically, at all events by means of the current education, it can be recognized and liberated in practical activity. In short, Will becomes the content of the 'science' of the sole Good—virtue. As against Platonic absolutism, with its aristocratic tendencies, which separate men from each other, the Cynics assert a democratic unity. They admit a pragmatic universal in the shape of a plan of life. Thus οἰκεῖος λόγος came by essential content, despite nominalistic logic (cf. Diog. Laert. vi. 12, 103). No matter what the theory, essence could be exhibited —in overt conduct.

(3) The Cynics preached a 'return to nature' as an escape from social convention with its ills. Here they stood in line with Hippias and Euripides. Man ought to be self-sufficient. They meant by

this that there is a human 'nature,' beyond the accidents of citizenship, language, and even race (Eurip. frag. 1050), and that civil institutions are unjustifiable because they interfere with the cultivation of this common possession. As Hippias said: 'All of you who are here present I reckon to be kinsmen and friends and fellow-citizens by nature, and not by law; for by nature like is akin to like, whereas law is the tyrant of mankind, and often compels us to do many things which are against nature' (Plato, *Protag.* 337); or, as Isocrates put it: 'Athens . . . has brought it to pass that the name "Greek" should be thought no longer a matter of race but a matter of intelligence' (*Or.* iv. 50). Hence Cynic cosmopolitanism. The Cynics proposed to realize this unitary 'nature' by denuding themselves of wants, by eschewing obligation to the 'resources of civilization.' Simplicity, temperance, ability to fend for self, were to be the means to this end. Hence their anarchism.

(4) Even before the Peloponnesian War, the Hellenic world had grown conscious of new displacements, and the course of the struggle accentuated this condition. The πολιτεία lacked the flexibility needed to meet the transition. Consequently, men became aware increasingly of a separation between the organized State and transient society (cf. G. A. and W. H. Simcox, *Demosthenes and Æschines 'On the Crown,'* 1872, p. lxvii f.). As has been said above, the citizen no longer found absorbing vocation in his citizenship: loyalty was on the wane. Besides, the war produced special effects of its own. The unity of Hellas and the independence of the rival cities proved to be incompatible ideals; the gulf between rich and poor yawned wider; the itch for personal recognition brought disregard of social responsibility; and numerous men 'without a country' roamed over all Greece (cf. Isocrates, *Ep.* ix. 10). The system of education had forfeited the confidence of many (cf. Isocrates, *Or.* xiii. 292 f., xi. 230 f., x. 208 f., xv. 84 f., 259 f.), while, on the other hand, the people were untouched by the things of the spirit (cf. Isocrates, *Or.* xi. 230, ii. 23 f., viii. 161 f., xv. 168 f.), as, indeed, Aristotle asserted later (*Eth. Nic.* i. 5. 3). Every one was finding fault with his neighbour; the efficiency of democratic government was in doubt. These grave matters were at once the incentives to, and the immediate objects of, the Cynic 'mission.' Unfortunately, hindered doubtless by the temper of the time, the Cynics, who surpassed all in fearlessness, appear to have employed no weapon more potent than contentious abuse, and to have prescribed no remedy more practicable than an impossible renunciation. Better known to the masses than any other teachers, their extravagance and licence rendered them easy marks for ridicule and resentment, so that the seriousness of the evils which they attacked legitimately was overshadowed by the bizarre conduct of the critics. Few, if any, constructive results were accomplished in the 4th cent., as the state of affairs under Eubulus (354–338 B.C.) serves to show (cf. Isocrates [*c.* 353 B.C.], *Or.* xv. 270 f.; J. Beloch, *Die attische Politik seit Perikles*, Leipzig, 1884, p. 173 f.). These influences, then, probably along with others, now irrecoverable, moulded the Cynic ethics.

Although the Sophist was a τεχνογράφος, the teacher of a practical 'art'—and Gorgias belonged very distinctly to this type—a man of Antisthenes' quality, when deflected by Socrates, could easily pick holes in Sophistic practice (cf. Plato, *Soph.* 250 A); he and, more emphatically, his follower, Diogenes, might retain portions of the Gorgian method (cf. Aristotle, *Rhet.* iii. 17. 7), the temper never. Seeking reputation and gain, the Sophists could not be entirely disinterested (cf. Xenoph. *Cyn.* xiii.). Perforce they had to adapt themselves to popular tastes; and Gorgias, conspicuously, seems to have conformed himself to current prejudices; in like manner, Hippias' ideal of a union between the Greek States, just because it was not original with him, serves to illustrate a similar tendency. Such pliability, amounting often to hollowness, revolted Antisthenes, when contact with Socrates had converted him. The times appeared to call for sterner stuff. It was not enough to suggest moral notions by elegant discourses; proselytes must be secured. Independence was needed above all else; and this could be justified on condition that a man found his ideal purposes within himself (cf. Eurip. *Troad.* 988; Plato, *Rep.* ii. 366 E). Thus the Cynics came to regard virtue, not as good, but as *the* Good, and this as an implicit quality inherent in manhood, made explicit in the 'wise man' (*i.e.* Socrates *universalized* by Cynic pragmatism); for without a universal there could be no philosophy (cf. Plato, *Parmen.* 136). No matter at what cost, the 'sage' must develop and guard this possession (cf. Cicero, *de Off.* i. 41), for on it depended the one great issue of life—self-sufficiency. Everything must be sacrificed for it; indeed, this complete sacrifice was regarded as the essence of virtue. On the other hand, vice was the sole evil; and the intermediate values of life, high or low, positive or negative,—wealth, position, health, poverty, shame, sickness, even death—were wholly indifferent. Thus self-control implied, not the moralizing of human relations, but their total eradication, because they are invitations to weakness or to submission (cf. Diog. Laert. vi. 93). So the Cynics came to 'exceed' the nature at which they had arrived; the subjective tendency overpowered them. And there are signs that, like the Stoics afterwards, they wavered here (cf. Diog. Laert. vi. 2, 6, 13, 30, 31, 63, 72); yet their professed ideal was to possess no home, no city, to be beggars and wanderers (cf. *ib.* vi. 38). For man comprehends by nature what is just and true (cf. *ib.* vii. 53), and this internal nature is to be set free as against the law or convention of society. The declaration of Hippias (Plato, *Protag.* 357 D), transmuted now into a φύσις ἀνθρωπίνη, is elevated into the single principle capable of moral authority. The insight of the 'wise man,' won by renunciation, becomes the supreme test; and, according to its judgment, all laws, institutions, and arrangements of society are found arbitrary and harmful. They hamper and enslave true manhood; for, morally viewed, men are free, and therefore equal, just because they possess a specific virtuous nature in their own individual right. Consequently, man is able to realize the Good only if he renounces them. Society is the great Sophist (cf. Plato, *Rep.* 492 A); it renders evil absolute; therefore it is infinitely better to be an uneducated beggar than an educated echo of 'civilization.' Thus the Cynics desert their theoretical Nominalism, and fall into the old paradoxes resultant upon the clash between personal ideal and social opportunity. Casuistry (their species of sophistry) marks them for its own, and antitheses displace reasoning. As always, their anarchism ends in communism, for, without fraternity, liberty and equality are but barren words. The socio-political indecision and helplessness of Hellas led to this extreme conclusion. An ulterior principle, the innate prerogative of simple manhood, came to be viewed as the only escape from contemporary evils. This indifference of the Cynics to political, social, and domestic obligations led, of

course, to antinomianism (cf. Diog. Laert. vi. 12). Curiously enough, however, they did not advocate quietism (cf. F. W. Bussell, *Marcus Aurelius and the Later Stoics*, 1910, p. 51 f.) as a result of their nonconformity and repudiation. The Cynic 'missionary' became a familiar figure, and he lived in face of the public. Like Crates, he was a 'door-opener' (Diog. Laert. vi. 86), but he seems, as a rule, to have been taken more jocularly than seriously. Nor is this wonderful. Strange as it may appear, the besetting sins of Athenian character—vanity and self-sufficiency—found a new incarnation in the censoriousness and self-advertisement of some Cynics. As a matter of fact, they had not investigated morality with due care, and so they could not deliver themselves from paradox. For, after all, consistent Cynicism is tantamount to a confession of failure. Deny the existence of the problem, as the Cynics did in relation to Athenian economic conditions, for example, and—you have solved it! 'Vanity of vanities,' saith the preacher, 'all is vanity'; whereas the greatest of vanities is apt to be the preacher himself.

It is possible, and too easy perhaps, to judge Cynicism as the temporary exaggeration of a clique. But, after all, it dealt with the immortal things of life, and in later times left its mark upon ancient thought; Epictetus could idealize even Diogenes (*Diss.* iii. 24). An overwhelming personality like Socrates transmutes the fluid tendencies of his epoch, and outpaces the average man. Nevertheless, Socrates was of his age, and could not escape its limitations. Antisthenes and his followers started from this temporary factor, and, by confining the Socratic doctrine to it, impressed the ordinary mind. Rudely enough, perhaps, they proved that Greece still had a conscience. They exercised the magisterial and reproving function (cf. Epictetus, *Diss.* ii. 21), emphasizing the force and conviction, though not the dignity and sublimity, of the master; yet this very bias freed them from the sordid passions of self-interest which so afflicted their contemporaries (cf. Diog. Laert. vi. 85 f.; Xenoph. *Symp.* iv. 34 f.). As their denunciation of slavery showed, they had a glimpse of a sublime idea, and were enabled consequently to enter a splendid protest against the otiose compromises and superficial conformities of the day. And, if their zeal outran discretion, or even decency, it must be recalled that they were bred of a society which lived *in puris naturalibus* to a degree incomprehensible by us; that, by insistence upon the moral significance of much that had been deemed non-moral, they aired questions to which otherwise Aristotle's saving common sense might never have been applied (cf. e.g. *Eth. Nic.* x. 6). As a result, they paved the way for the conclusion that virtue is not a theory, but a spiritual state—it is dynamic over against the trivial. Their defence of a thesis doubtless blurred their vision of the seminal personality of the 'wise man.' Notwithstanding, they did make the 'sage' the moral norm, and thus gave the first hint that 'the "Return to nature," so far from implying reversion to animalism, and the reduction of man's needs to the level of the beasts, was found to involve fundamental differentiation of reasoning man from the unreason of the brute or the inertia of matter, to place man on a unique spiritual plane, and eventually to summon him from individual isolation to conscious brotherhood with kind' (G. H. Rendall, *Marcus Aurelius Antoninus to Himself*, 1898, p. xlvi). Driven by a theory which spelt failure, the Cynics could not perceive these great issues; but ideals, whose end is not yet, originated with them.

See also Casuistry, Cyrenaics, Megarians, Neo-Cynics, Socrates, Sophists, Stoics.

Literature (in addition to the works mentioned in the text).—Ueberweg-Heinze, *Grundriss d. Gesch. d. Philos.* i.[10] (1910), gives a complete summary of the technical literature: see § 7, for the primary and secondary sources for the history of Greek philosophy; § 8, for literature on the pre-philosophical period of Greek culture; § 37, for literature on the Cynics specifically. For the English reader the best work is still E. Zeller, *Socrates and the Socratic Schools*, Eng. tr., London, 1868, and successive reprints; W. Windelband, *Hist. of Anc. Philosophy*, Eng. tr., London, 1899, is also very valuable; the most brilliant and readable account of the Cynics is to be found in Th. Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, Eng. tr. vol. ii., London, 1905. With special reference, as a rule, to the social, political, and literary environment, the following works may be added: T. C. Finlayson, *Essays, Addresses, and Lyrical Translations*, London, 1893, p. 194 f.; P. Girard, *L'Éduc. athén. au ve et au ive siècle avant Jésus-Christ*[2], Paris, 1891; O. Apelt, *Beitr. z. Gesch. d. gr. Phil.*, Leipzig, 1891 (the essay on Cosmopolitanism in Antiquity); R. E. Hammond, *Polit. Institutions of the Anc. Greeks*, London, 1895; A. Croiset, *Hist. de la litt. grecque*, tom. iv. [Paris, 1900] pp. 36 f., 240 f.; P. Decharme, *La Critique des traditions religieuses chez les Grecs*, etc., Paris, 1904, p. 217 f.; R. Hirzel, *Der Dialog: ein literarhist. Versuch*, i., Leipzig, 1895; M. Clerc, *Les Métèques athéniens: Étude sur la condition légale, la situation morale et le rôle social et économique des étrangers domiciliés à Athènes*, Paris, 1893; H. Francotte, *De la Condition des étrangers dans les cités grecques*, Louvain and Paris, 1903; H. Sidgwick, *Lectures on the Philos. of Kant*, etc., London, 1905 (the essay on the Sophists); Ed. Schwartz, *Charakterköpfe d. antiken Lit.*, 2nd series, Leipzig, 1910, p. 1 f.

R. M. Wenley.

CYRENAICS.—The name given to a school of thinkers founded at Cyrene, a Greek colony on the northern coast of Africa, towards the beginning of the 4th century B.C. It is one of the earliest attempts—and perhaps the most thoroughgoing—to base the conduct of life on the pursuit of the individual's pleasure. The founder of the school was **Aristippus.** He came to Athens to hear Socrates, whom he reverenced to the end of his life (Diog. ii. 65, 76), and whose scholar, in spite of the differences between them, he always avowed himself to be (*ib.* 74). Socrates would never really have accepted the pursuit of mere personal pleasure as the end of life; indeed, in the *Memorabilia* (ii. 1), Xenophon gives us an account of a keen dispute between him and Aristippus on this very point. Yet the 'pupil' might fairly have claimed to teach nothing inconsistent with his master's fundamental principles. Socrates, in fact, while claiming that man's rational life lay in the search after what was truly good, had yet left undetermined what this true good might be (see Sidgwick, *History of Ethics*, pp. 24, 31). The Cyrenaics argued that it could be found in nothing but *pleasure*, which was the one thing manifestly desirable, and which all creatures, unless perverted, did desire and choose (Diog. ii. 87, 88, 89).

This ethical doctrine seems to have been closely connected with their general view—derived probably from Protagoras—that the individual was limited to a knowledge of his own sensations. A man could know only what appeared to him, not what things were in themselves, nor even what they appeared to others; and there was thus apparently no possibility of a rational assertion that anything was noble or not in itself. All we could know of 'goodness' was what was pleasurable *to us* (Diog. ii. 92, 93; Sext. Empir. *adv. Math.* vii. 191-200). There was thus no room for the Cyrenaics to admit fundamental differences of quality in pleasure; and this, it would seem, they fully realized. One pleasure was no whit better than another (Diog. ii. 87), nor could the source from which it sprang, however base that might be called, make any difference to its worth (*ib.* 88). In this they were profoundly at variance with Plato and Aristotle, who both argued for absolute standards of value and of truth, standards going beyond the mere opinions of individual men (*e.g.* Plato, *Repub.* bk. vi. *ad fin.*; Arist. *Metaph.* bk. iii. c. 5. 1009a, *Eth. Nic.* bk. i. c. 8. 1099a). The famous discussion in the *Philebus* (36 C f.) as to the possibility of a distinction between true and false

pleasures, parallel to that between true and false opinions, is in all probability written with an eye to the Cyrenaic position. It is of great interest also to note that this initial scepticism of theirs led the Cyrenaics to turn aside from scientific inquiry into Nature, as from useless speculation (Diog. ii. 92).

The anecdotes told of Aristippus and his biting wit give a vivid commentary on his theory. His seems to have been one of 'the great experiments in life' that the Greek philosophers were not afraid to make. Resolute, daring, and self-controlled, on one side it recalls the great Socratic tradition of unswerving obedience in practice 'to that argument which seemed the best,' and even the Socratic scorn for non-essentials; 'it was better to be a beggar than a dunce; if the first had no money, the second had no manhood' (*ib.* 70). But there is a sinister side as well. Aristippus will take anything he can get from Dionysius, the tyrant of Syracuse. 'I went to Socrates when I wanted knowledge, I come to you when I want money' (*ib.* 78). He does not demand constancy from his mistresses; what did it matter to him if others sailed in his ship (*ib.* 74)? Money and what money could get are not to be shunned, but used, and used freely. The evil lies in being bound by our pleasures, not in enjoying them (*ib.* 75; Stobæus, *Floril.* 17, 18). Let them be as vivid as possible—the 'calm' so near indifference, afterwards advocated by the Epicureans, is scorned as nothing better than sleep (Diog. ii. 89)—but let them not defeat their own object by fettering the mind (*ib.* 66, 67). The 'smooth motion' of the Cyrenaic pleasure was always motion, but the rippling motion of a great sea which should never be roused into storm. Though circumstances may prevent the wise man from obtaining this always, yet he will be able to attain more of it, and in a more intense form, than any one else (*ib.* 90, 91). Aristippus himself was always famous for his easy mastery over all circumstances, prosperous and adverse alike; and the line of Horace (*Ep.* I. xvii. 24) that pictures him 'at peace in the present, yet striving for greater things' ('*Tentantem maiora, fere præsentibus æquum*'), gives us Cyrenaicism at its best.

The pressure of the practical problem, how to attain the maximum of individual pleasure, is shown in the divergencies of his successors. **Hegesias** felt the inevitable pain of life so keenly as to disbelieve in the possibility of anything deserving the name of happiness (Diog. ii. 94). The most that could be hoped for by the wise man, acting for his own interest alone, as a wise man should, was to escape from suffering, and this could be attained best by indifference to external things (*ib.* 95, 96). Here we reach a strange likeness to the Stoics and Cynics, and, stranger still, we find this leader of what purported to be the school of vivid personal life called by the name of 'Death's Advocate,' and accused of luring men to suicide (*ib.* 86; Cic. *Tusc.* i. 83).

Annikeris, at the cost of consistency, gave a gentler tone to the whole system. It is plain that the question between what might be called individualistic and altruistic hedonism, between the pleasure of oneself and the pleasure of others, was coming to the front and pressing for solution. According to Annikeris, there were such things of genuine worth as friendship and patriotism (which Hegesias had denied). The wise man would suffer for his country and still be equally happy, although he got little pleasure from it, and pleasure alone was the end. The happiness of another was not a reasonable object of choice, yet the wise man would endure for the sake of his friend (Diog. ii. 96, 97).

Theodorus, called 'the Atheist,' seems to have been the closest, both in keenness of intellect and in hardness of temper, to the original founder. Friendship he dispensed with; the foolish could not use friends, and the wise man had no need of them (*ib.* 98). There was nothing to be ashamed of in theft and adultery and sacrilege, provided one escaped the penalties (*ib.* 99). He seems to have differed slightly from Aristippus in that he felt the need of laying more stress on the attitude of the mind, and less on the external goods of chance as necessary for the well-being of man. Thus he was led to say that the vital matters were not 'pleasure' and 'pain,' these in themselves being indifferent, but 'joy' and 'grief,' which in their turn depended on prudence and folly. This at least is the interpretation suggested by Zeller for a somewhat obscure passage in Diog. ii. 98, and it is certainly probable.

About the time of the later Cyrenaics, Epicurus was developing a more subtle and elaborate form of the doctrine, and after the 3rd cent. B.C. we do not hear of Cyrenaics as distinguished from Epicureans. See also artt. HEDONISM and PHILOSOPHY (Greek).

LITERATURE.—No writings, other than fragmentary, of the Cyrenaics themselves are in existence. The chief ancient authorities are: Diogenes Laertius, *de Clarorum Philosophorum Vitis*, bk. ii. 65–104, c. 8, 'Aristippus' [for the ethical doctrines of the school and the character of Aristippus], Paris, 1878; Sextus Empiricus, *adversus Mathematicos*, bk. vii. 190–200 [for the metaphysical position], Leipzig, 1840. See also F. W. A. Mullach, *Fragmenta Philosophorum Græcorum*, ii. 397 ff., Paris, 1867; H. Ritter and L. Preller, *Historia Philosophiæ Græcæ*, 'Cyrenaici,' 204–213 B, Gotha, 1888; F. Ueberweg, *Grundriss der Gesch. der Philos.*[8], Berlin, 1894–98, i. 95 ff.; E. Zeller, *Socrates and the Socratic Schools* (tr. Reichel), ch. xiv. [very clear and thorough, with copious quotations and references],' London, 1868; J. E. Erdmann, *Grundriss der Gesch. der Philos.*[4], Berlin, 1895–96 (Eng. tr., London, 1890), i. 89 ff.; H. Sidgwick, *History of Ethics*, i. c. ii. §§ 2–4 [brief, but illuminating], London, 1896; G. W. F. Hegel, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, ii. 1. c. 2. C. 2 [the work of a master], Berlin, 1833. W. Pater, in *Marius the Epicurean*, London, 1885, gives incidentally a vivid though somewhat rose-coloured sketch of the system.

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D

DACOITY.—This term, which is derived from Hindi *dakait*, 'robbery belonging to an armed band,' probably from *ḍāknā*, 'to shout,' is now usually employed as an equivalent for brigandage (or, technically, the conspiracy of five or more men to engage in an act of robbery, or the actual commission of such an offence) arising from, or at least existing in, an unsettled condition of some of the administrative districts in India. It is in this sense that it is used with regard to Burma. Originally, however, it referred to a much more definite and curious condition of society, in which robbery with violence was not only an occupation but a religious and caste duty. Robbery was a hereditary profession, although the ranks of the Dacoits were continually augmented from the outside. The system reached its greatest development in the Native State of Oudh (shortly before its incorporation within the British Dominion in India), owing to the incapacity of its native rulers.

But it was also prevalent in nearly every Native State, and was encouraged by the rulers, who shared in the proceeds of the robberies as the price of their toleration. The Dacoits rarely committed their depredations near their native haunts, or even within the State which harboured them. As their victims were usually strangers, the Dacoits were not the objects of fear and hatred on the part of their neighbours, who were not, therefore, anxious to betray them to the authorities. Their raids were carefully planned, and the members of an expedition made their way to their rendezvous singly or in small bands, disguised as pilgrims or as holy water-carriers or as bullock-drivers. After carrying out their plans, they made their way back to their jungle fastnesses with almost incredible rapidity. As a rule, they preferred to avoid bloodshed, but on occasion they did not scruple to take life.

The Dacoits were usually of low caste, and their social and religious customs were of a totemistic character, exogamous marriage being the practice. Their raids were undertaken only when the omens were favourable, and after the exercises of religion. The deities of most of the Dacoit clans or septs were Kālī or Devī (an axe sacred to her being carried by Dacoit leaders in Central India) and Sorruj Deota (the sun-god).

The British authorities in India made great efforts in the decades preceding the middle of last century to stamp out the practice, but, as it was rooted in religion and social custom as well as encouraged by misrule in Native States, the task was very severe; and the evil came to life again when it had been apparently stamped out. But, with the final annexation of Oudh, its great stronghold no longer proved a shelter for the robber clans, and Dacoity since the Mutiny has been indistinguishable from local brigandage, to the suppression of which the police are adequate.

The attitude of the British authorities to Dacoity, as in the similar cases of Thuggee (see THAGS), affords an instance of interference with native religions and customs; but it brings out clearly the rationale of such action in that the custom must be recognizably of an anti-social and criminal character.

LITERATURE.—J. Hutton, *Popular Account of the Thugs and Dacoits*, London, 1857; E. Balfour, *Cyclopædia of India*[3], London, 1885, i. 874. See also the literature under THAGS.

JOHN DAVIDSON.

DĀDŪ, DĀDŪPANTHĪS. — 1. Dādū (A.D. 1544 to 1603) was born in Ahmadābād, of Brāhman parents. His father, Lodī Rām, had left his Shāstras and temple services for trade with foreign parts. About the time of the Reformation in Europe and a little before Dādū's birth, a Reformation of Hinduism had spread over all northern India, from Bengal to the Panjāb, and south towards Bombay. Kabīr, the founder of the Kabīrpanthīs (*q.v.*), had very thoroughly done a reformer's work round Benares. Nānak, from whom, under his ninth successor, came the Sikhs, had fought idolatry and superstition in the Panjāb. The influence of these two spread far and wide, and hundreds of earnest souls were protesting against the grosser abuses in Hinduism.

Dādū was early affected, and his religious convictions led him to spend his life in preaching the Reformation doctrines over the midlands, between Ahmadābād and Delhī. He lived for a time in Sāmbhar, where his monument is, and where his coat and sandals are kept as relics and worshipped. Amber, the old capital of Jaipur, was Dādū's home for a time, where a house of his followers still flourishes, and in the modern capital we have the headquarters of the Nāgās. Dādū visited Delhī, and had an interview with the famous Akbar. Thereafter he turned his face towards the south, making new disciples and strengthening his old ones, among whom were some nobles. After a year in Amber he went to Narainā, a village about 40 miles S.W. from the capital and 8 from Sāmbhar, and there died in A.D. 1603.

Dādū left 152 disciples to continue the work among his many followers. His teachings are embodied in the *Bānī*, a poetic work of 5000 verses. In its 37 chapters various religious subjects are treated, such as: The Divine Teacher, Remembrance, Separation, The Meeting, The Mind, Truth, The Good, Faith, Prayer. The Hymns appended are set to music, and are suitable for public and private worship.

2. From the *Bānī* it appears that Dādū condemned and rejected much that was new and false in Hinduism, and that he re-discovered and taught much truth about God, man, and salvation.

He rejected: (1) The *Vedas* and *Qur'ān* as ultimate truth; (2) the *Vedāntic* philosophy; (3) ritualism and formalism; (4) the corrupt priesthood; (5) caste and caste marks; (6) idolatry; (7) the use of the rosary; (8) pilgrimages and ceremonial ablutions. (9) He threw new light on the transmigration of the soul, holding that all possible re-births happen in man's one life on earth. The moods of mind and the quality of actions give the soul the birth of a fox, a goose, a pig, an ass, and such like. (10) He held that the gods Śiva, Viṣṇu, and Brahmā were only men who had been canonized. Their pictures and statues had been made and preserved as object-lessons, to teach men their history. (11) *Māyā*, the world, matter, was not evil in itself. The bad man made it evil by allowing it to lead his mind away from God. Worldliness, and not the world, is evil. (12) He again and again says: 'I am not a Hindu, nor a Musalmān. I belong to none of the six schools of philosophy. I love the merciful God.'

His doctrines about God, man, and salvation included the following.

'Forsake not the One God. Forsake all evil.' 'I have found that God is the unchangeable, the immortal, the fearless, the joy-giving, the best, the self-existent, the almighty, the beautiful, the glory-of-all, the pure, the unimaged, the unseen, the incomprehensible, the infinite, the kingly One.' 'He is brightness, effulgence, light, illumination, perfection.' 'I have made all things teach me of God, and I know that He is immanent in the universe with all its properties and elements.'

God is the *Creator*.

'So powerful is the Lord, that by one word He created all.' 'His works are wonderful, and cannot be fully understood.' 'He alone does all and gives power to all. He blesses all His servants and is not proud.' 'He created us after a model He had formed: of His plans, His wisdom, His works, no man can see the limit.' 'Where nothing was, He made all; and when He wills it becomes nothing. Become as nothing before Him, and love Him alone.'

God is the *Preserver* of all.

'I meditate on Him, who preserves all.' 'I adore the *Parabrahma*, the unsurpassable. My God is the Holy One. I worship the pure and unimaged one.'

Man is a creature, and made to worship God.

'Who is so wretched as the man who persuades you to serve other gods?' 'Not for a moment even let God's name depart from your heart.' 'My soul, if now thou knowest not that God's name is the chief good, thou shalt repent and say, "What a fool I was!"' 'The world is an ocean of pain, God is an ocean of joy. Go to this ocean and forsake the useless world.'

Conscience spoke clearly in Dādū.

'I have done very wickedly; be not angry, O Lord. Thou art the God of patience. To Thy servant all the blame belongs.' 'I have forsaken Thy service. I am a sinful servant. There is no other like me so vile.' 'I sin in every action, I am unjust in everything. I sin against Thee every moment. O God, forgive my sin.' 'I am the only great sinner in the whole world. My sins are infinite and countless.' 'From the beginning to the end of my life I have done no good; ignorance, the love of the world, false pleasure, and forgetfulness have held me.' 'I have lived in lust, anger, suspicion, and have not called on Thy name. I have spent my life in hypocrisy and the sins of the senses.' 'I am bound by many fetters. My soul is helpless. I cannot deliver myself. My beloved alone can.' 'I am a prisoner. Thou art my deliverer. Save me, O God most merciful.' 'The evil is in my soul, my heart is full of passion; reveal Thyself and slay all

mine enemies.' 'My soul is sorely afflicted, because I have forgotten Thee, O God. I cannot endure the pain; deliver me.'

Dādū knows that it is sin which separates the soul from God. The longest poem in the *Bānī* is called 'Separation.' It is the wail of a woman sick of love and maddened by the pain of separation.

'I am full of love. I greatly desire Thee. O Lord, my beloved, come and meet me; now is my time.' 'The wife, separated from her husband, calls day and night, and is sad. I call my God, my God, vehemently thirsting.' 'My whole soul calls as the *Chātrag*.[1] My beloved, my beloved, I thirst for Thee, I long to see Thee. Fulfil my desire.' 'O *Chātrag*! Thy voice is sweet. Why is Thy body so black? I am consumed of love. I call day and night, O Thou, O Thou.' 'To whom shall the wife tell her pain? By whom send news to her absent one? Watching his return, her grief turns her hair white. 'As the opium-eater longs for his opium, the hero for war, the poor for wealth, so longs my soul for God.'

Dādū had cast aside the *Vedas*, the gods, and all that men hold to be the means of salvation. He found nothing in the past or in the present, and so he rushes into the future and says:

'When will He come? When will He come? My beloved, when will He reveal Himself? Sweet will He be to me. I will embrace Him. Without Him I must die. Body and soul will find joy when God reveals Himself.'

Dādū knows from his wants what 'the meeting' ought to be and what ought to be revealed to him, and so he calls on God to come as 'the Divine Teacher,' 'the Deliverer.'

3. Dādū's disciples are called *Dādūpanthīs* ('they of the path of Dādū'). They exist in considerable numbers and in two divisions.

(*a*) The Laymen, 'the Faithful,' '*the Servants*.' These may marry, and follow any respectable trade or profession. In theory they are supposed to have given up Hinduism. They ought to store their minds with the *Bānī*, and use their creed and prayers. Discipline is lax, however, and so in practice there are various stages of attainment. At times the connexion becomes very slender indeed, for a dole to a begging *sādhū* is sufficient to maintain it.

(*b*) The Priests, 'the Esoteric,' '*the Masters*.' These are all monks, and keep up their ranks by adoption from the better castes. They devote themselves to a religious life and to teaching the *Bānī*; but this does not prevent them from bearing arms, practising medicine, lending money, or from agricultural pursuits. Only 52 of Dādū's original disciples opened, mainly in Rājputānā, 'doors of Dādū' (*Dādvārās*) and adopted successors. Some of these 'seats' have prospered in wealth and learning, and some have almost passed away. They produced a good deal of what, in relation to Hinduism, may be called Protestant Literature, written in verse, and in the common tongue (*Bhāṣā*). Probably much of this has been lost, for it has never been collected, printed, or translated.

The present distinctions arise not from difference in belief, but from locality and modes of life of the Dādūpanthīs.

(1) The *Khālsas* ('the pure, ruling').—The 'seat' of these is Narainā (Jaipur). Here Dādū died, and here lives his successor, the head of all the Dādūpanthīs. They all contribute something to keep up the dignity of their head; and here, once a year, a great gathering (*Melā*) is held.

(2) The *Nāgās* (soldier monks).—Their name, from *nagna* ('naked'), refers to the simplicity of their dress when they go to war. Their founder was Sundra Dās, a Rājput of Bīkānīr, who, seeing the value of the sword, before the Pax Britannica filled the land, trained his followers to serve as mercenaries. There are at present about 20,000 of them, in 9 camps, near the Jaipur borders, which they defend. They have fallen far behind in the modern accomplishments of the soldier in drill and arms. They have only the sword, the shield, and the match-lock. They were faithful to England in the Mutiny. They are a fine class of men, and their training to read the *Bānī* and to arms prevents them from falling into dissipation.

(3) The *Utrādis*.—These have come from a great and prosperous 'school' in the Panjāb. The founder was Bābā Banwārī Dās. These Dādūpanthīs take to medicine and money-lending, and many of them are very rich.

(4) The *Virkat*.—These may not touch money, but have to live on the alms they get. They wear salmon-coloured clothes and devote themselves to study. They seldom stay long in any place, but are guided by 'grain and water' (*i.e.* food) in their movements. 'The Master' has with him from one or two to many disciples—boys whom he has adopted and whom he trains. The present writer has seen them travel about in as large a 'school' as 150. They teach not only the *Bānī*, but also difficult Sanskrit books relating to Literature, Philosophy, and Religion.

(5) The *Khākīs* ('ashes-covered').—These Dādūpanthīs accentuate austerities, wear few clothes, have long coiled hair, and smear themselves with ashes. They usually go about in small companies, and believe that, like the stream, they keep pure by constant movement.

4. *The present condition of the Dādūpanthīs.*—Hinduism, against which Dādū protested, has, in a modified form, found its way amongst them again. It has come in by way of the intellect, and many are Vedāntists. It has also come in by way of the heart, and many use the rosary, worship the *Bānī* as an idol, and prostrate themselves before the sandals and old clothes of Dādū.

LITERATURE.—W. W. Hunter, *IGI*², London, 1885–87, vi. 344, vii. 53, and artt. 'Amber,' 'Naraina'; W. Crooke, *Tribes and Castes of the N.W. Prov. and Oudh*, Calcutta, 1896, ii. 236–239; E. W. Hopkins, *Religions of India*, London, 1896, p. 613 f.; J. C. Oman, *Mystics, Ascetics, and Saints of India*, London, 1903, pp. 133, 189; A. D. Bannerman, *Rajputana Census Report*, Lucknow, 1902, p. 47 f.

JOHN TRAILL.

DAGAN, DAGON.—**1. The Babylonian Dagân.**—In Bab. and Assyr. texts a god appears whose name is written with the syllabic signs *DA-GAN*. The objections of Jensen (*Kosmologie*, 449 ff.) to the phonetic reading of these signs have been set aside by the discovery of new texts in which *gan* receives a phonetic complement, e.g. *Da-gan-na* (*Vorderas. Bibl.* i. [1907] 231), and, in the Tell el-Amarna letters (Winckler, 1896, nos. 215, 216), *Da-ga-an* (without the determinative for 'god'). We meet also *Da-gan-ni*, with a different sign for *gan* (Jensen, *op. cit.* 449; Jastrow, *Rel. Bab.* 137); and in one case *Da-gu-na* (Bezold, *Catalogue*, 1889–99, iv. 1482).

In Babylonia, Dagân first appears in personal names on the obelisk of Manishtusu (*c.* 2400 B.C., Meyer), namely, *Karib* (?)-*Dagân* (A. v. 8), *Gimil-Dagân* (A. xi. 15), and *Iti-Dagân* (C. xvi. 7). The 37th year of Dungi, king of Ur, took its name from the building of the temple of Dagân (*Vorderas. Bibl.* i. 231). A king of Isin (2145 B.C., Meyer) bore the name of *Idin-Dagân*, and his son was *Ishmê-Dagân*. In the prologue to the Code of Ḫammurabi (iv. 27 f.) the king describes himself as 'warrior of Dagân, his begetter.' Dagân is mentioned in several other early Bab. inscriptions (Jensen, *op. cit.* 449). A seal-cylinder published by de Clercq (*Cylindres orientaux*, 1888, no. 245) bears the inscription '*Dagân-abî*, son of *Ibnî-Dagân*, servant of Dagân,' and in the Ira-myth he is mentioned along with Anu (*KIB* vi. [1900] 60, line 25).

In Assyria this god first appears in the name of the king *Ishmê-Dagân* (*c.* 1900 B.C.). Itti-Marduk-balatu, an Assyrian ruler whose date cannot be determined, calls himself 'the chosen of Anu and *Dagân*' (Winckler, *Unters.*, 1889, p. 139). Ashur-

[1] A bird supposed to drink only the rain from heaven.

naṣirpal (885–860 B.C.) calls himself 'darling of Anu and Dagân' (Layard, Pl. 1, line 1; *WAI* xvii. 10–11). The eponym for the year 879 B.C. was named *Dagân-bêl-nâṣir* (*KIB* i. [1889] 204). Shamshi-Adad (825–812 B.C.) and Sargon (722–705 B.C.) also mention Dagân in connexion with Anu (*KIB* i. 175, ii. [1890] 39, 41). Dagân is not found in personal names after the 9th cent., and his worship seems to have died out in the later days of the Assyrian empire. Sargon's reference to him is an archaism.

In tablets from the kingdom of Ḫana, on the upper Euphrates near Sâlḥîjeh, Dagân is mentioned in oaths along with Shamash (*PSBA* xxix. [1907] 177 ff., xxxi. [1910] 292; Ungnad, *BASS* vi. [1909] 5, p. 28; *Vorderas. Schriftdenkmäler*, vii. [1909] 204), and in one of these the personal name *Yashshuḫ-Dagân* occurs. In a tablet from the capital of this kingdom, Shamshi-Adad, *patesi* of Assyria, styles himself 'worshipper of Dagân, builder of the temple of Dagân in the city of Tirqa' (*ZA* xxi. [1908] 247; *OLZ* xi. [1908] col. 193). In a tablet of Ḫana published by Thureau-Dangin (*JA* xiv. [1909] 149) several priests of Dagân are mentioned, and the name *Izra'-Dagân* occurs. In the Cappadocian tablets also the name *Iti-Dagân* is found (Sayce, *Babyloniaca*, i. [1907]). Finally, the Canaanite writer of two of the Tell el-Amarna letters bears the name *Da-ga-an-takala* (Winckler, nos. 215, 216). It appears, accordingly, that the cult of Dagân extended all the way from Babylonia to the shores of the Mediterranean.

On the basis of a derivation of Dagân from *dāg*, 'fish,' many writers have assumed that he was a fish-god, and have appealed to the legend narrated by Berossus (Müller, *FHG* ii. [1885] 496 ff.; Lenormant, *Fragments cosmogoniques*, 1872, p. 6 f.; Hrozny, *MVG* viii. [1903] 252 ff.), that seven beings, half-fish and half-man, came out of the Persian Gulf and taught the primitive inhabitants of Babylonia the arts of civilization. The first of these was called Ōánnēs; the second, Annēdōtos; and the last, Ōdákōn. The last is supposed to be the same as Dagân; and, on the strength of this identification, the numerous fish-men depicted in Bab.-Assyr. art (Ward, *Seal-Cylinders*, 1910, pp. 217, 282, 355 f., 385, 410) have been supposed to be representations of Dagân (*e.g.* Layard, *Nineveh*, 1849, ii. 353 and pl. at end of book; Schrader, *KAT*², 1882, p. 182; and in Riehm, *HWB*¹, 1874, p. 250; Menant, *RHR* xi. [1885] 295 ff.; and most of the popular handbooks). Ōdákōn, however, has nothing to do with Dagân, but is the Sumerian fish-god *U-ki-di-a*, or *U-di-a-ki*, who is associated with the fish-god *Ḫan-ni*, the prototype of Ōánnēs (Reisner, *Hymn.*, 1896, pp. 91, 137; Hrozny, *MVG* viii. [1903] 258). The fish-men in Bab. art represent Ea, the god of the sea, and his attendants; but with these Dagân is never identified (Jensen, *op. cit.* 451; Zimmern, *KAT*³, p. 358; Hrozny, *op. cit.* 261; A. Jeremias, *Das AT im Lichte d. alt. Orients*³, p. 470). On the contrary, Dagân is constantly equated with En-lil, or Bêl, the god of the earth. In the passages cited above he is associated with Anu, the sky-god, in the manner in which Bêl is ordinarily associated, and in *WAI* (i. 4, no. 15, line 6 ff., iii. 68, 21 *cd*) the identity of the older Bêl of Nippur with Dagân is asserted (see BAAL in vol. ii. p. 295; Jastrow, *Rel. Bab.* 137, 142, 145, 219).

2. The Canaanite Dāgôn.—In the OT Dāgôn appears as a god of the Philistines who had a temple at Gaza, and a temple and image at Ashdod (Jg 16²³ᶠ·, 1 S 5²⁻⁷, 1 Mac 10⁸³ᶠ· 11⁴). Jerome in his com. on Is 46¹ (where some Gr. texts read 'Dagon' instead of 'Nebo') says: 'Dagon est idolum Ascalonis, Gazae et reliquarum urbium Philistim.' The Philistines were a non-Semitic people who came from Caphtor (prob. Crete). They are first mentioned as invading Palestine in the 8th year of Ramses III. (1190 B.C.). They seem not to have brought Dāgôn with them, but to have adopted him from the Canaanites among whom they settled, since he is found in place-names that are older than the time of their conquest and that lie outside of their territory. *Bayti-Duquna* appears in a list of the Egyptian king Ramses III., which is copied from an earlier original of the XVIIIth or XIXth dynasty (Müller, *Egypt. Researches*, 1906, p. 49). It seems to be identical with Bêth-Dāgôn (Jos 15⁴¹)—which is either the modern *Beit-Dejan*, 6 miles S.E. from Jaffa, or *Dâjûn*, 1½ miles farther S.—and with *Bit-Daganna* of Sennacherib (*Prism-Insc.* ii. 65 = *KIB* ii. 92). There was another *Bêth-Dāgôn* in Asher (Jos 19²⁷). Jerome knows a *Kepher-Dāgôn* (*OS*, ed. Lagarde [²1887], 104¹⁵, 235¹⁴) between Diospolis and Jamnia. There is also a modern *Beit-Dejan*, S.E. of Nâblus. All these are doubtless survivals of ancient place-names, and indicate a wide diffusion of the cult of Dāgôn in Canaan before the Philistine conquest. A borrowing of Dāgôn by the Philistines is not surprising, since they adopted the Canaanite 'Ashtart (1 S 31¹⁰) and the Syrian Atargatis (see ATARGATIS in vol. ii. p. 165). Whether Marnas (Aram. *Marnā*, 'our Lord'), a deity of the Philistines at the beginning of our era, is the same as Dāgôn is unknown (see Baethgen, *Beitr.*, 1888, p. 65 f.).

Dāgôn seems also to have been a god of the Phœnicians, either through survival from primitive Canaanite religion, or through adoption from the Philistines (cf. Philo Byblius in Müller, *FHG* iii. [1885] 567 f.). The *Etym. magn.* says that Bētágōn (Bêth-Dāgôn) is Kronos among the Phœnicians. Sayce (*Higher Criticism*, p. 327) reports a seal bearing in Phœnician letters the inscription 'Ba'al-Dāgôn,' and the inscription of Eshmunazar, king of Sidon, contains the words ארצת דגן, which may mean 'land of Dāgôn,' or merely 'corn-land.'

The theory that Dāgôn is derived from *dāg*, 'fish,' and that the image of Dāgôn was half-man, half-fish, is not found in old Jewish sources such as the Targum and Talmud, or in Josephus; it first appears in Jerome, who interprets Dāgôn as compounded of דָּג and און, and renders it *piscis tristitiæ* (*OS*, ed. Lagarde², 32⁷; cf. 189¹⁴). This theory was adopted by Jewish commentators of the Middle Ages, from whom it has been inherited by modern scholars. It is still defended by Cumont (in Pauly-Wissowa, *RE*, iv. [1909]), Baethgen (*Beitr.* 65), Lagrange (*Rel. sém.* 131), A. Jeremias (*op. cit.* 470). In support of this view it is urged (1) that Dāgôn is derived from דָּג, 'fish'; but it may come equally well from דָּגָן, 'corn,' and may be a foreign word for which no Heb. etymology is to be sought. (2) In 1 S 5⁴, after the account of how Dāgôn's head and bands were broken off, the Heb. text reads רַק דָּגוֹן נִשְׁאַר עָלָיו, 'only Dāgôn was left upon him,' which David Ḳimḥi translates 'only the form of a fish was left.' Wellhausen (*Text Sam.*, 1871, p. 59) reads דָּגוֹ instead of דָּגוֹן, and translates 'only his fishy part was left'; but Lagarde (*Proph. Chald.*, 1872, p. li), with more probability, reads גֵּוֹו, 'his body,' or, with the LXX, we may suppose that גֵּו has fallen out of the text before דָּגוֹן. In any case this does not prove, as Ḳimḥi says, that 'from his navel down Dāgôn had the form of a fish, and from his navel up the form of a man.' (3) Derketo, or Atargatis, at Askalon had a fish's tail (see ATARGATIS in vol. ii. p. 166), and she was possibly the consort of Dāgôn. But, even granting that the two were consorts, which is not known, there is no reason why Dāgôn should have had the same form as his spouse. The Sumerian fish-god Udaki has as wife the corn-goddess Nisaba (*MVG* viii. [1903]

263), and similarly the fish-goddess Atargatis may have bad as consort the corn-god Dāgôn. (4) Coins of Arados and of Askalon dating from about 350 B.C. depict a triton-like figure holding a trident in his right hand and a fish in his left (Head, *Hist. Num.*, 1887, p. 666; Hoffmann, *ZA* xi. [1896] 279 f.; Lagrange, *Rel. sém.* 131). These are supposed to be Dāgôn, but there is no proof. They are in pure Greek style, and far more probably depict Neptune. Accordingly, there is no better evidence that Dāgôn was a fish-god than there is in the case of Dagân. From the seal referred to above we learn that he was one of the *bᵉʿālîm*, who in Canaan were predominatingly agricultural deities (Hos $2^{7\,(5)}$), and on this seal an ear of corn is depicted. According to 1 S 6^{5}, Dāgôn was discomfited by Jahweh's sending mice which destroyed the crops. This looks like an agricultural divinity. Dāgôn must also have been a warder-off of disease, since he was attacked by Jahweh's sending tumours upon the Philistines (1 S $5^{6ff.}$). He was also the leader of his people in war, who delivered their enemy into their hand (Jg $16^{23f.}$) and in whose presence they set the ark as a trophy (1 S 5^{2}). He was worshipped in joyous festivals with athletic sports (Jg 16^{25}). The one rite of his cult that is known to us is his priests' avoidance of treading upon the threshold of his sanctuary (1 S 5^{5}, Zeph 1^{9}).

3. The identity of Dagân and Dāgôn.—This is doubted by Jensen (*Kosmol.* 449 ff.) and by Moore (*EBi* i. 985), but is accepted by Schrader, Baethgen, Baudissin, Sayce, Bezold, Zimmern, Jastrow, Hrozny, and Lagrange. It is probable for the following reasons:—(1) The two names are precise etymological equivalents. Heb. *ô* is a modification of an original *â*, and is represented in Assyr. either by *â* or by *û*: e.g. *Ammôn*, Assyr. *Ammânu*; *Ashkelôn*, Assyr. *Iskalûna*. Hence Heb. *Dāgôn* is rightly reproduced by Assyr. *Dagân*, or *Dagûna* (Bezold, *Catalogue*, iv. 1482). The occurrence of the two forms shows that the resemblance is not accidental. (2) The Canaanite *Dagân-takala* in the Amarna letters (Winckler, 215 f.) must have been a worshipper of Dāgôn. (There can be no doubt that this is the name of a god, in spite of the lack of determinative.) (3) The Heb. name *Bêth-Dāgôn* appears in the annals of Sennacherib as *Bît-Daganna*. (4) The combination *Dāgôn-Baʿal* on the seal referred to above is analogous to the combination *Bêl-Dagân* in Babylonia. (5) The statement of Philo Byblius (*FHG* iii. 567 f.) that Dāgôn was the son of Ouranos and Gē points to his identity with Bêl-Dagân, the earth-god of the Bab. triad. (6) The character of Dāgôn, so far as we know it, as a national god of agriculture and of war, corresponds to the character of the Bab. Dagân.

4. The origin of Dagân-Dāgôn.—Schrader (*KAT*², p. 181 f.), Delitzsch (*Wo lag das Paradies?*, 1881, p. 139), Sayce (*Higher Crit.* p. 325), on the basis of the association with Anu, regard Dagân as a Sumerian deity whose cult was adopted by the Semitic Babylonians, and by them passed on to Mesopotamia and Palestine; but his name never occurs before 2500 B.C., and then only in the inscriptions of Semitic kings. All the personal names compounded with Dagân are Semitic, and many of them show the West Semitic type that is frequent in the period of the dynasty of Ḫammurabi. Now that it is known that Babylonia was invaded by the Amorites about 2500 B.C., and that the first dynasty of Babylon was Amorite (Meyer, *Gesch.*² i. [1909] 463 ff.), the theory has become exceedingly probable that Dagân was a god of the Amorites, whose worship was brought by them from their original home into both Babylonia and Palestine: so Bezold (*ZA* xxi. [1908] 254), Meyer (*op. cit.* 467), Jastrow (*Rel. Bab.* 220), Clay (*Amurru*, p. 147), Cook (*Rel. Anc. Palestine*, 1908, p. 92). This theory is favoured by the fact that Ḫammurabi in the prologue to his *Code* (iv. 28) speaks as though Dagân were the ancestral god of his race.

If Dagân-Dāgôn was originally the god of a people speaking a language similar to Hebrew, then the most probable etymology for his name is the one given by Philo Byblius (*FHG* iii. 567), and suggested as an alternate by Jerome, that it is the same as Can.-Heb. דָּגָן, 'corn.' This agrees with the facts noted above, that both in Babylonia and in Canaan he was a god of the earth and of agriculture, and that on a seal he is called *baʿal* and has the emblem of an ear of corn (so Movers, L. Müller, Schröder, Pietschmann, Wellhausen). Jensen in Baudissin (*PRE*³ iv. 426) suggests a derivation from Arab. *dagn*, 'copious rain.'

LITERATURE.—See the bibliographies under BAAL, CANAANITES; and, for the older literature, Baudissin, art. 'Dagon,' in *PRE*³ iv. (1898); also Menant, 'Le Mythe de Dagon,' in *RHR* xi. (1885) 295 ff.; Jensen, *Kosmologie der Babylonier*, 1890, p. 449 ff.; Sayce, *Higher Crit. and Mon.*, 1894, p. 325 ff.; Moore, art. 'Dagon,' in *EBi* i. (1899); Thenius-Löhr, *Com. on Sam.*, 1898, p. 30; H. P. Smith, *Com. on Sam.*, 1899, p. 38; Cumont, art. 'Dagon,' in Pauly-Wissowa, *RE*, 1909; Jastrow, *Religion Bab. und Assyr.* i. (1905) 219 f.; Hrozny, 'Oannes, Dagan, und Dagon,' in *MVG* viii. (1903) 94–106; Zimmern, *KAT*³, 1903, p. 358; Lagrange, *Études sur les rel. sém.*², 1905, p. 131; A. Jeremias, *Das AT im Lichte des alten Orients*³, 1906, p. 470; Clay, *Amurru, the Home of the Northern Semites*, 1909, p. 146.

LEWIS BAYLES PATON.

DAIBUTSU ('Great Buddha').—The name given to several colossal images found in Japan. These vary in size, posture, material, etc.; some indeed are not much larger than the ordinary size of the human body, and scarcely deserve the title of *daibutsu* popularly assigned to them. Some of them are of wood, but the majority are of bronze; some are in a sitting posture, others in a standing one; recumbent figures, such as are seen in Ceylon or Burma, are never found in Japan. The Buddhas represented are Vairochana, Amitābha, Avalokiteśvara (Kwannon), Kṣitigarbha (Jizō), and Śākyamuni, but there are also representations of other Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. For the purposes of this article, three *daibutsu* only will be considered, viz. those at Nara, Kyoto, and Kamakura. These are the *daibutsu* that are properly so called.

1. Daibutsu at Nara.—This was erected under the auspices of the Emperor Shōmu Tennō (A.D. 724–748), the most zealous, perhaps, of all the Buddhist Emperors of the country. It is of especial interest to the student of the religious history of Japan, as being connected with Shōmu's audacious but successful plan of planting Buddhism firmly on the soil of Japan by proclaiming its essential identity with the Shintoism indigenous to the country. In this plan the Emperor was ably assisted by a Korean priest of the name of Gyogi,[1] who must be considered as the true parent of the *Ryōbu*, or amalgamated Buddho-Shintoism, which continued in force until the Meiji era. Gyogi's plan was to impress the native mind with the dignity of Buddhism by the erection of a colossal statue of Buddha set up in a temple architecturally worthy to be the religious centre of the country, and then to absorb into the organized system thus established the whole of the native cults which were then, as now, bound up with the life and worship of the nation. This could not be done without the sanction of the Shinto priesthood, and the instruments chosen to

[1] Gyogi, the descendant of a Korean king, was born in A.D. 668 in Japan, where his family had been domiciled for some time. Ordained to the priesthood at 18, he soon distinguished himself by his practical schemes for the improvement of the country—road-building, etc. He became spiritual adviser to the Emperor Shōmu and his consort Kōmyō, and inaugurated the movement for the amalgamation of the two religions then existing in Japan—undoubtedly with the best of intentions. He died in 749, just before the completion of the *daibutsu*.

secure their assent were Gyogi himself and the Udaijin Tachibana no Moroye. According to the *Daibutsu-engi*, Gyogi was sent to Ise, nominally for the purpose of prayer, but actually, it would seem, to confer with the authorities at the Ise shrines. A similar messenger was dispatched to the Hachiman shrine at Usa in Kyūshū. The results of these preliminary meetings having been found satisfactory, a formal embassy was sent, with Tachibana no Moroye at its head, to propitiate the Sun-goddess, and the result was a formal reply, conveyed first in a dream to Shōmu, and then in a definite message, that the Great Sun-goddess was pleased to identify herself with *Dainichi* ('great sun') *Nyorai*, whose true essence was the great Buddha Vairochana. Thus was laid the foundation of that great system which taught the Japanese to see in the gods of Shinto manifestations of the deities of Buddhism, and enabled them to become Buddhists without ceasing to be Shintoists. This was in 743. The colossal image was the perpetual memorial of the alliance thus cemented. The casting was completed in 749, the inauguration ceremony was held forthwith, and the whole work was finished in 751. The statue, which is in a sitting posture, is 53 ft. in height, 7 ft. higher than the similar image at Kamakura. It stands in the *Daibutsu den*, or 'Hall of the Daibutsu,' in the Todaiji Temple at Nara, the building in which it is enclosed serving to some extent to conceal the magnificence of its proportions.

It was the desire of the Emperor and Empress to have Gyogi perform the ceremony of inauguration. But he did not live to see the completion of the statue. At the New Year's festivities in A.D. 749, Shōmu and Kōmyō had received from Gyogi the vows of the Bodhisattva, and had retired from the world, abdicating in favour of their daughter Kōken. Gyogi, feeling the approach of death, then designated a fit person to take his place—an Indian monk of the name of Bodhisena, known in Japan as Baramon Sōjō, or the Brahman archbishop. (Japan was at the time feeling the effects of the Muhammadan upheaval. Refugees from India, Persia, and Central Europe, gathering at the court of the Tang in Singanfu, had continued their wanderings as far as Japan, and in the reigns of Shōmu and Kōken we find not only Buddhist monks from India, but Manichæans, and even a Nestorian Christian doctor, at the court of Nara.)

When the day for the inauguration of the statue came, Bodhisena mounted the platform and 'opened its eyes' with a brush dipped in water. The whole congregation had its part in the ceremony, for a long string, fastened to the brush, passed among them for those who would to take in their hands. The congregation comprised the ex-Emperor Shōmu and his Empress, the reigning Empress Kōken, and all the magnates of the court. It was an imposing congregation in another sense, for, in the parlance of the day, Shōmu was an incarnation of Kwannon; Ryōben, who was considered to be the founder of the temple, was looked upon as an incarnation of Maitreya; Gyogi, of Mañjuśrī; and Bodhisena, of Samantabhadra. The Buddhist doctrines that were at that time uppermost in the mind of Japan were those known as *Kegon*, contained in the mystic Scriptures of the Avataṃsaka.

The Nara *daibutsu* has experienced many vicissitudes. In 855 its head fell off and was with difficulty restored to its position; in 1180, during the civil wars, the temple was burned, and the head melted. The image remained headless until 1195, when it was restored, through the efforts mainly of Jūgen, a disciple of Hōnen, who had been in China, and who travelled through Japan on a wheelbarrow collecting money. In 1567, the temple was burnt, but the *daibutsu* remained uninjured. Time, however, has necessitated many repairs from generation to generation. Very little, probably, of the original material now remains, yet the *daibutsu* has retained its identity throughout all its changes.

2. Daibutsu at Kyoto.—We have seen that the temple enclosing the *daibutsu* at Nara was burnt during the civil troubles in 1567. The temple remained in a ruinous condition for many years, and this suggested to Hideyoshi, who became Kwampaku in 1585, the idea of reconstructing it on some other site, and of placing in it a colossal image which should be more magnificent even than the one at Nara, and which should also be a perpetual memorial of himself. In 1586 he selected a site on the Amida-zaka at Kyoto, and commenced the erection of his temple. It did not seem as though Heaven were propitious to his designs. The first temple, built of wood brought from the districts of Tosa, Kii, and Kiso, and containing a wooden *daibutsu* (of Lochana-Buddha), 160 ft. in height, was destroyed by an earthquake in 1596. Nothing daunted, Hideyoshi set to work again on a more substantial structure. On Jan. 15, 1603, the casting of the bronze *daibutsu* having been completed up to the neck, the building and scaffolding caught fire and were destroyed, and, Hideyoshi being by this time dead, no immediate attempt was made to repair the disaster.

A year or two later, however, Tokugawa Iyeyasu, being anxious to reduce the family of Hideyoshi to impotence, suggested to Hideyori that the completion of the *daibutsu* and temple would form a very fitting tribute to the memory of his great father. Hideyori and his mother fell into the trap, and ruined themselves financially with the carrying out of Hideyoshi's magnificent but extravagant design. Hideyoshi's structure was 150 ft. in height, 272 ft. in length, 167½ ft. in depth. The roof was supported by 92 pillars, with an average diameter of 5 ft., and the sitting figure of Lochana-Buddha was 58½ ft. in height. When the whole was finished, Iyeyasu picked a quarrel with Hideyori over an insult, real or pretended, supposed to be conveyed to him in the inscriptions on the bells. The dedication ceremonies were postponed, and it was not long before Iyeyasu took up arms against the family of Hideyoshi and crushed it for ever.

Hideyori's *daibutsu* was destroyed by earthquake in 1662, and the copper used for coinage. No interest attaches to its successors. The present Kyoto *daibutsu* dates from 1801.

3. Daibutsu at Kamakura.—This image, though smaller than the one at Nara, is much better known. It stands in the open, amidst beautiful surroundings, and is constantly being photographed. No illustrated description of Japan would be complete without it. It is an image of Amida, 49 ft. 7 in. in height, and may be taken as marking an era in Japanese Buddhism. The *daibutsu* at Kyoto had no real spiritual signification: it was erected by men devoid of religious faith, for purposes of self-glorification. That at Nara symbolizes that union of Buddhism and Shintoism which was made possible by an acceptance of the peculiar tenets of the Kegon school, with Vairochana as its chief Buddha. The Kamakura *daibutsu* is an image of Amida, and marks the period when Vairochana was going out of fashion, and Amitābha, with the sects devoted to his worship, was coming to the front.

It is said that the idea of having a *daibutsu* at Kamakura first occurred to Minamoto Yoritomo in A.D. 1195, when he was assisting at the cere-

monies of the re-dedication of the Nara image after its restoration. Yoritomo, dying in 1195, did not live to see the completion of his design. It was not, however, suffered to fall to the ground, Ita no Tsubone, one of the ladies of Yoritomo's court, undertaking to collect funds for the purpose. Ita no Tsubone's efforts were supplemented by a priest named Jōkō, who was also active in collecting contributions. A wooden image was erected in 1241, the bronze one in 1252. The first was dedicated to Amida, the second apparently to Śākyamuni. But the present image, representing Amida, is said to be the very image erected in 1252, in which case we have an image with a double dedication—to Śākyamuni and to Amida. This, however, presents no difficulty. *Ni son ichi* ('two blessed ones with one personality') is a common doctrine of the Jōdo sects, Śākyamuni and Amitābha being looked upon as identical in essence whilst distinct in personality and name. Like the *daibutsu* at Nara, this image was originally enclosed within a temple. But the temple was destroyed by tidal waves in the year 1369 and again in the year 1494, and no attempt has been made since the last catastrophe to rebuild it. Strange to say, the metal does not seem to have suffered at all from the inclemencies of the weather.

A. LLOYD.

DAITYA.—The word *daitya*, the formation of which is explained by Pāṇini (iv. 1, 85), etymologically means 'descendant of Diti,' just like *Daiteya* and *Ditija*; it occurs in classical Sanskrit literature from the Epics downwards, and is there synonymous with *Asura* and *Dānava*, which are already found in Vedic literature. This article must, therefore, treat of all three—Asuras, Dānavas, and Daityas—as denoting one kind of demons or enemies of the gods.

The word *asura* originally had not an altogether evil meaning, and it is still used in the Rigveda as an epithet of the higher gods, especially of Varuṇa;[1] but even there it has in other places the meaning 'inimical to the gods.' In the Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads the latter meaning is exclusively given to the word *asura*, which is there the common name of demons as enemies of the gods. Both the Asuras and the gods are descendants of Prajāpati. According to the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, the Asuras were created from the downward breathing of Prajāpati, and entered the earth;[2] they had darkness and magic (*māyā*) assigned to them by him,[3] and held to untruth.[4] Originally they had divided the world with the gods,[5] and once built three strongholds, one in each world. But they continually contended against the gods, and, though they were more numerous or more powerful than the latter,[6] they were in the end always defeated by them. Frequently they were put to flight by Indra, with or without the assistance of Bṛhaspati. Thus at last they were driven from the earth and the regions above.[7]

From these statements it appears that the authors of the Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads regarded the Asuras as the pre-eminently evil ones; once[8] it is even said that their alleged battles with the gods are fictitious, and that they became degraded through their own wickedness. It is, however, to be noted that they are enemies only of gods, not of men; some peoples (the Easterns and others) are even said to be of Asura-nature, and it is added that they make their burial-places round and line them with stones.[1] This seems to imply that some peoples were supposed to worship Asuras.[2]

1 *Asurya* (adj. and subst.) in the Rigveda refers to gods, and not to demons.
2 xi. 1. 6, 8.
3 ii. 4. 2, 5.
4 ix. 5. 1, 12 ff.
5 i. 2. 5, 1 ff.
6 *Bṛhad Āraṇyaka*, i. 3. 1.
7 *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, xiii. 8. 1, 5.
8 *Ib.* xi. 1. 6, 9.

As regards the second synonym of Daitya, mentioned above, viz. *Dānava*, we find this word, as well as *dānu*, from which it is derived, used in the Rigveda very much in the same sense as the later *asura*. A female *dānu* is mentioned (I. xxxii. 9) as the mother of Vṛtra (*vṛtraputrā*). She came in later times to be regarded as the mother of the Dānavas; for *dānava* might be taken as a metronymic from *dānu*, and mythologists, of course, gladly availed themselves of this etymology in drawing up their legendary genealogies. The Daityas are derived from Diti, as the Dānavas from Dānu; but there is this difference, that *dānava* was an ancient name for demons which gave rise to a myth of their descent, while *daitya* is a name derived, after the Vedic period, from a somewhat ill-defined and evidently not popular deity, Diti. She is mentioned thrice in the Rigveda[3] and several times in the Atharvaveda, almost always in conjunction with the well-known great goddess Aditi, apparently as her sister, to whom she may be said to owe her existence, through a popular etymology which regarded *aditi* as formed by *a* privative and *diti*, just as *asura* was derived from *sura*. Diti, a product of priestly speculation, would scarcely have given rise to the popular name Daitya; but the latter was apparently formed as a 'pendant' of Āditya—a name which already in the Rigveda denoted a class of deities including some of the highest gods, and at the same time had been regarded as a metronymic from Aditi. So, to match it, the foes of the Ādityas—the Asuras—were named, by another metronymic, Daitya, after Diti, though this goddess had scarcely any hold on the imagination of the people.

The only myth related of Diti in the *Rāmāyaṇa* (i. 46) and the Purāṇas[4] betrays a similar tendency. It is to the following effect:

In the battle between the gods and the Daityas, which ensued on the churning of the ocean, the latter were worsted and slain. Diti then performed austerities, and asked Kaśyapa for a boon, viz. that she might give birth to a son who should vanquish Indra. Kaśyapa granted the boon on condition that she should remain entirely pure for a thousand years. During her pregnancy Indra watched her closely, and at last found her in an impure position. Thereupon he entered her womb, and divided the embryo into seven parts, which became the seven lords of the Maruts, or winds.

The present writer is of opinion that this myth was invented in order to explain that the Daityas are the elder brothers of the gods. For *marut* is also used, at least in classical Sanskrit, as a synonym of *deva*, 'god.' The motive of the myth lies, obviously, in an etymology which derives *diti* from the root *dā*, 'to cut.'[5] The myth itself is evidently not an old one, for it rests on the assumption that the Daityas are the children of Diti, and that they were killed in battle by the gods.

In epic and classical Sanskrit literature, where Asura, Dānava, and Daitya are interchangeable terms, these beings continue to be regarded as rivals, and, occasionally, as deadly foes, of the gods; but the attitude of the writers has decidedly changed since the composition of the Brāhmaṇas. Thus, the great epic contains several stories in which the Asuras—Vṛtra, Bali, Śambara, Namuchi, and others—are spoken of as virtuous and wise;

1 *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, xiii. 8. 1. 5, xiii. 8. 2. 1.
2 It may be remarked, as illustrative of the godless character of the Asuras, that the secondary word *sura*, 'god,' was formed from *asura*, the latter being wrongly understood to be *a-sura*, 'non-god.'
3 According to Böhtlingk-Roth (*Skr. Wörterb.*, St. Petersb., 1875, *s.v.* 'Diti'), the Diti of the Rigveda is different from the Diti of the Atharvaveda.
4 Cf. Wilson, *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, ii. 79, note ‡.
5 It may be mentioned that the *Mahābhārata* (ix. 38. 32 ff.) contains an entirely different account of the origin of the Maruts; they were formed from the vital seed of the ṛṣi Maṅkaṇaka falling into the river Sarasvatī.

and some Asuras are acknowledged by gods as their friends and protégés, *e.g.* Prahrāda by Viṣṇu, and Bāṇa by Śiva. Moreover, they were not believed to lead a life of wickedness, but to conform to the precepts of the Veda. They had a teacher and priest of their own, a *purohita*, in the person of Śukra, otherwise called Kāvya Uśanas, a descendant of the great *ṛṣi* Bhṛgu.[1]

Finally, the abode of the Asuras, Pātāla, is described not as a dwelling-place of demons, but as equalling, and even surpassing, the heavenly regions in beauty and splendour. In popular literature, also, the Asuras seem to have been looked upon with a decided sympathy, for bk. viii. of the *Kathāsaritsāgara* contains the story of Sūryaprabha, apparently the subject of a romantic epic, the hero of which is an Asura who is held up to our admiration. People seem to have cherished a similar feeling towards the Asuras as towards the Nāgas, who shared the Pātāla regions with them. On the other hand, whenever the contention of the Asuras with the gods becomes the subject of the writers, they are at one with the Vedic authors, and describe the Daityas as demons given to deeds of violence, skilled in sorcery and magic power, and able to make themselves invisible or to assume any shape at will.[2]

The *Mahābhārata* and the *Purāṇas* contain accounts of the origin and genealogy of the Asuras, which, however, differ considerably in details. Marīchi, one of the six mental sons of Brahmā, produced by his will a son, Kaśyapa, a *prajāpati*, or secondary creator. He married thirteen daughters (*putrikās*) of Dakṣa, who was also a *prajāpati*. The first place in the list of these thirteen daughters of Dakṣa is always given to Aditi, and the second to Diti; but the latter was the eldest, as is expressly stated in *Mahāb.* xii. 207, 20. Diti had but one son, Hiraṇyakaśipu, the ruler of the Asuras. He had five sons, Prahrāda, etc.; Prahrāda had three sons, Virochana, etc.; Virochana's son was Bali, whose son was Bāṇa. These Asuras and their progeny[3] are, properly speaking, the Daityas; but popular usage takes no account of this genealogy, and regards all enemies of the gods as sons of Diti. By Dānu, another daughter of Dakṣa, Kaśyapa had 33 or 40 sons, among whom are enumerated the most famous Asuras. The sons and grandsons of these are said to be countless; they are the Dānavas proper, but the above remark about the Daityas applies also to them. Kaśyapa's son by the fourth daughter of Dakṣa, Siṃhikā, is the famous Asura Rāhu, whose head was cut off by Viṣṇu, and who ever since persecutes sun and moon, and occasionally swallows them (mythological cause of eclipses). Danāyus, the fifth wife of Kaśyapa, became the mother of Bala and Vṛtra, the Asuras who were killed by Indra; and Kālā, the sixth wife of Kaśyapa, gave birth to the Kālakeyas, a class of Asuras. Accordingly, the *Mahābhārata* (i. 65) derives the whole race of Asuras from five daughters of Dakṣa.

According to the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*,[4] Siṃhikā was the sister of Hiraṇyakaśipu, and wife of Viprachitti, a son of Dānu, and, as the same source does not mention the above-named wives of Kaśyapa, or at least does not make them the ancestresses of separate Asura families, there are practically only two races of Asuras acknowledged by the Purāṇas, viz. Daityas and Dānavas. There are variations

[1] It may be mentioned in this connexion that Indra, by killing Vṛtra, incurred the sin of *brahmahatyā*, or murder of a Brahman, and in consequence lost his celestial kingdom (*Mahābhārata*, iii. 101, v. 10, xii. 281, 342). Still, Vṛtra is but an Asura and an enemy of the gods.

[2] Cf. V. Fausböll, *Indian Mythology, according to the Mahābhārata*, London, 1903, p. 3 ff.

[3] Not enumerated in the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, but in some others, e.g. *Vāyu Purāṇa* (*Bibl. Ind.*), ii. 74 f.

[4] See Wilson, *op. cit.* ii. 69.

in other Purāṇas which need not be detailed here.[1]

The Purāṇas, however, have another account of the origin of the Asuras at the first creation of the world:[2]

> 'Brahmā, being desirous of creating the four orders of beings termed gods, demons, progenitors, and men, collected his mind into itself. Whilst thus concentrated, the quality of darkness pervaded his body, and thence the Asuras were first born, issuing from his thigh. Brahmā then abandoned that form which was composed of the rudiment of darkness, and which, being deserted by him, became night.'
>
> Wilson says in a note: 'These reiterated, and not always very congruous, accounts of the creation are explained by the Purāṇas as referring to different *kalpas*, or renovations of the world, and therefore involving no incompatibility. A better reason for their appearance is the probability that they have been borrowed from different original authorities.'

As regards the origin of the Asuras, it is probable that the myth quoted above has been developed from the statement in the Brāhmaṇas mentioned at the beginning of this article. The genealogy of the Asuras is of later growth, and introduces a new element of confusion into the accounts of them. How, for instance, could Hiraṇyakaśipu, the first-born of all Daityas and Dānavas, rule over the whole race of Daityas and Dānavas, who, according to the Pauranic theory, sprang from his children and grandchildren?

It has been said above that the Asuras reside in Pātāla, and the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* already states that they entered the earth. Yet they are not restricted to Pātāla, but may own towns and fortresses on earth, in air, and in heaven. Thus the three sons of Tāraka possessed three towns, which, united into one, became the famous Tripura, which Śiva reduced to ashes with his mystical arrow. The Paulomas and Kalakañjas inhabited the flying town Hiraṇyapura, which was destroyed by Arjuna (*Mahāb.* viii. 33 f., iii. 173). Another tribe of the Dānavas, the Nivātakavachas, live on the shore of the ocean, where Arjuna vanquishes them (*ib.* iii. 168 ff.). In most stories about Asuras, the scene is laid in the upper regions, where they acquire power even over the three worlds, till some god slays them.

The belief that the Asuras dwell in the regions below has been common to all Indian sects. Thus, according to the Northern Buddhists, the world of the Asuras, who, besides the Daityas, comprise the Rākṣasas, Yakṣas, and similar demons, is the uppermost of the four *Apāyalokas*, or worlds of suffering; and it is situated exactly as far below the surface of the earth as the world of Indra is above it. Among the Asuras the foremost rank is held by Rāhu, the demon who causes eclipses of the sun and moon.[3] The Jains reckon the Asuras, or, as they call them, the Asurakumāras, as the lowest class of the Bhavanavāsin or Bhaumeyaka gods, and assign them the uppermost part of *Ratnaprabhā*, the highest hell-region, as their residence.[4]

A great many names of Asuras are given in epic and classical Sanskrit literature, some of which have already been mentioned. We add the names of a few more who are frequently mentioned in connexion with the god who slew or overcame them: Bala, Vṛtra, Namuchi, Triśiras, Jambha, and Pāka were slain by Indra; Madhu, Kaiṭabha, Bali, Mura, and Naraka by Viṣṇu (who is thence called *Daityāri*, foe of the Daityas) or Kṛṣṇa; Pralamba by Balarāma; Sambara by Pradyumna; Andhaka by Śiva, who also destroyed Tripura; Śumbha, Niśumbha, and Mahiṣa by Devī; Tāraka and Bāṇa by Kārttikeya; and Ilvala and Vātāpi by Agastya.

[1] Wilson, *op. cit.*, in his notes to pp. 26, 69 ff. It may be mentioned that the *Vāyu Purāṇa* gives the progeny of Danāyuṣā (ii. 7, 30 ff.).

[2] Wilson, *op. cit.* i. 97 f.

[3] Kern, *Manual of Indian Buddhism* (*GIAP* iii. 8), 1896; and the works quoted there, p. 57, n. 7.

[4] *Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra*, iv. 11, tr. in *ZDMG* lx. 319.

The Asuras (Daityas, Dānavas) constitute the highest class of demons; they are the enemies of the gods, and not of mankind; indeed, men seem, as a rule, excluded from their sphere of action. This is the principal point in which they differ from the remaining classes of demons, such as Rākṣasas, Yakṣas, Nāgas, etc., who sustain hostile or friendly relations with men. See art. BRAHMANISM.

In conclusion, an opinion must be noticed which has been put forward by some writers—most recently by the Danish scholar V. Fausböll[1]—viz. that the wars of the Suras and Asuras are but a mythological account of what originally was a strife between the Aryans and the aboriginal inhabitants of India. Fausböll includes among the Asuras other classes of demons, Rākṣasas, Yakṣas, Nāgas, etc.—a course which, as has just been pointed out, cannot be admitted. As regards the Asuras proper, with whom alone we are concerned in this article, his theory is without foundation, and is quite unnecessary. The Indians had at least two war-gods—Indra, and, in later times, Kārttikeya. Warlike gods presuppose, in India as elsewhere, enemies with whom to wage war, and those enemies were the Asuras, Dānavas, or Daityas.

LITERATURE.—This has been sufficiently indicated in the course of the article.

HERMANN JACOBI.

DAKHMA.—See DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD (Parsi).

DANAIDS.—The Danaids (Δαναΐδες) were the daughters of Danaus. Their number is variously given: Hecatæus (schol. on Eurip. *Orest.* 872) enumerates twenty, and Hesiod (*ap.* Hecatæus, *loc. cit.*) fifty; the latter figure has won general acceptance. Their fame is enshrined in two legends—the one telling how they murdered their bridegrooms during their wedding night; the other how, after death, they were condemned to pour water into vessels full of holes.

1. The standard form of the first legend is that given to it by Æschylus; it forms the basis of the story as found in the *Bibliotheca* of Apollodorus, ii. 12 ff. (cf. schol. on Homer, *Il.* i. 42), and Hyginus's *Fabulæ*, 168 (cf. schol. on Stat. *Theb.* ii. 222; schol. Strozz. on German. *Aratea*, p. 172, ed. Breysig). We find part of it in the extant Ἱκέτιδες of Æschylus—the first portion of his Danaid-tetralogy—and the entire myth in the prophecy of Prometheus in *Prom. Vinct.* 853 ff. The story is as follows. The fifty Danaids flee, under their father's direction, from Egypt to Argos, in order to escape from the unwelcome suit of their cousins, the fifty sons of Ægyptus. The youths, however, set out after them, and, by mere superiority of force, compel the maidens to marry them. Danaus, however, commands his daughters to kill their respective husbands, and all of them obey save one, Hypermnestra, who spares Lynkeus out of love. Hypermnestra, saved from her father's vengeance, and at length reconciled to him, continues the lineage of the family, and by inheritance secures for her acknowledged husband the over-lordship of Argos.

The scene of the myth is thus Argos, and, indeed, the mere name of the father and his daughters indicates this locality, as in Homer the Argives are most frequently referred to as Δαναοί. Since the publication of Preller's *Griechische Mythologie* (cf. ii.[2] [Berlin, 1861] 45 ff.) the myth has been commonly interpreted as relating to the scarcity of water in 'thirsty Argos'; the slaying of the bridegrooms is taken to mean the drying up of the springs. This hypothesis is still adhered to by Ed. Meyer (*Forschungen zur alten Gesch.* i. [Halle, 1892] 74) and Waser (in Pauly-Wissowa, iv. 2089), but its lack of evidence is on a level with its failure in lucidity (cf. P. Friedländer, *Argolica*, Berlin, 1905, p. 24). It is certainly true that the full, though not identical, lists of the Danaids given by Apollodorus, ii. 16, and Hyginus, *Fab.* 170, contain at least one name, Amymone, which is also the name of a fountain in Argos; and, while there may be another here and there which could be appositely applied to a spring, this cannot be said of the majority. Amymone, moreover, is the subject of a special myth, which bears no resemblance to that of the others: she yields herself to Poseidon, who in return reveals to her the springs of Lerna; and she bears to him a son named Nauplius (Apollod. ii. 14 and 23; Hygin. *Fab.* 169). The purport of this story is, in fact, the direct opposite of the Danaid myth; the latter really implies that the maidens, in order to preserve their virginity, do not shrink from slaying even their bridegrooms. It is true that this aspect is not made explicit in the story as related by Æschylus, who lays stress on the Danaids' hatred of the Ægyptiads only, not of men in general, and speaks of their timidity of character. His reason for making this alteration is revealed in the only passage of any length that now remains of the third portion of his Danaid-tetralogy (fr. 44), in which Aphrodite extols the might of love, and so vindicates Hypermnestra and her disobedience to her father's cruel command. The Æschylean rendering, however, is really a transformation of the original myth, as appears from the following considerations. (1) The slaying of men by the Danaids has always formed the kernel of the myth. (2) Their fruitless labour of water-drawing after death, as will be shown below (§ 2), is an indication of the fact that they were never married. (3) The only extant fragment of the epic Δαναΐδες represents them as beings of Amazon-like nature. From this epic, which, according to the Borgia tablet (Jahn-Michaelis, *Griech. Bilderchroniken*, Bonn, 1873, p. 76, K[2]), contained 6500 lines, or about half the number in the *Iliad*, Clement of Alexandria (*Strom.* iv. 120–124), when giving examples of brave women, cites the cases not only of Leaina and Telesilla, but also of the Danaids, and in support thereof quotes from the epic as follows: 'And then the daughters of Danaus armed themselves quickly by the wide-flowing stream of the lord Nile.' We may, therefore, infer that the characterization of the Danaids in this epic was quite unlike that given by Æschylus. Amazons have no occasion for a father's care, or for an admonition to guard their virginity; and, in point of fact, Danaus himself, as has been long recognized (cf. Ed. Meyer, *op. cit.* p. 73), is a mere phantasm, having neither a cult nor a special myth of his own.

The story of the Danaids as slayers of men and adepts in the use of arms must, accordingly, be brought into line with the Amazonian myths. These have been admirably dealt with by J. Töpffer (Pauly-Wissowa, i. 1754; cf. also the same writer's *Attische Genealogie*, Berlin, 1889, p. 191 ff.; Kretschmer in *Glotta*, ii. [1908] 201 ff.; O. Braunstein, *Die politische Stellung der griech. Frau*, Leipzig, 1911, p. 69 ff.). In the myths of the Amazons, Töpffer sees fragmentary reminiscences of a pre-Hellenic 'gynaikocratic' race which survived for a considerable period in Asia Minor, but had at one time been spread over Greece proper and the Archipelago. The Danaid myth finds a parallel in the story of the women of Lemnos who slew their husbands, and it is perhaps more than a coincidence that Hypsipyle, one of these Lemnian women, should appear in Argos, associated with the legend regarding the institution of the Nemean Games by the seven Argive heroes who marched against Thebes. It is also worthy of note that Bellerophon,

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 41 f.

the earliest traditional antagonist of the Amazons in Lycia, came originally from Argos (*Il.* vi. 186). Now, as we find Amazon-like women—the Danaids, namely—in Argos, it is natural to infer that they had made the same journey as Bellerophon—had come, that is, from Argos to Lycia. As a matter of fact, the Danaids bear the name of a pre-Hellenic tribe. For, since the Canaanite Philistines have been identified with the *Palisatu* mentioned in the documents of Ramses III. (1200–1175 B.C.)—one of the tribes which worshipped Minos and brought their civilization to its highest development in Crete during the 2nd cent. B.C. (cf. Bethe, in *Rhein. Mus.* lxv. [1910] 200 ff., with lit. and proofs)—we can no longer doubt that the Argive *Danaoi* and the *Danuna* mentioned in Egyptian documents as early as the 14th cent. B.C. were one and the same people (Ed. Meyer, *Gesch. d. Alterthums*, i.² [Stuttgart, 1909] 226).

A word or two must be added regarding Hypermnestra, the only one of the Danaids who spared her bridegroom, and the mother of the royal race of Argos. Her story, even more than that of Amymone, runs directly counter to the specific bearing of the Danaid myth. Account must also be taken of two additional facts. (1) Of all the Danaids, Hypermnestra alone had a cult in Argos (cf. Hygin. *Fab.* 168=schol. Strozz. on German. *Aratea* [172, ed. Breysig], who speaks of a 'fanum,' while Pausan. ii. 21. 2, refers to the tomb of Hypermnestra and her husband in the city of Argos). (2) Lynkeus, again, is a standing figure in Peloponnesian legend, while the other sons of Ægyptus are but empty names. We may, therefore, assume that Hypermnestra, like Amymone, was a later addition to the group of the Danaids, designed to bring each of them into the imposing genealogical fabric of Argive mythology. This is confirmed by the legend that Lynkeus killed his sisters-in-law and their father (schol. on Eurip. *Hekuba*, 886). According to Archilochos (fr. 150, in Malalas, *Chronogr.* iv. 68), Lynkeus was depicted as a conqueror who robbed Danaus of both his dominion and his daughter.

The process of reducing the originally Amazon-like Danaids to human proportions, as we find it already consummated in Æschylus, led at length to the complete obliteration of their characteristic quality of hostility to men. After the murder of the Ægyptiads they all marry again. Their father gives them, without a price, as rewards to the victors in the games (Pindar, *Pyth.* ix. 112 f.)—a story which had originally no connexion with the Danaids (P. Friedländer, *op. cit.* p. 17).

The scene of the man-slaying was laid among the streams of Lerna (Pausan. ii. 24. 2; *Parœmiographi*, i. 108), but also in Argos itself—on the acropolis, where, as noted by Pausanias (*loc. cit.*), there stood some memorial of the sons of Ægyptus.

2. The earliest literary record of the tradition that after death the Danaids were doomed to the endless and aimless labour of pouring water into vessels with holes is found in the pseudo-Platonic *Axiochus* (3rd cent. B.C.), 371 E. In the 5th cent. B.C., Polygnotus, in his pictures of the under world, had portrayed men and women—characterized as 'unconsecrated'—engaged in a like task (Pausan. x. 31. 9; cf. Plato, *Gorgias*, 493 B, *Rep.* 363 D). Accordingly, Wilamowitz-Möllendorff (*Homer. Untersuchungen*, Berlin, 1884, p. 202) and Rohde (*Psyche*, Tübingen, 1891–94, pp. 292–297) have advanced the hypothesis that this penalty of fruitless labour forms a later accretion of the Danaid myth. But Rohde's assertion that the Danaids were ἀτελεῖς, *i.e.* that they had not attained their τέλος by marriage, suggests that the conception of the Danaids as aimless water-drawers in Hades may possibly be older than he believes. This drudgery, in fact, was regarded among the Greeks, and is regarded even to-day, *e.g.*, in the Tyrol, as the lot of the unmarried in the under world (Waser in Pauly-Wissowa, iv. 2087, 60 ff.; P. Friedländer, *op. cit.* p. 28).

The relative antiquity of this element in the story is likewise borne out by a further remark of Rohde, viz. that the Danaids could be associated with the task of drawing water only at a time when they were still thought of as unmarried. Even in Pindar's day (*Pyth.* ix. 112), however, this was no longer the case; while, according to Æschylus, at least two of them, Amymone and Hypermnestra, yield to the power of love. For that form of the myth which, as made known to us by the surviving verse of the epic Δαναΐδες, represented the Danaids as Amazon-like women hostile to men, we are thus brought to a date not later than the 6th cent. B.C. It must, therefore, have been about that time that the lot of the unmarried in Hades—the unending labour of drawing water—was first ascribed to the Danaids.

Once this feature had been added to their story, however, and had become effectually grafted upon it, the Danaids would come quite naturally to be regarded as drawers of water even in their lifetime. In this way they would then be brought into connexion with Lerna in Argos—perhaps originally the district haunted by their ghosts—and at length the water-nymph Amymone would be numbered with them. It accords with all this that Danaus was extolled as the hero who provided Argos with water: so Hesiod, fr. 24 [ed. Rzach], a verse given by Strabo, viii. 370, and again (371) in a simpler rendering, which, however, is of special interest, as it states that it was not Danaus, but the Danaids, who 'made Argos, once waterless, a well-watered land.'

LITERATURE.—Manuals of Greek Mythology, Roscher, and Pauly-Wissowa; Ed. Meyer, *Forschungen zur alten Gesch.* i. [Halle, 1892] 74; W. Schwarz, *Jahrb. für klass. Philol.* cxlvii. [Leipzig, 1893] 93 ff.; P. Friedländer, *Argolica*, Berlin, 1905, p. 6 ff.; Waser, *ARW* ii. [1899] 47–63; Fourrière, *Revue d'exégèse myth.* vii. [1898] 39, 318.

E. BETHE.

DANCING.—See PROCESSIONS AND DANCES.

DAṆḌĪS.—See YOGIS.

ḌĀNGĪ ('highlanders,' Hindī *ḍāng*, 'a hill').—A tribe of Dravidian origin, which at the Census of 1901 numbered 97,422, almost entirely confined to Central India, Rājputāna, and the Central Provinces, in which last they are described as originally robbers and freebooters, whose home was in the Vindhyan range. They are doubtless ethnologically connected with the Goṇd and Bhīl tribes which occupy the adjoining hills; but they are rapidly becoming Hinduized, and have now gone so far as to call themselves Rājputs, and to claim descent from a mythical Rājā Ḍāng of the Raghubansī sept. In the Jhānsī District, from which we have the most complete account of the religion of the tribe, they rank as low-caste Hindus; they cremate their adult dead, and perform the *śrāddha*, or mind-rite, through Brāhmans. Like all castes on their promotion to a higher social rank, they are particularly careful to avoid ceremonial pollution. This results in its most serious form from the killing of a cow. In this case the offender, in order to procure restoration to caste rights, must make a pilgrimage to the Ganges, feed his tribesmen and Brāhmans, or perform the mock marriage of the *śālagrāma* ammonite, representing Viṣṇu, with the *tulsī*, or holy basil tree. This rite, of course, necessitates the payment of liberal fees to Brāhmans. If the offender prefers to do so, he may purchase restoration to caste by paying the marriage expenses of two poor children of the

tribe. They now worship the ordinary Hindu deities, Rāmachandra, Kṛṣṇa, Śiva, Durgā, and others. Special regard is paid to the minor gods of the village, especially to those who cause and remove disease, such as Sītalā, the goddess of smallpox, and Hardaul Lālā, the deified hero who controls cholera (Crooke, *Popular Religion*[2], 1896, i. 138 f.). Bhūmiyā, the god of the soil, is represented by an old snake, which is worshipped in June–July. At marriages they perform a rite to propitiate the sainted dead, known as *deva pitra* ('ancestor gods'); but they have no definite idea of their nature or functions. Their sacred trees are the pīpal (*Ficus religiosa*) and the chhonkar (*Prosopis spicigera*). The cows of the household, as emblems of Lakṣmī (goddess of good fortune), are worshipped at the Divālī, or feast of lamps; and horses at the Dasahra.

LITERATURE.—W. Crooke, *Tribes and Castes of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh*, Calcutta, 1896, ii. 246 ff.; *Central Provinces Gazetteer*, 1870, p. 250; *Census Report Central Provinces*, 1901, i. 165.

W. CROOKE.

DANTE.—

1. Life.—Dante Alighieri was born at Florence, some time between May 18 and June 17, 1265, of an old Florentine family of supposed Roman descent. His father, Alighiero di Bellincione Alighieri, was a notary who adhered to the Guelf faction, for which his ancestors had fought. Cacciaguida, Alighieri's great-grandfather, who appears in the *Paradiso* as the founder of the house, is mentioned in a recently discovered document of 1131 as 'Cacciaguida, filius Adami.' The poet was the only child of his father's first marriage, but had a step-brother and two step-sisters (one of whom appears in the *Vita Nuova*) younger than himself. Two episodes chiefly colour his early life: his romantic love for Beatrice (probably the daughter of Folco Portinari and wife of Simone de' Bardi), whom he first saw at the end of his ninth year, and who died on June 8, 1290; and his friendship (gained by his first sonnet, written in 1283) with the older poet, Guido Cavalcanti, who died in August 1300. At an early age he fell under the influence of the Florentine philosopher and statesman, Brunetto Latini. Recent research tends to confirm the statement of his early biographers concerning his studying at the university of Bologna; a sonnet, now generally accepted as his, shows that he was in that city shortly before 1287. Dante served in the Florentine cavalry at the battle of Campaldino on June 11, 1289. After the death of Beatrice, he lapsed into a mode of life which he afterwards recognized as morally unworthy, and seems to have had relations with several women, the exact nature of which is uncertain. To this epoch belongs a series of satirical sonnets interchanged between him and Forese Donati (cf. *Purg.* xxiii. 115–119). About 1296 he married Gemma di Manetto Donati, a lady of a noble Guelf house, by whom he had four children. He entered public life in 1295, with a speech in the General Council of the Commune in support of modifications in the 'Ordinances of Justice,' the enactments by which nobles were excluded from the administration of the Republic. In May 1300, he acted as Florentine ambassador to the Commune of San Gimignano, and in the same year, from June 15 to August 15 (two months being the statutory term of office), he sat by election in the Signoria, the chief magistracy of the Republic, as one of the six priors. In this year, the Guelf party, which then swayed Florentine politics, split into the rival factions of Bianchi and Neri, 'Whites' and 'Blacks.' The former (to which Dante himself and Guido Cavalcanti belonged) was, in the main, the constitutional party, supported by the burghers of the city; the latter, led by Corso Donati, the brother of Forese and kinsman of the poet's wife, was more aristocratic and turbulent, looking to the Pope, Boniface VIII., and relying upon the favour of the populace. As prior, Dante probably played a leading part in opposing the interference of the Pope and his legate, the Franciscan cardinal, Matteo d'Acquasparta, in the affairs of the Republic, and in confining the leaders of both factions (including Guido Cavalcanti and Corso Donati) within bounds: in the following year, 1301, we find him, though no longer in office, still supporting an anti-Papal policy by his votes and speeches in the various councils of the State. On November 1, 1301, Charles of Valois, with French troops, entered Florence as Papal 'peacemaker,' and, with every circumstance of treachery and licence, restored the Neri to power. It is uncertain whether Dante was in Florence when this occurred, or in Rome on an embassy from the Bianchi to the Pope (as asserted by Boccaccio and Leonardo Bruni, but disputed by later writers). In any case, a charge of malversation in office and hostility to the Church was trumped up against him: he was sentenced to confiscation of his goods, two years' exile, and perpetual exclusion from public office (January 27, 1302), and finally to be burned to death (March 10, 1302), if he should ever come into the power of the Commune.

The rest of Dante's life was passed in exile, in the latter part of which he was joined by his two sons and one of his daughters, though he seems never to have seen his wife again. In the *Convivio* (i. 3) he speaks of himself as having 'gone through well-nigh all the regions to which this (Italian) language extends; a pilgrim, almost a beggar, showing, against my will, the wound of fortune, which is wont unjustly to be ofttimes reputed to the wounded.' Until the summer of 1303, he made common cause with his fellow-exiles at Siena, Arezzo, Forlì, and elsewhere, in attempting to return to Florence by force of arms and with Ghibelline aid, but ultimately broke with them, and found it 'for his fair fame to have made a party for himself' (*Par.* xvii. 69). Between the latter part of 1303 and the end of 1306 we find him at Verona at the court of Bartolommeo della Scala; at Bologna, where he may have made a more lengthy stay; possibly at Padua (though the document once regarded as attesting his presence there in August 1306 is now disputed); certainly in Lunigiana, with the Marquis Franceschino Malaspina (October 1306). We now lose sight of him for several years, during which he is said to have left Italy and gone to Paris.

In September 1310, the newly elected Emperor, Henry VII., entered Italy, with the avowed object of restoring the claims of the Holy Roman Empire, and healing the wounds of the country. Dante, recognizing in him the new 'Lamb of God' to take away the sins of the world, threw himself heart and soul into his enterprise. We find him, in the spring of 1311, paying homage to the Emperor in person at Milan, and writing terrible and eloquent letters to him and against the Florentines from the Casentino, whither he had, perhaps, been sent on an Imperial mission. By a decree of September 2, the Florentine government included the poet in the list of exiles to be excluded from amnesty. In April 1312, Dante was with the Emperor at Pisa, and there Petrarch, a little boy of seven, saw his great predecessor for the first and only time. Although he had urged Henry to lay Florence low, reverence for his fatherland (so Leonardo Bruni writes) kept Dante from accompanying the Imperial army which ineffectually besieged the city during the autumn of this year. Henry's death (August 24, 1313) annihilated the poet's hopes. His movements again become uncertain. It is possible that he retired for a while to the convent of Santa Croce di Fonte Avellana, in the Apennines, and afterwards sought the protection of Uguccione della Faggiuola, the great Ghibelline, at Lucca. By a decree of November 6, 1315, Dante with his sons, Pietro and Jacopo, was placed under the ban of the Florentine Republic, and sentenced to be beheaded if taken. The poet was further and finally excluded from amnesty by a provision of June 2, 1316. His famous letter to a Florentine friend, preserved to us by Boccaccio, refusing to accept recall to Florence under dishonourable conditions, probably belongs to this year. It is most likely that, in 1315 or 1316, Dante went again to Verona, attracted by the fame of Can Grande della Scala, upon whom he based what remained of his hopes for the salvation of Italy. About 1317 he finally settled at Ravenna, at the invitation of its Guelf ruler, Guido Novello da Polenta. There with his children, surrounded by a little group of friends and disciples, he passed the last years of his life. A curious process for sorcery held at Avignon in 1320 against Matteo and Galeazzo Visconti, in which Dante's name is mentioned, suggests that the poet visited Piacenza in that or the preceding year, and, if the *Quæstio de Aqua et Terra* is authentic, he went to Mantua and again to Verona about the same time. In August 1321, he was sent on an embassy from Guido da Polenta to Venice, to avert an imminent war, and, returning to Ravenna sick with fever, he died there on September 14 of that year. He was buried with much pomp in the church of the Friars Minor, crowned with laurel, 'in the garb of a poet and of a great philosopher.'

2. Works.—Dante's works fall into three periods: (*a*) the period of his youthful love and enthusiasm, finding expression in the poetry and prose of the *Vita Nuova*; (*b*) the period of the *Rime*, his later lyrics, his linguistic and philosophical studies and researches, bearing fruit in the Italian prose of the *Convivio*, the Latin prose of the *de Vulgari Eloquentia*, and his passionately developing political creed and ideals, represented by the *de Monarchia* and certain of his Latin letters; (*c*) the period of turning, for the reformation of the present, to the contemplation of another world, 'to the divine from the human, to the eternal from time' (*Par.* xxxi. 37, 38), in the *Divina Commedia*, with which are associated the prose Latin epistle to Can Grande della Scala, and the revival of the pastoral muse of Vergil in the two Latin Eclogues.

(1) The *Vita Nuova*, Dante's first book, which is dedicated to Guido Cavalcanti, tells the story of his love for Beatrice in thirty-one lyrical poems, symmetrically arranged, and connected by a prose narrative. The lyrics (twenty-five sonnets, one *ballata*, three *canzoni*, and two shorter poems in the *canzone* mould), written from 1283 to 1292, cover a period of nine years, while the prose commentary, composed between 1292 and 1295, weaves the whole into unity. Its earlier chapters, in particular, show the influence of the Provençal troubadours, together with the philosophical re-handling of their theme of chivalrous love which we find in

the poetry of Guido Guinizelli of Bologna, whom Dante elsewhere claims as his father in the use of 'sweet and gracious rhymes of love' (*Purg.* xxvi. 99). The first of the three *canzoni*, 'Donne ch'avete intelletto d'amore,' marks an epoch in Italian poetry. The later portions of the book are already strongly coloured with the Christian mysticism which inspires the *Divina Commedia*. There is much sheer allegory in the details and episodes, but the work as a whole is not to be taken in an allegorical sense. It is a mystical reconstruction of the poet's early life, in which earthly love becomes spiritual, but, being thus exalted above itself, falls to earth again when its sustenance and inspiration are removed, only to rise once more in repentance and humility to a clearer vision and a larger hope, with the resolution to turn to the daily work of life until such time as the soul may become less unworthy to attain the ideal which it has discerned.

(2) Besides the pieces inserted in the *Vita Nuova*, there exists a large body of lyrical poetry from Dante's hand, known collectively as the *Rime* (or, less correctly, the *Canzoniere*). It consists of (*a*) occasional poems in the *ballata* and sonnet form, composed at various times in Dante's life, which have not yet been satisfactorily collected or freed from spurious pieces; (*b*) a series of fifteen *canzoni*, which Boccaccio, probably following the poet's intention, arranged in a definite order to form a complete work. Two of these *canzoni* seem to belong to the period of the *Vita Nuova*; the rest represent the period in Dante's life between the death of Beatrice and the inception of the *Divina Commedia*. They give variety, dignity, and technical perfection to the metrical form which the early Italians had received and developed from the Provençals, and introduce, partly from the Provençal, two entirely new varieties to Italian poetry. Their subject-matter is partly philosophical love, in which the seeker after wisdom depicts his quest with all the imagery of an earthly lover's pursuit of an adored woman; partly, it would seem, more tangible human passion; partly, ethical and didactic themes. One of the noblest of the series is the *canzone* of the three ladies: 'Tre donne intorno al cor mi son venute' (probably written *c.* 1304); in this the legend told by Thomas of Celano and St. Bonaventura, of the apparition of Poverty and her two companions to St. Francis, is transformed into an allegory of Dante's own impassioned worship of Justice, which contains the *Divina Commedia* in germ.

(3) The *Convivio*, Dante's chief work in Italian prose, is an attempt to put the general reader of the epoch into possession of an abstract of the entire field of human learning, as attainable at the beginning of the 14th cent., in the form of an allegorical commentary upon fourteen of the poet's own *canzoni*. Its basis is the saying attributed to Pythagoras, to the effect that the philosopher should not be called the wise man, but the lover of wisdom—a conception which Dante elaborates in the terms of the chivalrous love poetry of his age, personifying Philosophy as a noble lady whose soul is love and whose body is wisdom, and identifying love with the study which is 'the application of the enamoured mind to that thing of which it is enamoured.' The work shows the influence of the *de Consolatione Philosophiæ* of Boethius (its professed starting-point), Isidore of Seville, the *Didascalon* of Hugh of St. Victor, the *Trésor* of Brunetto Latini, and the Aristotelian treatises and *Summa contra Gentiles* of St. Thomas Aquinas. Dante's aim is to make the mediæval encyclopædia a thing of artistic beauty, by wedding it to the highest poetry, and to show the world that the Italian vernacular was no less efficient than Latin as a literary medium. At the same time, it was to be his *apologia pro vita sua*, justifying his own conduct as a man and as a citizen, and, incidentally, explaining certain of his poems of earthly love as inspired purely by philosophical devotion. Internal evidence shows that it was composed between 1306 and 1308. It was left unfinished, only the introductory treatise and the commentaries upon three *canzoni* having been written.

(4) The *de Vulgari Eloquentia*, the earliest of Dante's Latin works, seems to have been begun shortly before the *Convivio* (probably in 1304 or 1305). Like the *Convivio*, it was left unfinished, only two of the projected four books having been written. In the first book, starting from the origin of language, Dante considers the rival claims for pre-eminence of the three romance vernaculars—French, Provençal, and Italian—and proceeds to examine in detail all the various dialects of the last, none of which he finds identical with the ideal language of Italy:

'The illustrious, cardinal, courtly, and curial vulgar tongue in Italy is that which belongs to every Italian city, and yet seems to belong to none, and by which all the local dialects of the Italians are measured, weighed, and compared.'

As Mazzini well said, Dante's purpose here is 'to found a language common to all Italy, to create a form worthy of representing the national idea'—the purpose which he was ultimately to fulfil by writing the *Divina Commedia*. In the second book, he defines the highest form of Italian lyrical poetry, the *canzone*; distinguishes the three subjects alone worthy of treatment therein—Arms, Love, and Virtue; and elaborates the poetical art of its construction, from the practice of the Provençal troubadours (Bertran de Born, Arnaut Daniel, Giraut de Borneil, Folquet of Marseilles, Aimeric de Belenoi, Aimeric de Pegulhan, together with the French poet, king Thibaut of Navarre), the poets of the Sicilian school (Guido delle Colonne and Rinaldo d'Aquino), and the poets of the *dolce stil nuovo* (Guido Guinizelli, Guido Cavalcanti, Cino da Pistoia, and himself). Dante refers to his own *canzoni* as those of 'the friend of Cino da Pistoia,' and it is possible that he intended to dedicate the work, when completed, to Cino, as he had done the *Vita Nuova* to Cavalcanti.

(5) The election of Henry of Luxemburg to the Empire, in November 1308, drew the poet back from these philosophical and linguistic studies to the political strife that was about to convulse Italy. Confronted with this new situation, of apparently unlimited possibilities for his native land, he felt that all that he had hitherto written was fruitless and insignificant. It was probably about 1309, in anticipation of Henry's coming to Italy, that Dante composed the *de Monarchia*, fearing lest he 'should one day be convicted of the charge of the buried talent.' For Dante, the purpose of temporal monarchy or empire, the single princedom over men in temporal things, is to establish liberty and universal peace, in order that the whole of the potentialities of the human race, for thought and for action, may be realized. In the first book he shows that this universal monarchy, thus conceived, is necessary for the well-being of the world; in the second he attempts to prove, first from arguments based on reason and then from arguments based on Christian faith, that the Roman people acquired the dignity of empire by Divine right. It is a cardinal point in Dante's reading of history that the history of the Jews and the history of the Romans reveal the Divine plan on parallel lines, the one race being entrusted with the preparation for the Gospel, the other with the promulgation of Roman law. For him, as for mediæval political theorists in general, the Emperor of his own day, when duly elected and

crowned, is the successor of Julius and Augustus no less than of Charlemagne and Otho. The third book proves that the authority of such an Emperor does not come to him from the Pope (the coronation of Charlemagne being an act of usurpation on the part of the latter), but depends immediately upon God, 'descending upon him without any mean, from the fountain of universal authority.' Divine Providence has ordained man for two ends: blessedness of this life, which consists in the exercise of his natural powers, and is figured in the Earthly Paradise; and blessedness of life eternal, which consists in the fruition of the Beatific Vision in the Celestial Paradise. To these two diverse ends, indicated by reason and revelation respectively, man must come by the diverse means of philosophy and spiritual teaching, and, because of human cupidity, he must be checked and directed:

'Wherefore man had need of a twofold directive power according to his twofold goal: the Sovereign Pontiff, to lead the human race to eternal life in accordance with things revealed; and the Emperor, to direct the human race to temporal felicity in accordance with philosophical teaching.'

This, then, is the purpose of Church and State, each independent in its own field, a certain superiority pertaining to the former in that mortal felicity is ordained for immortal felicity. We here find 'in its full maturity the general conception of the nature of man, of government, and of human destiny, which was afterwards transfigured, without being transformed, into the framework of the Sacred Poem' (Wicksteed).

(6) Dante's political letters are a pendant to the *de Monarchia*, but coloured by the realities, and finally embittered by the circumstances of the Emperor's expedition. From the Messianic fervour of his appeal on Henry's behalf to the princes and peoples of Italy (*Ep.* v. ['Oxford Dante'], written in 1310), we pass to the prophetic fury and *sæva indignatio* of his address to 'the most wicked Florentines within' (*Ep.* vi., March 31, 1311), and his rebuke to the Emperor himself (*Ep.* vii., April 16, 1311), when the former were organizing the national resistance to the Imperial power, and the latter seemed to tarry. To the latter part of 1314 belongs the eloquent letter to the Italian cardinals in conclave at Carpentras after the death of Clement V. (*Ep.* viii.), urging the election of an Italian Pope to return to Rome and reform the Church. Of Dante's private and personal correspondence, the only specimen that can be unhesitatingly accepted as authentic is the famous letter to a Florentine friend refusing the amnesty in 1316 (*Ep.* ix.); but two others, apparently accompanying two of his lyrical poems, addressed to Cino da Pistoia (*Ep.* iii., *c.* 1305) and Moroello Malaspina (*Ep.* iv., *c.* 1306 or 1311), are probably genuine.

(7) The authenticity of the letter to Can Grande della Scala, though much disputed, is gradually becoming generally recognized. Written apparently between 1318 and 1320, it dedicates the *Paradiso* to Can Grande, interprets the opening lines of its first canto, and explains the allegory, subject, and purpose of the whole poem. It is the starting-point for the study of the mystical aspect of the *Divina Commedia*, alike in its appeal to the authority of St. Augustine, St. Bernard, and Richard of St. Victor for the power of the human intellect to be so exalted in this life as to transcend the measure of humanity, and in its unmistakable claim for the poet himself that he has been the personal recipient of a religious experience too sublime and overwhelming to be adequately expressed in words.

(8) Dante's *first Eclogue*, a pastoral poem in Latin hexameters, was written about 1319, in answer to a Latin poem from Giovanni del Virgilio, a lecturer at Bologna, who had urged him to write a Latin poem and come to that city to receive the laurel crown. It is a beautiful and gracious poem, in which the Vergilian eclogue becomes a picture of the poet's own life at Ravenna in the comparative peace and calm of his latest years. A *second Eclogue* in the same spirit, sent to Giovanni del Virgilio by Dante's sons after the poet's death, is somewhat inferior, and was, perhaps, only in part actually composed by him.

(9) The *Quæstio de Aqua et Terra* professes to be a philosophical question concerning the relative position of water and earth on the surface of the globe, publicly discussed by Dante at Verona on January 20, 1320. Its authenticity has of late found several able defenders, but must still be regarded as highly problematical.

(10) It is impossible to decide at what date the *Divina Commedia* was actually begun. According to Boccaccio, the first seven cantos of the *Inferno* were composed before the poet's exile, and he was induced to take up the work again in consequence of his recovery of the manuscript in 1306 or 1307. Although this seems contradicted by internal evidence, there are some indications that these cantos were originally conceived on a different plan from that ultimately adopted in the poem. It is possible that the poem, as we now have it, was begun about 1308, interrupted by the Italian enterprise of Henry of Luxemburg, and resumed in the years after the latter's death. While there are no certain and definite allusions in the *Purgatorio* to events later than 1308, there are references in the *Inferno*, by way of prophecy, to occurrences of 1312, and possibly (though this is more open to question) of 1314, while the *Paradiso* (xii. 120) contains what appears to be an echo of a Papal bull of 1318. An allusion in the first Eclogue shows that, by 1319, the *Inferno* and the *Purgatorio* ('infera regna') were completed and, so to speak, published, but that Dante was still engaged upon the *Paradiso* ('mundi circumflua corpora astricolæque'); and we learn from Boccaccio that the last thirteen cantos had not yet been made known to the world at the time of the poet's death. In any case, it seems clear that the *Divina Commedia* as a whole, whenever it may have been begun, although the action is relegated by a poetic fiction to the assumed date of 1300, should be regarded as the work of the last period of the poet's career, when the failure of his earthly hopes with Henry of Luxemburg had transferred his gaze from time to eternity, and, himself purified in the fires of experience and adversity, he might lawfully come forward as *vir prædicans justitiam*, 'to remove those living in this life from their state of misery, and to lead them to the state of felicity.'

Dante's primary source of inspiration for the *Divina Commedia* is the actual life of his own times which he saw around him, interpreted by the story of his own inner life. His aim is to reform the world by a poem which should present man and Nature in the mirror of eternity. But he has, inevitably, his literary sources. While the sixth book of the *Æneid* may be called his starting-point, Dante was probably acquainted with some of the many mediæval accounts of visits of a living man, 'whether in the body or out of the body,' to the other world, the *immortale secolo*, which, beginning with the *Visio Sancti Pauli* and those recorded in the *Dialogues* of St. Gregory the Great, became especially abundant in the latter part of the 12th cent.; though the only one that has left notable traces in the *Divina Commedia* is the *Visio Tnugdali* of the Irish Benedictine Marcus (1149). Of the Latin poets, next to Vergil,

he was most influenced by Lucan, while Ovid and Statius are his main sources for classical mythology, and Livy and Orosius for classical history. Cicero was familiar to him from his early manhood; but he shows surprisingly little acquaintance with Terence and Horace. The Latin versions of Aristotle, the Vulgate, and the works of St. Augustine permeate the poem with their influence. He knew no Plato at first hand (he was almost completely ignorant of Greek), save, perhaps, the *Timæus* in the Latin version of Chalcidius, but there is a strong vein of Neo-Platonism in the poem, derived in part directly from the pseudo-Aristotelian *de Causis* and the Dionysian writings (either in the translation of Scotus Erigena or through the medium of Aquinas). Certain elements in his thought came from Boethius and St. Gregory the Great, while, of later mediæval writers, the influence of St. Peter Damian (esp. his *de Abdicatione Episcopatus*), of St. Bernard, and of Richard of St. Victor is especially marked. Indeed, the mystical psychology of the whole poem is largely based upon the *de Præparatione animi ad Contemplationem* and the *de Contemplatione* of the last-named writer. Of the poet's own contemporaries, Albertus Magnus and St. Bonaventura impressed him less than did St. Thomas Aquinas, the influence of whose Aristotelian treatises, his *Summa contra Gentiles*, and *Summa Theologiæ*, is profound and all-pervading. Recent investigation points to Dante's acquaintance with the mystical treatises of Mechthild of Magdeburg and Mechthild of Hackeborn, though it is questionable whether either of them can be identified with the Matelda of the Earthly Paradise. There is a certain element of Joachism in the *Divina Commedia*, but Dante was probably acquainted with the doctrines of the Abbot of Flora only at second hand, in the *Arbor Vitæ Crucifixæ* of Ubertino da Casale (1305), which is chronologically the last of the sources of the poem, and from which (together with the life of the Seraphic Father by St. Bonaventura, and, perhaps, the earlier legend by Thomas of Celano) he derived his conception of the life and work of St. Francis in the *Paradiso*.

The *Divina Commedia* is an allegory of human life and human destiny, in the form of a vision of the 'state of souls after death'; it is likewise, in the mystical sense, a figurative representation of the soul's ascent, while still in the flesh, by the three ways of purgation, illumination, and union, to the fruition of the Absolute in that 'half-hour during which there is silence in Heaven.'

Above and around the material universe is the celestial rose of Divine Beauty, flowering in the rays of the sun of Divine Love, still to be completed by man's correspondence with Divine Grace; while on earth—the threshing-floor of mortality—by use or abuse of free-will, character is formed, and human drama is played out. The dual scheme of the *de Monarchia* is transplanted from the sphere of Church and Empire to the field of the individual soul. Man, in the person of Dante, vainly attempts to escape from the dark wood of alienation from truth, and is barred by his own vices from the ascent of the delectable mountain (felicity, or, perhaps, knowledge of self); but Vergil, representing human philosophy inspired by reason, guides him through the nine circles of Hell (realization of the nature and effects of sin), and up the seven terraces of Purgatory (setting love, the soul's natural tendency to what is apprehended as good, in order, and purifying the soul from the stains still left after conversion) to the Earthly Paradise, which in one sense is the happy state of a good conscience, and in another the life of Eden regained by the purgatorial pains. This life is personified in Matelda, the realization of Leah, who, in the mystical system of Richard of St. Victor, symbolizes 'affection inflamed by Divine inspiration, and composing herself to the norm of justice.' Then the soul can rightly comprehend the history of Church and State, as represented in the allegorical pageant, and is prepared for a further illumination. Beatrice, symbolizing the Divine Science as possessing Revelation, thence uplifts the poet through the nine moving heavens of successive preparation, corresponding to the nine angelic orders, into the true Paradise, the timeless and spaceless empyrean heaven of heavens, where her place is taken by St. Bernard, type of the loving contemplation in which the eternal life of the soul consists; and, after the impassioned hymn to the Blessed Virgin placed upon Bernard's lips, the poem closes in the momentary actualizing of the soul's entire capacity of knowing and loving, when desire and will move in harmony with 'the Love that moves the sun and the other stars,' in an anticipation of the Beatific Vision of the Divine Essence.

In describing the 'spiritual lives' of Hell, Purgatory, and Paradise, Dante has given a summary, illumined by imagination and kindled by passion, of all that is permanently significant in the life and thought of the Middle Ages. He is throughout harking back to a primitive ideal of Christianity, freed from the corruptions and accretions of the subsequent centuries. Under the tree of an Empire renovated by the power of the Cross, Revelation is seated on the bare ground as guardian of the chariot of the Church, with no attendants save the theological and moral virtues, who bear nought save the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit. But the ideal is never realized, because, side by side with the conquest of the world by Christianity, had come the conquest of the Church by the world. The alleged donation by Constantine of wealth and territory to the Papacy is for Dante the turning-point in history, and the primal cause of the failure of Christianity, which was bearing such bitter fruit in the corruption of mankind. The supremely significant event of his own century is thus the rise of St. Francis, and his marriage with Lady Poverty, as the first attempted return to the ideal of Christianity that Christ had left. This, in its turn, having proved but a passing episode, the poet can only look forward to the coming of the deliverer, the mysterious *Veltro*, the 'Five Hundred Ten and Five,' to be sent from God to renovate the Empire and to reform the Church by other methods. For the rest, men at all times 'are masters of their fate,' through the supreme gift of free-will, to put violence upon which, as Richard of St. Victor had said, 'neither befits the Creator nor is in the power of the creature.' The soul of man works out its own salvation or damnation; and the tragic fact consists simply in the soul's deliberate choice of evil. The *Inferno* departs less than the other two canticles from mediæval tradition in its structure and machinery; but it is here that the dramatic side of Dante's genius is especially displayed. The tragic impression is intensified, on the one hand, by the wasted virtues of the lost (the patriotism of Farinata degli Uberti, the fidelity of Piero delle Vigne, the scientific devotion of Brunetto Latini, the high conception of man's origin and nature that impels Ulysses to his last voyage); and, on the other, by frequent and effective use of dramatic contrasts between the souls in Hell and those in Purgatory or Paradise (Francesca da Rimini and Piccarda Donati; St. Peter Celestine and King Manfred; Guido and Buonconte da Montefeltro). In the *Purgatorio*, with its sunsets and starshine, its angel ministers, its allegorical quest of liberty,

in which the souls find the very purgatorial pains a solace to be willingly undergone, Dante breaks almost completely from legend and theological tradition, and presents a conception of the second realm which is entirely his own. The *Purgatorio* depends less than the *Inferno* upon the splendour of certain episodes, though many of these are among the most beautiful in the poem. It is in its sustained harmony and all-pervading tenderness that it makes immediate and universal appeal to heart and mind. The noblest passages of the *Paradiso* are lyrical rather than dramatic, and there is naturally less action and less individualization of character. With the exception of St. Bernard, who is a singularly vivid character, the human aspect of the souls in bliss is somewhat lost in the glory of their state since they have become 'sempiternal flames'—the suggestion of humanity being held in abeyance after the third sphere (where the stretch of the earth's shadow is passed), until it reappears in celestial splendour in the tenth heaven. Notwithstanding this, we are sensible of no monotony in the passage through the higher spheres; for it is part of the poet's conception, worked out alike in the allegorical imagery and in the spoken narratives of each sphere, that, although each soul partakes supremely of the Beatific Vision, which is one and the same in all, yet there are not only grades, but subtle differences in the possession of it, in which the previous life has been a factor. As Wicksteed puts it, 'the tone and colour, so to speak, of the heavenly fruition of the blessed is affected by the nature of the moral warfare through which they rose to spiritual victory.' The human interest in the *Paradiso* seems concentrated in such episodes as the appearance of Piccarda Donati and Dante's colloquy with Cacciaguida, or the exquisite passage where Beatrice, her allegorical office completed, resumes her place, in the unveiled glory of her human personality, in the celestial rose. The mystical poetry of the *Paradiso* is unsurpassable: above all, in the closing canto it reaches a height of spiritual ecstasy for which it would be hard to find a parallel elsewhere in modern literature. Shelley wrote of the *Paradiso* that it is 'a perpetual hymn of everlasting love'; and Manning, 'Post Dantis paradisum nihil restat nisi visio Dei.'

The metre in which the *Divina Commedia* is written, the *terza rima*, seems to have been created by Dante from the *sirventese*, the Italian form of the Provençal *sirventes*, employed by the troubadours for political or satirical compositions in contrast to the statelier *canso*, or *canzone*, of love. His style has the highest qualities of terseness, condensation, variety of intonation, passion, vividness. The closely packed imagery is hardly ever introduced for its own sake, but to exemplify and clarify his meaning. Even at the heights of the *Paradiso*, he does not shrink from uncompromising realism in his similes and images. The beauty and fidelity of his transcripts from Nature are likewise unapproachable. He can render a complete scene in a few lines, sometimes in a single line, whether it be the flight of birds, the trembling of the sea at dawn, or the first appearance of the stars at the approach of evening. 'Dante's eye was free and open to external nature in a degree new among poets. . . . But *light* in general is his special and chosen source of poetic beauty' (Church, *Dante*, 1901, pp. 149, 163). Dante's fidelity to Nature has been well compared with that of Wordsworth. And, when he turns from Nature to the mind of man, '*his* haunt, and the main region of *his* song,' no such revealer of the hidden things of the spirit, save Shakespeare, has ever found utterance in poetry.

3. **Position and character.**—Dante is the last poet of the Middle Ages, and the first of the modern world. He has given perfect poetical utterance to what would otherwise have been artistically silent, and has proved the most influential interpreter of mediæval thought to the present day. If it can no longer be said, without considerable reservation, that he created the Italian language, or that he founded Italian literature, it is certain that he first showed that modern literature in general could produce a work to rival the masterpieces of antiquity, and he first gave to Italy a national consciousness. His character is reflected in his works: profoundly reverent to what he deemed Divinely ordained authority, but no less enkindled with prophetic fire against the abuse and corruption of that authority, whether in Church or State, and absolutely fearless in his reforming zeal; relentless in his hatred of baseness and wickedness, above all in high places, but with a capacity for boundless tenderness and compassion; liable to be carried to excess, both in speech and in action, by his impassioned hunger and thirst after righteousness; conscious of his own greatness, but ever struggling against pride, and exalting humility above all other virtues; listening for a while to the song of the *antica strega*, the siren of the flesh (*Purg.* xix. 58), but borne up 'even to the sphere of fire' by the eagle of the spirit (*Purg.* ix. 30). The visionary experience, upon which the whole *Divina Commedia* is based, was, it would seem, a sudden realization of the hideousness of vice and the beauty of virtue, the universality and omnipotence of love, so intense and overwhelming that it came upon him with the force of a personal and special revelation; but this was not all; we gather from the letter to Can Grande that the poet himself experienced one of those contacts with the Divine attributed to the great saints and mystics of all creeds—in which, as George Tyrrell puts it, the mind touches the smooth sphere of the infinite, but is unable to lay hold of it.

LITERATURE.—I. *BIOGRAPHY.*—Our earliest sources for the life of Dante, in addition to his own works and a few extant documents, are a chapter in the *Istorie Fiorentine* of **Giovanni Villani** († 1348), the *Vita di Dante* of **Boccaccio** († 1375), the insignificant sketch by **Filippo Villani** († *c.* 1405), the more authoritative and critical treatise of **Leonardo Bruni** († 1444), and the first commentators. There are ten 14th cent. commentators upon part or the whole of the *Divina Commedia*, including both Dante's sons and the author of the so-called *Ottimo Commento*, who professes to have known the poet personally. The most important is **Benvenuto Rambaldi da Imola** (1379–1410), edited by Vernon and Lacaita (Florence, 1887). Among recent publications should be especially mentioned: **G. Biagi-Passerini**, *Codice diplomatico dantesco* (documents, in course of publication); **C. Ricci**, *L'ultimo rifugio di Dante Alighieri*, Milan, 1891; **M. Scherillo**, *Alcuni capitoli della biografia di Dante*, Turin, 1896; various volumes of **Isidoro del Lungo**; **Paget Toynbee**, *A Dante Dictionary*, Oxford, 1898, also *Dante Alighieri, his Life and Works*, London, 1910; **N. Zingarelli**, *Dante*, Milan, 1903 (a work on an exhaustive scale with full bibliographies). For the disputed story of the letter of Frate Ilario, cf. **Wicksteed-Gardner**, *Dante and Giovanni del Virgilio*, London, 1902; **Rajna**, in *Dante e la Lunigiana*, Milan, 1909; **V. Biagi**, *Un episodio celebre nella Vita di Dante*, Modena, 1910.

II. *MINOR WORKS.*—A critical edition is gradually being produced by the Società Dantesca Italiana, of which the *de Vulgari Eloquentia* (ed. Rajna, Florence, 1896) and *Vita Nuova* (ed. Barbi, Florence, 1907) have appeared. The *Rime* are incomplete and unsatisfactory even in **E. Moore's** *Tutte le Opere di Dante*, 1894 (the 'Oxford Dante,' which is of the highest authority for the text of all the other works). A more recent edition, *Vita Nuova and Canzoniere*, by **Wicksteed-Okey**, is in the Temple Classics. **Michele Barbi's** long-promised edition of the *Rime* is much needed. There are critical editions of the *Eclogæ* by **Wicksteed** (in *Dante and Giovanni del Virgilio*) and **Albini**, Florence, 1903. The translations of the Latin Works (Howell and Wicksteed) and of the *Convivio* (Wicksteed) in the Temple Classics are provided with full critical commentaries; a more recent version of the *Convivio* is by **W. W. Jackson** (Oxford, 1909). For the problem of the *de Aqua et Terra*, see **Moore**, *Studies in Dante* (second series, Oxf. 1899), and **V. Biagi's** ed., Modena, 1907.

III. *DIVINA COMMEDIA.*—The best Italian editions with commentaries are those of **Scartazzini** (epoch-making, but now a little out of date), **Casini**, and **Torraca**; of the text with English translations and notes, by **A. J. Butler**, the Temple Classics

editors (Wicksteed, Oelsner, Okey), and W. W. Vernon (*Readings . . . chiefly based on the Commentary of Benvenuto da Imola*, new ed. Lond. 1906–09).

IV. *Subsidiary Literature.*—The reader must be referred to Toynbee's *Dante Dictionary* and the bibliographies included in Zingarelli. Dante literature has, especially of late years, assumed colossal proportions. Among English works stand out pre-eminently the three volumes of Moore's *Studies in Dante*, Toynbee's *Dante Studies and Researches*, Lond. 1902, and *Dante in English Literature*, Lond. 1909. Church's well-known essay still holds its place as the most suggestive of introductions to the divine poet. The Florentine quarterly publication, *Il Bullettino della Società Dantesca Italiana*, is indispensable to students.

Edmund G. Gardner.

DAPHLĀ (Dafflā, Daplā, Dophlā).[1]—A tribe occupying a section of the Himālaya lying N. of the Darrang and Lakhimpur Districts, Eastern Bengal, and Assam. They numbered 954 at the Census of 1901; but the greater part of the tribe is found in independent territory beyond the British frontier, whence, driven by famine or the oppression of the Abors, they have recently shown a tendency to migrate into the Darrang and Lakhimpur Districts. They call themselves Niso, Nising, or Bangnī, the last name meaning 'men.' According to Mackenzie (*Hist. of the Relations of the Government with the Hill Tribes on the N.E. Frontier of Bengal*, 541), Mirī, Daphlā, and Abor (see Abor, vol. i. p. 33) are names given by the Assamese to three sections of the same tribe inhabiting the mountains between Assam and Tibet.

'Their principal crops are summer rice and mustard, maize, and cotton, sown in clearances made by the axe or hoe in the forest or in the jungle of reeds. Their villages, usually placed on or near the banks of rivers, consist of a few houses built on platforms raised above the naked surface of the plain, presenting a strong contrast to the ordinary Assamese village. . . . Under the houses live the fowls and pigs which furnish out the village feasts, and the more prosperous villages keep herds of buffaloes also, though these people, like so many of the non-Aryan races of Assam, eschew milk as an unclean thing' (Mackenzie, *op. cit.* 541).

1. Ethnology.—The Daphlās are probably connected with the great Bodo (*q.v.*) or Barā race, which includes the Kāchārī, Rabhā, Mech, Garo, and Tipperā tribes, and they are by origin Tibeto-Burmans, who followed the Mon-Anam from N.W. China between the waters of the Yang-tse-kiang and the Ho-ang-ho (*Census Report Assam*, 1901, i. 120). Their language is closely related to that of the Akā, Abor-Mirī, and Mishmī tribes.

'We know a good deal about Abor-Miri and Daflā. Robinson [*JRASBe*, 1851, p. 131] gave us grammars and vocabularies of both in the middle of the last century, and, to omit mention of less important notices, in later times, Mr. Needham has given us a grammar of the former, and Mr. Hamilton one of the latter' (G. A. Grierson, *Census Report India*, 1901, i. 262 f.; and see E. A. Gait, *Assam Census Report*, 1891, i. 184).

2. Relations with the British Government.—The independent portion of the tribe has long been accustomed to make raids in British territory. Even in 1910 it was found necessary to send an expedition against them. This is due not so much to friction with the British authorities as to quarrels between the independent and the settled branches of the tribe. In 1872–3 one of these outbreaks occurred because the men of the hills claimed compensation for losses of life believed to have been caused by infection introduced from the plains. On this being refused, they raided British territory and captured several slaves (Mackenzie, 31).

3. Religious beliefs.—Much information regarding their religion has been collected since, in 1872, E. T. Dalton gave the first account of them (*Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal*, 36):

'I never heard of Dophla priests, but Robinson says they have priests who pretend to a knowledge of divination, and by inspection of chickens' entrails and eggs declare the nature of the sacrifice to be offered by the sufferer and the spirit to whom it is to be offered. The office, however, is not hereditary, and it is taken up or laid aside at pleasure. So it resolves itself into this, that every man can, when occasion requires it, become a priest. Their religion consists of invocations to the spirits for protection of themselves, their cattle, and their crops, and sacrifices and thank-offerings of pigs and fowls. They acknowledge, but do not worship, one Supreme Being, which, I conceive, means that they have been told of such a Being, but know nothing about him.'

During the Census of 1881 (*Report*, § 150 ff.; Mackenzie, 543 ff.) it was ascertained that the Mikirs and Daphlās worship Yāpum and Orom, the latter the malignant spirits of the dead, the former a sylvan deity or demon, who suffices for the needs of everyday life, though in critical conjunctures some great god has to be gained over by the sacrifice of a *mithan* or *gayāl* (*Bos frontalis*).

'A hill Mirī told me how he had once, while a boy, actually seen a Yāpum. The character of this god is that he lives in trees, and all the beasts of the forest obey him. My informant was throwing stones in a thicket by the edge of a pool, and suddenly became aware that he had hit the Yāpum, who was sitting at the foot of a tree in the guise of an old grey-bearded man. A dangerous illness was the consequence, from which the boy was saved by an offering of a dog and four fowls made by his parents to the offended Yāpum, who has since visited him in dreams' (Mackenzie, 543).

They also count the Sun among their deities; but their great god, who must be propitiated by the sacrifice of a *mithan*, is Uī or Wī, of whom no Daphlā cares to speak much for fear of incurring his displeasure. His character may be guessed from the Assamese equivalent of his name, Yom or Yama, the Hindu god of death (*ib.* 544). E. A. Gait (*Census Report Assam*, 1891, i. 223) adds:

'The general name for God is Uī, but there are also special names for each particular deity. Most of their gods are inimical to men, and have to be propitiated by sacrifices. The chief gods are Sonolē, the god of heaven; Siki, who presides over the delivery of women; Voglē and Lungtē, who hurt men; and Yeopu, who injures children. Then there is Yāpum, the god of trees, who frightens to madness people who go into the forest; Chili, the god of water; Prom, the god of diseases; Sotu, the god of dumbness; and numerous others. There are a few beneficent deities, such as Pekhong, the god of breath, and Yechu, the goddess of wealth. To all these gods, sacrifices are offered. When a person is ill, a sorcerer (*deondic*) is called in, and chants an incantation in a loud singsong voice, which he sometimes keeps up till he works himself up into a frenzy of excitement. The Daflās believe in a future life, but cannot say much about it, except that they expect to cultivate and hunt there. The dead are buried in a sitting position, and a small shed is put up over the grave; in it rice and drink are placed, and a fire is kept burning for five days. The mourners sacrifice fowls, pigs, and sometimes mithun, the blood of which is sprinkled over the grave; the flesh they eat themselves.'

B. C. Allen (*Census Report Assam*, 1901, i. 46 ff.) gives an account of similar beliefs among the allied tribes of this group—the creation legends of the Mikirs and Garos, and the conception of the other world held by the Mirīs, Mikirs, and Garos.

Literature.—E. T. Dalton, *Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal*, Calcutta, 1872; A. Mackenzie, *Hist. of the Relations of the Government with the Hill Tribes of the N.E. Frontier of Bengal*, Calcutta, 1884; *Reports of the Census of Assam*, 1881, 1891, 1901; B. C. Allen, *Gazetteers of the Lakhimpur and Darrang Districts*, Calcutta, 1905.

W. Crooke.

[1] The origin of the name, which, as pronounced in the Lakhimpur District, would be written *Domphilā*, is unknown.

DARDS.—The Dards are an Aryan race inhabiting the country round Gilgit, between Kashmīr and the Hindū Kush, and down the course of the Indus to near where it debouches on the plains. Colonies of the tribe are also found farther east in Bāltistān, where they are known as *Brokpas*, or Highlanders. Along with the Khōs of Chitral and the Hindū Kush Kāfirs of Kāfiristān, Dards are classed by the present writer as descendants of the *Piśāchas*, or Ὠμοφάγοι of Sanskrit writers. This is not accepted by all scholars, but no alternative has hitherto been suggested. Although of Aryan origin, their language cannot be classed as either Indian or Iranian, having issued from the parent stock after the former branch had emigrated towards the Kābul Valley, but before the typical characteristics of Iranian speech had become fully developed. They are mentioned by Herodotus (iii. 102–105), though not referred to by their present name. On the other hand, Sanskrit writers knew them as *Daradas*, and they are the *Derdai* of Megasthenes and Strabo, the *Daradrai* of Ptolemy, and the *Dardae* of Pliny and Nonnus. Most of the Dards belong to the tribe of Shīns, whose headquarters may be taken as Gilgit, and their

language is either Shīnā or some closely allied form of speech. By religion, the Dards of the present day are nearly all Musalmāns, but the Brokpa colonies in Bāltistān profess the Buddhist faith of their neighbours. It is not known at what period the Muhammadan Dards were converted to Islām, but, down to the middle of last century, when a reformation was carried out by Nathū Shāh, the Governor of Gilgit, on behalf of the Sikhs, it held but a nominal sway. Even after Nathū Shāh's time remains of the old pre-Islāmitic beliefs have survived, so that many Dard practices are very different from those enjoined on the followers of the Qur'ān. For instance, until about eighty years ago the dead were burnt and not buried, and this custom lingered on sporadically down to the last recorded instance in 1877. A memory of it still survives in the lighting of a fire by the grave after burial. Instead of considering the dog as unclean, they are as fond of the friend of man as any Englishman. The marriage of first cousins, which is frequent among true Musalmāns, is looked upon with horror by the purer tribes of Shīns as an incestuous union. Although the Muhammadan lunar calendar has been introduced, an ancient solar computation, based on the signs of the zodiac, still exists. According to Biddulph, 'Islām has not yet [1880] brought about the seclusion of women, who mix freely with the men on all occasions. Young men and maidens of different families eat and converse together without restraint.' The levirate custom has a strong hold, and this often leads to two sisters being the wives of the same man simultaneously, though such a practice is forbidden by Muhammadan law.

The Dards received Muhammadanism from three directions. From the south (*i.e.* Afghanistān) came the Sunnīs, and that branch of Islām is now prevalent in Chilās. From the Pāmirs in the north came the Maulā'ī sect (famous for its winebibbers), and this doctrine is now commonly held north of Gilgit. On the other hand, the people round Gilgit and to the south are mostly Shī'ahs converted from Bāltistān.

On the Buddhist Dards, or Brokpas, of East Bāltistān their nominal religion sits even more lightly than on their Musalmān fellow-tribesmen to the west. The only essential Tibetan practices which they have adopted seem to be the dress of the men and the custom of polyandry. The religious ideas of the Brokpas were examined by Shaw in 1876, and of late years by A. H. Francke, whose researches into the ancient customs and religion of the neighbouring Ladakh are well known. The information gathered from these two sources agrees closely with the traces of the ancient Shīnā religion observable in other portions of the Dard area, and from the whole we get a fairly clear, if incomplete, idea of its general character.

According to Francke, the origin of the world is believed by the Brokpas to be as follows:[1] 'Out of the Ocean grew a meadow. On the meadow grew three mountains. One of them is called "the White-jewel Hill," the second "the Red-jewel Hill," and the third "the Blue-jewel Hill." On the three mountains three trees grew. The first is called "the White Sandal-tree," the second "the Red Sandal-tree," and the third "the Blue Sandal-tree." On each of the trees grew a bird,—"the Wild King of Birds," "the House-hen," and "the Black Bird," respectively.'

Francke adds: 'As regards the system of colours, we are decidedly reminded of the *gLing chos*, or pre-Buddhist religion of Tibet (see GLING CHOS). I am inclined to believe that the three mountains were thought to exist one on the top of the other; the lowest being the blue mountain and tree forming the Under-world, the red mountain and tree being in the middle and representing the Earth, and the uppermost being the white mountain and tree forming the Land of the Gods. But in other respects the story of the origin of the world is at variance with the *gLing chos*, according to which the world is framed out of the body of a giant, while here it grows out of the water, as in Indian legends.'

[1] Quoted from a private communication.

Nothing like this cosmogony has been noted in other Shīn tracts, and it may be that it has been partly borrowed from Tibet. At the same time it may be noted that the *Klumo* or *Nāginīs*, who are prominent characters in the *gLing chos*, are also met, under the form of snakes, in Gilgit tradition, and, according to Leitner, the earth is there known as the 'Serpent World.'[1]

From the hymn from which Francke has culled the preceding information he also extracts the following two names of deities, *Yandring* and *Mandēde Mandēschen*. These names are, at any rate, not Tibetan, and are therefore probably Dard. In another prayer, the name *Zhúni* occurs as that of a house-god. *Múmmo*, which properly means 'uncle,' stands in the collection of hymns for the 'uncle of the past,' *i.e.* the 'forefather' or Adam of the race, who is also honoured almost like a god.

Francke mentions water, milk, butter, and flower offerings as sacrifices, and also burnt offerings of the pencil-cedar (see below). Sheep and goats are also offered to the gods, and in one song—that of the ibex hunter—the hunter carries all the necessaries for the offerings along with him when following his quarry, and after the lucky shot they are at once offered to the gods.

Farther west, we also come across traces of Buddhism. A rock-cut figure of the Buddha is still to be seen in a defile near Gilgit, and throughout the Gilgit and Astor valleys, as well as elsewhere, there can be found ruined *chortens* (*q.v.*), whose forms can even now be distinctly traced. One of the Shīn festivals, the *Talcni*, which commemorates the destruction of an ancient king who devoured his subjects,[2] seems to have a connexion with a similar festival among the Iranian fire-worshippers of the Pāmirs. In neither case, however, can we consider such remains as part of the true ancient Dard religion. They are just as exotic as Islām.

The practical side of Dard religion, as distinct from speculative theories regarding cosmogony and the like, is best described by Shaw in his account of the Brokpas (p. 29 ff.), which fully agrees with the information derived from other sources. The real worship is that of local spirits or demons, much like the cult of similar beings in the neighbouring Ladakh. Closely connected with this worship is a kind of cedar or juniper tree (*Juniperus excelsa*), called in Shīnā *chilī*, and by the Brokpas *shukpa*. In every village in which Shīns are in a majority there is a sacred *chilī* stone, dedicated to the tree, which is still more or less the object of reverence. Each village has its own name for the stone, and an oath taken or an engagement made over it is often more binding than when the Qur'ān is used. Shaw's account of the local Brokpa goddess of the village of Dah may be taken as a sample:

'Her name is *Shiring-mo*. A certain family in the village supplies the hereditary officiating priest. This person has to purify himself for the annual ceremony by washings and fastings for the space of seven days, during which he sits apart, not even members of his own family being allowed to approach him, although they are compelled during the same period to abstain from onions, salt, *chang* (a sort of beer), and other unholy food. At the end of this period he goes up alone to the rocky point above the village, and, after worshipping in the name of the community the deity who dwells there in a small cairn, he renews the branches of the "shukpa" (*Juniperus excelsa*) which were placed there the previous year, the old branches being carefully stowed away under a rock and covered up with stones.'

'. . . Formerly the priest used to be occasionally possessed

[1] Leitner, *Dardistan in 1866, 1886, and 1893*, p. 50.

[2] It is an interesting fact that all over the *Piśācha* region there are traditions pointing to ancient cannibal customs which were put a stop to by some hero or god. The Sanskrit word *Piśācha* means 'eater of raw flesh.'

by the demon, and in that state to dance a devil-dance, giving forth inspired oracles at the same time; but these manifestations have ceased for the last twelve or fifteen years [written in 1876]. The worship is now simply one of propitiation inspired by fear, the demon seeming to be regarded as an impersonation of the forces of nature adverse to man in this wild mountainous country. Sacrifices of goats (not sheep) are occasionally offered at all seasons below the rock, by the priest only, on behalf of pious donors. They talk of the existence of the demon as a misfortune attaching to their tribe, and do not regard her with any loyalty as a protecting or tutelary deity. In each house the fireplace consists of three upright stones of which the one at the back of the hearth is the largest, 18 inches or 2 feet in height. On this stone they place an offering to the demon from every dish cooked there, before they eat of it. They also place there the firstfruits of the harvest. Such is their household worship.'

This belief in demons is universal over the Dard area. They are called *Yach.* They are of gigantic size, have each only one eye, in the centre of the forehead, and, when they assume human shape, may be recognized by the fact that their feet are turned backwards.[1] They can walk only by night, and used to rule over the mountains and oppose the cultivation of the soil by man. They often dragged people away into their recesses, but, since the adoption of the Muhammadan religion, they have relinquished their possessions, and only occasionally trouble the believers. Their oath is by the sun and moon, and they are not invariably malevolent. On the occasion of their weddings they borrow the property of mankind for their rejoicings, and restore it faithfully, without the lender being aware of the loan. On such occasions they have kindly feelings towards the human race. The shadow of a demon falling on a person causes madness.

Fairies, known as *Barai*, are also common. They are as handsome as the demons are hideous, and are stronger than they. They have a castle of crystal on the top of the mighty mountain of Nanga Parbat, which has a garden containing only one tree composed entirely of pearls and coral. Although they are capable of forming love-attachments with men, like Lohengrin they have a secret, and they never forgive the human being who discovers it. Death is the only possible recompense for the indiscreet curiosity. They sometimes take the form of serpents (*Nāgas* or, feminine, *Nāginīs*).

While the shadow of a demon causes madness, that of a fairy confers the gift of prophecy. Divination is still practised, in spite of Muhammadanism. The diviner, or *Dainyal*, is one on whom the shadow of a fairy has fallen in sleep. When performing his or her office, the diviner is made to inhale the smoke of burning juniper wood till he is insensible. When he revives, the neck of a newly slaughtered goat is presented to him, and he sucks the blood till not a drop remains. He then rushes about in a state of ecstasy, uttering unintelligible sounds. The fairy appears and sings to him, he alone being able to hear. He then explains her words in a song to one of the attendant musicians, who translates its meaning to the crowd of spectators.

Amongst miscellaneous customs, we must first of all mention the remarkable abhorrence entertained for everything connected with a cow (we have already remarked the fondness for dogs). The touch of the animal contaminates, and, though they are obliged to employ bullocks in ploughing, the Dards scarcely handle them at all. They employ a forked stick to remove a calf from its mother. They will not drink milk or touch any of its products in any form, and believe that to do so causes madness. There is nothing of reverence in this. They look upon the cow as bad, not good, and base their abhorrence on the will of the local gods. Marriages are celebrated with much ceremony, for an account of which the reader is referred to Biddulph (p. 78 ff.). We trace a survival of marriage by capture in the bridegroom setting out for the bride's house, surrounded by his friends and equipped with bow, arrow, and battle-axe. An essential part of the dress of a Shīn bride is a fillet of cowrie shells bound round her head. When the bride and bridegroom take their first meal together, there is a scramble for the first morsel, as whichever eats this will have the mastery during the future wedded life. After the birth of a child the mother is unclean for seven days, and no one will eat from her hand during that period. Ordeal by fire is still practised. Seven paces are measured, and a red-hot axe-head is placed on the open palm of the accused, on which a green leaf has first been spread. He must then deposit the hot iron at the place appointed seven paces distant, and, should any mark of a burn remain on his hand, it is a proof of guilt. Magic has a prominent place in Dard ideas, and written charms are in great request. They are even attached to the mane and forelock of a horse. They confer courage and invulnerability. Certain springs are supposed to have the power of causing tempests if anything impure, such as a cowskin, is cast into them.

[1] So also in India. Compare the hoofs of the European devil and the *Diable boiteux*. Whitley Stokes tells of an Irish legend, according to which the devil could not kneel to pray, as his knees were turned the wrong way.

The principal festivals are as follows:—

(1) The *Nōs*, in celebration of the winter solstice. The word means 'fattening,' and refers to the slaughtering of the cattle, fat after the grazing on the pastures, which takes place. This is necessary because the pastures have become covered with snow, and only sufficient fodder is stored to keep a few animals alive through the winter. On the second day the *Taleni*, already mentioned, is celebrated.

(2) The *Bazono*, in celebration of the commencement of spring. The sacrifice is a sheep, which must be lean and miserable. The word means 'leanness.'

(3) The *Aiboi*, which took place in the first week in March, has now fallen into desuetude. It was said to mark the time for pruning vines and the first budding of the apricot trees. In some respects it resembled the Indian *Hōlī*. Prominent features were mock fighting amongst the men, and the licensed cudgelling of men by women. Its cessation is due to the Musalmān reform movement of Nathū Shāh.

(4) The *Ganoni* celebrated the commencement of the wheat harvest, and is still kept up. At dusk on the evening before the festival, a member of each household gathers a handful of ears of corn. This is supposed to be done secretly. A few of the ears are hung over the door of the house, and the rest are roasted next morning and eaten steeped in milk. The Dards of the Indus Valley below Sazin do not observe this festival.

(5) The last festival of the year, and the most important, is the *Chili*, which formerly celebrated the worship of the juniper tree, and marked the commencement of wheat-sowing. Within the last eighty years the rites connected with the tree-worship have ceased, but the ceremonies connected with sowing are still maintained. Bonfires of *chilī* wood are, however, still lit, and the quantity of wheat to be used in the next day's sowing is held over the smoke.

It will have been observed how frequently the sacred *chilī*, or juniper tree, has been referred to in the foregoing pages. In former years the worship of this tree was performed with much ceremony, and hymns were sung in its honour. In prayers to it for the fulfilment of any desire, it was addressed as 'The Dreadful King, son of the fairies, who has come from far.' The *chilī* stone, at the entrance of every Shīn village, has already been mentioned. On it offerings to the *chilī* were placed, and from it omens were deduced. A full account of the ceremonies connected with its worship will be found in Biddulph (p. 106 ff.).

To sum up. The present writer has met in none of the authorities on the Dard religion any reference to a Supreme Deity, corresponding to the Kāfir *Imrā*. In translations from Christian scriptures, the Musalmān word *Ḫudā* has to be used for 'God.' The centre of the worship seems to be the *chilī* tree, a mighty son of the fairies; and the whole mountain region in which the Dards dwell is peopled by spirits, some benevolent, and some malevolent, probably personifications of the powers of Nature, who exercise a constant influence on the lives of the human beings who dwell under

their sway. Most of the worship is in the form of propitiation of the malevolent spirits, though we occasionally find prayers addressed to the benevolent *chilī*. Over the whole is spread a complex mist. We see traces of the Magian religion of Irān; of Buddhism, left behind on its way to Central Asia; and, in modern times, Islām, in strong possession. The pure Dard religion has nothing in common with any of them. Attempts have been made, but in the opinion of the present writer entirely without any justification, to connect it with the religions of India, and (with better reason) with the ancient *gLing chos* religion of Tibet. It is a pure Nature-religion of an agricultural and pastoral people, dwelling in a barren land, amidst the highest mountain ranges in the world. The languages of the *Piśācha* people, of which the Dard languages form an important group, are, as has been stated, something between Indian and Iranian, and one of their most characteristic marks is the wonderful way in which they have preserved ancient Aryan forms of speech almost unchanged down to the present day. The same may be said of the Dard religion. It retains many of the characteristics of the oldest form of Aryan religion with which we are acquainted. There is the same adoration of a special plant (in the Vēdas the *sōma*, and amongst the Dards the *chilī*), and the same worship, mixed with terror, of the personified powers of Nature.

LITERATURE.—F. Drew, *The Jummoo and Kashmir Territories*, London, 1875; G. W. Leitner, *The Languages and Races of Dardistan*, Lahore, 1877, also the same writer's *Dardistan in 1866, 1886, and 1893*, Woking, no date; J. Biddulph, *Tribes of the Hindoo Koosh*, Calcutta, 1880; R. B. Shaw, 'Stray Arians in Tibet,' *JRASBe.* (1878), vol. xlvii. part i. p. 26 ff.; A. H. Francke, *Ladakhi Songs* (privately printed, Leipzig), 4th series (contains Dard songs, including a cosmogony).

GEORGE A. GRIERSON.

DARKNESS.—See LIGHT AND DARKNESS.

DARŚANA.—The term *darśana*, the literal meaning of which is 'seeing,' 'sight,' is more usually employed in Sanskrit literature with a derivative or metaphorical significance, as 'insight,' 'perception,' *i.e.* mental or spiritual vision. It is thus at once expressive of one of the most characteristic and fundamental thoughts of Indian philosophy—the meditative and mystical attitude of mind which frames for itself an idealistic conception of the universe; *e.g.* Manu, vi. 74:

'He who is possessed of true insight (*darśanasampanna*) is not bound by deeds,
But the man destitute of insight (*darśanena vihīna*) is involved in the cycle of existence.'

The word is also used of the vision of sleep, a dream or dreaming,[1] wherein the mind perceives and learns independently of the exercise of the bodily senses.

Thus *darśana* is thought, perception in general, the application of the mental faculties to abstract conditions and problems; and ultimately denotes thought as crystallized and formulated in doctrine or teaching—the formal and authoritative utterance of the results to which the mind has attained.[2] In this sense it is practically equivalent to *śāstra*.

As a technical term, *darśana* is applied to the six recognized systems of Indian philosophy, which give many-sided expression to Indian thought in its widest and most far-reaching developments. These form the six *darśanas*, systems of thought and doctrine properly so called, viz. the *Pūrva-* and *Uttara-mīmāṁsā* (the latter more usually known as the *Vedānta*); the *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga*; the *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika*. Of these, the first consists mainly of explanation and comment on the ritual texts of the Veda, while the second expounds the widely known speculative and idealistic philosophy of India. The third and fourth are nearly related to one another; and of these the ancient *Sāṅkhya* formulates a materialistic theory of the universe, which the *Yoga*—in its essential elements equally ancient—then takes up and interprets in a theistic sense. The *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* are not systems of philosophy at all in the ordinary acceptation of the term; the former treats of logic and literary criticism, the latter of natural philosophy and the physical constitution of the universe. The precise date at which these systems originated or were first reduced to order and writing is unknown; they represent, however, the outcome and final residue of Indian thought and speculation, extending probably over many centuries.

There is no reason to believe that the six *darśanas* contain all that the mind of ancient India conceived, or to which these early thinkers endeavoured to give expression. It would seem probable, however, that, while much has been lost, and the extant treatises are often fragmentary, enigmatic, highly figurative, and difficult of interpretation, there has been preserved in the *darśanas*, and in the traditional and literary sources upon which they have drawn, the best that India had to give of speculation and thought upon the problems and conditions of life.[1]

A somewhat similar word is *tarka*, 'investigation,' 'inquiry,' 'discussion,' which also in course of time was used to denote the science or system which was its outcome and fruit. It was then later employed in the same manner as *darśana*, specifically of the recognized philosophical systems. The former term, however, seems never to have obtained the same degree of acceptance or currency as the latter, which in the usage of writers of all periods was the ordinary and appropriate designation of the six systems to which alone orthodox rights and authority were secured.

A. S. GEDEN.

DARWINISM.—It has become customary to give the title of 'Darwinism' to that particular development of the doctrine of evolution which is associated with the name of Darwin (1809–1882), and which began, in 1859, with the publication in England of his *Origin of Species*. The central feature of this development of thought has been the conception of evolution as the result of Natural Selection in the struggle for existence. It has caused so great a change in the general tendencies of knowledge that Romanes probably did not exaggerate the effects when he described them to be without parallel in the past history of mankind. Nearly all the departments of thought related to the subject of religion and ethics have felt the effects of the revolution.

At first sight the *Origin of Species* accomplished nothing in itself very remarkable. The theory of evolution had long been in the air. While the conception of continuous development in the universe had come down to us from the Greeks, the modernized and scientific theory of it had become a commonplace of knowledge by the middle of the 19th century. Kant's nebular hypothesis, further developed by Laplace and Herschel, had familiarized the world with the idea of development as applied to the physical universe. In Geology, workers like Murchison and Lyell had brought home to men's minds the same conception in connexion with the history of the earth. Even in the biological sciences the idea of continuous development by the modification of existing types was strongly represented by Lamarck and many other distinguished scientists. But before Darwin all these separate developments lacked vitality. In the last resort they rested largely on theory.

[1] e.g. *Hariv.* 1285.

[2] e.g. *Mahābhārata*, xii. 11045. *Śāstradarśin* is one who has insight into, intuitive perception of, the meaning of the *śāstras*.

[1] For the literature and detailed expositions of the six systems see the separate articles VEDĀNTA, etc.

In particular, the idea of the evolution of life by gradual modification was unsupported by any convincing argument drawn from facts and evidence furnished by the existing conditions of life. The most characteristic position was that which had been reached in Biology. Controversy turned upon the meaning of species. These were held to be permanent and immutable. While it was admitted that there might be a certain amount of small variation of forms, species were considered to represent special acts of creation at various times in the past history of the earth. Among the leading representatives of the biological sciences, permanence of species was the accepted view. Down to the publication of the *Origin of Species*, said Darwin,

'all the most eminent living naturalists and geologists disbelieved in the mutability of species. . . . I occasionally sounded not a few naturalists, and never happened to come across a single one who seemed to doubt about the permanence of species (*Life and Letters*, ch. ii. [vol. i. p. 87 in 1887 ed.]).

Lamarck's theory, by which he accounted for divergence of types by the accumulation of the inherited effects of use and disuse of organs, was ridiculed. Cuvier had become the representative of prevailing opinion, according to which the past history of life was one of constant cataclysms and of constantly recurring creations. Finally, this scientific view was powerfully reinforced by all the indefinite authority of general and popular opinion, which took its stand on a literal interpretation of the Hebrew account of creation in six days, contained in the first chapter of Genesis.

It was into these intellectual conditions that the doctrine of organic evolution by Natural Selection was launched by Darwin in 1859. The distinctive feature of the doctrine of development which it put forward was that it accounted for the evolution of life by the agency of causes of exactly the same kind as are still in progress. It exhibited modification and progress in life as the result of the process of discrimination always going on in the struggle for existence. It was by formulating the conception of this kind of 'Natural' Selection as the mechanism by which the transmutation of species is effected, and then by supplying in the *Origin of Species* an enormous and well-organized body of facts and evidence in support of it, that Darwin instantly converted scientific opinion and succeeded in carrying the doctrine of evolution towards a new horizon.

The theory of the mechanism of Natural Selection formulated by Darwin was extremely simple.

'There is,' he said, 'no exception to the rule that every organic being naturally increases at so high a rate, that, if not destroyed, the earth would soon be covered by the progeny of a single pair' (*Origin of Species*, ch. iii. [p. 79 in 1909 ed.]).

This tendency to increase beyond the conditions of existence is accompanied by an inherent tendency in every part, organ, and function of life to vary.

'As many more individuals of each species are born than can possibly survive, and as, consequently, there is a frequently recurring struggle for existence, it follows that any being, if it vary . . . in any manner profitable to itself, under the complex and sometimes varying conditions of life, will have a better chance of surviving, and thus be *naturally selected*. From the strong principle of inheritance, any selected variety will tend to propagate its new and modified form' (*ib.*, Introd. [p. 5 in 1909 ed.]).

This is the Darwinian doctrine of the survival of the fittest. It presented the whole succession of life as a theory of descent from simpler forms, under the stress of the process of competition for the conditions of existence.

The far-reaching effect produced by the publication of the *Origin of Species* and by Darwin's theory of Natural Selection was undoubtedly due to two main causes. The first of these was the immediate illumination which it threw on some of the most difficult problems of the special sciences which were most closely concerned. This has been often discussed, and its character and tendencies are now well understood. The second cause was the character of the impression which the doctrines produced on the general mind. The nature of this impression is much less clearly understood. It is, however, in this second relationship that the full and more lasting significance of Darwinism has to be appreciated.

The general mind almost from the beginning perceived with sure instinct, and far more distinctly than the representatives of the special sciences concerned, the reach of the theories to the establishment of which Darwin had brought such a convincing array of evidence. It appeared to many at first as if the whole scheme of order and progress in the world was now presented as the result of a purely mechanical process. The interposition of mind or of Divine agency appeared to be excluded. Man himself seemed to be deposed from the place he had occupied in all previous schemes of creation. It was true, indeed, as has been pointed out, that before Darwin the idea of a continuous development in the physical and biological worlds alike had inspired speculations in many quarters; but this conception, being rejected by current opinion, had left no permanent impression on the general mind. It was not until Darwin's work appeared, Sir William Huggins affirmed in his Presidential address to the Royal Society in 1905, that the new evidence was perceived by scientific opinion to be overwhelming in favour of the view that man is not an independent being, but is the outcome of a general and orderly evolution.

At the first presentation, therefore, of Darwin's theories popular attention became fixed, with an extraordinary degree of concentration, on the nature of the destructive changes which the doctrine seemed to involve in the ideas which had hitherto been closely associated with prevailing religious beliefs. The most familiar ideas of the system of religion which had for generations held the Western mind seemed to have had their foundation removed. Instead of a world created for man in six days of twenty-four hours each, men saw a history of development stretching away back for ages and æons into the past. Instead of a being standing, by special creation, independent and alone, as he had previously been conceived, man was presented now as but the last link in a process of evolution. With Lyell's extension of the conception of time in geology and Darwin's extension of the conception of evolution, the old order in thought seemed to have been swept away. Sir William Huggins (*loc. cit.*) graphically describes the revolution as it appeared to a contemporary from the standpoint of science:

'The accumulated tension of scientific progress burst upon the mind, not only of the nation, but of the whole intelligent world, with a suddenness and an overwhelming force for which the strongest material metaphors are poor and inadequate. Twice the bolt fell, and twice, in a way to which history furnishes no parallel, the opinions of mankind may be said to have been changed in a day. Changed, not on some minor points standing alone, but each time on a fundamental position which, like a keystone, brought down with it an arch of connected beliefs resting on long-cherished ideas and prejudices. What took place was not merely the acceptance by mankind of new opinions, but complete inversions of former beliefs, involving the rejection of views which had grown sacred by long inheritance.'

The new doctrine seemed, in short, to gather up into a focus the meaning of a number of developments long in progress and revolutionary in their nature, the recognition of which in their due place and importance had long been resisted in Western thought. It seemed to give cumulative expression to intellectual tendencies which, since the period of the Renaissance, had struggled against the overpowering weight of accepted and often intolerant religious beliefs. The first condition, therefore, was a kind of intellectual Saturnalia. The effects were felt far and wide, at almost every centre of learning, and in almost every department of thought,

philosophy, and religion. Huxley in England, Renan in France, Haeckel in Germany, were representatives of one aspect of a movement of which Darwin in biology, Tyndall in physics, and Grant Allen in popular science represented another. Most extravagant conceptions became current even in circles of sober and reasoned opinion. Religious beliefs were said to have been so far shaken that their future survival was assumed as the object of pious hope rather than of reasoned judgment. They were, according to Renan, destined to die slowly out, undermined by primary instruction and by the predominance of a scientific over a literary education, or, more certainly still, according to Grant Allen, to be entirely discredited as grotesque fungoid growths which had clustered round the thread of primitive ancestor-worship.

The deepest effects of the movement were felt in England and the United States, and this for reasons to which still other causes contributed. When Darwin published the *Origin of Species*, the resemblance which the doctrine of Natural Selection, making for progress through the struggle for existence, bore to the doctrines which had come to prevail in business and political life was recognized. Almost every argument of the *Origin of Species* appeared to present a generalized conception of the far-reaching effectiveness of competition. Darwin lifted the veil from life and disclosed to the gaze of his time, as prevailing throughout Nature, a picture of the self-centred struggle of the individual, ruthlessly pursuing his own interests to the exclusion in his own mind of all other interests; and yet unconsciously so pursuing them —as it was the teaching of the economics of the day that the individual pursued them in business —not only to his own well-being, but to the progress and order of the world.

It soon became apparent that the crudities of conception which prevailed in such inflamed and excited conditions of thought were carrying men altogether beyond the positions which the doctrine of evolution involved. It also became gradually evident, as these first impressions were lived through, that the acceptance of the evolutionary faith implied conclusions which were not only different in kind, but more significant, more striking, and even more revolutionary—although in quite a different sense—than those which the first Darwinians contemplated.

Those who had realized the depth and reality of the spiritual hold of religion on the human mind, perceived from the beginning how superficial were judgments like that quoted from Renan, to the effect that religious systems had no place in the future development of the race. But it was when the subject came to be approached in the light of the evolutionary doctrine itself that the true nature of the situation became apparent.

The Darwinian doctrine of biological evolution had centred in the principle of utility. Every part, organ, and function had its meaning in the stress out of which types and races had come. Nothing had come into existence by chance, or without correspondence with environment. The consistent labour of all the first Darwinians had been to give prominence to the necessity for the establishment and reinforcement of this — the central arch of the doctrine of evolution by Natural Selection. It was evident, therefore, that while, on the one hand, the sanctions of faith and experience must remain exactly what they had always been for the religious life, the concept of revolutionary nature was the explanation which the doctrine of evolution would be itself bound to give of the phenomenon of religion in the light of its own central principle. What was the meaning of these systems of religious belief which had filled such a commanding place in the social evolution of man? To dismiss the phenomena as merely meaningless and functionless was, the present writer pointed out, impossible and futile, in the face of the teaching of the doctrine of evolution. They must have some significance to correspond with the magnitude and the universality of the scale on which they were represented.

As observation was carried from primitive man to the most advanced civilization, the importance of the subject was not diminished but increased. The history of social development in its highest phases was largely the history of a group of Western peoples who have been for many centuries the most active and progressive nations of the world. The civilization of these peoples was the most important manifestation of life known to us, first in effects on the nations included in it, and now, to an increasing degree, through its influence on the development of other peoples in the world. This group of Western peoples had been held for thousands of years in a system of belief giving rise to ideas which have profoundly modified their social consciousness, and the influence of which has saturated every detail of their lives. These ideas had affected the development of the Western nations at every point, and had filled their history with the intellectual and political conflicts to which they had given rise. They had deeply influenced standards of conduct, habits, ideas, social institutions, and laws. They had created the distinctive ethos of Western civilization, and they had given direction to most of the leading tendencies which are now recognized to be characteristic of it (cf. CIVILIZATION). How could it be possible to dismiss from consideration the enormous phase of human history of which this was an example, as if evolutionists had no concern with the causes which had produced it (cf. Kidd, *Social Evolution*, ch. i.)?

Further consideration, therefore, made it evident that, if the theory of organic evolution by Natural Selection was to be accepted in human society, it would have to be accepted, like any other principle in Nature, without any reservation whatever. It would be necessary, accordingly, to seek for the function of religious belief in the evolution of society on a scale proportionate to the magnitude of its manifestations.

Throughout the forms of life below human society, the stress through which Natural Selection operated was that of the struggle for existence between individuals. But in human history the fact upon which attention had to be concentrated was that we were watching the integration of a *social* type. It was the more organic social type which was always winning. The central feature of the process was that it rested ultimately upon mind, and implied the subordination of the individual, over long tracts of time, to ends which fell far beyond the limits of the individual's own consciousness. Correspondence with environment in the case of human evolution, therefore, involved projected efficiency. It was a process of mind. If we were to hold the process of evolution as a mechanical one with no spiritual meaning in it, there would be no rational sanction whatever for the individual to subordinate himself to it. The race was destined, therefore, under the process of Natural Selection, to grow more and more religious. The ethical, philosophical, religious, and spiritual conceptions which were subordinating man to the larger meaning of his own evolution constituted the principal feature of the world's history, to which all others stood in subordinate relationship.

As the early Darwinians have continued to struggle with the laws and principles of the stress

of existence between individuals enunciated in the *Origin of Species*, and as it has become increasingly evident that the application of the law of Natural Selection to human society involves a first-hand consideration of all the problems of mind and philosophy, a remarkable feature of the situation has presented itself. This has consisted in the extremely limited number of minds of sufficient scope of view and training to enable them to deal with the new and larger problems that have arisen. The exponents of philosophy, untrained in the methods of science and largely unacquainted with its details, have necessarily continued to be without a fully reasoned perception of the enormous importance of the Darwinian principles of evolution in their own subject. The biologists, on the other hand, continuing to be immersed in the facts of the struggle for existence between animals, have in consequence, on their part, remained largely unacquainted with the principles of social efficiency in the evolution of human society. The dualism which has been opened in the human mind in the evolution of this efficiency has, in the religious and ethical systems of the race, a phenomenology of its own, stupendous in extent, and absolutely characteristic of the social process. But it remains a closed book to the biologist, and the study of it he is often apt to consider as entirely meaningless. The position has, therefore, most unusual features.

Darwin made no systematic study of human society. But, where he approached the subject in the *Origin of Species*, it was to disclose the bewilderment produced on his mind in attempting to apply the principles of the individual struggle for existence to *social* evolution. He seemed to think that Natural Selection must be suspended in civilization:

'We civilized men,' he said, 'do our utmost to check the process of elimination [of the weak in body and mind]; we build asylums for the imbecile, the maimed, and the sick; we institute poor laws; and our medical men exert their utmost skill to save the life of every one to the last moment' (*Descent of Man*, ch. v. [p. 168 in 1871 ed.]).

Darwin thus exhibited no perception of the fact that this sense of responsibility to life, which is so characteristic of advanced civilization, is itself part of the phenomenology of a larger principle of Natural Selection. That the deepening of the social consciousness, of which this developing spiritual sense of responsibility to our fellow-creatures is one of the outward marks, is of immense significance as characteristic of the higher organic efficiency of the social type in the struggle for existence was a meaning which seemed to escape him.

Alfred Russel Wallace, in approaching the study of human society in his book *Darwinism* (1889), displayed the same inability to distinguish that it is in relation to the capital problems with which the human mind has struggled in philosophy, ethics, and religion that we have the phenomena of Natural Selection in social evolution. The qualities with which priests and philosophers are concerned, he asserted, were altogether removed from utility in the struggle for existence; and he even mistakenly used the suggestion as an argument in support of religion. Here also the fact in evidence was that the naturalist, with his mind fixed on the details of the individual struggle for existence as it takes place between plants and animals, has been altogether at a disadvantage, both by training and equipment, in attempting to deal with the laws and principles of social efficiency. Huxley reached an almost equally characteristic contradiction in the Romanes lecture delivered at Oxford in 1893, in which he attempted to make a distinction in principle and meaning between the social process and the cosmic process, the lesson of evolution, like the lesson of religion, being, of course, that they are one and the same. Sir Francis Galton, one of the last and greatest of Darwin's contemporaries, recently also exhibited this characteristic standpoint of all the early Darwinians. He put forward claims for a new science, 'Eugenics,' which he has defined as a science which would deal with all the influences that improve the inborn qualities of the race, and would develop them to the utmost advantage by 'scientific breeding.' The list of qualities which Galton proposed to breed from included health, energy, ability, manliness, and the special aptitudes required by various professions and occupations. Morals he proposed to leave out of the question altogether 'as involving too many hopeless difficulties.' Here once more we see the difficulty with which the naturalist is confronted in attempting to apply to human society the merely stud-book principles of the individual struggle for existence as it is waged among plants and animals. The entire range of the problems of morality and mind are necessarily ignored. The higher qualities of our social evolution, with all the absolutely characteristic phenomena contributing to the highest organic social efficiency, remain outside his vision.

We are as yet only at the beginning of this phase of knowledge. The present remarkable situation, here of necessity only lightly referred to, in which the biologists and the philosophers remain organized in isolated camps, each with the most restricted conception of the nature and importance of the work done by the other and of the bearing on its own conclusions, cannot be expected to continue. One of the most urgent needs of the present time is a class of minds of sufficient scope and training to be able to cover the relations of the conclusions of each of these sets of workers to those of the other and to the larger science of society. See also art. EVOLUTION.

LITERATURE.—C. Darwin, *Origin of Species*, *Descent of Man*; *Life and Letters of Charles Darwin*, ed. F. Darwin[2], Lond. 1887; A. R. Wallace, *Darwinism*, do. 1889; B. Kidd, *Social Evolution*, Lond. 1894, art. 'Sociology,' in *EBr*[11]; T. H. Huxley, *Evolution and Ethics*, Lond. 1893. BENJAMIN KIDD.

DASNĀMĪS.—See ŚAIVISM.

DĀWŪD B. 'ALĪ B. KHALAF.—Dāwūd b. 'Alī b. Khalaf, called al-Ẓāhirī (with the *kunya* Abū Sulaimān), a jurist celebrated as the originator of the Ẓāhiriyya school in Muslim theology, was born in Kūfa, A.H. 200 [=A.D. 815] (or, according to other authorities, A.H. 202 [=A.D. 817]), of a family belonging to Iṣfahān. Among the many eminent teachers under whom he studied in his youthful travels were two of the leading theologians of Islām, viz. Isḥāq b. Rāhawaih († A.H. 233 [=A.D. 847]) of Nīsābūr, with whom he enjoyed personal relations of the most intimate character, and Abū Thaur (Ibrāhīm b. Khālid) of Baghdād († A.H. 240 [=A.D. 854]). Having completed his career of study, he settled in Baghdād, where he soon established a great reputation, and began to attract pupils in large numbers. His audience, in fact, commonly numbered about 400, and included even scholars of established repute. At this time Baghdād possessed another teacher of renown, Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal († A.H. 241 [=A.D. 855]), the Nestor of ultra-conservative orthodoxy, whose name is borne by the Ḥanbalite party. Dāwūd sought to come into friendly relations with Aḥmad, but all his advances were repelled, as he lay under the suspicion of having affirmed, while at Nīsābūr, that the Qur'ān was a created work—a doctrine which Aḥmad had attacked with great vigour and at heavy personal cost. It was even said that Dāwūd had been punished for his error by Isḥāq b. Rāhawaih. Though Dāwūd met

these allegations with a distinct denial, Aḥmad still refused to receive him; nor was the strain relieved by the fact that the system promulgated by Dāwūd coincided in many respects with that of Aḥmad, and was even fitted to lend it support.

Although Dāwūd, in his travels as a student, had applied himself eagerly to the study of the *Ḥadīth*, 'prophetic tradition,' he has no outstanding reputation as an authority on that subject. In point of fact, he is said to have given currency to only one prophetic dictum of note, which came to be associated with his name through the instrumentality of his son, Abū Bakr Muḥammad, a well-known *bel esprit* of his day. The saying is as follows: 'He who loves and pines and hides (his torment), and dies thereof, is to be regarded as a martyr.' As a teacher of jurisprudence, on the other hand, Dāwūd's influence was enormous, and here he ranks as the founder of a distinct school. He allied himself with the system of the Imām, al-Shāfi'ī, for whom he manifested an extraordinary reverence, and to whose high qualities (*manāqib*) he devoted two of his books. But, while Dāwūd found his starting-point in the system of Shāfi'ī, he at length developed a new method in the deduction of sacred law—a method which, in its results, diverged from that of his master in the most pronounced way, and at the same time brought its author into collision with the universally received views of Muslim jurisprudence. According to the prevailing doctrine, the bases of juristic deduction were (1) the ordinances attested by the Qur'ān; (2) those which had the support of tradition; (3) the *consensus* (*'ijmā'*) of recognized authorities; and (4) the conclusions established by speculative reasoning from analogies (*qiyās*), and by deduction of the *ratio legis* (*'illat al-shar'*) from given ordinances. In cases where positive injunctions derived from the first three sources proved inadequate, the reflective insight (*ra'y*, *opinio prudentium*) involved in the fourth was regarded as valid ground for juristic reasoning. Dāwūd, however, denied the legitimacy of this last-mentioned source, *i.e.* the *ra'y*, and all that it implied, as also of all inquiry into the reasons of the Divine laws and the analogical arguments founded thereon. The only sources of juristic deduction which he recognized were the positive, or, as he calls them, the 'evident' (*ẓāhir*), *i.e.* the Qur'ān and Tradition. As for the *consensus*, he restricted it to the demonstrable 'agreement of the companions of the prophet' (*'ijmā' al ṣaḥāba*), assigning no more precise limits to the scope of this factor. In thus running counter to the procedure of the dominant schools, Dāwūd found himself in alliance with the extreme section of the party known as the *aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth* ('traditionalists')—in contrast to the *aṣḥāb al-ra'y* ('speculative jurists'),—and became the founder of the Ẓāhiriyya school, which is accordingly also called the *madhhab Dāwūd*. It is true that he brought himself to the point of conceding the admissibility of the 'obvious analogy' (*qiyās jalī*) plainly indicated by positive injunctions, but only as a last resource. As a preliminary of delivering judgment, moreover, he demanded an independent investigation of tradition, and deprecated a mechanical adherence to the established doctrine of a master or a school (*taqlīd*). 'The automatic repetition of the teachings of one who is not infallible is pernicious, and shows blindness of judgment.' 'Out upon him who, having a torch (*i.e.* tradition) wherewith he may light his own way, extinguishes his torch, and moves only by another's help.' Men should not blindly follow any human authority, but should examine the sources for themselves.

Of Dāwūd's writings, a list of which is given in the *Kitāb al-Fihrist*, nothing is now extant, but it would be possible to reconstruct his doctrines from quotations in later literature. Biographical writers are at one in extolling the piety and sincerity of his character, and his abstemious mode of life. His fame spread far beyond the confines of his domicile, and from the furthest limits of the Muhammadan world those who were perplexed with theological problems came to him for light. He died in Baghdād in A.H. 270 [=A.D. 883]. Vast as his influence was, however, his system, which, owing to its limited scope, did not adequately meet the requirements of juristic practice, failed to gain a firm footing in public life. Numerous Muslim scholars associated themselves with it, but their adherence was largely personal and theoretical, and, except in a single instance, the system never attained an authoritative position in the official administration of justice. Its solitary success in this respect was achieved in the empire of the Almohads in Spain and North-West Africa, the founders of which, repudiating all adherence (*taqlīd*) to particular schools, held that the appeal to the traditional sources was the only permissible procedure. The history of Muslim learning down to the 9th cent. A.H. contains the names of famous adherents of the Ẓāhiristic principle in many different countries. The most important, and, in a literary sense, the most eminent, of these was the valiant Andalusian, Ibn Ḥazm, 'Alī b. Aḥmad, who expounded the Ẓāhiristic method in his works, and applied it not only to the jurisprudence of Islām, but to its dogmatic theology as well.

LITERATURE.—*Tāj al-dīn ol-Subkī*, *Tabaqāt al-Shāfi'iyya* (Cairo, 1324), ii. 42–48 (biography of Dāwūd); I. Goldziher, *Die Ẓāhiriten, ihr Lehrsystem u. ihre Geschichte*, Leipzig, 1884; for the Almohadic movement, the same author's Introduction to *Le Livre de Mohammed ibn Toumert, Mahdi des Almohades*, Algiers, 1903, pp. 39–54.

I. GOLDZIHER.

DAY OF ATONEMENT.—See FESTIVALS (Hebrew).

DEACON, DEACONESS.—See MINISTRY.

DEAD.—See ANCESTOR-WORSHIP, DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD, STATE OF THE DEAD.

DEÆ MATRES.—The *Deæ Matres* are divinities of uncertain character and function, whose worship is found chiefly in the Celtic and German provinces of the Roman Empire (cf. art. CELTS, vol. iii. pp. 280, 286, and *passim*). How far they are to be identified or associated with so-called 'Mother-goddesses' among other peoples is a matter of dispute and will be discussed later. But there is evidence on Celtic and Germanic territory, and to some extent outside these limits, of a fairly definite cult of goddesses called usually *Matres* or *Matronæ*, and depicted in accordance with well-established conventions. Knowledge of them is derived entirely from inscriptions and monuments, of which a large number (over four hundred inscriptions) have been preserved; apparent survivals of their worship have been detected in the beliefs and traditions of the Celts and Germans of later ages; but no certain reference to them has been found in ancient literature. There is no reason for applying to them, as is sometimes done, a passage cited from Varro in the *de Civ. Dei* of St. Augustine (vii. 3, 'Unde dicit etiam ipse Varro, quod diis quibusdam patribus et deabus matribus, sicut hominibus, ignobilitas accidisset'). Varro's reference is probably general, and certainly the context in St. Augustine does not suggest an application to the particular divinities in question.

The inscriptions discovered up to the year 1887 were published and classified by Ihm in his very important monograph on the *Matronenkultus* (cited here by this short title; for exact references, see the Literature at end of article). Additional material

was included in Ihm's art. in Roscher (*s.v.* 'Matres'), and later discoveries will be taken account of, together with the results of later discussion, in the course of this article.

The name of the divinities appears in three forms in the inscriptions: *Matres*, *Matronæ*, and * *Matræ* (the last being the nominative case inferred from the datives *Matris* and *Matrabus*). A fourth form **Mairæ* is held by some scholars to be preserved in five inscriptions, but the evidence for it is in no case clear. Three of the inscriptions in question are lost, and in the other two—a stone altar at Dijon and a relief at Metz—the readings are very uncertain.[1] The form * *Matræ* may be due to Celtic influence, an old Celtic nominative singular * *Matar* having been latinized as * *Matra* and a dative plural * *Matrabus* developed from it, perhaps with the aid of Celtic datives in *b* (cf. *Matronenkultus*, p. 10). But, in view of such analogous Latin forms as *nymphabus*, *fatabus*, *filiabus*, *natabus*, etc., the Celtic explanation cannot be deemed necessary.[2] In the case of the dative plural *Matris*, the parallel formation *heredis* (=*heredibus*) has been similarly used as evidence against the theory of Celtic influence.[3] Whatever be the explanation of the Latin words in question, there is one inscription which is generally held to show a Celtic (Gaulish) form of the name. This is preserved in the Museum at Nîmes and reads, in Greek letters, Ματρεβο Ναμαυσικαβο βρατουδε. The epithet Ναμαυσικαβο is almost certainly local = 'to the Nemausian Mothers'; but the tr. of βρατουδε is more doubtful. If it contains the root of the Ir. *bráth*, 'judgment,' it may well mean *ex judicio*, and be equivalent to the common formula *ex imperio*.[4]

Matres and *Matronæ* appear to be synonymous, though their geographical distribution, as will be seen later, is somewhat different. They even occur as equivalents on a single inscription: 'Matribus sive Matronis Aufaniabus domesticis' (*Matronenkultus*, no. 207); and the same epithet is sometimes found in combination with both terms (cf. 'Matribus [V]acall[i]neis' [*ib.* no. 215] with 'Matronis Vacal(l)nehis' [*ib.* nos. 224, 225, 227]). But such close association of the two is exceptional, and certain distinctions have been pointed out in their use. Ihm (Roscher, p. 2466) shows that *Matres* is accompanied by epithets of greater veneration ('augustae,' 'deae'). Hild (Daremberg-Saglio, iii. 1636) tries to make out a difference in the fact that men pray oftener to *Matres*, and women to *Matronæ*; but his figures can hardly be regarded as significant. Roach-Smith (in his *Collectanea Antiqua*, vii. [1878–80] 213) argues that the *Matronæ* were concerned primarily with the feminine principle in Nature, with maternity and offspring, while the *Matres* presided over the fruits of the earth and, in general, over public and private business. None of these distinctions, however, is really established as valid. It is perhaps a significant fact, which is pointed out by Haverfield (*Arch. Æl.* xv. 320), that *Matronæ* does not occur in any land where the cult is demonstrably imported; and the name may be really the Celtic *Matrŏna*, which survives in the French *Marne* and a few other names of places, rather than the Lat. *Matrōna*. Since there is no evidence outside of inscriptions, the quantity of the *o* must be regarded as uncertain; and, if it was pronounced long, as is likely enough, this might simply mean that the familiar Latin word had been substituted for the Celtic. The substitution would have been entirely natural, and the two words would have come to be regarded as identical. The fact that *Matrŏna* appears regularly in the singular, whereas the *Matrōnæ* are named in the plural and depicted in groups, might show a divergent development of the two cults, but would not preclude a common origin. Moreover, there is some doubt, as will be shown later, whether the *Matres* or *Matrōnæ* were not sometimes conceived and represented singly. Even if the identification of *Matrōnæ* with *Matrŏna* should be accepted, it would not become any easier to make a distinction between *Matres* and *Matrōnæ*, for the Celtic (or possibly pre-Celtic) *Matrona*, like the Latin, appears to be a derivative of the simple word for 'mother.' The character of the divinities bearing the name *Matrŏna* is also quite uncertain.[1] On the whole, then, *Matres* and *Matronæ* seem to be equivalent in sense, and neither of them is probably Roman in origin. In the following discussion the two words will be used interchangeably, except where a distinction is explicitly made between them.

The dates of the monuments to the *Matres* or *Matronæ* range all the way from the time of Caligula (*Matronenkultus*, no. 35) to that of Gordianus (*ib.* no. 361). They are found chiefly in Cisalpine Gaul, Gallia Narbonensis, Gaul proper, and Lower Germany, and to a limited extent at Rome itself, in Britain, and in Spain.[2] Those at Rome and in Britain are apparently due to soldiers or tradesmen, and do not prove the local existence of the cult; and the same may be true of the few inscriptions preserved on the Spanish peninsula. The latter, however, are taken by d'Arbois de Jubainville as evidence that the Celtiberi had the worship in common with the Gauls; and the epithet 'Gallaicis' favours the supposition.[3] Still more remote provinces are brought into relation with the cult by the inscriptions, 'Matres Pannoniorum et Delmatarum,' preserved at Lyons (*Matronenkultus*, no. 394), and 'Matres Afræ Italæ Gallæ,' preserved at York (*ib.* no. 348). But no inscription to *Matres* or *Matronæ* has yet been found in either Africa or the Illyrican provinces south of the Danube, and it seems probable that the names indicate simply military service in those regions on the part of the dedicants or of their soldiers.[4] Monuments are commonest on the west bank of the Rhine and in the vicinity of Lyons; and the tribes among whom the worship chiefly flourished appear to have been the Vocontii, Arecomici, Allobroges, Sequani, Lingones, and Ubii. There are almost no traces of it in Aquitania or western Narbonensis, and few in the region east of the Rhine.[5] The geographical distribution of the names is, in general, as follows: *Matronæ* seems to be the only form in Cisalpine Gaul, though some abbreviations are doubtful, and it is the prevailing form in Germany; **Matræ* occurs chiefly near Lyons

[1] In support of **Mairæ*, see Hirschfeld, *CIL* xiii. no. 5478; against it, Ihm, *Matronenkultus*, p. 12 ff.

[2] See Haverfield, *Archæol. Æliana*, xv. [1892] 32. Sommer, *Handbuch der lateinischen Laut- u. Formenlehre*, Heidelberg, 1902, p. 360, explains such forms by the analogy of *deabus*. *Matronabus* also occurs (see *Notizie degli schiavi*, 1897, p. 6).

[3] See Siebourg, *Westdeutsche Zeitschrift*, 1888, p. 115, and *Bonner Jahrbücher*, cv. [1900] 86.

[4] See Thurneysen, *Handbuch des Alt-Irischen*, Heidelberg, 1909, p. 190, and Rhys, 'Celt. Inscr. of France and Italy,' *Proc. Brit. Acad.* ii. [1905–6] 291. It should be said that some scholars do not hold the inscription to be Celtic. D'Arbois de Jubainville (*RCel*, 1890, p. 250) explains it as Latin; and Bréal (*RA* xxxi. [1897] 104) as Italic. The latter scholar translates βρατουδε by *merito de*, comparing Oscan *brateis*.

[1] The comparison between *Matrōnæ* and *Matrŏna* is old. See, for example, Pictet in *RCel* ii. 8. On the occurrences of *Matrŏna*, see Holder, *Altcelt. Sprachschatz*, s.v. For the view that it is Ligurian, not Celtic, compare H. d'Arbois de Jubainville, *Premiers habitants de l'Europe*², Paris, 1889, ii. 169, and G. Dottin, *Manuel pour servir à l'étude de l'antiq. celtique*, Paris, 1906, p. 240.

[2] For a map showing their distribution, see Haverfield's art. in *Arch. Æl.* xv.

[3] See *RCel* xiv. [1893] 376; also J. Leite de Vasconcellos, *Religiões de Lusitania*, ii. [1905] 176 ff.

[4] See Ihm, *Bonner Jahrb.* xcii. [1892] 258, and *Matronenkultus*, p. 120 ff., for inscriptions to 'Campestres,' 'Triviae,' etc., in Africa and the Danube provinces.

[5] On certain evidences recently pointed out for such worship in the Palatinate, see Grünenwald, *Westdeutsche Zeitschrift*, 1906, p. 239 ff.

and in Gallia Narbonensis; and *Matres* is common in Gaul proper and in Britain.

So far as we have direct evidence, then, concerning the worship, it belongs to the Celtic and Germanic provinces of the Roman Empire, the chief points of radiation being Gaul and Lower Germany. With regard to its origin and early history there is difference of opinion. The theory that it was a general Indo-Germanic institution (set forth most fully by Becker, Kuhn's *Beiträge*, iv. [1868] 146 ff.) is rejected by most recent investigators, though the relation of this to other cults of Mother-goddesses among various peoples presents obscure problems which are not by any means to be summarily dismissed. This subject will receive further mention, but in the meantime clearness will be undoubtedly served by confining the discussion, as Ihm has wisely done, to the narrower range of forms which are evidently related. These are common to Celts and Germans, and both peoples have been held to be the original possessors of the worship. The probabilities are rather in favour of the view that the Celts first developed it and that the Germans borrowed it from them. The oldest dated monument (*Matronenkultus*, no. 35, of the age of Caligula) has been found in northern Italy, and the cult was undoubtedly native also to southern Gaul. It is unlikely that the Celtic population of either of those regions derived it from the Germans, and all that is known of the relations of Germans and Celts down to the beginning of the Christian era favours the theory that the Germans, in such matters, were the borrowers or imitators.[1] It is possible, of course, that both peoples possessed the worship equally from the beginning (cf. Siebourg, *op. cit.* p. 97; also Much, *ZDA* xxxv. 315 ff.), or that they derived it independently from older populations which preceded them in the occupation of western Europe. Attention has already been called to the uncertainty concerning the history of the names *Matres* and *Matronæ* themselves.

The Mother-goddesses, in the restricted sense in which they are now being considered, were apparently conceived in triads. Only one inscription ('Matribus tribus Campestribus,' *CIL* vii. 510, preserved in Britain) designates the number; but the goddesses are often depicted in groups of three, and no monument representing a different number is definitely associated with them by an inscription. The position and arrangement of the *Matres* vary somewhat on different monuments, the prevailing type showing three draped figures, seated beneath a canopy or arch, wearing round head-dresses like a nimbus, and holding baskets of fruit on their knee. The middle goddess is usually distinguished from the others in some fashion, either by the size and position of her figure or by a difference in head-dress. On one monument she is seated while the others stand, and on another she stands while the others sit. It is hardly to be supposed, however, that there was any distinction of rank or function among the divinities. Such variations in the type were doubtless purely artistic in purpose.[2] On a very few monuments, notably the Metz relief (*Matronenkultus*, p. 43, fig. 7), the three goddesses are represented as standing.

1 Cf. *Matronenkultus*, p. 57 ff.; and C. de la Saussaye, *Relig. of the Teutons*, 1902, p. 88 ff. See also, on the early relations of Celts and Germans, d'Arbois de Jubainville, *Premiers habitants*, ii. 323 ff.; Kluge, in Paul's *Grundriss*, i.[2] [1901] 324 ff.; Bremer, *ib.* iii.[2] [1904] 787 ff.; R. Much, *Deutsche Stammeskunde*, Leipzig, 1900, p. 41 ff. Kauffmann, in *Ztschr. des Ver. für Volksk.* ii. [1892] 24 ff., disputes the adoption of Mother-worship by the Germans, except when they had practically abandoned their nationality. But there is considerable evidence on the other side. See Siebourg, *Bonner Jahrb.* cv. [1900] 95 ff.

2 Cf. *Matronenkultus*, pp. 47–48, and Siebourg, *Bonner Jahrb.* cv. 100. For an attempt to connect the type with Gr. representations of the Mother of the Gods, see Loeschcke, *Bonner Jahrb.* xcv. [1894] 201.

It is doubtful how far monuments representing groups larger or smaller than three are to be associated with the worship of the *Matres*. Five dancing women on a relief at Avigliana probably do not themselves represent the goddesses, though the monument is inscribed 'Matronis' (see *Matronenkultus*, p. 48). A group of two figures on a relief at Poitiers, holding cornucopiæ and baskets of fruit, has also been taken to represent *Matres*. But the existence of other goddesses known to have been worshipped in pairs renders the identification extremely doubtful.[1] The single figures of a goddess riding a horse, often referred to in the past as an 'equestrian Matrona,'[2] are now held to be *Epona*, a divinity of distinct character, whose worship appears, however, in the same regions as that of the *Matres*.[3] Occasionally, in fact, Epona and the Mother-goddesses are associated on the same monument.[4] It is, of course, possible that Epona was originally, as Renel (*Les Religions de la Gaule avant le christianisme*, Paris, 1906, p. 281) suggests, only a Matrona with specialized function (*mère spécialisée*).

Of dubious connexion with the *Matres*, likewise, are numerous statuettes of single figures, without names, more or less resembling the inscribed representations of the goddesses. Some of these figures carry fruit or cornucopiæ, and have the same head-dress as appears on the larger monuments; others represent women with babes—a conception in itself suitable enough to *Matres* or *Matronæ*, though not in accordance with the usual convention. Ihm rejects all such figures, insisting upon the triadic group as characteristic of the cult (*Matronenkultus*, p. 53 ff.); and the existence of statuettes of the regular triad rather counts in his favour, making it more difficult, as Siebourg has argued, to identify single figures as *Matronæ*.[5] It is even doubted whether the numerous statuettes of women with babes or fruits represent goddesses at all. They may be merely votive offerings or talismanic images; but in the case of many of them the symbolism appears to indicate local or personal divinities similar in function to the *Matres*. The most reasonable conclusion, perhaps, is to recognize the probable existence of many related forms of worship, and at the same time to restrict the names *Matres* and *Matronæ* to monuments actually so inscribed or exhibiting the customary figures of the three divinities. The geographical limits already laid down for the cult were made up on this basis, and it does not seem wise to extend them by the inclusion of doubtful monuments.[6] The term 'Mother-goddesses,' which is applied, especially by French archæologists, to a great number of these statuettes of various types, is sometimes used very

1 Cf., for example, the inscription, 'Deabus Vercanae et Medunae,' at Trèves; and see, for other references, *Matronenkultus*, p. 53 ff., and Siebourg, *Bonner Jahrb.* cv. 98 ff.

2 Becker's 'reitende Matrona,' *Bonner Jahrb.* xxvi. [1858] 91 ff.

3 See *Matronenkultus*, p. 55 ff.; S. Reinach, *RA*, 1895, p. 163 ff. Reinach gives a map of the distribution of Epona monuments, which may be compared with Haverfield's map for the Mother-goddesses. For some modification of Reinach's statements, cf. Dangibeaud, *Revue des études anciennes*, vii. [1905] 236 ff.

4 See Domaszewski, *Rel. des röm. Heeres*, Trèves, 1895, p. 50.

5 See the *Bonner Jahrb.* cv. 98; also Monceaux, *Revue historique*, xxxv. [1887] 256.

6 On the statuettes of the types under consideration there is an extensive literature. See esp. *Matronenkultus*, p. 53; Tudot, *Figurines de l'époque gallo-romaine*, Paris, 1860; Vallentin, in *RCel* iv. [1879] 28; Monceaux, *Rev. historique* xxxv. [1887] 256 ff.; Chauvet, *Hypothèse sur une statuette antique*, Angoulême, 1901; A. Blanchet, 'Figurines en terre-cuite de la Gaule romaine,' *Mém. Soc. Ant.*, 6th series, i. [1890] 65 ff., x. [1901] 189 ff.; Baillet, *Mém. de la Soc. archéol. et historique de l'Orléanais*, xxix. [1905] 399 ff.; Gassies, *Revue des études anciennes*, viii. [1906] 55 ff.; and A. J. Reinach, *Pro Alesia*, iii. [1908–9] 426 ff. For a map of Gaul showing the distribution of Mother-worship in the more inclusive sense, see Renel, *Les Religions*, p. 286.

loosely. Thus Gassies, pleading against the restriction of the Mother-worship to Gaul and Germany, cites Venus, Juno, and Demeter as *déesses mères*; and other writers (see, for example, A. Wirth, *Danae*, Vienna and Prague, 1892, p. 95) have compared the *Matres* with the Semitic 'Ἀστάρται. Statuettes, moreover, of the sorts just referred to have been found in widely separate regions outside of Gaul: for example, in Greece, Italy, and Northern Africa.[1]

The difficulty, if not the impossibility, of keeping the worship of *Matres* and *Matronæ* distinct from all other cults is hardly less apparent in the case of inscribed than in that of uninscribed monuments. For the ancients themselves associated, and doubtless to some extent identified, these divinities with others. Just as in the case of several of the more important individual gods of the Celts and Germans, so with regard to the *Matres*, the modern investigator is puzzled by the uncertain meaning of the *interpretatio Romana*. Roman conquerors and romanized provincials alike were eager to identify the gods of the northern barbarians with those of the old classical pantheon, and the resulting equations are neither consistent with themselves nor easy to understand.[2] The *Matres*, in this way, are sometimes associated with the *Parcæ*, on the evidence of a few inscriptions 'Matribus Parcis.' But it is not clear that an identification of the two groups was intended by the dedicants in question. Moreover, the modes of representing the *Matres* and the *Parcæ* are quite different, and their fundamental characters appear to have been dissimilar (see below, p. 410ᵃ, and cf. *Matronenkultus*, p. 66 ff., and Haverfield, *Arch. Æl.* xv. 326). The association of the Fates with the *Matres* is also doubtful, and finds no positive support in the inscriptions.[3] In the case of the *Nymphæ*, whom some investigators have brought into relation with the *Matres*, there is little reason for the comparison, beyond the fact that both kinds of divinities have numerous monuments inscribed with local epithets.[4] Evidence is slightly better, as Ihm has shown, for connecting the *Matres* with the goddesses of the cross-roads (*q.v.*) named on various monuments as 'Biviæ,' 'Triviæ,' and 'Quadriviæ,' though the matter is by no means certain.[5] But the divinities who may with most probability be identified with the *Matres* are those who were called 'Campestres,' 'Junones,' and 'Suleviæ.' All these names appear both independently and in combination with *Matres* or *Matronæ*, and it is hard to say whether they stand for goddesses originally distinct and later identified with the *Matres*, or whether they were originally mere epithets of the *Matres* and afterwards came to be used independently. At all events the divinities concerned were closely associated in the end with the Mother-goddesses. The *Junones*, in the sense now under consideration, should probably be distinguished from the Roman *Junones*, conceived as the geniuses of women. They are very likely only *Matronæ* worshipped under another name, and the chief seat of their cult appears to have been Cisalpine Gaul.[6] The *Campestres* have sometimes been described as goddesses of the fields, but it is more probable that they were the special protectors of the military camp, or rather that their name was the epithet applied to the *Matronæ* when conceived as exercising this function.[1] In the case of the *Suleviæ* it is more probable that we have divinities originally distinct from the *Matres*, though of closely similar character and function. Inscriptions to them are far less numerous than those to the *Matres* or *Matronæ*, but their geographical distribution is similar. The origin and meaning of the name *Suleviæ* is unknown, though it is tempting to compare the British *Dea Sul*, worshipped at Bath (*Aquæ Sulis*), and to seek an etymology in the Celtic root *sul* (O. Ir. *súil*, 'eye'). If this theory is right, the meaning of the word would be similar to that of *Tutelæ*.[2]

In the absence of all ancient literary treatment of the Mother-goddesses, the only evidences of their divine functions are those furnished by the artistic representations of the divinities, and by the epithets applied to them. The customary figures of the *Matres* have been described already. The epithets, though numerous, contribute very little new information. Many of them are simply general terms of veneration, such as 'augustæ,' 'deæ,' 'divæ,' 'sanctæ,' perhaps also 'dominæ,' though the application of this to the *Matres* is not certain.[3] 'Nemetiales' is possibly equivalent to 'sanctæ,' but seems rather to be connected with the tribal name of the *Nemetes* or with some locality (see Rhys, p. 102; *Matronenkultus*, p. 16). Other epithets denote the special protective relation of the goddesses to individual dedicants or their families; for example, 'meæ,' 'suæ,' 'paternæ,' 'maternæ,' 'domesticæ,' 'trisavæ,' 'conservatrices,' 'indulgentes.' By far the greater number contain the names of nations, tribes, or localities, such as 'Afræ Italæ Gallæ,' 'Italæ Gallæ Germanæ Britannæ,' 'Omnium gentium,' 'Noricæ,' 'Treveræ,' Ναμαυσικαβο, and the numerous non-Latin or half-latinized names which, though largely unexplained, are held to belong chiefly to this class. A few of the latter have been brought into relation with definite place-names like 'Julineihiæ,' 'Albiahenæ,' 'Nersihenæ,' 'Mahlinehæ,' connected respectively with Jülich, Elvenich, Neersen, and Mechelin; but the great majority seem to go back to pre-Roman names, since displaced and lost.[4] The names *Aflims*, *Saitchamims*, and *Vatuims*—over against the latinized forms *Afliabus*, *Saithamiabus*, and *Vatuiabus*—which are of special interest as exhibiting very archaic forms of the Germanic dative plural ending, are also presumably of local significance.[5] The only native epithet which seems to have reference to function is 'Gabiæ,' with its compounds 'Ollogabiæ' (on two inscriptions at Mainz), and 'Alagabiæ' (on an inscription at Bürgel). Even this is not beyond dispute, and its meaning is not particularly individualizing at best. It is usually translated the 'Givers,' the 'All-Givers' (cf *Pandora*)—a name which is quite consistent with the representations of the goddesses. The etymology is easy in Germanic (cf. *geben*, 'give,' etc.), where

[1] Cf. S. Reinach, *Bronzes figurés*, p. 15, and Blanchet, *Mém. de la Soc. des Antiquaires*, vi. [1901] 10, p. 197 ff.).

[2] Cf., for example, the various views about Taranis and Teutates discussed by Reinach, *RCel* xviii. [1897] 137 ff.

[3] See *Matronenkultus*, p. 98 ff., and Espérandieu, *Musée Calvet, inscriptions antiques*, Avignon, 1900, p. 59 f.

[4] See *Matronenkultus*, p. 93 ff. The old comparison has been recently repeated by J. Leite de Vasconcellos, *Religiões de Lusitania*, ii. 193.

[5] With *Matronenkultus*, p. 87 ff., cf. Ihm's later remarks in the *Bonner Jahrb.* xciv. [1893] 165, and Haverfield in the *Arch. Æl.* xv. 326.

[6] See particularly Ihm's art. 'Junones II.' in Roscher. The *Proxumæ*, sometimes identified with the *Matres*, seem to correspond rather to the regular Roman *Junones* (cf. *Matronenkultus*, p. 97).

[1] See Siebourg, *de Sulevis Campestribus Fatis*, Bonn, 1886; Ihm, *Matronenkultus*, p. 76 ff.; and Roscher, *s.v.* 'Matres,' p. 2475.

[2] See Siebourg, *de Sulevis*, etc., and *Bonner Jahrb.* cv. [1900] 89 ff.; and Ihm, *Matronenkultus*, p. 78 ff.

[3] See *Matronenkultus*, p. 98, and Rhys, *Celtic Heathendom*, 1892, p. 102 ff., the latter comparing the Gaulish *Comedoræ*.

[4] On this class of epithets, see particularly von Grienberger, in *Eranos Vindobonensis*, Vienna, 1893, p. 253 ff., and Siebourg, *Bonner Jahrb.* cv. 79 ff. A wholly different theory, connecting epithets in *-nehæ* with *Néhe*, the name of a hot spring at Dax, and explaining them as Iberian or Ligurian, was proposed by C. Jullian, *Revue des études anc.* iii. [1901] 212. See also his *Hist. de Gaule*, ii. 131.

[5] See Kauffmann, *op. cit.* ii. 44, and Siebourg, *Bonner Jahrb* cv. 94–95.

several other divine names are perhaps to be derived from the same root; but in the Celtic languages, in which the root *gab* usually means 'take,' rather than 'give,' the explanation is more difficult. It is possible, therefore, that the epithet is Germanic in origin, and that the form 'Ollogabiæ,' in which the prefix has a Celtic appearance, is simply a case of the Celtic adoption of the Germanic 'Alagabiæ.'[1] The interpretation proposed for *Gabiæ* is supported by several divine names in Lithuanian ('Matergabia,' 'Polengabia') which have similar form and meaning.[2]

With regard to the nature and function of the goddesses, various theories have been held. According to older views, now generally abandoned, they were deified druidesses of the ancient Celts, or prophetesses of the Germans, or symbols of the three Gauls or of the three seasons.[3] The occasional association of the *Matres* with the *Parcæ* has led to their interpretation as divinities of destiny; but the evidence for this has already (p. 409a) been shown to be slight. And the representations of the goddesses, together with the few epithets that seem to bear on the question ('Indulgentes,' 'Gabiæ,' etc.), indicate that they were primarily friendly local divinities of wealth and fruitfulness. As such, their functions would resemble those of Fortuna or Pomona rather than those of the Fates, though the two conceptions would be naturally associated, and occasional equations between *Matres* and *Parcæ* might be expected to appear. Ihm, in defining them as 'gütige Schicksalsgöttinnen,' combines the two characters, and his definition may be allowed to stand, if it is understood not to imply too large an element of Fate or too close an approximation to the classical conception of the *Parcæ*. At the same time, the sphere of the goddesses should not, on the evidence of the reliefs, be too narrowly restricted to the care of lands and flocks. The conventional representation of them, which was doubtless of classical origin, may have been purely artistic in purpose and in no sense a complete expression of the cult. Even the number three, which is also characteristic of monuments of *Proxumæ*, *Parcæ*, and *Nymphæ*, may be a formal device for representing the plural and have no literal significance. Certainly the distribution of the worship, the occasional association of the *Matres* with *Mars*, and such epithets as 'campestres' and 'victrices,' all connecting the goddesses with the military camp, suggest a considerable extension of their powers in one direction; and various dedications by women imply their influence over still other phases of life. Their functions were doubtless vaguely conceived by their worshippers, and ought not to be narrowly defined. As the tutelary geniuses of tribes or localities, they presided over all the interests of the people, and gave success to all kinds of undertakings. They belong, in short, to a stage of religion in which 'departmental' deities were scarcely conceived, and their cult doubtless survived, with slight alteration, even after the development of gods with specialized functions.[4]

Although the cult of the *Matres* was wide-spread and in a sense influential, as is shown by the numerous monuments and also by occasional temples of the goddesses, yet in the Roman period, from which our evidence comes, it does not appear to have belonged to the higher social classes. All the dedicants, so far as can be determined, are persons of low rank, except perhaps the *tribunus militum* of a single inscription (*Matronenkultus*, no. 394), and it is possible that he is offering on behalf of his soldiers. The fact, too, that the worship is not mentioned in literature is further evidence that it belonged mainly to the humbler people.[1]

So popular a worship can hardly have failed to leave traces of itself in later ages in the regions where it flourished, and apparent survivals of the ancient cult have been detected in the beliefs of both Celts and Germans in mediæval and modern times. There can be little doubt that the fairies of western European folk-lore, particularly in the Celtic countries, correspond in part to the *Matres*. It is hard to speak precisely of the history of the lower mythology, which is far from precise in its own distinctions; and one cannot expect to keep by themselves the descendants of a single group of minor divinities. The modern fairies undoubtedly derive some of their characteristics from the ancient Fates, as their name itself implies. But the *Matres* also, in their character of divinities of wealth and good fortune, have much in common with the benignant fairy; they were associated in antiquity, as has been seen, with the *Parcæ*; and they must be allowed to share with the goddesses of destiny in the later development of fairy mythology.[2] The identification of *Matres* and fairies, moreover, is occasionally supported by definite evidence, such as the existence of an ancient inscribed monument in the neighbourhood of a fairy mound or dwelling.[3] Possibly, too, one of the modern Welsh names of the fairies, *Y Mamau* ('The Mothers'), may point back to the old relation.[4]

In some peculiar instances the worship of the Mother-goddesses appears to have survived in a quasi-Christian form. The representations of the *Matres* at Metz are said to have been venerated until the 18th century as the 'three Marys' (*Matronenkultus*, no. 385, p. 162, also p. 74 ff.). Similarly, at Thumb, near Nideggen, the worship of three maidens representing Faith, Hope, and Charity has been brought into connexion with traces of the Mother-worship; and the same explanation has been proposed to account for the 'Drei Merjen,' Bellmarie, Schwellmarie, and Krieschmarie, who are worshipped at Dürboslar, near Jülich, as protectors of infants.[5] It is possible that the images of the *Matres* may have started such cults even after the actual worship of the goddesses had been entirely forgotten. Thus various local dedications to the Madonna are probably due to the discovery of old statues which were conceived by the worshippers as being in some sense miraculous images; but these statues, in so far as they represent single figures, have been seen to be of doubtful connexion with the cult of the *Matres* in the restricted sense of the present discussion.[6]

One conspicuous modern literary reference to

[1] Cf. Kern, *Verslagen en Mededeelingen der K. Akademie van Wetenschappen*, Amsterdam, 1872, ii. 304 ff.; Ihm, *Matronenkultus*, p. 48; Siebourg, *Bonner Jahrb.* cv. 98; and Much, *Festgabe für R. Heinzel*, p. 262. The possibility of Celtic *Gabiæ* in the sense of 'Givers,' is by no means to be denied. See Stokes, *Urkeltischer Sprachschatz*, *s.v.* 'Gab,' in Fick's *Vergleichendes Wörterbuch der indogerm. Sprachen*, 1894, ii. 105.

[2] Cf. Schrader, *Reallexicon*, Strassburg, 1901, p. 680, and von Grienberger, *Archiv für slav. Philol.* xviii. [1896] 52–65.

[3] For references to these explanations, see *Matronenkultus*, p. 65 f.

[4] Cf. Siebourg, *Bonner Jahrb.* cv. 87; Anwyl, *Celtic Religion*, London, 1906, p. 42, and *CeR* iii. [1906] 26 ff.

[1] On temples of the *Matres*, see *Matronenkultus*, p. 51; Knuffmann, *op. cit.* ii. [1892] 36; Grimenwald, *Westdeutsche Zeitschrift*, 1906, p. 239 ff. On the dedicants, *Matronenkultus*, p. 62 ff. and Index; Rhys, *Celtic Heathendom*, 103; Siebourg, *Bonner Jahrb.* cv. 91 ff.; and Lehner, *ib.* cxix. 301 ff.

[2] Cf. T. Wright, *The Celt, the Roman, and the Saxon*, ed. 1875, p. 338 ff., and A. Maury, *Croyances et légendes du moyen âge*, ed. 1896, p. 1 ff., both of whom, perhaps, go too far in identifying *Matres* and the Fates.

[3] On an instance at St. Romain-en-Gal, see Vallentin, *RCel* iv. [1879] 33.

[4] Cf. Rhys, *Celtic Folklore*, 1901, p. 174.

[5] See A. Schoep, *Bonner Jahrb.* cx. [1903] 364.

[6] See Rhys, *Celtic Heathendom*, 102, and Baillet, *Mém. de la Soc. archéol. et hist. de l'Orléanais*, xxix. [1905] 403.

Mother-goddesses, the familiar passage on 'Die Mütter' in the second part of Goethe's *Faust*, has been sometimes associated with the Celtic and Germanic divinities in question. But Eckermann (*Gespräche mit Goethe*, Jan. 10, 1830) testifies that Goethe himself acknowledged no source except a passage in Plutarch which said that the ancient Greeks spoke of 'Mothers' as divinities. The reference seems to be to Plutarch's *Marcellus*, cap. 20, where the Sicilian Μητέρες, worshipped at Engyion, are mentioned. Very little is known of their cult or nature, and that little does not indicate any close resemblance between them and the *Matres* of the Celts and Germans.[1]

[1] Cf. *Matronenkultus*, p. 58 ff.

LITERATURE.—The most important treatise on the subject is Max Ihm's 'Der Mutter- oder Matronenkultus und seine Denkmäler' (*Bonner Jahrbücher*, lxxxiii. [1887] 1-200). An earlier work by J. de Wal, *De Moeder Goddinnen*, Leyden, 1846, is superseded by Ihm's investigations. The principal contributions since the *Matronenkultus* are: Ihm, art. 'Matres,' in Roscher, ii. 2, p. 2464 ff.; J. A. Hild, art. 'Matres,' in Daremberg-Saglio, iii. 1635 ff.; F. Haverfield, in *Archæol. Æliana*, xv. [1892] 314 ff.; R. Much, in *ZDA* xxxiii. [1891] 315 ff.; F. Kauffmann, in *Ztschr. des Ver. für Volkskunde*, ii. (1892) 24 ff.; Th. von Grienberger, in *Eranos Vindobonensis*, 1893, p. 253 ff.; M. Siebourg, in *Bonner Jahrbücher*, cv. (1900) 78 ff.; H. Lehner, *ib.* cxix. [1891] 301 ff. Valuable collections of references are given in Holder's *Altcelt. Sprachschatz*, Leipzig, 1896, under 'Matres,' 'Matræ,' 'Matronæ,' and under the various epithets; and many illustrations of the monuments are to be found in the *Recueil général des bas-reliefs de la Gaule romaine*, in process of publication by E. Espérandieu (Paris, 1907 ff.). For references on statuettes, see p. 408b above.

F. N. ROBINSON.

DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD.

DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD.—

I. Introductory.—The horror of death is universal among mankind. It depends not so much on the pain that often accompanies dissolution as upon the mystery of it and the results to the subject and to the survivors—the cessation of the old familiar relations between them, and the decomposition of the body. This horror has given rise to an obstinate disbelief in the necessity of death, and to attempts, continually repeated in spite of invariably disastrous experience of failure, to escape it. Even the most natural and inevitable decease is persistently ascribed to causes not beyond human control; and, on the other hand, legends of the origin of death are familiar and wide-spread. The picture thus presented of the desperate refusal of mankind to accept a cardinal condition of existence is one of the most pathetic in the history of the race.

II. Origin of death.—The best-known type of the story of the origin of death is that contained in Gn 3. There it is represented as the result of disobedience to the Divine command to abstain from the fruit of a certain tree. Disobedience is not a very uncommon cause of death in stories elsewhere.

Among various tribes of New South Wales it is said that the people were meant to live for ever. But they were forbidden to approach a certain hollow tree. The wild bees made a nest in the tree, and the women coveted the honey. In spite of warnings by the men, a woman attacked the tree with her tomahawk, and out flew a huge bat. The bat was Death, which was henceforth free to roam the world and claim all that it could touch with its wings (K. Langloh Parker, *The Euahlayi Tribe*, London, 1905, p. 98; R. Brough Smyth, *The Aborigines of Victoria*, London, 1878, i. 428). The story told by the Baganda of Central Africa is to the effect that Kintu, the first man, after undergoing various tests well known in folk-tales, is allowed to marry Nambi, one of the daughters of Mugulu (Heaven, or the Above). Her father sends them down to the earth with gifts, which include a hen, telling them to hurry lest they meet with Nambi's brother Warumbe (Death), at the moment absent, and forbidding them to return to fetch anything that they may have forgotten. On the way Nambi remembers that it is time to feed the hen, and consents to Kintu's immediate return for the millet she has forgotten. Mugulu is angry at the disobedience, and the result is that Warumbe claims to go with Kintu It is vain to object. Warumbe accordingly goes and dwells with Kintu and Nambi on the earth. Nambi gives birth to three children. Warumbe asks for one, but Kintu puts him off. In course of time many more children are born; but, when Warumbe repeats his request, Kintu again temporizes. Out of patience, he threatens to carry them all off; and the children begin to die. On appeal to Mugulu, another of his sons, Kaikuzi (the Digger), is sent to bring back Warumbe. Warumbe, however, sinks into the earth. General silence is proclaimed, and Kaikuzi goes into the earth to pursue him. He forces Warumbe out; but there are some children feeding goats at the place, and on seeing him they cry out The cries break the spell; Warumbe returns into the ground, and by Mugulu's command he is allowed to stay (Johnston, *Uganda Prot.*, Lond. 1902, ii. 700). According to the Masai of the Uganda Protectorate, a superior being or demiurge directed a Masai, when a child died, to throw away the body, uttering a spell: 'Man, die and come back again; moon, die, and remain away.' But, when a child that was not his died, the Masai disobeyed and reversed the spell. Afterwards, when he tried the spell on one of his own children, he found it had lost its effect; and now, when the moon dies, it comes back, but man does not return (Hollis, *Masai*, Oxford, 1905, p. 271).

In the legends of some peoples, death is the result of a god's curse unconnected with an act of disobedience.

The Bataks of Palawan in the Philippine Islands relate that their god used to raise the dead to life again. But they deceived him once with a shark wrapped up like a corpse. When he discovered the trick, he cursed them to remain for ever subject to suffering and death (*Ethnol. Survey, Phil. Islands*, ii. [1905] 188). More poetical is the Japanese tale of Prince Ninighi, who fell in love with Princess Flourishing-like-the-Flowers. Her father, the god of the Great Mountain, consented to her marriage, and sent with her her elder sister, Long-as-the-Rocks. This

lady, however, was frightfully ugly, and the bridegroom sent her back. Thereupon the god cursed his son-in-law, declaring that his posterity should be frail as the flowers (*RHR* liv. [1906] 169). A Haida story accounts for death by the fact that men were formed of grass and salmon-berry bushes. But the Haida have another legend, according to which men were made by the Raven, who decreed that they should never die. The decision was changed at the instance of the Wren, that he might have a place of resort under their grave-scaffolds (*Jesup Exped.* v. [1905] 216, 238). Among the Quinault Indians of British Columbia, where Eagle and Raven are the joint authors of things as they now are, Eagle proposes that when men die they shall come to life again. Raven, however, opposes this, and has his way. He regrets it when his own daughter dies and cannot be revived, but it is then too late (*op. cit.* ii. 111).

The enmity or the slackness of one of the lower animals is regarded by many people as the cause of death.

A story very wide-spread in Africa among Negroes, Bantu, and Hottentots alike, is found in two forms. The Hottentot version is that the hare was charged by the moon with the message to men: 'Like as I die and rise to life again, so you also shall die and rise to life again.' But the hare conveyed the message thus: 'Like as I die and do not rise to life again, so you also shall die and not rise to life again.' The angry moon split the hare's lip with a blow; but the mischief was done and was irremediable. Hence the hare is a tabued animal to the Hottentots. Among the Bantu the chameleon is made the messenger. But he is a slow creature, and after his departure the Superior Being changed his mind and dispatched the lizard with the message of death. The lizard overtook the chameleon and arrived first. When afterwards the chameleon delivered his message, it was too late: the irrevocable decree had been conveyed (Bleek, *Reynard the Fox*, Lond. 1864, pp. 71, 74). In Calabar a dog and a sheep are the rival delegates; and it is through the fault of the dog that we die (*Journ. Afr. Soc.* v. [1906] 194). The ill-will of the antelope is alleged by a tribe on the Ivory Coast as the reason for death. A man was sent to the great fetish of Cavalla for a charm against death. He was given a stone to block the path by which it came. But the antelope, offering to assist, maliciously sang a spell which rooted the stone to the spot (*Journ. Afr. Soc.* vi. [1907] 77).

The Melanesians of New Pomerania tell the story of the message wrongly transmitted. The Wise Spirit ordained that snakes should die, but men should slough their skins and live for ever. His brother, the Churl, reversed the decree (*ARW* x. [1907] 308). In the Shortland Islands the people (also Melanesians) relate that the great foremother of the race sloughed her skin at intervals and remained eternally young. The catastrophe of her death occurred because she was once disturbed in the operation by the screaming of her child, who was unluckily allowed to witness it. This was the way death came into the world (*FL* xvi. [1905] 115). A similar story is told by the Baluba, on the borders of the Congo State; but there the operation is interrupted by the woman's fellow-wife (*Globus*, lxxxvii. [1905] 193). According to the Hupa of California, people used to renew their youth, when they grew old, by sleeping in the sweat-house. But this happy condition came to an end, we learn from a ceremonial formula, because a certain mythological personage was unfaithful to his two wives, who in revenge took the two children they had borne him and buried them alive. When the children came up again they put them back, declaring that thenceforward every one should do that way (Goddard, *Hupa Texts*, Univ. California Pub. i. [1903–4] 75, 366). The Eskimo of Greenland relate that the first woman brought death by saying: 'Let these die to make room for their posterity' (Crantz, *Greenland*, Lond. 1820, i. 204).

In these stories, death is the result of curse or spell. Another Eskimo tale accounts for it as the issue of a dispute between two men, one of whom desires men to be immortal, the other to be mortal: their words are probably also spells (Rink, *Tales*, Edin. 1875, p. 41, citing Egede). A tale widely known in North America relates that, when the first death occurred, an attempt was made to bring the soul back from the land of the dead. But some prohibition was broken, the returned soul was greeted too soon, and it vanished: wherefore there is no return for mankind from the spirit-land (the Cherokee stories [*19 RBEW*, 1900, pp. 252, 436] may be taken as typical).

Similar to the Eskimo stories just cited are some Australian stories. The Kaitish and Unmatjera say that formerly, when men were buried, they came to life again in three days; and the Kaitish declare that permanent death is due to an old man who was displeased with this arrangement and wanted men to die once for all. He secured this effect by kicking into the sea the body of one who had just died and been temporarily buried (Spencer-Gillen[b], 513). So also the Wotjobaluk story runs that, when people died, the moon used to say, 'You up-again'; but an old man said, 'Let them remain dead,' and since then none has ever come to life again except the moon (Howitt, 429).

The phases of the moon naturally suggest death and restoration to life. It is, therefore, not wonderful to find that among the Australians, as among the Hottentots, the moon plays a considerable part in the legends. We have space to mention only one more.

The Arunta relate that, before there was any moon in the sky, a man died and was buried. Shortly afterwards he rose from the grave in the form of a boy. When the people ran away for fear, he followed them, shouting that if they fled they would die altogether, while he would die but rise again in the sky. He failed to induce them to return. When he died, he re-appeared as the moon, periodically dying and coming to life again; but the people who ran away died altogether (Spencer-Gillen[a], 564). The Chams of Further India see a female figure in the moon. She was a goddess who raised all the dead to life, until the great sky-god, tired of this interference with the eternal laws, transported her to the moon (Cabaton, *Nouvelles Recherches sur les Chams*, Paris, 1901, p. 19). Many other nations connect the moon with death.

Once more. The Todas of the Nīlgiri Hills say that at first no Todas died. After a time a man died, and the people, weeping bitterly, were taking the body to the funeral place when the goddess Teikirzi took pity on them and came to bring him back to life. But she found that, though some of the people wept, others seemed quite happy. She therefore changed her mind, and, instead of raising the dead man, ordained the funeral ceremonies (Rivers, *Todas*, Lond. 1906, p. 400). When in the Scandinavian mythology Baldur was slain, the goddess Hel promised to release him if all things wept for his death. This too, though not in its present form an ætiological story, possibly arose to account for the permanence of death.

The foregoing are but specimens of the sagas told in the lower culture concerning the origin of death. They exhibit the universal incredulity of mankind as to its naturalness and necessity.

III. Death believed to be unnatural.—1. *The escape of the soul.*—In practice, among the races of the lower culture, death, if not caused by violence, is generally ascribed to the action of supernatural beings, as gods or spirits, or to witchcraft. In a few cases, as among the Wadjagga of Central Africa, the weakness of old age may be reckoned among its causes (*Globus*, lxxxix. [1906] 198). Sometimes sickness and death are ascribed to the escape of the soul from the body. Thus, among the Hareskins of Canada, sickness is believed to be due to this cause, and it is the task of the medicine-men to capture the errant soul and oblige Ettsuñe, a supernatural being who is perhaps a personification of death, to enter the patient for the purpose of replacing it (Petitot, *Trad. ind.*, Paris, 1886, p. 278, cf. p. 434). The details of the belief in the soul, its escape and restoration, cannot here be discussed. It will be sufficient to say that from Siberia to Australia, from Puget Sound to the islands of the Eastern Archipelago, means are taken to prevent the soul from wandering, and to bring it back if from any cause it departs; for the permanent loss of the soul means nothing less than death.

Some peoples have developed the theory that the soul is not single but multiple, and that some, or one only, of these souls reside in or about the body.

Thus, according to the Balong of the Cameroon, one soul is housed in the body of the man himself, a second may be embodied in an elephant, a third in a wild hog, a fourth in a

leopard, and so on. This seems to multiply a man's chances of personal misfortune. For every mishap suffered by one of the secondary souls—more strictly of the body in which it is immured—reacts on the person concerned, and is able to draw after it disease and death. If, for example, any one comes home from hunting, or from the field in the evening, and says: 'I shall soon die,' and if death really occurs, it is clear that one of his 'outside souls' has been killed by a hunter through the slaughter of a wild hog or a leopard or some other animal in which the soul was incarnate, and that the man's death is the natural consequence (*Globus*, lxix. [1896] 277).

2. *The act of a supernatural being.*—The act of a god or of the spirits of the dead is also a cause of death known widely in the lower culture. Death by lightning is an obvious instance of the former. But it is by no means the only one. Death by accident is due either to a supernatural being or to witchcraft.

On the island of Keisar, one of the Moluccas, sickness is sometimes ascribed to the malignant spirit Limsirwali, or to the god who dwells in the sky or the sun (the latter from anger at neglect of some old custom), or to the spirits of the dead who have not been duly honoured (Riedel, *De sluik- en kroesharige rassen*, Hague, 1886, p. 419). The aborigines of Kola and Kobroor (also in the Moluccas) hold that the *nitu*, or spirits of ancestors, kill the living to feed on their souls (*ib.* p. 271). The Navahos attribute a death to the direct action of Chinde, described as the devil—probably a malignant spirit (*1 RBEW* [1881] 123). Among the causes assigned by various tribes of Negroes for a death, the act of a fetish and that of a deceased relative are enumerated (Clozel and Villamur, *Coutumes indigènes de la Côte d'Ivoire*, Paris, 1902, p. 363; Spieth, *Ewe-Stämme*, Berlin, 1906, p. 255). The Andamanese attribute 'almost all deaths, sickness, and calamities' to the machination of spirits; and all sudden deaths are ascribed to the malign influence of the evil spirit of the woods, or to that of the evil spirit of the sea (*JAI* xi. [1882] 288, 289). In the north-west of Australia every illness is ascribed to the *djuno*, an evil spirit otherwise known as *warruga* or *warrunga* (*Internat. Archiv*, xvi. [1904] 8).

3. *Witchcraft.*—But by far the most usual cause assigned for a death is witchcraft—the malicious act of some open or secret foe, performed not by the obvious means of violence, but by the subtle and mystical arts of magic. This does not exclude the action of angry or envious spirits, for they are frequently held to inspire the evil-doer; or his ill intentions may be accomplished by their aid. The Mission Indians of California, indeed, in their legend of the origin of death, attribute the first death in the world to witchcraft. No one had died before; but, with the success of the first practitioners of witchcraft, death came into the world (*JAFL* xix. [1906] 55). Witchcraft, in fact, is the ordinary reason given by savage and barbarous peoples for a death. On such an occasion, one of the foremost duties of the survivors is to discover the exact cause of death, and to ascertain and punish the author of the mischief. For this purpose the ancient Gauls used to put widows to the question like slaves; if detected, the unfortunate wretches were executed with fire and all sorts of torture (Cæsar, *de Bell. Gall.* vi. 19). Peoples as far apart as the Balong already mentioned and the Koryaks of Siberia make a *post-mortem* examination. In the Wimmera district of Victoria (Australia) the clever old men and relatives of the deceased watch the corpse through the night. They see the wraith of the slayer approaching with stealthy steps to view the result of its machinations. Having apparently satisfied itself, it disappears in the direction of the hunting grounds of its own people, and the relatives of the deceased know what tribe to retaliate on. In New South Wales the Tharumba repeatedly rub the body with a mixture of burnt bark and grease. Some of the old men scrape a portion of it off when dry, and throw a few pinches of it on the embers of a fire kindled for the purpose. By the way the smoke rises they judge the direction of the murderer's camp. A party is sent out to avenge the death. After identifying the murderer by a repetition of the process, this is accomplished, not by violence, but by incantations and by terrifying the victim, so that he really believes he must die (Mathews, *Ethnol. Notes*, 1905, pp. 145, 72). Among the Warramunga the divination is accomplished differently. A little mound of earth is raised on the exact spot where a man has died. A ceremonial visit is paid to it within a day or two after the occurrence, and a search is made for tracks of any living creature. According to the tracks found, conclusions are drawn as to the totem of the guilty person. The Warramunga commit the body not to the earth but to a tree. Similar ceremonial visits are paid to the tree for the discovery of some indication of the person who has caused the death. If unable to identify the person or his tribe, the relatives may at least find a beetle of a kind supposed to resemble a man, and by killing it may ensure the death of the enemy, whoever he may be. When everything else fails, they pay a further visit and thrust a fire-stick into the body, with certain ceremonies. Then, returning hurriedly to the camp, they sit down quietly for two days, abstaining from all food and drink. After this period has passed, each of the persons who has taken part in the rite imbibes a mouthful of water and spits it out secretly in various directions. This is regarded as sufficient to cause retribution to fall on the author of the crime, and they expect to hear his death-cry (Spencer-Gillen[b], 526 ff.).

Sometimes the dead man takes a more active part in the indication of the cause of death. This is common among the Negroes. Various branches of the Ewhe-stock go to the house of the *trõ* (fetish, god) and there inquire through the priest, who answers, speaking from an inner room, in an assumed voice believed to be that of the ghost (Spieth, *Ewe-Stämme*, 258, 260, 286, 492, 636, 752). So in Europe it has been believed, up to quite recent times, that the ghost of a murdered man (though not through the medium of priest or religious rites) will communicate the fact of his murder and call for vengeance on the slayer.

Other Negroes draw the information from the corpse. The Agni of Indénié cause it to be carried through the village on the heads of two men, who are made by the priest to run and turn round in all directions, until by some movement or arrest of the bearers it points out the guilty person. The ceremony practised by the Ngoulango is not so laborious. Three stakes are fixed in the earth, one representing the fetish (god), another a deceased relative, and the third a living inhabitant of the village, presumably suspected beforehand. If the corpse touch the stake representing the fetish or the deceased relative, a sacrifice of a few fowls is offered, and there is an end of the matter. If, on the other hand, the suspected man be indicated, he is immediately seized and put to an ordeal; or, in case of avowal, he is led away into the bush to execution (Clozel and Villamur, *op. cit.* 157, 362).

In Africa the ordeal is usually by means of some sort of poison, and frequently, in the case of chiefs and important persons, all the relations are compelled to undergo the test. Among the Wadjagga, a Bantu people on the Eastern side of the continent, however, it takes the form of an oath upon the ashes of the fire at which the funeral feast is cooked (*Globus*, lxxxix. 198). Ordeals, it need hardly be said, were for ages applied to persons in Europe accused of causing death and other evils by means of witchcraft. A common method was that of the ordeal by water, reported, so early as the 3rd cent. B.C., by Phylarchus, of the Thebi or Thibii, a tribe occupying the country about Trebizond (see ORDEALS, WITCHCRAFT).

Elsewhere it is deemed enough to convey to a 'wise man' some relics of the deceased.

Among the Siusi of the north-west of Brazil on the occasion of a death not long ago, some articles of clothing, together with the alleged 'poison' conjured by the witch-doctor out of the body of the patient, were sent after his death to a distant tribe, which included practitioners of renown. They inquired into the matter, performed their conjurations over the relics, calling the murderer, and solemnly burnt the 'poison.' It was believed, according to a well-known principle of witchcraft, that at the instant the 'poison' fell into ashes the enemy, whoever he was, died (*Globus*, xc. [1906] 328).

In general, throughout South America, it would

seem that it is the duty of the medicine-man to put himself into communication with the spirit-world and discover the culprit, who, at all events among some tribes, is thereupon put to death, and burnt with all his family and goods. If this were omitted the deceased would himself avenge his death on his relatives (*Internat. Archiv*, xiii. [1900], Suppl. 70; *Anthropos*, i. [1906] 880).

In old Tahiti, people were held to be killed by the gods (*atua*), either of their own motion or because they had been bribed by an enemy. It was the business of the priest to ascertain to which of these alternatives the death was to be attributed. He took a canoe and paddled slowly near the house in which the corpse lay, watching for the flight of the soul, which it was believed he could see. From the shape assumed by the soul in departing he judged of the cause of death (Ellis, *Polyn. Res.*, Lond. 1832, i. 398).

IV. Abandonment and premature burial.—1. *Abandonment of the dying.*—Among many savage peoples it is customary to abandon the dying to their fate.

The Yerkla-mining of Australia, when death approaches, leave the dying person alone, as comfortably as possible, near a fire, and quit the neighbourhood, not returning for a considerable time (Howitt, 450). The Banmanas of the French Sudan with loud cries abandon a dying man, for fear that he may drag one of them into the grave with him (Steinmetz, *Rechtsverhältnisse*, Berlin, 1903, p. 161). The fear lest the eyes of the dying man will fasten on them, and his ghost then molest and even kill them, causes similar conduct among some of the Ho in German Togo (Spieth, 632). The Selung of the Mergui Archipelago, off the coast of Burma, take the patient across to a desert island, and there leave him (*L'Anthropologie*, xv. [1904] 434). The Dorachos of Central America led a dying person to the woods, and left him, with some cake or ears of corn and a gourd of water, to his fate (*1 RBEW* 115).

2. *Burial before death.*—As an alternative to leaving the sick or the aged to die, they may be buried while still living.

The Indians of the Paraguayan Chaco, oppressed by the feeling of helplessness and by superstition, when hope of recovery is gone, neglect the patient and deny him food; and, lest he should die in the village during the night, he is removed to a distance, and there left to die in solitude, or death is hastened by premature burial (Grubb, *Among the Indians of the Par. Chaco*, 1904, pp. 41, 45). The tribes of Navitilevu, Fiji, place the dying man in the grave, with food and water. As long as he can make use of them, the grave remains open; when he ceases to do so, the earth is filled in and the grave closed (*JAI* x. [1881] 144). In the Gazelle Peninsula of New Pomerania, one who is too long in dying is wrapped in pandanus leaves and carried out to the dead-house (*ARW* x. [1907] 309). Among the Northern Maidu, persons who were long sick were securely tied up, in a squatting position, in a bear-skin, with small objects of personal use (the usual way of preparing a body for the grave), and buried before death (*Bull. Am. Mus. Nat. Hist.* xvii. [1905] 245). The Hottentots used either to bury old and superannuated persons alive, or to carry them away to a cleft in the mountains, and leave them with provisions for a few days, to be starved to death or devoured by some wild beast (Thunberg, *Travels*, Lond. 1795–6, ii. 194). So the various Bantu tribes of South Africa either abandoned the dying or buried them before death (Campbell, *Trav.*, Lond. 1815, pp. 428, 515; Kidd, *Essential Kafir*, Lond. 1904, p. 247).

Practices like these may have had more than one origin. Economic causes doubtless played their part. The care of the living was more imperious than that of the dying; and, where conflict arose between these two duties (as it often must in savagery), customs would grow up out of sad necessity, which would be continued when the necessity had ceased. Such causes would be aided by the beliefs current in the lower stages of culture. In West Africa it is not uncommon that a protracted sickness wearies the attendants.

'They decide that the body, though mumbling inarticulate words and aimlessly fingering with its arms, is no longer occupied by its personal soul; *that* has emerged. "He is dead"; and they proceed to bury him alive. Yet they deny that they have done so. They insist that *he* was not alive; only his body was "moving"' (Nassau, *Fetichism in W. Africa*, Lond. 1904, p. 54).

More potent, perhaps, is the universal dread of death and horror of a corpse. This horror is very lively in the Yakuts. Among them old people burdened with years or disease often begged their children to put an end to their life. The funeral feast was held for three days; neighbours and friends were invited to it, and the dying person received the place of honour and the choicest morsels. Then he was led out into the forest, thrust into a grave dug beforehand, and buried alive, with his arms, utensils, provisions, and horses (*RHR* xlvi. [1902] 212).

3. *Removal from house or bed.*—Where it is not customary to go to the length of burial alive, horror of the corpse leads very generally to the removal of the dying from among the living.

It is a common practice, *e.g.*, of the North American tribes to carry a dying person out of the house or camp (*1 RBEW* 123, 154, 157, 201; *17 RBEW* [1898] 487). The Sinhalese frequently take a person dangerously ill from the house and place him in an adjoining temporary building, in order that, if he dies, the house may escape pollution (Davy, *Ceylon*, Lond. 1821, p. 289). The Kamtchadals are reported to have had the custom of abandoning the cabin where death had taken place, because they believed that the judge of the subterranean world paid a visit to it, and caused all whom he found there to die. But, as the construction of a new cabin gave much trouble to people who had neither axes nor mattocks, they took care to transport the sick out of their cabins, for fear that death would surprise them there when it was too late (Georgi, *Description de . . . Russie*, St. Petersburg, 1777, iii. 91). In the island of Luzon, among the Serranos, when a sick person does not show signs of recovery, a family council is held and a fixed sum voted for his cure. When this is spent, the patient is removed from his bed and laid upon a hide on the ground outside the house. A child is posted to fan him and keep off the flies, and only water is given him until he dies (Sawyer, *Inhab. of the Philippines*, Lond. 1900, p. 277). Among the Basuto, when death is seen to be at hand, the patient is taken out of the hut to a screen, because it is said the *manes* (*melimo*) obtain easier access to the latter than to the interior of the hut. In fact, a hole is cut in the screen to enable them to enter, as they cannot do so through the doorway of mortals. There the patient dies, often not without the active assistance of the two old women who are set to watch him (*FL* xv. [1904] 255).

The motive of the procedure in all these cases would seem to be the same—the horror of the corpse and the fear of pollution of the dwelling by its presence. A description is given in the Report of the Palestine Exploration Fund for 1902 of a Samaritan assembly to celebrate the Feast of the Passover in 1898, at which a woman became very ill and a cry was raised to remove her to a tent outside the camp, lest the camp should be defiled by a dead body—a ritual ban perhaps derived from some passages in the Hebrew law. In this case the defilement would extend to the whole congregation.

There are, however, some cases of removal the motive of which is different. In the Reef Islands there are certain houses called 'holy houses,' which, if we may trust the report, seem to be connected with the cult of, or at all events with the belief in, superior beings. These houses are empty. If a man is sick and does not die quickly, he is put into one of these 'that he may die quickly' (*JAI* xxxiv. [1904] 230). Among the Warundi of German East Africa the dying are carried out and placed on an *ikitabo* (a sacred circle, either public or belonging to the family). There the priests recite a sort of litany consisting entirely of conjectures as to the origin of the sick man's malady, which appears to be ascribed to the deceased father or other *manes* of the family (van der Burgt, *Warundi*, 1904, art. 'Temple'). With these we may compare a remedy prescribed by the Ottoman Jews for one *in extremis*. It is to carry him to the cemetery and lay him down there for twenty-four hours. 'He may die there; but, if he has the good luck to live, he will quickly make a complete recovery' (*Mélusine*, viii. [1896–7] 278).

In Europe a very wide-spread custom is to take a dying man out of bed, and to lay him on the earth or on straw. This is practised from Ireland to the Caspian Sea. In the Malay Peninsula a dying man's mosquito-curtains are opened, 'and in some cases, at all events,' he is taken out of his bed and laid upon the floor (Skeat, *Malay Magic*, 1900, p. 398 n.). A Nambūtiri Brahman in Malabar is placed on a bed of *kuśa*-grass in the verandah, or some convenient place outside the foundations of the house (E. Thurston, *Castes and Tribes*, Madras,

1909, v. 214). In Cochin a Nayar 'is removed to the bare ground floor, as it is considered sacrilegious to allow the last breath to escape while lying on a bed and in a room with a ceiling, which last is supposed to obstruct the free passage of the breath' (*Rep. Census of India*, xx. [1901] 162).

The reason alleged by those who practise this removal in Europe is that a man cannot die on feathers (sometimes game-feathers, sometimes those of domestic fowls), and consequently that to lie on them adds to his agonies and makes his death 'hard,' or 'unlucky.' The Cheremiss of Kozmodemjansk declare that, if he were allowed to die on a feather-bed or a felt coverlet, he would be forced in the other world to count the feathers, or the hairs of the felt (Smirnov, *Pop. finnoises*, Paris, 1898, i. 137). These reasons, however, seem to be invented to account for a practice of which the real origin has been forgotten. Alb. Dieterich (*Mutter Erde*, 1905, p. 27) has endeavoured to explain it as an attempt to bring the dying man into touch with the earth, so that the soul may pass without delay into the realm of the dead beneath. Monseur (*RHR* liii. [1906] 204, 301), comparing it with other usages relative to the earth, attributes it simply to a survival of the custom of lying on the earth at a time when such luxuries as bedsteads and feathers were unknown. These reasons, however, do not account for the requirement, found in Germany, Sweden, and elsewhere, to place the moribund person on straw, and afterwards to burn the straw. So the Wends in the Spreewald lay him on fresh straw spread on the ground, 'else no one would be willing to lie in the bed afterwards.' The straw is subsequently burnt in the open field, and the water wherewith the corpse has been washed is thrown over the spot where the fire was made. Any one who passes across that spot before the birds have flown over it a few times becomes withered up (von Schulenburg, *Wendisches Volksthum*, 1882, p. 110). There can be little doubt that the real object of the custom is to avoid the death-pollution upon the bed. It is probably a survival of the practice of removing the patient from the house before death. It has naturally the effect sometimes of hastening death; and it is performed in Europe avowedly for that purpose, in the belief that it abridges the sufferings of the dying and is therefore an act of kindness. The same purpose is assigned for the removal of the pillow, which is an obvious attenuation of the practice of removing the patient from bed.

V. Separation of soul and body.—The usual theory of the process of death is the separation of the soul from the body. The soul may, however, separate from the body before death, as in dreams. Sickness is frequently held to be such a separation. The distinction between such a separation and that of death is that the latter is final. Occasionally it is requisite that the soul be caught as it escapes. The population of Nias believe that the chief of a village, especially if rich and possessed of descendants, has more souls than one, of which one is an hereditary essence called the *ehèha*. This must be received in his mouth by the son of the dying man, if there be a son; if not, it is received in a purse for the purpose of securing that the deceased will watch over the family money (Modigliani, *Viaggio a Nias*, Milan, 1890, p. 277). So among the Greeks the nearest relative received the last breath of the dying man in a kiss.

Efforts are often made to recall the soul, not merely as a remedy for sickness, but to restore one dead. They may consist in simple cries to the soul to come back, as among some Tongking tribes (Lunet de Lajonquière, *Ethnog. du Tonkin sept.*, Paris, 1906, pp. 263, 274); or they may be the regular incantations of an expert, similar to those in use during sickness, as among the Dayaks of Borneo (Furness, *Home-Life of Borneo Head-hunters*, Philad. 1902, p. 50). A survival of some such custom may be found in Europe, on the death of a Pope or of a king of Spain. In these cases a high official of the court calls with a loud voice three times the name of the deceased, and, receiving no reply, he certifies the death.

VI. Before the funeral.—Death having occurred, a number of significant customs are observed, only some of which can be enumerated here. Others will be reserved for a subsequent section.

1. *Opening of doors and windows.*—In the British Islands and all over Europe it is usual to open all doors and windows. Nor is the practice confined entirely to the uneducated classes. It was reported about twenty years ago (30th Aug. 1890) to have been performed at the death of a dignitary of the Church of England (*NQ*, 7th ser., x. [1890] 170). In France, Germany, and Switzerland it is not uncommon to take a tile off the roof. This is sometimes done before death, with the object of easing the departure of the soul. For the soul cannot escape unless the way be made open to it. Often, however, the window is permitted to remain open only for an instant, the return of the soul being feared (*Ztschr. des Vereins für Volkskunde* [=*ZVV*] xi. [1901] 267). In China a hole is made in the roof (Tylor, *Prim. Culture*, 1871, i. 409; *JAI* xxxiii. [1903] 103); and this used to be the practice of the Basuto wherever a man died within the hut (*Journ. Afr. Soc.* iv. [1905] 204).

2. *Observances in the house.*—Throughout Europe it is a common practice to stop all clocks in the house, and to cover all mirrors, or to turn them with their faces to the wall, immediately after a death. It may be conjectured that the latter was done to avoid puzzling and misleading the ghost in its efforts to quit the house. All water-vessels are emptied. Various reasons are assigned for this custom, the most usual being perhaps a desire to prevent the ghost from drowning itself. The ghost is certainly conceived in many places as thirsty or needing a bath; and a special jar or bowl of water is provided for its use. In Greece, bread and water are placed in the death-chamber (*JAI* xxiii. [1894] 37). In some parts of France a jar of water is placed beside the corpse (*RTP* xiv. [1899] 245). The Wends of the Spreewald place a dish filled with water under the bench on which the corpse is laid out, for which a sanitary reason is now given (von Schulenburg, *op. cit.* 112). The Mordvins put a cup of water on the window-sill of a dying man's house, for, on quitting its corporeal envelope, the spirit must wash (Smirnov, i. 357). Hindu rites require the heir (but apparently not until after cremation) to place in the habitation of the deceased a small vessel full of water, over which he ties a thread to the ceiling, and lets it hang down as a sort of ladder for the *prana* (life-breath, spirit) to descend and slake its thirst during the ten days following; and a handful of rice is placed as food every morning beside the vessel (Dubois-Beauchamp, *Hindu Manners*[3], Oxf. 1906, p. 488). It is probable, therefore, that the object of throwing away water standing in any vessels for household use is to prevent the death-pollution conceived as contamination by the touch of the ghost. This is confirmed by the practice in some districts of the Landes in the south-west of France where, after the death of the father or mother, for a whole year the cooking vessels are covered with a cloth and their previous order reversed, though the reason now alleged for the practice is to recall the memory of the deceased and renew the grief (Cuzacq, *Naissance, mariage,*

et décès, 1902, p. 162). See also §§ VI. 9 and XVII. 1 below.

3. *Telling the bees.*—Another custom is that of 'telling the bees.' When a Dayak dies, as soon as the body is removed the head of the household calls over the names of all the children and other members of the household, to prevent the soul of the dead from alluring their souls away, in which case they would die. This ceremony is repeated on the return from the funeral (*Int. Arch.* ii. [1889] 182). The catastrophe to be prevented here is exactly that which it is desired to prevent by the practice common in Europe of telling the bees of the death of their owner. Some one goes to the hive, knocks, and whispers the fact to the tenants, sometimes also informing them who their new owner is. A humming heard inside the hive is taken as an indication that they will remain. If the ceremony be not performed, they will all die or go away. Sometimes they are put into mourning by attaching a piece of crape to the hive, or the hive is turned round or removed, or a piece of turf laid on it. These are all expedients against the attempt of the ghost to lure the bees away, though other interpretations have been given by the people who practise them and who have lost the real reason. The precaution is by no means confined to bees. In Cornwall the bird-cages and indoor plants are put into black. In various parts of France all the domestic animals must be informed, crape must be attached to the pigsties and to the cat. Even the trees must be told, and sometimes put into mourning. Elsewhere similar customs obtain (*Choice Notes, FL*, 1859, pp. 65, 90, 180, 210; Sébillot, *Folk-lore de France*, Paris, 1904–7, iii. 103, 375; Lloyd, *Peas. Life in Sweden*, Lond. 1870, p. 131). Among the Cheremiss the people even avoid watching a funeral procession from the window, for fear that the dead man may take them with him (Smirnov, i. 137). The prohibition against watching a funeral procession from a window is not uncommon.

4. *Wailing and dirges.*—The custom of wailing is universal. The wail frequently begins before death, as among the Hottentots, who are said to surround a dying person, and 'set up such a terrible howling as were enough, one would think, to fright the soul out of the body.' But this is nothing to what succeeds the death. 'The kraal shakes under the raging din; you hear them miles off' (P. Kolben, *Present State of the Cape*, Lond. 1731, p. 312). Where the funeral does not take place the same day, the wailing often breaks out with fresh force on that occasion; and it is kept up for periods of varying length among different peoples—from a few hours to months, or even years. Naturally, in the latter case it is only certain relatives (chiefly widows of the deceased) who indulge in it, and only at stated times of the day. Widows and other relatives, among many peoples, go to wail at the grave. The wailing is renewed at certain intervals of time—on the anniversary of death, or at certain feasts, or on the occasion of the exhumation of the bones. Elsewhere, among the Kaffirs, a son away at a distance, when his father dies, must wail on his return every time he enters the kraal during the next six months (Kidd, 250 f.). In many cases the men join in the wailing, while in others, perhaps among related peoples, it is left chiefly or entirely to women. It may be accompanied (at first, at all events) by the wildest demonstrations of grief, amounting to temporary insanity.

At a stage less than that, Dr. Junker describes the conduct of the women and slaves of a ruler of the A-Sandé of the Sudan. Sixty or seventy women went round the *seriba* wailing, turning somersaults, rolling in the dust, pretending to search in every corner, crying out, 'O my lord! Where is Fadl 'Allah? Lie! Lie!' They crawled about on hands and knees under the projecting roofs, constantly howling and lamenting. In the evening, with music and dance, the men joined in the wailing, which lasted all night. The next day a raid was made upon the wardrobe of the deceased, and every woman who could get hold of an article of his costume put it on, and went round in procession, until the ceremony appeared like a fancy-dress ball. All their heads were strewn with ashes, that covered with dirt their faces and bodies as they rolled and tumbled in the dust. The proceedings lasted for fifteen days, becoming gradually less and less an exhibition of sorrow, and more and more the subject of evident enjoyment, until they finally degenerated into a festival of music and dancing (Frobenius, *Heiden-Neger d. ägypt. Sudan*, Berlin, 1893, p. 408).

In the Aaru Archipelago, when a member of the family dies, all the women leave the house with hair hanging loose, to wail upon the shore, tumbling head over heels, and smearing their bodies with dirt and mud (Riedel, *Sluik- en kroesharige rassen*, 268). Even in a much higher civilization, the conduct of the mourners is characterized by excess. At the death of a Maltese, two or three women, called *neuuieha*, were hired. Dressed in long mourning cloaks, they entered the house singing a dirge. After damaging and destroying certain parts of the property of the deceased, they threw themselves on their knees before the coffin, singing the praises of the dead, and cutting off handfuls of their hair, which they spread over the coffin (Busuttil, *Holiday Cust. in Malta*, 1894, p. 128).

It is obvious that the wailing, though doubtless originating in emotions common to humanity, has everywhere taken on more or less of a ritual character. This is seen alike in the excesses, in the fact that it is emphasized almost everywhere for men, in the prescriptions of time and place when and where it is to be repeated, and in the more measured forms into which it tends to pass. Among the latter are the dirges equally familiar in all quarters of the globe. There is little difference in the substance of dirges.

'Ah, ah me! Why hast thou died? Was there lacking to thee food or drink? Why then hast thou died? Ah, ah me! Hadst thou not a beautiful wife? Why then hast thou died?' and so on, runs the lament in the Ruthenian tongue of the ancient pagan Prussians (*FL* xii. [1901] 300). The Hereros of German S.W. Africa cry: 'Now he is dead, he who always was so good; always he slaughtered cattle; always did he say, "Take only, take only"' (*S. Afr. FL Journ.* i. [1879] 53). For one killed in war the Mundurucús of South America chant: 'Thou art dead; we will avenge thee. For that we are in the world, to avenge our own who fall in fight. Our enemies are not braver or more men than we are. My brother, my son, we come to bury thee. Thou art dead; to this end wast thou born. Thou art dead in war because thou wast brave; to that end our fathers and mothers brought us into the world. We must not have fear of enemies. Who dies in war, dies with honour—not like one who dies of sickness.' And reply is made by women in the name of the dead: 'My mother, my wife, you will die in your hammock; I died in war because I was brave' (*Int. Arch.* xiii. Suppl. 114).

Probably these specimens fairly represent the general matter of the dirges: a gentle reproach to the deceased for dying, and thus leaving those who were dear to him; praise of him—sometimes, as in the Irish 'keens,' in great detail; and vows to avenge him. In the more rudimentary cultures, dirges have not developed; the wailing, so far as it is articulate, is confined to a few words or phrases.

The ritual character of the wailing is expressed very clearly, not only in the dirges, but also in the practice of hiring mourners to wail.

Among the Gros Ventres and Mandans of Dakota, 'those who mourn are always paid for it in some way by the other friends of the deceased, and those who mourn the longest are paid the most' (*1 RBEW* 161). The Chiriguanos of South America caused their dead to be bewailed thrice a day—morning, noon, and evening—for several months at the grave by women hired for the purpose (*Int. Arch.* xiii., Suppl. 105). In Malta, as we have seen, and throughout the Nearer East, hired wailers are universally employed. Among the Bedui of Abyssinia it is the prostitutes who act in this capacity (Munzinger, *Ostafr. Stud.*[2], Basel, 1883, p. 150). In Calabria, so necessary is wailing deemed that, if a stranger dies, women are hired to attend his funeral and wail over the dead (Ramage, *Wanderings*, 1868, p. 73).

The reasons for the rite have been a subject of much discussion. There may be more reasons than one. In the first place, there can be little doubt

that excessive demonstrations of grief may, in some cases, be traced to the desire to avoid suspicion of having been accessory to the death. Bentley expressly asserts that in the Congo basin, where the belief in witchcraft is so powerful and so cruel, an ostentations exhibition of grief is to avoid the charge of witchcraft (*Pioneering on the Congo*, Lond. 1900, ii. 259). In Angola, however, the noise is supposed 'to drive away the spirits' (*JAFL* ix. [1896] 16). Similarly, it is believed by the Klamath Indians of the north-west coast of the United States that for three days during the funeral ceremonies the soul is in danger from the *O-mah-á*, or demon. 'To preserve it from this peril, a fire is kept up at the grave, and the friends of the deceased howl around it to scare away the demon' (*1 RBEW* 107). The Basuto hold that the spirits (we may assume that the ancestral spirits, including perhaps the immediately deceased, are meant) become enraged with any one who is so heartless as not to cry at the funeral of friend or relation, and punish him with some terrible sickness (Martin, *Basutoland*, 1903, p. 92). In some of the Moluccas the wailing is intended to affect the departed, to bring the spirit to its senses, or to render it conscious of its new condition (Riedel, *op. cit.* 465).

That the wailing is meant to affect the departed in some way seems to follow from the contents of the dirges, and from the fact that they are in many cases (perhaps usually) addressed directly to him. The sorrow expressed, the praises, the appeals to return, cannot but be supposed to have an effect on the spirit, which is believed to be hovering near and to partake in the ceremonies performed. A wide and careful comparison of the customs of the South American Indians has led Theodor Koch to infer that the native is fully convinced that the dirges are understood by the deceased; and he suggests that the chief motive is conciliation—the placation of one whose natural disposition would be hostile (*Int. Arch.* xiii., Suppl. 114, 117). That this motive does operate seems certain. A striking example is furnished by the Ja-Luo of East Africa. When a person dies, the whole village wails with great fervour for days, if not for months, and at stated intervals, according to the conventions laid down for the case. When a barren woman dies, the wailing is commenced in the usual way. The brothers and sisters of the deceased hasten to the place; and the first who arrives takes a sharp acacia-thorn, sticks it into the sole of the corpse's foot, and breaks it off. Immediately all wailing ceases, and it is never renewed (*JAI* xxxiii. 344). Hobley, who reports this ceremony, could obtain no account of its object. There cannot, however, be much doubt that the thorn is intended to prevent the deceased from walking after death and troubling the survivors. (A similar case is reported from the Moluccas by Riedel, *op. cit.* 81; see also § XI. 2 below.) A childless woman would naturally be envious and malicious, and would have no descendants over whose well-being she might be supposed to watch. Released, therefore, from the fear that she would leave the grave for hostile purposes, they would have no further motive for conciliating her.

But it cannot be admitted that fear is the only reason for wailing. There is abundant evidence that the dead are believed to regard their surviving relatives—in particular, their descendants—with a measure of affection (at least of friendly interest), not unmixed indeed with caprice, that they are often dependent on them for the sacrifices and other means of rendering comfortable their existence in the world of the departed, and that they grant them favours and good fortune if satisfied with their treatment and general conduct. In these circumstances, it seems inevitable to conclude that the wailing is, in part at all events, a genuine expression of affection, and is intended to call forth corresponding feelings in the deceased.

5. *Toilet of the corpse.*—Among the earliest cares after a death is the toilet of the corpse. The Yakuts perform this ceremony before death, in order doubtless to avoid embarrassment to the relatives by the defilement of death (*RHR* xlvi. 208). The body is usually washed. In the lower stages of civilization it is often merely painted. Whether washed or not, it is in these stages painted. The colour varies, but in the vast majority of cases recorded it is red. The bones of Neolithic dead in Europe are frequently found painted with red. Some of the Australian tribes rub off the outside skin, leaving the white underskin exposed—a practice not unconnected with the belief that the dead return white, as ghosts or white men (cf., *e.g.*, Parker, *Euahlayi*, 91). The eyes are carefully closed, and the eyelids weighted to keep them shut. The uncanny look of a corpse with staring eyes accounts, partly, but not fully, for the universality of this practice. The ghost has not yet wholly deserted his mortal tenement, and the reason given by the Nicobar Islanders is probably not far wrong, namely, that it is to prevent the ghost from seeing (*Ind. Cens.* 1901, iii. 208). At least it prevents the eerie feeling of the survivors that they are being watched. The best clothes of the deceased are commonly put on the body. Very often, relatives and friends contribute new clothes for the purpose. Among many peoples, as among the Chinese, and, indeed, among European peoples, the deceased has in life prepared special clothes, for the dead must enter the spirit-world in their best array. Sometimes, as in various districts of Germany, they are buried in their wedding-clothes. Ornaments, jewels, and particularly amulets, are not omitted. By a parsimony easy to understand, some peoples remove the most valuable clothing and ornaments before cremation or burial, but they are more usually left. Where shoes are worn, the deceased is shod, for he has a long journey to take. Such, for example, is the custom in many parts of Europe; and it extends in Great Britain as far back at least as the Late Celtic period. The toilet is concluded by binding the corpse in the attitude in which it is to be buried or otherwise disposed of. This attitude in all the lower planes of culture is very generally squatting, as we find among the pre-historic dead of Europe. It is often explained as that of the infant in its mother's womb; more probably it is that of natural rest. If necessary, the sinews, as among the Basuto (*Journ. Afr. Soc.* v. 357), or even the backbone, as among the Bechuana (*JAI* xxxv. [1905] 308), may be cut to admit of the body being bound in the proper position. Among the Slavic populations of Germany, as well as among the Masurs, it is customary to throw out the water used for washing the corpse, together with the vessel containing it, after the coffin as the funeral leaves the house, by way of precaution against haunting. In Silesia the water and water-vessel are buried where no one will step over them, else they will cause a wasting disease. The Wends scatter millet upon the poured-out water, for this will prevent the birds from eating it when afterwards sown (Tetzner, *Slawen in Deutschland*, Brunswick, 1902, p. 375; Töppen, *Aberglauben aus Masuren*[2], Dantzig, 1867, p. 108; *ZVV* iii. [1893] 150; von Schulenburg, *op. cit.* p. 110). The Negroes in Jamaica throw out the water after the hearse or upon the grave (*FL* xv. 206, 88). On the other hand, it is said to be the custom in Oleai, one of the Caroline Islands, to drink the water in which dead children have been washed (*Globus*, lxxxviii.

[1905] 20). Possibly this is a means of securing that the children shall be born again.

6. *Mummification.*—The process of mummifying, or drying up the body, either with or without embalmment, is widely practised.

In Australia the Unghi occasionally dry the body in the smoke of a fire made with green boughs of a species of sandalwood, and then carry it about to visit the places frequented by the deceased during his life. The Kaiabara also dry the body of a man of note, and carry it about for six months (Howitt, 467, 469). The same rough-and-ready way of preparing a corpse is found more or less throughout the west of Africa. It is thus that a Niamniam chief in the Upper Nile basin, and a king of the Warundi in German East Africa, are prepared for burial (Frobenius, *op. cit.* 409; van der Burgt, 40). Some of the tribes of British Central Africa attain the result by repeatedly rubbing the corpse with boiled maize (Werner, *Brit. Cent. Afr.*, Lond. 1906, p. 163; *Journ. Afr. Soc.* v. 434). The body of the king of the Baganda was squeezed dry, the viscera being first removed, butter rubbed into it, and the viscera then replaced (*JAI* xxxii. [1902] 44). The Baoule of the Ivory Coast take out the intestines, wash them with palm-wine or European alcohol, introduce into the cavity alcohol and salt, afterwards replacing the intestines and sewing up the body. These and other preparations, however, do not entirely prevent corruption; but it comes to an end in about three weeks, giving way to desiccation, and the body ultimately presents the appearance of an Egyptian mummy (Clozel and Villamur, 115). Some Philippine tribes dry the corpse by fire, while among the Betsileo and Antankarana of Madagascar, as frequently in the South Seas, it is dried in the air, the fluids being assisted to escape. By this process, in Eruh and the Murray Islands, it is described by Haddon as becoming almost as light as *papier mâché* (Sawyer, *Philippines*, 258, 277; *Madagascar au début du xx^e siècle*, 1902, pp. 282, 286; Haddon, *Torres Str. Exped.* vi. [1908] 136, *Head-Hunters*, Lond. 1901, p. 91). The bodies of chiefs in the Society Islands were dried in the sun, the more corruptible parts removed, the moisture extracted, and a species of embalmment practised with fragrant oils (Ellis, *Polyn. Res.* i. 400). A number of tribes in America, both North and South, practise desiccation, usually by fire. Some of the former inhabitants of Virginia and the more southerly Atlantic States used to perform a very elaborate process in the case of their kings and other important men, disembowelling them and filling the cavity with beads, celts, and so forth, or, in some cases, removing the flesh altogether and preserving it separately or not at all (*1 RBEW* 131, 132; *Int. Arch.* xiii. Suppl. 55, 56, 62, 79, 81, 88, 93, 103). The practice of desiccation is very ancient. Not only are buried mummified bodies constantly found in the seats of the older civilizations of South America; they have also been found in pre-historic graves in North America.

The object of mummifying is in many cases, as it was in ancient Egypt, to preserve the body as a permanent habitation, or at least as a place of resort, for the soul. It is not unconnected with the cult of the dead (see ANCESTOR-WORSHIP [Egyp.], vol. i. p. 440, and 'Egyptian' art. below, p. 458). Where other peoples set up images of the deceased, those who practised desiccation or embalmment were enabled to keep the bodies themselves without difficulty.

Thus, the ancient Macrobioi put the body, after drying it, covering it with plaster and painting it like the living man, into a hollow block of crystal, set it up in the house for a year, and offered sacrifices to it, afterwards removing it and setting it up, with similar blocks, round the city (Herod. iii. 24). The aborigines of Virginia and Carolina placed the bodies of their kings and rulers in a large hut under the care of priests or medicine-men, apparently for a similar purpose (*1 RBEW* 131).

Elsewhere, as among the Bangala of the Upper Congo (*JAI* xxxix. [1909] 451) and other African tribes, and in the South Sea Islands, mummification is a means of preserving the body until a convenient time for the funeral, which is frequently postponed, for one reason or another, over months or even years. But this object does not of necessity exclude the former.

7. *Feeding the dead.*—Many other observances take place, which we need not describe here. Two, however, may be referred to. The sitting in state of the dead, in the Aaru Archipelago of the Moluccas, has already been mentioned. While he so sits, food is offered him by the members of his family. Offerings of food and drink to the dead before burial are frequent in the lower culture; sometimes, as among the Thô of Northern Tongking, they are even placed in his mouth. These offerings are found in both hemispheres. Even in modern Europe they are not unknown.

In the Department of Loir-et-Cher, France, everything in the house that is eatable is thrown into the death-chamber (*RTP* xv. [1900] 382). De la Martinière reports, in the 17th cent., that in Russia, after death, it was usual to bring a basin of holy water for the soul to bathe, and to place a piece of bread on the corpse's head, that he might not die of hunger on the long journey before him (*ZVV* xi. 435). On account of the possibility that the ghost will put his finger in it to taste it, the watchers of the corpse about Konigsberg, in the east of Prussia, avoid drinking brandy (*Am Urquell*, ii. [1891] 80).

A different precaution was taken in the north-east of Scotland, where, 'immediately on death, a piece of iron, such as a knitting-wire or a nail, was stuck into whatever meal, butter, cheese, flesh, or whisky [was] in the house, to prevent death from entering them' (Gregor, *Folk-Lore of N.E. Scot.* 1881, p. 206). Although in recent times it was believed that corruption followed the omission of this precaution, it is probable that at an earlier period it was believed that the ghost partook of them. Iron is a well-known preservative against the attacks of supernatural beings.

8. *The wake.*—A formal announcement of the death, and an invitation to the kindred and others whom it may concern to come and perform the funeral rites, are given by messenger or by drum, or, at the present day in many communities in low civilization, by firing guns. During the interval between the toilet of the corpse and its final disposal it is watched—a ceremony known in this country as the *wake*, because it involves one or more all-night sittings.

The corpse of an Australian of the Wimmera district of Victoria is watched by the clever old men and relatives, for the purpose of gaining a hint where to look for the slayer by witchcraft (Mathews, *Ethnol. Notes*, 145). Elsewhere in Australia the object is to guard the corpse 'from the spirits' (Parker, *op. cit.* 85). In this they agree with the Sabobas of California, who hold that until burial the soul hovers near the corpse, and a certain demon is on the watch to seize it; and this is prevented only by the vigilance of the survivors (*JAFL* xvi. [1903] 159). Among the Garos of Assam the watchers are kept awake by the young men of the village, who dress up as wild beasts and enter the house, 'to frighten the women with their howls and antics.' More probably, the real reason is to frighten away the ghost or other evil-disposed spirits (Playfair, *The Garos*, Lond. 1909, p. 107). The Koryaks, who practise cremation and burn the body on the day of the death, or a day or two after, allow no one to sleep while the corpse is in the house. The deceased is considered still a member of the family, and, to entertain him, they even play cards on his body (*Jesup Exped.* vi. [1908] 110). Cards are, of course, a modern introduction from the Russians; but they, no doubt, replace some other mode of amusement necessary to keep the watchers awake. So in some of the Moluccas, while children watch the dead in a separate apartment, smoking and drinking go on, and cards are played, the night before the corpse is prepared for burial. In others of the islands the corpse is watched until it is put into the coffin, and the watchers ask riddles and play games to keep awake. Two days and nights it sits in state, clothed and adorned with corals, gold, and silver. The soul remains in the house the first night; and, if any one in the house sleeps, he is liable to encounter the soul in dreams, and to sicken in consequence. In other islands, again, the soul is held to be confused and stunned immediately after death, like a man who has fallen from a tree; and the kinsmen watch through the night, until it may be supposed to have recovered its senses (Riedel, 80, 267, 210).

The wakes of Europe are founded upon similar beliefs to these, and follow much the same course. The Wends awaken every one, that none may fall into the sleep of death (the soul of the deceased may perhaps entice them away, as among the Dayaks [*Int. Arch.* ii. 182]), and even the cattle are roused and the seed-corn handled (Tetzner, 375; von Schulenburg, 110). Among the Bulgarians in Hungary, only the nearest relations actually watch beside the dead. They relieve the tedium by games, among others divining by card-playing whether the soul of the deceased is saved (*Globus*, xc. 140). In the Landes the neighbours watch the body, making copious libations to the memory of the departed (Cuzacq, 159). Irish wakes have long been a byword of extravagant merry-making and debauchery; and English wakes used to be little, if any, better (cf. Croker, *Researches*, 1824, p. 170; Aubrey, *Remaines*, Lond. 1881, p. 30). It would seem as if they thought, as the Gilyaks do, that silence in the house of the dead is sin. For that reason, among the latter, so long as the corpse remains in the house, custom requires amusements, laughing, and joking to be kept up (*ARW* viii. [1905] 472).

9. *Tabus at death.*—The horror of the dead has already been mentioned. Everywhere, contact with a corpse entails a condition for the adequate expression of which we must have recourse to the Polynesian word *tapu*, or the Gr. word ἀνάθεμα. In English the word usually employed is 'pollution' or 'defilement.' Since, however, neither of these words, nor any other in the language, conveys the full force of the Polynesian or the Greek, we have in modern times been fain to borrow the word *tapu* or *tabu* from the former tongue, for the condition

of a person or thing set apart and shunned for a religious or quasi-religious reason, including not only objects to which we should attribute sanctity and invest with terror on that account (as the Ark among the ancient Hebrews), but also such as excite (at least in our minds) horror, disgust, and execration. A corpse is always tabu. And, as one of the most remarkable characteristics of tabu is its excessive contagiousness, the greatest care is needed in approaching or dealing with a corpse. It is not quite clear whether the corpse is feared in and for itself as a dead body, or as the vehicle of death, or whether it is feared owing to its connexion with the disembodied spirit. The rule observed among widely sundered peoples, that every one who kills another—even a warrior who has slain an enemy in battle—must undergo purification, perhaps points to the last alternative. In any case, from the contagious nature of tabu, the prohibitions consequent on a death reach far beyond the persons who have been compelled to perform the last offices about a corpse. They extend to the whole house, the whole family, the whole clan, the whole village, nay, to the very fields, and even sometimes to the heavens.

An unburied body fills the Yakuts with horror and fear. All Nature, indeed, feels uneasiness: violent winds arise, storms howl, fires break out, strange noises, mysterious cries, are heard; and, if it be a shaman who is dead, these manifestations acquire fabulous proportions (*RHR* xlvi. 211). The result of this mysterious sympathy of the various elements is that no work can be done until the body is disposed of. All labour in the entire settlement used to be stopped when a Koryak died, until his cremation. No one went hunting or sealing, nobody went to fetch wood, and the women did no sewing (*Jesup Exped.* vi. 104). Among the Central Eskimo, singing and dancing are forbidden during the first days after a death. Moreover, for three days no one is allowed to work on iron, wood, bone, stone, ice, snow, leather, to empty the oil-drippings from lamps, or to clean lamps; women may not comb their hair or wash their faces; and all sexual intercourse is forbidden. It is believed that the soul stays with the body for three days after death. During that time any violation of the tabus affects it so much with pain that by way of retaliation it brings heavy snowfalls, sickness, and death (Boas, *Eskimo of Baffin Land*, 1901, pp. 131, 144). Among the Barea and Kunama of Abyssinia there is neither ploughing, nor sowing, nor grinding until the corpse is buried (Munzinger, *op. cit.* 528). In many of the Molucca Islands all work is forbidden in a village while the corpse is unburied (Riedel, 168, 197, 223, 341, 414).

At Athens, according to Cicero, after the burial the grave was sown or planted as a kind of expiation, that the fruits might be rendered to the living. The statement seems to imply that the earth was put under a ban or tabu, either by the death or by the burial (see the passage discussed in *ARW* viii. 40; Farnell, *Cults Gr. States*, 1896–1907, iii. 23). Among the Bambala, a Bantu people of the Congo basin, the inhabitants of a village where a death has occurred forsake it during the period of mourning, and sleep in the open (*JAI* xxxv. 417). It is customary on the continent of Europe to put up on the house a cross of wood or straw, or in Holland and Flanders to pile trusses of straw before the house (*Bull. de FL*, ii. [1893–95] 346). The ancient Romans hung up a branch of cypress or pine. This practice is probably to be traced to an intention to give notice of the state of tabu. The hatchments on houses in Great Britain seem to owe their existence to the same cause.

The prohibitions are naturally emphasized when the person dying is a king or a chief. When a Kaffir headman or man of importance dies, all the people of the kraal shave their heads and are unclean. They may not drink milk or transact business with other kraals until the witch-doctor has cleansed them (Kidd, *Essential Kafir*, 1904, pp. 247, 249; *Cape Rep. Nat. Laws Com.*, App. 21). Among the Nilotic Kavirondo, the villagers do not cultivate the fields for three days after the death of any one of importance. But, if it is a chief who has died, no one cultivates the fields for ten days (Hobley, *op. cit.* 28). In Tibet, on the demise of the Dalai or the Tashi Lama, the work in all the public and private offices, all business and market gatherings, are suspended for seven days. For thirty days women are forbidden to put on their jewellery, and neither men nor women may wear new apparel. All classes refrain from amusements and festivities, and from going into groves for pleasure, sports, or love-making. Rich and respectable men, when their parents die, abstain for a year from taking part in marriage ceremonies and festivities, and undertake no journeys to a distance (Chandra Das, *Journey to Lhasa*, 1902, p. 256). We may suspect our own analogous customs on the death of any near relation, or important person in the neighbourhood or the State, to be due to the same origin as those on the death of a Kaffir headman or the Dalai Lama. See also §§ VI. 2; XVII. 1.

VII. **Disposal of the corpse.**—1. *Object of rites.*—The chief objects of the proper disposal of the corpse and the fulfilment of all the rites and customs in connexion therewith are to free the living from the defilement of death and to give rest to the deceased. Until they are all ended, the soul is not finally dismissed to its place in the other world, it is not united to the company of the fathers, it is not elevated to its due position in the household or tribal cult, and it continues to haunt the survivors unpleasantly. This belief is little short of universal in the lower culture, and might be illustrated from all quarters of the globe. The significance of the funeral ceremonies among the ancient Greeks and Egyptians is a commonplace of anthropology. In modern Europe the prejudice in favour of Christian burial in consecrated earth, with the full rites of the Church, may be traced to the same cause.

2. *Denial of rites.*—Yet for special reasons these rites are everywhere denied to certain classes of the dead.

(*a*) Babes and children under the age of puberty, or uninitiated in the tribal rites.—

In India, where the practice of burning the dead is prevalent, children are generally buried. In some cases at least, and possibly in all, this is done with a view to securing their re-birth, for the common practice is to bury in or quite close to the house, often under the threshold. Similar practices for the same reason prevail among many other peoples of the Old and New Worlds (Hartland, *Prim. Pat.*, 1909–10, i. 227). Funeral honours are denied by the Thô of Tongking to children under eighteen years of age and unmarried women. They are simply put into the bier and taken by the priest alone to the grave (Lunet, *op. cit.* 163). Among the Negroes of West Africa and some of the Bantu and Nilotic peoples, where burial is the ordinary practice, rites are denied to children, who are, indeed, often thrown out into the bush: the Wadjagga bury them in the ditch that serves as the village latrine, subsequently digging up their bones and throwing them away (Leonard, *Lower Niger*, 1906, p. 168; *Globus*, lxxii. [1897] 43, lxxxix. [1906] 199; Cunningham, *Uganda*, 1905, p. 344). In civilized Europe unbaptized children are commonly buried without rites.

(*b*) Slaves and common people.—

Among the Haida in Masset, slaves are thrown into the sea (*Jesup Exped.* v. [1905–9] 54). In Oregon they were thrown out into the woods or left wherever convenient (*Mem. Am. Anthr. Assoc.* i. [1906] 170). Very widely in Africa ordinary and especially poor persons and slaves are simply flung out and left to the wild beasts. Common people in the Marshall Islands used to be sewed into a mat and put into the sea (Steinmetz, *op. cit.* 438). The Ahts of Vancouver Island wrap old women and men and boys of no rank in the tribe in old blankets and leave them on the ground (Sproat, *Scenes and Studies of Savage Life*, London, 1868, p. 259). A worthless fellow is buried without rites in the New Hebrides (*Rep. Austr. Assoc.* iv. [1892] 730). The Wadjagga throw childless men and women into the forest (*Globus*, lxxxix. 200).

The foregoing classes are probably regarded as impotent for good or ill after death, just as they have been during life, and therefore needing no consideration. In other cases, however, this reason will not apply.

(*c*) Those who die a 'bad death.'—The manner of death frequently determines the death rites to be performed, because it determines the fate of the deceased in the other world. The list of deaths regarded as 'bad' is not identical all over the world, but a wholesome horror of suicide generally prevails. Christian Europe agrees with pagan Africa in performing only maimed rites, or denying them altogether, in the case of such as have taken their own life.

Suicides are held by the Ewhe of Togoland to have been driven mad, either by rage or ill-treatment, or by some angry ghost, malignant spirit, or god. A suicide defiles the land and hinders the due rainfall. The relatives of the deceased must therefore be fined. A stake is driven through the body, which is dragged into the bush and there huddled into a hastily excavated hole. The subsequent solemnities are few and meagre. No drum is heard, no dances are executed, no fire is lighted in the street, no sacrifice is slain for him. A few bananas and pig-nuts and a little maize are laid beside the grave, two guns are fired, and the obsequies are over (Spieth, *op. cit.* 276, 274). The Choctaws of North America dispose of their dead on scaffolds, and afterwards collect the bones with great ceremony. But they bury at once without the usual obsequies any one who commits suicide (*1 RBEW* 168).

Death by lightning is also widely attributed to the direct action of a god.

Among the Bechuana, if a thunderbolt kills a man, no one complains, none weeps; all unite in saying that the Lord has done right. They suppose the victim to have been guilty of some crime, probably stealing, for which the judgment of Heaven has fallen on him. The beliefs of their neighbours, the Basuto, Zulus, and Baronga, are similar (Arbousset, *Exploratory Tour*, Cape Town, 1846, p. 225; Casalis, *Basutos*, Lond. 1861, p. 242; Callaway, *Rel. Syst.*, Lond. 1870, pp. 60, 118; Junod, *Les Ba-ronga*, Neuchatel, 1898, p. 422. As to the meaning of 'Lord' and 'Heaven,' see art. BANTU, vol. ii. p. 364).

Divine anger may be manifested, indeed, in any accidental death: the attack by a wild beast, the bite of a snake, drowning, a fall from a tree.

The Dayaks of South-East Borneo do not bury such as die by accident; they are carried into the forest and laid on the ground (*Int. Arch.* ii. 181). The Malays of the Patani States inter in a waste place or cast out to the dogs and vultures 'those who die of being killed,' as they phrase it—that is to say, in any violent, sudden, or unusual way (*Fasc. Mal.* ii. [1904] 77).

Death by drowning is often regarded as the seizure by the water-spirit of a victim; hence no effort is made to save him.

Persons drowned, or shot, killed by wild beasts or by falling from a tree, are held in the Babar Archipelago to be slain by the messengers of Rarawolial, the war-spirit, in order that he may feed on their souls. Their bodies may not be laid out in the house or seen by children; they are left naked. They are put on scaffolds, with merely a piece of red linen thrown over them. Sacrifices of pigs are offered to Upulero, who is invoked on behalf of their souls. The pigs are not as a rule eaten, for fear of misfortune. Ultimately the body is laid on the ground in a spot set apart for such as have been slain by Rarawoliai (Riedel, 361). In the northern peninsula of Halmahera no funeral feast is solemnized for those who are unlucky enough to die away from the *kampong*, nor are their souls worshipped, unless they fall in battle (*Int. Arch.* ii. 209).

Everywhere those who die from the effects of the poison-ordeal, so commonly administered in Africa to discover a witch, are held to be slain by the 'fetish.' The body is usually denied sepulture, and is thrown into the bush. To die of certain diseases is to be struck by a god, or at all events tabued. Such diseases are cholera and smallpox commonly in India, smallpox or leprosy in the island of Nossi-Bé near Madagascar (Steinmetz, 378), consumption in Cochin-China (Aymonier, *Excursions et Reconnaissances*, xvi. [1883] 171). Among the Agni of the Ivory Coast, when by means of divination (§ III. 3) the corpse obstinately refuses to disclose whose witchcraft has caused the death, it is concluded that the deceased has offended some spirit, and he is denied burial as a punishment for the offence (Clozel and Villamur, *op. cit.* p. 120), or perhaps, we may conjecture, for fear of the enraged spirit. In ancient Greece executed criminals, though buried, were denied the customary rites; traitors and those guilty of sacrilege were refused burial at home (Rohde, *Psyche*², Freib. 1898, i. 217). On Nossi-Bé executed criminals and outcasts from the family are not buried in the family grave; wherefore in the other world they are condemned to find no rest (Steinmetz, *loc. cit.*); and the Ewhe bury them without rites (*Globus*, lxxii. 42). Down to quite modern times, in Europe it used to be the fate of certain classes of executed criminals to have their remains exposed on gateways and other places of public resort, until they rotted away. Repulsion, horror, dread, whether caused by the infringement of some tabu or by the *anathema* of supernatural beings, are doubtless the cause in all these cases of exceptional treatment and denial of the customary rites.

(*d*) Persons held in reverence are also under *anathema* or tabu. Their sacred qualities set them apart from mankind.

The Masai, whose reason for not burying ordinary persons is said to be that the bodies would poison the soil, bury their medicine-men and rich men (Hollis, 305). The inhabitants of Corisco Island, off the West Coast of Africa, lay their great men and twins (see art. TWINS) under a sacred tree (Nassau, 41). The Sea Dayaks expose their priests on a raised platform—a privilege, however, which others may share, if they desire. The rest are buried, except such as die in battle, who are left where they fall, surrounded with a paling to keep away the wild hogs (*TES*, new ser., ii. [1863] 236). By way of special honour, the Pabarias of the Santal Parganas do not bury their priests, but lay them under the shade of a banyan (Bradley-Birt, *Indian Upland*, 1905, p. 308). The Caddoes of North America leave unburied the warrior slain in battle (*1 RBEW* 103). Some African tribes, as the Latuka and the Wadjagga, also leave the slain warrior unburied. But among the Wadjagga the reason is said to be that to bury him would draw a similar fate on others (Frobenius, 451; Cunningham, 370; *Globus*, lxxxix. 199).

(*e*) Women dying in childbed are buried in Africa, both East and West, apart, and deprived of ordinary rites. The belief that a woman thus dying is under a curse, and becomes a malignant ghost or vampire, is widely distributed. Special precautions are, therefore, taken against her depredations. A special rite in the shape of a sacrifice is sometimes performed to keep her quiet, as in Yunnan (Anderson, *Report on Exped. to W. Yunan*, Calcutta, 1871, p. 131). A different expedient is mentioned below (§ XI. 2).

(*f*) Lastly, in the progress of civilization it has been held that burial cannot be accorded to the corpse of a man who has died in debt, until his creditors have been satisfied. This barbarous denial of rites necessary to future happiness seems to have been the law in mediæval Europe. A corpse was arrested for debt in the neighbourhood of Shoreditch as lately as 1811; and, though damages were recovered against the creditors by the representatives of the deceased, the fact witnesses to the late survival in England of the belief that the corpse of a debtor could legally be deprived of rites (*NQ*, 8th ser. ix. [1896] 241; cf. *ib.* 356 and x. 63). Even yet in many places—the island of Celebes and West Africa, for example (*L'Anthropologie*, iv. [1893] 626; *Globus*, lxxii. 42; Dennett, *Black Man's Mind*, 1906, p. 46)—the dead cannot be buried until his debts are paid; and among the Fantis, at all events, he who has the temerity to bury a man becomes liable for his debts (Cruickshank, *Eighteen Years on the Gold Coast*, Lond. 1853, ii. 221). The incident is the foundation of a number of folk-tales, from India to Ireland, and has repeatedly formed part of a literary plot.

3. *Mode of disposal.*—The modes of disposing of the corpse may be enumerated as (*a*) cannibalism, (*b*) sub-aerial deposit, (*c*) cave deposit, (*d*) water burial, (*e*) earth burial, (*f*) preservation in hut, (*g*) cremation.

(*a*) Cannibalism.—See art. CANNIBALISM, vol. iii. p. 194, and below, § XV.

(*b*) Sub-aerial deposit.—To leave the body on the ground was probably the earliest, as it is the simplest and most savage, form of disposal of the dead. Ordinary people are still by many tribes, as we have seen, simply flung aside. Among the Masai, burial is a special honour conferred only on a man of wealth or a medicine-man. All medicine-men are descendants of one family of supernatural origin. We may conjecture that the meaning of the tradition of supernatural origin is that their ancestor was a stranger belonging to a tribe on a somewhat higher level of civilization, where burial was customary (Hollis, 305, 325). Burial is, however, not necessarily a mark of advancing civilization. The Seri of the Californian Gulf, who are among the lowest of known savages, bury their dead (*17 RBEW* 288*). On the other hand, the religion of Zoroaster seems to have imposed the rite of exposure of the corpse, to be devoured by dogs and vultures, in comparatively civilized times on a reluctant people, who were previously in the habit of burying their dead. It appears, in contrast with the rite of the Masai medicine-men, to have been at first only the practice of the sacred caste, and to have been enforced by them on all believers under the most awful sanctions, both temporal and spiritual. A thousand stripes are denounced in the *Zend-Avesta* on him who shall bury in the earth the corpse of a dog or of a man, and not disinter

it before the end of the second year; but, if he delay beyond that time, there is no atonement for ever and ever. Death and damnation are his fate. Indeed, merely to omit the exposure of the corpse within a year, though other parts of the ritual may have been complied with, is to be liable to the same penalty as the murder of one of the faithful (*SBE* iv. xlv. 8, 31, 52). We may perhaps measure the difficulty of securing uniformity by the violence of the language and the terror of the threatened penalties. It must have been almost as uncomfortable to be a heretic in Persia as in mediæval and post-mediæval Europe. Nor have the Parsis of India, in spite of their high civilization, abandoned this distinguishing characteristic of their faith. See 'Parsi' art. on present subject (p. 502).

The Veddas of Ceylon, like the ancient Chinese, simply lay the corpse in the jungle, covered with leaves and brushwood (Tennent, *Ceylon*, Lond. 1859, ii. 442; Davy, *An Account of the Interior of Ceylon*, Lond. 1821, p. 117; de Groot, *Rel. Syst. China*, Leyden, 1892 ff., ii. 368).

Among the Australian tribes and those of Tasmania the most varied methods of disposal are found—exposure, cannibalism, burial, cremation.

Where exposure was practised, it was usually on a rude platform of boughs, or in the branches of a tree. The latter is regarded by the Unmatjera as an honour denied to the very old and infirm, and to such as have violated tribal customs (Brough Smyth, i. 108–121; Howitt, 456–474; Spencer-Gillen[b], 506–545; *Int. Arch.* xvi. [1904] 8; Roth, *Abor. of Tasmania*, Lond. 1890, pp. 128–134). The same honour is also paid by the Andamanese to those esteemed worthy (*Ind. Cens. Rep.*, 1901, iii. 65). In fact the exposure of the dead on stages, or by suspension from the branches of a tree, or from cross-bars supported on poles, is very widely spread in the Eastern Archipelago, and is practised by some of the tribes of Assam.

On the American continent, deposit on scaffolds, or in the boughs of trees, was extensively practised. In the interior of North America it was the common mode of disposal, the object being to keep the body out of the way of carnivorous beasts and to facilitate desiccation.

The Hurons and some other tribes put the corpse into a coffin or box of bark or wood (often a hollowed log)—a custom also followed in British Columbia, where the 'grave-box' was frequently deposited on the ground and covered with leaves (*1 RBEW* 158–164, 166, 168, 169; *5 RBEW* [1887] 111. The various Reports on the N.-W. Tribes in the *Brit. Assoc. Reports* describe the customs of the Indians of Brit. Columbia. See also *Jesup Exped.* v. 54, x. [1908] 142). Ruder than these was the custom of the Blackfeet. 'They think it a horrible practice to expose the body to the worms and vermin that live in the ground.' So they leave it for the wild beasts and birds, above ground, on a hill-top or in a tree (*B.A. Rep.*, 1887, p. 192; Petitot, *Trad. Ind. du Canada Nord-ouest*, Paris, 1886, p. 492). The Eskimo often leave the dead on the ground, though some of them have learnt to use 'grave-boxes' (*11 RBEW*, 175, 193; *18 RBEW* [1899] 312). The Kamtchadals used to throw away their dead to be devoured by dogs. The Chukchi, Gilyaks, and other Siberian tribes followed the same practice, or else disposed of the corpse by cremation; the Yakuts, however, used to put them in boxes and suspend them from the trees or put them on rough scaffolds in the forest (*Jesup Exped.* vi. 104; *RHR* xlvi. 211; *Amer. Anthr.* viii. [1906] 289). In New Caledonia the dead are placed on the summit of a cliff, on a bed of leaves or dried grass (*L'Anthrop.* xiii. [1902] 547).

The necessity of sub-aerial deposit either on the ground or on scaffolds or in the branches of trees has been, in some at least of these cases, forced upon the survivors by the condition of the soil. In the higher latitudes of the Northern Hemisphere the ground is often frozen for months, and it is impossible during that period (especially with the rude tools available) to dig. Even with the appliances of an advanced civilization this is found impracticable in Canada. Canadian settlers often have to content themselves during the winter with placing their dead above ground in a mortuary, and leaving them there until the spring. They only follow the example of some of their aboriginal predecessors and neighbours.

The Naskopies still 'suspend their dead from the branches of trees, if the ground be frozen too hard to excavate, and endeavour to return in the following summer and inter the body' (*11 RBEW* 272).

(*c*) Cave burial.—An archaic and widely distributed mode of burial is in caves.

Human bones, remains of sepulture of the Neolithic people formerly inhabiting Liguria, have been found in caves at various points along the Riviera, notably under stalagmitic floors in the Bas-Moulins cave at Monaco (*L'Anthrop.* xii. [1901] 7). Among examples of a much more recent date, but still very ancient, is that of the Hebrews (*e.g.* the cave of Machpelah, Gn 23[19] 25[9] 35[27ff.] 50[13]), and the custom is not yet wholly extinct in Palestine. In the Moluccas, the Philippines, the Sandwich Islands, as well as in the coral islands of the South Seas (both Melanesian and Polynesian), where caves abound, the practice prevailed of depositing the bodies, or, after desiccation, the bones, in caves and clefts of the rock often all but inaccessible. In some of the islands the custom is now restricted to the remains of chiefs, and the motive is said to be to prevent desecration by enemies, though probably it was at one time more general (Ellis, *Polyn. Res.* i. 405; *JAI* x. 141). Similarly, among the Betsileo of Madagascar the chiefs are deposited in caverns (*Mad. au xxe siècle*, 290, 291). In Africa it is found sporadically from north to south; it was the common practice of the Hottentots and the special privilege of the kings of Quissanga and Quiteve (Kolben, 313; *Rec. S.E. Africa*, vii. [1901] 378, 382). On the western side of the North American continent it has been recorded of many tribes from Alaska to Mexico, as well as in the Aleutian and West Indian islands. Among some of the Pueblo peoples of Arizona and New Mexico the practice seems a relic of the former habitation of the caves. When they were occupied as dwellings, the dead were frequently buried in the furthest recesses; and the same caverns or other clefts and shelters of the rocks have been retained by a very natural conservatism as the appropriate dwelling-places of the dead (*13 RBEW* 348, 355; *Am. Anthr.* vi., new ser., 656).

This method of disposing of the corpse, rude as it seems, has been capable, as in ancient Egypt, of developing grandiose sepulchres, by artificial excavation and the provision of pompous doorways, and thus of influencing the development of a national architecture. Even where, as in Sicily, such a result was not attained, artificial excavation was frequently practised. Enormous numbers of such tombs, attributed to the Siculi, have been explored in the mountain of Pantalica near Syracuse (*L'Anthrop.* xii. 190). It is obvious that cave burial, whether in natural or in artificial hollows, can be adopted only in rocky or mountainous regions, and then only where the geological formation is suitable. A mode of burial widely extended in Africa and found in other parts of the globe is that of sinking a perpendicular shaft in the soil and excavating, at or near the bottom, a side-vault in which the body is placed. These graves have lent themselves to the suggestion that their form is derived from a previous practice of cave burial. They are actually found in some of the Fiji Islands concurrently with burial in caves (*JAI* x. 144). Ordinary chamber-tombs excavated in the rock are found in Crete, as on the mainland of Greece. Side by side with them at Knossos and belonging to the same period, classed by Evans as the Third Late-Minoan Period, have been found also excavated in the soft rotten limestone both simple pit-graves and graves consisting of a shaft and side-vault; as though all three types of grave had diverged from one common original, and that original a natural cave. The conclusion, so far as regards the last-named type, is perhaps rendered all the more probable by its recurrence elsewhere around the Mediterranean, where burial in natural or artificial caves was practised (*Archæologia*, lix. [1905] 391 ff.).

(*d*) Water burial.—To fling a body into the sea or a river is one of the easiest ways of getting rid of it. That doubtless is the reason for thus disposing of the corpses of slaves or common people (see above, VII. **2** (*b*)), in various places. But it does not account for every case of water burial. Where the object is not merely to get rid of the body, but to prevent the deceased from returning to plague survivors, probably few more effectual means are known to peoples in the lower culture than to throw the corpse into the water; for water is usually esteemed a barrier

to maleficent spirits, and particularly to the dead.

The corpses of pregnant and barren women (who are naturally evil-disposed), and of lepers, are regarded in Tibet as specially tabu. They are, accordingly, either thrown beyond nine hills and dales, or packed in horse- or ox-skins and thrown into the waters of the great Tsang-po River (Chandra Das, *op. cit.* 255). The Guayakis of Paraguay and the Cherokees commit their dead to the waters of the nearest river; the Gosh-Ute of Utah sink them in springs, possibly for fear of the departed spirit (*L'Anthrop.* xiii. 658; *1 RBEW* 180).

This may have been one of the reasons for the occasional practice of water burial found in various parts of the world, as among the sect of Bhagar Panthis in the Panjab (*Rep. Cens. Ind.*, 1901, xvii. 168), or some of the West African tribes (Nassau, 233). On the other hand, water burial is sometimes regarded as an honour.

One who is specially beloved or beautiful is, in the Bismarck Archipelago, not buried but laid in a boat pulled far out to sea, and there the boat and its contents are sunk (Thilenius, *Ethnog. Ergeb. aus Melanesien*, ii. [1903] 230). To fling the dead into the sea was quite common in Polynesia. The Chibchas of New Granada were reported by Oviedo to lay their chiefs in golden coffins and sink them in the water (*Int. Arch.* xiii., Suppl. 56). The corpse of the slain Baldur, with his wife and steed, and the gift of Odin's ring Draupnir, was laid in his ship upon a funeral pyre and launched forth blazing on the sea. Myth as it is, this tradition doubtless records the striking spectacle of many a Viking's funeral.

In various parts of the world earth burial or subaerial deposit in canoes is found—a relic perhaps of earlier exposure to the waves. Thus it was not infrequent for a Viking to be laid in his ship and the howe heaped over it.

(*e*) Inhumation.—The position of the grave is determined by various considerations. Among some peoples there is no fixed rule; and it seems that the dead may be buried anywhere, according to convenience or the caprice of the survivors. This is said to be the case with some of the Bantu tribes, as the Matabele and the Barotse. The latter, however, bury in secret, from which we may probably infer that the object is to leave no clue to the burial-place lest it be violated by wizards (*JAI* xxiii. 84; Béguin, *Ma-Rotsé*, 1903, p. 115). In some of the Moluccas, graves are scattered everywhere outside the villages (Riedel, 81, 225). The Chilcotin are said to bury wherever the death occurs (*Jesup Exped.* ii. [1900-8] 788). Among the Chinese and other nations in the Extreme East the situation of the grave is determined by diviners, whose art is called in Chinese *fung-shui*, defined by de Groot (iii. 935) as 'a quasi-scientific system, supposed to teach men where and how to build graves, temples, and dwellings, in order that the dead, the gods, and the living may be located therein exclusively, or as far as possible, under the auspicious influences of Nature.' The practice is, therefore, founded on the conviction that the dead dwell in the grave exactly as the living dwell in a house. This conviction is by no means confined to China and the surrounding countries; it is explicit or implicit everywhere in the lower culture. The imagination clings to it; and mankind has found it extremely difficult to get rid of the notion, though it has continually come into collision with the teachings of the higher philosophies and religions. Accordingly, the dying man's own wishes are often consulted as to the place of his burial, or it is determined after his death, as in the Babar Archipelago (Riedel, 359), by supposed movements of the coffin in answer to questions put to the corpse. This is, of course, a species of divination. It is more commonly decided by the manner in which the dead are regarded, that is to say, whether fear, on the one hand, or affection and hope for future benefits, on the other hand, predominate in the minds of the survivors. But see § XIX.

(i.) Children.—As an illustration of the latter motive may be taken the wide-spread custom of burying children in, or at the door of, their mother's hut. A comparison of the reasons alleged for so doing, and of other practices and beliefs, leads to the conclusion that the object is to obtain a re-birth of the child.

The custom is found in Africa East and West, in the Panjāb, and among some of the Naga tribes of Assam, in Java, in the Andaman Islands, among the Karo-bataks, the Creeks, the Seminoles, the Chols of Southern Mexico, and in several of the Molucca Islands. On the island of Keisar it is suggestive that children are buried under their parents' sleeping-places, while in the Aaru Archipelago they are not buried, but hung up in the house above their parents' beds. In Tibet a new-born child who dies is kept in the house or on the roof. The ancient Italians buried their dead children under the eaves of the house; and to this day the Russian peasant buries a still-born child under the floor (Hartland, *Prim. Paternity*, i. 227; *JAI* xxvi. [1897] 200; *1 RBEW* 116; Starr, *Notes Ethnog. S. Mexico*, ii. [1902] 74; Riedel, 421, 267; Chandra Das, 220).

(ii.) Others than young children.—Burial or sub-aerial deposit at a distance prevails among the Australian tribes and among the Negroes and Bantu.

It is, however, far from being the universal practice among either the Negroes or the Bantu. Among both these races the head of the household is frequently buried within his own settlement or compound, or, as among the Kaffirs of South Africa, in the cattle kraal. Various tribes of Negroes bury in or near the village. On the Ivory Coast several bury under the hut (Clozel and Villamur, 118, 157, 321, 336, 419, 467). With some of these, as well as the West African Bantu, burial under the floor of the house, or in the kitchen-garden adjoining, is a distinction reserved for a chief, or a specially beloved relative. In others the custom seems more general, and the head of the household at least is usually buried in his own house (Nassau, 61; Leonard, 159; Spieth, 256, 634, 702, 752; *JAFL* ix. 17). The same rule applies to the Nilotic and Bantu tribes on the other side of the continent (Johnston, 554, 632, 693, 715, 748, 779, 793, 880; Casati, *Ten Years in Equatoria*, Lond. and N.Y., 1891, i. 303; Gessi, *Seven Years in the Soudan*, Lond. 1892, p. 32; *JAI* xxxii. 265; van der Burgt, *op. cit.*, art. 'Enterrement'; Werner, 157, 163, 165).

In Madagascar the practice differs with the tribe. The Betsimisaraka, Sakalava, and other tribes bury at a distance in solitary places, and their graves are greatly feared, while the Betsileo and Hovas bury on the roadside and even between the dwellings (*Mad. au xx^e siècle*, 278).

A similar diversity is found among the forest and pampas tribes of South America, some of which bury under the hut. The Uananas bury on small islands in the river (water is notoriously difficult for the dead to cross) or else in the hut occupied by the deceased. But in the latter case the hut is deserted (*Int. Arch.* xiii., Suppl. 85). The motive in both is obviously fear. In North America, tribes like the Hupa, Wichita, Nez Percés, Shuswap and Thompson Indians, to mention no more, laid their dead near the village or encampment. Some, like the Creeks and Seminoles, buried them under the house. Others, such as the Nomlaki of California, buried them at a distance. The Zuñis, who, like other Pueblo tribes, probably in former times buried their dead in their cave-dwellings, still pursue the practice in their modern houses on the mesas (*13 RBEW* 336, 345, 346, 365). Many of the islanders of the Eastern Archipelago and the Pacific Ocean bury in the dwelling of the deceased; but there is no uniform practice. In the interior of Viti Levu (Fiji), for instance, in the province of Ra, many persons were buried before the threshold of the house, or in case of men under the clan dormitory; elsewhere the dead are buried at a distance because they are feared (*Anthropos*, iv. [1909] 88, 90). In Assam the grave is dug in front of the house (*JAI* xxxvi. [1906] 96). In ancient Assyria and Babylonia the ordinary dead were buried under the floor of the house (*ARW* x. 105). What looks like a relic of the same custom is found among the Lolos of Western China: the day after the funeral a hole is dug in the death-chamber, and a formal prayer offered that the star of the deceased will descend and be buried in that hole. It is believed that if this were not done the star would fall and possibly hurt some one (*JAI* xxxiii. 103).

The burial-place is frequently in a grove or thicket, afterwards shunned as sacred. Chiefs or medicine-men, like Bantu monarchs and Buriat shamans, are, in particular, recipients of this honour. Chiefs and priests on the island of Rotuma are buried on the hill-tops (*JAI* xxvii. [1898] 431, 432). On a hill or a headland a noble Norseman loved to have his howe or barrow. The Arapahos, the Wichita, and other North American tribes lay their dead commonly on hills or bluffs.

Among many peoples each family or each clan has its own place of burial, whether the mode of disposal of the dead be by cave burial, in-

humation, sub-aerial deposit, or cremation. This was the custom of the ancient Greeks (Rohde, i. 229) as well as of the ancient Hebrews; and it is continued to this day in the Holy Land (Wilson, *Peasant Life*, 158). Nor is it confined to a comparatively high stage of civilization. It is a natural and by no means uncommon outgrowth of the feeling of kinship; and, where ancestor-worship exists in a developed form, it adds strength to it by concentrating the cult about one spot.

The Chinese custom dates from barbarism; and the practice of *fung-shui* has never necessitated its abandonment (de Groot, iii. 829). Every clan of the Baganda, and even of the Muhammadanized Swahili, has its burial-place (*JAI* xxxii. 51; Velten, *Sitten und Gebräuche*, 1903, p. 259). Every family of the Chechens in the Caucasus and of the Barea and Kunama in Abyssinia has its vault (*Anthropos*, iii. [1908] 734; Munzinger, 528). On the Gold Coast, among the Tanala of Madagascar, the Nicobarese, and some of the British Columbian tribes the families have common burial grounds (*JAI* xxxvi. 183; *Globus*, lxxxix. 361; *Int. Arch.* vi. 24; *Jesup Exped.* i. 336, v. 54). The Uralis of Southern India have a common burial-ground at Nirgundi, in which all are finally laid to rest; but each sept has its own burial-ground close to its village, where the preliminary obsequies are celebrated (Thurston, *Castes and Tribes*, vii. 256). The Chams of Further India and the Khasis of Assam practise cremation; their ashes are deposited in the family sepulchre (Cabaton, *Chams*, 48; Gurdon, *Khasis*, 1907, pp. 132, 140). As society becomes more highly organized, the custom contributes materially to the family pride, and it becomes emphasized by kings and nobles. The kings of ancient Scythians and modern Kaffirs, Tongan chiefs and English peers, agree in displaying the same vanity.

Where, strictly speaking, there is no family sepulchre, sometimes, at least, the body is buried upon the property of the deceased or his family.

The ancient Norseman's howe was upon his own land. The Quiché of Central America buried in their maize fields (*Int. Arch.* i. [1889], Suppl. 71). The Buquidnones of the Philippines and the Mossi of West Africa are laid in their own cultivated fields (Sawyer, 347; *L'Anthrop.* xv. [1904] 687); and the Chams have their family cemetery close to their richest cornfield (Cabaton, *l.c.*). In these cases probably the deceased is thought to guard the fields and enhance their fertility. Among the Igorots, however, where the dead man is buried in his own cleared land, unless he has selected some other spot, the place is abandoned (Sawyer, 313). The modern Corsicans lay their dead in the earth or in a little building called a chapel on their own property (*RTP* xii. [1897] 523).

Other distinctions, as has already been noted, are often made between the dead. On the island of Keisar, one of the Moluccas, a great nunu-tree stands in an open square in the centre of every village. Beneath that tree the forefathers sleep, and the dead of rank are still buried around them. It is thus a sacred place, and feasts are held there (Riedel, 422). The same character attaches to the Men's House, or Bachelors' House, necessary to a village in other islands of the East Indies; and often there, if not every man, at least every important man, is buried, and his bones are preserved after the final rites (cf. *Globus*, xciv. [1908] 166, 168).

(*f*) Preservation in house.—Many peoples preserve the body above ground in the house, either with or without previous desiccation or mummification. This practice originates in a rude and archaic condition of society, and is frequently abandoned, as civilization progresses, in favour of temporary or permanent burial.

Thus in Tahiti, a native tradition, which doubtless represents something like the real sequence of custom, speaks of a period when the dead were allowed to remain on a kind of stage in the house in which they had lived, and which continued to be occupied by the survivors. But by and by separate houses were built for the dead—small temporary buildings, where they were laid, and whence they were drawn out to be exposed to the rays of the sun. The corpse was visited from time to time by the relatives, and was rubbed every day with aromatic oils. The bones were ultimately deposited in the family *marœ*, or temple, or else buried, except the skull, which was wrapped in native cloth and preserved, often suspended from the roof of the dwelling-house (Ellis, *op. cit.* i. 404).

Notwithstanding all reverence for the dead, and all precautions in the shape of desiccation and perfumes, the custom of keeping the body in the dwelling during the process of decay must have been found intolerable. Tribes to which immediate burial was repugnant therefore usually adopted one of two courses: they abandoned the hut to the corpse, or they removed the corpse until dissolution had been carried far enough to render it no longer offensive.

So the Wagogo of East Africa keep the corpse of a man of rank in the hut until it putrefies, while they mourn and drink pombe. It is then placed on a scaffold in the open air until only the bones are left, when they at last are buried (Steinmetz, 211). The Attiwandaronks, or Neutrals, of North America kept the body in the house 'until the stench became intolerable.' It was then placed on a scaffold in the open air, that the work of decay might be there completed. The remaining flesh being scraped from the bones, the latter were afterwards arranged on the sides of the cabins in full view of the inmates until the Feast of the Dead, the great day of general interment periodically held (Hale, *Book of Rites*, 1883, p. 72). The Muong or Mon of Tongking kept the corpse in a coffin for three years in the house, before the altar of ancestors; but they palliated the results of dissolution to some extent by fixing a bamboo tube in the lid of the coffin and carrying it up through the roof to permit the foul gases to escape (Lunet, 352). In West Africa the Baoulé embalm and preserve the corpse in the hut for months or years. In spite of embalmment, the odour for three weeks is horrible. It then gradually diminishes, and by the end of two months the corpse presents the appearance of an Egyptian mummy. In this state it is kept until the convenient time for the final rites, with which it is laid in a grave under the hut (Clozel and Villamur, 115, 118). The Yumbos of South America also mummify their dead, and hang them up in the house under the thatch (*Int. Arch.* xiii., Suppl. 79). In the Gilbert Islands the body of a king or warrior is often wrapt in mats and preserved on one of the cross-beams of the hut (*ib.* ii. 43). On the other hand, the Saccha of South America lay out their dead in the house, pull down the house over him, and abandon it to him (*Int. Arch.* xiii., Suppl. 85). The practice of abandoning the hut to the dead is followed in many other places. Its motive is fear—whether of the death-pollution or of the ghost is probably no more than a question of terminology. See §§ IV. 3, VI. 9, XVIII., XIX.

(*g*) Cremation is a mode of disposal of the dead that has been adopted from time to time by nations widely scattered over the earth. It is the ordinary mode in India among the aboriginal peoples, as well as among the Hindus; it extends through Further India to Tongking, and has obtained a footing by Hindu influence on some of the East Indian islands. It is practised by many tribes of Siberia and of the Pacific slope of North America. In ancient times it was also practised widely (though perhaps not exclusively) by the tribes of the North American plains and of the Mississippi basin and Atlantic shores. It is customary among some of the northern tribes of South America, and among the Melanesians of North New Mecklenburg and New Hanover, two of the islands of the Bismarck Archipelago. The funeral mounds of Europe witness to its use in pre-historic times, from the south of Russia to the British Isles. The practice seems to have begun on the Continent in the Neolithic age. It became general during the Age of Bronze, and was continued right down to the Christian era, and among many tribes probably down to their conversion to Christianity. To the northern invaders who founded the dynasties and the polity predominant during the Homeric age of Greece we may with some confidence attribute the introduction into the Eastern Mediterranean of cremation, foreign as it was to the usages and beliefs of the Mycenæan age. From Greece, or directly across the Alps, it spread to Italy; and, though among the Romans it never succeeded in entirely ousting the prior practice of inhumation, it became throughout the Roman Empire the fashionable mode of disposing of the dead among the official and wealthier classes. It is sporadic or occasional in many other parts of the world.

More than one reason may have conduced to the practice of cremation:

(i.) Tribes without a settled abode may have found it convenient, if they desired to carry about the remains of their dead, or to remove such remains beyond the possibility of desecration by their enemies.

Some such motives perhaps operated in the case of the Cocopa Indians, who occupy the lower valley of the Colorado River. By the annual floods of the river they are driven from the bottom lands to the higher grounds. 'The annual irrigations are of

great regularity, and have affected the habits of the tribes in various ways.' On the death of an adult, his effects are collected for distribution among others than his relatives. The body is laid on a pyre beside his hut; and, after all the claimants have been satisfied, the corpse and the rest of his goods are burnt, together with the hut and any neighbouring huts belonging to the clan that may happen to catch fire. The survivors then abandon the site (*Amer. Anthrop.* iv., new ser. [1902], 480). The Man Côc are an immigrant people of Northern Tongking; and, though they have been settled as cultivators of the soil in the mountainous region of that country for many generations, their villages are still constantly removed from place to place, to suit their rudimentary method of agriculture. They formerly burnt their dead, and carried the ashes with them in their migrations. But the custom has been generally given up, because the accumulated ashes of generations became an intolerable burden. It continues, however, in the west of the Red River basin, where the bones, after incineration, are placed in earthen jars (Lunet, 246). The Northern Maidu cremated only those who died far from home; and in such cases the ashes were taken home and there buried (*Bull. Am. Mus. Nat. Hist.* xvii. 242). A similar practice was recorded among the Algonquins (Charlevoix, vi. [1744] 109), among the Haida of Masset (*Jesup Exped.* v. 54), and other tribes.

Many peoples hold that it is possible to work witchcraft by means of the bodies of the dead. It is probable that this may have been at least a contributory cause, inducing migratory tribes to burn their corpses.

(ii.) Another very powerful motive for cremation is the desire to be quit of the ghost. Various means are adopted for this purpose (see XI.). Cremation is only one of these, but it is not the least potent. This is best observed where cremation is exceptional, as on the continent of Africa.

Among the Yaos and Mang'anja a woman who was accused of witchcraft, and who refused the poison-ordeal, was burnt (Macdonald, *Africana*, 1882, i. 104). In West Africa burning is especially the mode of disposing of bodies of criminals, by which are meant persons accused of witchcraft, some of whom are also burnt to death (Nassau, 234). The Wakulwe and other tribes in the neighbourhood of Lake Tanganyika believe that a month or two after death the process of decomposition brings back the bones to life. A mysterious being called Nkiua animates them; and by means of the new body thus formed it sets about torturing, and even killing, some other member of the family of the deceased. In order to prevent this, the corpse is dug up and burnt to ashes. Not a bone must be left, for even the smallest would suffice to give shelter to the Nkiua. A witch-doctor, or diviner, presides at the ceremony, while an assistant asperges the body with a sort of holy water, saying, 'Sleep in peace, sleep in peace' (*L'Anthropologie*, xvi. [1905] 375). The Nkiua thus roughly corresponds with the Vampire of Europe, whose misdeeds were often stopped by a similar process of burning. But there is this difference that, whereas in Europe only some persons were credited with becoming vampires, among the African tribes in question all corpses are exhumed and cremated.

We have already seen that persons who die an evil death are denied the ordinary rites. Among such persons are usually reckoned those who die of smallpox, in childbed, by murder or suicide. In Siam the corpses of these persons are treated precisely like the corpses of the Wakulwe. It is alleged that if this were not done the spirits of the departed would return and torment their friends (*Globus*, xiv. [1868] 27). The Chingpaws of Burma bury; but burning is simulated in the case of those who die of smallpox or by violent deaths (Anderson, p. 131). Among the Kols of Chotā Nāgpur, where cremation is the ordinary mode of disposing of the corpse, the body is burnt, and the remains of the bones are picked out and put into an earthen pot. This is carefully closed, taken home, and hung on a post until the final ceremony, which does not take place until the *hārbōr* feast. We are expressly told that in this way the deceased is prevented from entering his former dwelling (Hahn, *Einfuhrung in das Gebiet der Kolsmission*, 1907, p. 83). The same fear of the ghost is visible in the ceremonies at the cremation of the former kings of Kandy. Some of the calcined bones were collected and put into an earthenware pot, which was closed and sealed. The remaining ashes were buried. The pot was placed on the head of a man, who was masked and covered all over with black, and was carried by him to the *mahawelle-ganga*. At the ferry the masked bearer was put in two canoes lashed together and covered with boughs in the form of a bower. These canoes were drawn to mid-stream by two men swimming, who when they reached that point pushed them forward and hastily swam back. The masked man then took a sword in one hand and the urn in the other, cut the urn in two, and at the same moment plunged into the stream. Diving under, he came up as far down stream as possible, swam to the opposite side, and disappeared. The canoes were allowed to float away (Davy, 162).

It has already been mentioned that the ancient Pueblo tribes of the south-west of the United States buried their dead in their cave-dwellings. Concurrent with this custom, however, there was another, by which the dead were cremated. The co-existence of these two customs was held by Cushing, one of the most careful and acute of observers, to be due to the coalescence of two peoples—namely, of Yuman and Piman tribes of the lower Colorado region—who practised cremation, with the true Pueblo tribes, who practised cave burial. The Zuñis have now abandoned cremation, if they ever practised it. 'They insist that, should they incinerate the bodies, there would be no rain, for their dead are the *uwannami* (rain-makers). Incineration, they believe, would annihilate the being' (*13 RBEW* 365; *22 RBEW* [1904] 175; *23 RBEW* [1904] 305).

(iii.) Thus cremation is an effectual protection of the survivors against haunting and injury by the dead. It is more than this: it thoroughly frees the ghost from the bonds of this life, and fits it for union with the society of the departed in the life beyond.

The Wayana of French Guiana burn their dead, 'that the soul may fly up to heaven on the smoke' (*Int. Arch.* xiii., Suppl. 87). Among the Laotians of Further India the higher classes are cremated encased in a puppet representing a mythical bird called Hatsadiling. It is said that, in order to obtain Nirvāna, the bird must be killed. Accordingly, a woman ceremonially shoots an arrow at it; and then the fire is lighted. There is, of course, a mythological tale of the slaughter of the bird in the first instance by a heroine who was an incarnation of a goddess; and the woman who shoots the ceremonial arrow pretends to be a descendant of the goddess. But there can be little doubt that Hubert's conjecture is correct, that the myth is of secondary formation, and that the bamboo bird really convoys to the other world the soul when released, together with it, by burning (*L'Année Soc.* ix. [1906] 238). In this case the shooting would be the ritual slaughter of the bird, in order to put it into the same condition as the deceased. Among the Haida of Masset, persons killed in battle or by any violent means, were believed to go, after death, to the abode of a supernatural being named Tāxet, which was suspended in the air. To enable them to do this their bodies were burnt: otherwise they would be refused admission. The precaution, however, seems to have been neglected with regard to friends killed in war at a distance from home—contrary to their practice in other cases. The practical difficulties were probably too great, and the custom may have been in decay (*Jesup Exped.* v. 54). The king of the Batutsi in East Africa was never buried. His body was exposed in his hut until putrefaction had advanced so far as to show the first worm. The hut was then set on fire, and was burnt with all its contents. When the conflagration came to an end and nothing was left, it was believed that the king had returned to heaven, whence, according to the tribal legends, his ancestors had been exiled, and whither this was the prescribed method of returning (*Anthropos*, iii. 6).

But the ghost is often conceived of as inhering in the calcined bones, and not completely disposed of until some further ceremony has been performed. The rites at the cremation of the king of Kandy are an example of this. Indeed, it is common among the tribes of India which have been influenced by Brāhmanism to throw the ashes into some sacred water, as a means of uniting the dead with the fathers. Elsewhere they are put into an urn or other receptacle, and buried, or kept in the house. This custom is familiar to us among the classic nations of antiquity. The covers of the urns were sometimes removable, in order to placate the spirit of the dead by periodically pouring libations upon his ashes.

VIII. The grave.—1. *Shape of the grave.*—On this subject something has been said above in dealing with cave burial. The grave is the residence of the departed; and efforts are not wanting in various parts of the world to render it as comfortable as circumstances permit. As already pointed out, the Chinese practice of *fung-shui* is traceable to this motive. It is possible also that the widespread practice of abandoning the hut to the dead, whether buried beneath it or exposed above ground, may have the same motive, in addition to that of escaping the infection of death. The destruction of the hut above the corpse, which frequently takes place, need not preclude it, since it is a common principle that things intended to be of service to the dead must themselves be killed by breakage, or even burning. Where burial does not take place in the hut, a hut or shelter is often erected over the grave.

This is the practice in lands as far apart as South America and the Philippines or New Guinea (*Int. Arch.* xiii., Suppl. 79; Sawyer, 203, 355; Chalmers, *Pioneer Life*, 1895, pp. 53, 110, 210); while, among the Baganda and other tribes of East Central Africa, kings and chiefs at least are thus honoured (*JAI* xxxii. 44, 92; Cunningham, 31, 224; van der Burgt, art. 'Enterre-

ment'); and this hut, as the abode of the deceased, becomes his shrine or temple, where his spirit is invoked. In this district of Africa miniature huts or shelters over the graves of lesser persons are not uncommon. By the Lendu the miniature hut is erected explicitly as a shelter for the spirit, which is supposed to remain seated on the grave for two months after burial (Cunningham, 337). Elsewhere, as in New Guinea, the shelter is as much for the convenience of the mourners, who go thither to weep, as of the departed (Chalmers, 110).

The underground resting-places of the dead are also provided with regard to their comfort, often to magnificence.

The Ewhe of West Africa bury beneath their huts. Rich people are buried deeper than poor, and the cavity prepared for them is as large as a room (Spieth, 634). The pre-historic graves of Crete, circular chambers of stones covered with mounds or domes, are modelled on the huts of the living (*ARW* vii. [1904] 265, viii. 520). The same intention is apparent in Etruscan tombs. So far, indeed, was it carried that, when cremation was adopted, the urns in which the ashes were placed were miniature huts. But the most striking and splendid examples of tombs as the dwelling-places of the dead are found among the ancient Egyptians (see § VII. 3 (c)).

Externally the shape of the grave has varied as much as its internal arrangements. In Europe the pre-historic dead of rank and importance were buried beneath round or elliptical barrows, frequently of huge dimensions—a custom found in many other parts of the world. These barrows are raised of stones or earth, and enclose cists of large slabs, within which the bodies were deposited. And they are generally surrounded with a trench from which the earth for the barrow has been taken, sometimes also with circles of stones. Where an elaborate structure of this kind is not made, it is quite common to cover the grave with a heap of stones, or with a simple mound of earth. Where, as among many tribes, the grave is shallow, the stones, or often (according to the nature of the country) a pile of branches, may be intended chiefly to defend the body against wild carnivora. Against human beings they are more often defended by fences, or smoothed and levelled down so as to remove the traces of burial, as is the practice of various South American tribes (*Int. Arch.* xiii., Suppl. 92, 97; *Globus*, xc. 305). Where mounds or huts are erected over graves, they become, with growing civilization, pyramids of wrought stone and mausolea.

2. *Position of the corpse.*—It is a very general custom in the lower culture to bury the dead in a crouching or squatting position. This is the natural position of rest during life for peoples who have not the civilized appliances of chairs, tables, and bedsteads. It is accentuated in the case of the dead by binding the body, sometimes even breaking the bones for that purpose. The body thus prepared is usually laid on one side in the grave, just as the skeletons in Neolithic and later graves in this country are found. Sometimes, however, it is placed seated or lying on the back.

Examples of both have been described among the West Australian natives (Calvert, 41, 42). Extended burials (lying at full length) are not so common. At Knossos, bodies have been found both flexed and extended. Extended burials were customary among the pagan Anglo-Saxons. The Wichita of North America (Dorsey, *Wichita*, 1904, p. 13), the Brignans of the Ivory Coast (Clozel and Villamur, 467), and the Yanadis of Southern India bury in the same attitude, but the last with the face downwards (Thurston, vii. 426).

The direction in which the body lies in the grave differs among different peoples, and even among the same people. In the pre-historic graves of this country, as well as of other countries, skeletons have been found quite differently orientated, though sometimes in the same barrow; and the explanation of the variations is still to seek. The Wotjobaluk of what is now the Wimmera district of Victoria, in the Commonwealth of Australia, had an elaborate system by which everything in the world was supposed to be divided among the totem-clans. Every totem had its own point of the compass; and a man was buried with his head towards the point of the compass appropriate to his totem (Howitt, 453). This arrangement is extremely rare, if not unique. More usually the direction is determined by either the rising or the setting sun.

Thus the Ngeumba of New South Wales bury with the head towards sunrise (Mathews, 72); the Awemba of Central Africa (*JAI* xxxvi. 157), the Maidu of California (*Bull. Am. Mus. Nat. Hist.* xvii. 243), and the Wichita bury with the head turned to the east. On the other hand, the Lillooet (*Jesup Exped.* ii. 269), the Mancagnes of Senegambia (*L'Anthrop.* xvi. 63), and the Brignans (Clozel and Villamur, *l.c.*), agree with the Christian populations of Europe in burying in the reverse direction. The Solomon Islanders bury with the feet turned inland (Codrington, *Melanesians*, Oxford, 1891, p. 254). Tribes which preserve a tradition of migration to their present habitat, frequently bury with reference to the direction from which they believe their ancestors to have come. For this reason some of the Bantu tribes of South Africa bury so as to face the North (Dannert, 3; Kidd, 248). This practice seems to be connected with a belief that after death the soul journeys back, as among the Miao of the Chinese province of Kwei-chow (*Anthropos*, iii. 409), to the ancestral seats of the race. Among the Wanyamwezi of East Africa a man who dies in a strange place is buried with his face to his mother's village (Burton, *Lake Regions of C. Afr.*: Lond. 1860, ii. 25). Muhammadan peoples bury so that the dead may face Mecca.

3. *Coffins.*—The corpse is further defended against external influences by a case or coffin. In the early stages of culture a coffin is wanting; and, if it is deemed desirable to protect the body from the earth, this is done by means of the niche or recess at the bottom of the grave-shaft so common in Africa, or a covering of boughs is laid over it before the earth is thrown in. Even yet some peoples in a comparatively high stage of civilization reject a coffin. Wood is the usual material for a coffin. Originally, probably a hollowed tree-trunk, as still among the Niamniam (Frobenius, 410), it has evolved into elaborate forms, painted, as among the Ibouzo on the Niger (*Anthropos*, ii. [1907] 102), or carved, as among the Eskimo and Indian tribes of the North-West of America, and the Dayaks of Borneo. These carved coffins or grave-boxes, however, are not intended to be put under ground. In this connexion the richly carved sarcophagi of late Roman and early mediæval times will be recalled.

A very general custom prevails in South America, where the art of pottery is developed, of putting the dead into large urns. In pre-historic Crete it was a well-known practice to enclose the body in a terra-cotta chest called a *larnax* (*Archæologia*, lix. 396–400). In Japan, bodies were often buried in sarcophagi of wood, stone, or terra-cotta (*Archæologia*, lv. [1897] 474). The Chinese, when, as often happens, especially among the rich, the dead are disinterred to be buried elsewhere in accordance with the demands of *fung-shui*, place the bones in large earthen jars (de Groot, iii. 1058; Lunet, 90). The Tagbanuas of the Philippines bury children in jars (Sawyer, 313). Under the floors of pre-historic temples in Palestine numerous remains of new-born children have been found buried in jars (Frazer, *Adonis*[2], 1907, p. 82). The Balearic Islanders, according to Diodorus, cut up the corpse, put the pieces into an urn, and erected a cairn of stones over it (Diod. Sic. v. 18). The bones, after being denuded of their flesh, were buried in urns by many of the tribes inhabiting what is now the United States (*Amer. Anthr.* vi., new ser. [1904], 660). A similar practice is recorded by a Chinese traveller in Tibet (*ZVRW* xx. [1907] 115). And the Kukis of Assam, after the body has undergone preliminary decomposition, clean and preserve the bones in a vase, 'which they open on all important occasions, pretending that in thus consulting the bones they are following the wishes of their deceased relative' (*ARW* xii. [1909] 448).

The burial of cremated bones in urns has been common wherever cremation was practised by peoples acquainted with the art of pottery. Burial in ships or boats has already been referred to. Sometimes, as among the Siusí of north-western Brazil, a coffin is fashioned out of the canoe of the deceased by cutting it in two and placing the body between the two halves (*Globus*, xc. 327). Lighter materials are often employed for the coffin. On the Gold Coast it is made of wicker-work, reeds, or bark (*Journ. Afr. Soc.* vii. [1908] 202). On the other hand, more than one coffin is sometimes employed in the case of a wealthy or important personage. In this wasteful practice African barbarians agree with the cultured peoples of Europe.

Nor is the object of a coffin always, or entirely, to protect the body. Possibly its original intention was to protect the living from the visits of the dead.

This was expressly alleged to Nelson by one of the western Eskimo as the reason for the grave-boxes in which the dead are deposited on the shores of Bering Strait. 'It was better,' he said, 'to keep the dead in grave-boxes, for it kept their shades from wandering about, as they used to do; besides, it was bad to have the dogs eat the bodies' (*18 RBEW* 312). The latter thus appears a mere subsidiary reason or after-thought.

Although, however, we may suspect the desire of imprisoning the deceased to have been a primary motive in the provision of a coffin, the desire to provide for his comfort in the grave was probably also—perhaps equally—present. That the intention of a coffin is not always to bottle up the soul with the body is clear in such cases as that of the Siusi just referred to, where a hole is left expressly to enable the ghost to go and come, and thus preserve its temporary connexion with the bones until the time for final severance arrives.

IX. Funeral ceremonies.—1. *Time of funeral.*—The length of time required to elapse between death and the funeral varies from a few hours to many months. Sometimes, as in the west of Africa and the Solomon Islands, it may extend for years, while the preparations for duly honouring the deceased slowly proceed. At length, however, the time comes when the solemn ceremony which is to sever the dead from the living is appointed to take place. The night is not infrequently reckoned the appropriate time.

The Hopi of North America conduct their funerals at night (*Ztschr. Ethn.* xxxvii. [1905] 634), the Dayaks of Sarawak at early dawn (*Anthropos*, i. 169). The Manansa of South Africa and the Negroes of the Lower Niger bury in the evening (Holub, *Seven Years in S. Africa*, Lond. 1881, ii. 240; Leonard, 159); while the Basuto dig the grave after dark, but defer the actual burial until just before dawn. It must be performed before the children wake, for they must not see the body (Martin, 90; *Journ. Afr. Soc.* v. [1906] 357).

The reason for the selection of the darkness as the season for burial seems to be that the survivors then cast no shadow, which is often confused with the soul, and hence that the deceased, or any evil-disposed spirit, would have more difficulty in capturing and retaining souls. The souls of children are particularly liable to attack. In the Southern Nicobar Islands, burial takes place at sundown, before midnight or early dawn, expressly in order to prevent the shadows—that is, the souls—of the attendants from falling into the grave and being buried with the corpse (*Ind. Cens.* 1901, iii. 209).

2. *Touching the dead.*—Throughout the rites and observances attendant on death, two motives—two principles—are found struggling for the mastery. On the one hand, there is the fear of death and of the dead, which produces the horror of the corpse, the fear of defilement, and the overwhelming desire to ban the ghost. On the other hand, there is the affection, real or simulated, for the deceased, which bewails his departure and is unwilling to let him go. Thus, though the touch or even the neighbourhood of the corpse causes defilement, there are not wanting peoples with whom it is a ritual necessity for mourners to touch the corpse.

The islanders of Mabuiag, Torres Straits, and the Negroes of Jamaica agree with the people of the British Isles and the neighbouring Continent in this requirement. In Europe the reason usually alleged is that it prevents being haunted by the deceased. The German-speaking population of Iglau in the hills between Bohemia and Moravia kiss the foot of the corpse that they may not be afraid, which we may interpret in the same sense (*ZVV* vi. [1896] 403); while in Montenegro every one who attends a funeral must kiss the corpse (*JAI* xxxix. 94). Among the Bulgarians all relatives kiss the right hand of the corpse, saying, 'Forgive me.' In addition, each of them who was born in the same month bends over it breast to breast and touches its head with his own thrice (Strausz, *Die Bulgaren*, Leipz. 1898, p. 450).

3. *Circumambulation.*—Another ceremony is that of walking round the corpse.

When the Argonauts in the poem of Apollonius Rhodius buried their dead comrade Mopsus, they marched round him thrice, in their warrior-gear. So among the populations of India which practise cremation, the son or other relative who lights the pyre first walks thrice round it. The custom of walking round the corpse, or the grave after burial, is recorded of peoples as far apart in space and in culture as the Central Eskimo, the Russian Lapps, the Buriats, the Shans, and the Arawaks of British Guiana. It has even been recorded as solemnly performed around the coffin of a clergyman's wife in Oxfordshire no longer ago than 1799 (*NQ* xi., 8th ser. [1897], 428). At Beauquesne in the Department of Somme (France), after placing the coffin in the grave the mourners go thrice round the grave backwards (*RTP* xv. 154).

The direction of the procession is probably sunwise, though it is rarely recorded; and it is usually performed thrice. There can be little doubt that the rite is magical, intended to keep the dead in the grave and prevent him from disturbing the survivors. Cf. art. CIRCUMAMBULATION.

4. *Carrying out the corpse.*—More widely spread still is the custom of taking the corpse out of the house by some other way than the ordinary door. Among peoples in the lower culture, from South Africa to Greenland, from Alaska to the farthest limits of Asia, the East Indian Archipelago and the isles of the Southern Ocean, where the huts are not provided with windows the dead are taken out by the smoke-hole, or a hole in the roof or side of the hut specially broken for the purpose, or, as among the Koryaks, by raising a corner of the tent. Where a window exists it is often utilized for the purpose. The hole is closed immediately after the passage of the corpse, the object being to prevent the deceased from finding his way back. As civilization progresses, the custom is gradually confined to the corpses of those that have died evil deaths.

A Norseman who, by his character or the circumstances of his death, was deemed, like Thorolf in the Eyrbyggia Saga, likely to give trouble after death was carried out in this fashion. On the Continent of Europe suicides are frequently thus carried out; and it would seem that the practice is not unknown in England (*NQ* iv., 8th ser. [1893], 189). Of the earlier and more general custom a relic has lately been discovered by H. F. Feilberg in Jutland, in a bricked-up doorway existing in some farmhouses and called the 'corpse-door' (*FL* xviii. [1907] 364). The Matse tribe of Ewhe carry out the body of a priest through a hole in the roof (Spieth, 756). The Wadjagga remove the corpse of a childless woman through a hole in the side of the hut opposite to the door (*Globus*, lxxxix. 200). On the island of Nias the same course is taken with a woman dying in childbed; while the Toba-bataks break up the floor of the house (the houses being all built upon piles) and throw down the corpse of such a woman, with imprecations, to men who are waiting beneath to tie it up fast. On the other hand, they take the corpse of an important man out through the wall (Kruijt, *Animisme*, Hague, 1906, pp. 264, 252). All these dead are formidable, either from the manner of death or from character and position.

Among the Masurs of East Prussia and in Bulgaria, when parents lose a succession of children, the last to die is taken out through the window (Töppen, *Abergl. aus Masuren*[2], 112; *ZVV* xi. 268). Here, perhaps, the successive children dying are regarded as the same child returned and re-born (Hartland, *Prim. Pat.* i. 200). In that case the object is to prevent access by the dead infant to its mother, that she may not bear it again.

5. *Other precautions against return.*—To prevent the return of the dead, it is not enough to take out the corpse by an unusual way. The dead man must be prevented from seeing the way back. It is for this reason that the body is carried out feet foremost—a practice shared by the civilized nations of Europe with the savages of Mabuiag in Torres Straits (*Torres Str. Exped.* v. 248). Or he must be confused and puzzled.

The Christian Indians of Tumupasa agree with the Basuto in changing the place of the door of the hut (*Int. Arch.* xiii., Suppl. 92; Martin, 91). The Atonga swing the corpse to and fro (Werner, 161). The Siamese not only break an opening through the house-wall, but having got the body out they hurry it at full speed thrice round the house (Tylor, *Prim. Cult.* ii. 23). The Chams turn the bier about from time to time, and by marching obliquely they cause the corpse to take the most diverse positions, in order to bewilder the soul and hinder it from returning home (Cabaton, 47). Analogous

practices are found in Europe. In Leitrim the longest possible road is taken to the churchyard (*FL* vii. [1896] 181); and it is probably for the same reason that both in Ireland and in Germany the corpse is carried thrice round the church.

In various places in Europe a number of precautions are observed. The chairs or benches on which the coffin has rested are thrown down (East Prussia; Iglau). The coffin is lifted thrice over the threshold and thrice rested upon it—an indication to the deceased that this is a solemn and final farewell (Styria; Wends; Mordvins). An axe is laid on the threshold or hung over the door as soon as the corpse has passed (East Prussia; Sweden).

Water (in some places the water used in washing the corpse) is thrown out, with or without the vessel containing it, after the funeral procession (East Prussia; Poland; various parts of Germany). In Greece not only is water thus poured out and the vessel broken, but also all the water stored in houses along the route is thrown out after the procession has passed (*JAI* xxiii. 35, 41; Rodd, *Cust. Mod. Greece*, Lond. 1892, p. 124). More than one motive has probably gone to form this custom. Purification may be intended; but the object also is to prevent the return of the dead, for they, like other supernatural beings, have a difficulty in crossing water. In Greece, indeed, the custom of flinging out water is said to ease the burning pains of the dead—a later and probably Christian interpretation.

In Brittany the dead of the commune of Plouguiel are carried across a small arm of the sea called the Passage d'Enfer, instead of being taken by land (a much shorter route) to the cemetery (*RTP* xv. 631). In the same way the Haida carry a shaman to his burial by water, even though the burial-place can be reached more easily by land. It is said that they do not fear a dead shaman like other dead people, but they want 'to handle his things,' and hence, we may conjecture, to pack him off so that he cannot return to interfere with them (*Jesup Exped.* v. 53). In Sweden, linseed is strewn outside the house to prevent the deceased from appearing as a 'wandering spirit.' It is a common belief that supernatural beings must in such a case count the seeds—a task that will occupy them until daylight. The practice of strewing seeds is, in fact, another attempt to puzzle and confuse the ghost. So the Swedes also strew hay-seed on the road and about the grave, believing 'that Satan is thereby deprived of his power over the deceased'—which may be a Christianized form of the superstition (Lloyd, 131, 134). Among the Iban of Sarawak, ashes are strewn over the footprints of the bearers to prevent the soul of the dead man from finding its way back to the house to haunt the living (*Anthropos*, i. 169). The practice would appear to be not unknown in some parts of Europe. A few years ago at Budapest a woman who was supposed to have died in hospital returned home. She was taken for a ghost. The doors were slammed against her, ashes were strewn on the ground, and her husband refused her admittance (*Daily Chron.*, 30 Aug. 1904). The barefooted dwellers on the Congo strew thorns along the path from the house to the grave (*ZVV* xi. 266). In the Solomon Islands 'the return from the funeral is by another road than that along which the corpse was carried, lest the ghost should follow' (Codrington, 254)—a practice likewise followed in Corfu (Rodd, 124). Many peoples erect barriers against the ghost in returning. Thus the Koryaks (who cremate the body) strew twigs around the pyre, representing a dense forest which is supposed to surround the burning-place. An attempt is made to obscure the tracks of the officiant, and a line is drawn across the road, over which the mourners jump and shake themselves. This line is supposed to represent a river. The Chukchi customs are similar. A small cup and the bunch of grass used in washing the corpse are hidden separately on the path: the one will transform itself into a sea and the other into a dense forest (*Jesup Exped.* vi. 112, vii. [1904-9] 528). It should be pointed out that it is by such means that the hero or heroine escapes in stories, including the incident of the Magical Flight from the pursuit of the Ogre, and that the Chukchis and Koryaks are only making use of means of defence familiar to them in their traditions.

These specimens of the various methods of preventing the return of the dead will suffice for the present. Reference will be made to others below.

6. *Reluctance of the corpse.*—The dead man is often supposed to be reluctant to quit his home. Among the Nawār, or Eastern Gypsies, as well as among other Arab tribes, he goes the length of forcible resistance, compelling the bearers even to return and leave him for two or three days unburied—to the great detriment of the public health (Jaussen, *Coutumes des Arabes au pays de Moab*, Paris, 1908, pp. 100, 105). The Negroes of Jamaica aver that, when a dead body wishes to go forward, it is easily carried; when it does not wish to go, it gives great trouble (*FL* xv. 453).

A ceremony is performed on Car Nicobar which is perhaps a dramatic representation of the unwillingness of the dead to be buried. The funeral procession is met by another band of men who drive the bearers back by force, struggling over the corpse, some dragging it towards the grave and others towards the village, until it often falls to the ground. An eye-witness on one occasion tells us that the women and children, who stood at a distance, began to cry out for fear lest the corpse should forcibly enter the village. In the end, however, it was picked up and thrown into the grave in a heap, and then the usual sacrifices were offered (*JAI* xxxii. 218, 221). The ceremony was said to be performed only in the case of men of the highest repute (*ib.* 222).

7. *Farewell speeches.*—Men, however, have not been content with such broad hints to the dead and defences against their return as described in previous paragraphs. They have told them in plain terms that they are not to come back, that the separation is definitive; and a considerable part of the funeral ceremony is often devoted to this purpose, enforced both by speech and symbol.

Among the Bataks of Sumatra, prior to the burial the *begu* (soul or individuality of the deceased) is made to understand by a Shamanistic ceremony that it belongs no more to the living, and must not consort with them. Then, after a dance, a vessel filled with *djerango* (a specific against the *begu*) is carried round it. Some parts of the body are rubbed with a piece of it, and it is thrown on the corpse with the words: 'Thy younger brother (or mother, or other relative) will converse with thee no more' (*ARW* vii. 503). During cremation among the Chams, a man, who bears the significant title of Master of Regrets, is left behind at the house. His business is to curse it and then to adjure the deceased not to come back to torment his family (Cabaton, 48). The Muong or Mon of Northern Tongking perform an elaborate series of rites with this object. They begin on the night following the death. The witch-doctor comes and recites invocations, accompanied by a bell to drive away evil spirits. He advises the soul of the departed to go to the other world and find relatives who have preceded him thither. In order to guide him in his journey he enumerates these relatives by name, pointing with his finger towards the spots where they have been buried. Then he casts lots to ascertain whether the dead man has understood him. If the lots be unfavourable, he begins again as many times as may be necessary. The second night a ceremony is performed in honour of the ancestors, and also of the tutelary spirit of witch-doctors. These are prayed to show the deceased the way to the dwelling of the superior genii, with whom he will find help; and the witch-doctor again casts lots to ascertain if he has been understood. The third night the ceremonies and offerings are specially in honour of the tutelary spirit or genius of witch-doctors, who is requested to conduct the soul to the grave where the body will lie, and which has been dug during the day. Before the procession starts for the grave, the witch-doctor again casts lots to satisfy himself that the soul knows the way to the tomb. At the grave two altars have been improvised, one in honour of the *manes* of the deceased, and the other dedicated to the genius of the earth. Amid the wailing, the witch-doctor prays the former not to torment the survivors, and the genius of the earth to keep him in peace (Lunet, 350).

The Lolos of Western China give the deceased specific instructions as to the route he is to take. On the way to the grave 'the priest recites the *Jo-mo*, or Road Ritual, and he accompanies the coffin a hundred paces from the house. This ritual begins by stating that, as in life the father teaches the son, and the husband the wife, it is only the priest who can teach the dead man the road that his soul must travel after death. The threshold of the house is first mentioned, then the various places on the road to the grave, and, beyond that, all the towns and rivers and mountains that must be traversed by the soul till it reaches the Taliang mountain, the home of the Lolo race. Here the priest says that he himself must return, and entreats the dead man to pursue his way beyond the grave alone. The dead man then enters Hades, and stands beside the Thought Tree and the Tree of Talk, and there he thinks of the dear ones left behind and weeps bitterly. After this ritual is read, the priest returns to the house, and the coffin goes on to the grave' (*JAI* xxxiii. 103). On the island of Serang, in the Moluccas, the priest prays the previously dead to do no harm to the soul, but cordially to receive it, winding up with a prayer to the Lord Heaven and the Lord Earth to let all sicknesses go away from the commune with the soul of the deceased (Riedel, 141). On the Western Continent similar intimations are given to the departed. Before the body of a Hupa was lowered into the grave, he was addressed: 'Don't be lonesome for what you have left. While you were living your time came. May it be well with the people where you used to live!' This, we are told, is to prevent the ghost's return and consequent misfortune to the family (Goddard, 70). More coarsely among the Greenlanders a woman waves a lighted

chip to and fro behind the corpse when it is taken out of the house or tent, crying: 'There is nothing more to be had here!' (Crantz, i. 237). In Central Africa, likewise, as among the Awemba, a speech is made over a man's grave, promising that the survivors will take care of his wife and children, and expressing the hope that he will become a good spirit in the next world (*JAI* xxxvi. 157; cf. *Journ. Afr. Soc.* v. 436).

8. *Death at a distance from home.*—The desire to find one's last resting-place at home, among one's kindred and friends, is natural to man; and it has been translated into a number of ceremonial prescriptions which emphasize the necessity of such a burial.

Sometimes, as among the Lillooet of British Columbia, the deceased is buried in a temporary manner where he dies, and the following year his bones are brought home to be buried with his kindred. If this is impossible, the body is burnt and the ashes carried home (*Jesup Exped.* ii. 270). Sometimes only a single bone is brought home, as in the case of Roman soldiers. Among the Ho of Togoland, when a man of importance is killed in war, he is buried on the spot; but later the grave is opened, his bones, hair, and nails are taken out, put into a coffin, and carried home, or at least his brothers on the maternal side must bring home his finger- and toe-nails and his hair (Spieth, 277). A large proportion of the modern Albanians (at least of the men) die away from home, owing to their migratory habits. Their bones are collected and sent home; or at any rate the skull or a single bone is brought back (Rodd, *op. cit.* 127). When a Spartan king was killed in war an image was buried in his place (Herod. vi. 58). In some of the villages around Cosenza an image is made of a member of the family dying away from home, and laid on his bed, and the rest of the family standing around bewail him (Dorsa, *Usi e nelle credenze pop.*, 1884, p. 93). At Ouessant in Brittany, when a sailor died at sea, a cross was taken to the house and made to represent the corpse. In the isle of Sein his portrait was laid on it, or, in default, some object that had belonged to him. The clergy attended, and a funeral procession and service took place over this representative of the body (*RTP* vi. [1891] 156, xiv. 346). When a man belonging to the Man Tien of Northern Tongking dies at a distance from his home, the priest calls back his souls (for a Man Tien is endowed with a plurality of souls), and causes them to enter a doll made for the purpose, to which funeral honours are then accorded (Lunet, 258). In Montenegro a dummy body is made with the clothing of the deceased; wailing and all other rites except actual burial are performed over it (*JAI* xxxix. 92). Among the Basoga a few of the relations go a little way from home, cut a twig, wrap it up in bark-cloth and treat it in all respects as the corpse, all the ceremonies being performed upon it, including burial (Cunningham, 118).

Proceedings like these are doubtless much more than mere make-believe to the people who indulge in them. Probably in the first instance a relief to the feelings of the survivors, they must be held to be of real value and importance to the deceased, who attains by their means his due place in the other world and the rest which can come only by means of the proper ceremonies. See, further, § XI.

X. **Grave furniture and food.**—The dead must be gratified with food, and with some or all of his most cherished worldly possessions. The practice of depositing these, either in the grave or upon it, is literally world-wide. Both fear of the dead and affection for him have concurred to carry it very often to extravagant lengths. Few examples will be required of a rite so well known.

1. *Food and drink.*—

In Tanembar and Timorlaut, two of the Moluccas, when children under two years of age die, the mother milks her breast into their mouths before burial (Riedel, 306). So, when an Urali of the Dimbhum jungles is about to be buried, a cow buffalo is brought near the car on the burial-ground, and a little milk drawn and poured three times into the mouth of the corpse (Thurston, vii. 255). The practice of placing food and water on the grave is recorded of several of the Australian tribes; it is sometimes continued for many days (Howitt, pp. 448, 455, 467, 474). Among some of the Hill Tribes of Assam, these offerings to the dead are kept up for a year (*ARW* xii. 453). Some of the Papuan tribes plant taro beside the grave (*ZVRW* xix. 163). The Iroquois, who practise sub-aerial burial, deposit with their dead a sack of flour, flesh-meat, his spoon, and generally whatever may be necessary for one who has to take a long journey (*1 RBEW* 140, quoting de la Potherie). The Achomawi Indians of California placed with the body quantities of food consisting of dried fish, roots, herbs, etc. (*ib.* 151). In Guatemala, provisions of maize and flesh were given (Stoll, *Die Ethnologie der Indianerstämme von Guatemala*, Leyden, 1889, p. 71). The Warraus of Guiana laid round the body bread, fruits, and dried fish (*Int. Arch.* xiii., Suppl. 55). And it may be said generally that similar practices are recorded of all the tribes on the American continent.

The Agni of West Africa provide the deceased with blood (reminding us of the incidents recorded by Homer, *Od.* xi.), food, and drink (Clozel and Villamur, 25). Of drink, brandy, pombe, or rum is commonly given among the Negroes. On the Lower Niger, two casks of rum or palm-wine are poured over the grave to supply the departed with spirit to entertain his friends in the next world (Leonard, 166). These customs are followed not only by the Negroes, but by most of the branches of the wide-spread Bantu race. The Kaffir tribes in the south slaughter an ox and lay a portion of its entrails on the grave. The Baganda in the north bring food and pour beer over the grave.

But it is not only in the islands of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, and among the ruder peoples of Asia, Africa, and America that the practice of providing the dead with food and drink obtains. The civilized Koreans agree with the Mannâns, one of the Hill Tribes of Travancore, in putting into the mouth of the corpse a quantity of rice (*JAI* xxv. [1896] 347); *Ind. Cens. Rep.* 1901, xxvi. 349). The carcasses of sheep and oxen, with jars of honey and oil, were among the gifts added by Achilles to the pyre of Patroclus (*Il.* xxiii. 166); and remains of the funeral banquet have been found carefully placed in graves of the prehistoric population of Greece. Nor has the custom of giving food to the dead ceased even yet in the south-east of Europe among populations of Greek tradition. In Bulgaria, for three days after a burial, women go every morning to the grave, kindle tapers, fumigate it with incense, and pour over it wine and water. On the fortieth day a woman goes with a priest carrying a cake, some *kólliva* (a funeral food made of boiled grain, sugar, almonds, sesame, parsley, and pomegranate seeds), and a bottle of wine, all of which she places on the grave, 'that the earth may be cleared from the eyes of the departed.' The priest repeats prayers, fumigates and levels the grave, digging a hole in it, into which he pours water and buries some of the food. Nor is this all. On every commemorative festival for the dead, the women go to the grave with their tapers and incense, and pour wine or water over it. Moreover, fruit (formerly also other food) is often laid on the grave. Widows whose deceased husbands were much addicted to coffee have been known to pour black coffee daily into an opening in the grave-mound (Strausz, *Die Bulgaren*, 1898, pp. 451–53). In Macedonia, an apple, a quince, or some other fruit is thrust between the feet of the corpse before the funeral (Abbott, *Macedonian FL*, 1903, p. 197). In Montenegro, apples are thrown into the grave; and, in some parts, oranges and bits of bread are among the objects hung on a young tree planted at the head of the grave (*JAI* xxxix. 93). Elsewhere, some of the *kólliva* cakes baked for the commemorative festivals are broken up over the grave, the rest being consumed by the mourners or given away (Rodd, 126). Amélineau, the distinguished Egyptian scholar, reports that at Chateaudun, in France, he has known a widow place a cup of chocolate on her husband's grave every day, for more than a year (*RHR* lii. [1905] 10 n.). The Wends and Kashubs, Slav populations of North Germany and Prussia, put a lemon into the hand of the corpse; and, among the Wends, children are said to be supplied with eggs and apples; while men addicted to drink are given pipe and brandy-flask, otherwise they will have no rest in the grave (Tetzner, *Die Slawen in Deutschland*, 1902, p. 462; von Schulenburg, *Wend. Volkst.*, pp. 113, 119). In Croatia there is a wide-spread custom of setting eggs, apples, and bread on the newly made grave for the hungry soul, and offerings of food are brought at every Hallowmass (*Globus*, lxxxv. [1904] 39).

The Bulgarian priest, as we have seen, digs a hole in the grave, more conveniently to pour down the water and bury the food. At Tronis, in ancient Phocis, was the grave of the hero-founder, who was daily worshipped with sacrifices: and there was a permanent hole communicating with the interior of the tomb, through which the blood of the victims was poured, while the worshippers consumed the flesh on the spot (Paus. x. iv. 7). Frazer, commenting on the passage, has adduced a number of cases of Greek and Roman tombs in which a permanent passage for food and libations has been found, and parallels from various parts of Africa, Peru, the East and West Indies, and elsewhere.

These examples might without difficulty be added to; but a more or less permanent communication between the living world and the interior of the grave was sometimes, as we shall find hereafter, made for other purposes than the supply of food.

2. *Wives and dependents.*—Another custom, almost too well known to need illustration, is that of killing, or burying alive with the corpse, his wives, his slaves, and other dependents or friends. This custom attains its greatest extension, of course, at the funeral of a chief or king. Its object is to provide for his comfort and his dignity in the other world, by giving him suitable companions and retinue. The best-known example is that of *satī* (*q.v.*), by which the Hindu widow was burnt alive on her husband's pyre—a rite abolished in British India in 1829, but still surviving in the native State of Nepāl. The rite was probably common to Aryan-speaking peoples while in a state of savagery, but abandoned as they progressed in

civilization, and re-introduced, after centuries of disuse, among the Aryan conquerors of Upper India, for reasons that can now only be the subject of conjecture, and perpetuated under the ecclesiastical influence of the Brahmans. Several of the non-Aryan tribes of India practised, until quite recent times, the analogous rite of burying alive slaves, or making a raid for heads to adorn the tomb (Crooke, *Things Indian*, Lond. 1906, p. 446, also *Anthropos*, iv. 473).

We need not follow the custom throughout the world. But, as showing that it prevailed among Aryan-speaking peoples, it may be of interest to recall that it is recorded by Cæsar and Mela of the Gauls, who practised cremation (Cæs. *Bell. Gall.* vi. 19; Mela, iii. 2), and the Thracians (Mela, ii. 2); that it is known in the Irish legends (O'Curry, *Manners and Cust.*, Dublin, 1873, i. cccxx.); and that the slaughter and cremation by Achilles of the twelve valiant Trojans on the pyre of Patroclus are only to be thus explained, though the fashion had changed before Homer's day. Among the Bulgarians of the Volga it was found by the Arab traveller, Ibn Fadhlan, in the year 921 or 922, when he witnessed the immolation, on a young chief's funeral pyre, of a girl, who seems to have been formally wedded to the dead youth before being thus sacrificed (*RHR* lii. [1905] 325). The old Slavs appear likewise to have put to death wives, companions, and slaves at the funeral of a person of importance; and, when they buried an unmarried man or woman, a wedding scene was enacted during the ceremonies—an obvious relic of such incidents as that recorded by Ibn Fadhlan.

Such relics are found elsewhere. Among the Bavenda in the Transvaal, if a virgin boy dies, a girl is sent after him into the other world to be his wife there. She is not now actually put to death; the witch-doctor knows of a ceremony which is quite as effectual for the benefit of the dead boy as her death (*JAI* xxxv. 381). Among the Wadjagga, or Wachaga, a Bantu tribe of Central Africa, another series of ceremonies is appointed for each of the widows, whereby 'she frees herself from death'—possibly here the contagion (*Globus*, lxxxix. 198). The Tolkotins of Oregon, with whom cremation is the rule, force the widow on the funeral pile; but, though they scorch her more or less severely, they do not burn her to death (*1 RBEW* 145).

It is, for obvious reasons, rarer to find a husband put to death with a wife than the converse. But probably the story told in the *Arabian Nights* of Sinbad, who was buried alive with his dead wife, was founded on a barbarous custom really practised by some tribe in the East.

The husband of a woman of the blood-royal of the Natchez was required to submit to this rule (*1 RBEW* 187). In Ashanti, with the king's permission, any of his sisters may marry a man who is pre-eminently handsome, no matter how low his rank and position may be. But a man of low rank who may have thus married one of the king's sisters is expected to commit suicide when his wife dies, or upon the death of an only male child; and any attempt to evade compliance is promptly defeated (Ellis, *Tshi-speaking Peoples*, Lond. 1887, 287).

After the abandonment of the custom of putting to death relatives and dependents, its relics continue to exist often for ages. Centuries ago it was abolished in Japan, China, and Korea; but the living slaves once sacrificed were for long, and indeed still are in places, represented by figures in permanent or perishable material, according to the wealth or lavishness of the survivors. To the same origin are due the statues and statuettes of servants and family found in Egyptian tombs. The Man Quâng Trang, of the province of Hung-Hoa in Northern Tongking, build a small hut beside the barrow, and place near it a doll representing a man or a woman, to be the companion of the deceased. Striking the doll, they bid it look well after him (Lunet, *op. cit.* 275).

It is perhaps necessary to add that many of our accounts of the immolation of human victims on the occasion of a death represent some, at all events, of the victims as dying willingly, or even committing suicide. It is conceivable that voluntary deaths may, in a certain number of cases, be the result of intense grief. The vast number, however, of deaths apparently voluntary are, as in the case of the Hindu widow or the dependents of a Gaulish chief, constrained by custom and the knowledge that refusal, while it destroys the religious merit of the act, will entail compulsion, or at least that life will be speedily rendered intolerable.

3. *Property.*—It is probable that in the beginnings of human civilization, when a man died, his entire property was destroyed, or left with the body, whether buried or simply exposed. This, in fact, is still done by many tribes in various parts of the world (see § XIX.). Its primitive purpose may have been to escape the death-pollution which would attach to everything closely associated with the deceased. His meagre property would be in a sense identified with him, and must therefore be put away from among the living. Such a practice, it is obvious, if everywhere persisted in, must have prevented that accumulation of wealth which has rendered progress in the arts of life possible. Consequently, most peoples have learnt to cut it down to comparatively small dimensions, giving only a selection from the goods left behind by the deceased, or reducing their gifts to a mere symbol.

(*a*) *Domestic animals.*—In a comparatively early stage, domesticated animals are often the chief wealth. Such animals are slaughtered not merely as food, but to accompany their owner into the other world. When a Herero dies, certain of his favourite cattle are at once killed, expressly in order to prevent the ghost from returning and molesting the survivors. On the following day the rest of his favourite cattle are slain as a sacrifice to the dead, and the horns are arranged on a tree adjacent to the grave (Dannert, 49). The Abipones of South America, who bury with their dead their entire property, or burn it in a bonfire, when a chief or a notable warrior dies, ceremonially stab the horses that were dearest to him, and fix them on stakes around the grave (*Int. Arch.* xiii., Suppl. 61). The Tangkhuls of Manipur kill a buffalo, in order that the creature may go with the dead into the next world and butt open the gates of heaven, which are kept shut against him (*JAI* xxxi. 307). Here the buffalo officiates as psychopomp; in other countries it is the dog. Whether it was in this capacity that some of the Lillooet hunters' dogs were killed does not appear. Their bodies were suspended from the four poles usually erected over the grave to sustain the ornaments, weapons, tools, and other valuables of the deceased, or such of these objects as were not buried with him (*Jesup Exped.* ii. 269). In pre-historic barrows of England, animal bones are frequently found. Where they are not of accidental occurrence, however, they are usually the remains of food deposited with the dead. But in one Late Celtic interment, at least, the skeletons of horses have been found with the remains of a chariot (Greenwell, *Brit. Barrows*, Oxf. 1877, p. 456). In Prussia, in graves of the Neolithic age, the war-horse has been found buried with the warrior. In Russia, what are called Scythian barrows and *kurgans* (pre-historic grave-mounds) frequently yield the remains of horses; and similar relics are recorded of Frankish graves on the Rhine, as well as of Magyar and Polish graves dating from heathendom, and of the various heathen tribes of Siberia. Some, like the Poles, buried also the falcon and the dog with their master (*Int. Arch.* i. [1888] 53). In all these cases the animals appear to have been designed not by way of food, but in order to accompany the deceased for use or state in the life after death.

(*b*) *Goods.*—Only a few of the more interesting examples can here be enumerated of a custom practically universal from the remotest times of which either history or archæology yields any record. The Negroes of Jamaica, when they think a man has been killed by witchcraft, bury him fully armed and equipped to take vengeance on his slayer (*FL* xv. 88). When a Tangkhul is killed by a tiger, a hunting-dog, a sharpened thorn, and a strong spear are put into the grave, that the deceased may have a helper and weapons to defend himself if he chance to meet a spirit-tiger on his way to heaven (*JAI* xxxi. 306). The Alsea Indians of Oregon placed goods of all kinds with the corpse, because the bodies were animated, and moved about at night if they so willed. Easy exit from the graves was afforded, and the things deposited were for use of the dead in such circumstances (*Amer. Anthr.* iii., new ser. [1901], 241). Pre-historic burials in the Aleutian Islands have been found, in which the corpse has been mummified in a lifelike posture, dressed, armed, and provided with implements, as if engaged in hunting, fishing, sewing, etc. With these burials have been found effigies of the animals that the deceased was supposed to be pursuing, also religious masks and paraphernalia, all the objects, however, being models in carved wood (*Contr. N. Amer. Ethn.* i. [1877] 90). Among the objects put into the grave by the Thompson Indians was the medicine-bag or guardian-spirit of the deceased (*Jesup Exped.* i. [1900] 328).

In Europe the corpse is often provided with corresponding gifts. In some districts of France, if the deceased could read, his Book of Hours was put between his hands; if he could not, it was enough to put the rosary over his arm. A twig of box blessed on Palm Sunday was often placed between his fingers; and, both in France and in Spain, it is believed that this branch will blossom every spring in the tomb if he be found worthy of entering heaven (Laisnel de la Salle, *Croyances et légendes du centre de la France*, Paris, 1875, ii. 72). Among the Wends of the Spree Valley and Lusatia, among the Masurs, and in Pomerania, a hymn-book is put into the coffin (von Schulenburg, 110; Toppen[2], 108; Knoop, *Volkssagen . . . aus dem östl. Hinterpommern*, Posen, 1885, p. 164). In the 17th cent. it seems to

have been not unusual, in various places, to put a knotted cord either into the hands of the corpse or upon the grave. The object of doing so, it may be conjectured, was to enable the dead to perform a penitential exercise neglected during life, or to deceive the powers of the other world into the belief that he was an assiduous penitent. However that may be, the practice was condemned as superstitious by the Synod of Ferrara in 1612, but with so little effect in France that Thiers, in his *Traité des superstitions*[2] (1697), thought it necessary to repeat the prohibition (Liebrecht, *Gerv. Tilb.*, 1856, p. 226). In the same century a French physician and traveller found among the Russian Lapps the custom of putting into the corpse's hand a purse with money, to pay for entrance into Paradise, and a passport addressed to Saint Peter and signed by a priest. A variant custom was to put a number of kopecks, or other small coins, in the mouth of the corpse, and in its hand a testimonial to the character of the deceased, addressed to Saint Nicholas by the bishop of the locality (*ZVV* xi. 434, 435). The anxiety shown in Europe to provide the dead with every comfort sometimes goes beyond the verge of grotesqueness. The Prussian Lithuanians, when the coffin has been put into the grave, open it, put a few coins under the corpse's head, a piece of earth on either shoulder, adding some of the small treasures of the deceased, and, if he were a magistrate, his whip (Tetzner, 85). In Voigtland, where the objects which the departed most delighted in are assiduously laid in his grave, his umbrella and goloshes have been known to be included (Köhler, *Volksbrauch im Voigtlande*, 1867, p. 441). In some ancient graves in Württemberg, attributed to the Alamanni, is found on either side of a body a wooden foot in the form of a last. It is conjectured that these artificial limbs are intended as toll to the ferryman, or to the keeper of the bridge of the dead, or the porter of the under world, in redemption of the real limb (*ZVV* xi. 457). But they may be intended to supply the place of a limb lost by accident in the long journey from this world to the place of the dead.

Perhaps the most pathetic of all objects found in graves are the toys buried with children. They are found almost all over the world, not less in Europe than elsewhere. The sarcophagus of a child named Crepereia Tryphæna, of the time of the Antonines, found at Rome in 1889 and now in the museum of the Capitol, contains, besides her betrothal ring, her jewels and her doll. The Masurs lay nosegays and gilded apples in the hands of children, so that when they reach Paradise they may be able to play on the great meadow provided for that purpose (Töppen[2], *l.c.*). The Wends give eggs and apples to their dead children (von Schulenburg, *l.c.*). The sterner Bosnians consign them to the other world with their school copybooks and slates (*ZVV* x. [1900] 119).

To women, who frequently own no property except their toilet utensils and personal adornments, household implements and those of their daily occupations are given. But all the objects buried with the dead are by no means his property. It is a widely spread custom for the survivors to add contributions, sometimes of large amount—a custom practised in all stages of civilization, equally by some of the Australian tribes and by the Bulgarians of Europe, who throw money into the grave before it is filled up (Strausz, *Bulgaren*, 450).

The tendency to economy in these deposits begins with the accumulation of property, though its operation is sporadic and uncertain. It may be said in general terms that among most peoples the entire property of the deceased is not buried or destroyed at his death. The greatest sacrifices of property would, as a rule, be on the death of a king or great chief. And even in those cases a part would be given for the whole, or a symbol for the reality. In burials of the Late Bronze or Early Iron age at Hallstatt and in Schleswig, rude images of oxen have been found (*ARW* v. [1902] 5); and Capt. Lyon found a decayed model of a canoe under a cairn beside an old Eskimo grave on Southampton Island (Boas, *Eskimo of Baffin Land*, p. 61). The models of boats, granaries, houses, and so forth, recovered from Egyptian graves, were doubtless all intended to do service in the other world for the originals. Gaulish warriors were buried sometimes in their chariots with their horses; but often enough, both in England and in France, excavations reveal the fact that no more than the wheels had ever been placed in Late Celtic graves (Greenwell, 455 ff.). The coin so frequently put into the mouth of the corpse, from the far east of Asia to the Atlantic Ocean, is usually interpreted as an obolus for the ghostly ferryman or the porter of the other world. This may be its use; but it is probably only an economic survival of the practice of giving a larger amount of property as an outfit for the other world and for the journey thither. Sometimes only old and worthless things are given; sometimes merely a pretence of giving is made. Both customs are illustrated in funerals of the natives of the Tami Islands, to the north-east of New Guinea. The ancient practice was to set the body afloat on the ocean in a canoe. Those of them who cling to the practice provide an old and miserable canoe, with mast, rudder, and sails equally bad, often merely indicated. The valuables of the deceased are laid on the platform of the canoe, with a couple of coconuts, but taken away again before the canoe is pushed into the sea (*ARW* iv. [1901] 344). In some parts of the Tyrol the convenient theory is held that the dead man cannot be happy if buried with any money or rings about his person. Careful search is therefore made, and these objects are removed to avoid any such misfortune (Zingerle, *Sitten des Tir. Volkes*, Innsbruck, 1871, p. 49).

The objects buried or left on the grave are often broken and rendered useless. This is said to have been done in order to prevent stealing. Thus, among the natives of British Central Africa, ivory and beads are first ground to powder, in order, we are told, to make them useless to witches and robbers (Werner, *Natives of Brit. Cent. Afr.*, 159). The real reason for this widely diffused custom lies deeper. In the eyes of the people who practise it the breaking of the object is the equivalent of the death of the human being to whose service it is dedicated. It is thus killed in order that its ghost may follow the ghost of the dead into the spirit-world, there to serve the purposes which it served in this world when whole. Thus the Ho of Togoland lay broken cooking-pots on the grave, expressly to serve the deceased for cooking-pots in the other world (Spieth, 634). The Hupa of California lay in the grave, with the corpse, his clothing, weapons, and other property, shell-money and dance-regalia—all first destroyed by breaking. On the grave are placed dishes and utensils, four large burden-baskets, each with a hole burnt in the bottom and a stake driven through it. Clothes, torn into strips, are hung on the poles laid across the grave. The reason for destroying the articles buried is said to be to prevent grave-robbery. But the same people tell us that all the objects accompany the spirit to the under world (Goddard, 71). We are, doubtless, justified in believing that the prevention of grave-robbery is a secondary reason.

An interesting case is reported from Lincolnshire, in which a widow put her husband's mug and jug on his grave, having first broken them. She told the rector: 'I was that moidered with crying that I clean forgot to put 'em in t' coffin. . . . So I goes and does t' next best. *I deads 'em both over his grave*, and says I to mysen, My old man, he set a vast of store, he did, by yon mug and jug, and *when their ghoastes gets over on yon side* he'll holler out, "Yon's mine, hand 'em over to me," and I'd like to see them as would stop him a-having of them an' all' (*FL* ix. [1898] 187). Thus the anxiety to provide the dead with an outfit for the other world, which is the real intention of the customs just passed in review, whatever secondary motives may have come to be mixed up with it, lingered in England down to the last quarter of the 19th cent., and perhaps lingers even yet in remote districts.

4. *Objects used in the funeral rites.*—We have now reached a class of objects put in, or upon, the grave for a different reason. They are not necessarily the property of the dead; but, having been used in the funeral rites, they are contaminated with death, and are no longer fit for the service of the living, lest they spread the infection further.

Hence the Yakuts break and throw on the grave-mound the shovels, the sledges, the stakes—in a word, everything used in the funeral (*RHR* xlvi. 211). The Apache also leave the shovel on the grave (*Am. Anthr.*, new ser., vii. [1905] 493); the Melanesians of Efate throw it into the sea (*Rep. Austr. Ass.* iv. 727). The Warundi, in Central Africa, throw on the tomb the door of the hut, and the basket with which the earth has been taken out of the grave (van der Burgt, 39). Among the Baganda, all who have taken part in the burial must wash their hands with moist plantain fibre, and the fibre thus used is put on the grave (*JAI* xxxii. 47). The Negroes in Jamaica, as we have seen, often throw on the grave the water in which the corpse was washed (§ VI. 5). In Europe similar practices are found. In France the bowl which has contained the holy water used for aspersion during the ceremonies is thrown into the tomb; and formerly in Brittany the incense brazier was buried with the coffin (Laisnel de la Salle, ii. 79). In Central Silesia everything used for the toilet of the corpse—the comb, sponge, rags, soap, and so forth—is put into the coffin. Even the needle and thread used for sewing the shroud must not be removed, but left hanging to it (*ZVV* iii. 151). But economy sometimes prevails. In some parts of Brunswick the bier and tools remain only for a few days on the grave (*ib.* viii. [1898] 437). It is as if the infection were then at an end. Another motive may, however, be present: they may be placed there to keep the dead man down as long as there is any chance of his returning, and be removed when this is over. The author cited adduces in favour of this suggestion the fear of the dead betrayed in the haste with which the relatives left behind in the house, when the funeral procession has started, shut the door in order that the dead may not fetch any one else. But this is a wide-spread custom.

5. *Blood and hair.*—Among many peoples, the delirium of grief, or more often perhaps (in accordance with well-established custom) the desire to divert suspicion of having caused the death by witchcraft, and the fear of the deceased himself, lead the mourners frantically to cut and wound, and even to mutilate, themselves.

The practice was forbidden to the ancient Hebrews by the Deuteronomical legislation (14[1]); hence we may conclude that it had been previously in use among them, as well as among their neighbours. It is universal among the Australian Blackfellows, and is reported from Polynesia, Melanesia, the East Indian islands, and from North and South America. In very many of these cases the custom is to let the blood drip over the corpse. Of Australian tribes, we are definitely informed that after the body was placed in the ground the mourners stood or knelt over it in turn, and were struck by a large boomerang on the head until the blood flowed over the corpse. In other cases the blood drips upon the grave after it has been filled in (*JAI* xxiv. [1895] 187; Curr, *Austr. Race*, Melbourne and Lond. 1886–87, ii. 179; Spencer-Gillen[a], 507, 509; *FL* xiv. [1903] 336). Among the Orang Sakei of Sumatra the kindred, making a cross-cut with a knife on their foreheads, drop the blood on the face of the corpse (Wilken, *Haaropfer . . . bei den Völkern Indonesiens*, Amsterdam, 1886–1887, p. 19). Four North American Indians from Montana, who were executed for murder at Helena, on the head-waters of the Missouri, in December 1890, were mourned by two squaws. One of the squaws cut off two of her fingers and threw them into the grave. The other gashed her face. Both caused the blood to flow into the grave (Letourneau, *L'Év. rel.*, Paris, 1892, p. 187).

We may assume, without much risk of mistake, that the rite in its complete and undegraded form included the dropping of the blood upon the dead body, and where this is not done the rite is in decay. Probably also it is only persons standing in certain specific relations with the dead who are commonly expected to perform it. This is certainly the rule with some of the Australian tribes. We may suspect it of other peoples also. If it has not been recorded, that may be because the point would be likely to escape not merely the casual traveller, but any one whose attention has not been specially drawn to it. But it is by no means invariable (*e.g.* the Arawaks mentioned below, § XVII. 1). The meaning of the rite has been the subject of much discussion. It is not merely a propitiatory offering; it may be this, but it is much more. A comparison of the blood-covenant and other blood-rites renders it almost certain that one object, at least, is that of effecting a corporal union with the dead. But is that the only object? First of all, there can be no question that the intention is to cause suffering to the survivors. This will be better discussed when we come to the section on 'Mourning' (§ XVII.). Further, human blood is frequently given for medical purposes, or to strengthen the recipient (Strack, *Das Blut*, 1900, 27 ff.; Spencer-Gillen[a], 461). It is, therefore, not impossible that the object of letting the mourners' blood drip over the corpse may be to strengthen the dead man for his life in the next world. This would be quite consistent with the avowed intention of expressing sorrow or pity (*Torres Str. Exped.* vi. [1908] 154). But there is, so far as the present writer is aware, no evidence pointing decisively to this interpretation. Moreover, it is always necessary to remember that rites different in intention are often similar in expression—a fact which makes their interpretation a matter of peculiar difficulty.

Parallel with the rite of dropping blood on the corpse is another mourning rite—that of cutting or tearing the hair and burying it with the corpse, or dedicating it at the grave. It is even more widely diffused than the former.

At the cremation of Patroclus his comrades cut off their hair and heaped it on the body; and Achilles, cutting off the golden lock that his father had vowed to offer at his return home to the river Spercheios, put it into the dead hands to bear away (*Il.* xxiii. 135-141). So the mourners among the Sioux cut locks of their hair and fling them on the body; and these locks are bound up with it, and with the dead man's valuables, before it is put into the grave-box or coffin (*1 RBEW* 159). Locks of human hair have been found with mummies in the ancient cemetery on the bay of Chacota, in southern Peru, and a large lock of soft human hair was found beneath the head of an infant (*Rep. Peabody Mus.* xi. [1878] 285 ff.). Arab women cut their hair on the death of a husband, or of a father, or other near relation, and spread the tresses on the tomb, or hang them on stakes or cords above it (Jaussen, 94; Hartland, *LP* ii. 220); while among the Râji of the United Provinces of India 'the children of the deceased and his younger brothers get their heads, beards, and moustaches shaved, and the hair is thrown on the grave' (Crooke, *TC* iv. 213). Among the Chechenes of the Caucasus the long queue of hair of the widow of the deceased is cut off and thrown into the grave; down to the middle of the 18th cent., it is said, her ear used to be thus sacrificed (*Anthropos*, iii. 735). The practice is not yet obsolete in modern Europe among the Montenegrin women. Not very long ago, indeed, when the men habitually shaved their heads and suffered only one long crown-lock to grow, that was cut off and thrown into the grave (*JAI* xxxix. 93).

But, as with the dropping of blood, it is by no means everywhere that the hair is dedicated in this way. It is often burnt.

The Bilqula of British Columbia, and some of the Central Tribes of Australia, *e.g.*, dispose of it thus (*Brit. Assoc. Report*, 1891, p. 419; Spencer-Gillen[b], 507, 520). The latter, indeed, sometimes mix it with some of the hair of the deceased and make it up into a girdle, which is worn by the avenger of the dead during the punitive expedition (Spencer-Gillen[b], 543; cf. 514).

More usually, however, we are not told what is done with the hair. In some instances this may be due to omission to observe, or forgetfulness to record, on the part of the reporter, a portion of the rite that is of importance. In the majority of cases we are probably right in assuming that the disposal of the hair is not an integral portion of the rite—that, in fact, the rite has ended with the cutting of the hair. Whether the dedication of the locks at or in the grave, or by burning, has in such cases ceased by ritual decay, or whether the dedication never took place, it is difficult to say. One object, at all events, of the dedication of the hair is, like that of the blood, to form a bond of union with the dead. The converse rite of taking a lock of hair of the dead may be said to be world-wide. Nor is it confined to a lock of hair: it extends in some cases to the nails and pieces of the garments. In the West Indian island of St. Croix the persons who wash the corpse prior to burial always take a lock of hair, a garment, or at least a fragment of a garment, in order to prevent the spirit from molesting them (Hartland, *LP* ii. 319). It must be borne in mind that, according to the theory of sympathetic magic, any portion of a human being, such as hair, nails, skin, bones, and so forth, which has become detached, is still, in spite of separation, in effective sympathetic union with the body of which it once formed part; for the personality inheres in every part of the body. The doctrine extended to the effigy, the

clothes, the property, and even to the personal name; so that anything done to any of these objects affects the owner as if it were done directly to him. He is in a sense present in each of them. Not only, therefore, if I take a lock of a dead man's hair do I establish effective union with him so as to prevent him from inflicting any harm upon me; but, conversely, if I give him a lock of mine or a drop of my blood, we are bound together by a similar bond. It is sometimes suggested that, as in the case perhaps of the dripping of blood, the throwing of hair on, or giving it to, the corpse is an attempt to endow the dead with some of the vital strength of the survivors. This is, according to savage theory, not impossible; but there is no direct evidence in support of it. Another suggestion is that it is a relic of human sacrifice to the dead—the gift of a part for the whole, or a mere symbol. Human sacrifices, as we have seen, are common enough. Evidence, however, of the intention of a gift of hair, as a commutation of the practice of human sacrifice, does not, so far as we know, exist. It would seem more likely in the gift of blood or of severed members, such as those of the Montana squaws above cited; but even there proof is wanting. On the other hand, there is evidence that sometimes where the rite is not completed by giving the hair to the corpse the intention is merely purification, as where the hair is cut at the end of the mourning.

Before leaving the subject it may be added that, while among many savage peoples there is weeping as well as blood-letting over the corpse, in Europe it is believed that tears ought not to be allowed to fall on the body. Even to weep overmuch, apart from the corpse, is wrong, because it prevents the dead from resting in the grave. There are many stories in European folklore of the dead who have appeared to survivors to reproach them with their excessive grief, and have exhibited their shrouds wet with their tears. Further, it is most important not to allow anything worn by a survivor to be buried with the corpse, or put into the grave. To do so means decline and death to the person to whom the article belongs; hence it is sometimes done maliciously, and is reckoned witchcraft.

6. *Fire.*—In the lower culture it is not unusual to light a fire at or on the grave—a practice common in Australia, where the reason assigned is to warm the ghost. The tribes about Maryborough add a further reason: to keep away the spirits of dead blacks of other tribes, or of bad men of their own tribe (Howitt, 470).

These fires at or on the graves are maintained for varying periods, according to the tribe, or the amount of affection for the deceased; and sometimes several are lighted. The same custom is found on several of the Melanesian islands and those of the East Indian Archipelago (*L'Anthrop.* xiii. 775; *JAI* xxxiii. 120; *Rep. Austr. Ass.* iv. 711; *Anthropos*, i. 23, iv. 465; Haddon, *Torres Str. Rep.* v. 249, 260; Riedel, 142, 143; Kruijt, 310), among various peoples of Further India and Assam (Lunet, 330; *JAI* xxxii. 135, xxvi. 200), among the insular Caribs and tribes of South America (*Int. Arch.* xiii., Suppl. 57, 59, 81). In North America, the Tarahumares of Mexico, who bury in caves, light a fire the first night after burial. All their burial-caves are consequently blackened with smoke (Lumholtz, *Unknown Mexico*, N.Y. 1903, i. 70, 383). The Seminoles of Florida make a fire at each end of the grave and keep it up for three days, while after nightfall torches are waved in the air, that the bad birds of the night may not get at the dead man (*5 RBEW* 521). The practice of lighting fires at the grave is reported of the Hupa (Goddard, 70, 72) and the Yurok on the other side of the continent in California (Powers, *Contrib. N. Am. Ethnol.* iii. [1877] 58). The latter believe the fire is necessary to light the spirit of the departed on its perilous journey to the other world. The same belief and consequent practice were known to the Algonquins; and the Klamath of the North-West keep up a fire for the three days which are occupied with the funeral ceremonies, holding that, until they are finished, the soul of the dead is in danger from O-mah-á, said to mean the devil. In addition to lighting the fire, the survivors howl around the grave in order to scare away the demon (*1 RBEW* 107).

From the numerous remains of fires in the pre-historic burial-mounds of the United States there seems reason to conjecture that at one time the practice of lighting fires at the grave extended over a wide area, of which the modern instances cited may be the survival (*5 RBEW* 17, 25, 47, 71, 78).

More than one reason, as we have seen, is alleged for the custom. On the one hand, it is to warm the ghost, and to light and comfort it on its way to the other world; on the other hand, it is to drive away evil-disposed beings. The use of fire and lights for the latter purpose is widely extended. It is, beyond reasonable doubt, the origin of the European practice of the lights in the death chamber, of the candles sometimes put into the dying hands, of the consecrated tapers that surround the coffin at the funeral. Similarly, lights are kept burning in the chamber with a new-born child and its mother, as a protection against witches and fairies; and they are used for the like purpose on many other occasions. But there is another reason equally potent, namely, to keep away the dead man himself. This reason may not be operative in all cases, as in Australia where it is definitely believed that the ghost haunts the fire on the grave, or among the Yurok where it is required to light the ghost in its perilous passage of a greasy pole across the chasm to the other world. But in other cases it is clear that the fire is a defence against the dead man himself.

One Australian tribe is said to go the length of cutting off the corpse's head and roasting it in the fire made upon the grave. When the head is thoroughly charred, it is broken up into little bits, which are left among the hot coals of the dying fire. 'The theory is that the spirit, rising from the grave to follow the tribe, misses its head and goes groping about to find it; but, being bereft of its head, it is, of course, blind, and therefore, not being able to see the fire, gets burnt. This frightens it so terribly that it retires into the grave with all expedition, and never again presumes to attempt a renewal of social intercourse with the human denizens of this world' (*JAI* xiv. [1885] 88). We have already seen that among the Eskimo of Greenland a lighted chip is waved behind the corpse when it is taken out of the house, with a clear intimation to the dead to be gone (§ IX. 7). In the Southern Nicobars a fire is made, even before the burial, at the entrance of the hut, out of chips from the bier and coco-nut husks, on purpose to bar the ghost; while, before the grave is filled in, the spirits of those present are waved out of it by a torch, thus rendering unmistakable the intention to place a barrier of fire between the living and the dead (*Ind. Cens. Rep.*, 1901, iii. 209). So, too, among the Ewhe of Togoland, who bury under the hut, a fire is maintained during the whole period of mourning, and strongly smelling herbs are burnt in it to keep the ghost at a distance (*Globus*, lxxxi. [1902] 190). The same motive may account for the practice in some districts of Europe of burning on the road from the house to the cemetery, after the funeral procession has passed, the straw on which the corpse has lain (*Am Urquell*, vi. [1896] 201).

XI. Precautions against haunting.—1. *Burying the soul.*—Ceremonies of the kind referred to in § IX. 8 seem to be directed to securing the soul, in default of the body, and performing over it the funeral rites. This was expressly the case in China (de Groot, iii. 847). But it is not only where the body is not obtainable that the soul is buried.

Several of the tribes of Northern Tongking collect the souls of the deceased and bury them, either with the body or apart in a separate grave (Lunet, 163, 244, 274). The mixed Melanesian and Polynesian population of Savage Island stand in great fear of the *aitu*, the spirit of the departed. Their injunction to a dying man is: 'If you leave us, go altogether.' At the burial, heavy stones are thrown upon the grave to keep the *aitu* down. Prior to the burial they spread a piece of white bark-cloth beside the body, and the insect that first crawls upon it is carefully wrapped up and buried with the body; it is the *mo'ui*, the soul. Further, a dome of concrete is made over the grave to prevent the ghost from rising (Thompson, *Savage Island*, Lond. 1902, p. 52; *JAI* xxxi. [1901] 139). So the inhabitants of the Nicobar Islands bury beneath the body a cloth carefully wrapped up, which is believed to contain the soul (*Int. Arch.* vi. [1893] 24). Among some of the Ewhe of Togoland, when one has been fatally bitten by a snake (one of the kinds of evil death), on the ninth day after burial the witch-doctor starts before dawn for the place in the bush where the deceased was bitten. His object is to fetch the soul. He takes only one man with him, so as not to frighten it. He performs incantations, summons the soul, and addresses soothing words to it. Presently he is joined by the young men of the village, who unite in endeavouring to console the ghost. They dig up the earth from the spot where the fatal wound was given, and put it in a jar, which is bound with some white fabric. The jar is put on the head of somebody who has previously met with the same accident, but has recovered; and with the firing of guns the procession returns to the house. Thence, accompanied by those

who have remained at home, they proceed to the place in the bush where the unfortunate man has been buried. They set the jar upside down on the grave and leave it there: it contains the soul (Spieth, 290; cf. 756, 760). Among the Brassmen of the Lower Niger a man who dies with unhealed sores (therefore 'a bad death') is buried apart from the ordinary burial-place. But his soul is afterwards evoked, and with an elaborate ceremony embodied in a wooden figure and buried in the proper place (Leonard, 168).

2. *Binding and mutilating the body.*—The intention of burying the soul is to prevent its wandering about, haunting the survivors, and perchance causing them misfortune or death. This is, of course, by no means the only precaution. We have already met with many, and there are some others which must be noticed here. The binding of the body in the attitude proper to burial (see § VIII. 2) has this at least for one of its objects. It is indeed often expressly reported as the object (e.g. *JAI* x. 145). It is said in Lincolnshire that 'when the corpse is placed in the coffin you must never forget to tie the feet, else the dead may return, or some other spirit may take possession of the body for his own purposes' (Gutch and Peacock, *Lincs. County FL*, 1908, p. 240). The practice of tying the feet, or at least the great toes together, is, in fact, not uncommon in Europe.

But binding is not enough. We saw that the sinews and the backbone were sometimes cut.

The Basuto and Bechuana are not alone in these practices; they are found in other African peoples. The customs of Australia are even more revolting. The Herbert River tribes beat the corpse with a club, often so violently as to break the bones; and incisions are made in the stomach, on the shoulders, and in the lungs, and are filled with stones (Howitt, p. 474). A tribe in Western Australia, as has been mentioned, burns the head and breaks up the charred bones, for the express purpose of preventing the deceased from haunting the survivors. It is said that certain of the Negroes of Bahia break all the long bones and twist the neck of the corpse (Rodrigues, *L'Animisme fétichiste des nègres de Bahia*, 1900, p. 119). When one has been killed by lightning, the Omaha of North America are accustomed to bury the body on the very spot where the death occurred, face downwards, and the soles of the feet previously slit (*JAFL* ii. [1889] 190). The practice in Europe, though not literally identical, has been parallel down to within the lifetime of the present generation. It is not very long since suicides were buried at cross-roads with a stake through the body. Another way of dealing with them was to cut off the head and place it between the legs. A mediæval corpse which had suffered this mutilation was found a few years ago in a stone coffin in Royston Church, near Barnsley (*FL* xii. 101). Bodies have been found with the same mutilation in a cemetery in Albania, dating probably from the 4th or 5th cent. A.D. (*L'Anthrop.* xii. 663); it was well known throughout Europe in the Middle Ages, and was practised as lately as the year 1892 among the Lithuanian population of Somenishki in the Government of Kovno (*Am Urquell*, v. [1894] 87), in the latter case avowedly that the deceased might not be in a condition to 'walk' and injure the fields; for suicides are believed to 'walk' in the shape of Germans, or else as he-goats, to mislead wayfarers, or with the weapon or cord in their hands with which they have taken their lives. They injure the fields by causing hail and storms; and the touch of their bodies blights the earth: hence they are buried in waste places (*Am Urquell*, iii. [1892] 50, 52, 53).

The cremation of vampires has already been mentioned (§ VII. 3 (*g*)). A dead man who gave trouble among the ancient Norse by haunting was often taken up and burnt. Sometimes milder measures were successful, as in the case of Thorolf Halt-foot, who was removed to another grave with a wall so high that none but fowl flying could cross it (Morris, *Ere-dwellers*, 1892, p. 92). The fencing of graves is by no means always to protect the dead; probably it is quite as much for the protection of the living. Thus the Cheremiss fence the grave with stakes that the dead may not get out and walk the fields (Smirnov, *Pop. finnoises*, i. 138). Many of the South American tribes with the same object stamp down the earth upon the corpse; and the Achagoas even cover the grave with mortar and carefully fill up every morning any cracks that may have taken place (*Int. Arch.* xiii., Suppl. 93, 96). Cists, urns, coffins, and grave-boxes also serve the purpose of shutting in the dead, that they may not torment the survivors; and perhaps this was their original intention. Among the natives of South Australia it seems to have been the custom to stop and fasten up all the orifices of the body, doubtless to keep the ghost within (*JAI* viii. [1879] 393)—a practice adopted by the Malays (Skeat, *Malay Magic*, p. 401). The inhabitants of Nias bind not only the fingers and toes, but also the jaws, and put stoppers in the nostrils to keep in the soul (Modigliani, *Nias*, 1890, p. 283). A more barbarous precaution is practised in Bulgaria, where sometimes a needle is stuck into the navel of the corpse (Strausz, *Bulgaren*, 454). On the islands of Ambon and Uliase, in the Moluccas, this form of protection is used only in the case of women dying in child-bed. In such a case thorns and pins are stuck between the joints of the fingers and toes, in the knees, shoulders, and elbows, eggs of hens or ducks are laid under the chin and armpits, and a portion of the corpse's hair is brought outwards and nailed fast between the coffin and its lid. These elaborate precautions are intended to prevent the deceased from getting out of the coffin and flying away in the form of a bird, to plague men and pregnant women. Even if she succeeded in getting out, it is believed that she would not forsake the eggs (Riedel, 81).

It should, however, be said that the corpse is sometimes wounded with quite a different intention from that just mentioned. The Puri of South America open the breast to let out the soul (*Int. Arch.* xiii., Suppl. 87). Another South American tribe, the Lengua of the Paraguayan Chaco, in accordance with a well-known principle of sympathetic magic, cut open the stomach of one whose death they attribute to witchcraft, and insert a stone and some charred bones. This is supposed to revenge the death by killing the wizard (*JAI* xxxi. 296; cf. Hartland, *LP* ii. 109). Some of the Naga tribes of Assam wound the corpse on the head, that the deceased may be received as a warrior with distinction in the other world (*JAI* xxvi. 198; *ARW* xii. 454).

XII. Return from the funeral.—The deceased being thus comfortably provided for and admonished by word and deed to stay where he has been put, or to go into the other world, and in any case not to meddle with the living, the mourners return from the grave. What they have to dread is that, in spite of these and other precautions, the ghost may attach himself to them and thus succeed in getting home again. For, as is obvious from what has already been said, the dead man is regarded as by no means willing to be deprived of the society to which he has been accustomed. Accordingly the burial is often conducted with the greatest haste.

Thus among the Bontoc Igorot of Luzon, when the corpse has been put into the coffin, it is hustled away with the help of many willing hands; no time is wasted at the graveside; the filling up of the grave is done in the shortest possible time—probably, in the case witnessed by Jenks, not over one minute and a half; and away the mourners hurry, most of them at a dog-trot, to wash themselves in the river (A. E. Jenks, *Bontoc Igorot*, 1905, p. 78). On the other hand, so deeply defiled are the members of the family considered by the Papuan tribes, and so impossible is it for them at once to get rid of the ghost, that they erect a hut on the grave and there camp for six weeks or more, the widows in particular huddled in one corner away from the rest, invisible and unwashed (*ARW* iv. 345). The Ojibwa widow springs over the grave and then runs zigzag behind the trees, as if she were fleeing from some one. She thus dodges the ghost of her husband, that it may not haunt her (Jones, *Ojebway Indians*, 1861, p. 99).

Specimens of the obstacles put in the way of the ghost have already been given. Without going over the same ground, a few examples may here be noted of the methods of preventing the ghost from attaching itself to those who have taken part in the last rites.

The Batak priest, as the grave is being closed, beats the air with a stick to drive away the souls of the living men (*ARW* vii. 504). In the Southern Nicobar Islands the family return to the hut, where they sleep. The next day it is purified by brushing and washing, the mourners bathe and are anointed on the head and shoulder by a priest, and a lighted torch is waved 'to drive away the spirits' (*Ind. Cens. Rep.*, 1901, iii. 209) In North-Eastern Rhodesia all spit on the grave when it is filled up, and return to the village without looking back. This is now said to be a precaution against giving a clue to some watchful hyæna to dig up the body; it is more likely that the custom originated in a precaution of a different sort (*Journ. Afr. Soc.* v. 436). The Masurs of Eastern Prussia hold that the deceased accompanies the first bearer home, whereupon the latter asks him: 'Have I made thy bed properly? If not, I will make it better.' Only then is the ghost appeased and goes back to the grave (Töppen[2], 110). The Mordvin mourners stop a little distance from the graveyard, and one of the gravediggers, with the same tool that he has used to dig the grave, draws a circle round them. This is repeated twice. When they reach the house, the oldest woman of the family throws in their way a log and a cutlass, over which they step. The intention of the cutlass is to frighten the deceased, who, according to popular belief, is at their heels (Smirnov, i. 364). In the Babar Archipelago four stakes with cross-beams are set up over the grave and a piece of coarse red cotton stuff stretched across them in the form of a canopy. A piece of rotan is fastened to one of the stakes, and one end of it is held by the villagers present. The rotan being held taut, the head of the household, counting from one to seven, cuts it in two with one blow of his parang. The end left in the hands of the survivors is brought back by one of the kin to the house of the departed, as a symbol that all intercourse with the departed is broken off, and that he now belongs to the kindred in the other world (Riedel, 359). The firing of guns and beating of drums, so usual at a funeral in various parts of Africa, is probably intended to drive away the ghost. Elsewhere, as in Melanesia, it is avowedly hunted away.

XIII. **Lingering of the soul.**—The unwillingness of the soul to sever its earthly ties is not easily overcome. So far from retiring into the other world when the last breath has left the body, it habitually lingers at the place of death, or with the corpse.

The Huron ghost walks in front of the funeral procession, and remains in the cemetery until the feast of the dead; by night, however, it stalks through the village and eats the leavings of the food of the living (Le Jeune, *Jesuit Rel.* x. [1636] 143). In a Negro funeral in Jamaica the ghost sits on the coffin (*FL* xv. [1904] 208). The Korean ghost, more luxurious, rides in a sedan chair (*JAI* xxv. 351). About Königsberg, if you look through the gravedigger's arm when the coffin is being let down into the grave, you can see the ghost (*Am Urquell*, ii. 80).

In the belief of peoples in every part of the world it haunts the grave for a period variously stated from a few days to many months, or even an indefinite period. Indeed, as already indicated, the grave is often conceived as the permanent residence not merely of the body, but of the soul. Where the belief in a world of the dead is developed, the ghost usually departs at latest after the performance of certain rites to be discussed hereafter (§ XXI.). Meanwhile it is necessary to attend to its wants by the placing of food and sometimes a shelter on the grave. The tribes of Central Nigeria considerately leave a small hole in the grave-mound, where it may go in and out (L. Desplagnes, *Le Plateau central nigérien*, Paris, 1907, pp. 249, 257, 262). It even sets at defiance the precautions taken to prevent it from returning to its earthly home.

A common superstition in Europe is that a mother who dies leaving a suckling returns for six weeks after the funeral to suckle her little one. According to the Bulgarians, the ghost lingers for forty days in the house, and returns again on the first Easter Day until the first Whitsunday after the funeral (Strausz, 451, 458). The Minangkabau Malays of the Padang Highlands keep the seat and bed of the deceased clean and tidy for a hundred days, lest the ghost be offended; for it haunts the house during that period (*Bijdragen tot de Taal- Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indië*, xxxix. [1890] 70). Among the Yakuts the ghost wanders round the body, visits the places the dead man frequented in his lifetime, and tries to complete any work he has left unfinished. In the silence of the night the ghosts of men attend to the cattle and meddle with the harness, while the ghosts of women may be heard washing up the dishes, sweeping the rooms, tidying the granary or the chests, sighing and whispering the while. The survivors may sometimes even see them sitting tranquilly in the firelight or walking about the fields (*RHR* xlvi. [1902] 224).

XIV. **Purification of the survivors.**—When the funeral is ended, all who have taken part in it must commonly be purified. As the necessity for purification attaches also to all mourners, and is sometimes deferred until, or perhaps more frequently repeated after, the completion of the death rites, the examples following are, in order to avoid repetition, not confined to the immediate return from the funeral. The most usual methods of purification are by fumigation and bathing.

The Euahlayi of New South Wales fumigate themselves beside the grave at and after a burial. A widow covers herself with mud and sleeps beside a smouldering fire all night. Three days afterwards she and her sisters (who might have been her husband's wives) are chased down to the creek, where a fire has previously been lighted. She catches hold of the smoking bush; putting it under her arm she jumps into the creek with it and extinguishes it in the water. As it goes out, she drinks some of the smoky water. On emerging she is smoked at the fire and calls to her husband, who is supposed to answer her. Not until then is she allowed to speak; the only utterances permitted to her up to that time have been lamentations. On her return to the camp another fumigation, apparently of the entire population, is made, and she continues to wear mourning for many months (K. Langloh Parker, *Euahlayi Tribe*, pp. 86, 88, 93). Among the Northern Tribes of Central Australia the women are released from their ban of silence by a ceremony, of which the chief item consists in their brushing themselves all over with burning twigs taken from a fire they have lighted for the purpose (Spencer-Gillen[b], 554). Yakut grave-diggers, on returning from the cemetery, purify themselves at a fire made of chips of the coffin, before they enter the *yurt* (*RHR* xlvi. 211). When a Bechuana widower is married, both he and his new bride must undergo an elaborate fumigation (*JAI* xxxv. 307); among the Bangala one who touches a dead body is placed in a circle of fire for purification (*JAI* xxxix. 114). The Manganja mourners not only bathe, but rub themselves with 'medicine-water' (Rattray, *Some Folk-lore Stories and Songs in Chinyanja*, 1907, p. 94). The ancient Hebrews accounted every one who touched a dead body or a grave, or who came into the tent where a corpse lay, unclean for seven days; and he was excluded from the community and from all religious rites. He was sprinkled on the third and again on the seventh day with the 'water of separation,' in which were mingled the ashes of the sin-offering. So contagious was his uncleanness or tabu that it attached to everything he touched, and even to the clean person who sprinkled him. Moreover, the unclean man after the sprinkling on the seventh day was required to bathe, and both he and the clean person who sprinkled him had to wash their clothes; nor was either of them reckoned clean until the evening (Nu 19[13ff.] 51). Among the Bontoc Igorot of Luzon all who take part in the burial hurry to the river to wash (Jenks, 79). Among the Indians of the Paraguayan Chaco they drink hot water and then bathe in hot water. The near relatives are considered unclean for a time and are excluded from the village. Before re-entering it they purify themselves by washing in hot water and putting aside the tokens of their mourning (Grubb, *Among the Indians*, p. 44). The Lillooets of British Columbia hold the funeral feast immediately on returning from the grave. The members of the household of the deceased pass the next four days in fasting, lamentations, and ceremonial ablutions. Their hair is then cut, they are painted and oiled, the hair is tied up, and they hold a second feast with more cheerful countenances. A young widower often goes into the forest alone for a year, builds himself a sweat-house, and drives the 'bad medicine' of his dead wife out of his body by repeated sweating or hot baths. A young widow during the whole period of mourning undergoes continuous ceremonial washings or cleansings, for the double purpose of lengthening her own life and rendering herself innocuous to her next husband, who would otherwise be short-lived (*JAI* xxxv. 137 ff.). Among the Thompson Indians the widow or widower, immediately after the death, goes out and passes through a patch of rose bushes four times. Among other ceremonies, a widower washes in the creek and cleans himself with fresh fir-twigs morning and evening for a year. It is significant that any grass or branches on which a widow or widower sits or lies down will wither up (*Jesup Exped.* i. 332, 333).

The meaning of these ceremonies is probably expressed in the belief of the Pima of California, who hold that ghosts are uncanny things to have about; they are liable to touch sleeping persons, which is a summons to accompany the ghost back to the shades (*26 RBEW* [1908] 194). Hence the Lillooet widow must free herself from the ghost, both for her own sake and for that of her next husband. And the contagious character of the death-pollution is shown by the custom of the Hupa which requires every one who has touched a corpse to cover his head until purification, 'lest the world be spoiled' (Goddard, *Hupa Texts*, 1904, p. 224 n.).

In Europe similar beliefs and practices have prevailed throughout historic times.

The ancient Greeks put at the door of the death-chamber a vessel full of pure water obtained from another house, so that all who came out might purify themselves (Rohde, *Psyche*, i. 219). It is still a very wide-spread custom on the Continent to meet the funeral party, on returning to the house, with water and towel, that all who have taken part may wash their hands before entering. In Istria the water is poured over a firebrand (*Globus*, xcii. [1907] 88). In Central France, two generations ago, the members of the funeral party used to hasten to the nearest brook or pool. In some of the villages so contagious was the pollution held that, if the funeral procession passed any clothes hanging out to dry, the clothes were always washed again (Laisnel de la Salle, ii. 79, 80). In the Tyrol all inhabitants of the house are assembled and fumigated by the house-father before the corpse leaves the house; to be absent from this ceremony is to run the risk of a speedy death. In another district when a dead body is carried out, every one must forthwith wash his clothes, otherwise a second corpse will soon be borne out (von Zingerle, pp. 49, 50).

XV. **Funeral feasts.**—A feast is usually (in the lower culture invariably) a part of the funeral rites. Frequently, indeed, a feast is partaken of in the presence of the corpse, another (sometimes kept up for days, or repeated at stated intervals) on the return from the funeral, and a third when the rites are closed by the second funeral, or re-burial of the bones (§ XXI.), and the mourning comes to an end.

1. *Before the funeral.*—

Among the Gilbert Islanders, when the corpse's toilet is completed, the wailing begins. In the meantime a feast with dancing and songs is prepared outside the hut where the body lies; and every one in turn, after his wailing is over, goes and joins the feast, which lasts for three days before the interment takes place (*Int. Arch.* ii. [1889] 42). In the Cauca Valley, Colombia, the dried corpse was kept in the house for two months before burial, and during the whole of that period

drinking-bouts, dirges, and singing-contests took place in honour of the departed (*Globus*, xc. 305). The relatives and friends of a deceased Araucanian sit round the corpse on the bare ground and weep for a while. Others, weeping, bring food and drink, of which all partake (*Int. Arch.* xiii., Suppl. 105). At the death of an Ainu, a large cup of food or a cake of millet, and water or *sake*, are placed by the head of the corpse after it has been laid out. The corpse is addressed in a farewell speech, and invited to partake, before he quite leaves the survivors, of food and drink such as he loved, 'for this is our good-bye feast made specially for you.' After the food has remained by the corpse for some time, it is taken and reverently divided among the nearest relations. Millet cakes and *sake* are also brought into the hut and handed round to all present, every one, before drinking, offering two or three drops to the spirit of the dead. Part of the millet cake is eaten, and the remainder buried in the ashes of the hearth, a little piece by each person. After the burial these pieces are collected and carried out of the hut to the domestic shrine (Batchelor, *Ainu and their Folkl.*, Lond. 1901, p. 556). Among the ancient pagan Prussians the body was dressed and placed upright on a bench. The nearest relations then sat down beside it, carousing with beer and wailing (*FL* xii. 300; Tetzner, 23). The ceremony among the Masurs is more elaborate. A messenger is sent through the village to summon to the burial, and the company is usually numerous. On one side of the room where the corpse lies is a long table, the middle of which is occupied by the corpse, while all around it are seats for the men. The women sit at another long table on the other side of the room. After two tedious funeral songs have been sung, schnapps and curd-cakes are served. The schnapps for the men is served in bottles with one glass, out of which all drink in turn; for the women it is served in a bowl with a spoon, and every woman takes a spoonful or two as the spoon and bowl pass down the table. The curd-cakes are handed round in a white apron or a basket (Toppen[2], 103).

The custom of eating and drinking in the presence of the dead is wide-spread in Europe as elsewhere; further examples will be adduced hereafter.

2. *After the funeral.*—A feast follows the disposal of the body.

The Ainu mourners return to the hut; the men make sacred willow emblems, called *inao*, pray, eat, drink, and get helplessly intoxicated (Batchelor, 559). Among the Uriya of Orissa the feast occupies several days (Rice, *Occasional Essays*, Lond. 1901, p. 56). So the pagan Norsemen feasted for three nights. The Masurs, whose ceremony prior to the burial has just been described, on returning find the tables and benches so arranged that men and women, who had previously sat apart, can sit together; and the schnapps is mixed with honey and served in bottles. Sometimes it is burnt before being mixed, and is then called by a special name. At noon a meal of flesh-meat, fish, and groats thickened with honey is served. All day the men remain in the house comforting the bereaved, and likewise comforting themselves with the remains of the food and with drink; nor do they separate until the evening (Töppen[2], 104). In some places the corpse, before removal, is covered with a table-cloth, and the same table-cloth is put on the table at the subsequent funeral meal (*ib.* 111). In Ille-et-Vilaine neither wine, nor cider, nor coffee, nor liqueur appears at the table; the conversation is carried on in a low tone; as the guests finish they retire (A. Orain, *FL de l'Ille-et-Vilaine*, ii. [1898] 294). A great contrast is afforded by the Frisian population of the marshes on the right bank of the lower Weser. They hurry from the church to the house, where piles of cakes, long rows of wine-bottles, clay pipes, plates of tobacco, matches, and cigars await the guests, and the feast begins. Hitherto stillness and whispering have reigned in the house. Now eating and drinking know no bounds; soon the tobacco-smoke fills the house, until it is impossible to see three paces ahead; all tongues are loosened; chattering and jesting, laughing and drinking, the clinking of glasses and the general good humour increase from hour to hour (*ZVV* ix. [1899] 55). In various parts of Europe it has been found necessary to put a limit by statute or local regulation to the expenditure on the funeral feast and the other abuses connected with it.

Among many peoples the feast is held at, or even upon, the grave.

The Ojibwas, who deposit their dead on the ground and cover them with a light roofing of poles and mats, as soon as this is finished, sit in a circle at the head of the grave and present an offering to the dead of meat, soup, or 'fire-water.' This, except a certain quantity kept for a burnt-offering, is consumed by the mourners (P. Jones, *loc. cit.*). In the Nicobar Islands, the day after the funeral a feast is held at the grave 'in the presence of the dead,' at which the relatives and friends bind themselves, according to their degree of kindred with the departed, to abstain from certain food, drink, and enjoyment for a longer or shorter period, the longest terminating with the great feast of the dead, when all the ceremonies are concluded (*Int. Arch.* vi. 25). The Gilyaks burn their dead. When the cremation has been accomplished, they sit round and partake of the flesh of dogs, killed there and then at the burning-place to accompany the soul of the deceased. They eat a portion of it and throw the rest about in all directions, probably for the deceased, afterwards adjourning to the *yurt*, where further refreshments are provided (*ARW* viii. 473). The ancient Romans used to offer to the *manes* on the ninth day after the funeral at the grave; and the meal was taken there. The funeral meal is still, or was quite lately, taken in the cemetery at Argentière in the Department of the Hautes Alpes, France; and the curé and the family of the deceased sat at a table placed upon the grave itself. As soon as the meal was over, every one, led by the next-of-kin, drank to the health of the departed (Laisnel de la Salle, ii. 81). The custom is not merely wide-spread; it descends demonstrably from a great antiquity. Neolithic graves are often found containing remnants of a feast, in the shape of broken bones of animals and traces of a fire.

As already mentioned, the feast following the funeral is by no means always concluded at one sitting.

The ancient Norse were, and the Uriyas are, however, quite abstemious in this respect compared with some other peoples. In the Moluccas, on the island of Keisar, the kinsmen ordinarily feast for twenty days in the house of the dead, and, after enjoying all sorts of delicacies, wind up the solemnity with dog's flesh. The Tanembar and Timorlaut Islanders enjoy from ten to a hundred days' festivities (Riedel, 421, 306). The Lepers Islanders go on 'eating the death' for a hundred days (Codrington, 287); while the Malagasy outdo them all. The length and brilliancy of their feasts are, of course, proportioned to the wealth of the deceased. Rum flows without stint from morning to night; and every one present is more or less plunged in drunkenness. So long as there is anything to eat and drink the feast goes on, and nobody thinks of going away. The funeral feasts of high and noble persons have been known to last for months (*Mad. au xx^e siècle*, 284). Or, on the other hand, the feast may be renewed at stated intervals. The ancient Prussians held their funeral meals on the third, sixth, ninth, and fortieth days (Töppen[2], 111 n.). The Muhammadan Malays feast on the day of the funeral, and on the third, seventh, and fourteenth days (Skeat, *Malay Magic*, 407). The Chinese of Northern Tongking feast every seven days for a month (Lunet, 89). On the death of a Buriat shaman the funeral feast is held at the burning-place, and repeated on the third day, when his cremated bones are collected and deposited in a hole hewn in the trunk of a big fir, and the rites are at an end for the time (*JAI* xxiv. 135). This simplicity may be contrasted with the Fijian custom, which requires that wailing proceed in the house for four days after the death. On the fourth day a feast is held, and it is followed by others on the tenth, thirtieth or fortieth (when the tomb is dressed), and the hundredth days (*Anthropos*, ii. 74). Among the Patagonians the wailing lasts for fifteen days after a death. It is accompanied with feasting on horseflesh and drinking-bouts, and is renewed every month under the same stimulating influences, and closed at the end of a year with a three days' celebration (*Int. Arch.* xiii., Suppl. 103).

A feast is often held at the completion of the funeral ceremonies or of the period of mourning (see § XXI.).

3. *Object of funeral feasts.*—The object of these feasts is not simply hospitality to the invited guests; they indeed very often contribute their full share in kind. Nor is the object merely the enjoyment of those who partake, or a natural reaction from sorrow, or ostentation on the part of those who provide them. Doubtless some or all of these impulses do enter into the motives for the frequently repeated and usually extravagant displays, and the gluttony and carousing inseparable from them. But there are deeper reasons for the observance. The above reasons would be insufficient of themselves to account for the practice, shared by civilized Europeans with savage Ainu, of holding the first formal meal in the presence of the corpse, or on the grave, if they would not indeed positively repel it. Moreover, the ceremonial of such a meal is not always that of abandonment to the pleasures of the table and of social intercourse; and, finally, the deceased is himself, even after cremation or burial, regarded as one of the convives. The belief that the dead man is present and joins in the feast is very widespread, and is evidenced in more ways than one.

In the German districts of Prussia a seat is left for the dead man, and food and drink are placed for him. The old Prussians used to throw the food and drink destined for him under the table (Töppen[2], 111 n.). The Thlinket of British Columbia are divided into two intermarrying classes, descendible exclusively through women. When a man dies, his body is carried out by members of his wife's class, and the members of his own class give them a feast. Before distributing the food the name of the dead is pronounced, and a little of the food is put into the fire. By this means he is believed to receive it (*26 RBEW* 431; cf. 462). The utterance of the name is a call to its owner to come and receive his portion. In various Melanesian islands, when the name is pronounced, the chief mourner with some

of the food in his hand says expressly, 'This is for you,' and throws or puts it aside for the deceased (Codrington, 271, 282, 284). Among the Chinyaï or Chinyungwe, on the Zambesi, a portion of the drink and the blood of the slaughtered sheep are poured into the grave, through a hole made for the purpose (*JAI* xxiii. 421). The Veddas make an offering to the newly dead, and afterwards consume it themselves (*Rep. Oxford Cong. Hist. Rel.* i. 62). On some of the Moluccas the soul after burial is believed to haunt the neighbourhood of the house. On the fifth day a wooden image of the deceased is prepared, the soul is enticed into it, and a meal of rice, pork, and chicken is presented. The mouth of the image is daubed with some of the food, and the deceased is addressed: 'Eat, drink, and watch over us, that no sickness arise.' After the deceased has finished, the feast of the survivors begins, and lasts all night (Riedel, 395). It is not quite clear from the report whether they partake of the identical food that has been placed before the image; but probably they do. The Cheremiss, on the fortieth day, go to the cemetery to invite the dead man to join the feast and to bring him back. In one district one of the convives impersonates him dressed in his best clothes. He is seated in the place of honour, and is treated as the master; the widow of the deceased addresses him as husband, the children as father. All night he eats, drinks, and dances with the rest. In the intervals of the dances he relates his life in the other world and his pleasure at meeting again those who have predeceased him; he begs them not to sorrow on his account—rather let them oftener repeat the feast of commemoration (Smirnov, i. 143). So, the Kols of Chotā Nāgpur provide a meal in the dead man's house, to which they summon a man from the Mahali, a neighbouring mongrel tribe with whom they never otherwise eat. He comes to the banquet, and there represents the deceased. Until he has done this, no meal can be eaten in the house. When the meal is finished he departs, and the house is thenceforward pure, and no longer haunted by the dead man (Hahn, *Kolsmission*, 84). There is a similar practice among some of the North American tribes (M. A. Owen, *Folkl. of Musquakie Indians*, Lond. 1904, p. 83).

The ritual character of the meal is rendered obvious also by the fact that very often it consists, wholly or in part, of a special kind of food. Pulse was partaken of by the Romans, and it figures prominently in the funeral feasts of many parts of modern Europe. Cakes and biscuits of various kinds are also used, from Wales to the Volga and the Greek islands. It is probable that this ritual food represents the flesh of the corpse, and is a long-descended relic of funeral cannibalism. The Abbé Dubois, describing the ceremonies attending the cremation of the king of Tanjore, who died in 1801, and two of his wives, informs us that some of the bones which had escaped complete destruction were ground to powder, mixed with boiled rice, and eaten by twelve Brahmans. The object of this rite was the expiation of the sins of the deceased; for these sins, according to popular opinion, were transmitted into the bodies of those who ate the ashes (Dubois-Beauchamp, 366). This is precisely parallel to the old Welsh custom of 'sin-eating,' whereby, when the corpse was brought out of the house and laid on the bier, a man was found whose profession it was to perform the ceremony. A loaf of bread was handed to him over the corpse before the funeral procession started, and a mazar-bowl full of beer with a piece of money (in John Aubrey's time sixpence), 'in consideration whereof he tooke upon him (*ipso facto*) all the Sinnes of the Defunct, and freed him (or her) from walking after they were dead' (Aubrey, *Remaines*, ed. 1881, p. 35). In the Bavarian Highlands a different interpretation was put upon a similar practice. Formerly, when the corpse had been laid on the bier and the room carefully washed and cleaned, the housewife prepared the *Leichennudeln*, or corpse-cakes. Having kneaded the dough, she placed it to rise on the dead body before baking. Cakes so prepared were believed to contain the virtues and advantages of the departed, and to transmit to the kinsmen who consumed them his living strength, which thus was retained within the kin (*Am Urquell*, ii. 101). Perhaps we may interpret in the same way an obscure rite at the funeral feast of the Man Côc in Tongking. Before the meal begins, the priest presents to all the relatives in turn a piece of flesh to be smelt. At the meal each of the guests receives a piece of flesh, and the priest is paid with a leg of pork (Lunet, 245).

Similarly, in a MS of the 18th cent., preserved in the British Museum, it is related of the tribes about Delagoa Bay that they 'generally kill some beast in proportion to the ability of the deceased, and, digging a round hole, they lay the deceased at his full length; when, opening the beast, they take out the paunch yet reeking, and lay it upon the face of the deceased, and, after dancing round the corpse, tear this paunch to pieces and tumultuously eat it. This done, they bend the corpse round while warm and lay him in the hole, casting in some part of the guts [of the slaughtered beast], and closing the hole up; ending this odd funeral with dancing' (*Rec. S.E. Africa*, ii. [1898] 460).

Ritual food with another meaning is found among the Baganda, where fowls are, as a rule, tabu to women. The reason they assign for this tabu is that death came into the world by the disobedience of a woman, who insisted on returning to heaven for food for a fowl (see § II.). But at the death of a man a fowl is cooked, and each of his widows eats of it prior to the distribution of his widows and effects (*JAI* xxxii. 48).

The distribution of articles of food to persons, whether relatives, friends, or the poor, who do not share in a formal meal is an extension of the feast.

In Sardinia, on the seventh or ninth day after death savoury cakes are prepared and sent hot from the oven to all the relatives and neighbours, and to all who have joined in the funeral ceremonies; but the funeral supper is confined to the immediate family (*Rivista Trad. Pop. Ital.* i. [1893] 959). At Gainsborough, penny loaves used to be given away at funerals to all who asked for them (*Ant.* xxxi. 331). In Bulgaria the villagers bring fruit for the departed, or for the previously dead, and it is distributed among the children at the funeral (Strausz, 446). Among the Uriyas, on the death of a rich man, copper coins and fried rice are scattered as the funeral procession passes (Rice, 55). On the island of Mabuiag a heap of food is piled up close to the platform on which the body lies, and afterwards divided among those present. Again, a few days afterwards, when the skull has been removed and cleaned and is handed over to the relatives, another quantity of food is provided by the mourners, and distributed to those who have assisted at the funeral. In both cases it seems to be consumed at home (*Torres Str. Rep.* v. 250, 251).

The money doles given to the poor in our own country are probably a commutation of the distribution of food (see Brand and Ellis, ii. 192). The analogous customs in India and elsewhere may be set down to the same cause. Doubtless, however, all have been affected by ecclesiastical influences. The fact that the gifts frequently include lavish doles and entertainments to ecclesiastics, both in Europe and in Asia, is evidence very difficult to gainsay.

Often the feast is merely a farewell banquet—a send-off of one who is unwilling to go—at the termination of which the deceased is formally but firmly shown the door.

Thus about Königsberg, in Prussia, a place is set for the dead man at the feast, in order that he may share it; and, when it is over, the bearers open all doors, that the ghost may depart (*Am Urquell*, ii. 80). The ancient Prussians used to drive the ghost out, saying: 'Be off! you have eaten and drunk' (Tetzner, 23). Among some of the Brazilian tribes, at the end of the feast, the widow, accompanied by the other women, and weeping, used ceremoniously to thank the men for their presence and help, and in the name of the deceased to call for a parting drink, that he might forthwith enter on his journey; for he could not set out while his friends tarried with him (*Int. Arch.* xiii., Suppl. 112). The Tarahumares of Mexico hold three feasts for a man, but four for a woman (see § XVIII.). These begin within a fortnight after the death and are increasingly elaborate, each lasting a day and a night. All the mourners talk to the departed. He is told to take away all they have given him, and not to come and disturb the survivors. The second feast is given half a year after the first, the third and largest later still. The sacred cactus, *hikuli*, is thought to be very powerful in chasing away the dead, driving them to the end of the world, where they join the other departed. Hence it is steeped in water and the water sprinkled over the people; and *hikuli*-dancing and singing always play a prominent part in all festivities. At these feasts for the dead other dances also take place; *tesvino*, the national stimulant, is drunk; and the survivors drink with the dead. At the third feast a large earthen bowl full of water is the subject of a ceremony by the shaman, at which he finally lifts it up and throws it in the air. It falls shattered to pieces, and the people dance and trample on the fragments. The function concludes with races by the young people. 'The men have their ball, and as they run they scatter ashes to the four cardinal points to

cover the tracks of the dead. They return rejoicing, manifesting their delight by throwing up their blankets, tunics, and hats, because now the dead is at last chased off.' Not until after the last function will a widower or a widow marry again, 'being more afraid of the dead than are other relatives' (Lumholtz, *Unknown Mexico*, i. 384 ff.).

Elsewhere the motive is stated to be the rest or the happiness of the deceased—often, however, with somewhat more than a hint at the benefit of the survivors.

Thus, among the Bulgarians of Hungary, before the burial a meal takes place, at which every one receives a loaf of bread and a taper wound with a cloth. The tapers are kindled in the house, and then extinguished. The bread is then eaten, and it is believed that the soul is now saved. In a room adjoining that where the corpse is being waked another meal goes forward, 'for the well-being of those who are left behind and that he may slumber for ever' (*Globus*, xc. 140). The Igorot dead in Luzon is admonished not to come and make the survivors sick, but to protect them from other *anito* (*manes*); he is reminded that, when they make a feast and invite him, they want him to come, but that, if another *anito* kills off all his relatives, there will be no more houses for him to enter for feasts. The Igorot are very fond of feasts; it is assumed that death makes no difference in this respect: consequently this last argument is considered very weighty (Jenks, 79). Among the Yakuts the horses or cattle killed for the feast are ridden or driven by the dead to the other world, and so add to his comfort or his state (*RHR* xlvi. 208). The Barotse take the same view. They no longer kill slaves, but they kill and eat the oxen, which will secure to the dead a favourable reception at the hands of his ancestors (Béguin, *Les Ma-Rotse*, 116). So, again, the Melanesian population of Aurora think that, if they do not kill many pigs, 'the dead man has no proper existence, but hangs on tangled creepers, and to hang on creepers they think a miserable thing. That is the real reason why they kill pigs for a man who has died; there is no other reason for it but that.' The deceased and the ghosts of others who have previously died are believed to come back to earth to attend his funeral feast (Codrington, 282, quoting a native account). In Angola it is held that the condition of the dead in the other world will depend upon the amount of food and drink consumed in their *tambi*, or mourning, which lasts from one to four weeks; and during that period wailings alternate with feasting and merry-making (*JAFL* ix. 16). The same idea may perhaps underlie the pathetic Silesian custom of adorning the house with garlands and green boughs at the funeral of an unmarried, especially of a betrothed, person, and of rendering the funeral meal a complete marriage-feast, to which others than the immediate relatives, mourners, and bearers are invited (*ZVV* iii. 152). Sometimes a more direct spiritual and unselfish motive is expressed. In Bulgaria at the meal taken before the funeral, every one, before drinking, pours a few drops of wine on the ground before the corpse and says: 'God forgive the sins of N.N.' After the burial the priest incenses the room, and then takes his place at the top of the table, saying: 'God forgive N.N.' During the meal, as the guests sit round the table, he from time to time says: 'Eat and drink and say "God forgive N.N."'; and the guests accordingly respond in chorus (Strausz, 450, 451). So, in the Lebanon, among the Christian population, a ritual food of boiled wheat, flavoured with spices, almonds, hazel-nuts, walnuts, or pine-seed, is distributed among the relatives, and especially to priests, often at the exit-door of the church. As they take it in passing, they say: 'May God bless him for whom we eat this now.' The same formula is used when it is eaten in the house of mourning (*FL* ix. 8).

XVI. Funeral games and dances.—Funeral games, familiar to us in classic literature, are of very wide distribution. They cannot be separated from dances, for there is no hard and fast line between the two. Many dances are mimic contests, and the ceremonies are by some observers reported as dances and by others as games. Whether dances or games, however, it would appear that the object is the same, viz. to drive away either the dead or the evil spirits to whose influence death is due, and to free the living from the resulting fear—a purpose which in process of decay first becomes divination as to the state of the deceased, and then is explained more simply as for the mere amusement of the deceased or the survivors. Naturally this object is not clear in every reported instance. Insufficient attention on the part of the reporter is sometimes the reason for this; but perhaps quite as often the decay of the ceremonies themselves, and the loss by those who practise them of their real meaning, are as much to blame.

Among the Bongo of the Egyptian Sudan a large heap of stones is erected over a grave, and upon it a number of votive poles are erected, adorned with notches and incisions, with their forked tops made to resemble horns. The meaning of these poles or stakes is said to have passed from the memory of the inhabitants; at all events Schweinfurth (*Heart of Africa*, Lond. 1874, i. 304), during his twelve months' stay in the country, failed to obtain any information on the subject. However, there is no doubt as to what is done. The entire village takes part in the digging of the grave, in covering it, and in planting the votive poles; and, when this is finished, they all equally shoot at the poles with arrows, which are left where they strike. The Yānādis of Southern India perform, on the sixteenth or some later day after death, a ceremony called *peddadinamu*. A handful of clay is squeezed into a conical mass representing the soul of the deceased, and stuck up on a platform, where the eldest son spreads cooked rice before it, lights a lamp, and burns incense. It is then taken with the rest of the cooked rice to a tank. There the recumbent effigy of a man is made close to the water with the feet to the north. This effigy is anointed with *shikai* (fruit of the *Acacia concinna*) and red powder. The conical image is set up at its head; the rice, made into four balls, is placed near its hands and feet, together with betel and money, and the son salutes it. The agnates then seat themselves in a row between the effigy and the water, with their hands behind their backs so as to reach it. In this way they slowly move it towards the water, into which it finally falls and becomes disintegrated (Thurston, vii. 428). These two customs of widely differing peoples are manifestly directed against the deceased.

A Sioux practice known as the 'ghost-gamble' presents the deceased as engaged in the contest. His effects are divided into many small piles. A man is selected to represent the ghost, and he plays for these piles of goods against all the other players. The playing is with wild plum-stones, which are marked like dice. When the deceased is a man, only men play; when a woman, only women play (*1 RBEW* 195). Of the real meaning of a contest of this kind we get a glimpse in the custom of the Bulgarians of Hungary, who while away the tedious hours of the wake with games, among others with card-playing to divine whether the soul of the departed is saved or not. At an earlier stage it probably did not merely divine, but determined, the fate of the soul, or its relations with the survivors (*Globus*, xc. 140). In the south of Ireland, formerly, on a similar occasion songs and stories, blindman's buff, hunt the slipper, and dancing were among the amusements. We are told also that 'four or five young men will sometimes, for the diversion of the party, blacken their faces and go through a regular series of gestures with sticks, not unlike those of the English morris-dancers.' This disguise and these evolutions in the presence or immediate neighbourhood of the corpse, there can be little doubt, were more than mere diversion. Comparison with other customs suggests that the players represented supernatural personages—ghosts or devils (Croker, *Researches*, 170).

This is certainly the case with savage dances in which masked and disguised figures appear. The assumption of the disguise is, according to the almost universal view of savage peoples, enough to cause the performer not merely to represent, but actually to be for the time, the supernatural being represented; and the appearance of such figures is quite common at death-dances.

Thus in the western islands of Torres Straits the performers personify the ghosts of persons recently dead, and they mimic in the dance the characteristic gait and actions of the persons so personified. 'The idea,' writes Haddon, 'evidently was to convey to the mourners the assurance that the ghost was alive and that in the person of the dancer he visited his friends; the assurance of his life after death comforted the bereaved ones'

(*Torres Str. Rep.* v. 256). In conformity, probably, with this object, a buffoon is provided, also disguised, whose antics as he follows the other performers are provocative of mirth. But the object is not the same in all savage death-dances. Among the Bataks the dance seems to be performed by the *guru* alone. The *guru* in such cases is a woman; it is her business to protect the living against ghosts. She dances both before and after the burial. As the grave is filled in, she lays about her with a stick, not, however, to drive away the ghost, but the souls of living persons—obviously to prevent their getting into the grave, or into the undesirable society of the dead (*ARW* vii. 503).

Among the Beni Amer of Abyssinia, in spite of Islām, women occupy a privileged and almost a sacred position. It is the women who perform the funeral-dance; and one of the sisters of the deceased, having dressed her hair in masculine fashion, parades with his sword and shield while his praise is sung (Munzinger, 327). The sex of the performers renders it probable that the object of the dance is prophylactic, and the appearance of a personification of the deceased is intended to do more than give assurance to the relatives of his continued life: it is to mollify him by singing his praise, so that he may do no harm to the survivors. So to ward off evil influences (probably to drive away the ghost) is the object of the dance practised by the Damaras and performed backward and forward over the grave (Kidd, *Ess. Kafir*, 251). On the burial of a chief among the Ibonzo on the Niger the last ceremony is called *i kwa ota*, 'bending the bow.' The young men, clad in short drawers and wearing caps of monkey-skin, scour the town, brandishing shields and cutlasses, as if they were starting on a warlike expedition. With an urgent air and panting as they go they utter a ferocious chant. Advancing in serried ranks they brandish the cutlasses over one another's heads, and the clash of the weapons is heard from afar. From time to time they strike their shields and leap to right and left as they chase the evil spirits before them (*Anthropos*, ii. 105).

But there is another kind of dance sometimes performed on these occasions, of which we have had a glimpse in some of the foregoing—the comic or burlesque.

Among the Indians of the Paraguayan Chaco a woman who has lost a child joins in a procession in circuit round a fire made outside the house. Young men appear dressed up as dragon-flies, and 'flit to and fro, provoking laughter by their antics and the capital imitation of the insect they present' (Grubb, 45). We are not told here the nature of the pranks played; but in many cases they are certainly of a priapic and what we should call obscene character. The description of the funeral of a king of Loango in the ninth decade of the 18th century reports performances of this kind carried out by players who were clad in feathers and masked with the heads of spoonbills. Similar dances are performed on the island of Yap on various (not necessarily funeral) occasions, especially on the death of a young girl (*Globus*, lxxxvi. [1904] 361); and in the Aaru Archipelago they are presented at the termination of the mourning, as an intimation to the widow that she is now at liberty to marry again, and as an incitement to her to do so (Riedel, 263).

It was such a dance as this that was imputed by legend to Baubo when Demeter was plunged in grief for the loss of Kore; and we may conjecture that it was an archaic Greek funeral rite. Its meaning probably was to drive away death, evil spirits, and mourning by the exhibition of the instruments of life, which are widely used as amulets, and of the process of reproduction. It was not that these called up pleasurable thoughts and memories, and thus operated to banish the unpleasant and sorrowful thoughts. They had a magical force of their own that conquered death and evil. But the burlesque nature of the dance, if not obvious from its inception, must have tended to grow, because it was meant to relieve sorrow as well as to expel death. Any burlesque, therefore, that produced laughter would be dragged in to assist, with the natural result that among many peoples the priapic ceremonies were gradually forgotten and entirely superseded by merely comic antics, or ceased at any rate to play more than a subordinate part in funeral ceremonies.

XVII. Mourning.—Reference has already been frequently made to the state of tabu induced by the occurrence of a death. It remains to consider a little more closely the effect upon survivors connected with the deceased by neighbourhood or kinship.

The whole village or settlement is in the lower culture often attainted by the occurrence of a death. The rule among the Kaffirs of South Africa has already (§ VI. 9) been mentioned, and it may stand as a type of many others. But it is more particularly the near relatives and those who have been brought into contact with the corpse who are affected by the death-pollution, most of all the widow or widower. Moreover, the period of mourning, and therefore of tabu, varies among different peoples, and according to the relationship of the mourners to the deceased, or his rank, from a few days to many months and even years.

1. *Practices.*—

On Teste Island, off the coast of New Guinea, death lays the whole settlement under tabu. Dancing is forbidden, and no traveller may enter. A circuitous path must be taken through the surrounding bush in silence (Chalmers, 41). Among the Manganja, on the occurrence of a death, strict continence is required of the chief mourners and the elders of the village (Rattray, 95). On the island of Aurora the wives and parents of the deceased abstain from going out as usual for a hundred days. The restriction is particularly severe on female mourners, who are forbidden to go into the open; their faces may not be seen; they stay indoors and in the dark, and cover themselves with a large mat reaching to the ground. The widow, however, goes out thus covered morning and evening to weep at the grave. All who are in mourning refrain from certain food; the immediate relatives may not eat any cultivated food. They are restricted to gigantic caladium, bread-fruit, coco-nuts, mallow, and other things which must be sought in the bush where they grow wild. A cord is worn round the neck to indicate mourning and abstinence from 'good food' (Codrington, 281). In the Nicobar Islands the mourning begins from the feast at the grave 'in the presence of the dead.' Two degrees of mourning are distinguished: the lighter, in which all relations and friends abstain until the torch-feast, three months later, from singing, gambling, dancing, adornment of the person, and in the house of mourning from certain food; and the deeper, which concerns the immediate relations (especially the husband or wife), and extends over a longer period until the great feast of the dead, and in which, in addition to avoiding the enjoyments just mentioned, they must abstain from certain foods, from smoking and betel-chewing (*Int. Arch.* vi. 25). The ancient Hurons likewise observed two degrees of mourning: the greater lasted for ten days. During that time the mourners remained lying on their mats with their faces to the earth without speaking, and replying with no more than a simple exclamation to those who came to visit them. They went out only at night for necessary purposes; they did not warm themselves in the winter, or eat warm food. A lock was cut from the back of the head as a sign of the deepest sorrow. The lesser mourning lasted all the year. Visiting was permitted during this period, but no salutations, nor the greasing of the hair. But women, although they might neither do these things nor go to a feast, might order their daughters to do either. Neither wife nor husband married again during the year, 'else they would cause themselves to be talked about in the country' (*5 RBEW* 111, translating *Jesuit Rel.*). Among the Arawaks of South America the nearest relations of the deceased cut his widows' hair short, and the widows laid aside their clothing. Some months later a drinking-feast was held, at which all the men of the village assembled and scourged one another with whips made of the fibres of a climbing plant, until the blood ran in streams, and strips of skin and muscle hung down. Those who participated often died of their wounds (*Int. Arch.* xiii., Suppl. 77, 71). Among the Charruas the widow and the married daughters and sisters of a man each cut a finger-joint off and inflict other wounds on themselves. They also remain shut up alone in their dwellings for two full months, fasting and lamenting. The husband, on the other hand, does not mourn for his wife, nor the father for his child. Grown-up sons, however, remain for two days entirely naked in their huts, and almost without food. Then, having suffered the infliction of certain painful wounds on the arm, the mourner goes forth quite naked into the wilderness, where he rests all night up to the breast in a hole previously dug in the earth, over which he builds himself a little hut, and stays there for two days without eating or drinking. On the third day his friends bring him food and lay it down, hastening away without speaking a word. It is only after the expiration of ten or twelve days that he may return to the village (*Int. Arch.* xiii., Suppl. 72).

In South America, as in many other places, the women especially were made to bear the weight of the mourning observances. In Guiana, mourners laid aside all clothing and adornments (among some tribes even the women went stark naked) and retired into solitude. The women in particular concealed themselves, and ventured out only early in the morning and late in the evening to weep at the grave. Among the Mbayas and Guaycurú the women and slaves were forbidden to speak for three or four months. Among the former they were allowed only a vegetable diet; among the latter general fasting and abstinence were the rule on the death of a chief (*ib.* 73, 75, 76). The Warramunga women in Central Australia fight with one another and cut one another's scalps; and all who stand in any near relation to the deceased, reckoned according to the classificatory system, cut their own scalps open with yam-sticks besides, the actual widows even searing the wound with a red-hot fire-stick. A strict ban of silence is also imposed on women who reckon as wives, mothers, sisters, daughters, or

mothers-in-law of the deceased. They are not released from this ban until the final mourning ceremonies have been completely enacted—a period which may cover one or even two years (Spencer-Gillen[b], 521, 525). Among the Ewhe of Togoland the mourning lasts for six months, that being the time taken by the deceased to reach the kingdom of the dead. He is buried beneath the hut; and for the first six weeks of mourning a widow must remain in the same hut concealed, only leaving it to bathe and for other absolutely necessary purposes. When she goes out she goes entirely naked, with bowed head, eyes bent down, and arms crossed over her breast, 'that no mischief may befall her from the dead man.' In fact, she has nothing so much to fear as the deceased. She carries a club to drive him away, for he may wish to renew marital relations with her, and that would be death. For greater security she sleeps upon the club. She must not answer any call. Beans, flesh, fish, palm-wine, and rum are forbidden to her; and the food and drink that she is allowed must be sprinkled with ashes, to prevent her deceased husband from sharing the meal, in which case she would die. By way of further protection, on the charcoal fire that burns by night in the hut she strews a powder consisting of peppermint-leaves dried and rubbed down, mingled with red pepper. This produces a smoke such as the dead man is naturally averse to encountering. A man undergoes similar seclusion on the death of his wife, but only for seven or eight days. In Agué the widows are not let out of the dead-hut until after six months; and even then they must submit to tedious purification ceremonies before they are quite free (*Globus*, lxxii. 22, lxxxi. 190).

Among the Matse tribe of Ewhe the mourning for the oldest man or woman in the family lasts from five to seven months, for others one to two months. The entire period does not last beyond a year, unless in case of mourning by a spouse who lived happily with the deceased, and who may choose to mourn for another year. For a widow the restrictions are very severe. She must sleep on the mat on which the deceased lay until his burial; she must remain in a dark part of the hut; instead of on a stool she must sit on a stone; the clothing must be made of similar stuff to that in which the corpse was buried; she may not put on any other clothes at midday or evening; she may greet nobody; she may talk with nobody; she may not walk through the main street of the village; if she has occasion to go to see any one she must steal round by a path on the outskirts of the village; she must stay in the hut, and is not allowed to leave it often; when she goes out she must put a maize-cob (?) between her toes; lastly, if she has things to sell she must not haggle over the price, for if the wares she has for sale remain on her hands it will be unlucky, and, when her mourning comes to an end and she wants to sell anything, nobody will buy. It is said that if a widow omits to observe all these customs strictly the mourning will stick to her and eat her up, with the consequence that she will go crazy and never cease chattering. A prospect so terrifying causes the tabus to be strictly observed (Spieth, 754).

We have referred in an earlier section (§ VI. 9) to the restrictions on cultivation, hunting, and other kinds of labour.

In Europe, death tabus have been and still are practised. Among the ancient Romans the touching of the corpse entailed pollution, and the near relatives and the house itself were deemed impure, requiring ceremonies of purification. In the south of Italy in modern times the impurity is not such as to prevent friends from paying visits of condolence, which indeed they are required by etiquette to do. But they must be received by the mourners seated on the bare floor. No fire can be lighted in the house for several days; hence the mourners are dependent on their friends for food. A lamp, however, is kept alight in the death-chamber, probably for reasons already considered. The men do not shave their beards for a month (Ramage, *Nooks and By-ways of Italy*, Liverpool, 1868, p. 72). In Malta no fire used to be lighted for three days; when dinner was kindly sent by some relative or friend, the mourners ate it sitting cross-legged on the floor; they were debarred from the ordinary use of the furniture. Women were secluded in the house for forty days, but men went out on the seventh day with their faces unshaven (Busuttil, *Holiday Customs in Malta*, 131). In ancient Athens all relatives who were reckoned within the ἀγχιστεία were affected by the defilement of carrying out a corpse and assisting at a funeral; and after the funeral the house could not be entered save by those naturally thus polluted, at any rate not by any woman (Seebohm, *Gr. Tribal Soc.*, Lond. 1895, p. 79). Although this particular prohibition does not seem to be observed in Greece now, there are others pointing to the same region of ideas. After a death the house is kept unswept for three days, and it is imperative that the broom then used be burnt immediately. The men allow the beard to grow; and during mourning the sweetmeats usually brought in before the coffee to entertain visitors are omitted. In Maina the men scratch their faces with their nails, and the women cut off locks of hair to fling into the grave. In Northern Greece the women dress in white and keep the head uncovered, with the hair hanging down (Rodd, 125). In Bulgaria, on returning from the funeral and before the funeral meal is set, the chips caused in making the coffin are collected and burnt, in order to burn the sickness remaining in the house—a ceremony of purification. For forty days the men neither shave nor cut their hair; the women neither oil their hair nor dance the Horo for a year. Before the burial and the day after it no one in the house works, on peril of having chapped hands (Strausz, 451, 452). In various parts of Germany nothing must be lent or given out of the house before the funeral, and only the most necessary work must be done. For some time after the funeral there must be no washing in the house, and the mourning clothes must not be changed on a Sunday (Wuttke[3], 461, 467). In the North Riding of Yorkshire the fire was put out at the moment of death and not lighted again until the body was carried forth. In Cleveland, however, this seems to have been disregarded in favour of the requirement to keep a fire lighted for purposes referred to above (§ X. 6) (Gutch, *FL Yorkshire*, 1901, p. 300).

2. *Garb.*—Everywhere mourning garb is an essential part of the observances. Primarily it seems intended to distinguish those who are under the tabu. For this reason it is usually the reverse of the garb of ordinary life. Peoples who wear their hair long cut or shave it; those who habitually cut or shave it allow it to grow. Those who paint omit the painting. Those who braid their hair unbind it and wear it loose. Those who wear clothing go naked, or wear scanty, coarse, or old worn-out clothes. Ornaments are laid aside or covered up. Those who habitually dress in gay clothing put on colourless—black or white—garments. Ainu mourners at a funeral wear their coats inside out or upside down (Batchelor, 106). Among the Bangala a man sometimes wears a woman's dress in token of sorrow (*JAI* xxxix. 453). Peoples who ordinarily cover their heads uncover them, and *vice versa*. Women, especially widows, cover themselves with a veil, and hide in the house—a practice pointing probably to the contagiousness of the tabu. But mourning garb is more than merely distinctive: it is, like other mourning rites, intended to express sympathy for the deceased and grief at his loss; it is intended to call forth pity, to avert the suspicion of foul play on the part of the mourner, and to deprecate the anger or ill-humour of the deceased at his separation. It has sometimes been suggested that there is a further motive, namely, the desire to escape by means of disguise the persecution of the deceased. A careful examination fails, however, to disclose sufficient evidence in favour of this interpretation. Protection is often held to be needed; but it usually takes a different form. The Charrua mourner is armed with a stick, the Ewhe widow with a club. And various other means are taken—fires or lights, incense and foul smells, exorcism—to drive off the ghost or to hold it at arm's length. In short, open war rather than guile is the favourite defence. But so protean are human motives that it is impossible to aver that in no case is disguise the intention.

3. *Duration.*—The death of a member of the community inflicts a wound not merely on the individual relatives and friends, but on the community as a whole. His place knows him no more; and time is required to fill the void thus created and to heal the wound. As we have seen, he is regarded as still in a sense living, and even active, though his activities are uncanny. They are at first likely to cause injury to the survivors, from his bewilderment and resentment at being cut off from the relations he has hitherto sustained with the society of which he has been part. The efforts of the survivors are, therefore, directed to soothing him, to guiding his footsteps to the permanent home of the dead, and smoothing his reception there. There he will find those who have gone before, he will be admitted to their society, the counterpart in the unseen world of the earthly community he has left. But the home of the dead and his place in it are not reached all at once. Until he is admitted, he is not at peace, and the survivors are subject to the risk of visits from him. Rather, he hangs about them, the contagion of death is upon them more or less heavily, according as they were more or less nearly connected with him in his lifetime, or according to the length of time that has elapsed since the death. The length of the period of tabu thus set up varies among different peoples. Our records

are very imperfect, and accurate statistics are not available. All that can here be done is to note a few examples showing how it is reckoned in some typical cases.

In the Babar Archipelago mourning lasts to the next new moon, and is brought to an end by bathing in the sea (Riedel, 363). Among the Lenguas of Paraguay the relatives cut their hair, and the mourning lasts until it has grown again (*Int. Arch.* xiii., Suppl. 76). Among the Musquakies it lasts for thirty days. At the end of that time the mourners wash and paint themselves, relinquishing the old torn garments they have been wearing for whole ones, and a feast is set. The deceased is summoned, and a representative appears, who joins in the festivity. He is called the 'ghost-carrier.' When sunset is near he departs toward the west with an escort of young men. It is believed that he carries the ghost to the Happy Hunting Ground, and on his return he is called by the name of the dead man whom he has represented (Owen, *FL of Musquakie Indians*, 80). In the New Hebrides the mourning lasts for 100 days (Codrington, 281). A year is supposed to be the period of mourning among the Agni of Baoulé on the Ivory Coast; but very often it is reduced to 6 or even 3 months, except for the widows, who must always mourn the full year. Although funeral ceremonies are proceeding during this period, the actual burial may be postponed for years (Clozel and Villamur, 115). In Korea the length of mourning depends on the degree of kinship. For father, mother, husband, adoptive parents, or first-born son, it is 27 months, though nominally 3 years; for relatives under 19 years of age it may be as little as 3 months (*JAI* xxv. 342). Among the Ewhe the survivors mourn in the hut for eight months. A feast is then held, the remains of the food when it is finished are thrown away, and the mourning is over: 'they say they have to-day sent the dead to his brethren—those who have gone before' (Spieth, 258). Among the Dayaks all the kindred are 'unclean' for a short period, from 3 to 7 days; they can pay no visits, and are restricted in diet, and so forth. The house also is 'unclean.' Then fowls are slaughtered, the mourners and the entrances of the house are daubed with the blood, and so purified. But for the immediate relatives—husband, wife, and children—the tabu lasts much longer; nor are they released until they have held the *tiwah*, or final feast of the dead, which gives the soul of the deceased admittance into the city of the dead, and is a costly solemnity to be provided for out of his estate. During that period they must wear mourning garb, and neither widow nor widower can marry again: hence the *tiwah* is held as quickly as possible (*Int. Arch.* ii. 182). The Warramunga mourn until the body has decayed away, and left nothing but bones—a process extending over a year, or even two years. The bones are then taken down from their temporary resting-place in a tree and, with one exception, put into an ant-hill as a permanent burial-place. The one exception is the radius of one of the arms. It is brought to the camp, where wailing and gashing of the limbs are repeated. After certain ceremonies the bone is solemnly smashed and the fragments buried and covered with a stone. As soon as this has been done, the spirit of the dead goes back to the camp of ancestral spirits of its totem, and there awaits its turn for re-incarnation. The mourning is over (Spencer-Gillen[b], 530 ff.). Among the Dieri, who hold that the deceased haunts the grave, when his footsteps are no longer to be traced the surviving spouse washes away the ochre from his or her countenance, smears it with a fresh mixture of ochre and fat, and is free to marry again (*Globus*, xcvii. [1910] 57).

4. *No mourning.*—Attention has been drawn to the common rule that the mourning tabus weigh more heavily on the women than on the men. The necessity of the labour and vigilance demanded from the latter for the provision of food, and for protection from wild animals and human foes, may probably form at least an excuse for their comparative exemption. Instances of total exemption are not quite unknown. In ancient Greece it is said the men of Keos wore no mourning garb (Rohde, *Psyche*, i. 257 n.); and the same statement is made of the inhabitants of some of the Moluccas (Riedel, 395). Where there are no outward signs there is probably (not certainly) no tabu. In the district of Kita (French Sudan), however, we are told, mourning is almost unknown for either sex. When a married woman dies, her sister is offered to the widower, even before the funeral is over; and the widower often marries again in eight days, though some wait longer—a month or two months; while others take a concubine at once. If a man dies, his widow may marry as soon as she likes, unless she is pregnant, when she must wait until the child is born (Steinmetz, 156). In Segnela, on the Ivory Coast, the burial and funeral dance take place the same day, and there is an end of the matter: mourning is quite unknown (Clozel and Villamur, 337). Among the Meo of Northern Tongking the funeral rites last for three days, during which the only sign of mourning is that the hair is untied and allowed to hang down upon the shoulders. There are no other mourning customs and apparently no tabus. For a day or two some food is laid on the grave for the deceased, and then he is forgotten (Lunet, 318).

XVIII. **Purification of house and village.**—In spite of the elaborate precautions to prevent the dead man from returning (§§ IX. 5; XI., XII.), he is often thought to be present in the dwelling after the actual disposal of the corpse (§ XIII.). Accordingly, either after the body has been removed or at the completion of the ceremonies (which may be long subsequent), measures must be taken to purify the place and remove the tabu. This is accomplished by driving away the ghost.

At the last of the funeral feasts of the Tarahumares the deceased, as we have seen, is driven away. Three feasts are required to get rid of a man, but four to get rid of a woman, because she cannot run so fast, and it is therefore harder to chase her off (Lumholtz, i. 387). Noise is a potent means of driving away ghosts, and indeed all inconvenient and hostile spirits. For, though often dangerous, they are all fortunately not only easily deceived, but possessed of very weak nerves. In these ceremonies there is often no clear distinction drawn between the different kinds of spirits, all alike being liable to be bluffed and tricked and frightened by the same means. It is impossible to say whether the guns universally fired in West Africa at Negro funerals are directed against the ghost or against other spirits. In South America the Macusi fire before the hut in which the corpse is lying, to scare off both the ghost and the evil spirit that has caused the death (*Int. Arch.* xiii., Suppl. 88). Drums, trumpets, musical instruments of all kinds, shouts, and yells are all very commonly employed. Among the ancient Greeks, brass was beaten to drive away spirits (Rohde, *Psyche*, ii. 77). In the Tyrol an approved method to banish a ghost is for the householder to collect his keys and jingle them. He can thus drive the ghost to the boundary of his property. Over the boundary, however, he must not step on peril of being torn to pieces (Zingerle, 57). Many of the funeral dances, as already mentioned, have the same intent.

In various parts of Europe, especially among Slav populations, the house is solemnly swept out after the funeral. Among the Dayaks, after the *tiwah*, or final feast of the dead, the priests take a besom made of the leaves of certain plants, moisten it with blood and rice-water, and asperge all who have taken part in the feast and everything in the house, 'to sweep away the pollution.' The priests then start in procession for the river. As they set out, the others beat the walls and floor, and the priests invite all causes of ill-luck to mount on them; they pretend to totter beneath the weight; and arrived at the river they load little floats with the misfortunes thus cleared out, and send them to the great black ship in the middle of the sea, where the king of the small-pox dwells (*Int. Arch.* ii. 201). When a death among the Thompson Indians of British Columbia took place in a winter house, it was purified with water in which tobacco and juniper had been soaked, fresh fir-boughs were spread on the floor every morning, and tobacco and juniper placed in various parts of the house. But, if more than one death took place in the house, or if a death took place in a summer house, then the house was burnt (*Jesup Exped.* i. 331). The ancient Greeks employed black hellebore in the purification of their houses and flocks (Rohde, ii. 73). An 'evil death' requires special ceremonies of purification, as among the Ewhe, where the whole village is defiled by a suicide, and the kindred are called upon to pay special compensation for the defilement and the risk of drought (Spieth, 274, 276; see § VII. 2 (c)).

XIX. **Destruction or abandonment of house and property.**—The purification of house and village presupposes a settled life and a certain advance in civilization. At a lower stratum of culture, where the huts are of little value and easily erected, or where economic, defensive, or sentimental reasons have not as yet rooted the population to one spot,

the house is destroyed or abandoned, or the whole settlement may be quitted and a new site chosen. In many of such cases, it may be noted, the deceased is either buried beneath the hut, or left unburied within it.

The Australian natives commonly remove the camp when a death occurs. Among the Bantu it is usual only to burn or pull down the hut of an ordinary person; but if a chief dies the entire kraal is quitted, at all events for a time; among some tribes it is burnt down. The reason given by the Ngoni for abandoning the house is not that the ghost of the deceased always lives there, but that it may return to its former haunts (Elmslie, *Among the Wild Ngoni*, Edinb. and Lond. 1899, p. 71). The coast is therefore left clear for it. Similar customs are reported of various tribes of Negroes, North and South American Indians, the Andaman Islanders, the Karens, the Yakuts, the Kamtchadals, of many of the peoples inhabiting the great Eastern Archipelago and the Melanesian Islands, the Central Eskimo, and others. The Ainu assert that it was customary when the oldest woman of a family died to burn down the hut, because they feared the ghost would return malignant and bring evil upon them. She is now given a tiny hut to herself, and when she dies it is burnt (Batchelor, 130). In earlier times at the death of a Japanese sovereign the capital was removed to a fresh site (Aston, *Shinto*, 1905, p. 252).

A relic of the custom of destroying the house is found in some of the Nicobar Islands, where the supporting post is cut through, or so severely notched that it requires renewal (*Ind. Cens. Rep.*, 1901, iii. 209). The Cheremiss, more economical still, when the coffin is placed on the cart, pray the dead man not to take away his house, but to leave it to his heirs (Smirnov, i. 137). A relic of the abandonment of the house may perhaps be found in the modern Roman custom by which 'the family, if they can find refuge anywhere else, abandon the house and remain away a week' (Hare and Baddeley, *Walks in Rome*, 1909, p. 433, quoting Story).

At an early stage of culture all the property of the deceased was buried with him or destroyed at his death. Either the custom or relics of it are reported from every quarter of the globe. Its object seems to have been not merely to give the property over to the deceased, that he might enter the spirit-world with all his earthly possessions and state, but to prevent his haunting them to the discomfort of the survivors. Originally, no doubt, it was to get rid of the death-pollution, for the practice often extends beyond his property to all objects associated with him. On the Melanesian island of Bougainville a man's work and its produce are regarded as the supreme manifestations of his personality, inseparably linked with their author (*ZVRW* xxiii. [1910] 351). Doubtless the same view was taken elsewhere; and it accounts for the destruction of his crops and fruit-trees so constantly reported from the East Indies and Melanesia. Naturally his garments and bedding, where such things are in use, are impregnated with his personality, are indeed a part of himself. The superstitions connected with witchcraft afford abundant evidence of this.

In Europe the Votiaks throw away in the forest or into a lake all the clothing of the deceased (*RTP* xiii. [1898] 254). In Worcestershire it is ominously said: 'The clothes of the dead will not wear long' (*FL* xx. [1909] 346). In Lincolnshire it is believed that, even though they be put away, they will rot as the body decays in the grave (*Antiquary*, xxxi. [1895] 332). In the French Department of Ille-et-Vilaine it is believed that everything belonging to the departed will soon disappear: his clothes, despite all that can be done to preserve them, will be promptly eaten by maggots; his cattle will die by accident or disease, if not sold to the butcher (Orain, ii. 299). From the Hebrides to the Caucasus the bed on which death took place is burnt or thrown away (see § IV. 3).

A custom so hostile to the growth of civilization and to the individual greed of survivors could not maintain its ground. Hence all sorts of compromises to satisfy the consciences, the fears, the affection, and the avarice of the survivors.

Among the Hareskins of North America part of the clothing is distributed among the relations, part interred with the body, and the rest tabued and burnt, or thrown into the water or to the winds (Petitot, 272). In some of the villages of Serang a part of the sago-plantation of the deceased is destroyed; in others a tabu is merely laid upon it, redeemable by a third person on payment of a large gong, a sarong, and ten dishes. He thus appropriates it, and afterwards gives it back to the blood-relations (Riedel, 142, 143). In others of the Moluccas the dead man is allotted a share of the trees of various kinds in his plantation, and these are cut down; the rest remain to the survivors (*ib.* 360, 394). A similar practice prevails on the Tami Islands. There the canoes are too valuable to be destroyed; accordingly a few chips are cut off them, and a figure-head detached (*ZVRW* xiv. [1900] 337). The same principle is applied in Malta, where the hair is cut off the tail of every horse in the stable. The hired mourners cut away branches of such vines as form arbours in the courts, disturb the furniture in the house, overturn the flower-pots in the windows, break some of the ornamental furniture, and, carrying the fragments to a retired spot, throw them into a cauldron of boiling water, in which they mix soot and ashes, afterwards staining all the doors in the house with the liquid (Busuttil, 130, 128). Among the Kirghiz no one will mount the steed of a dead man without first reversing the saddle, with the object, no doubt, of unhorsing his former owner (*ZVV* xii. [1902] 16). The Sioux used to gamble away the effects of the dead in a ceremony called the 'ghost-gamble,' in which the dead man himself was conceived to take part (*1 RBEW* 195); or his effects were given away among those who took part in the funeral rites, even though the family might be left destitute; and one or more of his horses was shot and placed under the burial-scaffold (*ib.* 159, 164). The Nicobarese, before appropriating anything belonging to one who has died, require it to be purified by the conjurations of a *minloven* (priest or sorcerer) (Featherman, *Races of Mankind*, ii. [1887] 250).

Many peoples, however, consider it sufficient to delay the appropriation and division of the goods for such a period as is requisite to elapse before the departed attains his final destination in the land of the dead—a period often coinciding with the completion of the mourning rites. During this time the property, like the widows, remains under tabu.

In New Georgia the final rites are performed and the bones disposed of at the end of 100 days. Not until then can the property be touched (*JAI* xxvi. 403). Among various Bantu tribes nothing is touched until the mourning is at an end. Among the Minangkabau Malays of the Padang Highlands in Sumatra, where the husband goes to reside with his wife in her village, his goods are divided the day after his burial, because his soul at once goes back to his own family village. When the wife dies, on the other hand, the husband has the right to remain in the house for 100 days. During that time the marriage-bond is deemed not to be entirely sundered, and he has common use with his wife of her property. On the 100th day she departs for good to the land of souls. The property can then be disposed of (*Bijdragen*, xxxix. [1890] 71). The Thompson Indians of British Columbia placed a portion of the property of the deceased in or near his grave. Such as was not so given up to him was divided among his relatives. But no one could with impunity take possession of his bow and arrows, leggings, or moccasins; nor was it safe for any one who had not a strong guardian-spirit to smoke his pipe. Clothing taken was washed or put for some time in running water, and afterwards hung out for several days; while the traps and snares of the deceased were hung up in a tree a considerable distance from human habitation or graveyard, for a long time before being used (*Jesup Exped.* i. 331). In Europe, among the Sorbs of the Spree Valley deep mourning lasts for four weeks. The inheritance remains untouched until it comes to an end; though the nearest relations are mourned for a year (Tetzner, 325).

XX. Tabu of name.—Many peoples avoid mentioning the dead by name, or even prohibit it. In some cases the intention seems to be to forget the deceased. This is expressly stated of the Arawak, Salivas, and other South American tribes. But the intention to forget probably arises from fear.

The Insular Caribs feared the souls of their forefathers as evil spirits, and never named them. The Guaycurús and Lenguas not only never mentioned the name of the deceased, but on the occasion of a death the survivors changed their own names so as to baffle the dead man (or death, or the evil spirit which had caused the death) when he came again to find them. Among the Guajiros, if the name of the dead was mentioned in the family-but the penalty was death, or at least a heavy fine (*Int. Arch.* xiii., Suppl. 99). The Yabim of New Guinea avoid mentioning the names of the dead, lest their ghosts may be disturbed at their occupation in the forest of eating otherwise uneatable fruits, and their anger be thus incurred (*ZVRW* xiv. 336). Among the Lillooet the name of a dead person must not be uttered for a year or more, 'not so much out of regard to the feelings of the surviving relatives, as on account of the mystic connection which is supposed to exist between names and their owners. To utter or use the name of a dead person is to affect and disturb his ghost or spirit, and draw it back to its earthly haunts. This is inimical both to the ghost itself and to the person using the name, and thus attracting the ghostly influence.' But time removes the danger (*JAI* xxxv. 138).

It should be observed, however, that this widely spread tabu is not inconsistent with the cult of the dead. On the islands of Nossi-Bé and Mayotte near Madagascar a king at his death becomes sacred; he is believed to have taken his place among the gods; yet no one in the district dares henceforth to utter his name (Steinmetz, 383). So

among many Bantu tribes, where ancestor-worship is the religion, the name of the dead and all similar sounds are tabued—a custom that frequently leads to considerable, though usually not permanent, changes in the vocabulary. This extension of the rule of avoidance is not confined to the Bantu: it is found in other parts of the world.

The tabu of the name of the dead is very well known, and need not be further illustrated here. If widely spread, it is not universal. Among the ancient Egyptians the opposite rule prevailed. The great desire of an Egyptian was to continue his ghostly existence. To be remembered by the living was one means to this. Accordingly the statue of a high official under Psammeticus I., in the Museum at Berlin, bears the following remarkable sentences in the course of its inscription: 'May the gods of this temple recompense you if you pronounce my name! He whose name is pronounced lives; and if another see that you act thus towards me, he will do the same for you' (*RHR* lix. [1909] 185). There is in the contemplation of many peoples more than a mystical connexion between the name and its owner; the name is part of its owner, and while it lives the owner too survives.

XXI. Second funeral. Ossuaries.—Among a very large number of peoples who practise earth-burial in one form or another, the ceremonies are not completed until the bones have been taken up, cleaned, and put into a place of final deposit. In many of the cases of sub-aerial deposit, also, the bones are collected at the end of a certain period and put into the tribal or local ossuary. Until this rite has been performed, the dead man is not at rest, and in many cases the mourning is not at an end.

1. *Decay or destruction of the flesh.*—Not merely is the journey of the soul often long and difficult: it is bound to the body until the process of decay is complete. Indeed, so refined a conception as that of the soul immaterial and independent of the body is beyond the imagination of the lower culture.

A Wonkatjerri man told a missionary in South Australia that in the grave the flesh separates from the bones; the bones that remain are the *kutchi*, the ghost; while the flesh goes as *múngara*, the soul, to heaven, where it reveals itself as still living, by thunder and lightning (*Globus*, xcvii. 56). So at the other end of the world the Hurons called the bones of the dead *atisken* (souls), believing 'that we have two souls, both divisible and material, and yet both rational; one leaves the body at death, but remains, however, in the cemetery until the feast of the dead [see below], after which either it is changed into a turtle-dove, or, according to the more general belief, it goes immediately to the village of souls. The other soul is attached to the body; it marks the corpse, as it were, and remains in the grave after the feast, never to leave it unless it be born again.' 'This is why they call the bones of the dead *atisken*, "the souls"' (*5 RBEW* 114, translating *Jesuit Rel.* 1636). The Toradjas of Celebes hold that the soul cannot enter the village of the dead so long as the body stinks, that is, until the soft parts have perished. 'So long as the soul [*sic*] stinks it is still a human being (*Mensch*), and the dwellers in the land of souls will not admit it into their territory' (Kruijt, 328). The Caribs likewise were persuaded that the dead did not go to the land of souls so long as the flesh remained. Rites performed by the Betsileo of Madagascar are intended to facilitate putrefaction and the transformation or re-incarnation of the dead in a snake called the *fanany*, supposed to issue from the decaying corpse (van Gennep, *Rites de passage*, 1909, p. 213, *Tabou et totémisme à Madagascar*, 1904, p. 277). In the Aaru Archipelago all the possessions of the deceased are collected on his grave, and his relatives must lay food there every day, until all the flesh has rotted away from his bones and they can be ceremonially transferred to the family burial-place. The transfer is preceded by a feast, and the ceremony already referred to which gives formal authority to the widow to marry again (Riedel, 267, 268). It is obvious that, until the flesh has perished, the soul is still within reach; it has not yet entered its final home; it clings to its property and must be duly fed like a living man. So, too, the Greek Church in its burial service prays that the body may 'be dissolved into its component elements.' Three years after burial the body is disinterred, and, if found thoroughly decomposed so that the bones can be removed to the ossuary, it is looked upon by the people as a certain proof that the soul of the dead is at rest. Partial or total absence of decomposition indicates, on the other hand, the sinfulness and sad plight of the departed. A common curse accordingly is 'May the earth not consume your body!' (Abbott, *Maced. Folkl.*, 210; Rodd, 127). This is in curious contrast to the belief in the Western Church, as well as among the Chinese and other nations of the East, that total absence of decomposition is an infallible mark of saintship. Such contrasts are, however, by no means uncommon in all kinds of superstition.

The process of decomposition is, therefore, frequently assisted by artificial means. Some examples of this have already been incidentally given (§ VI. 6). Thus the deceased is the more speedily dismissed to his final destination, alike to his comfort and that of the survivors. A different motive, however, sometimes underlies the practice. In the Solomon Islands the souls of chiefs and others who are held to have *saka* (to be hot with spiritual power) become ghosts of power. At Saa, on the island of Malanta, common people are buried in a common burial-place, and their flesh is allowed to decay in a natural way. But it is believed that even a ghost of power is weak so long as the corpse continues to smell. Hence water used to be, and still is in some places, poured over it to hasten decay. Exposure, sinking in the sea, and cremation—all of them occasionally practised—probably owe their use to the same motive. For, by taking the skull, hair, or nails of the corpse, the wonder-working power—what elsewhere is called the *mana*—of the ghost is then secured for the benefit of the survivors (Codrington, 260 ff.).

Nor is it only by such indirect means that the final ceremony is accelerated. Some of the South American tribes wait no more than ten to fourteen days. After the lapse of that time they disinter the body, strip the flesh from the bones, and after an elaborate ceremony re-bury the latter (von den Steinen, 458, 505; *JAFL* xv. [1902] 290). The Choctaws were said to have 'a set of venerable old gentlemen,' with very long nails, whose business it was to tear the flesh off the bones and burn it with the entrails preparatory to the final deposit of the bones in the bone-house (*1 RBEW* 168, 169). So in South Tetoen, on the island of Timor, a few days after the death of a king the bones are separated from the flesh and other soft parts of the body; and not until nothing but the skeleton remains does the wailing begin, 'for it is only then that the dead is dead indeed.' The skeleton is accorded a funeral suitable to the rank of the deceased; the flesh is simply thrust into a hole (Kruijt, 330).

Where the decay of the flesh is left to natural means, the length of delay before the bones are finally disposed of differs very widely among different peoples in different climates.

The Kukis of Manipur are satisfied with the decomposition of 'a month or so': they wrap what remains in a new cloth and bury it (*JAI* xxxi. 305). 'Fifty or a hundred days' suffice in the Banks Islands (Codrington, 267). Few tribes elsewhere exhume their friends in less than a year. Many wait two years or more. The Chinese of Tongking after three years take the bones from the coffin, enclose them in jars, and re-bury them in the grave, over which a small mausoleum is erected, or in columbaria on the hillsides (Lunet, 90). There is some evidence that a similar custom was formerly followed in China itself (de Groot, iii. 1070). Among the Bulgarians the parents of a dead child after three—in some districts, after as long as nine—years dig up the bones, wash them with wine, and let them lie for a whole year in the church before they are again buried (Strausz, 458). Throughout Europe it was customary during the Middle Ages and later to dig up the bones after a certain period and place them in a charnel-house. This custom is usually ascribed to want of room in the churchyard. The explanation is hardly sufficient: the origin of the custom is more likely due to causes considered here.

2. *Feast of the Dead.*—The tendency to postpone the final ceremony, where it involves exhumation or the collection of exposed bones or of ashes, is accentuated among small but closely organized communities by making a common ceremony, often called the Feast of the Dead, for a number of the departed. Even among the Bororo of Brazil, where the exhumation is so speedy, the relics of one person cannot be disposed of alone: one dead man must wait for a second, and the two leave the village in company (von den Steinen, 510). In these cases there is usually a common grave or place of deposit. The stock example is that of the Hurons, who every twelve years used to dig up the bones of those who had died since the last Feast of the Dead. The bones were first of all cleaned. If corruption had not finished its work, all the remaining flesh was stripped off and burned, unless the body was so newly buried as to be practically whole. The bones were then wrapped in sacks or blankets, covered with rich robes of beaver-skin, taken severally into the cabins, and mourned over. They were afterwards brought together, and a feast was held in their presence, with funeral games. On a subsequent day they were taken to a large pit, where they were all buried together, with much

ceremony and the distribution of gifts (*5 RBEW* 112). We need not determine whether these rites are more elaborate than those of other nations, or whether they are only more vividly described. It is certain that similar rites take place elsewhere. The Khasis, who burn their dead, deposit the ashes in small cairns. Thence they remove them to larger bone repositories, of which one belongs to every branch of a clan. The contents of these repositories are periodically, after the settlement of all outstanding disputes between the members of the clan, removed, with sacrifices, dancing, and other rites, to the common sepulchre of the clan, a massive stone building, where the remains of all the departed members of the clan eventually rest (Gurdon, 140). Corresponding ceremonies are observed elsewhere in India, and are common in the East Indian islands. They economize the energies of the survivors, and concentrate them on one occasion; but their chief value is to bring home to the members of the clan or community their common life, with its common sorrows and joys—in a word, their unity among themselves and with their dead.

3. *Destination of the remains.*—The final destination of the remains, like the preliminary disposal, is by no means the same everywhere. This will have been inferred from the examples just cited.

Various Australian tribes, after carrying the bodies or the bones about with them for a time, either bury or deposit them in the branches of trees (Howitt, 467, 470, 471). The Choctaws of Carolina had a common bone-house (*1 RBEW* 169), which doubtless was regarded as a sacred building. The name of temple is expressly given by older writers to the repositories of the dead Indians of Louisiana and Virginia, where religious rites were constantly performed, at all events to departed chiefs (*1 RBEW* 124). Of the natives of Sofala, in S.E. Africa, it was reported by the old Portuguese writer, João de Barros: 'After the flesh of the body is consumed they take the bones of their ancestors or descendants, or of the wife who bore many children, and keep them, with signs to denote whom they belonged to, and every seven days in the place where they keep these bones, as in a garden, they spread cloths and lay a table with bread and boiled meat, as if they were offering food to the dead, to whom they pray,' afterwards eating the food thus offered (*Rec. S.E. Afr.* vi. [1900] 113, 269). The Caribs hung the cleansed bones in a basket from the rafters of their dwellings (Boyle, *Archæol. Rep.*, 1903, 142); and in the Banks Islands, while the bones of a favourite son were hidden in the bush, some of them would be hung up in the house (Codrington, 267). Among the Andaman Islanders the relatives weep over the bones, each of them taking a bone, and the nearest relative taking the skull and lower jaw, and carrying them about for months suspended from the neck. Sometimes the bones are bound to posts of the hut (*Trans. Ethnol. Soc.*, new ser., ii. [1863] 37).

4. *Object of the practices.*—The rite of exhuming or collecting the bones and making a permanent disposition of them is thus generally connected with, or has for its object, the definitive severance of the dead from the society of the living, and their union with the fathers in the life beyond. The ceremonies for this purpose, however, are not always concerned with the bodily remains.

On the Timorlaut and Tanembar Islands, ten days after the burial of a warrior who has fallen in battle, the people of the village assemble on the shore, the men armed and the women in festival array. An old woman calls back the soul with wailing. A bamboo with all its leaves is then erected in the ground, a loin-girdle on the top. This bamboo is regarded as a ladder, up which the soul climbs to its destination. The *sernitu* (a sort of priest or shaman) pronounces a eulogy on the deceased, punctuated by the applause of the audience. When from the movement of the bamboo it is judged that the soul has climbed to the top, the bamboo is severed in two and the loin-girdle burnt, to prevent the soul from subsequently wandering about or causing mischief. A dish containing rice and an egg, previously provided for the ceremony, is also broken to pieces. Appeased in this way, the soul betakes itself to the little island of Nusnitu, off the north-west coast of Seelu, one of the islands of the group which is believed to be the dwelling-place of souls. The bones, it would seem, are disposed of at a later time (Riedel, 307). The Chechenes of the Caucasus hold what is called a Bed-memorial-feast a short time after the funeral. It is believed that the deceased has then reached the other world, but lies in bed there and cannot rise until this feast has been celebrated. It is therefore held as soon as possible, and consists of funeral games—chiefly shooting and horse-racing—followed by eating and drinking. The honour done to the deceased is measured by the drunkenness. Before it is over the four best horses which have taken part are consecrated—the horse which has won the first prize to the deceased in whose honour the feast is held, and the others to three of his ancestors by name. This consecration does not involve the entire loss of the animals by their owners, but only permission to the dead to whom they are consecrated 'to ride them whither they will.' The final or great memorial-feast is, however, not held for two years, when it is given by the widow. She then lays aside her mourning, and may marry the brother or some other relative of the deceased (*Anthropos*, iii. 736).

As to the races and other contests at the Bed-memorial-feast, see § XVI. They are expressly intended to affect the condition of the deceased in the other world. Pre-historic remains in various parts of both the Old World and the New point to the great antiquity of practices of exhumation and re-burial of the bones comparable with those discussed above.

5. *Disposal of the skull.*—Among the practices which we have just considered, special mention has several times been made of the skull of the deceased. The skull is sometimes worn or carried about for a time, most frequently that of a man by his widow. In such a case it is perhaps merely a dear memorial of the deceased, or at most an amulet. Thus in the Andaman Islands, where the bones are broken up and made into ornaments, and the skull is 'worn down the back tied round the neck, usually, but not always, by the widow, widower, or nearest relative,' not only is great importance attached to them as mementoes, but 'they are believed to stop pain and cure diseases by simple application to the diseased part' (*Ind. Cens. Rep.*, 1901, iii. 65). But amulets are on their way to become objects of cult. Accordingly, wherever we find bones, especially skulls, preserved in the house or in a special shrine, whether common or not to other similar relics of the family, or clan, or even of a larger community, we may suspect a more or less developed cult, though it may not be expressly recorded by our authorities. In many instances, however, this cult is recorded.

Folk-tales of the western islands of Torres Straits, in accord with the practices which obtain in those islands, describe the hero picking scented leaves, with some of which he rubs the skulls of his father and mother, and on others of which he beds them. They describe his telling the skulls his adventures, and inquiring as to the future. They tell the responses made to him by the skulls in his sleep, and the success which attended his following their directions and observing their warnings (*Torres Str. Rep.* v. 41 ff., 47; cf. 250, 251, 257, 258, 261, 362). In the Solomon Islands the skull is regarded as hot with spiritual power; and by its means the help of the ghost can be obtained. At Santa Cruz it is kept in the house in a chest, and food is set before it, for 'this is the man himself' (Codrington, 262, 264). Similarly, a Fan chief in West Africa keeps in a chest the heads of his ancestors, and invokes its contents on the eve of great events, such as war or the chase (Roche, *Au Pays des Pahouins*, 1904, p. 91).

It is this belief in the spiritual power associated with the head even of an enemy that forms the foundation of the practice, common in the East Indies, of head-hunting. The head is not a mere trophy; 'it is an object of heart-felt veneration, an earnest of blessing to the whole community.' 'Those who were once our enemies hereby become our guardians, our friends, our benefactors' (Furness, *op. cit.* 65, 59). They are addressed, soothed, and propitiated on all proper occasions; and it is to them that the happy owner ascribes his plentiful harvests, and his immunity from sickness and pain.

XXII. **Effigies of the deceased.**—Many peoples complete their funeral ceremonies by the erection of an effigy of the dead. Thus the Kāfirs of the Hindu Kush, one year after the death of an adult, set up a coarsely carved wooden statue, and inaugurate it with a feast (Robertson, p. 645). The Thompson Indians of British Columbia erect on the grave a wooden figure, carved and painted as nearly as possible in the likeness of the deceased—a practice of considerable antiquity, since posts carved with human faces are found on ancient graves, the ownership of which has passed out of memory (*Jesup Exped.* i. 329, 335, 405). In such cases the

effigies are, so far as our reports go, simple memorials. In other cases they seem to be something more than that.

'When a respected Ostiak dies, his nearest relations make a figure of him, which is kept in the tent of the deceased, and enjoys the same honour as himself when alive. At every meal the figure is brought in; every evening it is undressed and put to bed; every morning it is dressed and set in the usual seat of the deceased. The figure is honoured in this way for three or four years and then thrown into the grave' (Abercromby, *Finns*, Lond. 1898, i. 169). An Ojibwa widow ties up a bundle of clothes in the form of an infant; she lies with it and carries it about for twelve months, 'as a memorial of her departed husband.' Then she discards it with her mourning, and is free to marry again (Jones, *Ojeb. Ind.* p. 101). Among the Maidu in California a periodical burning of gifts in honour of the dead of the tribe or village takes place. On the first such occasion after the death of a person an image representing him is often made of skins, stuffed, and burnt, along with the gifts (*Bull. Am. Mus. Nat. Hist.* xvii. [1902] 36). In a certain Turkish tribe a wooden image of every dead man is laid in his grave (*ARW* v. 31). How far effigies like these may be identified with the departed may be questioned. In any case, they are only of temporary use, or entitled to respect for a very limited period. Elsewhere, however, images are expressly made as an embodiment for the spirit. Among the Bantu people of Bondei, on the east coast of Africa, when the head of a house dies he is washed and shaved by his maternal uncle. His hair, finger-nails, and toe-nails are taken and incorporated in an earthen image, which thereupon becomes a *mzimu*, the object of religious rites paid to the dead (*JAI* xxv. 236). On the islands of Leti, Moa, and Lakor, in the Moluccas, there are men who carve statues of a special sort of wood for funeral purposes. On the fifth day after burial one of these statues is procured, and the soul of the deceased is, by means of an offering of food, enticed into it for a temporary sojourn. It is implored to eat and drink, and to watch over the survivors that no sickness may betide them. A general feast of the family follows (Riedel, 395). Among the Lolo of Northern Tongking, with a stalk of a kind of orchid and some wisps of paper a figure of the deceased, about 10 centimetres high, is made. It is placed in the house between the wall and the roof, or fastened to one of the partition-walls, and serves the purpose of an ancestral tablet, such as the Chinese dedicate (Lunet, 331).

Examples might be multiplied, for the practice is wide-spread. But at this point funeral ceremonies merge into cult of the dead (see ANCESTOR-WORSHIP).

LITERATURE.—On death and death rites in general, see E. B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, London, 1871 (⁴1903), vol. i. ch. xi., vol. ii. ch. xii.; J. G. Frazer, 'On certain Burial Customs as illustrative of the Primitive Theory of the Soul,' in *JAI* xv. [1886] 64–104; R. Hertz, 'Contribution à une étude sur la représentation collective de la mort,' in *ASoc* x. [1905–6] 48–137; A. van Gennep, *Les Rites de passage*, Paris, 1909, ch. viii.; E. S. Hartland, *Legend of Perseus*, ii. (London, 1895) ch. xiii. The death rites of a particular people and its ideas on the subject of death must ordinarily be studied in the ethnographical accounts of that people. Many have been cited in the foregoing article. Detailed studies relating to special areas have been made by Theodor Koch, 'Zum Animismus der südamerikanischen Indianer,' forming the Supplement to *Internat. Archiv fur Ethnographie*, xiii. [1900], and William Crooke, 'Death Rites among the Dravidian and other Non-Aryan Tribes of India,' in *Anthropos*, iv. [1909]. See also the following series of articles.

E. SIDNEY HARTLAND.

DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD (Babylonian).

—In common with other Semitic races, the Babylonians regarded the present life as incomparably superior to that beyond the grave. It is not likely that the Sumerians, whose religion forms the principal element in the religious ideas of the Babylonians, differed from this pessimistic view of death so universal in antiquity. For the Sumerian period we have no direct statement concerning the life beyond the grave; but the evidence concerning their burial customs, their sacrifices to the dead, their communion meals with the souls of the dead, etc., is abundant. The word employed by them for the soul is *zid*, lit. 'the rush of wind,' and is translated into Bab. by *napištu*, 'breath,' which may also mean 'throat and organs of respiration.' The dread of death is revealed in the expressions for dying. In Sumerian the word is *diq*, lit. 'to seize away.' The early Bab. expression is, 'his god has gathered him' (*ilu-šu ikter-šu*), as yet found only for women in the phrase, 'when her god gathers her' (see *Cuneiform Texts of the Br. Mus.*[1], ii. 24, 27; viii. 5*a*, 17; 12*c*, 18; 17*c*, 18; Meissner, *Assyr. Stud.* iii. [Berlin, 1905] 53; Schorr, *Altbab. Rechtsurkunden*, i. [Vienna, 1907] 85, who compares Gn 25⁸), or 'she has gone to her fate' (*ana šîmati-ša illiku* [*C.T.* vi. 47*b*, 13 f.]; *ana šimtim ittalak* [*Code of Ḫammurabi*, viii. 5 f. and *passim*]), or 'fate has carried him away' (*šimtu ubbil-šu*). Ashurbanipal, describing the death of Tarḳû, says that 'the fate of his night came upon him.'

[1] Hereafter cited as *C.T.*

The life of man is fleeting and determined by the decrees of the gods of the lower world, says the poet:

'Build we an house for ever? seal we (our tablets) for ever?
Do brothers divide their inheritance for ever?
Shall hatred exist in the land for ever?
Doth the river rise bringing floods for ever?

. . . .

He that sleepeth, he that dieth when together [they lie?],
In death they preserve not their (solid) form.
When the *gallû*[1] and the guardsman have greeted them,
The Anunnaki, the great gods, assemble.
Mammit, fashioner of destiny, with them fixes destiny.
Death and life they arrange.
But of death the day they make not known.'[2]

Thus man, whose destiny at birth had already been fixed by Mammit, identical with Bau, goddess of childbirth, must pass a second ordeal before the same goddess and the judges of Arallû.[3]

After mortal dissolution the soul descended to *Arallû*, 'the desolate land,' to pass at best a dreary existence, in the dust and shadows of Hades. The body, in which the departed soul had still a lively interest, was either buried or burned, and the kinsmen supplied it with food, drink, clothing, and the implements which characterized the occupation of the person on earth. Cremation and body-burial existed side by side from the earliest times. In cases of cremation, the ashes were gathered carefully in an urn, in which jars of drink (beer in the early period, water in the later), bread, etc., were placed, to provide for the immediate needs of the soul. At Nippur funeral-urns of this kind were found in the court of the stage-tower in the earliest period (before 3000 B.C.). Two vast fire-necropolises have been partly excavated near Lagash, at modern Surghul and el-Hibba. Here the bodies were placed in narrow clay casings upon a brick platform, wrapped with inflammable material and covered with soft clay. The body was reduced to ashes by burning wood over the clay casing. After the fire was extinguished, a small hole was opened in the clay casing, which was now baked and quite imperishable, and the results of the cremation were examined. In cases where the heat reduced the body to ashes, these were removed, placed in an urn, and buried in the family plot. If, however, the heat did not reduce the body to ashes, the clay casing became the tomb and was left *in situ*. The more important families owned vaults, or rather narrow brick rooms, in which the urns of the family were placed, the pavement being drained by tile sewers descending to the water level. [These sewers were wrongly taken for wells by certain archæologists.]

Cremation appears to have been the rule in certain parts of ancient Sumer and Akkad, as in the region south of Lagash; but in other parts interment in coffins and vaults is more frequent. In the case of those burials in which bodies were committed directly to the earth (as represented on the Vulture Stele, *c.* 3200 B.C., where soldiers are buried in a huge pile, being covered with earth simply), every vestige has long since disappeared. Preservation of the body seems to have been a sentimental rather than an essential matter; never-

[1] A conductor of the shades to the lower world (cf. Craig, *Assyr. and Bab. Religious Texts*, Leipzig, 1895, lxxix. 9, and Langdon, *Sumer. Bab. Psalms*, Paris, 1909, pp. 314, 26).

[2] *KB* vi. 1, 228.

[3] Nergal, god of Arallû, is called 'the god of investigation, and of judgment' (*C.T.* xxiv. 41, 67 f.); and as a star he appears as the *kakkab šipṭi mîtûti*, 'star of the judgment of the dead' (ii. R. 49, no. 3, 40).

theless both Sumerian and Semite exercised much care in this respect. At Ur brick vaults of considerable size containing several skeletons were excavated by Taylor. Ordinarily each skeleton is accompanied by jars, platters for bread and food, the deceased's seal, combs, and, in case of women, even brushes (for colouring the eyes?). The cheaper method of interment consisted in placing the body upon a slightly raised platform of bricks, which was first covered with a reed mat. Over the body was fitted a large cover, made of one or two pieces of baked clay, and large enough to admit both the body and the articles of food and raiment. Taylor found round platforms, in which case the body lay with knees drawn towards the chest.[1] A still more economical method of burial consisted of a clay or porcelain coffin of capsule form, made by fitting together two huge bowls. Bodies were even mutilated and crushed into a huge vase, accompanied in all cases by food and drink. Common in later times is the bath-tub-shaped coffin, deep but not long, in which the body sits upright, with the back against one end, and the limbs stretched out along the bottom, the whole being, of course, protected with a clay covering. The flask-shaped coffin, bulging towards the base, is common in the late period. The excavators of Aššur found many elaborate stone family-vaults, probably of kings and priestly families. To each of these an opening at the west end, closed by a stone not too difficult to be moved, made access to the vault possible. Stone staircases led down to these openings. At the east end the vaults at Aššur generally contain a small niche for a lamp. The Assyrians employed such vaults both for body burials, the skeletons being found in orderly rows side by side on the pavement, and for cinerary urns. The latter are cone-shaped and made of baked clay.

Thus we see that cremation was practised at all periods—probably for sanitary reasons. The earliest graves are found in the temple courts, but these sacred spots must have proved altogether inadequate for the vast populations of Sumer, Babylonia, and Assyria. The only practical method would be to set aside certain parts of the city (as at Ur), or whole districts (as at Surghul).

The Sumerian word for the departed soul is *gidim*, 'creation of darkness' (*gig-dim*), which, by apocopation of the initial letter, became *idim*, *edim*, and passed into Semitic as *edimmu*.[2] There is no doubt that the Babylonians regarded the souls of the dead as minor deities, capable of interfering for good and evil in the affairs of men. Whether, in fact, the entire conception of divinity rests ultimately upon the notion of ancestor-worship cannot be determined from our sources. We can no longer doubt that the Bab. conception of the devils, spirits of disease and misfortune, rests absolutely upon the notion of evil ghosts which rise from hell to torment humanity. See DEMONS AND SPIRITS (Assyr.-Bab.).

Although the souls of those whose bodies were improperly buried, or whose memories were not cherished at the *parentalia*, return to the earth and must be driven back to the nether world by incantation and ritual, yet the vast majority of souls lead a shadowy existence in the dreary land of the dead. See STATE OF THE DEAD (Assyr.-Bab.).

We come now to that significant part of Bab. religion—the *communion with the souls of the dead*. We have seen that the kinsmen of the dead provided the soul with food and raiment in the grave. These are remnants of an ancient belief that the soul actually consumed the elements and wore the raiment left for his use. Although the Sumerians and the Babylonians continued to deposit these symbols of the material needs of man in the graves of the dead, they soon rose to a more spiritual interpretation, in which, behind the symbolic bread and drink, lay the mystery of communion with the deified souls and with Divine life itself. Each family seems to have made monthly offerings to the shades of its ancestors, which consisted in a communion meal at which images of the departed were present. In official accounts of the early period we find frequent reference to offerings made to the statues of deceased persons.[1] A list of official sacrifices in the period of Sargon of Agade mentions a lamb offered to the statue of an ancient Sumerian king, Entemena;[2] and Gudea, a later priest-king (*c.* 2400 B.C.), prays for his own statue that it may receive mortuary sacrifice.[3] Entries in official documents occur, stating the items of the monthly sacrifice for the souls of deceased persons whose service to the State had been great. This is especially true of kings and priests. More frequently the documents mention the mortuary sacrifices for all the souls who have died, a Feast of All Souls, occurring monthly and performed by the priests in various temples. The word ordinarily employed in the ancient inscriptions is *kianag*, 'place where one gives to drink'; but the notion of 'place' is often lost, and the idea of drinking is made to cover sacrifices of animals, bread, cakes, etc., as well as of liquors. That these sacrifices really consisted in a communion meal is made evident from one inscription which states expressly that the *kianag* was eaten.

Another word—also Sumerian, and employed for the *parentalia* less frequently in the early period, but ordinarily by the Semites—is *kisig*, 'breaking of bread,' where the emphasis is laid upon the eating of bread at a common meal (*kispa kasāpu*). The word occurs in the most ancient name of the fourth month as *sìg-ba*, and later as *kisig-ninazu*, or month of the breaking of bread to Ninazu, god of the lower world. This month was followed (in the calendar of Nippur) by the month of the feast of Ninazu. These two months correspond with our December and January, or the period of greatest darkness, when the gods of the under world, as deities of the shades, whither the sun-god and the god of vegetation had descended, were particularly honoured. We fortunately possess a letter from Ammiditana, a king of the first Semitic dynasty, concerning the feast of the breaking of bread for the fourth month (December):

> 'Unto Śumma-ili, son of Idin-Marduk, say, Thus saith Ammiditana: "Milk and butter for the *kisigga* of the month Nenenig are withheld. As soon as thou readest this tablet, may thy superintendent take 30 cows and 60 *ḳa* of butter and come to Babylon. Until the *kisigga* is finished, may he supply milk."'

Here we have direct evidence for a communion meal, 'breaking of bread,' for the souls of the dead, permanently adopted by the Semites at an early period. At Eski Harran an inscription has recently been found containing the autobiography of the high priest of the temple of the moon-god of Ḥarran. In col. iii. he refers to the monthly sacrifices which he performed for the souls of the departed. After a reference to the raiment which he wore for the service he says:

> 'Fat sheep, breads, date wine, cypress oil, fruit of the garden . . . I broke[4] unto them. As incense offering, the choice incense as a regular offering I fixed for them and placed before them.'

The high priest here performs for the kinsmen

[1] The coffins in which the body lay in a cramped position appear to have been called *napalsuḫu* (v. R. 16, 44).

[2] Possibly connected with *idim*, 'oppressed,' 'weak and miserable' (see Langdon, *Sumer. Gram.*, Paris, 1911, p. 221).

[1] Thureau-Dangin, *Recueil de tablettes chaldéennes*, Paris, 1903, p. 247, obv. i. 12; de Genouillac, *Tablettes archaïques*, Paris, 1909, p. 35, obv. v. 9.

[2] Constantinople, 1081, rev. 1.

[3] Gudea Statue, B 7, 55.

[4] *akassap-šunuti.*

the sacred ceremony of breaking bread for the souls of the dead. The expression 'placing incense before them' refers to the statues of the departed, whose souls are thus represented at the communion meal, and whose portion is the incense. In an incantation service against evil souls, stools are brought for the souls that they may sit at the service of breaking of bread.[1] Ashurbanipal restored the memorial services for the souls of his royal predecessors, of which he says: 'The regulations for the breaking of bread and the pouring of water for the souls of the kings who preceded me I arranged for.'[2] The king himself was supposed to perform this ceremony, as appears from another passage: 'The regulations of the day of offerings the king gave not, but the high priest gave.'[3] The practice of pouring water to the soul in connexion with the common meal gave rise to the title 'pourer of water,' applied to one's nearest kinsman. This appears in the terrible curse so common in the Semitic period, 'May God deprive him of an heir and a pourer of water!'[4]

The repose of the soul, we may say even its immortality, depends upon the communion sacrifice performed monthly for it by its kinsmen. Real immortality consists, therefore, in leaving male descendants; and the prayers of kings seldom fail to plead with the god for male lineage. In actual practice the family paid the priests for performing the ceremony of the breaking of bread, and consequently separate temples, called *é-kisigga*, or *bit kasap kispi*, were built for this purpose.[5] It is highly probable that the State had a regular fund to provide for the Feast of All Souls, for we find official accounts containing entries for this fund at all periods.

Concerning the *wailing for the dead* our sources are meagre. In an ancient Sumerian inscription there is a probable reference to an official wailer, whose pay is mentioned along with the food placed in the tomb.[6] Wailings at the death of a king are described in a letter of the period of Ashurbanipal. The chief great men clothe themselves in garments of mourning, and wear rings of gold, and the official singer sings.[7] The burial of an official (?) is reported to the king in the following manner:

'The tomb we made; he and the woman of his palace rest in peace; the psalms (?)[8] are ended; they have wept at the grave; a burnt-offering has been burnt; the anointings (?) are all performed; rites of loosing in the house of washing and the house of baptism, ceremonies of incantation, penitential psalms . . . they have finished.'[9]

Gilgameš wailed for his departed comrade Eabani six days and nights.[10] When the mother of Nabonidus, last king of Babylon, died, the king's son and all his troops put on mourning and wailed three days. The following month was entirely devoted to official mourning for the king's mother.[11]

Traces of embalming have not been found, but Herodotus says that the Babylonians embalmed in honey,[12] and a text has been cited which mentions embalming with cedar oil.[13] At any rate, embalming is not characteristic of Bab. burials, and the custom may be due to Egyptian influence.

LITERATURE.—(*a*) *BURIALS.*—Perrot-Chipiez, *Histoire de l'art*, Paris, 1882–99, ii. 247–378, based principally upon the reports of the explorers Layard at Nineveh, Taylor at Ur and Eridu, and Loftus at Warka; for the fire-necropolises at Surghul and el-Hibba, see Koldewey, *ZA* ii. (1887) 403–30; for the necropolises at Fara and Abu-Harab, see *Mitteil d. deutschen oriental. Gesellschaft*, Berlin, 1896–1911; for tombs and coffins at Babylon, *ib.* xxxvi. 12, xxxviii. 13; at Aššur, *ib.* xxi. 36, xxv. 48, 55, xxvii. 29, xxxi. 10, 18, xxxvi. 23, etc.; at Nippur, H. V. Hilprecht, *Explorations in Bible Lands*, Edinburgh, 1903, *passim* (also a discussion of the whole subject); at Sippar, V. Scheil, *Une Saison de fouilles à Sippar*, Paris, 1902, p. 55 ff.

(*b*) *BURIAL CUSTOMS, BELIEFS, ETC.*—Meissner, *Zeitschr. für Kunde des Morgenlandes*, xii. (Vienna, 1898) 59–66; A. Jeremias, *Leben nach dem Tode: Hölle und Paradies* ('Alt. Orient' i. [1900] 3); M. Jastrow, *Rel. of Bab. and Assyria*, Boston, 1898, pp. 595–611; S. Langdon, 'Bab. Eschatology,' in *Theological Essays*, New York, 1911.

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[1] H. Zimmern, *Beiträge*, Leipzig, 1896, pp. 166, 12–14.

[2] C. F. Lehmann, *Shamashshumukin*, Leipzig, 1892, L.[3] rev. 1.

[3] King, *Chronicles*, ii. (London, 1907) 74, 5.

[4] Memorial Deed of Melišupak, vii. 9–11; *KB* iv. 80, 19; *ib.* 72, iv. 20; Hinke, *A New Boundary Stone of Nebuchadnezzar*, Philadelphia, 1907, p. 291.

[5] *ZA* xxi. (Heidelberg, 1908) 248, 0; *Beiträge zur Assyriologie*, v. (Leipzig, 1908) 619, 17.

[6] Urukagina, Cone B ix. 33.

[7] Harper, *Letters*, Chicago, 1900, p. 473.

[8] *taklitu*, prob. same root as *kalû*, 'psalmist.'

[9] Harper, 437.

[10] *KB* vi. i. 224, 14.

[11] *Ib.* iii. 2, 130, 13–15.

[12] Herod. i. 198.

[13] K. 7850, col. i. 4, cited by Meissner, *WZKM* xii. [1898] 61.

DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD (Buddhist).

—**I. Death inevitable and painful.**—There are certain questions that must have an absolute and definite answer (*ekāṃsavyākaraṇāt*). As a type of these the commentators cite: 'Will all beings (*sattva*) die? Buddha said: "Short, O monks, is the life of man . . . we must do good; it is impossible that what is born should not die."'[1] In other words, 'Life, indeed, ends in death.'[2] 'All men fear death.'[3] For death is accompanied by physical and moral suffering; the formulæ of dependent origination enumerate 'sorrow, lamentation, misery, grief, despair' as the companions of death.[4] For death is only the beginning of a new existence for the punishment of sins: death and punishment (*daṇḍa*) are almost synonymous. It is in order to avoid death, and the consequent second death—in order to gain immortality—that the Hindus practise the religious life, the holy behaviour (*brahmacharya*) which enables one to pass above the sun, which is death (*Brāhmaṇas*).

If death inspires fear, it also generates that salutary emotion (*saṃvega*) which ends in a distaste for pleasure and existence. Death must be thought of.[5] Visits to the 'cemetery,' the place of cremation, or the place where dead bodies are left, and meditation upon the corpse and the various aspects of decomposition, play an important part in the spiritual hygiene of the Buddhist monk, be he a beginner (*navaka*), a more advanced disciple (*śaikṣa*), or a perfect disciple. They even become absorbing for some, who are called 'cemetery monks' (see TANTRAS). We find a number of details regarding the treatment of the dead[6] in the Buddhist texts.

To know that 'life ends in death,' and to be resigned to this law, is, as we learn from several conversion-stories, to know the essentials of Buddhist doctrine and to escape from the fear and the control of death. To detach oneself from the things of which death will deprive one, to detach oneself from the body itself, is to abolish pain: thus a man suffers when he sees a woman whom he loves in the possession of another man; he ceases to suffer

[1] *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*, MS of the Société Asiatique, 355*a*, 7 (hereafter cited as *A.K.V.*).

[2] *Dhammapada*, 148; see Fausböll's ed. 1900; Max Muller, *SBE* x. [1898] 41; and H. Oldenberg, *Buddha, sein Leben*, etc.[5], Stuttgart, 1906, p. 278.

[3] *Dhammapada*, 129; cf. *Bodhicharyāvatāra*, ix. 160; *Milinda*, p. 145 f. (*SBE* xxxv. 206); *Śikṣāsamuchchaya*, p. 206; *Jātakamālā*, xxxi. 61, xxxii. (tr. Speyer, *Garland of Birth Stories*, London, 1895 [=*Sacred Books of the Buddhists*, vol. i.]).

[4] See P. Oltramare, *Formule bouddhique des douze causes*, Geneva, 1909, p. 27; *Nettippakaraṇa*, p. 29. But in *Dīgha*, ii. 305, and *Vibhaṅga*, p. 37, sorrow, etc., are defined as the consequences of every cause of suffering.

[5] See H. Kern, *Manual of Indian Buddhism*, Strassburg, 1896, p. 55, n. 5. Cf. and ct. *Suttanipata*, 574 f. (*SBE* x. 105).

[6] On this subject, see the 'Chinese,' 'Japanese,' and 'Tibetan' artt. on DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD; and cf. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist India*, London, 1903, p. 78 ff., and sources cited, esp. *Dīgha*, ii. 295; Csoma, tr. Feer, *Analyse du Kandjour*, *AMG* ii. (Lyons, 1881) 194; *A.K.V.*, fol. 239: 'When a man has fulfilled his time, when a man is dead, his friends burn his honoured body with fire, or submerge it in the sea, or bury it in the ground, or leave it to dry, wither, and disappear with wind and heat. But what is called thought, mind, intellect, being saturated (or 'informed,' *paribhāvita*) with faith, morality, indifference, religious instruction (*śruta*), goes up above, attains to a privileged state (*viśeṣa*), goes into the heavens.'

whenever he ceases to love (*Majjhima*, ii. 223). Thus the saint (*arhat*) has no fear of death (*Aṅguttara*, ii. 173); he awaits his time without desire and without fear (*Therīgāthā*, 196, 703; see art. SUICIDE [Bud.]), for he is freed from desire, he knows that this existence is the last existence for him (*Therīgāthā*, 705; *Dhammapada*, 39). For others death is only a passing; for the saint it is 'interruption' or 'annihilation' (*samuchchheda*).[1]

If death is hateful to men, it is not less so to the gods (*devas*), though certain texts say that the gods are perfectly happy (*Aṅguttara*, v. 291). It is not that death for them is accompanied by the sufferings of human death, for they usually die without suffering (*A.K.V.*, fol. 254*b*). But, the greater the enjoyments of the gods, the more painful it is for them to give them up; death for them is not 'suffering consisting in suffering,' 'suffering of death' (*Mahāvyutpatti*, § 112, 4), but it causes 'suffering consisting in the change' to be accomplished at death (see H. C. Warren, *Buddhism*, Cambridge, Mass., 1896, p. 181).[2] The Brāhmanic views are all alike, or very similar (see, *e.g.*, *Vishṇu Purāṇa*, vi. 5, in Wilson, *Works*, London, 1870, x. 208).

2. Definition of death.—The Buddhist doctrine is opposed to that of the 'unbelievers' (deniers [of the other life]), according to whom the intellect (*vijñāna*) scatters into the ether, while the material elements (*bhūta*) of the body return to the mass of the earth, sea, etc. (cf. *Dīgha*, i. 55; *Saṃyutta*, iii. 207); it is also opposed to the popular idea of the transmigration of the soul, well expressed by comparison with a bird flitting from tree to tree (*Sumaṅgala-vilāsinī*, p. 114; S. Hardy, *Manual of Budhism*, London, 1860, p. 390). Death is the end of life—the end of a life or of an existence (see below, § 3); or, more exactly, death is the dissociation of the organism constituted at birth to experience the fruits of a certain set of actions. This organism, both material and mental, does not contain a single stable principle; it continues to renew itself moment by moment; in other words, it undergoes an 'incessant death' (cf. Warren, *Buddhism*, p. 252; *Madhyamakavṛtti*, p. 174, n. 4); but death marks the end of this homogeneous renewing: it is the separation of the constituent elements of the pseudo-individual, the dissociation of the elements (*skandha*), *i.e.* of the gross elements (*mahābhūta*, *rūpakāya*) and of the *vijñāna*, or intellect.[3]

We must consider for a little this idea of *vijñāna*. There is nothing permanent or individual in the complex union of the *skandhas*, which lasts from birth to death. Men were led, however, to regard it as 'individualized,' like a town with the *vijñāna* as master. The later works of Abhidhamma teach that, from the origin of an existence, the first thought, the thought which gives rise to the formation of the new being in the matrix (*pratisaṃdhi-vijñāna*, 'conception-intellect'), gives birth to certain thought, which is the master part of the existence, and is called *bhavāṅga*, or *bhavāṅga-santati*, 'existence-limb,' 'existence-limb-series,' because it is the limb of existence.[4] This thought evolves into an uninterrupted and relatively homogeneous mental series, like the flow of a river. To look at it in a somewhat different way, this thought constitutes what we might call the foundation of the soul, the support and origin of particular thoughts, which interrupt it. At the end of life, at death, it disappears by being transformed into 'thought in a dying state,' 'dying thought,' 'falling *or* emigrating thought.' Existence, *i.e.* one existence in the series of existences, is ended at the disappearance of the *bhavāṅga*; a new existence commences, in a new *status*, since the 'thought in a dying state' is reflected (we dare not say continued)[1] in a 'thought in a state of being born.' Death, then, is the transformation of this 'fundamental thought' called *bhavāṅga*, 'limb of existence,' into 'emigrating thought' (*chyutichitta*).[2]

'When the dead man is laid out upon his bed of death, the sinful action for which he is responsible, or the motive (or sign) of this action, presents itself at the door of his spirit. Then there is inaugurated the series of rapid intellectual operations (*javana* = 'swiftness') which ends in absorption with this object (action or motive) (*tadārammaṇa*),[3] and there is further produced the "emigrating thought" depending upon the *bhavaṅga* (*bhavaṅga-visayam ārammaṇaṃ katvā*). When that disappears, the "thought in a state of being born" is produced; and this, because of that action (or that motive for action) which presents itself before the spirit, moved by uninterrupted passion, belongs to an evil destiny.'[4]

On the other hand, death is often regarded as the end of a particular organ or sense, the *jīvitendriya*, the vital sense. Life, the activity of the organs, 'the persistence, subsistence, going on . . . of the bodily and mental functions or states' presupposes a 'vital organ'[5] supporting the living complex as the water supports the lotus, and playing a part analogous to that assigned by the Vedānta school to the 'principal breath' (or 'breath in the mouth,' *mukhya prāṇa*).[6] Death, therefore, will be 'the interruption of the series [of evolution] of the vital organ corresponding to a given existence' (*Nettippakaraṇa*, p. 29).[7]

Leaving out of consideration the schools which pay little attention to the 'vital sense,' some schools do not make it die at death. The theologians who admit an 'intermediate state' (*antarābhava*) between two existences properly so called assign a special rôle to the 'vital sense' in the mechanism of transmigration. 'Life' would then be prolonged from existence to existence, as long as these continue to be existences belonging to the same category (*nikāya-sabhāga*) (after *A.K.V.*, Burnouf MS, 58*a*).

The schools are not agreed as to the nature of the *jīvitendriya*, as may be seen from *Kathāvatthu*, viii. 10. Pāli theology appears to regard it as the eighteenth term of the *rūpakkhanda* (S. Hardy, *Manual*, p. 399). But the *Dhammasaṃgaṇi* treats it successively as mental and as material (*rūpa*). The *Abhidharmakośa* makes it an *arūpa chittaviprayukta*, 'immaterial, having no connexion with thought' (see *Dharmasaṃgraha*, p. 69), as do also the Yogāchāras (see *Muséon*, vi. [1905] 178 f.).

It must not be forgotten that 'life' is attributed to the body (*A.K.V.* 313*a*: 'The body lives when it is endowed with sense (*sendriya*), i.e. life is of the body endowed with sense, and not of a soul (*ātman*): and it is the body [and not a soul] which, when robbed of sense, is called "dead"'). By 'sense' or 'senses' must be understood either the organs of sense which depend upon the *jīvitendriya*, or the *jīvitendriya*, which is just the same as the *kāyendriya*, 'body-sense.' The working and persistence of the intellect (*vijñāna*) depend upon the *kāyendriya*, which, at death, perishes in various parts of the body according to the state in which re-birth is to take place: in the feet for a future damned soul, in the navel for a future man, in the heart for a future god . . . (*A.K.V.* 254*a*; cf. and ct. Beal, *Catena of Buddhist Scriptures*, London, 1871, p. 41; see also Rhys Davids, *Buddhist India*, p. 254 f.; Oldenberg, *Buddha*[5], p. 265).

Instead of *jīvita*, *jīvitendriya*, we sometimes find the terms *āyus*, 'life,' and *uṣman*, 'heat'—a popular conception of life.[8] 'What is the ground of persistence or continuity of the five senses?'—'Life'—'And of life?'—'Heat'—'And of heat?'—'Life.' (Just so the radiance of a lamp depends on its flame, and *vice versa* [*Majjhima*, i. 295].) Similarly, death is defined as the disappearance

[1] See, *e.g.*, the story of 'Gotamī the Thin,' in J. H. Thiessen, *Die Legende von Kisāgotamī*, Breslau, 1880; Rogers, *Buddhaghoṣa's Parables*, London, 1870, p. 98; E. Hardy, *Buddhismus*, Münster, 1890, p. 124.

[2] See Wenzel's tr. of 'Nāgārjuna's Friendly Epistle,' 98 f., *JPTS*, 1886, p. 27. On 'the five prognostics announcing death in heaven' (body becoming ugly, decaying of flower-wreaths, etc.), Wenzel refers to *Itivuttaka*, § 83, and *Divyāvadāna*, p. 193.

[3] See *Dīgha*, ii. 305 (= Warren, p. 368); *Visuddhimagga*, in Warren, pp. 241, 252; *Vibhaṅga*, p. 137.

[4] *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*, in *JPTS*, 1884, p. 25; see S. Z. Aung and C. A. F. Rhys Davids' tr. and notes, *Compendium of Philosophy*, *PTS*, 1910 (Index, *s.v.* 'Bhavāṅga').

[1] We read, however, in *A.K.V.* 213*a*: 'the "conceptional" state (at conception), *upapattibhava*, forms a series with the "mortal" state (at death).'

[2] There is no death without 'emigrating thought,' therefore trance or rapture is an obstacle to death (cf. *Dhammapada*, ed. Fausböll, Copenhagen, 1855, p. 299).

[3] See Aung-Davids, *Compendium*, pp. 29, 74, 'registering, or identifying, of the object.'

[4] *Visuddhimagga*, xvii. 1133–1139 (from proofs kindly lent by C. Lanman). See C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist Psychology*, London, 1900, pp. 132, 134; *Compendium*, p. 150 f.

[5] See C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Psychology*, 19, 192; S. Hardy, *Manual*, 402.

[6] *Jīvitendriyaṃ vā prāṇa iti* (*A.K.V.* 313*a*; cf. *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā*, p. 487).

[7] Cf. *Visuddhimagga*, xvi. *ad fin.* (*JPTS*, 1891, p. 137).

[8] P. Oltramare, *op. cit.* p. 28; and C. A. Foley, in *JRAS*, 1894, p. 328.

of heat (*Mahāvyutpatti*, § 245, 53). An ancient stanza associates the intellect (*vijñāna*) with *āyus* and *uṣman*.[1] The Dignāga school defines death as the 'destruction of the *vijñāna*, of the organ, and of life,' and claims authority from this definition to deny (in opposition to the Jains) that trees 'die.'

In the old version of the 'last days of the Buddha' (*Dīgha*, ii. 106; *SBE* xi. 44), it is said: 'The Blessed One rejected the *āyusaṃkhāra*' (according to Rhys Davids = 'the rest of his allotted sum of life'). In the Sanskrit sources (*Divyāvadāna*, p. 203; *Mahāvyutpatti*, § 235, 52) we have: 'The Blessed One enters such concentration of thought as to control his "vitality-virtualities" (*jīvitasaṃskārān adhiṣṭhāya*), and he begins to reject his "life-virtualities" (*āyuḥsaṃskārān*).' The plural ('virtualities,' 'co-efficients of life') indicates, according to a commentator, that life is not one thing but a collectivity. The Sautrāntikas say that *āyus*, 'life,' means the multiple *saṃskāras* which co-exist (having for nature the four or five *skandhas*), and is nothing beyond these *saṃskāras* (*A.K.V.*, fol. 74). The *Majjhima* (i. 296) enumerates the *āyusaṃkhāras* as follows: *āyus*, heat, and intact senses, which disappear at death, but persist in life even when plunged into the deepest ecstasies (see Warren, p. 389).

As to the vital breath (*prāṇa*), it is a wind (*vāyu*) which depends on both the body and the thought—for it disappears during the so-called 'cessation-trance' ecstasy (Sarvāstivādin *Abhidharmaśāstra*, quoted *A.K.V.* 312; see Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, i. 71, London, 1899-1910 [= *Sacred Books of the Buddhists*, vol. ii.]). Although the Buddhists deny the existence of a *prāṇin*, *anima*, 'being endowed with breath,' they use this expression; but, for them, to kill a *prāṇin* is only to stop the future production of the *prāṇa*.

3. Duration of life.—What is meant by an existence, *ātmabhāva*, and why is the eternal transmigration divided into this succession of fragments called lives or existences? Actions are by nature very variable, and very different actions are performed by the same person; in strict language—for Buddhism does not admit of the existence of a person, of an author of actions—actions very different from each other are 'caused' in one and the same series of states of consciousness, and must be rewarded in the same series. It is necessary, then, that the agent (to use a convenient expression) should pass through varying conditions,—god, man, animal, damned,—for it is not the nature of actions to get their reward in any state whatever. And, by a mechanism which will be explained in art. KARMA, a certain existence (*ātmabhāva*) falls to the lot of the agent, as the reward for a certain set of actions,[2] and this existence will be followed by another determined in the same way. Death marks the moment of the exhaustion of the actions called to 'ripen,' to fructify in some one existence, and of the maturity of actions called to ripen in the next existence.

In certain states of existence the length of life is fixed; the number of actions to be rewarded in the course of a divine existence of a certain class always corresponds exactly with the normal length of life of the gods of this class (see COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY [Buddhist]); the god will die at the exhaustion of the meritorious actions to be rewarded and the exhaustion of life. But it may happen that a life ends by the exhaustion of the actions, before the normal time: if, *e.g.*, a certain good action has caused a certain divine existence, and is not good enough to prolong this existence against the influence of evil actions striving to ripen. It is also possible to die by the exhaustion of life, without the merit being exhausted: in this case, re-birth takes place into a condition similar to that just left. Lastly, if one commits one of the sins demanding immediate retribution (*ānantarya*) and immediate dispatch into hell, one dies without the exhaustion of the vital forces: the retribution of

[1] *Saṃyutta*, iii. 143; and *A.K.V.*, Burnouf MS, 453*b*.
[2] Cf. the *ayuṣkakarman* of the Jains (*SBE* xlv. 165, 192).

the set of actions, begun at birth, is interrupted by an 'action cutting off [the fruit of] action.'[1]

Death is called 'timely' (*kālamaraṇa*) when it occurs at the end of a life of normal duration (see AGES OF THE WORLD [Bud.], vol. i. p. 189). It may be caused by a trouble of the bile (the essential fire-element of the body), of the phlegm (water-element), or the wind, either singly or all together: there are, therefore, four illnesses; for every class of illness, there are 100 deaths 'before the time' (*akālamṛtyu*)[2] and one timely death: or else there are 404 illnesses causing death (*Bodhicharyāvatārapañjikā*, ii. 55; *A.K.V.* 254*b*). A kindred expression to *akālamṛtyu* is *antarāmṛtyu* or *antareṇa kālakriyā*, 'death during the time, during the course of the normal duration of life': a death, which, according to certain sources, occurs even in the *ārūpya*, and in all stages of existence, except among the Uttarakurus (*Abhidharmakośa*). According to the Sautrāntikas (*A.K.V.*, fol. 218), it is a mistake to explain the phrase *antarāparinirvāyin* with certain (Pāli) scholars as meaning 'a saint who attains to *nirvāṇa*, by *antarāmṛtyu*, during the course of a heavenly existence, and before the close of this existence.' The reference is to a saint who attains *nirvāṇa* in the intermediate period between two existences (*antarābhava*).

The Buddhists believed that, just as the saint can abandon the 'co-efficients of life' (see preceding column), so he can also stop them (*sthāpayati*). According to the Vaibhāṣikas (*A.K.V.*, Burnouf MS, fol. 74), the saint says: 'May [the action] that is to ripen for me in enjoyment ripen in life!' By its nature, life (or the vital organ) is 'ripening' (*vipāka*), and it can replace any enjoyment which, normally, ought to ripen from a former merit, and which the saint no longer desires and has escaped by his sainthood. By this process, 'vanquishing death,' the Buddha prolonged his life three months for the salvation of men, and the disciples employ this to assure the duration of the law.

This term of three months seems to be given as a maximum, and as the mark of the victory of the Buddha over *Mṛtyumāra*, '*Māra* (=death, Satan), who is death.' The 'dominion of death,' which is a 'dominion of life' (*Mahāvyutpatti*, § 27, 1), is much more powerful in the *Mahāparinibbāna* (*Dīgha*, ii. 103=*SBE* xi. 42), and in *Śikṣāsamuchchaya*, p. 189, where the Bodhisattvas enjoy a life of almost infinite length by the protection of the Buddhas and 'deities' (*devatās*).

4. The last thought and re-birth.—Most of the Hindu theologians teach that the last thought, the thought of the dying, is of prime importance with regard to the future lot.[3] This doctrine is particularly dear to the devout sects: thinking of Kṛṣṇa on the death-bed assures salvation. The Brahmans everywhere believe as a rule that the Lord (*īśvara*) establishes the moral balance-sheet of the whole life, in order that the agent may be re-born into the world at the proper stage. In conformity with their psychology and their metaphysics, the Buddhists have to assign capital importance to the last thought. For not only do they refuse to admit a Lord, judge of all the

[1] See *Abhidhammasaṅgaha*, v. 12 (*JPTS*, 1884, p. 25); *Visuddhimagga*, in Warren, p. 252; *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī*, p. 110.
[2] The Śaivite Buddhists have made a deity of 'premature death' (Wilson, *Works*, ii. 24).
[3] See, *e.g.*, *Bhagavad-Gītā*, viii. 5 f. (A. Barth, *Religions of India*, London, 1891, p. 227; R. Garbe, *Bhagavadgītā übersetzt* . . . Leipzig, 1905, p. 52): 'Remembering whatever form of being he in the end leaves this body, into that same form he ever passes, assimilated to its being' (Thibaut, *Vedāntasūtras*, iv. 1, 12=*SBE* xxxviii. 352); 'Whatsoever being a man at his end in leaving the body remembers, to that same he always goes, inspired to being therein' (L. D. Barnett, *The Lord's Song*, London, 1905). See also the sources cited in *Vedāntasūtras*, *loc. cit.*, and Cowell, tr. of *Aphorisms of Śāṇḍilya*, Calcutta, 1878, § 81; for the Jain sect, see *Majjhima*, i. 376. Folk-lore is abundant on this subject; see, *e.g.*, *Kathā-sarit-sāgara*, tr. Tawney, 1880, i. 242, and *passim*. Rhys Davids compares Plato, *Phædo*, 69 (*Indian Buddhism*, London, 1881, App. viii., *Dialogues of the Buddha*, i. 298).

actions of a life, but they do not even admit of a permanent soul which would be responsible for all the actions. At the time of death, all that exists is the 'dying thought' (*chyutichitta*) and the '*skandhas* (dispositions, etc.), which come to an end at death.'[1] The 're-birth thought' (*pratisaṁdhi°, upapattichitta*)—and the *skandhas* associated with it—can be determined only by the 'dying thought,' which it continues. Hence it follows that, if the mental state at death is good, a pleasant birth will take place; if it is bad, an unpleasant one. The agent will be re-born into the spheres of desire, matter, non-matter (see COSMOGONY, etc. [Bud.]), according to the *fulcrum* (*ālambana*) of the last thought (*Abhidhammasaṅgaha*, v. 12–13 [*JPTS*, 1884, p. 25]); and 'to die with the thought fixed on space [or the void]' is to obtain *nirvāṇa* (*Madhyamakavṛtti*, p. 53).

But, if the last thought (or last action) is, according to the principle of the Buddhist system, the sole determining cause of the future life, good sense and equity require that the previous thoughts (or merit) should come into account in the retribution. Buddha was very categorical on this point. The conclusion arrived at will be that, if the last thought, in the quality of act 'close at hand' (*āsanna*), determines the future life, the latter may be conditioned by other acts, important from other points of view.

The difficulty or contradiction may be resolved by affirming that the last thought is the resultant of the life or of a former act which, by its importance or repetition, has to be rewarded in the next existence:

'It is at the moment of death (*chyuti*, 'fall of thought') and of re-birth that the thoughts are enabled to ripen' (*A.K.V.*, Burnouf MS, fol. 112*b*). 'The *Karman* remembered at death springs up in re-birth' and is therefore named 'close at hand.'

At death the mental working is weak and dull; therefore any passion which has been intense or habitual during life enters upon a state of activity (*A.K.V.* 249*a*). In short, the treatises of Abhidharma teach that the object of the last thought is either present (*pachchupanna*) or past (*atīta*), being determined both by the life that is completed, and by the state in which it is proper (by reason of this life or of even earlier merits) for the new life to be passed. It is, therefore, by the 'force of the merit' that there presents itself to the spirit of the dying either the action (accomplished previously by him) which is to determine the re-birth[2] (and above all others the 'heavy' action, *guru*, the reward of which comes before all others [*A.K.V.*, Burnouf MS, fol. 482]), or the object (sensation, etc.) experienced at the time of performing the action, or the motive or means of the action, or, lastly, the picture of the state about to be reached by the re-birth, the sign of the future lot.[3]

But this theory, that the last thought is the resultant of the life, is discouraging to piety. It is certainly the opinion of the Buddhist that we should not wait for death to become 'converted,' for the agonies and suffering of the last moment make thought very feeble (*Bodhicharyāvatāra*); the good thoughts of the last hour are by nature very weak: they may procure a little of paradise, but they cannot prevent a fall back into hell immediately after, if it is merited (Spence Hardy, *Manual*, p. 489). But numerous writings show that the last thought is not always determined beforehand, that it is possible to prepare oneself and others for death, and to make sure of a good re-birth by helping the 'production of good dispositions.'

We may quote some examples. Milinda says: 'Your people [Buddhists] say . . . that, though a man should have lived a hundred years an evil life, yet if, *at the moment of death*, thoughts of the Buddha should enter his mind, he will be re-born among the gods. . . . And thus do they also say: "By one case of destruction of life a man may be re-born in purgatory."' When asked if this was not a contradiction, Nāgārjuna replies: 'Would even a tiny stone float on the water without a boat? . . . Would not a hundred cart-loads of stone float on the water if they were loaded in a boat? . . . Well, good deeds are like the boat' (*Milinda*, p. 80, tr. Rhys Davids, *SBE* xxxv 123 f.).

Mahāmoggallāna sees a poor wretch, condemned to death, to whom the compassionate Sulasā has just given some cakes He thinks: 'This man, with no merits, a sinner, will be re-born in hell; if he gives me these cakes, he will be re-born among the terrestrial deities.' He presents himself before the condemned man, who thinks, 'What is the good of eating these cakes? If I give them away, they will serve me as a *viaticum* for the other world.' But, as he thinks also with affection of Sulasā: 'It is through Sulasā's kindness that I was in possession of this alms,' his thought, purified by the gift to the saint and soiled by this affection, causes him to be re-born as a tree-deity (inferior deity) (Petavatthu, *Commentary*, p. 5).

The deities of the gardens, the woods, the trees, and plants crowd around the master of the house, Chitta, who is very ill: 'Make your resolution, utter your prayer: "May I be a chakravartin king in a next existence"' (*Saṃyutta*, iv. 302; cf. Rhys Davids, *Early Buddhism*, London, 1908, p. 77).

A man is stained (*sāṅgaṇa*); he acknowledges his stain and does his utmost by prayer, effort, and exertion to wipe it out; he will die free from attachment, from hate, from error, and from stain, with pure thought. A man is free from stain; he knows it; be then conceives complacence, and, through this, attachment enters into his thought; he will die re-clothed in attachment, hate, error, stain, with impure thought (*Majjhima*, i. 26).

The Buddhists began early to think of preparation for death. Aśoka grants three days for this purpose to the damned (Pillar-Edict, iv.; see V. A. Smith, *Asoka*, Oxford, 1901, p. 165). The *Mahāvagga* commands the monks to attend, even during the rainy season, at the bed of a sick layman (iii. 5, 9 = *SBE* xiii. 304). The *Visuddhimagga* (xvii. line 1190) explains the ceremonies performed for the dying. The friends say to him: 'We are about to perform the *pūjā* (cult) of Buddha for you, quiet your spirit [in Buddha].' The *pūjā* includes flowers, etc. (*rūpa*, 'form' or 'colour'). 'See this offering we are making for you,' they say to the sick man—the recitation of texts and music (*sadda*, 'sound') . . ., perfumes (*gandha*, 'smell'), honey, etc. (*rasa*, 'taste'), and cloths (*poṭṭhabba*, 'tangible')—'Touch this offering.' Thus by the five senses the impressions penetrate which will be the object of the last thought.

Spence Hardy (*Manual*, 489) tells the story of a fisher who is made to recite the five precepts by a monk ('I renounce murder' . . .), and this wins a heavenly re-birth for him; and, when he recites them again in his last moments, he obtains re-birth among the higher gods.

Tantrism substitutes formulæ in abracadabra for the 'thought of the Buddha' and the repetition of precepts: the *oṁ maṇi padme hūṁ* plays a great part (see C. F. Köppen, *Die Religion des Buddha*, pt. ii. 'Die lamaische Hierarchie,' Berlin, 1859, p. 59); the cults of Amitābha substitute the repetition of ejaculatory invocations to Avalokiteśvara or Amita: 'Whosoever shall have heard the name of Buddha Bhaiṣajyaguru, to him will eight Bodhisattvas come at the moment of death to show him the way [to paradise]' (*Śikṣāsamuchchaya*, p. 175). In *Karaṇḍavyūha* (Calcutta, 1873), pp. 23, 95, twelve Buddhas surround the dying; in *Sukhāvatīvyūha* (Oxford, 1883), p. 47 (= *SBE* xlix. 45), Amitābha himself appears surrounded by [magic] monks. 'Seeing Bhagavat, their thought is quieted, and, falling from this world, they are born in Paradise' (cf. *Samādhirāja*, iv., at the end). In *Saṃyutta*, iv. 302, it is the forest-deities who care for the dying man and suggest to him the wish for such and such a re-birth.[1]

LITERATURE.—This is given throughout the article.

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[1] See *Madhyamakavṛtti*, p. 228 f., and sources cited.

[2] See *Śūraṅgamasūtra* quoted from the Chinese by Beal, *Catena*, p. 43: 'At the end of life, before losing animal heat, the good and the evil deeds are summoned up, as it were, in a moment.' Then the dying one thinks of his sin and of his good action, and, by a process well described by Nāgasena (*Milinda*, p. 297, tr. Rhys Davids, *SBE* xxxvi. 155), becomes absorbed into the sin committed, even while regretting it.

[3] Aung and C. Rhys Davids, *op. cit.* p. 149. See *Avataṃsakasūtra*, quoted by Beal, *op. cit.* 44: 'If he possesses a bad *karman*, he beholds all the miseries attending a birth in hell . . . he sees the infernal lictors.' Cf. the 'death of the sinner' in the *Bodhicharyāvatāra* of Śantideva, ii. 41 (Poussin's tr., *Introd. à la pratique des futurs Bouddhas*, Paris, 1907, p. 41; L. D. Barnett's tr., *Path of Light*, London, 1909, p. 42).

[1] We need not spend time over the acts and ceremonies for the benefit of the dead. Some bibliographical indications may be useful. Pāli sources (gifts for the dead): *Aṅguttara*, v. 296, Petavatthu, i. 5 (*Paramatthadipanī*, pt. iii. pp. 23, 35),

DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD (Chinese).—The Chinese discriminate between premature death and the inevitable ending of the term of natural life. The pictogram for untimely death is composed of the radical denoting 'evil' (originally depicting the cutting up of bones) and that for 'man,' the combination being interpreted by S. Wells Williams (*Syllabic Dict.*, Shanghai, 1889, p. 836) as 'the evil which parts men.' The character thus formed is explained as conveying the idea of 'the running out of the vital issues,' 'the emptying out of the breath'; whilst that for normal death, *i.e.* in old age, represents the end of a cocoon or ball of silk. The express mention of death is generally avoided, the Chinese preferring to employ some euphemistic phrase such as 'passed away,' 'returned to Heaven,' 'no more,' etc., or sometimes an expressive gesture—the hands tightly clenched, and the head thrown slightly back.

The customs which prevail in different parts of China in connexion with the treatment of the dying and the disposal of the dead are so dissimilar that a complete statement of them would be impossible; it will be sufficient to describe the observances which may be regarded as fairly characteristic. The details which follow do not apply in the case of children and unmarried persons. In these instances the dead are disposed of with as little ceremony as possible; in many cases the bodies of infants are simply rolled up in a coarse wrapper of matting, and deposited in a convenient spot of open ground, perhaps in a 'baby tower' specially intended for the purpose.

The conduct of funeral rites is described as early as the Chow dynasty (1122–255 B.C.), and it is evident that *burial*[1] has always been the mode adopted for the disposal of the dead. In the Chinese sense this does not consist in the lowering of the remains into a dug-out grave, but in the placing of them in a sarcophagus upon the surface of the ground, and the piling up of earth in the form of a mound, as a result of the annual visits to the place of interment. It was usual in early times to place in the coffin certain articles which the deceased valued during life; and specimens of jade, chess-men, etc., are frequently discovered in ancient tombs. In the case of kings it was often difficult to ascertain where the royal corpse was actually buried, as sometimes a number of separate coffins were interred in different places, each nominally containing the 'remains' of the late monarch, in order to render more remote the possibility of rifling the tomb.

The custom of immolating a number of slaves or relatives of the deceased was sometimes practised in China. Cases are quoted as early as the 10th cent. B.C., as, *e.g.*, that of the Duke Muh, at whose funeral some 177 persons were buried alive. References to the practice are found in the time of Confucius (551–478 B.C.), and even as late as the present dynasty an instance is quoted in connexion with the Emperor Shun-che (A.D. 1644–1661). The burning of paper effigies of servants and attendants at the present day may be a survival of this barbarous custom.

1. Importance of the subject.—The importance of the subject will at once be evident when we consider that there is, perhaps, no event in the 'pilgrimage' of the 'Chinaman' which demands so great attention, such scrupulous observance of immemorial custom, and such lavish expenditure of labour and capital, as the carrying out of a 'decent funeral.'

2. The dictum of Confucius.—Confucius lays down no rules with regard to the treatment of the dead, beyond the admonition that all things should be done 'decently and in order'; that the family circumstances should be taken into account, and that the various classes of society should be guided by the precedents which obtain in each class. The tradesman should not seek to emulate the official, and so forth; but Confucius enunciates one general principle which should govern the conduct of the entire affair: 'In mourning it is better to be sorrowful than punctilious.'

It is hardly necessary to say that the observance of the conventional funeral customs is inseparably connected with the extraordinary development of the idea of filial piety, and the ancestral worship of which it is the inspiration and the key.

3. Treatment of the dying.—When all remedies have failed to retain the departing spirit, the dying man is prepared for entering the presence chamber of the gods, before whom he must appear: the god of the local temple, the god of the city walls and moats, and the god of Hades. His head is shaved; his body and extremities are washed; the nails of his hands and feet are cut, the parings being carefully preserved; and his underclothing is changed. When *in articulo mortis* he is supported in a sitting posture, it being believed that the soul makes its escape from a recumbent figure by the lower part of the body, and, as a result, on re-incarnation will be gross and stupid; whilst from the upright body it flies aloft through the mouth, and re-appears eventually, by transmigration, in a highly developed condition. Tinsel money and charms are burnt before him, and the ashes are collected, wrapped in paper, and placed in his hand, whilst he is informed that the expenses of the journey have all been provided. Sometimes a small lantern, obtained from a Buddhist temple, and already used in the worship of Heaven, is placed in his hand, and he is advised to hold it fast, as the way before him will be dark. If the family can afford it, a sedan-chair with two bearers, all of paper and bamboo, is purchased. To die in the early morning is in some places considered felicitous, because there are three meals left for the dead man's posterity to enjoy; but to die after the consumption of the evening meal is considered to be ill-omened, for then, by implication, there is nothing left for his successors. It is important that the sons of the dying man and other relatives should be present to attend the deathbed; and, as they weep, they call upon him not to leave them but to awaken from his sleep. The cries of daughters are considered to have special virtue in opening Heaven's gate, and a man who does not possess a daughter or two is much to be pitied—contrary to a prevailing but very erroneous idea current among Europeans.

4. First duties of mourners.—As soon as death takes place, an elder conducts the proceedings, and orders the queues of the sons to be unravelled, and candles to be lighted before the ancestral shrine and the god of the hearth, because the warrant for the capture of the departed soul is supposed to have arrived from the god of Hades, and it must be countersigned by the ancestral spirits, or their representatives, and by the god of the hearth.

Milinda, p. 294 (*SBE*, xxxvi. 151); Oldenberg, *Rel. des Veda*, tr. V. Henry, Paris, 1903, p. 479. Great Vehicle: J. J. M. de Groot, *Code du Mahāyāna en Chine*, Amsterdam, 1893, p. 97 (tr. and comm. of the *Brahmajālasūtra*, Nanjio, no. 1087), *Sectarianism and Rel. Persecution in China*, Amsterdam, 1903, i. 231; *Buddhist Masses for the Dead at Amoy* (Congress at Leyden, and *AMG* xi.–xii. [1886]); S. Beal, *Catena of Bud. Scriptures*, p. 33; J. Edkins, *Chinese Buddhism* (London, 1880, and *AMG* iv.), p. 225; E. Chavannes, *Mélanges Harlez*, Leyden, 1896, p. 79. For Tibet: L. A. Waddell, *Lamaism*, London, 1895, p. 488.

[1] The practice of cremation is repugnant to the Chinese view of the necessity of preserving the body intact as far as possible, and is employed only in the case of Buddhist monks and nuns, though historical references may be cited in proof of its frequency in certain periods, probably as a result of foreign influences.

5. The dread messengers.—The messengers of the god of Hades are said to be two, viz. the *living Wu-ch'ang* and the *dead Wu-ch'ang*, the word *wu-ch'ang* meaning 'uncertain,' and being explained by the uncertainty of the summons of death. The living Wu-ch'ang is not a demon, but the soul of a living man who is employed by the Wu-ch'ang to guide him to the house of his victim. The true 'Uncertain,' as coming from the hidden world, is unable to find his way in the light of day, and requires a mortal spirit to guide him. Some say that these two characters represent, not individual agents of the god of Hades, but only the two souls (the animal and the spiritual, *i.e.* the *psyche* and the *pneuma*)—the *hun* and the *p'o*, as they are called in Chinese. The first of these is written in Chinese with a character which means 'black' attached to the word for 'spirit' or 'demon,' and hence represents 'black spirit,' and the other has the character which stands for 'white' prefixed to the same word meaning 'spirit,' and hence represents 'white spirit.' These have been personified, by the ignorant, as the lictors who come to carry off the soul; whereas they themselves are the essential parts of the soul which of its own accord is about to leave its tenement. The *hun*, in conformity with its nature, soars aloft and is dissipated; the *p'o* descends into the element of earth and haunts its old neighbourhood.

6. Post-mortem lustration.—The matting on which the deceased is lying is given a pull, with the idea that this will prevent a lingering illness in the next incarnation. The chief mourner, generally the eldest son, invests himself in the clothes which are eventually to be put upon the corpse, and, holding a bucket in one hand and a bundle of incense in the other, walks, or, in the case of an infant, is carried, to the waterside, an umbrella being held over his head all the time, as he is impersonating the dead and must be screened from the eye of heaven. In some cases he is escorted with music and fireworks. Paper money of different kinds is burnt; a coin, with a large nail fastened in the centre, is thrown into the water; and the water is thus supposed to be bought, and is drawn up and taken to the house. Here it is warmed, and a few rubs are given to the chest of the corpse by way of a bath. The hair of the dead man is next combed by the daughters and daughters-in-law, each taking a turn, kneeling and weeping at the same time; and then it is rolled up into a kind of knot on the top of the head, somewhat like the top-knot worn by the Chinese of the Ming dynasty, thus exemplifying the popular proverb, 'The living submit [to the Manchus], the dead do not.' After this perfunctory washing the dead man is removed from his bed and supported on a chair; and the matting and straw on which he has been lying are burned in the open street. It is of the utmost importance that the feet of the corpse should not touch the ground, and they are generally covered with a cotton cloth, and supported in the lap of the daughter-in-law. A small table is spread before the body, holding two bowls—one of rice, and the other containing vegetables with long stalks, to represent and bespeak a long life and firm root in the next stage of existence.

7. Announcement of the death.—The sons of the deceased, with the braid removed from their queues, wearing white gowns, aprons, and white fillets round their heads, and shod with straw sandals, take candles and paper money of two kinds, and proceed to the temple of the god of agriculture. On arrival at the temple, the eldest son, as chief mourner, lights the candles, makes his prostrations, and burns the paper money; this money is supposed to act as a guerdon to the god of agriculture, who is represented as the agent of the god of Hades in the arrest of the soul, and hence requires remuneration. The whole process is described as *p'u t'ang*, or 'strewing the hall'—a phrase applied in real life to 'squaring' the officials at a Yamen in order to be assured of 'justice'; and it is fairly inferred that the officials in the nether world are equally amenable to a 'consideration.'

8. Removal of the corpse.—On returning to the house, they make arrangements for removing the dead to the middle hall, which is reserved for special occasions, and which also contains the ancestral shrine. The position of the corpse is first reversed, indicating the hope that the dead man may return from the hidden world, and this is illustrated by the transposition of the fœtus before birth. A meal is laid out on a large sieve and placed before the dead, with wine and candles, and is then carried in procession to the front of the house and laid outside the door; the members of the family, in white clothing, kneel on a piece of coir matting, weeping and prostrating themselves alternately. The body is next carefully secured to a chair by broad bands, and four strong men are selected to convey it to the state apartment; the head is supported by the eldest son, and the feet by the daughter-in-law. The burden must on no account be laid down until its destination is reached; a fall would be considered a frightful calamity. An umbrella is held over the chair as it moves, to hide one who is now a denizen of the shades from the light of heaven, and handfuls of rice are thrown upon it, with the idea of expelling all evil influences. The corpse is then placed on the bed and a coverlet spread over it. A sheet of white paper is laid upon the face, and the feet are placed close together and propped in position; to allow them to fall apart would involve the death of the nuptial partner shortly after.

9. The public announcement.—A messenger is then sent to a Taoist priest to inform him of the date of the deceased's first attack of illness, the time of his death, and the number of his years. The priest writes a large sheet of yellow paper mentioning these particulars, and the date on which the spirit may be expected to return, together with the classes of persons, born under certain auspices, whose presence at the coffining is contra-indicated. On obtaining this information, which is sometimes pasted up diagonally on the wall of the house, the family is able to prepare for the return of the departed spirit and his attendant.

A large sheet is hung to screen the body from the observation of people passing the door, and a rude lamp, consisting of a bowl of oil with a wick in it, contained in a basket of lime, is kept constantly alight, day and night, so that the deceased may have 'a lamp to his feet' wherever he journeys.

10. Ceremonies connected with death in old age.—If the deceased happens to be aged, say seventy years old or more, the curtain at the foot of the bed is red in colour, to show that death, in his case, should not be considered an occasion of sorrow; and no word of consolation is spoken or sign of grief shown by the visitors; on the contrary, nothing but compliments are heard that such a happy consummation has been reached, full of years and in the midst of a numerous posterity. Wine-drinking, the 'Morra,' etc., are all the rule, and any one would be laughed at who insinuated that there was any occasion for grief. It is to be noted that, until the actual coffining takes places, the candles used are of the usual red variety; white candles are not employed until all hope of revival has departed, and the body is about to be placed in the coffin. The head and feet of the corpse are

supported on specially-made pillows of yellow cotton, stuffed with paper waste, or, in country districts where cotton is manufactured, a reel on which cotton is wound is used instead.

11. **Notifying the relatives.**—A swift messenger is dispatched to inform the relatives, who are expected to send gifts to the bereaved family. The presents consist of small quilts, about three feet long and a little more than a foot wide, which are carefully marked and reserved for placing in the coffin in due course; they are thus marked to ensure that those furnished by important members of the family shall have a first place.

12. **Visits to the house of mourning.**—Notice of the arrival of visitors is given by the gateman, who beats three times on a drum; a trumpet is sounded and a hand-cannon discharged. The musicians then strike up, and the mourners are warned of the approach. The chief mourner kneels at the side of the spirit table; the stewards escort the visitor to the curtain, where he kneels four times and bows four times.

13. **Coffins.**—The style of the coffin varies throughout the empire. In some places it represents the trunk of a tree; in the north the lid projects considerably over the head. The quality is determined by the circumstances of the family. Wealthy people prefer to buy their own coffins beforehand and keep them stored either in an outhouse or in a temple. Some buy the planks, keep them till seasoned, and then employ carpenters to make the coffin when required; whilst others buy theirs from a coffin-shop or from one of the Charitable Societies. At the end of the coffin a lotus flower is carved, expressing the hope that the deceased may become a Buddha and take his stand on a lotus, as Buddha is represented doing.

14. **The process of coffining.**—The time for coffining in some places is at full tide, and preferably after dinner, so that the deceased may not be put hungry to his 'narrow bed'; but in others it must be before daylight in the morning, or in the dark of evening, or on a day bearing an odd number, 3, 5, 7, etc., for fear of another death taking place if an even day should be selected. The floor of the coffin is covered with a layer of fine sifted lime or charcoal; then five large squares of coarse paper; upon these a narrow strip of matting, sometimes manufactured of special material like lampwick, is placed, and upon the top of all a cotton mattress. The garments for the dead are specially made for the occasion, if the family can afford it, and are fashioned after the pattern of the old Chinese costume, like that of the present Koreans; no buttons or knots are permitted—the Chinese word for 'knot' being pronounced like that meaning 'difficulty' or 'trouble,' and all such difficulties must be prevented from accompanying the traveller. The son now divests himself of the clothes he has assumed, taking them all off in one movement, without separating the several garments; and they are suspended over the backs of two chairs and perfumed or aired, by means of a brazier, containing fragrant herbs, placed underneath. Furs and leather of any kind whatever are carefully excluded, lest the dead should be turned into an animal in his next re-incarnation. The clothes are laid out on the inverted lid of the coffin, and the dead man is carefully placed in position for convenience of dressing; his arms are drawn through the sleeves; a long cord, which runs through the sleeves, is then fastened in a 'lucky' knot, and the clothes are carefully smoothed into position. The hands are placed crosswise over the lower part of the body, the left hand uppermost in the case of males, and the right in the case of females. A pair of cheap shoes are placed on his feet, and an official hat with a red tassel is put on his head. In upper-class families a winding sheet of deep red is used, sometimes of satin and elaborately embroidered, forming a sort of large bag like a sleeping-bag, in which all but the head is enclosed, and it is fastened at one side with tapes. A satchel containing paper money, a piece of silver, and the Taoist placard is put on his shoulder; and a piece of silver is placed under his tongue. A small pearl, called 'tranquillizing the heart pearl,' is placed on his breast; and, in the case of a woman, a small pearl is inserted in the toe of each shoe.

The corpse is now lifted and placed carefully in the coffin, the son supporting the head and the daughter-in-law the feet, with others assisting at the sides. It is important that it should rest exactly in the centre. Small bags of lime are then inserted to keep the head and feet in position; the pipe, fan, and handkerchief of the deceased are also inserted, and five small bags of different colours, containing nail-parings, old teeth which have fallen out from time to time, tea, and rice; a small casket containing a rosary, and the undress cap and 'riding-jacket' are also added; for the garments which the dead is at present wearing are his ceremonial clothes, required for his audience with the gods; these others he will wear on his journey. Then each person present takes from his breast a small piece of cotton wool, called 'warm the heart cotton,' and, rolling it up into a small ball, throws it into the coffin; the relatives are invited to take a last look, and care must be taken that no tears are allowed to drop in, lest the corpse should be found in another existence with marks or stripes on his face. Then the various coverlets are laid on in regular order, those presented by near relatives being given first place, and so on in order of precedence, until the coffin is quite full; whatever quilts are unable to find a place inside the coffin are burned. Before the lid is put on, all who are regarded as representing astral influences inimical to the deceased are requested to withdraw, and are allowed to return only when the lid has been put in place. The lid is smeared with crude varnish, to make it air-tight, or sometimes a cement made of rice, vinegar, and flour is used. Usually four large nails are employed to fasten the lid; but sometimes a sort of double wedge, fitting into a socket in the lid above and another in the side of the coffin, is used instead. The nails are driven in by a senior, the sons and, in some cases, the daughters meanwhile crouching under the trestles on which the coffin rests, lest the eyes of the departed should start out at the hammering.

15. **Preparation for removal.**—When the lid is fixed in position, the mourners are allowed to plait their queues with hemp-cord, and wear coarse shoes instead of the straw sandals they have been wearing, and they are permitted to eat. Food is now placed at the side of the coffin, and the dead and his gaoler are invited to partake; the friends and relatives kneel to pay their last respects, and the chief mourner returns the compliment on behalf of the departed. Two piles of paper money are then burned, one for the dead and the other for his guardian.

16. **Meals served before the coffin.**—The 'filial curtain,' made of white cotton, is next hung up before the coffin, drawn partially back at both sides, with a table and chair placed at the opening, a white cover like an altar-cloth draping the table. Regular meals are served to the deceased on this table every day, and, each time a meal is served, the server is expected to wail and cry. This continues until the funeral.

17. **The fairy guides.**—On each side of the chair are placed tall paper structures representing hills, one called the 'golden,' and one the 'silver' hill, intended to indicate the vast sums which the fond

relatives have provided for the voyager, and behind these are tall figures of the 'Golden Youth' and the 'Jade Maiden,' bearing streamers to guide him across the 'Fairy Bridge.' The portrait of the deceased is hung up, behind the chair, supported on each side by scrolls bearing doleful inscriptions, and with white candles placed in front. The chair is occupied by the ancestral tablet, mounted on an inverted tub, and crowned by a piece of red silk fastened with red cord. The wording of the tablet reads: 'Ch'ing (dynasty) of the Rank of such-and-such, Master so-and-so's Spirit Chief.'

18. Untying the knots.—The day before the funeral, Bonzes and Taoists are invited to conduct 'masses,' called 'the Water Mass,' the object of which is to cleanse the departed of all sins and transgressions committed during his life. In the afternoon a bowl containing rice, and a thread rope consisting of seven strands, on which are threaded and tied twenty-four copper coins, is presented to a Bonze, who places it on a table in front of the table already referred to, and, as he recites the virtues of Buddha in releasing souls from pain and trouble, unties the knots in succession, putting the coins one by one into his vest. This untying of knots is meant to illustrate the release from all tightness and difficulties in the next world.

19. The journey through the 'shades.'—A Taoist takes his stand at the corner of the table, holding a bell in his hands, and, as he rings it, he chants a sort of sermon whose text is 'All is vanity,' and whose language has a remarkable similarity to the twelfth chapter of Ecclesiastes. He then describes the different stages of the journey to Hades. The journey is divided into seven periods of seven days, or 'weeks,' which correspond with the various stages of the spirit's wandering in the infernal regions. These stages are described in detail, with a wealth of impromptu illustration and elaboration; and the moral of all is the importance of repentance for not having spent one's days in vegetarianism and the repetition of Buddha's all-potent name, in order to avoid such horrors as have been related. When this long discourse is finished, a space is cleared in front of the 'spirit table,' and a large square with ornamental borders is mapped out on the floor with chaff; twelve oil lamps, provided by the Taoist priests, are disposed round the sides of the square, and are supposed to illumine the darkness of the gate of Hades.

20. Funeral frivolities.—A table is placed at which a Bonze and six Taoists sit, each performing on a different instrument. In the intervals they sing ribald or humorous songs, with the intention of exciting laughter. They also sing the 'Flower Song of the 12 Moons,' describing the different flowers which bloom in the different months, and other compositions which have apparently very little funereal reference.

21. Offerings to the spirits.—After supper the ceremony known as 'Fang Yen-kow' takes place. The spirit table and chair are removed; another chair is substituted, on which a priest takes his seat. Two tables, supporting two large candles and twenty-four bowls of vegetable food, are placed at a little distance in front, intended for the delectation of the various gods. Four other tables are disposed at the sides of the hall, two on each side, intended for the sacrifice to the family ancestors; a small table a little lower down contains the offerings intended for the dead person; and the spirit tablet sits at this table in the chair as before, attended on each side by relatives in light mourning garments. When the priests have finished their reciting, a quantity of paper garments and money is burned outside the house.

22. Sacrifice to the dead.—The apartment is now re-arranged, and preparations for the sacrifice to the dead are made; musicians are requisitioned; large quantities of flesh and fowls are laid out; lamps are hung all over the room, and the chief mourner appears from behind the curtain, leaning upon the 'filial staff,' and supported by attendants. He kneels before the tablet and makes humble offering of the meats, etc. As he prostrates himself, a person standing at the side reads a long panegyric on the dead in a melancholy voice, and the chief mourner weeps as he lies upon his face. He is then escorted to the rear of the screen, and repeats the process three times; all the relatives and friends present follow him in his genuflexions. When all is finished, the offerings and all the temporary fittings are removed, and preparations are made for the funeral.

23. The funeral procession.—In some places the funeral takes place in the fifth watch, *i.e.* between 4 and 5 in the morning, perhaps in the fifth week, or as late as one hundred days after death, sometimes even later, and in cases of poverty the coffin is left in the house, or put in a mortuary chamber for the time being.

Every one is awake and stirring at daylight when the day arrives, and arrangements are made for the start. An immense paper figure, representing the 'Clear-the-way god,' leads the van; next come two large bamboos bearing streamers, and four 'wagheads'—paper figures of men, whose heads bob continually as they are carried along. The son-in-law or nephew carries a dish containing rice, in which is placed the ancestral tablet. In wealthy families the tablet is placed in a sedan-chair, which is supported on each side by a son-in-law or nephew. The bearer of the tablet is robed entirely in white, and the friends of the family walk on either side of him. Then follows the coffin, borne by four men or a larger number, according to the rank of the deceased, and covered with a red pall or with a satin embroidered cover. After the coffin comes the chief mourner, wearing a head-dress of coarse hemp gauze, shaped somewhat like a biretta, with 'pom-poms' of cotton-wool placed at the intersections of the frame, and worn over a small white cap. He hangs his head as he walks, and is followed by the relatives, male and female. The daughter-in-law wears a cowl or hood of coarse gauze over her head, and a jacket and skirt of the same material; she also carries a staff or wand like that borne by the chief mourner; she sometimes sits in a sedan-chair, and the heavy head-dress is then placed on the top of the chair instead of on her head. She weeps and cries aloud as she goes, like the 'keener' at an Irish wake. Rice is thrown over the coffin and chief mourners as soon as they move towards the outside door. The figure of a crane, with outstretched wing and uplifted foot, is placed upon the centre of the coffin, and is supposed to convey the soul to the 'Western Heaven.'

24. The entombment.—When the place of burial is reached, the coffin is temporarily supported by a couple of blocks, whilst the exact location is being considered, with special reference to orientation. In wealthy families, a stone receptacle is prepared beforehand, and the coffin laid very carefully in the exact centre. A meal is laid out, to which the deceased and also the denizens of the neighbouring tombs are invited. The mourners' head-dresses and cinctures are burnt, with a quantity of paper money, and the streamers and staves are left at the grave. All present now set up a cry; the stone door of the tomb is placed in position, and the tomb sealed. The head-stone is set up, bearing the names of the deceased, with the date of erection. The mourners then join hands and perform a sort of 'merry-go-round' about the tomb, which is repeated three days later.

25. Return of the ancestral tablet.—The procession returns in the same order as before, escorting the ancestral tablet to the home, with crying and burnings. On arrival at the house a great bonfire is made outside the door, and all who have attended the funeral are expected to step across it before gaining the threshold; no one is exempted. In some places a little water is sprinkled over each person by the Taoist priests. The son, in (lighter) mourning garments of blue, kneels and offers the viands prepared, and burns a quantity of paper money. He next climbs by a ladder to the ancestral shrine over the central partition, lights candles before each shrine, and then carries up the new tablet and places it in position. All present are invited to partake of the feast which follows. On the third day a visit is paid to the tomb, and offerings of food, etc., are presented. Those who are present join hands, forming a ring round the grave, and circle round in one direction three times and then reverse three times; this is with the idea of confining the spirit in his proper habitat.

26. The seven 'weeks.'—On the seventh day a number of Taoists are hired, seven in all, to 'open the road,' and a great variety of ceremonies take place on this day—morning, afternoon, and evening. In the evening the hall is again arranged, with a table and chair, and a portrait of the deceased hanging behind the chair. Two cups of tea are put on the table, and two bowls of light food, together with candles and incense. The daughter-in-law weeps before the picture, as she 'invites' the spirit to partake of refreshment, and a quantity of paper money is also burned. At daylight, tea, etc., is laid as before. At breakfast-time, food of different kinds is offered and candles are lighted. The performance is repeated at noon, with this difference, that the viands are more elaborate. This takes place every 'week' until the seventh, the only exception being that in the fifth week a further meal is laid in the death chamber. In the fifth 'week,' Taoists are called to 'force the city,' or 'force the gate of hell.' A paper city with men, horses, etc., is set up, and, when night comes, a Taoist priest in full robes breaks through the city with the sword he carries, and liberates the imprisoned soul; afterwards a great bonfire is made in the open air, and three or four priests take their stand around it, holding long bamboos, to which are attached elaborate 'fireworks.' In the sixth 'week' the daughters are expected to provide a feast for the dead, and they are given a share in the division of the clothing which he has left. At the end of the seventh 'week' the chief mourner is allowed to shave his hair for the first time, but, if the coffin has not yet been removed, he is not permitted to do so until one hundred days have expired. The next year the mourners, wearing white garments, pay their first annual visit to the grave on the day known as 'clear bright,' and on this day the sounds of wailing may be heard in all directions. A further visit is sometimes paid in the ninth moon; and at the winter solstice paper garments, representing warm winter clothes, are presented and burnt.

27. The spirit's homecoming.—On the night appointed for the return of the spirit, a table of eatables is laid in the death chamber, which is then evacuated by the relatives. In the kitchen a quantity of lime is placed beneath and around the fireplace. When the hour arrives, as announced by the Taoist priest, a procession is formed, the priest leading, and all enter the chamber. The kitchen is then visited and the lime examined, the traces of the spirit's presence being discovered by the marks, as of the feet of a goose, upon it. A white cock is caught and carried in one hand in front of a basket-lid, and, as the lid is struck by a measure held in the other hand, the cock crows; he is then escorted outside, and paper money burnt. This represents the sending off the spirit's escort. A white cock is said to be a protection against baneful astral influences, and to be the only capable guide of transient spirits.

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DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD

(Coptic).—When the decaying religion of ancient Egypt gradually gave place before the advance of Christianity, many of the beliefs, and much of the symbolism that had been so dear to the Egyptians for over three thousand years, survived the change of religion for some considerable time, and, as was to be expected from a people by whom burial rites had been magnified into a great and complicated magical system, the old customs were given up only gradually and reluctantly. To the Egyptians, Christianity presented itself in a somewhat different light from that in which it appeared to the other civilizations of the ancient world. From the dawn of history they had believed in a continuation of life after death, in a future existence that was well defined; and in order to secure this existence for the soul of man they had elaborated countless magical rites which were performed at the burial of the dead. They had also a god of the dead—a god who had once lived an earthly life, who had been slain by the power of Evil, and who by certain magical ceremonies had come to life again, and ruled as King of the under world. It was thus that in Osiris lay their hope of living again, and with him they considered the dead identified. The Christian belief in a resurrection was therefore not, in certain aspects, a new one to them, and the doctrine that the dead in Christ shall live in Christ was strangely familiar to all who had been reared in the Osirian creed. Thus it is not strange that, when Christianity began to be accepted in Egypt, the early believers continued to practise the ancient funeral rites, only slightly modified to meet the requirements of the new religion.

The chief concern of the pagan Egyptians had been the preservation of the bodies of the dead by embalming, so that the spirit of the deceased might pass to and fro between the kingdom of Osiris and the earthly shell which lay in the tomb; and the early Christians of Egypt saw no reason to alter the custom of their forefathers, more especially since the Christian and pagan doctrines of the resurrection had so much in common. Mummification of the dead, therefore, continued to be practised by the Christians until the beginning of the 5th cent., and only died out after that owing to the general opposition of the Church.[1] Mummies of anchorites and holy men and women have been found in various parts of Egypt, one of the most notable cemeteries containing Christian dead being the recently excavated burying-ground at Antinoë. The bodies are usually well preserved, the head being sometimes adorned with a garland. In the case of the men, the beard was allowed to grow, contrary to the ancient usage, and when the face is thin or emaciated it represents very much the type of the Good Shepherd as depicted in later iconography, but unlike the criophoric figures in the catacombs.[2] The body was carefully wrapped in bandages, usually intercrossed, and sometimes

[1] Anthony, the founder of Christian asceticism, had so great a dislike to it that he desired to be buried secretly, in order that his body might not be subjected to the general custom. It was probably his opposition that led to the suppression of the practice.

[2] Gayet, *AMG* xxx.

the face was covered with a painted plaster mask, as was the pagan custom of the time. In the case of a supposed Christian priest found at Deir el-Baḥarî, the outer wrapping was painted to represent the deceased holding the Eucharistic cup in his hand. On his left shoulder was the *swastika* ornament, which was much adopted in early Christian symbolism, while the lower part of his robe bore a representation of the boat of Isis.[1]

But it was not only the belief in the efficacy of embalming that survived the change brought about by Christianity, for many of the other old funeral customs lingered on, although it is difficult to decide how far their import was understood by the Christians. There is some evidence to show that offerings of food continued to be made to the dead. In the Christian cemetery in the oasis of el-Khargeh the tombs follow the ancient design, the body being laid at the end of a long shaft, at the opening of which is a chamber containing niches for offerings.[2] Wine-jars and baskets for food were sometimes buried with the dead, and in a will made by a Christian at Antinoë the deceased requests that the holy offerings may be made for the repose of his soul. This, however, may refer to an *agape*, or a kind of mass said for the dead.[3] It is interesting that at the Synod held at Hippo in A.D. 393, at which Augustine was present, the habit of placing the host in the mouth of the dead, which had become general amongst Oriental Christians, was strongly condemned. It was apparently also the custom to enclose some of the holy elements in the coffin. Some other pagan usages seem to have continued. As the dead were formerly buried with amulets and little figures of protecting gods, so the pious Christian was buried with figures of St. George and the Evangelists. In one case, at least, at Antinoë a sort of ivory praying-machine, a kind of primitive rosary, appears to take the place of the papyrus inscribed with prayers and magical formulæ. There was also found, held in the hands of this body, a flower of Jericho similar to the mystic rose which was supposed to be the emblem of immortality, and to flourish every year on the day Christ was born. Hitherto this symbol was not considered to have been employed before the Crusades, but its presence in the cemetery of Antinoë points to its use in very early times. It is interesting also to note that the body of a monk named Serapion, from the same burial, was encircled by an iron band from which hung a cross.[4] In cases where portraits of the deceased were painted on the outer coverings of the body, the ancient sign for life, the *ankh*, ☥, is sometimes represented grasped in the hand.[5] This symbol is very frequent in Egyptian iconography, and was often employed where the cross would have been expected. Its use was so persistent that it afterwards became identified with the cross, and was known as the *crux ansata*. See art. CROSS.

As the influence of the Bishop of Alexandria increased over the remoter parts of Egypt, many customs which appeared semi-pagan died out, and the funeral rites were performed more in accordance with orthodoxy. After the Council of Chalcedon (A.D. 451), when the Coptic Church was definitely separated from the orthodox body, there could be but few remaining. From descriptions in the Coptic writings, it would appear that the dead, wrapped in a winding sheet, were immediately carried out into the desert and buried. Persons of peculiar sanctity it was the custom to bury in a reliquary. The Coptic *Life of Shnoute* states that he was buried in a reliquary pierced with holes, probably in order that pilgrims might have the benefit of gazing on the holy remains.[1] As these relics are usually described as bones, it is evident that embalming had by then been abandoned. A Mass, or offering of the Eucharist, was sometimes performed before the funeral, but Masses for the repose of the dead in the Roman sense seem to have been unknown in the Coptic Church. The use of tombstones at this period was almost universal. They usually contain the words: 'One God who helpeth,' and the date on which the deceased 'fell asleep' or 'entered into rest.' Occasionally they contain pious ejaculations and quotations from Scripture. Rarely they are conceived in a more pagan spirit, with such phrases as 'Grieve not, no one is immortal,' an especially good instance of this being a tombstone in the British Museum [no. 400] which runs: 'O how dreadful is this separation! O departure to the strange land which removes one for all time! O condition of Hades, how do we come to thy gate! O Death, name bitter in the mouth! . . . Let all who love to weep for their dead come to this place and mourn greatly.'[2] This recalls the ancient Egyptian funeral prayer to the passer-by: 'O ye who love life and hate death . . . pray for the deceased.'

The Copts have undergone centuries of oppression under Muslim rule, which has driven many to embrace Islām. The Khalīf al-Mutawakkil (850) even went so far as to interfere with their burial customs, and ordered that all the graves of the Copts should be level with the ground. Possibly owing to the influence of Islām, which has surrounded them on all sides for so long a period, the funeral rites of the Copts to-day have become very similar to those of their Muhammadan fellow-countrymen. The corpse is borne to the cemetery on a bier, followed by the female relatives and women of the house wailing and mourning. At the burial-ground a sheep is often killed by the more well-to-do, and its flesh given to the poor; the poorer give bread alone. Professional mourning women are hired to wail in the house for three days after death—a survival, perhaps, of the ancient Egyptian custom, or possibly only a ceremony borrowed from the Muslims. The lamentations are renewed on the seventh and fourteenth days after death, and sometimes for longer still. On the eve of the festivals of *al-Mīlad*, *al-Ghītas*, and *al-Kiyamah* (*i.e.* the Nativity, the Baptism of Christ, and Easter), it is the custom of the Copts to visit the cemeteries and spend the night there, many of the richer having houses built specially for these occasions. The women spend the night in the upper rooms, the men below. Next day an ox or sheep is killed, and the flesh distributed among the poor. Lane (*Modern Egyptians*, p. 296) states that the Copts say that these visits to the tombs are merely for the sake of religious reflexion. This custom, however, together with the practice of slaughtering animals for food, possibly goes back to pre-Christian times in Egypt, when the relatives of the dead made periodical visits to the tombs, and brought food-offerings for the *ka* of the deceased to refresh him in the under world. The funeral services of the Copts are according to the liturgy of St. Mark. One is in use for ordinary periods of the year, and a special one is employed during Easter (Tuki, *Rit. Copt. Arab.* p. 525).

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[1] Gayet, *AMG* xxx.
[2] Myers, *Man*, 1901, no. 91.
[3] *AMG* xxx.
[4] *Ib.*
[5] *Ib.*

[1] Amélineau, *Mission archéol. au Caire*, vol. iv. (1889).
[2] Hall, *Coptic and Greek Texts of the Christian Period*, p. 4.

DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD (Early Christian).—**1.** During the earlier years the Christians followed in general the burial customs of the Jews. But a livelier hope in the resurrection robbed death and the grave of many of their terrors. This gradually modified inherited funeral rites. To the followers of Jesus death was a sleep, and the grave a resting-place (*κοιμητήριον*) for those who had died in the faith (Jn 11^{13}, Ac 7^{60}, 1 Th $4^{13f.}$, 1 Co 15^{18-20}). Not less but more respect was accordingly paid to the mortal remains of the departed, for their bodies had been 'temples of the Holy Ghost,' and were to rise and be glorified (1 Co 3^{18}, 6^{19}, 15^{42}, Rev 7^{13}). When death ensued, the eyes were closed, the body washed, the limbs swathed, the whole body wrapped in a linen sheet with myrrh and aloes, and laid upon a couch in an upper room (Ac $9^{37f.}$; cf. Mk 15^{46} 16^{1}, Jn 11^{44} $19^{39f.}$ $20^{5ff.}$). These acts were performed by the elder women—kindred and friends of the family. Relatives and intimates were admitted to view the face of the deceased, and an interval of eight or more hours was required before burial. The younger men carried the bier to the place of interment, followed by the relatives and friends (Ac 5^{6}; cf. Lk 7^{14}). Flute-players, hired mourners, and noisy demonstrations of grief were doubtless dispensed with (Mt 9^{23}, Lk 8^{52}, Ac 8^{2}, 1 Co $15^{54f.}$). The place of burial was outside the city or village, in a natural cave, or in a tomb cut out of the rocky hill-side, or in a subterranean chamber, or simple grave. Local conditions were determinative. The description in the Gospel of John of the tomb of Lazarus and of that of Jesus will hold for the early Christian Palestinian place and form of burial (Jn 11^{38} 19^{41}; *Gosp. of Peter*, chs. 6 and 10). In fact, the form and character of Jesus' entombment influenced all subsequent Christian practice (1 Co $15^{20f.}$). Tombs were, as a rule, private family possessions (Mt $27^{57ff.}$), and were large enough to receive several bodies, which were laid upon the ledges or in the niches cut in the sides. The brotherhood, however, from the beginning undoubtedly provided for the burial of its own poor (Ac 2^{44}; Aristides, *Apolog.* [Syr.] xv. 18). A large stone, rolling in a rabbet, closed the door of the hill-side sepulchre against prowling beasts and robbers (Mk 16^{3}). It is altogether probable that the Jewish Christians whitewashed their tombs, as did their compatriots (Mt 23^{27}). In Rome and in general throughout the West, as well as in Egypt and North Africa, the Jews had already adapted the Palestinian form of interment to local conditions, and the early Christians modified this still further to meet their own peculiar requirements. Of course they borrowed this and that local practice from the current pagan usage. The wide-spread development of 'catacombs' (*q.v.*) as places of Christian burial was but a re-adaptation of Jewish and pagan burial customs. Simplicity and even plainness must have characterized the earlier forms of Christian entombment in all lands, partly on account of the poverty of the brotherhood, and also because of the hope of a speedy resurrection. A brief inscription expressing the hope of immortality (*εἰρήνη σοι, κοίμησις ἐν εἰρήνῃ, in pace*, etc.), sometimes accompanied by a consecrated symbol (a palm-branch or anchor, fish or dove), was the final tribute to those who had died 'in the Lord' (Bingham, *Antiq. of Chr. Church*, ed. 1870, bk. xxiii.; *Am. Cath. Quart. Rev.*, 1891, xvi. 501 f.; Kaufmann, *Handb. d. chr. Arch.*, 1905, pp. 74 f., 111 f., 205 f., 277 f.; art. 'Koimeterien,' in *PRE*³ x.).

2. But changing conditions produced manifold developments. The wide-spread and increasing alienation between Jews and Christians in the early decades must often have suggested, if it did not compel, separate burial arrangements. And the rapid increase of the Gentile element in the various churches throughout the Empire naturally tended strongly in the same direction. The Jewish cemeteries, indeed, would hardly have been open for the interment of deceased Christians with pronounced pagan antecedents. Our sources, it is true, are practically silent regarding the progress of this development, but it is safe to say that separation between Jews and Christians as regards cemeterial requirements had taken place before the close of the first century, especially in prevailingly Gentile Christian communities. And a similar separation must have been going on as between pagans and Christians. Hostility between them became marked towards the close of the 1st century (Ac $8^{1f.}$ $15^{28f.}$, 1 Co $7^{12f.}$, 2 Co $6^{14f.}$, Col 2^{8}, 1 Jn $2^{18f.}$ 3^{13}, Rev $2^{10.20f.}$ $3^{9f.}$ $6^{1f.}$, and chs. 8–20), and martyrdom was not uncommon (Clem. Rom. *ad Cor.* 5–7; Tac. *Ann.* xv. 44; Suetonius, *Nero*, 16; Melito *ap.* Euseb. *HE* iv. 26, iii. 17–20; Pliny, *Ep. ad Traj.* x. 96, 97; Ign. *Ep. ad Rom.* 5, *ad Phil.* x. 2; Polyc. *ad Phil.* 1). The Christians would naturally wish to ensure the sanctity of the graves of their martyred dead, but in order to do so they had to provide separate cemeteries. That this began to be done in Rome by the opening of the 2nd cent. is generally admitted (de Rossi, *Roma Sott.* 1864–77, i. 343 f., iii. 386 f.; *Bull.* 1865, p. 36 f., 1886, p. 136; *Nuov. Bull.* 1901, p. 71 f., 1902, p. 217 f.; Bosio, *Roma Sott.*² 1650, p. 141 f.; Armellini, *Gli Antiche Cimit.*, 1893; V. Schultze, *Katakomben*, 1882, p. 307; Kaufmann, *l.c.* 111 f.). But that it did not come to pass throughout the Empire is abundantly proved (Ramsay, *Cities and Bishoprics of Phrygia*, 1897, i. 500 f. and 717 f.). Influences other than hostility would often operate to hasten or prevent the institution of separate Christian cemeteries. In some lands, such as Syria and Asia Minor, it took even centuries to accomplish the separation of Christians on the one hand, and Jews and pagans on the other, as regards burial accommodation (Ramsay, *l.c.*).

3. The earliest distinctly Christian cemeteries of which we have any knowledge are to be found in the neighbourhood of Rome. The Neronian persecution, followed by that of Domitian, doubtless constrained the Christian brotherhood to provide separate resting-places for their honoured heroes who had 'fallen asleep.' And, as martyrs to the faith multiplied, such cemeteries became consecrated ground, and the tombs of the martyrs were ere long places of pious meditation and devotion. In certain communities this often necessitated chapels, where the brethren could gather without imminent danger of molestation. Then funeral rites and ceremonies soon shared in the general development, and these in turn reacted powerfully upon the whole manner and mode of burial. The entire catacomb development at Rome, Naples, Syracuse, Alexandria, Trèves, and elsewhere, for example, is adequately explained only on such presuppositions. Instead of family tombs and brief temporary resting-places for the dead, the Church, especially in the West, gradually made provision for the burial of all its deceased members (by A.D. 250). There accordingly arose, in the suburbs of every considerable Occidental city, Christian burying-grounds. And, where the remains of noted martyrs were laid, chapels were erected, and the brethren gathered to observe the Holy Eucharist and to hold fellowship with the 'saints who had gone before.' The chapel was named after the martyr; often the title was given to the whole cemetery; more frequently the cemetery bore the name of the patron who had provided the ground; occasionally of the bishop who enlarged and elaborated it. Instances of each are the cemetery of the martyr Prætextatus, of the patron Priscilla, and

of the bishop Calixtus—all in the neighbourhood of Rome. In the Orient, developments were different. Palestine is rich in rock-tombs, and so is the whole of Syria. Asia Minor has few ancient church-cemeteries; it has mostly family burial-places. And this is largely true of the whole Orient. Stone sarcophagi with Christian inscriptions are frequently found. These were placed in simple graves beneath the surface, or in tombs erected on the hill-side, with more or less elaborate façades. In all this there is little that was distinctively Christian (Ramsay, *op. cit.* i. 500 f., 717 f.). But in the West the pre-Constantine developments were quite unique. Beginning with the Jewish or pagan type of family tomb, the Christian churches soon provided cemeteries for all their dead (Aristides, xv. 8, 11; Tert. *Apol.* xxxix.). The most common form of these was that which was later known as 'catacombs' (*q.v.*). These underground cemeteries are enormously extensive in the neighbourhood of Rome, and were used as burial-places by the Christians down into the 5th century. They give us the larger part of our information on the theme in hand. The transition, for example, from the private family-tomb to the common church-cemetery is illustrated by the St. Lucina crypt and the Calixtus catacomb, by the so-called *spelunca magna* and the Prætextatus catacomb, the Flavian vestibule and the Domatilla catacomb, and the 'Acilii Glabriones' chamber and the Priscilla catacomb. The growing use of obituary inscriptions can also be seen in the catacombs, from the simple εἰρήνη σοι to the most elaborate personal tribute on the tomb of Sixtus II. (A.D. 258). The development of Christian symbolism can likewise be traced therein, from the rude but suggestive 'anchor' to the portrayal in fresco of the Last Supper or of the story of Jonah. Christian art in general had its beginnings and early elaborations in the catacombs, and every phase of it was closely related to the burial of the dead. This is especially true of painting, sculpture, and church architecture. The same is also true of the development of the liturgical and sacerdotal rites in the early Church, and the worship of the dead. The ante-Nicene development of burial customs is, however, quite amply reflected also in the current literature. The *Martyrium S. Polycarpi* speaks of celebrating 'the anniversary of his martyrdom,' or birthday, at his tomb (xviii.). Tertullian says: 'As often as the anniversary comes round, we make offerings for the dead (martyrs) as birthday honours' (*de Cor.* iii.; see also *de Monog.* x., and Cyprian, *Epp.* xii., xxxiii., xxxvi. 2; cf., further, art. COMMEMORATION OF THE DEAD).

The Christians did not fear cremation, though they preferred 'the ancient and better custom of burying in the earth' (Min. Felix, *Oct.* xxxiv.; cf. *Mart. Polyc.* xviii.; Tert. *de Anima*, li., *de Res. Car.* lxiii., *Apol.* xlii.; Origen, *c. Cels.* v. 23, viii. 30; Lactantius, *Div. Inst.* vi. 12; Euseb. *HE* v. 2, vii. 22; August. *de Civ. Dei*, i. 12, 13). Simplicity prevailed throughout the 2nd cent. (Min. Felix, *Oct.* xii. and xviii.), but by the opening of the 4th cent. everything had become elaborated. Associations had been formed in the West to hold the property; space was sold in the cemeteries; gravediggers (*fossores*=κοπιάται) had become a separate class, and there were artists, stonecutters, painters, sculptors, and architects. The anniversary festival had been extended so that the third, seventh, and perhaps the thirtieth and fortieth days after burial were celebrated (*Apost. Const.* viii. 41 and 42). Prayers were made at the tomb, psalms sung, and the Eucharist celebrated as fellowshipping with the dead; lighted tapers were placed at the grave; personal ornaments, toilet articles, bottles, vases, etc., were interred with the corpse (Synod of Elvira, can. 34; of Laodicea, can. 9; of Gangra, can. 20; Euseb. *HE* vii. 16, *Vita Const.* iv. 66, 67, 70, and 71; Epiph. *Hær.* lxxv. 3; Socrat. *HE* i. 40, iii. 18; Jerome, *Ep.* xxvii. [cviii.] *ad Marcellam*).

4. With the recognition of Christianity by Constantine a new era opened. Recent martyrdoms had multiplied the number of saints and holy places, furnishing fresh sites for sacred buildings as well as holy relics for altars. Imperial favour and funds now facilitated the erection of churches throughout the Empire, and the graves of apostles, martyrs, and honoured saints were soon covered by imposing basilicas or mausoleums. In the suburbs of Rome, for example, the basilica of St. Peter arose on the Vatican Hill, that of St. Paul on the Via Ostiensis, that of St. Lawrence on the Via Tiburtina, that of St. Agnes on the Via Nomentana, and that of SS. Marcellinus and Peter on the Via Prænestina. These all were, or became, cemeterial churches, with which Imperial mausoleums were frequently connected, as in the case of the mausoleum of St. Helena, near the last-named church, and that of Constantina, near St. Agnes. All around this latter basilica were placed minor monuments in a large open-air cemetery. The 'churchyard' now soon becomes the prevailing type of cemetery throughout the West, including North Africa. Persecution having ceased, the Christians were free to bury *sub divo*, yet the martyr graves beneath the altars usually drew the cemeteries near the churches. Of course, local conditions were determinative. Churches within the walls of the cities could not have extensive cemeteries, though their crypts were used for burial purposes. Western Europe followed in general the lead of Italy and Rome as regards cemeterial churches and churchyards. North Africa seems to have early developed the open-air cemetery, independent of particular churches. Egypt continued for the most part the ancient practices of the native Egyptians and naturalized Jews. Syria also persisted in its old burial customs, though the elaborate mausoleums of antiquity were not erected as Christian tombs; and the same was true of Asia Minor.

5. The elaborate funeral ceremonies and the interment of the Emperor Constantine in Constantinople (Eusebius, *Vita Const.* iv. 60 and 66–72) indicate the stage which the development had reached and also lines of future progress:

> The body 'was placed in the principal chamber of the palace, and surrounded by candles,' and 'encircled by a numerous retinue of attendants, who watched around it incessantly night and day'; the second son, Constantius, himself headed the procession, 'which was preceded by detachments of soldiers in military array, and followed by vast multitudes, the body itself being surrounded by companies of spearmen and heavy armed infantry. On the arrival of the procession at the church dedicated to the apostles of our Saviour, the coffin was there entombed. . . . As soon as Constantius had withdrawn himself with the military train, the ministers of God came forward, with the multitude and the whole congregation of the faithful, and performed the rites of Divine worship with . . . prayers for his soul. . . . His statue was erected . . . in every province.'

The funeral and entombment of Basil, Bishop of Cæsarea, as described by Gregory of Nazianzus, is likewise instructive (*Paneg. on Basil*, 80):

> 'The saint was being carried out, lifted high by the hands of holy men, and every one was eager to seize the hem of his garment, or to touch his shadow or the bier which bore his holy remains. . . . The psalmody was overpowered by the lamentations . . . the body was consigned to the tomb of his fathers . . . and now he is in heaven, where, if I mistake not, he is offering sacrifices for us and praying for the people.'

Panegyrics on deceased distinguished personages, and over the remains of relatives and friends, became common (Euseb. *Vita Const.*; Ambrose on Valentinian and on Theodosius; Greg. Naz. on his brother, sister, and father [*Orat.* vii. viii. and xviii.], and on Athanasius; Greg. Nys. on Meletius;

August. *Conf.* ix. 12; Jerome, *Epp.* lxi. etc.). The anniversaries of famous martyrs were also occasions for elaborate discourses on their virtues. And their tombs now became the resort of pilgrims from far and near. The relics of martyrs and saints were frequently disinterred and sent to important churches for re-burial in the crypts, where shrines were erected and services held. The Synod of Gangra (*c.* 358 A.D.) declares: 'If any one shall, from a presumptuous disposition, condemn and abhor the assemblies (in honour) of martyrs, or the services performed there, and the commemoration of them, let him be anathema' (can. 20). Yet the Synod of Laodicea (before A.D. 381) announced that 'members of the Church shall not be allowed to frequent cemeteries or so-called martyries of heretics for prayer or worship' (can. ix.). Many councils in Spain, France, and Germany during the 6th cent. tried to stop burials in martyries and churches. Pelagius II. (A.D. 578) protested against the growing custom, but with slight effect. Burial around churches, or in porches, vestibules, and cloisters, soon became universal. Gregory the Great (*c.* 600 A.D.) complains about exactions of cemetery officials as a price of burial, but says: 'If parents or others wish to offer anything for lights, we do not forbid, but you must not ask it' (bk. ix. *Ep.* iii.). Jerome and Chrysostom had spoken approvingly of giving alms at funerals, for the relief of the souls of the dead.

6. A summary of the theme in hand may be given under the following heads. (1) The simple funeral rites and burial customs of the early days gradually gave way to more and more elaborate ceremonies and practices. (2) These developments were different in different lands, but they all tended in the same general direction. (3) Two universal influences were at work to produce these manifold changes: one arising out of the persistent faith and life of the Church, the other pressing in from the universal pagan environment. (4) Funeral rites were extended so as to include the elaborate ceremonials which have been described above, most of which were drawn more or less unconsciously from the surrounding pagan practices, although the Christians never lost the primitive faith and feeling which distinguished their early funeral customs. (5) The manner and forms of entombment were also steadily influenced by the various pagan practices, and yet to the Christians the grave remained the 'sleeping-place' for those who were to arise to 'newness of life.'

LITERATURE.—Besides the authorities cited in the article, see J. Wilpert, *Malereien der Katakomben Roms*, Freiburg, 1903; N. Müller, artt. 'Inschriften,' 'Christusbilder,' and 'Koimeterieo,' in *PRE*³; A. L. Frothingham, *Monuments of Christian Rome*, London, 1908; Cabrol, *DACL*, 1903 f.; S. Gsell, *Les Monuments antiq. de l'Algérie*, Paris, 1901; J. de Vogüé, *La Syrie centrale*, do. 1905 f.; J. Strzygowski, *Kleinasien*, Leipzig, 1903; F. Cumont, *Mélanges d'archéol.* 1895; L. Duchesne, *Orig. du culte chrét.*⁴, Paris, 1908 [Eng. tr.³ 1910].

EDWIN KNOX MITCHELL.

DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD (Egyptian)

(Egyptian).—Of no other country in the world have the burial customs always attracted so much attention as have those of ancient Egypt. The artificial preservation of the body, the elaborate care with which it was provided with covering and ornament, the monumental nature of the tombs which were built or excavated to contain it, struck the earliest foreign observers with astonishment, and are still the theme of wonder and admiration in our own day. Moreover, the dry and microbe-free climate of Egypt, in which nothing is destroyed by the disintegrating action of the atmosphere or the attacks of bacilli, has helped the artificial aids of mummification and carefully-sealed burial to preserve the human body and its appurtenances intact just as they were placed in the tomb. Even if removed from its wrappings, it is but rarely that a mummy is affected by any agency except damp; while the textile fabrics, the mats and baskets, and even the loaves of bread sometimes placed with it, are, if delicate and brittle and without elasticity, to all outward appearance the same now as when they were buried with the mummy. It is chiefly to their preservative methods of burial that we owe our present remarkable knowledge of the ancient Egyptians and their manners and customs, whereas in the case of Greece and Rome we have become acquainted with the course of daily life, and the objects of daily use, mainly through the medium of literary descriptions or the representations on painted vases. In Egypt we have the actual objects themselves, from the precious ornaments of gods and kings to the humblest bead-necklaces or rude idols of the *fellahîn*; we have chariots perfectly preserved, splendid furniture and marvels of cabinet-making which once adorned palaces, simple wooden benches, and the shoes, mallets, and baskets of the common peasants. The majority have been preserved in the tombs. Naturally we possess actual objects of daily use from Greece and Rome also, but they are rare, and tell us little compared with the vast corpus of knowledge which we have derived from the sepulchres of Egypt. And one thing we have from Egypt which is the most wonderful of all, and this we can never have from Greece and Rome. No man has seen the actual face and form of Themistocles, Pericles, or Cimon, of Solon, or of Socrates, of Alexander, Hannibal, or Augustus; yet every man now who wishes may gaze upon the actual bodies of kings whose ancient names were told by the priests to the Father of History, whose deeds as they were written on temple-walls were recounted to the nephew of Augustus, and whose statues were venerated as those of deities by the Emperor Hadrian. Sesostris, Ramses, and Osymandyas, who were ancient names to Hellenes and Romans, and were actually contemporaries of Greek kings who were the heroes and demi-gods of the classical period, lie now in the glass cases of the Cairo Museum. Mycerinus, of whom Herodotus (ii. 129–134) tells a merry tale, is No. 6006 of our national collection in the British Museum. Their preservation to the present day is due to the peculiar burial customs of their nation, and was intended.

The chief peculiarity of the Egyptian burial customs is the artificial preservation of the body. No doubt in later times a theory of resurrection was adopted, according to which, after a space of three thousand years, the several parts of a man—his *ikhu*, or spark of intelligence which had rejoined the gods, his *ba*, or bird-like soul which fluttered around the tomb, his *khaibit*, or shadow, and the *ka*, or double of him, which was born with him and accompanied him on earth during life and in the tomb during death—rejoined his *sahu*, or noble and venerable mummy, which had lain so long in solitary majesty in the tomb, and then the whole man rose again from the dead. But it is not clear that this actual man was to live again on earth as he had lived before. He was to live with the gods rather. According to another theory, the *sahu* was not the actual mummy, but a sort of spiritual body which germinated in the *khat*, or corruptible body, and sprang up out of it just as the wheat springs up out of the seed: so the dead Osiris gave birth to a new living Osiris. It was in this *sahu* that the concomitant parts of the man were re-united. A symbol of this belief is found in many tombs; it is a figure of Osiris on his bier, made of earth, in which seed was sown just

before the burial; as we find it now, we see the wheat which grew up and withered in the darkness. The two different ways of regarding the *sahu* probably arose from two different ideas of the actual dead body. In one aspect it was a mere dead thing, not different from a dead fish—the *khat* of a man like the *khat* of a fish—and was expressed in the hieroglyphic writing by the figure of a dead fish. But in another it was a fearful and wonderful thing—the *sahu*, dwelling in majestic loneliness and silence in the tomb, and endued with marvellous magical powers, which naturally included the power of summoning back to it at will the departed principles of life and intelligence, the shadow, the heart, and the name, ever regarded with awe by primitive races. So the *sahu* is represented as the human mummy lying on its bier. The two ideas were combined in later times by regarding the *sahu* as a spiritual body (which originally it was not) which sprang from the *khat*. The *khat* was simply the profane name for a dead body of any kind. In the oldest religion, when the actual human mummy was alluded to, it was called the *sahu*, and one prayed to the gods to allow the *ba* to re-enter the *sahu* and re-vivify it, so that it could feed upon the offerings which its descendants brought to it. It was probably out of this idea that the conception of a resurrection, whether of a spiritual *sahu* or of the actual man, grew. The real origin of mummification is to be found in a simple desire to preserve the dead man to his family. In the dry soil of Egypt bodies were found by experience not to decay utterly when they were buried in shallow graves, and the simple expedient of smoking or scorching was no doubt resorted to in order to stave off putrefaction even more. How far smoking is responsible for the crouched and drawn-up position of the oldest Egyptian bodies is doubtful. Real mummification was not known to the oldest Egyptians, but that it was introduced before the close of the Neolithic period is shown by the hieratic use, even in the very latest time, of a flint knife only, in order to make the incision through which the entrails were removed. Herodotus records for us this use of 'an Ethiopian stone' (see below). The ancient and holy stone-knife alone could be used for this act; the new-fangled metals were profane. Of this desire to preserve the dead as long as possible to 'those on earth who love life and hate death,' in the words of the Egyptian funeral-prayer, we may find a proof in the custom of keeping the mummy above ground for a specified period, in its own home, before it was finally committed to the tomb (see below, p. 462).

Wiedemann regards this custom, which we shall discuss further later on, as a survival of what he calls 'secondary' interment. In the most ancient days he considers that the primitive Egyptians buried the body first in ground near or under the house till it had partially decayed, and then transferred it to its final resting-place in the desert necropolis. In this way he explains, too, the fact of the disturbed condition of the bones in most of the Neolithic graves, which Flinders Petrie explains as due to a ceremonial cannibalism. Wiedemann thinks that the body was intentionally cut up after putrefaction had set in during the first burial in order to clean the bones before the second and final burial. He finds confirmation of this view in many texts of the 'Book of the Dead,' in which the cutting off of the limbs of the dead is referred to, while the deceased prays that his limbs may be restored to him, and that he may be whole. There is also the legend of the cutting up of the body of Osiris. That these passages are rightly interpreted as referring to a primitive custom of cutting up the body is possible. At Deshasha, Flinders Petrie found definite proof of dismemberment in some cases. But there is little proof that the reason for the practice is that advanced by Wiedemann. And, as a matter of fact, dismemberment was not so usual as has been thought, for much of the disturbance of the remains in pre-historic graves is no doubt due merely to predatory beasts and to wady-torrents (*sêls*).

The primitive custom of burial in a crouched-up posture gradually gave place, during the early dynastic period, to that of burial at full length, with which real mummification is associated. At Mêdûm, Flinders Petrie found both customs existing side by side in the graves of the age of the IIIrd–IVth Dynasty. It was probably not till the time of the Vth Dynasty, when Egyptian customs became crystallized in the form which they more or less retained ever afterwards, that the old custom of the Neolithic people finally died out and the burial customs of the Egyptians took the final shape which we know so well. At least from the time of the IIIrd Dynasty, prayers were made for the dead in the ancient form: 'May Anubis [the protector of the tomb at Abydos] or Osiris [the Busirite god of the dead] grant a royal offering: may he give thousands of flesh, fowl, and everything good and pure on which the god there liveth, to the *ka* of N., justified and venerated' (see below). And the piety of those 'on earth' erected a gravestone 'in order to make his name to live on earth.' This was as far as the Egyptians ever went in the direction of ancestor-worship. As has been shown in the art. ANCESTOR-WORSHIP (Egyptian), the belief that the dead man was absorbed in the personality of the great god of the dead, Osiris—a belief universal throughout Egypt by the end of the 'Old Kingdom'—prevented any worship of him under his own name: he was venerated as being himself Osiris, not as an ancestor. Otherwise a developed ancestor-worship would, no doubt, soon have grown up; for family life was close and affectionate in Egypt, far more so than among the surrounding nations; and the names and figures of parents, children, and other relatives were constantly commemorated on the gravestones of the dead. 'Those living on earth who loved life and hated death' (*ankhiu tep ta mer ankh mestjetj mut*) were always full of sympathy with and affection for those who had gone down before them into the mysterious tomb-world, and to this is due the whole elaborate paraphernalia of Egyptian burial. The smoked body of the earliest period was provided with a mat on which to lie peacefully, with jars of food to live upon, and with flint weapons to use if it could. For how did one know what happened to the venerated *sahu* in his tomb? Would not *ka* and *ba* return to it, bringing back beloved life? That he who had been alive was now absolutely and irrevocably dead was as inconceivable to the childlike mind of the oldest Egyptian as it was to that of any other primitive man. And among this most conservative of all races, the primitive idea merely became more elaborate and overgrown with ritual as civilization progressed.

A better means was devised of preserving the body in order that *ka*, *ba*, and *ikhu* might come back to it and give it life and intelligence to live upon the offerings of its pious friends on earth, to go whithersoever it would, to take any form it pleased, to exercise its undoubtedly magical powers (was not death itself magic?) for good. The easily putrefying entrails and brain were removed, and the body, reduced to skin, flesh, and bone only, was salted in natron, filled with spices, and carefully bound up, in order that decay might never come to it. The removed portions were not cast aside, but were also mummified, and stored in four special jars, which we call 'canopic jars,' each under the protection of a certain demon, so that the dead man could have them at his need. And the shallow grave on the sand became for the well-to-do Egyptian a great sealed tomb in the rock, in which he could rest with his body, safe from the prowling jackal or hyæna, and with his protective amulets and funerary furniture, often made of precious materials, guarded from the impious hands of human robbers. For in Egypt,

as elsewhere, lust of gold drove men to theft; and even in Egypt, the most pious of lands, many could at all times be found who would brave the anger of gods, priests, and the outraged dead themselves to obtain riches. Many tombs were violated within a century of the burial of their owners, in spite of all the precautions taken in order to hide them. That of Thothmes IV. was already violated during the troubles of the reign of the heretic Ikhnaten, and the royal burial was 'restored' in the reign of Horemheb. The knowledge shown of the precise position of the carefully-hidden tombs makes it evident that the thieves, no doubt, came from among the ranks of the priests and guardians of the necropolises themselves; and in the reign of Ramses IX. the scandal had become so great that a royal inquisition into the robberies of tombs was held, which resulted in the conviction and punishment of many offenders. But tomb-robbery went on gaily; the prizes were worth having; and fifty years later all the royal mummies at Thebes had to be taken out of their original tombs and hidden in remote hiding-places, where they remained till discovered in our own time, and placed in the Museum of Cairo. The primitive Egyptian, however, had no fear of tomb-robbers, or of any disturbance beyond that of a storm-flood which might descend from the hills and lay his bones bare to the winds, or of the prowling jackal. This last was a very real danger, and a naive way of forestalling it was devised by regarding the magic-working beast who lived among the tombs as their protector as well as their ravager, and praying to him to take care of the resting-places of the dead and to allow the offerings of the living to remain in peace, and himself to give funerary offerings of the very best ('a kingly offering'), of thousands of flesh, fowl, and everything good and pure on which the god there (the dead man) lives, to the *ka* of the dead man. This is the origin of the well-known *di-ḥetepsuten Anup* formula, which we have already quoted (p. 459[b])—'May Anubis (the jackal) give a royal offering,' etc., which was inscribed on every Egyptian gravestone, till Osiris or another god took the place of Anubis, in which case, however, the formula remained the same. Another theory has explained the occurrence of the word *suten*, 'king,' in this formula as referring to an actual intervention of the earthly reigning king on behalf of the dead man. It is known that the kings often provided magnificent burials for favourite courtiers or nobles; but whether in the early period the monarch was always expected at least to make offerings vicariously at the grave of every subject is very doubtful.

The process by which Anubis lapsed into the position of a mere satellite of Osiris, whose worship as god of the dead spread from Busiris in the Delta over the whole of Egypt, has already been traced (see ANCESTOR-WORSHIP [Egyptian], *B*). The inscriptions and decorations of the tombs, especially those of the royal tombs at Thebes, exhibit to us a temporary degeneration of Osiris himself, at any rate at Thebes. During the Theban period Theban ideas naturally coloured the beliefs of the majority of Egyptians, and Osiris had become largely identified with Amen-Rā. The ideas of Busiris, Saḳḳâra, and Abydos as to Osiris-Sekri-Khentamenti had all become blended with the Heliopolitan idea of the dead sun-god who, after his midday glory as Rā, set as Tum, and during the night sailed through the tomb-world beneath the earth in his barque, attended by the souls of the blessed; and to this was added the identification of the ram-headed Amen of Thebes with Rā. So that we find the dead Amen-Rā-Osiris, blue in colour like the dead Osiris but ram-headed like Amen and called by the mystic name of Auf, 'his limbs,' passing, attended by Isis and Nephthys, the companions of Osiris at Busiris, through the lower world. The Theban priests developed a set of the ancient systems of spells and incantations designed to protect the dead man in the under world and describing his proceedings there (which the Egyptians called 'The Book of Coming Forth from the Day,' and we have named 'The Book of the Dead') into two 'books,' entirely separate from the ordinary 'Heliopolitan' and other recensions of the Book of the Dead. These they called 'The Book of the Gates,' and 'The Book of That-which-is-in-the-Underworld,' which are written and pictured on the walls of the royal tombs at Thebes. There is no doubt that the Egyptians pictured the *Duat*, or Underworld, as actually beneath the earth. This arose from the fact of the tomb being excavated in the earth. The houses of the dead in the necropolis, the *Kherti-neter*, or 'divine under-place,' as the Egyptians called it, formed in their ideas a subterranean world of their own, in which the *sahus* resided in awful majesty each in his tomb, while the ghosts could pass from tomb to tomb through the mazes of the under world. Later, the boat of the sun, in which the god of light crossed the heavens by day, was thought to pass through this dead world between his setting and his rising, accompanied by the souls of the righteous. In this under-Egypt, over which Osiris presided as the mortal king presided over the living Egypt above, and to which a dead sun gave illumination as the living sun gave light to living Egypt, the soul was supposed by some to live very much as the man had lived on earth: there were rivers and lakes to be navigated and fields to be tilled there, and the dead might be called upon to do work as he had worked on earth. But surely rest was the guerdon of a man who had lived a laborious life, so that with the dead were buried boxes full of little Osiris figures called *ushabtiu*, or 'answerers,' because, as the sixth chapter of the 'Book of the Dead' inscribed upon many[1] of them said, 'If one calleth Osiris at any time to do any labours which are to be done there in the under world, to plough the fields, to fill the canals with water, to carry sand from east to west, behold! say, "Here am I when ye call!"' They answered for the dead man. There is little doubt that these *ushabtiu* were the descendants of very real 'answerers' in the shape of dead slaves, who in very ancient times were strangled and buried with their lords in order to serve them in the other world as they had done in this. Growing humanity and culture substituted wooden and stone slaves for real ones; but it may be that the custom of giving real 'answerers' was continued in the case of the kings till quite a late date. It may be even that the dead bodies found lying by the wooden boat in the tomb of Amenḥetep II. (1450 B.C.) were murdered slaves. In the earlier days of Mentuhetep II. (2200 B.C.?) priestesses of Hathor who were members of his harem seem to have been killed and buried in the precincts of his tomb-temple at Deir el-Baḥarî in order to accompany him to the next world. And naturally enough we find the bodies of slaves in the tombs of the 1st Dynasty kings at Abydos.

Although in later times the Egyptians were certainly more humane than either the Greeks or the Assyrians, it would be a mistake to suppose that they had always been so. In earlier days they had been, like all semi-civilized races, more or less children, and a child has no idea of the sanctity of life. Certainly the Egyptians had originally no conception of the sanctity of *human* life as distinct from other life. The slaves followed their masters

[1] Some have merely the inscription 'Illuminate the Osiris N!'

to the tombs as the food did, or the caskets, or the jewellery.

In the tombs, if they are tombs, of the kings of the 1st Dynasty at Abydos, we find an immense *bandobast* for the journey to the next world. There were stacks of great vases of wine, corn, and other food, covered up with masses of fat to preserve the contents, and corked with a pottery stopper, which was protected by a conical clay sealing, stamped with the impress of the royal cylinder-seal. There were bins of corn, joints of oxen, pottery dishes, copper pans, and other things which might be useful for the ghostly cuisine of the tomb. There were numberless small objects, used, no doubt, by the dead monarch during life, which he would be pleased to see again in the next world—carved ivory boxes, little slabs for grinding eye-paint, golden buttons, model tools, model vases with gold tops, ivory and pottery figurines, and other *objets d'art*, the golden royal seal of judgment of king Den in its ivory casket, and so forth. There were memorials of the royal victories in peace and war, little ivory plaques with inscriptions commemorating the founding of new buildings, the institution of new religious festivals in honour of the gods, the bringing of the captives of the royal bow and spear to the palace, and the discomfiture of the peoples of the North-land. All these things, which have done so much to re-constitute for us the history of the earliest period of the Egyptian monarchy, were placed under the care of the dead slaves whose bodies were buried round the tomb-chamber of their royal master at Abydos.

Passing over a space of two thousand years, we see the burial of Iuaa and Tuyu, father and mother of Queen Tii, the consort of Amenhetep III., at Thebes. Here we have the same *bandobast* for the next world: beautifully carved chairs and beds, boxes for wigs and garments, even a chariot, besides all the regular appurtenances of the dead as now prescribed by religion. But the place of the dead slaves is taken by the stone and wooden *ushabtiu*. All this funerary pomp and circumstance grew up from the simple burial of the Neolithic Egyptian with his mat, his pots, and his flints. What kind of religious services were celebrated at the grave in the earliest period we do not know, but it is certain that they contained the germs of the later ritual as it was carried out in Pharaonic times. The descriptions given by Herodotus and Diodorus of the different processes of mummification and the funeral ceremonies are well known. They were eye-witnesses of what they describe; and their descriptions, with exceptions in the case of Diodorus, tally entirely with what we know from the monuments and inscriptions. The account of Herodotus (ii. 85 ff.) is as follows:

'When in a house a man of any importance dies, all the women in that house besmear their heads and faces with mud, and then, leaving the body in the house, they wander about the city, and beat themselves, with their clothes girt up and their breasts exposed; and all their relations accompany them. And on their part the men beat themselves, being girt up in like manner. After they have done this, they carry out the body to be embalmed. There are those who are appointed for this purpose and practise this art: these, when the body has been brought to them, show to the bearers wooden models of dead men made exactly like by painting. And (they show) the finest style (of embalming), which they say is His [*i.e.* Osiris'] whose name I do not think it right to mention in connexion with this matter. And they show the second style, which is inferior and cheaper; and the third, which is cheapest. Having explained them all, they learn from them in what way they wish the body to be prepared; then the relations, when they have agreed upon the price, depart; and the embalmers remaining in the workshops thus proceed to embalm in the finest manner. First they draw out the brain through the nostrils with an iron hook, taking part of it out in this manner, the rest by pouring in medicaments. Then with a sharp Ethiopian stone they make an incision in the flank, through which they take out all the bowels; and, having cleansed the interior and rinsed it with palm-wine, they next sprinkle it with pounded incense. Then, having filled the belly with pure myrrh pounded, and cassia, and other perfumes, with the exception of frankincense, they sew it up again; and, when they have done this, they pickle it in natron, entirely covering it for seventy days: longer than this it is not allowable to pickle it. When the seventy days are expired, they wash the corpse, and wrap the whole body in bandages of flax cloth, smearing it with gum, which the Egyptians ordinarily use instead of glue. Then the relations, having taken the body back again, make a wooden case in the shape of a man, and, when it is made, they enclose the body in it; and thus, having fastened it up, they store it in a sepulchral chamber, setting it upright against the wall. Thus they embalm bodies in the finest manner.

Those who desire the second method, in order to avoid great expense, they prepare in the following way: when they have charged their syringes with oil made from cedar, they fill the abdomen of the corpse with it without making any incision or taking out the bowels, injecting it at the fundament; and, having prevented the injection from escaping, they pickle the body in natron for the prescribed number of days, and on the last day they let out from the abdomen the oil of cedar which they had before injected; and it has such power that it brings away the intestines and vitals in a state of dissolution, while the natron dissolves the flesh, and nothing of the body is left but the skin and bones. When they have done this, they return the body without any further operation.

The third method of mummification is this, which is used only for the poorer people: having thoroughly rinsed the abdomen with a purge (συρμαία), they pickle it in natron for seventy days, and then deliver it to be carried away.'

Diodorus gives much the same account; he adds that the first method cost one talent of silver (about £150), the second twenty minæ (about £60), the third much less. He gives additional details about the mourning, saying that during the interval between the death and the burial the relatives abstained from the baths and from wine, ate the simplest food, and wore no fine clothes; and also with regard to the embalmers themselves, adding the picturesque detail of the stoning and flight of the *paraschistes*, which is of considerable religious interest.

He says (i. 91) that, after the 'scribe' had made the mark on the body indicating the place where the incision was to be made by the *paraschistes*, or 'ripper,' the latter performed his duty with the 'Ethiopian stone' (as Herodotus says), and then immediately fled away, pursued by a volley of stones and imprecations from the other embalmers, for the Egyptians held in abomination any person who wounded or committed any act of violence on the human body. We can see that this reason was not quite the correct one. The ceremonial stoning and fleeing away of the *paraschistes* was, like his ceremonial use of the 'Ethiopian stone' for the performance of his duty, an act of religious significance: the necessary cutting of the holy body of the Osiris had from the first been regarded as an impious act though one necessary for the preservation of that body; therefore a religious act of disapprobation and punishment had to be performed, though doubtless no one but a fanatic would really endeavour to hurt the agent of necessary impiety. That the *paraschistes* was universally regarded as unclean, however, is certain; whether the actual embalmers, or *choachytæ*, shared this reputation to any extent or not is uncertain. Diodorus says that they consorted freely with the priests, to whose lower orders they in fact belonged, and were allowed to enter the sanctuaries. Diodorus also mentions the practice, to which we have already referred, of keeping the mummy in the house after death, with considerable detail, even going so far as to say that the richer Egyptians kept their dead in magnificent chambers, and enjoyed the sight of those who had been dead for several generations. There is little doubt that this is rather a misunderstanding than an exaggeration: the magnificent chambers can hardly be other than the real tombs, in which the Egyptian could always, if he were so disposed, see the sarcophagi which contained the bodies of his ancestors. In all probability the tombs of private persons were not entirely covered up and hidden away, as those of the kings were, for many years after their deaths.

We have one instance in the tomb of Aahmes, son of Abana, the admiral of king Aahmes in the war against the Hyksos, at el-Kab. In it we see a portrait of his grandson, the well-known Paheri, and an inscription which says: 'Lo! here is the son of his daughter, the director of the works of this tomb as making to live the name of the father of his mother, the scribe of the reckonings of Amen, Paheri, deceased.' From this we know that he embellished his grandfather's tomb as well as constructed his own, and we see that an inscription about him could be inserted on the walls of the earlier tomb after *his* death even, which shows that at least the hall of offerings in a tomb usually remained accessible to the relatives of the deceased for generations after his death. Thus, indeed,

may the Egyptians well have felt satisfaction in seeing the coffins which contained their dead, and have regarded the dead, to a certain extent, as contemporaries, as Diodorus says they did, though we know that they never looked upon the actual bodies themselves, as he seems to think. Yet that the dead were actually kept in the houses for some time before their burial seems certain, and Lucian gives his personal testimony to the fact: *ταριχεύει δὲ ὁ Αἰγύπτιος· οὗτος μέντοι—λέγω δ' ἰδών—ξηράνας τὸν νεκρὸν ξύνδειπνον καὶ ξυμπότην ἐποιήσατο* (*de Luctu*, § 21). This may have been a very ancient custom,—we may compare the way in which barbarian tribes still preserve the bodies of their dead chiefs or the dried heads of their enemies, *e.g.* the Dayaks of Borneo,—but we have no illustration of it on the Egyptian monuments, and we cannot doubt that Diodorus' account is due to a misunderstanding. The 'storehouse' in which Herodotus says the body was kept (*θησαυρίζουσι ἐν οἰκήματι θηκαίῳ, ἱστάντες ὀρθὸν πρὸς τοῖχον* [see above]) may either be a place for the temporary storage of the mummy, or the actual tomb. The detail as to the position of the coffin might seem to point to the former alternative, as the proper thing for the coffin was to be placed horizontally on the ground; but in later times it would seem that the coffin was often actually placed on end in the tomb, probably to economize space. Diodorus gives the same detail about placing the coffin on end, but says that this was done in a chamber which those who had not private tombs built on to their houses, in order to contain the mummy. Now it seems very probable that something of this sort was done by poorer Egyptians. Children are often found buried under the floors of the ancient houses, and during his recent examinations among the brick ruins of the ancient Thebes burnt by the generals of Esarhaddon in 668 B.C., Legrain found a burial chamber containing a mummy with *ushabtiu* of the 7th century B.C. This was undoubtedly a chamber built on to a house. Perhaps this may be the explanation of Herodotus' *οἴκημα θηκαῖον*, and of Diodorus' apparent statement as to the retention of the body for a long period above ground. Ordinarily, however, the body of a well-to-do person would be buried in a tomb when the period of mourning was over and the tomb ready, till which time it was, no doubt, kept in a special chamber in the house. The time between the death and the actual burial is given differently by different authorities as from three to ten months. According to Gn 50[3], the embalming occupied forty days, and the period of mourning seventy days.

With regard to the actual funeral ceremonies Diodorus (i. 93) gives some details which are not borne out by the monuments, and are evidently due to misunderstanding. His description of the exaggerated mourning at the death of a king is probably correct, but the details about the funeral oration pronounced over the body by the priests, and the liberty allowed to the people to express their disapproval of a bad king and so prevent his proper burial, have no actual authority to back them up, and seem highly improbable. Yet we have a curious sentence in the inscription describing the battle of Momemphis, in which Amasis says that he gave Apries proper burial, 'in order to establish him as a king possessing virtue, for His Majesty decreed that the hatred of the gods should be removed from him'—which seems to tally somewhat with Diodorus' statement. Evidently a king not considered to be *neb menkh*, 'possessing virtue,' could be debarred proper burial as an Osirian. But the judge would doubtless be a successful rival or usurper, not the common people. No doubt all usurpers had not always been so politic as Amasis was, and we know that the bodies of rival kings were often torn from their tombs and cast to the winds by their enemies, whether usurpers or 'usurpees': Amenmeses, of the XIXth Dynasty, is an instance in point.

A funerary ceremony of very peculiar character which was actually carried out in the case of the kings is not mentioned by Diodorus. This is the remarkable 'Festival of the End' (literally, 'of the Tail'), or *Ḥeb-sed*. It would seem that in primitive times, as has been the case among many semi-savage peoples, the Egyptian king was not allowed to live beyond a certain term. He was then killed, and another took his place upon the throne, only to be killed himself eventually unless he died or was killed before his term had expired. The term was one of thirty years; at the end of his thirty years' reign the monarch was solemnly murdered and buried with all pomp and ceremony. But, as in the case of the human *ushabtiu* mentioned above, the growing humanity of later days, and doubtless the growing reluctance of the kings to let themselves be slaughtered, brought about a compromise. The king was no longer killed, but all the paraphernalia of the ceremony of his 'end' were preserved: he himself celebrated his own funeral ceremony, and performed mystic ceremonies before his own image as Osiris beneath the standard of the funerary wolf-god of Siut, Upuaut (sometimes called *Sedi*, the god 'with the tail'). At the same time his eldest son or other heir-apparent was usually associated with him on the throne, so that a new king appeared in fact as well as in theory. We have illustrations of the 'Festival of the End' from the time of king Den, or Udimu, of the 1st Dynasty; well-known later representations of it are taken from the temple of Amenhetep III. at Sulb in Nubia and the 'Festival Hall' of Osorkon II. at Bubastis. In later times the festival lost all significance, and Ramses II. and other kings celebrated it at far shorter intervals than thirty years. In the old days, even so late as the time of the Middle Kingdom, so far did the pretence of killing and burying the old king go, that very probably an actual *Ḥeb-sed* tomb was made for his supposed dead body, a statue which was ferried over the river and carried in procession to the *sed*-temple and tomb. It may well be that the funerary temple of king Mentuhetep Neb-hetep-Rā, of the XIth Dynasty, discovered by Naville and the present writer at Deir el-Baḥarī in 1903, is in reality a *ḥeb-sed* temple: the great hypogæum beneath its western hall, which they called a '*ka*-sanctuary' or a 'cenotaph,' may then, if it is not the actual tomb, be the *ḥeb-sed* tomb of the king, and the neighbouring tomb called the *Bab-el-Hosân* may be the *ḥeb-sed* tomb of another king of the dynasty.

Connected with Diodorus' statement as to the popular judgment of the virtue of a deceased king is his remarkable description of the carrying of the body of every man to a certain lake, where it was judged by forty judges, before whom any one could make accusations against the dead man: if these were substantiated, he was adjudged unworthy of proper burial; if not, his traducers were heavily mulcted, and his body was placed in a *baris*, or boat, and ferried across the lake to the place of burial. There is no doubt whatever that nothing of this kind actually took place, and that Diodorus or his informants were misled into thinking that the judgment of the dead man by Osiris and his forty-two assessors happened upon earth instead of in the next world: the lake and the boat are equally taken from the pictures of the 'Book of the Dead.' A full description of what is known to us from Egyptian sources as to the real proceedings at the funeral of an Egyptian of high rank will be found in Wallis Budge's book *The Mummy*, p. 153 ff. This account is based largely upon the evidence of the well-known 'Papyrus of Ani,' in the British Museum.

In accordance with Egyptian conservatism in religious matters, the bier and the various chests containing canopic jars, etc., which were borne to the tomb, were not till a comparatively late period placed upon wheels. The ancient sledge-runners of the days before the invention of the wheel were still used when the funerary rites were elaborated, and, when, at a later period, wheeled carriages were introduced for the funerary procession, the old sledge-runners were still preserved, and the wheels were placed beneath them. Oxen were used to drag the carriages to the tomb. The chief priestly participants in the procession and in the rites performed at the tomb were the *kher-ḥeb*, or 'cantor,' as the word is sometimes translated, the *sem* or *setem*, and the *an-mut-f*. The *kher-ḥeb* seems to have acted as a sort of general director of the funeral; he was often a relative of the deceased.

He read the appointed prayers and spells. The function of the *an-mut-f* is not clear. He seems to have represented the god Osiris, and walked in the procession, bearing the crook and flail, the emblems of the god. The *sem* had very peculiar duties. On the night before final burial, after the procession, he proceeded to the tomb, and there laid himself down to sleep, covered with the mystic cow-skin, before the upright coffin containing the mummy. During his sleep he was supposed to 'see all the transformations of the god,' *i.e.* the dead man, in the next world. In the morning three persons preceded the procession and solemnly aroused the *sem*, who then took part with the *kher-heb* in a sort of antiphonal service, in which the two took the parts of Horus and Isis, that of Osiris probably being taken by the *an-mut-f*. Finally the *sem* donned the skin of a leopard, and performed the very important ceremony of the 'Opening of the Mouth and Eyes,' in order that the dead man might be able to see and eat the offerings brought to him. The 'opening' was performed by touching the mouth and eyes of the mummy with a model adze or chisel of antique form. The ordinary ceremonies of offering at the grave were performed by the *ḥen-ka*, or 'servant of the ghost,' in the case of a private person a near relative, in that of the king a regularly appointed priest. The funerary chapels of the kings had broad lands assigned to them for their maintenance, and in the time of the XIXth Dynasty developed into huge temples, of which the Ramesseum and Medinet Habu at Thebes are examples. These, like the royal tombs, were decorated with funerary subjects taken from the Theban 'Books of the Under World,' already mentioned; but in the royal temples scenes of the ordinary life of the monarch were also introduced. The private tombs are almost exclusively decorated with such scenes, as they had been in earlier days.

An interesting circumstance in connexion with the funerary chapels and tombs may be mentioned here. Since Osiris had become, in succession to Anubis, pre-eminently the god of Abydos, the necropolis of that place became, so to speak, the metropolis of the under world, to which all ghosts who were not its rightful citizens would come from afar to pay their court to their ruler. So the man of substance would have a monumental tablet put up to himself at Abydos as a sort of *pied-à-terre*, even if he could not actually be buried there; while for the king, who, for reasons chiefly connected with local patriotism, was buried near the city of his earthly abode, a second tomb would be erected, a stately mansion in the city of Osiris, in which his ghost could reside when it came to Abydos. We know that both Senusret III. and Aahmes I. had second tombs, which they never occupied, made for them at Abydos; queen Teta-shera, grandmother of Aahmes, had an imitation pyramid made for her there by her grandson (see ANCESTOR-WORSHIP [Egyptian], *B*); and it is by no means improbable that the so-called royal 'tombs' of the kings of the Ist Dynasty, the contents of which have already been described, were in reality cenotaphs also, the monarchs being buried elsewhere. And Seti I. and Ramses II. had funerary chapels at Abydos, which, as at Thebes, are large temples.

From this sketch it will be seen that, in spite of the conservatism of the Egyptians, especially in such matters as these, considerable development and alteration took place in their burial customs and cult of the dead during the course of centuries. A difference is noticeable between the appurtenances of the mummy under the Old and Middle Kingdoms and under the New Kingdom. In the earlier period *ushabtiu* of the conventional type were rare, but wooden models of boats and boat-men, butchers and bakers at work, field-labourers, soldiers, women carrying baskets, and other figures of the same kind, which were all *ushabtiu*, were *de rigueur*. Under the New Kingdom these all disappear, with the exception of an occasional boat, and their place is taken by the boxes of conventional *ushabtiu* in the form of a mummy holding two hoes for agricultural work in the next world, and by a much greater number of amulets than had been usual before. Chief among these were the 'pectoral' and the 'heart-scarab,' often combined in one, and inscribed with a certain chapter of the 'Book of the Dead.' The ordinary small scarab is, of course, constantly found, but was quite as much an amulet of the living as of the dead. As a matter of fact it is commoner as an amulet of the dead under the Middle Kingdom than under the New Kingdom. The names of dead persons are constantly commemorated on scarabs of the Middle Kingdom, very rarely on those of the later period, except during the Saïte archaistic revival. It must be remembered that, although the idea of the design or inscription on the base of a scarab was originally derived from the inscription of a seal, and although actual scarabs were often used as seals, yet the scarab itself was always an amulet, typifying 'coming into being' or 're-birth,' expressing the hope that the 'members' of a man would ultimately re-unite in a new life.

From the time of the Theban domination onwards, papyri containing chapters of the 'Book of the Dead' were always buried with the mummy, so that he could have with him his guide to the next world and its dangers. In earlier times this was not done; only in the case of kings were the older series of spells, out of which 'The Book of Coming Forth from the Day' developed, inscribed upon the walls of their tombs. These are known to us as the 'Pyramid Texts,' and they are a most interesting monument of the archaic stage of the Egyptian language. Later such kings, as we have seen, had the spells of 'The Book of the Gates' and 'The Book of That-which-is-in-the-Underworld' similarly painted on the walls of their tombs. The style of mummification and of the coffin varied at different periods: the great rectangular coffins and sarcophagi of the early period are very different from the gaily painted cartonnage coverings and coffins in the human shape which were usual in later days. Later still a casket-like form was again preferred, and in the Roman period painted portraits of the dead, either on flat panels or modelled in plaster in the round, were inserted in the coffins. The *ushabtiu*, which from the XIXth to the XXIInd Dynasty often represented the deceased in his habit as he lived, not as a mummy, in later days reverted to the mummy-form, till in early Ptolemaic days their use was practically abandoned. One of the latest known (now in the British Museum) is of the Roman period: it is of faience, but very rude in style, and bears in Greek letters the simple inscription Σωτὴρ ναύτης—'Soter, a sailor.' By this time the Egyptian mummies and funerary ceremonies had become the theme of the half-derisive wonder of the rest of the world, and indeed we need hardly be surprised at the derision, for the whole spirit and practice of the ancient rites had degenerated utterly and they became mere ridiculous exhibitions, while the ideas which they were supposed to express became the sources of religious charlatanism and more or less humbugging 'philosophies.' So Egypt 'expired, a driveller and a show.'

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H. R. HALL.

DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD (Europe, Pre-historic).—**I. Palæolithic period.**—Owing to the negative evidence of archæological researches, there are no data with which to combat the supposition that during the earlier stages of the evolution of humanity little or no attention was paid to the disposal of the dead, the deceased members of a family or community being simply abandoned by the way, like those of the lower animals. Nor is it known in what precise phase of social culture the custom of burial became recognized as a sacred duty of the survivors, for it is still a debatable problem among archæologists whether the reindeer hunters of the Palæolithic period, who frequented the caves and rock-shelters of the Dordogne and other parts of Western Europe, were in the habit of systematically burying their dead. The few human remains hitherto encountered in the débris of these inhabited sites, which are accepted without cavil as belonging to the people of that period, are held by some archæologists to be those of persons who had been accidentally killed by the fall of materials from overhanging rocks, and their skeletons are now occasionally met with under circumstances which clearly establish the above sequence of events. On the other hand, those which show from inherent evidence that they had been intentionally deposited in the Palæolithic débris and attended with sepulchral rites are still regarded by some anthropologists as interments of later times. The three well-known skeletons found in the rock-shelter of Cro-Magnon have long been regarded as representing the people of the later Palæolithic period; but, as they were lying on the surface of the culture strata of the shelter, in a small open space between it and the roof which only became covered up by a subsequent talus, they are now often regarded as belonging to the Neolithic period.

That Neolithic people were in the habit of burying their dead in caves formerly inhabited by Palæolithic races has been frequently noticed and recorded by explorers. Thus, in the upper strata of the débris in the Schweizersbild rock-shelter, a Neolithic civilization was attested, not only by a characteristic assortment of relics, but also by the fact that the shelter had been latterly made use of as a cemetery which contained no fewer than 22 interments. The graves were dug into the underlying Palæolithic deposits, and ten of them contained the remains of children, as well as those of adults. Fourteen adult skeletons reported on by Kollmann belonged to two very different races, one of a fair size (5 ft. 3 in.), and the other so small as to be characterized as a race of pygmies. Dr. Nüesch, the explorer of this rock-shelter, thought that man in the Neolithic time visited it only for the purpose of burying, or perhaps cremating, the dead—an idea suggested to him by the large quantity of ashes in the upper strata. It would appear, from the facts disclosed during the exploration of this early inhabited site, that there had been no discontinuity in the human habitation of this part of Switzerland since the reindeer hunters made this rock-shelter their rendezvous up to the Bronze Age; but no evidence of systematic burial had been detected till the true forest fauna of the Neolithic period had taken possession of the land (*Neue Denkschriften der allgem. schweizerischen Gesellschaft fur die gesammten Naturwissenschaften*, vol. xxxv.).

The celebrated station of Solutré (Saône-et-Loire), which has given its name to one of the intermediate phases of Palæolithic civilization in de Mortillet's classification, had also been subsequently utilized as a cemetery up to, if not beyond, Roman times; but, although some of the graves were clearly shown by their contents to be of greater antiquity than others, it was impossible to assign any of them with certainty to the Solutréen period. Moreover, the cephalic indices of 18 crania submitted to Broca varied from 68·34 to 88·26—an extent of variability which could be better accounted for by a post- than by a pre-Neolithic population.

Palæolithic burials.—Formerly it was commonly held among anthropologists that the Palæolithic people had no religion. But a fresh examination of old materials and some more recent discoveries supply data which modify this deduction, if, indeed, they do not prove the contrary. It is difficult to epitomize the facts and arguments thus raised, but the effort must be made, as otherwise our evidence would resolve itself into a series of bare assertions.

The sepulchral phenomena associated with some of the human skeletons disinterred in the Mentone caves (Balzi-Rossi), notably those known under the names of *Barma Grande* and *La Grotte des Enfants*, leave no doubt that the bodies had been intentionally buried with their personal ornaments, coiffures, necklets, pendants, etc., made of perforated shells, teeth, fish vertebræ, pieces of ivory, etc. Among the grave-goods discovered along with some of these skeletons, were one or two well-formed implements of flint, which differed from those met with in the surrounding matrix in being made of large flakes of foreign material, and showing a style of workmanship more akin to the Neolithic period. The discovery of two skeletons, of a negroid type, in the *Grotte des Enfants*, which Verneau describes as belonging to a new race, intermediate between those of Neanderthal and Cro-Magnon, marks an important addition to human palæontology.

The *Chancelade* skeleton, found in the small rock-shelter of Raymonden (Dordogne) and described as that of a man of about 60 years of age, lay at a depth of 5 ft. from the surface, in Magdalénien débris, on the left side, with the hands and knees strongly bent towards the face.

L'Homme écrasé de Laugerie Basse (Dordogne) is here noted, because the evidence is conclusive that during life this individual had been crushed, probably while asleep, by a fall of rock from the roof, and that consequently the victim must have been contemporary with the Magdalénien débris in which he reposed. He lay on his side, with the knees bent upwards in front of the breast, and appeared to have been adorned with a series of shells distributed symmetrically on different parts of his person. The corner of a great stone, part of a fallen mass, lay across his spine, and doubtless had caused his death, as the underlying bones were crushed.

A remarkable contrast to the skeletons of Chancelade and Laugerie Basse is that recently found in a small grotto at La Chapelle-aux-Saints (Corrèze).

It is described as that of an aged man, about 5 ft. 3 in. in height, who had been buried in a prepared grave beneath a bed of undisturbed Moustérien débris, 12 to 16 in. thick. The grave measured 4 ft. 8 in. in length, 3 ft. 3 in. in breadth, and 1 foot in depth. The body lay on the back, with the legs bent upwards, the right hand flexed under the head, and the

left extended. Around the body were bones of various animals broken for their marrow, together with a few flint scrapers and bone pointers—supposed to have been the remains of a funeral feast (*L'Anthropologie*, xix. 519).

Another skeleton, which has a striking resemblance to that just described, was recently found in the under strata of the rock-shelter of Le Moustier, in the upper valley of the Vezère.

It is described as having been buried intentionally in the attitude of sleep, beneath undisturbed strata of Moustérien age. The right arm was folded under the head, and the left extended. Near the left hand lay a pointed flint implement of the *coup-de-poing* type (6¾ in. long), and a little further on a flint scraper. The cranium is described as having the osteological characters of the Neanderthal and Spy skulls. The face was strongly prognathic, and there was no chin. The skeleton was that of a young man, about 4 ft. 10 in. in height, whose wisdom teeth had not yet been fully developed. Bones of various animals, some of them being described as partially calcined, were close to the body. Both the discoverers and Dr. Klaatsch, who examined this skeleton, formed the opinion that it had been intentionally buried with sepulchral rites (*ZE*, 1909, p. 537).

A further discovery of a portion of a human skull has been announced, at a place called Combe-Capelle, near the town of Montferrand-du-Périgord (Dordogne). From its osseous characters and associated relics this individual is regarded as occupying a chronological horizon intermediate between the Moustérien and Magdalénien periods.

It is a fact of some significance that all the races hitherto recognized as coming within the Palæolithic range of Western Europe are dolichocephalic, and that brachycephalic skulls are rarely found outside Neolithic burials, and then only in deposits of the transition period, to which reference will now be made.

2. Transition period.—Outside the haunts of these highly skilled hunters, artists, and workers in stone and bone, there existed, in certain parts of Europe, other communities, probably emanating from the same stock, who, owing to the exigencies of a changing climate and the gradual disappearance of wild animals from the plains, began to exploit new sources of food, which, in the course of time, caused a considerable divergence in their domestic economy. Thus, while the Chelléen and Moustérien culture relics can be more or less paralleled throughout the whole of Southern Europe, the artistic phases of the later civilization of the reindeer hunters are not forthcoming beyond a limited area, mostly in Southern France. Implements of Moustérien types have been found in the Mentone caves, but not a trace of the relics characteristic of the Magdalénien stations of France; and yet both sets of cave-dwellers may have been contemporary.

Perhaps the most interesting feature of the investigation of the 'kitchen middens' of Mugem, in the valley of the Tagus, was the discovery of upwards of a hundred interments at various depths in the shell-mounds; but it does not appear that any special grave-goods had been associated with them.

From the data at our disposal the point of most importance to the present inquiry is that the recently discovered skeletons at Moustier and Chapelle-aux-Saints, which undoubtedly were survivals of the earlier types of humanity, appear to have been interred with sepulchral rites, so circumstantially carried out as to suggest that they were founded on an already established cult of the dead. But, however this may be, it cannot be gainsaid that, during the Neolithic civilization, there is unmistakable evidence to show that the disposal of the dead had become a sacred obligation on the surviving relatives and friends. By this time the sepulchral materials are overwhelmingly conclusive in support of the doctrine that religiosity and a belief in a future life were the dominating factors in the social organizations of the period.

3. Neolithic period.—During the Neolithic period the cult of the dead prevalent among the peoples of Western Europe was the outcome of psychological ideas which linked human affairs with the souls of men, animals, and things in the spirit world. The writer agrees with the animistic theory of Tylor, which represents man as first attaining to the idea of spirit by reflexion on various physical, psychological, and psychical experiences, such as sleep, dreams, trances, shadows, hallucinations, breath, and death, and so gradually extending the conception of soul or ghost till all Nature is peopled with spirits. However this may be, there can be no doubt that the religion of these pre-historic peoples, as disclosed by their sepulchral remains, involved a belief in intercommunications between mankind and the supernatural world. When a prominent man died, his weapons, ornaments, and other cherished objects were placed in the tomb along with suitable viands for his supposed journey to the Unseen World; and, indeed, there is evidence to show that in some instances his favourite wives, slaves, and pet animals were sacrificed, and buried in different parts of the mound. The selected grave-goods were appropriate to the standing and tastes of the individual, so much so that on this ground alone the graves of distinguished men, women, and children are readily recognizable. Such facts undoubtedly suggest that the people of those times did not regard life beyond the grave as differing widely from that on earth. To them death was the portal to the community of departed heroes and friends, to which they looked forward, across the span of human life, with hopeful anticipation of a more perfect state of existence. Hence the abodes of the dead were considered of greater importance than those of the living. Constructed of the most durable materials, and generally placed on a commanding eminence so as to be seen from afar, the tomb became an enduring memorial for many generations, till eventually its actual purpose and meaning became lost amidst the changing vistas of succeeding ages. One of the most common and effective methods of perpetuating the memory of the dead was by rearing a mound of stones or earth over the grave. To this custom we owe some of the grandest monuments in the world's history—the Pyramids of Egypt, the topes and *dagobas* of India, the mighty mounds of Silbury and New Grange, the megalithic circles of Stonehenge and Avebury, together with the numberless rude stone monuments known as dolmens, cromlechs, menhirs, etc., scattered along the western coasts of Europe and extending into Africa. To comprehend fully the motives which underlay the construction of ancient sepulchral monuments, it would be necessary to examine not only their structural peculiarities and contents, but also their surface accessaries, such as stone circles, cairns, mounds, menhirs, earthen ditches, etc. Although a strong family likeness permeates the whole series in Western Europe, they differ so widely in certain districts that to deal with their local peculiarities and distribution alone would entail at least as many chapters as the number of countries within that area. Then the attentions paid to the dead before, at, and subsequent to, the burial disclose a wide field of speculative research, involving the foundations of religion, ancestor-worship, and general cult of the dead.

(1) *Inhumation and cremation.*—Pre-historic sepulchres vary so much in form, structure, position, and contents that to make a systematic classification of them on the lines of their chrono-

logical development is almost an impossibility. One special element which complicates such an inquiry was the custom of cremating the dead, which appears to have originated in Eastern lands, and to have spread westwards, reaching the British Isles towards the close of the Stone Age. This practice, of course, introduced various innovations on the sepulchral customs previously in vogue. Burial by inhumation, which, according to Greenwell, was much more common in the Yorkshire Wolds, is thus described by that veteran explorer:

'It [the unburnt body] is almost always found to have been laid upon the side, in a contracted position, that is, with the knees drawn up towards the head, which is generally more or less bent forward: the back, however, is sometimes quite straight. So invariable is this rule, that out of 301 burials of unburnt bodies, which I have examined in the barrows of the Wolds, I have only met with four instances where the body had been laid at full length' (*British Barrows*, p. 22). 'In most cases there is nothing to protect the body against the pressure of the overlying sod, but now and then a few large blocks of flint or thin slabs of chalk have been placed round it, thus forming a kind of rude covering; and from the appearance of the earth immediately in contact with the bones, it would seem that turfs had sometimes been laid over the corpse' (*ib.* p. 13).

On the other hand, when the body was cremated, the incinerated remains were carefully collected and usually placed in an urn, and then buried. When no urn was used, the remains were laid in a little heap, either in the grave, over which a mound was subsequently raised, or in a hole in earth already consecrated to the dead, such as a former barrow. The corpse, thus reduced to a few handfuls of ashes and burnt bones, required no great space for its preservation either in a public cemetery or in a family burying-ground. Hence sprang up a tendency to diminish the size of the grave, and thus megalithic chambers gave place to short stone cists containing the body placed in a contracted position.

Simple inhumation, *i.e.* placing the body in a hole in the earth and re-covering it with the excavated earth, was probably the earliest method of disposing of the dead; and to mark the site the survivors naturally raised over the spot a mound of earth or stones. Among a sedentary population the next step in advance would be to protect the body from the pressure of the surrounding earth. This was usually done by lining the grave with flagstones set on edge, over which a larger one was placed as a cover, thus forming the well-known cist; sometimes, instead of flagstones, wooden planks were used in the shape of a rude coffin. The material used was not always a matter of choice, but rather depended on what was most readily procurable in the neighbourhood. Greenwell tells us that in the Yorkshire Wolds the stone cist, so common in other parts, was almost entirely wanting, because in chalk districts the requisite slabs were unprocurable. On the other hand, wood is so liable to decay that it is rare to find evidence of its having been used.

On one occasion the writer of this article was present at the excavation of a barrow, near Bridlington, under the guidance of Greenwell, and on reaching the primary interment there was only a large empty cavity, with nothing but the enamel of a few teeth lying on the floor to show that a burial had taken place. Greenwell, however, soon cleared up the mystery by pointing out the unmistakable impression of wooden beams on the clay walls of the empty space, which, doubtless, had formed some kind of coffin. A few instances of tree coffins have been discovered both in this country and on the Continent. One well-known specimen from a barrow at Gristhorpe is now preserved in the Scarborough Museum. It consisted of the trunk of a large oak, 7½ ft. long and 3 ft. 3 in. wide, roughly hewn and split into two portions; one of the portions was hollowed out to make room for the corpse, and the other formed the lid of this improvised coffin. Among the grave-goods were a small bronze dagger, 3½ in. long, containing 2 rivet holes for the handle, fragments of a ring and of an oval disk both of horn, together with a few flint objects (Jewitt, *Grave Mounds*, p. 48). Another remarkable discovery of a grave was made at Treenhöi, in Jutland, which contained a woollen garment, leg bandages, a horn comb, a small bronze knife, and a bronze sword in its wooden sheath. The whole of the deposit in the grave was wrapped up in a large deer-skin, which probably had served as the warrior's outer cloak (Worsaae, *Danish Arts*, London, 1882, p. 52).

The stone-lined cist is perhaps the most widely distributed type of early grave known. From this to the megalithic chamber, with its sepulchral compartments, entrance passage, and superincumbent cairn, was an easy transition. But the chronological sequence thus suggested is of little value in dating these monuments throughout the British Isles, as there is evidence to show that some of the chambered cairns and long barrows were constructed before the introduction of cremation. Thus, in the counties of Gloucester, Wilts, Somerset, and some neighbouring localities, there are chambered cairns in which the primary burials were by inhumation, and the human skulls found in them belonged to a dolichocephalic race. Similar chambered cairns, containing remains of a dolichocephalic race, have been found in the Island of Arran; but as regards the analogous groups of sepulchral monuments further north, such as those in the counties of Argyll, Inverness, Sutherland, Caithness, and the Orkneys, it is conclusively proved that cremation and inhumation were contemporary from the very beginning; and the same remarks apply to the dolmens of Ireland. It would thus appear that, subsequent to the erection of the early chambered cairns of the Stone Age in Britain, there was a period of degradation in this kind of sepulchral architecture, during which the well-known barrows of the Bronze Age became the prevailing mode of burial.

In Scandinavia the Giant graves belonged to the Stone Age, but gave place during the Bronze Age to large stone-lined cists, suitable for more than one corpse. Finally, in the early Iron Age, both these monuments were discarded for simple burial, either by inhumation or after cremation; and there were then raised huge earthen tumuli, such as the mounds of Thor, Odin, and Freya at Gamla Upsala, and the ship barrow at Gokstad. The dolmens of the Iberian Peninsula, known as *antas* in Portugal, belonged to the Stone Age, and their interments, which were almost exclusively of unburnt bodies, showed that the people who constructed them were a dolichocephalic race—a remark which also applies to the cave burials of that country, some of which were older than the dolmens. Cremation appeared at a comparatively late period in the Bronze Age, probably owing to the distance of the Iberian Peninsula from the seat of its supposed origin.

The primary object of inhumation might have been nothing more than protection of the corpse from enemies and wild beasts; but, in the evolution of the grave from a mere hole in the earth up to the elaborately constructed chambered cairn, we must seek for a higher motive than a pious act of respect to the memory of a departed friend. The general idea entertained by archæologists on the subject is that the grave was looked upon as also the temporary abode of the ghost, who was supposed to hover around the corpse till the natural decay of the latter had been completed—a process which took some time, and entailed on the ghost the irksome ordeal of passing through a sort of purgatory, or intermediate stage, between this life and that of the spirit-world. It is now surmised that the effect of fire had long been known as a means of purifying not only the body, but also the soul, from the pollution which death brings with it—an opinion which may account for the finding of so large a number of partially burnt bodies in graves, even before cremation was generally adopted. As soon as it became fully realized that burning was merely a speedy method of accomplishing the dissolution of the

body,—now regarded as nothing more than a mass of corrupt matter,—cremation became the culminating point of a religious cult, which taught that it was a most desirable object to set free the soul from its association with the corpse as speedily as possible.

But, whatever were the motives which led to the adoption of cremation, whether religious or sanitary, there can be little doubt that burial by inhumation was associated with religious rites and ceremonies long before its introduction into Western Europe. Subsequently both methods were practised concurrently during the whole of the Bronze Age, and down to the time when Christianity superseded paganism. According to classical writers, the Greeks and Romans practised both methods, but in fluctuating proportions, probably due to the influence of fashion or current religious opinions. That cremation was more prevalent among the richer classes was partly due to its being an expensive process, and, therefore, beyond the means of the common people. But one has to be cautious in drawing deductions founded on motives, as the predominance of one or other of these burial customs varied in separate districts, even within such a limited area as the Wolds of Yorkshire. On this point Greenwell writes (*op. cit.*, p. 21):

'In some localities on the Wolds it has been seen that cremation prevailed, though inhumation was the general custom throughout the whole district. In other parts of Yorkshire, however, cremation was all but universal; as, for instance, in Cleveland, where Mr. Atkinson's very extensive investigations did not produce a single instance of an unburnt body; and near Castle Howard, where a large series of barrows contained nothing but burnt bodies.'

Burial mounds are called 'cairns' when their constructive material consists of small stones, and 'barrows' when that material is ordinary soil; but not infrequently both substances were used in the same mound—a small cairn being often inside an earthen barrow. Their great diversity in external form gave rise to a number of qualifying epithets, such as 'long,' 'round,' 'oval,' 'bell-shaped,' etc. Sometimes the mound was surrounded by a ditch, or a stone circle, or both; and instances are on record in which one or both of these features were found within the area covered by the mound. Also, an interment, whether by inhumation or after cremation, may be found beneath the natural surface without any superincumbent mound, or any surface indications whatever. At other times, when the mound or cairn is absent, a standing stone, or a circle of stones or of earth, or a ditch may indicate the site of a burial. Sometimes the mound may be raised over an interment, whether burnt or unburnt, which had been simply laid on the surface of the ground. At other times a mound, seemingly of earth, and covered with vegetation, may contain a megalithic chamber with an entrance passage, and sometimes divided into sepulchral compartments. Structures of the latter kind were evidently family vaults, and often contained the osseous remains of several generations. As the abodes of the dead, specially adapted for the burial of unburnt bones, were continued after cremation began to be practised, it often happens that both burnt and unburnt remains are found in the same barrow. We have already seen that the earliest interments in the chambered cairns in the North of Scotland were burnt bodies.

(2) *Dolmens.*—Among the sepulchral monuments still extant in Europe, the megalithic graves, known as 'dolmens,' take the first place, not only for the wealth of evidential materials which they have supplied, but also on account of their great number, imposing appearance, and wide geographical distribution. A dolmen, in its simplest form, may be defined as a rude stone monument, consisting of at least 3 or 4 stones, standing a few feet apart, and so placed as to be covered over by one megalith, called a capstone or table.

A well-known example of this kind in England is Kits Coity House, near Maidstone, which in its present condition consists of three large free-standing stones supporting a capstone measuring 11 ft. by 8 ft. Originally the spaces between the supports had been filled up by smaller stones, so as to enclose a small sepulchral chamber, and after interment the whole was then covered over by a mound of earth, but without an entrance passage.

Between this simplest form and the so-called *Giants' Graves, Grottes des Fées, Allées couvertes, Hunnebedden*, etc., there is an endless but regular gradation of structures in proportion to the number of supports and capstones used.

The well-known *Allée couverte* of Bagneux, near the town of Saumur, measures 18 mètres in length, 6·50 in breadth, and 3 in height. It is constructed of huge flagstones, standing on edge, 4 on each side, with 4 capstones—the largest of which measures 7·50 mètres in length, 7 in breadth, and 1 in thickness. Another, near Esse (Ille-et-Vilaine), called La Roche aux Fées, and about the same length, is constructed of thirty supports and eight capstones, including the vestibule.

Although many of these free-standing dolmens show no signs of having been at any time embedded in a cairn or mound, some archæologists maintain that that was the original condition of all of them—a theory which derives some support from their present dilapidated condition, for many of them may be seen throughout the whole area of their distribution in all stages of denudation. Were the materials which compose the tumulus of New Grange, in Ireland, removed, leaving only the large stones of which its entrance passage and central chambers are constructed, there would be exposed to view a rude stone monument similar in all essentials to that at Callernish in the Island of Lewis.

The covered dolmens greatly vary in shape and appearance, owing to vegetation and other natural surface changes; and, as to size, they range from that of an ordinary barrow—a few yards in diameter—up to that of New Grange, which rises, in the form of a truncated cone, to a height of 70 ft., with a diameter at the base of 315 ft. and of 120 ft. at the top. Silbury Hill is 170 ft. in height, and over 500 ft. in diameter at the base.

There is no rule as to the position of the entrance gallery, it being attached, sometimes to the side, as in the Giant's Grave at Oem, near Roskilde, in Denmark, and sometimes to the end, as in the tumulus of Gavr'inis (Morbihan). The Drenthe Hunnebedden, which in the present day are all uncovered, had both ends closed and the entrance passage on the side facing the sun, as was the case in all the dolmens.

Ruined dolmens are abundantly met with in the provinces of Hanover, Oldenburg, and Mecklenburg. According to Bonstetten, no fewer than 200 are distributed over the three provinces of Lüneburg, Osnabruck, and Stade; but the most gigantic specimens are in the Duchy of Oldenburg. In Holland they are confined, with one or two exceptions, to the province of the Drenthe, where between 50 and 60 still exist. The Borgen Hunnebed, the largest of the group, is 70 ft. long, 14 ft. wide, and in its primitive condition contained 45 stones, ten of which were capstones.

In Scandinavia the dolmens are confined to Danish lands and a few provinces in the south of Sweden. In the former country, in addition to the great chambered tumuli, free-standing dolmens may be seen situated on the tops of artificial mounds, and surrounded by enclosures of standing stones either in the form of a circle (*Rundysser*) or oval (*Langdysser*).

Only one dolmen has been recorded in Belgium, but in France their number amounts to close on 4000, irregularly distributed over 78 Departments, of which no fewer than 618 are in Brittany. From the Pyrenees they are sparsely traced along the north and west coast of Spain, through Portugal and on to Andalusia, where they occur in considerable numbers. The most remarkable monument of the kind in Spain is that near the village of Antequera, situated a little to the north of Malaga. The chamber is slightly oval in shape, and measures 24 mètres long, 6·15 mètres broad, and from 2·7 mètres to 3 mètres high. The entire structure comprises 31 monoliths—ten on each side, one at the end and five on the roof. The huge stones are made of the Jurassic limestone of the district, and, like those of Stonehenge, appear to have been more or less dressed. The

entire structure, now partially exposed, was originally covered with earth, forming a mound 100 ft. in diameter. In Africa, dolmens are met with in large groups throughout Morocco, Algeria, and Tunis. According to General Faidherbe, who has examined five or six thousand specimens, they are quite analogous to those on the European Continent, with the exception that, in his opinion, none of them had been covered with a mound (*Congrès Internat.*, 1872, p. 408). In Great Britain, Ireland, and the Channel Islands every type of the sepulchral monument is met with, especially chambered cairns, stone circles, and barrows.

The manner in which these sepulchral monuments are distributed along the Western shores of Europe, to the exclusion of central parts of the Continent, in which no dolmens are found, has given rise to the theory that they were erected by a migratory race called 'the people of the dolmens,' moving, according to some, from Scandinavia to Africa, and, according to others, in the opposite direction. But this theory has fallen into disrepute. Their magnitude and local differences in structure, even in districts bordering on each other, show that their builders were a sedentary population. Besides, the skeletons found in their interior belonged to different races. Against the theory advanced by Aubrey and Stukeley, that these rude stone monuments had been used as Druidical altars, there is *prima facie* evidence in the care taken by their constructors to have the smoothest and flattest surface of the stones composing the chamber turned inwards. Also, cup-marks and other primitive markings when found on capstones are invariably on their under side, as may be seen on the dolmens of Keriaval, Kercado, and Dol au Marchant (Morbihan).

(3) *Cromlechs.*—The word 'cromlech,' as used by some English archæologists, is almost synonymous with 'dolmen'; but, as defined by Continental authorities and adopted by the present writer in this article, it is exclusively applied to enclosures (*enceintes*), constructed of rude standing stones placed at intervals of a few feet or yards, and arranged roughly on a circular plan—circle, oval, horse-shoe, or rectangle. In this sense it comprehends the class of monuments known in this country under the name of 'Stone Circles' or 'Circles of Standing Stones.' Stone circles are, or were formerly, more numerous in the British Isles than elsewhere in Europe. They generally consist of one line of stones, but not infrequently two or more circles are arranged concentrically, as may be seen in those at Kenmore near Aberfeldy, and Callernish in the Island of Lewis. At Avebury one large circle, 1200 ft. in diameter, surrounds two other circles placed eccentrically to the former, and each containing a second circle arranged concentrically.

Cromlechs may also be associated with alignments, menhirs, and other megalithic monuments, as at Carnac, Callernish, etc. In the British Isles, Scandinavia, some Departments of France, and elsewhere, they surround dolmens, tumuli, and cairns. Outside the ordinary stone circle there is often a ditch, as at Avebury, Stonehenge, Arbor Low, Ring of Brogar, etc. The most remarkable monument under this category now extant is Stonehenge, which differs from all others of its kind in having the monoliths of the outer circle partially hewn and connected at the top by transverse lintels. That most of the smaller circles have been used as sepulchres has been repeatedly proved by the finding of urns, burnt bones, and skeletons, sometimes deposited in the centre and sometimes at the base of the standing stones, or indeed anywhere within the circular area. It is difficult to believe that burial was the sole purpose of the large cromlechs such as Avebury, Stonehenge, the Giant's Ring near Belfast, Mayborough near Penrith, etc. This last consists of a circular mound composed of an immense aggregation of small stones in the form of a gigantic ring, enclosing a flat space 300 ft. in diameter, to which there is access by a wide break in the ring. Near the centre of the area there is a fine monolith, one of several known to have formerly stood there. It is more probable that such enclosures were, like our modern churches, used not only as cemeteries, but for the performance of religious ceremonies in connexion with the cult of the dead.

(4) *Sepulchral caves.*—The custom of burying the dead in natural caves, to which we have already referred as having been met with in the Palæolithic period, was continued throughout the Neolithic and Bronze Ages. Discoveries of this character have been recorded in numerous localities throughout Europe, and especially in France. Professor Boyd Dawkins informs us that the most remarkable examples of caves used as sepulchres in Britain are to be found in a group clustering round a refuse-heap at Perthi-chwareu, a farm high up in the Welsh hills, in Denbighshire:

'The human remains belong for the most part to very young or adolescent individuals, from the small infant to youths of 21. Some, however, belong to men in the prime of life. All the teeth that had been used were ground perfectly flat. The skulls belong to that type which Professor Huxley terms the "river-bed skull." All the human remains had undoubtedly been buried in the cave, since the bones were in the main perfect, or only broken by the large stones which had subsequently fallen from the roof. From the juxtaposition of one skull to a pelvis, and the vertical position of one of the femora, as well as the fact that the bones lay in confused heaps, it is clear that the corpses had been buried in the contracted posture, as is usually the case in Neolithic interments. And, since the area was insufficient for the accommodation of so many bodies at one time, it is certain that the cave had been used as a cemetery at different times. The stones blocking up the entrance were probably placed as a barrier against the inroads of wild beasts. . . . The Neolithic age of these interments is proved, not merely by the presence of the stone axe or of the flint flakes, but by the burial in a contracted posture, and the fact that the skulls are identical with those obtained from chambered tombs in the South of England proved to be Neolithic by Dr. Thurnam' (*Cave-Hunting*, pp. 155–158).

The same writer describes similar remains from caves in the limestone cliffs of the beautiful valleys of the Clwyd and the Elwy, near St. Asaph. He has also shown that the people who buried their dead in these caverns were of the same race as the builders of the neighbouring chambered tomb of Cefn, just then explored. The crania and limb bones were identical, and in both the tomb and caves the dead were buried in a contracted position.

In Scotland, human remains regarded as sepulchral have been found in some caves at Oban, which had been exposed by quarrying operations at the foot of the cliff overhanging the ancient raised beach on which part of the town is built. In one of these caves (M'Arthur Cave), along with some fragmentary skeletons, were two skulls sufficiently preserved to enable Sir William Turner to take correct measurements of their special character, from which it appears that their owners belonged to a dolichocephalic race, their cephalic indices being 70·2 and 75·4. Although no grave-goods are known to have been associated with these bodies, there is sufficient evidence from collateral phenomena to show that the chronological horizon to which they must be assigned is the Neolithic period.

Of all the countries of Western Europe, France has yielded by far the largest number of burials under this category. De Mortillet, writing in 1883 (*Le Préhistorique*, p. 598), states that he could count 117 in France distributed over 36 Departments, 24 in Belgium, 8 in Italy, and only 1 or 2 specimens in each of the other countries.

The following epitomized notices of one or two examples will give the reader some general idea of the importance attached to this class of sepulchral remains:

In the course of exploring the natural cave of Casa da Moura, near Lisbon, a large quantity of human bones, representing some 150 individuals, was disinterred. It appears that the Neolithic inhabitants had converted the grotto into a cemetery —which would account for the large number of bodies it contained. The bones were much decayed, only three or four entire skulls being amongst them, which so far indicated a dolichocephalic race. The upper portion of one of these skulls is of exceptional interest, inasmuch as it furnishes positive evidence of having been partially trepanned, thus disclosing the initiatory stage of the method of performing that operation (Cartailhac, *Les Âges préhistoriques de l'Espagne*, p. 84).

Of the French caverns which contained only long skulls, the two most remarkable are those of L'Homme Mort and Baumes-Chaudes, both in the Department of Lozère. In the former were nineteen skulls sufficiently well preserved to furnish the necessary measurements. Of these the cephalic indices of seventeen varied from 68·2 up to 76·7, and the other two were 78·5 and 78·8. There were, therefore, no brachycephalic skulls in this sepulchre, so that the race appears to have been comparatively pure. It may also be mentioned that some of the crania had been trepanned—a feature which, though at first overlooked, subsequently became the subject of much interest to anthropologists. The animal remains were those of the Neolithic epoch, but among them were none of the reindeer, horse, ox, or stag. Among the relics were a lance-head, and a portion of a polished stone axe. Drs. Broca and Prunières were of opinion that the individuals whose remains had been consigned to this ossuary belonged to an intermediate race, who flourished in the transition period between the Palæolithic and Neolithic civilizations, and thus became connecting links between the people of the reindeer caves and the dolmens.

The crania recorded from the station known as Baumes-Chaudes were found in two natural caverns distinct from each other, but opening on a common terrace. They contained a vast collection of human bones, representing some 300 individuals; but both were regarded by the investigators as the continuation of the same family burying-place, which, indeed, had not been altogether abandoned till the beginning of the Bronze Age, as one of the skeletons in the upper deposits had beside it a bronze dagger. In one of these caverns only chipped flints, rude implements of horn, etc., were discovered; but in the other there were a few arrow-points, a bead, some roundlets of deer-horn, etc., which suggested some progress in culture. The crania measured and classified in M. Salmon's list from the Baumes-Chaudes ossuary amount to thirty-five, and they are all dolichocephalic, the indices varying from 64·3 to 76·1. The average height of this race was calculated to be about 5 ft. 3½ in.

As examples of sepulchral caverns in which brachycephalic crania formed the majority, a series of caverns at Hastières and Furfooz in Belgium may be cited. Of 33 skulls from the former measured by Professor Houzé, six are dolichocephalic, eleven mesaticephalic, and sixteen brachycephalic. The well-known cave at Furfooz (*Trou du Frontal*) was merely a rock-shelter with a projecting cavity extending inwards for some 2 mètres, and about one mètre in height and one mètre in breadth, and closed in front by a large slab. This cavity was filled with human bones mixed with earth and stones, but none of the bones retained their relative positions as regards the rest of the skeleton, so that dismemberment must have taken place before their final deposition in the cave. From the number of lower jaws, whole or broken, it was calculated that this sepulchre contained 16 individuals, of whom 5 were children. The cephalic index of some of the skulls was over 80. A disturbing element in the conclusions suggested by this discovery was the presence of fragments of pottery among the contents of the cave; while outside the slabstone there was an accumulation of débris and food refuse, which, judging from the fauna represented by its osseous remains, belonged to the Palæolithic period. Hence, at the time, the human remains of Furfooz were regarded as belonging to that period—an opinion which is no longer held, as the sepulchre is now admitted to be of the Neolithic age (*Rev. de l'école d'anthr.*, 1895, p. 155 f.).

Artificial caves used for sepulchral purposes have also been discovered in certain Departments of France, more especially those with chalky formations, like the Marne district. Here upwards of a dozen stations, each containing a number of artificial caves excavated in the flanks of low hillocks, have been most successfully explored by Baron de Baye (see his *Archéologie préhistorique*, 1880). Among some hundreds of interments, over 120 crania, including various trepanned specimens and cranial amulets, have been collected and are now preserved in the Château de Baye. Associated with them were a number of implements, weapons, and ornaments of Neolithic types, such as stone axes and their handles, arrow points, flint knives, bone pointers, polishers, beads and pendants of amber, bone, stone (one of callais, like those of the tumuli of Brittany), fossil shells, teeth, and so on. Of the crania, 44 were submitted to Dr. Broca for examination, and are thus classified:—dolichocephalic (71·6 to 76·7), 15; mesaticephalic, 17; and brachycephalic (80 to 85·7), 12.

Dr. Broca recognized in these human remains the union of two races analogous to those of Furfooz and Cro-Magnon—the latter having already been identified by him as of the same type as the dolichocephalic people of L'Homme Mort and Baumes-Chaudes.

Some of these caves, especially those of Petit-Morin, are supposed to have been constructed in imitation of the dolmens, as they were preceded by an entrance passage and occasionally a vestibule, from which a low door, closed with a stone slab, led to the sepulchral chamber. Baron de Baye thinks that some of them had been used as habitations for the living before being appropriated to the dead, as they had sometimes niches and shelves cut out of the solid chalk walls, on which various industrial relics had been deposited. A rudely executed human figure with a bird-like nose, two eyes, a necklet, and breasts, together with the form of a stone axe in its handle, was sculptured in relief on the wall of the vestibule of one of the larger caves. This cave appeared to have been much frequented, as the threshold was greatly trodden down by the feet of visitors. M. Cartailhac explains this peculiarity by supposing that it was a place for temporarily depositing the dead before transferring them to their final resting-place. All these caves contained abundance of relics characteristic of an advanced Neolithic civilization, but without any trace of metals, and the surrounding neighbourhood is rich in flint objects of that period.

Finally, it may be observed that sepulchral phenomena and grave-goods associated with the artificial caves of France are precisely of the same character as those of the neighbouring dolmens and natural caves, thus conclusively showing that all these monuments belonged to the same epoch and the same civilization. Their relationship to the rock-cut tombs of Egypt, Etruria, Palestine, and other countries, we must leave to readers to work out for themselves.

(5) *Grave-goods.*—The gifts to the dead, as already mentioned, bear some relationship to the social position among the community in which the deceased lived. They include all manner of things —ornaments, weapons, tools, utensils, pet animals, and even the wives and slaves of great heroes. When a departed friend appeared in a dream dressed in his usual garments and armed with his favourite weapons, it was natural to suppose that these objects, as well as their owner, had shadowy existences in the spirit world. From this it is supposed that the pre-historic people believed that not only men, but animals and inanimate objects, had souls—a belief which may account for the frequency with which weapons and other grave-goods were broken.

The quality of grave-goods varied according to the culture and civilization prevalent at the time of the interment. During the Stone Age they consisted of perforated shells, teeth, pendants of ivory and coloured pebbles, stone axes, spear-heads, arrow points, bone pins, buttons, and other objects of the toilet. During the Bronze and early Iron Ages, to the above objects were added necklets made of beads of jet, amber, and coloured glass, rings, armlets, and fibulæ of bronze, and sometimes gold rings. The stone weapons gave place to others made of metal. In the absence of written records, the objects thus collected and collated form the principal materials on which archæologists base a more or less positive system of chronology. Among the calcined bones of cremated subjects, small articles such as pins, beads, buttons, etc., are occasionally found, showing that the corpse had been clothed when subjected to the fire. When de-

posited in the earth without an urn, it has been argued that such objects had been used for binding the cloth or skin in which the calcined bones were wrapped up. From the quantity of objects sometimes deposited in the grave, it has been surmised that, when a person was possessed of property of rare and exceptional value, it was customary to bury it along with him, evidently with the intention of its being utilized in the world of spirits. As an illustration of this the following notice of a remarkable discovery of axes made of jade and other materials will be of interest:

The tumulus of Mont-Saint-Michel, which occupies a conspicuous position among the Carnac group of antiquities, rises to the height of 10 mètres, on an elongated base measuring 115 mètres in length by 58 mètres in breadth. In recent times the top of the mound was flattened, and the eastern third is now occupied by a chapel, while at the other extremity there are the ruins of a modern observatory. In 1862 a small megalithic chamber, some two mètres square and rather less than one mètre in height, was discovered, and on the floor of the chamber, amidst a thick deposit of dust, the following objects were found: (1) Eleven beautifully polished axes of jade, varying in length from 9½ to 40 centimètres. Two of these celts were pierced near the point for suspension. One was broken into three portions, two of which were lying at one end of the crypt and the other at the opposite end. (2) Two large celts of a coarser material, both broken. (3) Twenty-six very small celts of fibrolite. (4) Nine pendants of jasper and 101 beads of jasper and turquoise, supposed to have formed a necklet; also a number of very small beads made of some kind of ivory. After the entire débris had been removed from the floor of the chamber, there were found, under a flagstone, remains of an interment occupying a shallow space between the floor and the natural rock (René Galles, *Bull. de la soc. polym. du Morbihan*, 1862).

(6) *Pottery*.—The pottery found with pre-historic burials consists of a variety of vessels collectively called 'urns'; but, as they are found in graves containing either burnt or unburnt bodies, they could not all have been intended for cinerary purposes, so that they have to be classified according to their ascertained special functions. Vessels associated with inhumed bodies are supposed to have contained food and drink—hence they are called 'food-vessels,' and 'drinking-cups' or 'beakers.' The cinerary urns, used exclusively for the purpose of preserving the cremated remains of the corpse, vary considerably in size, form, and ornamentation, being generally 10 to 18½ in. in height. They are narrow-based and wide-mouthed, with a broad overhanging rim to which the ornamentation is commonly confined; or they may be flower-pot-shaped, and ornamented by one or two transverse ridges. The food-vessel, which is considerably smaller, more globular, and more highly ornamented than the cinerary urn, is also wide-mouthed and narrow-based. As a rule it was placed with an unburnt burial in the vicinity of the head of the corpse.

Drinking-cups, or beakers, are tall, highly ornamented vessels, narrowing from the mouth to near the middle, then bulging out and again narrowing at the base. A few specimens have been found with a handle like a jug. Beakers are almost invariably associated with unburnt burials—only two out of 24 having been found by Greenwell in the Wold barrows, with cremated burials. Very small cup-shaped urns, often pierced with two or more holes in the side, and generally found inside a large cinerary vessel, are known under the name of 'incense cups'; but there is no evidence to support this suggested use of them, and they are now regarded as cinerary urns for infants.

The Hon. John Abercromby holds that the beaker is not only the oldest Bronze Age ceramic in the British Isles, but also an imported type from Central Europe by way of the Rhine Valley (*JAI* xxxii. 373 ff.). As an interesting corollary to Mr. Abercromby's views, it has been observed that, in almost all the instances in which the beaker has been found associated with human remains, the skull was brachycephalic.

That sepulchral ceramics of the beaker type have rarely, if at all, been found in Ireland may be accounted for on the supposition that the Continental brachycephali were later in penetrating as far as Ireland; or, perhaps, that the few who did find their way to that country did so by a different route from those who entered Britain by way of the Rhine Valley. Anyhow, the rarity of both beakers and brachycephalic skulls in the prehistoric burials of Ireland is a suggestive fact to the student of Irish ethnology.

(7) *Cemeteries*.—As population increased and the influence of religion became more powerful as a governing factor in social organizations, the isolated and sporadic graves of the earlier people gave place to their aggregation in the form of cemeteries in certain selected localities, which were thus, as it were, consecrated as common burying-grounds for the disposal of the dead. The remains of such cemeteries may be found dispersed throughout the whole of Europe. There is documentary evidence that in pagan times the Irish had regal cemeteries in various parts of the Island, appropriated to the interment of chiefs of the different races who then ruled the country, either as sole monarchs or as provincial kings.

This authority consists of a tract called *Senchus-na-Relec* ('History of the Cemeteries'), being a fragment of one of the oldest Irish MSS, and in it reference is made to the cemetery of *Taillten*, which Mr. Eugene Conwell of Trim has identified as a group of chambered cairns on the Loughcrew Hills, near the town of Oldcastle, Co. Meath. Mr. Conwell also quotes the following stanza, among others, from a poem in the same old MS, viz. *Leabhar na hUidhre*:

'The three cemeteries of Idolaters are
The cemetery of Taillten, the select,
The ever-clean cemetery of Cruachan,
And the cemetery of Brugh.'

On the ridge of this range of hills, which extends for a distance of about two miles, are situated from 25 to 30 chambered cairns, some measuring as much as 180 ft. in diameter, while others are much smaller and nearly obliterated. They were examined in 1867–8 by E. A. Conwell, and an account of his discoveries was published in 1873 under the title of *Discovery of the Tomb of Ollamh Fodhla*.

An analogous group of dilapidated chambered cairns, with settings of stone circles, may be seen at Clava near Inverness, and other localities in Scotland. Stonehenge is in the centre of a vast burying-ground consisting of barrows in groups over the downs.

Urn cemeteries, without any external markings to indicate the site of the burials, are frequently met with in the British Isles, being exposed by agricultural operations, and especially by the removal of clay beds for the making of bricks. As the underlying clay slides from under the covering of soil to a lower level, urns are frequently seen sticking in the broken margin of the surface soil. A small urn cemetery was recently discovered at the digging of the foundation of a villa in the town of Largs. The site was a low gravelly mound, and the cemetery disclosed an unique feature in the finding of a stone-lined cist covered over with a large flagstone and containing seven flower-pot-shaped urns, all having more or less calcined bones in them (*Archæologia*, lxii. 239–250).

In 1886, in the course of removing the surface-earth above a gravel- and sand-pit at Aylesford in Kent, the following relics were discovered: a wooden pail or *situla*, with a bronze band ornamented with late Celtic designs; a bronze jug (*oenochoë*); a long-handled pan and two *fibulæ*, also of bronze, together with calcined bones and fragments of pottery. 'These objects were discovered in what had been a round burial-pit, about 3½ ft. deep, the sides and bottom of which had been coated with a kind of chalky compound. The bronze *situla* contained burnt bones and the *fibulæ*,

the bronze vase and pan lying outside it, while around were the remains of several earthenware urns, some of which had been used as cineraries.' The discovery, fortunately, came under the notice of Dr. A. J. Evans, who lost no time in making a full inquiry into the circumstances. The result of his researches was a paper, 'On a Late Celtic Urn-Field at Aylesford,' which appeared in 1890 (*ib.* lii.). The conclusion to which Dr. Evans comes, after a wide comparison of Continental ceramics, is that the Aylesford urns are 'the derivatives of North Italian, and in a marked degree old Venetian prototypes.'

Perhaps the most instructive cemetery in Europe is that of Hallstatt, of which the present writer has elsewhere given the following brief account:

'The ancient necropolis, known as Hallstatt, lies in a narrow glen in the Noric Alps, about an hour's walk from the town of Hallstatt, situated on the lake of the same name. Discovered in 1846, and systematically explored for several years under the superintendence of Bergmeister G. Ramsauer, the results were published by Baron von Sacken in 1868, in a quarto volume with twenty-six plates of illustrations. One of the peculiarities of this cemetery was that it contained burials by inhumation and incineration indiscriminately dispersed over the entire sepulchral area, both, however, belonging to the same period, as was clearly proved from the perfect similarity of their respective grave-goods. The graves were thickly placed over an irregular area, some 200 yards in length and about that in breadth, but there were no indications above ground to mark their position. They were not arranged in any order, and their depth varied within the limits of 1½ to 5 ft.—a disproportion partly accounted for by the sloping nature of the surface, which caused a considerable rain-wash of the soil to the lower levels.

Out of 993 tombs described in v. Sacken's work, 525 contained simple interments; 455 had incinerated human remains; and in 13 the bodies had only been partially burnt before being interred. The inhumed bodies lay, generally, from east to west, having the face towards sunrise with the head occasionally resting on a stone. At other times the body lay on a prepared bed, or coarse casing, of hardened clay. In two instances traces of a wooden coffin were observed. Sometimes two or more skeletons were found in the same grave, while, at other times, some portion of the skeleton was wanting. The skeletons were not so scientifically examined as could be desired, but, according to Dr. Hoernes, they belonged to a well-developed dolichocephalic race, of medium height (5 ft. 6 to 8 in.), with a prominent occiput, long and slightly prognathic face, and a straight or gently receding forehead. The ashes and charred bones were carefully collected and deposited in the natural sod, sometimes laid over a flat stone, and sometimes in a roughly burnt trough of clay. Only twice were burnt bones found in a bronze vase, and once in a clay urn. When the cremated remains had been deposited the grave-goods were placed near them, after which the coarser pieces of charcoal were heaped over the whole.

An analysis of the contents of the graves gave the following results:—The 538 tombs, after inhumation, contained: bronze—18 objects of armour, 1543 articles of toilet, 57 utensils, and 31 vases; iron—165 objects of armour, and 42 utensils; 6 articles of gold, 171 of amber, and 41 of glass; 342 clay vessels; and 61 diverse objects (spindle-whorls, sharpening stones, etc.). Similarly classified, the relics in the 455 tombs after incineration were as follows: bronze—91 objects of armour, 1735 of toilet, 55 utensils, and 179 vases; iron—348 objects of armour, and 43 utensils; 59 articles of gold, 106 of amber, and 35 of glass; 902 clay vessels; and 102 diverse objects.

From these statistics it would appear that the burials after cremation were richer in articles of luxury—such as bronze vases and fibulæ, beads of glass, gold cloth stuffs, etc., with the exception of objects of amber, which were more abundant with inhumed bodies' (*Rambles and Studies in Bosnia*[2], p. 399 ff.).

It may be noted as a point of some significance, that neither silver nor lead has been found in Hallstatt. Their absence, together with that of money, has been used to support the opinion that the cemetery was discontinued before these metals came into general use about the beginning of the 4th cent. B.C.

Baron von Sacken assigned the Hallstatt cemetery to the second half of the millennium immediately preceding the Christian era, and thought that it might be in continuous use till the advent of the Romans into that part of Europe. But, according to other writers, this range ought to be extended further back by several centuries, even to 1000 B.C. Owing to commercial currents from Eastern lands, especially by way of the Adriatic, and also, no doubt, to changes initiated by native skill, we might expect a considerable variation in the *technique* of the Hallstatt relics, even on v. Sacken's hypothesis of the more limited duration of the cemetery. The collection as a whole is thus a mere jumbling together of an assortment of objects, influenced not only by a rapidly progressing civilization, but also by a continuous importation of new materials; hence the difficulty of classifying them into a more precise division than earlier and later.

In the cemetery of S. Lucia, near Tolmino, above the head of the Adriatic, in which incineration was almost exclusively the mode of sepulture—there being only three interments by inhumation out of 3000 tombs examined by Dr. Marchesetti—the warlike element was represented by only one sword, two spears, and seven lances (all of iron). The sword is distinctly the La Tène type—thus suggesting that the peaceful ways of the people had been disturbed only in later times, probably during one of the marauding excursions of the Gauls into Italy. On the other hand, the *fibulæ* numbered 1629 of bronze and 108 of iron; of which 248 were of the 'Certosa' type—*i.e.* not much earlier than 400 B.C.—and 3 of the La Tène type. Of metallic vases there were eighty of bronze and one of iron, among the former being six *ciste a cordoni*. A few of these bronze vessels were decorated with dots, circles, and perpendicular flutings, but rarely with animal figures, and all in the same style of art as the analogous objects from Hallstatt.

(8) *The proto-historic people of Western Europe.*—As a general result of the preceding remarks on the sepulchral phenomena of Western Europe, the following propositions may be accepted as a fair summary of the ethnic elements, so far as these have been determined by modern research, which have helped to mould the physical characters of the highly mixed population now inhabiting the British Isles, but, of course, altogether apart from the influence of the environment.

(*a*) Anthropological researches have shown that during the Neolithic Age a long-headed race, of short stature but strong physique (average height 5 ft. 5 in.), who buried their dead in rudely constructed stone chambers, had spread over the whole of Western Europe, from the Mediterranean to the south of Scandinavia. Tacitus informs us that he identified the Silures, a people then occupying South Wales, as Iberians, on account of their swarthy complexion and curled hair (*Agricola*, xi.). The inference that these Silures were the direct descendants of the primitive long-headed people was not unreasonable, more especially as by that time the eastern parts of Britain had been taken possession of by successive waves of Gaulish and Belgic immigrants from the Continent—thus causing the earlier inhabitants to recede more and more westwards. And, if this is so, it follows that the long-headed men of the chambered cairns of Britain, Ireland, and France, as well as many other parts of the Continent, had a swarthy complexion, with dark hair and eyes, like so many people still inhabiting the more secluded parts of these localities.

(*b*) The incoming brachycephali were taller than the dolichocephali already in possession of the country—a statement which is proved by actual measurements of skeletons (average height 5 ft. 8 in.). Although they have been described by many modern writers as 'light in hair and complexion' (Greenwell, *op. cit.* p. 636), there does not appear to be any archæological evidence to support this assertion. The mistake seems to have arisen from inadvertently applying to the Bronze Age brachycephali qualities which were undoubtedly applicable at a later period to the Celts of history. The former buried their dead in short cists and round barrows, and carried with them a knowledge of bronze. While these two early races (the dolichocephali and brachycephali) were living together, apparently in harmony, the custom of disposing of the dead by cremation spread over the land—a custom which was introduced from the Continent, and had its origin probably in the strong religious

elements of the time, as it was practised by both races.

(*c*) At a considerably later period, but not many centuries prior to the occupation of Britain by the Romans, there was another Continental wave of immigrants, generally regarded as an offshoot of the *Galli* of classical authors, and probably the *Belgæ* of Cæsar, who introduced the industrial elements of the civilization known in this country as 'Late Celtic.' These newcomers differed radically from the former so-called Celtic invaders in having dolichocephalic heads — a statement which is supported by archæological evidence; for example, a skull found in a characteristic Late Celtic tumulus at Arras, Yorkshire, was described by Dr. Thurnam as having a cephalic index of 73·7. They were a branch of the Celts of history, whose very name at one time was a terror in Europe; and by classical writers they are described as very tall and fierce-looking, with fair hair, blond complexion, and blue eyes.

(*d*) The next and last of the great racial elements which entered into the ethnic composition of the British people of to-day were the successive Teutonic invasions from Germany, Denmark, and Scandinavia, all belonging to a tall blond dolichocephalic people who existed in Central Europe from time immemorial—possibly the descendants of the Neanderthaloid races of Palæolithic times.

There is no reference made here to the Roman occupation as a factor in British ethnology, because the Romans were a mere ruling caste, who, although they introduced new arts, industries, and customs into the country, kept themselves aloof from the natives, and did not, as a rule, intermarry with them. Hence, when they finally abandoned Britain they left its inhabitants racially unaffected, much as would be the case with India if the British were now to retire from it. To-day we hunt for remains of military roads, camps, accoutrements of war, and other relics of their civilization, but of their skeletons we know very little, and of their British offspring nothing at all.

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DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD (Greek).—Burial was the method of disposing of the dead followed by all the Mediterranean peoples during the Neolithic epoch, and the same custom obtained in Greece, and was continued without interruption at least until the Homeric period. That the Greeks of the pre-Mycenæan and Mycenæan civilization buried their dead is evident from the tombs discovered in Crete, in the Cyclades, at Mycenæ, Orchomenus, and Vaphio. It has also been proved that Schliemann was mistaken in believing that he found in the Mycenæan tombs indications of a partial cremation of the dead. In the island of Crete, Evans and Halbherr, who discovered many tombs of the Mycenæan epoch and others of different periods, found burial to be the invariable custom without any sign of cremation, either partial or total.

Apparently, then, the first notice of cremation occurs in Homer; it is described with grim vividness, especially in the account of the obsequies of Patroclus (*Il.* xxiii. 110 ff.). Homer also offers an explanation of this new funerary custom, which appears to be contrary to the beliefs of the Greek people. He makes Nestor say that it is necessary to burn the bodies of those who died in battle, in order that the bones might be carried back to their native land to the sons of the dead (*Il.* vii. 331 f.). But this reason is inadequate to account for so profound a change of custom. The change from burial to cremation must already have taken place in the Homeric age, just as it had previously been made in Central and, in part, in Southern Europe. It was then introduced into Greece as it had been into Italy, and very probably by the same races who were afterwards known under the name of Aryan, and who originated many other changes in the customs of the peoples subdued by them.

While in some regions of Europe there was a period during which cremation prevailed (and among these regions must be included Northern and also, in part, Southern Italy), in Greece the ancient and the new practices flourished for a long time side by side, just as was the case in Rome; but in Rome, from the discoveries in the Forum and from those made in other parts of the city and in Latium, we can plainly recognize the substitution of cremation for burial. This does not appear so clearly in Greece; but it cannot have happened otherwise. At the time of the Homeric rhapsodies, cremation must have been in use quite as much as burial. In succeeding epochs both methods were employed, as may be gathered from Greek authors, who attest the existence now of the one custom and now of the other.

We have at the present day full information regarding the forms of the tombs used by the Greeks previous to the classic epoch, and especially in those characteristic periods which are to be referred to pre-Mycenæan and Mycenæan civilization both on the continent and in the various islands. The funerary architecture of these periods may be classified under four chief forms: (1) dome-tombs, (2) chamber-tombs, (3) shaft-tombs, and (4) pit-tombs.

The finest example of a dome-tomb is that of the tomb called the Treasury of Atreus at Mycenæ, discovered by Schliemann. Then come those of Orchomenus, of Vaphio, of Heraion, of Eleusis, and of other places, which are magnificently and splendidly decorated, not indeed like that at Mycenæ, although they have the same architectural form.

The chamber-tombs are distinguished from the dome-tombs by the rectangular form of their plan, the dome-tombs being circular; by their more or less flat roof; and also by the diminished height of the mortuary chamber. But, like the others, they have a corridor (δρόμος) for entrance, with a door of ingress, and they may also have a varying number of lateral chambers. These tombs were excavated in the rock, and are found throughout the whole of Greece and in the islands, especially in Crete, where they were discovered by Evans and Halbherr. Sarcophagi are found in them—sometimes one, two, or even four—made of terra-cotta and painted on the outside; or else there is a trench in them in which the corpse has been placed; or sometimes the corpse was laid upon the floor of the sepulchral chamber (Evans, *Prehistoric Tombs of Knossos*, p. 5; Orsi, *Urne funebri cretesi*, p. 2 ff.).

The shaft-tombs were dug in the ground and

covered with either rough or squared slabs of stone. In these graves the body was usually placed on its back; sometimes it was curled up.

The pit-tombs consist of a kind of well which was almost always excavated in the rock, with steps to descend into it; at the bottom an arched aperture is found which gives access to the sepulchral cell. The cell is generally supported by a double wall of rude blocks, and is sufficiently long to contain a skeleton stretched out at full length. But Evans remarks that this type of tomb, although it has different characteristics, resembles in its cell the shaft-tombs.

In the island of Crete no dome-tombs have been discovered like those of Mycenæ or of Orchomenus; but the royal tomb of Isopates described by Evans and re-constructed by Fyfe (Evans, *op. cit.*) fills up the lacuna.

It appears to have been the primitive custom of the Greeks to bury their dead in the village where they dwelt, and sometimes in the houses themselves. It is certain that at Mycenæ tombs have been found in the houses, here and there in groups of five, or even of twenty, among the remains of habitations. At Athens, also, houses with tombs have been discovered. Plato makes mention of this custom, and calls it barbarous (*Min.* 315). It seems to have been abolished by the laws of Solon. The *agora* also appears to have been used for burying: Mycenæ supplies an example of this. Further, it is well known that in the classic epoch many Greek cities had, or believed that they had, in the *agora* the burial-place of their more renowned heroes.

It appears, further, that the Greeks in primitive times offered human sacrifices at funerals. This seems certain not only from the Homeric account of the obsequies of Patroclus, but also from some indications in the tombs of Mycenæ. In the *dromos* of the rock-tombs, human bones have often been found, and in front of one sepulchre there were discovered six human skeletons placed crosswise and mingled with the bones of animals and broken pieces of common utensils. From this it has been suspected that the bodies were those of victims sacrificed to the dead (Perrot-Chipiez, *Histoire de l'art*, vi. 564). Further, Plato says (*ib.*) that human sacrifices were offered in Lykaia (Λυκαῖα), and also by the descendants of Athamas, although they were Greeks and not barbarians.

From the most remote antiquity, as we gather from the pre-historic tombs, the Greeks had a religious cult for their dead. They considered the right of sepulture as sacred, and consequently as a law. This sentiment was handed down to the historic Greeks, the true Ἕλληνες. It was also a duty and a kind of Pan-Hellenic law (Πανελλήνων νόμος, Eurip. *Suppl.* 524) to give sepulture to enemies who died in battle. The law of Solon, which exempted a son from the obligation to support a father who had rendered himself unworthy, imposed upon him the duty of burying him with all due honours (Æsch. *in Timarch.* 13; the very words δίκαια, νόμιμα, affirm the right of the dead to sepulture). In the classic epoch, religious belief was permeated with the notion that the spirit of the dead could not enter into the subterranean realm if the body had not received burial—the soul (ψυχή) would wander about without a resting-place, and would not be able to pass over the fatal river in order to enter Hades.

We do not know how the primitive Greeks conducted themselves between the death and the burial of the deceased; but from what we know of the historical epoch we may infer without any doubt what were their customs in primitive times.

In the pre-historic tombs of Knossos the corpse was buried in a grave, or else was laid on the pavement of the sepulchral chamber, or in a sarcophagus in a *larnax* of clay. It was usually placed stretched out at length, or sometimes curled up, either in the grave or in the sarcophagus. There was no fixed direction or orientation of the position of the dead. In tombs of every type, objects belonging to the deceased are found, according to sex and condition: weapons, swords, knives, arrows, razors, ornaments of gold and of bronze, rings, seals, lamps, and so on. Tombs like those of Mycenæ and Vaphio have furnished objects of great value both as to their material—principally gold—and as to their artistic make. Objects which were most dear to the deceased, and which he had possessed when living, were placed with him in the tomb. This usage continued without interruption into the historic epoch, together with other usages which were gradually abolished by various successive laws, because they were held to be barbarous. We have proof of this in the Homeric period, which may be regarded as an intermediate one between the pre-historic and the historic periods, primitive funeral customs being still found which were no longer practised in the period which followed, as well as others which were retained.

In order to give an idea of this, it will be sufficient to relate in full what was done at the funeral of Patroclus, so admirably described by Homer (*Il.* xviii., xxiii.). We shall follow the poet's order:—

The corpse of Patroclus was washed with hot water (*Il.* xviii. 345 ff.), then anointed with unguents and oil, and covered from head to foot with a thin linen cloth. It was laid in state on a bed (ἐν λεχέεσσι, 352), and was wept over with great lamentation by Achilles and the Myrmidons (315 ff.). On the return from the fight in which Hector was slain, Achilles and the Myrmidons again wept over the bier of Patroclus, since weeping is an honouring of the dead (ὃ γὰρ γέρας ἐστὶ θανόντων, xxiii. 9). A funeral meal follows the weeping. The corpse is to be cremated, and accordingly an immense pyre is prepared which is to receive the body of Patroclus. When the pyre is ready, the transportation of the body takes place in the midst of a great cortège of armed men; Achilles supports the head of his deceased friend, while the Myrmidons cut off their locks and cast them upon the corpse, thus covering it. Achilles also sacrifices his hair, which he puts into the hand of his dead friend. During the night those who attend to the preparation of the funeral (κηδεμόνες, xxiii. 163) remain with Achilles. On the following day the body of the deceased is placed in the midst of the pyre, and is covered from head to foot with fat taken from the oxen and sheep which have been sacrificed; alongside are placed the dead animals, and amphoræ of honey and of oil. Four horses are sacrificed, and two of the nine dogs which the deceased possessed, together with twelve young Trojans who are to be burnt on the same immense pyre. The pyre burns all the night. In the morning the order is given to extinguish it with libations of wine, to pick out the calcined bones of the dead from among the other bones of men and animals—an easy task, since the body of Patroclus had been placed in the centre separate from the rest—and to enclose them in a cinerary urn between two pieces of fat. Finally, a tumulus of earth receives the urn, and is the sepulchre of Patroclus. But the funeral rites do not end here: Achilles orders funeral games, and distributes rewards to the victors (258 ff.).

In the classic period the dead body was washed, anointed with unguents and oil, and wrapped in a white garment. It appears, however, that the garment was not always white; it might be black. The eyes were closed, and the jaw was bound to the head in order that the mouth might remain shut when rigidity came on. The care of the dead was the business of the people of the house, especially the relatives, and among these the women. Further, a garland was placed on the head of the deceased. Afterwards the corpse was laid on an ordinary bed (κλίνη), and was exposed to view. This exposing (πρόθεσις) took place in the house, the feet of the dead being turned towards the door; a law of Solon prohibited an exposing before the door, as seems to have been done at first. This exposing took place the day after death. An earlier time was prohibited in order, naturally, that there might be assurance that

actual death had taken place; and, on the other hand, a too prolonged exposing was not allowed. According to Greek beliefs, the dead must be buried relatively soon in order that the soul might be able to enter the realm of the dead and might not wander about. Patroclus, whose body, on account of the solemn funeral rites, was exposed for twelve days after his death, says to Achilles, to whom he appears in a dream, θάπτε με ὅττι τάχιστα, πύλας Ἀΐδαο περήσω (*Il.* xxiii. 71).

At what seems to be a late period, a piece of money was placed in the mouth of the deceased as a ναῦλον to pay the ferryman who transported him to the further side of the river into the realm of the dead. A honey cake (μελιτοῦττα) was buried with him, as an appropriate offering to the guardian of the doors of the infernal regions (Aristoph. *Lys.* 599). The scholiast on Aristophanes adds that the cake serves for Cerberus (*q.v.*), the piece of money for the ferryman, and the dead man's garland is for the struggle which he has undergone in issuing from life.

Upon the bier was placed a vessel of earth, usually a λήκυθος, which contained an unguent. On this vessel, which was of a characteristic form, were depicted appropriate funeral scenes; and, in fact, it represented the deceased. At the door of ingress was placed an earthen vessel (ὄστρακον) containing spring water (Aristoph. *Eccl.* 1033), which was to serve for purifying those who had been in contact with the dead, and in general all those who were in the house.

The exposing of the body was followed by its being carried (ἐκφορά) from the house to the place of sepulture, and this could be done only by day; criminals alone were buried by night (Eurip. *Troad.* 446), when sepulture was granted them at all. The dead person was carried on the bed upon which he had been exposed to view; but it is not easy to say exactly who were the bearers, although there are expressions like νεκροφόροι, νεκροθάπται, νεκροτάφοι, which imply persons specially employed in this duty of carrying and of burial. However, we gather from Plato, Plutarch, Lucian, and others that these bearers were young men who lent themselves to this pious duty. Plato speaks of young men of the gymnasium (*Legg.* xii. 947). When the conveyance of the body took place, it was attended by a cortège which accompanied the bier as it made its way to the sepulchre. According to the laws of Solon, the men must go first, the women must follow; the latter, moreover, must not be less than sixteen years of age (Demosth. *Arist.* i.). Plato describes at length (*Legg.* xii. 947) how the funeral cortège was to be formed, and he also notes that the women who took part in it must not be younger than the child-bearing age. The sepulchre (θήκη) must be excavated underground, of elongated shape, and must be constructed of stone. But the dead were not always laid in a tomb of stone without a coffin (σορός, λάρναξ). When the latter was used, it was made of cypress or other wood.

The different stages of the funeral were usually accompanied by weeping and lamentation on the part of the relatives and friends, and of other persons who visited the dead when exposed to view and attended him to the sepulchre. These manifestations of grief must originally have been excessive, and not different from those we have met with in Homer. They were prohibited by legislators like Solon and Charondas, who desired to restrain what appeared to many Greek writers to be clamorous and barbaric forms of grief. Plato describes as indecorous the weeping for the dead, and would have liked to prohibit lamentations (θρηνεῖν) outside the house (*Legg.* xii. 960). It is true that Æschylus (*Choeph.* 20 f.) and Euripides (*Hec.* 642 f.) describe displays of grief such as striking the breast, tearing and lacerating the face and garments, and pulling out the hair; but probably these two authors wished to reproduce primitive customs which were no longer permitted in their day. In spite of legislative prohibitions, however, there was no cessation at funerals of more or less exaggerated manifestations of grief; the bier was certainly accompanied by funeral-singers (θρηνῳδοί). Plato himself speaks of them (*Legg.* vii. 800) in the masculine only. This duty, however, was carried out also by women called Καρίναι, θρηνῳδοί, μουσικαί, probably, as is supposed, from their Carian origin, whence came the employment of the term for those women who sang over the dead, just as a kind of flute was called Phrygian as having been invented by the Phrygians, *e.g.* αὐλὸς θρηνητικός (Poll. iv. 75).

While in pre-historic times the places of sepulture were either the houses or the streets of the city or village, or even the *agora*, in the classical period the Greeks had fixed places outside the city, cemeteries in the common and broad signification of the term; or else they made use of the roads outside of the city, as may still be seen in Italy, *e.g.* at Pompeii. Moreover, distinguishing signs or inscriptions were placed upon the sepulchres. The sepulchres themselves had different names, as θῆκαι, τάφοι, μνήματα, and they might have different forms, among which was that of the tumulus (χῶμα, barrow). There were placed upon them stelæ (στῆλαι), a kind of posts, or actual columns (κίονες), or little temples (ναΐδια, ἡρῷα), or else horizontal slabs of stone (τράπεζαι), with inscriptions (γραφαί).

In the sepulchres in Greece, from the most ancient and primitive onwards, have been found objects and vessels frequently of great value, such as those of Mycenæ, of Vaphio, and of Crete. These were deposited in the tomb with the dead, and were objects which had belonged to him. Thus there have been found objects for the toilet, weapons, little figures of earth or of bronze, and, especially, bronze or earthen vessels. The sepulchres themselves contain the bones of domestic animals, among which are those of the horse. In the ideas and beliefs of the Greeks there was the conviction that the dead person must have for his journey to the subterranean world the same objects of use and of ornament which he had possessed when living, and also utensils and vessels which were proper for eating and drinking from, and containing food and drink. This usage did not cease in classic Greece, as has been proved by the vessels and other objects which have been found in the sepulchres of this epoch.

The burial was followed by the funeral meal (περίδειπνον), already met with in the Homeric period, though not by the games, which had been abolished; and also by the purification (καταλούεσθαι). But solicitude for the deceased did not end here: on the third day after the burial, sacrifices (called τρίτα) were offered upon the tomb, especially on the stele or other object placed on it; these sacrifices were repeated on the ninth day (ἔνατα); and in the meanwhile the mourning began. This, in the majority of cases, lasted thirty days; the shortest period was twelve (Plut. *Lyc.* 27). As to external signs, mourning was shown by abstinence from everything which might cause joy and pleasure, and also by putting on a black garment, or clothing which was only in part black. According to Plutarch (*Quæst. Rom.* xiv.), it was a custom with the Greeks that during the mourning the women should shave off their hair, and the men should let theirs grow, if the regular usage was for the men to shave off the hair, and the women to let theirs grow. Euripides makes mention (*Iphig. Aul.* 1437 f.) of the cutting off of the hair

and the putting on of a black *peplum* for mourning. The Argive custom of wearing a white garment for mourning instead of a black one (Plut. *op. cit.* xxvi.) seems to have been an exception.

In Athens there was also an anniversary of the death called by Herodotus (iv. 26) *γενέσια*, a funeral feast, during which sacrifices were offered to the earth (*τῇ γῇ*)—a commemoration called by others *νεκύσια* or *ὡραῖα*. It is to be supposed that such a commemoration was chiefly found in the case of men well known and highly thought of, notwithstanding that no distinction of persons or classes is made by Greek writers. But a general feeling of respect for tombs, and especially for ancestors, may be inferred from what one reads in Æschylus (*Pers.* 401 ff.) concerning the tombs of forefathers (*θῆκας τε προγόνων*). Just as in the commemoration on the third and ninth days after burial, so at the annual commemorations, there were sacrifices, offerings and libations (*ἐνάγισμα*) to the dead, who was supposed to be already in the subterranean world; whence such libations took also the name of *χοαί*, and of *χθόνια λουτρά*.

The unhappy criminal alone was denied sepulture and a funeral. In Athens the bodies of criminals were thrown behind the tower Melita and along by the northern walls of the city (Plut. *Them.* xxii.; Plato, *Repub.* iv. 439). The suicide's right hand was cut off; but he was granted burial. Plato would have the suicide buried in silence and without any sign of sepulture (*Legg.* ix. 873). Finally, to those whose bodies could not be obtained, cenotaphs or empty monuments were erected. Euripides (*Hel.* 1241) says that it was a law of the Greeks that he who died by drowning in the sea should be 'buried in a tissue of empty robes' (*κενοῖσι θάπτειν ἐν πέπλων ὑφάσμασιν*).

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G. SERGI.

DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD

(Hindu).—Life and death stand in perpetual contrast. To give expression to this fact is the aim of Hindu ritual in all its processes, down to the minutest details. In the case of offerings to the gods the participants circumambulate the fire with their right side turned towards it, and in a direction from left to right; in offerings to the *manes* the left side is turned, and the direction is from right to left—the opposite of the sun's course (see CIRCUMAMBULATION); in the former case the right knee is bowed, in the latter the left; in the one the sacrificial cord is put on from left to right (under the right arm), in the other from right to left (under the left arm); ropes are twisted from right to left; even numbers are assigned to the gods, odd ones to the *manes*; to the former belongs everything that is young, healthy, and strong, to the latter what is old, weak, or deformed. Everything that is bright-coloured—the forenoon, the ascending half of the month or the year—is assigned to the gods; whereas the *manes* have their portion in all that is dark—the afternoon, the descending half of the month or the year. Even in the course of a human life the 50th year marks a boundary, those who have not reached it belonging to the gods, those who have passed it to the *manes*.

Dread of the evil influence of the dead, their impurity, their return, and their interference with the living is another characteristic of the ritual. Fire-brands and jets of water serve to ward off this influence; stones are laid down between the village and the place of cremation; on the way home from the latter, care is taken to obliterate footprints in order to prevent the dead from finding the way, or perhaps to save the footprint, which is a possible subject of magic, from being exposed to the influence of hostile spirits; at the funeral ceremonies plants are selected whose names—such as *apāmārga*, *avakā*, *yava*—have a protective sense.

The living are bound to prepare the way for the dead in the other world, to provide them with food for their great journey into Yama's realm, and to supply them with means for crossing the rivers. These ends are served by the *utkrānti* or *vaitaraṇī* cow, which in some cases has been presented to the Brāhmans before his death by the deceased himself or his son. The same was originally, no doubt, the purpose also of the *anustaraṇī* cow, which is led along in the funeral train, and whose members are finally laid upon those of the dead, its kidneys being deposited in his hands as food for Yama's dogs. The streams which have to be crossed are probably indicated by the piece of reed which is introduced into the wall of the tomb, and which is meant to serve as a boat (cf. CERBERUS, BRIDGE).

The realm of the dead is variously located in the west or the south—occasionally in the east, no doubt in conformity with the conception of Rigv. x. 15. 7, which speaks of the fathers as *aruṇīnām upasthe*, 'in the bosom of the dawn.' The dead are sought for in earth and air and heaven, in sun and moon and stars—in the last-named very rarely. In fact, we encounter a number of frequently contradictory views, which originated at different times and among different races, and which, after undergoing artificial amalgamation, now emerge in the Vedic ritual and its hymns (Hillebrandt, *Ved. Myth.*, Breslau, 1891–1902, iii. 414 ff.).

The usual method of disposing of the dead is cremation. But the well-known distinction drawn in Rigv. x. 15. 14 between *agnidagdhas* and *anagnidagdhas* (cremated and un-cremated *manes*) shows that other forms were known and practised. It is not at all impossible that Rigv. x. 18. 10 ff. originally referred to the rite of burial (Winternitz, *Gesch. d. ind. Litt.*, i. [Leipzig, 1905] 85). But our present ritual is not acquainted with burial except as applied to young children and ascetics, in whose case, from a motive half-philosophic, half-superstitious, and after a fashion known even at the present day, the skull was split with a coco-nut (Caland, *Altind. Bestatt.* § 50, p. 95). The only other trace which appears to point with any certainty to burial is found in the *śmaśānachiti*, which follows the placing of the remains in the urn. The Brāhmans were reluctant to abandon old customs; they modified them when necessary, and linked them on to other existing usages. Just as the *pravargya* ceremony—once an independent milk-offering—was combined with the soma-offering, so the non-obligatory *śmaśānachiti* may have been originally an independent custom. In the measures of this *chiti* Caland (*l.c.* 181 f.) has rightly seen the 'survival' of original burial; and the circumstance

that there the urn is not interred, but cast away, also appears to point to the independence of the *śmaśānachiti*, for which urn-burial is not a necessity.

The data as to burial are found in the Vedic hymns, and especially in the Sūtras—the Gṛhya and Pitṛmedha and kindred texts—and in the records of modern usages. It is not without interest that many of the regulations of the Sūtras find parallels at the present day among Indian tribes. As we find the injunction that those returning from the place of cremation are to deposit stones or other objects between the dead man and his village, so 'the Mangars of Nepal obstruct the road leading from the grave with a barricade of thorns, through which the soul, conceived of as a miniature man, very tender and fragile, is unable to force its way' (*Census of India*, 1901, i. 355). On the other hand, our Sūtras do not contain an account of all the customs that existed or may have existed, and do not coincide with the ritual known to the Rigveda. An interesting illustration of this is supplied by Dr. Bloch (*Annual Report of the Archæol. Survey*, Bengal circle, for the year ending April 1905, Calcutta, 1905 [*ZDMG* lx. 227 ff.]), who opened some burial-mounds at Lauriya, and found in the midst of them remains of a wooden post (*sthūṇā*), which recalls the post mentioned in Rigv. x. 18. 13, and of whose meaning the Sūtra ritual gives us no idea.

It would be quite out of place here to treat even superficially of the huge mass of prescriptions to be found in published and unpublished texts, or of the variations presented by the usages of different schools and families. Caland divides the whole ceremonial into 114 acts, not to speak of the variations found in each of these. It is equally impossible to discuss the numerous verses which accompany the particular acts, and whose real relation to these is not always clear; or, more especially, the circumstantial casuistry with which the highly ingenious spirit of Brāhmanism has sought, in a manner that is far from uninteresting, to provide for all possibilities. Like the ceremonies connected with birth, those attending on death are a *saṁskāra*. 'It is well known,' says the *Baudhāyana Pitṛmedha*, iii. 1. 4, 'that through the *saṁskāra* after birth one conquers earth; through the *saṁskāra* after death, heaven.' Ritualists are therefore eager to have this *saṁskāra* performed with care and with regard to all circumstances. It may happen, for instance, that the Hindu dies in a foreign land and must be brought home, or that he dies there and remains forgotten. In the latter case cremation is performed in effigy upon a human figure composed of *palāśa* stems. Should it chance, however, that after all the man returns alive, the ritual provides even for this, and ordains that he must be born anew—*i.e.* undergo all the rites of *jātakarman*, in which he sits speechless and with clenched fists, like an embryo in the womb (Caland, § 44). When a prostitute dies, she must not be cremated, according to some teachers, with ordinary fire, but with that of the forest, wild and unchecked. Other regulations apply to the death of a widow or a woman in childbirth. If a man longs for death, he presents an offering, the various acts in which symbolize this longing (cf. *Kāt. Śr. S.* xxii. 6. 1). If one dies in the act of presenting an ordinary offering, certain rules are to be followed. But it is impossible to go into all this; only when the *Śrauta* Sūtras have been translated, will the historian of religion and the ethnographer obtain full insight into this circle of ideas. Here we must content ourselves with a brief account of the most important features of the ritual.[1]

[1] For fuller details, see the present writer's sketch in *GIAP* iii. 2; and Caland (*op. cit. infra*), whose work is thorough, and yet does not exhaust the enormous quantity of material.

1. Death.—When the Hindu feels the approach of death, he must summon his relatives, hold friendly converse with them, and, if the dying-hour is very near, have himself placed on a cleansed spot on sandy soil. It promotes his future weal to make presents before his death to Brāhmans; among these gifts a special value attaches to the *vaitaraṇī*-cow as his conductor over the stream of the under world. His dying-couch is prepared in proximity to the three fires, or, if he keeps up only one, near to it, viz. the domestic fire, and here he is laid down with his head turned towards the south. In his ear are repeated passages from the Veda of his school, or, if he is a Brahmavid, from an *Āraṇyaka*. When death has taken place, they bring the corpse to a covered place, and then (or, with many, at a later stage) cut his hair and nails, which, according to Gautama (ii. 24), should be deposited in a hole in the ground. Many follow the practice (prohibited by others) of opening the body, removing the excrements, and replacing the entrails after they have been washed in water and filled with butter—a procedure intended, in the opinion of the present writer, simply to facilitate cremation, which would be hampered by the heavy *fæces*. Then the corpse, with its head turned towards the south, is laid upon a bier covered with a black skin; on the dead man's head is placed a wreath of nard; he is clothed down to the feet in a new robe, the old one being given to the son, to a pupil, or to the wife of the deceased, to be worn for life or till it becomes too old for use. Others have a piece of the death-robe cut off, and hand it over to be kept by the sons. Noteworthy is the practice of some, who bind together the thumbs (or the toes) of the deceased—a custom which, as Caland (*l.c.* 176) and Steinmetz (*ap.* Caland) remark, is found also among other than Indian peoples (see above, p. 433[a]).

If the deceased has in his lifetime presented animal-offerings, three he-goats are provided; if he has offered *sāṁnāyya* (sweet and sour milk libations) at new and full moon, a milk-offering (*āmikṣā*) is to be presented [evidently slight differences of cult going back to primeval times]. If goats are not used, many take 'black rice-grains,' of which from one to three rice-paps are made. A remarkable figure is that of an old, un-horned, vicious cow (*anustaraṇī*). When the cow is brought, the servants of the deceased have each to throw three handfuls of dust over their shoulders. At the head of the procession (according to the teaching of many) walks a man with a firebrand which he has kindled at the domestic fire; he is followed by the sacrificial fires of the deceased and the apparatus for the cremation ceremony, including the above-mentioned *anustaraṇī* cow; next in order is the dead man on his couch, which is placed on a mat or on the before-mentioned bier, carried by servants, old people, sons, or relatives near and remote, according as the custom may be. In many circles it is the practice—still followed in certain instances in India—to employ for the transport of the corpse a waggon drawn by black oxen, and to place upon it also the fires and sacrificial utensils of the deceased. Behind the corpse come the relatives, the older ones first, men and women, the latter with loose dishevelled hair and their shoulders besprinkled with dust. [In points of detail we meet with many variations.] When the corpse is lifted, the invocation, 'May Pūṣan bring thee from here!' is addressed to Pūṣan, who in the whole ceremonial appears as ψυχοπομπός—a rôle already assigned him in the Rigveda. When a third or a fourth of the way has been covered, one of the goats is killed, or one of the paps of rice (or, if there be only one, a third of it) is poured upon a clod of earth thrown to the south. Thereupon the

company, with the younger ones in front, thrice circumambulate the corpse and the clod from right to left, with their hair loose on the left side and bound up on the right, at the same time striking their right thigh with the hand and fanning the corpse with the extremity of their garments. Then comes a thrice-repeated circumambulation from left to right, with the hair loose on the right side and bound up on the left, with a striking of the left thigh, but, according to the view of certain scholars, without another fanning of the corpse. The same procedure is repeated at the second third of the journey and at its termination. The rice-vessel is finally dashed on the ground, and its fragments so shattered that water will not remain upon them. [The variations encountered here in the practice of the different schools are numerous. Some walk along strewing small pieces of iron or roasted grains of rice upon the ground, while they recite or sing Yama-hymns. The Mādhyandinas deposit a rice-clod at the place of death, one near the door as they leave the house, one for the *bhūtas* half-way between the dwelling and the place of cremation, and one for the wind as soon as the place of cremation is reached, while one is deposited in the hand of the deceased.]

2. **Cremation.**—Special regulations, particularly as to its orientation, are offered for the choice of the place of cremation, which in some respects resembles the place of offering for the gods, while in others it is quite different. The duly selected spot is purified, and a formula is employed to scare away demons or ghosts. The kind of wood used, the size and orientation of the pyre, and everything of a like kind are regulated by rigid prescription, scarcely anything being left to caprice. The corpse is now (or later) laid on the pyre, the threads which bind the thumbs are loosed, the cords which hold the bier together are severed, and the bier itself is flung into the water or laid on the pyre, upon which the fires of the deceased also find a place. When all is done according to rule, the *anustaraṇī* cow is brought forward, and so held by the relatives of the deceased that the youngest of them touches her hind-quarters, while the others are so arranged that an older person always touches a younger. The cow may either be slaughtered or —manifestly in connexion with a later custom—let go. The latter course must be followed in the case of one who has presented no animal-offerings. The animal is in that case led round the fires, the pyre, and the corpse, and with certain formulæ set free. To the north of the pyre the widow of the deceased crouches down, but (with formulæ which originally belonged to an entirely different ritual) is called on to rise and return to the world of life. There, too, is placed the bow of the deceased, which is afterwards cast upon the pyre. Upon the openings of the face are laid small pieces of gold, or at least melted butter is allowed to trickle down upon them. The sacrificial utensils of the dead, which he has had in his possession since the kindling of the fires, are distributed over his limbs, those of them that have a cavity being filled with butter—plainly for the purpose of feeding the fire; the two millstones (according to one version) are appropriated by the son, and so is everything made of copper, brass, or clay. In like manner the parts of the cow are distributed over the members of the deceased: the caul, for instance, being laid on his head and face, the kidneys (for Yama's dogs) being placed in his hands, along with a lump of curds (for Mitra-Varuṇa) if he has presented *sāṁnāyya*-offerings. Before or during the process of cremation [here, as almost everywhere, different opinions prevail in the schools] the pyre is asperged after a fashion that may still be observed: the person performing this office walks round the pyre carrying on his left shoulder a pitcher, in the back of which there has been made, by an axe or a stone, a hole through which the water runs out. After a triple circumambulation he casts the pitcher behind him.

Now begins the *cremation*, which is regarded as an offering into the fire, conducting the corpse to heaven as a sacrificial gift. In the *Dakṣiṇa*-fire are offered libations for Agni, Kāma, Loka, etc., and finally a libation on the breast of the deceased to Agni, 'who is now to be born of him as he once was of Agni.' If the man was an Anāhitāgni, the firebrand is taken from the domestic fire; if he was an Āhitagni, the cremation is performed by the flames of the three or five fires kept up by him. Note is taken of which fire reaches him first, and it is augured therefrom whether the deceased has gone into the world of the gods or of the *manes*, or into some other world. To the north-east of the *āhavanīya* a knee-deep trench is dug, in which a certain water-plant is placed—clearly an ancient superstition—in order to cool the heat of the fire. The traditional explanation of the custom is that 'the dead man rises from the trench and ascends along with the smoke to heaven.' Behind the pyre a goat is fastened, but in such a manner that it is possible for it to break away, and, if it does so, nothing is done to prevent it. The cremation is accompanied by a number of verses or songs selected according to the school to which the deceased belonged. While the pyre continues to blaze, the relatives move off without looking round. The officiant gives them seven pebbles, which on their way home they scatter with the left hand turned downwards. [According to the prescription of another school, three trenches are dug behind the pyre; they are then filled with water from an uneven number of pitchers, and gravel is thrown in. The relatives enter the trenches, touch the water, and then creep through branches set in the ground behind, and bound together by a rope made of *darbha*-straw. The last to creep through tears the branches apart. Gautama directs a thorny branch, Vaikhānasa a grass snare, to be held in front of them, under which they must creep.] The company, as they leave the place of cremation, must restrain themselves from any exhibition of mourning, and go forward with heads bent down, entertaining one another with well-omened speeches and virtuous tales. Many tears, it is said, burn the dead (cf. *Raghuvaṁśa*, viii. 86). Yudhiṣṭhira is rebuked by Vyāsa for bewailing the death of his nephew. Story-tellers (*paurāṇikas*, etc.) are therefore engaged in order to drive away by their skill the sorrows of the relatives (Lüders, *ZDMG* lviii. 706 ff.).

3. **Udakakarman.**—The offering of water to the deceased which follows is carried out in a variety of ways. According to one view, all the relatives —down to the seventh or tenth generation—must enter the water. They wear only a single garment, and the sacrificial cord hangs over the right shoulder; many also direct that the hair must be dishevelled and dust thrown upon the body. They turn their face towards the south, plunge under the water, call upon the dead by name, and offer him a handful of water. Then they emerge, bow the left knee, and wring their dripping garment.

An interesting usage prevails at the present day. Immediately after the bath a quantity of boiled rice and peas is set out for the crows (Caland, p. 78). This recalls the primitive notion that the dead appear as birds, and the comparison of the *Maruts* with birds, for the *Maruts* are an offshoot from the cult of the dead. Scarcely anything connected with the history of cults can be seen more interesting or more strongly reminiscent of the earlier times than an enormous Pipal tree—not the one sacred to the Buddhist community on the western side of the *stūpa*—growing to the north of the Buddhist sanctuary at Bodh-Gayā, beneath which offerings to the *manes* are continuously presented, while blackbirds fly to and fro amongst its branches.

After the bath the relatives seat themselves

upon a clean grassy spot, where they are regaled with stories or Yama-songs. They do not return to the village till the first star shows itself, or the sun is partly set, or the herds come home. At the door of the house they chew leaves of the *pichumanda* (*Azadirachta indica*), rinse their mouth, touch water, fire, cow-dung, etc., or inhale the smoke of a certain species of wood, tread upon a stone, and then enter.

4. **Āśaucha** (uncleanness).—The occurrence of death renders those associated with it unclean—a condition which lasts from 1 to 10 days, and is variously regulated according to circumstances and the usages of particular schools. 'After ten days' the mourning ceremonies for Indumatī are ended (*Raghuvaṁśa*, viii. 73). The prescriptions to be attended to during the *āśaucha* are partly negative—in so far as they forbid certain things, such as the cutting of the hair and beard, study of the Vedas, *Gṛhya*-offerings; and partly positive—*e.g.* the enjoining of certain offerings. The first night a rice-ball is offered to the dead, before and after which water for washing is poured out for him, and he is called on by name. Milk and water are set out for him in the open air. Many set out perfumes and drinks for him, as well as a lamp to facilitate his progress through the terrible darkness that enshrouds the road to the city of Yama. Others cause a trench to be dug, into which perfumes and flowers are cast, while a pot suspended by a noose is hung over it. Even to-day the notion is to be met with that a thread serves the spirit of the deceased as a ladder to reach the drink suspended by it (Caland, p. 88).

5. **Saṁchayana.**—The collecting of the bones after cremation is usually carried out on an uneven day; according to some, during the dark half of the month, and under certain constellations. For the bones of a man a plain urn is employed; for those of a woman, a 'female' one, *i.e.* one adorned with breasts. The bones are picked up one by one, with the thumb and ring-finger, and are laid without noise in the urn. Among the Taittirīyas this duty is performed by women, regarding the selection of whom the prescriptions vary. According to the rules of Baudhāyana they must attach a fruit of the *bṛhatī*-plant to their left hand with a dark-blue and a red thread, mount upon a stone, wipe their hands once with an *apāmārga*-plant, and with closed eyes collect the bones with the left hand. The urn, which is closed with a lid, is placed in a trench prepared in the same manner as the place of cremation, and having no flow to it except rain-water; or it may be laid under the root of a tree. Others place grass and a yellow cloth in a trench, and then throw in the bones. From the latest period we have an account of how one 'puts [the remains] into a little new barrel, and throws them into the water, if there be any at hand, or, if not, into some desert and lonely place.' The Kapola-Banias tie up the bones in a piece 'of silken cloth, and the bundle so made is suspended to the bough of a tree in the burning-ground' (*JASB* iii. 8, p. 489; Caland, 105[384]). Many schools enjoin a second cremation, in which the bones that have survived the first process are pulverized, mixed with butter, and then offered in the fire.

6. **Śāntikarman.**—This is another important department of the death-ritual. [In many ceremonies it comes at the point we have now reached, in many not till after the *śmaśānakaraṇa*. The reason for this appears to be that the *saṁchayana* and the *śmaśānakaraṇa* were originally parallel usages, which were only afterwards brought into connexion, and the *śāntikarman* continued in several schools to hold the place which belonged to it at first.] According to Āśvalāyana, the ceremony is to be held on the day of new moon. The same authority directs that a fire, with ashes and fireplace, is to be carried southwards and set down at a cross-road or elsewhere; then the participants are to circumambulate it thrice, striking the left thigh with the left hand. [Others kindle an ordinary fire at a spot between the village and the *śmaśāna* ground.] Then they return without looking round, touch water, and furnish themselves with a number of new articles—jugs, jars, fire-sticks of *śamī*-wood, etc. The fire is kindled afresh, and they sit till nightfall around it, entertaining one another with auspicious stories. When the stillness of night reigns, an uninterrupted stream of water is poured around the house from the south to the north side of the door, and then the participants take their places on an ox-skin that is spread for them. The formulæ uttered during this and other parts of the ceremony have regard to life and the averting of death. A stone is laid down to the north of the fire, 'to keep off death.' The young women anoint their eyes with fresh butter. Many texts speak also of the leading around of an ox, of which the company take hold and walk behind it: the one who closes the procession has to obliterate the footmarks. A strange notion entertained by certain Indian tribes is cited by Caland (*l.c.*) from the *Bombay Gazetteer* (xiii. 1, *passim*), to the effect that, at an assembly held on the 12th day, the dead man takes possession of one of the company and intimates what his friends are to do for him, or takes leave of his relatives.

The fundamental aim of the *śāntikarman* is to take effective measures to ward off evil and to return to ordinary life. Hence even the fire that served the deceased is removed—not, however, by the door—and extinguished outside. Its ashes are placed on a mat or in an old basket, and carried to the south or the south-west, where they are set down on a saliferous, and therefore unfruitful, piece of ground (Caland, 114). The new fire is kindled by the eldest son, after (or, sometimes, before) the removal of the old. The Rigveda is acquainted with a similar ceremonial, but the details of the ritual are considerably different (Hillebrandt, *Ved. Myth.* ii. 108 ff.).

Many of the ceremonies prescribed by the ritual literature for the *śāntikarman* are connected by some authorities with the *śmaśāna*: e.g. the digging of seven trenches to represent the seven rivers is met with sometimes in the one ceremony, sometimes in the other; but for the general interest of the subject it is a matter of no great importance to what part of the death-ritual we assign particular actions.

7. **Pitṛmedha or Śmaśāna.**—The questions for whom and at what time the *śmaśāna* is to be performed have given rise to ritual discussion, and have been variously answered by the different schools. The season of the year and the reigning constellations are also of significance; on the whole, a preference seems to have been given to the day of the new moon. On the preceding day certain plants are rooted up at the spot destined for the *śmaśāna*, to the north of which earth is dug up, and from this are made the 600–2400 bricks which serve for the structure, besides the number (not precisely defined) employed for packing. The urn with the ashes is brought and laid between three *palāśa*-stakes driven into the ground inside a hut which must be between the village and the *śmaśāna* spot. If the bones are not to be found in the trench mentioned above, dust is taken from this spot, or the dead man is called upon from the bank of a river, and then any small animal (this being taken to represent him) that happens to spring upon an outspread cloth is treated as if it were the bones. Upon the three stakes is placed a perforated vessel containing sour milk and whey, which trickles through the numerous holes upon the urn below. To trumpet blast and the sound

of the lute the company circumambulate the spot after the fashion already described (striking the left thigh with the hand, etc.), and fan the urn with the extremities of their garments. [Many ritual authorities speak also of song and dance and female dancers: some do not mention the hut; others have additions to, or modifications of, the above. The variations are great, indeed: *e.g.* some place an empty kettle in the hut, and beat it with an old shoe.]

The ceremonies take place during the first, middle, and last parts of the night. The company repairs quite early to the *śmaśāna* spot, regarding whose extent there are widely deviating prescriptions. It must be out of sight of the village, in a hidden situation, yet visited by the rays of the midday sun. The spot must be staked off and surrounded with a rope, and—as in the case of the *agnichayana*, with whose ritual the *śmaśāna* has many points of contact—its surface must be covered with small stones. Furrows must be opened with a plough drawn by six or more oxen, and various seeds cast into them. In the middle of the ground a hole is made, into which gravel, saliferous earth, etc., are cast. Milk from a cow whose calf died is poured into the half of a bowl and stirred up with groats into a kind of drink; and this, or something else, is set out as food for the dead. [Towards the south (according to some) two crooked trenches are to be opened, and filled with milk and water. It may be mentioned, as one of the numerous and frequently characteristic details, that in the *śmaśāna* a piece of reed is immured, apparently to serve the purpose of a boat to the deceased (cf. above, p. 475[b]).] The bones are laid down upon a bed of *darbha*-grass, arranged in the figure of a man, covered with an old cloth, and asperged. The urn is destroyed. Over the remains is erected the monument, which conforms to a definitely prescribed plan, and in which the present writer sees the precursor of the *stūpa* of later days. When the structure has reached a certain height, food for the dead is walled in. After its completion, the *śmaśāna* is covered with earth, and water is poured over it from pitchers which it is the custom to destroy, or it is bestrewn with *avakā*-plants and *kuśa*-grass. Much is done also to separate the world of the living from that of the dead: the boundary betwixt them is marked by lumps of earth, stones, and branches; and the same purpose is served by the uttering of certain formulæ.

The soul of the deceased does not pass at once into the world of the Pitaras; it remains separate from them for a time as a *preta*, or 'spirit,' and has special offerings presented to it. But, after the lapse of a certain period, or when some fortunate circumstance occurs, the dead man reaches the circle of the *manes* through the instrumentality of the *sapiṇḍīkaraṇa*. The grandfather now drops out, since, as a rule, only three rice-balls are presented; but, as one of the *manes*, he receives his place in the ancestor-cult. This cult has struck its roots deep in Indian life. To feed the ancestors, to propitiate or keep them away, and to summon their aid, are the purposes served by the *śrāddhas* described in ritual- and law-books. The *śrāddhas* are offered either on special occasions, when fortunate occurrences take place, or regularly at certain periods of time. To the first category belong the birth of a son, the *nāmakaraṇa*, and other festivals, when the *manes* are spoken of as 'cheerful,' and are honoured in the same way as the gods: to the second belong the daily worship of the *manes*, that on the day of the new moon, the monthly worship, the great offering to the *manes* at the four months' sacrifices, at the soma-sacrifices, and the *aṣṭakā* celebration with the *anvaṣṭakya*, which coincide with the close of the year (see, for details, the present writer's sketch in *GIAP* iii. 2).

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A. HILLEBRANDT.

DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD (Indian, non-Aryan).

—**1. Conception of death: not due to natural causes.**—The conception of death among the non-Aryan tribes of India does not materially differ from that entertained by other savage and semi-savage races. Death is not regarded as the result of natural causes, but is supposed to be due to the interference of devils, demons, or other evil spirits. This is particularly the case with diseases like dementia, the delirium of fever, and the like, which seem to indicate action by some indwelling spirit. This belief is naturally extended to accidents caused by wild animals, and deaths due to epidemic diseases, each of which is attributed to the working of a special disease-spirit. Hence many of these tribes use special means to identify the spirit, and the methods usually partake of the nature of Shamanism. The soul, again, is regarded as a little man or animal occupying the individual, which causes him to move. It leaves the body through the skull-sutures or other pure orifices of the body, in the case of persons who have lived virtuous lives; in the case of the wicked, by one or other of the impure exits. The soul may at times live apart from the body—a theory which explains to those who hold it the nature of dreams and the danger of waking a sleeper. There may be more souls than one, and these may have separate abodes—a belief accounting for the performance among some tribes of funeral rites at the place of death, at the grave, or at some other spot, where offerings are made to appease the spirit, and explaining much of the vagueness which characterizes their funeral ceremonies. The soul, again, is believed to be mortal; and with their lack of interest in their national history, and their imperfect recollection of past events, these people, after a time, regard their deceased ancestors as no longer objects of reverence or fear, and the attention of the survivors is concentrated on the more recently dead. The soul, when it leaves the body, is figured as a

naked, feeble mannikin, exposed to all kinds of injury until, by the pious care of its friends, a new body is provided for it. This often takes the form of a temporary refuge—a hut, a stone, a tree, or a piece of sacred grass. Or the soul may abide in an animal or insect; and this temporary refuge, or, among tribes who accept the theory of metempsychosis, this form of re-birth, may be identified by laying out ashes or flour at the scene of death. These, when carefully examined, often show the footmarks of the creature by which the soul has been occupied. Among the jungle tribes the soul is commonly supposed to abide in a tree—a belief which may in some instances have been suggested by the habit of tree-burial (see § 4 (*h*)). In W. India a common refuge of the soul is the *jīvkhāḍa*, or 'life-stone,' which is selected at the time of the funeral rites, and to which offerings and libations are made. This naturally leads to a further development, when a rude image of the deceased is made, placed among the household gods, and honoured with gifts of food and drink. In some cases, as among the Kachins of Upper Burma, an attempt is made to enclose the soul within a barrier of bamboos, from which it is solemnly released at the termination of the funeral rites (*Gazetteer Upper Burma*, I. i. 409). Sometimes, again, during this intermediate period, the soul is believed to haunt the scene of death, and at a later period it abides in the grave or at the cremation-ground. When beliefs such as these are current among the people, it is obviously of supreme importance that the funeral rites should be duly performed. No infective tabu is more dangerous than that which proceeds from a corpse unpurified by the customary rites; and perhaps no people in the world devote more anxious care than the Hindus to placating the friendly, and repressing or scaring away the malignant, spirits of the dead.

2. Spirits friendly and malignant.—The line between these two classes of spirits is clearly drawn, and it is based on the close family- and clan-organization of the non-Aryan tribes. The souls of the family dead, unless they are irritated by neglect, are generally benevolent; the souls of strangers are, as a rule, malevolent and hostile. In the case of the former no means of placation are neglected. Some tribes, after the soul has left the body, endeavour to recall it, and invite it to abide with them as a house-guardian; others make a miniature bridge to enable it, as it returns, to cross a stream, and thus evade the water-spirit (cf. art. BRIDGE, ii. 2, *c*); others, again, make a pretence of capturing the soul and bringing it back to its home. The provision of fire and light for the soul, either in the house itself or at the grave, is more general. Sometimes rites are performed to guide the soul to its longed-for place of rest; or it is solemnly invited to leave the grave and ascend to the other world, where it is welcomed by the friends who have gone before—a conception of the realm of the sainted dead which may have been independently arrived at by the non-Aryan tribes, though the details may be due to Hindu influence. To secure the peaceful departure of the soul, it is essential that the due egress should be provided for it by removing the dying person into the open air or into an upper chamber—a precaution which possesses the additional advantage of relieving the house from the death-tabu. With the same object, the skull is often broken at the time of cremation. When death occurs, the soul is placated by the wailing of its relatives; or, as among the Kandhs, it is exhorted to keep quiet, to employ its time in working in the other world, and not to transform itself into a tiger and plague its friends (Risley, *TC* i. 408). More remarkable is the procedure of the Nāgas of Assam, who curse the evil spirit which has removed their friend, and threaten to attack it with their spears (*JAI* xxvi. 195, xxvii. 34; Dalton, 40). This custom apparently does not prevail among the Manipur branch of the tribe (T. C. Hodson, *The Nāga Tribes of Manipur*, 1911, p. 146 ff.).

After death, the wants of the dead are provided for by gifts of food and drink (see art. FOOD FOR THE DEAD). Among some tribes the feeling prevails that the goods of the dead man should be appropriated to his use, and not taken by his friends, lest the envious spirit may return and claim them (Dalton, 21, 205; cf. Crawley, *Mystic Rose*, Lond. 1902, p. 98). In some cases a viaticum, in the shape of a coin or some article of value, is placed with the corpse to support it on its way to the other world, as among the Pahāria (Hosten, 'Paharia Burial-Customs,' *Anthropos*, iv. 670, 672). But people in this grade of culture, while strictly governed by a regard for precedents, contrive to evade the duty by placing worthless representations of the dead man's effects in the grave, or by merely waving them over his pyre (Rivers, *The Todas*, 362 f.). The arms and implements which are often buried with the corpse, or placed upon the grave, are obviously intended for the protection or use of the dead; and these are sometimes intentionally broken, either in the belief that, if left uninjured, they are useless to the dead, or to render them unavailable, and thus prevent the rifling of the tomb. Special clothing is also sometimes provided for the soul, and, as the garments of the dead man are supposed to be infected by the death-tabu, they are generally presented to some menial priest, whose sanctity guards him from danger in using them. Ornaments are sometimes placed in the grave: a set of diadems, for instance, like those of Mycenæ, having been found in a S. Indian interment at Tinnevelly, where they were probably deposited as amulets to protect the soul from evil spirits (Thurston, *Notes*, 149 f.). Some deposit with the dead a prayer written by the tribal priest; others, like the Gāros of Assam, slay a dog at the grave to guide the soul to Chikmang, the tribal paradise; or, as among the Gonds, clay images of horses, on which the soul may ride to heaven, are placed on the tomb (A. Playfair, *The Garos*, 1909, p. 109; Oppert, 84 f.). Closely connected with this is the custom of slaying human victims at the funeral, in order that they may accompany and serve the soul. Some of the wilder Assam and Burma tribes, down to quite recent times, killed slaves with this object (*Gazetteer Upper Burma*, I. i. 553; F. Mason, *Burmah*, 1860, p. 92 f.). Blood being the favourite form of refreshment for the dead, it is provided by animal sacrifices. The victim is often slain at the grave, and its blood is poured upon it. The Andamanese mother places a shell full of her milk on the grave of her child, and the Dosādh of the United Provinces pours blood into a pit, so that it may reach the soul (*JAI* xii. 142; Crooke, *TC* ii. 354). With the same intention water is poured on the grave, or dropped into the mouth of the dead or dying man. Many articles of food placed with the dead serve the additional purpose of scaring evil spirits. Rites such as these, performed at the grave, naturally develop into a periodical feast held in the house or in some holy place; food, again, is offered to a rude image representing the dead. The final stage is reached when it comes to be believed that, by feeding the tribal priest or a Brāhman, the food passes on for the use of the soul.

3. Rites performed to repel evil spirits.—The rites performed in the case of the malignant dead assume another form. Such spirits are the souls of those who have been removed from this world by an untimely or tragical death—those of the

murdered, the unburied, the unmarried, childless women, robbers, men of evil life, and strangers. These are included under the general title of *bhūt* (Skr. *bhūta*, 'formed,' 'produced')—a term which does not necessarily connote malignancy, but is now generally accepted in this sense. They all cherish feelings of envy and malignancy towards the living, and it is necessary to placate or, more generally, to repress and coerce them. The souls of the unmarried dead are often propitiated by a mock posthumous marriage, in which a boy or girl represents the dead youth or maiden. For the unburied dead a mock funeral is performed over such relics of the dead as may have been recovered, or over an image representing the deceased. The soul of a dead bandit, as among some of the robber tribes of N. India, is sometimes deified and worshipped. The most common example of the discontented spirit is the *churel* of N. India, or, as she is called in the S., the *alvantin*, the spirit of a childless woman, or of one who has died within the period of sexual impurity. Like demons in other countries, she has her feet turned backwards, and is much dreaded. She is repelled by scattering grain on the road from her grave. When she rises, she halts to collect this, until the morning call of the cock forces her to return—a practice extended even to the benignant dead by the Pahārias of British Sikkim, who drive a nail through each finger and toe of a prospective *churel*, to prevent her from harassing the living (Hosten, 673, 679). The ghost of a mutilated person is also an object of fear; but, except among the Chakmas of the E. frontier (Lewin, *Hill Tracts*, 74), there seems to be no Indian example of the custom of mutilating the corpses of enemies to prevent them from 'walking' (though Hosten, 679, records, without having been able to obtain any explanation for it, the custom of the Yākhās of British Sikkim, who, 'when a man has died, split open his hands from the middle knuckles to the wrist'). Spirits of this description of the malignant dead are repelled in various ways. Some tribes have an annual ghost-hunt, by which the evil spirits are scared from the house and village. Guns are fired, gongs and drums are beaten, and rockets are exploded. Dances and other revels, in which the rules of morality are disregarded—indecency being a mode of scaring evil spirits—are performed. Sometimes the rite takes the form of a mock combat—one band of performers representing the evil, and another the friendly, spirits; and it is always arranged that the latter shall be victorious (Lewin, *Wild Races*, 185). Some tribes measure the corpse, or watch it until it is buried, lest it may be occupied by an evil spirit.

The devices intended to prevent the return of malignant spirits are manifold. In some cases a cairn is raised over the grave (§ 4 (*d*)), or, as an additional precaution, the excavation is filled up with stones or thorns; or, as among many of the wilder tribes, the body is buried face downwards—a practice adopted by the Thugs. In Upper India the ghosts of menial tribes, such as sweepers, are so much dreaded that riots have followed an attempt to bury their dead in the usual way with the face turned to the sky. Sometimes the grave is enclosed by a fence too high for the ghost to 'take it,' particularly without a 'run.' Such an enclosure has the additional advantage of marking the place as tabu, and was the origin of the stone circles, erected round cairns, which subsequently developed into the artistic railings of Buddhist *stūpas*. Another common method is to deceive the spirit by carrying out the corpse feet foremost or by a special door, so that it may be unable to find its way back, by removing the house-ladder, or by forcing the bearers to carry their burden at a trot and to change places on the road. Special precautions are taken not to name the dead, at least for some time after death, lest the soul may consider it an invitation to return.

4. **Methods of disposal of the dead.**—(*a*) *Cannibalism.*—Of that most archaic method of disposal of the dead, the funeral feast, 'when the meat is nothing less than the corpse of the departed kinsman' (Hartland, *LP* ii. 278), India has so far supplied no clear examples. There are, however, cases of eating the aged with a view to reproducing the virtues or powers of the departed, as among the Lushais of Assam, and the Chingpaws and Was of Upper Burma (Lewin, *Hill Tracts*, 107; *Gazetteer Upper Burma*, I. i. 436, 496). But this custom is confined to the most isolated and savage tribes, and the similar tradition recorded by Dalton (220 f.) of the Birhors of Chotā Nāgpur is probably quite baseless—possibly an echo of a story told of tribes much further east.

(*b*) *Dolmens and other stone monuments.*—The earliest form of corpse-disposal of which physical evidence exists is that in dolmens, kistvaens, and other forms of stone monuments, of which India furnishes numerous examples. Though sporadic remains of such structures have been found in many parts of N. India, the assertion of Fergusson (*Rude Stone Monuments*, 475 f.) may be accepted as generally correct, that they are peculiar to the country south of the Vindhyan Hills, and are numerous in the country drained by the Godāvarī and its affluents, and in particular in the valley of the Kistna and its tributaries, on both sides of the Ghāṭs, through Coimbatore down to Cape Comorin, and especially in the neighbourhood of Conjeeveram. The most complete account of these stone monuments is that of Breeks, who describes them under three heads—cairns, or rather mounds enclosed by a stone circle; barrows; and kistvaens. In the cairns have been discovered earthen jars containing fragments of burnt bones, and some beautiful bronze vessels, probably imported from Babylonia or some other foreign country. Questions connected with the origin, purpose, and date of this series of monuments have given rise to much controversy. The fact that stone circles, of a form analogous to that of the ancient monuments, are used by the modern Todas has led to the inference that the members of this tribe are the successors of, or closely allied to, the old circle-builders. The character of the remains discovered does not, as a rule, suggest a date earlier than the Iron Age, which, if the analogy of Europe be accepted (though there are no materials for such a comparison), need not imply a date earlier than 850-600 B.C. But V. A. Smith (*IGI*, new ed., 1908, ii. 98) supposes that the Iron Age in N. India may go back to 1500 or even 2000 B.C. The difficulty of fixing an approximate date for these structures largely depends upon the fact that modern tribes, like the Kols and their kinsfolk in Chotā Nāgpur, as well as the Nāgas and Khāsis of Assam, still erect stone monuments of a type closely resembling the pre-historic examples. The modern funeral monuments of the Khāsis have been fully described by Gurdon (*The Khāsis*, 144 ff.), who divides them into three classes—those intended as seats for the souls of the dead while their bones are being conveyed to the tribal ossuary; memorial stones erected in honour of deceased ancestors; and stones which mark tanks used for purifying the mourners from the death tabu. Many monuments in Madras and among the tribes of the E. frontier take the form of ossuaries, into which the bones are removed after disinterment.

(*c*) *Exposure to beasts and birds of prey.*—Among other modes of disposal of the dead the most crude is that of exposure of the remains to beasts and

birds of prey. This custom still prevails among the Tibetans and certain tribes of the N. frontier, where it probably originated from the difficulty of providing wood for cremation, or excavating graves during the severe winter of these regions. At a later period it was re-introduced from Persia by the Parsis. Among the non-Aryan tribes of the Peninsula this method is occasionally employed for those dying in a state of tabu, as is the case with the Pahārias of Bengal, the Nāgas of Assam, and some menial tribes in the northern plains (Dalton, 274; *JAI* xi. 203; Rice, *Essays*, 60; Crooke, *TC* ii. 92, i. 7, iii. 144).

(*d*) *Cairn-burial.*—The idea of protecting the corpse from violation, and the desire to prevent the ghost from 'walking,' account for cairn-interment, which was used by the early tribes of S. India, and is found at the present time among the Bhīls of Bombay (*BG* xii. 87), the Kachins of Upper Burma (*Gazetteer Upper Burma*, I. i. 393, 409), and some of the Assam tribes (Dalton, 9; Risley, *TC* ii. 112). From such cairns the *stūpas* of the Buddhists have been developed.

(*e*) *Cave-burial.*—Cave-burial, common in other regions of E. and S. Asia, does not seem to have prevailed widely in India. But it must be remembered that many caves have been occupied continuously even to the present day, and thus the evidence may have become obliterated, and numbers of them may still remain unexplored. In Malabar, however, sepulchral chambers excavated in the laterite and containing clay vessels and iron implements have been discovered; and in the same class are the *pāṇḍū-kulī*, the name of which is based on the absurd belief that they were the abodes of the Pāṇḍava heroes of the *Mahābhārata* (*JAI* xxv. 371 f.; Thurston, *Notes*, 148). See also the account of cave-burials in 'anterior India,' a region not capable of identification, by Nicolo Conti (*India in the xvth Cent.*, ed. R. H. Major, Hakluyt Soc., 1857).

(*f*) *House-burial.*—Cave-burial naturally leads to house-burial, and the examples of this practice are abundant. More than one reason probably led to the adoption of the custom—the desire to retain the corpse in the house in the hope of its revival; the dread lest the relics might be used for purposes of black magic; or the hope that the soul of the ancestor thus buried might be re-incarnated in the person of some female member of the family. This last belief seems to be most general, and the custom, sometimes with this explanation, has been recorded among the Andamanese (*JAI* xii. 141, 144; Temple, *Census Report*, 1901, p. 65), the Nāgas of Assam (*JAI* xxvi. 200), the Was and allied Burman tribes (Scott, *Burma*, 408), and some Madras and Panjāb tribes (Thurston, *Notes*, 155; *PNQ* i. 123).

(*g*) *Disposal in water.*—The custom of consigning the dead to water is more common. Among orthodox Hindus, the bones and ashes after cremation are deposited in a river or tank at some sacred place. Among the lower tribes, in most parts of the country, the corpse is often flung into the nearest river, sometimes after a perfunctory attempt at cremation by singeing the face and beard. It has been suggested that this method of disposal is in some cases based upon the desire to free the bones rapidly from the products of decomposition, and thus to placate the spirit; but more usually the intention is simply to get rid as quickly as possible of the corpse and the tabu which emanates from it. Hence it is frequently adopted in the case of those dying in a state of special tabu, as, for instance, those perishing from epidemic disease; and the bodies of *sannyāsīs* and other holy men are frequently consigned to running water. Sometimes, again, the rite is in the nature of sympathetic magic, as when in Bengal those dying of leprosy, on the principle of water to water, are flung into the Ganges (*Asiat. Res.* iv. 69; Buchanan, *E. India*, i. 114).

(*h*) *Tree-burial.*—The practice of tree-burial in India seems to depend partly on the desire to placate the spirit by saving the remains from the attacks of wild animals, and partly on the fact that the tree is the haunt of spirits. It is found among the Andamanese, Nāgas, and Māriyā Gonds (*JAI* xii. 144 f., xi. 205, xxvi. 199; Dalton, 43; *Census Report Assam*, 1891, i. 246; Hislop, App. xiii.). Among the Khāsis of Assam the corpse is placed in a hollow tree, and the next development is the use of a tree-trunk as a coffin, as among the Nāgas and Karennis of Burma (Dalton, 56; *Gazetteer Upper Burma*, I. i. 528; *JAI* xxvi. 199).

(*i*) *Platform-burial.*—This rite further develops into the custom of platform-burial, which prevails among the Andamanese and some tribes on the E. frontier (*JAI* xii. 144; *Census Report Andamans*, 1901, 65; Lewin, *Hill Tracts*, 109). Among the E. tribes the custom of smoking the corpse is frequently combined with this.

(*j*) *Jar-burial.*—Jar-burial, in the sense that the corpse is deposited in an earthenware vessel, does not appear to prevail at present among the non-Aryan tribes; but instances of corpses placed in large mortuary jars have been discovered in prehistoric S. Indian interments (*JAI* xxv. 374); and some of these terra-cotta coffins closely resemble those found in Babylonia. At present, among most tribes which practise cremation, the ashes and bones are deposited in an earthen jar before burial or consignment to water.

(*k*) *Contracted burials.*—Besides the ordinary mode of burial in a recumbent posture, there are other methods which deserve special mention. First comes what is known as contracted burial, when the corpse is interred with the knees closely pressed against the breast. The tribal distribution of this practice does not throw much light upon its origin or significance. It is found among some of the more savage tribes, such as the Andamanese and the Pen tribe in Car Nicobar (*JAI* xii. 141, 144; *PNQ* iv. 66); and among the Lushais and Kūkīs of the E. frontier (Lewin, *Hill Tracts*, 109, *Wild Races*, 246). Among such people it has been suggested that it represents an attempt to prevent the ghost from 'walking'; and in some cases, among various races, the thumbs and toes of the dead are bound, apparently with this intention. Another theory is that it symbolizes the prenatal position of the child in its mother's womb. In some instances it may be due to the practical difficulty of digging a grave of the shape and size in which the body may rest in a recumbent posture; in others it may represent the position of a savage sleeping beside a camp fire. It has been adopted by some of the religious orders, like the *sannyāsīs* of N. India and the Shenvī Brāhmans and Lingāyats of the south. Here it probably represents the posture of the *guru* engaged in meditation, or lecturing to his pupils, because some of these sects place the bodies of their *gurus* in this posture after death, and worship them (*BG* xv. i. 149).

(*l*) *Shelf- or niche-burial.*—Shelf- or niche-burial, in which the corpse is deposited in a chamber or cavity excavated in the side of the perpendicular entrance to the grave, seems to be based on the intention of preventing the incumbent earth from resting upon the corpse and thus incommoding the spirit—a feeling which prevails among some wild tribes, like the Mīrīs of Assam (Dalton, 34). It is found among some of the E. and S. tribes, like the Kaupūīs of Manipur and the Paniyans of Malabar (*JAI* xvi. 355 f.; Thurston, *Notes*, 144); it has been adopted by some religious or semi-religious orders,

like the Jugīs of Bengal, and the Rāvals or Lingāyats (Risley, *TC* i. 359; Crooke, *TC* iii. 19; *BG* XVIII. i. 361); and it is the orthodox method among Muhammadans, who place the corpse in a niche (*lahd*) high enough to allow the spirit to rise when the dread angels, Munkar and Nakīr, come to interrogate it regarding its belief in the Prophet and his religion.

(*m*) *Concealed burial.*—Concealed burial and the obliteration of all marks of the grave appear generally to be due to a desire to get rid of the spirit. It is found among the wilder tribes in Madras and Burma (Oppert, 199; Scott, *Burma*, 408).

5. Disinterment of the remains.—The practice of disinterment of the remains after decomposition has ceased probably rests upon the belief that the soul is immanent in the bones. The Andamanese and the Nicobarese disinter their dead, wash the bones, and, after wrapping them in cloth or leaves, re-bury them, or fling them into the jungle, or sink them in the sea (*JAI* xxxii. 209, 219 f., xii. 143, iv. 465, xi. 295 f.). Among the Khāsis of Assam those who die from infectious disease are buried, the remains being dug up and cremated when danger from infection is over (Gurdon, 137). This custom leads, among some tribes, to the provision of ossuaries in which the dry bones are stored. Such structures are found in E. and S. India (*JAI* v. 40, vii. 21 ff.). The same belief in the continued, though mysterious, oneness of the body with its severed parts leads to the formation of tribal cemeteries, to which, often from long distances, as among the Chinbons of Upper Burma and some tribes in the central hills, the bones of tribesmen are removed (*Gazetteer Upper Burma*, I. i. 467; Dalton, 34, 262).

6. Immediate and deferred burial.—In most cases climatic conditions necessitate the immediate disposal of the remains by cremation or burial. The custom of deferred burial, in which the remains are retained in the house to enable friends from a distance to pay their last tribute of respect to the dead, is less common, and is found chiefly among the E. tribes like the Khāsis, Nāgas, or Lushais (Gurdon, 138; *JAI* xxvi. 195; Lewin, *Hill Tracts*, 109).

7. Embalming the dead.—Customs of this kind naturally develop into the practice of embalming the dead, which is not common in India. In the form of preservation of the remains in honey or by smoking them over a slow fire, it is found only among some of the E. and Burmese tribes (Hooker, *Himalayan Journals*, ed. London, 1891, 486 f.; Shway Yoe [Scott], *The Burman*, ii. 330 f.).

8. Inhumation and cremation.—The methods of disposal of the dead which have been considered hitherto are all more or less abnormal. The modes now generally adopted are either simple burial in a recumbent position or cremation. We may, perhaps, in consideration of the Indian evidence, assume that the most primitive form was exposure of the corpse, followed by inhumation, and then by cremation. It has often been asserted that cremation was specially an Aryan practice; but the evidence from S. India monuments indicates that possibly it was only in the case of persons of rank that cremation prevailed (cf. art. ARYAN RELIGION in vol. ii. p. 16). At the same time, the facts at our disposal do not enable us definitely to decide why cremation displaced inhumation. Among the Aryans, as Ridgeway argues (*Early Age of Greece*, Cambridge, 1901, i. ch. vii.), the idea that fire was the only medium by which sacrifice could reach the gods may have led to the introduction of the process of cremation after the belief in an abode in the sky where the soul joined the *pitri*, or sainted dead, had become finally established; and, if it arose, as he argues (*ib.* i. 539 f.), in a forest country, where the hut was consumed with the corpse to avoid tabu, there seems no reason why it may not have been independently discovered by the non-Aryan tribes.

At present it is only the most primitive non-Aryan tribes and some ascetic orders who still maintain the practice of earth-burial. On the other hand, many tribes in a low state of culture who now cremate their dead may have adopted the practice under Hindu influence. No literary evidence exists by which the historical development of these customs can be traced. The transition, however, between the two forms of disposal is in many instances clearly indicated. For example, among some tribes the ordinary dead are buried, while those under tabu are cremated; or the rich are cremated, while the poor are buried; or the question which mode is to be adopted depends upon the season of the year in which the death occurs. Among some tribes we find more than one method in use. One clan of the Nāgas combines platform-burial with cremation, placing the dead in open coffins raised several feet above ground, whence the remains are subsequently removed and burned close by (*JAI* xi. 213). The Kāmīs of Bengal burn, bury, or fling the corpse into water, as may be convenient at the time (Risley, i. 395). The Hābūras of the United Provinces either cremate or expose their dead in the jungle, as best suits their nomadic habits (Crooke, *TC* ii. 476). The widest variety of practice appears among the Nāgas, who bury, expose on a platform or in a tree, and sometimes cremate the corpse after placing it on a platform (*JAI* xi. 203, 213; Hodson, 146 ff.). After cremation the bones and ashes are usually deposited in a river or tank, the vessel while in process of removal to the sacred place being hung in a tree so that the spirit, when so disposed, may revisit the bones.

9. The death-tabu.—As among all races in the same grade of culture, the infective tabu arising from the corpse is specially dreaded. All who come in contact with the dead are considered to be infected. The corpse-bearers, for instance, as among the tribes of the central hill tract, have their shoulders rubbed with oil, milk, and cow-dung by the women of the mourning family, while they are sprinkled with cow's urine from twigs of the sacred Nīm tree (*Melia azadirachta*). The dread of the death-tabu appears throughout the rites of mourning. Thus, among some tribes a special dress is provided for the chief mourners, the intention possibly being in some cases to disguise the mourner from the ghost. With the same object the Andamanese smear their heads with clay (Temple, *Census Report*, 1901, p. 65). As the tabu infects the house, no cooking can be done there, and the mourners either fast or receive supplies of food from relatives or friends. Persons, again, when exposed to the death-tabu, are not allowed to leave the house or village, lest they may infect the neighbourhood. This form of tabu is specially observed by the E. tribes, like the Nāgas of Assam and the hill races of Arakan (*JAI* xi. 71, xxvi. 191, ii. 240; Hodson, 173 f.). Tabu is also marked by the rule that mourners sleep on the ground: partly because, if beds are used during this period, they too become infected; partly because spirits cannot touch Mother Earth. The continence enforced upon mourners is probably, as in the case of the sacred dairyman of the Todas (Rivers, 100 f.), a precaution against the dissipation of physical energy, all of which is needed during this critical period. By an extension of the principles of tabu, if the death-rites have been, by a misconception, performed for a person who subsequently returns, he is tabu, because the powers of the other world seem to have

rejected him as unworthy. The period of tabu varies among the different tribes, and seems usually to depend on the time during which, before the completion of the funeral rites, the spirit is supposed to haunt the neighbourhood of the place of death or the grave.

10. Purification from the death-tabu.—Purification from tabu is effected in various ways. One method is that adopted by the Andamanese and Gonds, who quit the house of death or burn it, along with some or all of the effects of the dead man (*JAI* xii. 142; Hislop, 19). But generally there is a special rite of purification. This usually consists in ablution, by which the clinging spirit or tabu is washed from the body of the mourner. Sometimes special substances, usually the products of the sacred cow, are used for this purpose. With the same object many touch fire on their return from the funeral, or pass their feet, which naturally are supposed to be specially liable to infection, through the smoke of burning oil. In other cases the tabu is removed by transferring it, and, by a later conception, the sins of the dead man, to a scape-animal. In its clearest form the rite appears among the Badagas of Madras (Gover, *Folk-Songs of S. India*, London, 1872, p. 71; Thurston, *Notes*, 195 f.). Traces are also found of the remarkable custom of 'sin-eating,' by which the sins of the dead are transferred to a Brāhman who eats food in the house of death, or even, as used to be the habit at Tanjore, eats the bones of the dead Rāja ground up and mixed with rice (Dubois, *Manners and Customs*[3], 1906, p. 366).

Lastly, the custom of shaving the mourner may be mentioned. The idea seems to be to get rid of the death-infection clinging to the hair, which, possibly with the same intention, is often let loose in mourning, as is the case with other persons under tabu, like the ascetic classes (*Madras Museum Bulletin*, iii. 251 f.). The hair is sometimes dedicated to the dead, as in the Deccan and along the lower Himālaya (*BG* XVIII. i. 364, 149; *NINQ* iii. 117), the intention being to strengthen the feeble spirit of the deceased by dedicating that portion of the human organism which, by its growth, furnishes the strongest proof of vitality (Frazer, *GB*, pt. i. [1911], 'The Magic Art and the Evolution of Kings,' i. 31, 102). More usually the hair is shaven after the mourning period begins, or at its close. The shaving is usually confined to the immediate relatives or kinsmen; but in some cases the whole population shave their heads and beards on the death of a Rāja, *e.g.* in Kashmīr and other parts of the Himālaya (*NINQ* iv. 18, 98; Drew, *Jummoo*, 54).

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W. CROOKE.

DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD (Jain).

—The Jains agree, on the whole, with the Brāhmans in their notions on death. The soul of every living being—the highest gods included—must be re-born as long as it possesses *karma*, i.e. merit or demerit; but, when the *karma* has been annihilated, then the soul, on death, will enter on its innate state of purity, and will be released for ever from the cycle of births. But on some points the Jains have developed peculiar notions.

1. Re-incarnation and liberation of the soul.—According to the Jains, *karma*, the effect produced on the soul by its deeds during life, consists of extremely subtle matter, which pours or infiltrates into the soul when worldly actions make, as it were, an opening into it (*āsrava*). This *karma*-matter, as we may call it, fills the soul as sand fills a bag, and acts on it like a weight. The soul by itself has an upward gravity (*ūrdhvagurutva*), and is kept down, during its worldly state, by the *karma*-matter, which, like all matter, has a downward gravity (*adhogurutva*). Therefore, if cleansed of all *karma*, the soul, on leaving the body, will rise in a straight line to the top of the universe, where the liberated souls reside for ever (see above, p. 160ᵇ, 'Jain cosmography')—just as a pumpkin coated with clay sinks to the bottom of a tank, but rises to the surface of the water when the clay has fallen off. But, if the soul is burdened with *karma*, it will, on leaving the body, move in any direction—upwards, sideways, or downwards. It does not travel in a straight line, but in a broken line, with one, two, or three angles or turns, and thus gets, in two, three, or four movements, to the place where it is to be re-incarnated. There it attracts gross matter, in order to build up a new body according to its *karma*.[1]

2. Voluntary death or euthanasia.—It is a well-known fact that religious suicide is occasionally committed by the Hindus: under a vow to some deity they starve themselves to death, eat poison, drown themselves, enter fire, throw themselves down a precipice, etc. The Jains condemn such practices as an 'unwise death' (*bālamaraṇa*), and recommend, instead, a 'wise death' (*paṇḍita-maraṇa*), as provided in their sacred books.

Two cases must be distinguished: religious suicide may be resorted to in case of an emergency, or it forms the end of a regular religious career; both cases apply to laymen as well as to monks.

(1) If a Jain contracts a mortal disease, or is otherwise in danger of certain death, he may have recourse to self-starvation. This practice is frequently mentioned in Jain narratives, and prevails, no doubt, even at the present day. If a monk is unable to follow the rules of his order, or cannot any longer sustain the prescribed austerities, he should rather commit suicide than break the rules. A particular case seems to be the following. When a monk falls sick, and foresees that he will not be able to go through the 'ultimate self-mortification' to be noticed hereafter, he may keep a long fast. If he gets well in the meantime, he is to return to his former life. But, if he should not recover, but die, it is all for the best. This conditional self-starvation is called *itvara*.[2]

(2) A pious layman may go through a regular course of religious life, the phases of which are the eleven 'standards' (*pratimā*); the first is to be observed for one month, the second for two months,

[1] Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra*, ii. 26–36 (tr. *ZDMG* lx. [1906] 304 ff.)

[2] *SBE* xxii. 72, note 3.

and so on.[1] In the last standard, which he must observe for eleven months, he becomes practically a monk. At the end of this period he abstains from all food and devotes himself to 'self-mortification[2] by the last emaceration,' patiently awaiting his death, which will occur within a month.

In the case of a monk, the 'self-mortification' lasts twelve years, instead of twelve months. If a monk believes himself purified to such a degree that he may enter upon this last mortification of the flesh, then he should apply to his *guru*, or spiritual master, who will test him in various ways before he gives him his permission. Then, for a period of twelve years, the monk has to exert himself by every means to overcome all passions, worldly feelings, desires, etc., and to annihilate his *karma* by austerities—trying, however, to ward off a premature death. At the end of this period he should abstain from all food till his soul parts from the body. There are three different methods by which this end is brought about; they are called *bhaktapratyākhyānamaraṇa*, *iṅgitamaraṇa*, and *pādapopagamana*[3]—of which the last two are distinguished by the restriction of the movement of the person, and the motion of his limbs.

The rules for religious suicide form the subject of three canonical books—*Chausaraṇa*, *Āurapachchakkhāṇa*, and *Bhattaparinna*.

LITERATURE.—This has been sufficiently indicated in the article.

H. JACOBI.

DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD

(Japanese).—I. *GENERAL.*[4]—The oldest traditions respecting burial speak of a *moya* ('hut'), in which the body of the deceased was kept, often for a very long time (*e.g.* that of Jimmu Tennō is said to have been kept for 19 months in the *moya*); of religious dances and music; of an eulogy or elegy (*shinubikotoba*) pronounced by the head of the family; and of a funeral feast or wake. They also tell of the practice of the self-immolation of wives, retainers, and servants at the grave of a husband or master. The advent of Buddhism in the 6th cent. A.D. brought in certain limitations and modifications. Cremation was introduced in A.D. 703; from that date to 1644 all the Emperors were cremated. Funeral regulations concerning, *e.g.*, periods of mourning, etc., have existed since the 10th cent.; the self-immolation of retainers began to lose favour in the 14th cent., and was prohibited by Iyeyasu, though it still continued sporadically for some time. During the whole of the Tokugawa period only members of the Imperial House were buried with Shinto rites, and even the present forms of Shinto funerals date from the same period.

We will suppose the patient to have been given up by his medical attendant. Relatives and friends stand around his bed, watching his last struggles. Some of them moisten his lips with drops of water conveyed on a feather (*matsugo no mizu*, 'water of the last moment'), others gently rub his eyelids and lips with their hands, so that mouth and eyes may keep shut the more readily after death has taken place. In the province of Iyo, in Shikoku (a district in which there are many quaint survivals), efforts are sometimes made to retain the dying soul, especially when there still remains some communication to be made by or to the man at the point of death. Three men climb to the roof of the house, sit astride on the roof-ridge, and cry aloud: 'Come back, So and So, come back once more.' Nobody inside the house is supposed to have heard the cry, but the dying man will revive for a little, and his spirit will linger for an hour or two before taking its final departure.

After death, the corpse, which is washed by all Buddhist sects, but not universally by the Shinto (some sects apparently being contented with rubbing with a wet cloth), is laid out, with its face covered with a piece of white cotton or silk, and placed on a mat in some suitable place, very often in front of the *toko-no-ma* ('alcove'), in the best sitting-room. The corpse lies with its head to the north (as did that of Buddha), either on its back (Buddhist) or facing the west. At its head is placed a mirror, and a sword for protection (the latter especially in the case of a *samurai*). Round the corpse is a screen. Outside the screen is an eight-legged table (Shinto) with offerings of washed rice, fresh water, salt, fish, and a *tamashiro*,[1] etc. In Buddhist houses there is no necessity for the table to have exactly eight legs, but the offerings are so placed that the deceased may be able to see them. On the Buddhist table stands an *ihai*, or tablet, inscribed with the posthumous name of the deceased, offerings of vegetable foods (*kumotsu*), and, in a vase, a single branch of *shikimi* (Chinese anise). The single branch or stem is so specially associated with funerals that on other occasions a Japanese housewife will not use a single branch for room-decoration.

Both in Shinto and in Buddhism a kind of fiction is kept up, during the days intervening between death and burial, that the spirit is still present with the body. Meals are brought at stated intervals, the corpse is sometimes rolled from side to side, under pretence of giving it ease in lying, and conversation is kept up with it as though it were still alive.

The corpse is dressed, in Shinto, in (1) a *tafusagi*, a kind of apron tied round the waist; (2) a *hadagi*, or shirt, reaching down to the knees; (3 and 4) a *shitagi* and an *uwagi*, a lower and an upper garment, corresponding to the *kami-shimo* (lit. 'upper and lower') of ancient Japanese dress; (5) an *obi*, or belt; and (6) *shitagutsu*, or shoes. A corpse is never dressed in ceremonial clothes or uniform. These are placed in the coffin later. In Buddhist houses the garments are very much the same, only that a distinction is made between winter and summer garments, which may be either of white cotton or of silk (a further development of the fiction of the continued presence of the spirit in the body). But the garments are put on inside out, with the seams showing, and they are worn *hidarimæ*, folded to the left, instead of to the right, as in life. At different parts of the garments are stitched the formulæ *Namu Amida Butsu* ('Glory to Amida the Buddha'), or *Namu myō hō rengekyō* ('Glory to the Mystic Scripture of the Lotus of the True Law'), which are said to be

[1] Hoernle, *Uvāsaga Dasāo* (*Bibl. Ind.*), 1890, tr. p. 44 f., 'Vivaraṇa.'

[2] Hoernle, *op. cit.* p. 47.

[3] Prākrit *pāovagamana*, for which the correct Sanskrit is *prāyopagamana* (see *SBE* xxii. 74 ff.).

[4] The present writer is under great obligation to Dr. Ohrt, of the German Embassy in Tokyo, for permission to consult the MS of two lectures delivered before the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Natur- und Völkerkunde Ostasiens in Tokyo, during the winter of 1909–10.

[1] The *tamashiro* is a wooden tablet, just like the Buddhist *ihai*, except that it contains the actual name of the deceased, and not the *kaimyō* ('posthumous name'). When the sick person is about to draw his last breath, the head of the family, or the person whose duty it will be to perform the funeral ceremonies (*moshu*), washes his hands, changes his clothes, places the tablet on a low table by the bedside, and then, taking it up again, carries it to the sickbed, and there respectfully writes on it the sick man's name. Then, addressing the dying man, he announces to him that the *tamashiro* has been prepared as a place of residence for his spirit: 'With all respect I address thee. Suffer thy excellent spirit to remain in this tablet, and accept the worship which will henceforth be perpetually offered before it by thy posterity in future ages.' Then, gently clapping his hands, he bows once and retires. The *tamashiro* is then put in a wooden box, or covered with a cloth, and placed, facing the south, on a low table in another room, where offerings are made before it. The Buddhist *ihai* (which is made in duplicate) cannot be prepared until after the priests have been called in to select a posthumous name for the deceased.

potent protectors of the soul. In addition to the other garments, the Buddhists dress their corpses in straw sandals (*waraji*) and socks (*tabi*), the sandals being put on behind before. The corpse is also provided with a *dzudabukuro*, or bag, containing the *rokumonsen*, or six pieces of money required for the ferry across the Sandzunogawa, or Japanese Styx. Originally these were six pieces of actual money; at a later period six pieces of paper, cut and stamped in imitation of actual coins, were used; the present *rokumonsen* is simply a piece of paper with the representations of six coins stamped on it. The number of coins is not always the same —6, 12, 18, 49, according to circumstances; and the *dzudabukuro*, which is really an ascetic pilgrim's bag, contains all manner of things necessary for the long journey now commencing — the first lock of hair cut from the head of the deceased in infancy, bits of his beard, nail-parings, teeth, a rosary, 'letters of orders' (*kechi-myaku*), a tobacco-pouch, a comb, pins, needles, threads, a single change of garments, and a towel; but there must not be more than one of each of these things. When a husband dies, a wife cuts off her hair and puts it into the bag; when a father dies, the children cut their nails and put the parings into the bag.

In some houses, when a death occurs, a notice—*kichū* ('period of mourning')—is posted at the entrance as a notification to visitors. In one of the busiest thoroughfares of Tokyo the present writer recently observed an expansion of this idea. In addition to the *kichū* notification, there was a little white table standing in the street, with a white cloth over it, a bowl, and a flower-vase containing a single branch of *shikimi*.

One of the first things to be done after a death is the notification to the authorities. This is made, first of all, to the headman or mayor of the village or urban district, while in the case of the Shinto it is also made to the priest of the *ujigami* shrine (*i.e.* the shrine of the tutelary god of the village or family). Should that shrine be at an inconvenient distance from the deceased's residence, some other temple near by is selected. The Shinto clergy do not, however, have much to do with the arrangements for the funeral, although, as a matter of course, they have a voice in the selection of the day for the funeral obsequies.

In Buddhist funerals the priests play a larger part, and in former days their rôle was more important even than it is now. This may be seen in the fact that in some very ancient temples there may still be found a *yukamba* ('bath-room'), in which the ceremony of washing the dead (*yukan*) was carried on under their directions. (The washing ceremony takes place after midnight; a new wash-tub, pail, dipper, and towel are used, and, after the washing is over, all these utensils, together with any hair, nails, etc., taken from the body, are buried in some secluded spot.) The intervention of the priesthood is also necessary for the ceremonial shaving of the corpse, since shaving is the sign of ordination, and it is the theory of all Buddhist sects that the Buddhist layman passes at his death into the Order of Monks. When the shaving ceremony is over, the priests prepare a *kechi-myaku*, (lit. 'letters of orders,' *i.e.* 'certificate of ordination'), which, as we saw above, is placed in the *dzudabukuro* for use during the soul's pilgrimage in the realms of the dead.

The priests are also consulted about the selection of a day suitable for the funeral, and about the posthumous name to be given to the deceased. Government regulations and sanitary requirements interfere somewhat (not much) with the absolute freedom of choice of a propitious day, and attempts are made to get the funeral fixed for some time within 24 hours after death. But these regulations are more frequently honoured in the breach than in the observance, and an interval of many days sometimes occurs. (The difficulty is occasionally got over by postponing the formal announcement of the death until all the necessary arrangements for the funeral have been made.) In addition to the ordinary cycle of the seven days of the week, there is another cycle of six days (generally to be found in the almanacs), according to which the propitious and unpropitious days are selected. The names of these six days are *senshō*, *tomobiki*, *sempu*, *butsumetsu*, *daian*, and *shakkō*;[1] a *tomobiki* day is never selected for a funeral. The posthumous name is always one with a religious meaning, and it is also so formed as to mark the sect to which the deceased belonged. Thus *yo* always appears in the posthumous name of a Jōdo believer, and *nichi* and *zen* in those of Nichiren and Zen believers respectively, but it is not always the case with the latter. Appended to the posthumous name is a designation of the deceased's status: *koji* ('landlord') and *daishi* ('landlady') for a gentleman and lady of high rank; *shinji* ('layman') and *shinnyo* ('laywoman') for ordinary men and women; *dōji* ('lad') for a boy; *dōnyo* ('lass') for a girl. The posthumous name is inscribed on the *ihai*, which is executed in duplicate, one being retained in the house, while the other goes to the funeral and is deposited in the temple. At the end of 100 days after death, lacquered *ihai* take the place of the plain wooden ones first used. In the same way, in Shinto rites, the *tamashiro* is at first placed in a 'temporary soul-receptacle' (*karimitamaya*); at the end of 50 days it is placed in a 'permanent soul-receptacle' (*mitamaya*). In some Buddhist families there is a large family *ihai*, on which the names of all the deceased members are inscribed, 100 days after death. It should be noticed that some Buddhist sects, *e.g.* the Shinshu, speak of two kinds of posthumous names: the *kaimyō*, given by the priests; and the *hōmyō*, given to the soul in Paradise by Amida himself—a kind of 'new name which no man knoweth saving he that receiveth it.'

Notice is now sent, by post-card or otherwise, to friends and relatives, announcing the decease. It is customary to pay visits of condolence, and to send presents to the house of the deceased. The nature and manner of presenting these gifts are fixed by custom, but it is very common at the present day to offer money in lieu of other gifts—a kindly tribute which is always very acceptable in view of the heavy expenses which a Japanese funeral entails.[2]

[1] The cycle of six days (see the talismanic tables in books on magic, *e.g.* Barrett's *Magus*, 1801) depends on the six elements common to Kabbala, Gnosticism, and Shingonism, which are symbolized by the term *Abarakakia*, to which reference is made in this article. It is one of the many links connecting the Mahāyāna with the Judæo-Gnostic thought of the New Testament times.

The days are (i.) *Senshō*, 'first half good.' A *senshō* day is good for pressing and urgent business during the forenoon, but not after midday. By urgent business, lawsuits, petitions, etc., are meant. (ii.) *Tomobiki*, 'drawing friendship.' These days are good in the forenoon or evening, but not in the afternoon. There is no contest about anything. The day brings its own luck, and no amount of human striving will alter it. (iii.) *Sempu*, 'first half bad.' No urgent business should be undertaken on such a day. The afternoon is, however, lucky. (iv.) *Butsumetsu*, 'destruction of Buddha.' A sort of unlucky Friday. Nothing done on such a day will prosper. (v.) *Daian*, 'great peace.' Very lucky for anything, especially removals or journeys; cf. the old seaman's superstition about starting on a journey on Sunday. (vi.) *Sekko*, 'red mouth.' With the exception of the noontide hour, the whole of this day is unlucky. In the cheap Japanese calendars (*koyomi*) each day is marked according to this sixfold cycle.

[2] E. Schiller, 'Japan. Geschenksitten,' in vol. viii. of the *Mitteil. der deutschen Gesellsch. für Natur- und Völkerkunde Ostasiens*; cf. also A. H. Lay, 'Funeral Customs of the Japanese,' in *TASJ*, vol. xix. pt. iii. The subject is a very large one, and beyond the limits of this article.

In due course the body is placed in the coffin. Coffins (*hitsugi* or *kwan*, the former distinctively Shintoist) are of two kinds—*nekwan* ('sleeping coffin') and *zakwan* ('sitting coffin'). In the latter the corpse is placed in a praying posture; in the former, in a recumbent one. At the bottom of the coffin is placed a piece of white cotton cloth, 4 hand-breadths wide, and 8 *shaku* (Jap. feet) in length; over this, a white *futon* and *fusuma* ('quilt' and 'coverlet'), and a pillow. Then the corpse is put in, together with any objects, *e.g.* an inkstand or photographs, prized by the deceased during life; and the whole is filled up with buckwheat husks to keep the body from moving. No metal object may be put into the coffin.[1] The interval between the encoffinment and the funeral is the most important period of the watching by the dead. It was a period of festivity in the old Shinto, but is now generally passed in silence: in the Buddhist *tsūya* ('wake') the silence is broken by the voices of the priests who are summoned on the last night to read Sūtras by the side of the deceased and for his benefit. This is known as *makuragyō*,[2] or 'pillow-Scripture,' and is accompanied by much burning of incense. Entertainments are provided for the guests. The lawfulness of the officiating priests partaking in these festivities is frequently discussed in Buddhist magazines. Very often the priest is provided with his meal apart from the laity, who do not begin until the clergy have finished; and an attempt is sometimes made to save appearances by drinking the *saké* out of tea-cups.

There are several strange old customs with regard to the choice of a location for the grave. Thus, in some of the remote mountain-villages in Tosa, while the corpse is still lying outstretched on the rush-mat, one of the near relatives kicks the pillow from under its head and carries it off to the cemetery. When he has selected the proper place for the grave, he puts down the pillow there, and, taking out four small coins, throws them east, north, west, and south. 'With these coins,' he says, 'I buy seven square feet of ground from the god of the earth.' Another old custom, still surviving in remote districts, is for a person not connected with the deceased by blood, and therefore free from death pollution, to sweep the ground selected for the grave, to spread a rush-mat on it, and on a table placed on the mat to erect a *himorogi* ('temporary tabernacle') for the earth-god. This is done by setting up *sakaki* branches with little paper pendants (*nusa*), etc., and by making offerings of rice, fish, vegetables, seaweed, and fruit. Then he offers the following prayer:

'I address the great god who is the lord of this locality. A new grave is here to be made for N. (name, office, rank). With an offering of wine, boiled rice, and *nusa*, I pray thee to grant that he may lie in this grave for ever, free from affliction and in peace. I speak with all respect and humility.'

Then he clasps his hands and bows twice.

When the preparations for the funeral are all complete, the coffin is carried into a front chamber, and incense, lights, and a single flower are again offered before it. A set of *zen* is also provided. In this case, the *zen* consists of a bowl of unhulled boiled rice (*kurogome no meshi*), soup, raw *miso* ('bean-paste'), unrefined salt, and a pair of chopsticks, one of which is made of wood and the other of bamboo. Everything is now in readiness for the funeral ceremony. From this point sectarian differences become more marked, and it will be well to treat of Japanese funerals in detail according to the various sects.

[1] In certain Buddhist sects a pilgrim's staff and a doll are also put into the coffin (Ohrt).

[2] The Sūtra varies with the sect. In the Zen sect it is *Yuikyō* (Eka-Sūtra); in the Shingon, *Rishukyō* (Buddhi-Sūtra). These Sūtras, which do not exist in Sanskrit or Pāli, are said to have been preached by Śākyamuni shortly before his entry into Nirvāṇa. They are classified under the Nehangyō or Nirvāṇa Sūtras.

II. *SHINTO.*—A purely Shinto funeral is divided into five distinct portions: (*a*) *mitamautsushi*, or introduction of the spirit into the *tamashiro*; (*b*) *shukkwan*, or taking the coffin out of the house; (*c*) *sōsō*, or funeral procession; (*d*) *maisō*, or committal to earth; and (*e*) the subsequent purification. The actual ceremonies are conducted by the *moshu* ('chief mourner'), who is generally the heir, eldest son, or other near relative. Relatives in the ascending line are generally excluded. Recently, when H.I.H. Prince Arisugawa lost his son, the *moshu* was Prince Itō. The *moshu* is dressed in a dress of some dark colour, over which is worn a white *hitatare* ('surplice') and an *eboshi* ('mitre'). In the middle classes, however, the ordinary *haori* ('upper garment') and *hakama* ('nether garment') are frequently worn.

(*a*) The *mitamautsushi* takes place apparently as soon as the *tamashiro* is provided. The *moshu* (sometimes a *kannushi*, 'priest') sits down before the *tamashiro*, bows twice, claps his hands, and announces that the spirit (*tama*) of the deceased has taken up its abode in the *tamashiro*. This is known as the *zokuji*, and the following *norito* ('prayer' [Shinto]) is used (tr. by Ohrt):

'Alas! my (father), thou hast been taken away from us. I, N. N., and the rest of us that remain behind, will still continue to do thee faithful service in our hearts. Thy life has come to its close upon earth. Hear us in thy place of rest, as we celebrate thy obsequies. Deign, exalted spirit, to take up thy abode in this *tamashiro*, and remain at rest for ever in this thy house. I address thee with the deepest reverence.'

This *norito* is frequently repeated, as well as the invitation to the soul to participate in the feast. The *tamashiro* is then placed on the *kamidana*, or 'god-shelf,' used in Shinto houses.

(*b*) *Shukkwan.*—Before the bier is taken out of the house, offerings of boiled rice, *saké*, etc., are again made. Then the celebrant seats himself before the bier, bows, claps his hands, and, presenting a *tamagushi*,[1] addresses the spirit with the following *norito*:

'This day, as the sun sets, we shall reverently celebrate thy obsequies. We pray thee to behold us in peace and without anxiety, as we start on our journey and pursue our way (to the cemetery). I speak with deep reverence and humility.'

Then he bows twice, claps his hands, and retires. All relatives present do the same. After this, four men, dressed in white, carry the coffin into the court-yard, where a fire is burning (on the theory of a midnight funeral), and the procession is formed in the following order: (1) coolies (or outriders); (2) coolies carrying torches or lanterns (still on the theory of the midnight funeral); (3) servant with a broom (relic of the old custom mentioned above); (4) white banner, 15 in. in width by 8 or 9 ft. in length, carried on a pole, and inscribed with the name and title of the deceased; (5) bearers with consecrated branches of the *sakaki* tree; (6) chest with offerings; (7) bearers with torches and lanterns; (8) the coffin (if a *zakwan*, it is carried in a *kago* ['litter']; if a *nekwan*, on a bier of white wood; it is carried on the shoulders of bearers in white surplices); (9) *bohyō*, a post, inscribed with the name, to be set up as a temporary mark for the grave; and (10) the chief and other mourners, on foot, as a general rule. Trestles (*koshidai*), a table for offerings, hangings, and a wooden pail and dipper also form part of the paraphernalia, but are now more generally found at the place of interment.

(*c*) The *sōsō no shiki* is generally celebrated within a curtained enclosure, though in Tokyo and other large places there are mortuary chapels to serve the purpose. The enclosure, or chapel, is invariably arranged in accordance with the annexed plan, the ritual observed in the chapel differing very slightly from that in the enclosure.

As the funeral procession arrives, the musicians take their seats and begin to play. During this

[1] *i.e.* a consecrated branch adorned with numerous pendants and streamers of paper.

time the bier is placed in its proper place, the flower-standards are arranged, and a high stand is erected, from which a pendant will later be suspended. When every one is seated, the celebrant, with his assistant, advances before the bier and bows. During this ceremony the music has ceased, but it begins again as soon as the priests return to their places.

The assistant now takes his place before the bier, but a little to the right of it. Acolytes bring a banner for the stand, and offerings to be placed on the table—*saké*, boiled rice, fresh fish, vegetables, seaweed, cakes, fruit, etc. Again the music ceases, while the chief celebrant advances once more, and, with his mace on his left hip, commences the repetition of certain prayers, which contain a recital of the dead man's birth, lineage, school-life, and career, official or otherwise, and conclude with words much to this effect:

'Our honoured N. has passed away to our great regret; to our sorrow he has given up the ghost. The prayer of our inmost heart was that he might live to very great age, but it is the way of the fleeting world that he should come to this. Our prayer is that he will regard with tranquil eyes the obsequies we are now performing, and lie down to rest in his grave, leaving his spirit behind him to guard the house. Reverently and with humility I make this prayer.'

This prayer is known as the *maisō-no-kotoba* ('words of committal'). Everybody stands while it is being offered. When the music begins again, the chief mourner, habited in black with a white surplice, and wearing a black *eboshi* ('mitre') and straw sandals, comes forward and offers a branch of *sakaki* as a *tamagushi*. All the relatives and friends follow this example, the attendant priests having a large number in readiness for the needs of the visitors. Funeral orations are delivered, sometimes before and sometimes after the offering of the *tamagushi*.

(*d*) *Maisō*.—The coffin is now carried to the grave, and lowered into it, with few or no ceremonies. A few handfuls of earth are thrown upon it, and a *boshi*, 'plate,' inscribed with the name, age, rank, etc., of the deceased, is put on the coffin-lid. Then the grave is filled up, and on the new-made mound is planted the *bohyō*, a few lanterns, and banners. An open shed resting on four pillars is sometimes built over it, and generally it is surrounded with a *magaki* ('bamboo fence'), and a *shime* ('cordon') of rice-straw string.

The Shinto ritual does not contemplate cremation, but it is sometimes adopted. In that case the *maisō-no-kotoba* and the ritual that follows are used at the time of the interment of the ashes.


(*e*) The purificatory rites are of two kinds—of the house and of the mourners. The house is purified, immediately after the corpse has been taken out, by a Shinto priest, who comes in and waves a *tamagushi* in every direction, though sometimes the purification is accomplished by the priest's rinsing his mouth with water and throwing salt over his head.

The mourners are purified on their return from the funeral. (The return journey is always by a different road from that taken when going to the funeral.) There are apparently three methods of purifying persons, viz. (1 and 2) the methods observed in purifying a house, and (3) a slightly more elaborate one. Offerings are placed before the *tamashiro*, and in front of them a branch of *sakaki*. The priest (or the *moshu*) recites the following *norito*:

'I thus address the spirit of (my father) who has now become a god. I prayed day and night that thou mightest live to be a hundred years old, and now I can but weep and lament that thou hast left this beautiful world, and gone to the dark land beyond. I beseech thee, listen in peace to us thy relatives assembled here, as we celebrate the worship of the dead with all manner of food.'

Then the offerings are removed.

The first fifty days after death are observed according to the Shinto rituals with daily offerings before the *tamashiro*. Special emphasis is laid on the 10th, 20th, 30th, etc. On the fiftieth day, the *tamashiro* is removed from its temporary shrine to the *mitamaya* or *kabyō* ('spirit-house'), and henceforth the worship of the spirit is performed along with that of the other ancestors. On this occasion,



the *saishi-no-kotoba* are used—prayers asking the spirit of the deceased to take up his abode in the *kabyō*, and beseeching the whole body of the ancestors to receive him into their company. Similar prayers are offered on the 100th day after death. On that day the temporary post should be removed from the grave, and a stone monument set up. The first anniversary is observed; after that, the anniversaries of the 3rd, 5th, 10th, 20th, 30th, 40th, 50th, and 100th years. After that, there is a commemoration every 100 years. The reader will understand that it is only in very exalted families that such minutiæ can be attended to, but the Shinto funeral is in any case almost entirely confined to the highest classes.

III. *BUDDHIST.*—Something has already been said about customs observed in Buddhist houses in the care of the dead. The general procession is somewhat as follows (it is more striking to the eye by reason of the greater splendour of vestments, etc.): (1) bearers with natural flowers (*seikwa*); (2) bearers with artificial flowers (*tsukuri-bana*); (3) four (sometimes two) paper dragons on poles (*jatō*), these being evidently connected with the friendly Nāgas of Indian Buddhism; (4) banner (*meiki*), with the personal name of the deceased; (5) the officiant priest (*dōshi*), with his assistant (*mukaisō*); (6) white paper lanterns; (7) one *ihai* (the other is left at home); (8) incense (*kōro*); (9) the coffin on a bier, borne on men's shoulders, and with a few friends of the deceased walking beside it; and (10) the mourners (generally in *jinrikisha*). A bird-cage full of birds to be released at the grave-side, and a *sotoba* or *stūpa*, actually a post, notched near the top, and inscribed with Sanskrit characters, often form portions of the procession.[1]

I. Ceremonies of the Zen.[2]—(1) *The service in the house.*—In this sect, the officiating priest is generally called the *indōshi*, because a large part of his duty is supposed to be to guide (*indō suru*) the soul of the deceased on its voyage through the realms of the dead. The *indōshi* begins by laying his *hossu* ('chowry,' a brush made of long white hair) on the lid of the coffin, as a sign of authority. Then he takes up the razor that has been used to shave the deceased. This is followed by the words:

> *Teijo shuhatsu Tōgwan shujō Yōri bonnō Xugyō jakumetsu*: 'The hair and beard have been shaved. I pray that all creatures may forsake evil passions for ever, and reach the goal of annihilation.'

This verse is sung three times, sometimes by the officiant alone, sometimes by the officiant and chorus. Next follows, sung or said in the same manner:

> *Ruten sangaichū Onnai funōdan Kion nyūmui Shinjitsu hōon sha*: 'Whilst transmigrating through the Three Worlds, ties of kindness and affection cannot be cut off. He who has cut off this tie, and entered the realm of the unconditioned, is truly a grateful man.'

Now follows an exhortation to the deceased to confess his sins:

> 'Young man of good birth' [it will be remembered that the deceased is supposed to have received the tonsure], 'if thou wish to stand fast in the Refuges and to observe the commandments, thou shouldest first confess all thy sins. [There are two formulæ of penitence; there is also the form of confession which has come from the former Buddhas and been handed down by successive patriarchs.] All thy sins will be pardoned. Recite these words after me.'

Then the priest recites the confession, with the sound of clappers (*kaishaku*) once at the end of each line, and twice at the end of the stanza. The spirit of the deceased is supposed to join him in his recitation:

> 'All the evil *karma*, which I have accumulated in the past, has had its origin in desire, hatred, or ignorance, in a series of previous existences which has had no beginning. It is due to the body, the tongue, and the mind. All this I confess.'

The priest continues:

> 'Thou hast confessed thy evil deeds of body, tongue, and mind, and hast obtained the perfect purification. Now, therefore, thou must stand fast in the Three Refuges, in Buddha, the Law, and the Order. The Three Treasures have a threefold virtue, the threefold absolute virtue, the threefold virtue as it was in Buddha's time, the threefold virtue as it is in a time when there is no Buddha (*ittai sambō, genzen sambō, jūji sambō*). When thou hast taken refuge in them, thy virtues shall be completed.'

Recitation of the ninefold Creed follows:

> *Namukie Butsu*, 'Glory to Buddha in whom I take refuge.'
> *Namukie Hō*, 'Glory to the Law in which I take refuge.'
> *Namukie Sō*, ' „ „ Order „ „ .'
> *Kie-butsu-mudō-son*, 'I take refuge in Buddha, the supereminent.'
> *Kie-hō-ri-jin-son*, 'I take refuge in the Law, the undefiled.'
> *Kie-sō-wagō-son*, ' „ „ the Order, the harmonious.'
> *Kie-buk-kyō*, 'I have finished taking refuge in Buddha.'
> *Kie-hō-kyō*, ' „ „ „ the Law.'
> *Kie-sō-kyō*, ' „ „ „ the Order.'
> [After each sentence the clapper sounds once; at the end it is sounded twice.]

The officiant goes on:

> 'After this wise have I now conferred on thee the Refuges. Henceforth, the Tathāgata [the Buddha], the Truest, the Perfectly-Enlightened is thy Teacher. Put no faith in the Tempter, nor in any heretical teachers, but have respect to the great Benevolence, Deliverance, and Compassion that have been vouchsafed thee. Now will I recite for thee the ten grave commandments. They are these:
> 1. *fusesshō*, "thou shalt not destroy life."
> 2. *fuchūtō*, " „ steal."
> 3. *fujainā*, " „ commit fornication or adultery."
> 4. *fumōgo*, " „ lie."
> 5. *fukoshu*, " „ sell intoxicating liquors."
> 6. *fusekkwa*, " „ backbite."
> 7. *fujisankita*, " „ praise self at the expense of others."
> 8. *fukenhōzai*, " „ be grudging of the gifts of the Law."
> 9. *fushin-i*, " „ be angry."
> 10. *fuhōsambō*, " „ speak evil of the Three Treasures."
>
> These ten grave commandments have been formulated by previous Buddhas and handed down by successive Patriarchs. I have now entrusted them to thee. Keep them well in all thy existences until thou attain to the Buddhahood. [This formula may be repeated at the discretion of the celebrant.] Sentient beings that fulfil the Commandments of Buddha are placed in the same rank with Him. He that is in the same rank as the Perfectly Enlightened One is truly a Son of Buddha.'
> [Wooden clappers twice, handbell thrice.]

The priests present now chant a stanza known as the *daihishu*. When it is finished, a priest (not the one who led the service before) takes up his word:

> 'After this wise has been sung the *daihishu*. The merits arising therefrom are to be transferred to N. [here insert the *kaimyō*], newly returned to the elements. We pray that when we place his body in the coffin the Sambhoga land may receive him.'

Then all together:

> 'All the Buddhas in the Ten Directions and in the Three Worlds, all the Honourable Bodhisattvas and Mahāsattvas, and Mahāprajñāpāramitā, the land of the Sambhoga Kāya.'

The same priest continues:

> 'If we meditate deeply on these things, lo! birth and death succeed each other as heat follows cold. They come like the lightning flashing over the deep sky, their going is like the cessation of waves on the great sea. The newly deceased N. has this day suddenly come to the end of his life, by reason of the exhaustion of all seeds of existence. He understands that all composite objects must be dissolved, and is convinced that the extinction (of the seeds of existence) is bliss. The holy congregation here assembled will respectfully recite the names of the saints. May the blessings resulting from that recitation serve to adorn the road leading to Nirvāṇa.
> Vairochana, the Buddha of the Holy Dharmakāya.
> Ṛochana, the Buddha of the Perfect Sambhogakāya.
> Śākyamuni, the Buddha, whose Nirmāṇakāya Incarnations are hundreds upon hundreds of millions.
> Honourable Maitreya Buddha, for whose coming we wait.
> All Buddhas in the Ten Quarters and the Three Worlds.
> Mahāyāna-Saddharmapuṇḍarika Sūtra (personified).
> Mahārya Mañjuśrī Bodhisattva.

[1] The Sanskrit characters are *Kha la ka va a*, representing the five *skandhas* ('forms of mundane consciousness'), and, as an alternative, the five elements which compose the universe. In Shingon, we have the pair of formulæ *A-ba-ra-ka-kia* and *Kha-la-ka-va-a*: in Irenæus, the Gnostic terms *Abraxas* and *Caulacau* (Irenæus says that *Caulacau* = 'mundus' [cf. vol. ii. p. 428, note]). See the present writer's *The Faith of Half Japan*, London, 1911.

[2] We take the Zen first, not as being the oldest of the now existing sects, but as representing most specially the purely Indian side of Japanese Buddhism.

Mahāyāna Samantabhadra Bodhisattva.
Mahākāruṇika Avalokiteśvara Bodhisattva.
Honourable Bodhisattvas and Mahāsattvas.
Mahāprajñāpāramita.'

[Here follows the *shariraimon*, or stanza for worshipping the relics of Buddha.]

One priest alone:

'After this wise the Names of the Holy Ones have been recited, and the Sūtra has been chanted. The merits arising therefrom will be transferred to the newly-deceased N. to adorn the Sambhoga land, with the prayer that the soul may travel beyond the consecrated border (of personified existence), that its *karma* may be exhausted, that a superior lotus flower may open for it, and that the Buddha may give it a prediction for life. Once more the Holy Assemblage is invited to chant.'

All present:

'All the Buddhas in the Ten Quarters and the Three Worlds, all the Bodhisattvas, Mahāsattvas, and Mahāprajñāpāramita.'

Then the *indōshi*:

'We are now about to lift the sacred coffin, and to celebrate imposing obsequies. The assembly is implored to recite the great names of saints, and to assist the soul of the deceased along the road to Nirvāṇa.'

This ends the *makuragyō*, or service in the house. The procession is now formed outside, and, when the coffin has been put on the bier, a start is made for the temple or graveyard.

(2) *The services in the temple.*—Whilst the procession, professedly modelled on the funeral of Suddhodana (the father of the Buddha), is making its way to the temple, certain preparations have been made for its reception. The temple-bell has been set tolling, and goes on until the cortège reaches the front gates. In the court-yard four small *torii* ('gates') of wood have been erected facing E., S., W., and N. On each is suspended a tablet with an inscription: (1) *Hosshinmon*, the gate of religious awakening; (2) *Shugyōmon*, the gate of religious practices; (3) *Bodaimon*, the gate of Bodhi; and (4) *Nehammon*, the gate of Nirvāṇa. They are symbolical of the various ways that lead to Eternal Life, and the coffin is carried three times round to them all to show that, in the opinion of the Zen, all four are necessary. The ceremony may be held either in the main hall of the temple or in an open court-yard.

While the procession is making its round of the four *torii*, some of the priests slip into the temple or hall, and begin the recital of certain *dhāraṇī* ('secret formulæ'). These are supposed to be very efficacious, even by the Zen sect, which originated in a protest against the magic formulæ that were so rife in the China of the 6th cent. A.D. Gradually the assembly take their seats; when all are seated and the music and chanting have come to an end, the *indōshi* recites the *indō*, or 'guiding words,' for the benefit of the soul of the deceased. Then another priest says:

'This day the newly-deceased N., having exhausted all the causes of life (Skr. *pratyaya*), has entered Nirvāṇa, and is now to be buried according to the Law. His phenomenal body, the body that endures for a hundred years, will be buried; the real Self will be sent to tread the long path that leads to Nirvāṇa. The holy assembly (of monks) is therefore prayed to assist the soul that is being enlightened, and to recite.'

Here all the priests present take up their cue and recite:

'Vairochana, the Buddha of the Holy Dharmakāya,' etc., as above.

The priest resumes:

'After this wise have the holy Names been praised, and the soul that is being enlightened has been helped. Let us pray that the mirror of Wisdom may shed its brightness on him, that the wind of Truth may waft on him its splendours. In the garden of *Bodhi* ('infinite knowledge') may the flowers of Enlightenment and Wisdom bloom, and on the sea of reality may the waves roll free from every stain. We offer three cups of tea, we offer incense to accompany him along the solitary, clouded path, and we worship the assemblage of the saints.'

Here the congregation recites the *Ryōgonshu*; then the priest alone:

'After this wise have the names of the Holy Ones been chanted and the Sūtra been recited. The merits accruing from this act of worship are to be transferred (*ekō*) to the newly-deceased N., at the time of his interment, to adorn the Sambhoga land.'

Chorus of attendant priests:

'All the Buddhas in the Ten Quarters,' etc., as above.

Small bells, drums, and cymbals are beaten in chorus three times, and the coffin is taken away for cremation or [and] interment.

No special ceremonies are observed in cremation. When the body (or the ashes, as the case may be) comes to the place of interment, it is lowered into its grave by the nearest kinsman. All the banners are placed on the coffin-lid, and the relatives each take a handful or spadeful of earth, which they throw into the grave. The grave is then filled up.

2. Ceremonies of the Shingon.—We now come to a sect whose ceremonies it is most difficult to describe, for the reason that a great deal is done by dumb show, the so-called *mudrā*, 'signs of the hand,' being matters of prime importance in these ceremonies. Great stress also is laid on the recital of mystic formulæ in debased Sanskrit, which it is not always easy to understand. Some of these formulæ are secret, and may not be revealed to the general public. [For all these the student is referred to vol. viii. of the *Annales du Musée Guimet.*] The Shingon sect is in many ways the most interesting of all the Buddhist sects in Japan; for not only has it been the great inspirer of Japanese art, but it has certain most striking resemblances both to Alexandrian Gnosticism and to the Jewish Kabbala. These will be duly pointed out as they occur.

(1) *Ceremonies in the house.*[1]—A temporary place of worship having been arranged, when the service is about to commence, the officiant, also called *indōshi*, goes before the coffin with the long-handled incense-burner in his hand, and makes a bow. Then he takes his seat on the *raiban* ('exalted seat of worship'), rubs his hands with *dzukō* ('liquid incense'), and spends some moments in meditation, the subjects of which are supposed to be the 'three secrets' (*i.e.* the secret *dhāraṇī*, the secret *manual acts*, and the secret *teachings* which have been committed to him); the 'way of purifying the three deeds,' *i.e.* of body, mouth, and heart; the 'three sections,' *i.e.* the world of Buddhas, the world of the Lotus, and the Diamond World; and the 'putting on of spiritual armour.' All these meditations are exhibited by the corresponding formulæ and manual acts. This section is closed by a meditation on the scented water, which is called the *kajikōsui*,[2] 'scented water signifying the acceptance by the believer of the great mercy of the Tathāgata projected over the hearts of his creatures' (so explained in *Sokushinjōbutsugi*). This produces an effectual union of the worshipper's heart with that of the Buddha.

The celebrant now proceeds to the invocation of the Buddhas. Commencing with a manual act ('diamond-joining-hands'), which signifies the raising of the thoughts towards *bodhi*, accompanied by a *dhāraṇī* of the same import, he proceeds by a series of gestures and formulæ, which it is not necessary to give here, to invoke the Universe[3] and the Atoms.[4] From the invocation of

[1] The Shingon house-ceremonies are performed before a small temporary altar, on which stand the images of the thirteen Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, supposed to take charge of the soul of the dead for several years after death. These thirteen Buddhas, who are clearly not particularly connected with primitive Buddhism, appear to correspond with the Æons of the thirteen realms of the dead, through which, *e.g.*, in the book *Pistis Sophia*, the Gnostics supposed the souls of the dead to pass in Hades. The thirteen Buddhas are not peculiar to the Shingon, though this sect lays more stress on them than does any of the others. See note on the subject in the present writer's *Shinran and his Work* (Tokyo, 1910), Appendix iii., and also *The Faith of Half Japan*.

[2] The *kajikōsui* is also used in the *abhiṣeka*, or baptismal rites (Jap. *kwanjō*), of both Shingon and Tendai. It corresponds to the *opobalsamum* mentioned by Irenæus as used in the baptisms of the Marcosian heretics.

[3] The *dhāraṇī* is *Om-sammaya satoban*, a debased Sanskrit which we have not been able to understand. The manual act is called a meditation on Samantabhadra.

[4] Here the *dhāraṇī* refers to the five exterior elements; it is *Om Abiraunken*, 'earth, water, fire, wind, void.' This name

the Universe impersonal he passes to that of the Universe personal, to the Five Buddhas,[1] to Amitābha, the giver of immortality,[2] and to Amitābha with his attendants Avalokiteśvara and Mahāsthāmaprāpta, that they will come to the funeral ceremony and invite the deceased to enter the bliss of Paradise. After each of these invocations, the *kōmyōshingon*,[3] or invocation of the Five Dhyānibuddhas, is chanted three times. Then, coming lower in the scale of dignity, we have the invocation of Kṣitigarbha, the sixfold protecting angel of the dead (*Roku Jizō*), and that of *Fudō-myō-ō* (*Achāravidyārāja*) and the other great *vidyārājas*—Mahātejas, Vajrayakṣa, Kundali, and Tribhavavijaya. The *mantra* of Kṣitigarbha is *Kakakabi samayei abiraunken sowaka*; that of Fudō-myō-ō, which is chanted three times, is *Nōmaku sāmanda bāsarada sendam mākara shātei sowataya untaratā kamman*. (The meaning of these Sanskrit formulæ is now wholly lost.)

We now get three *mudrās*, representing the 'preaching' of Vairochana of the three *kāyas*—the Dharmakāya (*Namu A*), the Sambhogakāya (*Namu Vam*), and the Nirmāṇakāya (*Namu Un*). The three syllables *A-vam-un* (possibly Skr. *oṁ* $=a+u+m$) represent the 'Trinity' of Vairochana. Then the *stūpa* is figuratively opened and shut—an evident allusion to the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra; next, a *mudrā* (or manual gesture) figuring the *abhiṣeka* of Fudō-myō-ō (see above), with *Namu baṃ* repeated thrice; next, three representing respectively the Dharmakāya, Sambhogakāya, and Nirmāṇakāya (possibly of Fudō-myō-ō), with *mantras* respectively—*An ban ran kan ken, Abiraunken*, and *Arahashanō*. But Fudō, like Kṣitigarbha, is sixfold in his operations in the six spheres of sentient existence, and we consequently have a suitable gesture, imparted to Kōbō Daishi by his Chinese tutor Keikwa, for which the *mantra* is *Abiraunken*, together with a secret formula which may not be written down, but which may be attained by means of a proper 'meditation on the Fire.'

Thus, the whole celestial hierarchy of the Shingon having been invoked, it remains only to procure for the deceased, on whose behalf all these celestials have been summoned, a suitable understanding of what it all means. This is effected by means of four more sets of manual acts and *mantras*, signifying respectively the attainment of the perfect knowledge of *rūpadharma* ('objects having form'), of *chittadharma* ('objects conceivable, but without form'), of *rūpadharma* and *chittadharma* together, which are not two, but one; and, finally, a meditation on the *dharmadhātu* ('universe'), for which the *dhāraṇī* is *Om Maitreya Svāhā*. [The Shingon are firm believers in Maitreya, more so than any other of the Buddhist sects. It is their conviction that the body of Kōbō Daishi, which never decays, is awaiting the advent of Maitreya in his tomb at Kōya San, and Shingonists often send the bones of their dead, after cremation, to Kōya San, so as to be near to Kōbō at the resurrection, which will take place when Maitreya makes his appearance.]

The officiant now prostrates himself three times before the assembled deities, offers incense, strikes the bell three times, and recites a sort of creed:

'With deep respect for all the Buddhas here assembled, I take my refuge in Buddha. May all creatures follow my example! I take my refuge in Dharma. May all creatures follow my example! I take my refuge in the Saṅgha. May all creatures follow my example! The excellent physical body of the Tathāgata is without a parallel. The form of the Tathāgata is inexhaustible, and all the *dharmas* (Jap. *issaihō*='all matter') are permanent. With deepest reverence I address the great Vairochana, the Tathāgata, the Master of Shingon Buddhism, and all the venerable ones and saints of the two assemblies (*i.e.* the Vajradhātu and Garbhadhātu); and especially Amitābha, the master and teacher of the Land of Bliss, the Merciful Maitreya, for whose coming we wait; the holy Henjō Kongō (*i.e.* Kōbō Daishi), who sits cross-legged in deep meditation; all the great Āchāryas, the transmitters of religious light in the three countries (India, China, Japan), and also in all the lands illuminated by the eye of Buddha, and pitied by the Three Gems.

If we meditate deeply thereon, the moonlight of "Opportunity-which-is-born-when-the-desire-thereof-ariseth" (*Kikwai ki okoreba sunawachi shōzu*) shines in the sky of the tranquil spiritual Nature. The colour of the flower of "The-Cause-that-being-exhausted-presently-disappeareth" blooms in the Garden of unbounded Adornment.

Appearance is as non-appearance.
Disappearance is as non-disappearance.
Both appearance and disappearance are unattainable.
They cannot be named.

The deceased N., his causes of life having been exhausted, has gone to another world. He has left his body in Jambudvipa,[1] and has entered the intermediate state (Skr. *antarabhava*, Jap. *chū-u*). Therefore now, in accordance with the testament of the Sakyan king, who was endowed with the ten merits (*jūzen*), we will with tears celebrate the ceremonies of funeral-rites and cremation. Having adorned the Sacred Altar upon which the Tathāgata will descend in answer to our prayers, we will pray for the favourable acceptance of his soul by the Venerable Ones, and for its deliverance. We will kindle the pure fire, which passes through all the six elements (*rokudai mu-e*), and so cremate the body which from the beginning has had no true phenomenal appearance (*honrai fushō*). We pray that all the Buddhas may certify for him, that all the Saints may pray for him, and that they may receive him to a lotus-stand of superior dignity. May the living and lawful king of reason and wisdom (Vairochana [?] Amitābha [?]) endow him with the highest Buddhahood! . . . And may all sentient beings in the Dharmadhātu be equally benefited! . . . I speak this with all respect.'

This ends that portion of the service which is known as *hyōhaku*, 'the expression of belief.' Next follows the singing or chanting of the *Jimbun shingyō*, *i.e.* the Mahāprajñāpāramitāhṛdaya Sūtra, for the purpose of giving pleasure to the assembled spirits, in order that they may make their appearance upon the altar. After this a priest says:

'In the yard where funeral services are being conducted (for a deceased person), it is generally the case that his sins all perish, and that his merits rise heavenwards. This is the time of his ascension to the land of Bliss, and we may consequently expect that Yama the lawful king, and the five infernal officers of the other realms of existence, will make their appearance. We pray, therefore, to the thirteen great Buddhas, to the infernal officers, and to all their retainers and followers, that they may aid this man to lay aside his *karma*, and attain Supreme Enlightenment.'

Chorus. 'Hail, Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra!' (one bell).

'That the departed soul may ascend to the secretly adorned sphere of flowers (*mitsugonkezo*), we invoke'—

Ch. 'The Name of the great Buddha Vairochana' (one bell).

'That he may ascend to the world whose inhabitants hunger not, neither thirst (*anyō jōdo*), we invoke'—

Ch. 'The Name of Amitābha (one bell);
The Sacred Name of Avalokiteśvara' (one bell).

'That he may be re-born in the inner palace of Tuṣitaloka, we invoke'—

Ch. 'The Name of the Buddha Maitreya (one bell);
The Names of all the Saints in its inner and outer palaces' (one bell).

'That the Buddha-field may be accessible at all times to all who desire it, we invoke'—

Ch. 'The Three Holy Treasures' (one bell).

'That all sentient Beings in the Dharmadhātu may be benefited equally (with him whose obsequies we celebrate), we invoke'—

Ch. 'The Name of Avalokiteśvara (one bell);
The Name of Vajrapāṇi' (one bell).

[Here the officiant lays down his censer and takes up his *nyo-i*, or mace.]

Namo ('homage').
Kimyō chōrai Mujōshugwan.
Shōrei indō Ōjōgokuraku,

appears often as *Ambamramkakau* and as *A-ba-ra-ka-kia*. It is almost certainly the Gnostic *Abraxas*—a conclusion in which we are strengthened by the fact that the Gnostic *Caulacau* also seems to appear in the *mudrā*. See above, p. 489a, n. 1.

[1] In this place the five Dhyānibuddhas are Amogha, Vairochana, Mahāmudra, Maṇipadma, and Jālapravarta—a very unusual enumeration. The more usual one is given below. We believe these to represent the five Dhyānibuddhas of the *Vajradhātu* ('Diamond World,' *i.e.* world of ideas), the others the corresponding set of the *Garbhadhātu* ('Womb World,' *i.e.* world of birth, death, concrete existence).

[2] The Shingon form of Amitābha is Amṛitābha.

[3] In *Shinran and his Work* the present writer has shown that the word *kōmyō* seems always to have Manichæan associations and connexions. It is quite possible that this *mantra* may have them too.

[1] It is a common fiction amongst Japanese Buddhists that Jambudvipa, which is, of course, Hindustan, comprises China and Japan as well. It is in Japanese pronounced *Nan-embudai*. In Nichiren Sect books it is Ichi-embudai, which comes nearer to the sound of Jambudvipa.

Hail! Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, whom I worship with bowed head and potent invocations! May this holy soul be led to, and be re-born in, the land of Bliss!

It is by the adornment and honouring of the Altar of the Teaching of Supernatural Power that Supreme Buddhahood may be obtained as in a moment. It is by the proclamation of the teaching that the material body is identical with Buddha,[1] that the Buddhas will themselves develop enlightenment in the doctrine that phenomenon is itself reality.'

Next follows an *ekō* ('prayer of transference'). The officiant lays down his *nyo-i*, and resumes his censer. (One bell.)

'I respectfully pay homage to the Three Eternal Treasures, and extol the teachings of Buddha, the Tathāgata who has realized Nirvāṇa and passed beyond birth and death. If any man will listen to Him with all his heart, that man's soul shall be filled with unbounded joy. All composite things are impermanent; they are possessed of the necessity of growth and decay. They spring into existence; again they perish; their extinction is bliss.'

Then the *Rishukyō* (Buddhi Sūtra) is read, and the ceremonies in the house are closed. On the road from the house to the temple, the priests meditate upon Fudō, and chant his *mantra* (see above).

(2) *Ceremonies in the temple.*—Near the entrance to every Shingon graveyard or temple will be found the six images of Kṣitigarbha (*Roku-Jizō*), the friend and protector of the dead. These must first be worshipped, as also the corresponding set of six Avalokiteśvaras (*Roku-Kwannon*). Then the officiant, entering, walks three times round the sacred fireplace which is found in every Shingon temple, with manual gestures and formulæ representing the five elementary colours, the putting on of spiritual armour, the breaking of hell, the raising of the mind to the contemplation of *bodhi*, and the meditation on Samantabhadra (*Fugen*), the special patron of truth. The last of these *dhāraṇī* is *Om-sammaya satoban*, which we have mentioned above (p. 490[b]).

All this leads up to what appears to be the central portion of this temple-service, the ceremony of *abhiṣeka* (Jap. *kwanjō*, 'besprinkling'), a kind of baptism mystically performed, and transferred by a subsequent *ekō* to the credit of the deceased.[2] The *abhiṣeka* is threefold, and is followed by an *indō*, 'guiding words,' very much the same as that used in the Zen ceremonies. But the Shingon *indō*, which is traditionally attributed to Kōbō Daishi, is not in writing, neither are the *dhāraṇī* used in this, the most sacred part of the service. They are all handed down orally from teacher to disciple, and it is not every Shingon priest that knows them. Next follows a passage from the *Dainichikyō* (Mahāvairochanābhisambodhi Sūtra), also with a secret accompanying *mantra*:

'Without leaving this physical body, man may attain to the supernatural power of *jinkyōtsū* (Skr. *ṛddhipāda*, 'means of attaining magic power'), and, walking freely about in great space, may comprehend the secret of the body.'

Then come: *abiraunken* (five times); the *mantra* and gesture of the eye of Buddha (not committed to writing); a list of the succession of teachers, with the *kaimyō* of the deceased inserted at the end; separate *mantras* and gestures for all the six elements composing the 'enlarged Abraxas'[3]—earth, water, fire, wind, emptiness, consciousness; the *fujumon*, 'address,' describing the deeds, character, etc., of the deceased; the repetition of several *mantras* and hymns; another formula of *ekō*, transferring all the merit thus accumulated to the credit of the deceased; the dedication (figuratively) of the staff that is to accompany the deceased on his journey through the valley of the shadow of death; a number of prayers never committed to writing; and a similar manual gesture on the 'most secret Nature.' This brings the service to a close.

3. Ceremonies of the Tendai.—The Tendai has always been a sect with strongly developed Erastian tendencies. In the days of its initiation in China, it was the ally of the Sui and Tang Governments in their efforts to control the heterogeneous mass of teaching calling itself Buddhist, which was flooding China in the 6th cent. A.D. Introduced into Japan about A.D. 800, it served the same ends. And, when Iyeyasu had brought peace to Japan in the 16th cent., the Tendai played a considerable part in the spiritual policing of the country which was carried on during the whole of the Tokugawa period. The Tendai rites which we are about to describe were those observed at the obsequies of Viscount Takamatsu (August 1904).

(1) *Ceremonies in the house: the otogi, or 'wake.'*—The ceremonies begin with the adoration of the Three Precious Things. The celebrant (*indōshi*) thus begins:

'I take my refuge in Buddha. May all sentient beings comprehend the great Path, and raise their thoughts towards the Supreme Object!

I take my refuge in the Law. May all sentient beings (follow my example, and), plunging deep into the Treasure House of the Scriptures,[1] acquire knowledge as vast as the sea!

I take my refuge in the Order. May all sentient beings (following my example) attain to positions of rule in the great assembly!'

Then follows what is called the instructive stanza, as taught by the previous Buddhas, the predecessors of Sākyamuni:

'It is our prayer that all sentient beings may refrain from the commission of sin, that they may do good, and purify their own minds. This is the teaching of all the Buddhas. We worship the assemblage of the Saints.'

The Stanza of Evening:

'Hearken to the Stanza of impermanency under the similitude of evening. When this little day is over, our lives will end and we shall disappear. We are here like fish in a shallow (basin of) water. O ye Bhikṣus, is there anything in the world that is pleasurable? Exert yourselves with diligence, and lose no time in saving yourselves from the fire. Meditate on the impermanency of material objects which are empty as the void, be diligent, be not slothful.'

The Stanza of Impermanency:

'All composite things are impermanent, for they are liable to growth and decay. They spring up into existence, and perish. Their extinction is bliss. The Lord Buddha has realized Nirvāṇa and banished for ever birth and death. He that wills to listen to this teaching with his whole heart shall gain immeasurable happiness.'

The Six 'Fors':

'For all believers[2] in the Ten Quarters, let us meditate on the Tathāgata Sākyamuni. (One bell.)

For His Majesty our Emperor, let us meditate on Yakushi Rurikō Nyorai.[3] (One bell.)

For the four "benefactions"[4] in the Three Worlds, let us meditate on Amitābha Nyorai. (One bell.)

For our Great Teacher, Dengyō Daishi,[5] and all the Venerable

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[1] It is an essential feature in Shingon teaching that all material objects—stones, trees, the human body, etc.—partake of the Buddha nature.

[2] If the present writer is right in his conjecture that *Abarakakia* or *Abiraunken* connects Jap. Shingon with Alexandrian Gnosticism, we may also be justified in supposing that the *abhiṣeka* thus administered in the Shingon funeral rites throws much light on the 'baptizing for the dead' mentioned by St. Paul (1 Co 15[29]).

[3] The fivefold scale of elements is represented by *A-ba-ra-ka-kia*. When a sixth element, *ālaya* ('consciousness'), is added, the word becomes *A b a r a k a k i a un*. The addition of this sixth element is sometimes, though without good authority, attributed to a priest named Ryugyō Hōshi, about A.D. 1140. We believe this to rest on a misinterpretation of the *Hōjōki*, 'History of the Hōjō Regents.' See *Romaji* for 20th Nov. 1909.

[1] The Tendai is one of those sects which profess to base their tenets on the whole vast Canon of the Mahāyāna.

[2] The Jap. word is *danna* (Skr. *dānam*, 'generosity'). Giving is the first duty of a layman. The word has come to mean 'householder,' 'layman,' and is commonly used by servants, etc., in addressing their master.

[3] See above, for the connexion of Tendai with the State. Yakushi (Bhaishajyaguru) is the master of medicines, who went about healing sickness and had twelve disciples. He was a very favourite god during the Nara period.

[4] The *shi-on* represent the gratitude we owe for the benefactions we receive from (1) our parents, (2) our rulers and the State, (3) sentient creatures in general, and (4) the Three Precious Things of religion.

[5] Dengyō Daishi, founder of the Japanese Tendai, A.D. 767–822.

Ones, let us meditate on the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra. (One bell.)
For all the gods,[1] let us meditate on the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra. (One bell.)
For all Sentient Beings in the Dharmadhātu, let us meditate on the Bodhisattva Mañjuśrī.' (One bell.)

The Four Reverential Invitations:[2]

'There is delight in the scattering of flowers (*bis*).
We reverentially invite all the Tathāgatas in the Ten Quarters to alight on this sacred altar. There is delight, etc.
We reverentially invite Śākyamuni the Tathāgata to alight on the sacred altar. There is, etc.
We reverentially invite Amitābha the Tathāgata, etc. There is, etc.
We reverentially invite Avalokiteśvara, Mahāsthāmaprāpta (Kwannon and Seishi) and all other Bodhisattvas, etc. There is delight in the scattering of flowers.'
Namu Amida Butsu, Amida butsu, Amida butsu.

The reading of the *Sukhāvativyūha* (Amida Kyō).
Namu Amida Butsu, Amida butsu, Amida butsu.

Prayer of Transference (*ekō*):

'All the benefits arising from the invocations we have just made, we transfer to the Lord Amitābha in the Land of Bliss. May we be graciously accepted in the great sea of His Vow, may our *karma* be destroyed, and may we realize *samādhi* ('supernatural tranquillity')! May the Devas and deities of the sky and the earth experience an increase of their dignities, and may the gods (Shinto) assembled in this place take pleasure in what we do! May the Great Teachers who have passed away accomplish Perfect Enlightenment, and may all souls, noble and mean,[3] attain to Buddhaship! May Jikaku, our great Teacher,[4] experience ever-increasing happiness, and may our benefactors during the last seven generations be re-born in the Land of Bliss! May the venerable soul that has now passed away be re-born in the Land of Bliss and attain to Buddhahood, seated on a lotus-seat of high degree! May the Court of our Wise Emperor be preserved from harm, and may the reign of His Majesty be long drawn out. May the country be peaceful, and may religion prosper! May the laymen in the Ten Quarters be free from evil and sorrow, and may the fraternity of monks who invoke the names of the Buddhas accomplish perfection! When they come to the end of their lives, may they not miss the ascent to the Land of Bliss, and may they meet Amitābha and his attendant hosts face to face! May their desire for *bodhi* ("supreme knowledge") never fail them, and may they be the leaders of all sentient beings in the Three Worlds and in Dharmadhātu! And may they all, partaking, as they do, of the same spiritual nature, alike attain to *bodhi*!'

The post-*ekō* hymn:

'May we, living in this world, be as though we lived in the heavens, like the lotus untarnished by the water! Prostrate on the ground, we worship the Pre-eminent One, with hearts purer than the lotus.'

Adoration of the Three Precious Things.

The Instructive Stanzas preached by the Seven Previous Buddhas.

The Confession of Sins:

'May the three obstacles (passion, *karma*, and the secondary results of *karma*, Jap. *hōshō*) be removed absolutely and universally for the benefit of the four benefactors (note 4 above), and for beings in all spheres of existence and throughout the *dharmadhātu*. For their sakes, we repent of all our sins, from the bottom of our hearts, in the presence of all the Buddhas in the Ten Quarters.'

Gonenmon, or meditation on the Five Gates of praising Amida, by which men enter into the Pure Land. These are all taken from Vasubandhu's treatise on the Pure Land (*Jōdoron*). They are: (1) *Raihaimon* ('the Gate of Worship'); (2) *Santammon* ('the Gate of Praise'); (3) *Sagwanmon* ('the Gate of Prayer'); (4) *Kwansatsumon* ('the Gate of Observance'); and (5) *Ekōmon* ('the Gate of Transference'). The following is an abbreviated form of the *Gonenmon*, as recited at a Tendai funeral:

'With my head touching the ground I adore Amitābha the Sage, the noblest of two-footed beings, whom gods and men delight to honour, who dwells in the choice Paradise of ease and bliss, surrounded by an innumerable host of the Sons of Buddha. The pure golden body of the Buddha is like the king of Mountains, and his footsteps, when he walketh in tranquillity, are like those of the still-treading elephant. His eyes are as pure as the lotus. I, therefore, with my head touching the ground, adore the venerable Amitābha. His face, good, round, and pure, is as that of the moon at her full. His majestic brilliancy is as that of thousands of suns and moons. His voice is as mighty as that of the celestial drum (thunder) and as soft as the voice of the Kariobinga bird. Therefore I, placing my head on the ground, adore the venerable Amitābha. . . .
Thus I worship the Buddha and praise his merits. May the *dharmadhātu* be adorned (with many virtues)! May sentient beings, arriving at the term of their lives, go to the Western Land, and, meeting with Amitābha, may they accomplish Buddhahood! May sentient beings go and be re-born in the Paradise of Bliss! May they go and meet with Amitābha, the Venerable One!'

Next follow the burning of incense and the presentation of oblations (cakes, tea, hot water sweetened with sugar, boiled rice). The chief mourner, the family, and relatives offer incense. Then are read passages from the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra, illustrating the various 'gates' of the *Gonenmon*, and thus the *otogi* ceremony (which is supposed to take place on the day of death) is brought to a close.

(2) *Ceremonies in the house: the first part of the actual funeral.*—This is conducted by the *fukudōshi* ('second celebrant'), with a choir of six assistants, the first celebrant (*dōshi*) awaiting the cortège at the temple.

The Four Invitations (as in the *otogi*).

Stanza of Repentance:

'All the evil *karma*,' etc. (see above, 'Ceremonies of the Zen,' p. 489[b]).

The three Refuges:

'Hail be to, and I take refuge in, Buddha.
" " Dharma.
" " Saṅgha.
I take refuge in Śākyamuni, chief of two-footed beings.[1]
" " Dharma, chief of lustless things.
" " Saṅgha, noblest of congregations.
I have finished taking refuge in Buddha.
" " Dharma.
" " Saṅgha.'

The General Vows (*sōgwan*):

'Sentient beings are numberless. May I make them all traverse the sea of *saṁsāra* ("metempsychosis")!
Evil passions are endless. May I help sentient beings to destroy them!
The gates of the Law (Scriptures) are infinite. May I cause sentient beings to understand them!
Supreme Buddhahood is ineffable. May I make sentient beings attain to it!'

Hyōhaku (see under 'Shingon,' above, p. 491[b]).

Chanting of a Sūtra; either the Sukhāvativyūha or the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka.

Post-*ekō* hymn (as in the *otogi* above).

Burning of incense and offering of oblations (as above).

Chief mourner, family, and relatives burn incense.

The Invocation of the Buddhas in the Ten Quarters.

'Hail to the Buddhas in the Ten Quarters.
" Dharma " " .
" Saṅgha " " .
Hail to Śākyamuni Buddhas.
Hail to the Buddha Prabhūtaratna (mentioned in Saddh.).
Hail to Śākyamuni, whose body is divided into the Ten Directions.
Hail to the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra.
" Mañjuśrī the Bodhisattva (Monju).
" Samantabhadra the Bodhisattva (Fugen).'

This ends the ceremonies in the house.

(3) *The ceremonies in the temple.*—On arrival at the temple, the bell is tolled, and the choir of clergy take their seats, followed by the celebrant

[1] *i.e.* the Shinto deities of Japan, adopted into the Buddhist pantheon.
[2] Similar forms will be found in the sects of Jōdo and Shinshu, which, originating in the Tendai, developed the doctrine of Amida. In the Nichiren, which rejects Amida, they are not found. The Zen derived neither doctrines nor ritual from Tendai, nor did the Shingon.
[3] It was from this that Genshin (A.D. 942–1017), the first Japanese Patriarch of the Shinshu, derived his teaching about the twofold Paradise, *Kwedō*, in which the sins of the 'mean' souls are purged, and *Hōdō*, in which noble and mean alike attain to Perfection. This is brought out in Shinran's poem *Shōshinge*.
[4] Jikaku, the second Patriarch of the Tendai (A.D. 794–864).

[1] The Tendai very generally identify Śākyamuni with Amitābha. Hence the application of the same epithet to both. In the *Shinshu*, which derives much of its terminology from Tendai, this identification is known as *ni-son-itchi* ('the identity of the two Blessed Ones').

and his assistant. The choir recite, in debased Sanskrit, the fourfold hymn of Wisdom:

'Om basarasataba shigyaraka.
basaraaratanamadotaran.
basaradarumagyaganai.
basarakarumakaro bava.'[1]

The celebrant now goes up to the High Altar, and there makes a *mudrā* ('manual gesture') known as *kōmyōgu.*[2]

An introit is sung, the 'Hymn of taking the seat.'

Indō, 'guiding words,' spoken by the celebrant.

The praise of the *shakujō*, 'pilgrim's staff':

'I take a staff in my hand (does so). May all sentient beings follow my example!'

The whole choir say with the celebrant:

'I give a feast of charity, and, showing the true Way, make offerings to the Three Precious Things (*bis*). With a pure mind I make offerings to the Three Precious Things (*bis*). Striving to raise a pure mind, I make offerings to the three gems (shakes the *shakujō* twice); may all sentient beings follow my example! May I become the Teacher of Devas and men; may I fill the Heavens with my vows; may I cause suffering beings to traverse the sea of *saṁsāra*, and, guarded by spiritual beings, to make offerings to the Three Precious Things! May they meet with Buddhas and obtain the Buddhahood! (Shakes the *shakujō* twice.) May all sentient beings learn the sacerdotal Truth[3] (*shintai*); may they treat their fellow-beings with respect and sympathy; may they learn worldly truth and treat their fellow-beings with respect and sympathy; may they learn the doctrine of the One Vehicle,[4] and treat their fellow-beings with respect and sympathy; may they respectfully make offerings to the Three Precious Things—to Buddha, to Dharma, to Saṅgha—to each individually, to all three conjointly (*ittai sambō*). [The *shakujō* is shaken twice.] May all sentient beings practise Śilapāramitā (the perfection of character), . . . Dānapāramitā (the perfection of generosity), . . . Kṣāntipāramitā (the perfection of long-suffering), . . . Vīryapāramitā (the perfection of fortitude), . . . Dhyānapāramitā (the perfection of meditation), . . . Prajñāpāramitā (the perfection of wisdom), . . . and may they treat their fellow-beings with benevolence and sympathy! [The *shakujō* is shaken twice.] Buddhas in the past have taken up the pilgrim's staff and have been enlightened. Buddhas in the present have taken up the staff and have been enlightened. Buddhas in the future will take up the staff and be enlightened. I therefore take up the staff and make offerings to the Three Precious Things (*bis*).'

The celebrant comes down from the High Altar and burns incense.

Offerings of tea and hot water with sugar.

Lifting the coffin off the bier and closing it.

The assistant (*fukudōshi*) reads the Funeral Oration.

Chanting of a Sūtra.

Chief mourner, family, and relatives burn incense.

General congregation follow their example.

When all who wish have burned incense, the celebrant and choir leave the temple.

So end the funeral ceremonies of the Tendai.

4. Ceremonies of the Jōdo.—The Jōdo sect, founded by Hōnen Shōnin in A.D. 1174, is an offshoot of the Tendai, or rather an attempt to call back the Tendai to that sole Faith in Amitābha which the Jōdo sects maintain to be the essential feature of primitive Mahāyānism.

(1) *The service in the house* (*Gongyōshiki*).—Opening verse of the regular service:

'May our minds be purified as the incense-burner! May our minds be bright and clear as the fire of Wisdom!
Burning the incense of morality and tranquillity, thought by thought, make offerings to the Buddhas in the Ten Quarters, in the Three Worlds.'

Sambōrai, or worship of the Three Precious Things:

'With all our hearts we pay supreme honours to the Supreme Buddhas in the Ten Quarters. . . .
With all our hearts we pay supreme honours to the Supreme Dharmas in the Ten Quarters. . . .
With all our hearts we pay supreme honours to the Supreme Saṅghas in the Ten Quarters. . . .'

Shibujō, or fourfold Invitation, as in the ceremonies of the Tendai: (1) all the Buddhas, (2) Śākyamuni, (3) Amitābha, (4) Kwannon, Seishi, and the other Mahābodhisattvas.

Tambutsu no ge, or hymn of praise for all the Buddhas:

'The handsome physical bodies of the Tathāgatas are unparalleled in the Universe. They are incomparable beyond conception. Therefore, behold, I worship them. The physical bodies of the Tathāgatas are inexhaustible and everlasting, and their Wisdom is as their bodies. Dharmas are infinite. Therefore I take refuge in them.'

Ryakusange, or abridged form of confession:

'All the evil *karmas*,' etc., as in the Zen and Tendai.

Sankikai, or the threefold Taking of Refuge:

'I take refuge in Buddha . . . Dharma . . . Saṅgha.'

The ceremony of tonsure. While the head of the corpse is being shaved, the name of Amitābha is being repeated ten times. This is known as *Jūnen.* The number of repetitions shows that the shaving occupies only a short time. It is merely symbolical. In the Shinshu sect there is a ceremony called *Kamisori*, 'head-shaving,' roughly corresponding to Christian confirmation, which implies a formal acceptance of and admission into the sect. It is administered by the head of the sect only, and consists in passing a golden razor lightly over the hair of the candidates as they kneel before him. The ceremonial shaving of the dead is very often nothing more than this.

Kaikyōge, or hymn introductory to the reading of the Scriptures:

'The Law, which is pre-eminent, profound, and sought out,[1] can rarely be met with, scarcely once in a thousand *kalpas* ["ages of the world"]. But we have seen and heard, and do accept it May we understand the true meaning of the Tathāgata's teaching!'

Reading of a Sūtra—generally a chapter from the Amitāyurdhyāna Sūtra, or the Aparimitāyus Sūtra. Sometimes also the Amitābhatathāgatamuladhāraṇī is read:

'In accordance with the Original Vow of the Buddha we pray that we may hear His Name, and be re-born in the Land of Bliss. On being re-born in that land, may we all obtain the safe position from which there is no falling back! The 84,000 doors,[2] each different from the others, were opened as means of escape from ignorance, *karma*, and the results of *karma.* A sharp sword verily is the name of Amitābha Buddha. He that shall invoke it but once and meditate thereon,—his sins shall be destroyed for ever.'

Hotsugwanmon, or the raising of vows:

'Humbly we pray that our minds, at the hour of death, may be undistracted, unconfused, and in possession of all their faculties. With mind and body free from pain and filled with joy, in the state of contemplation, and in the presence of the Holy Ones (Amitābha and his 25 Bodhisattvas), by the merits of the Buddha's Vow, may we have a favourable re-birth in the Land of Amitābha.

On being re-born in that land, may we obtain the Sixfold Supernatural Power (*roku-jin-dzu*), which shall enable us to assume visible forms at will and to manifest ourselves in the Worlds of the Ten Quarters for the Salvation of mankind. The Sky and the Law are infinite in extent; our vows are co-

[1] This in Sanskrit would be somewhat as follows:

'Oṁ vajra sattva saṅgraha!
vajraratnamanuttaram!
vajradharma gāganaḥ!
vajrakarmakaro bhava!'

'Hail! Store of Diamond-Essence! Diamond-Jewel that hath none higher! Heaven of the Diamond-Law! Be thou working the Diamond-Karma!'

[2] *Kōmyōgu* is very possibly a Manichæan word. It was used in the designation of the Manichæan temples (cf. Lloyd, *Shinran and his Work*, Appendix i. and ii.).

[3] There is a distinction made in Tendai (also in Shinshu) between the 'noble' and the 'mean,' just as Manichæans were divided into 'hearers' and 'perfect.' For the hearers only a very simple creed was required (Jap. *zokutaimon* [cf. Lloyd, *op. cit.* p. 109]). A more elaborate form of faith and life was required from the perfect (*shintaimon*), which included assent to theological truths.

[4] The Jōdo sects maintain that the One Vehicle is the one by Faith in Amida, also that the Tendai, if true to their own doctrinal standards, are committed to this position. It is perhaps worth our while to note as an interesting point that Amida is, to Tendai, Jōdo, and Shinshu, pre-eminently the Buddha, that the character for Buddha was introduced into China A.D. 64, that it signifies 'the man with the arrows and bow' (Emp. Ming-ti's Vision; cf. Rev 6²), that in the legend it is connected with a 'white horse,' and that, divided into its constituent elements (man, arrows, bow), it represents the first three letters of the name of Jesus.

[1] Not in the Biblical sense of 'sought out of them that have pleasure therein.' The allusion is to the Vow of Amitābha, which was framed after a careful survey and examination of all the Buddha-fields.

[2] *i.e.* the doctrines of Buddhism.

extensive with them. With these vows we take refuge in Amitābha Buddha with our whole hearts.

Kōmyō henjō
Jippō sekai
Nembutsu shujō
Sesshufusha,

Shining upon all the worlds in the Ten Quarters with the bright rays issuing from his halo, the Buddha accepts the beings who call upon him. He will never abandon them.'

Invocation of Amida's name.

Ekō, 'transference':

(1) Special: 'May the soul of the newly-deceased N. (*kaimyō*) migrate to the pure fields, and may his *karma* give up dust-like trouble! May he see Buddha, hear the Law, and rapidly reach the pre-eminent way!'

(2) General: 'May the merits resulting from this service be transferred to all sentient beings alive! May they all lift up their hearts to Enlightenment, and all be re-born in the land of ease and comfort!'

Shinseigwan, or Four Holy Vows (see Tendai rites).

Sanrai, or Worship of the Three Precious Things: *Namu Amida butsu* is repeated nine times, three times for each.

This concludes the service in the house. The procession is now formed and starts for the temple.

(2) *The service in the temple* is almost a replica of that in the house. It begins with *gongyōshiki, sambōrai, shibujō, ryakusange*, and *tambutsu no ge* (see above). Then follow the beating of cymbals (*nyohachi*), the *indō*, or 'guiding words,' *kaikyōge*, the reading of Scriptures, *kōmyō henjō*, etc., the invocation of Buddha's name, and another *ekō*:

'May the merits arising from this chanting of the Sūtra and the invocation of Buddha's name be transferred to the newly-deceased N. May his soul migrate,' etc.

(The rest as in the *ekō* above.)

Then follow invocations of Amida's name, the Four Holy Vows (as in Tendai), and the adoration of the *honzon*, or image of Amitābha. This brings the service to a close.

5. Ceremonies of the Shinshu.—The Shinshu sect, founded by Shinran Shōnin in A.D. 1224, carries still further than the Jōdo the doctrine of salvation by Faith only. The account of the ceremonies described in this section is taken from the *Fūzokugwahō* for Feb. 1894, and gives a summary view of the obsequies of Kōshō, the 21st Abbot of the Eastern Hongwanji, who died at Kyoto on 15th Jan. 1894.

(1) *The worship of the corpse.*—This ceremony is not peculiar to the Shinshu sect, but is observed in the case of all monks and priests [the Shinshu clergy are not monks; they marry and live with their families]; but naturally, in the case of the head of a great organization, such as the Hongwanji, the ceremonies connected with this worship were more carefully carried out than usual.

Three days after death, the corpse was dressed in silk crêpe robes of a grey colour, with a small *kesa* ('stole') over the shoulders, and was placed in a sitting posture on a *kyokuroku* ('camp-chair') in one of the rooms of the Abbot's official residence. The face was covered with a white cloth, so that only the eyes were visible. Screens were set up behind the chair and on either side of it, and in front there was a slight curtain of split bamboo, which could easily be drawn up and down. Six laymen, in *kamishimo* (upper and nether ceremonial garments) of a grey colour, were constantly in attendance, to draw up the curtain whenever a group of worshippers presented themselves. Many thousands of Shinshu believers thus offered their last respects to the deceased prelate, the worship consisting of a silent prostration before the corpse.

On the following day the corpse was put into a coffin and removed to another apartment, where similar worship was offered before it. In this case, however, a scroll-picture of Amitābha was suspended on the wall behind the coffin, to represent the idea that the deceased had now passed definitely under Amitābha's protection. Immense crowds of worshippers from every part of Japan came to worship.

(2) *The farewell to the corpse.*—This took place on the following day. Three short ceremonies were observed, the first in the apartment where the coffin had been lying in state since the previous day. It was then removed to the *daishidō*, or hall set apart for the worship of Shinran Shōnin, the founder of the sect, and from there to the *Amidadō*, or Hall of Amida. In each of these places a service was held, consisting very largely of repetitions of the *Namu Amida butsu*[1] and the burning of incense. Not unnaturally the third service was esteemed the most dignified. Not only blood relations, but proxies representing the princes of the blood, and the heads of other subdivisions of the Shinshu, came forward to burn incense, and, immediately after this last ceremony was over, the procession was formed and the funeral cortège started for Uchino, where the main obsequies were to take place.

(3) *The procession* need not delay us. It was on the same general lines as the procession mentioned at the beginning of this section (above, p. 489a). Only, as befitting a personage who, in addition to being the hereditary head of one of the largest of the Buddhist sects in Japan, was a peer of the realm, and a collateral descendant of the great Fujiwara family, it was, of course, a very imposing procession, more than a mile in length.

(4) *The service at Uchino.*—Uchino was in former days the cremation-place connected with the Eastern Hongwanji temple. But the growth of the city has rendered it unsuitable for the purpose. In the case, however, of the funeral of an Abbot, there are historical reasons why a part of the service should still be held there. An open space had therefore been curtained off, large enough to seat the great number of invited guests, and it was here that that part of the service took place which in ordinary cases would be held in the temple. (The farewell to the corpse, thrice repeated, corresponded to the service in the house at ordinary funerals. It followed, then, almost exactly the same order as is observed in Jōdo funerals.) A temporary crematorium had been erected for the symbolic cremation to be held here. The chief mourners were the new Abbot and his wife (the *urakata*). The actual cremation took place later at Kwazan, where the regular crematorium is situated.

The service, which was of the regular type,[2] followed the usual order:

The Four Invitations.

The *Shōshinge*.[3]

Nembutsu wasan,[4] or hymn in praise of Buddha, followed by invocations of Amida's name.

Ekō, as in Jōdo sect, with the following addition:

'*Gwannishi Kudoku,*
Byōdōse issai,
Dōhotsu bodaishin,
Ōjō anrakukoku,

We pray that the merit of this service may be given equally to all sentient beings, that they may lift up their minds to the attainment of enlightenment, and ascend for re-birth in the Land of Ease and Comfort.'

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[1] It is to be noted that the common interpretation given to these words is 'Believe in (trust) me; for I will save you.' This meaning, which has been read into, not out of, the Sanskrit words, is interesting.

[2] In the memorial service held by the Shinshu in Tokyo in honour of King Edward VII., the form approximated much more closely to the Tendai ritual. The explanation of this will be found in the Tendai origin of the Shinshu, and also in the fact that it was not a funeral service proper.

[3] This is a poem by Shinran Shōnin giving an account of the transmission of the Amida doctrines. For text and tr. see Lloyd, *Shinran and his Work*, p. 35.

[4] *Wasan* are hymns of praise composed in Japanese. The Shinshu sect, which, to its credit, has always used the vernacular whenever possible, is particularly rich in these hymns, some of which are of very great interest.

Symbolical cremation. The Abbot entered the temporary crematorium and lighted some straw, and, as the smoke issued from the building, it was accepted as an actual cremation. This was, of course, a special feature of this particular funeral.

Shōshinge again.

Burning of incense by mourners, etc.

The coffin was now removed for the actual cremation.

(5) *The cremation.*[1]—This was carried out semi-privately at Kwazan, only the new abbot, near relatives, old body-servants, and the superintendent of the crematorium being admitted into the curtained-off space around the furnace. The pyre was made of pine logs skilfully arranged on a hearthstone, and was attended to by four master-carpenters in white robes, overlooked by two priests in black. The Abbot, as chief mourner, having already, as we have seen, symbolically lighted the fire, it was apparently not necessary for him to do it actually on this occasion; though in ordinary funerals this is a duty which always falls upon the chief mourner. It must be a 'pure' fire (no sulphur or brimstone to be used in the kindling), and, when once kindled, is kept alive not only with additional fuel, but also by constant libations of *natane abura* ('rape-seed oil'). It is desirable that the coffin, as in this case, should be so thick that the body inside may be completely consumed before the sides of the coffin fall in; but this is, of course, merely a counsel of perfection not applicable in all cases.

When the cremation was over, the remains were reverently collected, with a short service (not used in ordinary cases), put into a small box, covered with a white silk cloth, and carried back to the late Abbot's residence, where they were privately disposed of in a suitable manner. A certain amount of secrecy was observed on this occasion. There existed for many centuries a bitter feud between the parent sect of the Tendai and her more prosperous but rebellious daughter, the Shinshu. When Rennyo Shōnin, the greatest of all the successors of Shinran, died in A.D. 1499, the jealous Tendai monks made an assault on the procession that was carrying home the sacred relics, and tried to seize and dishonour them. Since that time it has been customary, at the cremation of a Hongwanji Abbot, to bring the ashes home in secret, by some circuitous route, and under guard.

In collecting the bones, etc., after a cremation, it is customary to pick them up with chop-sticks, one of wood, and one of bamboo. Hence, in ordinary life it is deemed most unlucky to use chop-sticks of different materials, *e.g.* one of wood and one of bone. Shingon believers send the bones to Kōyasan; amongst the Shinshuists in Echigo and Shinshu they are often preserved in the house. In most cases, however, they are interred. Great efficacy is sometimes attributed to these relics (*shari*).

6. Ceremonies of the Nichiren sect.—The Nichiren sect, founded in A.D. 1253, differs from all other sects of Buddhism in that it concentrates the whole of its attention on the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra, which it almost personifies. This Sūtra consists of two parts, known as *Shakumon* (chs. i.–xiv.) and *Hommon* (chs. xv.–end); and the peculiar position of the Nichiren School is that for it the latter is the most important portion of the Sūtra, while all other Japanese sects lay special stress on the former. Nichiren himself claimed to be the first of the Four Great Bodhisattvas mentioned in the latter part of that Sūtra as rising out of the earth at the head of a large company of believers. The services are very long; but they admit of condensed statement, because they consist almost entirely of readings from the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra.

(1) *The house ceremonies.*—(*a*) *Makuragyō*, entrusted to a minor priest (*shokesō*).

Kwanjōmon, or words of Invitation:

'We humbly invite Juryō,[1] the *honzon* (principal idol) of the True Teaching,[2] to be present.

Glory to the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra, in which are contained the Three Mysteries of the True Teaching.[3]

Glory to Śākyamuni-Buddha, who is the great benefactor of sentient beings, who accomplished enlightenment before innumerable ages, and who alone is the Master of the Teachings.[4]

Glory to the Buddha Tahō,[5] who certified to the teachings of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra.

Glory to the Buddhas mentioned in the *Hommon* ('Real Teaching'—see above), as also to those spoken of in the *Shakumon* ('Temporary Teaching'), in this and in other worlds. Glory to the Great Bodhisattvas in the thousand worlds, who were taught by the Buddhas of the *Hommon*, and who issued forth in troops out of the earth, when the *Kenhōtōhon* was being preached.

Glory to the Three Everlasting Precious Things mentioned in the Saddh. Sūtra, in which the Temporal Buddhas are secreted (swallowed up) and the True Buddha revealed.

Glory to Nichiren,[6] the Great One, the founder of the sect, our mighty leader, who has been entrusted by Śākyamuni with the Secrets of the True Doctrine.

Glory to the successive Patriarchs (of Nichirenism).

May all the Devas and good gods, the protectors of the True Faith, descend upon the altar and watch our worship.'

Reading of *Hōbenhon*, sect. 2 of Saddh. Sūtra.

" *Juryōhon*, sect. 16 " "

Much repetition of the *Daimoku*, or the true standard of faith and worship (*Namumyōhōrengekyō*, 'Glory to the Lotus-Scripture of the Wonderful Law').

Ekō, 'prayer of transference.' The gist of the prayer is that, by the virtue of the Sūtra, sentient beings may attain to Buddha-ship in their bodies.

Bestowal of a *Kaimyō*. This service may be performed before or after death, or may be entirely omitted. It is of great importance to the student, as giving the doctrinal position of the Nichiren body.

(*b*) The wake (*otogi*). This is also entrusted to a minor priest. The whole of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka is chanted once, or sect. 16 thirty-six times. Sermons are delivered at intervals—for the edification both of the living and of the dead.

The tonsure. A leaf of *shikimi* is cut with a razor over the head of the deceased.

(*c*) The home funeral service, by one or more minor priests. Five banners are prepared and set up, inscribed as follows:

(1) 'Glory to Prabhūtaratna, to the Saddh. Sūtra, to Śākyamuni, to Nichiren, the Great Superior Teacher of the Latter Days.'

(2) 'Glory to Jōgyōbosatsu,' *i.e.* to the Nichiren, first of the Four Great Bodhisattvas.

(3) 'Glory to Muhengyōbosatsu,' second of the Four Great Bodhisattvas.

(4) 'Glory to Jōgyōbosatsu,' third of the Four Great Bodhisattvas.

(5) 'Glory to Anryūgyōbosatsu,' fourth of the Four Great Bodhisattvas.

Four smaller banners are also prepared and set up, and inscribed as follows:

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[1] The Japanese word for 'cremation' is *dabi*. It comes from the Pāli *jhāpe* (causal of *jhāya*, 'to burn'), and is one of the few instances of the survival of a Pāli word in Japanese.

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[1] *Juryō* is a portion of the Saddh. Sūtra personified (sect. 26), and treated as the embodiment of the Deity.

[2] Nichirenists maintain that there are three stages of Buddhist Teaching—the Smaller Vehicle, the Larger, and the True (*jitsujō*).

[3] The Three Mysteries are: (1) The revelation of the true object of human worship made in the Sūtra, (2) the establishment of the true standard of faith and worship, (3) the true teachings of morality.

[4] Observe that the Śākyamuni of Nichirenism is only incidentally the historical Gautama.

[5] *Tahō* (Skr. *Prabhūtaratna*) is a Buddha, previous to Śākyamuni, who, in the Saddh., is seen descending upon the latter as he teaches, in a *stūpa*; who is dead, then revives, and, after commending the teachings which Śākyamuni is giving in the Sūtra, becomes in some mysterious way identified with him. This account appears in *Kenhōtōhon* ('opening of the stūpa'), the 12th section of the Saddh. Sūtra (Chinese). It is to be noticed that Tahō's Paradise is represented as in the East.

[6] Nichiren is supposed to have had the power of teaching committed to him by virtue of his being a re-incarnation of the first of the Four Great Bodhisattvas.

(1) *Kaibutchiken*, i.e. 'May the deceased attain to the opening of a supernatural insight like that of Buddha!'
(2) *Jibutchiken* . . . 'May he show forth a . . . etc. . . . !'
(3) *Gobutchiken* . . . 'May he understand, more and more . . . etc.!'
(4) *Nyūbutchiken* . . . 'May he enter into . . . etc. . . . !'

Whilst the banners are being set up, the priests read—

Hōbenhon, sect. 2 of the Saddh. Sūtra.
Juryōhon, sect. 16 ,, ,, (or only its gāthās).
Ekō, as before.

(2) *Ceremonies at the temple.*—
Kwanjōmon (see above).
Juryōhon (prose sections only).
Beating of drums and cymbals.

After this a minor priest says in a distinct voice:

'*Nyokyakukenyaku*
Kaidaijōmon,
Lo! the Gate of the Great Castle has been opened, and the bolt has been taken away' (from the *Kenhōtōhon*, sect. 12).

Offerings.
Indō, pronounced by the leader (*dōshi*).
Chanting the gāthā portions of sect. 16 of the Saddh. Sūtra.
Incense.
The *Daimoku*, oft repeated.
Ekō.

The ceremonies come to a close. There seem to be no ceremonies specially connected with cremation or interment.

See, further, art. FESTIVALS (Japanese).

LITERATURE.—The greater part of this article is based on information collected for the writer by his friend Mr. S. Tachibana, a Buddhist priest of the Zen sect. The other authorities have been cited in the text. A. LLOYD.

DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD (Jewish).

—1. **Conception of death.**—Although there is uniformity, in a sense, in the physical phenomena of death, its character and circumstances and the impression which it makes vary in different times and places. In ancient Israel, death, like life, was more a matter of the family than it is now; it was not so much an occasion when an external professional element, represented by priests, lawyers, doctors, nurses, and hospitals, broke in upon or set aside the family. Again, violent deaths were more common; and the last illness of a dying man was not prolonged, as it is now, by the resources of medical science. In all probability the death-rate was much higher than it is with us, so that death was more common and familiar.

The impression made by death depends partly on belief as to its cause and as to the future of the individual after death. The modern mind is occupied with the physical cause of death, the particular disease, and the failure of remedial treatment. The Israelite and the Jew thought of death as an act of God; more especially a death in early years, or in the prime of life, or under exceptionally distressing circumstances, was often regarded as a judgment upon sin.

Death[1] was not the annihilation of the individual—at any rate, according to the ordinary Hebrew view. A feeble ghost of the dead man maintained a dim, shadowy existence in Sheol, the under world or Hades. But probably in early times other beliefs supplemented or replaced this view. There are traces of ancestor-worship and necromancy in ancient Israel, and these imply that the spirits of the dead could manifest themselves to the living, and could exercise some influence upon their fortunes. Samuel, for instance, appeared at the call of the witch of Endor and foretold the death of Saul (1 S 28). Although there is little positive evidence, it is probable that the popular belief in ghosts prevailed in earlier as in later times. In Lk 24[37ff.] the Apostles take the risen Lord for a ghost.

In a sense the Israelite looked forward to re-union after death, so far as this may be implied in such phrases as 'buried with his fathers' (2 K 12[21]), 'slept with his fathers' (1 K 2[10]); but there is nothing to suggest that he looked forward to any satisfying fellowship with his deceased brethren in a future life. Thus, for all practical purposes, death was a final parting.

As regards what happened to the individual when he breathed his last, death was thought of as the departure of the *nephesh* (נֶפֶשׁ), or vital principle;[1] though, curiously enough, *nephesh* is sometimes used in the sense of 'corpse' (Lv 19[28] 21[1] 22[4] [all H], Nu 5[2] 6[11] 9[10] [all P], Hag 2[13]).

Probably various primitive views prevailed in ancient Israel as to death and the individual after death, and these views were connected with general Semitic mythology; but the editors of the OT eliminated accounts of such crude superstitions, in the interests of orthodoxy and edification, so that only a few traces remain. A familiar myth is the death and resurrection of a god. Traces of this are found in the women weeping for Tammuz (Ezk 8[14]). According to Gressmann,[2] the account of the death and resurrection of the Servant of Jahweh in Is 53 is based on some such myth; of this possibly other traces are found in the references to אֵבֶל יָחִיד, 'mourning for an only son.'[3]

The later books of the OT contain hints of a resurrection, which develop in the later literature, especially in the Wisdom of Solomon and the Apocalypses, into an express doctrine, so that for later Judaism and for Christianity—following Judaism—death became the portal to a future life. When Judaism evolved a hierarchy of angels, with proper names and special functions, there appeared among the rest, Sammael, the Angel of Death. See DEMONS AND SPIRITS (Heb.) and (Jewish).

Later Judaism inherited or developed many curious fancies as to the hour of death; as, for instance, that the dying soul has a vision of the Shekinah just before its departure. Ben Kaphra, a Rabbi of the early Christian centuries, is quoted as saying:

'For three days the spirit hovers about the tomb, if perchance it may return to the body. But, when it sees the fashion of the countenance changed, it retires and abandons the body' (cf. *Expos. Gr. Test.* [1897] on Jn 11[44]).

2. **Disposal of the dead.**—The regular and legitimate mode of dealing with a corpse in ancient Israel was *burial*, and this has always remained the general custom of the Jews. *Embalming* was not an Israelite practice; when we read that Jacob and Joseph were embalmed (Gn 50[2. 26]), we must clearly understand that they were treated as Egyptians, amongst whom embalming was the regular custom. In later times we are told that the body of Aristobulus was embalmed in honey (Jos. *Ant.* XIV. vii. 4). Embalming in the strict sense must be distinguished from the Jewish custom referred to in 2 Ch 16[14] and in NT (Jn 19[39f.] etc.) of anointing the dead body and placing it in or wrapping it up in spices. *Cremation*, amongst the Israelites, was exceptional. According to 1 S 31[12], the men of Jabesh-Gilead burned the bodies of Saul and his sons, probably to prevent their falling into the hands of the Philistines. The fact that 1 Ch 10[12] omits the burning, and that Josephus (VI. xiv. 8) states that the bodies were buried, is probably evidence of the repug-

[1] Cf. W. H. Bennett, *Religion of the Post-exilic Prophets*, Edinburgh, 1907, p. 361 ff.

[1] W. H. Bennett, *op. cit.* 228 ff.
[2] *Der Ursprung der isr.-jüd. Eschatologie*, Göttingen, 1905, p. 328 ff.
[3] Am 8[10], Jer 6[26], Zec 12[10]; cf. Cheyne, *The Two Religions of Israel*, London, 1911, p. 211.

nance of the Jews, at any rate in later times, to the cremation of the dead. The EV of Am 6^{10} speaks of 'he that burneth' a corpse; but the reference to burning the corpse is due to corruption or misunderstanding of the text. In some cases, however, criminals were burnt alive (Gn 38^{24}, Lv 20^{14} 21^{9}), or their corpses were burnt (Jos $7^{15.25}$). The picture in Is 66^{24} of the corpses of sinners consumed by fire may have been suggested by the actual treatment of dead criminals. According to Kimchi[1] there were perpetual fires in the Valley of Hinnom for consuming dead bodies of criminals and animals. In Am 2^{1} the burning of the bones of the king of Edom is an outrage which calls down inexorable doom on Moab.

Exposure without burial was a disgrace and a misfortune. Criminals or their representatives might be so treated (2 S $21^{9f.}$), but, according to Dt $21^{22f.}$, even *their* corpses were to be buried. Such a misfortune might befall sinners as the judgment of God (1 K 14^{11}, Jer 7^{33}, Ezk 29^{5}, Ps 79^{3}). To bury relatives, and even strangers, was a supreme duty; it is specially insisted on in To 1. 2, and is illustrated by the story of Rizpah (2 S $21^{10f.}$). Job complains that God allows the wicked man to have an honourable burial (Job $21^{32f.}$). The desecration of a grave was a kind of posthumous punishment (2 K 23^{16}, Jer $8^{1f.}$).

There is not much evidence in the OT of graves dug in the earth in the modern fashion, though doubtless such were often used. The labours of the various Palestine Exploration Societies show that rock-hewn tombs were exceedingly common; they usually occur in groups. A space for a single corpse is hewn in the face of a rock and closed with a stone slab; this space was called a *kûk*, כוך (Jastrow, *Dict. of the Targumim*, 1886–1903, *s.v.*), by the Jews in later times. These are found grouped in one or more chambers in natural or artificial caves. One of the most interesting examples of such a burying-place is the cave of Machpelah, where Sarah, Abraham, Isaac, Rebekah, Leah, and Jacob are said to have been buried (Gn 23^{19} 25^{9} 49^{31} 50^{13}). Masonry tombs with groups of *kûkim* are also found; and sometimes monuments were erected over tombs; for instance, Simon the Maccabee built an elaborate mausoleum at Modin for his father and brother (1 Mac 13^{27-29}), no trace of which has yet been discovered.

In ancient times each family, like that of the patriarchs, had its own burying-place. Such burying-places would naturally be on the family estate. We read of Manasseh being buried in the garden of his own house, and Amon in the garden of Uzza (2 K $21^{18.26}$). But usually the kings of Judah were buried in a royal burying-place in the city of David: *e.g.* Jeash (2 K 12^{21}), apparently near the Temple (Ezk 43^{7-9}), the Temple being in ancient times an adjunct of the royal palace. Obviously dwellers in towns, who had not extensive gardens, would be required, as in later times, to bury their dead outside the walls. Poorer people would have no family burying-place, and we read of a public cemetery, 'the graves of the *b^enê hā'ām*' (2 K 23^{6}, Jer 26^{23}). Apparently a measure of disgrace attached to burial there, 'in a pauper's grave,' so to speak.

The family desired to be together in death as in life, and men were anxious to 'sleep with their fathers,' *i.e.* to be buried in the family tomb. It is part of the punishment of Pashhur that he is to be buried in Chaldæa (Jer 20^{6}); and the Chronicler, in contradiction to the Book of Kings, states that certain wicked kings of Judah—Jehoram and Joash—were not buried in the sepulchres of the kings (2 Ch 21^{20} 24^{25}). In post-Biblical times the Jews have had their own cemeteries. They still retain their anxiety to be buried with their own people. Jews who are lax in many religious matters will keep the Day of Atonement in order that they may be buried in a Jewish cemetery.

A certain sanctity attached to the graves of ancient saints and heroes, and probably, as amongst the Muhammadans, such tombs became shrines; *e.g.* the tomb of Joseph at Shechem (Jos 24^{32}), and the tomb of the patriarchs at Machpelah. Necromancy and similar superstitions were often connected with graves (Is 65^{4}).

On the other hand, the grave is unclean (Lk 11^{44}). In later times, at least, cemeteries were supposed to be special haunts of evil spirits; and the spirits of the dead lingered there, at any rate till the corpse had been assimilated to the soil. This belief, that the spirits of the dead inhabit the tombs, is found in most primitive religions, and was probably prevalent amongst the Israelites in early times.

3. Mourning and other observances.—Numerous passages illustrate the distress caused to the Jews by bereavement: the mourning of Jacob over the supposed death of Joseph (Gn 37^{35}); of David over Absalom (2 S 18^{33}); Rachel refusing to be comforted (Jer 31^{15}). The behaviour of David, who fasted and wept when his child was dying, but arose and ate when it was dead, was a puzzle to his courtiers; his explanation, that lamentation was useless, hardly seems adequate (2 S $12^{15ff.}$).

The feelings, sentiments, and ideas called forth by death gave rise to various burial and mourning customs. Decease was and is followed by the necessary arrangements for the seemly 'laying out' of the corpse. The eyes and mouth are closed (Gn 46^{4}, Jn 11^{44}), and the body is washed (Ac 9^{37}). It has been supposed that the dead were, sometimes at any rate, buried in their usual dress, with their arms and ornaments; Samuel appears to the witch of Endor in his mantle (1 S 28^{14}), and the dead go down to Sheol with their weapons and their 'pomp' (שָׁאוֹן). The practice certainly prevailed in later times. Thus Herod buried ornaments with the body of Aristobulus (Jos. *Ant.* XV. iii. 4); treasures were said to have been buried with David (XVI. vii. 1); Herod was buried covered with purple, with his diadem, crown, and sceptre (XVII. viii. 3; *BJ* I. xxxiii. 9). We are told that in later times such practices led to great extravagance, so that Rabbi Gamaliel II. ordained that corpses should be buried in a simple white dress. We read of Ananias, that they 'wrapped him round,' apparently in the clothes he was wearing, and carried him out, and buried him (Ac 5^{6}).

Later on, the use of a shroud or special grave-clothes or wrappings for the dead became universal; but it is not clear when this custom was first introduced amongst the Jews. In Jn 11^{44} Lazarus' hands and feet were bound with linen bandages (κειρίαις), and his face with a napkin (σουδαρίῳ). The body of our Lord was wrapped in strips of linen (ὀθονίοις). We have already referred to the use of spices.

Coffins were not used by the Jews in ancient times, except in the case of Joseph (Gn 50^{26}), whose remains were placed in an *'ărôn*, or chest; but this, like his embalming, was an Egyptian custom. The Jews laid their dead on a bier (OT *miṭṭâ*, מִטָּה, 'couch' [2 S 3^{31}]; NT σορός [Lk 7^{14}]), as is the custom amongst Eastern Jews now. They use this bier to carry the corpse to the grave, and do not bury it.

The exigencies of the climate of Palestine called for burial soon after death, on the same day, or within 24 hours. As often, a natural necessity hardened into a sacred custom, which was long maintained amongst Jews in Western countries, where the same necessity did not exist; but after

[1] Cf. Sir C. Warren, in *HDB* ii. 385.

a while it fell into disuse, and a longer interval is allowed in the West.

The carrying of the corpse to the burying-place was the work of friends of the deceased, and was the occasion of public lamentation, which, at any rate in the early centuries of our era, was partly performed by hired mourners and musicians. There does not seem to have been any formal burial service of a religious character in Biblical times,[1] but then and later funeral orations were sometimes delivered. According to *JE* (*s.v.* 'Funeral Rites,' v. 529), the mourners recited Ps 91 on their way to the cemetery; in the cemetery, other formulæ, concluding with the *Ḳaddish*, or doxology; and on their return, passages from Lamentations. Women attended funerals in ancient times, and still do so amongst the foreign Ashkenazim, but not amongst the Sephardim or the English Ashkenazim.

The funeral of Herod the Great is thus described by Josephus (*Ant.* XVII. viii. 3; cf. *BJ* I. xxxiii. 9):

'The body was carried upon a golden bier, embroidered with very precious stones of great variety, and it was covered over with purple, as was the body itself: he had a diadem upon his head, and above it a crown of gold; he had also a sceptre in his right hand. About the bier were his sons and his numerous relations; next to these were the soldiery, distinguished according to their several countries and denominations; and they were put into the following order: first of all went his guards, then the band of Thracians, after them the Germans, next the band of Galatians, every one in their habiliments of war; and behind these marched the whole army, in the same manner as they used to go out to war, and as they used to be put in array by their muster-masters and centurions; these were followed by five hundred of his domestics, carrying spices.'

We may also quote the following description of modern Samaritan rites, which probably preserves many of the customs of Palestinian Jews in early times:

'Upon death the corpse is carefully and ceremoniously washed; it is not forbidden to the Samaritans, as has been frequently stated, to handle their dead, except in the case of the high-priest. Candles are burnt at the head and foot of the corpse before burial. Coffins are used—an exception in modern Palestinian custom. The mourning ceremonies last until the following Sabbath, the community going each day to the tomb, where they read and pray. On the Sabbath the community again visit the tomb, where they partake of a meal, while further appropriate services are held in the synagogue.'[2]

The duration of mourning has always varied, according to the rank of the deceased and his relation to the mourner. Seven days was a very common period. The men of Jabesh-Gilead fasted seven days for Saul and Jonathan (1 S 31[13]); Joseph mourned seven days for Jacob (Gn 50[10]); Judith was mourned seven days (Jth 16[24]); Sir 22[12] mentions seven days as the period of mourning. In later Judaism the period of strict mourning, the *Shib'a*, lasts seven days; mourning of a less severe character lasts till the end of thirty days, and in the case of children to the end of the year.[3]

As to mourning-dress, the rending of garments and the wearing of sackcloth are mentioned in Gn 37[34] etc. We also read of garments of widowhood (Gn 38[14], Jth 10[3]), which apparently were worn by the widow throughout her life, and consisted of, or included, sackcloth. Modern Jews usually wear black as mourning, except in Russia, Poland, and Galicia, where white is worn.[4] Mourners rend their garments at the time of death, and wear the outer garment cut and unbound during the thirty days of mourning.[5]

The presence of numerous guests at a funeral necessitated a special meal, 'funeral baked meats,' which, in spite of the character of the occasion, was apt to become a feast. This meal is perhaps spoken of in the OT as *leḥem 'ônîm*, 'bread of mourners' (Hos 9[4]), and was provided for the mourners by their friends at the close of the fast

[1] Stapfer, *Palestine in the Time of Christ*, Eng. tr., Lond. 1887, p. 168.
[2] J. A. Montgomery, *The Samaritans*, Philad., 1907, p. 43 f.
[3] Oesterley and Box, 307.
[4] *JE*, *s.v.* 'Mourning,' ix. 101.
[5] Oesterley and Box, 304 ff.

which occupied the day of the funeral (2 S 3[35], Jer 16[7])—a custom which seems to have prevailed ever since.[1]

Other acts of mourning were fasting (1 S 31[13]), beating the breast (Is 32[12], cf. Lk 18[13]), sitting in ashes (Jon 3[6]), sprinkling ashes on the head (Est 4[1]). Ezk 24[17] implies that mourners were wont to cover the lip and to go barefoot and bareheaded. According to Jer 16[6], mourners mutilated themselves, and plucked out or shaved off the hair; but such practices are forbidden in Lv 19[28], Dt 14[1].

Traces remain in the OT of the worship of the dead, of sacrifices offered to or for them, and of furnishing them with food. Probably the later funeral feast was partly a survival of such practices. The worship of the dead was closely connected with necromancy, which was prevalent in Israel (*e.g.* Is 8[19]). The graves of ancient worthies seem often to have been shrines, as in Islām. Thus there was a *maṣṣebā*, or sacred pillar, at the grave of Rachel (Gn 35[20]), and the important sanctuary at Shechem may have been connected with the grave of Joseph (Jos 24[26. 32]). The interpretation of Dt 26[14] is a little doubtful. The EV renders '[I have not given food] for the dead,' but the reference probably is to offering food to the dead or providing food for them. The practice was condemned by official Judaism, but persisted nevertheless. Tobit 4[17] bids the Jew place food on the tomb of the righteous;[2] and Sir 30[18] also refers to the custom.[3] In some quarters necromancy and its allied customs survived among the Jews in later periods.

In Rabbinical times and among the stricter modern Jews, during the *Shib'a*, or seven days of strict mourning, the relatives abstain from work and remain at home, sitting on the floor or on a low bench, reading the Book of Job, and receiving visits of condolence. Bereaved children should abstain for a year from music and recreation.

A special feature of Jewish mourning is the repetition of the *Ḳaddish* by a bereaved son. According to the Jewish Prayer-book, this is to be repeated by sons for eleven months after the death of a parent, and also on the *Jahrzeit*, or anniversary of the death. It is a special form of *Ḳaddish* which runs thus:

'May His great Name be magnified and hallowed in the world which He created according to His will! May He establish His kingdom speedily and in the near future in your lifetime and in your days and in the lifetime of all Israel! Say ye Amen.

May His great Name be blessed for ever; may it be blessed for ever and ever!

May the Name of the Holy One (Blessed be He) be blessed and praised and glorified and exalted and set on high and honoured and uplifted and sung above all blessings and hymns and praises and consolations that are repeated in the world!

May the Name of the Lord be blessed from now even for evermore! May there be great peace from heaven and life upon us and upon all Israel, and say ye Amen. My help is from the Lord that made heaven and earth. May He that maketh peace in His high places make peace for us and for all Israel! And say ye Amen.'

This is publicly recited in the synagogue, but according to Oesterley and Box[4] it 'is in no sense in itself a prayer *for* the dead, but the public recitation of it in this fashion by a son is regarded as a proof of the piety of the dead, as represented by a pious survivor.' This no doubt is the view of enlightened Jews; but others believe that the repetition of the *Ḳaddish* by the son shortens the purgatorial period which the father must spend in Gehenna or exalts him to a higher sphere in Paradise.[5] The repetition terminates on the anniversary of the death, because it would be unfilial to suppose that a father's sins would require more than a

[1] Oesterley and Box, 304 ff.
[2] Sometimes interpreted, improbably, of the funeral feast given to mourners.
[3] See Smend, 112 f.; Benzinger, 165 ff.; Nowack, ii. 300; and Dillmann and Driver on Dt 24[16].
[4] P. 340.
[5] *JE*, *s.v.* 'Kaddish,' vii. 401 f.

year's purgatory. In the Ashkenazic synagogues prayers are said four times a year by the bereaved for the souls of the deceased.[1]

Priests were forbidden to mourn except in the case of the nearest relationships (Lv 21^{1-5}, Ezk 44^{25}).

4. Significance of death and of funeral customs.—Some scholars[2] see in many of the funeral rites, notably cutting of the hair, self-mutilation, etc., which were forbidden by the more advanced Judaism, traces of an animistic stage of the religion of Israel, of the worship of ancestors, and of the allied ideas of the continued life of the dead, of the possibility of communion with them, of the necessity of providing for their needs and protecting them from evil spirits; or, on the other hand, of the need of protecting the living from injury by the spirits of the dead. No doubt the Semitic peoples passed through a stage of religious development when such ideas were current; and these ideas persisted and do persist when they have been outgrown by the purer forms of religion; but they do not belong to Jahwism or to Judaism so far as either was or is dominated by revelation. Nevertheless, the great importance attached to burial in the last centuries of the pre-Christian era suggests that the condition of the spirit of the deceased was supposed to be influenced by the treatment of the corpse. Later on, in some districts the habit prevailed of visiting cemeteries in order to obtain the help or intercession of the dead.

Another quasi-animistic explanation of mourning rites which involve disfigurement, unattractive dress, covering the head, etc., is that they were intended to prevent the spirit of the dead man from recognizing the mourner, and so to protect the latter from any injury the spirit might wish to inflict upon him. Similarly, the mourners' shrieks were intended to drive the spirit away; and satisfactory burial was necessary in order that the dead might find their way to Sheol and stay there. The suggestion that many mourning rites were due to the anxiety of the mourner to humble himself before God[3] hardly seems probable. The most obvious explanation is that mourning arose out of a natural desire to express the emotions caused by bereavement. Such distress gives rise to wailing, frantic gestures, neglect of the dress and person, an aversion to the pleasures of life. Acts which were originally spontaneous would soon harden into a fixed etiquette or ritual. Many customs might easily be thus explained; and it is possible that this may be the true explanation, even in cases where a mourning custom does not seem to us a natural expression of grief. A man distraught by sorrow may seek relief in any unexpected, strange, unusual act; such an act may appeal to the imagination of spectators by its very strangeness, and be imitated till it becomes a custom.

The contagious uncleanness of a corpse (Nu 5^2, Lv 21^{11}) might be suggested in many ways: by the fear of the spirit of the dead man mentioned above, by the natural shrinking from an object so changed from the living friend or kinsman, and even by sanitary reasons. The uncleanness of the corpse would naturally be extended to the tomb. In the same way an unburied corpse defiled the land and brought down a curse upon it (Dt 21^{23}). It would be a mistake to try to explain all the mourning customs, even of one people, by the consistent application of a single principle. Bereavement affects men in many ways, so that natural affection, practical considerations, superstition,

[1] Oesterley and Box, *loc. cit.*

[2] *E.g.* F. Schwally, *Das Leben nach dem Tode*, Giessen, 1892.

[3] *PRE*³ xx. 88 f.

and religion all contribute to give rise to the ritual connected with death. Moreover, a rite changes its significance and value from time to time, so that the meaning attached to it in later times may be quite different from that which it had originally, and the popular explanation of it may throw no light on its origin.

According to Gn 3, death was a consequence of the sin of Adam and Eve (cf. Ro 5^{12}); it would be natural to draw the conclusion arrived at in the latter passage, that henceforth each man died because of his own sin (a view perhaps implied by Nu 27^3).[1] But the narrative in Genesis stands apart from the general course of OT thought, which regards death as the natural end of life. The righteous man, according to a widely prevalent view, enjoys a long and happy life, and is gathered to his fathers in a good old age. Some passages of the Wisdom Literature, even apart from any belief in a real future life, regard life as a burden and death as a boon (Job $7^{15.16}$, Ec 1^2 $4^{2.3}$).

In some passages of OT, death is personified (*e.g.* Job 28^{22}, Is 28^{15}, Hab 2^5). In others the term is extended to mean spiritual death; it doubtless includes physical death, but only as a part of a wider judgment which also involves separation from God and exclusion from the Kingdom. In such passages, as Schultz said, 'death includes everything which is a result of sin.'[2] This usage of the term is extended and developed in the later literature. Thus Philo: 'The death of the soul is the decay of virtue, the taking up of evil.'[3]

In later Judaism, death is regarded as atoning for the sin of the deceased. According to a popular superstition, the dead man suffers pain while his body is decaying in the grave, and this pain has an atoning value. But, apart from such ideas, we find the doctrine taught by Rabbinical and other authorities. Thus the Sephardic ritual for a dying man includes the following:

'Let my death be an atonement for all my sins, iniquities, and transgressions, wherein I have sinned, offended, and transgressed against Thee, from the day of my first existence; and let my portion be in the Garden of Eden.'[4] Again we read: 'The Day of Atonement and death make atonement when accompanied with sincere repentance.'[5]

LITERATURE (in addition to works referred to in the body of the article; this list also gives the full titles of works referred to merely under authors' names).—H. Ewald, *The Antiquities of Israel*, Eng. tr., London, 1876, pp. 149, 153 ff.; J. Benzinger, *Heb. Archäol.*, Freiburg, 1894, p. 163 ff.; W. Nowack, *Lehrb. der heb. Archäol.*, Freiburg, 1894, i. 193 ff., ii. 273–280, 300 f.; H. Schultz, *OT Theol.*, Eng. tr., Edin. 1892, ii. 254, 313 ff.; A. Dillmann, *Handb. der AT Theol.*, Leipz. 1895, pp. 366–400; W. Robertson Smith, *Rel. Sem.*², 1894, pp. 235, 369, 373 f., 414 f.; R. Smend, *Lehrb. der AT Religionsgesch.*², Freiburg, 1899, pp. 112 ff., 327, 504 f.; J. Köberle, *Sünde und Gnade*, Munich, 1905, pp. 54, 116, 334, 568 ff.; A. P. Bender, 'Beliefs, Rites, and Customs of the Jews, connected with Death, Burial, and Mourning,' in *JQR*, 1894 ff.; W. O. E. Oesterley and G. H. Box, *The Religion and Worship of the Synagogue*, Lond. 1907, p. 303 ff.; W. O. E. Oesterley, *The Jewish Doctrine of Mediation*, do. 1910, p. 110; together with the articles on 'Burial,' 'Funeral Rites,' 'Kaddish,' 'Mourning,' 'Sepulchre,' 'Tomb,' etc., in *HDB*, *EBi*, *JE*, and the art. 'Trauergebräuche,' in *PRE*³.

W. H. BENNETT.

DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD (Muhammadan).

—According to the Qur'ān, 'every soul must taste of death' (iii. 182); the difficulty as to those who may be alive at the Last Day is got over by the explanation that on the blast of the trumpet all 'shall expire, except those whom God pleases' (xxxix. 68), the exempted being possibly some of the greater angels (Baiḍāwī, etc., *in loc.*). Further, it is laid down that the exact hour of each person's death is foreordained (xvi.

[1] Köberle, *Sünde und Gnade*, 334; but probably the passage regards Zelophehad as involved in the sin of Israel in refusing to enter Canaan from Kadesh.

[2] *OT Theol.*, Eng. tr., ii. 310, 316 f.; cf. Bennett, 283; and see Ezk $20^{11.25}$.

[3] *Legg. Allegor.* i. 33, quoted by Hughes, *Ethics of Jewish Apocryphal Lit.*, Lond. 1909, p. 280.

[4] Oesterley, p. 110.

[5] Mish. *Yoma*, viii. 8, quoted by Bender, *JQR* vi. [1894] 666.

63). In the traditions, men are forbidden by the Prophet to wish for death, though to a believer it will be desirable. Whoso's last words are the *Kalima* (profession of faith, 'There is no god but God') will enter into paradise; and it is directed that this shall be recited in the presence of the dying, and the *Sūra Yā Sīn* (Qur. xxxvi.) should be said over the dead. A fantastic tradition, given on the authority of Abū-Ḥuraira, relates what Muhammad is supposed to have said about the passing of the soul. In the case of a believer, angels of mercy clad in white come and invite the soul to the rest which is with God, and the soul comes out with a delicious smell of musk, which the angels sniff with satisfaction; the soul is handed on from angel to angel, till it reaches the souls of the faithful, who rejoice and question it about those left behind on earth. But angels of wrath come to the dying infidel, and his soul departs with a bad smell, which disgusts them, and they bring it to the souls of the infidels. This idea is elaborated in other traditions, in which the soul of the righteous is said to issue forth like water from a skin, and the angel of death seizes it; but the angels in white snatch it from him and wrap it in a shroud with an odour of musk, and convey it on and on to the seventh heaven, where the believer's name is registered, after which it is returned to its body on the earth, to undergo the questioning of the grave. But the dying infidel is visited by black-faced angels, and the soul is drawn out like a hot spit out of wet wool which sticks to it, and is wrapped in sackcloth, smelling fetidly; and its name is written in hell (*sijjīn*); and it is violently thrown down upon the earth, to be examined by the angels of the grave, as will be described later.

Meanwhile the body is treated with a ceremonial which varies little in different parts of the Muslim world, and is nearly the same for men and women. Precedents for most of the ritual are traced to traditions of the Prophet; but two customs—the wailing of women and the recital of praises of the dead—are observed in direct defiance of his commands. The dying man is turned to face the *qibla*, or direction of Mecca, and, as soon as his eyes are closed in death, the surrounding men ejaculate pious formulæ and the women raise cries of lamentation (*walwala*), the family calling upon the dead in such terms as 'O my master!' 'O my resource!' 'O my camel!' 'O my misfortune!' The clothes of the deceased are instantly changed, his jaw bound, and his legs tied; and he is covered with a sheet. Women friends, and sometimes professional 'keeners' (*naddāba*), with tambourines, join the mourners and cry, 'Alas for him!' If he was one of the '*ulamā* of Cairo or some man of mark, his death would be announced from the minarets in the call known as the *Abrār* (from Qur. lxxvi. 5–9). The lamentations go on all night, if the death occurred in the evening, and a recitation of the Qur'ān by hired *fiqīs* takes place; but, if the death occurred in the morning, the burial follows on the same day, as, in addition to the rapid decomposition in a hot climate, there is often a superstitious dread of keeping a corpse all night in the house. The washing of the dead is done by a professional washer (*mughassil* or *ghassāl*), male or female according to the case, who brings a bench and bier, and does the work, often in a courtyard, with much reverence and decency, and with care in the disposal of the water, which people fear to touch; while the *fiqīs* continue chanting in the next room. After a very elaborate washing, the nostrils and other orifices are stuffed with cotton, and the corpse is sprinkled with camphor, rosewater, and lote leaves (*nabq*), the feet tied together and hands laid on breast, and the grave clothes (*kafan*) put on according to precise rules. Those vary from two or three pieces of cotton (or five for a woman), or a mere sack, in the case of the poor, to a series of layers of muslin, cotton, silk, and a Kashmir shawl, among the rich; and the fashions vary in different lands. Women usually have a long shift (*yalak*) added, and in India a coif (*damnī*). White and green are the favourite colours for the *kafan*, or any colour but blue, but white alone is allowed in India. A shawl is thrown over the body when placed on the bier (*janāza* or *ṣandūq*). There is no coffin, and, of course, no priest.

The funeral or procession varies in different countries. In India, women do not attend as a rule, but they do in Bukhārā. In Egypt the cortège is often preceded by half a dozen poor men (*yamanīya*), blind by preference, walking in pairs and chanting the *Kalima*. After them come the male friends and relations, and perhaps some darwīshes, especially if the deceased belonged to a darwīsh order. A few schoolboys follow, carrying a Qur'ān on a desk, and chanting lively verses on the Day of Judgment and similar topics. Then comes the bier (which for women and children has a post [*shāhid*] at the head, covered with a shawl, and often adorned with gold ornaments, or, in the case of a boy, surmounted by a turban), carried head foremost at a brisk pace by friends, who relieve each other in turn. It is an act of merit for any passer-by to lend a hand or to follow the bier; and the Prophet made a point of always standing up when a bier was passing, and saying a prayer. The women walk behind the bier, with dishevelled hair, keening and shrieking, and the hired mourners swell the chorus and sound the praises of the dead, contrary to the Prophet's will. Blue headbands and handkerchiefs distinguish the women relations, who slap their faces and sometimes smear them with mud. There are some variations in the procession when the deceased is a woman. Rich people add camels to the procession, and hire *fiqīs* to chant chapters of the Qur'ān on the march, or members of religious orders carrying flags; and also sacrifice (*al-kaffāra*) a buffalo at the tomb for the benefit of the poor; whilst ladies riding the high ass often follow their female relations. If it be a saint (*walī*) who is being buried, the women raise joy-cries (*zaghārīt*) instead of *wilwāl*, or keening; and, if these cries cease, the bier stops too; for saints are believed to be wilful and able to stop their bearers, and even to direct them to where they prefer to be buried. It is said to be useless to try to rush a saint's bier in a direction he does not like, but the somewhat bizarre device of turning the bier round rapidly several times has been found successful in confusing the corpse's sense of orientation (Lane, *Mod. Eg.*[5] p. 518).

The ceremony at the mosque consists in laying the bier on the floor, right side towards Mecca, when a service of prayer is recited by an *imām* and his attendant *muballigh*, in the presence of the congregation of mourners and all who choose to attend, ranged in a prescribed order, ending with an appeal to the audience: 'Give your testimony concerning him,' and their reply: 'He was of the righteous.' The *fiqīs* may then recite the *Fātiḥa*, etc., and the funeral goes on to the graveyard.

There a tomb has been prepared, of ample size, with an arched roof, so that the corpse may sit up at ease to answer the interrogatory of the examining angels, Munkar and Nakīr, who will enter the tomb to question him as to his orthodoxy. If the replies are satisfactory, the grave will be enlarged to him, and a man with a beautiful countenance will appear to tell him: 'I am thy good deeds'; otherwise, a hideous face comes to represent

his evil deeds, and painful experiences ensue. The fear of 'the torment of the grave' is very real among Muslims.

The construction of tombs varies in different places, and no one pattern can be indicated. In Egypt, the entrance is at the foot, the side furthest from Mecca, and the tomb is often made to hold several bodies; but, if they are of opposite sexes, a partition is set up. Over the tomb is an oblong stone slab or brick monument (*tarkīya*), with an upright stone (*shāhid*) at head and foot. The inscription is on that at the head, which is often carved with a turban. A small chapel covered with a cupola is frequently built over the tombs of saints and other distinguished people, while the tomb-mosques of sultans and amīrs are often beautiful examples of Saracenic art.

The body is lifted out of the bier and laid in the tomb, on its right side, with the face towards Mecca, propped in that position by bricks. Its bandages are untied, its Kashmīr shawl rent, lest it should tempt grave-robbers, a little earth is sprinkled, ch. cxii. of the Qur'ān, or xx. 57, is recited (but this was forbidden by the Waḥhābīs and others), and the entrance is closed. There is no service at the grave; but, before leaving (unless the funeral be of a Mālikī), a *fiqī*, in the character of *mulaqqin*, or tutor of the dead, sits before the tomb and tells the defunct the five correct answers to be given to the examining angels that night (the 'Night of Desolation,' *Lailat al-waqsha*) when they come and ask him his catechism: he must reply that his God is Allāh, his prophet Muḥammad, his religion Islām, his Bible the Qur'ān, and his *qibla* the Ka'ba. The grave is left in solitude and the mourners depart, saying a *Fātiḥa* for the defunct and another for all the dead in the cemetery. Some *fiqīs* take a repast in the room where the deceased died and recite ch. lxvii. of the Qur'ān, or perform the more elaborate ritual called the *Sabḥa*, 'Rosary,' in which a rosary of a thousand beads is used to count the thousands of repetitions of the *Kalima* and the hundreds of other formulæ repeated. This performance ends with one of the *fiqīs* asking the others: 'Have ye transferred [the merit of] what ye have recited to the deceased?' and their answer: 'We have transferred it.'

Wailing is resumed by the women on the Thursdays of the first three weeks after the burial, and the men receive friends of the deceased in the house and hire *fiqīs* to perform a *ḥatma* of the Qur'ān; and on the Fridays following these three Thursdays the women visit the tomb and go through various rites, including the placing of a broken palm branch on the tomb and giving food to the poor; and the same is done on the Thursday and Friday completing or following the forty days after the funeral. Men do not display mourning in their dress, but women dye their veils and other gear dark blue, and sometimes smear the walls of their rooms, and even stain their hands and arms with the same indigo dye. They also disarrange their hair, and the furniture and carpets are upset in mourning for the head of the house.

LITERATURE.—The most minute account of all the ceremonies and processes used in regard to the disposal of the corpse is to be read in G. A. Herklots and Ja'far Sharif's *Qanoon-e-Islam*, London, 1832, ch. xxxviii.; the ceremonies after the funeral are described in ch. xxxix.; but a good deal of this account consists of details peculiar to the Muslims of Hindūstān. The corresponding ceremonies observed in Egypt are described in Lane's *Modern Egyptians* 5, London, 1860, ch. xxviii., where also is a notice of a curious dance performed on the occasion of a death by the peasants of Upper Egypt. The Egyptian customs are similar to those observed in Syria and Turkey, though local differences of usage are to be noticed, a fairly detailed account of which for Turkey may be read in *The People of Turkey*, ed. S. Lane-Poole, London, 1878, ii. 136–143. See also Hughes' *DI*, London, 1885, *s.v.* 'Burial' and 'Death,' where Herklots is conveniently abridged. The traditions of Muḥammad on the subject are accessible to English readers in *Mishkāt al-Maṣābīḥ*, tr. Matthews, Calcutta, 1809, vol. i. pp. 355–403.

STANLEY LANE-POOLE.

DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD (Parsi).—**1. Before death.**—When death approaches, one or two priests are summoned to make the dying person confess his sins. The *Patet*, or confession of sins, is recited for his benefit, and it is a meritorious act if he is able to join the priest in repeating the confession. According to the *Ṣād Dār* (xlv.), the man who 'accomplishes repentance' does not go to hell, but, having received his punishment at the end of the Chinvat bridge, is led to his place in heaven. In a case of urgency the short *Ashem-Vohū* (*Ys.* xxvii. 14) formula may suffice, and the Hātōkht Nask fragment (*Yt.* xxi. 14 f.) attributes a special value to the recital of *Ashem-Vohū* in the last moments of life. The *Ṣād Dār* adds (lxxx. 11) that it brings one who has deserved hell to the *Hamīstakān* (the 'ever stationary' region between heaven and hell); one who has deserved the *Hamīstakā* to heaven; and one who has deserved heaven to the highest paradise. The *tanu-peretha*, after whose death the *upaman*, 'waiting,' 'mourning,' of the relatives must be prolonged beyond the usual period (*Vend.* xii.), is explained by tradition as one who has died without *Patet* and without *Ashem-Vohū*. Sometimes a few drops of the consecrated *haoma* juice mingled with water are poured, if possible, into the mouth of the dying person, *haoma* being believed to produce immortality. Formerly this custom was more common; and it was also usual to drop into the mouth of the dying person a few grains of pomegranate, belonging to the holy ceremonies of the Parsi sacrifice.

2. Death.—According to *Vend.* v. 10, the ancient Zarathushtrians had special chambers or buildings (*kata*) for the dead—one for men, one for women, and one for children—in every house or in every village, and the common mortuary still exists amongst the Zarathushtrians of Persia and in the Mofussil towns of Gujarāt. In Bombay and other parts of India a special place in the house is prepared beforehand and washed clean in order to receive the dead body. The body is bathed all over and covered with a clean, but worn-out, white suit of cotton clothes, which must be destroyed and never used again after having served for this purpose (cf. *Vend.* v. 61, viii. 23–25). A relative girds the sacred cord round the body, reciting the *Ahura Mazda Khudāi*, a short prayer in Pazand. The corpse is placed on the ground on a clean white sheet. Two relatives sit by his side keeping themselves in contact with him—a custom probably derived, like the *paivand* (see below) held by the watchers and the bearers of the corpse, from the idea of forming a bridge or a way for the soul. An *Ashem-Vohū* is recited close to the dead man's ear.

3. Impurity of the corpse.—The corpse is now supposed to be assailed by the corpse-demon, the *Druj Nasu*. According to *Vend.* vii. 1–5, the *druj* of the corpse rushes on the body from the north, in the shape of a fly, immediately after death in a case of natural death. But in a case of violent death (by dogs, or by the wolf, by the sorcerer, by an enemy, or by the hand of man, by falling from a mountain, by strangling oneself, or by treachery) the demon comes only in the *gāh* (one of the five divisions of the day) that follows after death. Only special despised officials, set apart for that purpose, are allowed actually to touch the body, and they must scrupulously observe certain fixed rules. If any one else happens to touch it, the contagion spreads to him, and he must undergo the great purification, *bar-*

ashnūm, for nine days (being washed with the urine of the cow, etc. [*Vend.* ix.]). The glance of a dog (see below) or other animal is considered to be particularly effective for driving away the corpse-demon.

In theory the old tabu ideas concerning the dead have been modified in a characteristic manner by the Avestan dualism. Thus, since the death of a Mazdayasnian implies a victory of the Evil Power, his body is unclean, but the corpse of an unbeliever is clean, because his death favours the cause of Ahura Mazda, and a wicked man defiles only during his life, not after his death (*Vend.* v. 36–38).

4. Isolation of the corpse.—The place of the two relatives waiting beside the body is next taken by the *nasu-kashas* of the Avesta, now called *khāndhya* ('shoulder-men') by the Parsis of India. Two of those funeral-servants prepare themselves by washing and by putting on clean suits of clothes and the sacred cord, and by reciting the *Srōsh-bāj* (on which see Darmesteter, *Le Zend-Avesta*, ii. 686–688) up to the word *ashahē*. They then enter the room where the dead body is placed, keeping between them a piece of cloth or cotton tape—the *paivand*. They cover the body with cloth except the face—which, however, in some parts of Gujarāt is also covered—with a *padān* (the *paitidāna* of the Avesta, a piece of white cotton stuff which the Parsi priest holds before his nose and mouth in order not to defile the sacred fire and the other pure things). Then the two *khāndhyas* lift the corpse on to slabs of stone placed in a corner of the room, its arms being folded across the chest. The face must not be turned towards the north, whence the demons proceed. In some districts of Gujarāt the old Avestan rule (*Vend.* viii. 8) is still observed of laying the body on a thin layer of sand in a cavity dug in the ground five inches deep, while in Yezd the corpse, after being lifted from the bier in the common mortuary, is placed 'on a raised platform of mud paved with stone, about nine feet long and four feet wide' (Jackson, *Persia*, p. 391). The place in which the body reposes is ritually separated from connexion with the living by three deep circles, *kasha*, drawn with a metallic bar or nail by one of the two *khāndhyas*, who afterwards leave the house, still making *paivand*, and finish their *Srōsh-bāj*.

5. The sag-dīd.—If possible, 'a four-eyed' (*cathrueashma*) dog, *i.e.* a dog with two eye-like spots above the eyes, is now brought near the corpse in order to frighten the *druj* by his look, *i.e.* the *sag-dīd* ('dog-gaze') is arranged. According to *Vend.* viii. 16, a white dog with yellow ears has also a particular power against the demons, but any dog may suffice. The *sag-dīd* is repeated at the beginning of every *gāh*, until the body is carried from the house. The prescription of *Vend.* viii. 14–18 seems not to be observed nowadays, namely, that a yellow four-eyed dog or a white dog with yellow ears must be led three times if he walks willingly, six or nine times if he is unwilling, along the road where a corpse of a man or of a dog is carried, in order to scare away the corpse-demon. In Yezd the ordinary street-dog is used, and 'morsels of bread are strewn around the corpse, or, according to the older usage, laid on the bosom of the dead, and the dog eats these' (Jackson, *op. cit.* p. 389). Immediately before entering the *dakhma* ('tower of silence'), the dead body is once more exposed to the *sag-dīd*. The demon-expelling glance is attributed by *Vend.* vii. 3. 29 f., viii. 36, not only to the dog, but to 'the flesh-eating birds' as well as to 'the flesh-eating dogs.'

These passages evidently refer to the moment when the animals, to which the body is exposed, rush on it to devour it; but the eminent Parsi scholar J. J. Modi, to whom we principally owe our knowledge of the actual funeral ceremonies of the Parsis, interprets *Vend.* vii. 3 in the following way: 'It is enjoined that in case a dog is not procurable, the "Sagdeed" of flesh-devouring birds like the crows and vultures should be allowed, that is to say, it will do if a flesh-eating bird happens to pass and sees the corpse from above or if the flesh-eating birds fly in that direction' (*JASB* ii. 414).

6. Demon-frightening fire.—We return to the mortuary room, where, after the first *sag-dīd*, the demon-killing fire (*Vend.* viii. 80) is brought and fed with fragrant sandal-wood and frankincense, and where, until the body is removed, a priest recites the Avesta, keeping himself, as well as every other person, at least three paces from the dead body (*Vend.* viii. 7).

7. Time of removal.—The removal of the body must take place in the daytime, in order to expose it to the sun (*Vend.* v. 13). In ancient times the corpse might lie in the special mortuaries as long as one month or even until the next spring (*Vend.* v. 12). Now, in India, the body is removed the next morning, if death takes place early in the night; if a person dies late at night or early in the morning, the body is removed in the evening. In case of death by accident the body may wait longer.

8. Removal. — Two 'corpse-bearers' (*nasā-sālārs*), clothed in white, with 'hand-cover' (*dastānā*) on their hands, and making *paivand*, enter the house about one hour before their departure to the *dakhma*, carrying an iron bier (*gāhān*). They must be at least two in number (*Vend.* iii. 14), for a single man is not allowed to carry even the body of a child. Wood being more liable to infection, the bier must be of iron. It is placed beside the body. The corpse-bearers read the *Srōsh-bāj* up to the word *ashahē* (the remaining portion of that prayer is recited only when their operations relating to the corpse are finished), and add in a low voice: 'According to the dictates of Ahura Mazda, the dictates of the Amshaspands, the dictates of the holy Sraosh, the dictates of Aderbād-Mahrespand, the dictates of the Dastur of this time.' Then they sit silent, while two priests, having performed the *kosti* (cf. Darmesteter, *op. cit.* 685 f.) and repeated the special prayers of the *gāh*, enter the chamber, making *paivand*, put on their face-veils, 'take the *Srōsh-bāj*' (*i.e.* repeat it as far as *ashahē*), and commence the Ahunavaiti Gāthā (*Ys.* xxviii.–xxxiv.), keeping themselves near to the door or at least at a distance of three paces from the corpse. At the words of *Yasna* xxxi. 4: 'Seek thou for me, O Vohu Manah, the mighty Kingdom, through whose increase we may overcome the Druj,' they stop; the corpse-bearers lift the dead body on the bier, when the priests turn to the dead and finish the Gāthā, after which a new *sag-dīd* is performed. The moment is now come for relatives and friends, who have gathered in the house (or, in Yezd, in the common mortuary, the *zād-ō-marg*, 'birth and death,' or *pursish-khānah*, 'inquiry house'), to have a last look at the deceased. They bow before the body, *i.e.* make the *sejdo*, before its face is covered up.

9. Funeral procession.—Having carried the body outside the house (according to *Vend.* viii. 10, the corpse should be removed through a breach specially made in the wall of the house, and in this connexion it is worthy of note that the Persian *zād-ō-marg* has two doors, the corpse being brought in by the one and carried out by the other), the *nasā-sālārs* entrust the bier to two or more *khāndyas* (who are also sometimes called *nasā-sālārs*) to bear it to the 'tower of silence.' Two priests walk in the front of the procession, at a distance of thirty paces after the bier, accompanied by relatives and friends, two abreast, clothed in white and making *paivand*. In Persia, however, the order

is different. There the procession is led by a man bearing a vase containing fire (and formerly also by a musician playing a doleful air), followed by the relatives and friends, the corpse, the priests, and additional members of the family of the deceased. Here, too, if the *dakhma* is far distant, the body may be conveyed on a cow or donkey (cf. the Pahlavi commentary on *Vend.* iii. 14), and the mourners may ride, though the priests are required to walk.

10. In the tower.—At the gate of the tower the bier is set down, the face is uncovered to let the accompanying procession pay their last respects to the dead from a distance of at least three paces, and once more the *sag-dīd* is performed. Now the two real *nasā-sālārs*, who had arranged the body on the bier in the house, and who alone are allowed to enter the tower (not wearing their usual clothes [*Vend.* viii. 10], but the so-called 'clothes of *dakhma*'), open its gate, which is closed with an iron lock, lift the bier, carry it into the tower, place the body, with the head toward the south (the auspicious quarter), on one of the beds of stone (*kesh*) arranged in concentric circles, rising like an amphitheatre, which are intended for receiving the bodies. These circles are separated by canals (*pavis*, a word which seems also to be used of the sections divided by the canals). They remove the clothes from the corpse, leaving it naked (*Vend.* vi. 51), and cast them into the central well, forming the middle of the tower, and surrounded by the amphitheatre-like circles of stone beds. The naked corpse may be left 'on the earth, on clay, bricks, and stone and mortar.' The vultures, Nature's scavengers, are already waiting, and in one or two hours they devour all that is corruptible of the body. Twice a year the *nasā-sālārs* throw the skeletons into the well, where sun, rain, and air soon reduce the whole to dust. The *Dīnkarṭ* to *Vend.* v. 14 considers the falling of the rain on the corpses in the *dakhmas* and on the impure liquids as a great advantage. Formerly the bones were preserved in an ossuary.

'Whither shall we carry the bones of the dead, Ahura Mazda? Where shall we place them?' Ahura Mazda answered: 'You may make a structure (*uz-dānem*) for them beyond the reach of the dog, of the fox, of the wolf, inaccessible to the rain from above. If the Mazdayasnians are rich, they may construct it of stones, of plaster, or of earth. If they are not rich, they may place the dead on the ground in the light of heaven and looking towards the sun' (*Vend.* 49–51).

If, in Persia, a Zarathushtrian community is too small to support a *dakhma*, the body 'is carried to some remote place in the hills or mountains, is then piled around with stones and covered with a slab, but not interred' (Jackson, *op. cit.* p. 394).

The *Dādistān* (xviii.), in the 9th cent. A.D., recommended collecting the bones and putting them in an *astōdān*, elevated above the ground and covered with a roof to preserve them from rain and from animals. These receptacles to protect the bones from the sun were made of two excavated stones, one forming the coffin, the other the cover. They might also be real monuments, perhaps corresponding to the caves of the Achæmenians at Naksh-i Rustam (Modi, 'An old Persian Coffin,' *JASB*, 1888; cf. Darmesteter, *op. cit.* p. 93, note 34). At the present day the bones of the dead are no longer preserved.

Vend. vi. 45, in directing the dead to be carried 'to the most elevated spots, where flesh-eating dogs and flesh-eating birds may most surely perceive it,' gave sanction to a primitive method of disposing of the dead, still practised, *e.g.*, by the Kāfirs, who expose their dead in wooden coffins on the tops of the mountains (Lassen, *Ind. Alterthumskunde*, i.², Leipzig, 1867, p. 520), by some wild tribes of India (Crooke, *JAI* xxviii. [1899] 245 f.), and by the Masai, where a person dying without children is abandoned, some hundred yards outside the kraal, to the hyænas, whose speedy devouring of the corpse is considered a favourable sign (Merker, *Die Masai*, Berlin, 1904, p. 193). The Hawaiians threw their dead to the sharks, etc. (Segerstedt, *Le Monde oriental*, Upsala, 1910, iv. 2, p. 64). According to Strabo (p. 517; cf. Kleuker, *Anhang zum Zend-Avesta*, Riga, 1783, II. iii. 71 f.), the Bactrians threw their sick and aged people to dogs, trained to devour them; the Caspians considered it more auspicious if birds devoured their dead exposed in the desert than if they were eaten by dogs or wild animals (cf. Marquart, *Philologus*, Supplem. x. [1907] i. 141).

11. Dakhmas.—Special constructions or towers (*dakhmas*), for exposing the corpses, are well known to the Avesta. They constitute the most awful and impure spots on the earth, and it is one of the greatest merits to demolish them when they have served their purpose, and thus restore the ground to cultivation (*Vend.* iii. 13, vii. 49–58). The construction of the actual 'towers of silence' used by the Parsis of India is accompanied by a series of religious ceremonies, the consecration lasting three days (Menant, *Les Parsis*, Paris, 1898, pp. 206–235, with plans and illustrations).

12. Dispersion of procession.—At every *dakhma* a kind of chapel (*sāgrī*) is built, to which the funeral procession retires while the *nasā-sālārs* do their work with the dead inside the tower. When the *nasā-sālārs* are ready, the assistants, gathered in the *sāgrī* or seated at some distance from the *dakhma*, get up and finish the *Srōsh-bāj*, which they had commenced before starting in the funeral procession. In concluding the *paivand* they recite this prayer: 'We repent of all our sins. Our respects to the souls of the departed! We remember here the fravashis of the pious (departed).' They then take urine of the cow, wash the naked parts of their bodies, make the *kosti*, and repeat the *Patet*, mentioning the name of the departed at the end of the prayer, after which they return home and take a bath.

13. Ceremonies at home.—At home, immediately after the removal of the body, urine of the cow (*nīrang*) is sprinkled over the slabs of stone on which the corpse was placed, and upon the road by which it was carried out of the house. All clothes, utensils, and other articles of furniture must be cleansed, principally by the same means—*gōmēz* (urine of the cow) and water—or rejected altogether, if they have come into any contact with the dead body. After the removal of the body, all the members of the family are required to take a bath.

In an ancient Iranian province, Harōiva (Harāt), the custom recorded from later times (Chardin, *Voyages en Perse*, Amst. 1735, iii. 109), of abandoning the house to the dead, seems to have prevailed according to the *vish-harezana* of *Vend.* i. 9 (cf. N. Söderblom, *RHR* xxxix. [1899] 256 ff.). The *Great Bundahīshn* gives the following explanation of this custom: 'We keep the prescriptions (of removing the fire, the *barashnūm*, the cups, the *haoma*, and the mortar) during nine days (in the winter) or a month (in summer)' (cf. *Vend.* v. 39 ff.). 'They abandon the house and go away during nine days or a month' (Darmesteter, *op. cit.* p. 9, note 20). It may be that *upaman*, 'waiting' (*Vend.* v.) originally meant a temporary abandoning of the house. At present, in Bombay, all the members of the family have to take a bath after the removal of the body, and fragrant fire is burnt on the spot where the corpse was laid. During nine days in winter and one month in summer a lamp is kept burning on the same spot, and no one is allowed to go near it during that period. After its expiry the whole room is washed. The members of the family and also near friends abstain from meat during three days after the death.

We do not deal here with the festivals and gifts intended for the priest and for the poor after the death of a wealthy Parsi, or with the recital of several offices for his soul (see IMMORTALITY [Parsi]). The funeral expenses of an eminent Parsi gentleman who died in 1763 amounted to more than 733 rupees, which would mean more than double this sum at present (Bomanji Byramji Patell, *JASB* iii. 144 ff.).

14. Recent opposition.—In some circles of Parsi society the question of introducing a more hygienic

and less savage manner of disposing of the dead has of late been very eagerly agitated. Both burning and burying being prohibited because of the purity of fire and earth, it has been proposed to consume the corpse by electricity, and the exegetical question has been discussed whether such a method can be considered as burning or not. No change has been officially permitted as yet in the disposal of the dead, which shows the tenacity of custom, and maintains continuity with an immemorial antiquity.

LITERATURE.—J. J. Modi, 'On the Funeral Ceremonies of the Parsees, their Origin and Explanation,' in *JASB* ii. (1892); J. Darmesteter, *Le Zend-Avesta*, ii. 146 ff., Paris, 1892; D. Menant, *Les Parsis*, Paris, 1898; D. F. Karaka, *Hist. of the Parsis*, i. 192 ff., London, 1884; A. V. W. Jackson, *Persia Past and Present*, pp. 387–394, London, 1906; Khudayar Sheheryar, 'A Zoroastrian Death in Persia' (in Gujarati), in *Zartoshti*, i. 169–181.

NATHAN SÖDERBLOM.

15. Ancient Persian rites.—In ancient Persia, before the spread of Zoroastrianism, the means of disposal of the dead were quite different from those observed by the adherents of the great Iranian religious leader. Attention has already been called, in § 10, to the Bactrian custom of leaving the sick and the aged to be devoured by dogs—a practice recorded not only by Strabo (p. 517), but by Cicero (*Tusc. Disp.* i. 45) and by Eusebius (*Præp. evang.* I. iv. 7). Both Herodotus (i. 140) and Strabo (p. 735) expressly state that, while the Magi exposed their dead to dogs or birds (as the Avesta enjoins), the Persians interred the dead body after coating it with wax (κατακηρώσαντες δὴ ὦν τὸν νέκυν Πέρσαι γῇ κρύπτουσι). It was, therefore, rank blasphemy (οὐχ ὅσια) when Cambyses ordered the corpse of Amasis to be cremated (Herodotus, iii. 16); and it is very doubtful whether any credence can be given to Xenophon's account (*Cyropæd.* VIII. vii. 25) of the request of the dying Cyrus—'Put my body, my children, when I die, neither in gold nor in silver nor in anything else, but commit it to the earth as soon as may be (τῇ γῇ ὡς τάχιστα ἀπόδοτε). For what is more blessed than this, to be mingled with the earth (γῇ μιχθῆναι)?'—since this last phrase would seem to exclude any coating of the body with wax. Equal suspicion seems to attach to Xenophon's story (*ib.* vii. 3) of the death of Abradates, for whom a grave was prepared, and whose dead head was held on her lap by his wife, whose corpse, after her suicide, and his were both covered over by her nurse before burial. Ctesias, however, who is much more reliable than his ancient contemporaries would allow, may be right when he states (*Pers.* 59) that Parysatis buried the head and right hand of Cyrus the Younger, for here the wax coating may perhaps have been employed.

Unfortunately, our sole information on this subject must thus far be gleaned from the meagre statements of the classics. If we may judge from the tombs of the Achæmenians, their bodies were not exposed as Zoroastrianism dictated; but it is by no means impossible that they were coated with wax, or even, as Jackson also suggests (*Persia Past and Present*, p. 285), 'perhaps embalmed after the manner of the Egyptians.' According to Arrian (*Anab.* VI. xxix. 4–11), the body (σῶμα) of Cyrus was laid in a coffin of gold (πύελον χρυσῆν; cf. Jackson, *loc. cit.* and p. 304 f., for further references).

All this was, of course, changed when Persia definitely became Zoroastrian. In his account of the obsequies of Mermeroes († A.D. 554), Agathias (*Hist.* II. xix. 22) recognizes only the usage of the Avesta (with the addition of the exposure of the sick while still living), and he expressly says that the Persians could not place the dead in a coffin (θήκῃ) or urn (λάρνακι), or bury in the earth (τῇ γῇ καταχωννύναι); and the 5th cent. Sasanian monarch Kobad demanded, though without success, that the Christian Iberian ruler Gurgenes should adopt the Persian custom of exposing the dead to birds and dogs, instead of burying them (Procopius, *de Bell. Pers.* i. 12).

LITERATURE.—In addition to the works mentioned in the previous section, reference may also be made to Kleuker, *Anhang zum Zend-Avesta*, II. iii. 9 f., 57 f., 144, Riga, 1783; Brisson, *de Regio Persarum principatu*, ed. Lederlein, p. 619 ff., Strassburg, 1710; Rapp, *ZDMG* xx. [1866] 53–56.

LOUIS H. GRAY.

DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD (Roman).

—As in other lands and in other times, so also among the ancient Romans the customs attendant upon death and burial varied so considerably according to wealth, rank, occupation, nationality, religion, place, and period that no single succession of circumstances may be taken as typical, and great caution must be exercised in dealing with the scattered and fragmentary evidence on the subject, in order to avoid confusing the particular with the universal, or attributing to one period the customs peculiar to another.

The greater part of our evidence having to do with the upper classes during the late Republic and early Empire, it will be best to re-construct, as a nucleus around which to build up an account of burial customs in general, a typical instance of the death and burial of a Roman grandee of the 1st cent. of the Empire.

As the man breathes his last, the assembled relatives loudly and repeatedly call out his name in the *conclamatio*—a more or less formalized expression of grief which is probably reminiscent of primitive attempts to wake the dead back to life; and perhaps the nearest of kin kisses him, as if to catch and preserve in the family line the last breath. After the formal announcement '*conclamatum est*,' the eyes are closed, and the usual bathing and anointing, perhaps embalming, take place, performed by one of the household, or by the professional *libitinarius* or *pollinctor*. The body is composed, arrayed in the toga—the full dress of antiquity—ornamented with all the insignia won during the dead man's career, and placed in state on the *lectus funebris* in the *atrium*, or main chamber of the house, with the feet towards the street-door. There are also flowers, *coronæ* of honour, and burning censers supported on candelabra. Near by are attendants, among them being sometimes included paid mourners who chant the funeral wail. [These details may be seen in the Lateran Museum on the tomb relief of the Haterii, a family of considerable importance during the latter part of the 1st century.] Possibly a coin is placed in the mouth as passage-money across the Styx—a custom always in vogue to some extent. A wax impression of the face is then taken, afterwards to occupy its niche in the *ala*, a state room off the *atrium*, along with the masks (*imagines*) of the ancestral line, and to be supplied with the appropriate inscription, or *titulus*, recording the name, years, offices, and deeds of the dead. Outside, the fact of death is made known, and the proper safeguard taken against chance religious or social impropriety, by the hanging of a cypress- or pine-branch at the entrance of the house.

In due time, which in ordinary cases is as soon as arrangements can be made, and in funerals of state from three to seven days, the last ceremonies take place. Criers go through the streets announcing its coming occurrence in the ancient formula: '*Ollus Quiris leto datus. Exsequias, quibus est commodum, ire iam tempus est. Ollus ex aedibus effertur*' ('This citizen has been given over to death. His obsequies those who find it convenient may now attend. He is being carried forth from his dwelling'). Under the supervision of the *designator* and his attendant lictors, the stately

funeral-train takes form and moves: musicians, and perhaps paid singers; dancers and pantomimists, who jest freely, sometimes impersonating in humorous wise even the deceased; a succession of cars, at times amounting to hundreds (six hundred at the funeral of Marcellus), on which sit actors dressed to impersonate the long line of the dead man's ancestors, wearing their death-masks, now taken from the niches in the *alæ*, and accompanied by lictors, as in life—symbolically conducting the most recent of the family line to take his place with his forefathers in the lower world; a display of the dead man's memorials—trophies, horses, dogs, insignia, painted representations of his exploits—after the manner of a triumph; more lictors, with down-pointed *fasces*, reminiscent of olden-time burial by night; and then, high on a funeral car, the dead himself, with face exposed to the sky, or enclosed in a casket and represented by a realistic figure clad in his clothes and death-mask; the immediate mourners—sons with veiled heads, daughters bareheaded with flowing hair; and finally the general public, not without demonstration. On both sides, as the procession passes, is the Roman populace, pressing to the line, and climbing up

'To towers and windows, yea, to chimney tops,'

to witness what must have been one of the greatest spectacles of all time.

Arrived at the Forum, the great centre of civic life, the dead is carried to the Rostra, on which, surrounded by his ghostly ancestry, he lies while his nearest relative delivers over him the *laudatio*, a formal and often extravagant glorification of the deceased and his forefathers which is preserved among the family archives, and whose uncritical use will do so much to falsify or distort Roman history. The procession then forms again, resumes its way, and passes through the city-gate to the destined place of cremation or inhumation at one of the great *mausolea*, such as that of Augustus, at the north end of the Campus Martius, or in one of the long lines of lots which border the high road. Here the dead, with ornaments, weapons, and other possessions dear in life, together with many memorials brought by friends and relatives, is placed upon an elaborate pyre, to which, with averted face, the nearest relative or friend, or some civic dignitary, applies the torch. As the flames rise to the summit of the pyre, perhaps they liberate from his lightly fastened cage an eagle, which soars aloft—the symbol of the spirit of the dead setting out for its home among the immortals. The embers are quenched with water or wine, the final farewell (another *conclamatio*) is uttered, and all return to the city except the immediate relatives, who collect the ashes of the departed in a napkin, bury the *os resectum* (see below) to preserve the form of earth-burial, perform a purificatory sacrifice, and partake of the funeral-meal in the family tomb-chapel.

There follow nine days of mourning, on one of which the now dry ashes are enclosed in an urn of marble or metal, and carried by a member of the family, barefooted and ungirdled, to their final resting-place in the tomb-chamber. At the end of this period, the *sacrum novendiale*, a feast to the dead, is celebrated at the tomb, and a funeral-banquet is held at the home. Mourning continues ten months for husbands, wives, parents, adult sons and daughters, eight months for other adult relatives, and in the case of children for as many months as they have years. Memorial festivals, which partake of the nature of a communion, are celebrated on Feb. 13–21, the *Parentalia*, or pagan All-Souls' Day; again on the birth or burial anniversary; and again at the end of March and May, the *Violaria* and *Rosaria*, when violets and roses are profusely distributed, lamps lighted in the tomb-chambers, funeral-banquets held, and offerings made to the gods and to the *manes*, or spirits of the dead.

Such a funeral, though not unfamiliar to the Roman people, was the exception rather than the rule. The imposing nature of the whole—the splendour of its appointments, the dignity of the participants, the impressiveness of the stately train, with its hundreds of impersonated prætorians and consulars, traversing the principal thoroughfares between thronging spectators—may best be compared with the funerals of Italian royalty in modern times, though the latter probably fall far short of the magnificence of the ancient ceremony.

The funerals of middle and lower class people, and of most of the upper class, were less ostentatious, and unaccompanied by the *laudatio*, the display of death-masks, and the paraphernalia of wealth. Children, citizens of the lowest class, and slaves were carried to their last rest without public procession, and with few formalities.

Unlike modern burial-places, the Roman cemeteries were not public communal enclosures set apart by themselves, but were situated along the great highways that led from the city-gates, and took the form of a very long and narrow series of private holdings, whose front, occupied by imposing monuments, bordered immediately on the road. All streets leading from Rome had their tombs, and the location of sepulchres along them in the country also, on landed estates, was frequent. Most prominent among the highway cemeteries at Rome were the Via Flaminia and the Via Salaria on the north, the Tiburtina and the Prænestina on the east, the Latina and the Appia on the south, and the Aurelia on the west. Most magnificent of all was the Appian Way, *Regina Viarum*, which still displays almost unbroken lines of tomb-ruins from its issue at the old Servian Porta Capena to the Alban Mount, fourteen miles away. Among its two hundred or more larger monuments, displaying great variety of architecture and ornamentation, are to be seen most of the types of the Roman tomb: the *mausoleum*, round, and probably once with conical summit, copied and named after the tomb of Mausolus, the king of Icaria, who died about 351 B.C.; the *tumulus*, a conical mound heaped over the body or ashes of the dead, also reminiscent of Asia; the tomb above ground; the tomb excavated in the tufa bed of the Campagna; the combination of both, with tomb below and chamber above; the *columbarium*, for the reception of the cremated dead of burial-associations; the chambers in series called 'catacombs' (*q.v.*). Burial lots were marked by boundary stones, inscribed with measurements: e.g. '*in fronte p. xvi. in agro p. xxii.*' ('frontage, 16 ft., depth, 22 ft.'). Threats and curses were frequently added to safeguard the area and monuments against violation or profanation. The more pretentious areas were great family burial-places, where were laid to rest all the members of a gens, or branch of a gens, including its freedmen and slaves, and sometimes even clients and friends. Such a burial-place might include a generous plot of ground, with an area before the tomb, a garden behind, an *ustrina*, or crematory, *ædiculæ*, or shrines with statues of the dead, banquet-room for anniversary use, pavilion, well, and custodian's quarters. The epitaphs, incised upon slabs let into the front of the monument, or on tombstones at the graves of individuals, or near the remains inside the vault, are characterized by great variety of content and expression. Name, parentage, public offices, and an accurate statement of the length of life are found in most of them, without dates of death and birth. A type may be seen in that of Minucia, the daughter of Fundanus, whose death is the subject of Pliny's *Ep.* v. 16:

'D. M. Minuciae Marcellae Fundani F. Vix. A. XII., M. XI., D. VII.' ('To the Departed Spirit [*Dis Manibus*] of Minucia Marcella, the Daughter of Fundanus, who lived 12 years, 11 months, and 7 days') (*CIL* vi. 16631).

A portrait-bust sometimes accompanied the epitaph, and it was not infrequent for the inscription to be in the form of an address to the passer-by from the mouth of the departed, as the quaint archaistic one of Marcus Cæcilius, which lies by the Appian Way (*CIL* i. 1006):

'Hoc est factum monumentum Maarco Caicilio.
Hospes, gratum est quom apud meas restitistei seedes.
Bene rem geras et valeas; dormias sine qura.'

('This monument is erected to Marcus Cæcilius. Stranger, it gives me pleasure that you have stopped at my resting-place. Good fortune attend you, and fare you well; may you sleep without care.')

Such appeals as this upon stones, the use of portrait-sculpture, and the custom of roadside burial illustrate the Roman yearning for continued participation in the affairs of the living, and an instinctive conviction as to future existence.

Among the lower classes, especially freedmen and the labouring part of the population, a most popular form of tomb was the *columbarium*, so named because of its resemblance to a dove-cot. Long narrow vaults were either built above ground or excavated in the tufa, and in their walls were formed numerous compact rows of niches, each of a size barely large enough to receive an urn containing the ashes of one person, whose identity was made known by a *titulus* upon a slab below the urn, or on the urn itself, sometimes accompanied by a small portrait-bust. One of these *columbaria* on the Via Appia, from which three hundred *tituli* have been preserved, was for the use of the freedmen of Augustus and Livia. Such tombs were sometimes given as benevolences, and sometimes erected by speculators, but it was more usual for them to be constructed, or at least managed, by *collegia funeraticia*, co-operative funeral associations, which sold stock, assessed regular dues, and paid benefits, thus ensuring their members proper disposition after death. They were administered by *curatores*, who divided and assigned the space by lot to the shareholders, who might in turn sell their holdings.

The lot of the ordinary slave and the very poorest class of citizens was less fortunate. Outside the line of the Servian Wall, where it crossed the plateau of the Esquiline, there existed, down to the time of Horace (when it was covered with earth and transformed into the Gardens of Mæcenas), a great burial-ground which might be called 'the potter's field' of Rome. Here, as shown by excavations made from 1872 onwards, was an area of irregular dimensions extending a mile or more along the wall, from near the present railway-station on the north-east to the Lateran on the south-east, which had served as a necropolis from time immemorial, and was the burial-ground to which Horace made reference in *Sat.* I. viii. 8–16:

'Huc prius angustis eiecta cadavera cellis
Conservus vili portanda locabat in arca;
Hoc miserae plebi stabat commune sepulchrum,
Pantolabo scurrae Nomentanoque nepoti.
Mille pedes in fronte, trecentos cippus in agrum
Hic dabat, heredes monumentum ne sequeretur.
Nunc licet Esquiliis habitare salubribus, atque
Aggere in aprico spatiari, quo modo tristes
Albis informem spectabant ossibus agrum'

('Hither, of yore, their fellow-slave contracted to carry in their cheap coffins the dead sent forth from their narrow dwellings; here lay the common sepulchre of the wretched *plebs*, for Pantolabus the knave, and Nomentanus the ne'er-do-weel. A thousand feet front, three hundred feet deep were the limits; the monument not to follow the heirs. To-day you may dwell on a healthful Esquiline, and take walks on the sunny *agger*, where but now your sad gaze rested upon a field ugly with whitening bones').

The reference in the above lines to the cheap coffins, the slave hireling, the contrast between the gloomy bone-strewn Esquiline of former days and the healthful gardens of the present, and the sardonic allusion to the *cippus* as the one monument of a whole city of wretched poor constitute an eloquent comment on the mortuary destiny of the lowest class, though to interpret literally the poet's mention of whitening bones seems unnecessary. Excavation has revealed pit-graves 13 to 16 ft. square and of great depth, in which the bodies of the criminal and otherwise unfortunate were deposited one above the other, unburned, and with little ceremony.

Cremation and inhumation existed side by side throughout the pagan period. The earliest cemeteries—the lowest stratum of that on the Esquiline, and the necropolis recently (1902) excavated on the Sacred Way near the Forum—contain both cinerary urns and sarcophagi, the latter being sometimes made of hollowed tree-trunks. The later strata on the Esquiline also contain both. The Cornelian gens held to earth-burial until Sulla chose cremation as a measure of safety. The tomb-chambers of the Scipios, a branch of the Cornelian gens, on the Appian Way inside the Wall of Aurelian, were filled with sarcophagi containing unburned dead; and in many large tombs the heads of families were laid away in sarcophagi, while the cremated remains of their freedmen and the humbler members of the household were deposited about them in the same chamber. Inhumation, as the cheaper and more natural method, seems to have been the earlier, basic, and popular custom; even in Augustan times, when cremation was as nearly universal as it ever became, it was the custom to perform at least a symbolical burial of the body by the interment of a small part of it, the *os resectum*, usually a joint of the little finger.

The foregoing account of death and burial has to do principally with the 1st cent. A.D. and with the city of Rome. Naturally, there were variations in detail before and after this period: *e.g.* burial by night was the practice of earlier times, and was prescribed again by Julian, on the ground of inconvenience to urban business caused by diurnal rites; the cemeteries of the earliest times were less distant from the heart of the city, by reason of the lesser circumference of the primitive walls, each successive fortification carrying the line of tombs farther out because of the law forbidding burial within the city limit; there was less of both display and poverty before the rise of the Empire; sumptuary laws governing funerals were known from the first centuries of the city; the employment of chambers and galleries excavated in the bed of the Campagna, long known on a small scale, grew much more general and extensive after the rise of Christian Rome, developing into the great communal burying-places called 'catacombs'; cremation died out because of its expensiveness and the influence of belief in the resurrection. As to other cities, practice there was essentially the same as at Rome; and in small towns in the country a great deal of conservatism no doubt obtained, manifest in the retention of customs long after they had gone out in the capital.

All periods of the history of Roman burial, however, are unified by the belief in the continued existence of the dead, and in his ghostly participation in the life of the family and community, and by the consequent scrupulous care about proper burial, and the maintenance of right relations with the spirits of dead ancestors. The quick and the dead of ancient Rome were in a more than usually intimate communion.

LITERATURE.—The appropriate chapters in S. B. Platner, *Topography and Monuments of Ancient Rome*², Boston, 1911; J. H. Middleton, *Remains of Ancient Rome*, London, 1892; J. Marquardt, *Das Privatleben der Römer*², Leipzig, 1886; Daremberg-Saglio, *Dict. des Ant. gr. et rom.*, Paris, 1873 ff., s.v. 'Funus.'

GRANT SHOWERMAN.

DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD (Slavic).—The subject of death and the disposal of the dead, so far as the Slavic peoples are concerned, was discussed with considerable fullness in the art. ARYAN RELIGION, vol. ii. p. 11[b] ff. It cannot be doubted that the primitive conditions in this particular phase of human life, though to some extent overlaid with a dressing of Christian thought and practice, have been maintained most faithfully among the peoples in question, and it was therefore quite natural that the writer of that article should begin with Slavic ideas and customs, so that, by comparing these with the corresponding phenomena among the linguistically allied races, viz. the Indian, Iranian, Greek, Roman, Celtic, Teutonic, and Lithuanian, he might carry his investigation back to the so-called Aryan period. There is consequently no need to cover the same ground again, but it may not be out of place to record here such facts as have emerged, or have come to the writer's knowledge, since the appearance of the article referred to. We shall arrange these fresh data under five heads.

1. Burial and burning of the corpse (cf. ARYAN RELIGION, vol. ii. p. 16 f.).—In the early historical period, as was shown in the passage cited, both of these methods were in operation—probably simultaneously—among the Slavs, and, as recent archæological investigation shows, they prevailed also in the pre-historic age. With reference to *burial*, there has recently come to light a most remarkable correspondence between Middle Germany and Southern Russia in regard to the practice of constructing the tomb in the form of a hut.

At Leubingen, a station on the railway from Erfurt (Thuringia) to Sangerhausen, and not far from Sömmerda, there is a now celebrated sepulchral mound, which has been excavated by Prof. Klopfleisch, a long misunderstood pioneer in the study of primitive history. Near Helmsdorf, again, a village at no great distance from Leubingen, in the so-called Mannsfeld Seekreis, another mound, similar in many respects to that at Leubingen, was recently opened (cf. P. Höfer, in *Jahresschr. f. d. Vorgesch. d. sächs.-thüring. Länder*, v. [Halle, 1906]; and H. Grössler, *ib.* vi. [1907]). In each case the remains (which in the mound at Leubingen lay upon a flooring of wood, and in that near Helmsdorf in a bed-shaped chest of hewn timber) had been arched over by an actual wooden hut of excellent workmanship, with a steep roofing, the planks of which in the Leubingen example were thatched with reeds. The remains found at Leubingen were those of an elderly man, across whose breast had been laid the body of a girl some ten years old, while the Helmsdorf mound, to all appearance, contained but a single body, in a doubled-up position. The objects found beside the dead in both cases—bronze axes, dagger-rods and daggers, small chisels, a diorite hammer, and also numerous ornaments in gold, such as armlets, pins, spiral rings and bracelets—point to the Bronze Age (*c.* 1500 B.C.?), and also show that the dead had been persons of rank. In a dense layer of ashes under the chest in the Helmsdorf mound were found the skeletons of two men, who had doubtless been given to the dead as his servants. But the most interesting feature of either barrow is unquestionably the wooden hut, designed unmistakably to provide a house for the dead.

Now, although students of pre-historic times are as yet unaware of the fact, similar, and, indeed, almost identical erections are found in great profusion in the Russian *kurgans*, *i.e.* the sepulchral mounds which lend a picturesque variety to the monotony of the Steppes in the districts to the north of the Black Sea. These erections are met with, moreover, not only in the *kurgans* constructed by the Scythian tribes who once dominated that region, but also in those dating from the earlier epochs, which in so many respects still require investigation. It will be to the purpose, therefore, to give a relatively full description of a single specimen of the South-Russian burial-huts —that, namely, discovered in 1903 by V. A. Gorodzov in a *kurgan* situated in the Government of Ekaterinoslav, and dating, according to its discoverer, from the close of the second millennium B.C. (cf. *Results of the Archæological Excavations in the District of Bachmut in the Government of Ekaterinoslav in 1903* ([Russ.], Moscow, 1907, p. 152 ff.). In the heart of the *kurgan* was a spacious square cavity, on the floor of which rested a framework box of thick oak boards — some kind of coffin. Between the walls of the cavity and the box, on the east side, lay a red-coloured jar and a cow's head, while each of the four corners of the cavity contained a cow's foot. Inside the box was the doubled-up skeleton of a woman, lying on its left side, with the head turned towards the north-east, and the wrists under the face. At the neck of the skeleton were found small fragments of bronze beads or other ornaments of the kind. In front of the face stood an earthen vessel; and before the breast were a number of rattles, which had been cut from the backbone of an animal. The skeleton lay on chalky earth, but the skull had a pillow of rushes. The most striking feature of this burial vault, however, is the hut erected over the chest. This hut was supported by two posts fixed in roundish holes at the head and feet of the skeleton, but outside the box in which it lay. The post supported a beam, which had branches leaning against it on either side, so forming the sloping framework of the roof; the branches, again, were covered with reeds. Upon the roof-beam stood a number of pots upside down, and also a badly-weathered quern of sandstone. Above these was a layer of ashes, containing a cow's head, four cow's legs, a large pot with a dimpled ornamentation at its neck and a perforated bottom, incinerated bones, and a whetstone.

As bearing upon the primitive history of Russia, and even of Europe, however, these discoveries are surpassed in importance by the places for the cremation of corpses—perhaps the oldest in Europe —which have been discovered in the valleys of the Dniester and the Dnieper, to the east of the Carpathians, and at no remote distance from the localities above referred to. These places for cremation date, for the most part, from a late Neolithic civilization, which yields little of importance, but in their pottery they furnish a new factor in the cultural development of Europe, extending, as it does, towards the west, across Southern Russia and Bessarabia, and to the north of the Balkan Peninsula. Among its characteristic products are magnificently painted vessels, with plastic decorations of bulls' heads and the like, and numerous idols, mainly representing women and cattle.

The last-mentioned discoveries are due in the main to the researches of Chvojko, of Kiev (*Papers of the XIth Archæol. Congress at Kiev* [Russ.], i.; also *Antiquités de la region du Dniepre* [*Collection B. Khanenko*, première livraison, Kiev, 1899], and [for Bessarabia] v. Stern ('The "pre-Mycenæan" Civilization in Southern Russia,' in *Papers of the XIIth Archæol. Congress in Ekaterinoslav* [Russ.], i.), and they have been critically examined by E. Meyer, *Gesch. d. Altertums*, i.[2] (Stuttgart, 1909) 741 ff. But we are not yet in a position to identify with certainty the peoples from whom emanated the civilizations thus traced at Tripolje, to the south of Kiev, and at Petreny, in Bessarabia.

2. The funeral procession (cf. art. ARYAN

RELIGION, vol. ii. p. 20).—In the passage cited we were able to indicate that the practice of bearing the dead to the grave on sledges, even in summer, once prevailed in certain parts of Russia. In an exhaustive work shortly referred to in that passage (viz. 'Sledge, Boat, and Horse as Accessories of Burial Ritual' [Russ.], vol. xvi. of the Moscow *Drevnosti*), Annčin has conclusively proved that in ancient Russia the dead were often, even in summer, conveyed to the grave on sledges, which, however, might be either *driven* or *carried*. The former method is illustrated by a picture in the Sylvester MS ('Conveyance of the Remains of St. Glebu by Sledge to the new Church'); the latter by a picture in the Sylvester MS of SS. Boris and Glebu ('Conveyance of the Corpse of Prince St. Boris by Sledge'). But, as the use of the sledge in funeral obsequies is also found, according to Annčin, among many Finnish tribes, and as to this day the funeral-sledge often supersedes the waggon—even in the finest season of the year—in the north-east of Europe, it is safe to conjecture that the Russians had adopted the practice from the East European peoples with whom they mingled as they spread towards the north-east. Traces of funeral-sledges are likewise found in Egypt, while Lycian grave-stones sometimes exhibit houses resting upon sledge-runners (cf. R. Meringer [*Indogerm. Forschungen*, xix. [1905] 409).

3. **The gifts to the dead** (cf. art. ARYAN RELIGION, vol. ii. p. 20 ff.).—Just as we read in the *Iliad* (xxiii. 171 f.) that the four-horse team of Patroclus was burned upon his funeral-pyre, in Herodotus (iv. 71 f.) that large numbers of horses were buried with the Scythian kings, and in Tacitus (*Germ.* 27) 'quorundam [the Germans] igni et equus adicitur'; so from the Russian *bylins*, or histories, we learn that men were interred with their horses, and sometimes even upon horseback. The burial of Bogatyrĭ Potok Mikhail Ivanović, for example, is thus described:

> 'Then they began to dig a grave there;
> They hollowed out a grave deep and large:
> A deep one, some twenty fathoms wide.
> And then was Potok Mikhail Ivanović,
> *With his steed and harness of war*,
> Lowered into the deep grave.
> And they covered it with a roofing of oak,
> And strewed it with yellow sand.'
>
> (Annčin, *loc. cit.*).

4. **The funeral feast** (cf. art. ARYAN RELIGION, vol. ii. p. 20[b]): **attentions paid to the dead after the funeral rites (Ancestor-worship)** (*ib.* 23 ff.).—The various facts—and especially those referring to the White Russians—set forth in the paragraphs cited have meanwhile been largely supplemented from various quarters of the Slavic world. This fresh information is supplied by Matthias Murko in an art. entitled 'Das Grab als Tisch,' in *Wörter und Sachen: Kulturhist. Ztschr. f. Sprach- u. Sachforschung*, ed. R. Meringer, etc., ii. 1, Heidelberg, 1910, p. 79 ff. The first three chapters of this most instructive essay deal respectively with the following subjects: (1) funeral repasts of the Slavs at the burial-place after the interment; (2) sepulchral meals of the Slavs at the graves of individuals; and (3) sepulchral meals on the all-souls'-days and at the ancestral feasts of the Slavs, and meals for the dead among aliens in Russia. That Murko is in this field of inquiry essentially at one with the present writer appears, *e.g.*, from his remarks on p. 110:

'For experts in this study, it will not be necessary that I should emphasize the fact that so many customs and festivals still in vogue recall those of the Greeks and the Romans, and even surpass the latter in remoteness of origin, so that we must look for their parallels among primitive peoples. I shall merely state that the original purport of the practice of eating and drinking at the grave can still be clearly recognized: the deceased still takes part in the meal; the mourners leave a place vacant for him at the grave-table; they expressly invite him; they eat with delight of his favourite dishes; they give him wine and honey to drink; they pour wine and water upon the head of his grave; and beside or upon the grave they set food for the dead,' etc.

5. In the article referred to, however, Murko carries his investigation considerably further, as in subsequent chapters he sketches the process by which the relics of ancient ancestor-worship have in the Eastern Church become intermingled with the primitive worship of the dead among the Slavs ('worship of heroes and its transference to the Christian martyrs'). The details of the process are given in the following chapters: (4) the early Christian Agapæ and the meals connected therewith; (5) the survival in the Slav languages of Gr. *τράπεζα* and other foreign words connected with the cult of the dead (cf. art. ARYAN RELIGION, vol. ii. p. 27[a], regarding Russ. *kanunŭ* = Gr. *κανών*); (6) Romano-Greek influence upon the spring festivals for the dead among the Slavs (O. Slav. *rusalija*, Serv. (*d*)*ruzičalo*, Russ. *radunica*; cf. vol. ii. p. 25[b] and 25[a]); Murko's derivation of Russ. *raduniea*, from Gr. ῥοδωνία· ὁ τῶν ῥόδων λειμών of Suidas, is original and convincing, so that its meaning is the same as that of *Rosalia*, the spring festival for the dead); (7) Lat. *silicernium*, *silicern(i)us* (cf. vol. ii. p. 28[a]; Murko thinks that this word denotes the feast held upon the *silices*, *i.e.* the rubble of the grave).

LITERATURE.—This is sufficiently indicated in the art. and in ARYAN RELIGION.

O. SCHRADER.

DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD (Tibetan).

—In Tibet, death is regarded as the work of the death-demon, who has accordingly to be exorcized from the house and locality. The ceremonies at death and the methods of disposal of the body are almost entirely of a pre-Buddhistic or Bon character, although now conducted for the most part by orthodox Buddhist priests.

The Tibetans believe that the soul lives after the death of the body, but the future life desired by the people is not the Buddhistic one of a higher earthly re-birth or the arhat-ship of *Nirvāṇa* or Buddhahood. They desire the new life to be in an everlasting paradise, which is now identified with the Western Paradise of Buddha Amitābha of the later Indian Buddhists. The object of the death-ritual, therefore, is, firstly, to secure the due passage of the soul of the deceased to this paradise, and, secondly, to safeguard the earthly survivors against harm from the death-demon, as well as from the spirit of the deceased in the event of its failing to reach paradise and so becoming a malignant ghost.

Formerly, so late as the 8th cent. A.D., human sacrifices were made on the death of kings and nobles. Five or six chosen friends from amongst their officers were styled 'comrades,' and killed themselves on the death of their master, so as to accompany him to paradise, and their bodies were buried alongside of his. The crests of the hills were crowned by such sepulchral mounds, as in China and amongst the Turkic tribes. Beside the body were buried the clothes and valuables of the deceased, his bow, sword, and other weapons, and his favourite horse; and a tumulus of earth was thrown up over all. Animal-sacrifice seems also to have been practised, as is evidenced by the dough effigies of animals which are offered as part of the sacrificial rite by the hands of Buddhist monks, who now perform the popular death-rites, and by their religion are prohibited from taking life (L. A. Waddell, *Buddhism of Tibet*, p. 518 f.).

1. **Extraction of the soul.**—On the physical death of a person, Tibetans believe that the spirit does not depart forthwith, but continues to linger within the corpse for a varying period, which may extend to four days, after the cessation of the heart and

breath. In order to secure the release of the spirit in that direction in which it has the greatest chance of reaching paradise, the services of an expert priest are necessary.

After a death occurs, no layman is allowed to touch the body. A white cloth is thrown over the face of the corpse, and a priest is sent for to extract the soul in the orthodox manner. This priest is one of the higher monks, and bears the title of 'The Mover or Shifter' (*'p'o-bo*). On his arrival in the death-chamber, all relatives and others are excluded, and the priest, closing the doors and windows, sits near the head of the corpse and chants the directions for the soul to find its way to the Western Paradise. After exhorting the soul to quit the body and give up its attachment to earthly property, the priest seizes with his forefinger and thumb a few hairs on the crown of the corpse, and, jerking these forcibly, is supposed thereby to make way for the soul of the deceased through the pores of the roots of these hairs, as though actual perforation of the skull had been effected. If, in the process, blood oozes from the nostrils, it is an auspicious sign. The soul is then directed to avoid the dangers which beset the road to paradise, and is bidden God-speed. This ceremony lasts about an hour. When, through accident or otherwise, the body is not forthcoming and the fourth day is expiring, this rite is performed *in absentia* by the priest conjuring it up in spirit whilst seated in deep meditation.

2. Handling the corpse.—All persons are tabued from touching a corpse (*ro*) except those who belong to the father's family or those indicated by the astrologer-priest, who casts a horoscope for the purpose. This document also prescribes the most auspicious date for the funeral and the mode and place of disposal of the body, as well as the worship to be performed for the soul of the deceased and for the welfare of the surviving relatives.

The persons who may ordinarily handle a corpse must be children by the same father as deceased (*p'as-spun*), though in Lhasa and large towns with many strangers the professional scavengers may do this work. In rural communities, when a man has no paternal relatives of his own, he procures admission into the family of a friend for such funeral purposes as official mourner by giving a dinner to announce the fact. The persons so authorized then approach the body with ropes, and, doubling it up into a crouching attitude, tie it in this posture, with the face between the knees and the hands under the legs. If *rigor mortis* be present, bones may be broken during the process. The attitude of the body resembles that found in some of the early sepultures, and is probably a survival of the pre-historic period. It ensures portability of the corpse.

When tied up in the proper attitude, the body is covered with some of the clothes of the deceased, put inside a sack made of hide, tent-cloth, or blanket, and removed from the room to the chapel of the house (where there is one) as a mortuary, and placed in a corner there. A sheet or curtain is stretched in front of the sack as a screen, and all laymen retire. Where the body has to be kept a long time for climatic or other reasons, it may be slung up to the rafters.

3. Pre-funeral rites.—Priests remain in relays day and night chanting services near the corpse until it is removed. The head priest sits near the screen, with his back to the corpse; the other priests face him, and all read extracts from the Buddhist scriptures, often from different books at the same time; and they keep alight lamps (from 5 to 108, according to the means of the deceased). The relatives sit in another room, and offer food and drink to the deceased. His bowl is kept filled with tea or beer, and he is offered a share of whatever food is going; and such drink and food as are offered are afterwards thrown away, as it is believed that their essence has been abstracted by the soul of the departed. Feeding the *manes* is also found in the Indian Buddhist practice of *avalambana*, based upon the Brāhmanical rite of *śrāddha*.

Before the funeral the guests, after libations, partake in solemn silence of cake and wine within the house in which the corpse is lying; but, after the latter is removed, no one will eat or drink in that house for a month.

4. Funeral procession.—This occurs on the auspicious day and hour fixed for it by the astrologer. The relatives and guests bow to the corpse, which is then lifted by the official mourners, put on the chief mourner's back, and carried to the door, where it is placed in a square box or coffin (*ro-rg'am*) provided by the monastery which is conducting the funeral, and the box is carried thence by the official mourners to the cemetery or cremation ground. If the chief mourner is a woman, she does not accompany the funeral, but, after walking thrice round the coffin and prostrating herself thrice, is conducted back to the house.

In front of the procession go the priests, chanting Sanskrit spells or *mantras* extracted from the later Indian Buddhist scriptures, and blowing horns, or beating drums, or ringing handbells; then follow the relatives and friends, and last of all comes the coffin. This is led by the chief priest by means of a long scarf, one end of which is attached to the coffin; the other end he holds in his left hand, whilst with his right he beats a skull drum as he walks. This scarf probably represents the 'soul's banner' (*hurin-fan*), which is carried before the coffin by the Chinese.

The spot or cemetery to which the body is carried is usually a solitary rock on a wild hilltop, and is believed to be haunted by evil spirits. In Lhasa the ordinary cemetery (*dur-k'röd*) is within the city. The corpse must not be set down anywhere *en route*, otherwise the final ceremony would have to be performed at that place.

5. Disposal of the body.—The particular mode in which the body is to be disposed of is prescribed by the astrologer-lama. Of the various modes, one only, namely cremation, presents Buddhistic features. The methods may be said to be five in number:

1. *Consumption of flesh by animals and burial of bones.*—This, the so-called 'terrestrial method,' is the commonest and obviously the most ancient. It was a custom of the ancient Scythians known to Herodotus; and its practice by the Parsis at the present day may also be derived from such a source or from the Turkic tribes. There seems no reason to ascribe it, as has been conjectured, to the influence of those Jātaka tales which relate that Śākyamuni in former births offered his body to feed famished tigers and other animals. Such a practice of disposal of the dead is not recorded in Indian Buddhism, and its present-day practice in Siam and Korea, as well as in Tibet, is obviously a survival of the ancient Scythic and Mongolian custom.

At the cemetery the body is placed face downwards on the rock or slab of stone, divested of its clothes, and tied to a stake. The priest, chanting *mantras*, scores it with a large knife, and the corpse-cutters slice off the flesh and throw it to the vultures and other animals of prey which frequent these cemeteries. In Lhasa dogs and even pigs assist in devouring the corpses. As, however, vultures are esteemed more auspicious, the attendants for a small sum engage to keep off the other less desirable beasts of prey. The rapidity with which the body is devoured is considered of good

omen, and the skull of such a corpse is prized as an auspicious libation-bowl.

The bones of the stripped and dismembered body are then buried, and, if the person be wealthy, a mound or tower is erected over them.

2. *Total consumption of flesh and bones by animals.*—This, the so-called 'celestial method,' is much less common, though not infrequent with the richer classes. The bones, stripped of their flesh as above, are not buried, but pounded and mixed with meal, and given to dogs and vultures to consume.

3. *Throwing into rivers or at waste places.*—This, the most ignoble method, is the fate of the poorest, as burying entails considerable expense. The body is dragged by a rope like a dead beast. In this way are also disposed the bodies of criminals, those killed by accident, lepers, and sometimes barren women. The skulls of enemies slain in battle are deemed auspicious for drinking-goblets.

4. *Cremation.*—This mode of disposal of a quasi-Buddhistic kind is reserved in Tibet for the bodies of the higher lamas, though, in those districts where wood fuel is more available, it is also used for the laity.

The body is placed on the pyre, seated erect in a devotional attitude, cross-legged like Buddha's image. The soles of the feet are turned upwards, the right hand with palm upwards resting on the flexed thigh, and the left hand is raised in front of the shoulder in the 'blessing' attitude. In the case of the laity, the face seems usually to be placed downwards. When the wood is lighted, melted butter is poured over the body, and, when the first limb or bone drops from the body after a few hours, the funeral ends, though some of the relatives remain till the cremation is over. The body is seldom completely reduced to ashes. The ashes and unconsumed relics are removed by the priests to the house of the deceased, and there pounded and mixed with clay to form in a mould miniature votive *chaitya* medallions called *ts'a-ts'a*, the *dharma śarīra* relics of Indian Buddhists. These are placed in the niches of the funereal towers known as *chortens*, or, if the deceased be rich, a special tower may be erected over them (see art. CHORTEN).

5. *Preserving the entire body by embalming.*—This mode seems to be restricted to the sovereign Grand Lamas of Lhāsa and Tāshilhunpo. The body is embalmed by salting, and, clad in the robes of the deceased and surrounded by his personal implements of worship, is placed, in the attitude of a seated Buddha, within a gilded copper sarcophagus in one of the rooms of the palace; it is then worshipped as a divinity. Before it, on an altar, food and water are offered, and lights are kept burning. Eventually it is enclosed in a great gilded *chorten*, surmounted by a gilt dome, and becomes one of the recognized objects of worship to pilgrims.

With the disposal of the body, the relatives and guests disperse, after a feast given in the open air.

6. **Post-funeral obsequies.**—The funeral does not end the ceremonies. The soul of the deceased is not effectively disposed of until forty-nine days after the death, and the death-demon is also to be expelled from the locality. This latter exorcism is an indigenous Bon rite, and must be performed within two days after the funeral. It is termed the 'Turning away of the face of the Devouring Devil (*Za-'dre*).' The demon is represented as of human form, riding upon a tiger; and, in laying the evil spirits, figures of animals moulded in dough are used in the sacrifice. For the final disposal of the soul of the deceased, further priestly services are required weekly until forty-nine days after death. During this period (*i.e.* 7 × 7 days) the soul is believed to remain in a purgatory or intermediate stage (*bar-do*) between death and regeneration, and is assisted onwards by the prayers of the priests. For this a lay effigy of the deceased is made in the house, on the day on which the corpse was removed, by dressing up a bench or box with the clothes of the deceased, and for a face a paper mask is inserted bearing a print of a dead Tibetan. On the forty-ninth day this service is completed, the paper mask burned, and the clothes given away. The priests receive as presents some valuable articles from the property of the deceased, and a feast concludes the ceremony.

Mourning is practised chiefly for young people; the old are less lamented. The full term of mourning is about a year, but three or four months is more usual. During this time no coloured clothes are worn, nor is the face washed or the hair combed; men may shave their heads, and women leave off their jewellery and rosaries. For Grand Lamas the general mourning of the people lasts from a week to a month.

All the places where bodies are buried or otherwise disposed of are esteemed sacred.

LITERATURE.—S. W. Bushell, *JRAS*, 1880, pp. 443, 521, 527; C. F. Köppen, *Lamaische Hierarchie*, Berlin, 1859, p. 322; H. Ramsay, *Western Tibet*, Lahore, 1890, p. 49 f.; W. W. Rockhill, *Ethnology of Tibet*, Washington, 1895, pp. 727, etc., *JRAS*, 1891, pp. 233, etc., *Land of the Lamas*, London, 1891, pp. 287, etc.; L. A. Waddell, *Buddhism of Tibet*, do. 1895, pp. 488, etc., *Lhasa and its Mysteries*, do. 1905, pp. 233, 392 f., 422.

L. A. WADDELL.

DEATH OF THE GODS.—See DEICIDE.

DEBAUCHERY (French *debaucher* [*de*, 'from,' and old Fr. *bauche*, 'a course,' 'a row'], 'to lead from the straight course'; hence 'seduction from duty,' 'excessive intemperance,' 'habitual lewdness').—Although individuals who habitually indulge in reckless dissipation are justly regarded as defective in ordinary self-control, and although it might be shown on incontestable evidence that no inconsiderable proportion of such persons are insane or mentally defective, it would still be preferable to approach this subject from the standpoint of normal psychology in order to trace the nature of the impulse which impels men in the direction of excessive intemperance and lewdness. To do this successfully we must take into consideration the habits and proclivities of primitive men. Uncivilized peoples manifest an intense love of excitement, particularly in connexion with their social and religious gatherings. All the writings of travellers referring to the domestic and social life of savages are unanimous as to the fact that every event out of the daily routine which causes people to assemble together is likely to become an occasion for intoxication. Birth alone is perhaps less associated with this form of enjoyment; marriages and deaths are certainly a very common excuse for it, and it is remarkable that we still retain survivals of these customs even in Western Europe. A culmination in intense excitement without the aid of intoxicants is frequent in their social gatherings. Featherman (*Social Hist. of Races of Mankind*, 1881–91, iii. 341) gives many examples, from which the following may be selected:

'They arranged themselves in groups, and at a given signal each group began to sing at first in a low tone of voice, which became louder and terminated in dreadful yells and hideous howls. The jumping was so violent and their efforts were so furious that some of them fell senseless to the ground. Three or four players or sorcerers stood in the centre, shook their tamarak, and blew tobacco smoke from a cane pipe upon the dancers.'

Mrs. French-Sheldon (*JAI* xxi. [1891] 367), speaking of the natives of East Africa, says:

'At some of their festivals this dancing is carried to such an extent that I have seen a young fellow's muscles quiver from head to foot, and his jaws tremble without any apparent ability on his part to control them, until, foaming at the mouth and with his eyes rolling, he falls in a paroxysm upon the ground,

to be carried off by his companions. This method of seeking artificial physical excitement bears a singular resemblance to the dances of other nations outside of Africa.'

Not only are the reunions of savage peoples characterized by intoxication and induced physical and mental excitement, but their religious ceremonies owe attraction largely to the induced mental fervour of the ministrants and audience. Partridge (*AJPs*, Apr. 1900, p. 363) goes so far as to hold that intoxication is one of the most important parts of the religious and social life of primitive man. He says:

'The use of alcoholic beverages arose in connexion with the religious social life in the effort to heighten the religious self-consciousness. Its use for these purposes among primitive people is widespread and almost universal.'

Among some tribes in the Philippine Islands the shaman (usually a woman) works herself up into frenzies of nervous excitement by means of contortions and copious draughts of fermented liquor. Feasting and revelling follow, until ofttimes at her ceremonies all present become intoxicated, and fall into an unconscious state (cf. Tylor, *Prim. Cult.*[3] ii. 134 ff.). Similar practices are universally prevalent at the present day among the Persian dervishes, who produce in themselves states of exaltation and hallucination by means of opium and hashish. A similar condition is induced by the Peruvian priests by means of a drug known as 'tonca' (*ib.* 416 ff.). The reunions of savage and barbarous peoples are characterized not only by intoxication, but also, frequently, by sexual orgies of a revolting character. Bancroft (*Native Races*, i. 551) says (quoting Kendall):

'Once a year the Keres have a great feast, prepared for three successive days, which time is spent in eating, drinking, and dancing. . . . To this cave, after dark, repair grown persons of every age and sex, who pass the night in indulgences of the most gross and sensual description.'

Writing of the Mosquitos, the same author (p. 735) states:

'Occasionally surrounding villagers are invited, and a drinking-bout is held, first in one house and then in another, until the climax is reached in a debauch by both sexes of the most revolting character.'

The ravenous appetite of certain savages justifies the accusation of gluttony which has been ascribed to them by various authors. The enormous development of the jaw muscles, as well as the protuberance of the alimentary system, is a sufficient indication of their propensity for swallowing enormous quantities of food when opportunity offers. A Yakut child, according to Cochrane, devoured at a sitting three candles, several pounds of sour frozen butter, and a large piece of yellow soap, while an adult of the same tribe devoured forty pounds of meat in a day. Wrangle says each of the Yakuts ate in a day six times as many fish as *he* could. The Comanches, according to Schoolcraft, eat voraciously after long abstinence, and without any apparent inconvenience (quoted from Spencer's *Sociology*, i. 45). That debauches are restricted solely through the want of opportunities for prolonging and repeating them is only too apparent from the histories of those savage or barbarous tribes which have been brought into close and constant contact with the more unscrupulous representatives of civilization. So long as alcohol and pleasurable excitement were obtainable, no price was grudged for them until, as a consequence of reckless self-abandonment, the wretched hedonists stood stripped of their possessions, and incapable of resuming their previous methods of life. The unfitness of savages, in the majority of instances, for regular or sustained employment of any kind is one of their most marked characteristics. It might be objected that such a generalization is too sweeping, and, moreover, that war and the chase are the only careers open to primitive man. It may be admitted that many members of the so-called inferior races have shown exceptional aptitude for commerce, agriculture, and industry of various kinds; but the history of the emancipated Negroes and of the native Indians in the Reserve Territories of the United States is conclusive proof of the inadaptability of these races, as a whole, for the rôle of civilization in which sustained and regular labour is the active and most important element. In these races labour is fitful and distasteful, and alternates with long spells of inactivity and unproductiveness.

From the foregoing statements it is evident that among the members of uncivilized communities certain anti-social defects which are hostile to the progress of civilization are extremely prevalent. These defects may be summed up as: (1) a craving for intense mental states, which is most easily gratified by induced excitement, by alcohol or other drugs, by sexual excitement, or by the appetite for food; (2) an inability or, at any rate, a strong disinclination for sustained mental or physical exertion. The representative anti-social elements in a modern civilized community may be regarded as the legitimate survivals of uncivilized ancestors. They all manifest the same strong craving for intenser mental states, which can be fully gratified only by the grosser forms of dissipation, while they also exhibit the natural disinclination for sustained and productive labour. The prostitute, the gambler, the drunkard, the criminal, and the loafer have this in common, that they desire the grosser forms of excitement, that they are prodigal of their means, and unproductive in their methods of supplying their wants.

The view which regards the pronounced anti-social members of a community as the survivals of a period when the race as a whole was comparatively primitive in its social development is the only scientific one, and displaces to a large extent the older views of deliberate sinning and moral responsibility; for a little consideration will enable us to see that a person who is constitutionally *a*-moral cannot be also at the same time *im*-moral. Such a statement must not be taken to imply a disbelief in individual moral responsibility, for it must be recognized that persistent immoral conduct may depend upon opportunity and the absence, for any reason, of public opinion. It follows that a person who is able to control his conduct under the influence of any ordinary deterrent must be, more or less, responsible for his conduct in the absence of these deterrents. In the development of society, as of the individual, there are two factors—environment and evolution. The environment is never constant but is always changing, while the development of a society depends upon the development of its units, subject to the influence of the environment. Physically as well as mentally, the individual must be in harmony with his surroundings or he cannot exist. In every established race of living beings the majority of the individuals present an average mean of certain qualities the possession of which entitles them to be regarded as normal representatives of their race; but there is in every such race a large minority of individuals who vary to a greater or less extent from this mean of any given quality. Some of them possess the quality in excess of the mean, others in defect. The majority of the members of a civilized community subordinate their desires for the grosser pleasures to the duty of sustained effort and the dictates of morality. Through a long process of natural selection this standard has been attained; but, just as a race of men present marked divergencies in stature or mental ability, so do they manifest throughout their composing units the greatest differences in respect to social qualities, varying from the highest manifestations of altruism to an absence of the

sense of responsibility and a reckless craving for gross self-indulgence. 'A community,' says Giddings (*Princ. of Sociol.*, 1898, p. 414), 'that delights in many harmonious pleasures has, on the whole, more chances in life than one which is satisfied with a few intense pleasures.' It is scarcely necessary to insist upon the instability of a community the majority of whose members are constitutionally indolent or immoral. We see, therefore, that the debauchee and the loafer are variations from the mean type of their society; we also see the sense in which they may be described as representatives or survivals of more primitive social states. In relation to their social environment they are anti-social and irretrievably doomed to elimination. The rapidity of this process of elimination is apt to be obscured by the fact that each new generation produces its fresh quota of individuals who are socially abnormal; but it must be borne in mind that the rapidly changing environment advances the moral standard of each generation, and that therefore a relatively higher and more stringent natural selection is gradually being brought to act upon those unfortunate units whose mental or physical organization is out of harmony with its requirements. With the advance in the standard of morals of a community there emerges gradually an expression of the ethical attitude of the public towards disease and infirmity, of which sufficient proof is to be seen in the improved condition of the insane, in the founding of 'homes' for epileptics and inebriates, and in the increased interest in the study of criminology. All these movements exhibit the tendency of modern societies to regard the actions of its anti-social members as irresponsible. It therefore seems highly probable that at no distant date civilization will enable us to dispense with retaliative punishment as a deterrent in certain moral delinquencies, and that the State will take upon itself the regulation of the lives of those who are incapable of living up to the standard of decency and order required by the existing social environment.

LITERATURE.—Featherman, *Social History of the Races of Mankind*, London, 1881–91; *JAI* xxi. [1891] 357; *AJPs*, April 1900, p. 363; Tylor, *Primitive Culture*³, London, 1891; Bancroft, *Native Races of the Pacific States*, London, 1875–6; Schoolcraft, *Hist., etc., of Indians of U.S.*, Philad. 1853; Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, New York, 1898. Cf. also the art. on ETHICS AND MORALITY.

JOHN MACPHERSON.

DECALOGUE.—*Introductory.*—There is probably no human document which has exercised a greater influence upon religious and moral life than the Decalogue. On account of its brevity, its comprehensiveness, its forcefulness, and its limitations, it has stood out from other teaching, and has been embedded in Christian liturgies and catechisms, so that it is difficult for any one brought up with any degree of Christian culture to escape knowledge of its contents. The exalted idea of its superior value goes back certainly to the Book of Deuteronomy; for we are told repeatedly there that the Ten Words were written upon two tables of stone by God Himself, and even with His finger[1] (4¹³ 5²² 9¹⁰ 10¹⁻⁴; cf. Ex 31¹⁸ 32¹⁶ 34¹·²⁸). However freely the statements may be interpreted, however figuratively the author may have written, it was certainly his intention to show that he placed this code above all other legal codes, these words above all other revealed words. In other cases it sufficed to say that Jahweh spoke to Moses, and Moses' memory was depended upon to convey accurately to the people all the vast amount of revelations given in the course of many days. But the Ten Words were so precious that no risk of forgetfulness could be run, and they were at once engraven on the solid stone. And there is more to show their high station. When Moses brought the stones down from the mountain, and saw Israel's apostasy, he dashed the stones to the ground and broke them. The precious record could not be lost, however; nor could Moses, who may be presumed to have known them by heart, be trusted to reproduce them. He was directed to prepare two new tablets of stone, and take them up to the mountain again, that the original text might be restored by the same finger which engraved the first copy. Finally, that there might be no further chance of breakage, Moses by command made an ark of acacia wood for their safe keeping (Dt 9. 10). It is now advisable to see what this document is, and to test the statements accounting for its origin.

1 Compare our Lord's casting out devils by the 'finger [*i.e.* the power] of God' (Lk 11²⁰).

1. The two forms of the Decalogue.—The Decalogue has come down to us in two versions which differ to a considerable extent, one (in common use) being in Ex 20²⁻¹⁷, the other (unfortunately almost ignored) in Dt 5⁶⁻²¹.[1] Some of the variations in the Decalogue may be due to accidents in the transmission of the text, but the most of them are certainly deliberate. Moreover, the process of development did not stop with our present Heb. text, as the LXX shows still further modifications, few if any of which can be fairly attributed to the translators.

In the case of the *Fourth Commandment*, the important differences are indicated in the following parallel renderings, italics showing variations:

Ex 20⁸⁻¹¹.	Dt 5¹²⁻¹⁵.
Remember the sabbath day to sanctify it. Six days shalt thou labour, and do all thy work; but[2] the seventh day is a sabbath to Jahweh thy God. Thou shalt not do[3] any work: thou and thy son and thy daughter, thy man-servant and thy maid-servant, and thy cattle,[4] and thy guest who is within thy gates.[5] *For in six days Jahweh made the heavens and the earth, the sea*[6] *and all that is in them, and he rested on the seventh day.* Therefore Jahweh *blessed* the sabbath[8] day *and sanctified it.*	*Guard* the sabbath day to sanctify it, *as Jahweh thy God commanded thee.* Six days shalt thou labour and do all thy work; but the seventh day is a sabbath to Jahweh thy God. Thou shalt not do any work: thou and thy son and thy daughter, *and* thy man-servant and thy maid-servant, *and thy ox and thy ass and all* thy cattle, and thy guest who is within thy gates;[7] *in order that thy man-servant and thy maid-servant may rest as well as thou. And thou shalt remember that thou wast a servant in the land of Egypt and that Jahweh thy God brought thee out from there by a strong hand and by an outstretched arm.* Therefore Jahweh *thy God commanded thee*[9] *to make* the sabbath day.

1 There are many other instances of duplicates in Holy Scripture: Ps 18 has been incorporated in the history of David (2 S 22), on the supposition that it is an account of an episode in his life; but a more striking parallel for our purpose, because of the importance of the material, is the Lord's Prayer (Mt 6⁹⁻¹³, Lk 11²⁻⁴).

2 LXX has τῇ δὲ ἡμέρᾳ; so in Dt 5¹⁴=וביום, 'but on the seventh day there is a sabbath (or rest).'

3 LXX adds ἐν αὐτῇ; so in Dt 5¹⁴=בו, a necessary correction, followed by Lat. and Eng. versions. This reading is found in the Papyrus Nash (see Peters, *op. cit. infra*).

4 LXX reads: 'thy ox and thy ass and all thy cattle,' in agreement with Dt 5¹⁴. The translator would scarcely have inserted this phrase for the sake of harmony when he leaves so much else divergent; therefore the early Heb. texts must have differed from each other in the same code.

5 LXX reads: 'the guest who dwells with thee'; so in Dt 5¹⁴. In spite of its more primitive appearance (cf. below), this reading can hardly be original, for the Heb. phrase would not have been changed after the Greek version was made. The LXX expression is more comprehensive, and may be a free rendering, though all else is intensely literal.

6 LXX B lacks 'the sea'; perhaps it is a later addition.

7 LXX B adds here: 'for in six days the Lord made the heaven and the earth and the sea and all that is in them.' The words are a manifest harmonizing gloss, as is shown by the impossible connexion with the following clause, 'in order that thy man-servant and thy maid-servant may rest as well as thou.' The gloss may have been found in a Heb. text.

8 LXX has ἑβδόμην, 'seventh'—a better reading, for it was Jahweh's blessing of the seventh day which made it the sabbath.

9 LXX reads: 'that thou shouldst guard the sabbath day and

The peculiar phrases in the Deuteronomic edition are characteristic of the author; they are unmistakable, for there is no other OT writer whose style is so readily detected (see Driver's *Deut.*, *in loc.*). It will be noted that we have here a commandment, and the reasons for its observance. The two versions have no important divergence in the commandment, but separate absolutely on the reasons. Beyond question Deut. is the older. The sanction on humane grounds is original with him, for it accords with his spirit through and through. There came a time when grounds of humanity were not strong enough. Another editor, perhaps the one who constructed the Creation story in Gn 1–2[4] for this purpose, put it on a basis which is to him distinctly higher—that man should follow the example of God. That story of the Creation is much later than Deut., and this addition to Ex. is perhaps the latest touch to the Decalogue. It is unfortunate that this version, with its sanction on a ground which nobody believes now, is the one in general Christian use.

In the *Fifth Commandment*, Dt 5[16] has two clauses which do not appear in Ex 20[12]. The former version runs: 'Honour thy father and thy mother, *as Jahweh thy God commanded thee*, that thy days may be long, *and that it may be well with thee*, upon the land which Jahweh thy God is giving thee.' These are common Deuteronomic phrases, and are plainly editorial additions. The first obviously overlooks the fact that Jahweh Himself is supposed to give the words from His own mouth. The second is found in the best Greek texts of Exodus, but preceding the clause about long days. The words may have got into some of the Heb. editions, but not into those which have come down to us. In earlier times, length of days would be a sufficient reward, but later the craving for good days would naturally find expression.

In the *Ninth Commandment*, Dt 5[20] differs from Ex 20[16] by a single word: instead of שֶׁקֶר, 'false,' we find שָׁוְא, the word used in the Third Commandment for 'vain' (cf. below). The Greek text renders freely: 'Thou shalt not falsely testify against thy neighbour false testimony,' and the renderings of Deut. and Ex. agree *verbatim et literatim*, showing a careful comparison, which ignores the difference in our present Heb. text. The proper rendering of the Hebrew is: 'Thou shalt not answer against thy neighbour a false witness.' By a slight change of the text (עֵדוּת for עֵד) we get 'testimony,' as LXX. But the Heb. seems to mean that a man shall not bring a false witness to testify against his neighbour, as Jezebel did against Naboth. This view makes the mandate more ethically refined, laying the stress of the wrong on the procurer of false testimony rather than on the witness.

In the *Tenth Commandment* we have a considerable variation:

Ex 20[17].	Dt 5[21].
Thou shalt not covet the *house*[1] of thy neighbour; thou shalt not *covet* the *wife* of thy neighbour,[3] nor his man-servant nor his maid-servant, *nor* his ox nor his ass,[4] nor anything which is thy neighbour's.	Thou shalt not covet the *wife* of thy neighbour. Thou shalt not *desire*[2] the *house* of thy neighbour, *nor his field*, nor his man-servant nor his maid-servant, his ox nor his ass, nor anything which is thy neighbour's.

The use of 'desire' instead of repeating 'covet' is presumably for rhetorical elegance. The transposition of 'wife' and 'house' is not so easily explained. It may be due to the greater importance of the wife in the time of Deut., taking the wife out of the property class (so *EBi* i. 1049, *s.v.* 'Decalogue'); it may be a copyist's error; it may be an effort to secure a more logical sequence, the wife not belonging so strictly to the category of property as the other objects enumerated; or it may be due to the influence of such facts as David's marriage with Bathsheba. The interpolation of 'field' seems surely to reflect the impression made upon the people by the story of Naboth's vineyard, and of other instances which gave occasion to Is 5[8] 'Woe unto them that join house to house, that lay field to field, till there be no room, and ye be made to dwell alone in the midst of the land.' Cf. Mic 2[2]. There are a few other variations, but they practically consist of the addition of conjunctions in Deut. to connect the clauses for greater rhetorical effect.

A few of the more important readings of the Greek text may be noted beyond those already cited. In Ex 20[1] A reads: 'And the *Lord* spake *to Moses* all these words, saying.' Here we have an explanation of the singular which is used throughout the Decalogue. The words are in the first instance commands to Moses. This introduction is scarcely consistent with the statement of Deut., that they were first inscribed upon stone tablets by the finger of God. Deut. reconciles the two ideas by saying that Jahweh first spoke the words unto all the assembly with a great voice, and then wrote them upon the stone (5[22]). In v.[2], instead of 'house of slaves,' LXX has 'house of bondage' (so in Deut.)—a reading which is followed by our versions. The Heb. is better, for the term 'house of slaves' is used to designate the land of Egypt. In v.[3], LXX renders עַל־פָּנָי, 'except me' (πλὴν ἐμοῦ) in Ex.; but in Dt 5[7] B has 'before my face' (πρὸ προσώπου μου, Lat. *in conspectu meo*). The Eng. versions have 'before me' in the text, but RVm 'beside me.' The latter is a doubtful rendering, like the Prayer-Book form 'but me.' The words literally are 'upon my face,' and would most naturally mean 'in preference to me.' If that is the true sense, then this command represents a more primitive religious conception than the absolute monotheism of the prophetic age. Weiss holds that the words forbid the worship of all other gods (*Das Buch Exodus*, Graz, 1911).

In v.[4 (3)] 'any likeness which is in the heavens' (an exactly literal tr.) gives no sense. LXX has παντὸς ὁμοίωμα (so in Deut.), and this is followed by Eng. versions. Kittel (*Bib. Heb.*, 1905) suggests תְּמוּנַת כֹּל, on the basis of LXX (cf. Dt 4[25]). The reason for this prohibition is given at length in Dt 4[16-19].

In v.[5] עַל־שִׁלֵּשִׁים, LXX B has ἕως τρίτης, implying a reading עַד instead of עַל. The Heb. is right. The absence of the conj. (though Deut. has it erroneously) shows that we have a case of apposition, *i.e.* 'upon the sons, upon the third and fourth generations.'

In v.[12] LXX has 'upon the good land' (ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς τῆς ἀγαθῆς). The addition of 'good' sounds like Deut., and yet the reading is found only in Exodus.

In vv.[13-15] LXX A transposes here and in Deut., having the order: adultery, stealing, killing. The change may be accidental, or due to an idea that the Seventh Commandment is more closely related to the Fifth. The relation is not very obvious, and the LXX was not wont to take such liberties. There is much variation in the order of these three commandments. In MT, Jos., Syr., the order is murder, adultery, stealing; in Codex Alex. and Ambros., murder, stealing, adultery; in Codex Vat., adultery, stealing, murder. Peters holds that the original order was adultery, murder, stealing, which he says, 'commends itself on internal grounds' (*op. cit.* p. 33). If conjecture could govern, the present writer would prefer the order—murder, stealing, adultery—after some Gr. texts, on the ground that we have then a true sequence in the development of the moral standard. Murder was recognized as wrong long before adultery.

2. Real meaning of some of the commandments.—We turn now to the interpretation of some of the more difficult passages.

In the *Second Commandment* the meaning of the word 'thousands' is not altogether clear. In Dt 7[9] we have apparently a commentary on this commandment: 'the faithful God, keeping the covenant and mercy to those who love him and keep his commands, to a thousand generations.' This interpretation was followed in the Targums, and has been generally accepted. Weiss, the latest writer on Exodus, takes this view. The contrast with 'third' and 'fourth' seems to support it. But the antithesis between the two clauses is not so clear

sanctify it.' This could scarcely be a rendering of the present text. In the text above, instead of 'make' we might render 'institute.'

[1] The LXX order is 'wife,' 'house,' as in Deuteronomy.

[2] LXX uses the same verb in both clauses, as in Exodus.

[3] LXX adds: 'nor his field,' as in Deuteronomy.

[4] LXX adds in both versions: 'nor any cattle of his,' to agree with v.[10]. Codex L has 'nor any vessel of his,' reading כֹּל as כְּלִי. The two texts of LXX in that verse, as in the preceding, agree *verbatim et literatim*.

as appears at first sight. In the first part we have 'visiting the sins of the fathers'; in the second, 'showing the mercy of God.' In the one case God brings the consequences of paternal sins upon the sons, in the other He displays His own mercy to thousands. It appears, therefore, that 'thousands' is contrasted with 'sons,' not with 'third and fourth generation.' Further, אֲלָפִים never means 'a thousand generations'; it has two distinct meanings: a 'thousand' as a numeral, and a body of a thousand people, such as a regiment. In the latter connexion the word is used to indicate a subdivision of a tribe, and means a clan (cf. Jg 6^{15}, 1 S 10^{19}). The word here must either be a numeral, 'thousand,' or it must = 'clans.' The extension of mercy is therefore outward not downward. The sin goes down to the sons, the mercy goes outward to the whole family or clan.

'There's a wideness in God's mercy
Like the wideness of the sea.'

The meaning is illustrated in Abraham's plea for Sodom and Gomorrah (Gn $18^{22ff.}$); if there had been ten righteous men in the city, the whole population might have been saved.

The *Third Commandment* is the vaguest of all: 'Thou shalt not take the name of Jahweh thy God in vain.' The moment we reflect upon the words, the vagueness appears. The usual interpretation is that it is an injunction against profanity. Weiss (*in loc.*) says that 'not only false swearing, but every sinful use of the name of Jahweh, in imprecation, blasphemy, charm, divination, and every frivolous use is included.' And yet it is a little difficult to discover that sense in the original. We should expect the Ten Words to deal with vital matters. There is no evidence that profanity was specially common among the Hebrews, or that they regarded it as a serious offence. From the concluding clause, 'Jahweh will not hold innocent' the one who commits this wrong, it is clear that we are dealing with a serious evil; in fact, with the unpardonable sin of the OT. Indeed, we might well render 'Jahweh will not forgive,' etc. It is at least a step in clearing up the matter to note that נָשָׂא means 'speak.' First there was the full expression, 'he lifted up his voice and spake,' then he 'lifted his voice,' finally 'he lifted,' but with the meaning 'spoke.'[1] לַשָּׁוְא means 'in vain,' *i.e.* without result (cf. Jer 2^{30}). We therefore have: 'Thou shalt not speak the name of Jahweh thy God without result,' *i.e.* without doing what was vowed in His name. Thus we can grasp the force of what is otherwise a pure redundancy, 'for Jahweh will not deem innocent him who speaks his name without result.' Now, if there was a principle cherished by the Hebrews above any other, it was the obligation to carry out a vow made in the name of Jahweh. We may note the case of Jephthah, who felt bound by his vow to sacrifice his daughter (Jg 11). Other cases will occur to the reader; and we find the principle strongly urged in Ec 5^{1-6}. It may be remarked that, so far as internal indications go, this command may be early. At all events the obligation was recognized in the primitive ages. It was the misuse of the command as above interpreted that our Lord sought to correct (cf. Mt $5^{33ff.}$ $23^{16ff.}$). The Jews held that only a vow in Jahweh's name was binding; Jesus teaches that a man's personal word should be as strong an obligation as any oath.

3. Original form of the Decalogue.—It is apparent from a comparison of the texts that the Decalogue has not come down to us in its original form.[1] Many attempts have been made to determine what that original form was. For the most part it is a matter of pure conjecture. But it has been noted that there is a persistent tradition that there were 'Ten Words,' and that they were inscribed on two tables of stone. It has been assumed that there would be practically an even division—five on each table.[2] The Decalogue divides into two parts, but Commandments 1–4 deal with man's relation to God, and 5–10 with his relations to men—not therefore an even division. In the Heb. text of Exodus, Comm. 1–5 contain 146 words, 6–10 contain 26 words. Taking the division by subject, 1–4 have 131 words, 6–10 have 41 words. Comm. 1–3 contain 76 words, 4–10 contain 96 words. This is the nearest approach to an even spatial division. Hence it is assumed that the commandments must originally have been all short, as 6–9 still are. Com. 2 then would have been simply: 'Thou shalt not make thee a graven image'; Com. 4: 'Remember the sabbath day to sanctify it'; and Com. 10: 'Thou shalt not covet.' This would make commands of sufficiently even length. The growth is easily explained. The images were hard to get rid of, as all religious usages are hard to change. To reinforce the law and to prevent evasions, amplification was necessary and dire consequences of disobedience must be added. Down to the time of Nehemiah the rule for cessation of labour on the sabbath day was disregarded (cf. Neh $13^{15ff.}$). Reasons were appended to the law to secure a stricter conformity.

While all this is very probable, the reason urged on the ground of an even division on the two tables is not convincing; for we have many ancient inscriptions on stone and clay, and there is no evidence of an attempt to conform the contents to the size of the material used for the inscription. The size of the characters and of the tablet is determined by the amount to be written. The commandments must have taken shape originally according to their substance, and could hardly have been framed with reference to two tables of stone. The only reason for using two stones was that there was not room enough on one, just as a correspondent takes up a second sheet when one does not suffice for his letter.

4. How far Mosaic.—A still more baffling problem is found in the origin of the Decalogue. In both codes it is attributed to Moses, *i.e.* Moses is the mouthpiece of Jahweh. In Dt 9. 10 there is an unusual wealth of detail about the matter, describing the first writing, the breaking of the stones, the second writing, and the care for the preservation of the final record. The Covenant and the Decalogue are certainly identified in the story, but that is, of course, due to the author of Deut., who lived long after Moses' day. His identification may be correct, but is not necessarily so.

We are obliged to face the question as to the value of this evidence. Now, we know that in the OT all Hebrew law is attributed to Moses, as practically all Hebrew psalmody was ascribed to David, and all wisdom to Solomon. There is, therefore, a presumption against this testimony; for it would be extraordinary if the whole body of a nation's laws were enacted by a single individual,

[1] Morgenstern holds that *nis ili* in Bab. is a technical name for an oath, and that speaking the name of the gods was a sin for any but priests. He regards נשׂא שׁם as an equivalent term, and the Third Commandment as having that meaning ('The Doctrine of Sin in the Bab. Religion,' *MVG*, iii. [1905] 35 f.). There is no evidence in the OT to support this view.

[1] The Rabbis were puzzled by the variants, but, as usual, were equal to the occasion, holding that both versions alike were of Divine origin, and were spoken miraculously at the same time. Saadya alleges that the Exodus version was on the first set of tables that were broken, and the Deut. text on the second (cited in *JE* iv. 494, *s.v.* 'Decalogue').

[2] The Rabbis indulged in their usual fanciful guesses about this distribution. Some held that all ten were on each stone; others that all ten were on each side of each stone; while Simai goes further and alleges that all ten were engraved four times on each stone (*JE*, *loc. cit.*). The idea was that the more times the words were inscribed the more important they were.

and that before there was any nation at all. The evidence, therefore, that Moses produced the Decalogue is no greater than that he produced the law governing the fringe on the priest's cloak. The persistent tradition proves, in the opinion of the present writer, that Moses was a truly great lawgiver; but, by ascribing all laws to him, it puts upon us the necessity of determining as best we can his connexion with any particular law. We are compelled, therefore, to consider whether the Decalogue could have come from so early a date as that of Moses.

Some of the prohibitions are of such a general character that they might belong to any period; such is the case with Comm. 3, 5–9. Others seem to have a closer relation to the development of religion, and a place for them ought to be found accordingly. Com. 1 is monotheistic, though perhaps not so sharply so as has generally been assumed; for the meaning may certainly be that no other god is to be set above Jahweh, and this possibility must have full weight (see above). So far as we know, the victory of monotheism was won by the prophets, one of the great battles being fought by Elijah. But it is certainly true that there were monotheists from the earliest days, such as Deborah, Gideon, and even the freebooter Jephthah. This law may have been as early as Moses for anything we know to the contrary.

The law against images does not belong to the same category. Image-worship was certainly practised down to the Exile, and as late as Hezekiah's time (2 K 18⁴), without rebuke. The war against it appears to have had as its mainspring the effort to centralize the worship at the temple in Jerusalem.[1] As a means of destroying the cult at the local shrines, where images abounded, they were forbidden, for there appear to have been no sacred images in Solomon's temple. It is true that disobedience to a law does not prove its non-existence. The teaching of Jesus about the perils of wealth has not made a very profound impression on the world even yet. But there was no strong motive for images, and it is difficult to think that David would have defied so fundamental a law (1 S 19[13]), or that Isaiah would have countenanced images (19[19]). This command, therefore, appears not to have been formulated long before the time of Deuteronomy.

In its present form, Com. 4 cannot be Mosaic. The nomad is never a very hard worker, and a day of rest is not of urgent necessity for him. Moreover, such work as he does is necessary on every day of the week. Further, in the time of Moses there were no guests (*gērîm*, 'protected strangers') within the gates. Sufficient emphasis does not appear to have been laid upon the term 'gates,' disclosing as it does urban life, and therefore belonging at the earliest to the period after the conquest. It is true that so acute a scholar as Weiss holds that שַׁעַר may mean the gate of the camp as well as of the city, and he thinks, therefore, that this term does not presuppose the settlement in Palestine. But the only instance of this meaning that occurs to the present writer is Ex 32[26], where the word is a natural figure for 'entrance,' easily used by a writer familiar with gates. Moreover, the expression 'within thy gates' is a characteristic Deuteronomic expression, occurring some twenty times in Deut., and not found elsewhere in the Pent. save in Ex 20[10]. The solicitude for the stranger or guest is also Deuteronomic.

The silence about the sabbath day in the records of the early days is truly remarkable from any point of view. In Jos 6[4. 14. 15] we read of the army's marching around Jericho on seven successive days, one of which must have been the sabbath. That looks very like 'any kind of work,' and was certainly unnecessary. There are, however, two references to the sabbath which throw welcome light on the situation. In 2 K 4[23] the Shunammite asks his wife why she is going to the prophet Elisha, and gives as the reason for his question 'it is not new moon and it is not sabbath.' It would be easy to draw too large a conclusion from this statement, but one thing is certain, viz. that there is no objection to a journey from Shunem to Carmel (30–40 kilometres, 20–30 miles; see Kittel, *Bücher der Könige*, 1900, *in loc.*) on the sabbath day; further, it is a reasonable inference that the sabbath was a day for religious rites, but that cessation of labour was not a part of its observance. Something like half a century later Amos makes the people say: 'When will the new moon be over that we may sell grain, and the sabbath that we may open up corn' (8⁵). It is clear that we have an advance from Elisha's time, in that trade is not permitted on the sabbath—precisely the conditions which Nehemiah enforced (Neh 13[15ff.]). The new moon is not mentioned in the Decalogue, but it is here, as in Elisha's time, on the same plane as the sabbath. There is hardly evidence, therefore, to support the existence of the Fourth Commandment. The passage may seem to imply that the sabbath had already come to be a mere form (Marti, *Dodekapropheton*, 1903, *in loc.*). But it is more likely that the prevention of trade was a new feature, not approved by the merchants; hence their impatience at the loss of trading days. It appears that under the prophetic influence a movement was making for a stricter regulation of both these festivals. The effort finally centred on the sabbath, and by Josiah's time all labour as well as trade was forbidden. The older idea always persisted, for Nehemiah did not attempt to check sabbath labour in the fields, but restrained trade even by threats of violence. Even to-day Sunday trading is objected to much more than Sunday labour.

Finally, Com. 10 cannot be Mosaic in its present form. In the Exodus version the first object whose coveting is forbidden is the house; in Deut. this is followed by the field. Nomads have neither houses nor fields. It is true that בַּיִת is often interpreted as meaning 'household' in Exodus. This use is very common, especially in the Hexateuch.[1] But it would be strange to say, 'Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's family,' and then to continue, 'Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's wife, and servants and cattle.' It is plain that in the time of Deut. בַּיִת was interpreted as meaning 'dwelling,' for it is not difficult to see why 'field' was added. As we have noted above, there was much taking of others' land even by violence. The oppressors might easily reconcile their aggressions and the law by saying they had not taken the house but only the field. The law is, therefore, amended to carry out its original intent. Doubtless the sweeping final clause, 'nor anything which is thy neighbour's,' was added to meet casuistical juggling. If the command was Mosaic, therefore, it could only have been in the form quoted by St. Paul, 'Thou shalt not covet' (Ro 7⁷). But here we meet a new difficulty. It is often urged that this law shows an ethical refinement too great for the period of Moses. Quite true. But it is not so sure that the refinement was too great for Moses, the man of God. The Decalogue does not profess to be a production showing the moral sentiment of the age, but is the work of the most enlightened man

[1] Wellhausen holds that the early Hebrews would object to a פֶּסֶל, 'image' (the word used in the Decalogue), but not to a מַצֵּבָה, 'pillar' (*Reste Arab. Heid.* pp. 101, 141). It is difficult to see sufficient ground for this distinction.

[1] See the Hebrew lexicons.

of the time. Among a rude people it is always possible for one to rise head and shoulders above the rest, not only in stature, like Saul, but in moral insight, as Moses certainly did.

In a word, if we strip the Decalogue of the known later accretions, and the probable additions to meet new conditions, the Commandments may all be Mosaic except possibly the First, and almost certainly the Second. This is confessedly very far from affirming that they did come from the hand of the great lawgiver. Indeed, it is not unlikely that the Decalogue itself may be a growth covering a period of some centuries before the last addition was made. Various men may have tried their hand at putting the great principles of the Law into a terse and comprehensive form. All that we can say positively is that the Decalogue was complete some time before 621 B.C. (the date of Deut.), and that it has not survived in a standard and authoritative form. If it was originally issued on stone tablets, such a version is lost beyond present power of recovery.

There has never been agreement even as to the proper division of the material we have. In Deut. the command against coveting falls into parts, and Com. 1 may be regarded either as a part of the introduction, or less probably as part of the First Commandment, which here deals with images. This arrangement is followed by the Roman Catholic and Lutheran Churches to this day, while most Protestant bodies and the Greek Church adhere to the division in Exodus.[1]

5. Theology and ethics of the Decalogue.—In its theology the first striking feature of the Decalogue is its monotheism. It is true that there is some doubt as to the meaning of the First Commandment, but, whatever its original meaning, it was ultimately interpreted as an uncompromising prohibition of the worship of any deity other than Jahweh. That is a necessary step in the development of any religion. Even some that are formally monotheistic are not really so. A prophet may be exalted to the place of a subordinate deity, as in Muhammadanism; or a saint may be made to stand so close to God that the distinction is unreal to the ordinary worshipper. In the lower forms of religion there is a tendency to divide the supposed Divine functions, and assume a deity to preside over each. In the Decalogue, even in its most primitive form, there is but one God, and all Divine offices are performed by Him. In the Deuteronomic form there is nothing which goes beyond nationalism. Jahweh is the only God in Israel. He brought them out of Egypt, and He ordained laws for them. In the later form, the thought of Jahweh as the God of the whole world is brought out in reference to creation.

The prohibition of image-worship puts the religion on a high plane. Though it was supposed that Jahweh could engrave stones, His image could not be made in stone. Jahweh was truly a spiritual being, too sublime to be represented in an image, and too great to be portrayed in the likeness of animal life. In the present form of Com. 2, idolatry is deemed the worst form of sin. It is this that arouses the jealousy of Jahweh, and calls down enduring punishment upon the offenders, and wide-spreading mercy to the innocent. Hating Jahweh is synonymous with idolatry, and loving Him is equivalent to spiritual devotion. This conception could hardly have come from the pre-prophetic period.

The ethical tone of the Decalogue is very high, especially if we assign it to the early period of national life. We note first the demand for truthfulness. Really this appears in both Comm. 3 and 9. No one was to swear to his neighbour and then disappoint him, no matter what the consequences might be—a command correctly interpreted in Ps 15[4];[1] and no one was permitted to bolster up a bad case against his neighbour by the introduction of false witnesses. Killing and stealing are fairly common vices among undeveloped races, and are far too prevalent even among the most advanced peoples. But the clear terse laws on the two tables, without any qualifications whatever, doubtless saved many a life in Israel, and helped to maintain personal property inviolate. The forbidding of coveting reaches the evangelical note (cf. Mt 5[28]). It is hardly necessary to assume that coveting is as great a vice as stealing, or that a lustful desire is as degrading as a lustful act. But even in the early ages it must have been apparent that coveting leads to vicious action. Abimelech coveted the throne, and the murder of his seventy brothers resulted (Jg 9). Ahab coveted the land of Naboth, and the murder of Naboth and the confiscation of his land was the consequence (1 K 21). David's passions were aroused by the sight of a beautiful woman, and there followed the criminal death of Uriah and the unholy marriage with his widow (2 S 11).

The ethical standards of the world are still far too low, but it is certain that they would be even lower but for the great influence of the Ten Commandments. It is very desirable that they be stripped of later accretions, and in a simpler and more original form continue to be read to the people in the churches and taught to the children in the Sunday schools.

LITERATURE.—The student will naturally consult the various commentaries on Exodus and Deut., the Bible dictionaries and encyclopædias, and works on Hebrew religion. The following may also be consulted: G. L. Robinson, *The Decalogue and Criticism*, Chicago, 1899; R. Kraetzschmar, *Die Bundesvorstellung im AT*, Marburg, 1896; Meisner, *Der Dekalog* Halle, 1893; B. Baentsch, *Das Bundesbuch*, Halle, 1892; N. Peters, *Die älteste Abschrift der zehn Gebote*, Freiburg i. B. 1905; F. W. Farrar, *The Voice from Sinai*, London 1892; J. Oswald Dykes, *The Law of the Ten Words*, do., 1884; E. Kautzsch, art. 'Religion of Israel,' in *HDB*, vol. v. p. 612.

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DECISION.—The term 'decision' may be used (1) concretely, of the judgment which is affirmed at the conclusion of a period of deliberation (*q.v.*); or (2) abstractly, of the ability to 'come to a decision,' *i.e.* to bring deliberation to a conclusion.

Decisions are as various in kind as the subjects about which we deliberate. Thus the judge issues his decision—that a charge is proved or not proved; a connoisseur decides that he prefers one wine to another. Decisions which consist in the resolve that a certain kind of action is to be performed by oneself seem to form a class apart. It is in connexion with these that the strife between necessitarians and libertarians has been waged. This, however, is a controversy affecting the determination of content of the judgment which is a decision, *i.e.* the quality of the conduct decided on. Though extreme necessitarians declare that every decision is mechanically determined, no one denies the reality of decision as a psychological crisis. This crisis consists in a concentration of the attention on the idea of one of the possible courses of action before us, with a consequent inhibition of the ideas of the other possibilities. Recent advocates of the doctrine of free will (*q.v.*) base their argument upon the feeling of effort which accompanies a typical class of decisions. See, further, DESIRE, WILL.

LITERATURE.—W. James, *Text-book of Psychology*, London, 1892, pp. 415-460; W. M. Wundt, *Human and Animal Psychology*, Eng. tr., 1901, p. 233.

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[1] There are really three uses, the Jews taking the preface as Com. 1. For the details, see art. 'Decalogue,' in *HDB* i. 580.

[1] This is finely brought out in the Prayer-Book version: 'He that sweareth unto his neighbour, and disappointeth him not, though it were to his own hindrance.' This is a conflate reading. The Heb. has: 'He that sweareth to his own hurt'; the Greek: 'He that sweareth to his neighbour.' The liturgical version contains both readings. See Perowne (*Psalms*[8], London, 1898) on the passage.

DECOLLATI.—The full expression is *le anime dei corpi decollati*, 'the souls of executed criminals.' These souls are the object of a popular cult in Sicily. It is spread throughout the island; but its most famous shrine is the Church of the Decollati, near the river Oreto at Palermo. It seems to have arisen out of the sympathy naturally felt in an oppressed community for sufferers at the hands of a ruling caste. For many centuries Sicily was subject to rulers who were either foreigners, or at any rate divided by a sharp and impassable line from the mass of the people. The latter were ignorant, and more or less passively hostile to the governing class. They regarded all who were put to death under the forms of law as heroes; nor did they distinguish between moral and merely legal crimes,—between acts directed against the rulers and acts directed against society at large,—if, indeed, these two categories were always distinguishable. The priests were for the most part drawn from the 'folk,' and probably shared to a great extent their ignorance, their superstitions, and their feeling towards the government. The executions were public. The condemned man (called *l'afflitto*, 'the afflicted'), having been reconciled to the Church and having received its consolations, was regarded as a martyr; and his death-scene was a species of triumph. He passed, it was true, into purgatory; but his prayers on behalf of others, even from purgatory, were deemed to have great intercessional value by virtue of his sufferings.

Formerly at Palermo several of the churches witnessed the cult of the Decollati. During recent centuries, however, it became the custom to bury in the graveyard adjoining the little church beside the Oreto such bodies of criminals as were not given to their friends, or reserved to adorn the gallows in chains. Accordingly, the cult has concentrated there. Its particular shrine is a side-chapel filled with votive offerings of wax, testifying to the various benefits for which the intercession of the Decollati is sought. The souls of the Decollati are believed to congregate under a large stone just inside the door of the chapel. Pilgrimages are frequent; and the pilgrim, having performed his devotions at the altar of St. John the Baptist, adjourns to the chapel and prays to the Decollati, listening for an answer to the prayer. The slightest sound is taken for a favourable reply. Invocations, however, may be addressed to them elsewhere by suppliants who cannot undertake the pilgrimage.

The objects for which intercession is sought are primarily protection from violence or accident, and the cure of sufferers from either. For the Decollati, however much they may in their lifetime have been guilty of violence, now having suffered and been reconciled to the Church, hate violence and punish it, or at least protect and heal its victims. By an extension of the idea, they are invoked against diseases, especially hæmoptysis, of which bleeding is the manifestation. Two long cases of rude water-colour drawings on the churchyard walls record with ghastly detail many examples of vows made and benefits received, where violence, accident, or disease of the kinds indicated was concerned. But, in fact, the good offices of the Decollati are not limited to these. They are implored for aid by the poorer classes throughout Sicily on all sorts of occasions, and for all sorts of purposes. They have their prayer-formulæ, which are extensively used; and many stories of miracles performed by them in person are current. The ordinary vehicles of the country are light carts, painted with scenes from the history and traditions of the island. Many of these carts are adorned with paintings of the Decollati.

LITERATURE.—The cult has been described and illustrated with many details by Giuseppe Pitrè, the venerable recorder of the insular traditions and customs. See particularly his *Biblioteca delle tradizioni popolari siciliane*, i. (Palermo, 1871) 77, ii. (1871) 38, xvi. (1889) 4 ff., *La Vita in Palermo*, ii. (Palermo, 1905) ch. xviii., *Mostra etnografica siciliana* (Palermo, 1892), 51, 80. See also a paper by the present writer, with plates from photographs, in *FL* xxi. (London, 1910) 168.

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DECRETALS.—See BULLS AND BRIEFS.

DEDICATION.—See CONSECRATION.

DEGENERATION.—**1. Application of the term.**—'Mental degeneracy' is a term which is applied to a group of characteristics inferred from the speech, behaviour, or productive activity of individuals, and generally held to be symptomatic of defect in the central nervous system. The nervous defect in question may be either congenital or acquired through accident or disease; in either case, it may be organic or 'functional.' Savill (*Neurasthenia*, 17) defines a functional nervous disease negatively, as one in which 'no anatomical changes can be found after death, either with the naked eye or with the microscope, which can account for the symptoms during life.' It may really be due to some structural change, which available means cannot determine, to the presence of toxic materials in the blood (of endogenous or exogenous origin), to deficient quantity or quality of blood, or to exhaustion of the nerve tissues from excessive use, etc.

The term also implies that the individual falls markedly below the mental level attained by the average or normal member of the race, sex, age, and period of civilization; but, since the number of degrees of defect is potentially infinite, and the defect may be either general or special (in the former case touching all the mental capacities, in the latter such special functions as sensation, memory, emotion, etc.), the actual usage of the term is extremely indefinite. Thus it is employed to denote (1) actual insanity, including amentia, imbecility, dementia, mania, and melancholia; (2) persistent criminality; (3) mental instability, excitability, excessive irritability, or mere eccentricity; and (4) the neuroses of hysteria, psychasthenia, and others: to the last two groups belong those whom Dr. Balfour has named the 'denizens of the borderland' (*Edin. Med. Journ.* 1901). It would seem that strictly the word should apply only to those who have some *congenital* defect in mental capacity, excluding those in whom the defect has been due either to accidental injury, or to lesions of the brain arising from toxic influences, subsequent to the birth of the individual (for example, alcoholic insanity, or insanity sequent upon typhus fever). It is impossible, however, to draw a hard and fast line between the congenital and the acquired, as many cases of insanity would not have occurred had not the individual been already predisposed to the disease by physiological or mental weakness. On the other hand, the term is also frequently applied to an acquired defect, especially when it is of the progressive type.

In popular usage the word 'degenerate' means one whose tastes are lower than those of the society in which he has been educated, *e.g.* a clergyman's son who associates with racing touts or public-house loafers; or one whose intelligence and tastes show a marked deterioration from his own earlier standard, as in alcoholism, etc. It is applied æsthetically to those whose interests, whether as readers or as authors, as artists or as critics, lie in disease, physical or moral; to realists or naturalists in the narrow sense of these words; and also to pessimists. The assumption is that the healthy

mind will avoid these things as topics of thought or imagination, except with the object of removing them or lessening their evil effects; that only the diseased mind will seek to dwell upon disease, or take a pleasure in its contemplation.

To the biologist, the degenerate appears as a reversion to an older type of the race, as one who has been born with a physical nature in which some primitive human or even pre-human stage of cerebral development is reproduced. He is a primitive being set in a civilized environment, unable to adapt himself to it, and hence coming into conflict with its conditions.

The only common feature underlying these diverse applications of the term is a marked 'deviation from type' either in quantity (energy, rate, etc.), or in quality, of thought and action.

2. Physical and mental conditions of degeneracy.—The causes of such mental deviations may be grouped in three classes: (1) an originally defective physical and mental capacity, or defective development; (2) physical accident or injury, disease, privation, etc., by which the central nervous system is weakened locally or generally; and (3) social conditions, such as family life, educational disadvantages, poverty, occupation, etc. (Ferri, *Criminal Sociology*, Eng. tr., London, 1895, ch. 2). Thus, alcoholism may occur in a given individual because he is by nature unstable, excitable, pleasure-loving; because his brain has been weakened by an exhausting disease; through mere imitation of heavy-drinking companions; from lack of employment, unbearable home life, or other social conditions; or from any combination of such factors—the result in each case being a gradual deterioration of the nervous system, by which the original tendency is strengthened, until the control of the will is destroyed.

The relation between mental and physical defect is by no means so clear or so simple as is commonly assumed. It is argued that, with the exception of those relatively few cases in which the disorder can be traced to some definite accident, such as a fall or blow upon the head, or to some virulent fever which has been caught by infection, it invariably arises from a congenitally defective disposition of the nervous system; this defect or weakness predisposes to insanity, so that any physical or mental shock which might leave a healthy individual uninjured overthrows the balance of such subjects and renders them insane. They suffer from what Maudsley (*Body and Mind*, 43) has called 'the worst of all tyrannies, the tyranny of a bad organization.' The result of this organization may be that the normal development cannot be completed, that the subject remains at a lower level, mentally and physically, than his more fortunate brethren; hence either definite idiocy, insanity, or some of the minor forms of defect already referred to. In cases of idiocy there is almost invariably some malformation of the brain, whether in its size, in its shape, or in the complexity of the convolutions (the brains of many idiots remaining as smooth as those of the higher apes); the result is an arrested development, and a disproportionate growth of the different parts of the system, which, under the principle of 'recapitulation,' suggest a reversion to, or a stopping short at, some stage in the animal ancestry of the human individual. Popular superstition has always recognized a close relationship between mental defect and congenital physical deformity; Shakespeare's 'stigmatic' contains both the modern name and the modern idea (the 'stigmata' of the insane, of the criminal, of the hysterical temperament). From Hippocrates onwards many have insisted that in a great number of persons the predisposition to insanity is inherited, and hence that slighter causes are sufficient to produce its onset than in other persons; moreover, that this predisposition may be inherited from parents not necessarily insane, but only nervously diseased; the contrary is also true—mere nervous disease in the child corresponding to and connected with insanity in the parents or near ancestors. In 'degenerate' families there is a tendency for this degeneracy to be progressively worse from generation to generation, until ultimately sterility appears, leading to the extinction of the degenerate race (Talbot, ch. 1). Moreau-de-Tours renewed the old thesis that genius is twin brother to madness, both being in many cases derived from the same parentage, and argued that degenerate types often represent throw-backs or reversions to more primitive types of evolution. The principal application given to this doctrine has been in the theory of criminality, of which Lombroso was the chief exponent, viz. that the criminal is born, not made, that (passion and accident apart) crimes spring from natures in which both the physical and the mental characteristics are those of primitive man, or, it may be, of the ape. The physical stigmata of the 'congenital criminal'—deformity of skull, sloping forehead, prominent cheekbones and projecting jaw, large ears, small deep-set and 'shifty' eyes, irregular dentition, cleft palate, stammering, etc.—are not now so seriously taken, and, according to Lugaro (p. 17), the anthropological theory, whether applied to insanity or to crime, is 'a thing of the past.' It is true that both the criminal and the idiot or imbecile are more liable to diseases, such as phthisis, etc., than the normal individual, and have many other physiological deficiencies; while statistics have been frequently compiled to show the apparent transmission from parent to child of the 'criminal temperament,' and its hereditary relationship with imbecility and insanity. From such data, however, even if we exclude the immeasurable influence of environment, physical and social, it can be argued only that *some* nervous deficiency is transmitted, which disposes, under 'favourable' conditions, to insanity, crime, or mental instability.

Against the physical theory of degeneracy (as an all-sufficient account), there may be pointed out the frequency with which mental causes produce, or at least initiate, a change of intellectual or moral character, *e.g.* emotional shock, disappointment, loss of occupation or of means, death of husband, wife, or child, social degradation, religious emotion, school strain, privation, prolonged worry, etc. It is by no means necessary that a hereditary or congenital *physical* predisposition should exist in all cases; thus, a shock coming closely upon or during an illness or exhaustion, or a period of insomnia, may give all the conditions necessary for the outbreak of insanity. The influence of the mind upon the production of insanity was fully recognized by Pinel in 1801, and by others after him. The evolution theory gave, however, a stronger hold to the *organic* theory of mental disease, and its connexion with heredity, so that this view is now practically universal. It is clear that such disease is always a product of two factors—a predisposition on the one hand, physical or mental; and, on the other, a shock or a stress leading to the actual appearance of the insanity or mental defect. Thus the physiologically critical periods of life are those at which outbreaks of insanity are most frequent—first and second dentition, puberty, adolescence, the climacteric, etc. Of course, if we assume from the first that mind is never an agent of bodily changes, but always their mere concomitant or their effect, then mental degeneracy cannot but be the sign or symptom of physical degeneracy, which is the

reality underlying all the phenomena. On the other hand, it may with equal plausibility be argued that the real factor is the *mental disposition*, the fundamental mode of *feeling* and of *reacting* upon impressions, which has a characteristic form and degree in every individual, but is variously modified by the *temporary disposition* which arises in connexion with bodily states—fatigue, exhaustion, illness, etc. A shock or stress will disturb the mind more or less, according to its fundamental and temporary disposition at the period when the strain comes. Without prejudice to any theory of the relation of body to mind, it may be admitted that actions are the outcome of the dominant feeling or emotion, which in its turn is mainly a product of perceptions and reproductions or memories; hence in human conduct the mental life predominates over the physiological: and this is especially the case after the child has become able to appreciate moral ideas. It is not denied that the physical nature has an immense influence in the causation of insanity.[1] But it is claimed (1) that this physical nature may be largely modified by education and by suggestion; (2) that it may itself be of a mental origin either in the ancestors or in the individual; (3) that the outbreak of insanity is almost invariably caused by mental factors, including, for example, emotional shock or mental contagion (as in imitative insanity); and (4) that the insanity may be cured by suggestion and other mental measures, in addition to physical hygiene (Dubois, in *Archives de psychologie*, x. [1910] 1: 'Psychological Conception of the Origin of Psychopathies').

3. **Symptoms of mental degeneracy.**—The manifold forms in which mental degeneracy expresses itself may be illustrated from the two most important 'functional' diseases—hysteria and psychasthenia.

(i.) *Hysteria* has been defined as a 'morbid mental condition in which ideas control the body and produce morbid changes in its functions' (Dana, *Journ. of Abnormal Psychol.*, Feb. 1907). Its most prominent features are anæsthesia, amnesia, loss of control over the attention, paralysis of certain muscles. (1) The anæsthesia may be the loss of sensibility in the whole of a special sense (*e.g.* blindness) without any injury either to the sense-organ or to the conducting nerve-fibres; or it may be partial (monocular blindness; narrowing of the field of vision in both eyes; colour-blindness), or systematic (loss of power to perceive certain persons or classes of objects, while the sensibility is otherwise intact). A historical illustration is the 'devil's marks' on the skin, by the insensibility of which a woman's guilt in trials for witchcraft was often determined. The insensibility differs from that which is due to nerve-injury, in that it is not permanent, but varies; it is, for example, sometimes removed during sleep, or under the influence of chloroform, or in the hypnotic trance, while emotional excitement of any kind is said to intensify it. Also the insensibility does not correspond to the distribution of a particular nerve or group of nerves; many of the reflexes are preserved in connexion with the sense-organ, while the insensible limb is not liable to accident or to injury, as is the case with insensibility arising from a severed nerve. It has been proved also that, while the subject is unaware of the existence of such anæsthesias, and therefore does not, of course, notice the impressions which are made on the insensitive organs, these are nevertheless recorded, and may be later brought to consciousness, *e.g.* when the patient is hypnotized; these and many similar facts show that the seat of the anæsthesia is not in the sense-organ but in the central organ, the cerebrum. *Physiologically* the impression is made on the nervous system, but it is, under the special conditions, unable to effect consciousness, as in other conditions it would (Janet, *L'État mental des hystériques*, p. 20 ff.).

(2) A further group of symptoms is found in the *amnesias*, which also almost always accompany hysteria. The memory may be defective in one or more of many different ways; it may simply show weakness, the subject being unable to remember events of recent occurrence, or material which has been learned, with the same vividness, accuracy, and completeness as a normal individual; or the defect may be specialized so that particular qualities or classes of experiences can no longer be recalled at all; for example, visual memories, or auditory memories, or the memory of actions; and within any one of these groups there may be specialization: in the visual group the patient may be unable to recall the colours of objects, while remembering their forms and their light and shade; in the auditory group, he may remember spoken words, but not melodies or tones, etc. Or the lapse of memory may be systematized, and this also in two ways: (*a*) with reference to the time-series; a period of life may be wholly forgotten—sometimes a recent period, sometimes a more distant one, while events before and after this period are remembered with distinctness; (*b*) with reference to systems of knowledge, as, for example, when the power of reading lapses, or the memory for a particular language, or a particular science, etc.; still more completely systematized are the cases in which a particular object or person, formerly familiar, is no longer remembered.

(3) The will and power of attention may be affected. There may be excessive concentration on one impression or idea, or there may be incapacity to concentrate the attention upon *any* impression or idea; in the former case we have an approximation to the state of melancholia, in the latter case to the state of mania or the insane flight of ideas. Whether the span of attention is narrow or wide, a subject may be distracted from a task by the slightest stimuli, and hence be unable to learn new material or to complete any task attempted by him; on the other hand, even though the attention be unconcentrated, it may still be excessively persistent, just as in ordinary experience a weak-willed individual may on occasions reveal the utmost obstinacy of character. Education and development are mainly a function of the power to direct the attention, at will, to objects uninteresting in themselves, or for the moment uninteresting to the individual: this power the hysteric patient possesses to a minimum degree. His attention is easily caught by sensory impressions which fall within his field of morbid interest, by ideas which enter the mind through purely casual associations (associations of contiguity, of similarity of sound, or the like), but is not caught or held by ideas of deeper logical value. As the attention decides which of the many ideas that are clamouring on the margin of consciousness shall enter its focus and become determinative of the course of our actions and of the course of our thoughts, so in hysteria the level of thought and action falls. Words suggest thoughts through their sound (punning, rhyming words) rather than through their meaning; actions are decided by

[1] Cf. Lugaro, p. 22: 'The functional insufficiency of a shrunken gland in the neck causes the syndrome of cretinism. Slight but chronic lesions of the kidneys can determine conditions of stupidity, temporary loss of speech, and violent attacks of confusion and agitation. A febrile malady occurring in infancy, though transient, attracting little notice, and passing away almost unobserved, can ruin the brain beyond repair. The effects of this may either manifest themselves as moral and intellectual defects of every degree, or as epileptic convulsions which may appear after many years, and by their repetition progressively destroy the mind.'

sensations or simple associative images rather than by systematized tendencies built upon experience; originality and spontaneity are replaced by banality or by automatism.

(4) On the motor side, there is frequently paralysis, or *paresis*, inability or weakness in the use of the limbs on one side of the body, or of a particular limb or organ, or a particular muscle; and (5) usually also disturbances, of 'nervous' origin, in the circulatory and other functions of the body—asthma, vertigo, palpitation, fainting, congestion, etc. Sometimes a power is exercised over these functions, which to the normal individual appears impossible: *e.g.* control of the heart, or of the digestive processes, ability to hasten or retard them at will. Both the muscular and the organic defects or abnormalities are, like the anæsthesias, of purely central origin; *i.e.* they spring directly from some temporary and local change in the cerebral system—a change which, however, has probably a mental origin.

The different phenomena in a particular case may usually be traced to a single system of ideas, which has obtained an undue control over the personality—for example, the memory, conscious or suppressed, of some emotionally exciting event or experience. Cure is sometimes effected by suggestion, which strengthens the power of the personality over the ideas, sometimes by a shock or accident calling up the dormant energies of the individual: thus in one case (Donaldson, *Growth of Brain*, London, 1895, p. 304, from Taylor, *Journ. of Nerv. and Ment. Dis.*, 1888) a lady recovered from a hysteric paralysis on the sudden death of her husband; in another, a cure resulted from the elopement of a daughter. For the most part, however, almost any stimulus is enough to re-excite the dominant idea, and to determine thought and action according to it. Thus a man who had been lost in the Australian Bush, and in the agony of thirst had frequently plunged into imaginary pools of water, used, long after his rescue, under the slightest dose of alcohol, to go automatically through the actions of diving, regardless of the surroundings or of the position in which he was. There is, for the most part, some such absorption by, or fixation of the mind upon, the compelling thought, with entire failure to correlate it with the immediately given sensations and impressions, or to criticize it by them. Epidemics of hysteria or insanity are common among peoples or races at a low level of development, or who suffer from insufficient nutrition (J. M. Clarke, 'On Hysteria,' *Brain*, xv. [1892] 526).

A well-known case is that of Haute-Savoie, 1857, in which a young girl saw a companion taken out of a stream half-drowned; the girl fell down in unconsciousness, and a few days later a friend who was with her became similarly affected. Other hysterical phenomena followed. Within four years there were 120 persons in the same neighbourhood affected in the same way, and this in spite of the fact that public exorcisms were held by the priest. The epidemic was stopped 'by the Government sending a force of gens d'armes to the district, removing the parish priest, isolating the patients, and sending the worst cases to distant hospitals' (Clarke, *loc. cit.*). Here it is the force of suggestion acting on an unstable nervous organism, and securing an influence over the internal organs of the body such as is not possessed, or is possessed only to a very slight degree, by the normal individual. See also art. HYSTERIA.

(ii.) A different complex of symptoms is presented by what is now called *psychasthenia*, or 'obsessional insanity' (Janet), although at some points it is closely related to hysteria. Whereas in the latter the morbid ideas are specific or particular, in obsessional insanity they are general or governing ideas, entering into relation with every possible action or thought of the subject, for example, the idea that one is a criminal, or has committed some unpardonable sin. The idea is involuntarily, continuously, and painfully present to the mind, if not in the centre, at least on the verge, of consciousness, so that to escape from it is impossible. The general ideas most commonly present are those of (*a*) *crime*, including homicide, suicide, dipsomania, sacrilege, etc., and there are two forms—the obsession of committing the crime, and the obsession of remorse for a crime already committed, the actual crime being in such cases enormously exaggerated in the mind (what was really a mere thought or passing idea being transformed into an actual deed); (*b*) *physical or mental defect*, again in two forms—obsession of being, and obsession of becoming. Thus, a lady who is distressed at her actual stoutness may refuse food, or take insufficient rest in consequence, while a lady at present of moderate dimensions may adopt the same tactics from fear of becoming unduly stout. Other instances are the fear of approaching old age, of approaching madness, of approaching death.

The common qualities, as regards the content of the obsessional ideas, are: (1) they regard acts or states of the subject himself, not primarily of any external object; (2) the acts or states are socially disreputable, wicked, or ridiculous, or in general undesirable; (3) (and in this is the fundamental difference from hysteria) they are endogenous, self-suggested, whereas in hysteria the morbid idea is usually exogenous, or suggested from without. Accordingly, we find that at the early stages there is full consciousness of the absurdity or folly of the obsession; and also that, except in rare cases, the morbid action is not completely realized. Thus, a kleptomaniac used to take a servant with him when he went shopping, to watch and afterwards return the stolen articles; in another case, a youth, after taking poison, telephoned to his mother to inform her of the fact, with the (expected) result of a doctor's arrival. Again, the hallucinations have not the same definiteness or 'body' as those of hysteria; they lack details, and hence the slightest effort of the attention destroys them, as is the case in dreams; they are seldom completely externalized, or definitely located; they are really symbolic or type-ideas, standing for a system of thought rather than for a definite object.

On the volitional side, there are almost invariably automatisms, that is, actions which occur independently of and even in opposition to the will of the subject. These Janet classifies into three groups, in each of which the disturbance is either systematic or diffuse. (1) Mental agitations, including the systematic forms—manias of interrogation, of doubt, of precision, of explanation; and the diffuse form—the mania of rumination or reverie. The essential character of all is a movement of the mind which is incapable of arresting itself upon any one fact or thought, but is compelled to pass beyond it, to add something to it, and then something more, and something more, without end—'ideas either revolving in a circle, or branching out endlessly, but in any case never reaching an end, a definite conclusion' (*Les Obsessions*, i. 150). Familiar cases are those in which a patient deliberates for hours about carrying out some simple, and, normally, habitual action: *e.g.* that of putting on a sock, choosing a necktie, stepping over an object in the roadway. (2) On the motor side, what are called 'tics,' that is, automatic actions, twitchings, movements of the lips, etc., these being in nearly all cases symbols or traces of complete actions as suggested by the ideas—'psychic short-cuts.' (3) On the emotional side there are systematic dreads, or 'phobias,' or a generalized anguish or terror. Among the 'phobias' are the fear of crossing an open space (*agoraphobia*), fear of remaining in a shut or closed place (*claustrophobia*), fear of infectious disease (*nosophobia*), fear of insanity, of snakes, of vermin, etc. The diffuse form has sometimes been called *panophobia*,

a generalized expectation or dread of some untoward event happening.

4. Explanation of the symptoms.—The explanation of these phenomena is found first in a weakening of the mind, by which the control over the finer mechanism, alike of association and of voluntary movement, is relaxed and ultimately destroyed. The contrast with the normal individual is the same as that which occurs, within an individual life, between bodily health and sickness or fatigue—in the former case the greater activity, co-ordinative power, effectiveness of movement, ability to recollect at will, and to direct the thoughts; in the latter state the weakening or failure of these powers. Obsessional insanity is an exaggeration of this relatively healthy state, having its centre or point of support in some actual psychical experience of the subject. In hysteria, the general symptoms may most simply be referred to a disaggregation of the personality: some group or groups of memories, or of habits, or of other acquired activities, separate off from the controlling consciousness with which the normal individual identifies his self or ego. Thus, in the automatic writing and other expressive movements of hysteric or neurasthenic patients (Binet, Janet, etc.), the subject is entirely unaware of the actions done, although they would normally imply consciousness both to initiate and to carry out. So, the hypnotized subject may carry out many actions which apparently involve deliberate consciousness, and, on awakening, show complete ignorance of them; and there are familiar cases in which a patient leads, for a shorter or longer period of time, a different life from that of his normal condition, during which he is unconscious, or at least has no memory, of his previous state, while afterwards, on recovery, he has forgotten the temporary abnormal state (Ansel Bourne, etc.). Morton Prince gives a remarkable instance of such a case of double or multiple personality in his *Dissociation of a Personality*. Normally all our experiences, or at least those which are important to us, are synthesized, unified in the single dominant consciousness or personality; abnormally, some bundles of experience, more or less large, are detached from this unifying consciousness, and form secondary personalities, which may make use of the general fund of memories, habits, etc., organized in our experience, and represented in the intimate structure and fabric of the brain. It is not necessary here to discuss how far these self-realizing ideas deserve the name of 'separate consciousnesses' or 'separate personalities.' There are all degrees of disaggregation—between the simple hearing and answering of a question by an absorbed reader, without subsequent awareness on his part of the action, and the extreme form found in Ansel Bourne, Janet's 'Léonie,' or Prince's 'Miss Beauchamp.' There is a close parallelism between such cases and insanity—for example, the insanity of fixed ideas, or of delusions, etc. Freud argues that many of these secondary personalities, as is the case in insanity, represent attempted realizations of certain wishes, desires, ambitions, which the subject has been prevented from successfully carrying out, or which he has voluntarily repressed (*Neurosenlehre*, ed. E. Hitschmann, Leipzig, 1911, p. 54). On the one hand, there is a loss (or a defect), in Janet's view, of tension or *tonus* in the central nervous system, or some part of it, and on the other a 'psychic misery,' a disorganization of the mental life, in which images and ideas tend to realize themselves apart from the control usually exercised by the self on the basis of past experience and according to the claims of the social environment. (On mental dissociation, see also J. Macpherson, *Mental Affections*, London, 1899.)

Corresponding to this disorganization of the mind is the existence of what may be called a floating mass of emotion, dread, or anxiety, ready to attach itself to any idea that may arise, and leading to actions that may be out of all proportion to the motive-idea, taken by itself. This emotion is really the mass of feeling that springs from the altered bodily constitution, and the altered organic and other sensations which form the basis of the 'feeling of self.' Since the alterations consist largely in an increase of bodily and especially of painful sensations, the emotion as a whole is of the depressive type. Such an emotion necessarily alters the whole mental character, and especially the *moral* character: the subject becomes timid, secretive, cunning, superstitious, selfish, and cruel. In originally higher types there is a tendency to pessimism: the patient is unable to carry out the ideals, frequently extravagant, which he sets before himself; hence doubt and distrust of himself and others; his life is suffused with pain; slight motives cause him distress and anxiety; this 'psychosis' he projects into others, and believes life to be predominantly painful.

Obsessions and fixed ideas are for the most part the result of a logical attempt to account for the emotion of which—although not of its cause—the subject is conscious. In other cases the system of ideas may be derived first from the environment—consciously or unconsciously—and the dread or anxiety is built upon it or attached to it afterwards (see Williams, in *Journ. Abn. Psychol.* v. [1910] 2).

The same features—disaggregation, depressive emotional-tone, or both—may occur in mental degeneration at all its levels. Thus in the *imbecile*, there is failure to co-ordinate experiences, to take more than the first few steps in the synthesis of personality: the result is impulsiveness of character, inability to concentrate the attention, motivation only by the simplest ideas, and these only in isolation from one another, no coherent or sustained activity either of thought or of action. Where depression is also present, the imbecile may become the criminal, with homicidal or other socially dangerous tendencies. In the *paranoiac*, there is failure to form, or the lapse of, the highest mental synthesis—the recognition of the 'social self'—on which the possibility of morality and of religion depends: hence the primary self-consciousness has the field to itself; there is an unrestrained assertion of individual wishes and desires, and a total disregard for the convenience, wishes, or claims of others. The enormous self-esteem easily leads to delusions of unlimited power, wealth, or high rank (*megalomania*), or, where depression is present, to mania of persecution, etc. The nearest parallel that we have in normal life is to be found in dreams (*q.v.*), the analogy of which with insanity has been frequently pointed out (Moreau-de-Tours, Maury, Sir Arthur Mitchell, etc.). The higher systems are out of function, for the time being; the will is at rest; each idea, suggested by present sensory impressions, or by recent experiences, has the field of consciousness to itself: hence it takes on an illusory objectivity, and appears as a *real* experience or perception, while it tends to call up associate ideas which, however, are bound to it only by the lowest, purely mechanical, bonds (habit-associations, associations of sensory similarity). Thus, Maury (*Le Sommeil et les rêves*[3], Paris, 1865, ch. vi.) describes a dream in which the main incidents were connected together through the words 'Kilomètre,' 'Kilogram,' 'Gilolo,' 'Lobelia,' 'Lopez,' 'Loto.' Simultaneous dissociation of personality is also a common feature of the dream; we appear to be debating with another person, who questions us and answers us; both dis-

putants, however, are ourselves. Jaury (*loc. cit.*) mentions that the apparent revelations of dreams may sometimes be traced to forgotten memories of our own, which we recall to ourselves and put in the mouth of another person, in our dream. In general, however, the thoughts of the dream are trivial, absurd, meaningless, as any one may prove for himself by writing down, immediately on waking, the words he has just been uttering in his dream. The same defect, and the same lack of power to criticize what passes through the subject's own mind, we have found to be common in mental degeneracy. The hallucinations of the insane, and the vague emotional depression, dread, or anxiety, have also their analogy in dream-life. All these phenomena of degeneracy appear also in normal life during fatigue, exhaustion, illness, senility, and in the temporary insanity of intoxication by alcohol or other drugs (nicotine, opium, hashish, etc.; see, for example, R. Meunier, *Le Hachich*, Paris, 1909).

5. Progressive mental degeneration.—When degeneration attacks a well-developed mind, the symptoms frequently show a regular sequence, according to Ribot's Law of Regression or Involution (see his *Diseases of the Memory*); the more unstable forms of experience or acquirement are the first to lapse, *i.e.* (1) the most recently acquired, (2) the most complex, (3) the least frequently repeated, the least habitual or automatic powers. Thus, in senile insanity, or in the beginnings of alcoholic insanity, it is the power to meet new situations, to face difficulties, to create, invent, or discover, that fails earliest: habitual situations are met, adequately perhaps, in habitual ways, but the bloom of individuality is gone. There follows the delicate appreciation of moral values—there is an increase of selfishness, and of obstinacy, along with a failure of higher ambitions; then the more complex intellectual acquisitions, professional skill, scientific interests; then the memory for recent events, the recollection of the less familiar complexes of experience. With the narrowing of intellectual interest, the emotional life occupies a larger space; the patient becomes irritable, and irritating, discontented, malicious, neglectful of the ordinary conventions of life; his thoughts and his speech become less coherent, more vulgar and petty, until, finally, dementia leaves no powers in function except the primitive instincts and reflexes, with at the most a few of the more ingrained habits of mind and body. In a general way also, although by no means in detail, these stages have their parallels in the different concrete forms of degeneracy found in different individuals—from the morally deficient 'intellectual' down to the congenital imbecile or idiot.

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J. L. MCINTYRE.

DEGRADATION.—See DISCIPLINE.

DEHRĀ.—A town, the capital of Dehrā Dūn, a valley projecting from the Plains of Northern India like a triangle towards the source of the Jumnā river and the main range of the Himālaya, lat. 30° 19′ 59″ N.; long. 78° 2′ 57″ E. From a religious point of view, the place is remarkable as the seat of a strong body of Udāsīs, a Sikh order of Hindu ascetics, who are said to owe their establishment to the son of Gurū Nānak, the founder of Sikhism. Their *gurudwārā*, or temple, the work of their leader Rām Rāy, was erected in A.D. 1699. The central block, in which the bed of the *gurū* is preserved, was built on the model of the Emperor Jahāngīr's tomb at Lahore. At the corners are smaller monuments in honour of the *gurū's* four wives. The temple is supported by a large endowment, and the *gurū*, who has the revenues at his disposal, is the richest man in the Dūn valley. Formerly the appointment of each new *gurū*, who was selected from among the disciples of the deceased *gurū*, was in the hands of the Sikh chiefs of the Panjāb, who, at each new installation, made a gift to the British Government and received in return the complimentary present of a pair of shawls. This practice is now discontinued. The special dress of the members of the sect is a cap of red cloth shaped like a sugar loaf, worked over with coloured thread, and adorned with a black silk fringe round the edge. The *mahant*, or *gurū*, enjoys high consideration in the country round; and large numbers of devotees, drawn from all classes of Hindus, attend the shrine. But the most enthusiastic worshippers naturally come from the Cis-Sutlej Sikh States. The annual ceremonies, which last ten days, are performed at the Hindu feast of the Holī in spring.

LITERATURE.—Atkinson, *Himalayan Gazetteer*, iii. [1886] 197 f.
W. CROOKE.

DEICIDE.—This term, though not new, has been used in the past with such restricted meaning, and so seldom, that there is an imperative need to enlarge its definition before it can be of service in that branch of scientific research in which it is increasingly used. The following definition, taken from Ogilvie's *Imperial Dict. of the Eng. Lang.*, will show this:

'*Deicide* = (1) The act of putting to death Jesus Christ our Saviour. "Earth, profaned, yet blessed with *deicide*" (Prior). (2) One concerned in putting Christ to death (Craig). [Rare in both senses.]'

Another quite recent dictionary defines the word thus: 'The killing of God; especially the crucifixion of Christ.' Though there is here a definition more in accord with modern requirements, the student of religions, acquainted with facts which seem to show that there has been a wide-spread custom of putting to death both men and animals thought to be gods incarnate, must set aside everything that so narrows the word as to make it unfit for his purpose. Doing this, one is left with what is, after all, a mere translation of the Latin term, viz. 'the killing of a god,' or, more briefly, 'god-slaughter.' It is in this largest sense that the word is to be here used. For obvious reasons, there will be few, if any, references to what was at one time looked upon as the sole instance of deicide—the Crucifixion.

None of the phenomena which the scientific study of religions has made known has aroused more interest than those obscure rites and ceremonies, those strange customs, which seem best explained by the theory that deicide, once supposed to find its only example in the Crucifixion, has been, in fact, a wide-spread custom, which has left a deep impress on the religious thought of the race. Before giving the few instances of this custom which space limits allow, it will be well to make some kind of classification, which will enable the student to understand more fully their nature and extent. It is suggested that instances of god-slaughter may be placed in one or other of two

main classes, as being (1) *real*, (2) *mimetic* or *symbolic*. A noticeable variety of the former is, on one theory at least, traceable in certain solemn expiatory sacrifices, and may therefore be termed 'expiatory' or 'piacular.' Again, in many of these instances for which the name 'mimetic' or 'symbolic' has been suggested, the effort 'to keep in remembrance' seems so prominent that they may well be termed 'commemorative.' The following is therefore suggested as a working classification for those instances of god-slaughter which seem to have been enacted.

1. Real (with sub-class 'piacular' or 'expiatory').—Cases of real god-slaughter may be seen in the strange custom, at one time wide-spread though now well-nigh extinct, of putting to death kings and chieftains at set times, or when they showed some sign of approaching decay and death. There is evidence to show that originally these high-placed victims were looked upon as Divine in a very real sense—gods incarnate. Such Divine honours are still ascribed by savage people to their king or ruler. The existence of these Divine beings in full vigour was deemed necessary to the welfare of all their people. It was a proof that their god could still safeguard their interests. The reason for putting these gods incarnate to death is believed to have been the dread lest, through disease or decay of strength, they might be unable any longer to help and keep in safety those who looked to them for these blessings. It was necessary, therefore, that a fresh and more vigorous incarnation should be sought for, to take the place of that which was ready to vanish away.

Africa and India furnish the best attested instances of such deicide, though traces of it are supposed to have been discovered in the accounts of old-world rites handed down by classical writers. Three centuries ago it was the practice to put to death the king of Sofala, an African State, when even a slight bodily blemish became manifest; whilst the king of Eyeo, also in Africa, was expected to commit suicide should his headmen think it demanded by the needs of the State. Again, in one of the kingdoms of Southern India the king was put to death or compelled to self-immolation, after a reign of twelve years. Similar customs seem to have obtained in others of the Indian States. It is not surprising to find that, in course of time, means of evading this disagreeable necessity were discovered; one method, that of providing a substitute, human or animal, having a special interest as being the possible beginning of vicarious sacrifice.

An interesting variety of these customs may be seen in cases where an original totem has developed into a deity worshipped by the members of the totem clan. It has been observed that at certain times, when the deity seems to be estranged from his worshippers, or for some other reason the clan-bond needs renewing or cementing, recourse has been had to sacrifices of special solemnity and efficacy. In these the victim has been an animal of the same species as the original totem. In other words, the very deity constitutes the sacrifice which is to heal the breach between himself and his worshippers. It is not difficult to see in these solemn renewals of covenants the beginning of expiatory or piacular sacrifice. There seems to be a sufficient reason for thinking them to be cases of piacular deicide. On the other hand, the solemn putting to death, by his own priests, of the divine Apis bull of Egypt, after the lapse of a certain number of years, seems rather to be an instance of the endeavour to secure a renewal of the Divine life in an incarnation of unbroken vigour.

2. Mimetic or symbolic (with sub-class 'commemorative').—This has its roots in those myths which constitute so large a part of the *quasi*-theology of the great ancient Nature-religions. In these myths the phenomena of Nature are personified and deified, and her processes become incidents in the lives of the gods thus originated. The myths which most readily furnish illustrations of the matter now in hand are those connected with the changes of the season which are so closely related to the growth of vegetation, the quickening of the seed, and the maturing of the kindly fruits of the earth. Such are the myths of Adonis, the Syrian deity, slain by the hunted boar on Mount Lebanon, so that his blood reddened the waters of the river which carried it down to the sea; of Osiris, slain by the malice of his brother Set or Typhon; of Dionysus, god of the vine, who, according to the Greek myth, was put to death by jealous Juno. Many quaint superstitions and ceremonies still surviving, among the peasantry of Europe as well as among the farmers and cultivators of well-nigh all other lands, find their best explanation in the wide-spread belief in similar stories. In them, and in the rituals based upon them, were set forth the death by violence and, in some cases, the subsequent resurrection of a god—a god of vegetation, and especially of corn.

J. G. Frazer writes thus of the Adonis rite: 'His death was annually lamented with a bitter wailing, chiefly by women; images of him, dressed to resemble corpses, were carried out as to burial and then thrown into the sea or into springs; and in some places his revival was celebrated on the following day' (*GB*[2] ii. 116).

Concerning the Egyptian deity Osiris he says: 'Of the annual rites with which his death and burial were celebrated in the month Athyr we unfortunately know very little. The mourning lasted five days, from the eighth to the twelfth of the month Athyr. The ceremonies began with the "earth-ploughing," that is, with the opening of the field labours, when the waters of the Nile are sinking. The other rites included the search for the mangled body of Osiris, the rejoicings at its discovery, and its solemn burial. The burial took place on the 11th of November, and was accompanied by the recitation of laments from the liturgical books' (*ib.* 140).

Again, of Dionysus he writes: 'The Cretans celebrated a biennial festival at which the sufferings and death of Dionysus were represented in every detail' (*ib.* 163).

Other evidence obtainable warrants the belief that mimetic or symbolic deicide occupied no small place in the ritual of long-vanished religions. Such god-slaughter was not a mere amusement, or even a gratification of the dramatic instinct so deeply implanted in human nature. It had a far more serious purpose. Most probably these annual rites were performed in the firm conviction that they would further and assist those great and all-important natural processes on which the very life of the world depended. No doubt, in course of time, many of these customs, at least before they became mere superstitions, would be retained as a means of keeping in remembrance that which ought not to be forgotten. In other words, they would be more distinctly 'commemorative.' Such seems to have been the case with some very striking ceremonies observed by the ancient Mexicans, in which it was the custom to make paste or dough images of certain of their gods. These images were then 'killed' and broken in pieces to furnish material for a sacrificial meal. It is a curious circumstance that portions of this consecrated food were reserved for the sick, and carried to them 'with great reverence and veneration.'

Concerning such customs as these, many questions arise which it is not easy as yet to answer. Even the conclusions already arrived at are by no means so established as to be accepted without reserve. The evidence, after all, is so scanty and elusive that one is compelled to a resolute distrust of one's own judgment, and to reliance rather on the sagacity of those skilled in such investigations, reserving to oneself the right of giving a casting vote in cases where the evidence for and against a certain view seems evenly balanced. Yet, not-

withstanding all this, no part of the great study of religions is fuller of suggestion than this, more especially in the strange parallels noticeable between pagan and Christian thought and ritual. It is only necessary to name such themes as 'Incarnation,' 'Crucifixion,' 'Sacrifice,' 'Eucharist,' etc., to show this. What influence the recognition of such analogies may have, in the future, on Christian speculation it is impossible to say.

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T. STENNER MACEY.

DEIFICATION (Greek and Roman).—**I. The Greeks.**—The deification of actual men and women among the Greeks is a natural development of that view of the gods which their early literary documents show already prevalent. The Greek was not satisfied to leave the superhuman beings whose presence he divined in the operations of Nature, and whose legends he learnt as a child, in a mystical haze, as vast powers of shadowy and uncertain outlines; his mind loved the light of day; he early wanted to know exactly what these beings looked like, what definite things they had done, in what relations of kinship they stood to each other and himself. Hence it was that the gods of the Greek came to be anthropomorphic in a peculiar sense. He conceived them as really like men; they had actually trodden the hills and fields familiar to himself: the Athenian could look at the very mark which the trident of Poseidon had left upon the rocks of the Acropolis; the Spartan knew from a child the grave of Hyacinthus, whom Apollo had slain with the discus.

'From one origin are begotten gods and mortal men,' says a line attributed to Hesiod (*Works and Days*, 108); and Pindar echoes it in the opening of *Nem.* vi.: 'There is one self-same race of men and gods; and from one single Mother have we both the breath of life; only faculties altogether diverse distinguish us; since man is a thing of nought, and those have brazen heaven for a sure abiding home. And yet we have some likeness, either by greatness of soul or by fashion of body, to the Deathless Ones.'

Yet more, the gods had begotten human children in intercourse with men; the families of the legendary chieftains, and such families of a later day as could make out a descent from the heroes of legend, were literally and physically their issue. The ancient heroes, as Homer tells us by a number of recurring epithets, were very much like gods to look at. And not only could the Divine thus come to earth, but the legends knew of men becoming gods (Eur. *Andr.* 1255, etc.).

Especially is the boundary-line between the worship of the dead and that of the gods hard to draw, for the rites offered generally to the dead implied the belief that the deceased had some power of action in the living world; only the scope of such power was greater in the case of those worshipped as heroes, whilst the distinction, again, between the rites proper to heroes and to gods respectively tended in practice to become blurred (Deneken, col. 2526, note). A difference was, indeed, recognized in common parlance between the ordinary attention to the dead, 'heroic' honours, and divine honours (see Arr. iv. 11. 3); but, when we try to draw a hard-and-fast line, the difference appears rather one of degree.

The mass of the heroes worshipped by the Greeks were mythical figures imagined in a remote past, especially the legendary founders of cities, the eponymous ancestors of clans, or the patrons of particular professions. How some cases occurred in which actual men were assimilated after their death to these heroes of the fabulous past we cannot say, but it seems to have happened early in certain parts of the Greek world (esp. Thrace and Sicily) that the founders of new cities received the same honours which the older cities gave to their legendary heroes (Timesius in the 7th cent. B.C. [Hdt. i. 168]; Miltiades in the 6th cent. [Hdt. vi. 38]; Gelon, Theron, and Hiero in the 5th cent. [Diod. xi. 38, 53, 66]; Hagnon and Brasidas in the same century [Thuc. v. 11]); or that the spirits of those who had been violently slain under circumstances which made some community dread their vengeance were placated with 'heroic' honours (Philip of Croton in the 6th cent. [Hdt. v. 47]; Onesilus, king of Salamis, in the 5th cent. [Hdt. v. 114]).

It was thus natural that, when the emotions of reverence or gratitude entertained with regard to some actual man were raised to a high degree, they should be felt as almost identical with those which had the gods for their object (*ἶσον γάρ σε θεῷ τίσουσιν Ἀχαιοί* [Hom. *Il.* ix. 603]; *θεὸς δ' ὣς τίετο δήμῳ* [*ib.* v. 78, etc.]). In a moment of exaltation it might even seem proper to express such feelings in the same ritual performances as those used for the gods. *Ὦ παῖδες, Ἀργείοισιν εὔχεσθαι χρεών, θύειν τε λείβειν θ' ὡς θεοῖς Ὀλυμπίοις σπονδάς*, exclaims the Danaus of Æschylus (*Supp.* 980 ff.). Such language was, of course, a rhetorical exaggeration; but, when the notion, even as an extravagance, was present to the mind, it was a short step, in days when the old awe of the gods had declined and novel dramatic expression was craved for, to translate it into action. According to Duris, the first instance of the formalities of religious worship being addressed to a living man was when Lysander, at the end of the 5th cent., became the object of a cult in Samos; altars, sacrifices, pæans, and games are specified as its constituents (Plut. *Lys.* 18). The case did not remain isolated. In Thasos, soon after, it was taken for granted that the State might confer divine honours on whom it pleased; but the fact that this new development was reprobated in quarters where old-fashioned piety still existed is shown by the answer of Agesilaus when the Thasians informed him that they were building him temples (Plut. *Apophth. Lac. Ages.* 25). When Dion entered Syracuse in 357, he was received as a god, with sacrifices, libations, and prayers (Plut. *Dion*, 29). Clearchus, the tyrant of Heraclea, adopted the insignia of the Olympian gods, and compelled his subjects to approach him with prostrations (Suid. *s.v.* Κλέαρχος).

To understand the state of mind which led to such practices, we must remember the movement of Greek thought which had taken place since the days of Æschylus. The religious scepticism which was abroad had, no doubt, for many minds emptied the traditional forms of worship of their content of awe and devotion, and in proportion as they had become mere formalities there was less restraint from offering them to men. So far as the old gods remained as figures for the imagination, anthropomorphism had gone a step further, as may be seen in the contrast of Praxiteles with Phidias. Scepticism had in fact brought anthropomorphism to its ultimate conclusion by asserting roundly that the gods were men, as was done by the popular Euhemerism. The gods, according to this theory, were kings and great men of old, who had come to be worshipped after their death in gratitude for the benefits they had conferred (see EUHEMERISM). On this view, there was nothing monstrous in using the same forms to express gratitude to a living benefactor. In so far as the worship of living men arose from these conditions, it was a product, not of superstition, but of rationalism. It shows, not how exalted an idea was held of the object of worship, but how depreciated in meaning the forms of worship had become. If this is so, Frazer (*Early Hist. of Kingship*, 1905, p. 137) errs in confusing it with primitive superstition, of which it is really the antithesis. At the same time, the development of religious feeling, which revolted against the traditional anthropomorphism, was not altogether unfavourable to such cults. The tendency to merge the separate divinities in the conception of One pervading Divine power (Schmidt, *Ethik d. alt. Griechen*, 1882, i. 52) would make it easier to see manifestations of this power in human personalities which asserted themselves

strongly. A special kind of deification was that which we find in connexion with the mystic sects dispersed through the Greek communities and the philosophies which borrowed from them. If deathlessness had been all along the distinguishing characteristic of the gods, those who laid stress upon the deathlessness of the individual soul thereby came near to making it divine. And so we get the idea that the human soul is a divine being imprisoned for some pre-natal offence in the mortal body. The notion, current among the Orphics, passed from them to the Pythagoreans (Rohde, *Psyche*[4], ii. 121 f., 161 f.). So, too, Empedocles declared that, if a divine being sinned, he was incarnate for punishment till he had worked out his salvation in a number of successive lives, and was restored to fellowship with the gods (frag. 146, 147 [Diels]). Empedocles himself was already reaching that consummation, and claimed divine honours: *ἐγὼ δ' ὑμῖν θεὸς ἄμβροτος, οὐκέτι θνητός, | πωλεῦμαι μετὰ πᾶσι τετιμένος, ὥσπερ ἔοικα, | ταινίαις τε περίστεπτος στέφεσίν τε θαλείοις* (frag. 112 [Diels]; cf. Rohde, *Psyche*[4], ii. 171 f.). So, again, on the funeral tablets discovered at Thurii, the dead man declares to the gods that he is of their kindred, and is saluted as one who has passed from mortality to deity: *Ὄλβιε καὶ μακαριστέ, θεὸς δ' ἔσῃ ἀντὶ βροτοῖο. Θεὸς ἐγένου ἐξ ἀνθρώπου* (Michel, *Recueil*, 1896–1900, nos. 1330, 1331; Harrison, *Prolegomena to Gr. Relig.*[2], 1908, p. 660 ff.).

If any one had the right to divine honours, Alexander, after feats of conquest to which Greek story knew no parallel except the mythological triumphs of Dionysus and Herakles, obviously had a pre-eminent claim. Already his father, Philip, had in his own kingdom caused his own statue to be carried in procession, together with those of the twelve gods (Diod. xvi. 92. 5). It is absurd to call in the influence of 'the East' to account for what followed so inevitably from the prevalent disposition of the Greek world. As a matter of fact, the Achæmenian kings were apparently not worshipped as gods (Æsch. *Pers.* 157 is cited by Beurlier and others to prove that they were, but the evidence of the native monuments is against it, and the Greek notion represented by Æschylus seems to rest upon a misapprehension of the formality of prostration). In Egypt, indeed, since the New Empire, the reigning king had been so worshipped, and it was natural that Alexander should here be saluted as the son of Amen (Ammon). But we may safely say that, even without this, the Greeks would have worshipped him. The oracle of Didyma had already in 331 (unless Strabo is right in his scepticism) declared Alexander to have been begotten by Zeus (Strabo, xvii. 814). In 323, on Alexander's return from India, embassies arrived at Babylon from Greece, wearing and bringing crowns such as indicated that they were *θεωροί*, approaching a god (Arr. vii. 23. 2). There was still, indeed, in Greece a party of old-fashioned piety who opposed the extravagant flattery as profane. The question provoked stormy debates in the Athenian assembly. The divine honours were defended on the other side with flippant sarcasm as a form too empty to matter. 'By all means,' exclaimed Demosthenes, 'let Alexander, if he wish it, be the son of Zeus and Poseidon both together' (Hyper. [Blass] i. 31. 17; cf. ps.-Plut. *Vit. X. Orat.* vii. 22; Valer. Max. vii. 2, 13; Dinarch. *in Demosth.* i. 94). The expression shows that Alexander was understood himself to demand such honours. According to an account preserved by Arrian, it was the philosopher Anaxarchus who was employed to propose divine honours to Alexander in the circle which surrounded the king's person. The *prostration* which Alexander demanded was regarded by the Greeks as an acknowledgment of deity, and Anaxarchus is represented as defending Alexander's deity on purely rationalistic euhemeristic grounds (Arr. iv. 10). For Hephæstion, at any rate, Alexander demanded worship after his favourite's death. The worship was 'heroic' in kind; Arrian gives under reserve the story that Alexander had wished to make it properly divine, but had been forbidden by the oracle of Ammon (Arr. vii. 14. 7; but cf. Diod. xvii. 115).

If worship offered to the living Alexander had offended the more conservative Greek feeling, worship offered to the dead Alexander as a hero was in accordance with Greek tradition. The forms of worship chosen would show numberless local variations which we cannot now trace. The Ionian Confederacy maintained a cult of Alexander centred in a sanctuary near Teos (Strabo, xiv. 644) till the days of the Roman Empire. Under the Roman Empire itself the cult of Alexander flourished (Lamprid. *Alex. Sev.* 5. 1; Herodian, iv. 8; Dio Cass. lxxvii. 7).

Naturally, the Macedonian chiefs who entered upon Alexander's inheritance saw their interest in publicly recognizing his divinity. In what forms they severally did so is not recorded. Eumenes had a 'tent of Alexander' in his camp, with a throne before which the officers offered a sacrifice as to a present god (Diod. xviii. 60, 61; Plut. *Eum.* 13; Polyæn. iv. 8. 2). The appearance of Alexander's head, with the horns of Ammon, upon the royal coinages is an assertion of his assimilation to the gods.

Antipater was an exception; in him the old feeling which condemned these practices as impious (*ἀσεβές* [Suidas]) still found a representative. The official worship of Alexander at Alexandria as god of the city cannot be traced further back than Ptolemy II., who transferred the conqueror's body from Memphis to the new temple called the *Sêma* in Alexandria. [It is curious that Diod. speaks of the honours offered to Alexander in Alexandria as *ἡρωϊκαί* (xviii. 28. 4). Probably the expression is used loosely, because the honours were offered to a dead man.] Henceforward the annual priest of Alexander, chosen from a limited number of privileged families, was eponym for the year till Roman times. A golden crown and a crimson robe were his insignia. The cult continued in Alexandria till the institution of Christianity (Otto, *Priester und Tempel in hellenist. Aegypten*, i. 138 f., 253).

The Greeks, who had worshipped Alexander in his lifetime, were ready enough to give the same sort of worship to his successors. Craterus, who died in 321, was honoured at Delphi with a pæan (Athen. xv. 696*e*). Scepsis in 310 voted the living Antigonus a *τέμενος*, altar, and image; they had already some time previously instituted sacrifice, games, and *stephanephoria* in his honour (Dittenberger, *Inscr. Orient.* i. 6). In 307 Athens exhausted all forms of adoration in regard to the same two princes. They were addressed as *θεοὶ σωτῆρες*; a regular priesthood was established for them; and changes, ostensibly permanent, were made in the calendar and religious organization of the people. In 290, a hymn, which has been preserved, was composed for the reception of Demetrius. In it Demetrius is hailed as the son of Poseidon and Aphrodite; he and Demeter are the 'greatest and friendliest of the gods,' and so on (Diod. xx. 46; Plut. *Dem.* 10 f.; Athen. vi. 253, xv. 697*a*). It is important to observe that the really religious people still protested against these perversions, and saw in the failure of the vintage a judgment of the true gods (Philippides, *ap.* Plut. *Dem.* 12). The first Greek State to offer divine honours to Ptolemy was apparently the Confederation of the Cyclades (*τετιμηκόσιμ πρώ[τοις τ]ὸν σωτῆρα Πτολεμαῖον ἰσοθέοις τιμαῖς* [Ditt. *Syll.*[2] i. 202]); Rhodes in 304, or soon after, conferred upon him the divine surname of

'Saviour,' and dedicated to him a *τέμενος* and festival (Diod. xx. 100. 3 f.; Paus. i. 8. 6; cf. Πτολεμαίου τοῦ Σωτῆρος καὶ θεοῦ [Ditt. *Inscr. Orient.* i. 16]); and Lysimachus was worshipped with altar and sacrifice at Priene (*Inscr. of the Brit. Mus.* cccci.) and in Samothrace (Ditt. *Syll.*² i. 190). Seleucus, after his conquest of Asia Minor (281), had an altar built to him by Ilion, and games were instituted to him like those held in honour of Apollo (Hirschfeld in *Archäol. Zeitschr.* xxxii. [1875] 155; Haussoullier in *Rev. de Philol.* xxiv. [1900] 319). Both Seleucus and his son Antiochus were worshipped by the Athenian colonists in Lemnos (Phylarch. *ap.* Athen. vi. 254). Especially where a chief had founded or re-founded a city, he had the founder's prerogative of worship: so Cassander at Cassandrea (Ditt. *Syll.*² i. 178), Demetrius at Sicyon (Diod. xx. 102 f.), and Ptolemy at Ptolemaïs (Otto, *Priester u. Tempel*, i. 160).

It is probable that all through the epoch when the dynasties of Seleucus and Ptolemy ruled in Asia and Egypt respectively, the Greek cities which were subject to them, and some which were merely allied, expressed their loyalty in a cult. Our evidence is, of course, fragmentary.

We find at Ilion a priest of Antiochus I. soon after his accession (Ditt. *Inscr. Orient.* i. 219); and cults of the same king celebrated by Bargylia after his death, and by the Ionian Confederacy during his lifetime (*τέμενος*, altar, image, sacrifice, games, *stephanephoria* [Michel, 486]). At Erythrae, games called Σελεύκεια are mentioned, and Σωτήρια at Mylasa (Michel, 252, 502). At Didyma, Antiochus I. and his wife Stratonike seem to have been worshipped after their death as θεοὶ σωτῆρες (*CIG* 2852; cf. Haussoullier, *Hist. de Milet*, 1902, p. 51). Smyrna instituted a special worship of Stratonike as Aphrodite Stratonikis, in which her son Antiochus II. was associated with her (Ditt. *Inscr. Orient.* i. 229: Tac. *Ann.* iii. 63). Similarly, in the case of the Ptolemies, we find Πτολεμάεια celebrated at Athens, where Ptolemy I. was chosen as the eponymous hero of a tribe (Paus. i. 5. 5; *CIA* ii. 444. 32, etc.), in Lesbos (Ditt. *Inscr. Orient.* i. 360), and by the Confederation of the Cyclades (Delamaire, *Rev. de Philol.* xx. [1896] 103 f.). Halicarnassus dedicated a stoa to Apollo and king Ptolemy (Ditt. *Inscr. Orient.* i. 46). The Antigonid dynasty which inherited Macedonia was honoured by Ἀντιγόνεια, which are found at Delos (*BCH* vi. 143), in Eubœa (*ib.* x. 102 f.), and, after 223, among the Achæans (Plut. *Arat.* 45, etc.; cf. Niese, ii. 338). Attalus of Pergamum became in 200 B.C. the eponym of an Athenian tribe, and his wife Apollonis the eponym of a deme; a special priest was attached to his service (Polyb. xvi. 25; *CIA* ii. 1670, 465, 469). Sicyon in 198–7 instituted a festival in honour of Attalus I. (Polyb. xviii. 16); Cos a πομπή to Eumenes II. (Ditt. *Syll.*² ii. 619). As a matter of course, the cities actually subject to the Attalids maintained some such worship (Cyzicus [temple of Apollonis], *Anth. Pal.*, bk. iii.; Sestos [priest, birthday festival], Ditt. *Inscr. Or.* 339; Elaea [Attalos σύνναος with Asklepios, priest, daily sacrifice], Ditt. *Inscr. Or.* 332; Ilion [tribe Ἀτταλίς], *CIG* 3616; Sardis [Eumeneia], Ditt. *Inscr. Or.* 305; Ionian Confederation, *Arch. Anzeig.*, 1904, p. 9; Nacrasa [βασίλεια], Ditt. *Inscr. Or.* 268; Eumenia [φιλαδέλφεια], coins; Aphrodisias [Ἀττάλεια], coins; Teos [priest of Eumenes and deceased Apollonis, priestess of Stratonike and Apollonis, temple of Apollonis Ἀποβατηρία], Ditt. *Inscr. Or.* 309; Hierapolis [deification of Apollonis], Ditt. *Inscr. Or.* 308; Magnesia-on-Meander [tribe Ἀτταλίς], Ditt. *Syll.*² ii. 553; and Ægina [Ἀττάλεια, Εὐμένεια], Ditt. *Inscr. Or.* 329).

All these cults are instituted by cities, ostensibly by their own act, as separate communities; the cult of one city differs in its forms from that of another. They are to be distinguished therefore from cults instituted by the kings themselves for the realm. The first cult of the latter sort we know of is that instituted for the first Ptolemy, as θεὸς σωτήρ, after his death (282–3), by his son Ptolemy II. (Ditt. *Syll.*² i. 202). With his father Ptolemy II. associated his mother Berenice on her death (soon after 279), the two being worshipped together as θεοὶ σωτῆρες. 'First of all men, dead or living,' says Theocritus, 'this man established temples fragrant with incense to his mother and his sire' (xvii. 121). When the sister-wife of Ptolemy II., Arsinoë Philadelphus, died in 270–1, she too was deified. And now a further step was taken. Ptolemy II. had himself put on a level with his sister; the living king and the dead queen were worshipped together as θεοὶ ἀδελφοί. This cult was combined with that of Alexander, a single priest serving the group of divinities; the cult of the θεοὶ σωτῆρες remained for the time distinct. When Ptolemy II. was succeeded by Ptolemy III. Euergetes, the θεοὶ εὐεργέται (*i.e.* Euergetes and his wife Berenice II.) were added to Alexander and the θεοὶ ἀδελφοί, and so on with the other kings till the end of the Ptolemaic dynasty. Under Ptolemy IV. Philopator (between 220 and 215) the cult of the θεοὶ σωτῆρες ceased to be distinct; their name now appears in the official registers after that of Alexander. The seat of this official cult seems to have been the *Sēma* of Alexander, to which a Πτολεμάειον (a mausoleum of the Ptolemies) was joined (Otto, *Priester und Tempel*, i. 139). Some of the Ptolemaic queens had priestesses of their own—Arsinoë Philadelphus a κανηφόρος, Berenice II. an ἀθλοφόρος, Arsinoë, sister-wife of Ptolemy IV., a ἱέρεια, and Cleopatra III. (daughter of Ptolemy Philometor, wife of Ptolemy Euergetes II.) a variety of ministers, a στεφανηφόρος, a πυροφόρος, a ἱέρεια, and a male priest styled ἱερὸς πῶλος (Otto, p. 158, cf. p. 411). The priestesses of the queens may have performed their rites at separate shrines in Alexandria. Distinct, of course, from this system of Greek worship was the worship given by the Egyptians, on the lines of their national tradition, to their foreign kings and queens; though the influence of the Egyptian forms of worship upon the Greek may be seen, *e.g.* in the king himself becoming, on occasion, priest of his own deity in Alexandria (Otto, p. 182, note 6). Cyprus, a Ptolemaïc dependency, had a high priest (ἀρχιερεὺς τῆς νήσου or τῶν κατὰ τὴν νῆσον ἱερῶν) of its own, in whom we may see the president of the provincial cult of the kings (Strack, *Dynastie der Ptolemäer*, no. 76, etc.).

In the Seleucid realm, when Seleucus was murdered in 281, his son Antiochus I. was forward to do as much for his father as Ptolemy II. had just done for his. The tomb of the old king at Seleucia was constituted a temple, a Νικατόρειον, and a cult was officially instituted for him as a god (App. *Syr.* 63). With him each of the following kings was in his turn associated; one priest served the founder and his deified successors, and one the reigning king (Ditt. *Inscr. Orient.* 245). How soon it came about in the Seleucid realm that the living sovereign was the object of worship instituted by the court we do not know. The important inscription which gives us a rescript of Antiochus II. (261–246 B.C.) (Ditt. *Inscr. Orient.* 224) shows us such already existing. It is a worship of the king organized by provinces, each province having a high priest. The rescript is issued in order to associate the queen Laodike in the cult, instituting provincial high priests for her, side by side with those of the king. Incidental mention of provincial high priests in later reigns shows us the system still in continuance (Michel, 1229), and they present an obvious parallel to the high priests of Cyprus in the Ptolemaïc realm.

Although a difference is rightly insisted upon between the cults instituted by the central government and those offered by the Greek communities as independent agents, the dividing line between the two is not easy to draw. This is due to the ambiguous position of the Hellenistic kings, who wished, while retaining Greek cities under their control, to leave them the semblance of autonomy. Cults offered ostensibly by a city spontaneously might be framed at a suggestion from the court which it was impossible to disobey. In what class, for instance, are we to put the cults offered to the Ptolemaïc kings at Ptolemaïs, to the Seleucid kings at Seleucia, to the Attalids at Pergamum? All these cities had the forms of municipal autonomy, but were entirely subject to royal dictation. The nucleus of the cult at

Ptolemaïs is that of the founder Ptolemy I. Soter, and to him the later kings (at any rate after the θεοὶ φιλοπάτορες) become attached. The cult of Seleucia founded under Antiochus I. we have already mentioned. At Pergamum a sheep was sacrificed by the civic authorities to Eumenes I., that is to say, even before the rulers of Pergamum had acquired the title of kings (Ditt. *Inscr. Orient.* 267). An inscription of the time of the last king of Pergamum, Attalus III., shows us sacrifices offered to the founder Attalus II., his brother Philetærus, and the reigning king (*Mitt. Ath.*, 1904, p. 152).

In connexion with the assumption of deity by the kings themselves, we must reckon the appearance of their effigy on coinages struck by royal authority. The official surnames, again, which they bear have been thought to have religious significance. This is difficult to prove, because the king would naturally be addressed in worship by his full titles, and if, therefore, we find the surname used in the cult, it would not necessarily show a religious *origin*. In favour of the hypothesis are: (1) the fact that some of the surnames, *e.g.* σωτήρ, ἐπιφανής, have undoubted religious associations; and (2) the practice of the Greeks of attaching surnames to the names of deities—Athene Promachos, Zeus Meilichios, etc.; cf. also the title of εὐεργέτης conferred on Diogenes (see below).

The title of θεός does not seem usually to have been assumed by kings during their lifetime. For the Greeks of Egypt, as we have seen, their living king was a god from the time when Ptolemy II. associated himself with his dead and deified sister. But, whilst the living king and queen were, after Ptolemy II., regularly worshipped together as θεοὶ εὐεργέται, θεοὶ φιλοπάτορες, etc., the kings do not seem to have had themselves called θεός in the protocol of State documents till the time of Euergetes II. (Strack, *Dynastie der Ptolemäer*, p. 120). In the Seleucid dynasty also it is to be noted that Antiochus IV. Epiphanes is the first king under whom θεός is attached to the royal name upon the coinage, and Antiochus is exactly the king who seems to have put his deity prominently forward (cf. Bevan, *House of Seleucus*, 1902, ii. 154). The usage of the Pergamene kingdom appears also to have confined the title of θεός to deceased sovereigns. A king or queen at death seems to have been officially declared to have joined the number of the gods (Cardinali, 'Regno di Pergamo,' p. 153, note 4). This did not exclude the offering of rites of sacrifice, etc., to the living sovereign. Whether, in the case of acts which were understood to be ceremonial flattery, any attempt was made to reconcile the inconsistency of worshipping some one whose apotheosis was still future we do not know.

It remains to consider the relations to the older gods in which these cults in theory placed the men worshipped. These were of three kinds.

(1) *Descent.*—Those Greek families which professed to trace back their family tree to heroic times had, of course, no difficulty in making out their descent from some god. It can hardly, therefore, have been the peculiar prerogative of the royal dynasties in Hellenistic times to possess this sort of link with divinity. They seem, nevertheless, to have thought it worth while to emphasize the divine origin of their families. So we find that the family of Ptolemy at the Egyptian court was traced back to Herakles and Dionysos, the latter deity after the reign of Philopator being given prominence over the former. Possibly the family of the Seleucids claimed descent in the same way from Apollo. The Attalids, like the Ptolemies, apparently took Herakles and Dionysos for the founders of their race (Cardinali, *op. cit.* 147).

(2) *Immediate sonship.*—Dignity of family was not enough. If possible, the person worshipped had to be himself the offspring of a god. Already, in the times before Alexander, this was asserted at the Syracusan court of Dionysius (Plut. *de Alex. virt.* ii. 5). Alexander claimed that his mother had conceived him of Zeus Ammon. The real father of Seleucus, it was asserted at the Seleucid court, was Apollo (Just. xv. 4). Apollo was ἀρχηγὸς τοῦ γένους (*CIG* 3595).[1] So, too, we saw that the Athenians in 308 hailed Demetrius as the son of Poseidon and Aphrodite.

(3) *Identification.*—For this, again, we have a precedent before Alexander in Clearchus of Heraclea (*FHG* iii. 526). The first instance we can trace after Alexander is that of Seleucus, who was worshipped at Seleucia as *Zeus* Nicator. His son at the same place was Antiochus *Apollo* Soter (Ditt. *Inscr. Or.* i. 245). In Egypt, Arsinoë at her apotheosis was identified with Aphrodite (Strabo, xvii. 800; Athen. vii. 318*d*, xi. 497*d*), and so was Stratonike I. at Smyrna. Antiochus Epiphanes probably identified himself with Zeus (*JHS* xx. [1900] 26 ff.). The surname νέος Διόνυσος was borne by Antiochus VI. (145–143 B.C.) and Antiochus XII. (86–85 B.C.) in Syria; and by Ptolemy Auletes (81–52 B.C.) in Egypt. Cleopatra VII. was styled νέα Ἶσις (Strack), and the last Cleopatra also bore the same title, and appeared in public arrayed as the goddess (Plut. *Ant.* 54).

The Greeks had no idea of any divinity in kingship *per se*. The proffer of divine honours in the 4th cent. B.C. was the recognition simply of a personality mighty to impress and modify the world. The Greeks, as a matter of fact, who approached Alexander with worship did not regard him as *their* king (he was king of the Macedonians and Persians). Naturally the Macedonian chiefs who made themselves kings after Alexander attained thereby a position which gave them preeminent power upon the world, and the proffer of divine honours expressed a desire to secure their good-will and protection. We have here further evidence that it is a mistaken track to assimilate the Greek worship of kings with a worship of the king as such, like that which had existed recently in Egypt and, centuries before, in Babylonia. Naturally, too, when the new kingdoms had developed settled institutions, the courts found in the cult of the sovereigns a useful means of imposing upon the popular imagination and securing an expression of loyalty. And, as Kaerst has pointed out, it was not easy to find a formal expression for dominion over a number of Greek States which were, by Greek political theory, independent sovereign communities. Over the authorities of the city had been, in olden days, only the gods, and the assumption of deity gave a sort of legality to the relation of the king with the subject Greek States. Antiochus IV. turned his deity to further account by representing himself as the divine husband of the goddess of a rich temple like that of Hierapolis, and claiming the temple treasure in that capacity (Gran. Licin. 28).

The Greek practice passed to the new dynasties which arose in the East. The Greek kings of Bactria, Agathocles and Antimachus (*c.* 190–160), are styled 'god' upon the coins. The Arsacid kings of Parthia, if, as adherents of some form of Zoroastrianism, they recognized only One Supreme God, found no difficulty in giving the name of 'god' to subordinate powers, and in classing them-

[1] Something of the same sort seems to be implied when the Pergamene king is called Ταύροιο διοτρεφέος φίλον υἱόν (Paus. x. 15. 2; cf. Suidas, *s.v.* Ἄτταλος), *i.e.* son of the divine Bull, Dionysos.

selves among the number. Here, too, on some of the coins the name of the king is accompanied by the epithet θεοῦ or θεοπάτορος (Wroth, *Coins of Parthia*, 1903, p. xxix). So, too, the Sasanian kings (after A.D. 224) continued to bear the title of θεός (Pers. *bag*); but, whilst the Greek was ambiguous, in the native language the distinction between the lower divinity of the human deity and that of the gods proper was made plain by another word (*yazdān*) being reserved for these last (Ditt. *Inscr. Orient.* i. 432, 433). So far, then, from its being the case that the deity of the human ruler was an idea borrowed by the Greeks from the East, the borrowing was the other way; the Orientals took it from the Greeks.

Even the minor dynasties of the East came to bear divine titles. So Antiochus I. of Commagene describes himself as θεός in the same breath with which he professes piety to be the rule of his life, on the monument where his body rests after his soul has gone to the 'heavenly seats of Zeus Oromasdes.' The honours to be paid to himself and the other kings are distinguished, as 'heroic' (lines 48, 118, 125), from the cult of the greater gods. His own image is σύνθρονος with that of Zeus-Oromasdes, Mithra, Artagnes, and Commagene (line 60) (Ditt. *Inscr. Orient.* i. 383). The Jewish Herod Agrippa I. received from heathens the now banal ascription of deity (Ac 12[22]; Jos. *Ant.* xix. 8. 2).

Even in the age of the Hellenistic kings, deification was not their peculiar prerogative. It was open to other men, in their degree, to become objects of religious worship. Sometimes they might secure this by the authority of the kings themselves. Antiochus II. had his favourite Pythermus worshipped as Herakles (Athen. vii. 289 f.), and Ptolemy II. consecrated his mistress Bilistiche as Aphrodite (Plut. *Amat.* 9). Consecration sometimes took place by the authority of a Greek State.

So Athens conferred *heroic* honours after his death upon Diogenes, who had commanded the Macedonian garrison in the Piræus (title of εὐεργέτης, priest, τέμενος, games [*CIA* ii. 467, 24; 481, 57; 1669]). Aratus after his death was worshipped with *heroic* honours at Sicyon; and, as in the case of the deified kings, it was asserted that his mother had really conceived him of a god (Polyb. viii. 14. 7; Plut. *Arat.* 53; Paus. ii. 8. 2, 9. 4). Philopœmen after his death was worshipped with *divine* honours at Megalopolis (altar, τέμενος, games [Plut. *Philop.* 21; Paus. viii. 51. 2; Diod. xxix. 18; Liv. xxxix. 50; Ditt. *Syll.* 210]).

Probably to this age, and not an earlier, belongs the consecration of the athletes of former generations who had brought glory to their cities, like Theagenes, who was worshipped as a god at Thasos (Paus. vi. 11. 2), Oebotas of Dyme (Paus. vi. 3, vii. 17. 3 and 6), and Diognetus the Cretan (Ptol. Heph. *ap.* Phot. *Bibl.* p. 151*a*, 20). Other consecrations were the act of gilds or associations, who worshipped their founders or distinguished members. So we find a gild of Dionysiastæ (2nd cent. B.C.) in the Piræus 'heroizing' a certain Dionysius (ὅπως ἀφηρωσθεῖ Διονύσιος) (*Mitth. Ath.* ix. [1884] 279 f., 288 f.), and something like a heroic cult of their founder was maintained in the philosophical schools created in the form of religious gilds by Plato and Epicurus. In the case of Plato, the story of a miraculous birth was again circulated; he was the son of Apollo (Diog. Laert. iii. 1. 2; Olympiod. *Vit. Plat.*). So, too, Hippocrates seems to have been worshipped in schools of medicine, not in Cos only, but in the Greek world generally (Luc. *Philops.* 21). Sometimes the consecration took place according to testamentary dispositions, which founded an association for the cult of the testator, as in the case of a family of Thera, whose *herōon* is the subject of the will of Epicteta (*CIG* 2448), and in the case of Epicurus.

When the power began to pass from the hands of kings to that of Rome, the Greeks, in transferring their homage, continued the forms of religious worship. The cult which replaced that of the Hellenistic kings was that of the goddess Rome. Smyrna was the first Greek city to erect a temple to Rome in 195 B.C. (Tac. *Ann.* iv. 56), and the cult later became general. The Roman general Titus Flamininus a few years later was receiving divine honours in Greece (Plut. *Flamininus*, 16). In the last cent. B.C. it seems to have become the usual thing for Roman governors to be worshipped by the provincials under their rule (Cic. *ad Q. frat.* i. 1, 26, cf. *ad Att.* v. 21; Suet. *Aug.* 52); the notorious Verres in Sicily had games (*Verria*) celebrated in honour of his divinity (Cic. *Verr.*, Orat. ii. 2. 21). Of the numerous temples erected to Pompey (τῷ ναιοῖς βρίθοντι πόσῃ σπάνις ἔπλετο τύμβου, *Anth. Pal.* ix. 402) no material trace has been recovered; but two inscriptions, one from Ephesus and one from the island of Carthæa, show the sort of worship offered to Julius Cæsar by the Greeks in his day of power. The first (*CIG* 2957) describes him as 'God manifest and universal saviour of humanity'; and the second (*CIG* 2369), as 'God and Emperor and Saviour of the world.' But now the ruling race itself was prepared to follow the Greek fashion.

2. Deification under the Roman Empire.—For the old Romans the gap between gods and men was not bridged as it was for the Greeks. They had indeed, like other primitive peoples, rites for placating the spirits of the dead (*di manes*), but such spirits did not pass into gods proper; there was no intermediate class of heroes. The offering of divine honours to living men would have seemed to them highly shocking. As, however, the Greek element grew in Rome, new ideas found entrance. Scipio Africanus was not worshipped, but there was believed to be something supernatural about him, and stories were told of his divine birth (Liv. xxvi. 19). In the last century of the Republic, rites proper to divine worship were offered to Metellus Pius (Macrob. *Sat.* iii. 13. 7) and Marius Gratidianus (Cic. *Off.* iii. § 80; Seneca, *de Ira*, iii. 18); but in the former case by private friends, members of a Hellenized aristocracy; in the latter, by a semi-Hellenic populace; in neither case, with official authorization.

The note of that Empire which Julius Cæsar conceived was an assimilation in which the old Roman tradition lost its prerogative. Under his rule the Roman people were allowed (Suet.) or encouraged (Dio) to adopt the Greek forms of homage. The image of Cæsar now figured along with those of the gods. A month of the year was called by his name. In 45 B.C. a temple was even founded to Juppiter Julius and his Clementia, in which M. Antony was to serve as flamen (Dio Cass. xliv. 6; Suet. *Cæs.* 76; App. *Bell. Civ.* ii. 106). On Cæsar's murder in 44 the scheme collapsed (Cic. *Phil.* ii. 43); but in the comet which appeared the following year the Roman populace saw Cæsar's spirit raised to heaven (Plin. *HN* ii. 94; Virg. *Ec.* ix. 47; Ov. *Metam.* xv. 843 ff. etc.). When the Cæsarian party triumphed, the worship of the dead Cæsar was put upon a regular footing; public policy was now shaped by the cautious spirit of his nephew. A law passed by senate and people set Divus Julius among the gods, and a temple was erected (42 B.C.) to him on the spot where his mangled body had been displayed to the people (Dio Cass. xlvii. 18; App. ii. 148; *CIL* i. 626, ix. 2628). There is no reason to suppose that *divus* had at this time acquired a meaning different from *deus*; it was the precedent of the Cæsars which limited it to those divinities who had once been men (Mommsen, *Staatsr.* ii.[3] 756, note 1; Wissowa,

p. 285). In *CIL* x. 3903, we find *dei Caesaris* alongside of *divi Augusti* (cf. *ib.* 1271). So, too, we find Καῖσαρ ὁ θεός as the proper designation of Julius Cæsar in Greek (Strabo, viii. 381, etc.).[1] From Rome the worship soon spread to other places. An altar of Divus Julius is mentioned at Perusia in 41 (Dio Cass. xlviii. 14; cf. *CIL* i. 697, 698). In the Western provinces the cult seems to have been maintained only in the colonies founded by Julius Cæsar. Antony and Sextus Pompeius, who disputed with the adoptive son of the *divus* the empire of the world, each advanced his own claims to divinity. Antony masqueraded in the character of Dionysos, and at Athens followed the precedent of Antiochus Epiphanes by demanding a dowry as the husband of the city-goddess (Plut. *Ant.* 24; Dio Cass. xlviii. 39; Athen. iv. 148; M. Seneca, *Suas.* i. 6; Vell. Paterc. ii. 82; Plin. *HN* viii. 55). Sext. Pompeius claimed to be the son of Neptune (Dio Cass. xlviii. 19; App. v. 100; Plin. *HN* ix. 55). When the young Cæsar stood forth supreme and brought to the vexed world an era of peace, the tide of worship could not be stayed. But the temper and policy of the new ruler inclined him rather to reduce such honours to their minimum, and among the Romans to bring them into connexion with the national tradition rather than with foreign usage. In 27 B.C. he accepted from the Senate the name of *Augustus*, which connoted sanctity without asserting absolute divinity (Dio Cass. liii. 16; Suet. *Aug.* 7; Ovid. *Fasti*, i. 609; Censorinus, *de Die Nat.* 21. 8). He showed the same moderation in the provinces.

But first three sorts of cults offered to the Emperor must be distinguished: (1) the *provincial* cult, maintained by each province as a whole at one of the provincial centres; (2) the *municipal* cults, maintained by the separate cities; (3) the *private* cults, maintained by individuals or voluntary associations. The first were far more completely controlled (if not instituted) by the Imperial Government; and to them alone strictly applies the rule laid down by Augustus, that he was not to be worshipped save in association with the goddess Rome. Asia and Bithynia were the first provinces to be authorized to establish a provincial cult of this sort; and temples to Rome and Augustus were reared at Pergamum and Nicomedia. This permission did not extend to resident Roman citizens; they were to worship, not Augustus, but Rome and Divus Julius in temples of their own at Ephesus and Nicæa (Dio Cass. li. 20; cf. Tac. *Ann.* iv. 37). In the West the first provincial cult seems to have been instituted in 10 B.C., when an altar was consecrated to Rome and Augustus at Lugdunum (Lyons) for the province of the Three Gauls. A few years later a similar altar was consecrated for Germania at Oppidum Ubiorum (Cologne). To the municipal and private cults much greater liberty was allowed. In ordinary practice, however, the cities seem under the early Empire to have combined the name of Augustus with that of Rome. The cult instituted in A.D. 11 by the colony of Narbo is addressed to the *numen* of Augustus alone (*CIL* xii. 4333). Or, again, the municipal and private cults might emphasize the Emperor's deity by giving him the name and attributes of some traditional god. In Egypt and Caria, Augustus is Zeus Eleutherios (Καῖσαρ, *ποντομέδοντι καὶ ἀπείρων κρατέοντι | Ζανὶ τῷ ἐκ Ζανὸς πατρὸς* Ἐλευθερίῳ, *CIG* 4923; cf. 4715; *BCH* xi. [1887] 306; and the expression 'god of god,' *i.e.* son of Divus Julius, in Ditt. *Inscr. Orient.* 655); at Alabanda in Caria, Apollo Eleutherios (*CIG* 2903*f*=Ditt. *Inscr. Orient.* ii. 457). At Athens the temple begun by Pisistratus to Zeus Olympios was consecrated to the *genius* of Augustus (Suet. *Aug.* 60). Not only Augustus himself, but other members of the Imperial family become objects of worship. Athens honours his grandson Gaius as *νέος* Ἄρης (*CIA* iii. 444); Mitylene, his son-in-law Agrippa as *θεὸς σωτήρ* (*CIG* 2176); Nyssa has a special priest for his stepson Tiberius (*CIG* 2943). A temple was consecrated to Octavia after her death by Corinth (Paus. ii. 3. 1). The first day of each month in Egypt and Asia was called Σεβαστή (Kaibel, *Inscr. Græc. Sic.* 1890, p. 701). Games, among the Greeks a form of religious festivity, were everywhere instituted in honour of Augustus or members of the Imperial house (Ῥωμαῖα Σεβαστά, Καισάρηα Ἀγριππῆα, Ditt. *Syll.*[2] 677; Suet. *Aug.* 98, etc.). Even king Herod built temples and instituted games to Augustus and Rome (Jos. *BJ* i. 21, §§ 403 f.). In Italy the cult of Augustus seems to have spread largely before his death; temples and priests (*sacerdotes* in some places, *flamines* in others) are found in existence, at any rate, in colonies which Augustus had founded, and in cities of which he was in some way the patron (Beneventum, Cumæ, Fanum, Fortunæ, Pisæ; see Beurlier, *Culte impérial*, p. 17; Hirschfeld, p. 838). It was at Rome that the worship was most severely restrained. The Emperor refused to be saluted by his fellow-citizens as god, or to allow a temple to him to be erected in the capital. But he permitted his name to be inserted in the ancient hymns of the Salii (Mommsen, *Res gestæ divi Aug.*, 1883, p. 44), and the Genius Augusti to be worshipped along with the Lares of the city—*i.e.* so far as the worship of a living man was admitted, it must put off its alien complexion and be screened by the formulæ of the national religion, though here again the restraint could not extend to the action of individuals or the exuberant language of literature.

The poets, inspired as they were by Greek ideals, and using the old mythological conceptions without any belief in their literal truth, let their fancy run free in expressing the Emperor's deity (Virg. *Georg.* i. 24 f.; Hor. *Od.* iii. 3. 11; 5. 1 f., 25. 4 ff., etc.).

In Rome, too, men found pleasure in identifying the Emperor with some particular one of the old gods; sometimes it was Apollo (Suet. *Aug.* 70; Serv. *ad Ecl.* iv. 10); sometimes it was Mercury (Hor. *Odes*, i. 2. 41 f.); cf. Reitzenstein, *Poimandres*, 1904, p. 176 f.); sometimes it was Juppiter (Hor. *Epist.* i. 19. 43; Preller-Jordan, *Röm. Myth.* ii. 445).

When Augustus died (A.D. 14), the Roman people might at last worship him without restraint. After the precedent set in the case of Julius Cæsar, he was declared a *divus* by a decree of the Senate. As the timely appearance of a comet was not to be counted upon, an eagle was liberated at the funeral, to represent visibly the soul of the Emperor flying to heaven; and a senator was found to bear witness to having seen the actual Emperor ascend (Suet. *Aug.* 100). Tiberius followed his predecessor in restraining the divine honours offered to himself. It is only due to his resolution that we do not to-day say 'Tibery' for September or October, as we say 'July' and 'August' in memory of the first two *divi*. The Greeks, indeed, were permitted as before to worship the living Emperor, and to consecrate temples to himself and his mother Livia, while the merely figurative character of the worship was emphasized even more than before by the 'God-Senate' (*θεὸς σύγκλητος*) taking the place of the goddess Rome in the cults maintained with Imperial sanction by the provincial centres (Tac. *Ann.* iv. 15). Municipal priests of Tiberius are found in one or two Italian towns (Venusia, Surrentum)

[1] That the Daphnis who is deified in Virgil, *Ec.* v., represents Julius Cæsar was suggested by the scholars of antiquity and is commonly repeated to-day. Daphnis has, however, nothing but his deification in common with Cæsar; and, since the deification was a part of the old Sicilian story, it forms a very slender ground for the identification.

(Hirschfeld, p. 842), but in Rome itself no such cult was tolerated, nor would Tiberius entertain the request of the province Bætica to be allowed to build a temple to him and his mother (Tac. *Ann.* iv. 37, 38). The worship of Divus Augustus, on the other hand, Tiberius piously furthered. A temple was begun to him in Rome; and, whereas only altars had hitherto been erected to him in the Western provinces, Tarraco was allowed in A.D. 15 to build him a temple (Tac. *Ann.* i. 78). In the East, Cyzicus was even punished for slackness in this cult (Tac. *Ann.* iv. 36). The severity with which the transgressions of individuals were visited increased as the reign of Tiberius went on. It became punishable even to change one's garments before an image of Augustus, or carry a ring with his effigy engraved upon it into an unclean place (Suet. *Tib.* 58). At the death of Tiberius it was seen that the formality of consecration, if religiously empty, had some political value as a verdict passed upon a deceased ruler by his subjects. The Senate refused to raise Tiberius to divinity. It had, indeed, not improbably been the intention of Tiberius that consecration should by no means become a rule, but should be confined to the founders of the dynasty, Julius and Augustus. But Caligula, who succeeded him (A.D. 37), was so far his opposite that he claimed the honours which Tiberius had repelled. No mummery was too extravagant for this wretched maniac. A temple was built for him on the Palatine; he made himself the equal of Juppiter, and the Roman aristocracy were compelled on pain of death to offer him all the forms of religious homage. On his assassination in 41, the Senate refused him also divinity; his reign was a mad episode; but under Claudius we register further developments of a lasting kind in the worship of the Emperors. Caligula had already caused his sister Drusilla to be consecrated by the Senate as the first *diva*. Claudius had his grandmother Livia associated as *diva* with her husband Divus Augustus (Suet. *Claud.* 11; Dio Cass. lx. 5); and he permitted (between A.D. 50 and 54) a temple (not an altar) to be erected to himself in Britain at Camulodunum (Tac. *Ann.* xiv. 31; Sen. *Apokol.* 8; cf. Kornemann, p. 102, note 2; Toutain, *Cultes païens*, p. 86). Claudius after his death (54) became the third *divus* by decree of the Senate; his elevation provoked the lampoon called *Apokolokynthosis*, which has come down to us among the works of Seneca.

After the precedent set by the elevation of Claudius, consecration became a normal formality at the decease of every Emperor, unless it was desired to affix a stigma to his reign. The outlines of the worship of the Emperors remained very much as they had come to shape themselves under Augustus, Tiberius, and Claudius, *i.e.* in the Greek East various local cults of the reigning Emperor, whilst at the provincial headquarters the cult of Rome and Augustus became, after the apotheosis of Claudius, a cult of the θεοὶ Σεβαστοί, among whom the reigning Emperor was included; in the Western provinces, the cult of Rome and (the first) Augustus became a cult of Rome and (the reigning) Augustus or 'Romæ et Augustorum.' Beside the original *altars*, temples would seem to have generally arisen after the precedent of Tarraco; at Lyons, in the latter part of the second century, the altar was consecrated to the cult of the reigning Emperor ('Cæsaris nostri'), the temple to the deceased Augusti (Kornemann, p. 109). It also remained common for other members of the Imperial family to be consecrated on their decease (Poppæa and her daughter under Nero, Domitilla, the wife of Vespasian, the infant son of Domitian, the father of Trajan, etc.), although after Hadrian the privilege seems generally to have been restricted to Empresses[1] (see list of *divi* in Beurlier, p. 325 f.). And, although the worship of the living Emperor was not usually countenanced in Rome, the worship of his *numen* or *genius* was part of the official religious system. The oath generally recognized in the business of the Empire was by the genius of the Emperor (ὁ Σεβάστιος ὅρκος, cf. Apul. *Metam.* ix. 41). In the laws of Salpensa and Malaga the formula for swearing inserts, between Juppiter and the *penates*, first the list of consecrated *divi*, and then the genius of the reigning Emperor.

None but the worst Emperors followed Caligula in demanding for themselves divine honours during their lifetime. Nero did so, and a temple to him as *divus* would have been erected in Rome but for its ill omen, 'for the honour of the gods is not conferred upon the ruler before he has ceased to act among mankind' (Tac. *Ann.* xv. 74). Domitian established a worship of himself, and was addressed at court as 'dominus et deus' (Dio Cass. lxvii. 13; Suet. *Dom.* 13; Martial, v. 8). Commodus had himself worshipped as Hercules, and was fond of masquerading with club and lion-skin (Lamprid. *Commod.* 8, 9; Herodian, i. 14. 9, 15. 2-5).[2] Aurelian (A.D. 270-275) was the first Emperor of sound understanding who took to himself the titles of divinity ('dominus et deus'), but he already had conceived the idea of giving the Roman autocracy an expression no less ceremonious than that of Oriental monarchy. What Aurelian conceived Diocletian (A.D. 284-305) carried out. Among his measures was one to introduce the custom of prostration, and to take for himself and his colleague the names of Jovius and Herculius. When Christianity became dominant with Constantine, worship of the earthly sovereign had, of course, to cease. To the forms, however, of the old worship a political or social value had come to attach which made it difficult to abolish them absolutely. The Christian Emperors as late as Valerian I. (A.D. 364-375) were officially consecrated after their death (Ausonius, *Gratiar. act.* 7), and the use of the term *divus*, in common parlance, of a deceased Emperor continued for centuries (Gregory of Tours, *Hist. Franc.* ii. 8; *Cod. Just.* v. 27. 5, etc.). The provincial temples of the Emperor had become so much a centre for public festivities, etc., that Constantine allowed them to continue, stipulating, however, that no rites of pagan sacrifice should be performed in them (Wilmanns, *Exempla Inscr. Latin.* [1873] 2843, l. 45 f.). Such temples were no longer dedicated to any Emperor personally, but to the Imperial Family (*gens Flavia*) in the abstract. The priests of the Imperial cult and the *sacerdotales* (ex-priests) had come to form an important element in the cities of the Empire, discharging secular as well as religious functions. These, therefore, the Christian Empire allowed to subsist. Since, however, they still bore the insignia of old pagan *coronati* or *sacerdotales*, there was a feeling against them among the religious (Synod of Elvira, Canon 55). Christians did, indeed, accept the office (*CIL* viii. 8348), but Pope Innocent I. (Mansi, iii. 1069) pronounced that all who had done so after baptism were disqualified for the Christian priesthood. The municipal *flamines* continued locally as secular officials with the old name as late as Justinian (*CIL* viii. 10516; cf. Synod of Elvira, canons 2 and 3).

We have seen that the offering of divine honours to men arose among the Greeks as a formality

[1] Such consecration did not, however, imply necessarily the persistence of the cult when the Imperial power had passed to other families.

[2] It was always, of course, possible for private persons to use forms of flattery, and the Imperial portraits which have come down to us often represent them in the conventional guise of some old divinity, the Empresses especially as Demeter; this need not signify more than the fancy of some individual.

whose religious significance was mainly that it showed how empty religion generally had become. Can we say the same of the mass of organized cults we have just surveyed—cults which endured throughout the Græco-Roman world for more than three centuries? It is obvious that to some extent we can. Among the Roman aristocracy, among the better educated people everywhere, the ascription of deity to the living Emperor, if not mere flattery, as in the case of the Augustan poets, was no doubt understood in a metaphorical sense which emptied it of value properly religious. The better Emperors, as we saw, repelled such homage, and Vespasian jested on his death-bed at the court fiction ('Vae, puto, deus fio,' Suet. *Vesp.* 23).

But how, if these practices had so little meaning, could they go on so widely and so long. The answer to this might perhaps be as follows. (1) The practices were not meaningless in so far as they reposed upon a genuine sentiment, if not, strictly speaking, a religious one. Octavianus Cæsar brought the world relief from long anarchy, and for the following centuries order and peace around the Mediterranean were felt to be bound up with the Imperial government. Real feelings of loyalty to the head of the world-State may, therefore, have sought symbolical expression, and the symbol, according to the conditions of the ancient world, could be nothing but a religious formality.[1] The Christians appeared rebels to the civil power when they refused to throw incense upon the altar consecrated to the genius of Augustus. (2) Among the masses of the people, among those to whom the Emperor was a distant and unseen power, some real belief in his deity may have existed. The formalities of worship impressed the mind insensibly, and in the sphere of belief there are notoriously many half-shades that cannot give a clear logical account of themselves. The common oath by the genius of the Emperor must have acted continually to suggest his actual presence. The exclamation Ὦ Καῖσαρ seems to have been the one which naturally sprang to the lips of an over-driven menial (Luc. *Lucius*, 16). Especially where the personality of an Emperor had impressed itself upon the popular mind might it be believed that he had at death actually become an operative supernatural power. Images of Marcus Aurelius were to be seen among the *penates* of Roman houses as late as the time of Diocletian, and he was believed to reveal the future to men in dreams (Capitolinus, *Marcus*, 18. 6 f.). (3) The cults of the Emperor once established served various interests incidentally. The prestige and profit brought to its locality by an illustrious temple, the festivities and holidays connected with a provincial or municipal cult, would tend to perpetuate it apart from religious motives; the motives to-day which maintain the observance of Christmas or Easter are by no means all religious. So, too, the natural instinct of men to form societies of a friendly or convivial kind could be gratified under cover of Cæsar-worship, just as they had been gratified by *quasi*-religious associations under the Ptolemies (cf. the clubs of *Cultores Augusti*, φιλοσεβαστοί, etc., in Beurlier, p. 258 f.). The cosmopolitan gild of dramatic artists thought it politic to set the name of Hadrian as νέος Διόνυσος alongside of the old Dionysos who was their patron deity. So, too, the social ambitions of the freedman class found an opportunity of gratification in the institution of the *Augustales* in the Latin cities of the Empire (Boissier, *Religion romaine*, i. 162 f.).

Deification, we have seen, had not been among the Greeks and Romans a recognition of the divine right of kings *per se*, but of the material or moral power of individuals. And under the Roman Empire, if the Emperors alone were divine for the whole realm by the theory of the State, other men might attain deity for a particular locality or a particular sect. The deification of widest range after that of members of the Imperial family was that of Antinoos, the youth loved by Hadrian. The Emperor on his death (A.D. 130) encouraged the worship of him as a god; temples and innumerable statues were erected to him, and a star was discovered which was clearly his soul in heaven (Dio Cass. lxix. 11; Paus. ix. 7; Spart. *Had.* 14. 7; *CIL* xiv. 2112, etc.). Theophanes of Mitylene, the friend of Pompey, was worshipped as a god by his native city after his death (Tac. *Ann.* vi. 18; coins of Mitylene), and, similarly, Cnidus voted his contemporary Artemidorus τιμαὶ ἰσόθεοι (*Inscr. in Brit. Mus.*, no. 787). The vote recorded in the inscription was passed in his lifetime; but the divine honours were probably not to be offered till after his decease. Apollonius of Tyana, according to Philostratus, though he disclaimed deity, was saluted as a god by large numbers of people (iv. 31; cf. iii. 50); Caracalla built a temple to him (Dio Cass. lxxvii. 18), and he continued for long to be an object of popular worship (Vopisc. *Aurelian*, 24).

The practice of offering *heroic* honours to the dead became much more general in the later times of pagan antiquity. Such honours were sometimes conferred publicly by a city or association as a special distinction, as, *e.g.*, by Tarsus upon the philosopher Athenodorus (pseudo-Luc. *Macrob.* 21; cf. Head, *Hist. Num.*, 1887, p. 488); Athens (*CIA* iii. 889); Cyzicus (*Mitt. Athen.* ix. [1884] 28 f.).[1] But the private consecration of the dead by their relatives and friends became increasingly common in Roman times. Cicero resolved on the 'apotheosis' of his daughter and designed a temple for her (*ad Att.* xii. 36; cf. the temple of Pomptilla, *Inscr. græc. Sic. et It.* 607).[2] The salutation of the dead as 'hero' or 'heroine' becomes an ordinary formula on grave-stones; ἡρῷον becomes an ordinary name for a tomb. That many a bereaved person who had such an epitaph engraved meant to imply that his or her dead had actually passed into a life of higher power or beatitude, is shown by such phrases as 'Thou livest as a hero, Thou art not become a dead thing' (ζῇς ὡς ἥρως, καὶ νέκυς οὐκ ἐγένου, Kaibel, *Epig. græc.*, 1878, p. 433). But the custom of coupling the title 'hero' in common speech with the name of a dead man became so general that it survived in Christian times, 'hero' being now simply an equivalent of μακαρίτης, 'sainted,' just as in the West *divus* survived as the title of deceased Emperors (Deneken, in Roscher, col. 2547 f.; Rohde, *Psyche*[4], 646 f.).

LITERATURE.—**Deneken**, art. 'Heros,' in Roscher; **Rohde**, *Psyche*[4], 1907, p. 146 f. etc.; **Beurlier**, *De divinis honoribus quos acceperunt Alexander et successores eius* (Paris, 1890); **Kaerst**, 'Die Begründung des Alexander- und Ptolemäer-kultes in Aegypten,' *Rhein. Mus.* vol. lii. (1897) p. 42 f.; **H. von Prott**, 'Das ἐγκώμιον εἰς Πτολεμαῖον und die Zeitgeschichte,' *ib.* vol. liii. (1898) p. 460 f.; **Kornemann**, *Zur Geschichte der antiken Herrscherkulte* (Leipzig, 1901); **E. R. Bevan**, 'Worship of the Kings in the Greek Cities,' in the *English Historical Review*, vol. xvi. (1901); **Breccia**, 'Il diritto dinastico nelle monarchie dei successori d'Alessandro Magno' (1903), p. 80 f., in Beloch's *Studi di storia antica*; **Beloch**, *Griech. Gesch.*, vol. iii. (1904) p. 369 f.; **P. Wendland**, *Die hellenistisch-römische Kultur* (1907). For the Ptolemies: **Strack**, *Die Dynastie der Ptolemäer* (1897), p. 12 f.; **W. Otto**, *Priester und Tempel im hellenistischen Aegypten*, vol. i. (1905) p. 138 f. For Pergamum: **Cardinali**, 'Il regno di Pergamo' (1906), p. 139 f., in Beloch's *Studi di storia antica*. For Roman Empire: **Preller**, *Röm. Mythologie*

[1] If the Empire was one, some universal religion was needed to extend over its confused variety of national, tribal, and civic gods. Cf. art. CÆSARISM.

[1] There seem even cases where the title 'hero' is applied in public inscriptions to persons still living (Paton, *Inscr. of Cos*, 1891, p. 76; cf. *CIG*, 2583).

[2] Sometimes the dead was represented in the guise of some god, especially Dionysos or Hermes.

(3rd ed. by Jordan, 1883), vol. ii. p. 425 f.; Jean Réville, *La Religion à Rome sous les Sévères* (1886), p. 30 f.; Mommsen, *Röm. Staatsrecht*[3] (1887), vol. ii. p. 755 f., 809; Hirschfeld, 'Zur Gesch. des röm. Kaisercultus,' in *SBAW* for 1888, p. 833 f.; Beurlier, *Le Culte impérial* (1891); Kornemann, *Zur Geschichte der antiken Herrscherkulte* (1901); Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus der Römer* (1902), in I. von Muller's *Handbuch*, p. 280 f.; Boissier, *La Religion romaine d'Auguste aux Antonins*[6] (1906); Toutain, *Les Cultes païens dans l'empire romain* (1907).

E. R. BEVAN.

DEISM.—I. *HISTORICAL.*—The movement of religious thought known as 'Deism' was of comparatively brief duration. Its rapid rise into notoriety, its short-lived prevalence, and its gradual subsidence all fall within the limits of a single century. Roughly speaking, the beginning of the movement was contemporaneous with the Revolution of 1688. Its epitaph was pronounced in 1790, when Burke could speak of the Deistic writers as already forgotten. Nor is the speedy exhaustion of interest difficult to explain. The conditions which combined to direct men's attention to the Deistic problem were transient; and the whole dispute was too frigid and too little in contact with real life to affect the deeper currents of religious thought. Superficially, much excitement was stimulated, until the air was thick with controversial writings. But, with a few exceptions, neither was any conspicuous literary merit displayed by the controversialists, nor did their arguments penetrate far into the secrets of the spiritual life. This serves to explain why the religious debates of the 18th cent. have faded from the common memory more completely than those of earlier periods. On the other hand, to the student Deism presents special points of interest. English religion would never have reached its present condition if it had not passed through the stage with which we are about to deal.

If the movement is to be understood in relation to the general development of theological thought, it will be necessary to seek for an explanation of its origin in a period when the name 'Deism' had not yet come into vogue, and in speculations the true issue of which was not anticipated by their own authors. Halyburton, in his book entitled *Natural Religion Insufficient* (1714), was the first to name **Lord Herbert of Cherbury** as the parent of Deism. The charge was endorsed by Leland, whose *View of the Deistical Writers* (1754) contains much carefully amassed material, very useful to later students. Since then Lord Herbert's responsibility, whether to his credit or discredit, has been commonly recognized, and this in spite of the fact that his famous book *de Veritate* was composed with a purpose quite different from that to which its arguments subsequently contributed. The book deserves an epithet often applied in cases where there is little justification for so strong a term. It was, without exaggeration, 'epoch-making.' It initiated a line of thought and a method of religious speculation pregnant with results, the full measure of which has not even to-day been exhausted. No better introduction to the study of Deism can be provided than a brief analysis of the main theses which Lord Herbert sets out to establish. The title of the book, given in full, clearly indicates the writer's purpose: *de Veritate, prout distinguitur a Revelatione, Verisimili, Probabili, et a Falso* (Paris, 1624). At the basis of the author's theory is his belief in the existence of *notitiæ communes*, or innate principles. These he explains in his chapter 'de Instinctu Naturali,' to be distinguished by six marks, viz. Priority, Independence, Universality, Certainty, Practical Necessity, and Immediate Cogency. Ideas to which these marks belong are imprinted on the mind by the hand of God. They are axioms, neither requiring nor admitting proof. When dealing with the subject of religion, he distinguishes five principles as exhibiting this primary character, and consequently independent of all tradition, whether written or oral. They come direct from a heavenly source and are common to all religions. These five fundamental truths are the following: (1) that God exists, (2) that it is a duty to worship Him, (3) that the practice of virtue is the true mode of doing Him honour, (4) that man is under the obligation to repent of his sins, and (5) that there will be rewards and punishments after death. The axiomatic character claimed on behalf of principles such as these is open to debate, and Lord Herbert's theories were afterwards subjected to damaging criticism by Locke. But, whatever opinion be held as to the validity of Lord Herbert's assumptions, it remains true that in his works we are brought face to face with the principles which lie at the root of Deism. Here we find assertion of the competence of human reason to attain certainty with regard to fundamental religious truths, and insistence upon the indissoluble connexion between religion and the practical duties of life. This is precisely the theme on which the Deistic writers enlarged. The pivot of the whole controversy is the disputed question of the sufficiency of natural reason to establish religion and enforce morality—a sufficiency as vehemently asserted by the Deists as it was denied by their opponents.

Much misunderstanding will be avoided if it be remembered from the outset that the Deistic controversy was in the main philosophical rather than religious. Had it not been so, it would have been incorrect to indicate a metaphysician like Lord Herbert of Cherbury as the forerunner of Deism. Disappointment awaits those who expect to find in the writings of this period any searching analysis of a living spiritual experience. The controversy arose not from the attempt of the soul to explain to itself its joys and fears in the presence of God, but from the desire of the thinker to remove from his theory of the world inconsistencies of which he was continually becoming more uncomfortably conscious. The details of the controversy will show that the chief impulse came from the wish to find a way of reconciliation between the then commonly accepted philosophic view of the Divine nature and the facts of observation. And new facts were the order of the day. It was a period of discovery and of the rapid acquisition of all kinds of knowledge. Information was pouring in with regard to the religious systems of other parts of the earth. It was no longer possible to live in a religious world limited by the horizon of Western Europe. Travellers were bringing home from recently discovered, or re-discovered, countries reports of imposing civilizations, in which the sanctions of civil order were provided by religions of the utmost diversity in origin and character. In this way materials for the study of comparative religion began to be collected, and it became possible to form some conception of the bewildering multiplicity of religious customs, ceremonies, and doctrines throughout the world. No philosophic explanation of man and man's religious faculties could claim to be adequate which left all this mass of new material out of account.

At the same time, other more subtle influences were at work stimulating man's natural desire to unify his knowledge. In the domain of physical science the process of unification was advancing with unparalleled rapidity. The so-called 'natural philosophers,' among whom were numbered the greatest intellects of the day, were engaged in establishing those wide generalizations which have formed the basis of modern science. The visible success thus achieved, deserving and receiving the applause of the world, prompted the philosophic student of religion to search for some wide formula that would cover his facts as satisfactorily as the formula of Newton covered the phenomena of the physical world.

1. Forerunners of Deism.—It is far from easy to form any estimate of the phase of intellectual development through which the nation was passing at the time when it was disposed to accept, or at all events to discuss, the novel theory of religion which the Deists proposed. English philosophy has never flowed in a very wide or deep stream. It is a common reproach that as a nation England has been in the past, and remains to the present day, strangely insusceptible to the influence of abstract ideas. It is difficult to deny the truth of the criticism. Even the controversies of the Reformation were in England decided to a great extent upon practical considerations. Little atten-

tion was for the most part paid to the examination of first principles. An exception to the general rule, however, is afforded by **Hobbes** († 1679). Together with other writers of the time, he exhibits a strong prejudice against the scholastic philosophy. In certain respects he represents, with some characteristic English peculiarities, the sceptical tendency of the Renaissance. It was, indeed, chiefly as an exponent of political philosophy that he made his mark and arrested the attention of his contemporaries. With the political theories which he defended, and with the controversies which ensued, we are not concerned. His importance in relation to the course of religious speculation lies rather in the temper which he contributed to produce than in the acceptance of his principles by any body of disciples. His self-sufficiency, his obvious one-sidedness, his disregard of necessary qualifications, and his rigorous insistence on the most paradoxical conclusions from his premisses aroused an angry opposition. Hence it is not surprising to come across the statement that, while he had innumerable opponents, his supporters numbered but one. It was a true instinct which made the men of his time feel that the tendency of the *Leviathan* was in the direction of a thoroughgoing infidelity. The literature of the Restoration bears witness to the existence of a general opinion that danger was to be apprehended from the spread of his influence. Though Hobbes himself was utterly opposed to that kind of natural religion which afterwards formulated itself as Deism, yet he was, in fact, one of the pioneers of the movement. As much as any other single writer he gave the impulse to religious speculation, and, by helping to shake the old confidence in tradition, contributed to the removal of one of the main obstacles to the introduction of Deism.

Another and a very different element at work in the intellectual life of the nation was derived from the influence of the **Cambridge Platonists** (*q.v.*). They were a small body standing much aloof from the general life of the country, who from the vantage ground of academic seclusion surveyed the troubled course of the political struggle and the contentions of the warring sects. For themselves, they desired to establish on rational grounds a Christian philosophy, leaving to others the barren victories in the field of popular controversy. In them the genuine philosophic instinct to pursue the search for ultimate truth was unmistakably present. It was their dominant motive. Influenced by the wide-spread reaction against the Aristotelianism of the Middle Ages, they discovered, in a modified form of Platonism, a theory which afforded satisfaction alike to their religious and to their intellectual requirements. In the forefront of their system they placed the conception of the human reason as receptive of illumination from the Divine source. From the elevation of the standpoint thus attained—so it seemed to them—the questions at issue between the sects were reduced to their true dimensions, and lost the exaggerated importance which had been conventionally attached to them. In the speculations of these students the ethical motive is markedly prominent. They insisted on the immutability of the moral law and on its independence of any positive commands, human or Divine. For the most part they were inclined to abstain from controversy. But some of them found it expedient to meet the theories of Hobbes with an explicit refutation. Against his materialism, and his speciously simple reduction of all human motives to various manifestations of self-love, they opposed their Platonic idealism and their belief in the existence of moral principles to which an inviolable obligation essentially belonged. At first sight it might appear paradoxical to maintain that two systems so consciously and directly opposed to one another as those of Hobbes and the Cambridge Platonists both helped to prepare the ground for the growth of Deism. But it will be remembered that the effect of the writings of Hobbes has been described as in the main negative. He helped to sap the defences of authority, whereas the Cambridge School contributed something more positive, accustoming the minds of men to the hope of finding in their own reason a judge capable of bringing to an end the weary series of doubtful disputations over matters of faith.

In a still more marked degree is it true that the writings of **Locke** († 1704) produced an effect upon the current of religious thought which he neither intended nor approved. Locke was not a Deist, though the reproach was naturally enough cast in the teeth of the man apart from whose influence Deism would never have enjoyed the vogue to which it eventually attained. While his relation to the movement was unquestionably close and intimate, it was at the same time far from simple. For not only did the Deists profess to draw their inferences from his principles, but many, perhaps most, of the opponents of the movement likewise were convinced adherents of his philosophy. Locke may therefore be said to have laid down the lines along which the controversy was destined to move. This he did, above all, by his short but very significant work on the *Reasonableness of Christianity* (1695; see art. LOCKE). In the pages of the writers who followed along the path where he led the way we shall find the same ostensible attempt to simplify the ancient faith, at first with an apologetic purpose, then with a gradually increasing and more overt hostility; the same principle of discrimination between the supposed valuable and worthless elements of the Creed; the same pre-eminence assigned to the ethical teaching of Christianity; the same conception of religion as a moral philosophy and a code of precepts rather than a power enabling the enfeebled will; the same treatment of miracles and prophecy as external evidences of the truth of the claims of Christianity; the same anxiety to discover a reconciliation between belief in the absolute impartiality of the Divine goodness and the position of privilege assigned to revealed religion. It would not, of course, be true to say that all these ideas were novel when they were propounded by Locke. Many of them had already a long history behind them, and had provided the subject-matter of mediæval disputations. But what is worthy of remark is that here, for the first time, we meet them in systematic combination with one another. They are made to converge upon a certain point, and to conduct to a conclusion which involves certainly the modification, and possibly the repudiation, of important elements in the hitherto accepted creed.

2. Deism in progress.—Those who wish to be supplied with a chronological list of the Deistic writers may be referred to the work of Leland (see Literature at end). It will be more profitable for our present purpose to select certain writers, not necessarily those of the greatest reputation, but those most typical because representative of some critical moment in the development of the movement. Of these the first to deserve mention is **John Toland**, who in 1696 published his *Christianity not mysterious, showing that there is nothing in the Gospel contrary to Reason nor above it, and that no Christian Doctrine can properly be called a Mystery.* The author claimed to be drawing the natural inferences from the premisses of Locke's philosophy; and the title of the book indicates clearly enough in which direction

he pushed forward the argument. Where Locke had urged the 'reasonableness of Christianity,' Toland would interpret the word 'reasonable' as equivalent to 'not mysterious.' This is not in the least what Locke meant. It is a long step further forward along the road which led to the rejection of Christian belief.

The book was of no particular merit, but, owing to the highly charged condition of the intellectual atmosphere, its publication caused a considerable explosion of indignation. It was condemned by the Irish Parliament and ordered to be burnt. The Lower House of the Convocation of Canterbury took cognizance of it, and would have proceeded further, had not the Bishops decided, on a point of law, to take no action in the matter. Though the ecclesiastical authorities did not move, there was a general feeling that it was an abuse of the recently accorded freedom of the press when a young author put forward such crude and revolutionary views as that 'neither God Himself nor any of His attributes are mysteries to us for want of adequate ideas,' and that so far as any Church allows of mysteries it is anti-Christian (cf. Wilkins, *Concilia*, 1737, iv. 631). Toland desired so to enlarge the jurisdiction of reason as to make it co-extensive with the contents of revelation. In deliberate opposition to the principle of earlier writers,[1] he refused to acknowledge the validity of the distinction between apprehension and comprehension. What man could not comprehend was on that account to be rejected as false. Not content with merely stating this general principle, he attempted to give a historical account of the process by which mystery had intruded itself into a Christianity originally devoid of this baser element. He pointed out, correctly enough, that in the language of the NT the word 'mystery' signified not something incomprehensible, but a secret revealed to the initiated. Hence he inferred that the conception of mystery in the sense of that which is beyond the reach of human understanding was alien from the spirit of original Christianity, and he endeavoured to show that a gradual assimilation of the new faith to the lower type of Jewish and heathen religions, the intrusion of Platonic philosophy, and the ambitious projects of an unscrupulous priesthood were responsible for the deterioration.

Although Toland cannot be credited with any large measure of originality, yet his book marks a critical point in the gradual change of men's views with regard to the comparative authority of reason and revelation. A certain arrogant assertion of superiority on behalf of reason was now substituted for that deference which had hitherto been considered the fitting attitude of the human mind in the presence of knowledge communicated from above. Another and more easily recognizable result of his rash speculations was connected with his theories as to the course of early Church history. The discussion of the views which he set forth stimulated a lively inquiry into the nature and value of the documents on which the historian of that period must depend. In a book entitled *Amyntor*, which was published in 1699, Toland himself, taking part in the discussion, endeavoured —or so it was supposed—to undermine the credit of Scripture by calling attention to the large mass of early Christian literature, and by suggesting covertly that canonical and uncanonical writings alike were the offspring of superstition and credulity.

Another new departure was taken when **Anthony Collins**, in 1713, published the *Discourse of Freethinking occasioned by the Rise and Growth of a Sect called Freethinkers*. Collins reiterated and emphasized the claim of reason to pronounce upon the contents of revelation. He advanced beyond the point where Toland had left the matter, by attempting to provide a theoretic justification of the claim to unlimited freedom of inquiry, in all directions, over the whole field of moral and religious speculation. Toland had himself exercised this freedom, but without prefixing any thorough examination of the positive and negative arguments in favour of extending this privilege to all classes. Collins had the acuteness to perceive that the whole of the Deistic argument, involving, as it did, an appeal to the reason of the ordinary man, rested ultimately upon a decision in favour of unconditional individual liberty to pursue investigation, and upon a conviction of individual capacity to discover the truth. Accordingly he set out systematically to prove that the progress of civilization has been furthered where men have claimed this right for themselves and extended it to others, while, on the other hand, deplorable consequences have ensued wherever the privilege of free thought has been withheld.

In some directions his task was easy. History provided an ample supply of examples of the evils which attend a policy of obscurantism, coupled with a blind and unintelligent deference to external authority. But he adopted a much more questionable position when he maintained that the cause of morality would be benefited by its complete dissociation from all mysterious sanctions whatever. He supported his case by the assertion that the great moral teachers of mankind had appealed, not to the fears, but to the reason, of their hearers. It was the method of the Prophets, of the Apostles, of Christ Himself. On the other hand, the endeavour to enforce belief by any other means than the plain straightforward appeal to the individual reason had been the bane of both Church and State, the source of moral corruption, the cause of every kind of discord, disturbance, and disaster. Bitter attacks are made upon all professional ministers of religion. Invective of this kind was a favourite theme with the Deistic writers, and for various reasons, chiefly political, was not distasteful to the public. The supposed machinations of the clergy served as a convenient explanation of certain facts in the history of religion, which did not easily square with the Deists' theory of contented reliance on the natural reason and instinct of man. From their point of view the prevalence of patently false religions and the persistence of superstitions were anomalies that had to be accounted for. So they sought to save the credit of the natural human reason by fixing the responsibility for these evils upon an intriguing, selfish, and idle priesthood.

Another point to be observed is the markedly utilitarian character of the reasoning employed by Collins. In defending the principle of freedom of thought he calls attention primarily to the desirable consequences which will follow upon its adoption. Like many others of his school, he made expediency a criterion of ethical values. The spirit of the age, devoted to the supposed interests of practical common sense, resented the application of any rule except one calculated on the basis of consequent pleasures and pains.

A later work by the same writer is significant of the transition to yet another phase of the controversy. In the *Discourse of the Grounds and Reasons of Christian Religion* (1724), Collins forsakes the question of the relative reasonableness or unreasonableness of the contents of the Christian Revelation, and turns to an inquiry into the credibility of prophecy and miracle. It had been a recognized mode of traditional Christian apology to rest the case for Christianity on two main supports—the correspondence of NT facts with OT prophecies, and the miraculous powers displayed by Christ and the Apostles. So long as the Biblical record remained unquestioned and uncriticized, this position was strong enough to withstand assault. But, now that the spirit of criticism had begun to throw suspicion upon the authenticity and the good faith of the Biblical documents, serious weaknesses in this line of defence revealed themselves, of which the innovators were quick to take logical advantage. If the facts were doubtful, what became of the argument from correspondence with prophecy and from miracle? So began the long debate over the 'external' evidences of Christianity. It was a descent from the comparatively higher level of an inquiry into the fundamental truths of religion to undignified and often vituperative disputes over the veracity of the Apostles and the other NT writers. But, although the tendency to substitute this less important issue showed itself as early as the third decade of the century, it was not till some years later that the change became general.

Christianity as old as the Creation, or the Gospel a Republication of the Religion of Nature, was published in the year 1730. Its author, **Matthew Tindal**, Fellow of All Souls' College, Oxford, had passed through various changes of religious belief, and did not bring out this, his best-known work, till near the end of a long life. It was at once recognized as a noteworthy contribution to the controversy. It was sober and restrained in tone, and

[1] *e.g.* Bacon, 'Concludamus theologiam sacram ex verbo et oraculis Dei, non ex lumine naturae aut rationis dictamine hauriri debere' (*de Augm. Scient.* ix. i.).

on the whole was free from the personalities which disfigure so much of the contemporary literature. Tindal collected, arranged, and shaped with considerable skill the arguments on which the Deists relied, and presented their case in a compact intelligible form. His book marks the culmination of Deism, when the movement had reached the height of its development, and was not yet affected by the deterioration which soon afterwards set in. He did his work as well, perhaps, as it could be done. The inconsistencies, mistaken hypotheses, and historical impossibilities which find a place in his book belong to the system as such, and could not be removed without causing the collapse of the whole construction.

Tindal brought to its logical conclusion the process initiated by Toland and Collins. His professed purpose was the same as theirs had been—to lay down such plain and simple rules as should enable men of the meanest capacity to distinguish between religion and superstition. Like his predecessors, he repudiated mystery and mere deference to authority, and insisted on the duty of every man to fashion his own religious belief for himself. And, in order to show that it is actually possible for every man so to do, he maintained the thesis that the ultimate truth of religion is a common constituent in all creeds (apart from the influence of deterioration) and not the exclusive property of revelation. His argument may be very briefly summarized as follows:

The point of departure of Tindal's argument is found in a peculiar conception of the unchangeable nature of God, whence is drawn the inference that He will treat all men at all times alike in this important matter of supplying them with the same sufficient means of recognizing and discharging the duties required of them. Of course, a racial development of the faculty of conscience was an idea which was altogether beyond the reach of the 18th century Deist. It was therefore assumed that, from the first, man was in possession of a ready means of calculating the ultimate consequences of his actions and so securing his future happiness. Only perversity could lead him astray, because God, 'that we may not fail to be as happy as possible for such creatures to be, has made our acting for our present, our only means of obtaining our future, happiness' (*Christianity as old*, etc., p. 15). 'The reason of things or the relation they have to each other teaches us our duty in all cases whatever' (p. 19). Upon this primary revelation in and through the reason is constructed the edifice of natural religion. In making this point Tindal was able to avail himself of the opinions expressed by orthodox writers. Thus he quotes from Dr. Prideaux: 'Let what is written in all the books of the New Testament be tried by that which is the touchstone of all religions, I mean that religion of nature and reason which God has written in the hearts of every one of us from the first creation.' From such a statement it was not unfair to deduce the superiority of the truths of natural religion. Tindal, however, went beyond this and argued that any further revelation must of necessity be mere surplusage, adding nothing of importance to man's knowledge about either faith or morals. In his opinion, all laws, whether the laws of nations or of particular countries, are only the law of nature adapted and accommodated to circumstances: 'nor can religion, even in relation to the worship of God, as it is a reasonable service, be anything but what necessarily flows from the consideration of God and His creatures' (p. 63).

The religion of nature is represented as possessing a perfection so complete that revelation can add nothing to it, nor take anything from it. True religion, whether externally or internally revealed, must always be identically the same in its contents, and this identity will exhibit itself alike in doctrine and in precept. The ethical teaching of revelation cannot, in fact, be superior to that of nature, because no positive command can be considered obligatory unless the reason for it be perceived, in which case it is equally obligatory on the grounds of natural religion (cf. p. 70). Indeed, to suppose anything which is merely positive in the sense of being undemonstrable by reason to be a necessary ingredient of true religion, is inconsistent with the good of man and with the honour of God (p. 141).

The practical conclusion of the argument is presented in the following sentence: 'Nothing can be requisite to discover true Christianity and to preserve it in its native purity free from all superstition, but after a strict scrutiny to admit nothing to belong to it except what our reason tells us is worthy of having God for its author. And if it be evident that we can't discern whether any instituted religion contains everything worthy, and nothing unworthy, of a Divine original, except we can antecedently by our reason discern what is or is not worthy of having God for its author, it necessarily follows that natural and revealed religion can't differ, because what reason shows to be worthy of having God for its author must belong to natural religion, and whatever reason tells us is unworthy of having God for its author can never belong to the true revealed religion' (p. 220). Into this single dilemma is compressed the quintessence of Deism.

At many points in the above argument it would have been possible to intervene, had it been in accordance with the design of this article to find particular answers to particular Deistic contentions. But no good purpose would be served by thus taking part in an obsolete controversy. It will, however, be useful now to point out some general weaknesses, which are not peculiar to Tindal, but are integral parts of the Deistic scheme of religious philosophy.

(*a*) In the first place, it will be noticed that every religious truth is measured against the standard of an imaginary Golden Age. Whatever truth Christianity possesses it retains from an original revelation to human reason, co-eval with the Creation. But in Deistic literature references of this kind to the beginning of the world must be interpreted in a conventional rather than in any literal sense. For, though the Deists professed to look to the far past, their eyes were, as a matter of fact, riveted on the present. It was the reason of their own day to which they appealed. Not until later was any attempt made to discover by historical methods of examination what the earlier intellectual and moral condition of the human race had actually been.

(*b*) Secondly, it is remarkable how, in estimating the value of the Christian religion, and distinguishing between its truths and its errors, the Deist maintains a consistent silence with regard to the Person of its Founder. He has practically nothing to say about the present operation of the influence of Christ in the world. And even stranger than his silence is his apparently complete unconsciousness that the omission of so fundamental a consideration might vitiate his results. So oblivious were the Deists, and many of their orthodox opponents likewise, of the mystical elements in Christianity, that the very conception of a personal union between the believer and Christ would have been forthwith dismissed as 'enthusiastic,' and to the reproach of enthusiasm the temper of the age was morbidly sensitive.

(*c*) Thirdly, a kind of supercilious superiority is assumed whenever the question of miracles arises. The Biblical records are not rejected on *a priori* grounds as in themselves impossible. Abstract metaphysical arguments have strangely little influence upon the course of the Deistic controversy. But, from the point of view of the Deist, miracles were beneath the notice of the man who claimed to be guided by his reason only. At best they might serve to arrest the attention of the vulgar herd. Religion being regarded as essentially the practice of duties, miracles were superfluous. For 'duties neither need, nor can receive, any stronger proof from miracles than what they have already from the evidence of right reason' (p. 374).

(*d*) Lastly, Tindal, like other Deists, exhibits an extraordinary incapacity to estimate fairly the strength of evil tendencies in human nature. It seemed to them as though all would be well if only some artificial obstacles in the way of moral progress could be removed. The adoption of the principle of Latitudinarianism—the universal recognition of sincerity as the one and only thing needful—would not only put an end to all persecution, but would set free an amount of moral energy sufficient to regenerate the world. In Tindal's own words, 'this principle, and this alone, would cause universal love and benevolence among the whole race of mankind; and, did it prevail, must soon produce a new and glorious face of things, or, in Scripture phrase, a new heaven and a new earth'

(p. 413). Verily, this was a flimsy optimism, out of all relation with the stern facts of the world's condition.

The time has now come to pass on to the consideration of the last stage of the controversy, when the pivot of the dispute had become *the question of prophecy and miracle.* It was the beginning of the end, and yet, when the current of controversy first turned into this channel, the public excitement rose to a higher pitch than it had hitherto reached. Nor is it difficult to discover the explanation of this immediate increase of interest. Up to this point the controversy, though not very profound, had yet concerned itself in some measure with the first principles of religious philosophy. In so doing it had moved in a region where the mind of the nation did not follow freely or with comfort. But now, in the place of these recondite and elusive questions concerning the adequacy or insufficiency of human reason, far plainer issues were raised that lay seemingly well within the compass of the ordinary understanding. Was the fulfilment of prophecy a fact or a delusion? Did the Resurrection of Christ really occur, or was it a fable easily explicable upon the supposition of enthusiasm or fraud on the part of the witnesses? Here were plain alternatives on which the book-writers and the pamphleteers could join issue. They hastened to avail themselves of the opportunity.

Notice has already been taken of the fact that Collins' book, *A Discourse of the Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion*, had contained criticism with regard to the commonly received views as to prophecy and miracle. Professing (though with doubtful sincerity) to write in the interests of Christianity, he sought to convict earlier apologists of a serious misrepresentation of the true relation between prophecy and fulfilment. The object of his attack was the detailed correspondence between the two; and he endeavoured to prove the impossibility of maintaining the old position, in the light of a sound historical criticism of the prophecies. Historically the predictions did not bear the meaning which the apologists required. If, then, the argument from correspondence were to be preserved, it could only be by giving to the prophecies in question a mystical and allegorical interpretation. Such, Collins argued, had in fact been the method of procedure adopted by the writers of the NT. In accordance with this general attitude towards the OT, he defined Christianity as a mystical Judaism. It was a plausible phrase, but not likely to commend Christianity to an age which regarded mysticism with a mixture of contempt and dislike.

This novel representation of the relation between Judaism and Christianity met with an unfavourable reception. For the most part it was vehemently repudiated by the defenders of orthodoxy. But, weak as Collins' arguments may have been, and easily riddled by the criticisms of better scholars than himself, it must be admitted that his attack on the traditional and mechanical conception of prophecy gave an impetus to a fruitful attempt at an investigation of the historical conditions out of which the writings of the OT took their rise. It was, in fact, an anticipation, however poorly equipped with linguistic and archæological knowledge, of the Biblical criticism which has been rich in results during the last half century.

Naturally enough, the attempt to apply the allegorical method of interpretation was extended from prophecy to miracle. The best known name in connexion with this further development of the controversy is that of Woolston. It is strange that writings which should properly have been disregarded as the ravings of a disordered mind should have received the serious attention which was actually accorded them. If the author could be accounted responsible, then there would be no possible defence for the tone and manner of his *Discourses on the Miracles of our Saviour* (1727–29). He has recourse to suggestions and insinuations which are no less absurd than offensive to reverent ears. Every miracle, including that of the Resurrection, is explained away as the result of a mistake or conscious fraud. An utterly impossible attempt is made to prove by quotations from the early Christian Fathers that they were wholly regardless of positive historical facts, and found in the Gospels nothing but an emblematic representation of the mystical life of Christ in the souls of men. That Woolston was not wholly responsible for what he said, or for his manner of saying it, is the obvious excuse for the breaches of propriety of which he is guilty. In his own day, however, the excuse was not allowed. The law was set in motion against him, and he was sent to prison.

No particular theological merit belongs to the defences of the miraculous element in the Gospels which were called forth by the attacks of Woolston and others. Sherlock's *Tryal of the Witnesses of the Resurrection of Jesus* (1729) is a characteristic specimen of the kind of answer which found favour at the time, and was comfortably accepted as conclusive. An elaborate parody of legal forms is employed in order to give life to the argument. Unquestionably many good points are made, the value of the concurrent testimony of the Apostles is exhibited, and their unimpeachable character as witnesses vigorously upheld. But, while considerable technical skill is displayed, the vital warmth of a genuine spirituality has given place to a frigid cleverness.

At the stage now reached in our review of the history of Deism little vitality remained in the ideas which underlay the movement. A process of disintegration had set in. Deistic writers were no longer inspired by any genuine impetus of conviction, nor was the general public in a mood to give as much interested attention as heretofore. The controversy was perishing of inanition, and had almost collapsed through the operation of these internal causes. The end, however, was hastened by a damaging blow delivered from without by one who was equally out of sympathy with either side. Hume's philosophy, though it made little stir at the time, was in its effects fatal to the continuance of Deism. A movement which had been initiated under the influence of the ideas of Locke could not survive the transformation which Locke's philosophy underwent in the hands of Hume. This is a circumstance which gives confirmation to the view that the inner meaning of Deism is best understood in relation to the development of philosophical, rather than of religious, ideas. It was because Deism had arisen through the application of Locke's philosophy to the subject-matter of religion that its position ceased to be tenable, so soon as that philosophy was found to issue in general scepticism. A little examination of the nature of Hume's criticism of religious belief will show how completely he cut away the foundations on which the Deists had built.

The Deists, as we have seen, had begun by defending the pre-eminence of Christianity on the ground that it and it alone corresponded with the true religion of nature; but, gradually becoming more conscious of their divergence from historic Christianity, they transformed themselves into the champions of natural, as opposed to revealed, religion. And natural religion meant for them that religion which any man at any time from the beginning of the world was capable of discovering for himself through the exercise of his own individual reason. The existence of a religion 'as old as the Creation' was their fundamental assumption. It was precisely this assumption which collapsed as soon as it was criticized in the light of Locke's own principles concerning the gradual acquisition of knowledge. Hume pointed out that the religion of primitive man, so far from consisting of a few pure, elevated, and incontrovertible truths, must have been a medley of crude beliefs and puerile superstitions. 'It seems certain that, according to the natural progress of human thought, the ignorant multitude must first entertain some grovelling and familiar notion of superior powers before they stretch their conception to that perfect being who bestowed order on the whole frame of nature' (*Works*, iv. 421).

Along these lines Hume developed his *Natural History of Religion* (1757). He exhibited the rude beginnings of religious belief in a barbarous type of polytheism, and sought to provide an explanation of the mode in which purely natural influences, as distinct from supernatural revelation, transformed this primitive faith into something less crude and less full of patent absurdities. Such explanations afford convenient cover for the insinuation that the final product possesses no real superiority over the rude beginnings, being equally human in origin, insecure in its foundations, and destitute of all reasonable proof.

Hume's irony serves as a very thin disguise for his real sentiments. The declaration of belief in the existence of God, with which he opens his dissertation, is couched in language that would be appropriate in any Deistic treatise; but its insincerity is obvious. With the manifest purpose of undermining the common belief in God, he attributes its prevalence to the operation of irrational causes. 'The doctrine of one supreme Deity, the author of nature, is very ancient, has spread itself over great and populous nations, and among them has been embraced by all ranks and conditions of men; but whoever thinks that it has owed its success to the prevalent force of those invincible reasons on which it is undoubtedly founded, would show himself little acquainted with the ignorance and stupidity of the people, and their prejudice in favour of their particular superstitions' (iv. 446). At the conclusion of the treatise, discarding even this slight veil of sarcasm, and declaring the whole question to be a riddle, an enigma, an inexplicable mystery, he advocates an escape from the contentions of discordant superstitions into the calm regions of philosophy. In this way Hume makes short work of the pure original religion by which the Deists set such store. Not only had he the best of the argument

in contending for the probability of progress from crude to refined types of religion, but, in the face of the evidence which it was easy for him to produce with regard to the condition of religion in earlier times and among the uncivilized nations of the world, it was impossible for the fiction of a religion as old as the Creation to maintain itself.

In passing it should be noticed that the strength and the weakness of Hume's essay on 'Miracles' can be properly appreciated only when it is remembered that, throughout the Deistic controversy, miracle was treated as the chief evidence of the Divine authorship of a revelation. From this point of view, the more startling the event the greater will be the stupor which it produces, and the higher its value as a credential. Unconscious of the dangers to faith involved in their procedure, the apologists degraded miracle to the level of portent. It was a blunder of which Hume was quick to take advantage. If Deist and apologist alike were willing to treat miracle as a naked sign of arbitrary power, it was not for the common enemy of Deism and Christianity to set them right. He was only taking up the ordinary position of the time when he defined miracle as a violation of nature; and, when it is so regarded, with every adequate cause for its occurrence eliminated from consideration, it is undeniably plausible to contend that no amount of external evidence can outweigh the inherent improbability.

3. Writers with relations to Deism, but not properly Deists.—Some writers, commonly reckoned among the Deists, have been intentionally passed over in silence. It will be well, therefore, to add a few words of explanation why this course has been adopted. During the period under review, while the Deists were the most forward and active antagonists of orthodoxy, it was not unnatural that any writer who maintained unorthodox opinions should be reckoned as belonging to their camp. Yet obviously the classification is likely in some places to be inexact. It was so, for example, in the case of **Lord Shaftesbury**, the author of *Characteristics* (1711). It is no doubt true that there are certain points which he and the Deists have in common, but the superficial resemblances are more than counterbalanced by fundamental differences. He displays the same antipathy to priests, and employs the same kind of invective against the poisonous influence of superstition; but, while he thus directs his attack upon the same objective, the principles on which he bases his criticisms are very far from being those of the Deists. Their characteristic conception of a law of nature imposed upon His creatures by the Creator, and enforced by means of rewards and punishments, is absolutely alien from his system of thought. For him the ethical standard was determined by the dictates of an intuitive moral faculty, forming part of the essential endowment of human nature. Of this moral faculty the effectiveness would indeed be reinforced by theistic belief, but is not dependent on it, whereas in the Deistic system the sense of moral obligation is derived from the recognition by man of his relation to his Maker.

Since the existence of God was of comparatively little moment in Lord Shaftesbury's system, he cannot properly be styled a Deist; and in some ways he exhibited a positive antagonism to their mode of thought. For example, he raised a much needed protest against the undue prominence given to hedonistic considerations by both parties in the controversy. He found an appropriate object for his wit in exposing the shallowness of the conception by which ethics was degraded into an elaborate calculation of pains and pleasures. The pointed weapon of ridicule is effectively used in his hands. Unfortunately, in his references to religion his satire frequently degenerates into a sneer. The defenders of religion winced under his sarcasms, and retaliated by calling him a Deist. But there was little justification for the charge. The word 'Deism' would cease to have any definite connotation if it were made to cover systems so radically divergent as those of Shaftesbury and Tindal.

If there is little justification for ranking Shaftesbury among the Deists, there is even less for assigning a writer like **Mandeville** to their company. The Deist may not have been remarkable for any particular moral excellence, but at least he was eminently respectable. There is no reason to question the sincerity of his desire to further the cause of morality, and to lend his aid in raising a barrier against the encroaching tide of moral laxity. Such was not the purpose of Mandeville. He is cynical enough to set out on the title-page of the *Fable of the Bees* (1714) the thesis that private vices are public benefits, and in his opening inquiry into the nature of moral virtue adopts the conclusion that it is the political offspring which Flattery has begot upon Pride. Intrinsically the book is as worthless as it is paradoxical, but it raised a laugh, and its sophistical arguments in favour of self-indulgence ensured its popularity in circles where every moral restraint was regarded with contemptuous indifference.

Leland, the contemporary historian and critic of Deism, devotes as much as a third of his work on the Deistical writers to a consideration of the works of **Lord Bolingbroke**. It is a clear indication of the high importance which was at the time attached to this attack on the claims of revelation. When Leland wrote, Bolingbroke's collected writings (with Life by D. Mallet), of which the one here most relevant is his *Letters on the Study and Use of History* (written in 1738), were newly published, having been issued posthumously in the year 1754. The effect of the book, however, was almost *nil*, and Dr. Johnson's sentence, in which he contemptuously described it as a blunderbuss which the author had not resolution enough to fire off in his lifetime, is a more accurate appraisement of it than Leland's elaborate criticism. The old sneers at priestcraft, the old arguments in favour of a purely rational religion, re-appear. But there was no new point to make; and Deism was too far gone in decay to be revived even by Lord Bolingbroke's name and his 'five pompous volumes.' In England, Deism was to all intents and purposes defunct, though about this time a kindred movement on the other side of the Channel was exhibiting fresh vitality under new forms.

4. The foreign movement.—Deism such as we have been describing was so native a product of English thought, with a form so markedly determined alike by the strength and the weakness of the English mind, that its transplantation to a foreign soil could not be accomplished without the most profound modification of its character. When the ideas to which the English Deists had first given expression were taken up by French exponents, new elements were introduced which gave to the resultant product a very different quality. Thus, what had been Deism in England became in France another movement, with a character and history of its own, which cannot properly be handled in this article. At the same time the history of Deism is not complete unless account be taken of the fact that it is the parent stock from which sprang the French movement of reaction against traditional belief.

It is significant that both **Voltaire** († 1778) and Rousseau were largely indebted to English sources for their inspiration. During the years which the former passed in England (1726–1729), he gathered impressions which he afterwards systematized and elaborated into a philosophy of religion. As a friend of Lord Bolingbroke he naturally came into close contact with men who, whether secretly or openly, sympathized with the Deists. The ideas which he derived from this intercourse were in keeping with the bent of his mind. Moreover, his peculiar abilities enabled him to give them a keener edge and a wider range than they had possessed in the hands of the English writers. In France the conceptions characteristic of Deism found a soil more favourable to their rapid development than England had ever afforded them. The logical French mind, impatient of compromise and qualification, insisted rigidly on the necessary consequences of abstract principles, where English conclusions had been influenced by numberless practical considerations. And, further, the con-

ditions of social, political, and ecclesiastical life in France were such as to accentuate the criticisms of those who were opposed in spirit to the prevailing order. Resentment against repression manifested itself in a sharper opposition to the unbending attitude of authority. In proportion as an external submission to rule was enforced, so was an internal passion for revolt stimulated, especially in the domain of religious thought. So marked was the opposition between the old and the new points of view, that Deism became almost at once identified with an anti-ecclesiastical movement. Instead of aiming at a transformation of the old theology into another pattern, as had been the object of the earlier English Deists, the French representatives of the movement advocated a general repudiation of theology and the substitution of an undogmatic religion in place of Roman Catholicism. To this end Voltaire applied the weapons of his caustic satire, and the Encyclopædists added the weight of their accumulated knowledge. Indeed, Diderot († 1784) and his school represent a further stage in the downward transition from Deism towards Materialism. With him even that residue of natural religion which Voltaire would have retained became a mere superfluity, resting on no secure foundation of reason, and therefore destined to disappear before the advance of intellectual enlightenment. See art. ENCYCLOPÆDISTS.

This tendency to a bare Materialism was to some extent checked by the influence of Rousseau († 1778), who was at once the product and the champion of a reaction against the stiffness and coldness of a cramped Rationalism. In the fact that he thus represented the protest of common sense against the bare negations of Materialism is to be found the explanation of his wide popularity. But the effect which he produced must not be overestimated. Whatever may have been the result of his political speculations in hastening the crisis of the Revolution, his influence upon religious thought was not more than evanescent. Though his genius galvanized for a time into fresh activity some of those ideas which had been the stock-in-trade of the Deistic writers, he could not restore to them the real vigour of life. Deism had had its day. The intellectual opposition to the supernatural element in Christianity was about to assume another form. A new criticism and a new apologetic were destined to arise, constructed upon lines determined by the new metaphysical theories of Kant.

5. Permanent results.—Controversies upon which the attention of thinking men has been focused can neither pass away without leaving some definite mark on subsequent theology, nor be appraised at their proper value unless the character and extent of their permanent results be taken into account. It will therefore be necessary to ask what lasting contribution was made by Deism to English theological thought. It is almost a matter of surprise to find on examination how comparatively scanty is the residuum which has stood the test of time. But something no doubt has survived. To some extent the Deists were successful in establishing their principle of the appeal to human reason, even while in their own application of it they showed little skill or power of discrimination. It is noteworthy that they called in, as arbiter of the dispute, the common sense of the ordinary man, and, as witness, the trained skill of the expert. Obviously, the critical questions which were raised could not be settled without thorough investigation by men who had devoted years of study to the data of these problems. A new class of Bible students arose who professed to approach their tasks with minds entirely unbiased by any dogmatic considerations. Whether they were as free from prejudice as they themselves supposed, is open to question. At any rate the Deists gave an impulse to Biblical criticism, the benefit of which still makes itself felt. It has not been forgotten that the same methods of scientific inquiry must be applied to sacred as to profane history. What has now become a commonplace of theology was first insisted upon by the Deists. That they should have led the way in this direction is so much to their credit.

Again, the appeal to the common sense of those who make no claim to any professional knowledge of theology has remained markedly characteristic of English religion. The religious public, as it is called, is disinclined to divest itself of responsibility by seeking shelter behind the pronouncements of authority. Conscious of inability itself to undertake in detail the processes of criticism, it insists on seeing the results openly displayed. The debate between the champions of tradition and of innovation is not carried on behind closed doors, but in open court. The public desire to follow the argument and form for themselves an intelligent estimate of the issue. This feature also of our religious life is in great measure the outcome of the Deistic movement.

The Deistic controversy left no more important legacy behind it than the apologetic method of Bp. Butler († 1752). The *Analogy* (1736) may always be read with profit, but its true greatness cannot be rightly appreciated unless the argument be viewed in its proper setting as an answer to the Deistic attack on Christianity. What calls for remark is Butler's careful and guarded exposition of the principles of religious evidence in opposition to the exaggerated insistence by the Deists on certain aspects of the truth and their corresponding neglect of other equally important considerations. It is most interesting to observe how free he is from any undue bias against his opponents' point of view, how far he is ready to go with them, and how sincerely, unhesitatingly, and fearlessly he recognizes the validity of their appeal to reason, while brushing aside their pretentious claim to be the only 'Free-thinkers.' It is just because he is thus frank in his acknowledgment of the ultimate authority of human reason that he is able to insist with effect on the limitations imposed by ignorance, inseparable from our finite condition. He did an inestimable service to religion when he exposed with relentless logic the absurdity of the claim that all things in revelation should be made transparently intelligible to the human mind. It was another service of scarcely less value when he made men realize that revelation consisted *ex hypothesi* of a scheme composed of a large number of interrelated parts, not one of which can be legitimately criticized except in its full context. These were precisely the considerations which the Deists overlooked. If they have now become the truisms of theology, it is because Butler first expounded them as the necessary corrective to the crude speculations of Deism. See, further, art. BUTLER.

An allied but distinguishable reaction against the temper of Deism reveals itself in the idealistic philosophy of **Bp. Berkeley** († 1753), who, like his contemporary Butler, was moved to indignation at the unintelligent superficiality of the prevalent unbelief. To him it appeared that the decay of faith was in the main due to the general acceptance of a faulty metaphysic, inherited from Locke. The Christian verities were rejected on the plea that they did not approve themselves to the philosophic intellect. But the philosophers were themselves responsible for creating unnecessary intellectual difficulties. It was they who had raised the dust, through which, as they complained, they could not see. Berkeley directed his

criticism against the half-developed Materialism which was the orthodox metaphysic of the day. His rejection of Locke's conception of the real existence of extended matter was accounted paradoxical, and on that account chiefly attracted attention both favourable and unfavourable. But it is sometimes forgotten that this Immaterialism of Berkeley was only part of his system. It was the foundation on which he built. It led on to his conception of the world as the perpetual manifestation of the spiritual presence of God. Thus he delivered a powerful protest against the view that the evidence for the existence of God can be disclosed only through a long and intricate process of inference. In opposition to the commonly accepted cold mechanical outlook on the universe, he preached the doctrine of a continuous communication between the Divine and the human spirit through the medium of sensible experience. To him the material world was the language of God addressed to the spiritual ear, and charged with an infinite significance for those who would address themselves to the task of its interpretation. It was too high a conception to commend itself to the temper of the 18th century. Nevertheless, the impulse towards a religious idealism which Berkeley initiated has not been altogether without effect. His teaching, which originated in opposition to Deism, has remained to this day part of our theological heritage. See, further, art. BERKELEY.

The religious protest against Deism which found expression in the writings of Butler and Berkeley was carried further by **Law** and **Wesley**, but with a characteristic difference. The two bishops had met the Deists on the field of intellectual reasoning. This was not the method which commended itself to the judgment of the mystic and of the revivalist. They appealed from the intellect to the verdict of the religious consciousness. Perhaps the statement should be made with some qualification with respect to Law, since in the treatise which he composed against Tindal his mysticism does not yet appear.

In the *Case of Reason* (1731), Law appealed without scruple to the logic of intellect; moreover, he possessed the power of marshalling his arguments with skill and clothing them in apt language. Before the inscrutable mystery of the Infinite he prostrated himself in silent submission, and with a feeling of profound reverence yielded a willing obedience to the message of revelation. It is strange to find Law at this time referring to miracles as the proof of revelation. A little later he discovered a method of statement more congenial to his natural temperament. In the place of controversial argument he substituted the positive affirmations of the mystic's experience. In opposition to Tindal he had taken a low view of the range of human reason, and this position he consistently maintained, but in the writings of the mystics he found it stated that man possessed a faculty of spiritual intuition incomparably more efficacious than reason in the attainment of Divine wisdom. In Christian mysticism, Law discovered a system which afforded satisfaction to his religious instincts; and he strove to influence others in the same direction, by means of writings which are a strange compound of deep spiritual insight and fanciful imaginations. But in the 18th cent. the message of the mystic was *vox clamantis in deserto*. The seed fell on barren ground, where it had no opportunity of germinating.

Law founded no school of English mysticism. Though there were many who, like himself, recoiled from the irreligiousness of Deism, there were few ready to follow whither he led the way. He was before his time, and has perhaps more disciples at the present day than he had in his own lifetime.

The same recoil from Deism, but under yet another aspect, is illustrated by the life and work of John Wesley († 1791). Profoundly influenced by Law's example and ethical teaching, he differed widely from him in temperament, and was alike ignorant and impatient of the mystical tendencies to which the older man resigned himself. Emphatically a man of action, he gave expression to the protest of the practical religious consciousness against the religious impotence of Rationalism. It mattered little whether the Rationalism was of the type preached by Tillotson or of that preached by Tindal. In either case it had proved miserably ineffective in stemming the tide of infidelity and immorality. Wesley came forward at the precise moment when there was a wide-spread and despairing consciousness of the utter sterility of mere argument about religion. Boldly discarding the discredited appeal to the intellect, he addressed himself to the ineradicable religious instincts of mankind, their sense of sin, their longing for forgiveness, the hopeless unrest of the soul to which no vision of God has come. In pressing home his appeal he touched the hearts of multitudes by means of those very Christian doctrines which the Deists had found too irrational for acceptance, and had made the butt of their shallow satire. The fall of man, the fact and the malignant influence of original sin, the offer of redemption, the mystery of the Atonement—these were the topics handled by the preacher round whom the crowds gathered in their thousands. There could not have been a more complete repudiation of the whole temper of which Deism was the expression. The stale arguments were allowed to drop into oblivion. There was a return to older methods of less intellectual pretensions. The proof of religion was sought no longer in the appeal to natural reason, but in the letter of Scripture and in the experience of daily life.

Thus the rise of Wesleyanism coincided with the extinction of Deism. Not that Deism disappeared because the problems which it had raised had received final and conclusive answers. On the contrary, many of these problems involve mysteries which, it is probable, will always remain inscrutable to the finite mind. It is no discredit to the apologists of the 18th cent. that in such cases they had no solution to offer. They had done all that could be expected of them. They had shown the alternative creed of the Deist to be weighted with difficulties as great as those which he hoped to escape by his rejection of Christianity. They had pointed to a way of reconciliation between the rights of reason and the claims of faith. It was not until this work had been accomplished that the Evangelical Rèvival could exhibit the undiminished spiritual energy latent in authoritative and traditional religion. Then began another stage of religious history, a period even more distracted with controversy than that which we have been passing in review. But the struggle was over new issues. Deism was forgotten.

II. *PHILOSOPHICAL*.—**1. View of God's relation to the material and the moral world.**—The word 'Deism,' besides serving as the designation of an historical religious movement, has been commonly used to describe a particular view of God's nature and of the dependence of the world upon Him. Between the two uses of the word a connexion exists, of which some notice will presently be taken, but it would be a mistake to suppose that philosophic Deism was necessarily the accepted creed of the Deists of the 18th century. Indeed, some who bore the name would at the present day be called Theists. But the distinction now made between Deism and Theism did not then exist. The two expressions were used indiscriminately. It is only in later times, since the study of the philosophy of religion has been prosecuted with greater attention, that to the word 'Deism' has been attached a more defined and exact connotation. We proceed to ask, What is the meaning conveyed by the word in this later and more abstract sense?

The great question concerning the relation of God to the world has received a vast number of different answers. To classify into distinct groups the various solutions proposed is no easy matter. It is difficult to draw lines of division, when the

gradations are almost imperceptible, though at the two extremities members of the same series may stand in conspicuous opposition to one another. But, since some form of classification is necessary, it has been found convenient to separate views as to the being of God into two divisions, according as they approximate to Pantheism on the one hand or to Deism on the other. With the second only are we here concerned. Let it be borne in mind that our subject of study is not a definite school of thought sharply outlined and admitting historical treatment. It is rather a vague inclination or bent of mind, which in varying degrees is continuously present in human thought, and occasionally, coming prominently to the front, becomes the dominant factor in religious and philosophic systems.

Deism approaches the ultimate problem of the universe with a self-satisfied confidence painfully out of proportion to the difficulty of the task of finding a solution. With little sense of reverence for the mystery that lies behind all outward appearances, it accepts an answer suggested by anthropomorphic analogies, and framed in accordance with uncritical prepossessions. Common sense admits no obstinate questionings as to the independent existence of the external world, nor does it care to inquire too curiously what may be the real character of human freedom. It rests content with the common assumptions of daily life. The Deist, adopting these assumptions as his starting-point, finds comparatively little difficulty in constructing his theory of God and the world, He is ready to acknowledge a Creator. In order to account for the existence of the material world, it is necessary to assume the existence of a First Cause, at whose command creation took effect and the cosmos entered on its life. But the Deist's conception of creation is essentially restricted. The fabric of the universe is supposed to stand to God in the relation which the instrument bears to its maker. The heavens are the work of His hands, just as the watch is the work of the watchmaker. As the craftsman determines the characteristic properties of his machine, the correlation of its parts, their positions and their functions, so is God conceived to have dealt with the world. He brought it into being and ordained its laws. He imparted to it once for all the energy which serves as the driving power of the stupendous mechanism. The Deist recognizes in God the ultimate source of matter and motion, and, consistently with this conception, admits the possibility of occasional interferences on the part of the Deity. But, though the possibility of such interference is granted, the probability is called in question. It seems more in accordance with the principles of Deism that Nature should be left to work itself out in obedience to laws originally given. Any suggestion of a deviation from the established order is resented, as though to admit it were to be wanting in due respect for the inviolable majesty of God's unchangeableness and the original perfection of His work. A perfect machine, it is supposed, would not require from time to time to be adjusted by its maker; nor would the Unchangeable introduce any later corrections into a creation which from the first reflected His omniscience and omnipotence.

Similarly based on anthropomorphic analogies, and subject in consequence to similar defects, is the Deistic conception of the relation of God to the moral world. He is the supreme Governor, the author of moral as of physical law, but as remote in the one region as in the other from the particular cases exhibiting the working of His laws. He is thought of as filling the part of legislator and judge to the universe of moral beings; and these analogies, derived from the organization of human society, are treated as though they were entirely adequate not only to illustrate, but even to explain, His supreme authority. The moral law is assumed to be sufficiently well known by all for the practical purposes of life. Pains and pleasures, present and future, are attached respectively to its infringement and its observance. Men are automatically punished and rewarded, in strict accordance with their deserts. In the moral as in the physical world there is neither need nor room for the special interposition of the supreme Governor.

Whatever shortcomings such a view of the nature of God may have,—and they are both obvious and important,—yet in some respects it tallies with the promptings of the religious instincts of men. It is opposed to Materialism, avoiding the desperate necessity of ascribing to matter an independent eternal existence of its own. Nor is God reduced, as in Pantheism, to a mere abstraction, an impersonal substratum of the universe. He is a real person, standing over against the world and man. Human personality also is preserved. Man retains his freedom, and justice is done to his responsibility. As he sows so shall he reap, according to laws that admit of no exception. Obviously in these ideas there is much that is true, and the truth is of that positive kind to which appeal must be made in practical exhortation and the enforcement of ethical teaching. But with the truth is mingled much error. The consequent weaknesses of Deism are both theoretical and practical.

2. Defects in conceptions of Creation and Finite Existence.—Deism labours under the disadvantage of being a dualistic explanation of the world. Not indeed that it is explicitly so. The charge would be repudiated. But the repudiation means no more than that the Deist is unconscious of the fact, having been content to leave unexamined many of the conceptions with which he deals. Notably is this the case with the idea of Creation. The God of the Deist is, in fact, a demiurge who has shaped into a cosmos a matter essentially alien from Himself. And, though the Deist replies that, according to his teaching, matter is not shaped by God but called into being by His creative word, the answer is unsatisfactory. For this creation of an alien matter out of nothing presents, on examination, insuperable difficulties. There is nothing to bridge the gap between the Creator and His creation. Nor is any attempt made to find in the nature of God any motive towards the act of creation. Recourse is had to the conception of an entirely arbitrary and inexplicable act of power.

Equally lacking in depth is the Deist's view of the problem of finite existence. From his standpoint the words 'in God we live, and move, and have our being' are destitute of any real significance. For to all intents and purposes he conceives of the world as existing independently of the Deity. The essential dualism of the conception is disguised, not removed, by laying stress on the origination of one form of existence from the other. Whatever may have been the relation of the two at the moment of creation, the finite, as it now is, possesses a substantial independence of the Infinite. The apparent simplicity of the view is gained by the abandonment of any attempt to reach the conception of an underlying unity.

A further weakness of Deism is disclosed as soon as the relation of the moral law to the will of God becomes the subject of discussion. For it is precisely here that those analogies with earthly rulers on which the Deist relies break down and fail the inquirer at the most critical point of his investigation. For, if the analogy of legislation be pressed, then it will appear as though the moral law were determined arbitrarily according to the Divine

will and pleasure. Its necessity or inevitableness seemingly disappears. On the other hand, if the judicial function of the Supreme Governor be put in the forefront, and the moral law be regarded as existing in the reason of things, and requiring only to be enforced by the Divine power, then it would seem as though the freedom of God's action were limited by a rule superior to Himself. From this dilemma the principles of Deism offer no way of escape. If the externality of God in relation to the world, physical or moral, be assumed, then in some way or other limitations and restrictions are placed upon the Divine nature. In the one case, God is left confronted by an independent material world; in the other case, by an independent law of right and wrong. And the very essence of Deism lies in its assumption of God's externality.

Theoretic unsoundness is attended with practical deficiencies. Deism has not been without injurious effect on those who have adopted it as their creed. If it be admitted that man's highest spiritual life is attained in proportion as he rises to communion with God, then it must be confessed that Deism can never carry the soul up into this region. The appearances of the world, however intricate in design and prodigal of beauty, convey to the heart no message significant of the indwelling presence of God. The most that the Deist may legitimately do is to follow back a many-linked chain of inference to a point in the far past when God, at the moment of creation, was in contact with His world. In a universe so conceived, man feels himself left to his own resources. A cold tribute of perfunctory worship is all that he is likely to offer to a God whose arm is never stretched out in answer to prayer, whose ear is never open to the supplication of the penitent. Man learns to think that his welfare depends entirely upon the accuracy of his knowledge of those general laws by which the course of the world is determined, and upon his skill in adapting himself to them. There is stimulated in him a spirit of self-sufficiency and self-assertion as towards God, and a certain hardness and lack of sympathy towards his fellow-men.

Deistic premisses do not positively exclude the possibility of revelation, but create a strong prejudice against it. For revelation is a species of miracle, and open to all the objections which, in the mind of the Deist, bear against the miraculous. It is an interference with the regular course of the world. In some forms of Deism the idea of a Divine interposition is accepted without hesitation or sense of incongruity. But further consideration is likely to suggest the thought that the need for interference with the world is due to some original weakness of construction; and the Deist, in his anxiety to uphold the credit of the First Cause, is led to deny first the need for, and then the fact of, revelation.

Deism is a curiously unstable system of belief. It could hardly be otherwise, considering that the premisses from which it sets out are wanting in consistency and in definiteness. Beginning by assuming the unqualified correctness of a few of the truths which appeal to the religious instinct, it reaches at length a position in flagrant contradiction to fundamental religious beliefs. The utility of prayer and the possibility of communication between God and man are ideas which have always found a home in the unsophisticated religious consciousness; yet these are the ideas which Deism finally discovers to be incompatible with its teaching about the Divine nature. And, when these ideas have been repudiated, there follows the gradual encroachment of an irreligious temper, and the elimination from life of the effective power of religion. Though nominally belief in God be retained, it becomes wholly inoperative—the furniture of the mind rather than the inspiration of the heart.

3. **Examples of Deistic systems.**—Deism in the sense which we are now investigating we have defined to be a tendency of thought. It is a tendency which for the most part has been counteracted by stronger forces. But occasional examples in the history of religion and philosophy prove that it is capable of gaining the ascendancy. Apart from the influence of revelation, the drift of ethnic religions has been in the direction of Polytheism and Pantheism rather than towards the opposite extreme of Deism. For men are swayed more easily by their emotions than by their reason, and to the feelings the colder system of Deism is less attractive than these other forms of error. The most conspicuous example of a religion in which Deistic forms of thought are paramount is **Confucianism**, which exhibits a characteristic combination of qualities and defects. In particular, there is a decorous recognition of heaven as the source from which man derives his nature, although, for the attainment of virtue, little importance is attached to the communication between God and man. Its ideal includes the observance of an exacting moral code, but does not rise above this level. Sin as an offence against God, and virtue as trustful dependence on His help, are conceptions that find no place in a system which is almost pure Deism.

Stoicism is another, but less complete, illustration of the working of the same tendency. The insistence on the law of nature, and on the universal order extending through the world, is a thoroughly 'Deistic' idea. So also, in several respects, are the ethical notions of the Stoics, their emphasis on the power of the will, and their doctrine of man's self-sufficiency. These indeed are points on which they set precedents followed in later times. For the 18th cent. Deists, familiarized through a classical education with the writings of the ancient Stoics, drew much of their inspiration from this source. On the other hand, Stoicism contained ideas irreconcilable with pure Deism. Its Pantheism, though far from being consistently developed to its logical issues, is sufficient to differentiate it from any system in which God is assumed to be personally distinct from the world. In ethics, its rejection of all utilitarian considerations is opposed to the characteristic temper of Deism. Thus, though there is a genetic relationship between Stoicism and English Deism, the offspring differed in some essential features from the parent.

Its marked preference for the Deistic explanation of the universe accounts in large measure alike for the strength and the weakness of **Muhammadanism.** No one will deny that the effect of the teaching of Islām is to produce in its adherents a very real and deep reverence for God, the all-powerful Creator and Ruler of the world. At the same time the oppressive sense of a great and unbridged gulf between God and man checks and thwarts the natural action of man's religious instincts. Great as is the regularity with which the prescribed forms of devotion are observed, the worshipper adores an infinitely distant God. The specifically Christian conception of freedom of access to the Divine throne is conspicuously absent. When petitions for particular benefits are offered up, they are addressed (at any rate in many parts of the Muhammadan world) to inferior powers rather than to God. This degradation of prayer is remarkable evidence of the obstacle which Deism opposes to the exercise of man's highest spiritual function, communion with his Maker.

After all, the classical example of the Deistic tendency is to be found in the 18th cent. Deists; and herein lies the justification for attaching to the same word an historical and an abstract sense.

In the writings of Toland, Collins, Tindal, and other historical Deists is contained the exposition of precisely those ideas which combine to make up Deism in the abstract. Not, indeed, that in any single one of these writers is Deism logically rounded off and cleared from all inconsistencies. Men seldom press their principles to the uttermost; nor were the Deists, with their lack of philosophical acumen, likely to be exceptions to the rule. Side by side with arguments which in effect exclude God's direct action on the world, they placed statements of belief which the most exacting Theist would find irreproachable. Gradually the logic of events disclosed the true implications of their principles, with the result that Deism was either repudiated in favour of a return to historic Christianity, or exchanged for avowed infidelity. See, further, art. THEISM.

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DELHĪ.—The name applied specially to the modern city of Shāhjahānābād on the right bank of the Jumnā (lat. 28° 38′ 58″ N.; long. 77° 16′ 30″ E.), and generally to a collection of ruined cities, covering an area of about 45 sq. miles, in the neighbourhood. Classifying these cities from N. to S., we have (1) Fīrozābād of Fīroz Shāh Tughlaq (*c.* A.D. 1360), adjoining modern Delhī on the south; (2) Indrapat or Indraprastha, associated with the earliest legends of the Aryan occupation of the Jumnā valley, the foundation of which by Yudhisthira and his brothers, the five Pāndavas, is recorded in the Mahābhārata; the site was reoccupied by Humāyūn and Sher Shāh (*c.* 1540); (3) Sirī, fortified by Alā-ud-dīn (*c.* 1300); (4) Jahānpanāh, the space between old Delhī and Sirī, which was gradually occupied and ultimately connected with the cities N. and S. of it (*c.* 1330); (5) Old Delhī, or the Fort of Rāē Pithorā, the original Delhī of the Paṭhān invaders in the 12th century; (6) Tughlaqābād, built by Muhammad bin Tughlaq (*c.* 1320). Modern Delhi, or Shāhjahānābād, named after the Emperor Shāhjahān (1628–58), may be said to date from about 1650, the famous palace being first erected (1638–48), and forming the nucleus of the new city. The cities thus enumerated contain a vast variety of architectural remains, some of the greatest interest and beauty. Here it is possible to name only a few of those most closely connected with the religious beliefs of the successive occupants of this historic site.

In the first place, Delhī contains two of the famous inscribed pillars of the Emperor Aśoka (*q.v.*), erected about 250 B.C. The inscriptions contain the code of moral and religious precepts promulgated by this great ruler. These pillars, one of which stands on the historic ridge, the other in the ruined city of Fīrozābād, were removed to Delhī in A.D. 1356 by Fīroz Shāh Tughlaq, the former from Meerut in the United Provinces, the other from Toprā in the Umballā district of the Panjāb. The pillar on the ridge was much injured by an explosion early in the 18th cent.; that at Fīrozābād is in an excellent state of preservation, and is the most interesting of all the Aśoka pillars, inasmuch as it is the only one on which the invaluable Seventh Edict is inscribed. Another interesting Hindu relic is the iron pillar which stands near the Kutab Minār in Old Delhī. It was erected by a certain Rājā Chandra, and may be dated approximately A.D. 400. It is a marvellous example of the skill attained by the Hindu metallurgists of the time. Close by, the mosque of Qutb-ud-dīn was rebuilt out of the materials of one or more Jain temples. One cloister, with rows of finely carved pillars, remains in good preservation. The innermost court of this mosque, with its corridors and west end, was built in A.D. 1191, and the screen of arches, the glory of the building, was erected six years later. The splendid tower, the Qutb or Kutab Minār, named after its founder, was completed by Shams-ud-dīn Altamsh (1211–36), who also extended the great mosque. Much controversy has arisen regarding the purpose for which this tower was erected. Fergusson (p. 506) denies that it has any connexion with the great mosque at the south-east corner of which it stands. According to him,

'it was not designed as a place from which the mueddin should call the prayers, though its lower gallery may have been used for that purpose also, but as a tower of victory,—a Jaya Stambha, in fact,—an emblem of conquest, which the Hindus could only too easily understand and appreciate.' This view appears to be mistaken.

Cunningham (*Archæological Reports*, iv. p. ix) shows that it is distinctly called a *mazanah*, or muaẕẕin's tower, by the Syrian geographer Abulfida (A.D. 1273–1345), and he cites several examples of early mosques which have but one *minār* each. The inscriptions also prove that this was the purpose of its erection.

The lovely Alāī Darwāza, or gate of Alā, was built by Alā-ud-dīn Khiljī (1295–1315). Close by is the beautiful tomb of Shams-ud-dīn.

'Though small,' writes Fergusson, 'it is one of the richest examples of Hindu art applied to Mahomedan purposes that Old Delhi affords, and is extremely beautiful, though the builders still display a certain inaptness in fitting the details to their new purposes. . . . In addition to the beauty of its details, it is interesting as being the oldest tomb known to exist in India. He [Shams-ud-din] died A.D. 1236.'

Among the other interesting and beautiful mosques, of which Delhī possesses such a large number, the following may be mentioned: the Kālā or Kalān Masjid, built in Fīrozābād about A.D. 1380, is interesting as an example of the early so-called Paṭhān style. The façade of the mosque of Sher Shāh in the Purāna Qila is, says Fanshawe (p. 228), 'quite the most striking bit of coloured decoration at Delhi, and has been satisfactorily restored. . . . The interior is extremely fine, the pattern in the pendentives below the dome being very effective.' 'The Jāmi' Masjid, or cathedral mosque of Shāhjahān, built in 1648–50, is,' says Fergusson (p. 600), 'not unlike, in plan, the Motī Masjid of Agra (*q.v.*), though built on a much larger scale, and adorned with two noble minarets, which are wanting in the Agra example; while, from the somewhat capricious admixture of red sandstone with white marble, it is far from possessing the same elegance and purity of effect. It is, however, one of the few mosques, either in India or elsewhere, that are designed to produce a pleasing effect externally.' This great mosque, built close to the palace, seems to have rendered it unnecessary to erect a private court chapel within its walls. When a Motī Masjid was added by Aurangzīb, the building was small, and, though pretty, quite unworthy of the place, and illustrates the rapid decadence of Muhammadan ecclesiastical architecture after the time of Shāhjahān.

Delhī is equally rich in the number and variety of its sepulchres. Humāyūn, the second Mughal Emperor, lies in a stately tomb. 'In mere beauty,' says Fanshawe (p. 230), 'it cannot, of course, compare with the Tāj at Agra, but there is an effect of strength about it which becomes the last resting-place of a Moghul warrior whose life was marked by many struggles and vicissitudes; and most people will probably prefer its greater simplicity to either the son's [Akbar's] tomb at Sikandra, near Agra, or the grandson's [Jahāngīr's] tomb at Shadara, near Lahore.' The *dargāh*, or shrine, of Shaikh Nizām-ud-dīn Auliya and the other Chishtī shrines at Ajmīr, the Kutab and Pakpattan, are the places most revered in all India by Muhammadans. His story is fully given by Fanshawe (p. 236), who believes that there is no ground for the popular legend which attributes the origin of Thuggee to him. He died at Delhī in A.D. 1324, and the buildings—the gate of which bears the date 1378—are mostly due to the Emperor Fīroz Shāh Tughlaq. Round the resting-place of the saint are many beautiful and interesting monuments. That of Jahānārā Begam, the faithful daughter of the Emperor Shāhjahān, bears the touching epitaph: 'Let green grass only conceal my grave; grass is the best covering of the grave of the meek.' Close by is the tomb of the unfortunate Emperor Muhammad Shāh, who died in 1748, in whose time Delhī was captured and sacked by the ruthless Persian, Nādir Shāh. If not a triumph of design, its beautiful pierced marble screens are admirable. Near these are the earlier tombs of the poet Amīr Khusrū, who died in 1324, and of the historian Khondamīr—the latter not being now identifiable.

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DELIBERATION.—Deliberation is a complex mental state, preceding, and issuing in, choice or decision. It is a fundamental characteristic of personal consciousness, due to the fact that a mind furnished with experience is generally confronted with alternative possibilities. There is in the child a long and interesting genetic period before full-blown deliberation is born. This early dawning stage, before self-consciousness has arrived, and while the processes of decision are below the ideational level, has been called 'deliberative suggestion.' While life is still on the organic and impulsive level, co-ordinate sense-stimuli confront one another, and there is a corresponding conflict of motor-reactions.

Baldwin, in his *Mental Development* (p. 127), gives a good example of this primitive type of deliberation. A child of eight months, under his observation, formed the habit of scratching the face of its mother or nurse with its finger-nails, until, as a result, the close proximity of any face was a sufficient suggestion for it to give a violent scratch. To break the habit, the child's father slapped its fingers each time it scratched, and after a few experiences the habitual reaction was checked. When a face approached the child, it would grow solemn and quiet, and gaze at the face, hardly moving a muscle; then, after a trying period of balance, it would either suddenly scratch or turn away to something which its father provided as a counter-attraction.

Out of this organic and neural stage the higher, full-grown type of deliberation evolves. These instinctive and impulsive motor processes, with their corresponding emotional tones, are gradually registered in consciousness and furnish the basic memory-material for *real* deliberation. The alternatives now in conflict are more or less clearly envisaged, and in turn occupy the centre of the mental stage, until one alternative dominates attention and is selected, though throughout life conscious deliberation is only rarely necessary. Organized, *i.e.* habitual, reactions determine a very large part of our choices, and, though we often delay action because of inhibitory tendencies, such delay is not necessarily deliberation. Much of our deliberation, again, does not rise to a clear cognition of alternative ends. Blurred images, fitful feelings, disconnected words, or a system of mental 'labels,' often stand for the act of deliberation, and we oscillate from one alternative to the other without a clear forecast of the grounds at issue, or the ends in view. Moreover, we are often relieved of the necessity to deliberate by the dynamic character of ideas. Many of the acts of a normal person are ideo-motor, that is to say, the idea itself is propulsive enough to sweep directly and unhindered into action. All ideas would thus produce action (1) if they were sufficiently propulsive, and (2) if they did not meet conflicting situations in the mind. It is this complex conflict of ideas, of reasons, of motives, of practical means, that forces deliberation upon us.

The inhibitory situation which blocks impulsive tendencies or ideo-motor action, and which involves indecision and deliberation, may be, and often is, the marginal, or fringe, consciousness that forms the background to the idea in full focus. We cannot *tell* why we do not act upon the idea which points us towards any end. We feel an indescribable restraint that checks our impulses and holds us from action. As W. James puts it:

> 'No matter how sharp the foreground-reasons may be, or how imminently close to bursting through the dam and carrying the motor consequences their own way, the background, however dimly felt, is always there; and its presence . . . serves as an effective check upon the irrevocable discharge' (*Princ. of Psychology*, ii. 529).

The period of hesitation, balance, or deliberation may be indefinitely prolonged; but usually, by processes which are largely sub-conscious, the 'reasons' for one alternative over the other, or for one possibility over the others, come into clearer focus, stay fixed in attention, and plainly dominate; and the mind settles into a decision.

The moral significance of this inward balance, this weighing of alternatives, is obvious. All higher ethical behaviour has its rise here. The person who *deliberates* is no longer at the mercy of the solicitation of instinct, impulse, or a sudden thought; for all these motor tendencies are now forced to run the gauntlet of well-organized inhibitions. Each idea must dominate, if it is to dominate at all, by finding its place in the complex whole of a formed consciousness by adjusting itself to the ground-swell of a fashioned character.

A genuine moral decision, a self-determined action, is arrived at only when the permanent core of the self has found expression; and that is ordinarily reached through serious reflexion and exhausting inner struggle, which is *deliberation* in its deepest significance.

LITERATURE.—J. M. Baldwin, *Mental Development*, New York, 1895, also *Feeling and Will*, do. 1895; H. Höffding, *Outlines of Psychology*, Eng. tr., London, 1892; G. Spiller, *The Mind of Man*, do. 1902; A. Bain, *Emotions and Will*, do. 1859 (³1889); J. Sully, *Human Mind*, do. 1892; W. James, *Principles of Psychology*, New York, 2 vols., 1891 (²1905), also *Psychology* (a briefer course), do. 1892.

RUFUS M. JONES.

DELICT.—Considerable difficulty exists in regard to the definition of the term 'delict' in Roman law and in systems of modern law founded on the Roman. The difficulties are not so great, however, as those which attach to the definition of 'tort,' the term which, on the whole, corresponds to it in English law. English lawyers have failed to produce a perfectly satisfactory definition of the latter term, and it is probable that it really represents, as Markby (*Elements of Law*, p. 347) says, a false

classification. Usage, due to historical accident and variety of jurisdiction, has excluded from the English term cases which in principle fall under it. The definition of 'delict' in General Jurisprudence ought to give the essential principle underlying the technicalities of particular legal systems.

Moyle (*Justiniani Institutiones*, lib. iv. pt. 1, note) says: 'A delict is usually defined as a violation of a *jus in rem* which generates an obligation remissible by the private individual who is wronged.' He finds fault with this definition, as admitting cases where the party injured is only entitled to recover damages. According to Moyle (*ib.*), true delicts possess three peculiarities: they give rise to independent obligations; they always involve *dolus* or *culpa*; and the remedies by which they are redressed are penal. Sohm (*Institutes*, Eng. tr.[2], 1901, p. 432), on the other hand, includes such non-penal actions under actions arising from delicts.

The above definition seeks to distinguish 'delict,' as generating an obligation remissible by the private individual, from 'crime.' This is to adopt Austin's distinction between civil and criminal injuries; for he holds that the distinction consists in a mere difference of procedure, viz. whether the offence is pursued at the discretion of the injured party or at that of the State (*Lectures on Jurisprudence*[5], p. 405). Blackstone (iv. 5), followed by Holland (*Elements of Jurisprudence*[10], p. 320), regards the distinction as turning on whether the wrong is one against individuals as individuals, or affects the whole community as a community. Again, some have regarded the very circumstance whether mere redress is given for loss suffered, or whether, on the other hand, a penalty is inflicted for wrong done, as the distinguishing feature between civil and criminal injuries. If the latter line of distinction be adopted, what Moyle considers an essential of all delicts would become the distinguishing characteristic of crimes as contrasted with delicts.

In English law, wrongs to property to which no ethical censure attaches are included among 'torts.' Pollock (*Law of Torts*[8], p. 18), in order to maintain intact the features of *dolus* ('wrongful intention') or *culpa* ('negligence'), and consequent penal culpability, as essential ingredients in those torts that are delicts, regards the torts from which these features are absent as obligations arising, not *ex delicto*, but *quasi ex delicto*. This leads to the distinction between delicts and *quasi*-delicts. By some there is said to be no distinction in principle, delicts being those wrongs which were made actionable by the old civil law of Rome, *quasi*-delicts those which were made actionable by the legislation of the prætor. If, however, we take the instances given in the *Institutes of Justinian*,—a judge who, corruptly or through ignorance of law, has made a suit his own, and an innkeeper who is responsible for the loss of property of his guests,—we see a distinction perfectly analogous to that between contracts and *quasi*-contracts. As in some cases the law establishes a tie or obligation between the parties, the same as would have existed had there been a contract between them, so, in other cases, it establishes an obligation similar to that which would have arisen, had a delict been committed. The point of difference between a contract and a *quasi*-contract is that one is formed voluntarily by the person bound, the other is formed involuntarily. In like manner, in the case of a delict, there is voluntary action—action from which it is possible to abstain; in the case of a *quasi*-delict, the obligation arises from an act or position in regard to which the person bound has had no option. The judge must decide the suit. The innkeeper is bound by the act of the thief. There may or may not be *dolus* or *culpa*. It is true that, in the case of the corruptly decided suit, a volitional element is present. The involuntary element arises from the law which forces on the judge the position of having to decide the suit. Yet this very case shows that *dolus* or *culpa* may be present in *quasi*-delicts. If this is the true point of distinction between delict and *quasi*-delict, it justifies the profound comment of Austin (styled by Pollock [*op. cit.* p. 18] 'perverse and unintelligent criticism'), which implies that there is no essential distinction from the point of view of legal classification between *quasi*-contract and *quasi*-delict (Austin, *op. cit.* p. 914). The only possible distinction must be that stated by Austin: that, in the one, the obligation arises from services rendered; in the other, from wrong done or services omitted.

LITERATURE.—*Institutes of Justinian*, Sandars' or Moyle's ed.; J. Austin, *Lectures on Jurisprudence*[5], London, 1863; T. E. Holland, *Elements of Jurisprudence*[10], Oxford, 1906; W. Markby, *Elements of Law*[3], do. 1885; F. Pollock, *Law of Torts*[8], London, 1907; A. Underhill, *Law of Torts*[8], do. 1905.

GEORGE J. STOKES.

DELOS.—See AMPHICTYONY.

DELPHI.—See AMPHICTYONY, ORACLES (Gr.).

DELUGE.—**I. Meaning of the term.**—The word 'Deluge' (Lat. *diluvium*, Fr. *déluge*, 'a great flood') has been very generally used to denote the Bible Flood (Heb. מַבּוּל) recorded in Gn 6–9[17]. It is commonly understood to imply that the Noachian Flood, as the narrative naturally suggests, covered the surface of the whole world, and that all men and all terrestrial animals perished, excepting those providentially saved in the Ark (see esp. 6[7. 13] 7[21-23] 9[15]).

II. Supposed confirmation of the Bible Deluge.—So considered, the Deluge formed, it was once believed, a very important epoch in the world's history.

1. Attention was called to the marked difference between the extinct species of animals which lived before the Deluge, and whose fossil remains are found in various geological strata, and those in existence at the present day; nor does it seem always to have been realized that this distinction is in itself an argument against the literal truth of the Bible narrative, according to which all species of animals should have survived, or God's purpose must have failed.

2. A more cogent proof of the general truth of the Bible story seemed to lie in the fact that Deluge stories, or stories in which a great Flood forms a more or less prominent part, are remarkably frequent in the folklore of the ancient literature of peoples scattered over the greater part of the world. It has been confidently argued that these all originated in the great universal Deluge, of which they were more or less obscure traditions handed down from their ancestors—Shem, Ham, and Japheth. Moreover, special stress was laid on the extraordinary accuracy with which the memory of certain details had in some cases been preserved (see below, IV. *A.* v.).

III. Reasons for not accepting a universal Deluge.—The belief in a universal Deluge has long been abandoned by well-informed writers.

1. It was found impossible thus to account satisfactorily for the various races of mankind and their distribution. Ethnological research suggested the existence of races altogether independent of the Bible system, who survived the Flood and were themselves descended from a pre-Adamite stock (see ANTEDILUVIANS).

2. But the most fatal objections are those that arise from a study of the natural sciences.

(*a*) Geology, as now understood, gives a very simple and credible account of the history of the world by natural agencies—shrinkage, gradual sinkings and upheavals, deposits by action of animalculæ and otherwise, the action of heat, water, and ice, etc., in which a Deluge finds no place. It is, in fact, absolutely

impossible, unless we may postulate a period in which the surface of the earth was so even that all the water possible at any given time could have covered it as one vast ocean. But even if this ever were so, such a Deluge would find its analogue, not in the Bible Flood, but in the 'deep' (*tĕhôm*) of Gn 1[2].

(*b*) The study of comparative Zoology has abundantly proved that there is no definitely marked division between extinct species of animals and those of the present day which could be accounted for by such a break in the history of the animal world. In fact, the extinct species, as, *e.g.*, the trilobite, ammonite, and ichthyosaurus, had died out countless ages before man appeared on the earth, and by the operation of natural laws which still prevail.

(*c*) The same also is true of plant life and its history. And in this connexion it may be observed that the Bible story, in contradistinction to the Akkadian (see below, IV. *A*. vi. (*m*)), says nothing of the preservation of vegetation, the greater part of which must have perished had the Flood lasted a year.

3. To the unscientific mind, however, the most striking difficulties are those which arise from the obvious improbabilities, or rather impossibilities, of the story of Genesis itself.

Most of us have from childhood, through the influence of pictures and toy-arks, been accustomed to imagine Noah's Ark as a great vessel with a huge raised hold in the middle. But there is nothing in the Hebrew תֵּבָה or in the Bible narrative to suggest anything of the kind. The Ark was rather a huge box with a closed door and dark windows, which had to be opened for its inmates to look out. There were no sails or oars, no sailors to navigate this strange structure or tell Noah what he wished to know. The box, nevertheless, floated safely across what one would naturally have supposed a stormy sea (see Gn 7[11], and cf. Akkadian story [V. *A*. i.]), and that for presumably some hundreds of miles to the mountains of Armenia (Ararat). Large as this box was, it was infinitely too small to contain sevens of all clean animals, and pairs of unclean animals, *as we now know them*. But this is what the story requires, unless we are to suppose—a thing highly improbable in itself, and opposed to geological records—that there has been a very large evolution of species since that, geologically speaking, recent period. These animals, thus huddled up together, are tended and preserved for apparently a whole year with necessarily huge supplies of food of various kinds—animal and vegetable. In a word, four men and four women were able to do, under such conditions, without, it would seem, the slightest difficulty, what taxes the utmost skill and ingenuity of zoologists with such space and under such conditions as are possible in our Zoological Gardens. Imagine, for example, the hippopotamus or the seal a whole year without water, or the polar bear cooped up for a single year in the vitiated atmosphere of a 'room' in the Ark! But even these difficulties are hardly so bewildering to the imagination as those connected with collecting the animals and getting them into the Ark. If we attempt to realize the journeys necessary to the Tropics and the Arctic regions, to islands and continents, to marshes and mountains and seas, the difficulty of capturing all these animals alive, bringing them back and getting them into the Ark, we are forced to the conclusion that it was absolutely impossible, except by a series of miracles, of which the story in the Bible gives no hint. The whole is narrated in a simple childlike way by those who evidently did not see the difficulties, and obviously could not have seen them then as we see them now.

4. A further ground for not accepting as literally true the Bible Deluge story will be found by comparing it with parallel stories of similar origin which will presently be discussed. It will be sufficient to observe here that diverging accounts of any supposed event tend of themselves to cast suspicion on any one of them, unless that is obviously the source of the rest, which certainly cannot be proved of the Bible story.

5. To these difficulties may be added, in conclusion, the general difficulties in accepting as historically and literally true the early chapters of Genesis, of which the Deluge story forms a part. One who on scientific grounds rejects the literal truth of Gn 1, or on mythological grounds that of Gn 2. 3, would very naturally feel some hesitation in accepting the Deluge story, even if it presented no serious difficulties of its own.

IV. **Explanations of Deluge stories discussed.**—But, if such a Deluge as that described in the Bible is impossible, at least without a series of improbable miracles, how else explain the prevalence of that belief among so many and so far-separated peoples? An attempt to answer this question will form the chief subject of this article. It involves a complicated inquiry. The Deluge, or Flood, stories in question vary so greatly that a really adequate discussion would carry us beyond our necessary limits. The reader will grasp the full force of the arguments given only if he studies for himself the stories as given by Andree and in other sources here referred to. The course now proposed is first to give the answers which have already been suggested, with such illustrations and comments as may help the student towards a satisfactory solution, and then to discuss separately some of the more important stories or groups of stories on mainly ethnological or geographical lines.

Speaking generally, then, the following five explanations have been given of the prevalence of Deluge, or Flood, stories among different races of mankind: that they are (*A*) traditions of the Bible Deluge; (*B*) traditions of independent, generally local, floods of greater or less extent; (*C*) pseudo-scientific explanations of natural phenomena or the like; (*D*) parts of cosmological systems; (*E*) Nature myths. In point of fact, comparatively few writers have adopted any one of these theories exclusively. Cheyne, for example, in his article 'Deluge,' in *EBr*[9], made a marked distinction between a Deluge proper—a supposed submersion of the whole world—and partial floods, which may have given rise to Deluge stories. Certainly few, whatever general theory of Deluge stories they may hold, would fail to recognize that the Chinese story, at any rate, is based on the tradition of a local flood.

A. The traditional origin of Deluge stories.—Is the belief that the many and various Deluge stories of different parts of the world had their common origin in the Flood described in the Bible, borne out by the stories themselves *in detail* and by what we may reasonably infer as to their history?

i. Andree lays special stress on the fact that there are many parts of the world where no Deluge story has yet been discovered, such as Egypt and Japan. There are others, such as Africa, where they are very rare. It is therefore, so far as our present knowledge goes, an exaggeration to say, with some writers, that the tradition of a Deluge of some sort is practically universal, or even, as Lenormant maintained (*Orig.* i. 489), among all except black races. On the other hand, it must frankly be recognized that Flood stories are very numerous, and that they are found among nations scattered far and wide over the world.

ii. Exceptions must be made of a large number of stories which have evidently a local origin.

iii. Account must be taken of the influence of missionaries in unconsciously, or even consciously, changing and developing folklore, and of the difficulty which the savage mind has in distinguishing clearly between old and new, and its frequent tendency to paint the old in new colours. It was the avowed policy of many missionaries to make Bible stories more acceptable by combining them with ideas with which their converts were already familiar. Moreover, the missionary, through whom the Deluge stories were in many cases originally communicated, was a prejudiced witness. He had a very natural wish to find confirmation of an event which he believed to be undeniably true, and which it seemed impiety to deny. No wonder if, without the least wish to deceive, he encouraged his heathen convert to give him the kind of information he desired, and, in reporting it, unconsciously assimilated it still more to the familiar Bible story. Andree (p. 111) has given an interesting example of the way in which natives were sometimes asked leading questions.

iv. That many of the Deluge stories current among uncivilized tribes were actually coloured by Christian influence becomes evident on examination of the stories themselves. For it will be found that—

(*a*) Those Biblical details on which so much stress is sometimes laid are often attached to a

story entirely unlike the Bible Deluge narrative, both in character and in purpose.

Thus the sending out of the raven and the dove by the old man who had found refuge from the Deluge in a boat on one of the Rocky Mountains (Déné Indians) is altogether meaningless, and yet, according to Petitot, it is almost exactly similar to the Bible incident, except that a fir-branch is substituted for the there unknown olive-branch. A still more interesting variation is found in a story as told by the South-American Macusi tribe, in which a rat sent out to investigate matters came back with an ear of maize in its mouth. Here the Biblical motive is combined with the common feature among Indian Deluge stories of sending out animals to *procure* land (see below, IV. *C.* (*a*)).

(*b*) The Deluge stories which thus resemble the Bible narrative in some of its details often betray their Biblical colouring by mixing up other familiar Bible stories, such as the creation of woman and the Tower of Babel.

When we read in the story of the Macusi just referred to that, when the Good Spirit created the first man, the latter fell into a deep sleep, and on waking up found a woman standing by his side, we are not surprised to hear the incident of the rat and the ear of maize. In a story of the Papagos, in Arizona, it is the hero of the Deluge, Montezuma, who, disregarding the warning of the Great Spirit, builds a house that should reach to heaven, which is destroyed before its completion by lightning from heaven. In the story of the Washo, a Californian tribe, the slaves are compelled by their masters to build a temple as a place of refuge from any future Flood. When a great earthquake with a terrible rain of fire occurs, and the temple sinks up to its dome in the Tahoe Lake, the masters clamber in vain on to its top, from whence they are hurled by the angry god. Andree remarks here that the building of the temple is evidently a modern feature alien to the customs of the tribe, and certainly a domed temple is not a very ancient feature. That the purpose of the temple is not worship, but escape from the Flood, would seem to suggest an early adaptation of the Tower of Babel story. It would thus be a parallel to the story of the neighbouring Papagos, and to that of the Mandans (see IV. *A.* vi. (*e*)).

(*c*) Speaking generally, what have the appearance of traits due to Christian influence are found most frequently in those countries where Christian influence has been longest at work, especially on the American continent.

v. The argument from Biblical details in Flood stories is in any case hazardous, as it proves too much. We find details not given in the Bible narrative also repeating themselves in a most remarkable way in the legends of localities far removed from each other.

(1) The boat or raft of safety is frequently described as moored by a rope. A new element is sometimes introduced by some of the ropes not being long enough and the occupants of the boats being drowned (Finns [Lenormant, *Origines*, i. 455]). In one form of a legend of the Pelew Islanders, such was the fate even of the one surviving old woman, until the oldest of the gods in pity revived her. (2) Again, the Greek story of Deukalion and Pyrrha and the stones has an exact analogy in the story of the Maipuri, in which the coco-nuts thrown by the man over his head become men, those thrown by the woman, women. In the legend of other tribes on the Orinoco, as also of the Macusi, stones were thrown by the surviving man. In a Lithuanian story a rainbow was sent to the old couple to comfort them, and to advise them, if they would have offspring, to leap over 'the bones of the earth.' (3) The miraculous growth of the fish, a conspicuous feature of the Indian legend (see V. *D.* i.), has its counterpart in the cuttle-fish of the Thlinkits, which grew so large as to fill the whole house.

It is by no means easy to say how far features of this kind are actually borrowed from other stories, and how far they are the result of imagination and reason acting in similar fashion on different peoples. There is certainly no difficulty in supposing that the tying of the boat was introduced as the most natural thing for the survivors to do. On the other hand, the enigmatical phrase 'bones of the earth' combined with the consolation of the rainbow (Lithuanians), and a similar combination of the stones story with the rat and the maize-ear (Macusi, see above, IV. *A.* iv. (*a*)), suggest that both elements in either case were due originally to the influence of Christian teachers. We can readily understand how well-educated missionaries might, in drawing attention to the prevalence of Deluge stories, have instanced that of Deukalion, and how such a picturesque incident might have found its way into a popular folk-tale.

vi. The extraordinary variety in every detail in the different Deluge stories makes it improbable that all originated from one traditional story, as will best be realized by taking what might be regarded as the normal type and pointing out some of the variations which we find. Thus: (*a*) some god or gods, angry with the Antediluvians (*b*) usually on some specific ground, (*c*) determine to send a Deluge, but (*d*) give warning of it to some one or more beings. (*e*) The latter, usually following Divine directions, construct some kind of boat or box, or adopt some other means of escape. (*f*) In this structure they preserve also the necessaries of life, including domestic animals, more rarely pairs of animals generally. (*g*) Shortly after, (*h*) by rain or other means, (*i*) comes a Deluge. (*j*) When the Deluge subsides, (*k*) they land on some mountain or island, and (*l*) sometimes offer a sacrifice. (*m*) Future descendants of men (and sometimes of animals also) are reproduced, often in a miraculous way. (*n*) The survivors (or the chief of them) are translated to heaven.

This imaginary norm, from which, or from something like it, all the stories might naturally be supposed to have come, is obtained by putting together the features which are most frequently found. No story, in fact, gives them all. Even the Bible story has no translation of Noah (but see ANTEDILUVIANS). The Greek legends have no post-diluvian sacrifice, and the Indian story in its earliest forms gives no reason at all for the Deluge. But, apart from such omissions, we find variations, under each head, of almost every conceivable kind.

(*a*) The Deluge, though almost always the work of some god, is occasionally, among the North American Indians, ascribed to a malignant being, as the Black Serpent (Algonquins), an eagle (Pimas), or a raven (Hare Indians).

(*b*) (1) The Deluge is a punishment for sin, not only in the Bible, but among the Pelew and Fiji and Society Islanders, the Algonquins, and some others. (2) More frequently it results from the resentment of a god for some act of violence or personal injury, such as, rather frequently, the refusal of hospitality (Greek Deukalion story) or the slaying of a favourite. Thus, according to a Greek Flood story preserved by Nonnus, it was sent to put out a conflagration caused by Zeus for the murder of Dionysos by the Titans (Usener, p. 42). In a story of the Fiji Islanders it is the anger of the god for the slaughter of his favourite bird. The Dayaks of Borneo attribute a great Flood to the destruction and cooking of a boa constrictor. With the Hare Indians (N. America) it is the raven who brings about the Deluge to punish the Wise Man for having thrown him into the fire, though, curiously enough, the raven escapes with him on the raft. Even more original is the cause of the Deluge as reported from the Leeward Islands. A fisherman who had been fishing in sacred waters caught the hair of the sea-god as the latter was having a nap (Ellis, *Polynesian Researches*, ii. 58). (3) In the Transylvanian Gipsy story it is the punishment for the disobedience of a woman in eating a forbidden fish—a motive which may have originated from the Bible story of the Fall. In both these last stories the Deluge appears singularly unreasonable. In the latter the woman herself, who is alone responsible for the crime, is slain by the first flash of lightning; in the former, more unfairly still, the fisherman, his wife, and, according to some versions of the story, a few friends, are alone allowed to escape.

(*c*) The warning of the Deluge is generally made by revelation, sometimes directly (Genesis), sometimes by another god than the author of the Deluge (Akkadian), often through the medium of some animal, as the fish, which a later form of the story regards as an incarnation of Viṣṇu (Indian), by a wounded dog (Cherokees), or by llamas to a shepherd (Peru). The last two cases seem to have arisen out of the observed faculty that some domestic animals have of foretelling rain. The motive of the Indian story seems connected with an ancient mythological conception, which attached a peculiar sanctity to the fish. In a story of the

Pimas a warning is given three times in vain by an eagle (himself the cause of the Flood) to a prophet (Bancroft, *NR* iii. 78).

(*d*) Those who are permitted to escape vary very largely. Frequently it is one person only, as the old man in the Gipsy story referred to above, the god's son Szeuka (Pimas, see Bancroft, iii. 78), one woman (Borneo), or frequently a man and his wife (Darjīling, Himālayas), a brother and sister (Kolarians, East India), or two pairs (Andamanese). Less frequently a few friends or relatives are also saved, as in the Bible and in the Leeward Islands stories, where, however, accounts differ. Rarely we find a considerable number, including slaves (Akkadian). In a highly original story of Kabadi, in New Guinea, all the men escape by getting up into the peak of a mountain and waiting till the Deluge has subsided. In other stories they are all destroyed, and the Deluge is followed by a new creation (Kashmīr). Especially was this the case where the purpose of the Deluge was the destruction of monsters (see ANTEDILUVIANS). In some American Indian stories it is an animal only that survives, such as the coyote (Wappo, etc., California); in a legend of the neighbouring Papagos, it is the coyote and the demi-god Montezuma, while the Thlinkits make the raven and his mother the sole survivors.

(*e*) While by far the most usual means of escape is by one or more boats or rafts, there are a few legends outside the Bible story in which a larger or smaller box or ark serves the purpose, as with the Banar of Cambodia and in some forms of the Greek Deukalion legend. Possibly this is the origin of the so-called 'Big Canoe,' a sort of sacred tub, which forms the centre of extremely curious ceremonies among the N. American Mandans, which are certainly connected with some old Deluge story (see G. Catlin, *O-Kee-pa*, London, 1866). Very frequently the refugees escape to a mountain, either by means of a boat or directly, and some very curious and graphic accounts are given of the straits to which the survivors were reduced, as the water came higher and higher.

Thus in a legend of the Ojibwas, Manabozho, when the waters have reached the mountain peak, gets up into the topmost branch of a fir-tree, where the waters gradually rise to his mouth, in which position he has to wait five days before he discovers a means of safety. In another story the survivors escape from the mountain peak in a coco-nut shell thrown down casually by a god as he was feasting (Lithuanians); and in yet another it is by a canoe which the survivor makes out of a piece of the sky (Sac and Fox Indians). In not a few stories the survivors escape by simply climbing up into a fruit-tree (Karens in Burma, Tupi in Brazil, Acawaios in British Guiana), or, more curiously still, by sheltering under a tree (Mundāri of East India). In some Peruvian stories the mountain of refuge itself floats on the Deluge like a boat. Caves are, singularly enough, the place of refuge in a legend of the Mexican Cholula and of the Arawaks of British Guiana, and the hole of a monster land-crab serves the purpose in the story of the Uraus, a tribe of the Kolarian Indians. From a translation of a very remarkable bark pictograph of a tribe of the Algonquins, it would appear that the place of refuge was a turtle's back, which became identified with an island. But quaintest of all is the story of the Crees, in which the one surviving girl saves herself by catching hold of the foot of an eagle, which carries her to the top of a lofty mountain. In the Thlinkit story the raven and his mother escape in the skins of cranes; in that of the Papagos the coyote saves himself in a bamboo sealed with resin.

(*f*) Speaking generally, food for the future is provided in one of two ways, either by the survivors taking it with them, as in the Bible story, or by its being produced in some marvellous way afterwards. The preservation of animals, apart from their use for food and sacrifice, is very rare, not being found even in the Akkadian version, and is probably derived from the Bible story. Food is miraculously brought to the surviving brothers by two primeval parrots in a Peruvian story (cf. Elijah and the ravens); in another the survivors feed on fish, which they warm under their arm-pits (Tolowa in California).

(*g*) The Deluge in many stories comes without warning, as, it would appear, the necessary consequence of crime, *e.g.* the cooking of the fish and the serpent respectively in the Gipsy and Dayak stories already referred to. More frequently it is after a short interval of a day or so, not foretold beforehand. The 7th day of the Bible (Gn $7^{4.\ 10}$), and probably of the Akkadian story also, has its parallel in a late version of the Indian story (see below, V. *D*. i. (3)).

(*h*) The physical causes to which the Deluge is assigned in different legends are numerous. Naturally enough it is generally rain, often with thunder and lightning. In a Sac and Fox Indian story the rain is said to have fallen in drops as large as a wigwam. Less frequently it is the incursion of a wave (Washo, California), or the pouring in of the water of the sea on to the land (Makah Indians of Cape Flattery). Sometimes it is the sudden melting of the winter snow, as when a mouse gnawed through the bag containing the heat and let it out (Chippewas). Sometimes the cause ascribed is very fantastic. A man accidentally lets fall and breaks the jar containing the water of the ocean which he had picked up out of curiosity (Haiti), and it is the same motive, with the same fatal consequences, that tempts the ape to remove the mat which covered the waters in a hollow tree through which they communicated with the ocean (Acawaios).

(*i*) In a Finnish story the Deluge is of hot water. According to a legend of the Quiché Indians, a deluge of resin followed one of water, and in some cases fire may be said to take the place of water, the conflagration story being in many respects analogous to the more usual deluge of water (Yuracarés of Bolivia, Mundāri of East India; cf. artt. AGES OF THE WORLD).

In extent the Deluge varies from an obviously local flood to a universal deluge. Very frequently everything is covered except a few lofty ranges such as the Rocky Mountains (Déné Indians). In one Australian legend the low island of refuge alone remained uncovered, when the lofty mountain on the mainland, on which the people had taken refuge, was submerged, this idea probably arising from a not uncommon notion that islands float.

(*j*) The duration of the Deluge is very seldom given, and, as the two Bible narratives differ both from one another and from the Akkadian (see below, V. *A*. i.), little importance need be attached to the fact that 40 days, in agreement with the Bible (J), is the duration of the Deluge according to some of the legends of the Polynesian Islands (see Max Müller in Preface to Gill's *Myths*). It is hardly likely that in all these centuries a single isolated detail should have been accurately preserved which had become obliterated in what were, *ex hypothesi*, comparatively early recollections of the fact.

(*k*) See under (*e*).

(*l*) This is an uncommon feature almost confined to the Semitic legends and some forms of the Deukalion story. In the most important Indian story the Deluge leads up to a very complicated and scarcely intelligible religious ceremony; but this belongs rather to the next head.

(*m*) The most striking example of this is the story of Deukalion and Pyrrha; but, as already pointed out (IV. *A*. v. (2)), it has its analogies and possibly its derivatives in a Lithuanian and in certain S. American Indian stories. A more remarkable proceeding is that of the surviving coyote, who, according to the Wappo Indians, planted feathers wherever the wigwams used to stand and they grew into men and women. A similar story is told by Bancroft (iii. 87) of some Californian tribes who relate that men were created

by the coyote and a feather which became an eagle. The Déné Indians sometimes asserted that the gods changed animals into men, but it is not explained where the animals came from. In a story of the Pimas Szeuka, the surviving son of a god, having slain the eagle which had caused the Deluge, restored to life those whom it had killed (Bancroft, iii. 78). The Indian post-diluvian rite was a complicated sacrificial ceremony by which Manu was apparently directed to produce both men and animals by an offering of clarified butter. But it is impossible here to distinguish primitive legend from later ritual and mystic accretions.

Where there is a single survivor, or only survivors of one sex, the re-peopling of the earth is frequently effected by union with some god or animal.

We have an example of the former in a story of the Pelew Islanders. In the story of the Crees the surviving maiden forms an alliance with the great eagle, through whom she has effected her escape. In a Peruvian story one of the surviving brothers seizes the parrot who has brought him food and she becomes his wife. In the Akkadian story the preservation of seed is almost a unique feature. The necessity of re-planting the earth, or at any rate of re-stocking it with cereals and vegetables, does not generally seem to have suggested itself.

(*n*) The apotheosis of the chief survivors is an important feature of the Babylonian story. There may possibly be a trace of it also in Gn 6[9] (P; cf. Gn 5[24]; see ANTEDILUVIANS).

If, then, the argument from the many existing Deluge stories were pressed, the most that it could with any reason be supposed to prove would be a purely colourless tradition of a Deluge or great Flood of some sort; but any such argument would have to be largely discounted, if not altogether neutralized, by facts to be considered under the next head.

B. Local inundations. — That this supposition will account for a very large number of Flood stories is obvious.

i. The Chinese Deluge story is merely an early tradition, though highly coloured, of such an inundation as has frequently taken place in the valley of the Hwang Ho (see V. *E.* ii., iii.).

ii. Such stories are especially frequent in volcanic districts subject to earthquakes and seismic waves, as in the Prince of Wales Peninsula (Bering Strait), Cape Flattery (Washington), or the Tahoe Lake in California. In a legend connected with the last-named place the inundation is expressly ascribed to a monster wave which burst over the land. In the story of Cape Flattery, the prairie which was flooded was certainly once submarine, and has an alluvial deposit of about a foot, as Swan argues, who gave the story in *Smithsonian Contributions to Knowledge*, vol. xvi. (quoted by Eells in *Amer. Antiquarian*, i. 70–72). In northern districts the Deluge is sometimes assigned to the melting of the snow (*e.g.* Chippewas), and very probably originated in a reminiscence of an exceptional inundation from such a cause. The same may be said of the Deluge stories of island peoples. The experience of high tides occasioned by storms would naturally make an impression upon the active imagination of a savage race, and occasion, or at any rate give a certain colour to, stories of this kind. Such tides are the common nightmare of a child living by the sea; and the normal savage is like a clever child only half awake. A more potent cause might be found in the submergence or appearance of islands through volcanic action.

iii. That so many Deluge stories obviously originated in purely local events makes it highly probable that this is the true explanation of many others, where the local cause has been obscured as a tradition, has then become a legend, and has finally passed into a myth, the tendency of the imagination being towards making the story more and more wonderful. Thus, what was originally a local flood may become a universal Deluge, the surviving ancestors being a few single individuals out of the human race. What was quite natural is ascribed to the direct, and often quite miraculous, action of Divine Beings. How far any particular story can be thus explained must be considered on its own merits.

C. Explanations of natural phenomena.—How far did Deluge and Flood stories arise as a hypothetical explanation of observed facts or racial conditions?

(*a*) They often appear as a pseudo-scientific explanation of natural phenomena. The savage mind would naturally ask, How came the sea and land, mountains and valleys, and lakes and islands to be where they are and what they are? Whence differences of colour, language, and character? How came the fossils which are found upon the hills? To these questions they found an answer in the hypothesis of a great Deluge which left the fish turned into stone on the land (Eskimo [see Hall, *Life with the Esquimaux*, London, 1864, ii. 318], Leeward Islanders, Samoan Islanders); or formed a large lake (such as the Tahoe in California, or Dilolo Lake on the southern border of the Congo State); or caused men to seek refuge in distant lands, to divide and learn different languages (Twanas [Washington], Makah Indians of Cape Flattery, Thlinkits, Bella-Coolas); or left the red colouring on the Indians' skin (Crees). Sometimes the Deluge plays quite a subordinate part in a story which itself serves a different purpose.

A Deluge story of the Pelew Islanders is connected with a picturesque account of the origin of the red stripe on the head of the bird called the tariit (*Rallus pectoralis*). A Persian Deluge myth, among other motives, explains the saltness of the sea. In an interesting myth connected with Mangaia (Cook Islands), the general purpose of which is to explain the origin of the coco-nut, the Flood is merely required to bring up the eel, out of whom the coco-nut grew, to the door of the maiden Ina's hut, whose pious duty it was to slay him. In fact, there is another version of the same myth in which there is no Flood at all (Gill, *Myths*, v. 77–81). Gill, who was for 22 years a missionary in the Hervey Group, had specially favourable opportunities of collecting stories uninfluenced by Christian teaching, as he obtained them direct from Tereavai, the last priest of the god Tiaio, who took the double form of a shark and an eel. Incidentally also the Flood story given above accounts for the passage by which the water drains into the sea. In another legend, told by Gill, the chief object of the Flood was to put out the furnace in which Miru, the hag of the nether world, had designed to cook Ngaru. The Flood puts out the furnace and permits Ngaru to effect his escape.

It is very probable that to the same intelligent curiosity we must refer those many stories which seem to lead up to the origin of land, or at least of islands.

There is an old Indian legend according to which Viṣṇu in his *avatāra* as a boar brings up land from the bottom of the ocean (Muir, *Original Sanskrit Texts*, vol. i.[2] [Lond. 1873], chs. i. and vii.). With this we may compare the legend, that Rangi pulled up the island of Mangaia out of the nether world. But there are several apparently analogous stories among the American Indians connected with a Deluge which occurs as an event, not as a primordial condition. In such stories some animal, a duck or beaver or fish, more often a musk-rat, dives down for earth and brings it up between its feet or in its mouth (Sac and Fox Indians, Chippewas, Ojibwas). Some have compared the curious sequel to the sending out of birds by Xisuthros in the later Babylonian story. But there the clay on the feet of the birds is a proof of the re-appearance of ground, on which, though still wet, the birds could walk, and it is a far less poetical variant of the dove and the olive branch. It is very unlikely that, as Andree thinks, the sending out of animals in the American Indian stories has any connexion with that Bible incident. More probably it is an ancient myth accounting for the origin of land among an originally seafaring people, which has become mixed up with later inundation traditions of a more local character.

(*b*) It seems probable that in some cases, among island and coast-land peoples, the Deluge story originated in the tradition of the early migration of the people. In such cases the ocean is itself the Deluge, and the island or coast-land the home to which they escaped. In some such way the Binnas account for their settlement in the Malay Peninsula. How easily traditions of such a kind could

pass into myths may be seen in many of these Deluge stories, in which comparatively recent events have become interwoven with them.

Thus a Deluge myth of Western Australia is connected with a quarrel between 'black' and 'white' races, and can have originated or taken its present shape only after the first English settlements in the country. In a Deluge myth of the Papagos, the Great Spirit, unable otherwise to tame Montezuma's rebellious temper, sent an insect into the unknown land of the East to fetch the Spaniards, who destroyed Montezuma, and people no longer worshipped him as god. Here Montezuma, an Aztec ruler, who was actually killed by the Spaniards in 1520, has become the demi-god hero of an ancient Flood myth.

D. Deluge stories explained as part of a definite cosmological system.—This has been incidentally touched upon under the last head. Some of the Deluge myths might certainly be so explained, *e.g.* that of Viṣṇu in his *avatāra* as a boar bringing up land from the bottom of the ocean. But in such stories the ocean is not so much a Deluge as the primeval Deep (cf. תְּהוֹם, Gn 1[2]). As a rule, however, such conceptions are hardly of a kind to account for the general prevalence of Deluge stories. Moreover, the savage mind, at any rate, was essentially local and limited in its range, and comprised within its view very little beyond the horizon of its ordinary experience.

E. Deluge stories explained as Nature myths.—In this view some forms of the Deluge story, especially those of Palestine, Babylon, Greece, and India, are a mythical representation of some ordinary natural phenomenon of constant recurrence. Noah in his Ark is generally regarded by its exponents as a sun myth, but as regards the interpretation of the story there is a wide divergence of opinion.

1. Cheyne, for example (see art. 'Deluge,' in *EBr*[9]), following Schirren and Gerland, suggests that the Deluge has been transferred from the sky to the earth. So understood, the progress of Noah in the Ark, like that of Zeus in his chariot, is a mythical interpretation of the course of the sun. But this would imply an incredible twist of the primitive imagination.

2. Usener, on the other hand, who has written on the subject at very great length, makes the whole point of the myth lie in the *landing* of the Deluge hero, which represents the *rising* sun. He derives his argument partly from philology, but chiefly from comparative mythology. He explains Deukalion as 'the little Zeus'—a suitable name for the newborn sun, and he compares the many stories, such as those of Perseus and Oedipus, in which a child is thrown into the sea in a chest or otherwise, and whose landing gives rise to some cult, which he connects sometimes, rather curiously, with that of the sun. In fact, almost every legend which has for its theme any one traversing the sea in a marvellous manner, from Arion on his dolphin to the legend of Lucian's corpse, is made to serve his purpose. Usener finds developments of the same idea in fairy tales, Christian legends, and many myths and religious customs, coins, etc., representing the sun-god, be it Dionysus or Saturn, in a ship. Strangest of all are the illustrations drawn from the legend of St. Christopher bearing the Infant Christ, and even an ancient picture of Christ's baptism. He lays great stress on the fact that the season of Baptism was called *Epiphaneia*, an emblem of rising light, and even directs attention to the fact that the water is depicted as stormy, seeing in this the idea that the water was conceived as lifting up the Christ. Similarly the Deluge might be regarded as lifting up the sun-god in the Ark, preparatory to his landing, *i.e.* rising. Such arguments as these hardly need serious discussion.

F. General conclusion.—Speaking generally, the comparative study of Deluge legends tends to make it more and more evident that, while a very large proportion of them certainly arose originally out of local events, these have always been highly coloured, and not infrequently quite transformed, by the imagination, which among more uncivilized races saw all Nature teeming with conscious life in manifold forms. Either in conjunction with such traditions, or sometimes independently of them, Deluge stories arose out of an inquisitive creative imagination, which first sought to explain the natural wonders of the present by even greater wonders in the past, and by a process of repetition changed the guesses of an earlier into the traditions of a later age. Like all folklore, such stories have a living interest to the student of psychology, but are of far less importance in the comparative study of religion. It should be added that, though the common derivation of Deluge stories from the Bible Deluge can no longer be maintained, the Bible story and those related to it have had in various ways a wide and important influence upon a large number of them.

V. Groups of Deluge stories.—*A.* SEMITIC.—The Semitic Deluge story is found in three forms: (i.) that of the Akkadian tablets, (ii.) the Bible Deluge, and (iii.) the story as narrated by later Babylonian historians, esp. Berossus. It is now generally recognized by scholars of different schools that (i.) represents the most ancient form of the story, of which (iii.) is merely a variant, while (ii.) is a very different version of the old story adapted to an altogether different conception. The grounds on which this opinion is based are: (1) the belief that, though the date of the inscription upon the Akkadian tablets is probably about 660 B.C., it is a copy of a poem dating from at least 2000 B.C., as is confirmed by the mutilated fragment of another Babylonian Deluge story, discovered by Scheil at Abū Habbah (Sippara), the colophon of which points to a date for the inscription of 2250–2150 B.C. (see Ball, p. 43); (2) that the tablets belonged, roughly speaking, to the country from which the Israelitish people migrated; (3) that the story itself, in both its Biblical and Akkadian forms, is connected more nearly with the same region of the world than with Palestine (note the mountains of Nizir [Akkadian], Ararat [Bible]); (4) that the Akkadian story is based on the religious ideas of that country and the worship of the ancient gods of Babylonia, while that of Genesis is conceived in the spirit of the high morality and monotheism of the Jews.

i. THE AKKADIAN DELUGE STORY.—The Akkadian Deluge story, discovered by George Smith in 1872 among some monuments in the British Museum, was inscribed on the eleventh of twelve tablets, each containing one canto of an ancient epic poem. Each tablet is connected with a sign of the zodiac, and, as the eleventh is that corresponding to Aquarius, the Deluge story is particularly suitable.

The epic relates the adventures of a certain Gilgameš, who is frequently identified by scholars with the Nimrod of Genesis. In order to seek a remedy for sickness, he pays a visit to his ancestor Sîtnapišti (Nuhnapishtim [Ball]) at the mouth of the river Euphrates, and Ṣîtnapišti gives him an account of the Deluge and of his own translation, of which the following is an abstract:

The gods in Šurippak, even then an old city, determine to send a Deluge. Ea, the lord of wisdom, reveals their purpose to Ṣîtnapišti, and bids him build a ship of certain dimensions, there bring the seed of life, and launch it. Ṣîtnapišti carries out these instructions, building it 120 cubits (?) high, of six storeys, and divided into seven parts, pouring over it several measures of 'pitch' both inside and out, and providing it with oars. Having celebrated a great sacrificial feast with oxen and sheep, beer, wine, oil, and grapes, he brings into the Ark stores of gold and silver, beasts of the field, man-servants and maid-servants, and the sons of his people ('all the craftsmen' [Ball]). Having done so, Ṣîtnapišti is bidden to enter and shut the door, and to await the Deluge that night. He appoints Buzur-sadi-rabi (Smith and Sayce ['Buzur bel,' Haupt and Ball]) his pilot, and waits in dread for the storm, which bursts forth next morning. The description of the storm and the consternation of the gods are thus graphically and forcibly described (87–111):

'When the first light of dawn appeared,
There arose from the fountain of heaven a black cloud;
Rimmon in the heart of it thunders, and
Nebo and Merodach march before;
The Throne-bearers march o'er mountain and plain.
The mighty Dibbarra (or Girra) wrenches away the helm;

Ninib goes on pouring out ruin.
The Anunnaki (earth-spirits) lifted torches;
With their sheen they lighten the world.
Rimmon's violence reacheth to heaven;
Whatever is bright he turneth to darkness.
. . . . .
One day the Southern blast . . .
Hard it blew, and . . .

Like a battle-charge upon mankind rush [the waters].
One no longer sees another;
No more are men discerned in (descried from) heaven.
The gods were dismayed at the flood, and
Sought refuge in ascending to highest heaven (*lit.* the heaven of Anu);
The gods cowered like dogs; on the battlements [of heaven] they crouched.
Ishtar screams like a woman in travail,
The loud-voiced Lady of the gods exclaims:
"Yon generation is turned again to clay!
As I in the assembly of the gods foretold the evil.
A tempest for the destruction of my people I foretold.
But I will give birth to my people [again], though
Like fry of fishes they fill the sea."
The gods, because of the Anunnaki wept with her;
The gods were downcast, they sate a-weeping;
Closed were their lips' (Ball, p. 38 f.).

For 6 days and nights the storm rages, and abates on the 7th, when the waters begin to subside. Ṣîtnapišti weeps at the sight of the corpses; he opens the window, however, and discovers distant land. Thither the ship steers, and grounds on Mt. Nizir. Here, after another 7 days' interval, Ṣîtnapišti sends forth a dove, which finds no resting-place, and returns. He then sends forth a swallow, which finds no resting-place, and returns; then a raven, which, when it sees that the waters have subsided, returns not. He then sends forth the animals to the four winds of heaven, builds an altar, and offers sacrifices with libations of wine, at which the gods collect like flies (?), while the great goddess Ištar lights up the mighty bow (?).[1] The account goes on to describe how, when Bel sees the ship, he is filled with anger, and commands the gods that no one shall come forth alive. Ea expostulates with him for having caused a Deluge, and suggests in future other punishments, such as wild beasts, famine, or plague. He declares that he did not reveal the counsel of the gods, but only sent a dream to Atraḫasis. His pleas are so successful that Bel takes Ṣîtnapišti's hands, and blesses him *and his wife*, and bids them be as gods, and dwell at the mouth of the rivers.

Unfortunately, there are a large number of *lacunæ*, and in many other passages the language is very obscure; but the above may be taken as fairly representing the general drift.

There can be little doubt that the text as we have it is composite (see Sayce, *Higher Crit. and Mon.* ch. iii.). The Deluge is ascribed first to the gods of Šurippak collectively, then to the sun-god (Šamaš), and, lastly, exclusively to Bel. The hero of the Deluge is twice called Atraḫasis instead of Ṣîtnapišti. Moreover, a double version of Ea's warning speech is given, and, lastly, Bel's counsel to stop Ṣîtnapišti, etc., from leaving the ship is clearly out of place after the sacrifice just recorded. However precarious it may be, and indeed unnecessary, to attempt an exact analysis of the whole, it is of some importance to realize that the Deluge story was a popular one, and even in Babylon was told in various ways. We have at least evidence of one story in which Ṣîtnapišti is presumably the hero, ending in the sacrificial thank-offering, and another in which, after a quarrel among the gods, the hero Atraḫasis is translated. In addition to the Akkadian Epic here given, a few other fragments have been found containing more or less divergent versions of the same story. The most important of these—that discovered by Scheil, already referred to—consists of 37 lines. It represents some god as calling upon Rammân to bring a flood on the earth, and Ea as interposing to save Atraḫasis (see Driver, *Genesis, in loco*; Ball, p. 43).

Before passing on to consider the Bible Deluge, we must call attention to a few points in the Akkadian story. (1) The recurrence of periods of seven days' duration. The preparations appear to have taken 7 days (cf. Gn 7^4 [J]), the ship being completed on the 5th, and 2 days more being required for the sacrifice and embarkation. The storm itself lasted 7 days, and there was another interval of 7 days, while the Deluge was abating, before sending out the birds, which were sent out consecutively, apparently on the 7th day, or, at any rate, at no great interval (cf. the story of Berossus, 'after some days').—(2) The dimensions of the ship are uncertain. There are *lacunæ* in the inscription where the directions are first given, but, at any rate, the height and breadth are the same. In describing the actual building of the ship, the height (and, therefore, the breadth also) is 10 *sars* (120 cubits [Sayce, Hommel]), but the length is not given. It was, therefore, enormously larger than the Bible Ark—4 times the height and over twice the breadth (cf. Gn 6^{15} [P]).—(3) Those saved in the ship included Ṣîtnapišti, his wife and slaves (male and female), and the pilot and all his people; but the mention of other relatives is at least doubtful.—(4) Most important of all: Atraḫasis and his wife (but no others) are translated.

ii. THE BIBLE DELUGE STORY.—1. *Analysis.*—The Bible Deluge story, like the Akkadian, is certainly composite, parts belonging to the comparatively late Priestly Code (P), and parts, speaking generally, to the ancient Jahwist source (J).

The parts usually assigned to J * are: 6^{5-8} $7^{1-5.\ 7-10}$ (in part [see below]) $^{12.\ 16b.\ 17.\dagger\ 22-23}$ $8^{2b-3a.\ 6-12.\ 13b.\ 20-22}$.

The parts usually assigned to P are: 6^{9-22} $7^{6.\ 11.\ 13-16a.\ 16-21.\ 24}$ $8^{1.\ 2a.\ 3b-5.\ 13a.\ 14-19}$ 9^{1-17}.

2. *The J Deluge story.*—(*a*) *Its date.*—Though the composition of J as a whole can hardly be earlier than the 9th cent. B.C., it seems probable that the Deluge story in its Hebrew form, though not necessarily reduced to writing, is far older. It preserves, at any rate, what appears to be a very ancient custom, not otherwise known, by which *all* clean animals were regarded as suitable for sacrifice (Gn 8^{20}), whereas, according to Dt $12^{15.\ 22}$ 15^{22}, there is clearly a distinction intended between certain domestic animals that were sacrificed and wild game (*i.e.* clean animals) which it had been the custom to eat, but which could not be sacrificed—a distinction which is also implied in the story of the deception of Isaac (Gn 27 [JE]).

On the other hand, the Deluge was not a universal tradition among the Israelites, or, at any rate, did not form part of a generally recognized historical system. The tradition concerning Lamech's sons (Gn 4^{19-22}) implies an unbroken history of civilization; and, if the writer of this last section was aware of the Flood tradition, he certainly did not regard it as a universal Deluge. Many critics, therefore, regard the Deluge story as a comparatively late insertion into the original cycle of J traditions (see *Oxf. Hex.*, *in loc.*).

(*b*) A relation of some kind between J and the Akkadian story is evident. The chief points of similarity are the Divine decision to bring about a Flood (Gn 6^{5-7}) in consequence of man's sin (this is implied in Ea's expostulation with Bel in the Akkadian story); the warning by Divine agency that the Flood was coming (7^4); the command to build an Ark, implied in 6^8 $7^{1ff.}$; the periods of 7 days, though not so connectedly as in the Akkadian story ($7^{4.\ 10}$ $8^{10.\ 12}$); the sending out af birds at intervals; the sacrifice after the Deluge, and the delight shown in it by Jahweh ($8^{20.\ 21}$). On the other hand, it differs in the monotheistic character of the whole story, and the necessary omission of the petty quarrels of the gods; and in its infinitely higher religious and moral tone (the occasion of the Flood, Jahweh's wrath against man's sin, receives an emphasis which we do not find in the Akkadian story); the means of preservation, an ark or chest, instead of a ship; ‡ the Flood's duration of 40 days instead of 7; the birds sent out—raven, dove, dove, dove, instead of dove, swallow, raven; the incident of the olive branch (but cf. Berossus); and the omission of the apotheosis of Noah.

[1] 'She lifted up the Great Gems' (Ball, p. 40, who explains: 'The Babylonian myth evidently regards the rainbow as the great jewelled collar of Ishtar, held up arch-wise in heaven' [see also p. 201]).

* For full analysis, see *Oxford Hex.*; Kautsch and Socin (quoted in Usener, pp. 17–22); Driver, *Genesis*, 1904.

† Some assign v.^{17a} (afterwards corrected by redactor) to P.

‡ Ball argues from the dimensions that the Akkadian ship was really a chest; but it had oars and a steersman, and was launched and navigated.

(c) At this point two important questions arise. (1) Is the Bible story derived from the Akkadian, *as we find it in the tablets*? Probably not. That there were several versions of the story current in Babylon is clear from the evidence of two stories combined in the Akkadian tablets, and by the evidence of the other mutilated fragments, as well as by the account of Berossus, which differs in some important particulars. The olive branch in the dove's mouth is the kind of picturesque detail which looks very ancient, and may have been original, and is to some extent confirmed by Berossus (see below, V. *A*. iii. 1, *b*, *c*). It has been suggested that the sending out of birds may have originated in the well-attested ancient custom of letting birds loose to ascertain the direction of land; but, while this is not altogether improbable, it must be admitted that such a purpose is not very evident in the Akkadian story, and is quite inadmissible in that of the Bible. On the whole, it would appear that the Bible story is derived from one that did not differ essentially from the Akkadian as we know it.

(2) Is the story of J a deliberate paraphrase of whatever form it was derived from, or was it the result of a gradual process of development? The subject is hardly capable of positive proof, but the probability seems in favour of the latter alternative. (α) If the story was, as seems likely, derived from Babylonia at an early date (note its anthropomorphic conception of Jahweh, Gn 7^{16} 8^{21}), it would, in all probability, have been handed on by oral tradition many centuries before it was written down, and, if so, would naturally have become gradually changed in the telling, as religious ideas developed from time to time. (β) We can thus best account for one of the most characteristic differences—the chest of the Bible left to drift by chance or at the Divine will, in the place of the purposely navigated boat of the Akkadian story. No doubt Lenormant was right in saying that the latter is a feature suitable to the story as told by a maritime people, such as the inhabitants of the Persian Gulf, whereas the Bible Ark points to a people wholly ignorant of navigation (*Orig.* i. 408, quoted by Andree, p. 8); but it seems unlikely that a writer in comparatively late times would have deliberately altered the ship into an ark, whereas such a change might naturally have come by degrees. Some writers have urged this difference as a proof of the priority of the Bible narrative; and even Cheyne, while very far from admitting such a view, suggested that possibly this particular feature may be more primitive—the conversion of the chest into a ship being due, if this be the case, to a rationalizing tendency (art. 'Deluge,' in *EBr*[9]). But such an argument cannot be considered as to any extent outweighing the strong grounds for the priority of the Akkadian story; and, after all, that the Bible Deluge should be in this, as it is in other respects, more marvellous than an early form of the story, is what we might naturally expect in a later stage of tradition.

(d) *Conclusion.*—We probably have in the J story a very early Israelitish tradition, either brought with the people from Babylonia at their first immigration, or obtained from that country through the frequent intercourse which we know to have existed from early times between the two peoples, but so modified as to have become, in the gradual course of transmission, a suitable vehicle for enforcing those great moral and religious truths which became the distinguishing features of the Israelites.

3. *The P version of the Deluge.*—(a) Compared with that of J, P has *in addition* the description and the dimensions of the Ark, the description of the Deluge as due to the breaking up of all the fountains of the great deep, as well as the opening of the windows of heaven (7^{11} 8^{2}), the stranding of the Ark on Mt. Ararat (8^{4}), and the rainbow (9^{13-16}), together with statistical references to Noah's age, etc. P *omits* the sending out of animals and the post-diluvian sacrifice, substitutes one pair of all animals for 7 pairs of clean and one of unclean, makes the Deluge last 365 days instead of 61, and substitutes the elaborate covenant connected with the rainbow (9^{1-17}) and laws of blood for the simple promise of J based on the sacrifice (8^{20-22}).

(b) The comparison with J and with the Akkadian Deluge raises a somewhat difficult question. Was P's story derived independently from Babylon during or shortly after the Exile, or was it, on the other hand, merely a revision of J's Deluge story; or, again, was it in some respects an independent version of the ancient story, belonging, like J's account, to ancient religious traditions?

Those who adopt either the first or third of these alternatives lay stress on the fact that so much of what is peculiar to P has its parallels in the Akkadian story, in which we find certain dimensions of the ship, its being tarred with pitch, the Deluge ascribed *apparently* to the sea as well as the rainstorm, and the rainbow (Sayce, Ball). But, on the other hand, it may be observed (α) that, as already pointed out, the actual dimensions of the Akkadian ship are enormously greater than those of P's ark, and, moreover, that the insertion of exact dimensions is exactly in accordance with the custom of P, as, *e.g.*, in the dimensions of the Tabernacle and all its furniture; the resemblance, therefore, on this point, such as it is, may be merely accidental; (β) that the reference to the rainbow in the Akkadian story is at least doubtful, and is not admitted by several translators (*e.g.* Haupt); (γ) that almost all the differences between the accounts of P and J may be explained by the general character of P; *e.g.*, the picturesque story of the birds would have no interest for P, who omits all the most picturesque stories of Genesis. In any case, such an incident would be unsuitable in a Deluge which covered the highest mountains (7^{19}) and lasted 365 days, though not in one of 61, in which the mountains were not necessarily covered at all. Again, the omission of the sacrifice of Noah accords with the omission of all the Patriarchal sacrifices—an omission which certainly suggests the inference either that P disbelieved in or held of no account sacrifices which preceded the law of Sinai. The omission of 7 pairs of every kind of clean animal is very possibly an example of the same spirit, as these animals were, according to J, intended for sacrifice (8^{20}). Lastly, the omission of such an anthropomorphism as 'Jahweh shut him in' in 7^{16b} is quite in character with P's usual practice. (δ) As the present combined account of the Deluge is based on P's story, which appears to have been preserved almost intact, whereas some parts of J are obviously omitted (those, for instance, giving the warning of the Deluge and directions for building the Ark), it is quite possible that some general statement of the Ark's dimensions, a description of the pitch, rooms, etc., like the Akkadian story, and the incident of the rainbow, may originally have had a place in J's story. If this be so, P must have retained the latter, not because of its picturesqueness, but as the basis for a favourite theme, a Divine covenant (cf. 6^{18}); on the other hand, the change of 61 to 365 days, the number of days in the solar year, though it does not agree with the three weeks of the Akkadian story, appears to be based upon some astronomical theory, and may be due to Babylonian influence of some kind. It may also be reasonably urged that the reference to 'the fountains of the great deep' really corresponds with P's ideas and nomenclature (cf. Gn 1^{2}), and finds a

parallel in the post-exilic Is 24^{18}. It is not likely, therefore, that it was originally derived from J.

It may, then, be considered not improbable that, in addition to J, P may have had access to some other version of the Akkadian story, but, if so, when and how it was derived is quite uncertain.

iii. THE DELUGE ACCORDING TO LATER BABYLONIAN ACCOUNTS.—1. *The story as given by Berossus.*—Berossus was a priest of Bel in Babylon about 300 B.C., who wrote a history of Babylonia (see art. BEROSUS). He claims to have copied out MSS of several authors which had been carefully preserved in Babylon for 15 myriads of years. Unfortunately, only a few fragments of his work have been preserved, which were copied by later authors. His Deluge story is given or referred to in three sources.

(*a*) It was copied by Alexander Polyhistor (a Milesian writer of the 1st cent. B.C.), whose work is also lost. Thence it was copied by Eusebius in his *Chronicon*; and, though the original of the *Chronicon* is also lost, it still exists in an Armenian tr., and it was also reproduced, probably *verbatim*, by Syncellus in his *Chronographia*.

(*b*) A Latin translation, based partly on the Armenian version, with the various readings of the Greek text of Syncellus, is given in Migne, *Chron. Eus.* I. ch. iii. (see also Müller, *FHG* ii. 501). It runs as follows:

'After the death of Ardates, his son Xisuthros reigned 18 *sars* (18×3600 years). During his reign occurred a great flood, of which the following account has been given. Kronos appeared to him in a dream and revealed to him that on the 15th of the month Daisios men would be destroyed by a flood, and he therefore ordered him to bury all existing MSS, beginning, middle, and end, in the sun-city of Sippara, to build a boat, to embark with his relatives and friends, to lade it with food and drink, to put therein animals, birds, and quadrupeds, and to make all ready for a journey. He then asked whither the boat should go, and was told, "To the gods to pray [*v.l.* having prayed] for good to mankind." He was not disobedient, but built a boat of 5 stadia long and 2 stadia broad, and carried out all that had been commanded him, and embarked with wife, children, and relatives. When the flood came, and very soon had begun to subside, he let go some of his birds; but, when they found neither food nor place to settle, they came back to the ship. Xisuthros, after some days, let the birds go away again, and they returned to the ship with mud upon their feet. When they were let go for the third time, they returned no more to the ship. Then Xisuthros perceived that the land had appeared, and he broke open some of the joints of the ship, and ascertained that the ship had grounded on a certain mountain. He stepped out with his wife and daughter and the pilot, kissed the ground, erected an altar, offered sacrifice to the gods, and vanished together with those who had come out of the ship.' The narrative goes on to relate how a voice from the sky informed the comrades of Xisuthros that he and those with him had gone, on account of his piety, to dwell with the gods, and bade them recover the MSS, and adds in conclusion: 'Of this ship that stranded in Armenia a part still remained in the Kordyaean mountains of Armenia, and some people scraped off the pitch from the ship and used it as amulets. They came to Babylon, dug up the MSS, and took them from Sippara; and they rebuilt Babylon, building many cities and re-founding temples.'

(*c*) This story appears to be an epitome of the Akkadian or one much like it:

(α) The name of Xisuthros (=Ḥasis-atra transposed from Atra-ḥasis) agrees with that of one of the versions of the Akkadian story. (β) The means of refuge, as in the Akkadian story, is a ship and not an ark. (γ) As in the Akkadian, Xisuthros and others are immortalized. It differs, however, in (α) the prediction of the exact date of the Deluge, (β) the specific mention of relatives and friends as saved (a smaller number seems implied than in the Akkadian story), (γ) the mud on the feet of the birds, (δ) the stranding of the ship in Armenia, and (ϵ) the apotheosis not only of Xisuthros and his wife, but also of his daughters and even of the pilot. Of these (γ) and (δ) are of special importance. The latter would seem to prove an ancient Babylonian tradition independent of the Akkadian story, and followed by P, Ararat being the regular name of Armenia in Assyrian monuments. Of the former it may be said at least that the story of the clay on the feet of the birds looks like the earlier analogue of the olive branch.

It should be added that the points of contact with the Bible story are not sufficiently striking to make it likely that the later Babylonian traditions were influenced by it. On the whole, then, the story of Berossus tends to confirm the view of some variety in the Babylonian traditions of the Deluge.

2. *The Deluge story of Abydenus.*—An epitomized version of the same account, derived originally either from Berossus or from the source from which he derived it, comes to us through Abydenus, a later Babylonian historian, whose work, like that of Berossus, has also been copied both in the *Chronicon* of Eusebius (I. vii., also in *Præp. Evang.* ix. 12, p. 414) and in the *Chronographia* of Syncellus (p. 70).

It differs, however, (α) in making a double interval of three days before and between the sending of the birds, and (β) in the birds being sent only twice. Migne's attempt to get out of the text of Syncellus a third sending is hardly successful. At best it would require that it took place after they had returned with the clay.

3. *Reference to Berossus's Deluge story in Josephus.*—Josephus's account of the Deluge (*Ant.* I. iii. 5, 6) differs slightly from that of the Bible. He mentions that Noah, when the Ark rested on the top of a certain mountain of Armenia, opened it and saw a small piece of land. The dove was sent out 7 days after the raven, and only once returned, covered with mud and bringing an olive-branch. After waiting 7 days more, he sent forth the living creatures. These differences may be partly due to carelessness and to narration from memory, but the reference to the clay, at any rate, is taken from the account of Berossus, which he had seen, and probably other accounts also, for he goes on to say: 'All writers of barbarian histories make mention of this Flood and this Ark, among whom is Berossus the Chaldaean,' and he quotes from him the statement about the remains of the ship on the Kordyæan mountains, and the use made of the pitch, in the same words as those used by Eusebius and Syncellus, who themselves refer to Polyhistor as their authority. This proves beyond a doubt that Polyhistor's story was derived from Berossus. Josephus's statement about the universality of the Deluge story may be taken as showing at least that the Deluge story was a common theme among ancient historians.

iv. ORIGIN OF THE SEMITIC DELUGE STORY.—(*a*) There is nothing to suggest in this case that it formed part of a consistent mythological system. (*b*) Being concerned with rain and water, the subject was clearly suitable for treatment in the Akkadian Epic in connexion with the rainy month; nor need we suppose it, therefore, connected with any special astronomical theories. (*c*) Its more or less mythological form, in which gods and goddesses play their part, finds its analogies in many Deluge and other stories throughout the world, in which natural events form the basis of, or become mixed up with, mythological details (see above, IV. *C.* (*b*)). (*d*) The frequency of Deluge stories arising out of natural inundations gives a *prima facie* probability that such an event was the origin of the tradition in this instance. (*e*) In both the Bible story and the Akkadian the Deluge is ascribed to natural causes: (1) an excessive rainfall; (2) somewhat more indefinitely, the rising of the sea. The first is obvious in both accounts. The second is definitely stated in P in the words 'all the fountains of the great deep were broken up' (Gn 7^{11}). The deep being regarded as being under the earth, such language would very naturally suggest an earthquake breaking up the ground and letting the deep burst forth. It seems implied also in the Akkadian story, which, if it does not, as some scholars maintain, expressly speak of the earth trembling, and the floods breaking out below the earth, at least describes such a terrific storm and tempest and invasion of waters as to imply a cyclonic wave rather than a mere overflooding of rivers. (*f*) The traditional resting-places of the ark, Ararat=Armenia (Bible

and Berossus), and Nizir = Rowandiz in the North-East of Babylonia (Akkadian), point to a definite region of the world. (*g*) Süss has pointed out with great force that the necessary conditions are fulfilled by supposing that the shores of the Persian Gulf were struck by an enormous volcanic wave, accompanied by a tremendous cyclone. The very great distance which such waves travel, and the fearful destruction of life and property which is often involved, have frequently been pointed out.

Thus the wave associated with the Backergunge cyclone in the delta of the Ganges reached a height of 45 ft. and destroyed more than 100,000 persons (*EBr*[9] xvi. 155). A wave caused by the eruption of Krakatoa (26th–28th Aug. 1883) reached 50 ft. (cf. the 15 cubits of P, Gn 7[20]) and destroyed more than 36,000 lives. One wave reached as far as Cape Horn, 7818 geographical miles distant (*EBr*[9] xxviii. 639).

It can hardly be deemed improbable that a phenomenon of such a kind occurred on the coast of the Persian Gulf, then probably lying much further north than now, and that but few survivors escaped in boats to the more hilly regions, with what effects they could secure. We have, in an event like this, all that is needed for the growth of such stories as are preserved in the Akkadian Epic and the Bible Deluge.

It need hardly be added that the religious value of the Bible story does not lie in its improbabilities, which sometimes amount, as has been shown, to absurdities, but rather in the religious and moral lessons, of which the ancient tradition was made the vehicle, viz. that Jahweh hated and would punish sin, but would save those who were faithful and obedient, while the further thought is suggested in P, at least, that His mercy is a more abiding motive than His wrath.

B. The Greek Deluge stories.—i. *Story of Deukalion and Pyrrha.*—This is by far the most important of the Greek Deluge, or Flood, stories. (*a*) Its most typical form is that given by Apollodorus (140 B.C.) in his *Bibliotheca*, I. vii. 2:

When Zeus determined to destroy the men of the age of copper, Deukalion, at the suggestion of Prometheus his father, constructed a chest (λάρνακα), into which, having placed therein the necessaries of life, he entered with his wife Pyrrha. Zeus sent a great rain, which flooded most parts of Greece, and destroyed all except those who escaped to the neighbouring hill-tops. The pair, after drifting in the chest for 9 days and nights, reached Parnassus, and, the Flood having somewhat abated, disembarked, whereupon Deukalion sacrificed to Zeus his protector. The latter sent Hermes to ask what he wished. He replied 'Children.' At the direction of Zeus they threw stones over their heads, and those which Deukalion threw became men, and those which Pyrrha threw, women. Then follows a derivation of the word λᾱός ('people') from λᾶας or λᾶς ('stone').

(*b*) This story evidently originated in a confusion of a myth with what may have been an ancient tradition. If Pandora, as Apollodorus had just asserted, was the first woman, and Prometheus first made men of earth and water, how could Deukalion be, as Apollodorus likewise states, king of Phthia, and who were the men who were nearly all destroyed? How, again, is the survival of any consistent with the story of the stones?

(*c*) (1) There seems to be an allusion to the story of the stones in Hesiod (Ἠοῖαι, fr. 141, ed. Rzach; see Usener, p. 32). (2) The earliest complete reference, however, to Deukalion's Flood is in Pindar, *Ol.* ix. 64–67, where he mentions how Pyrrha and Deukalion descended from Parnassus and founded of stones a race like themselves, and how the mighty waters which had overflooded the earth had been suddenly stopped by Zeus. Pindar evidently refers to it as a well-known story; otherwise, much of what he says would have been quite unintelligible to his readers. (3) The best-known form of the story, however, is that given by Ovid, *Met.* i. 155–415, the most curious feature of which is the fact that no mention is made of Deukalion and Pyrrha having been warned of the Deluge and commanded to build a ship. They appeared on the heights of Parnassus, where they had landed, and invoked the gods of the mountain and Themis. Zeus, seeing this, and satisfied that they were good and pious people, stopped the Deluge. A full description is given of their trouble, and the story about 'the bones of the great mother' is given in detail. It should be noticed that here the means of refuge is a ship, not, as with Apollodorus, a chest. There are also several other more or less different versions of the Deukalion story. (4) According to Nonnus (see Usener, p. 38), a conflagration sent by Zeus (in anger at the Titans for murdering Dionysus Zagreus) was put out by a Deluge. This is very abruptly connected with the story of Deukalion and Pyrrha, who suddenly appear floating about in a chest (λάρναξ); but we are not told how or where they got in, or where they landed. The Deluge ends by Poseidon splitting the rock with his trident, and making an escape for the water through the Vale of Tempe, thus connecting the Deluge with the north of Thessaly, whereas the older legends connect it with Photis in the south-east. (5) According to Hellanikos, Mt. Othrys was the place of landing. Aristotle, curiously enough, maintained that the waters of the Deluge flowed into Achelous. Others, such as Thrasybulus and Akestodorus, maintained that Deukalion and Pyrrha founded the sanctuary of Zeus at Dodona, and dwelt in the territory of the Molossi. Possibly here we have a local Flood tradition combined with the better known traditional story. Very late legends connect the landing of Deukalion with Mt. Athos, and even with Ætna.

ii. *Other Deluge stories current in Greece.*—1. According to a legend connected with Megaris, Megaros, its founder, was rescued from the Deluge, being guided in swimming through the water by the cry of cranes; hence was derived the name of Gerania.

2. The Oxygian Flood story, found only in quite late writers, such as Julius Africanus, is confined to Bœotia and Attica. Oxygos, its hero, was described as king, sometimes of Athens and sometimes of Thebes.

3. Dardanus was said to have escaped in a Flood from Samothrace or Arcadia (Dionysius of Halicarnassus), in a boat of skins made by himself (Lykophron), or with his sons, and to have founded the kingdom of Ida. This story was often brought into connexion with that of Deukalion.

4. An altogether different Flood story is referred to by Istros (see Usener, p. 46), who connects a great flood with the severing of Asia and Europe by the Hellespont.

iii. *Origin of the Greek stories.*—Speaking generally, the Greek Deluge stories form good illustrations of what appear to be the common causes of such legends (see above, IV. *C*). Several of them grew up as explanations of the founding of a city or temple, ascribed to a waif miraculously guided across the waters, and to this extent Usener is probably right in finding analogies to the Deukalion myth in such stories as those of Perseus and Oedipus. Other Greek Deluge stories are connected with special geographical features, such as the opening of the Vale of Tempe. All are local in character, and that one of them, from its antiquity and picturesqueness, should have found a permanent place, though often mixed with others, in Greek mythology is natural enough. And there is no reason why it too may not have originated from a local inundation, the story receiving such accretions of the picturesque and marvellous as are common in similar cases.

The occurrence of the chest instead of a boat is interesting in view of the same variation in the Semitic story, and might suggest the possibility that the Greek legend, as we find it in Apollodorus, was influenced in some indirect way by the Bible narrative. But there is a great difference between a chest,

holding only a couple of persons and such food as they required for 9 days, and the monster Bible 'Ark' with all its arrangements and contents. Moreover, the chest was not an uncommon feature in the waif stories of Greek legend.

iv. *The mixed Deluge story of the pseudo-Lucian.*—We have a real mixture of the Greek and Semitic Deluge stories in the story given in the *de Dea Syria* (Lucian, ed. Jacobitz, Leipzig, 1881, iii. 344 f.). This version was connected with a hole in the ground over which the temple was built and into which the Deluge was said to have subsided.

According to this account, Deukalion, and his wife and children, were saved in a great chest (λάρναξ). As he entered it, there came all kinds of animals, wild and tame, sows, horses, serpents, lions, etc., in pairs. He received them all, and there was great friendship between them, and they all sailed in one chest as long as the water prevailed. When the water had disappeared through the hole, Deukalion built an altar and the temple over it.

Usener certainly goes too far in saying that this is the Babylonian Deluge story with only the name Deukalion inserted from Greek legend. It contains several features from both, and, except that to Deukalion it gives a second name Σκύθεα (which, according to Buttman, is a corruption of Σισύθεα, and is intended for Sisuthros, the Noah of Berossus), it bears a far closer resemblance to the Biblical than to the other forms of the Babylonian Deluge legend. *E.g.*, wild animals are preserved as well as tame; all in pairs; only Deukalion and his family escape; in a chest, not a boat (the last perhaps from the Greek story). That traditions of the Deluge ultimately derived from the Bible should have been current in Syria is likely enough, and there seems also evidence, in another tradition that the people was founded by Semiramis, of early intercourse with Babylon.

C. Persian Deluge stories.—i. A curious legend is contained in two fragments of the Yima songs preserved in *Vendīdād* (*SBE* iv. 10 ff.). It is given in full by Usener, pp. 208–212, from the critical tr. of Geldner.[1]

A council was held by the gods, in which Ahura Mazda decreed that a terribly severe winter would be followed by a great Deluge from the melting of the snow. Yima was directed to build an enormous fort foursquare, and to stock it with men and animals of all kinds. Yima carried out these instructions, but it is not actually said that the Deluge came.

Usener regards the whole story as an ideal picture of the future, the eternal city where men are to live in harmony and righteousness a life free from moral and physical evil, when the world is destroyed by the Deluge; but the passages which seem most ideal are among the prose portions, which Geldner regards as later insertions. It seems more probable that we have here also an example of the tendency to idealize what was originally a natural event.

ii. A second story is found in *Bundahiŝn*, vii. (tr. by E. W. West in *SBE* v. 25–28). Tîŝtar, in the three forms of a man, a horse, and a bull, sends successive Deluges each of ten days' duration, and destroys all the noxious creatures on the earth. This is part of what is clearly an astrological myth describing the contest between good and evil, and accounting for lightning and thunder, the salt sea, and the origin of lakes and seas.

D. Indian Deluge stories.—i. *The Fish Legend.*—(1) The oldest form of this typical Deluge story of India is preserved in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, i. 8. 1 (*SBE* xii. 216, tr. by J. Eggeling; for other translations see A. Weber, *Ind. Streif.*, 1868, i. 9, *Ind. Stud.*, 1868, i. 161; Max Müller, *Hist. Skr. Lit.*, 1859, p. 425; J. Muir, *Orig. Skr. Texts*, i.[2] [1873] 181 ff.):

In the morning, Manu, when water was brought to him for washing, found a fish in his hands. The fish foretold the coming Deluge, and promised to save him if he would preserve it, first in a jar, then in a pit, and, when it had outgrown this, would take it to the sea. Manu was to build a ship, and enter it, and look out for his preserver. Manu did as directed, and finally took the fish, which had then grown to an enormous size, to the sea. Then Manu entered the ship, and the Deluge came, which destroyed all living creatures. Meanwhile the fish approached Manu, who fastened the ship to its horn, and was so conveyed *up to* [or '*over*'] *the Northern Mountains.* Manu was directed to tie the ship to a tree, and gradually to descend as the waters abate.

The rest of the story is concerned with a complicated and very unintelligible rite with clarified butter, by which a woman was first produced, and, by her means, offspring of men and cattle.

According to Weber, the final redaction of the *Śatapatha* is only a little before the Christian era; but, as Eggeling shows, it is a compilation of earlier treatises, and this particular story gives the impression, in its main features, of being ancient.

One special interest in the story lies in its curious points of resemblance and contrast to other Deluge stories. The warning of the Deluge by an animal, the fastening of the ship by a rope, the post-diluvian sacrifice, and the miraculous reproduction of men, have all their analogies; but they are not found, as here, in combination, and the towing of the ship by a fish is quite unique. The probability is, therefore, that this legend is of native growth.

Weber and, to a less extent, Muir see in the story a tradition of an original immigration of the race from across the Himālayas. They base their opinion on a rendering of the words given above in italics, '*over* the Northern Mountains.' Eggeling, however, renders 'up to,' and some writers suppose the story to have originated in an exceptional overflowing of the Ganges. The question is primarily one of textual criticism, the choice lying between the reading *abhi-dudrāva* (Eggeling) and *ati-dudrāva* (Weber, etc.). The chief argument against an originally mythical origin of the story is that here also the tendency is to become more and more mythical, and if we reverse this tendency we can easily explain the story as having grown out of a natural inundation.

(2) A second version of the Indian story is that given in the *Mahābhārata* (quoted from tr. by H. Jacobi in Usener, p. 29; see also Muir, *op. cit.* i.[2] 196 ff.). The story has here assumed a more elaborate and marvellous form.

Manu is a prince among monks, renowned for his asceticism 'Standing on one leg with his arms raised on high, and with head bent down and never blinking an eye, he practised terrible austerities,' etc. The fish appeared to him as he was practising austerities by the shore. Of such virtue were they that the fish became many miles long, and yet Manu could carry it quite easily. The storm is very graphically described. In the end the fish reveals himself as Brahmā, and appoints Manu as creator of all things.

In this version there appears to be a confusion, not uncommon in similar myths, in the character of Manu as himself a descendant of former ancestors, and as the founder and creator of men and all things. In the older form of the story he is the first man, and never more than a man.

(3) A third version is found in the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*, viii. 24. 7 ff. (for Eng. tr. see Hardwick, *Christ and other Masters*, new ed., Lond. 1863, vol. i. pt. ii. ch. iii. pp. 312–315; Muir, *op. cit.* i.[2] 208 ff.). According to Cheyne, this book cannot be earlier than the 12th cent. A.D. The story itself is mainly a development of that of the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, with a mixture of the mythical and *quasi*-philosophical elements characteristic of the *Purāṇas*.

The Deluge took place during a sleep of Brahmā, when the strong demon Hayagrīva stole the Vedas. Hari took the form of a minute fish, and so finally revealed himself to Satyavrata, a devout king who lived only on water. The gradual growth of the fish is like that in the earlier legends, except that he outdid them by becoming, in his final form, a million of leagues long. The ark in this case was miraculously brought to Satyavrata, who, accompanied by the chiefs of the Brahmans, spent his time therein in singing hymns of praise and receiving Divine revelations. Finally, Hari slew Hayagrīva and recovered the Vedas. Satyavrata, instructed in all Divine and human knowledge, was appointed the 7th Manu. But, after all, the

[1] For a divergent interpretation of this Iranian material, see art. Blest, Abode of the (Persian).

appearance of the horned fish was *māya*, or delusion, and 'he who shall devoutly hear this important allegorical narrative will be delivered from the bondage of sin.'

It is interesting to note that this version has several points of contact with the Bible story. (1) The Deluge is caused by rain as well as by the sea. (2) Seven days' warning is given of the Deluge. (3) It is sent because of the depravity of man. (4) Animals are preserved in the ark, (5) and these in pairs. Of these (3) is inconsistent with the beginning of the story, and is evidently an interpolation. The most probable explanation of them all is that they were due to Christian influence. Their appearance only in the latest version of the myth makes it impossible to use them as arguments to prove that the story itself is derived from the Bible story, or originated in the event which that story describes.

ii. *The Boar Legend.*—Another Deluge myth is given in Muir, *op. cit.* i.[2] 50 f. It is one of the creation stories of the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa.*

It tells how the Divine Brahmā, awaking from his night slumber, and perceiving that the earth lay within the waters of the universal ocean, assumed the form of a boar, plunged into the ocean, and raised up the earth and placed it on the surface.

This is a creation myth, and has a curious analogy with some of the American Indian stories (see IV. *C* (*a*)).

E. CHINESE FLOOD STORY.—Accounts of this are found in the *Shu King* (especially ii. 4. 1; cf. also pref. 5, ii. 1. 17, 2. 1, 14, iii. 1. 1, v. 27. 8), the *Shih King* (iv. 3. 4. 1), and the writings of Meng-tsze (iii. 1. 4. 7, 2. 9. 3 f.).

i. According to the *Canon of Yâo* (*Shu King*, i. 3. 11, tr. Legge, *SBE* iii. 34 f.),

'the Tî said, "Ho! (President of) the Four Mountains, destructive in their overflow are the waters of the inundation. In their vast extent they embrace the hills and overtop the great heights, threatening the heavens with their floods, so that the lower people groan and murmur! Is there a capable man to whom I can assign the correction (of this calamity)?"' Khwăn was appointed, and laboured unsuccessfully for nine years. The Tî afterwards resigned his throne to Yü, who had coped successfully with the inundation.

ii. The *Shu King* (ii. 4. 1) gives the account of Yü's work as follows (in Legge's translation):

'The inundating waters seemed to assail the heavens, and in their vast extent embraced the mountains and overtopped the hills, so that people were bewildered and overwhelmed. I [Yü] mounted my four conveyances [carts, boats, sledges, and spiked shoes] and all along the hills hewed down the woods, at the same time, along with Yi, showing the multitudes how to get flesh to eat. I opened passages for the streams throughout the nine provinces, and conducted them to the sea. I deepened the channels and canals, and conducted them to the streams, at the same time, along with Chi, sowing grain, and showing the multitude how to procure the food of toil in addition to flesh meat. I urged them further to exchange what they had for what they had not, and to dispose of their accumulated stores. In this way all the people got grain to eat, and all the States began to come under good rule.'

Elsewhere in the *Shu King*, Yü is repeatedly described as having determined the relations of land and water, and the *Shih King* declares that, 'when the waters of the Flood had become widespread, Yü caused the various regions of the earth world to appear: the great outlying realms received their limitations.'

According to these accounts, all these works were accomplished during a single journey. In fact, the accounts probably describe work gradually carried out through many ages, though possibly commenced by Yü. They were evidently intended to avert a constantly repeated and wide-spread disaster.

iii. *Origin of the story.*—Legge believed that the occasion of Yü's special work was an actual inundation of an alarming kind of the Hwang-Ho ('the sorrow of China'), which he puts in the 24th cent. B.C., whereas he ascribes this treatise to the 12th.

According to Meng-tsze (b. 372 B.C.), however, the tasks of Yü were carried out under far more difficult conditions.

'In the time of Yâo, when the earth was not yet in ordered state, the masses of water flowed unchecked and flooded the earth. Flora was excessively luxuriant, and birds and other living creatures went about in enormous quantities. Grain could not grow. Animals pressed hard on man. . . . Yâo alone concerned himself about this. He appointed Shün, who developed an ordering activity and gave Yî control of fire. Yî caused devastating conflagrations on the mountains and in the marshes, so that the animals fled and sought shelter. Yü divided the nine rivers. . . . Then it became possible for the folk of the Middle Kingdom to support themselves' (iii. 1. 4. 7). At this same period, moreover, serpents and dragons infested these deluging waters; but Yü, while appointing the rivers their courses, banished these monsters, the animals that had oppressed man vanished, and the plains of China became habitable for the human race (iii. 2. 9. 3 f.).

It is by no means impossible that, as Legge held, these accounts all had their rise in a tradition of an extraordinary inundation by the Hwang-Ho; and in this connexion it is worthy of note that the great flood of 1851–53 is said to have cost some millions of lives, while it took 15 years to repair the damage and to confine the river within embankments. At the same time, it should not be forgotten that Grill, in his 'Zur chinesischen Flutsage' (*Festgruss an Roth*, Stuttgart, 1893, pp. 9–14), maintains that the story is based on a cosmogonic myth, devoid of connexion, even in its basal ideas, with the Bible account, and associated in form with experience of the frequent inundations of the Hwang-Ho; and, like von Gutschmid (*ZDMG* xxxiv. 192 f.), he holds that Yü, to whom he denies any actual existence in history, was essentially a sort of demiurge, who helped to establish civilization on earth. It is open to question, therefore, at least on the basis of Meng-tsze's statements, whether this whole story is not to be regarded as a cosmogonic rather than as a Deluge story.

F. FOLKLORE DELUGE STORIES.—Under this general heading are included the numerous stories of peoples, mostly in a savage or semi-savage state, not included under previous headings. It is not necessary for the present purpose to make any general classification of them on either geographical or ethnological lines. It will be sufficient to point out a few facts bearing on the subject of this article.

i. One of the essential characters of these stories arises out of the fact that they *are* folklore. In the Deluge stories of Babylon, Greece, and India we have well-defined legends capable of being traced out more or less distinctly in their developments and ramifications. Though a few of the stories now under consideration have come to us in a written form more or less ancient, they are not literature in the same sense, but only stereotyped folk-tales. By far the greater number of these stories, however, are still, or were till recent years, in a fluid and formative condition. The imagination which has produced them is, or was till recently, still at work, and has been continually modifying them. It has already been noticed how both historical events and fancy-striking anecdotes, such as Bible stories, have in many cases become mixed with the early tale, nor is it possible to separate them with scientific accuracy. Not infrequently what is essentially the same story is differently told on different occasions, or at any rate is differently reported (Leeward Islands; see IV. *A.* vi. (*d*)).

ii. There are many difficulties in the way of getting trustworthy evidence. As already pointed out, the missionaries, by whom most of these stories have been reported, were frequently prejudiced witnesses (see IV. *A.* iii.), and, moreover, the stories in several cases were collected some time after the conversion of the people with whom they originated. These missionaries had to depend on their own memory or that of their converts, and it was only in quite exceptional cases that the

opportunity afforded to Gill was offered (see above, IV. *C.* (*a*)), of reporting from the evidence of one whose knowledge of heathen lore was both fresh and complete.

iii. Another striking fact is the irregularity in the distribution of these stories. For example, there are very few independent Deluge stories reported from Africa, a considerable number from the islands of the Pacific, and an extraordinarily large number from the continent of America. This is accounted for negatively by Andree on the ground that Deluge stories do not readily arise where, as in Africa, the inundation of the great rivers is an annual occurrence, which does not therefore impress the imagination. It may be noticed in this connexion that one of the most important exceptions is connected with a special local feature—the formation of the Dilolo Lake on the southern border of the Congo State (see Andree, p. 49). Again, the Deluge legend of the Masai in Uganda, to which attention has been lately called by Merker (see *Guardian*, 1906, p. 945), is so obviously parallel with the Bible Deluge that it cannot be regarded as independent. We find here the Ark, pairs of animals, birds sent out (a pigeon and a vulture [cf. the crow of the Lummi Indians and the humming-bird of a Mexican story]), and four (!) rainbows.

iv. It would appear that there must be some positive reason for the frequency of Deluge stories among the American Indians. George Catlin, in his *O-Kee-pa* (p. 2), stated that among 120 tribes there was not one which did not relate some distinct or vague tradition of a Flood, and, in fact, a very considerable number of these stories have been preserved. It certainly must be admitted that the idea of a Deluge impressed itself very readily on the Indian tribes, but how far this was due to their past experience as an island people, and how far to the psychological character of the race, is a question for the ethnologist or anthropologist rather than the student of comparative religion. This much at least can be said, that there is some reason for believing that several of these stories are of comparatively ancient origin.

(1) In the first place, there is abundant evidence to show that Deluge stories were current in Central and Southern America at the time of the Spanish occupation. (2) The common elements in the stories of neighbouring and related tribes in some cases point to an ancient tradition in which a characteristic feature has become rooted in the imagination. (*a*) Several of the tribes about Peru, though their Deluge stories differ widely in other respects, have the common feature of a floating mountain—a combination, it would seem, of the ark and the mountain of refuge. (*b*) In more than one Mexican legend men were turned by the Deluge into fish. (*c*) We have noticed that several tribes about the Orinoco and its neighbourhood have the common features of stones (or coco-nuts) thrown to produce men (see IV. *A.* v. (2)). (*d*) Of still greater interest is the curious feature already mentioned (IV. *C.* (*a*)) that land was produced after the Deluge, not by the water subsiding, but out of scattered grains of sand or earth springing up and growing like seeds. Thus in the story of the Ojibwas, after the loon has dived several times in vain, it is the musk-rat restored to life by the surviving Manabozho (who was standing up to his neck in water on the summit of a high tree) that dives and brings up the grains of sand between its toes. These Manabozho throws into the waters, and they grow into islands, which unite into mainland. In a story of the Sac and Fox Indians, another branch of the Algonquins, the survivor, seeing that the Deluge would soon overwhelm the mountain on which he had sought refuge, built a canoe out of a piece of the blue sky. After sailing about some days, he sent out one of the largest fishes, which returned with its monster mouth full of earth, out of which he formed the dry land. In the story of the Chippewas (Montagnais), a related group, it is the northern diver that eventually returns to the canoe with clay on his webbed feet, after the beaver, otter, and musk-rat have failed. This the old man breathed upon, and it became a great island. (*e*) We find, again, in certain groups of tribes that a particular animal plays a prominent part, as the coyote among the Californians (Wappos, Papagos, etc.), the raven among those on the north-west seaboard of N. America (Thlinkits and Bella Coolas).

v. This prominence of animals is a very characteristic feature of the American Indian stories, and is by some believed to be connected ultimately with totem-worship, whereas in the stories of some other groups, such as those of the South Sea Islanders, a greater prominence is given relatively to what we should call the wonders or powers of Nature. Thus, according to Bancroft (iii. 87), the Californians describe themselves as having originated from the coyote.

Among the Algonquin tribes the black serpent is the enemy of man and of created beings, and sends the Deluge. Manabozho, in more than one story of this group, takes refuge on the turtle's back. In the stories of the Ojibwas his helper is usually the diver or the musk-rat. With the Hare Indians it is the raven who causes the Deluge in vengeance for being thrown into the fire; and it is the white owl who befriends the wise man by letting out the cattle which the raven had imprisoned. With the Cherokees it is a dog which foretells the Deluge; with the Peruvians the llamas reveal it to a shepherd. The Crees have it that an eagle rescued the one surviving maiden, and became by her the father of the new race. In a very original story of the Pimas (California), the god's son Szeuka, being angry with the eagle for having caused the Deluge, climbs up to its eyrie, slays it, and restores to life those whom it had killed (Bancroft, iii. 78).

vi. The general inference from a study of these folklore Deluge stories is that we have not to deal with mythological or cosmological systems, in which a Deluge occupied a part, but rather that these stories were the result of experience, tradition, imagination, and natural curiosity, acting sometimes separately, but more often in combination in different ways and different degrees.

LITERATURE.—The best general book, esp. for Deluge folklore, is R. Andree, *Die Flutsagen*, Brunswick, 1891, which contains a large and interesting collection of Deluge stories. Among the most important books referred to by Andree are H. H Bancroft, *Native Races of the Pacific States*, 5 vols., London, 1875–76; A. Humboldt, *Sites des Cordillères et monuments des peuples indigènes*, Paris, 1868; W. Ellis, *Polynesian Researches*, 2 vols., London, 1829; W. W. Gill, *Myths and Songs from the S. Pacific*, London, 1876; E. Süss, *Das Antlitz der Erde*, 3 vols., Leipzig, 1883–85; F. Lenormant, *Les Origines de l'histoire d'après la Bible*, Paris, 1880. For a careful tabulation of Deluge stories, see M. Winternitz, 'Die Flutsagen des Altertums und der Naturvölker,' in *Mitteil. der anthrop. Gesellsch. in Wien*, xxxi. [1901] 305–333. Translations and comments upon the Akkadian Deluge story are given in *KIB* vi. 299 ff.; P. Haupt, *Der keilinschriftliche Sintflutbericht*, Leipzig, 1881; A. H. Sayce, *Higher Criticism and the Monuments*, London 1894, ch. iii.; C. J. Ball, *Light from the East*, London, 1899, pp. 34–43. The most important Indian, Chinese, and Persian Deluge legends are given in *SBE*, ed. by Max Muller (see also references in this article). For Greek Deluge stories, apart from theories about them, the best work is H. Usener, *Die Sintflutsagen*, Bonn, 1899.

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DELUSION.—Delusion in the popular sense simply means a mistaken belief. In the technical sense, however, it means a wrong belief which is maintained because of a defect in thinking. And that is the meaning which the word should always have; for there is manifestly an important difference, for example, between a mistaken opinion which may be held because of wrong information supplied or facts withheld, and one which is maintained owing to an error in reasoning. A delusion is a belief falsely believed—that is, believed be-

cause of a faulty mind. To stretch the point, an opinion, even if it is a good opinion, is delusional if it is not supported by facts. And that brings us to a distinction which is of some value—that there are beliefs which are demonstrably untrue and which are delusions; and there are beliefs which we cannot prove to be untrue, which may even be correct, yet are arrived at by a delusional process.

The delusional state of mind—the kind of thinking which is prone to delusion—very often results from some disease, of greater or less degree, acquired in adolescent or adult life, which warps the judgment by tampering with the brain's mechanism, upon which correct thinking depends. In the development of a mind to the level of a mature judgment, an enormous mass of experience contributes, and a very great part of our thinking rests upon obvious opinions which we never take the trouble to test. It is part of the misfortune of a delusional mind that it may begin to question such standard opinions—opinions which ought to be regarded as axioms, and upon which the whole fabric of our thought is based. For example, a man may have a doubt (and it has occurred, and much writing has been wasted in the exposition of it) as to whether two and two really do make four. Scepticism of this sort, when it goes far, is an exhausting mental process, and the mind that indulges in it is apt to suffer further trouble. It is a form of illness which may be called a wasting disease of the mind, as if a man were to consume his own skeleton and have neither backbone nor leg by which to stand erect. On the other hand, a great deal of delusion can be traced to a vice at the opposite extreme—a kind of mental indolence. A large number of people who have wits enough to think if they had energy to use them, believe things which they have no right to believe, and entertain opinions which do not harmonize with those which they have earned a right to entertain. In these cases, again, there is what we may call a sore spot in the mind—a place where friction occurs when the rational process is checked by superstition. It is always a source of mental weakness in a thoughtful man to reserve certain subjects and to neglect or refuse to discuss them. That, however, is not to say that there is no place in good thinking for reverence, or that a good mind will not continue in mystery. On the contrary, the essence of delusion is the being too certain, too quick to seize and hold a definite opinion. This is illustrated by a very constant quality of delusion —that it refuses to be guided by facts or modified by argument. There are some people whose minds are very hard to move; once they have formed an opinion—and such people form opinions about many things—they will not give up or even be shaken in their belief; and the reason is that it is one of their mental characteristics, due in part to brain conditions, to find changes irksome. We must also observe that there are certain beliefs which are essentially pleasure-giving; it is tempting to hold an opinion which seems fitting and good, and it is easy to retain, as convictions, some comfortable beliefs which have never been subjected to criticism; perhaps the majority of the delusions commonly entertained concern things which people like to believe and refuse to disturb, not on grounds of reason, but on grounds of feeling.

In insane delusions—by which we mean delusions which occur in insanity, and which are due to actual brain disease—the quality of unreasonableness is very marked. If an insane person insists that he is made of glass, he will not be disillusioned by a demonstration of the fragile nature of glass and of his own resistance to fracture; he will only retort that the kind of glass of which he is made is not the ordinary breaking kind; hence the common practice with such people on the part of those who have the care of them. And it is the best method for all delusional people, whether sane or insane; there is no use trying to argue with them; therefore change the subject, encourage reasonableness in general, and trust that in time, after a development of other parts of the mind, the 'patient' on coming back to the vexed question again will see it in a new light.

It need hardly be said that the subjects concerning which people are prone to express delusions are often mystifying even to the most expert thinker—electrical phenomena, facts connected with mesmerism or hypnotism, insanity, occult religious facts, and all sorts of novelties and new inventions.

From what has been said concerning the nature of delusion, it becomes clear that the subject is an important one, both in a theory of mind and in practical affairs; and it is instructive to try to determine the extent and the province of delusion in normal thought. To do so exhaustively is impossible; but it is easy to cite a few examples which will suggest, to any one who cares to pursue the subject, a great many more. There is, for instance, a very large group of what we may call natural illusions, which are inevitably and inextricably woven into the fabric of experience, and which, assumed as true, become delusions. In the strict sense, an illusion (*q.v.*) differs from a delusion in that it is an error in *sense-perception* rather than an error in thinking. And it is permissible to hold that delusion includes illusion; that all illusions, when accepted as true, are delusions, though only a few delusions are illusions. By natural illusion, then, is meant all that margin of error—and it is a large one—by which the senses, in their natural and normal activities, convey wrong information to the brain. For it is strictly true that things are not what they seem. It is usual, in this connexion, to enlarge upon visual errors, partly because these are obvious and admit of being proved. It is certain that the picture which the brain receives from the eyes does not correspond to the object looked at. Some of the delusions thereby suggested have been corrected. Every educated man, for example, refuses to accept the testimony of his eyes that the world is flat. Yet a great mass of visual error goes uncorrected; men and women take the picture suggested by the eyes to be true; and, as the error and its acceptance are natural and all but universal, the delusion passes muster in common thought. But, to appreciate the amount of error thus imported, we must not forget that all the other senses are similarly faulty. It is certain, and again capable of scientific proof, that errors of hearing are considerable. Not only do ears differ widely in individuals in their acuteness, but it is certain that no one hears correctly, that the sound-image accepted by the brain never corresponds to the 'pattern' of the sound-waves in the atmosphere. Yet the great majority of people hear enough for practical purposes with approximately the same error in the hearing of it, and, by tacit consent, the error is not regarded. A great fallacy similarly besets the sense of touch and the muscular sense, which gives us information concerning resistances —the hardness and density, weight and strength of things. And, if this is true of senses which supply to the mind data which can be to a large extent scientifically tested, it may be assumed to be equally true of the senses of taste and smell. We may even conjecture that, subtle and complex as these senses are, they are also occasionally illusional.

Before leaving this aspect of delusion, it is well

to advert to hallucination (*q.v.*). A hallucination, like an illusion, is a wrong sense-perception, but differs from it in that there is no outward object for the hallucination. A hallucination is a perception—most commonly of the eye or ear—which is purely and wholly subjective. If the mind accepts this fiction of the senses, there is obviously delusion. Hallucinations do not bulk largely in normal thinking; but they are frequent and important in mental disease.

In conclusion, we may refer briefly to common forms of delusion more in the sphere of thought. Perhaps the best example of all but universal delusion is the common belief in an absolutely free will. It would be entirely out of place here to regard the subject philosophically. Suffice it to say that it is obvious that sometimes one's will is not wholly free in the ordinary sense. Yet people invariably think and speak as if choices were always of their own making. This delusion is clearly necessary and salutary; without it both thinking and doing would come to a standstill. Another delusion, equally inevitable and necessary, is one which besets every thinking man, that is, that he believes he possesses a thinking organ which works correctly. Give two men exactly the same data and let them think out a conclusion: each believes, is bound to believe, that he is thinking correctly; yet in many cases the conclusions will differ; so there must be error somewhere. Finally, we may cite the very prevalent delusion that any thought can reach a final conclusion. Nearly every one feels, and a great many people believe, that a subject can be finished, that thought can reach and hold all there is to be known about it, and usually a statement of the conclusion is forthcoming. And, while it is obvious that no subject can be exhausted and no statement final, this delusion is also inevitable. These examples will suffice to illustrate the subject, and it only remains to add that a wise mind will take note of the inevitable margin of error in its own operations and perhaps discount it, yet not be daunted by it.

LITERATURE.—J. Sully, *Illusions: a Psychological Study*, London, 1881; E. Parish, *Hallucinations and Illusions*, do. 1897; C. A. Mercier, *Psychology, Normal and Morbid*, do. 1901; T. S. Clouston, *Mental Diseases*, do. 1904, and *Hygiene of Mind*, do. 1906; J. H. Hyslop, *Borderland of Psychical Research*, do. 1906; G. Störring, *Mental Pathology in its Relation to Normal Psychology*, tr. T. Loveday, do. 1907; D. P. Rhodes, *The Philosophy of Change*, New York, 1909.

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DEMOCRACY.—See GOVERNMENT.

DEMOCRITUS.—A Greek philosopher (*c.* 460–*c.* 356 B.C.) whose importance lies in his being the pioneer of Materialism and the mechanical explanation of the universe.

1. **Life and writings.**—The birthplace of Democritus was Abdera in Thrace, a flourishing colony founded by the Ionian city of Teos. He must have been a fellow-citizen, and, if the received dates are approximately correct, a younger contemporary, of Protagoras. The accounts of his life which have come down to us are open to suspicion on various grounds. They dwell on his insatiable scientific curiosity, which impelled him to spend years in foreign travel. He is said to have visited Egypt in order to learn geometry from the priests, and to have held personal intercourse with Magi and Chaldæans in Persia and Babylonia. What amount of truth there is in these tales it is hard to say. Like Pythagoras, Democritus became to later ages a legendary figure, whose real attainments in mathematics, physics, and astronomy appeared less remarkable than his supposed skill in alchemy and magic. The list of his writings that survives shows him to have been a prolific author. The grammarian Thrasyllus, in the time of Tiberius, arranged the collection in tetralogies, or sets of four—the same arrangement which he had adopted for the *Dialogues* of Plato. The lucidity and simplicity of Democritus' style are praised in antiquity by competent critics like Timon, Cicero, and Dionysius of Halicarnassus. He wrote in the Ionic dialect, hitherto almost exclusively employed by prose writers, although in his own lifetime it was being gradually superseded by Attic. The subjects treated were, to judge by their titles, chiefly Mathematics, Physics, Astronomy, Anthropology, and Ethics. We have fragments definitely stated to come from the Κανών and the Κρατυντήρια, both dealing with the method of science, and from the περὶ Εὐθυμίης, an ethical treatise.

To his mathematical achievements there is unimpeachable testimony. Three of the thirteen tetralogies consisted of treatises on Geometry and kindred subjects, including Optics and Astronomy. From the title of one of them, 'On irrational straight lines and solids' (περὶ ἀλόγων γραμμῶν καὶ ναστῶν), it may be inferred that Democritus preceded Euclid in the investigation of irrationals—a problem which, as we know from Plato's *Theætetus*, was occupying the foremost geometers in the 4th cent. B.C. Similarly, Archimedes in his περὶ τῶν μηχανικῶν θεωρημάτων πρὸς Ἐρατοσθένην ἔφοδος (lately discovered at Constantinople, and published by Heiberg in 1907) assigns to Democritus no small part of the credit for two important theorems, namely, that the cone is one-third part of the cylinder, and the pyramid one-third part of the prism, having the same base and equal height. Democritus made the discoveries by means of mechanical methods; Archimedes afterwards supplied a rigorous geometrical proof. The investigation by means of mechanics involved a partial anticipation of the infinitesimal calculus (see Heath's *The Thirteen Books of Euclid's Elements*, Cambridge, 1908, iii. 366–368, 4, ii. 40).

It is not, however, from the meagre fragments remaining that we derive our best information as to the doctrines Democritus taught, but rather from the criticism of opponents, especially Aristotle and Theophrastus, who gave to his works the attention they deserved. Aristotle in his scientific treatises is evidently much indebted to Democritus, and, though he often dissents from his conclusions, invariably speaks of him with respect and admiration. Plato, it is true, never mentions him by name, yet from various passages in the *Dialogues* it is obvious that not only was he acquainted with the system of the Atomists, but even regarded Democritus as the type and representative of all those tendencies which he himself most actively combated.

2. **Leucippus.**—Democritus can hardly claim to have originated the system which he taught. There seems no valid ground for doubting the statement that Leucippus preceded him in laying the foundations of Atomism, which they both afterwards developed in common.

The metaphysical basis of Leucippus' doctrine, as stated by Aristotle, presumed the Eleatic paradox that reality or real being is One, not Many, immutable and eternal, not transient and diverse: whence the Eleatics deduced that our world of manifold and fleeting appearances is not that which truly exists. As all the earlier Greeks, from Thales downwards, in their search for a primary substance were unconsciously endeavouring to frame a conception of matter, the permanent substratum of the outer world, the Eleatic paradox is only another way of stating that matter alone is, where by 'matter' is meant the Full, not the Empty, or, in modern parlance, that which has mass. Empty space, then, if it is not matter, is

non-existent; the world is a continuous indivisible *plenum*. Leucippus, if he is to be credited with originating the Atomistic doctrine, altered this conception by opposing extension to mass as the fundamental postulate. The extended as full and the extended as empty, the *plenum* and the *vacuum*, or matter occupying space and space unoccupied by matter, were in his view equally real. The Eleatics were right in asserting the one, but wrong in denying the other. By introducing real space and the geometrical forms of bodies as spatially determined, Leucippus destroyed the Eleatic One and reverted to pluralism. But he had still to meet the subtle arguments from infinite divisibility, by which Zeno of Elea had disproved the possibility of motion and of multiplicity. Since these arguments could not be refuted, nothing remained but to postulate indivisibles (ἄτομοι, ἄτομα) as the ultimate constituents of corporeal reality—things in space (Ar. *Phys.* i. 3. 187*a*, 1–3). The sum of existence, then, includes empty space as well as the atoms or indivisible particles of matter in space. Both matter and space are eternal, infinite, and homogeneous throughout. The only differences which single atoms present are differences of shape, from which must follow differences of magnitude. But fresh differences are introduced when single atoms come to be grouped and arranged in what we call individual things. There then arise differences of order and position of the atoms in space; for, to use a familiar illustration, A differs from N in shape; AN is not the same as NA, the order is different; nor is ⌶ the same as H, the position is different. Aristotle (*Metaph.* i. 4. 985*b*, 13 ff.) in giving this account admits that he is substituting, for the precise Ionic terms ῥυσμός (fashion), διαθιγή (inter-contact), τροπή (turning), his own equivalents σχῆμα (figure, shape), τάξις (arrangement, order), θέσις (position). It will be obvious, upon reflexion, that these three kinds of difference are merely spatial relations posited and presupposed by the very conception of space as extended in three dimensions.

Here seems the proper place to deal with a controversial question of great difficulty: of the three differences between atoms (shape, order, position), only one (shape) relates to single atoms. That size must go with shape as a property of the single atom seems certain: *e.g.* atoms of fire are described as the smallest as well as the most mobile. But no good authority attributes to Leucippus or Democritus any utterance implying that weight was a fundamental property of the atom, although Epicurus, when he revised the original doctrine of the Atomists, expressly derived weight as well as magnitude from shape, and, as is well known, deduced from their weight the tendency of free atoms to fall. Later authorities not unnaturally confused the Atomic doctrine of Leucippus and the revised version of Epicurus. But the opinion has now gained ground that Leucippus and Democritus put forward no positive views as to weight being a fundamental property of a free or isolated atom, or as to the direction and force of the motion originally inherent in a free atom.

3. **Developments of Atomism.**—(*a*) *Relativity of sensible qualities.*—We have given in outline the theory which Democritus adopted and developed. When compared with the rival systems of Empedocles and Anaxagoras, it is seen to be decidedly superior in simplicity and logical coherence. These other systems also resolve the universe into matter in motion; but, in the resolution proposed by the Atomists, qualitative changes in things result from quantitative changes in their constituent elements, and all proceeds uniformly by a law of natural necessity. Each of these two positions calls for further elucidation. The conception of a permanent substratum, or primary matter, to the early Greek thinkers, involved two attributes. It was, they thought, at once indestructible and immutable; in other words, the sum of matter in the universe remains quantitatively and qualitatively constant amid all the change and variety of Nature. How this result was secured by the Eleatics has already been shown. Empedocles and Anaxagoras took another way, maintaining a plurality of elements qualitatively constant. The four elements of Empedocles—earth, water, air, fire—and the infinity of seeds assumed by Anaxagoras are alike in this, that they possess as fundamental and inalienable the qualities perceptible to sense. But these attempts to shape the conception of matter were attended by insuperable difficulties, so long as the sensible qualities of derivative bodies were ascribed to the original elements (whether four or an infinite number) out of which these bodies were compounded. In fact, on the theory of Anaxagoras, the distinction between original and derivative forms of matter vanishes, for there must be as many primary substances as there are varieties of sensible qualities.

This difficulty the Atomists solved by distinguishing the fundamental properties of matter as such from all other sensible qualities. In principle the distinction is the same as that made by Locke between primary and secondary qualities. The changing qualities of sensible things, such as colour, flavour, odour, temperature, cease then to be attributes of matter as such; and Democritus expressed this by saying: 'By custom there is bitter and sweet, hot and cold, and colour; in reality nothing but atoms and void' (Sext. *adv. Math.* vii. 135; Diels, 55 B, 9 [i.[2] 388]). It would, however, be misleading to characterize these secondary qualities as subjective: they lose nothing of objective validity because the mode in which they produce their effects has become explicable. To take the first pair of qualities in the citation from Democritus—sweet and bitter. It is an acknowledged fact that wine, which normally tastes sweet, is bitter to the jaundiced patient, and we may infer from Plato's *Theætetus* that Protagoras had called attention to this and similar facts. Now the Atomistic doctrine declares wine, like all other sensible bodies, to be merely a complex of atoms of such and such a shape, size, and position, and containing such and such a proportion of *vacuum*. As such, each body produces a certain effect upon all other similar bodies, including the human organs of taste. That effect, again, must partly depend upon the constitution of those organs, and on their permanent or temporary, common or individual, qualities. But, whereas Protagoras emphasized the divergence of the effects under different conditions, and left out of sight its possible causes, the Atomistic theory took account of both. It allowed a relative value to the divergent perceptions, while at the same time it maintained the objective validity of that which produced them—in other words, the structure of perceptible material bodies and the essential properties of the matter out of which they were constituted. Viewed in this light, an enigmatical utterance attributed to Democritus by the Epicurean Colotes becomes perfectly intelligible. If Democritus said that an object does not possess one kind of quality more than another (τῶν πραγμάτων ἕκαστον εἰπὼν οὐ μᾶλλον τοῖον ἢ τοῖον εἶναι—Plut. *adv. Col.* 4, p. 1108 F; Diels, 55 B, 156 [i[2]. 413]), we may be sure that he was speaking of the secondary qualities, and not of the properties of matter as such. The atoms have no secondary qualities. Thus colours, flavours, odours, tem-

perature, have no objective existence *per se*; they, at all events when perceived, are relative to the percipient. To one who held this view the task of science was immensely enlarged, at the same time that it became more definite. The problem was to advance from the known to the unknown, to determine precisely how the motion of atoms in the void produced the totality of changes, and the variety of changing qualities perceived by sense. No wonder that, unaided by the apparatus of modern science, the explorer from time to time regretted the futility of results attained, and confessed with a sigh:

'Truth lies in the deep' (Diog. Laert. ix. 72. 6; Diels, 55 B, 117 [i.[2] 407]). 'We perceive, in fact, nothing certain, but such things only as change with the state of our body, and of that which enters it, and which resists it' (Sext. *adv. Math.* vii. 136; Diels, 55 B, 9 [i.[2] 388]).

No less important is the part played in the system by the conception of causation. A fragment of Leucippus lays down the axiom that 'nothing comes by accident, but everything from a cause and under stress of necessity' (Aet. i. 25. 4; Diels, 54 B, 2 [i.[2] 350]). In such unequivocal terms did he state the universal law of causation, and to this principle his successor consistently adhered. For all that happens in Nature a sufficient explanation was furnished by kinematics and mechanics; there was then no need of any supplementary hypothesis, whether of design on the one hand or of arbitrary spontaneity on the other. It was enough to assume motion as an inherent attribute of matter—an ultimate fact for which no derivation was required. The motions of the atoms were as eternal as the atoms themselves, and were necessary; that is, in the unending series of movements each followed upon and was determined by definite antecedents. Granted that atoms moving in space come into collision, the whole history of the universe becomes an application of mechanical laws. Colliding atoms suffer pressure and impact, unite in groups, and break away from such unions; and thus arises all change, the succession of all events: the birth and destruction alike of particular things and of the infinite worlds are but moments in this succession.

(*b*) *Cosmogony*.—The direct outcome of Atomic motion must be the production of our world and of all the individual things in it, for these are given in experience. As to the process by which this goal is reached, our information is sadly defective. Of one thing we are certain—that Leucippus and Democritus had no recourse to external forces, such as the attraction and repulsion which Empedocles personified as Love and Strife, or the νοῦς of Anaxagoras. A late epitomator writes of Leucippus:

'The worlds arise when many atoms are collected together into the mighty void from the surrounding space and rush together. They come into collision, and those which are of similar shape and like form become entangled, and from their entanglement the heavenly bodies arise' (Hippol. *Ref.* i. 12; Diels, 54 A, 10 [i.[2] 345]). Another account gives fuller details: 'Many atoms of manifold shapes cut off from the infinite are borne into a vast void, and there collecting set up a single vortex movement, in which they collide and are whirled in all directions, so that separation is effected and the like atoms come together. And, as they become too numerous to revolve with equal velocity, those which are light are, so to speak, sifted out, and fly off towards the outer void; and the rest remain together, and, becoming entangled, join their orbits with one another, and form in the first place a spherical mass. This becomes a sort of shell, including in itself atoms of all kinds; and, as these through repulsion from the centre are made to revolve, the enclosing shell becomes thinner and thinner, the adjacent atoms being attracted as soon as the vortex overtakes them. In this way the earth was formed as the portions brought to the centre coalesced. And, again, even the outer shell grows larger by the influx of atoms from outside, and incorporates with itself whatever it touches. And of this some portions are locked together and form a mass which was at first damp and miry, then dried as it revolved with the universal vortex, and afterwards took fire and formed the substance of the stars' (Diog. Laert. ix. 32; Diels, 54 A, 1 [i.[2] 343]).

In this effort of the scientific imagination several points deserve notice. The doctrine of innumerable worlds or cosmical systems becomes clearer when we consider that matter and space are supposed to be infinite, and any place where atoms meet may become the kernel or nucleus of a world, provided that a vortex motion is thus set up, and in consequence a sufficient aggregation of matter crystallizes, so to speak, around a centre. As, moreover, the atoms are infinitely various in shape, the worlds formed from them will display the greatest diversity; though it may also happen that some of them are absolutely alike. Again, the principle of 'like to like,' common to most of the Greek physicists, receives some sort of explanation from the assumption of a vortex. As, on the beach, pebbles of like size and shape are collected by the tide, as the winnowing-fan sifts and separates grain (Sext. *adv. Math.* vii. 117; Diels, 55 B, 164 [i.[2] 415]), so the cosmical vortex plays the same mechanical part in bringing together homogeneous particles, that is, atoms approximately alike in size and shape. Thus Democritus is able to bring his notion of our world into tolerable harmony with popular opinion. It floats in the void, surrounded by its revolving shell of tightly compressed atoms—the vault of heaven; the space between this outer envelope at the circumference and the solid earth at the centre is filled with air in which the stars move. The earth presents a flat surface above and below, round horizontally like a quoit or tambourine, and so broad as to support itself on the air.

We may note the influence of Anaximander, with whom probably originated the old Ionian theory of infinite worlds, and of Anaxagoras (*q.v.*), who postulated a rotatory movement to effect separation of unlike and aggregation of like. Democritus can hardly be credited with original contributions to astronomy; but he welcomed the novel doctrines of Anaxagoras which had so startled his contemporaries. He held the sun to be a red-hot mass, but regarded it and also the moon as originally the nucleus of a separate system, which had been entangled in the vortex-motion of our world and subsequently ignited. The oceans were formed when, under the influence of wind and solar heat, the smaller particles were forced out of the earth, and ran together as water into the hollows. In relative size the central earth exceeds the sun, moon, and stars; yet the latter must have been accorded considerable dimensions if Democritus accepted the Anaxagorean assumption of plains, mountains, and ravines upon the moon's face (Aet. ii. 25. 9; Diels, 55 A, 90 [i.[2] 367]).

This cosmology is vitiated through and through by the undue importance it gives to our planet. The geocentric hypothesis still retained its sway over the philosopher, who tells us:

'There are infinite worlds, differing in size; and in some of them there is no sun and moon, in others the sun and moon are larger than in our world, or there are several suns and moons. The worlds are unequally distributed in space; here there are more, there fewer; some are waxing, some are in their prime, some waning; coming into being in one part of the universe, ceasing in another part. The cause of their perishing is collision with one another. And there are some worlds destitute of moisture and of living creatures. In our world the earth was born before the stars; the moon is nearest to the earth, the sun comes next, fixed stars are furthest off. The planets themselves are at unequal distances from us. A world is in its prime so long as it is able to absorb fresh matter from without' (Hippol. *Ref.* i. 13; Diels, 55 A, 40 [i.[2] 360]).

In the words of an enthusiastic admirer (Gomperz, *Griechische Denker*, i.[3] 295), we seem to be listening to a modern astronomer who has seen the moons of Jupiter, has recognized the lack of moisture on the moon, and has even caught a glimpse of nebulæ.

(*c*) *Psychology*.—All particular things, and amongst them the four so-called elements—earth, water, air, fire—are aggregates or atom-complexes;

and their character is determined by the shape, order, and position of their component atoms. Atmospheric air plays its part, but the most important is fire, because the most mobile, being composed of atoms exceedingly fine, smooth, and round. Fire-atoms are the moving principle of organic bodies, the soul being a sort of fire or heat, while mental activity is identical with the motion of these fiery particles. Upon this foundation is constructed a materialistic psychology, which in turn determines the epistemology and ethics of Democritus. Such a doctrine invites comparison with the speculations of Heraclitus and Anaxagoras, the former of whom regarded soul as an exhalation fed by vapours from the warm blood. The νοῦς of Anaxagoras, whether by this he meant simply intelligence, or some sort of mind-stuff, was supposed to be diffused throughout the universe; and similarly the theory of Democritus tends to destroy any fixed line of demarcation between organic and inorganic in Nature. For, according to him, fiery soul-atoms are taken in from outside. Owing to their great mobility, they are constantly liable to escape from the animate body, and this tendency is counteracted by the process of respiration, which checks the escape of imprisoned soul-atoms by a current of air, and continually renews them. In sleep or in a swoon there is less resistance: more of the fiery atoms escape, and mental activity is proportionately diminished; while death itself is the result of their entire dispersion in the surrounding air. Since all qualitative change in things is reduced to, and explained by, quantitative changes of atoms and atomic motions, no exception can be made in dealing with psychical activities and the phenomena of mental life. Sensation, thought, and all other functions of the soul are in reality movements of the soul-atoms, produced in accordance with the mechanical laws of pressure and impact. This principle is rigorously carried out, and its consistent application is a characteristic feature of Atomistic psychology. It is most obvious in the theory of sensation, which Democritus in part inherited from Empedocles. Contact between object perceived and percipient is the indispensable condition of all perception, so that all the various senses are in the last resort modes of one—viz. touch (Ar. *de Sensu*, iv. 442*a*, 29).

When, as in the case of sight, hearing, and smell, the perceptible object is at a distance, Democritus, like Empedocles, supposed that particles of external things found their way into the pores of the sensory organs. It is true that, according to Empedocles, the pores or passages through which the particles travelled were never absolutely empty, for, on his view, the universe was a *plenum*; whereas Democritus supposed the particles thrown off to move, like all atoms, through empty space; but this hardly affects the general likeness between the two theories. The introduction of atoms in certain ways, through the organs, to the soul answers to the introduction of effluxes (ἀπορροαί) through the pores, which Empedocles maintained. The atom-complexes thus given off resemble the external objects themselves. Democritus called them δείκελα—an Ionic term for which Aristotle substituted εἴδωλα. What we perceive, then, is in a manner in the soul; but the soul itself must consist of matter capable of being affected mechanically by it, that is, capable of the impact, reaction, movement, ἀλλοίωσις, which is the essence of perception.

The sensory organs thus become passages for instreaming atoms. Take vision. The eye is a moist porous organ—seeing results when the image of an object is mirrored in the pupil. So much we are told on excellent authority; but how it comes about that the pupil receives, or, if it is a mirror, reflects, this image, is a point on which neither the criticisms of Aristotle and Theophrastus nor the later accounts of Aetius and Alexander Aphrodisiensis throw much light. In fact, it remains doubtful whether the efficient cause is the emanation from the visible object or the air which has received a certain impression, comparable to that of a seal upon wax, from this emanation. The suggestion that in seeing nearer objects the former, in seeing distant objects the latter, is the proximate agent, although ingenious, lacks all authority. Colour, the proper object of vision, as explained above, is not a primary quality of bodies, but is relative to the percipient. The visible thing is composed of colourless atoms of given shape arranged in a certain order and position, and, when it is said to have colour in virtue of its atomic structure and the movements of its atoms, this really means that it is capable of exciting a particular effect in the sensory organ—the eye. Democritus assumed four primary colours—white, black, red, and green (χλωρόν)—and derived all other shades of colour from the mixture of the primary four in definite proportions. From this it follows that the numerous bodies which cannot be classed as having one or other of the primary colours must be of a composite nature; they must, that is, include in their composition other than merely homogeneous atoms. Thus, referring white to smooth and red to round atoms, he must have assumed, in the structure of gold and bronze, the presence both of smooth and of round atoms, since he declared the colour of these metals to be a mixture of white and red. This theory of colour seems to have been carefully elaborated, to judge by the summary and criticisms of Theophrastus (*de Sensu*, 49 ff.). The crudeness of his assumptions is obvious: whiteness is supposed to be due to smooth, blackness to rough atoms, redness is caused by heat, and the atoms of fire are supposed to be spherical.

In the treatment of hearing and its correlative object, sound, of which speech or vocal sound is the leading type, Democritus agreed in the main with his contemporaries. As emanations (δείκελα) from visible bodies are the stimulus of vision, so the sounds (φωναί) which stimulate the organ of hearing are particles or atom-complexes thrown off by the sonant body, and conveyed by the medium of the air to the ear, and through it to the soul. The stream of atoms given off by a sonant body sets the atoms of the air in motion, and, joining itself with these according to similarity of shapes and sizes, makes its way into the body. The orifice of the ear is the chief, but not the sole, entrance for such a current. In making the current affect not the ear alone, but other organs of the body, Democritus showed decided originality. He may have meant no more than that the whole body is sympathetic to the operation of hearing. Probably the purity of sounds was made to depend on the similarity, the pitch and volume on the magnitude, of their constituent atoms. The process by which the sound-atoms themselves and the air broken up by them are, as it were, sorted so that similar shapes and sizes come together must be understood as purely mechanical.

If a theory of emanations from bodies at a distance be employed to explain seeing and hearing, no difficulty will be encountered in applying it to the sense of smelling. The rapid diffusion of perfume is a familiar fact, and it is easily inferred that a finer matter is given off by odorous bodies in the form of an attenuated stream of atoms, which reaches the nostrils. Theophrastus complains of the omission to connect a distinctive quality of the various odours with the atomic

configuration of their particles; but Democritus probably regarded this connexion as easily deducible from the similar connexion between atomic configuration and distinctive quality in the kindred region of tastes, with which he dealt very fully. Thus, he referred an acid taste to atomic shapes which are angular, winding, small, and thin; the sweet to shapes which are spherical and not too small; the astringent to shapes large and with many angles. The bitter is composed of shapes, small, smooth, and spherical, with hooks attached to the spherical surface; the saline of large shapes, in many cases not spherical, but in some cases also not scalene, and therefore without many flexures; the pungent is small, spherical, and angular, but not scalene.

With this the theory of sensation is complete. All senses have been resolved into modes of touch, which must, therefore, have been for Democritus the primary sense, as it was for Aristotle. But of touch itself as a physiological function he could give no detailed investigation. Pressure, impact, and motion—purely physical conceptions—are employed by the Atomists without misgiving, as if they had not realized the true nature of the physiological process. The relations between realities of every kind were reducible to the purely mechanical form. The interaction involved in sense-perception could not differ from the action of any atomic bodies whatsoever upon one another, for this contact is the necessary and universal condition, and contact between *percipiens* and *percipiendum* only a special case. Sensation itself is the movement set up when spherical soul-atoms have thus been brought into contact with the atoms of an external object, or the atom-complexes (δείκελα) emanating from them. On this theory, then, sensory facts have nothing to distinguish them from the larger total of physical facts; nor can there be a fundamental difference between sensation and intellect. Aristotle expressly testifies that Democritus made no such distinction (ταὐτὸ λέγει ψυχὴν καὶ νοῦν [*de Anima*, i. 2. 404*a*, 28, 31; cf. 405*a*, 9]). There is no evidence that he put to himself Aristotle's question, What is the faculty by which the data of sense are combined and distinguished, by which we are conscious of our mental acts, by which we imagine and remember? All our information is that, while the soul-atoms were divided or distributed over the entire body, he located certain mental functions in certain parts of the frame; *e.g.* the separate sensations in the sensory organs, and, further, according to some doubtful authorities, intelligence in the brain, anger in the heart, appetite in the liver. Such statements are not in themselves incredible, on the assumption that, in different parts of the body, soul-atoms of distinctive size and mobility are apt to be associated and massed together; but the partial anticipation of Plato's tripartite division of soul is open to suspicion, and on such points Aetius and pseudo-Hippocratean writers of the 2nd cent. are not to be trusted.

What, then, is thought, and how does thinking come about? It must be analogous to sensation in so far as it is a movement of soul-atoms stimulated by an external cause; the latter is not far to seek, when we reflect on the familiar fact of the similarity between a sensation and the corresponding idea. Emanations from external objects (εἴδωλα ἔξωθεν προσιόντα) must then be postulated for the latter as for the former. The same causes acting upon soul-atoms in the same mechanical fashion accounted for dreams, visions, and hallucinations. So far from rejecting these mental processes as illusory, Democritus seems to have based upon them some sort of divination or mantic. The emanations which excite these abnormal processes must be supposed to be of a finer texture than those of ordinary sensation or thought.

(*d*) *Epistemology.*—What, then, is the relation between sensation and thought—in other words, what contributions does Democritus make to the theory of knowledge? The *locus classicus* is a passage preserved by Sextus (*adv. Math.* vii. 138; Diels, 55 B, 11 [i.[2] 389]). It was taken from a work entitled 'The Canon,' which presumably discussed the process of inference from the known to the unknown, and laid down rules for induction. The passage runs as follows:

'There are two forms of knowledge, the genuine and the obscure. To the obscure belong all these: sight, hearing, taste, smell, touch; the other form, genuine knowledge, is altogether distinct from this. . . .' 'In what follows,' says Sextus, 'Democritus ranks the genuine form above the obscure, and adds [to follow the restoration of the text by Diels]: "When the object becomes too minute for the obscure form of knowledge to see, or hear, or taste, or smell, or touch it, when greater precision is required, then the genuine knowledge comes into play, as the possessor of a more precise organ of discrimination."'

This means that thought can reach that which is inaccessible to sense. The Atomic theory, as it shaped itself in the mind of the philosopher, is a proof, for neither the atom nor space is sensibly perceived. Moreover, the geometrical forms and the whole of geometrical science, to which Democritus gave as loyal a support as Plato himself, being inseparable from space, have the same rational origin. It is true that he made no fruitful application of geometry to physical research, but the same may be said of the Pythagoreans, of Plato, and of all who preceded Galileo. Further, it is easy to see why the Atomists preferred thought to sense, though both have essentially the same object—corporeal things and material processes, atoms and atomic movements. Thought was to them mental intuition, an affection which registers, so to speak, more delicate movements due to complexes of minuter atoms. The senses do not extend far enough; the mental vision descries the atom, but the bodily eye cannot. The senses, being unaffected by the finer atomic movements, desert us at the point where the minutest bodies and the most delicate processes require investigation.

(*e*) *Ethics and religion.*—The scanty fragments which have come down to us under the name of Democritus include a mass of moral reflexions. Much of it is undoubtedly spurious, and the task of sifting the grain from the chaff has not yet been accomplished with success. Though little of scientific value has been preserved, the outlines of a definite view of life stand out clearly. In form these utterances bear the stamp of the scattered moral reflexions attributed to Heraclitus and the Pythagoreans, the single exception known to us being the treatise περὶ Εὐθυμίης, which made some advance to a definition of the ethical end. The treatise apparently opened with a description of the miserable condition of the majority of mankind, distracted by inordinate desire and superstitious terror, vainly striving for a multitude of objects without finding in any of them permanent satisfaction. As the goal of moral endeavour, Democritus proposed what he himself called tranquillity or cheerfulness (εὐθυμίη) and well-being (εὐεστώ). Such composure or peace of mind he compared to an unruffled calm at sea (γαλήνη). Other terms for this ethical end occur in the fragments, such as ἀθαμβία, ἀταραξία, ἀθαυμασία, ἁρμονία, ξυμμετρία; but it is not certain whether they were ever used by Democritus himself. His main tenet, repeatedly enforced in a variety of ways, is that true happiness, this inestimable tranquillity, does not depend on anything external, on wealth or goods of the body, but on uprightness and intelligence. Moderation and contentment, purity of deed and thought, are its distinctive marks; education is the best means to it.

The question arises whether this ethical teaching (of which, after all, we know so little) is intimately connected with the physical doctrines of the Atomists, so as to form part of one system. On this opinions are divided. Some deny all connexion, and are inclined to regard Democritus, not as the systematizer, but as the eager inquirer, who disperses his energy over a multitude of subjects, and lays the foundation of separate unrelated sciences. Again, it has been suggested that the contemplation of an infinite universe impressed Democritus with a just sense of the pettiness of man and the futility of the ends which ordinary men pursue. But this conjecture is just as improbable as the popular conception of him as the 'laughing philosopher,' provoked to merriment by the incongruity of all around him. Others, taking the distinction between genuine and obscure knowledge as their text, draw a parallel between the preference of thought over sensation, and the similar preference of tranquillity over violent and exciting pleasure. As sensations are atomic movements, so also are feelings, whether pleasurable or painful, and desires. Aristippus had called pleasure a smooth, and pain a rough or violent motion. To Democritus the distinction is not so much qualitative as quantitative; it is in minute and delicate movements of the finest matter, which are imperceptible to sense, that thought and the joys of thought consist.

The views of Democritus about religion are very imperfectly known. A fortunate accident has preserved in the pages of Sextus Empiricus (*adv. Math.* ix. 19; Diels, 55 B, 166 [i.[2] 415]) his curious belief in superhuman beings, and from other sources he is known to have maintained the possibility of divination from dreams and from the inspection of the liver and other organs of the sacrificial victim. There is nothing in these beliefs which is not in harmony with the principles of atomistic physics, although development in this direction is at first sight somewhat startling. To take divination by victims first. According to Cicero (*de Divin.* i. 57 [131]), the changes to be foretold by an inspection of the entrails were such as affected public health or the prospect of the harvest. The limitation to such cases proves that the symptoms examined and reported upon were such as were due, in the belief of Democritus, to natural causes. Dreams, whether of the ordinary or of the prophetic kind, were, on the atomistic hypothesis, due to images or εἴδωλα presented in sleep. Emanations from all possible objects flit about continually; amongst them there may be some which reflect the mental condition or even the opinions and designs of other men. Information then obtained in dreams of this sort is a matter of inference, just as when in waking hours the condition and intentions of others are inferred from their looks. The data, however, are less trustworthy, and hence the interpretation of dreams is often erroneous. Emanations, it will be seen, can thus be satisfactorily employed to explain what is unusual and abnormal.

As to the popular theology, it could not be accepted by any of the early Greek thinkers, least of all by Democritus. The interference of Homer's deities in the course of natural events was utterly at variance with speculations which, if they agreed in nothing else, all tended to establish the reign of law and the inevitable sequence of phenomena. If nothing exists but atoms moving in void, if every event is inexorably determined by natural necessity, Divine agency and design in Nature are alike excluded. Democritus was true to this principle, and incurred the censure of Aristotle because he refused to see in the beauty and order of the universe, and more especially in the adaptation of means to ends in the structure of animals and plants, any evidence of design. It remains, however, for the philosopher to explain how the belief in gods arose. Democritus in part ascribed it to man's terror at the awe-inspiring phenomena of Nature—thunder and lightning, eclipses of the sun and moon, comets, earthquakes, and the like. In the popular belief the gods were certainly regarded as the causes of natural phenomena, and, so far, as personifying natural forces. But this was not all; in part the faith of the multitude rested on actual evidence of sense, observations which there was no reason to doubt, even if they had been misunderstood. To meet this case, Democritus introduced as a *vera causa* beings differently constituted and in some respects superior to man. He may have been prompted by the common Greek notion of dæmons (δαίμονες), found, *e.g.*, in Hesiod, as something intermediate between men and gods; or it might even be said that he degraded the gods to the rank of dæmons. He assumed, at all events, that there are in the surrounding atmosphere beings who are similar to man in form, but surpass him in size, strength, and longevity. Streams of atoms would emanate from them as from all other external objects, and, coming in contact with the sensory organs, might render these beings visible and audible to men. The popular belief in their divinity and immortality was a gratuitous assumption; in truth, they are not indestructible, but merely slower to perish than man. Of these beings and their images there were two species—one kindly and beneficent, the other destructive and harmful. Hence Democritus is said to have prayed that he might meet with such images as were kindly and beneficent.

The atomistic doctrine which, as mentioned above, supposed an entire dispersion of soul-atoms to take place at death, left no ground for inferring the survival of individual existence. The instinctive fear of death is once or twice referred to in the fragments, and generally as something unreasonable. With the interest of a modern man of science, Democritus appears to have investigated cases of resuscitation of persons apparently dead, and to have decided that, however violent the injury received, life during the swoon or trance cannot have been altogether extinct (Procl. *in Remp.* ii. 113, 6 [Kroll]; Diels, 55 B, 1 [i.[2] 384]). We have no evidence that he or any of his school were active in denouncing and opposing superstition. One of his works bears the title Περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου, but the sole reference extant to belief in a future life is the passing allusion:

'Some men do not understand that a mortal nature is subject to dissolution, and, being conscious of the evil in life, painfully spend all their days in troubles and fears, inventing lies about the time after death.'

4. Historical importance.—The doctrine here presented in outline was never popular in antiquity, or rather it may be said to have fallen into disrepute. This was due in part to the fact that Democritus avoided dialectical discussions, so dear to the Greeks from the time of the Sophists. Yet Aristotle, his keenest critic, praised him for his empirical method of research, and agreed that it was better to deal with things in the concrete (φυσικῶς ζητεῖν) than to reason from vague abstract premisses to conclusions which did not exactly fit the facts of the case (λογικῶς ζητεῖν). The great prominence given after the time of Socrates to ethics and the practical side of life was another reason why Atomism failed to attract public attention. Few names of adherents have come down to us, hardly enough to be called a school. Epicurus (*q.v.*) absorbed in his own system what he thought fit, leaving one fundamental doctrine—that of natural necessity—to his rivals, the Stoics. Here the genuine doctrine of Democritus vanishes, or re-appears only in those criticisms of Aristotle's which, as Lasswitz has shown, formed, to some of the keener intellects among the schoolmen, a rallying-point from which to question or even ultimately to undermine the authority of the Stagirite. The loss of Democritus' writings was, in Bacon's opinion, the greatest which antiquity had sustained; and, after Galileo's experiments had opened a new era in physical research, this appreciation of empirical methods was triumphantly vindicated.

The chief service which Democritus rendered to

philosophy lay in the rigid consistency with which he worked out his crude Materialism. His merits in this respect are best seen by comparison with the Ionian hylozoists who preceded, and the Stoic pantheists who followed, him. So long as material reality is endowed with sentience or reason, the problem of Materialism is not adequately conceived, nor are its difficulties properly faced. The Atomists saw clearly what they had to do, namely, to show how out of matter, which is neither sentient nor intelligent, but merely obeys mechanical laws, it is possible to derive organic bodies which both feel and think. The difficulty of the task was not removed by this clear conception of its nature. There is a gap in the deduction, which no ingenuity can bridge over. The formation of an image on the pupil and the visual sensation contemporaneous with it remain wholly distinct: the physics of Democritus may explain the first, but not the second. Ever so correct a theory of the mechanism of local movements in the animal still leaves the phenomena of purpose and volition as mysterious as ever, as Aristotle pointed out. The resolution of secondary qualities, as they are called—colour, sound, temperature, odour, etc.—into effects of atomic movements on the percipient was a great step in advance; but Democritus did not realize all its consequences. Modern psychology has shown that the same analysis can be applied to primary qualities, and the seeming solid bodies of the Atomists' external world replaced by groups of tactile sensations; while, further, it asserts that these states of consciousness are our primary data of immediate reality. Thus Materialism, if worked out consistently, is apt to lead out of itself to Phenomenalism or Subjective Idealism, or in some other direction.

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R. D. HICKS.

DEMONS AND SPIRITS.

DEMONS AND SPIRITS (Introductory; African and Oceanian).—Although a rough distinction may be drawn between demons and spirits by considering the former as malevolent and the latter as benevolent, actual study of the subject soon shows that there is, to the primitive mind, no clear line of demarcation between the two allied classes. Their modes of operation are identical, and the same being may often be either beneficent or maleficent, as circumstances may dictate, though some are normally kindly disposed towards man, while others are almost or quite invariably hostile to him. The very terms 'spirit' and 'demon' are colourless. The former word signifies simply 'breathing,' 'breath' (see artt. BREATH, SPIRIT), while the latter (δαίμων) originally denoted either 'apportioner' or, less probably, 'apportionment,' 'destiny,' being connected with Gr. δαίομαι, 'divide,' 'apportion,' and Eng. *time* (Boisacq, *Dict. étymol. de la langue grecque*, Heidelberg, 1907 ff., p. 162; cf. also ARYAN RELIGION, vol. ii. p. 54[a]). The term 'demon' has, moreover, suffered a complete transformation of meaning *in malam partem*, for originally, as will be clear from the 'Greek' section of this art., it had a good connotation, which was changed into an evil one when Christianity condemned the deities and spirits of paganism (see, further, 'Christian' section below)—a change quite analogous to that by which the Avesta *daēva*, 'demon,' is the precise etymological equivalent of the Skr. *deva*, 'god.'

Again, both demons and spirits—to retain for the nonce their somewhat artificial contrast—must be carefully distinguished from souls or ghosts (cf. artt. SOUL, ANCESTOR-WORSHIP, and the 'Egyptian' section below). This comes out very clearly among the Melanesians,[1] with whom

> 'it is most important to distinguish between spirits who are beings of an order higher than mankind, and the disembodied spirits of men, which have become in the vulgar sense of the word ghosts. . . . They [the Melanesians] themselves make a clear distinction between the existing, conscious, powerful, disembodied spirits of the dead, and other spiritual beings that have never been men at all' (Codrington, *Melanesians*, Oxford, 1891, p. 120 f.).

The *vui*, or spirit, thus contrasted with the *tindalo*, or ghost, was defined as follows to Codrington by a native of the Banks Islands:

> 'It lives, thinks, has more intelligence than a man; knows things which are secret without seeing; is supernaturally powerful with *mana*; has no form to be seen; has no soul, because itself is like a soul';

and in Omba, Lepers Island, the definition of *vui* is as follows:

> 'Spirits are immortal; have bodies, but invisible; are like men, but do not eat and drink, and can be seen only by the dead' (Codrington, 123, 170).

That, despite this assignment of a purely spiritual nature to the *vui*, they should often be regarded practically as in human form, and even as sometimes dimly visible (*ib.* 151 f.), is by no means surprising when we remember that it is well-nigh impossible for man at any stage of civilization to escape entirely from anthropomorphism (*q.v.*).

This distinction between spirits and ghosts is, however, much easier to make in theory than in practice, and Taylor's words regarding the New Zealanders (*Te Ika a Maui*[2], London, 1870, p. 108)

[1] A very similar distinction may be found in Greek between θεοί, δαίμονες, and ἥρωες, the two latter classes corresponding respectively to the Melanesian *vui* and *tindalo* (cf. Usener, *Götternamen*, Bonn, 1896, p. 248 f.).

—'Maori gods are so mixed up with the spirits of ancestors, whose worship entered largely into their religion, that it is difficult to distinguish one from the other'—may be applied to more than one people (cf. also, for Africa, Schneider, *Relig. der afrikan. Naturvölker*, Münster, 1891, p. 113).

But, if demons and spirits must be distinguished from ghosts or souls, an equally clear line must be drawn between them and gods—although it is true that confusion of demons and spirits with gods is frequent, exactly as demons and spirits are often confounded with souls or ghosts. There is, nevertheless, this difference between the two kinds of confusion, that, whereas demons and spirits are, strictly speaking, distinct from souls and ghosts in that the *vui* 'were never men, and have not the bodily nature of a man' (Codrington, 124), the difference between demons and spirits as contrasted with gods appears to be one of degree rather than of kind, so that demons and spirits may be, and very often are, elevated to the rank of gods. On this point Jevons writes as follows (*Introd. to the Hist. of Religion*[3], London, 1904, pp. 173, 175):

'For the savage, supernatural beings are divided into three classes—the gods of his own tribe, those of other tribes, and spirits which, unlike the first two classes, have never obtained a definite circle of worshippers to offer sacrifice to them and in return receive protection from them. This last class, never having been taken into alliance by any clan, have never been elevated into gods. . . . On the one hand, the community originally drew its god from the ranks of the innumerable spiritual beings by which primitive man was surrounded; and, on the other hand, the outlying, unattached spirits, who were not at first taken into alliance, and so raised to the status of gods, may ultimately be domesticated, so to speak, and made regular members of a pantheon.'

The relations of demons and spirits to that phase of primitive religion properly known as Animism (*q.v.*) are peculiarly close, so that Tylor (i.[3] 426) declares:

'It is habitually found that the theory of Animism divides into two great dogmas, forming parts of one consistent doctrine; first, concerning souls of individual creatures, capable of continued existence after the death or destruction of the body; second, concerning other spirits, upward to the rank of powerful deities.'

Whether, however, Animism actually furnishes, as was once fondly supposed, a complete explanation of the origin of religion, or whether it was even the earliest form of religion, seems open to grave doubts (cf. the views of various scholars recorded by Schmidt, 'L'Origine de l'idée de Dieu,' in *Anthropos*, iii. [1908]); and the theory is scarcely supported in Melanesia, where so accurate an observer as Codrington can say (p. 123):

'There does not appear to be anywhere in Melanesia a belief in a spirit which animates any natural object, a tree, waterfall, storm, or rock, so as to be to it what the soul is believed to be to the body of a man. Europeans, it is true, speak of the spirits of the sea or of the storm or of the forest; but the native idea which they represent is that ghosts haunt the sea and the forest, having power to raise storms and to strike a traveller with disease, or that supernatural beings, never men, do the same.'

It must also be borne in mind that, while spirits are very frequently believed to inhabit trees, rivers, rocks, and the like, there are many spirits to which no such specific habitat is assigned. In other cases the abode, even in a tree, river, or rock, may be but temporary—a phenomenon which is especially characteristic of dream-demons, disease-demons, and the like.

There is, furthermore, a close connexion of demons and spirits with the great type of religion known as Fetishism (*q.v.*), which may roughly be defined, with Tylor (ii. 144), as 'the doctrine of spirits embodied in, or attached to, or conveying influence through, certain material objects,' the fetish itself being a material, or even animal (cock, serpent, bear, etc.), or natural (river, tree, etc.), object in which a spirit is believed to take up its abode, either temporarily or permanently. To quote Tylor (ii. 145) again:

'To class an object as a fetish, demands explicit statement that a spirit is considered as embodied in it or acting through it or communicating by it, or at least that the people it belongs to do habitually think this of such objects; or it must be shown that the object is treated as having personal consciousness and power, is talked with, worshipped, prayed to, sacrificed to, petted or ill-treated with reference to its past or future behaviour to its votaries.' Cf., however, the well-founded objection of Jevons, pp. 166–169, to the scientific use of the word 'fetish' at all, since it 'may mean one thing to one person and another to another, because it has no generally accepted scientific definition.'

Nevertheless, however vague the term 'fetish' may be, it is at least clear that the idea of spirit-habitation which it conveys is closely connected, in its development, with the forms of religion associated with amulets (see CHARMS AND AMULETS, vol. iii. p. 398[a]) and idols (see IMAGES AND IDOLS).

Generally speaking, a spirit is regarded, unless properly propitiated, as malevolent and maleficent more often than as benevolent and beneficent; in other words, to revert to the common, though lax, phraseology, demons are more numerous than spirits. At first sight this state of belief is analogous to that which gives more prominence to malignant than to benignant deities, because the benevolent gods are already good and need no propitiation, while every effort must be made to appease and to propitiate the malevolent ones. Such, however, does not seem to be the real psychology in the case of demons and spirits. The true ground for the predominance in number and in importance of malevolent over benevolent spirits appears to be well outlined by Jevons (p. 177), who finds the explanation in the fact, already noted, that the spirit is unattached to any clan or community, whereas a god is connected with one or another clan. The spirit is, therefore, much in the position of an unattached ghost; and, as to the primitive mind, with its intense concept of kinship—whether real or artificial—all that is not akin is hostile, a spirit thus unattached, and consequently unakin, would naturally tend to be regarded as hostile and malevolent. It must be remembered, too, that the qualities ascribed to the spirits reflect in great measure the qualities of their worshippers (cf. Schneider, 106); for instance, the Kioko of Portuguese West Africa hold that each spirit has his own district, which he jealously guards, being deeply angered by the intrusion of any neighbouring spirit (*ib.* 150). Spirits also possess other traits still more human, so that, among the African Bambara, the spirits 'have sex, males and females are found among them, they have children, and some, if not all, even believe them to be clothed' (Henry, in *Anthropos*, iii. 702); while in Loango we find a specific 'mother of spirits' named Bunsi, who has peopled the whole land with spirits, who in their turn have begotten others (Schneider, 132 f.); and the Australian Urabunna and Warramunga believe that the black-snake totem ancestor begot spirit children who now live in water-holes and in gum-trees along the bank of the creek (Spencer-Gillen[b], p. 162, cf. also p. 301).

It is comparatively seldom that the primitive mind makes a clear discrimination between good and evil spirits so far as to distinguish them by special epithets, as do the Africans of Benguela (Schneider, 135); and the very fact that the names applied by the Malays of Passumah Lebar to good spirits (*dewa*) and to evil spirits (*jinn*) are of Skr. and Arab. origin respectively (Waitz-Gerland, *Anthropol. der Naturvölker*, Leipzig, 1860–72, v. i. 166) betrays the late date of this nomenclature (cf. also Tylor, ii. 319).

In the regions under consideration, belief in demons and spirits is especially characteristic of Africa (as is shown at once by the fact that 'fetishism' is *par excellence* the type of African

religion[1]), where it maintains itself side by side with ghost-worship. In Oceania, on the other hand, the two types of religion are mutually exclusive. In Polynesia, Australia, and Micronesia, spirits are practically unworshipped as compared with ghosts, while in the Ellice Islands and the Union Group (Tokelau) the reverse is the case (Waitz-Gerland, v. ii. 139–142, 194–199); and in Melanesia

'religion divides the people into two groups; one, where, with an accompanying belief in spirits, never men, worship is directed to the ghosts of the dead, as in the Solomon Islands; the other, where both ghosts and spirits have an important place, but the spirits have more worship than the ghosts, as is the case in the New Hebrides and in the Banks Islands' (Codrington, 123).

Naturally, the same effect may be ascribed by primitive man to different causes. Thus, among the Orang Kubu of Sumatra and the Mintira of the Malay Peninsula, disease is caused by spirits (Waitz-Gerland, v. i. 181; *Journ. Ind. Archipel.* i. 307), whereas in Africa generally and in Melanesia (Schneider, 116, 125, 152; Codrington, 194) disease is more commonly due to malignant ghosts—although here, too, the vague distinction between ghosts and spirits, already noted, often renders uncertain any precise determination of the cause of disease (cf. Tylor, ii. 125 ff., where further examples will be found; and see art. DISEASE AND MEDICINE). The same statement holds true of possession (or obsession) by spirits and ghosts. Sometimes, as normally in Melanesia, it is the shades of the departed, rather than the *vui*, that cause the phenomena comprised under the category of possession (Codrington, 218–220); while, along the shores of Blanche Bay, New Britain, all this is caused by the *iňal*, a being which is evidently a spirit, not a ghost (Meier, 'Der Glaube an den *iňal* und den *tutana vurakit*,' in *Anthropos*, v. [1910] 95 ff.; see, further, both for ghost- and for spirit-possession, Tylor, i. 98, ii. 123 ff.); and in the vast domain of magic (*q.v.*) it will be found that both ghosts and spirits are among the powers controlled by magicians.

As regards the places of abode of demons and spirits, the words of Brun (in *Anthropos*, ii. [1907] 728) with reference to the African Malinke, a Mandingo stock, may serve as applicable to almost any people among whom this type of religion prevails:

'Dans la pensée des Malinkés, notre planète est peuplée d'une multitude d'esprits. Les uns résident dans des lieux déterminés, fleuves, rivières, montagnes, blocs de rochers; d'autres dans certains arbres. Le grand vent et le tonnerre sont produits par les esprits. Dans presque tous les villages, il y a un grand arbre dans lequel réside l'esprit protecteur du village.' Among the Polynesians, in like manner, Ellis (*Polyn. Researches*[2], London, 1832, i. 327–330) records deities (who may, however, originally have been ghosts) of the sea, air, valleys, mountains, precipices, and ravines.

It is, indeed, this very type of Nature-spirit which has in great part given rise to the theory of Animism (cf. Tylor, ii. 205 ff., and, for Polynesia especially, Waitz-Gerland, vi. 295–298). To give a complete list of such spirits would be to catalogue almost every object both in inanimate and in animate Nature—a task that would be not merely enormous, but, for the present purpose, useless, since the underlying principles are everywhere the same, and the varying details do not materially affect the cardinal doctrine involved. It will be quite sufficient, therefore, to note a few of the more prominent classes of Nature-spirits in Africa and Oceania by way of examples of the whole type.

(*a*) *Animals*.—Along the Slave Coast, Danhgbi, the python spirit, receives divine homage, as do crocodiles and, in Togo, leopards (the latter may, however, be the abodes of ghosts rather than of spirits; see ANIMALS, vol. i. pp. 509 f., 520 f.), and among the Mandingo reverence is paid to serpents as divine (cf. *ib.* vol. i. p. 525 f., and art. SERPENT-WORSHIP). Yet here, too, as just noted, the difficulty of accurate distinction between spirits and ghosts confronts us, and the animal is more usually the home of the latter than of the former (cf. Tylor, ii. 7 f., 229, 378 f.; see also above, vol. i. p. 493 f.): and we must also remember that animals are often held to be god-homes, and that there are still other factors which go to make up the complex system of animal-worship (see artt. ANIMALS, TOTEMISM).

(*b*) *Water-spirits*.—Attention has been called in art. BRIDGE to the wide-spread belief in deities and spirits believed to be resident in rivers, and the same thing is, of course, true of larger bodies of water, such as lakes, as in the Banks Islands (Codrington, 186). To this category belongs the African Fugamu, at once the deity of the Rembo Ngoyai (a tributary of the Ogove) and the teacher of the smith's art, while dreaded demons dwell in the falls of the Congo, and the Kafirs fear the water-demons Ikanti and Uhili (Schneider, 131, 133, 137, 151 f.; Kidd, *Essential Kafir*, London, 1904, p. 10, inclines to regard the Kafir demons as ghosts rather than as spirits); thus, as Tylor sums up the matter for Africa (ii. 211; cf. also i. 108–110, ii. 209 ff.),

'in the East, among the Wanika, every spring has its spirit, to which oblations are made; in the West, in the Akra district, lakes, poods, and rivers received worship as local deities. In the South, among the Kafirs, streams are venerated as personal beings, or the abodes of personal deities, as when a man crossing a river will ask leave of its spirit, or having crossed will throw in a stone; or when the dwellers by a stream will sacrifice a beast to it in time of drought, or, warned by illness in the tribe that their river is angry, will cast into it a few handfuls of millet or the entrails of a slaughtered ox.'

(*c*) *Forests and trees*.—Forests and trees likewise are the abodes of spirits. The New Britain belief in the *iňal*, which, in the form of an owl, has its usual home in a tree, has already been noted, and a similar belief prevails in Melanesia (Codrington, 186 f.). For a like reason the Wanika reverence the coco-nut palm (Schneider, 159), while the Bambara also are among the many African peoples that believe trees to be tenanted by spirits (Henry, in *Anthropos*, iii. 703; for further examples, where ghosts, totems, etc., are also factors, see Jevons, ch. xvi.; Tylor, i. 475, ii. 215 ff.; and art. TREES).

(*d*) *Mountains*.—The African Malinke believe that the mountain at Kita is the home of malevolent spirits (Brun, *loc. cit.*), and throughout Oceania there was an abundance of mountain- and rock-spirits, some of which must, however, be reckoned as ghosts (see Waitz-Gerland, vi. 295–297, where may be found a general survey of Nature-spirits in the Pacific islands). The extent to which mountain-spirits may be specialized is well illustrated in the list of the dread deities of the volcano Kilauea, in Hawaii, thus recorded by Ellis (iv. 248 f.):

Kamoho-arii ('king Moho,' or 'king vapour'), Ta-poha-i-tabi-ora ('explosion in the place of life'), Te-au-a-te-po ('rain of night'), Tane-hetiri ('husband of thunder'), Te-o-ahi-tama-taua ('fire-thrusting child of war')—all these being brothers; Makore-wawahi-waa ('fiery-eyed canoe-breaker'), Hiata-wawahi-lani ('thunder-rending cloud-holder'), Hiata-noho-lani ('heaven-dwelling cloud-holder'), Hiata-taarava-mata ('quick-glancing-eyed cloud-holder'), Hiata-hoi-te-pori-a-Pele ('cloud-holder embracing [or, kissing] the bosom of Pele'), Hiata-ta-bu-enaena ('red-hot mountain-holding [or lifting] clouds'), Hiata-tareiia ('wreath-encircled cloud-holder'), and Hiata-opio ('young cloud-holder')—all these being sisters of the great goddess Pele.

Prominent among the distinctly good spirits are those whose special function it is to act as guardians. From this class we must, of course, exclude the 'separable soul,' such as the *okra*, or *kra*, of the Tshi and the *luwo* of the Ewe, which is a second soul, created together with the individual whom it is to guard throughout his life (see art. SOUL); and we must also once more essay the far

[1] It must, however, be noted that Nassau regards all the spirits worshipped in W. Africa as originally ghosts ('Spiritual Beings in West Africa,' in *Journ. Amer. Geograph. Soc.* xxxiii. [1901] 389–400, xxxv. [1903] 115–124).

less easy task of distinguishing guardian spirits from guardian ghosts. To the latter class seem to belong such supernatural guardians as the Zulu *ama-tongo*, the Bantu *mizimi* and *ombwiri* (Schneider, 139 ff., 152; Hartland, art. BANTU, vol. ii. p. 360a), and the Tahitian *oramatua* (Waitz-Gerland, vi. 316); yet there are also cases where the guardian is believed to be a spirit in the strict sense of the term. Such appears to be the case in the Gold and Slave Coasts (Jevons, 165 f.; see also his whole ch. xiv.), and in Samoa and other Polynesian islands the guardian spirit was expressly declared to be a god (*aitu*), not a ghost (*varua*; see the examples collected by Waitz-Gerland, vi. 317 ff.). For further details, see artt. TOTEMISM, TUTELARY GODS.

Another important class of spirits is formed by those of prophecy, their functions being to a large extent shared, as is perfectly obvious, by ghosts. As examples of this kind of beings we may refer to a spirit dwelling in an enormous stone near Kita (Brun, *loc. cit.*), the Matabele Makalaka (Schneider, 144), and the *iñal* of Blanche Bay (Meier, in *Anthropos*, v. 96 f.; cf. also Tylor, ii. 131 ff.). These spirits may simply be consulted, as at Kita, or they may enter into an individual, producing a state of ecstasy, as at Blanche Bay (see artt. ORACLE, POSSESSION). Again, it is to the agency of spirits that primitive man attributes a large proportion of his dreams (Tylor, ii. 189–191, 411; see also art. DREAMS), especially those of an erotic or nightmare character, while ordinary dreams of persons, animals, and things would normally be ascribed rather to the action of souls, whether of the living or of the dead. That demons and spirits are important factors in causing disease has already been noted (above, p. 567a).

The presence of demons and spirits is normally revealed solely by intangible manifestations which the primitive mode of thought can explain only through the agency of such supernatural beings, as in the case of disease, dreams, many natural phenomena, and the like; but a demon or spirit is also often regarded as sufficiently tangible to leave footprints in ashes or similar substances strewn where it may be thought likely that he will come; and animals are frequently believed to be able to perceive spirits which the duller vision of men cannot discern (Tylor, ii. 196–198). Beneficent spirits, when present, are, of course, gladly entertained, and are even constrained to remain; but there is, naturally enough, a determined effort to get rid of maleficent demons. All these operations of invitation or of expulsion are part of magic (*q.v.*), and come to the front especially in case of disease (see art. DISEASE AND MEDICINE), or, from the more ethical and ritual side, in the ceremonies associated, for example, with the scapegoat in ethnic religions (see AZAZEL and SCAPE ANIMALS).

There is one class of beings that may perhaps be regarded as on the border-line between spirits and ghosts, though inclining rather to the latter category. One or two peoples preserve a tradition that they have conquered their present territory by invasion and subjugation of a former tribe of entirely different nature, and are convinced that this vanquished tribe still survives in spirit form. It is generally held that we have here one of the sources of the folk-belief in fairies, brownies, kobolds, dwarfs, giants, and the like (cf. Tylor, i. 385 ff.; *CF*, pp. 21 f., 429). To this class belong the Maori *patu-paerehe*, who lived chiefly on the tops of lofty hills, while the *taniwha* had their homes in river-holes or under cliffs, etc., where they caused such calamities as land-slips and the like (Tylor, pp. 153–157). Similar beings, explicitly called *vui*, or spirits, are believed to dwell in the New Hebrides and Banks Islands, where 'they have been seen of late in human form, smaller than the native people, darker, and with long straight hair' (Codrington, 152 f.).

The cult rendered to demons and spirits may be discussed very briefly, for it differs in no matter of principle from that of the gods themselves. As Jevons (p. 175 f.) says,

'The method by which the negro of Western Africa obtains a *suhman* [a tutelary deity of an individual] is an exact copy of the legitimate ritual by which a family obtains a family god. . . . All over the world these private cults are modelled on, derived from, and later than, the established worship of the gods of the community. The difference between the private cult of one of these outlying, unattached spirits and the public worship of the community's gods does not lie in the external acts and rites, for these are the same in both cases, or as nearly the same as the imitator can make them. . . . The difference lies first in the division which this species of private enterprise implies and encourages between the interests of the individual and of the community, at a time when identity of interest is essential to the existence of society, and when the unstable equilibrium of the small community requires the devotion of every member to prevent it from falling.' (For a detailed study of the spirit-cult of a specific African tribe, see Henry, 'Le Culte des esprits chez les Bambara,' in *Anthropos*, iii. 702–717.)

LITERATURE.—There seems to be no special treatise on this subject, so that the material must be gleaned from the writings of missionaries and travellers in Africa and Oceania (in the older works much care is needful in distinguishing, where such distinction is possible, between spirits and ghosts or gods), from works on the regions under consideration (such as those of Waitz-Gerland and Schneider, quoted in the art.), and from general studies on Comparative Religion. Particular interest still attaches to the chapters (xi.–xvii.) on 'Animism' in Tylor, although the animistic theory is subjected to sharp criticism by many scholars of eminence.

LOUIS H. GRAY.

DEMONS AND SPIRITS (Assyr.-Bab.).—

Among the ancient Assyrians and Babylonians, as among the modern Arabs of Mesopotamia, superstition was rife, and a firm belief in all kinds of demons and *jinn* was current in every class of society. The Semitic element, when it entered Babylon, took over from the Sumerians much of their folk-lore, and it is for this reason that so many of the Assyr. words for ghouls, hobgoblins, and vampires bear their Sumerian origin patently; and out of this amalgamation sprang the elaborately developed system of magic in vogue during the later Assyr. and Bab. empires. This art provides the magician with all possible means for combating hostile devils and spirits.

The unseen enemies of mankind fall naturally into three classes. The simplest form—that of the disembodied spirit or ghost—is probably universal. The second—always supernatural—differs from gods by reason of its low order, and, as Robertson Smith says of the *jinn*,[1] is mentioned by the name of its class and not by a personal name, save in such cases as Namtar and the like, who are properly gods. Lastly, there is the half-human, half-supernatural creature, born of human and ghostly parentage—some awful monstrosity sprung from a *succuba* or *incubus*. These, too, are known by a class-name and have no individual title, whereas the higher order of this element in religion, the demi-god, is always a personality.

1. Ghosts.—We may examine, then, first in order the disembodied spirit, the ghost of a man or woman, which for some reason or other returns to this world. The Assyr. word in use is *edimmu*.[2] This *edimmu* was supposed to come back to earth for many reasons; it became hungry and restless, if its descendants ceased to pay it due rites or offer sacrifices on which it might feed; or it obtained no resting-place in the world of shades underground, if its earthly body remained unburied. The Assyr. ideas of Sheol were probably much the same as those of the ancient Hebrews. When a man died, his body was duly buried in the earth, and the spirit then inhabited the under world, 'the House of Darkness, the seat of the

[1] *Rel. of Sem.*2, 1894, p. 126.

[2] See Hunger, *Becherwahrsagung bei den Babyloniern*, Leipzig, 1903.

god Irkalla . . . the house from which none who enter come forth again.'[1] Here its food was dust and mud, doubtless eked out by the libations and offerings which percolated through the earth from the mourners' sacrifices. The blood of animals slaughtered at the grave-side trickled through to reach the hungry spirit in the under world, and hence the belief in such sacrifices. But, if the attentions of descendants towards an ancestor should cease on earth, and the spirit thus was deprived of its food, it was then driven by stress of hunger to come back to earth to demand its due. How it succeeded in breaking loose from that bourn whence no traveller returns is difficult to understand, unless we suppose that there was a dual conception of ideas arising from a confusion between the grave as the actual habitation of the dead man, and Sheol as the place of shades; probably the primitive beliefs of savages in regard to ghosts were never very definite in details, and ideas of such incorporate and invisible beings must necessarily have been indeterminate. For example, Ishtar, when she descends to the under world, threatens to break down the door of Hades:

'I will smite the door, I will shatter the bolt,
I will smite the threshold and tear down the doors,
I will raise up the dead, that they may devour the living,
And the dead shall outnumber those that live.'[2]

Yet in another Assyr. tablet the return of spirits from the grave is thus described:

'The gods which seize (upon man) have come forth from the grave,
The evil vapours have come forth from the grave,
To demand the payment of rites and the pouring of libations
They have come forth from the grave.'[3]

The word 'vapours' or 'winds' here requires some explanation. The reference is probably to the transparency of the spirits: when the spirit of Ea-bani is raised from Hades at the instance of his friend, the Bab. hero Gilgamesh, his shade rises 'like the wind' through an opening in the earth made by the god Nergal.[4]

Similarly, another incantation, although it confuses ghosts with demons, refers to the return of hostile spirits:

'The evil spirit, the evil demon, the evil ghost, the evil devil, from the earth have come forth; from the pure abode unto the earth they have come forth; in heaven they are unknown, on earth they are not understood.'[5]

In the instance of the *utukku*-wraith of Ea-bani being raised, like Samuel at En-dor, the text continues with a speech of the ghost, describing the under world to Gilgamesh:

'The man whose corpse lieth in the desert (thou and I have often seen such an one), his spirit resteth not in the earth; the man whose spirit hath none to care for it (thou and I have often seen such an one), the dregs of the vessel, the leavings of the feast, and that which is cast out into the street are his food.'

The name of the necromancer in Assyrian—*mušelû edimmu*, 'raiser of the ghost'—is pertinent here, to show that the belief in such wizardry was accepted.[6]

Besides the unfed ghost, however, there was also the spirit of the unburied body to haunt mankind. According to Assyr. ideas, which tally in great measure with those of modern savages, if the bones of the dead were removed from the tomb, the spirit at once became restless, and was compelled to roam about the world. Ashurbanipal, giving full credence to this belief, in his invasion of Elam carries away the bones of the kings of Elam from the tombs, and causes the rites paid to them to cease, that their spirits may have no rest.[7] Furthermore, unless the body was buried, the spirit of the dead man never reached its resting-place in the under world; and there are long catalogues of all possible classes of ghosts to be exorcized, identified by the reason of their return to earth:

'Whether thou art a ghost that hath come from the earth . . . or one that lieth dead in the desert, or one that lieth dead in the desert uncovered with earth . . ., or a ghost unburied, or a ghost that none careth for, or a ghost with none to make offerings (to it), or a ghost with none to pour libations (to it), or a ghost that hath no posterity' (or, 'that hath no name').[1]

Or, if through some accident the man had died an untimely death and had not been given due burial, the same thing would happen:

'He that lieth in a ditch . . ., he that no grave covereth . . ., he that lieth uncovered, whose head is uncovered with dust, the king's son that lieth in the desert or in the ruins (or waste places), the hero whom they have slain with the sword.'[2]

Those who died prematurely became ghosts also, those who perished of hunger or thirst in prison, or had not 'smelt the smell of food,' dying of want, or had fallen into a river and been drowned, or had been overcome by storm in the plains,[3] those who died as virgins or bachelors of marriageable age,[4] and women who died in travail, or while their babes were yet at the breast.[5]

This last ghost, the wraith of the woman dying in childbirth, is universal. Doughty relates that the Arab women explained the hoot of an owl as the cry of a woman seeking her lost child, she having been turned into this bird.[6] Among the Malays a woman who dies thus becomes a *langsuyar*, or flying demon, which the rest of the tribe prevent from wandering by putting glass beads in the mouth of the corpse, a hen's egg under the arm-pits, and needles in the palms of the hands.[7] The original *langsuyar* was supposed to be a kind of night-owl like the Lilith of Rabbinic tradition, and is therefore similar to the ghost of which Doughty speaks.[8]

Now, if any one of these disembodied spirits returned to earth, it was likely to attack any mortal who had been in some way connected with it on earth. To have shared food, water, unguents, or clothes with any one in this world rendered a patron or friend liable to a visitation from the ghost of his dead beneficiary, demanding similar attentions after death; nay, even to have eaten, drunk, anointed oneself, or dressed in company with another was reason enough for such a ghostly obsession. The living man exorcizes, through his priest, all these forms of ghost in the Assyr. incantations, threatening them that no rites shall be paid them until they depart:

'(Whatever spirit thou may be), until thou art removed,
Until thou departest from the man, the son of his god,
Thou shalt have no food to eat,
Thou shalt have no water to drink.'[9]

Many of the medical tablets give elaborate prescriptions of drugs and ceremonies to be employed 'when a ghost seizes on a man.' Others give the ritual for laying a ghost which has appeared; and in this case the magician repeats long formulæ of all possible ghosts, thereby showing, as is necessary in this magic, that he knows the description of the spirit with which he is dealing:

'A brother's ghost, or a twin, or one unnamed, or with none to pay it rites, or one slain by the sword, or one that hath died by fault of god or sin of king.'[10]

The fear of the obsessed man is apparently that the ghost will draw him from this world to the other, for he states in his incantation:

'O ye dead folk, whose cities are heaps of earth, whose . . are sorrowful, why have you appeared unto me?
I will not come to Kutha [the under world]! Ye are a crowd of ghosts: why do ye cast your enchantments upon me?'[11]

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1 King, *Bab. Rel.* p. 179. 2 *Ib.* p. 180.
3 Thompson, *Devils and Evil Spirits of Babylonia*, vol. ii., Tablet 'Y'.
4 King, *op. cit.* p. 175.
5 Thompson, *Devils*, ii., Tablet 'CC'.
6 *WAI* ii. 51, 2, *r.* ll. 20, 21.
7 *Ib.* v. 6, l. 70 ff.; for other and parallel instances, see Thompson, *Semitic Magic*, p. 10 ff.

1 Thompson, *Devils*, i., Tablet IV. col. iv. l. 41 ff.
2 *WAI* ii. 17, col. iv. l. 6 ff.; Haupt, *Akkad. u. sumer. Keilschrifttexte*, Leipzig, 1881–82, II. ii. l. 6 ff.
3 *Ib.* ii. 17, l. 22; Haupt, *op. cit.* II. ii. l. 22 ff.
4 This is a probable rendering of the cuneiform; see Thompson, *Semitic Magic*, p. 19.
5 Thompson, *Devils*, i., Tablet IV. col. v. l. 23 ff.; Tablet V. col. i. l. 52 ff.
6 *Arabia Deserta*, Cambridge, 1888, i. 305.
7 Skeat, *Malay Magic*, London, 1900, p. 325.
8 For other comparative instances, see Thompson, *Semitic Magic*, p. 21 ff.
9 Thompson, *Devils*, vol. i., Tablet IV. col. v. l. 54 ff.; Tablet V. col. ii. l. 55 ff.
10 See *PSBA*, Nov. 1906, p. 219 ff. col. i. ll. 6–8.
11 *Ib.* col. i. l. 13.

Even looking upon a corpse rendered a man liable to attacks from the ghost, and such an act demanded a long ritual to free him.[1]

Were any further evidence required that the ancient Assyrians firmly believed in the possibility of visible ghosts, we have only to turn to an omen-tablet in the British Museum (K. 8693) which gives a list of the events to be expected if a ghost appears in the house of a man. But enough has been said on the disembodied spirits to show that the Assyrians were convinced of their existence, and had even reduced them to exact classes and species.

2. Unhuman spirits.—The second kind of demons, those entirely unhuman, for whose creation mortals are not directly responsible, existed among the Assyrians, as among other Semites, in innumerable hordes. The first of them is the *utukku*. This word is used, once at least, for the wraith of the dead man returning to earth (in the incident of Ea-bani quoted above from the Gilgamesh Epic), but elsewhere it appears to have a far wider meaning than a simple ghost, and we shall probably not be far wrong in considering it for the most part as the equivalent for a devil. It lurked in the desert, the common home of many Semitic devils, lying in wait for man; or it might have its home in the mountains, sea, or graveyard; and evil would befall him on whom it merely cast its eye.[2] Another, less well known, is the *gallû*, apparently sexless,[3] and this is used as a term of abuse in classical Assyrian, Sennacherib calling the hostile Babylonians by such a name.[4] The *rabiṣu* is a lurking demon, which sets the hair of the body on end.[5] The *labartu*, *labaṣu*, and *aḫḫazu* are a triad frequently found together, the first-named having a whole series of incantations written against her. She was a female demon, the daughter of Anu,[6] making her home in the mountains or cane-brakes of the marshes; and children were particularly exposed to her attacks. To guard them from her, the tablets inscribed with incantations against her include an amulet to be written on a stone and hung round their necks, and the inscription runs:

'"Labartu, [daughter] of Anu," is her first name;
The second, "Sister of the [gods] of the streets";
The third, "Sword that splitteth the head";
The fourth, "Wood-kindler";
The fifth, "Goddess of awful mien";
The sixth, "The trusted and accepted of Irnina,"
The seventh, "By the great gods mayst thou be exorcized; with the bird of heaven mayst thou fly away."'[7]

Of the other two of this triad the *aḫḫazu* is apparently combated in the medical texts.[8] Of the *labaṣu* practically nothing is known.

Two others are mentioned in the cuneiform tablets—the *šêdu* and the *lamassu*, the former being the name for either a guardian deity or an evil spirit. As evil, it is found in an exorcism which begins, 'Spirit (*šêdu*) that minisheth heaven and earth, that minisheth the land, spirit that minisheth the land, of giant strength, of giant strength and giant tread.'[9] In this quality of evil the surrounding Semitic nations borrowed the word from Assyria—the Hebrews under the form *shēdîm*, the Aramæans as *shêda*; but it had also its beneficent side, thus approximating to the idea of a guardian angel. With the *lamassu*, which appears always as a kindly spirit, it is appealed to at the end of invocations, both being frequently called upon to be present after the evil spirit has been cast out.[1]

In addition to the Assyrian demons specified by separate class-names, there are the 'Seven Spirits,' now well known from the following incantation:

'Seven are they! Seven are they!
In the Ocean Deep, seven are they!
Battening in heaven, seven are they!
Bred in the depths of the Ocean;
Nor male nor female are they,
But are as the roaming wind-blast,
No wife have they, no son can they beget;
Knowing neither mercy nor pity,
They hearken not to prayer or supplication.
They are as horses reared amid the hills,
The Evil Ones of Ea;
Guzalû to the gods are they,
They stand in the highway to befoul the path.

Evil are they, evil are they!
Seven are they, seven are they,
Twice seven are they!'[2]

'From land to land they roam,
Driving the maid from her chamber,
Sending the man forth from his home,
Expelling the son from the house of his father,
Hunting the pigeons from their cotes,
Driving the bird from its nest,
Making the swallow fly forth from its hole,
Smiting both oxen and sheep.
They are the evil spirits that chase the great storms,
Bringing a blight on the land.'[3]

'They creep like a snake on their bellies,
They make the chamber to stink like mice,
They give tongue like a pack of hounds.'[4]

These seven spirits are undoubtedly the same as those mentioned in Lk 11[24ff.], and in a Syriac charm.[5] They are exorcized under the name of 'seven accursed brothers.' They are described in this charm as saying: 'We go on our hands, so that we may eat flesh, and we crawl along upon our hands, so that we may drink blood.' Their predilection for blood is shown in the Assyrian incantation:

'Knowing no mercy, they rage against mankind,
They spill their blood like rain,
Devouring their flesh (and) sucking their veins.'[6]

To them eclipses were due; just as the modern Semite believes that he must frighten away the evil spirits from the darkening sun or moon,[7] so did the ancient Assyrian ascribe such a phenomenon to spirit influence. These seven spirits are said to have attacked the moon-god; and Bel, hearing what they had done, sent his servant Nuzku to take counsel with Ea against them:

'O my minister, Nuzku!
Bear my message unto the Ocean Deep,
Tell unto Ea in the Ocean Deep
The tidings of my son Sin, the Moon-god,
Who in heaven hath been grievously bedimmed.'[8]

Ea heard the message which Nuzku brought, and bit his lip in grief; he summoned his son Marduk and conveyed to him the tidings of the moon-god. [After this the tablet becomes mutilated.] When an eclipse did occur, it was held that man might be susceptible to its concomitant evils; many, indeed, are the prayers made to avert the baneful influence:

'In the evil of an eclipse of the moon which in such and such a month on such and such a day has taken place, in the evil of the powers, of the portents, evil and not good, which are in my palace and my land.'[9]

3. Semi-human demons.—The third class of spirit—a goblin of semi-human parentage—must be reckoned the most interesting of the three; and the evidence for belief in such a monster is well-

1 Zimmern, 'Ritualtafeln,' in his *Beiträge zur Kenntnis*, etc. p. 164.
2 See Thompson, *Devils*, i., Tablet III. l. 28, Tablet 'C', l. 179; *WAI* ii. 17, i. 4. 3; and Haupt, *loc. cit.* II. i. l. 3.
3 Thompson, *Devils*, i., Tablet V. col. iv. l. 17.
4 G. Smith, *Hist. of Sennacherib*, 1878, p. 114, l. 6.
5 *WAI* v. 50, i. l. 51; cf. Job 4[15] 'Then a spirit passed before my face; the hair of my flesh stood up.'
6 Haupt, *loc. cit.* II. iii. l. 59.
7 Myhrman, *ZA* xvi. [1902] 155; *WAI* iv. 56, l. 1.
8 Küchler, *Assyr.-bab. Medizin*, Leipzig, 1904, p. 60, ll. 28, 30, 31, etc.
9 Thompson, *Devils*, i., Tablet V. col. iv. l. 8 ff.

1 Thompson, *Devils*, i., Tablet III. ll. 88 ff., 153, 286; Tablet 'K', ll. 205, 224, etc.
2 *Ib.* Tablet V. col. v. l. 28 ff.
3 *Ib.* Tablet IV. col. i. l. 24 ff.
4 *Ib.* Tablet 'C', l. 213 ff.
5 H. Gollancz, *Selection of Charms*, 1898, p. 87.
6 Thompson, *Devils*, i., Tablet V. col. iv. l. 22 ff.
7 Doughty, *Arabia Deserta*, i. 289; on noise driving evil spirits away among other races, see Frazer, *GB*[2], 1900, iii. 66, 91.
8 Thompson, *Devils*, i., Tablet XVI. l. 114 ff.
9 King, *Bab. Magic and Sorcery*, London, 1896, p. xxv; see also Scheil, *Une Saison de fouilles*, Paris, 1896, p. 96.

attested among the Semites. We must first discuss the triad called *lilû*, *lilitu*, and *ardat lilî*. The second is obviously the feminine counterpart of the first, but it is not so easy to discern what is the difference between the two last. These two—the *lilitu* and *ardat lili*—are both female demons, the femininity of the latter being especially emphasized by the word *ardatu*, which always has reference to the woman of marriageable age. The *ardat lili* seems to have assumed the traditional functions of the Heb. Lilith (obviously the same word as *lilitu*), who was Adam's second wife during the period of Eve's separation; and ever since that time the class of *succubæ* known by the same name have been reckoned as the ghostly wives of unmarried men. The Assyr. *succuba*, the *ardat lilî*, was forced by her desire to roam abroad by night until she found a mate. In a tablet giving a list of demons and spirits we read of the '*ardat lilî* that hath no husband, the *idlu lilî* that hath no wife'[1] (the second being the male equivalent of the first); and in another we find mentioned 'the man whom an *ardat lilî* hath looked upon, the man with whom an *ardat lilî* hath had union.'[2]

The Arabs believe in the same possibility. Sayce quotes as an instance that 'about fifteen years ago there was a man in Cairo who was unmarried, but had an invisible *ginna* as wife. One day, however, he saw a woman and loved her, and two days later he died.'[3] The present writer met with the same form of belief at Mosul, and, while discussing *jinn* and spirits with some of the Arabs on the mound of Nineveh, was told by one of them that he knew a man who was visited by night by a beautiful woman-spirit, who had already borne him three children.[4] The Rabbis attest the same belief in their stories of Lilith having borne to Adam devils, spirits, and *lilin*;[5] and they held that men might have children through a *mésalliance* with a demon, and, although these might not be visible, yet they would crowd round their father's death-bed, waiting for his demise to hail him as their parent.[6]

Besides these demons, various diseases were personified in the same way. We find exorcisms against sickness beginning thus:

'Fever unto the man, against his head, hath drawn nigh,
Disease (*namtaru*) unto the man, against his life, hath drawn nigh,
An evil spirit against his neck hath drawn nigh.'[7]

Or another:

'The evil Fever hath come like a deluge, and
Girt with dread brilliance; it filleth the broad earth.[8]

The Ninth Tablet of the series 'Headache' is similar:

'Headache roameth over the desert, blowing like the wind.'[9]

The Plague-god, Namtar, is best known from the story of the Descent of Ishtar into Hades. He is the 'messenger of Allat, the queen of Hades,' and, when Ishtar reaches the under world, he is sent by his mistress to smite the goddess with disease.[10]

Another spirit of Pestilence is Ura, and with this demon are connected the little amulets of inscribed clay,[11] written to avert evil from the house, just as the modern inhabitant of the Near East affixes Arabic charms to his walls[12] (see also CHARMS AND AMULETS [Assyr.-Bab.]).

LITERATURE.—F. Lenormant, *La Magie chez les Chaldéens*, Paris, 1874, 1875 (Eng. tr. 1877); A. H. Sayce, *Hibbert Lectures*, London, 1887 (3rd ed. 1891), also *Religions of Ancient Egypt and Babylonia*, Edinburgh, 1902; M. Jastrow, *Rel. of Bab. and Assyria*, Boston, 1898, also *Rel. Bab. und Assyriens*, 2 vols., Giessen, 1905 ff.; L. W. King, *Bab. Religion*, London, 1899; H. Zimmern, *Beiträge zur Kenntnis der bab. Religion*, Leipzig, 1896–1901; C. Fossey, *La Magie assyrienne*, Paris, 1902; R. Campbell Thompson, *Devils and Evil Spirits of Babylonia*, London, 1904, 1905, also *Semitic Magic*, London, 1908; T. G. Pinches, *Rel. of Bab. and Assyria*, London, 1906.

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1 Haupt, *loc. cit.* II. ii. l. 30.
2 *WAI* v. 50, i. l. 41.
3 *FL* xi. [1900] 388.
4 See *PSBA*, Feb. 1906, p. 83.
5 Eisenmenger, *Entdecktes Judentum*, Frankfort, 1700, ii. 413.
6 *Ib.* pp. 421, 425.
7 Thompson, *Devils*, ii., Tablet XI. l. 1 ff.
8 *Ib.* Tablet 'M', l. 1 ff.
9 *Ib.* p. 65, l. 1.
10 King, *Bab. Rel.* p. 181.
11 King, *ZA* xi. 50.
12 The present writer saw two such at Chokurlu in Asia Minor, written in Arabic against face-ache (see his art. in *PSBA*, Nov. 1910, p. 238).

DEMONS AND SPIRITS (Buddhist).—

Demon-worship enters largely into the daily life of Eastern peoples. In India, where Buddhism arose, the popular religion, both Buddhist and Brahmanical, in common with that of Easterns generally, has concerned itself less with the prospects of happiness in a future life and the 'higher truths' of the religion than with the troubles in the present life supposed to arise from evil spirits, who everywhere infest the atmosphere and dwellings, and are regarded as the cause of all sickness and misfortune. The higher dogmatic religion and the arrangements for the future life are handed over largely to the priests; but the people themselves take an active and anxious part in counteracting the machinations of the evil spirits, of whom they live in perpetual dread.

Buddhism from its very commencement appears to have accepted the Hindu mythology, with its evil and good spirits, as part of its theory of the universe. Śākyamuni himself seems to have taken over from the Brahmanical teachers of his time, amongst other tenets, the current belief in the gods and demons of the Indian pantheon, and he is represented in the more authentic early texts as referring to these beings as objects of fixed belief. He also accepted the current Brahmanical view that, like all other living things, they were impermanent and ultimately subject to death and endless re-birth, many of them having in previous existences been men. Thus, the gods and demons, being incapable of saving themselves from death and the misery of re-birth, could not be expected to save man; and so Buddha declared that their worship was one of the things which are not profitable and therefore unnecessary, and that he himself as 'the Perfectly Enlightened One,' or the Buddha, was superior to all divinities. Nevertheless, as these gods and demons were still believed to be capable of doing harm as well as good to man, though they could not effect his spiritual salvation, they continued more or less to be objects of popular worship even in early Buddhism, as is seen in the most ancient monuments.

Whether Buddha himself seriously believed in these divinities may be doubted. Yet the earliest texts agree in ascribing to him the statement that he descended from 'the heavens of the 33 gods,' in order to save mankind. Moreover, in the early Jātaka tales of his imaginary previous existences, he claimed to have been one or other of the gods in former times, mentioning himself 4 times as Brahmā (the most exalted of all at the epoch of Buddha), 20 times as Śakra or Indra, 43 times as a tree-god, and once as a fairy. In his *sūtras*, or sermons, the god Brahmā is referred to as one of the most frequent of his auditors. And the culminating episode of Śākyamuni's career—the attainment of Buddhahood at Gaya—is universally represented as a personal struggle with Māra, the Satan of the Buddhist world, and his daughters, Desire, Unrest, and Pleasure. This event is regarded by Buddhists generally not as an allegory, but as an actual bodily temptation and a conflict with manifested evil spirits.

The Buddhist pantheon thus had for its nucleus the polytheistic Brahmanical one, which embodied a physiolatry, or worship of the personified forces of Nature. It soon, however, became much more extensive: (1) by the creation of new deities and spirits of a special Buddhist type, personifying abstract conceptions of that religion; and (2) by the wholesale incorporation of much of the contents of the aboriginal pantheons of those peoples outside India over which Buddhism extended its conquests as a 'world-religion.' In this way the Buddhist pantheon has become the largest in the world, especially in its array of demons and spirits.

The distinctively Buddhist demons and spirits of Indian Buddhism, while generally modelled on the type of the Brahmanical, are specifically different from these in their functions, in their appearance as pictured and sculptured, and in their outward symbols. They range from the modes of their prototype Rudra (Śiva) in his destructive mood, through the *asuras*, or Titanic demons, to the *rākṣasas* and *piśāchas*, the most malignant fiends. To these classes may be relegated most of the non-Brahmanical spirits mentioned in the early Buddhist texts or figured in the early sculptures. Some of these supernatural beings, although unknown to Brahmanical texts, may have been local Indian spirits, not necessarily Buddhistic, *e.g.* the famous she-devil Hāritī. Māra, the personified Evil Principle and tempter of man, presents a close analogy to the Satan of the Bible, although he was not a fallen angel in the literal sense; nor was he, like Ahriman of the Persians, an antagonist of equal power. Though unknown by that name to the Brahmans, he is manifestly a form of the Indian god of death, Yama (Skr. *mar*, 'to die'), and in other aspects he resembles the god of sensuous desire (*kama*).

As Buddhism extended its range outside its monastic order and became a religion of the people, it gave greater prominence to these supernatural beings, in which the people implicitly believed, and began to create special divinities of its own. These new divinities and demons it figured in special conventional attitudes, with characteristic symbols, which at once distinguished them from the Brahmanical; and the laity were made familiar with the conventional appearance of the leading ones by means of the frequent sacred plays and masked dances. These various spirits are not classed in any definite systematic order in the Indian Buddhist texts, but they are often enumerated as follows:

(*a*) *Celestial Bodhisattvas*, of a divine or demoniacal Śaivite type, *e.g.* Avalokita, and Vajrapāṇi. (*b*) *Nāgas* and *Mahoragas*, snake-like or dragon beings, resembling clouds, living in the sky or under water, their maidens assuming siren-like shapes, often evil spirits: *e.g.* Muchilinda, who shielded Śākyamuni under the Bodhi tree at Gaya. (*c*) *Yakṣas*, genii often friendly to man: *e.g.* the *yakṣa* Vardhana (='Increase'), who was the guardian of Buddha's family and tribe at Kapilavastu. (*d*) *Asuras* (lit. 'ungodly' spirits), giant demons, headed by Rāhu, the personified eclipse. (*e*) *Rākṣasas*, ogre-fiends capable of assuming siren-like forms; *daityas*, *kumbhāṇḍas*, *piśāchas*, and *pretas*, or starveling ghosts, spectres, vampire-ghouls: *e.g.* Piṅgala. (*f*) Malignant fiends of hell and the soil.

Many of these evil spirits, like the *δαίμονες* of the Greeks, might become friendly and good genii to their human votaries. The exorcizing or coercing of the actively harmful amongst these evil spirits, by means of certain *sūtras* spoken by Buddha or stereotyped sentences culled therefrom, seems to have been practised from very early times, possibly even from Buddha's own day. The right-hand disciple of Buddha, Maudgalyayana, is generally credited in the early scriptures with having exorcized evil spirits in this way; and the recital of such *sūtras*—the so-called *Paritta*, or '*Pirit*' service—is the most favoured and popular way of combating sickness and misfortune at the present day amongst the 'Southern' Buddhists; whilst in 'Northern' Buddhism such procedure is still more widely developed.

In later times the Indian Buddhist pantheon—itself an offshoot of the Brahmanical, and living side by side with it—continued to develop along lines similar to those taken by its parent. Thus, in the extreme pantheistic phase it evolved a supreme primordial Buddha-god existing from everlasting to everlasting, the Adibuddha (*q.v.*). The rise of the devotional spirit, with its craving for personal deities to whom intimate prayer could be addressed — the *Bhakti* phase, resulting in the introduction into Brahmanism of Śiva, Viṣṇu, Kṛṣṇa, Rāma, and others, with their female energies (*śaktis*)—was echoed in Buddhism by the creation of a host of celestial Bodhisattvas, male and female, *e.g.* Mañjuśrī and Tārā. These were able and willing to assist those who invoked them as personal gods (*yidam*); and some of them (*e.g.* Marīchī) were fiendish in type. Similarly, with the innovations of *Yoga* and the degraded Tantra developments, certain sections of the Buddhists kept pace with these by parallel movements which added to the Buddhist pantheon.

The extreme Tantrik phase termed *Kālachakra*, or 'Wheel of Death,' about the 10th cent. A.D., introduced a rampant demonolatry, with exacting priestly rites, into a religion which in its origin was largely a protest against worship and ritual of every kind. The majority of these demons were monstrous 'king-devils' of the most hideous Śaivite type, with their equally repulsive spouses. The chief were Vajra-bhairava, Saṁvara, Hayagrīva, and Guhya-kāla. Their function was to be tutelaries (*yidam*) to guard their human votary against the attack of the swarms of minor demons, whilst they themselves were to be gained over to perform these friendly offices by the coercing power of Buddhist spells. Certain of them were also specially selected as 'defenders of the faith' (*dharmapāla*), and also as guardians of particular monasteries and particular sects.

At the present day, such extravagant demonolatry prevails to a greater or less extent throughout the Mahāyāna (or 'Great Vehicle') form of Buddhism in China, Korea, and Japan; but most of all in Tibet (see 'Tibetan' art. below) and Mongolia. The demonolatry of the 'Southern' Buddhists in Burma, Ceylon, and Siam is of the earlier and less rampant type.

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DEMONS AND SPIRITS (Celtic).[1]—*Introductory.*—In the case of Celtic countries it is not always easy to draw a clear line of distinction between the beneficent and the maleficent types of those supernatural beings that cannot be counted in the ranks of definite individual gods and goddesses. There are, indeed, imaginary beings in Celtic folk-lore that are predominantly of a maleficent disposition; but the majority of these beings are, like human beings themselves, of mixed character. The term 'demon' in English has acquired a precision of meaning, as applied to maleficent supernatural beings, which makes it a difficult term to employ in describing the conditions reflected in the religion and folk-lore of the Celts. Again, the term 'spirits,' so far as the facts of Celtic folk-lore are concerned, must be used in a somewhat wide sense, and, in some measure, its use is bound to overlap that of 'demon,' since it is difficult, in the folk-lore of Celtic countries, to draw very clear lines of distinction between the different types of beings which the Celtic imagination has created. The clearest and broadest line of demarcation, perhaps, that would meet the case would be that separating the actual living beings, both animal and human, which people the visible tangible world of everyday life on the one hand, and, on the other, those unreal beings which are imagined as living normally a life hidden from view in those localities and recesses of the earth which easily lend themselves to concealment (such as caves or hollows, or some supposed subterranean, sub-lacustrine, or submarine region), or in islands of the sea (actual or

[1] Cf., throughout, artt. CELTS and COMMUNION WITH DEITY (Celtic).

imaginary), or in some wild and inaccessible tract of land, or in the depths of a great forest. Further, the lives and actions of these imaginary beings are pictured as being governed by conditions that may be summarily described as magical—conditions entirely at variance with the facts of human experience, but which have, none the less, occasional points of resemblance to those of ordinary existence. Moreover, the beings which are imagined as living under these abnormal conditions are thought of as endowed with abnormal powers; hence, in the Celtic world, they are viewed as equipped with various forms of magic skill, and are thereby specially associated with those human beings who are thought to have similar endowments. Nor is it always easy to distinguish, among these beings of the Celtic Other-world, (*a*) those which may be regarded as survivals from primitive Animism, such as the animate 'spirits' of inanimate things; (*b*) those which are ancient spirits of vegetation; (*c*) those which are beings imaginatively considered necessary as dwellers in a hypothetical Other-world; and (*d*) those which are exclusively regarded as the souls of departed human beings. In all parts of the Celtic world, as in other countries, there are ghost-stories, wherein the ghost is viewed as that of a particular human being; but very often the relationship of a ghost to an individual man or woman, whose soul it was, sinks into the background of the story, and the ghost is made to act like some other type of imaginary supernatural being. The various types, both in form and character, often merge into one another.

Again, one of the characteristics of the Other-world of the Celts, which may be said to follow as a corollary from its contrast with the normal world, is that the beings supposed to people it do not, like those of the actual world, keep their own forms, but undergo various transformations. Hence it is not always possible to distinguish clearly between those of animal and those of human form, inasmuch as those of one form may pass into a form that is usually characteristic of the other, and, along with the change of form, there may also be a change of character or disposition. Consequently a being which might appear as a demon, in the English sense of the term, at one time, might at another conceivably be represented in some other form as a benign spirit. In some degree, perhaps, the absence of definiteness of character[1] in question may be the reflexion in Celtic folk-lore of certain human types, which are not unknown in Celtic experience, where qualities that are in the highest degree laudable are combined with others that are glaringly out of harmony with them, as, for example, the combination of a highly temperate and devout life with constant unpunctuality or frequent remissness in the keeping of promises and engagements. The inhabitants of Celtic countries have not, as a rule, been sorted out, during a process of severe and relentless moral drilling, into distinct and fixed ethical classes to the same extent as the inhabitants of some Teutonic lands; and the prevalent ethical conditions in Celtic society are naturally in some degree reflected even in Celtic folk-lore.

Another point, again, which deserves consideration is that, in Celtic folk-lore, the beings whose normal home is the Other-world are far from being rigidly confined to that region, but are represented as coming to view in the actual world either by day or by night—in current folk-lore preferably by night. They are regarded as appearing either singly or in groups; and those to whom they appear may see them either as solitary spectators or in company with others. They are also represented as entering into various dealings with normal human beings, and among the relations included in folk-lore narrative is that of intermarriage. Further, just as the beings of the Other-world may enter this world, the men of this world may enter the Other-world, whether by invitation, accident, or invasion. Many Celtic legends, such as *Tochmarc Étaine* ('The Betrothal of Étain') in Irish, and the story of *Pwyll, Pendefig Dyfed* ('Pwyll, Prince of Dyfed'), in Welsh, are largely based upon belief in inter-relations between the two worlds of the type in question. Christian teaching and the spread of education have done much to assimilate the Celtic consciousness, in the matter of belief in imaginary beings, to that of advanced civilization; yet enough of the ancient psychological attitude of the native Celtic mind still exists to enable one to form a fair estimate of the extraordinary hold which this belief must have had upon the mind in ages further back.

1. Celtic demons and spirits in antiquity.—A large number of the names of Celtic deities that have survived (for the most part on inscriptions) are names which occur but once, and consequently they may be regarded as probably the names of local deities or local tutelary spirits. Sometimes the name is clearly identical with that of some town, river, or mountain (see the present writer's list of 'Ancient Celtic Deities,' in *Trans. Gaelic Soc. of Inverness*, 1906); in other cases, the origin of the name is unknown. About two hundred and sixty names, which occur only once on inscriptions, have come down to us, and there were at one time, doubtless, many more. Along with these individual names there existed others of grouped supernatural beings, such as (*a*) the *Bacucci*, of whom Cassian (*Conlat.* vii. 32. 2) says:

'Alica ita eorum corda quos ceperant inani quodam tumora videmus infecisae, quos etiam Bacuceoa vulgus appellat, ut aemetipaoa ultra proceritatem aui corporis erigentca nunc quidem aa in quosdam fastus gestusqua auatollerent, nunc vero velut adclines ad quendam ae tranquillitatia et adfabilitatia atatum communes blandosqua aubmitterent, aeseque velut inlustrea et circumspectabilea omnibus aestimantes nunc quidem adorare ae poteatates sublimiorea corporis inflexione monstrarent, nunc vero ab aliia ae crederent adorari et omnes motus quibus vera officia aut auperbe aut humiliter peraguntur explerent.'

(*b*) The *Castæcæ or Castæci* are known to us only from an inscription from Caldas de Vizella (*CIL* ii. 2404: 'Reburrinus lapidarius Castæcis v.l. [s] m.'), and similarly (*c*) the *Icotii* or *Icotiæ* are mentioned on an inscription at Cruviers, Dép. Gard (*CIL* xii. 2902: 'Icotiis'), while (*d*) the *Dusii* are mentioned by three writers, who all appear to view them as maleficent. The word *dusios* in Celtic probably meant an unclean demon or *incubus*, but the root of the word is not improbably cognate with that of the Greek θεός (where θ stands for an original *dh* which would become in Celtic *d*), and suggests that, at one time, the character of these beings was regarded as beneficent or neutral.

The passages relating to the *Dusii* are tba following: Augustine (*de Civ. Dei*, xv. 23): 'Quosdam daemonea, quos Dusios Galli nuncupant, adaidue hanc inmunditiam et temptare et efficere, plures talesqua adseverant, ut hoc negare iopudentiae videatur.' Similarly, Isidore (*Or.* viii. 11, 103): 'Pilosi, qui Graeca Panitae, Latine Incubi appellantur. . . . Saepe inprobi existunt, etiam mulieribus, et earum peragunt concubitum, quos daemones Galli Dusios vocant, quia adsidue hanc peragunt inmunditiam'; *ib.* 104: 'Quem autem vulgo Incubonem vocant, hunc Romano Faunum Ficarium dicunt.' Further, Hincmar (*de Divortio Lotharii*, i. 654, ed. Sirm.) aaya: 'Quaedam etiam feminaa a Dusiis in specie virorum, quorum amore ardebant, concubitum pertulisse inventae sunt.'

(*e*) The *Ifles* are a group of male gods, whose name occurs on an inscription at Dormagen, in the region of Düsseldorf (*Corp. Inscr. Rhenanarum* [*CIR*] 292: 'Iflibus Marcus et Atius v.s.l.l.m.'), that were clearly regarded as beneficent. (*f*) The *Nervini* or *Nervinæ* were probably a tribal group

[1] In tba case of tha Welsh fairiea, for example, tbe elements of beneficence and maleficence, as the folk-lore atories about them abow, are curiously blended in their characters. They are represented as being at times helpful to man, at other timea aa mischievous and vindictive (see Rhŷs, *Celtic Folklore*, vol. i. *passim*).

of beneficent deities or spirits that were connected with the tribe of the Nervii. In one case we have, as the name of a group of deities that were regarded as beneficent, the plural of one of the most widely diffused of Divine names in the Celtic world, namely (*g*) *Lugoves*, the plural of *Lugus*.

This plural form occurs on the following inscriptions: (1) at Osma, in the territory of the Celtiberi (*CIL* ii. 2818): 'Lugovibus sacrum L(ucius) L(icinius?) Urcico collegio sutorum d(enum) d(edit)'; (2) at Avenches, in the territory of the Helvetii (*CIL* xiii. 5078): 'Lugoves'; (3) at Bonn (*CIR* 469): '[Do]mesticis [Lugo]vibus. . . .'

Other beneficent spirits are (*h*) the *Di Casses*, who are mentioned on inscriptions as follows:

(1) At Lorsch (*CIR* 1386): 'Cas[sibus] pro sal[ute] dd(dominorum duorum) nn(ostrorum)'; (2) at Ober-Klingen, in Hesse-Darmstadt (*CIR* 1398): 'Cassibus vota fece(runt) Macelu(s) Faustinu(s) m(erito) p(osuerunt)'; (3) at Landstuhl, Pfalz (*CIR* 1779): 'Diss (*sic*) Cassibus Matuinus v.s.l.m.'; (4) at Neustadt, on the Hardt: 'Dis Cassibus Castus Taluppe v.s.l.l.m.'

Another group of beings that corresponded to the type in question was that of (*i*) the *Di Silvani*, to whom, along with their female counterparts the *Silvanæ*, there is a reference on an inscription at Barcelona (*CIL* ii. 4499: 'D(is) d(eabus) Silvanis M. Antonius Cr[esc]ens v.s.l.m.'). This is the only certain instance of a group of male gods of this name. By far the most common groups of supernatural beings mentioned on inscriptions in connexion with Celtic districts are (*j*) the *Matres* and (*k*) the *Matronæ*, while there are smaller groups of (*l*) *Proximæ* and (*m*) *Junones*. These 'Mothers' and 'Kinswomen' seem to have been regarded as the protecting deities of various localities; and their worship appears to have been prevalent, not only among the Celts, but also in certain Teutonic tribes (see an article by the present writer on 'Celtic Goddesses' in *CeR* for July 1906, and art. CELTS, vol. iii. p. 280). These goddesses probably represent a very early phase of Celtic religion, and are to be regarded as more akin to groups of spirits (possibly corn-spirits) than to the individualized deities of a later stage. There is a remarkable parallel to them in one of the current Welsh names for a type of beneficent fairy, namely, *Y Mamau*, 'the Mothers,' used in some parts of S. Wales as a name for the fairies in the expression *Bendith y Mamau*, 'the blessing of the Mothers,' and also found in the name of a well-known hill of the Clwydian range, *Y Foel Famau*, 'The hill of the Mothers.' Cf. art. DEÆ MATRES. To the foregoing may be added (*n*) the *Niskai* ('water-nymphs') mentioned on the Amélie-les-Bains tablets (COMMUNION WITH DEITY [Celtic], vol. iii. p. 748[a]).

2. Demons and spirits in mediæval times.—From the foregoing account it will be seen that, in the Celtic countries of antiquity, a belief was held, not only in certain individual gods and goddesses, both local and non-local, bearing names of their own, but also in groups of supernatural beings, who, by the very fact that they were nameless, may be regarded as beings in a sense on a lower plane than the named deities, and so may be fitly included, for the most part, in the category of demons and spirits. How far they may have been considered as the indwelling spirits of inanimate things, or as the spirits of vegetation, or as the souls of dead ancestors, animal or human, it is impossible to say. The Celts, like other nations of antiquity, doubtless believed in the existence of spirits of human beings, which were, in some mysterious way, connected with the breath, the name, and the shadow. Like the Greek σκιά and the Latin *umbra*, the Welsh term *ysgawd* ('shadow'), for instance, was used for the soul. The more usual Welsh word, however, for the soul is *enaid*, a derivative of the root *an-*, 'to breathe.' In mediæval Welsh this term is constantly used in the sense of 'life,' but the meaning 'soul' is also frequent. There are traces, too (Rhŷs, *Celt. Folk-lore*, iii. 601–604), of a belief that the soul might take on the bodily form of some animal, such as a lizard. In the Middle Ages, Christianity had introduced, both into Goidelic and into Brythonic speech, certain terms of Greek and Latin origin, such as Ir. *diabul*, Welsh *diafl* (in a later form *diafol*), from *diabolus*; together with such forms as Ir. *demun*, 'demon,' and Welsh *cythraul*, the latter being derived from Lat. *contrārius* through **contrālius* (where *l* has been substituted for *r* by dissimilation). The Ir. *spiorad* (older *spirut*), 'spirit,' and the Welsh *ysbryd* of the same meaning, both come from Lat. *spiritus*. At the same time other terms of native origin for the supernatural beings of folk-lore survived, such as Ir. *side* and *aes side*, 'the fairies,' whence the term *ban side* ('banshee'), which means literally 'woman-fairy.' The oldest Welsh term used in mediæval Welsh for a fairy is *hud*, together with its derivative *hudol*, in the same sense, for a male fairy and *hudoles* for a female fairy. *Hud* also means 'magic,' and this use of the same term for both fairy-land and magic well illustrates the inseparable connexion, for the Celtic mind, of magic with the Other-world.

In Irish legend there are many allusions to the *side* (as, for instance, in *Serglige Conculaind* ('The Sick-bed of Cúchulainn' [Windisch, *Irische Texte*, Leipzig, 1880–1905, i. 214 f., 227]); and in *Tochmarc Étaine* ('The Betrothal of Étain' [*ib.* pp. 120, 131]). In one passage of the latter a fairy domicile (*síd*) is definitely associated with *Brig Léith*, 'the hill of Liath(mac Celtchair),' the Irish counterpart of the Welsh Llwyd, son of Kilcoed, a famous magician, twice mentioned in the *Mabinogion*, and once by the Welsh 14th cent. poet, Dafydd ab Gwilym. In the *Book of Armagh*, the *side* are called 'dei terreni,' and they appear to have been regarded as dwelling either in hills or on islands such as Mag Mell. In the latter case, one of the means of journeying to them was in a ship of glass. Some of the fairies were regarded as male (*fer-side*), but they were more often regarded as female (*ban-side*). The legendary characters, Mider (*Tochmarc Étaine*, in Windisch, *Ir. Texte*, p. 121 ff.) and Manannán mac Lir (*Serglige Conculaind*, 225), were associated with them, and, in the latter story, two of their kings bear the names Failbe Find and Labraid. When pictured as women, they were represented as being clothed in white raiment. In the story of Cendla Caem (given in Windisch, *Ir. Gram.*, Leipzig, 1879, pp. 118–120) they are described as wishing to carry off mortal men into their land of perpetual youth, or to marry mortals; thus Étain, a fairy princess, married Eochaid Airem, and was carried back later on to fairy-land by Mider, a prince of the fairies. The connexion between the *side* and the Tuatha Dé Danann of Irish legend is very obscure.

In Irish legend there was one native term for a supernatural being which was apparently always of maleficent import, namely, *siabrae* (*Leabhar na hUidhre*, 113[b] 41, 114[a] 12, 115[a] 32). This word is undoubtedly the phonetic equivalent of the Welsh *hwyfar*—a term no longer used except in the Welsh original of Guinevere, namely, Gwenhwyfar, a name which must originally have meant 'the white phantom.' This appellation would suggest that *hwyfar* had not originally in Welsh the connotation of malignity, which *siabrae* seems to have acquired in Irish.

In mediæval Welsh the name *hud* in the sense of 'fairy' is applied in the *Black Book of Carmarthen* (Poem xxxiii, l. 17) to Gwyn, son of Nudd (*Gwyn* = Ir. *Find*; *Nudd* = Ir. *Nuada*); and his mistress is said to be Creurddilad, the daughter of Lludd (the Welsh original of Geoffrey of Monmouth's Cordelia, daughter of King Lear). In the story of *Kulhwch and Olwen*, Gwyn is represented as fighting every first of May until the Day of Judgment with Gwythyr for the hand of Creurddilad. In the poetry of Dafydd ab Gwilym, which reflects the current Welsh folk-lore of the 14th cent., Gwyn is regarded as in some sense the leader of the 'fairies,' since they are called by the poet *Tylwyth Gwyn* ('the family of Gwyn') in two passages. The Welsh picture of fairy-land given by the poet by no means represents it as a 'land of eternal youth,' since among its dwellers are mentioned *gwrachiod* ('hags'), nor can it be said that the picture given of its inhabitants suggests their beneficent character.

The expression *Y Tylwyth Teg* ('the fair family') for the fairies is found in the poems of Dafydd ab Gwilym (middle of 14th cent.), and the term itself would seem to imply that, in the main, their disposition was originally viewed as beneficent and their appearance pleasing, though the poet describes the colour of one of them as brown (*gwineu*). At the same time the allusions to them in Dafydd ab Gwilym well illustrate the statement made at the beginning of the article, that it is difficult to assign a hard and fast type of character to several of the beings of the Celtic Other-world. For example, the

term *pegor*, used for 'a pygmy,' and for the fabulous dwellers in submarine regions (*Bl. Book of Carmarthen*, Poem v. l. 4)—a term found also in Dafydd ab Gwilym (Poem lxv.)—is one of a neutral type; and so is *corr*, 'a dwarf'—a word which occurs several times in the *Mabinogion*. In some cases a *corr* is represented as acting in a brutal and churlish manner (as in the story of *Geraint and Enid*), but in the story of *Peredur* the narrator appears to view the dwarf and his wife sympathetically. The name of the mythical tribe called the *Coraniaid*, in the story of *Lludd and Llevelys*, probably means 'the pygmies,' and they are certainly represented as intellectually acute but morally malicious.

Side by side with these beings of neutral or variable disposition, Welsh folk-lore in the Middle Ages, like that of Ireland, deals with certain types of beings that can only be regarded as 'demons' in the ordinary English sense. The term *ellyll*, for example, appears to be nowhere used in Welsh literature in a good sense.[1] In the Welsh triads (*Oxf. Mab.*, 1887, pp. 305, 306) there are references to *ellyllon* (pl. of *ellyll*), called 'the three forest-demons of the Isle of Britain' and 'the three stag-demons of the Isle of Britain,' but the precise significance of these names is not explained. In some of the instances given, the word *ellyll* is followed by a personal name, as in the phrase *ellyll Gwidawl* ('the demon of Gwidawl'). It is possible that, originally, the term *ellyll*, in expressions such as these, may have denoted a person's 'familiar spirit.' In Dafydd ab Gwilym, *ellyllon* are represented as 'wry-mouthed' (*mingeimion*), as haunting dingles, and as being foul and ill-grown. This picture of them is implied in the description of the owl as *ellylles adar* ('the female demon of birds'). The same writer has another term for a certain kind of goblin or ghost, namely *bwbach*—a term which clearly implied an object of terror. He calls his shadow, for instance, 'a goblin (*bwbach*) in the form of a bald monk,' while, further, he uses the verb *bwbachu* in the sense of 'to frighten as a ghost.' A term used for a kind of female demon by Dafydd ab Gwilym and others is *Y Ddera* (probably meaning originally 'the red one,' *dera* being phonetically equivalent to Ir. *derg*, 'red'). For ghosts, too, the term *gwylliaid* appears to be used by this poet (*e.g.* in Poem clix.), but the more usual mediæval term is *gwyllon*. This term appears to have been used for 'the ghosts of the dead' (*Bl. Book of Carmarthen*, Poem i. l. 35). The departed spirits of warriors seem to have been proverbially associated, even in mediæval Wales, with the Caledonian forest (*ib.* l. 36; also, *ib.* Poem xvii. l. 57). In a Welsh mediæval poet, Llywarch ab Llywelyn (*Myvyrian Archaiology*[2], Denbigh, 1870, p. 212a), there is an allusion to *gwyllon Kelyddon* ('the ghost of Caledonia'), as if this were a proverbial expression, and, when Arthur is represented as making an expedition (in the story of *Kulhwch and Olwen*) to the 'wild land of hell,' he is described as going to the North.

The abodes of the supernatural beings here described are, in the main, located in *Annwfn* or *Annwn*—a term most probably derived from *an-*, 'not,' and *dwfn* (cognate with Ir. *domun*), 'the world.' The dominant conception of *Annwfn*, therefore, was as a kind of magical counterpart of this world, and the Welsh mind in the Middle Ages associated with it the idea of illusion and want of substantiality. Dafydd ab Gwilym, speaking of a mirror as fragile and perishable, says of it that it was constructed by fairies (*hudolion*), and other references by him of the same type point in a similar direction. Hence, *Annwfn* appears to have meant 'a world which is no world.' *Annwfn* was usually regarded as being located beneath the earth, but certain poems of the *Book of Taliessin* (14th cent.) appear to regard it as consisting of a cluster of islands, to which Arthur journeys in his ship *Prydwen*. One poem in the same MS calls it 'Annwfn beneath the world' (*is cluyd*), and in keeping with this is the description of it by Dafydd ab Gwilym as 'the deep land of Annwfn,' to which the Summer is said to have gone during the months of Winter. According to the story of *Pwyll, Prince of Dyfed*, *Annwfn* was divided into kingdoms, whose boundaries were sometimes streams, as in the upper world. Inter-relations and inter-marriage were conceived as possible between the beings of the two worlds, and the boons of human civilization, at any rate in the form of swine, were thought to have come into the actual world from *Annwfn*. The relations, however, between the two worlds were not always necessarily amicable, and, just as heroes from the actual world might make expeditions into *Annwfn*, so beings from *Annwfn* might make raids upon this world. Such a raid appears in mediæval Welsh to have been called *gormes* (lit. 'an overflow,' then 'oppression'). Certain raids of this kind are suggested in various parts of the *Mabinogion*; for example, in the carrying away of the infant Pryderi, in the raid upon Teyrnon's foals, in the narrative of Manawyddan and the mice, and in the story of *Lludd and Llevelys*, as well as in the stealing of Mabon, son of Modron, from his mother. In these raids certain fabulous packs of hounds took part, which are sometimes called *Cwn Annwfn* ('the dogs of Annwfn'), and, by Dafydd ab Gwilym, *Cwn gormes* (Poem xliv.). There appear to be no beings of the vampire type among the supernatural beings of Irish and Welsh mediæval legend, but in Breton stories the werwolf (*bisclavaret*) seems to have played a part even in mediæval times.

[1] In the current folk-lore of some Welsh districts it appears that even an *ellyll* can be conciliated and made to bestow prosperity, if the candle is left burning on going to bed (Wirt Sikes, *British Goblins*, p. 15).

3. Demons and spirits in Celtic lands to-day.—In the remoter parts of Ireland, Scotland, Wales, and Brittany there is still a considerable survival of the older psychological attitude, especially in the sphere of the emotions, towards the supernatural beings of which Celtic folk-lore treats. The teaching of Christianity, whether by Roman Catholics, Anglicans, Presbyterians, or other religious denominations, for example, as to the lot of the dead, runs entirely counter to the belief in ghosts that are free to wander at random among the living; nevertheless, the fear of ghosts is a very real terror to many people, after nightfall, in Celtic as in other countries. So far as the period of daylight is concerned, the older frame of mind may, with the exception, perhaps, of the inhabitants of the least progressive Celtic regions, be said to have been completely modified through education and experience. With the advent of darkness, however, this older frame of mind tends to assert itself in consciousness—not, perhaps, so as to produce beliefs which their holder would regard as justifiable, but to a sufficient extent to perturb the emotions, especially in the presence of some uncanny or weird-looking object. In Ireland and the more secluded parts of the Highlands and Islands, there has been, on the whole, less of a breach of continuity with mediæval times than in Wales; and the same may be said of Brittany. Hence the beliefs of the Middle Ages form substantially the ground-work of the present-day attitude towards demons and spirits as it prevails in those regions. The Isle of Man, too, may be regarded as belonging, in the main, to the same psychological zone as Ireland. In the latter it is the 'Fairies' still, as in the Middle Ages, that are the chief supernatural beings of the type here considered; but, side by side with them, there subsists, in Ireland as elsewhere, the belief in the re-appearance of the ghosts of the departed, and also in the appearance of fabulous creatures, such as the *Puca*, the *Leprachaun*, the Water-bull, the Water-horse, and the like (see T. Crofton Croker, *Fairy Legends*). As to Gaelic Scotland, there is abundant material for the student of the modern Celtic mind in Campbell's *Tales of the W. Highlands*.

These tales describe such beings as the *glashan* (the Manx *glashtyn*), which was a hirsute sprite that rebelled against clothing, and, in this respect, resembled the *gruagach*, a similar sprite from Skipness. One of the tales (no. 100) describes an underground world of giants, and an earlier tale (no. 98) similarly points to a belief in gigantic beings. Another tale (no. 38) speaks of a monstrous being called *Eitidh MacCallain*, 'who had one hand growing out of his chest, one leg out of his haunch, and one eye out of the front of his face.' Other tales describe fairies, sleeping giants, flying ladies, mermaids, brownies, and the like, while not a few of the stories speak of such beings as the Water-horse or Water-kelpie (sometimes transformed into a man), the Water-bull, the Water-bird called the *Boobrie* (said to inhabit the fresh-water and sea lochs of Argyllshire), dragons (thought to haunt Highland lochs), and the Water-spirit called the *Vougha*. The Water-bull is generally

represented as the foe of the Water-horse and the friend of man. There are also stories of demons appearing as goats and dogs. It will readily be seen how this mass of Gaelic folk-lore has been coloured by the geographical conditions of the Western Highlands, and what is here true of the folk-lore of the Highlands is true of the folk-lore of all Celtic countries. In the Isle of Man the same essential beliefs are found as in the Western Highlands. The island had her fairies and her giants, her mermen, her brownies, her Water-bulls, and her Water-kelpies or Water-colts. The Water-bull (*tarroo ushtey*) haunts pools and swamps, and is the parent of strangely formed beasts and monsters. The Water-kelpie has the form of a grey colt, and wanders over the banks of the streams at night. The Manx name for a giant is *foawr* (from the same root as the Ir. *fomhor*). For a brownie the Manx name is *fenodyree*, and this being appears to resemble the Welsh *ellyll* in being a hairy and clumsy creature. There are also in Manx folk-lore beings called *glaistig* and *glaisrig* respectively, the former being a she-goblin, which takes the form of a goat, while the latter is described as a female fairy or a goblin, half-human, half-beast. The nearest approach to a vampire in Celtic folk-lore is the Water-colt, which is thoroughly vicious, and sucks the blood of maidens. Possibly to the Water-colt should be added certain Welsh fairies said to eat infants (Rhŷs, *Celtic Folklore*, ii. 673).

In Wales, the firm stand made against all forms of superstition by the strong Protestantism of the country, especially since Nonconformity has penetrated into every corner of the Principality, has, to a very great extent, shattered to pieces the mental attitude towards the Other-world which we find so clearly represented in the *Mabinogion* and in Dafydd ab Gwilym; but in remote districts, such as the Lleyn district of Carnarvonshire and the Welsh parts of Pembrokeshire, as well as in the more secluded portions of other counties, the old spirit still prevails among the unlettered, and not a few people retain a kind of working belief in the beings that may be roughly classified as demons and spirits. The spirits of the dead (called *bwganod* and *ysbrydion*) are still feared in such districts,[1] and tales concerning them abound. Every uncanny-looking portion of a lane has its ghost, and from caves they are rarely absent. Fairies are still known in most regions of Wales as *Y tylwyth teg*, but the term *Annwn* has gone out of use, except in the expression *Cwn Annwn*, 'the dogs of Annwn.' In Pembrokeshire, fairies were even in the 19th cent. supposed to attend the markets at Milford Haven and Laugharne. For ghosts the term used in some districts is *bwgan*, while in others the terms in use are *bwci* and *bwbach*. It is not improbable that one old term was *buga*, which is found in the Welsh name of the town of Usk in Monmouthshire—*Brynbuga*; while, in Glamorganshire, the name seems to take the form *bica*, found in the farm name *Ty Fica* ('the house of Bica'). The Welsh word *coblyn*, used especially of the sprites that are thought to haunt mines, is merely a modification of the English 'goblin'; while *pwca* is simply the English *Puck*—a name found as that of the glen of *Cwm Pwca*, a part of the vale of the Clydach in Breconshire. *Ellyllon* are still thought to haunt groves and valleys, and *bwyd ellyllon* ('demons' food') is the Welsh name for the poisonous toad-stool, just as *menyg ellyllon* ('demons' gloves') is a name for the foxglove. The term *ellylldan* ('demons' fire') is also used for 'the will-o'-the-wisp.' In the Lleyn district of Carnarvonshire a certain fiery apparition is said to take the form of 'a wheel within a wheel of fire.' The relation of fairies, sprites, and goblins with human beings are described in various folk-lore tales, for which the reader may consult the works of Sir John Rhŷs and Wirt Sikes (see Literature at end of art.).

Among the names used for certain of the supernatural beings here under consideration are *Bendith y Mamau*, 'the mothers' blessing'; *Gwragedd Annwn*, 'elfin dames'; *Plant Annwn*, 'elfin children'; *Plant Rhys Ddwfn*, 'the children of deep Rhys'; *Gwrach y Rhibyn*, a kind of Welsh banshee; *Cyhyraeth*, a kind of dreadful and doleful moan in the night, proceeding from an invisible source; *Tolaeth*, the imitation of some earthly sound, such as sawing, singing, or the tramping of feet; *Cwn y Wybr* (also known as *Cwn Annwn*), dogs that haunt the air; *Aderyn y Corph*, a bird which appears as a foreteller of death; *Toelu*, a phantom funeral; *Y Fad Felen*, the yellow plague; and *Mallt y nos*, a night-fiend.[1] Among the forms which the Welsh imagination has assigned to spectres have been a fiery ball, a black calf, an ass, a dog, a round ball, a roaring flame, a bull, a goose, a mastiff, a gosling. One type of female demon is described as being 'a hideous creature with dishevelled hair, long black teeth, long, lank, withered arms, leathern wings, and a cadaverous appearance.' The appearance of this being was always regarded as an omen of death. In Welsh folk-lore, as in that of the Gaelic world, there are stories of water-monsters, more especially of the *afanc*, which is usually regarded in Wales as a kind of crocodile, but which was originally, in the opinion of Sir John Rhŷs, a kind of monster in human form, as is suggested by the Irish cognate *abhac*.

In Wales, as elsewhere where a belief in demons and spirits is found, certain effective barriers could, it was thought, be placed to their malevolence and capacity for mischief. One check to them was piety, others were the possession of a black-handled knife (iron being a source of great terror to fairies), the turning of one's coat inside out, the pronunciation of the Divine name, the crowing of a cock, change in one's place of residence, and—last but not least—a barrier of furze, through which, on account of its prickly nature, it was thought that fairies and similar beings could not penetrate. In Brittany substantially the same conceptions of demons and spirits prevailed as in Wales; but, while Welshmen have to a great extent abandoned the attitude of intellectual assent to the legends in question, the more conservative Breton, with his closer attachment to mediæval conditions, is still often haunted by them, and probably will be for a long time to come. In Wales, it is not impossible that, before very long, these ancient relics of primitive belief will be things of the past; but in the remoter parts of Ireland and Scotland they will probably linger on for many generations.

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E. ANWYL.

DEMONS AND SPIRITS (Chinese).—The two words *kuei shen* (variously translated 'demons and spirits,' or 'demons and gods'—the variation indicating a vexed question in the tr. of Chinese religious terms) together make up a binomial phrase such as does duty in Chinese for a general term, and may be taken as denoting all the inhabitants of the spiritual world, the various objects of religious worship and superstitious fear.

The spiritual world lies very near to the average Chinaman. Signs of his belief in its influence on his daily life are frequent; and it gives one at times a shock of surprise to find, as may happen in a casual conversation, that one's interlocutor—a well-read scholar or shrewd merchant—holds firmly by conceptions of it which are to oneself grotesque. Its nomenclature is fairly extensive, but not precise. Nor is it easy to describe the spiritual world in any very orderly or consistent fashion. Allowance must be made not only for differences in local superstitions, but also for the intermingling of diverse strains of thought in the more generally

[1] There is no trace in the Welsh literature or folk-lore of any belief that the dead bodies themselves rise from their graves and haunt the living.

[1] In Carnarvonshire one particularly malevolent type of demon is called *Y Bodach Glas*, 'the blue goblin.'

diffused religious conceptions. While it is possible that Chinese religion started from a pure monotheism, we have no record of any such time. In the most ancient books the worship of Shang-ti is accompanied by the worship of natural objects, of the spirits of ancestors, and of the worthies of former times. All these elements have been continued and developed.

In the popular religion of to-day, the worship of spirits immanent in, or in some vaguely conceived way connected with, natural objects, takes a much larger place than can possibly be taken by the worship of Shang-ti, confined as this is to the Emperor. The number of such spirits is, strictly speaking, indefinite. In virtue of the spiritual efficacy connected with it, anything—rock, tree, living creature—may become an object of worship. No extraordinary feature in the object is necessary to call forth this religious observance—a whole town has been known to go after a common viper found in a bundle of firewood. Among the commonest signs of the recognition of such spiritual powers bound up with natural objects are the votive tablets frequently seen suspended from the branches of trees, and the small pillars which are erected alongside graves and inscribed to the spirit of the soil, in acknowledgment of his property in the site of the grave. Some such acknowledgment is due to the local genius, on any interference with what is supposed to be under his control. It is a moot question whether the spirit of the soil is one only, identified with Hou-t'u, one of the ministers of Huang Ti (2698 B.C.), or whether there are not, rather, at least in the popular mind, many local genii.

Alongside of such spirits, and at the lower end of the scale of spirits hardly to be distinguished from them, are the supernatural beings called *hsien, yao, kuei, ching* ('fairies,' 'elves,' 'goblins,' 'sprites'), of various kinds, harmless, or, more usually, mischievous and malevolent. Every locality has its own traditions with regard to such beings. In Swatow the morning watch is not sounded because of a 'kelpie' (*yao-ching*) in the harbour, which on hearing the watch-drum was wont to carry off any early-stirring inhabitant. Of living creatures it is said that in the south of China the serpent, and in the north the fox, are those round which belief in supernatural powers has mostly gathered. In general it is said that birds and animals when they grow old become sprites (*ching*). The fox, for instance, increases in supernatural qualities with increase of years, and possesses different powers at fifty years of age or a hundred or a thousand. Even of trees it is said that by long absorption of the subtle essences of heaven and earth they become possessed of supernatural qualities.

Besides these supernatural beings, and wholly impersonal, are the maleficent influences called *sha*. They move, like physical forces, in straight lines, and can be warded off in various ways, as by earthenware figures of lions set on the roof of a house or in other positions of vantage, or by a stone or tile placed at a road-end and inscribed with the 'Eight Diagrams' (see COSMOGONY, etc. [Chin.]), or with words intimating that, as a stone from the Thai mountain, it will resist the evil influences.

According to Chinese etymology, the word *kuei*, 'demons,' is connected with a word of similar sound meaning 'to return,' and a *kuei* is accordingly defined as the spirit of a man which has returned from this visible world to the world invisible. 'Alive a man, dead a *kuei*' is a proverbial saying. In such use of the word *kuei* we must remember that nothing derogatory is implied, and that 'departed spirit' rather than 'demon' is the proper translation. There seems to be no possibility of making consistent with themselves the various popular Chinese views of the spiritual nature of man and his state after death: to determine, *e.g.*, the relation of the *kuei* to the three souls which each man possesses, according to Taoist teaching, or, according to another theory, to the twofold soul which dissolves at death into its component parts. In any case, existence in some fashion after death is assumed. Whether such existence is necessarily or in all cases immortal, it is not easy to determine. Taoism may teach an eternity of punishment; but, on the other hand, there is a word *chi*, which means the death of a *kuei*.

Kuei (*manes*) are to be honoured in the appropriate way; and, as otherwise evil may be expected from them, fear has a large place in present-day ancestral worship. Each family worships the *manes* of its own ancestors. *Manes* otherwise unprovided for are placated by public rites, particularly by 'the feast of desolate ghosts,' the '*kuei* feast,' on the 15th of the 7th moon. All *kuei* are more or less objects of dread; but in particular the *kuei* of a wronged person may be expected to seek revenge ('the wronged ghost impedes the murderer's steps'), and the *kuei* of evil men are evil *kuei*. According to one popular representation, the other world is for the Chinaman at least a replica of the Chinese Empire with similar social gradations, however, allotted otherwise than in this upper world; and mourning relatives may be comforted by a soothsayer's assurance that the meritorious deceased has been appointed by Yü Ti a mandarin of such and such a grade in the shadowy double of this or that Chinese city. Moreover, however difficult to work in consistently with other views, the doctrine of transmigration holds a large place in a Chinaman's theory of the relation between the unseen world and this.

While a *kuei* is, strictly speaking, a departed spirit, it is hardly to be supposed that all the innumerable *kuei* imagined to be active in this world or as retributive executioners in the infernal regions are of this origin. Perhaps what we might distinguish as ghosts and demons are alike called *kuei*. The Chinese generally are obsessed by the fear of *kuei*. These are supposed to abound everywhere, and to be specially active at night. Any untoward happening or uncanny sound—particularly any sound that is thin and shrill—is ascribed to them. Many houses are reported to be haunted by *kuei* because of misfortunes befalling their inmates. There are appropriate ceremonies for the placating of offended *kuei*, who in such cases are addressed euphemistically (*e.g. Shêng jên*, 'Sagely person'); and they can also be controlled by charms of Taoist origin.

The spiritual world is peopled from the human race not only by 'departed spirits' but by inhabitants of another grade called *hsien*. This name is applied not only to the fairy-like beings mentioned above, but also to those of mankind who 'by a process of physical or mental refinement' have raised themselves to the rank of immortals.

Finally, as in ancient times sages and worthies were worshipped as tutelary spirits (*e.g.* Hou-t'u), so has it been in later times. 'The gods (*shen*) of to-day are the men of ancient times' is a common proverb. Thus the Chinese pantheon has been filled with canonized worthies (such as Kuan Yü [A.D. 219], canonized as Kuan Ti, god of war; and the magician Chang, canonized as Yü Ti, who is practically the chief god of the Taoist religion); and not only with such, but also with an ever-increasing number of gods of all kinds and grades. 'The pope does not canonize on so large a scale as the Emperor of China' (Legge, *Rel. of China*, p. 184). These are the idols of China whose temples and images are everywhere to be seen.

While the multiplication of deities and the pervasive dread of demons are mainly connected with

the Taoist strain in Chinese religion, the influence of Buddhism has been potent in its development. 'The religion of Taoism was begotten by Buddhism out of the old Chinese superstitions' (Legge, *op. cit.* p. 201). Directly Buddhist elements are also of course present. *Shen, kuei, hsien, fo* ('gods,' 'demons,' 'genii,' 'Buddhas') are the four orders of beings superior to man; and, to instance from both the upper and the nether regions, Kuan Yin, the Goddess of Mercy, and Yen Wang, the King of Hades, are both of Buddhist extraction.

One extraordinary feature of the Chinese view of the spiritual world is the power believed to be exercised over its inhabitants by the Taoist priesthood, and specially by the Taoist pope, the spiritual successor (by the soul's transmigration) of Chang Tao-ling (A.D. 34). Demons and spirits unsubmissive to ordinary Taoist spells are subject to him; and from him protection against them may be purchased. In a case reported to the present writer, a merchant in Chao-Chow-foo, whose house was haunted by a spectre, went several days' journey to see the pope, and for $200 purchased relief from the spectre's presence; for $300 he might have had it recalled altogether from the world of men.

Mention should be made of demon possession, where the subject is possessed by a demon causing disease or madness, and of spirit-mediums inspired by an idol-spirit and who utter oracles in his name.

As an illustration of the incoherence of the whole spiritual system of the Chinese, it may be noted that, while the Emperor is the source of canonization, the exposition of the seventh maxim of the Sacred Edict not only brands Buddhism and Taoism as heretical, but pours scorn on their pretensions and superstitions, and casts doubt on the existence of Yü Ti himself.

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P. J. MACLAGAN.

DEMONS AND SPIRITS (Christian).—I. *IN THE EARLY CHURCH TO COUNCIL OF CHALCEDON* (A.D. 451).—It is stated by Origen (*de Princip.*, *prœm.*) that the Primitive Church did not lay down any definite doctrine with regard to the nature of the angels. The Church, however, he tells us, asserts their existence and defines the nature of their service as ministers of God for the purpose of promoting the salvation of men (*ib.*). Other early writers are not equally reticent. Some information concerning good and evil spirits may be gained even from the earliest Christian writers.

1. **Apostolic Fathers.**—(*a*) *Clement of Rome*, exhorting those to whom he writes to zeal and well-doing, points his readers to the example of the whole host of God's angels who stand by, ministering to His will (*Ep.* i. *ad Cor.* xxxiv. 5).—(*b*) In *Ignatius* we find the statement that the heavenly beings (ἐπουράνια), including the δόξα τῶν ἀγγέλων, will receive judgment if they believe not in Christ (*Smyrn.* 6). There is a further reference in *Trall.* 5, where Ignatius claims to be able to understand the heavenly things, and the dispositions of the angels.[1]—(*c*) In the *Letter of the Smyrnæans on the Martyrdom of Polycarp*, it is stated that the martyrs 'gazed with the eyes of their heart on the good things reserved for those that endure, but already shown to them by the Lord; for they were no longer men, but already angels' (*Mart. Polyc.* ii.). It is also said in the same chapter that they were condemned to their torture that the devil might, if possible, bring them to a denial, for he had tried many wiles against them (cf. also the Prayer of Polycarp, *ib.* xiv.).—(*d*) Passing to *Hermas*, we find that, in answer to his inquiry as to the nature of the six young men who are building, he is informed that they are the holy angels of God who were created first, and to whom the Lord delivered all His creation, to increase and to build it and to be masters of all creation (*Vis.* iii. 4). The doctrine of guardian angels is also taught by Hermas. Each man has two angels, one of righteousness and one of wickedness. He deals with this question at some length, and states that good works are inspired by the angel of righteousness, evil works by the angel of wickedness (*Mand.* vi. 2).—(*e*) In a quotation from *Papias*, preserved by Andreas Cæsariensis (*c.* A.D. 520), we find an obscure reference to the work of the angels:

'To some of them (δηλαδὴ τῶν πάλαι θείων ἀγγέλων) He gave also to rule over the ordering of the earth, and He charged them (παρηγγύησεν) to rule well.' The words in the first brackets are, in Routh's opinion, the insertion of Andreas (cf. *Reliq. Sacr.*, 1814–18, i. 14, and the notes, where a further passage is quoted from Cramer).

2. **The Apologists.**—We find a number of passages in the writings of Justin, Tatian, Athenagoras, and Irenæus bearing on the subject.

(*a*) *Justin.*—The most important of these is the well-known passage in 1 *Apol.* § 6, where, in refuting the charge of atheism, Justin says:

'But both Him (*sc.* the Father) and the Son who came forth from Him and taught us these things, and the host of the other good angels, who follow and are made like unto Him, and the prophetic Spirit we worship and adore.'

The insertion of the angels among the Persons of the Trinity is unique, and is possibly to be explained by the fact that we frequently find 'angel' as a title of the Son (Tixeront, *Hist. des dogmes*, i. 243). With this passage should be compared the *Dial. c. Tryph.* § 128, in which the existence of angels is asserted and their relation to the Logos discussed. In 2 *Apol.* § 5, Justin defines the functions of the angels, stating that 'God committed the care of men and all things under heaven to angels whom He set over these' (ἔταξεν). He then accounts for the existence of evil in the world as the result of the transgression of angels, who had 'transgressed the Divine appointment (τάξιν), and by sinful intercourse with women produced offspring who are demons.' These demons 'subdued the human race to themselves' and 'sowed among men all manner of wickedness.' He proceeds to identify the demons who were the offspring of the fallen angels with the heathen gods. Justin is the earliest authority for the cultus of angels (cf. the first passage quoted above, σεβόμεθα καὶ προσκυνοῦμεν). To the passages already quoted may be added *Dial. c. Tryph.* § 88, in which the free will of the angels is asserted, and § 57, where it is said that, of the three men who appeared to Abraham, one was the Logos and the other two angels.

(*b*) *Tatian* denies the material nature of demons, asserting that their constitution (σύμπηξις) is spiritual, as that of fire or air. He also states that their nature is incapable of repentance (*Orat.* 15, cf. 12, 20). The ministry of angels in the government of the universe is also alluded to by the writer of the *Ep. to Diognetus*, vii.

(*c*) *Athenagoras* defines the office of the angels as being that of exercising the providence of God over things ordered and created by Him. God has the general providence of the whole; particular parts are assigned to angels (*Apol.* 24). In the same chapter he writes at some length of the fall of certain of the angels, and identifies the giants mentioned by the Greek poets with their illicit offspring. He speaks of one angel in particular (Satan) who is hostile to God, and discusses the difficulty of this belief. He states that Satan is

[1] It should be noted that in the longer recension the latter passage is amplified in a manner consistent with the more developed doctrine of pseudo-Ignatius (cf. *Ap. Const.* viii. 12), while the former passage is omitted as possibly inconsistent with his doctrine.

a created being like other angels, and is opposed to the good that is in God. In another passage he asserts that it is the demons who incite men to worship images, being eager for the blood of sacrifice, these images having no particular relation to the persons they represent (*ib.* 26; see further reference to the work of the angels at the end of ch. 10).

(*d*) The writings of *Irenæus* contain a large number of passages dealing with the angelology of the Gnostics, which he refutes. He is himself of opinion that the angels are incorporeal beings (*adv. Hær.* iii. 22), and, in opposition to the Gnostics, states that the Christian does (*facit*) nothing by their invocation (ii. 49. 3). He alludes to the fall of the angels, and refers to the domination of Satan and the deliverance of man from his power (iii. 8. 2; cf. also v. 21, § 3, and 24, §§ 3, 4).

3. Greek Fathers.—The doctrine of good and evil spirits was greatly developed by the Alexandrian writers *Clement* and *Origen*. In the writings of the latter, especially his commentaries on Scripture, numerous references are to be found to the functions of angels and demons. The notion of the guardian angel, already noted in Hermas, is here especially developed. He assigns to each nation its guardian spirit, basing this view upon his exegesis of Dt 32[8f.], where he follows the text of the LXX (ἔστησεν ὅρια ἐθνῶν κατὰ ἀριθμὸν ἀγγέλων θεοῦ). But God reserved Israel to Himself for His own inheritance, appointing the angels as guardians of the nations. The power of these angels was broken by Christ at His coming, and hence they were moved to anger, and in turn stirred up persecution against the preachers of the gospel (Orig. *in Joh.* xiii. 49). Origen understands literally the 'angels of the churches' of the Apocalypse; he boldly (*audacter*) refers to the angels of churches as their invisible bishops ('per singulas ecclesias bini sunt episcopi, alius visibilis, alius invisibilis; ille visui carnis, hic sensui patens' [hom. xiii. *in Luc.*, ed. Lommatzsch, v. 131]). Each individual has also his guardian angel, to whom is entrusted the soul of the believer when received into the Church by baptism. By him it is protected from the power of the devil; but, if it falls, it loses the protection of its guardian and comes under the power of an evil angel. The angels present the prayers of the faithful to God, rejoice at their progress, correct their failings, and intercede for them before the throne of God. He states, however, that they should not be worshipped or invoked (*c. Cels.* v. 5). Clement appears to have some doubt as to whether individuals possess guardian angels in the same sense as nations and cities possess them (*Strom.* vi. 17). But in other passages he lays stress on their work of intercession for men (cf. *Strom.* v. 14, vii. 12, and iv. 18, vii. 13). Under the influence of Neo-Platonic ideas, the Alexandrian Fathers assert that there is a double activity—a higher dealing with spiritual things, a lower with the material order; and that in both of these the angels of God are employed. Origen clearly expresses the view that the world has need of angels, who are placed over animals, plants, and elements (hom. xiv. 2 *in Num.*).

The following passages in Origen may also be consulted: *de Princip.* i. 5, 8, ii. 8, *c. Cels.* iv. 29, v. 4, 5, 48, 58, viii. 31, 32, 34, *de Orat.* 6, 28, 31, *in Levit.* hom. ix. 8, *in Num.* hom. xi. 4, xx. 3, *in Ezek.* hom. xiii. 1, *in Ps.* xxxvii. hom. i. 1, *in Luc.* hom. xii. xxiii.

4. Later Greek writers.—There are a number of references in the Cappadocian Fathers to the nature and functions of angels. Concerning their nature there appears to have been some difference of opinion. (*a*) *Basil* held that their substance (οὐσία) was ethereal spirit or immaterial fire (*de Spir. Sanct.* § 38).—(*b*) *Gregory Nazianzen* is doubtful (*Orat.* xxxiv. 16).—(*c*) *Gregory of Nyssa* declares them to be entirely spiritual (*in Orat. Dom.* hom. iv.).—(*d*) Many references are contained in the writings of *Chrysostom*. He asserts that their nature is superior to ours, but cannot be accurately comprehended by us (*de incomprehensibili Dei Natura*, v. 3). They are possessed of an incorporeal nature (ἀσώματος φύσις), and he rejects on this account the earlier interpretation of Gn 6[2] (*in Gen.* hom. xxii. 2). According to Basil, the sanctity of the angels is due to the activity of the Holy Spirit (*op. cit.* § 38). They are less liable to sin than we are (δυσκίνητοι), but not incapable of it (ἀκίνητοι). This is proved by the fall of Lucifer, whose sin was envy and pride. These Fathers assign guardian angels to individuals, churches, and nations. Basil is, however, of opinion that the guardian angel is driven away by sin 'as smoke drives away bees and a bad odour doves' (hom. *in Ps.* xxxiii. 5). Gregory of Nyssa is the only Greek Father who follows Hermas in the view that every man has both a good and a bad angel as his constant companion (*de Vita Moysis*). Angels are described as overseers (ἔφοροι) of churches. Gregory Nazianzen addresses a special farewell to these ἔφοροι on his departure (*Orat.* 32, *sub fin.*; cf. Basil, *Ep.* ii. 238). They are the guides (παιδαγωγοί) of the just, and lead them to eternal blessedness (Bas. *de Spir. Sanct.* xiii.; Chrys. *in Ep. ad Coloss.* hom. i. 3, 4). It would appear that Cyril of Jerusalem was of opinion that certain of the fallen angels had obtained their pardon (*Cat.* ii. 10; cf. also Basil, *in Ps.* xxxii. 4; Gregor. Nyss. *contra Eunom.* hom. x.; Greg. Naz. *Orat.* xxxiv. 81; Joh. Chrys. *in ascens. Dom.* 1, *de laud. S. Paul. Ap.* hom. ii. sermo 43, *in Gen.* hom. iv.).

5. Latin Fathers.—(*a*) We find in *Tertullian* a number of references to spirits, good and evil. Like Origen, he connects the ministry of angels with the sacrament of baptism. According to this writer, the baptismal water receives its healing properties from an angel (*de Bapt.* 4). Furthermore, the actual purification effected in baptism is due to a spirit who is described as 'angelus baptismi arbiter,' who prepares the way for the Holy Spirit ('non quod in aquis spiritum sanctum consequamur, sed in aqua emundati sub angelo, spiritui sancto praeparamur' (*ib.* 5, 6). Marriage which has received the blessing of the Church is announced by the angels and ratified by the Father (*ad Uxor.* ii. 9). The angels, looking down from heaven, record the sins of Christians; for example, when they are present in the theatre, where the devil is working against the Church (*de Spectac.* 27). A more detailed account of the work of the angels and demons will be found in *Apol.* 22, where they are stated to be spiritual substances. Tertullian alludes to the fall of the angels, corrupted of their own free will, from whom sprang the race of the demons. Of the former, Satan is the chief. They are the source of diseases and all disasters. They delude men into idolatry in order to obtain for themselves their proper food of fumes and blood. Both angels and demons are ubiquitous; both are also winged. These spiritual agencies are invisible and not to be perceived by the senses. On the question of the bodily forms of the angels, see *de carne Christi*, 6.—(*b*) The concern of the angels in human affairs is referred to by *Firmilian* in a letter to Cyprian (*Ep. lxxv. inter Cyprian.* 1; cf. Euseb. *HE* v. 28).—(*c*) The doctrine of *Lactantius* is peculiar. Before the creation of the world, God produced a spirit like to Himself (the Logos); then He made another being in whom the disposition of the Divine origin did not remain. This being, of his own will, was infected with evil, and acquired for himself another name. 'He is called by the Greeks διάβολος, but we call him *criminator*, because he reports to God the faults to which he

entices us' (cf. the Jewish appellation, *Satan*, הַקַּטֵּרְג, 'the accuser'; Lactant. *Divin. Institut.* ii. 9).

At this point some MSS of Lactantius insert a passage which is regarded by the best authorities as spurious, and in which the origin of the devil and the ministry of angels are treated in a Manichæan fashion. Here it is stated that, before the creation of the world, God made two spirits, themselves the sources of creation—the one, as it were, the right hand of God, the other, as it were, His left hand, and eternally opposed to each other. These two spirits are the *Logos* and *Satan*. The fall of the angels and the origin of the demons, who are divided into two classes, are described in ii. 15, and in the same passage the latter are identified with pagan deities (cf. also *Epitome*, 28; *Instit.* iv. 8; and, on the devil, iii. 29, vii. 24-26).

(*d*) Later Latin Fathers, such as *Ambrose* and *Jerome*, were of opinion that the angels were created before the material world (cf. Ambrose, *de Incarnat. Dom. Sacr.* 16; Jerome, *in Ep. ad Tit.* 1[2]). Some difference of opinion exists among them about the interpretation of Gn 6[2], Jerome appearing to regard the spirits as possessed of bodies (cf. *in Ezech.* 28[16]); Ambrose, on the other hand, agrees with Hilary in the statement that they are 'spirituales et incorporales' (cf. Ambros. *in Luc.* vii. 126; Hilar. *in Ps.* cxxxvii.). The sin of Satan, according to Jerome and Ambrose, was pride (cf. Ambros. *de Virgin.* i. 53, *in Ps.* 118, serm. 4. 8, 7. 8, 16. 15). The views of the Latin Fathers with regard to guardian angels are similar to those which we have already encountered in the writings of the Greek Fathers. Numerous references to this subject will be found in their commentaries and homilies, where it is stated of nations, churches, and communities that each possesses its guardian angel.

See esp. Jerome in his com. on Ec. 5[5], where he says that 'the things which are said pass not into the wind, but are straightway carried to the Lord, *a praesenti angelo qui unicuique adhaeret comes*.' Other references will be found in Jerome, *in Dan.* 7[3], *Mic.* 6[1, 2], the last-named passage being of special interest. See also Ambros. *in Ps.* 118, serm. 3. 6, and Hilary, *in Ps.* lxv. 13, cxxxii. 6, cxxxiv. 17.

Jerome is among the earliest of Latin writers to call attention to the diversity in the orders of spirits, comparing the angelic hierarchy with the organization of the officials of the Empire (cf. esp. *adv. Iovin.* ii. 28, *adv. Ruf.* i. 23). Ambrose has a passage which bears upon the cultus of the angels, whom he appears to place on a level with the martyrs, and whose invocation he warmly recommends (*de Viduis*, ix. § 55).—(*e*) Already in *Eusebius* a distinction is found between the worship (σέβοντες) due to God alone and the honour (τιμῶντες) paid to the angels (*Præp. Ev.* vii. 15; cf. also *Dem. Ev.* iii. 3, *Præp. Ev.* xiii. 13).—(*f*) Finally, for this period the writings of *Augustine* may be consulted, especially the *de Civ. Dei*, in which the angels play no small part. They form the heavenly City of God, and this part of the Holy City assists that other part here below: 'hanc [*sc.* Civitatem Dei] angeli sancti annuntiaverunt qui nos ad eius societatem invitaverunt civesque suos in illa esse voluerunt' (x. 25). The angels minister alike to Christ, the Divine Head of the mystical Body, who is in heaven, and to the members of the Body who are on earth. Thus it is in the Church that the angels ascend and descend according to the words of Scripture.

'This is what happens in the Church: the angels of God ascend and descend upon the Son of Man, because the Son of Man to whom they ascend in heart is above, namely the Head, and below is the Son of Man, namely the Body. His members are here; the Head is above. They ascend to the Head, they descend to the members' (*Enarr. in Ps.* xliv. 20).

Augustine states that the angels are spirits of an incorporeal substance, 'invisibilis, sensibilis, rationalis, intellectualis, immortalis' (cf. ps.-August. *de Cognit. veræ vitæ*, 6). The designation 'angel' refers to the office, not to the nature, of these spirits (*Enarr. in Ps.* ciii. serm. 1. § 15). Angels received at their creation, from the Holy Spirit, the gift of grace, and it is possible that, in the case of those who did not fall, they received also the assurance of perseverance (*de Civ. Dei*, xii. 9. 2, xi. 13). Augustine refuses to identify the 'sons of God' (Gn 6) with the angels (*ib.* xv. 23). The sin of the fallen angels was pride. The fall of Satan occurred at the very beginning of his existence, and the good angels have enjoyed the vision of the Word from the first moment of their creation (*de Gen. ad Lit.* ii. 17, xi. 21, 26, 30). The office of the evil angels is to deceive men and to bring them to perdition (*in Ioan.* tract. cx. 7). They occupy themselves with the practice of divination and magic (*c. Academ.* i. 19, 20). But the power of these evil spirits is limited; God employs them for the chastisement of the wicked, for the punishment of the good for their faults, or even for the purpose of testing men (*de Trin.* iii. 21, *de Civ. Dei*, xi. 23. 2). Augustine asserts that the good angels announce to us the will of God, offer to Him our prayers, watch over us, love us, and help us (*de Civ. Dei*, vii. 30, x. 25; *Ep.* cxl. 69). They are even entrusted with the care of unbelieving nations (*Enarr. in Ps.* lxxxviii., serm. i. 3). He also, like Origen, affirms that to them is committed the charge of the material world, 'iubente illo cui subiecta sunt omnia' (*de Gen. ad Lit.* viii. 45 ff.). It should, however, be noted that Augustine does not assign a guardian angel to each individual.

It has been suggested that this is due 'to his doctrine of predestination, which precludes the constant ministration of a particular guardian angel, though it leaves room for the ministry of angels as mediators between God and the faithful' (Turmel, quoted by Kirsch, *Communion of Saints in the Ancient Church*, Eng. tr., p. 246 f.). It may be mentioned in support of this view, that Cassian, the great opponent of the doctrine of predestination, following Hermas, attributes the choice between the good and evil angelic counsellors to man's free will (Cassian, *Collat.* viii. 17; cf. also viii. 12, 18).

Augustine does not favour any cultus of the angels: 'honoramus eos caritate non servitute' (*de Vera Relig.* lv. [110]). They do not desire our worship, but rather that with them we should worship their God and ours (*de Civ. Dei*, x. 25). With regard to the order of the angelic hierarchy and the signification of the titles attributed to the angels, Augustine declares himself to be entirely ignorant, and appears to discourage speculation on this subject (*Enchir.* 15; *ad Orosium*, 14). (See Tixeront, *Hist. des dogmes*, ii. 372-376; Kirsch, *op. cit.* pt. iii. ch. 5.)

Conclusion.—The evidence of the passages cited above may be summarized as follows. The earliest Fathers of the Church, acquainted with the angelology and demonology of Scripture and of Jewish apocalyptic literature, all affirm or imply the existence of spirits good and evil. At a very early period, as we can see from the writings of Hermas, the doctrine of good and evil angels appointed to watch over individuals and institutions had already been adopted, and we may trace a steady development of this doctrine in the writings of both the Greek and the Latin Fathers, while it is probable that later speculations on this subject were greatly influenced by the writings of Origen. Opposition to Gnostic speculation led earlier writers to insist on the fact that angels and demons were created beings, while some writers refuse to allow to the former any part in the work of creation. Difference of opinion seems to have existed as to the nature and constitution of angels and demons, though the majority of writers appear to have regarded them as incorporeal spirits. A further difference is seen in the exegesis of Gn 6[1, 2]. The earlier writers more usually identify the 'sons of God' with angels; later writers frequently reject this interpretation. The legend of the fall of the angels, and the person of Satan especially, led later writers to indulge in speculation as to the problem of evil and the relation of evil spirits to God. It would appear that the majority at least of later writers held the view that angels were capable of sinning, being possessed, like men, of free will. There are some traces of the beginnings

of a cultns of the angels which, according to some authorities, may be traced back as far as Justin Martyr, and which appears to be clearly taught in the writings of Ambrose. It is probable, as may be gathered from Irenæus, that the dangers of the cultus became apparent during the Church's struggles with Gnosticism. During this period we find very little about orders or numbers of angels. This subject, as well as the dedication of a church by Constantine to the archangel Michael, will be best discussed in the next section.

II. *FROM THE COUNCIL OF CHALCEDON TO A.D. 800.*—During this period we have especially to observe two points: (1) the development of the cultus and invocation of the angels, and (2) the elaborated and systematic doctrine regarding the orders of spirits.

1. **Cultus of angels.**—We have already noted a passage in the writings of Justin Martyr which possibly implies a cultus of the angels, and another in Ambrose where their invocation is directly recommended. On the other hand, Irenæus appears definitely to oppose both invocation and worship, and a writer so late as Augustine explicitly teaches that they should find no part in Christian worship. The statements of Origen have led some authorities to regard him as favourable, though there are passages in his writings where the cultus is explicitly condemned. To the authorities cited we may add canon 35 of the 4th cent. Council of Laodicea, in which Christians are forbidden 'to forsake the Church of God, and go away and name (ὀνομάζειν) angels, and to form assemblies, which is unlawful' (Hefele, *Hist. Counc.*, Eng. tr. ii. 317). But the passage is of doubtful meaning, and it should be observed that Dionysius Exiguus renders ἀγγέλους by *angulos*. The canon goes on: εἴ τις οὖν εὑρεθῇ ταύτῃ τῇ κεκρυμμένῃ εἰδωλολατρείᾳ σχολάζων, ἔστω ἀνάθεμα. This canon was known to Theodoret, who refers to it twice (*Ep. ad Col.* 2^{16} 3^{17}). In the former of these passages he states that this disease (πάθος) is still to be found in Phrygia and Pisidia.

This view is supported by certain inscriptions discovered in that neighbourhood, among which may be included the following: Ἀρχάνγελε Μιχαὴλ ἐλέησον τὴν πόλι σου κ[α]ὶ ῥύσῃ αὐτὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ πονη(ροῦ) ✝: 'Archangel Michael, have mercy on thy city and deliver it from evil' (for these inscriptions, see Dom Leclercq's art. in *DACL*, *s.v.* 'Anges,' col. 2085).

In the latter passage, Theodoret again quotes the cauon of Laodicea, as forbidding prayer (εὔχεσθαι) to angels. One other passage in this writer may be referred to, viz. *Græc. Affect. Cur.* 3, where, in answer to the pagan objection that Christians also worship other spiritual beings besides God, he answers that Christians do indeed believe in invisible powers, but do not render to them worship (σέβας, προσκύνησις). He states that these beings are incorporeal and, unlike the pagan deities, sexless, and that they are employed in worshipping God and furthering the salvation of man. The evidence of Theodoret with regard to the cultus of angels and churches dedicated to them is supported by Didymus (*de Trin.* ii. 7–8), who says that churches are to be found in both towns and villages, under the patronage of angels, and that men are willing to make long pilgrimages to gain their intercessions. The earliest historic reference to the dedication of a church to an angel is to be found in Sozomen (*HE* ii. 3), where it is stated that Constantine erected a church, called the Μιχαήλιον, not far from Constantinople. The reason of the dedication was that the archangel Michael was believed to have appeared there. In the West we find instances of the dedication of churches to the archangel Michael at least as early as the 5th cent. (see *DACL*, vol. i. col. 2147). St. Michael is the only angel of whom we find a commemoration in the calendar before the 9th century. Various festivals of this angel are to be found in different calendars, but they appear in all cases to be the anniversaries of dedications of churches. This was the case with the festival of the 29th of September, still observed in the West, which commemorated a church, long since destroyed, in the suburbs of Rome on the Via Salaria (Duchesne, *Christian Worship*, 276). Five masses for this festival (then kept on the 30th, not the 29th) are found in the earliest Roman service-book, the Leonine Sacramentary (ed. Feltoe, pp. 106–108). In the prayers contained herein are found clear references to the invocation and cult (*veneratio*) of angels.

In the Second Council of Nicæa (A.D. 787), which dealt with the iconoclastic controversy, the question of the nature of the angels was discussed. At this Council a book, written by John, bishop of Thessalonica, was read, in which the opinion was advanced that angels were not altogether incorporeal and invisible, but endowed with a thin and ethereal or fiery body. In support of this view John quotes Basil, Athanasius, and other Greek Fathers. He expresses the same view with regard to demons, and states that Christians both depict and venerate angels. These views appear to have met, on the whole, with the approval of the Council, which sanctioned the custom of depicting angels and venerating their images (Conc. Nic. ii. act. v.). By the action of this Council it would appear that the cultus of the angels, which had originated before the beginning of the period under consideration as a private devotion, and had met with considerable opposition from various ecclesiastical writers, formally received the sanction of the Church, and may henceforward be regarded as part of the *doctrina publica*.

2. **Orders of spirits.**—We must now turn to the consideration of the angelic hierarchy. We have seen, in the earlier period, that occasional references were made to this subject by some Fathers, but that a writer so late as Augustine had not only declared his ignorance of the subject, but had apparently discouraged speculation thereon.—(*a*) The first writer who definitely elaborated the subject was *pseudo-Dionysius* (*c.* A.D. 500), and his detailed classification and description of the spiritual hierarchy may probably be regarded as the basis of all subsequent speculation both in the East and in the West. The outline of his scheme is as follows. He divides the celestial hierarchy into three orders (τάγματα), and further subdivides each of these into three. Thus the first order comprises: (1) θρόνοι, (2) χερουβίμ, (3) σεραφίμ; the second: (4) κυριότητες, (5) ἐξουσίαι, (6) δυνάμεις; and the third: (7) ἀρχαί, (8) ἀρχάγγελοι, (9) ἄγγελοι. It is impossible here to enter into any detailed description of the theory of the Areopagite concerning the functions of the angelic hierarchy. It may suffice to state that it is a hierarchy of illumination, the highest rank being nearest to God, the lowest nearest to man. Cf. esp. *de Cœlest. Hier.* 10, § 2: 'Now all angels are interpreters of those above them . . . the most reverend, indeed, of God who moves them, and the rest in due degree of those who are moved by God.' It would appear that the members of each triad are on an equality with each other, being distributed into a first, middle, and last power. In this manner Is 6^3 is interpreted, where it is stated that the seraphim cry one to another, 'indicating distinctly, as I think, by this, that the first impart their knowledge of divine things to the second' (*ib.*).

(*b*) In the West the classification of the Areopagite is closely followed by *Gregory the Great*, who affirms the existence of nine orders of angels, viz. Angeli, Archangeli, Virtutes, Potestates, Principatus, Dominationes, Throni, Cherubim, Seraphim (*in Evang.* lib. ii. hom. xxxiv.). In the same work a number of other passages occur dealing with the ministry of angels, the explanation of

the names and the offices of the different orders of angels, and the manner in which we may profit by the imitation of the angels, together with certain other points of lesser interest. References to evil spirits will be found in the same author (cf. *Moral.* iii. *passim*).

(*e*) Finally, *John of Damascus*, who in his writings so frequently shows traces of the teaching of the Areopagite, follows the latter in his classification of the celestial hierarchy (*de Fid. Orth.* ii. 3). In the same passage he gives a description of the angels, in which he defines a number of points which, as we have seen, had been matters of controversy, both before and during the period under discussion. The definition is as follows:

'An angel, then, is an intellectual substance, always mobile, endowed with free will, incorporeal, serving God, having received, according to grace, immortality in its nature, the form and character of whose substance God alone, who created it, knows.'

It may be said that at the close of this period something like a general agreement had been reached about the nature and functions of spirits, good and evil, and it remains only to discuss some further elaborations which we encounter in the mediæval period.

III. *FROM A.D. 800 TO THE REFORMATION.*—During the mediæval period, speculations concerning the nature of good and evil spirits are constantly to be found in the writings of the schoolmen. These, for the most part, consisted in the application of mediæval dialectic to the statements of Scripture, the opinions of Augustine, and the schematization of the Areopagite, whose works had been translated by John Scotus Erigena, and obtained great popularity throughout the West (Bardenhewer, *Patrology*, Eng. tr. 1908, p. 538). It is impossible here to enter into details about the nature of these speculations, and it seems most convenient to illustrate their general trend from the writings of certain representative theologians. In spite of the diversity of opinion, it should be observed that the first canon of the Fourth Lateran Council (A.D. 1215) made certain clear and definite statements with regard to spiritual beings, and their relation to God, without apparently, however, terminating the disputes of later theologians on this matter. It is stated that

'God is the Creator of all things, visible and invisible, spiritual and corporeal, who of His own omnipotent power *simul ab initio temporis utramque de nihilo condidit creaturam, spiritualem et corporalem, angelicam videlicet et mundanam, ac deinde humanam quasi communem ex spiritu et corpore constitutam.* The devil and other demons were created, indeed, good by God, and became bad of their own accord (*per se*). Man sinned by suggestion of the devil.'

As we have said, this decree appears to have failed to produce unanimity of opinion among the schoolmen, and the subject remained, as Harnack remarks, 'the fencing and wrestling ground of the theologians, who had here more freedom than elsewhere' (*Hist. of Dogma*, Eng. tr., vi. 186). But on many points we discern a general agreement. Thus, with regard to guardian angels, all held that each man from his birth possessed a guardian spirit, and that this applied also to sinners, while some asserted this even of Antichrist himself. Evil spirits, on the other hand, tempt and incite men to sin, though it should be observed that even the power of the devil was held to be subject to the limitation that he cannot affect the free will or spiritual knowledge of man, but can approach him only through his lower nature (so Albertus Magnus, *Summæ Theol.* pt. ii. tract. 6; see also Bonaventura, in *Sent.* 2, dist. 11, quæst. 1, and Alb. Mag. *ib.* tract. 9). But the question of the substance, essence, endowments of grace, peccability, modes of cognition, and individuation of the angels, as well as certain other problems, still remained in dispute.

(*a*) *Peter Lombard* († 1164), the first systematic theologian of the West, devotes ten sections of the second book of the *Sententiæ* (dist. ii.–xi.) to the subject of good and evil spirits. In his teaching he follows the Areopagite, and deals, among other things, with the questions of the nature, creation, free will, fall, and peccability of angels, and the relation of demons to magical arts; he also discusses the question whether Michael, Raphael, and Gabriel are the names of orders or of individual spirits, and whether each man has a good and bad angel assigned to him; and concludes with a discussion as to the possibility of progress of the angels in virtue.

(*b*) In the numerous references to good and evil spirits contained in the writings of *Bernard*, two passages are especially worthy of notice. The first is contained in the *de Consideratione* (v. 4), where the angels are described as

'cives [Ierusalem matris nostrae] . . . distinctos in personas, dispositos in dignitates, ab initio stantes in ordine suo, perfectos in genere suo, corpore aetherios, immortalitate perpetuos, impassibiles, non creatos sed factos, id est gratia non natura, mente puros, affectu benignos religione pios, castimonia integros unanimitate individuos, pace securos, a Deo conditos, divinis laudibus et obsequiis deditos, haec omnia legendo comperimus, fide tenemus.'

In the long passage which follows we find a disquisition on the angelic hierarchy, which closely follows that of the Areopagite. In the second passage (serm. v. *in Cant.* § 7), Bernard enumerates some points which he feels unable to resolve:

'The Fathers appear to have held various opinions on such matters, nor is it clear to me on what ground I should teach either opinion, and I admit my ignorance; neither do I consider a knowledge of these things to conduce to your progress.'

The points in dispute refer to the nature of the bodies of the angels: it is asked whether their bodies are part of themselves, as is the case with men, or assumed for purposes of revelation. On guardian angels, see *in Ps.* 'qui habitat,' serm. xii. 2; serm. vii. *in Cant.* § 4; on the devil and evil angels, see *in Ps.* 'qui habitat,' serm. xiii.; *de Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, cap. vi. § 18.

(*c*) *Anselm*, who may justly be regarded as the pioneer of speculative theology in the Middle Ages, is probably the first Western writer to apply with any fullness the processes of the Aristotelian dialectic to the traditional teaching of the Church about good and evil spirits. These play a somewhat important part in his remarkable system, especially in the elaborate arguments of the *Cur Deus Homo*, where it is suggested that man was created for the purpose of completing the number of the angels, which had been diminished by the fall of the devil and his companions. This opinion Anselm rejects, saying that the human race is made for itself and not merely to replace individuals of another nature (*Cur Deus Homo*, i. 18). In the long discussion which follows concerning the number of the angels, and whether the number of the elect will exactly correspond with the number of those that fell, Anselm admits a diversity of opinion, and concludes that it is permissible to hold any view that is not disproved by Scripture. Cf. also *de Casu Diaboli*, cap. 4, where the cause and manner of the Fall are discussed. On the angels, cf. *de Fide Trin.* 3.

(*d*) In order to present a clearer view of the Scholastic doctrine of good and evil spirits, it will be best to give here a brief summary of the teaching of *Thomas Aquinas* on this subject, where we probably find it in its most developed form. This is contained in the 'Tractatus de Angelis' which is comprised in Quæstiones l. to lxiv. of Pars prima of the *Summa*:—

Angels are altogether incorporeal, not composed of matter and form; exceed corporeal beings in number just as they exceed them in perfection; differ in species since they differ in rank; and are incorruptible because they are immaterial. Angels can assume an aerial body but do not exercise

the functions of life. Thus they do not eat *proprie*, as Christ did after His resurrection. Angels can be localized, but cannot be in more than one place at the same time. The substance of angels is not pure thought, because, in a created being, activity and substance are never identical. Similarly the *esse* of angels is not pure thought. They have no sensory cognition. Their cognition is objective—not, however, through determinations in the object, but through innate categories. The cognition of the higher angels is effected by simpler and fewer categories than is that of the lower. Angels by their natural powers have knowledge of God far greater than men can have, but imperfect in itself. They have a limited knowledge of future events. The angels are possessed of will, which differs from the intellect in that, while they have knowledge of good and evil, their will is only in the direction of the good. Their will is free, and they are devoid of passion. The angels are not co-eternal with God, but were created by Him *ex nihilo* at a point in time (this is strictly *de fide*); their creation was not prior to that of the material world (the contrary opinion is here permitted). The angels were created in a state of natural, not supernatural, beatitude. Although they could love God as their Creator, they were incapable of the beatific vision except by Divine grace. They are capable of acquiring merit, whereby perfect beatitude is attained; subsequently to its attainment they are incapable of sin. Their beatitude being perfected, they are incapable of progress.

Concerning evil spirits, Aquinas' teaching is briefly as follows. Their sin is only pride and envy. The devil desired to be as God. No demons are naturally evil, but all fell by the exercise of their free will. The fall of the devil was not simultaneous with his creation, otherwise God would be the cause of evil. Hence there was some kind of interval between the creation and the fall of the demons. The devil was originally the greatest of all the angels; his sin was the cause of that of the other fallen angels, by incitement but not by compulsion. The number of the fallen angels is smaller than that of those who have persevered. The minds of demons are obscured by the deprivation of the knowledge of ultimate truth; they possess, however, natural knowledge. Just as the good angels, after their beatification, are determined in their goodness, so the will of the evil angels is fixed in the direction of evil. The demons suffer pain, which, however, is not of a sensory character. They have a double abode—hell, where they torture the damned, and the air, where they incite men to evil.

(*e*) The foregoing will give some idea of the teaching of the scholastics on the nature of spirits in its developed form. Many other questions were raised which it is impossible to discuss here; but one further instance may be given, viz. the speculation as to the manner in which angels hold communication with each other. This matter is treated by *Albertus Magnus* and *Alexander of Hales*. This communication is effected immediately, and the speech of the angels is described by Albertus Magnus as 'innuitio,' by Alexander of Hales as 'nutus' (cf. Alb. Magn. *Sum. Theol.* 2, tr. 9, quæst. 35, m. 2; Alex. Hal. *Summa*, pt. ii. quæst. 27, m. 6).

(*f*) Finally, we may quote one 14th century authority, namely, *Tauler* († 1361), who, though, like his contemporaries, he follows the Dionysian classification of spirits, yet expresses himself with much reserve about the nature and character of angels. The following passage is contained in his sermon on Michaelmas Day:

'With what words we may and ought to speak of these pure spirits I do not know, for they have neither hands nor feet, neither shape nor form nor matter; and what shall we say of a being which has none of these things, and which cannot be apprehended by our senses? *What* they are is unknown to us, nor should this surprise us, for we do not know ourselves, viz. our spirit, by which we are made men, and from which we receive all the good we possess. How then could we know this exceeding great spirit, whose dignity far surpasses all the dignity which the world can possess? *Therefore we speak of the works which they perform towards us, but not of their nature.*'

With regard to the development of the cultus of the angels during this period, the following observations may suffice. Dedication of churches to angels and especially to St. Michael became far more common, both in the East and in the West. With regard to festivals of angels we find special offices in the mediæval breviaries by which the unofficial cultus of the angels obtained formal recognition. The names of individual angels are encountered in many litanies, and, finally, the cultus of the guardian angels received official sanction when a feast in their honour was instituted (October 2nd) after the Reformation. No doubt the introduction into the formal liturgy of the Church lingered behind the practice of popular devotion, in this as in other matters.

In conclusion, we may remark that, at the Reformation, Protestant theologians retained their belief in good and evil spirits; even maintaining that the former intercede for mankind, but forbidding any invocation. This belief, based on Scripture, underwent considerable modification in the 18th cent., which witnessed many and various attempts at rationalization in different directions. The beginning of the 19th cent. was marked by a revival among Protestants of the belief in angels expressed 'in a philosophic and idealizing sense' (Hagenbach, *Hist. of Doctrines*, iii. 193, 334 f.). It may be said that among modern writers of this school the whole subject has ceased to excite any interest either speculative or practical. In the Roman Church we cannot detect any change in belief or practice concerning the existence of good and evil spirits, though we may point to certain indications of a tendency to discount the subtleties of mediæval speculation on the subject (Liebermann, *Instit. Theol.* lib. iii. cap. 2, art. 1, in vol. iii. p. 280). In the Anglican Church the belief in angels has the fullest liturgical recognition, though the subject is hardly dealt with in her formularies. The invocation of angels was defended by some of the Caroline divines: the practice of dedicating churches to angels has remained unbroken. In the Book of Common Prayer the 29th of Sept., still known in the Roman calendar as the 'Dedicatio Sancti Michaelis Archangeli,' has become the feast of St. Michael and All Angels.

The comparative lack of interest felt in the whole question of the existence and nature of good and evil spirits may be explained by reference to the fact that, while belief in the existence of such spirits is generally accepted by Catholic theologians, there is still to be found a strong reaction from the excessive speculation of scholasticism.

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DEMONS AND SPIRITS (Coptic).—The beliefs of the Coptic Christians on the subject of demons and spirits were derived from those of their pagan predecessors in the Græco-Roman period (see 'Egyptian' art. below), and show interesting traces of Gnostic influence. In spells to ward off the attacks of devils the designations of the æons are given, and the mysterious magical names of the spirits are recited, confused in true Gnostic fashion with the Hebrew appellations of the Deity. Here is a typical invocation:

'Pantokrator Iaô Sabaôth Môneous Soneous Arkôeous (?) Adonai Iaô Elôi, who is in the Seventh Heaven and judgeth the evil and the good: I conjure thee to-day, thou that providest for me the twenty thousand demons which stand at the river Euphrates, beseeching the Father twelve times, hour by hour, that He give rest unto all the dead.'

Here we have the Gnostic spirit Iaô confused (naturally enough) with the Deity (Jahweh), but he is not the Deity who is appealed to later on as 'the Father.' However, Iaô Sabaôth in Coptic spells is hardly to be distinguished from the Deity. Good spirits are invoked as

'ye who are upon the northern and eastern sides of Antioch. There is a myrtle-tree, whose name is the Achelousian (*sic*) lake which floweth from beneath the throne of Iaô Sabaôth.'

This is a very curious confusion of classical Hades-allusions with the Gnostic-Christian throne of Iaô-Jahweh. For the rest, it is the usual gibberish of the medicine-man. The names of the Deity and those of the angels are often confused: Emmanouel appears as the name of an angel, with Tremouel and Abraxiel; the last has a very Gnostic sound.

Chief among the good spirits were, of course, the archangels—sometimes four, sometimes seven: 'those who are within the veil' (καταπέτασμα). Each man had a guardian angel, who specially protected him against evil. With the angels are invoked also the cherubim and seraphim, and the four-and-twenty elders, and even the four beasts that uphold the throne of the Father. These were all conceived as objective spiritual beings, to be invoked in prayer against evil. The names or descriptions of the spirits had to be known, or they could not be invoked: some appear named after the letters of the alphabet, others are merely 'those who come up with the great stars that light the earth.' This is a very old Egyptian touch, and reminds us of the ancient dead who were thought to walk among the stars, the *akhemu-sek*.

Among the evil spirits we find, of course, Satan, whose name in one case is Zêt—an interesting survival of the name of the old Egyptian Typhonic god Set. Fate (Μοῖρα) seems to occur as an evil demon. Disease was thought to be largely due to the attacks of devils, and especially so in the case of epilepsy. It has been conjectured, with probability, by Crum (*Catalogue of the Coptic MSS in the British Museum*, 1905, p. 253, n. 9) that the name ἐπιληψία has been corrupted into the name of a female demon, Aberselia, Berselia, or Berzelia, who appears in an Ethiopic transcription as Werzelyâ. Berselia was apparently regarded as a flying vampire, and classed in Coptic vocabularies as a kind of bird. A demon of the mid-day heat appears in the Ethiopic versions of the 'Prayer of S. Sisinnius,' with the 'Werzelyâ' mentioned above (references in Crum, *loc. cit.*).

Magical charms (φυλακτήρια) against the attack of demons were common enough. They were usually written on slips of parchment and enclosed in a little leather box, generally tied to the arm or, no doubt, hung about the body just as the modern charm of the Egyptian *fellāḥ* is worn. The contents are usually vague invocations, as has been seen. One of the finest is the MS Or. 5987 of the British Museum (published by Crum, *op. cit.* 1008), from which excerpts have been given above. Cf. art. CHARMS AND AMULETS (Abyssinian).

The usual Coptic word for a demon or spirit, good or evil, is *iḫ*, which is the Old Egyp. for a good spirit. The term *ḥik*, for an evil spirit, which is the same as Old Egyp. *ḥekau*, 'magic' or 'enchantment,' occurs occasionally. The appellation *refšaar*, 'sunderer,' 'divider,' is a tr. of the Gr. διάβολος, which is itself often used in Coptic. For 'angel' the Gr. ἄγγελος is used.

LITERATURE.—In addition to that cited in the text, see list of authorities appended to art. CHARMS AND AMULETS (Abyssinian).

H. R. HALL.

DEMONS AND SPIRITS (Egyptian).—**1. Scope of the article.**—The delimitation of an investigation on the subject of demons and spirits presents no little difficulty in religions which are of so distinctly animistic a character as those of Egypt. In the first place, we cannot divide the subject and study angelology and demonology separately, because spirits are never good or bad by constitution or in their origin; this aspect is of relatively secondary formation or date (see DUALISM [Egyp.]). In the second place, the various kinds of demons or spirits of the dead, although in very many cases their characteristics, powers, attributes, and dwelling-places are identical with those of the other spirits, really belong to a different category from the latter (see below, § 9; and cf. art. STATE OF THE DEAD [Egyp.]). Lastly, with such a vast array of demons, properly so-called, as we have in Egypt, a short account like the present can give only the general characteristics, while, as to particular personifications, it can mention only the principal ones whose active and definite rôle is witnessed to by texts or representations. In a world in which all beings and objects possess a 'demon' or 'demons,' we must confine our attention to those which are of special importance in the life of the gods or of men.

2. Pre-historic demons and spirits.—Our information on the earliest period is preserved in the earliest texts (numerous chapters of the Book of the Dead), some of them going back even to pre-historic times (as the funerary chapters of the proto-Theban coffins, certain parts of the celebrated ritual of 'the opening of the month,' and especially the Pyramid Texts). The chief demons and spirits in these are called sometimes *biu*, sometimes *khuu* (see below). The meaning of the special terms by which they are designated is very difficult to state accurately. Of the significance of such terms as *afau*, *utennu*, and *ashmu*, we must admit that as yet we have no precise knowledge. The passing allusions in a very few texts seem to indicate that they were conceived under the form of 'devouring spirits,' troops of monkeys, lizards, and hawks. These are, in any case, survivals of the most ancient periods. The same is true of the jackal-demons (Pyramid of Pepy II., line 849). The higher and lower 'Beings of Sit' lead us to suppose a classification of spirits into heavenly and earthly. The *rokhitu* are, according to the texts, both spirits full of wisdom and personifications of the powers opposed to (and vanquished by) Egypt or the gods of Egypt. There is much discussion as to the best translation of this word. The present writer thinks that the French word *malin*, 'mischievous,' might be taken as an exact equivalent of the Egyptian term with its double meaning. The *urshu* play a somewhat more definite part of 'watchers.' They are bands of demons who watch, lie in wait for, keep their eyes upon. This function has followed naturally from the ordinary evolution of meaning: from having simply designated an individual characteristic, neither good nor bad,

it has become a protective function of a specially determined group of men or a locality, heavenly or earthly. The *hunmamit* are often mentioned; they even figure in a number of representations that have not yet been noticed—if, as the present writer suggests, it is indeed figures of these spirits that are carved on several parts of the sacred furniture (tabernacles, shrines of the sacred barque, supports for vases or utensils of worship), represented in a number of temple bas-reliefs and in frescoes of Theban tombs. They have hardly ever been studied, except by Budge (*Gods of the Egyptians*, i. 159), who quotes, without approving, the view that they are the great flock of souls of future generations. This view does not seem sufficiently borne out by the texts. The *hunmamit* of the primitive cults seem rather to have been swarms of spirits of a beneficent character, in the sense that they watched over the safety of the sun, at the time when the religious world consisted of innumerable bodies of spirits and an impersonal sky-god with no precise attributes, and when the various heavenly bodies (even the most important ones, like the sun) were entrusted to the care of spirits, who directed their movements, defended them, repulsed their enemies, etc. In the historical period, the power and individuality of the gods proper were detached from the mass of spirits, and left a more and more vague rôle to all the demons of this category. The *hunmamit* are also often confused, in the Theban texts, with the sun's energy, and are, it would appear, its effluences or rays. Some also become angel-choirs, traditional accessaries, and practically a simple *motif* of ornamental symbolism attached to certain objects of ritual and worship. They may be compared, *from this point of view*, with various angels and spirits of Oriental angelology, such as, *e.g.*, the cherubim (*q.v.*).

An important class of demons is made up of the 'spirits' (*biu*) (1) of Pu and Dapu, (2) of the East and the West, (3) of Khimunu, (4) of Nekhen, and (5) of Heliopolis. The polytheism of the historic period reduced these spirits also to the rôle of simple attendants, who hailed the sun when it rose (or the king on his coronation, etc.), carried the litters of the Divine *bāri*, and performed other humble or vague functions (see below). Theology has made several attempts to assimilate them to secondary gods of the pantheon with proper names (*e.g.* Book of the Dead, 'Chapters on knowing the *biu* of . . .'). These explanations at least enable us to reconstruct several of the phases of their original function, of which the geographical symmetries (earthly or heavenly) are a survival. These demons were once the guardian genii of the geometrical divisions (two or four) of the universe; they supported the mass of the firmament at its extremities, and welcomed or destroyed the souls of the dead as they arrived at the borders of the earth. Their stellar rôle also seems to have been considerable; they inhabit certain constellations, or the sanctuaries on earth that are the magical counterparts of those regions of the heavenly sphere. Sometimes they inhabit a special region of the firmament (*e.g.* the *biu* who inhabit, in the territory of Heliopolis, the 'Abode of the Combatant,' the magical representation of this celestial abode); sometimes they escort certain heavenly bodies (stars or planets), whose guardians they are, across the vault of heaven. Polytheism makes these bodies divine persons, and reduces them to the position of devotees of the sun. Finally, theology confuses them more and more with the various 'souls' of the gods, employing the evolution in meaning of the word *biu* itself. A great number of these spirits are classed together under the vague title of 'followers of Hor,' whence the priesthood deduced more and more lofty funerary meanings in relation to the lot of the dead.

The historic period, however, preserves a fugitive rôle for them on certain occasions of immemorial tradition, just as the material part of the cult continues to reproduce their images. The 'spirits' of the North and South become a sort of heraldic representation of the forces of the world considered as composed of two halves, or they are transformed into genii guarding the frontiers of Egypt, the sum of the whole earth. They play a part also in several incidents in the coronation of the king. Other spirits, as the 'demons' of one of the Anubis, regarded as a constellation of the Northern world (cf. Brugsch, *Rel. und Myth.*, Leipzig, 1884–1888, p. 671), perhaps the Great Bear (cf. the jackal-demons mentioned above), or as the genii of other parts of the astral world, reappear as figures in the mysterious ceremonies of the royal coronation or the jubilee (see Naville, *Festival Hall*, London, 1892, pl. ix.–xi., for specimens of these figures, whose mystical value has been very much exaggerated by modern writers). As a general rule, however, their rôle is a purely traditional one, and their exact nature does not seem to have been early understood.

Besides the innumerable representations of *biu* and *rokhitu* in statues, statuettes, bas-reliefs, frescoes, etc., several other spirits have left material traces of their former rôle in parts of sacred furniture, on which they are seen as traditional figures, symbolic or even purely ornamental. The most characteristic are certain animal figures on sacred vessels and on some of the statuettes traditionally placed on board the sacred barques used in processions to convey the Egyptian gods, in representations of their journeys in the other world. Thus the 'griffin,' which is found on the bow of all the barques of solar gods, seems to have been one of these spirits before it became confused with the 'warlike soul' of the god; and the same may be said of the birds that are placed in rows on the bow of the boat of Rā (cf. the boats of el-Bersheh), or those on the strange boat of Sokharis (a good example in the temple of Deir el-Medineh). The interpretations of these figures as the 'followers' or as the 'souls' of the god are of later date, and represent two attempts to adapt them to developed beliefs. They seem really to be a survival of the time when these groups of 'demons' had an active share in the general direction of elementary forces. The predominance of 'functional epithets' serving as collective names for the majority of these demons is perhaps one of the most significant facts in this connexion.

The whole question of these groups of spirits calls for an exhaustive study, which would yield the most ancient form of Egyptian religions thought that could be attained, and would also explain the development of forms of this kind (similar to those of certain religions of modern savage Africa) into polytheisms proper. Such a study should be joined logically with an account of primitive Egyptian religion, comprising both the animistic manifestations of all kinds of 'spirits' and the existence of a sky-god similar to the god postulated in so many parts of the continent of Africa. This vague, primordial god—who, however, has no demiurgical functions whatsoever—is found in Egypt in two parallel forms, proceeding from two great local systems of mythology: (1) the sky-god Hor, and (2) the sky-goddess Nuit (subdivided even earlier into the day-sky, Nuit, and the night-sky, Naut). A foundation might be found in the data supplied for one part in the very remarkable work of Budge in his *Gods of the Egyptians* (see Lit.).

3. Historic period: number, aspects, forms.—The Egyptian terrestrial and ultra-terrestrial worlds are naturally peopled with an infinite number of demons and spirits. But, if we look closely, we find that this body of spirits is not so great as that of many other religions. It shows neither the abundance of the Chaldæo-Assyrian religions or of Mycenæan demonology (see Pottier, *BCH*, 1907, p. 259), nor even the crowd of devils and spirits of Vedic religion. The number of 4,601,200 demons, given in ch. lxiv. of the Book of the Dead, is a ἅπαξ λεγόμενον which does not correspond with any teaching or fact of any importance. As a matter of fact, ancient Egypt has not, *to our present knowledge*, left any of those terrible lists of demons and spirits which we find in so many other countries.

These legions of beings, generally invisible, but always provided with material bodies, are per-

ceptible to men at certain times, or to those who can fortify themselves with the necessary charms and formulæ. Their size does not seem ever to have been a question of interest to the Egyptians. No text mentions giants, though one passage in the Book of the Dead speaks of demons 'twelve feet high' (ch. xliv.), this modest figure being evidently the *summum*. None of the numerous paintings of demons of the under world makes them any larger than the men or beasts of the terrestrial world, except in the case of a certain number of serpents (where, however, as a rule, we are dealing with allegorical or symbolical serpents). Nor do any of the ancient texts make allusion to extraordinary dimensions. The difference between Egyptian and Oriental religions in this respect is noteworthy.[1] Another difference also is the absence in Egypt generally of the monstrous or hideous forms which are very characteristic of the majority of demonologies known to us. Most of the demons of the 'hours of hell' are wild beasts, reptiles, lizards, human forms with black bodies (*shades* [?]; these forms are more especially the 'enemies of Rā'), or somewhat colourless combinations of animal and human forms. The demons who frequent the way to the other world in the Book of the Dead are especially serpents, crocodiles, and monkeys. (The gigantic insect *abshāit* [cockroach?] is chiefly an artifice of the artist to show up the traits of this enemy of the dead.) There is only one monster—with a lion's tail, the body of a monkey (?), and the face of a bearded man—which has some claim to a terrifying appearance (Book of the Dead, ch. xxiii.). The demons of the 'seven-headed serpent' type of the Pyramids are a very unimportant exception. Finally, the fantastic animals of the desert—winged lions with hawks' heads, wild beasts with serpents' heads, with winged heads placed on their backs, etc.—are not, as we have said, *afrit*, or demons. It was actually believed that such beings existed in distant parts, as well as the lion with human head, the prototype of the Sphinx. The spirits, good and bad, attached to the celestial world, have usually the form of birds. The *rokhitu* are represented as a kind of hoopoe still existing in Upper Egypt; the *biu* have hawks' or jackals' heads—a relic of the time when they moved under the complete forms of these very animals; other *biu* are entirely birds; the *hunmamit* are either birds or men with birds' heads; and the evil demons proper, the enemies of Rā (see below) are simply serpents, antelopes, gazelles, crocodiles, or anthropoids.

4. Classes, localities, and attributes.—In the absence of demonologies composed by the Egyptians themselves, we may form a material estimate of the principal kinds of 'spirits' and their functions in *historical* Egypt from the following very condensed account, adopting the somewhat rough, but clear, classification of spirits according to the region they inhabit—the sky, the earth, the other world. This classification has the further merit of being that used in the earliest epochs by the incantation formulæ of the magicians, and there is, therefore, a possibility that it corresponds, to a certain extent, with the divisions imagined by the Egyptians themselves.

(*a*) *The celestial world.*—Several of the prehistoric groups already mentioned persist, but with a much less important position, and more and more confused with souls or manifestations of the gods. A certain number of spirits not mentioned above appear in the representations, but are absorbed in a subordinate or momentary function, *e.g.* the bands of dog-headed monkeys who attend the sun at its rising and setting—a theme popularized in thousands of papyrus-vignettes, in temple bas-reliefs, and in the magnificent obelisk statues of Luxor, the temple of Maut, and the great temple of Ipsambul of the Theban period; the rowers of Rā's barque in the 9th hour of his voyage round the world; and the jackals that draw this barque at the 11th hour. In the rôle of all these anonymous troops of demons we have a clear survival of the time when they played a prominent part in the direction and protection of the heavenly bodies, each controlling a definite part of the firmament, and to this point also a study of primitive Egyptian religion ought to devote special attention.

The material fact that these spirits and others of the same type were carried to the under worlds in the sun's journey is a simple artifice of Theban theology, and Maspero (*Myth. archéol.* ii. 34 ff.) has shown that these different under worlds, compiled in actual geographical order, are a product of local mythologies which really describe the world of night and the celestial world.

The groups of very feeble demons and spirits which are devoured by the stronger ones (Pyramid Texts) are not mentioned in the texts or drawings of the historic period. No doubt the whole conception was thought barbarous (see below).

(*b*) *The earth.*—As in all the religions, classical and unclassical, of the ancient world, the universe of Egyptian religion is full of all kinds of demons, closely resembling those found in the religions mentioned above or among the savages of to-day. But in Egypt there is no proper classification of spirits belonging to water, to rocks, woods, marshes, etc. Furthermore, their multiple rôles in dreams, or in illnesses of man or beast, seem to belong rather to the popular domain than to official beliefs. It would appear, from a study of the texts of both kinds, that historic Egypt had already, to a great extent, got rid of that *naïveté* which is the characteristic of polydæmonism in primitive Animism, and which persists so strikingly in Chaldæo-Assyria in the organized cults. The distinction between official and popular religion, however, is still a delicate question of the appreciation of facts, and especially of the period. It is, nevertheless, certain that phenomena such as storms, floods, and epidemics are attributed to the gods in historic Egypt, and not to the demons, as in Chaldæo-Assyrian belief. On the other hand, the inscriptions from the temple of Abydos prove that the priesthood frankly admitted that demons were continually prowling about in the air, ready to do harm, and that it was necessary to purify the king's retinue with charms, as it proceeded to the temple. The fumigations and incantations that took place at funerals bear witness to the same practice, while the famous inscription of the Princess possessed of Bakhtan proves the official belief in demoniacal possession. The literature shows us that the demons, as in all other countries, inhabited by preference desert places, the borders of marshes, and cemeteries (where they become confused with ghosts properly so called); and it is a certain fact that their power was greatest at night. They were also most powerful on certain days of ill omen, on which the influence of the good gods was diminished, as is proved by the horoscopic papyri of Leyden and London. The light of the sun put them to flight. They were combated, according to varying circumstances, by means of talismans, amulets, incantations, etc., and in all these innumerable details Egyptian differs from other religions in a material way only, and not in doctrine. It is also very difficult to see a specially Egyptian characteristic in the almost complete confusion that exists, in all these attributes of the earthly demons, between demons proper and the ghosts of the dead; and, as the latter have the same name of *khu* in a number of cases, it is sometimes almost impossible

[1] The Giant Monkey, Gigantic Crocodile, and Great Hippopotamus of the Theban texts (cf. Maspero, *Études égyptiennes*, 'Manuel de Hiérarchie,' Paris, 1883) are terms designating at this time constellations, and not stellar spirits, as, indeed, is shown by their representations in the astronomical ceilings.

to distinguish whether such and such a case of illness, dreams, possession, torment, etc., is the work of a demon or of the dead. Sometimes the Egyptian text is quite clear, *e.g.* in the formulæ relating to 'the imprisoning of the shades of the dead that can do harm' (Book of the Dead, ch. xcii. line 10); and we can proceed gradually to certain classifications by variants.

When well considered, Egyptian ordinary life does not seem to have been so much overshadowed and tormented by the constant fear of demons as in the case of many other religions of civilized and non-civilized peoples. While the official cult admits the hidden presence of numerous demons, we do not find it going the length of constantly trying to dispel them, *e.g.* during the performance of duties, at the opening of the tabernacle, or, again, at the time of sacrificing. (Porphyry, however, says that the priests beat the air with whips to put the demons to flight [*de Philos. ex oraculis haurienda*, ed. Wolff, 1856, p. 148].) The Egyptians do not, like the Indians, trace trenches round their offering. (Notice, however, in the foundation-rites of a temple, the purification of the ground by means of a mock chase of evil spirits, performed by the king and figures dressed as gods.) Nor does any Egyptian text ever say that demons are specially dangerous at the time of death, as is taught, *e.g.*, in the Avesta. The dead, it is true, are protected against demons during the preparations for the funeral; they are surrounded, on their way to the grave, by every kind of magical precaution; at the grave itself, talismans and phylacteries of every description protect the coffin and mummy (note that these precautions are meant both to ward off the demons of this earth as they prowl around the grave, and to accompany the dead, by magic, on his journey to the other world); mystic eyes are painted on the proto-Theban sarcophagus, and other precautions of the same kind are the finishing touches. But all these precautions do not amount to so much as we find, in this connexion, in civilized religions of the highest organization; and we may say that the dying Egyptian was not tormented by terrors of the demoniacal order so much as most races with systems of organized beliefs. We must not be misled by the constant presence and importance of demons in the literature. No one would think of maintaining that the thought of Satan and his demons was a continual weight on the ordinary life of a man of our European Middle Ages; and yet the popular tales, processes of justice, legends, and even theology itself, gave the demons of this time a power, a multiplicity, and a constant aggressiveness which are greatly in excess of anything that we learn of ancient Egypt in this respect.

(*c*) *The other world* (this term including the various classes of regions separating Egypt from the abodes of the dead, under whatever form they may be conceived, and these abodes themselves: paradise, Elysian fields, caverns, 'passages,' *rositiu*, etc.).—An account of all the demons of the other world cannot be attempted here. A good idea of them may be obtained from the indexes in the various editions of Budge's *Book of the Dead*, or from Maspero's *Études de mythologie et d'archéologie égyptienne*, ii. 1–180 (for the royal tombs). These demoniacal spirits are as numerous as the devils of the under world in all other religions. They are the inhabitants of night. It is worthy of remark that none of them has any symbolical value; the majority are simple repetitions of beings like the mischievous or terrifying beings of the earth. In the group of books of the Book of the Dead type we have tree-spirits, monkeys, crocodiles, a considerable variety of serpents, lions, etc., and the vignettes of the Theban epoch employ all the precision that could be desired on the subject. In the series of the type 'Book of Hours,' 'Book of Hell,' 'Book of the Gates,' etc., we have a more sombre view of the demons, yet still of the same specific character: the serpents vomit flames; a great number of these demons, in the shape of men, of animals, or of mixed form, are armed with weapons of various kinds, but are not fantastic. Their names are far oftener functional epithets than true proper names, and this fact is of importance for the historian of religions. The onomastic list, however, is quite short, and shows the poverty of Egyptian thought on this point: 'the Archer,' 'the Pikeman,' 'the Lancer,' 'the Cutter,' 'the Ripper,' 'the Bounder,' etc. The female demons have the same names, or are called 'the Lady of Terror,' 'the Lady of the Sword-thrusts,' 'the Brave,' 'the Violent.' The serpent demons are called 'Life of the Earth,' 'He who lives on gods' (=eater of gods [?]). The guardian serpents Akaba, Jetba, and Tokahiru, and the viper Naga are deities by this time rather than demons (see below).

Generally speaking (without distinguishing the various classes of under-world literature), the original Animism of Egypt is reflected in the number of demons that are simply the 'spirits' of material objects: a thread and its different parts (ch. cliii.); a boat, each part of which has its genius (ch. xcviii.); posts, doors, parts of a building, boxes, etc. This process is all the more logical from the fact that Egyptian beliefs naturally admitted that every object, natural or manufactured, on this earth possessed a spirit or a demon—rocks and trees as well as houses, pillars, sceptres, clubs, etc.; and iconography sometimes shows these spirits with their heads appearing out of the objects they inhabit. The evolution of belief consisted mainly, here as elsewhere, in gradually 'detaching' the 'spirits' from their objects; and the demons of our present discussion were transformed step by step into *guardians*, and, in the case of some of them, into *masters*, of these objects. The latter privileged members have contributed to the number of the gods.

5. Nature.—By means of a large number of accurate texts, we can form an estimate of the constitutional character of the demons and spirits of Egypt, and by the aid of the ancient texts we can get back to the very beginning of their formation. All our information is in absolute conformity with the general animistic character of the primitive religions of the Nile Valley. The universality of 'spirits' in Egypt is well known, and we have just seen that there is not a single being or object, natural or manufactured, but has its demon or demons. Their different names of *biu* and *khuu* did not imply any difference of nature originally, and the ancient texts show, by variants, that the two terms are frequently interchanged. They merely signify the different degrees of carnal materiality of these souls or spirits—which are always material (see BODY [Egyp.]). The word *biu* seems later to have tended to belong to demons and spirits of a beneficent character, while the name *khuu* was given by preference to maleficent spirits; but this indefinite classification has arisen purely from later dualistic thought (see DUALISM [Egyp.]).

Now, these texts clearly prove that the demons are absolutely the same in the essentials of their nature and attributes as the most ancient Egyptian gods. The formulæ confuse them constantly. Demons and gods have the same 'determinative' in hieroglyphic script (the three signs of the 'axe' [really a mast with two pennants], or the archaic sign of three hawks perched on a sort of gibbet). At first, the strongest devoured the weakest impartially; and later, the dead, assimilated by magic to these strongest members (cf. Pyramid of Unas, line 506 ff.), are shown devouring the *notiru* (gods) as well as the *khuu* (demons).

A single characteristic will serve to distinguish them, and to indicate the process by which the *gods* gradually emerged from the dense crowd of *demons*. The demons, or genii, or spirits, are *anonymous* groups, with only a collective name, and confined to a special activity or settled function. As they did not all have the same activity or the same importance, certain groups of them rose by a slow process of elaboration to higher dignity. The others remained for ever a few millions of obscure spirits, whose mode of life was of no importance; or else they formed the troops of spirits of which examples are given in § 2. In the groups with important functions, the characteristics led to fusion with a more individual being provided with a proper name. Difficult as it is to

draw the line of demarcation between a god and a demon in such a conception, a careful examination of the texts leads to the conclusion that the mark of a god is possession of a name. A demon possessing a name is already a god, a *notir*. The case is incontestable for well-established gods like Sorku (the crocodile) and Ririt (the hippopotamus); it is equally incontestable for demons like Apōpi and the twenty-three great serpents of the Pyramid formulæ, or the other reptiles named in the rest of the sacred literature; it can be demonstrated for demons like the cat of the sacred tree *ashdu* in the famous ch. xvii. of the Book of the Dead, and for all the principal demons in the descriptions of the other world. Each one is in every way a true god from the time that it has a name, both for its life and for its aspect. Power, the amount of reverence inspired, and the importance of functions are only questions of degree, insufficient to separate, in this religion, a number of humble gods from demons. Even specialization in a unique or momentary action is not a criterion. Naprit, demon of harvests, Ranninit, Maskhonit, the 'Seven Hathors,' and many others of this type are deities rather than demons, from the very fact that they have names; and, if the cult they receive is humbler than that of other gods, it is identical in conception and form. (Here there is a noteworthy difference from what is said of Semitic spirits by Lagrange, *Rel. sém.*², Paris, 1905, p. 16.)

We may now class the innumerable personalities mentioned in the Egyptian texts not among the demons and spirits, but, more rationally, as gods. The following are the chief: the spirits of the seasons, months, days, hours, *decani* (see CALENDAR [Egyp.]), the winds, planets, stars, etc. The astrological nature of nearly all these entities will be noticed by all, and confirms what we have seen of the stellar character of numbers of these groups of spirits before polytheism. The texts show, further, that a number of those spirits, escaping the secondary character of the mass, were treated exactly as true gods by the Egyptians, with a tendency to be assimilated to the principal great gods. It will be observed also that the demons remaining in anonymous groups still retain some worship on certain occasions in the historic epoch. Under the Memphites, for example, there are priests of the 'spirits' of Heliopolis, Buto, and Nekhen (=el-Kab).

The fact that demons become gods by a process of 'emergence' goes a long way to explain why there are not in Egyptian religion, as in other religions, lists and hierarchies of demons and angels. Not only is there nothing resembling the sort of fixed castes of angelologies or demonologies of other races, but there are not even chiefs of groups or protagonists, like, *e.g.*, the Chaldæan demon of the south-west wind. The fact is that, as soon as a primitive group attained to importance in the gradual comprehension of the world-forces, it detached a god from itself, who absorbed his group entirely or became a chief; so that the demons, good and bad, always arise directly from a god, and naturally share his character and attributes.

6. Rôle and character.—Just as the demons have at first no hierarchy, so they have no general characteristic rôle, no functions of general cosmogony, directed for or against the harmony of the *κόσμος*. The distribution of their activities into functions that are always very limited and highly specialized is a strong proof of the antiquity of their formation. Their power does not go the length of raising a scourge like a tempest (see above), or, like the Indian demons, of preventing rain. This paucity of attributes, in a character otherwise always material, and this distribution of groups of spirits without classification, make it quite comprehensible how their final rôle and their good or bad aspect depended, in the era of polytheistic formations, upon the relative character of the gods round whom they were grouped, since such a god was simply the synthesis of the activities of which the demons were the analysis. The god himself was at first of vague significance as regards his general rôle in the progress of the world; it was only when he had acquired a more precise energy that he brought along with him his troop of demons—good or bad for man. It would thus be precarious to attempt much precision regarding Egyptian religions. The necessarily *un-moral* character of the spirits does not allow of any classification which would arrange them by 'angelology' and 'demonology'—these terms being used with a moral signification. Even in the historic period their original character remained ineffaceable: the demons were, first of all, the inhabitants of a place or an object, the guardians of a locality, of a door, a passage; they ended, more or less, by having a god as sovereign; while they modelled themselves on his nature and tendencies. But one point is clear, that they are subject to their god, and consequently favourable and subject to his relatives and friends, and hostile to others. They are, then, good spirits for the living or dead man who is assimilated by worship or magic to the congregation of their master, bad spirits to all others; and the whole Book of the Dead, which has not the least moral character (even the famous ch. cxxv. of Confession), is essentially neither more nor less than a series of proofs that magic alone is capable of winning over the demons of the other world, and making them defenders of the dead, or at least submissive spirits. Nothing shows the persistence of these conceptions so well as certain passages, preserved down to the historic period, in which, *e.g.*, the demon, 'the serpent who devours souls,' is considered dangerous to the sun itself, which has to take great care when passing over its back (Tomb of Seti I., third hour of hell; theology has invented symbolic explanations, but the primitive fact is clear).

7. Final organization.—The organization of all these incoherent spirits, united by chance facts (and by nothing but facts) around multiple gods of early polytheism, was the result of great labour. It must have taken local theologians a long tale of centuries; nevertheless it always presented great gaps. It can be partly reconstructed by the help of the texts of the Memphite and proto-Theban coffins. The unifying of provincial eschatologies under the form of the Theban 'Book of the Dead' or of the various 'Books of the Under World' ('Hours,' 'Doors,' etc., of the royal hypogees, etc.) has been one of the greatest aids to this work of harmonization, which adjusted the demons more or less successfully to the gradual conception of the *κόσμος*.

This formation of armies of good and evil, being the final characteristic of unified Egyptian religion, is too important to be studied in connexion with demons alone. It will be treated in the art. DUALISM (Egyp.). For the understanding of the present article we may note here only the following facts: the grouping around the sun and his companions of former adjutant demons of the Stars, or vassals of Thoth, Horus, Hathor, etc.; the inverse grouping, around the Great Serpent Apōpi and his officers, of the chief demons opposed to the sun. Finally, a god of order and light, Osiris-Rā, is opposed, with all his allies, to a Sit-Apōpi, the prince of evil and darkness, and the enemy of order. The struggle continues without truce and with its fixed dates (see CALENDAR [Egyp.]), until, in the last period, Sit-Apōpi becomes confused in Coptic religion with Satan. This dualism, already developed in the Theban era, throws light upon the representations of the under world of this period, in which armies of demons, under command of Rā, tear, stab, decapitate, slaughter, and burn legions of the damned.

The damned are not sinners in the moral sense, but adversaries of Rā, conquered enemies. This task was reserved for the last centuries—to transform hostility to the sun, Rā, into hostility to the moral law of Rā-Osiris; but the task was accomplished (see DUALISM [Egyp.]). Even the forty-two judges of the Negative Confession are only silent demons with no moral rôle, and quite artificial; and Shait, the demon who devours the souls rejected by Osiris, is only an entity with no moral character.

The absence of a part in the good or evil of the moral world appears still more clearly in the conception of the rôle of demons in connexion with the living. There is no single Egyptian text in which they have any part in the sins of men, or in suggesting evil thoughts, or even, as in Assyria, in sowing seeds of envy, misunderstanding, and family quarrels. They are restricted exclusively to physiological evil.

Petrie's remarkable book, *Personal Religion in Egypt before Christianity* (London, 1910), shows, however, a class of demons in the hermetic literature who play a perverse part (see pp. 42, 49, 54, 86, 115, 166). But, in spite of the author's efforts to assign the first compositions to a very ancient period, the earliest date he can reach (5th cent.) merely succeeds in showing the coincidence of these new ideas with the Persian dominion; this emphasizes the resemblance between these non-Egyptian characters and the teaching of the Persian religion. We may add that at no time in Egyptian religion is the army of demons ever seen increasing its ranks by the soul of a single sinner.

8. Popular demonography.—The phase of demons which has attracted the keenest attention of Egyptologists is their rôle in popular life and literature and in current magic. The causes of this are the abundance of information furnished by papyrology, the picturesqueness and precision which such documents give to the knowledge of Egyptian life, and the data they supply for the study of magic. From a comparative point of view, however, such a study does not exhibit many of the characteristic traits. An account—even highly condensed—of the activity of demons in Egyptian life or superstition would require considerable space (see CHARMS AND AMULETS [Egyp.], MAGIC [Egyp.]). As everywhere, here the demons are at the command of the magician, to bring about dreams and illnesses, human or animal; or else they themselves cause these phenomena, just as they cause madness and epilepsy (see DISEASE AND MEDICINE [Egyp.]).

The horoscopic or simply superstitious influence of days, the force of the voice, the sensitiveness of demons to song, to the *carmen*, the chant, are facts that apply to all popular religions. The purely Egyptian traits are not many: the demons have sex (see Hierarchic Papyrus); there are none of the sexless demons of Assyria. The popular literature (see the Story of Satni-Khamois) seems to indicate the possibility of belief in *incubi* or *succubæ*, but the passages, which are very numerous, require to be discussed carefully. The threatening aspect of demons in connexion with infants (see CHILDREN [Egyp.]; also Berlin Papyrus, 3027) is also the same as appears elsewhere. On the other hand, we must remember the restrictions made above—the abundance of demons in the magic and literary papyri is not to be taken as a faithful picture of the actual life of the Egyptians. It will be noticed, further, that the Egyptians never mention demons who are wantonly cruel, or thirsting for blood, death, and carnage, as in Chaldæo-Assyria, or demons who dare to *attack* the gods (the combats between Rā and the demons of Apōpi are *antagonism*, which is a different thing). The purely animistic character of these demons, struggling to live on their own account, but never doing evil for evil's sake, is worth noting. Finally, the sum of all the innumerable details supplied from Egyptian evidences shows us a state of affairs (1) differing only by attenuation from that of the ancient civilizations of the classic East or the societies of the savages of modern Africa, and (2) somewhat similar to the classical Mediterranean civilizations of the Europe of the Middle Ages or of the Renaissance.

As in all religions during decline, we observe at later epochs the growth of demoniacal beliefs in connexion with black magic, and in opposition to the official cults. The combination of Egyptian with other Asiatic or Mediterranean demonologies shows itself in the demotic papyri, and particularly in the *tabellae devotionis* (see MAGIC [Egyp.] and, provisionally, Budge, *Egyptian Magic*, or Erman, *Die ägypt. Rel.*, ch. vii.).

9. Ghosts.—The complexity of the Egyptian notion of personality is an initial difficulty in the way of classifying the phenomena relating to ghosts. The eight or nine elements which, in the historic period, constitute a person (see BODY [Egyp.]) have each their fate, form, and habitation in the second existence. The only one of these that concerns our present purpose is the *khu*.

The etymology of the word *khu* is still very doubtful, and we cannot deduce any indication whatever of the primitive rôle from the radical meaning of the word. The sense of 'luminous,' 'brilliant,' has suggested to several authorities the explanation based on the phosphorescence of putrefying flesh, or on the will-o'-the-wisps playing in certain parts of Egypt on the skirts of the desert, supposed to be the favourite haunts of ghosts. A loftier interpretation has been proposed, taking the word *khu* as a brilliant spark, a part of the solar substance. But this seems to involve the theological speculations which played upon the amphibological meaning of the word when solar theories held the first rank in eschatological doctrine. The signification '*honoris* or *timoris causa*,' which would attach a complimentary meaning of 'resplendent' or 'glorious' to the epithet *khu* given to the ghosts of the dead, seems more probable, but has never yet been definitely proposed by the Egyptological School. The present writer would suggest, finally, a connexion between this name of 'luminous,' which is the intrinsic meaning of *khu*, and the special soul 'which shines in the eyes,' and to which a great many peoples accord a particular personality. The observation of the difference between the lustre of the living eye and the dullness of the dead eye suggested, in Egypt as among those peoples, the idea of a special 'soul-force' having magic virtues of its own (which would justify, besides, all the magic relating to the power of the look), and continuing to live after death with the various attributes which we accord to ghosts. There is, however, no formal proof by texts of this explanation.

The *khu* is generally a wretched being. It has never been credited with a lofty rôle. It is *a priori* a wandering, unhappy, hungry being, a sort of outcast from the great crowd of the dead and other 'spirits'—such as a dead man, *e.g.*, whose grave has been destroyed, and whose soul, double, etc., have perished by privation or by the attacks of monsters. Accordingly, we never find the *khu* of a king or a nobleman appearing in the texts in the rôle of 'ghost,' as this rôle is always a humble and maleficent one. The attributes of the Egyptian ghost, then, reduce themselves finally to those of harmful demons, and agree very largely with what is believed on the subject in all religions. Ghosts afflict people with 'demonic possession' in all its varieties; they torment in dreams (*q.v.*); they find their way into the interior of the body of living people, and cause innumerable ills (see DISEASE AND MEDICINE [Egyp.]); they appear suddenly to terrify the living, especially at certain hours of the night, and preferably in the neighbourhood of cemeteries, or in places reputed to be their favourite haunts (cf. Maspero, *Contes populaires*, *passim*); they attempt to violate any woman they can take by surprise in a lonely place (*e.g.* one of the chapters of the Book of the Two Ways, in which a magic power is accorded the *khu* 'of taking by force any woman he wants'); or, in order to devour living substance, they throw themselves into the body of beasts, excite them to frenzy, and cause them to die; the *khuu* of women dying in child-birth aim especially at causing infants to die (cf. the curious formulæ of the papyrus *Zaubersprüche für Mutter und Kind*, published by Erman, 1901; see also Erman, *Religion*, p. 158, etc., for other good examples of the part played by ghosts; this belief is analogous to numerous beliefs throughout all Africa). The *khuu* of suicides, executed criminals, unburied dead, and shipwrecked sailors are particularly tormented and miserable. It was to them that the magician of the later centuries applied by preference—conjuring, invoking, and putting them at his service for his thousand and one evil purposes:

tormenting in sleep, causing death by enchantment or by fever, assisting lovers to exact vengeance, or helping those who wished to attract or recall an unfaithful mistress (cf. the series of *tabellae devotionis*, the dominating Egyptian element in which is nevertheless tinged with magic of Asiatic or North African origin). The baleful activity of all these ghosts is naturally specially excited at certain unfavourable times in the calendar (see CALENDAR [Egyp.]), and they come in their hordes at these times to join the troops of evil 'spirits' struggling against order (see DUALISM [Egyp.]), just like a band of plunderers accompanying the real combatants. Very seldom do we find mention of a *khu* playing the simple inoffensive part of a ghost (Budge cites one example, in *Egyp. Magic*, Lond. 1899, p. 219, of a *khu* which points out to a mortal a suitable place for building a tomb), this form of activity being reserved especially for the 'doubles' and the 'souls' (see STATE OF THE DEAD [Egyp.]).

10. Conclusions.—The original complete confusion of troops of demons (or spirits) with the earliest gods has been affirmed repeatedly in this article. On the other hand, it has been said that the spirits of the dead were confused with the demons as to habitat, needs, functions, character, and powers. This double assertion would require a more detailed demonstration than is here possible. Presented thus in a condensed form, it seems to lead, by syllogism, to an equating of the spirits of the dead with the first gods, in whole or in part. But, as a matter of fact, no theory of Egyptian religion could be more contrary to truth or more capable of vitiating all knowledge of that religion. Never at any time or under any form did the Egyptian dead become gods. The case of the sons or heirs of gods (chiefs and kings) belongs to an entirely different category, and the confusion of the dead with Osiris, or some other of the gods of the dead, by magic or by religious process is either an euonymous assimilation or an absorption of the dead man's personality by an already existing god. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary to insist on the fact that the demons and spirits, the original forms of the Egyptian gods, have nothing to do with the spirits of the dead in their essential nature, but merely resemble them in the aspects of their activity (see STATE OF THE DEAD [Egyp.]). Between the nature of 'spirits' and 'demons'—all those myriads of beings, this 'dust of gods' from which the gods sprang—and the nature of the spirits of the dead there is an impassable limit set which Lang has called 'the abyss of death.' The spirits, or *khuu*, of the Egyptian dead come from beings who did not exist before their birth on earth, who have known physical death, and are liable to suffer the 'second death,' or final destruction. None of these three characteristics can be applied to the demons or genii any more than to the first of the actual gods, who became detached from their various innumerable troops of spirits. Later theologies credited the gods of the historic period with having been born, and even attributed to Osiris or his mythological 'doublets' a physical death. They never touched on the third characteristic. And, on the other hand, Egypt never knew of an ordinary mortal who became a god, or for whom there was such a possibility even under the humble form of a demon.

LITERATURE.—The provisional state of the sources and evidence regarding demonology has been noted in the course of the article. The whole theory of spirits has never been gathered together in one work; views on the spirits, however, are scattered through all the works that discuss Egyptian religion. We may only mention, among those in which the information is more specially grouped, the following: E. Amélineau, *Prolegomènes*, Paris, 1908 (where an exactly opposite euhemeristic theory is supported at length); E. A. W. Budge, *Egyptian Magic*, London, 1901, *Gods of the Egyptians*, do. 1904, *Liturgy of Funerary Offerings*, do. 1909, *Opening of the Mouth*, do. 1909, and *Book of the Dead*, do. 1909; A. Erman, *Die ägypt. Relig.*, Berlin, 1905; G. Maspero, *Études de mythol. et d'archéol*, vol. ii., Paris, 1893, and *Contes populaires*[4], do. 1908; W. M. F. Petrie, *Religion and Conscience in Ancient Egypt*, London, 1898. A certain number of details are given in the manuals of Egyp. religion of Ermoni (Paris, 1910), Petrie (London, 1906), Virey (Paris, 1910), and A. Wiedemann (Münster, 1890). The documentation proper naturally fills the whole series of Egyptological monumental bibliography. See especially, besides the works already mentioned, E. Lefébure, *Hypogées royaux de Thèbes*, Paris, 1883; and P. Lacau, *Sarcophages antérieurs au Nouvel Empire*, Indexes, Cairo, 1903–1906.

GEORGE FOUCART.

DEMONS AND SPIRITS (Greek).—Students of Greek literature cannot fail to be impressed by the complex system of the Olympian theocracy, and by the richness of legendary fable which envelops it. In variety of detail and precision of outline it seems to be separated by long periods of development from the vague beliefs and rude ceremonies which characterize the religions of primitive man. But, while it is certain that the Greek gods, as they appear in literature, are the product of a long course of evolution, beliefs in the existence of various supernatural beings, which belong to an earlier stratum of religious thought, and can be paralleled from the records now available of savage superstitions, continued to maintain themselves during historical times. Of these intermediate beings the most important are those known as demons.

1. In early times.—In early religion the most powerful forces are those which are comprehensively attributed to Animism. To these belong the notions that all natural objects are informed with a living principle akin to the human soul, and that the souls of the dead continue to visit the haunts with which they were familiar in life. To the operation of these spiritual powers are ascribed such of the vicissitudes of life as cannot be explained by visible agencies. Similarly, it is inferred that the soul of a living man may be temporarily detached from its normal habitation in the body, as in sleep or trance; and that the bodies of the living may be possessed by alien spirits, as in epilepsy, lunacy, or hysteria. There is plenty of evidence that beliefs of this kind flourished in ancient Greece as vigorously as they have survived in mediæval and modern times; and the general name of 'demons,' which the Greeks gave to certain of these invisible but potent spirits, has been adopted by modern writers, who employ the term 'demonology' to describe the science relating to supernatural beings with a nature intermediate between that of gods and men.

But, in the exposition of these beliefs, we are met with difficulties arising from the nature of the evidence. We cannot reach the crude fancies of the vulgar in their original form, but are obliged to view them through the transfiguring medium of literature. The rationalizing genius of the race stands in our way. The notices relating to demons are drawn, for the most part, either from the writings of philosophers, who endeavoured to harmonize current superstitions with their own interpretation of the universe; or from poetry, where the creative imagination insensibly tones the simple outlines of the popular conception.

The earliest text requiring notice is the passage of Hesiod (*Op.* 122 ff., 251 ff.) in which he identifies the demons with the souls of those who lived in the Golden Age. They are described as continuing in the upper world, kindly guardians of men, distributors of prosperity and wealth, but wrapped in darkness so as to be invisible while they wander over every region of the earth. Here we meet the statement that the demons are the souls of the dead, overlaid with the legend of the Four Ages and the deterioration of mankind. For the popular belief on which it rests we must refer to passages

where the Greek δαίμονες is employed, like the Latin *manes*, to denote the spirits of the departed (Lucian, *de Luctu*, 24; for the evidence of inscriptions, where θεοῖς δαίμοσιν = *dis manibus*, see Roscher, i. 929; Frazer, *Pausan.*, 1900, iv. 24). The literary evidence is hardly less conclusive, when we find Darius and Alcestis described as demons in reference to their condition after death (Æsch. *Pers.* 623; Eur. *Alc.* 1003), and when the Muse prophesies that Rhesus, though dead, shall rest hidden in a Thracian cave as a man-demon (ἀνθρωποδαίμων, Eur. *Rhes.* 971). See, further, Usener, *Götternamen*, p. 248 ff.; a somewhat different view is taken by Rohde, *Psyche*[4], i. 95, 153. As the shades of ancestors, so long as they are treated with due respect, are expected to show favour, a reference to the 'good demon' sometimes implies nothing more than this (Waser, in Pauly-Wissowa, iv. 2012). But the good demon also appears in circumstances which cannot be associated with ancestor-worship. In Bœotia a sacrifice to the good demon was made the occasion for first tasting the new must (Plut. *Qu. Conv.* iii. 7. 1, p. 655 E); and at Athens it was the custom after dinner to pour out a small libation of unmixed wine in his honour (Aristoph. *Eq.* 85, etc.). At other times he is the personification of good fortune, as the protecting spirit of a community, a family, or an individual; in this sense, Nero arrogated to himself the title of 'good demon of the world' (*CIG* iii. 4699). See Rohde, i. 254 f.

With the various manifestations of the good demon we may contrast cases where the influence of the spirit was pernicious. An evil spirit was often conceived as a ghost.

A good illustration is afforded by the story of Euthymus the boxer, who fought with a 'hero' enshrined at Temesa in S. Italy. This was the ghost of one of Odysseus' crew, Polites or Alybas, who had been stoned to death by the people of Temesa for ravishing a girl. Every year the ghost required the dedication to him of the fairest maiden in Temesa as his wife, which was yielded by the townsfolk in order to save themselves from his wrath. The practice was of immemorial antiquity at the time when Euthymus chanced to come to Temesa, and, having entered the temple, saw the maiden, and fell in love with her. So Euthymus put on his armour, and, when the ghost appeared, withstood his assault and vanquished him; and the hero, driven from the land, plunged into the sea, and was never seen again. Pausanias, who tells the story (vi. 6. 7–11), as well as other authorities (Strabo, p. 255; Suid. *s.v.* Εὔθυμος), had seen a picture illustrating the event which he records, and, in the course of describing it, he quaintly remarks: 'The ghost was of a horrid black colour, and his whole appearance was most dreadful, and he wore a wolfskin.' The ghost-idea is less prominent in the story of the demon of Anagyrus, one of the Athenian demes, who destroyed the family of a neighbouring peasant for a trespass committed on his sanctuary (Suid. *s.v.* Ἀναγυράσιος δαίμων).

Hesiod (*Op.* 159, 172) distinguished between 'heroes' and 'demons,' and later philosophical speculation treated demons as belonging to a higher grade of dignity (Plut. *de Def. Or.* 10, p. 415 B). But in stories like the above the two terms are used without distinction; and heroes as ghostly beings were considered so dangerous that persons passing by their shrines were warned to keep silence, lest they should suffer injury (Hesych. *s.v.* κρείττονας). The belief that a hero is incapable of conferring blessings, and is only powerful to work ill, is enforced by Babrius, *Fab.* 63.

Other evil demons are represented as specially attached to an individual. Thus, the dread and strange vision of monstrous and fearful shape which appeared to M. Brutus in his last campaign announced itself to him as his evil demon (Plut. *Brut.* 36). Or an avenging demon may be the instrument appointed to punish the crimes of a particular family, as when, in the *Agamemnon* of Æschylus (1477), after the murder of her husband, Clytemnestra boasts that she herself is the incarnate demon of the Pelopids, 'so gross with o'ergrown flesh.' In such capacity the evil demon often bore the special title of 'Alastor'; and in the *Persæ* (357) the slave Sicinnus, who entrapped Xerxes into a fatal manœuvre, so that he lost the battle of Salamis, is described by the Persian messenger to Atossa as having been inspired by an *alastor*. Sophocles, in referring to an action impossible for any one but a madman, does not hesitate to say: 'Who would choose this, unless maddened by *avenging fiends*?' (ὅστις μὴ 'ξ ἀλαστόρων νοσοῖ [*Trach.* 1235]). It would be easy to multiply instances where demonic agencies are made responsible for good or evil fortune; and it is not surprising that the prevalence of such opinions opened the door to chicanery and imposture. Among the crowds of oracle-mongers, diviners, and interpreters of dreams, who swarmed at Athens during the latter part of the 5th cent. B.C., were some who professed to foretell the future by the agency of familiar spirits obedient to their summons. A notorious instance was Eurycles the ventriloquist (ἐγγαστρίμυθος, στερνόμαντις), who, by giving utterance to his oracles in a feigned voice, persuaded his hearers that they were the pronouncements of a demon lodged within his own breast (Aristoph. *Vesp.* 1019; Plat. *Soph.* 252 C and the scholl.). This proceeding corresponds exactly with the methods of savage magicians, as reported by E. B. Tylor in his article on 'Demonology' (*EBr*[9] vii. 63).

The notion of a guardian spirit, which watches over a man from his birth, directs his actions, and may be either friendly or hostile, was widely entertained among the Greeks. It is best expressed in the famous fragment of Menander (550 K.): 'By every man at birth a good demon takes his stand, to initiate him in the mysteries of life.' This is not a literary fancy, but a popular opinion: 'There are many who have a craven soul, but a good demon,' says Theognis (161). Or we may appeal to Pindar, a witness of a very different type (*Pyth.* v. 122): 'The mighty purpose of Zeus directs the demon of those whom he loves' (see W. Headlam, in *JPh* xxx. [1906] 304; Rohde, ii. 316; Usener, 296). But, in regard to the force of particular passages, there is room for disagreement. The word δαίμων is used in such a way that it is often difficult to seize its exact significance in a particular context. Thus, besides bearing the special meaning with which we are now concerned, it may be employed either (1) as a synonym of θεός, distinguishable, if at all, as expressing the Divine power manifested in action rather than the Divine personality as an object of worship; or (2) in the abstract sense of *destiny*. Yet, although we may sometimes hesitate (as, *e.g.*, in Eur. *Ion*, 1374, *Supp.* 592) between the abstract and the concrete meaning, with a view to the selection of an English equivalent, it is unlikely that to a Greek the word ever became so colourless as the tr. 'fate' or 'destiny' suggests. That this was the original sense, as has been suggested in recent times (Gruppe, *Gr. Mythol.* 991, n. 4; see, however, Usener, 292), is hardly credible.

We have seen that the belief in the separate existence of the soul after death leads to the assumptions that the souls of the dead are powerful over the living, and that other potencies of a similar character, spirit-like but not souls, exist independently and visit the earth. A further step is taken when these demons are regarded as capable of entering into and possessing human bodies (Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers* [Eng. tr. 1901], ch. i. §§ 5, 6). This may be illustrated by the various instances in which the human representative is permanently or temporarily identified with the Divine being whose power he assumes. Hermes became incarnate in the ministrants at the oracle of Trophonius at Lebadea (Pausan. ix. 39. 7), Bacchus in the *mystæ* (schol.

on Aristoph. *Eq.* 408). Similar is the inspiration drawn from the chewing or eating of magic substances, such as the laurel leaves sacred to Apollo (Soph. frag. 811, etc.), or the honey which inspired the Thriæ on Parnassus (Hom. *h. Herm.* 560). These are special applications of the general belief in demonic possession, which is implicit in the use of the adjectives εὐδαίμων, κακοδαίμων, etc., and is expressed by that of the verbs κακοδαιμονᾶν, δαιμονίζεσθαι (Soph. frag. 173), and δαιμονᾶν (Eur. *Phœn.* 888, with the present writer's note). The demon which took possession of a man's body was sometimes conceived as a fiery spirit, which raised the blood to a condition of fever. Hence the fiery emblems of love (Gruppe, 849, n. 7), which permeates the frames of its victims with a feverish ecstasy. Hippocrates found it necessary to combat the superstition that epilepsy is due to some god—Poseidon, Apollo, Ares, or Hecate—having taken possession of the sick man (*Morb. sacr.* 592 K). Phædra's wasting sickness is attributed by the chorus in the *Hippolytus* of Euripides to possession by Pan, Hecate, the Corybantes, Cybele, or Dictynna (141-147); and the sudden illness of Glauce, described in the *Medea*, was thought by those present to have been caused by the anger of Pan (1172). See also Usener, 294.

2. In the classical age.—The Olympian religion, if we may call by this name the impression which we receive from Greek literature about the ordinary beliefs of the classical age, is a composite structure, largely built up by the transference from past generations of elements on which time has worked an essential change. The demons passed into gods; the shadowy gods became definitely conceived personalities. A good illustration of this process may be taken from the development which can be traced in the notions entertained of the Nymphs (Gomperz, i. 26). The Oreads, Dryads, and Naiads owe their origin to the fetishism which believes that every natural object is endowed with a living spirit. In course of time the spirit is separated from its environment: the Dryad, for example, inhabits the oak, but the oak itself is no longer animate. But the indwelling spirit has not yet become immortal; the Dryad cannot outlive the oak (Hom. *h. Aphrod.* 257; Apoll. Rhod. ii. 481). A later stage has been reached when Homer describes how the Rivers and Nymphs were summoned by Zeus to join the conclave of the immortals (*Il.* xx. 7 ff.). We need not pause to illustrate the process by which a tribal deity has been elevated to national dignity, or a god with limited powers has merged his identity in the attributes of an Olympian. Other demons have taken subaltern rank in the celestial hierarchy, as when the Corybantes are classed as the attendants (πρόπολοι) of Rhea (Strabo, 472), and the Satyri attach themselves to Dionysus. *Eurynomus*, a grisly demon who ate the flesh of corpses, was painted by Polygnotus among the inhabitants of the lower world; he was blue-black in colour like a carrion-fly, his teeth were bared, and he was sitting on the skin of a vulture (Pausan. x. 28. 7). Dionysus was sometimes attended by *Akratos*, the potent spirit of the unmixed wine (Pausan. i. 2. 5); and Aphrodite by *Tychon*, perhaps the spirit of good luck, not unlike our Puck or Robin Goodfellow (Gruppe, 853, n. 2). Even the hell-hounds of Hecate are recognized as evil demons (Euseb. *Præp. Evang.* iv. 23. 7, 8).

It has recently been contended (Farnell, *CGS* v. [1909] 444) that the personification of abstract ideas as Divine beings claiming our veneration and worship is to be explained as due to the demonic power which was attributed by a primitive habit of mind to any outbreak of excessive emotion. Typical cases are quoted from the ceremonial observances paid in various parts of Greece to Shame, Pity, Laughter, Fear (Pausan. i. 17. 1; Plut. *Cleomen.* 9). If the suggestion is correct, it throws a remarkable light upon the development of Greek psychology. It is easier to recognize primitive ideas in the deification of Madness (Pausan. viii. 34. 1) and Hunger (Plut. *Qu. Conv.* vi. 8. 1, p. 694 A). The Maniæ are supposed by Pausanias to be the Erinyes under another title, as producing frenzy in their victims. But Hunger is hardly to be explained as the concrete embodiment given to the sufferings of starvation. Rather we should infer that the failure of the crops through drought, and the wasting of the flocks and herds through disease, were taken as irrefragable testimony to the operation of a malignant and supernatural power. In order to avert such a calamity, an annual expulsion of a disease-laden scapegoat in the character of a slave, who was beaten with rods of willow to the words of the refrain, 'Out of doors with famine, and in-doors with plenty and health!' took place at the town of Chæronea in Bœotia. Plutarch, in the passage quoted above, tells us that he had himself performed the ceremony when holding the office of chief magistrate. For its significance, see Frazer, *GB*[2], 1900, iii. 124ff.

Again, as the crude fancies of primitive superstition ceased to correspond with advancing enlightenment, they tended to gather round them the details of legendary adventures, and to become associated, in the record of a mythical past, with particular localities or heroic names. The Sphinx, a ravening monster, compact of indigenous stories of a destructive dragon fused with Oriental or Egyptian elements, was localized in Bœotia and connected with the story of Œdipus. The Harpies or 'Snatchers' (Hom. *Od.* xiv. 371), another composite notion in the evolution of which wind-demons and death-angels had taken part, survived ultimately for their share in the punishment of Phineus, which was related as an incident in the voyage of the Argonauts. They are nearly related to the Erinyes and the Sirens—both chthonic agencies; but, whereas the belief in an avenging spirit punishing homicide survived longer, and has preserved the Erinyes in literature as a potent spiritual force, the Sirens soon passed into the region of fairy-land, and were remembered chiefly from Homer's description of them in the *Odyssey*. The Gorgons—also under-world powers and storm-spirits—are hardly known to tradition except through the adventures of Perseus.

Besides these, there was a whole host of sprites, bogeys, and hobgoblins which remained nearer to their primitive associations. Their names are generic rather than personal, and they were rarely dignified by a connexion with some heroic tale. Such was *Empusa*, a demonic apparition that appeared sometimes at mid-day and sometimes by night. She had the power of continually changing her shape, but could be detected, it would seem, by the donkey's leg which was her constant attribute (see Dem. xviii. 130; Aristoph. *Ran.* 289 ff.). *Gello*—a name which has been compared with the Arabic *ghoul*—was a spectre which kidnapped children. Almost unknown to literature, the name lasted through the Middle Ages, and survives in some localities down to the present day (Maas, in Pauly-Wissowa, vii. 1005). Somewhat more familiar to us is *Mormo*, a bogey of the nursery, invoked to frighten children (Theocr. xv. 40; Xen. *Hell.* iv. 4. 17)—perhaps a hypocoristic form of Mormolyke—a werwolf (μορμολύκεια, Plat. *Phædo*, 77 E, etc.). Another bogey-name is that of *Lamia*, who was said to have the remarkable power of taking out her eyes and putting them back at pleasure. She also was a kidnapper and murderess of children, and is sometimes identified with Mormo and Gello, as if these were different names of the same monster. But in Lamia there are more traces of a definite personality; and she has almost become a mythical heroine, as a Libyan queen beloved by Zeus, whose children were killed by Hera, and who in consequence revenged herself by killing other children (see Didymus *ap.* schol. Aristoph. *Pax*, 758). To the same class belonged *Acco* and *Alphito*—words of doubtful meaning which perhaps signify 'booby' and 'grey-head' (Chrysipp. *ap.* Plut. *de Stoic. rep.* 15, p. 1040 B). *Ephialtes* was the name given to the spectre in-

vented by the ignorant to account for the nightmare which results from indigestion; and he is not always distinguished from *Epiales*, the cold shivering-fit which preceded an attack of fever (Aristoph. *Vesp.* 1037). Ephialtes was sometimes figured as the long-eared owl (ὦτος). Owls (στρίγγες) were regarded as birds of evil omen (*Poetæ Lyrici Græci*[4], ed. Bergk, Leipzig, 1878-82, iii. 664), and as embodiments of the spirits of the dead which appear by night to suck the blood of the living—a superstition which survives in modern Greece.

For the conception denoted by *Keres*, which is closely allied to, and largely co-extensive with, the present subject, see the article under that title.

3. In the hands of the philosophers.—We have now to examine how the popular belief in demons was treated by the philosophical schools. Thales is credibly reported to have said (Arist. *de Anima*, i. 5. 411*a* 8) that all things are full of gods, and it is hardly to be doubted that in so maintaining he sought to explain Animistic beliefs by the application of rational principles. By the Pythagoreans a belief in demons was always fostered, especially in their character as representing the souls of the dead. They entertained no doubt that such demons were visible as if in actual bodily presence, and were surprised that any one should deny that he had ever seen a demon (Arist. frag. 193 [Rose]). All the air, they said, is full of souls, and these are called demons and heroes. It is they who send dreams and signs of disease and good health not only to men, but also to sheep and cattle. With them relations are established by purification and expiation, by divination and by omens (Diog. Laert. viii. 22). Hence Aristoxenus (Stob. *Flor.* 79. 45) is following Pythagoras when he recommends the worship of gods and demons, and the Golden Poem places the heroes and subterranean demons, *i.e.* the souls of the dead, after the gods, but as worthy of honour corresponding to their degree. Later doxographers (Aët. *Plac.* i. 8. 2) join Pythagoras with Thales, Plato, and the Stoics in holding that demons and heroes are spiritual substances, or souls separated from bodies, and that there are good and bad demons corresponding to the same varieties of soul. There is also attributed to Pythagoras the fantastic notion that the sound emitted from a brass gong when struck is the voice of a demon shut up within the metal (Porphyr. *Vit. Pyth.* 41). The popular idea of an indwelling demon, by which a man is possessed or controlled, was refined and interpreted by several philosophers. To Heraclitus (frag. 119 [Diels]) is ascribed the pregnant saying that 'character is each man's demon,' his inner self is his true divinity, and his fate is moulded by his own individuality. The same thought is expressed by Epicharmus in a simpler form: 'His disposition is to each man a good or bad demon' (frag. 258 [Kaibel]). Similar but less striking is the saying of Democritus that 'blessedness dwells not in herds or gold, but the soul is the dwelling-place of the blessed being' (frag. 171 [Diels]). Democritus (Sext. *adv. Math.* ix. 19) explained the belief in gods by degrading them to the level of demons, which he held to be material images perceptible to our senses, long-lived but not immortal. Empedocles speaks of the wanderings of wicked demons, which have been cast out of the abodes of the blest but return there after a banishment of 30,000 years, during which they pass through various stages of incarnation (frag. 115, 2). These δαίμονες, as Hippolytus explains, are human souls; but they are not necessarily separable entities, since the figurative language of the poem requires to be controlled by the materialism of the philosophical system which it expounds (see Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, 1892, p. 271; Rohde, ii. 178 ff.).

Socrates was in the habit of asserting that he was frequently impeded by a Divine sign from taking a particular course of action. This customary sign was imparted through the medium of a warning voice, and was manifested on trifling as well as on important occasions (Plat. *Apol.* 31 D, 40 A). The deduction that Socrates intended to imply that he was guided throughout his life by a familiar spirit, though at one time generally held, has in recent years fallen into disfavour (see Zeller, *Socrates* [Eng. tr. 1868], p. 82 ff.; H. Jackson, in *JPh* v. [1873] 232 ff.). But, whatever may have been the real intention of Socrates, it can hardly be denied that, in a society where the belief in the existence of demons was widely prevalent, to many of his hearers the Divine sign must have suggested such an agency.

Plato, in this sphere as elsewhere, has gathered up the threads of previous speculations and woven them into new combinations by the play of his philosophic fancy. In accordance with popular tradition, he says that the demons are the bastard sons of gods by nymphs or some other mothers (*Apol.* 27 D). The demons are of an airy substance, inferior to the heavenly ether, and serve as interpreters between gods and men (*Epinom.* 984 E). Love is a great demon; like all spirits, he is intermediate between the Divine and the mortal; he conveys to the gods the prayers and sacrifices of men, and to men the commands and replies of the gods (*Symp.* 202 E). This recalls the Pythagorean doctrine previously quoted, and Proclus says it is also Orphic; modern critics have seen in it a mode of reconciliation between the old theology and the new conception of an inaccessible god (Gruppe, 1054). Plato accepts the popular view of demons, as identical with the souls of the dead: when a good man dies, he is honoured by being enrolled as a demon, which is only another form of δαήμων, 'the wise one' (*Cratyl.* 398 B). Every man has a distinct demon which attends him during life and after death (*Phædo*, 107 D, *Rep.* 617 D). Each demon has his own allotted sphere of operation, and watches over his appointed charge like a shepherd over his flock (*Polit.* 271 D, 272 E). The last-quoted passages are drawn from the narratives of the myths with which Plato diversified his more formal arguments, and his true mind is to be sought rather in a passage of the *Timæus* (90 A) in which, with a reminiscence of Heraclitus, he declares that God has given to each man, as a guiding genius, the supreme form of soul within us, the rational faculty which dwells in the summit of our body and lifts us towards our celestial kindred.

Aristotle is reported to have assented to the belief that all men have demons which accompany them during the whole period of their mortal existence (frag. 193 [Rose]); but it is impossible to say whether he attached to it any philosophical importance. Xenocrates agreed with the statement in the *Timæus*, that the soul of man is his guardian spirit (Arist. *Top.* ii. 6. 112*a*, 37); and he also maintained the existence of a number of good and bad demons (Zeller, *Plato*, etc. [Eng. tr. 1876], p. 593). But the school which did most to establish a belief in demons as a part of the mental equipment of its students was unquestionably the Stoic. The Stoics sought with unwearied industry to bring every conception of popular religion into connexion with their own theology; and their doctrine of pantheism enabled them without difficulty to find a place for the demons within their system. They were firmly convinced of the existence of demons, which, having like passions with men, and responding to their desires and fears,

their pains and pleasures, superintended and directed their fortunes (Diog. Laert. vii. 151). These demons are composed of soul-substance, which is not scattered and lost, as Epicurus maintained (frags. 336, 337 [Usener]), at the dissolution of the body, but, having in itself the principle of permanence, is located in the region beneath the moon, and sustained, like the other stars, by the exhalations rising from the earth (Sext. *adv. Math.* ix. 71). Posidonius, who gave particular attention to the matter, explained that human souls after death are not sufficiently pure to reach the upper ether, and are restricted to the lower level, where they congregate among the demons. Hence it is that, with the strictest accuracy, the soul dwelling within the body may be described as the 'demon born with us' (Schmekel, *Philos. d. mittl. Stoa*, Berlin, 1892, p. 256). On the other hand, the Epicureans controverted these fairy-tales: there are no such beings as demons; and, even if there were, it is inconceivable that they would assume human shape, or that it would be possible for them to communicate with us by speech or otherwise (Plut. *Brut.* 37; see, further, Epicur. frags. 393, 394 [Usener]).

In writers of a later period, such as Maximus Tyrius, Apuleius, and Philostratus, the maxims of demonology have come to be commonplaces, partly owing to the influence of the sources which we have enumerated, and partly by the contact with Oriental civilizations, which had become continually more intimate since the beginning of the Hellenistic epoch (Rohde, ii. 364; Gruppe, 1468). Since the demons were regarded as unceasingly active in the service of the gods, they were assigned a definite place in the celestial hierarchy of the Neo-Platonists, as subordinate to angels and archangels (Porphyr. *Ep. ad Arnob.* 10; demons were first associated with ἄγγελοι by Philo, according to Dieterich, *Nekyia*, 61). Hence, as part of the machinery by which the apologists of paganism sought to shore up their tottering edifice against the assaults of the Christians, they appear with considerable frequency in the controversial writings of the early Fathers of the Church.

It is not within the scope of this article to examine the various methods employed by Greek magic for the purpose of averting, deceiving, or conciliating evil spirits. The details will be found elsewhere under the titles CHARMS AND AMULETS, MAGIC, etc. It is only within recent years that the comparative study of anthropology has shown the way by which the future investigation of Greek religion must travel. But the evidence of ritual drawn from literary sources is difficult to appraise; partly because the development of theology tended to obscure the primitive elements, and partly because the ritual facts, even when separated from later accretions, are capable of various interpretations. It is well established that the beating of drums and cymbals, and particularly of various kinds of bronze vessels (schol. *ad* Theocr. ii. 36), was intended to frighten away any demons which might be at hand on important or ceremonial occasions; similarly, the use of iron was effective against demonic influence (Riess, in Pauly-Wissowa, i. 50). When, however, the desire to be on good terms with evil demons is held to be the leading motive in such various rites as sword-dances, the ploughing with magic animals, the smearing of the face with chalk or meal, or the dressing of a boy in girl's clothes (cf. *ClR* vii. [1893] 243), it must be remembered that such hypotheses are far removed from certainty. The debatable evidence will be found collected in Gruppe, 894 ff.

For demons in relation to the Orphic cults, see ORPHISM.

LITERATURE.—The main facts are summarized in the articles, *s.v.* 'Daimon,' by von Sybel, in Roscher, i. 938, and by **Waser**, in Pauly-Wissowa, iv. 2010, where references are given to the less accessible of the special treatises. See also **R. Heinze**, *Xenocrates*, Leipzig, 1892, pp. 78–123; **J. Tamburnino**, *de Antiquorum Dæmonismo*, Giessen, 1909. Much useful information will be found in **O. Gruppe**, *Gr. Mythol. und Religionsgesch.*, Munich, 1906; **J. E. Harrison**, *Proleg. to the Study of Gr. Religion*², Cambridge, 1909; **A. Dieterich**, *Nekyia*, Leipzig, 1893, esp. pp. 46–62; **H. Usener**, *Gotternamen*, Bonn, 1896, esp. p. 292 ff.; **E. Rohde**, *Psyche*⁴, Tübingen, 1907.

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DEMONS AND SPIRITS (Hebrew)

DEMONS AND SPIRITS (Hebrew).—It will be most convenient to divide the material into three periods: pre-exilic, exilic and post-exilic, and Apocryphal.

I. *THE PRE-EXILIC PERIOD.*—**1.** In the early Heb. poems there is but one allusion to an angel, and none to spirits or demons. The 'holy ones' in Dt 33^{2}, later supposed to be angels (cf. Ac 7^{53}, Gal 3^{19}, He 2^{2}), were probably not a part of the original text (cf. Driver, *Deuteronomy*, Edinburgh, 1895, p. 392 ff.). In Jg 5^{23} we read: 'Curse ye Meroz, saith the angel of Jahweh.' Probably the angel was a manifestation of Jahweh, as in the J document.

2. Our next earliest evidence is in the *J document.* In Gn 3^{24} **cherubim** are said to have been the guardians of Eden's entrance. There is reason to believe that these beings were personified winds. They find a counterpart in the winged figures of the Assyr. sculptures, which are often pictured in the act of fertilizing the sacred palm tree; hence Tylor suggested that they were winds—a view now accepted by many others.[1] The association of such figures with the tree of life would lead to the view that they were denizens of Paradise, and hence guardians of the tree of life. Apart from the cherubim, no other spirits appear in the early chapters of Genesis, but Jahweh Himself deals directly with men. This is the case in the Eden narrative (Gn 3), the Flood story (chs. 6–9), the confusion of tongues (ch. 11), and the story of Abraham (ch. 15). In the last-mentioned passage Jahweh appears as a flame of fire.

In Gn 16^{7} we first come upon the **'angel of Jahweh,'** who found Hagar in the wilderness and aided her, but whom, as v.^{13} shows, Hagar regarded as Jahweh Himself. The word here and elsewhere in the OT translated 'angel,' *mal'ak*, is from a root which appears in Arabic as *lâka*, and in Ethiopic as *la'aka*, 'to go' or 'send as a messenger.' In this case *mal'ak Jahweh* means a special mission or coming of Jahweh to accomplish a special purpose. The 'angel' is not, accordingly, an angel in the later acceptation of the term.[2] The same is true of the following instances, which all appear in J, or in literature closely akin to it.

In Gn 18 the word 'angel' is not used, but Jahweh is said to have visited Abraham. The 'two angels' of ch. 19 are a later addition to the narrative, and, in the language of a later epoch, describe Jahweh's companions. In Gn $32^{24ff.}$ a 'man' comes and wrestles with Jacob; he is in reality Jahweh, though not formally declared by the text to be so. This 'man' represents a 'mission' or 'coming' of Jahweh, as did the 'angel of Jahweh' in ch. 16. It is probably this 'man' who is referred to in Gn 48^{16} as 'the angel which hath redeemed me [Jacob].' In Ex 3^{2} the 'angel of Jahweh' appeared to Moses in the burning bush, but it was Jahweh Himself who saw that Moses turned aside to see the bush (v.^{4}), and Jahweh who spoke to Moses (v.^{7}). Similarly, the 'angel of Jahweh' appeared in the way to stop Balaam (Nu 22^{22-35}). In Jos 5^{13-15} a 'man' appeared to Joshua as the captain of the host of Jahweh; he was the same manifestation elsewhere called the 'angel of Jahweh.' In Jg 2^{1} the 'angel' or 'manifestation' of Jahweh moved up from Gilgal to Bethel. The 'angel of Jahweh' appeared to Gideon (Jg 6^{11}), and it is clear from vv.$^{21-23}$ that He was Jahweh Himself. The same is true of the 'angel of Jahweh' who appeared to the wife of Manoah in Jg $13^{2ff.}$. In 2 S 24^{14} David falls into the hand of Jahweh, who turns out (v.^{16}) to be His angel.

In all these passages the 'angel of Jahweh' is

[1] Cf. Barton, *Sem. Or.*, London, 1902, p. 91, and the references there given; also Skinner, *Genesis*, Edinburgh, 1910, p. 89 ff.; for a divergent view, see art. CHERUB, vol. iii. p. 508 ff.

[2] Cf. W. E. Addis, *Documents of the Hexateuch*, London, 1892, i. 24, n. 1.

Jahweh Himself, who has come upon some special mission. Perhaps it was regarded as a kind of partial manifestation of Jahweh, but at all events there was no clear line of distinction between Jahweh and His angel. These manifestations of Jahweh were regarded as blessed or beautiful things, so that, when it was desired especially to praise a man, one said to him: 'Thou art good in my sight as an angel of God' (cf. 1 S 29[9], 2 S 14[17. 20] 19[27]). At the same time, the term *mal'ak* was often used to designate the messenger of a king (see 1 S 11[3] 16[19] 19[11. 14. 20], and cf. 1 K 20[2], Jer 27[3]).

In the J document other beings of the Divine order besides Jahweh are represented as real. These are called 'sons of God' (*b'nê hā-'elôhîm*) in Gn 6[2. 4], where they are said to have taken human wives and to have begotten the heroes who lived in olden days. These beings are not called angels, and do not appear again in pre-exilic literature.

3. In the *E document* the same conditions of thought prevail, though here angels appear at times in numbers.

In Gn 22[11] an angel called to Abraham out of heaven to prevent the sacrifice of Isaac. The present text calls him the 'angel of Jahweh,' but it is thought that in the original form of the text he was called the 'angel of God.' In Gn 28[12] Jacob saw the angels of God ascending and descending upon the ladder of his dream, but they were so closely associated with God that he said: 'This is none other than the house of God.' In Gn 31[11] the 'angel of God' appeared to Jacob in Aram, but v.[13] tells us that he said: 'I am the God of Bethel.' The angel was, then, only a manifestation of God. In Gn 32[1ff.] 'the angels of God' met Jacob, and he said: 'This is God's host.' Here apparently the angels were a manifestation of God and of His attendant company of spirits. In Ex 3[4b] it was God Himself who called to Moses out of the burning bush. In Ex 14[19] the 'angel of God' who had gone before the camp of Israel removed and went behind. This angel performed the same function as the pillar of cloud in the J document (cf. Nu 20[16]). That the 'angel of God' was practically identical with God is shown in Ex 23[20ff.], where God declared that His 'name' was in the angel that should go before Israel.

There is, then, no radical difference of conception between J and E. In both of them the angel of the Deity is usually a manifestation of Deity Himself, though in one instance (Gn 32[1ff.]) the angels are apparently the spirits who accompany God. In Jg 9[23] (a passage which G. F. Moore [*SBOT*, New York, 1898] attributes to E), God is said to have sent an evil spirit between Abimelech and the men of Shechem; and similarly in 1 S 16[14-16. 23] 18[10] (a passage which Budde attributes to J) an evil spirit from God is said to have come upon Saul.

4. This last conception is similar to that in 1 K 22[19-23], where Jahweh is thought of as surrounded by a host of spirits. These spirits were as yet undifferentiated. They had no moral character; they were neither angels nor demons, but took on their character from the nature of the tasks which they were given to perform. Jahweh Himself was responsible for whatever was done; He lured Ahab to his death; it was at His bidding that one of the spirits became a lying spirit in the mouths of Ahab's prophets to accomplish this end. The spirits of Jahweh's court were not the only spirits in which the Hebrews of the period believed. In 2 K 2[12] and 6[17] reference is made to a kind of horsemen of the air, who seem to have been regarded as spirit defenders of Israel, for one passage relates that, when the chariot of fire took Elijah away, Elisha exclaimed: 'The chariots of Israel and the horsemen thereof!' and the other represents these horsemen as the defenders of Elisha from a foreign army.

5. There are few other references to angels or spirits before the Exile. An early Ephraimite narrative (1 K 19[5]) tells us that an angel touched Elijah and awakened him. One late prophetic narrative tells us twice that an angel of Jahweh spoke to Elijah (2 K 1[3. 15]), while another, also late (1 K 13[18]), tells that an angel spoke to another prophet. In 2 K 19[35] = Is 37[36] we are told that an angel of Jahweh smote the Assyrians of Sennacherib's army. Pre-exilic prophets make almost no reference to angels, although Hosea (12[4]) declares that Jacob 'had power over the angel.' This is a reference to the 'man' of Gn 32[24ff.], and is the only occurrence of 'angel' in a pre-exilic prophet. The Deuteronomist makes no mention of angels. One Deut. editor refers to the 'angel of Jahweh' (Ex 33[2]), but he was influenced by E.

6. One other class of supernatural beings of the time before the Exile remains to be considered, viz. the **seraphim**. Our knowledge of them is gained from one passage only, Is 6[1-7]. In his vision, Isaiah saw Jahweh, above whom the seraphim were standing. Each one had six wings, and they constantly uttered the trisagion. At the sound of their voices 'the foundations of the threshold were moved.' Finally, it was one of these who took from the altar a live coal and touched the prophet's lips. It is clear that, like the cherubim, the seraphim were not angels (*i.e.* messengers), but were attendants of Jahweh. Like the cherubim, they are composite figures, and later Jewish thought placed them with the cherubim in Paradise (cf. En. 61[10] 71[7], Slav. En. 20[1] 21[1]).

Various explanations of the name and nature of the seraphim have been offered. (1) An old explanation, now generally abandoned, derived *sārāph* from the Arab. *šarufa*, 'to be eminent in glory,' and held the seraphim to be a kind of archangels. (2) Delitzsch and Hommel have connected it with the Assyr. *šarrāpu*, the 'burner,' an epithet applied to the Bab. god Nergal, a sun-deity; but, although an old syllabary says that this was the epithet of Nergal in the 'Westland,' no such deity has appeared in any real Canaanite source, and is consequently improbable. (3) Cheyne (*EBi*, art. 'Demons') has, under the influence of the previous suggestion, attempted to connect the name of the god *Rešef*, whose name occurs in a Phoen. inscription (*CIS* i. 38). This he equates with *sārāph*, supposing that a transposition of letters occurred—a solution which seems even more improbable. (4) Less satisfactory still was Hitzig's suggestion that *sārāph* is to be connected with the Egyptian Serapis. (5) More recently Marti and others have connected the seraphim with the Egyptian griffins found, for example, in a XIIth dynasty tomb at Beni Hassan. These griffins were winged, were guardians of the grave, and in demotic were called *seref* (cf. R. Pietschmann, *Gesch. der Phönizier*, Berlin, 1889, p. 177 ff.). (6) Probably the true explanation connects the seraphim with the fiery (*s'rāphîm*) serpents of Nu 21[6], and supposes that the seraphim were primarily serpents. This view is supported by the fact that Heb. tradition gave the serpent a prominent rôle in Paradise (cf. Gn 3), that they worshipped a serpent-god down to the time of Hezekiah (2 K 18[4ff.]), that there was at Jerusalem a well called the 'Dragon's fountain' (Neh 2[13]; probably the modern Bir Eyyub), that a brazen serpent was found at Gezer in the pre-exilic Hebrew stratum (R. A. S. Macalister, *Bible Side-Lights from the Mound of Gezer*, London, 1906, p. 76), and that in En. 20[7] serpents (Gr. δράκοντες) are associated with the cherubim in Paradise, as in the Enoch passages cited above seraphim are associated with the cherubim. In course of time these serpents of Paradise were regarded as the attendants or guards of Jahweh, and were given wings, etc. to make them composite.

In pre-exilic Hebrew thought, then, Jahweh had three classes of attendants—cherubim, spirits, and seraphim. The cherubim and seraphim were guardians of Paradise and attendants of Jahweh. The spirits were His courtiers, and might be sent on missions by Him. They played, however, a very small part. Jahweh Himself was thought to appear in special manifestations to accomplish His purposes. Such manifestations were called the 'angel of Jahweh,' or the 'angel of God.'

7. Of demons in this period there are but slight traces. In the old poem which now forms Dt 33 it is said in v.[13] that the 'deep' (*t'hôm*) 'coucheth' (*rôbeṣeth*) beneath. Driver has noted (*Deut.* p. 406) that *rôbeṣeth* is ordinarily used of an animal; and, when one recalls that under the kindred name *Tiamāt* the deep was personified in Babylonia as a dragon, and that this dragon appears in post-exilic Heb. literature as Rahab and Leviathan (see below), it becomes probable that Dt 33[13] personified the subterranean abyss as a great dragon or demon. In Dt 32[17] Hebrews are said to have sacrificed to *shēdîm*, not to *'Elôah* (God). *Shēdîm* was understood by the translators of the Septuagint as

demons, but, as it is made parallel with 'foreign gods' (cf. v.[16]), and is the equivalent of the Assyr. *šêdu*, or bull-deity, it is probable that it is used here as the name of a foreign deity. The fact that the root *shēd* became in later Judaism the general term for 'demon' (cf. Jastrow, *Dict. of the Targ., Talmud, and Mid.*, New York, 1903, p. 1558*a*) does not prove this inference wrong. If this view is correct, it makes no difference to our subject whether we date Dt 32, with Ewald and Dillmann, in the reign of Jeroboam II.; with Kuenen and Driver, about 630 B.C.; or, with Steuernagel, in the Exile.

There are no clear references in pre-exilic literature to other demons, but it is probable that the Hebrews of the period believed that demons inhabited waste places, and that they endeavoured to propitiate them. The sacrifice to the wilderness demon Azazel (*q.v.*) (Lv 16) is clearly a survival from pre-exilic days, and it is probable that Lilith (Is 34[14]) was an old wilderness demon.

II. *EXILIC AND POST-EXILIC CANONICAL MATERIAL.*—1. In *Ezekiel* the term 'angel' does not occur, though in 9[2ff. 5ff.] and in 40[3ff.] a supernatural man appears who performs the functions of an angel. In the former passage he directs the marking of idolaters for destruction; in the latter he measures off the dimensions of the new sanctuary. The older belief in spirits survives to some extent in Ezekiel. In 2[2] 3[12. 14] 8[1ff.] a 'spirit' is said to have come upon Ezekiel and filled him with ecstatic inspiration. This spirit was one of the members of Jahweh's court, of which 1 K 22 gives such a vivid description (cf. Toy, *SBOT*, New York, 1899). This usage of 'spirit' is found only in the earlier chapters of Ezekiel, and in 8[1ff.] is made synonymous with 'the hand of Jahweh.' In 11[5ff.] the term 'spirit' occurs, but it here approaches more nearly the spirit of Jahweh, and does not seem to denote a separate entity of a lower order. It inspires the prophet to reflexion rather than ecstasy. In other parts of Ezekiel 'spirits' do not occur.

2. In *Deutero-Isaiah* angels are not mentioned, and in *Trito-Isaiah* only one reference to an angel or spirit is found, viz. 'the angel of his [Jahweh's] presence' [Heb. 'face'], Is 63[9]. The expression occurs in a poetic reference to the angel mentioned in Ex 23[21], of whom it was said, 'My name is in him.' The term 'presence' or 'face' seems to be borrowed from Ex 33[12ff.], where Jahweh says to Moses: 'My presence shall go with thee.' The reference in Isaiah really betokens a post-exilic literary survival of a pre-exilic idea.

3. In *Zechariah* the 'angel' in the function of messenger appears as a fixed idea. The angel talked with the prophet, and in this way Zechariah received all his prophetic messages (cf. Zec 1[9. 11. 12. 13. 14. 19] 5[5. 10] 6[4. 5]). The angel is here clearly an intermediary between God and man. Zechariah never is said to have seen God. In Zechariah, too, we meet for the first time with the division of angels into ranks. In 2[3. 4] one angel is clearly the commander of another, and sends him on a mission. The 'angel of Jahweh' appears here also as a kind of guardian of Israel, since he protects the priest, the representative of the nation. In 1[11ff.] and 4[1ff.] the angel of Jahweh appears as a kind of Grand Vizier among the other angels. Possibly this early differentiation of angels into ranks was due to Persian influence, though this seems improbable, for, when this prophecy was written, only twenty years had elapsed since Cyrus's conquest of Babylonia and Palestine.

4. In the Book of *Job* we have different strata. The prologue is older than the poem, and may have been composed before the Exile. In it Jahweh is represented as surrounded by a court of supernatural beings. These are called *bᵉnê hā-'elôhîm*, or beings of the Divine order—the old name employed in Gn 6[2-4]. These beings are pictured as free to walk through the earth wherever they will, but upon appointed days they gather to pay their court to Jahweh. Satan is still a member of this group, though he has become offended and has lost his faith in the existence of disinterested virtue. He is permitted to go forth upon a mission of experimentation—a mission which proves most painful to his victim. The whole conception is quite akin to that of 1 K 22. In the poem, which is later than the prologue, little is said of angels, though that little is of interest. In 5[1] the possibility of angelic intercessors is referred to. The angelic beings are here called 'holy ones.' In 4[18] and 15[15] these 'holy ones' are said to be less pure than God, but much holier than men. The 'angel' of 33[23] (RV) is better rendered, with the margin, 'messenger,' since Elihu is referring to himself and not to a heavenly messenger (cf. Barton, *Com. on Job*, N.Y., 1911). In 38[7] the 'sons of God' of the prologue are referred to, and are identified with the morning stars.

5. In the *Psalter*, angels are messengers of either good or evil. Ps 34[7] declares: 'The angel of Jahweh encampeth round about them that fear him,' *i.e.* he is their protection. Ps 35[5. 6] declares that God lets His angel chase and persecute the wicked. Similarly, Ps 78[49] declares that God cast upon the Egyptians 'the fierceness of his anger, wrath, indignation, and trouble, a band of evil angels.' Here the angels are personifications of the wrath and indignation of Jahweh. Ps 104[4] reverses in a way the process, declaring: 'He makes his angels winds.' The angels as guardians are again referred to in Ps 91[11f.]: 'He shall give his angels charge over thee, to keep thee. They shall bear thee up in their hands.' Ps 103[20] and 148[2] call upon angels as well as men to praise God. Ps 89[6. 7] implies that God is surrounded in heaven by a council of angels. This is also implied in Ps 103[20. 21] and 148[2], where the angels are spoken of as the 'ministers who do God's pleasure,' and as 'his host.' In Ps 8[5], where the present text, in speaking of man, reads: 'Thou hast made him little less than God' (*'elôhîm*), the reference is probably to angels, and the original text was, perhaps, 'sons of God' (*bᵉnê hā-'elôhîm*).

6. The *Priestly document* contains no reference to angels. It conceives of God as far away, but also as so powerful that He can simply speak and His word is obeyed. It represents Him in Leviticus as speaking to Moses, but how He spoke it never tells. It gives no hint that it was through angels.

7. The same is true of the Books of *Chronicles*, which are closely dependent upon P for their point of view. The Chronicler mentions angels in two passages only, 1 Ch 21 and 2 Ch 32[21]. The former passage is dependent on 2 S 24, and has taken over the angel who inflicted the punishment for David's census (see vv.[9. 11. 12. 13. 14. 19]); the latter is dependent upon 2 K 19[35], and has taken over the story of the angel who destroyed Sennacherib's army.

8. Angels do not really appear in the Book of *Ecclesiastes*. The word 'angel' is found, it is true, in 5[6] (Heb. 5[5]), but it is probably a reverent way of referring to God Himself (cf. Barton, *Ecclesiastes*, in *ICC*, 1908). The Chronicler had set the example for this procedure by making the angel who afflicted Israel stand for God (cf. 1 Ch 21[16. 20]).

9. In the Book of *Daniel* the belief in angels re-appears, and they are thought to be exalted far above man (see 8[16-18] 10[16]). In 3[25] an angel comes in human form to deliver the three children from the fiery furnace (cf. v.[28]), and in 6[22] God's angel

is said to have stopped the mouths of the lions. The conception of the division of angels into ranks, which was found in Zechariah, re-appears in an accentuated form in Daniel. Each nation apparently has a 'prince' or archangel detailed to look after its interests, so that there is a 'prince of the kingdom of Persia' (10[12-20]), a 'prince of Greece' (10[20]), and a 'prince of Israel' (10[21]). The last mentioned is Michael, who was 'one of the chief princes' (10[13] 12[1]). Possibly this conception is also found in Is 33[21ff.], which dates from about 335–333 B.C. In Daniel, too, we come upon a new feature found in no other canonical book of the period: the angels, or at least the archangels, begin to have names. In addition to Michael, already mentioned, 'the man Gabriel' (Gabriel means 'hero *or* man of God') appeared to impart wisdom to Daniel (8[16ff.] 9[21ff.]). The giving of definite proper names to angels—a feature very common in some of the apocryphal books—marks another step forward in the evolution of the conception.

10. Taking the post-exilic time as a whole, some interesting general facts with reference to angels may be gathered. They are called by a variety of names: 'sons of God,' *i.e.* of *'elôhîm* (Job 1[6] 2[1], Dn 3[25]); *'elôhîm*, i.e. 'gods' (Ps 8[5] and perhaps 97[9]), 'sons of the mighty,' *i.e.* of *'ēlîm*, lit. 'gods' (Ps 29[1] 89[6]); *'ēlîm*, or 'gods' (Ex 15[11]); *gibbôrîm*, or 'heroes' (Jl 3 [4] [11]); *shômᵉrîm*, or 'keepers' (Is 62[6]); 'host of the height' (Is 24[21]); 'morning stars' (Job 38[7]); *'îrîm*, i.e. 'watchers' (Dn 4[17 (14)]); 'holy ones' Zec 14[5], Ps 89[7]), and 'princes' (Dn 10[13. 20. 21]). Although angels are once identified with stars (Job 38[7]), there is no attempt in the canonical books, such as appears in some of the apocryphal books, to define the nature of angels or to tell the substance of which they are composed. The term 'host of the height' applied to them in Is 24[21] is, no doubt, a modification of the pre-exilic phrase 'host of heaven,' which was applied to the stars. During the last years of the Judæan monarchy those had been worshipped (see Jer 8[2], Zeph 1[5], Dt 4[19]); they were then considered as gods, and the prophets opposed their worship. As the close of the Exile drew near, Jahweh was declared to be supreme over them (Is 45[12]; cf. 40[26]), and in Neh 9[6] they are said to worship Jahweh. Apparently it was believed that this host was not subdued to the position of subordinates and worshippers without a struggle (see Job 25[2], Is 24[21] 27[1] 34[5]), and the reference in 27[1] to Leviathan, which, as shown below, is a name for the Bab. dragon Tiamāt, suggests that the idea of a struggle was borrowed from the Babylonian Creation Epic.

It has been held by some that the division of angels into ranks and the belief in archangels point to the fact that the angels originated in the subjugation of other gods to Jahweh. The argument in favour of this view is strong. It would seem improbable that the development of archangels was due in the first place to Persian influence, for they appear already in Zechariah, when Persian influence was too new. The fact that in Daniel the different archangels are each the prince or guardian of a special nation is in favour of the origin suggested, for it assigns to them just the rôle that the national gods of the heathen world had performed.

The functions of angels were various. They acted as Jahweh's court (Job 1. 2) and as His council (Ps 89[7]); they might be intercessors for men (Job 5[1]), or guardians of the righteous (Ps. 34[7]), whom they bear up in their hands (Ps 91[11f.], Nu 20[16] [P]); they are the guides and channels of Divine revelation to prophets (Zec 1[9. 11. 12. 13. 14. 19] etc., Dn 8[16ff.] 10[9-11ff.]); they inflict punishment on the wicked (Ps 78[49]); some of them guard the nations (Dn 10[20. 21]); and in general they do whatever Jahweh wishes to have done.

Angels during this period were for the most part without names. There are only three exceptions to this: the 'angel of his presence' (Is 63[9]), which, as pointed out above, is a poetic way of referring to a pre-exilic idea; and the individual angels Michael and Gabriel. These last appear in Daniel only, the latest book of the canon to contain any reference to angels. They are canonical examples of a tendency which is abundantly illustrated in the apocryphal literature to individualize angels and to attribute permanent characteristics to them. The name *Michael*, meaning 'Who is like God?', was a natural one to apply to an angel, though it had previously been borne by a number of men (see Nu 13[13], 1 Ch 5[13. 14] 6[40] 7[3] 8[16] 12[20] 27[18], 2 Ch 21[2], and Ezr 8[8]). *Gabriel*, as already noted, signifies 'man of God,' and was also a natural name to give an angel.

11. The Hebrew belief in **demons** belongs especially to the time after the Exile. There were several causes which led to this belief. In pre-exilic times, it had been thought that Jahweh did everything, both good and bad. Amos says (3[6]). 'Shall evil befall a city and Jahweh hath not done it?' This evil might be accomplished through the agency of non-ethical spirits, as in 1 K 22[19-23], but Jahweh was in reality responsible for it. As in the case of the spirit that visited Saul, it might be called an 'evil spirit' (1 S 16[14ff.]); but this only signified that its effects were undesirable, not that the spirit was morally bad. The spirit in this case came from Jahweh, and He was really responsible. This view was entertained by one writer until near the close of the Exile, for Deutero-Isaiah represents Jahweh as saying: 'I make peace, and create evil' (Is 45[7]). In the time after the Exile, men began to feel that to attribute evil to God was to think unworthily of Him; hence the occurrence of evil was ascribed to the agency of demons. This was, however, only one of the forces at work. With the triumph of monotheism the belief in the reality of the heathen deities did not altogether disappear, and those gods whose worshippers had been hostile to Israel, or had opposed the prophets so as to be denounced in the sacred books, were reduced to the rank of demons. From time immemorial, too, the belief had existed that dark and deserted localities were inhabited by unfriendly spirits. From the earliest times, pains had been taken to propitiate some of these by sacrifices, and such unfriendly spirits now became demons in the commonly accepted view. Then, too, the old mythology had preserved the memory of a heavenly court of spirits, or *bᵉnê hā-'elôhîm*. It kept alive the memory of how some of these spirits had been commissioned in the olden time to bring men to destruction, and from this circle of ideas there was born a belief in an arch-enemy of good—Satan—who has since held a large place in the world's thought. Some of these demons were believed to inhabit the deserts and to roam about at night (cf. Is 13[21] 34[14]). Like the *jinn* of the Arabs, they were supposed to take on the forms of wild animals. Some of them still maintained the quasi-Divine character which they had possessed before the Exile, and sacrifices were still offered to them. Once it is implied that the home of the arch-demon is in Sheol (cf. Job 18[14]).

Of individual demons, the one that played the largest part in later thought is Satan, though he appears in but three passages of the OT. (*a*) The earliest of these is the prologue of Job, which may be pre-exilic. Here Satan is one of the 'sons of God,' or 'spirits,' who compose the court of Jahweh. Much of the character of the un-ethical spirit which was sent on a mission of evil to men still attaches to him, but he has developed beyond this, for he has become permanently sceptical of disinterested virtue. He can do nothing without

Jahweh's permission, but his state of mind is thought to be a cause of regret to Jahweh. In consequence of Jahweh's concern for Satan and His desire to win him once more to a proper attitude, He permits him to make investigations in disinterested virtue by bringing evil upon Job. In this narrative Jahweh is represented as ultimately responsible for the evil, but it is permitted for a good end—the scattering of the doubts which had invaded the angelic circle and embittered one of the courtiers of heaven.

(*b*) In Zec 3[1] Satan appears to oppose the high priest Joshua before the 'angel of Jahweh.' The 'Adversary' (for such is the meaning of the name *Satan*) stands in the court of Jahweh as a public prosecutor, and, as Joshua is the representative of the nation, so Satan is the adversary or prosecutor of the nation. The fact that the angel of Jahweh rebukes him shows that Satan has undertaken his evil opposition to the people of God on his own initiative and not by Divine permission, as was the case in the Book of Job. His malignity is accordingly somewhat more developed, and in the circle of ideas represented by this passage Satan really relieves Jahweh of the responsibility for evil.

(*c*) The only other OT passage where Satan is mentioned is 1 Ch 21[1], which is a further witness to the fact that Satan was now held to be responsible for the existence of evil. The chapter gives an account of David's census and of the punishment for it, and is dependent on 2 S 24; but, whereas it is said in Samuel that Jahweh said to David, 'Go, number Israel,' because He was angry with the people, it is said in Chronicles that Satan 'moved David to number Israel.' Satan is clearly a development out of the group of spirits which were in earlier days thought to form Jahweh's court, members of which were sent upon errands of disaster to men.

Another demon who appears in one post-exilic canonical passage (Lv 16) is **Azazel** (*q.v.*). In the ritual of the Day of Atonement it is prescribed that a goat shall be chosen 'for Azazel,' that the sins of the people shall be confessed over him, and that then he shall be sent into the wilderness by a special messenger and turned loose (cf. Lv 16[8. 10. 26]). The goat is in reality a sacrifice to Azazel. The ritual of this chapter is clearly a survival from pre-exilic days. It is also clear that Azazel was a wilderness demon, and probably the sacrifice was originally offered to him to propitiate him. It is, accordingly, a survival from a kind of worship of fear. The name *'Azā'zēl* signifies 'entire removal.'

Another class of demons were **se'îrîm**, lit. 'hairy ones' (RV 'satyrs'; marg. 'he-goats'), who, like Azazel, were thought to inhabit wastes and ruins. Is 34[14], in a picture of the future desolation of Edom, says that 'satyr shall call to his fellow there'; and Is 13[21], an exilic passage, in portraying the desolation of Babylon, declares that 'satyrs shall dance there.' Just as the Arabs degraded the gods of the heathen to *jinn* and attributed to them some of the hairy characteristics of animals, so these satyrs appear to have been originally heathen deities (cf. W. R. Smith, *Rel. Sem.*[2] 120 ff.). It is for this reason that Lv 17[7] prohibits, for the future, sacrifice to satyrs, implying in the statement that they had been the recipients of sacrifices in the past. Similarly 2 Ch 11[15], in reproducing 1 K 12[31]—the statement concerning Jeroboam's arrangements of priests for the high places—amplifies it by saying that he appointed 'priests for the satyrs and calves which he had made.'

The **shēdim** which are mentioned in Dt 32[17] are once referred to in a post-exilic canonical writing, Ps 106[37], where *shēdîm* is a synonym for demons. The word really, as the parallelism shows, refers to the heathen deities of the Canaanites, whom some of the post-exilic writers made satyrs, as just noted. That it was the intention of the Psalmist to call them demons here is confirmed by the fact that in the Mishna and Talmud *shēd* is the root used to designate demons in general (cf. Jastrow, *Dict.* p. 1558*a*).

Is 34[14] mentions **Lilith** (RV 'night-monster') in connexion with satyrs. It is probable that the name is connected with the Heb. root for 'night,' and that Lilith was a night-monster or demon which was thought to lurk in desolate places.

The 'horse-leech' (*'alûqā*) of Pr 30[15] was perhaps a demon. While there was a large leech to which the name was applied, it was also regarded by the Jews of later time as the name of a demon. This seems to be the case in the Targ. to Ps 12[9], which says: 'The wicked go round in circles like *'alûqā*, who suck the blood of men.'

In Ca 2[7] 3[5] the Shunammite adjures the daughters of Jerusalem 'by the roes and hinds of the field.' These are here probably not simple animals, but faun-like spirits by whom, as by other supernatural beings, adjurations could be made.

In four passages (all exilic or post-exilic) a great demon or dragon called **Rahab** appears. She was surrounded by a host of helpers, but after a severe struggle she and her helpers were overcome by Jahweh. The passages are: Is 51[9] 'Art not thou he who hewed Rahab in pieces, who pierced through the dragon?'; Job 9[13] 'The helpers of Rahab do stoop under him; how much less shall I answer him?'; Job 26[12. 13] 'He quelleth the sea with his power, by his understanding he smiteth through Rahab; by his breath the heavens are bright,' etc.; Ps 89[10] 'Thou hast broken Rahab in pieces as one that is slain; thou hast scattered thine enemies with the arm of thy strength.' It has long been recognized (see the writer's art. 'Tiamat' in *JAOS* xv. [1890]) that Rahab in those passages is simply another name for the Bab. primeval sea-monster Tiamāt. She is, accordingly, here not a native Heb. demon. For the original picture of her and her helpers, see L. W. King, *Seven Tablets of Creation*, London, 1902, Tablets ii. and iv. Although Rahab is not native to Heb. soil, she plays a considerable part in post-exilic thought. Jahweh was naturally substituted for Marduk in the story circulated among the Hebrews, and His worshippers magnified His power as they thought of the might of this terrible dragon of a demon.

In at least two passages this primitive Bab. monster was known among the Hebrews as **Leviathan**. In Job 3[8] Leviathan is evidently a mythical dragon capable of darkening the day, while in Ps 74[14] we read, 'Thou brakest the heads of Leviathan in pieces,' and vv.[16. 17] go on to speak of the creation of the sun, the fixing of earth's bounds, and the making of summer and winter. In the psalm, therefore, we clearly have a reference to the Bab. Creation Epic, and it is probable that the passage from Job refers to the same monster. In Job 41 the crocodile is described under the name Leviathan, but in vv.[19-21] the description of the natural animal is mingled with elements drawn from a mythical fire-breathing dragon. It is probable, therefore, that Leviathan, like Rahab, was the Bab. Tiamāt under another name.

III. *In Apocryphal literature.*—While but few individual demons can be traced in the canonical literature, the apocryphal writings bear witness to the fact that the popular thought abounded with them. In the Apocalyptic writings of the Jews, composed prior to A.D. 100, all the main features of belief in spirits, angels, and

demons which appear in the canonical literature were continued and heightened. There is, however, a great difference between them in this respect. Some of them, like Sirach and Maccabees, make almost no reference to angels. Sirach mentions only the angel that destroyed the Assyrian army (48[21]), the writer of 1 Mac mentions angels only in referring to this event (7[41]), while the author of 2 Mac refers to them only in saying that the Jews of the Maccabæan time prayed that an angel might be sent to smite the Greeks, as one was sent to smite the Assyrians (cf. 11[6] 15[22f.]). Similarly, the Wisdom of Solomon makes no reference to angels except that in describing the Exodus it declares that the word of God was an active angel of vengeance (cf. Wis 18[15]). In some of the Enoch apocalypses, on the other hand, belief in angelic and demoniacal agency is carried to great length. This is especially true of the oldest Enoch apocalypse (Eth. En. 1–36), of the Parables (Eth. En. 37–71), and of the Slavonic Enoch. Other works make a more moderate use of this belief, although it clearly underlies all their thinking. This is true of Tobit, the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, the Apocalypse of Baruch, the Greek additions to Daniel, 2 Esdras, and the Book of Jubilees. The beliefs continued and were in some respects intensified, but, in proportion as the writers came under the sway of Greek rationalistic thought, they ceased to feel the need for such supernatural agencies. The author of Jubilees, in re-telling the story of Genesis, employs angels only where they appear in that book.

1. In certain writers the old tendency to attribute a spirit to everything still manifests itself. The author of the Enoch Parables speaks of a spirit of the sea, of hoar-frost, of hail, of snow, of fog, of dew, and of rain (Eth. En. 60[17-21]), while his favourite title for God is 'Lord of spirits' (38[2. 4] 39[12] and *passim*). The author of Jubilees speaks of the spirits of fire, wind, darkness, hail, snow, frost, thunder, cold and heat, winter and summer (Jub 2[1]), but he calls them angels at the same time, and he also terms the 'watchers' (an older name for angels) the 'fathers of spirits' (10[5]). These two agree in making spirits of the phenomena of Nature. In a different vein from those, the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs make spirits of man's immoral tendencies. Those spirits are in reality demons, and are under the direction of Beliar, the prince of demons (see art. BELIAL). Thus, we are told that there are seven spirits of deceit (Reuben 2[1]). These seven are said to be the spirit of fornication, of insatiableness (resident in the belly), of fighting (resident in the liver and gall), of obsequiousness and chicanery, of pride, of lying and fraud, and of injustice with which are thefts and acts of rapacity (cf. Reuben 3[3-6], Simeon 6[7], Judah 20[1], Dan 5[4], Gad 4[7]). Later additions make the senses and sleep spirits of wickedness (Reuben 2[3] 3[1]). The function of these spirits was to lead men into various sins, and, after having done so, to take vengeance on them (Levi 3[2]). The evil spirit which a man had served was said to await his soul as it left his body at death in order to torment it (Asher 6[5]). In most of the Apocryphal books the spirits have passed over either into angels or into demons.

2. Through literary influence there is a slight survival of the Cherubim and Seraphim of an earlier time. They, together with the Ophanim (serpent-beings developed out of the original Seraphim), are said to be holy angels who praise God (Eth. En. 61[10] 71[7], Slav. En. 20[1] 21[1]); but these beings play no important part in the thought of the period.

3. It is far otherwise with the angels, who are declared to be innumerable (Apoc. Bar. 59[11]). This clearly represents the view of several of these writers. Thus the author of the Enoch Parables declares that the Most High is accompanied by 1000 × 1000 and 10000 × 10000 angels (Eth. En. 60[1] 71[13]). Angels were thought to be the agency by which everything was performed. Thus, it is said that myriads of angels accompany the sun on his course (Slav. En. 11[4. 24]), and that 400 take the sun's crown to God at sunset, and return it to the sun in the morning (14[2. 3]). How vast must have been, then, the number of all the angels!

These numerous angelic hosts were believed to be divided into ranks. Distinguished from the common mass, the archangels commanded and directed others. This division appears most clearly in the evil angels or demons, a long list of whose leaders is given in the earliest Enoch apocalypse and in the Enoch parables (cf. Eth. En. 6[7] and 69[2]). This list will be further considered in discussing demons below. The good angels had similar chieftains, of whom Gabriel was one (Slav. En. 21[3]). But, apart from the archangels, the angelic hosts were thought to be divided into several ranks. It is said in Slav. En. 20[3] that, as the Lord sat on His throne, the heavenly hosts stood on the ten steps of it according to their rank. This implies that there were numerous gradations of rank. Four angels were called 'angels of the throne.' They were Michael, Gabriel, Uriel, and Raphael (Eth. En. 9[1] 40[2] and *Sib. Or.* ii. 215), though two passages (40[9] 71[9]) substitute Phanuel (*i.e.* Penuel) for Uriel. Just as human hosts had human commanders, so the archangels were the commanders of the others. Thus in the Testament of Levi 3[5ff.] the angel of the Presence is counted an archangel, to whom angels below make an announcement of what is transpiring. This development of the angelic hosts into ranks was to some extent reflected in the canonical literature, and its later development may have been influenced by contact with Persian thought.

As to the nature of angels, the conception was not uniform. At first they were considered a kind of supernatural men: thus, in all the books that speak of them, they are frequently called 'men' (see, *e.g.*, Slav. En. 1–7). They are, like men, said to possess bodies and spirits (Eth. En. 67[8]). They intermarried at one time with human women (Eth. En. 7[1], Slav. En. 18[4]). Enoch after translation became an angel (Slav. En. 22), showing that they were considered in many ways kindred to men. This view is a survival of the old conception reflected in Gn 6[2-4]. Gradually another view developed, according to which the constitution of angels was quite different from that of men. They are, accordingly, said to have a nature like that of fire (Slav. En. 29[1. 3]), and to have been made at the beginning of flame and fire (Apoc. Bar. 21[6]); their splendour is said to be equal to that of the stars (51[9]). This view was, in some cases where tradition perpetuated the crasser view, blended with the other. Thus Enoch was thought to have been put through a process of purification and glorification before he became an angel (Slav. En. 22); and later, when he was permitted to return to the earth for thirty days, an angel chilled his face, apparently to dim the lustre of its angelic glory, before he descended to mingle with men (cf. Slav. En. 36[2] 37[1] 38[1]). The forces of Nature were at times regarded as angels. Thus frost, hail, and fog are so designated in Eth. En. 60[17-19], and the author of Jubilees calls these and similar forces of Nature indifferently 'spirits' and 'angels' (Jub. 2[1]). At the same time angels were thought to have definite limitations. They were not able to hinder the work of God (Eth. En. 41[9]); they were ignorant of their own origin (Slav. En. 24[3]); fallen angels could not see the glory of God

(Eth. En. 14^{21}, Slav. En. 24^{3}), and Enoch, a man, interceded for them (Eth. En. 15^{2}).

The whole course of Nature was thought to be carried on by angelic agency. Myriads of angels attend the sun (Slav. En. 14), they regulate the courses of the stars (ch. 19), they guard the habitations of snow (ch. 5), and keep the treasuries of oil (ch. 6). Spirits or angels control the lightning, causing a pause before the thunder comes (Eth. En. 60^{13-15}). They control the workings of frost, hail, mist, dew, and rain; they preside over the treasuries of these (vv.$^{16-22}$). Activities of many other kinds were attributed to angels. They kept the garden of Eden (Slav. En. 8); fiery angels now surround Paradise (30^{1}); and angels built the ark (Eth. En. 67^{2}).

One of the important functions of angels was to guide and instruct the great apocalyptic seers. The angel of peace went with Enoch (Eth. En. 40^{8} 43^{3}), and conducted him to the first heaven (Slav. En. 3), while Gabriel later took Enoch to God (20^{2}). An angel talked to Ezra (2 Es $2^{44.\ 46.\ 48}$ 5^{15} 7^{1}); and Uriel was sent to Ezra ($4^{1.\ 36}$ $5^{15.\ 20}$ 7^{1} $10^{28.\ 29}$). An angel revealed to Jacob Reuben's sin with Bilhah (Test. of Reuben 3^{15}); an angel invited Levi to heaven, and showed him the secret of heaven to prepare him for the priesthood (Test. of Levi 2^{6} 5^{1}); an angel informed the patriarch Judah that he should be king of Jacob (Test. of Judah 21^{5}), and announced to Jacob the birth of Rachel's children (Test. of Issachar 2^{1}). The angel of peace guides the soul of a good man at death (Test. of Benj. 6^{1}). Angels, called 'watchers,' came to earth in the days of Jared to teach men (Jub. 4^{15}); an angel, spoken of as a 'holy one,' called to Hagar (17^{14}); angels went up and down the ladder of Jacob's dream (27^{21}); angels smote the flames of fire for the three children (v.^{26}). An angel told Habakkuk to carry his dinner to Daniel who was in the lion's den at Babylon, and took Habakkuk by the hair and transported him from Judæa to Babylon for this purpose and back again (Bel vv.$^{34-39}$). The angel Raphael came to heal Tobit's blindness (To 3^{17}), accompanied the young Tobias ($5^{4-6.\ 21}$), instructed him how to drive an evil spirit away (6. $8^{ff.}$), was sent by Tobias to Media after money ($9^{1ff.}$), opened Tobit's eyes ($11^{2ff.\ 7ff.}$), and was offered half the money (12^{5}). Angels are portrayed as pitiful; they were in anguish when Zion was delivered to destruction (Apoc. Bar. 67^{2}); and they are also represented as intercessors (Test. of Levi 3^{5} 5^{7}, Test. of Dan 6^{2}). It thus appears that all possible helpful agencies were attributed to them.

As angels were God's agents for blessing, so they were His instruments of chastisement. In the time of the Maccabees, prayer was offered that an angel might destroy the Greeks, as an angel destroyed the Assyrians (2 Mac 11^{6} 15^{22}). Enoch in the place of punishment saw angels administering torture (Slav. En. $10^{2ff.}$). It was believed that on the Day of Judgment an angel would be appointed avenger (Assump. Mos. 10^{2}). An angel of God is said to have received orders to cut a sinner in twain (Sus vv.$^{55.\ 59}$). The word of God was said to have been an active angel of vengeance on the night of the Exodus (Wis 18^{15}), and two angels were believed to have once descended from heaven to bind a hostile king (3 Mac 6^{18}). When Jerusalem was destroyed, four angels stood at its four corners with lamps and accomplished its ruin (Apoc. Bar 7^{1} 8^{1}). There was also an angel whose chief function was to bring death (21^{23}). Whatever, therefore, needed to be accomplished, whether good or bad, there was an angel to do it.

The tendency observable in a slight degree in the canonical literature to give the angels individual names appears in a greatly heightened form in the Apocryphal literature.

4. The conceptions of demons which appear in the Apocryphal literature are of four distinct types. Two of these regard the arch-demons as fallen angels, but in one type this angelic genesis of demons is much more prominent than in the other. (*a*) In the canonical literature discussed above, Satan was regarded as once of the number of the Divine beings who formed Jahweh's court (Job 1. 2). The steps by which in the canonical literature he became the great opposer of good have already been sketched. In one type of Apocryphal thought he became the arch-demon, who tempted man and led him astray (see Wis 2^{24} and Slav. En. 3^{31}). These writers simply took Satan over from the canonical literature, and his semi-Divine or angelic origin apparently was forgotten. The author of Wisdom moved in an atmosphere of philosophic thought in which neither angels nor demons played any considerable part. The author of Slavonic Enoch, though he makes much of angels, has almost nothing to say of demons. He probably believed in them, but the interest of his narrative led him to place the emphasis elsewhere. These writers call Satan by the Gr. tr. of his name, *diabolos*, or 'devil.' They identify him with the serpent of Eden, and account for the origin of sin by his agency in leading man astray.

(*b*) The authors of Eth. En. 1–36 and of the Enoch Parables (En. 37–71) represent a different type, being much more keenly interested in tracing the origin of demons and of evil. Instead of taking one arch-demon from the canonical literature, they go back to the narrative of Gn 6^{2-4}, and account for the origin of demons and of sin by elaborating the hint there given. Persian dualism had sufficiently influenced their thought, so that matter was to them corrupt. That angels should come to earth and have connexion with human wives implied, they thought, a previous rebellion and sin on the part of the angels. The hint which supplied the point of departure for this view was probably given by the story of Satan in the prologue of the Book of Job. Those angelic hosts who sinned were numerous, but they were led by certain archangels, whose names are given somewhat differently by the two writers. These with their followers landed on Mount Hermon, and, after satisfying themselves with human wives, taught men various sins, some teaching one and some another. One taught enchantments, another astrology, another the making of swords, another the art of abortion, and another that of writing. The one who taught the use of coats of mail and of swords also seduced Eve (cf. Eth. En. 6–9 and 69). These writers, like the author of the J document of the Hexateuch, regarded the arts of civilization as having had a common origin with sin. Among the names of these arch-demons the canonical names of Satan and Azazel are found, but they play a comparatively small part. The rôle of Azazel is more prominent than that of Satan. The larger number of these angels (and to them are attributed the most hurtful influences) are called by names not found in the canonical literature. It appears from these names that many of them were called by names appropriate to angels. The degradation of the names to demons was in accord with the theory that they were fallen angels. In one passage (Eth. En. 21^{8}) they are identified with the stars. Having introduced sin into the world, those fallen angels were regarded as the presiding geniuses of various forms of transgression and corruption. They were themselves, however, thought to be already undergoing punishment. They were bound and were being tormented by a great fire (Eth. En. 21^{5-10} 54^{1-5}).

(*c*) The Book of Tobit represents a third type of thought. In it but one demon appears,—Asmodæus,—and he is clearly, as his name implies, of Persian

origin (but see Ginzberg, *JE* ii. 217–219). The author of this book had so come under Persian influence, probably by living in the East, that its demonology or demonological vocabulary influenced him more than did that of the canonical, or even the apocryphal, writings of his people.

(*d*) A fourth type of thought is represented by the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs and the Ascension of Isaiah. In these works the demonology, while very real and all-pervasive, is made up in a rational way, and such contact as it has with canonical thought is at quite a different point of that thought. As mentioned above, the world is thought to be pervaded by evil spirits, but these are simply the personification of the evil propensities of man—jealousy, lust, pride, chicanery, injustice, rapacity, etc. Writers who thus made evil spirits of the sinful tendencies of men about them moved in a somewhat different realm of thought from those who connected these evil spirits with the story of Gn 6[2-4] and gave to them orthodox Hebrew names. Over this mass of evil spirits the two writers under consideration believed that Beliar presided. Beliar to them takes the place of the devil in Wisdom and the Secrets of Enoch, of Semyaza in the other Enoch books, and of Asmodæus in Tobit. Beliar is a form of *Belial* (see vol. ii. p. 458[b] f.). Belial had been used by Nahum (1[15]) as the name of a great evil power. Possibly Belial was an old name for Sheol, though that is uncertain. It it were so, it is easy to see why these writers took it as the name of the prince and leader of all evil and destructive spirits.

To most Jews of the period, as indeed to most men of that time, the world was full of supernatural agencies. As there were angels to accomplish every good act, so there were demons or evil spirits to perpetrate every evil deed or to prompt every sinful impulse. Some of the writers, however, manifest no trace of this demonology; such are Ben Sira and the authors of the Books of Maccabees. The subject-matter of Sirach as well as the philosophical point of view of its author excluded any reference to them, while the author of 1 Mac had probably come so far under the influence of incipient Sadduceeism that demons had little or no place in his thought. To most men, however, demons in one form or another were very real, and played an important part in life.

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GEORGE A. BARTON.

DEMONS AND SPIRITS (Indian).—**1. Prevalence of the belief in spirit influence.**—The people of India, particularly the forest tribes and the lower castes, from the cradle to the grave or burning-ground, are oppressed with a feeling best described as demonophobia—the belief that they are haunted by evil spirits of all kinds, some malignant fiends, some mischievous elves, to whose agency are attributed all kinds of sickness and misfortune. Their worship is a worship of fear, the higher gods, particularly in the opinion of the less intelligent classes, being regarded as otiose and indifferent to the evils which attack the human race, while demons are habitually active and malignant.

Among the Ṭhārūs of the Himālayan Tarāī, 'the *bhūts*, or demons lurking in the forest trees, especially the weird cotton tree (*Bombax heptaphyllum*), and the *prets*, or spirits of the dead, lead them a very miserable life. When the last ray of light leaves the forest, and the darkness settles down upon their villages, all the Ṭhārūs, men, women, and children, huddle together inside their fast-closed huts, in mortal dread of those ghostly beings, more savage and cruel than the leopards, tigers, and bears that now prowl about for their prey. Only the terrible cry of "Fire" will bring these poor fear-stricken creatures to open the doors and remove the heavy barriers from their huts at night. And even in the daytime, amid the hum of human life, the songs of the birds, and the lowing of the cattle, no Ṭhārū, man, woman, or child, would ever venture along a forest-line, without casting a leaf, a branch, or a piece of old rag, upon the *bansati* [Skr. *vanaspati*, "king of the woods"], formed at the entrance of deep woods, to save them from the many diseases and accidents the goblins and malignant spirits of the forests can bring upon and cause them' (S. Knowles, *The Gospel in Gonda*, 1889, p. 214).

In S. India, where this belief is even more widely spread than in the N., 'every village is believed by the people to be surrounded by evil spirits, who are always on the watch to inflict disease and misfortunes of all kinds on the unhappy villagers. They lurk everywhere, on the tops of palmyra trees, in caves and rocks, in ravines and chasms. They fly about in the air, like birds of prey, ready to pounce down on any unprotected victim, and the Indian villagers pass through life in constant dread of these invisible enemies. So they turn for protection to the guardian deities of their village, whose function it is to ward off these evil spirits and protect the village from epidemics of cholera, smallpox, or fever, from cattle disease, failure of crops, childlessness, fires, and all the manifold ills that flesh is heir to in an Indian village' (Bishop H. Whitehead, *Bull. Madr. Mus.* v. 126 f.). Traill, who took over charge of Kumaun in 1820, reported that the population was divided into two classes, human beings and ghosts (E. S. Oakley, *Holy Himalaya*, 1905, p. 217 f.). For other testimony to the same effect, see S. Mateer, *The Land of Charity*, 207 ff.; Sir W. Sleeman, *Rambles and Recollections*, 1893, i. 268 ff.; Bishop R. Caldwell, 'The Tinnevelly Shanars,' in B. Ziegenbalg, *Genealogy of the S. Indian Gods*, 1869, p. 156 ff. This feeling of pessimism, due partly to racial idiosyncrasy, partly to the rigour of their environment, has prevailed among the races of India from the very earliest times (see H. Oldenberg, *Rel. des Veda*, 1894, p. 39 f.; Atharvaveda, *SBE* xlii. *passim*).

2. Origin and character of the cult of demons and evil spirits.—Demonolatry, the worship of devils or demons, is a form of belief in its origin independent of Brāhmanism or the orthodox form of Hinduism, though the latter has in many cases annexed and absorbed it (see § 12). The cultus is a true form of worship, and here the distinction between 'deity' and 'demon' is unmeaning, the latter being, as in the case of the orthodox gods, controlled by true worship or propitiation. But, like similar forms of popular belief in other parts of the world, it is amorphous and ill-organized, possessing little or no sacred literature and no established priesthood. The most obvious distinction is between non-human and human spirits.

(*a*) *Non-human spirits or fiends* are 'endowed with superhuman powers, and possess material bodies of various kinds, which they can change as they list, and which are subject to destruction. As free agents, they can choose between good and evil, but a disposition towards evil preponderates in their character' (G. Oppert, *Original Inhabitants of Bharatavarṣa or India*, 515 ff.). The so-called Asuras, Dānavas, Daityas, and Rākṣasas belong to this group, 'all personations of the hostile powers of Nature, or of mighty human foes, both which have been eventually converted into superhuman beings.' This group as a whole seems to be derived from pre-Animistic beliefs, the worship or dread of 'powers' (*numina*, not *nomina*), the vague impersonations of the terror of night, hill, cave, or forest. They appear in the Vedas as malevolent beings hostile to the orthodox gods (A. Macdonell, *Vedic Mythology*, 1897, p. 156 ff.). Max Müller and J. Muir agree in denying that all these Vedic evil spirits were borrowed by the Aryans from the aborigines of India (*Contributions to the Science of Mythology*, 1897, i. 212; *Original Sanskrit Texts*, 1860, pt. ii. 380 ff.). It is safer to believe that among both Aryans and non-Aryans they were the result of pre-Animistic beliefs common to both races. At the same time, it is probable that the Aryan view of the demon world was coloured by their association with the indigenous races.

'The black complexion, ferocious aspect, barbarous habits, rude speech, and savage yells of the Dasyus, and the sudden and furtive attacks which, under cover of the impenetrable woods, and the obscurity of night, they would make on the encampment of the Āryas, might naturally lead the latter to speak of them, in the highly figurative language of an imaginative people in the first stage of civilisation, as ghosts or demons; or even to conceive of their hidden assailants as possessed of magical and superhuman powers, or as headed by devils. . . . At length the further advance of the Āryas would either drive the Dasyus into the remotest corners of the country, or lead to their partial incorporation with the conquerors as the lowest grade in their community. When this stage was reached, the Āryas would no longer have any occasion to compose prayers to the gods for protection against the aboriginal tribes; but their superstitious dread of the evil spirits, with which the popular mind in all ages has been prone to people the night, would still continue' (*Orig. Skr. Texts*, pt. ii. p. 409 f.). Hence it was the habit in ancient, as well as in modern times, to personify Niśī or Night as a demon; she comes at midnight, calls the house-master, and forces him to follow her whither she will; she drags him into the forest, drops him among thorns, or on the top of some high tree; and it is very dangerous to answer her call (*JASB* i. [1886] 49 f.; *Kathā-sarit-sāgara* of Somadeva, tr. C. H. Tawney, 1880, ii. 604; Lal Behari Day, *Govinda Samanta*, 1874, i. 9; *NINQ* iii. [1894] 199).

As representing the vague terrors felt by early man in the desert and forest, these Indian spirits resemble in many ways the Arabian *jinn* (W. R. Smith, 119 ff.); or, as Westermarck (*MI*, 1908, ii. 589) designates them, 'beings invented to explain what seems to fall outside the ordinary pale of Nature, the wonderful and unexpected, the superstitions imaginations of men who fear.' Hence many of the Indian races represent their deities or demons as inhabiting wild hills or lonely forests. The Meitheis believe that their demons occupy hills (T. C. Hodson, *The Meitheis*, 1908, p. 120). The Konga Malayans of Cochin worship two demoniacal deities named after the rocks in which they reside; Sasthi, a sylvan deity, is adored by the Vallans, and is said to live in a hill; the Eravallars believe that their forests and hills are full of dangerous demons, who live in trees, and rule the wild beasts, some of them afflicting particular families or villages, and are propitiated to relieve their hunger, not in the hope of gaining any benefit for their worshippers; the Nayādis worship a group of forest demons, one of which brings them game, and is abused for his ingratitude if the hunt proves unsuccessful (L. K. Iyer, *The Cochin Tribes and Castes*, i. 41, 239, 47, 53). Trees are also a favourite demon-haunt (Tylor, *Prim. Cult.*², 1873, ii. 221). The Izhuvans believe that trees are occupied by demons; and, when it is proposed to cut a tree, a notice to the demons is written on the bark informing them that it is intended to eject them (Iyer, i. 281; cf. Crooke, *PR*², 1896, ii. 90 f.; R. V. Russell, *Census Rep. Central Provinces*, 1901, i. 92). Many of the non-Aryan tribes in Bengal worship deities who reside in hills. Such are the Juāngs, Santāls, Orāons, Cheros, Kandhs, and Bauris (Risley, *Tribes and Castes of Bengal*, 1891, i. 353, ii. 233, 145, i. 202, 403, 80). The Todas believe that, before they were created, their gods occupied the Nilgiri Hills; they now reside in heights close to the Toda hamlets (Rivers, *The Todas*, 1906, p. 182 ff.). In the same class are the water spirits or deities found all over the country, which are malevolent, and drag down unwary travellers—an idea which appears in the classical tale of Narcissus (Crooke, i. 42 ff.; Frazer, *GB*², 1900, i. 293). These Rākṣasas, Dānavas, or Daityas still maintain their position in popular belief, the tradition surviving through the study of the Epic literature and the older collections of folklore, like the Jātakas or the tales of Somadeva.

(*b*) *Human spirits.*—The second and much more important class of evil spirits is that of the ghosts of human beings, known collectively as *Bhūta* (Skr. rt. *bhū*, 'to become, be'). In contradistinction to the fiends or non-human spirits, these are the malignant spirits of men, which for various reasons cherish feelings of hostility to the human race, and, if not expelled or propitiated, do endless mischief. Among the more primitive or debased tribes the belief that disease and death are the result of the normal or abnormal processes of Nature is only imperfectly realized; and these and other calamities are regarded as the work of evil spirits, sometimes acting on their own initiative, sometimes incited by a sorcerer or witch.

3. The Bhūta: their characteristics.—In S. India three terms are used to designate these spirits—*Bhūta*, *Preta*, *Piśācha*, the first name being ordinarily applied to all three classes.

'These beings, always evil, originate from the souls of these who have died untimely or violent deaths, or been deformed, idiotic, or insane; afflicted with fits or unusual ailments; or drunken, dissolute, or wicked during life. The precise distinction between the three classes is that the Prēta [Skr. rt. *pré*, "to depart from life"] is a ghost of a child dying in infancy, or of one born deformed, imperfect, or monstrous—events attributed to neglect in performing certain ceremonies prescribed during the ten days when, according to popular notions, the limbs of the embryo are forming in the womb: such a ghost becomes a misshapen, distorted goblin. The Piśācha ["flesh-eater"], on the other hand, is derived rather from mental characteristics, and is the ghost of madmen, habitual drunkards, the treacherous and violent-tempered. . . . Bhūtas emanate from those who die in any unusual way, by violence, accident, suicide, or sentence of law; or who have been robbers, notorious evil-doers, or dreaded for cruelty and violence. The death of any well-known bad character is a source of terror to all his neighbourhood, as he is sure to become a Bhūta or demon, as powerful and malignant as he was in life' (M. J. Walhouse, *JAI* v. 408 f.). They are represented with small thick bodies, of a red colour, with pigtails round their heads, horrible faces, the teeth of a lion in their mouths, and their bodies covered with ornaments (Caldwell, in Ziegenbalg, 153). In the Deccan they live in large trees, empty houses, or old wells; they often appear as a deer, a tall figure, a strange ox or goat; if a person sleeps under a haunted tree, cuts a branch of it, defiles the abode of the Bhūta, or jostles one on the road, he falls sick or some ill-luck befalls him (*BG* xviii. pt. i. 292). In Gujarāt the Bhūta and Preta, like the European Vampire, are believed to take possession of a corpse, and speak through its mouth; they appear in the form which they possessed when living; enter a living man, and cause him to speak as they please; afflict him with fever or other disease; appear as animals, and frighten people by vanishing in a flame of fire; remain sometimes invisible, and speak only in whispers; a Bhūta has been known to come to fisticuffs with a man, or to carry him off and set him down in a strange place; cases have been reported in which women have been found with child by them; when a Bhūta appears in a tree, a pile of stones is raised at its root, to which every passer-by adds one; if stones be not procurable, a rag is stuck to the tree, which is hence known as the 'Rag-uncle' [cf. Hartland, *LP*, 1895, ii. 175 ff.; Crooke, *PR*² i. 161 ff.] (Dalpatrām Dāyā, 'Bhoot Nibundh,' in A. K. Forbes, *Rās Mālā*, 644 ff.). The Bhūta eat filth, and drink any water, however impure; they cannot rest on the ground, and for this reason a peg, or brick, or bamboo pole is placed at their shrines on which they may sit or perch; they speak a sort of gibberish in a nasal tone, and hence 'goblin speech' (*piśācha bhāṣa*) is the term applied to the jargon in the mediæval drama and in modern English (*PR*² i. 238); those who come from dead Brāhmans are wheat-coloured, while others, like the ghost of a negro, are black and specially dreaded (*ib.* i. 236 ff.). As a rule they are helpless by day, and move abroad at night; but midday, when they cook, and evening are specially dangerous times, and women should not move about, especially at midday, unprotected (E. Thurston, *Castes and Tribes of S. India*, vi. 230; A. K. Iyer, i. 150; *BG* xviii. pt. i. 292; *PNQ* iv. 132; cf. the similar classical belief [Theocr. *Idyll.* i. 15; Lucan, *Pharsal.* iii. 423; R. Rodd, *Customs and Lore of Modern Greece*, 1892, p. 181; J. T. Bent, *The Cyclades*, 1885, p. 85]; cf. also art. CALENDAR [Celtic], vol. iii. p. 82).

4. Spirits of the murdered, the unsatisfied, the foreigner.—Of these classes of Bhūta the most dangerous are the spirits of the murdered, the unsatisfied, and the dreaded foreigner.

(*a*) *Spirits of the murdered.*—All over the world the ghost of a murdered person is believed to cherish an angry passion for revenge (Westermarck, i. 418 f.). Some of the most dangerous Bhūta are of this class.

In Coorg the demon most widely feared is that of a magician who was shot. Elmakaltai, mother of seven sons, who was buried as a sacrifice under the walls of the Kolhapur fort (cf. Crooke, ii. 173 ff.), causes food supplies to dwindle, the milk to give no butter, and the cattle to sicken; the Orāons distinguish three classes of such demons, who are known as the Bhūla, 'wanderers who have lost their way,' including those who have been murdered, hanged, or killed by a tiger (G. Richter, *Manual of Coorg*, 1870, p. 165; *Mem. As. Soc. Bengal*,[1] 1906, i. 140 f.). Several of the most widely revered local deities of N. India are the spirits of persons, particularly Brāhmans, who have lost their lives in some tragical way, and the ghosts of dead bandits, or of those who were slain by tigers or other wild animals (E. A. Gait, *Census Rep. Bengal*, 1901, i. 196 ff.; Crooke, i. 191 ff., ii. 213 f.).

Hence comes the conception of a special Brāhman demon, known as Brāhma-rākṣasa, Brāhma-daitya, Brāhma-puruṣa, or popularly as Brahm, the spirit of a murdered Brāhman. The Brāhman being himself spirit-laden, his ghost is invested with special potency for good or evil. In Bengal

'such spirits are specially powerful and malicious. Sometimes they are represented as a headless trunk, with the eyes looking from the breast. They are believed to inhabit large trees by the side of a river or in some lonely place, whence they throw stones at travellers and lead them astray on dark nights, and woe betide the unfortunate who should give one of them cause for offence (*e.g.* by unwittingly felling the tree in which they have taken up their abode), or who was in any way responsible for his death. He can only escape the evil consequences by making the Bárhám his family deity and worshipping him regularly' (Gait, i. 198; Crooke, ii. 78). In W. India the rulers of the

[1] Hereafter cited as *MASB*.

State of Sāvantvāḍi are afflicted by the demon-spirit of a Brāhman killed in the 17th century. He is particularly excited if any one uses his seal of office, and down to the present day a Brāhman is always employed to seal the State papers (*BG* x. 440). In the Deccan the Brāhma-samandh, the spirit of a married Brāhman, haunts empty houses, burning-grounds, river-banks, seldom attacks people, but when he does attack them it is difficult to shake him off (*ib.* xxiv. 415). In the same region the Brāhma-puruṣa is the spirit of a miser Brāhman, who died in grief, intent on adding to his hoard; when he lives in his own house, he attacks any member of the family who spends his money, wears his clothes, or does anything to which in life he would have objected (*ib.* xviii. pt. i. 553 f.).

(*b*) *Those who have left this world with unsatisfied desires.*—The spirits of the unhappy or unsatisfied fall into several groups:—

(*a*) *Unhappy widows and widowers, childless women.*—Among these the most dreaded is the Churel, Churail, Chudel, Chudail, or the Alwantin, as she is called in the Deccan—the spirit of a pregnant woman, one dying on the day of child-birth, or within the period of puerperal pollution.

In the Panjāb she appears as a pretty woman, with her feet turned backwards, and is specially dangerous to members of her own family (*PNQ* ii. 168 f.). Among the Orāons, when the exorcist forces her to appear in the flame of his lamp, she looks like the Ḍākinī, the common type of ogress; but her feet are distorted, she is hunch-backed, and has a large hole in her belly like the hollow in a tree (*MASB*, 1906, i. 140). In Madras a woman who dies prematurely, especially as the result of suicide or accident, becomes a she-devil, known by the euphemistical title of Mohanī, 'the charmer,' and she so continues until her normal term of life is over (*NINQ* i. 104). In the Deccan the Jakhin (Skr. *yakṣiṇī*, rt. *yakṣ*, 'to move') is the spirit of an uneasy married woman, who haunts bathing and cooking rooms, attacks her husband's second wife and children, takes her own children from their stepmother, or, like the British fairies, steals babies and returns them after a time (*BG* xxiv. 416). The spirit of a deceased husband or wife, particularly the latter, is most dangerous to his or her successor. This is, in part, an explanation of the objection felt among the higher castes to widow-marriage, of the custom of performing the rite at night in order to avoid the observation of the angry spirit, and of the use of sundry ceremonies which repel evil spirits (R. E. Enthoven, *Bombay Census Rep.*, 1901, i. 208). Among the Kolis of Aḥmadnagar a widow bride is held to be unlucky for three days after her marriage; and must take care that no married woman sees her until that period is over; if after such a marriage the widow bride or her husband should fall sick, the medium, when consulted, usually reports that it is caused by the spirit of her first husband, who is annoyed because his wife has married again; the bride has to give a feast, spend money in charity, and wear in a copper case round her neck a tiny image of her late husband, or set it among the household gods (*BG* xvii. 206). Such amulets are known in the Panjāb as 'the crown of the rival wife' (*saukan maurā*), and to them all gifts made to her are presented as a measure of precaution (H. A. Rose, *Census Rep.*, 1901, i. 121). Sometimes the widow wears a gold-wire bracelet on her right wrist, and every year, in the name of her deceased husband, feeds a Brāhman woman whose husband is alive, and gives her clothes (*BG* xxii. 814). When a widow of the Let tribe in Bengal marries again, her second husband is usually a widower, and he places the iron bangle of his first wife on the arm of her successor (E. A. Gait, i. 421). In the Deccan the Āsrā is the spirit of a young woman who committed suicide after bearing one or more children; she attacks young women, and must be propitiated by offerings of cooked rice, turmeric, red powder, and a bodice (*BG.* xviii. pt. i. 553). The Hadal or Hedalī, the spectre of a woman dying in pregnancy or childbirth, is plump in front and a skeleton behind, lives in wells, trees, or dark corners of the house, attacks women, and, sometimes appearing as a beautiful woman, lives with men until her fiend nature or spectre form is discovered (*ib.* xviii. pt. i. 554). The corpses of women dying under such circumstances are often burnt in order to prevent sorcerers from digging them up and using the unborn fœtus or the bones of the mother for purposes of Black Magic (*ib.* xxiii. 201; A. K. Iyer, i. 77 f.).

(*β*) *Unhappy children and the unmarried.*—Under the influence of the same belief that the spirits of those dying with unsatisfied desires become malignant, children and unmarried persons are included in the army of evil spectres.

In the Himālaya, the Tolā or Masān (the latter a term ordinarily used to designate cemetery spectres) are the spirits of children or bachelors, sometimes appearing in the form of a will-o'-the-wisp, banished from the society of other spirits, living in wild and solitary places, sometimes prowling about in the form of bears or other wild animals. They are, as a rule, harmless, and their present estate is only temporary, because after a time they undergo transformation, and assume other shapes (Crooke, i. 261; Oakley, 218).

The spirits of the unmarried dead form a large group.

In S. India such spirits are called Vīrika (Skr. *vīra*, 'heroic,' 'eminent'), 'and to their memory have small temples and images erected, where offerings of cloth, rice, and the like are made to their *manes*. If this be neglected, they appear in dreams, and threaten those who are forgetful of their duty' (F. Buchanan, *A Journey through Mysore, Canara, and Malabar*, i. 359; cf. ii. 120, 152, where the name is extended to the spirits of bad men, who afflict the living). In Kanara, if neglected, such spirits send pestilence among men and sheep, and disturb people by dreams and nightmares (*BG* xv. pt. i. 300). In the Deccan the Jhoting is the spirit of a youth dying unmarried and leaving no relatives; it lives in trees, ruins, or burial-grounds, is most faithless and can be bound by no oath, personifies absent husbands, leads wayfarers into pools and drowns them, waylays postmen, who are safe so long as they do not lay down their bags (*BG* xviii. pt. i. 554). Elsewhere the Jhoting is the ghost of a low-caste Hindu who died with unsatisfied desires, wears no clothes, and lets his hair flow loose; he lives in a house of his own, but, if this be burnt or pulled down, he removes to a river or well; he fears to enter sacred places, or to attack persons learned in the Vedas and strict in the performance of their religious duties (*ib.* xxiv. 417). In the Deccan those who die after the rite of thread-girding and before marriage become evil spirits, known as Muñjā (Skr *muñja*, 'the fibre girdle of the Brāhman') or Āṭhavar (Skr. *aṣṭavarṣa*, 'eight years old') (*ib.* xviii. pt. i. 539). Such spirits are greatly feared in the Panjāb, where they are known by the euphemistical title of 'father' (*pitā*); shrines are erected to them near tanks, and offerings are made (*NINQ* v. 179). A typical case of the deification of the unmarried is found in the cult of Dūlhā Deo, 'the deified bridegroom,' which seems to have originated in the Central Provinces, where a bridegroom on his wedding journey was killed by a tiger or in some other tragical way; at marriages a miniature coat, shoes, and bridal crown, with a little swing to amuse the child, are offered to him (R. V. Russell, i. 80; Crooke, i. 119 ff.). In the Panjāb, under the influence of Vaiṣṇava beliefs, he is said to represent the relationship of God to the human soul, exhibited as that of a lover to his mistress (H. A. Rose, i. 130). For similar legends of a bride and bridegroom turned into stone, see J. Grimm, *Teut. Mythol.*, Eng. tr., 1888, iv. 1446; W. C. Borlase, *Dolmens of Ireland*, 1897, ii. 549.

(*c*) *Spirits of foreigners.*—The same feelings of awe or fear naturally attach to the spirits of dead foreigners, whose valour, cruelty, or other qualities have impressed the minds of a subject people.

At Sahāranpur a Musalmān named Allah Bakhsh, who died in a state of impurity, has become a dangerous demon, worshipped by the lower castes of Hindus (*NINQ* v. 183) Such a spirit is known by the euphemistical title of Mamdūḥ 'praised,' 'famous,' or as Najis, 'the impure one.' He wears Musalmān dress, with his hair on end, and carries branches in his hands; even the Pīr, or saint, sometimes becomes hostile to people who unguardedly sit upon his tomb, spit at it, or in other ways annoy him (*ib.* v. 106; *BG* xxiv. 416 f., xviii. pt. i. 554). People resort to the shrine of a Muhammadan saint Ālam Pīr, at Muzaffargarh in the Panjāb, to procure release from such spirits. In fact, the Indian Muhammadans have appropriated much of the demonology of their Hindu neighbours, and exorcism and the modes of securing control of evil spirits have become important branches of science (G. A Herklots, *Qanoon-e-Islam*, 1863, p. 201 ff.; *BG* ix. pt. ii. 147 ff.) In the same way the dread spirits of Europeans are propitiated That of a certain Captain Pole, killed at Travancore in 1809, is appeased with gifts of spirits and cigars (*JASB* i. 104; E Thurston, *Ethnographic Notes*, 1906, p. 296 f.). Similar cases of the propitiation of the spirits of European men and women are common in various parts of the country (Crooke, ii. 199; *BG* xviii. pt. i. 413, pt. iii. 447; *NINQ* ii. 93; *PNQ* ii. 133). In some places, however, such spirits are regarded as kindly, as in the cases of General Raymond, who died at Haidarābād in 1798, and Colonel Wallace, who died in the Deccan in 1809 (S. H. Bilgrami and C. Willmott, *Hist. and Descr. Sketch of H.H. the Nizām's Dominions*, 1883, ii. 600 ff.; *BG* xviii. pt. iii. 447 f.).

5. Modes of repelling or conciliating evil spirits.—Various methods are employed to repel or conciliate evil spirits. If the spirit after death is to pass to the home of the Pitṛi, or sainted dead, or to undergo the necessary stages of transmigration, it is necessary that the funeral rites (*śrāddha*) shall have been duly performed (see ANCESTOR-WORSHIP [Indian], vol. i. p. 450 ff.). Hence the family spirit is usually benevolent, if care be taken to provide for its wants. Thus arises the very common classification of spirits into the 'inside' and the 'outside'—the former usually friendly; the latter, being foreigners, usually hostile. The Orāons divide their spirits into those of the house, the sept, the village, and the Bhūla, or dangerous wanderers (*MASB*, 1906, i. 138). In the Deccan there are 'home' and 'outside' spirits, the latter not being greatly feared, because, though every field has its evil spirit, they are restrained by the Guardians (see § 9), who are more powerful and able to control them. The friendly house spirit generally merges

into the protecting family deity, like Gumo Goṣāin, the Mālē god who dwells in the house pillar, or Dharma Pennū, the Kandh god of the family or tribe (Risley, ii. 58, i. 403).

In any case, after a time, usually represented by the period of human memory, the spirit automatically passes to its rest, and ceases to be a source of danger to the survivors.

In the Deccan the life and influence of a Bhūta last for four, and the evil conditions of haunted places for two, generations (*BG* xviii. pt. i. 555); the Hpon of Upper Burma worship only their fathers and mothers (*Gazetteer Upper Burma*, i. pt. i. 568, 600; cf. Crooke, i. 178).

When the inability to perform the funeral rites and the consequent restlessness or maliciousness of the spirit are due to the absence of the corpse, as in the case of death occurring in a strange land or the failure to recover the body, the relatives perform the funeral in effigy.

Among the Garos, when a man dies away from his village and cannot be cremated at home, the relatives buy a number of cowrie-shells and put them in a pot to represent the bones of the dead man, or erect a mortuary hut in which they are deposited (A. Playfair, *The Garos*, 1909, p. 111). In some cases, among orthodox Hindus, the corpse is represented by branches of the sacred *Butea frondosa* tree—the head by a coco-nut; pearls, or, failing them, cowrie-shells, for the eyes; the whole being covered with paste made of ground pulse to simulate the flesh, and a deer-skin representing the cuticle; the officiating priest, by the use of magical formulæ (*mantra*), infuses life into the image, the animating principle being represented by a lamp placed close by; when the lamp goes out, the usual funeral rites are performed (*NINQ* iii. 201; cf. *BG* xviii. pt. i. 564). When the death of a relative occurs under an unlucky constellation in a Brāhman family, a special quieting rite (*śānti*) is performed to appease the uneasy spirit.

Even in the case of those dying in a natural way, precautions are taken to prevent the spirit from returning to its original home from the burial- or cremation-ground.

Among the Madras tribes, when a Bāvurī is being buried, the friends say: 'You were living with us; now you have left us. Do not trouble the people'; the spirit of a dead Savara is solemnly adjured not to worry his widow: 'Do not send sickness on her children. Her second husband has done no harm to you. She chose him for her husband, and he consented; O man, be appeased! O unseen ones! O ancestors! be you witnesses' (Thurston, i. 179, vi. 321). When the corpse of a Taungtha is carried outside the house, the chief mourner pours water on it, saying: 'As a stream divides countries, so may the water now poured divide us!' (*Gazetteer Upper Burma*, i. pt. i. 557).

Another plan is to endeavour to deceive the spirit, so that it may not find its way back, by taking it out of the house feet foremost, or through a door not usually opened for ingress and egress.

The Meitheis never carry the corpse over the threshold of the main door; sometimes a hole is cut in the wall, or the tiny side entrance is used (Hodson, 117). Among the Maghs of Bengal, when the master of the house has died, the mourners on their return cut away the house ladder, and creep in through a hole cut in the back wall, in order to baffle the ghost (Risley, ii. 34). A similar device is that of making the corpse-bearers change places on the road to the grave, and turn the corpse in the opposite direction (*BG* xviii. pt. i. 424; ix. pt. i. 48). With the same intention, the mourners are forbidden to look back when leaving the cemetery (Crooke, ii. 56 f.), the evil influence being communicated through the sight (E. Crawley, *The Mystic Rose*, 1902, p. 115; *FL* xviii. [1907] 345).

Sometimes the repression of the evil spirit is secured in a physical way.

The thumbs and great toes of the corpse are tied together to prevent the ghost from 'walking,' or it is tied up in a cotton bag, as among the Bhotiyas (Playfair, 106; Thurston, iii. 104, iv. 371, 494, v. 483, vii. 83; *Gazetteer Upper Burma*, i. pt. i. 557; *MASB*, 1905, i. 109). Among the Koyis of Madras, when a girl dies of syphilis, a fish-trap is erected to catch the spirit, and prevent it from entering the village (Thurston, iv. 55). Some people, when returning from the funeral, fling pebbles towards the pyre to scare the spirit, or make a barricade of thorny bushes between the grave and the house (Crooke, ii. 57; Risley, ii. 75). With the same intention, the names of deceased relatives are tabu for a generation, to avoid recalling their spirits; or, when parents die, men assume the names of their deceased grandfather; women, of their grandmother (Sir R. Temple, *Census Rep. Andaman Islands*, 1901, i. 253). One reason given for the wide-spread custom of shaving after a death is that it changes the appearance of the mourners so as to deceive the pursuing spirit, or removes the shelter in which it may hide and cling to the mourner (Frazer, *JAI* xv. [1886] 99). To prevent the spirit rising from the grave and 'walking,' it is a common practice, particularly among menial castes, to bury the corpse face downwards, and to pile stones and thorns on the grave (Thurston, iv. 322, 374, vii. 426; Gait, i. 419; Crooke, ii. 60; *BG* xxii. 195; cf. R. S. Hardy, *Eastern Monachism*, 1850, p. 322).

Precautions in the case of more dangerous spirits.—Precautions of this kind are more urgent in the case of spirits specially malignant.

In the case of the Churel, sometimes the corpse of a woman dying pregnant is cut open and the child removed; or the spirit is scared by fire, earth, and water; or iron nails are driven into her fingers, and the thumbs fastened together with iron rings (Crooke, i. 272 ff.). The Orāons carry the corpse of such a woman to a distance, break the feet above the ankles, and twist them round, bringing the heels in front, into which they drive long thorns; they bury her deep in the earth face downwards, and place with her corpse the bones of an ass, reciting the anathema: 'If you come home, may you turn into an ass!'; the roots of a palm-tree are also buried with her, with the curse: 'May you come home when the leaves of the palm wither!'; when they leave the burial-ground, they spread mustard seeds along the road, saying: 'When you try to come home, pick up all these!' (*MASB*, 1906, i. 140). This last charm is very common, and is one of the usual impossible tasks found in the folk-tales (Crooke, i. 273 f.; *BG* xix. 134, xxiv. 417; Steel-Temple, *Wide-awake Stories*, 1884, p. 436). These precautions, under Brāhman guidance, have been elaborated into a special funeral ritual for women dying during the menstrual period, after the sixth month of pregnancy, and within ten days after childbirth (*BG* xviii. pt. i. 561 f.).

The misery of the unmarried dead is relieved by the curious rite of marriage with the dead (cf. Frazer, *Pausanias*, v. [1898] 389 ff.)—a custom which in India seems to prevail only in Madras and among some Burmese tribes.

When a Toda boy dies unmarried, a girl is selected; her head is covered by her father with a mantle, and she puts food into the pocket of the mantle of the dead; the Nāmbūtiri Brāhmans perform the rite of tying the marriage necklace on a dead unmarried girl (Rivers, 357, 701; *Bull. Madr. Mus.* iii. 61). The disgusting custom of enforced sexual connexion by a male with such a dead girl, ascribed by Abbé Dubois to the Nāyars, seems to be based on a misunderstanding of this rite of mock marriage (J. A. Dubois, *Hindu Manners, Customs, and Ceremonies*[3], 1906, p. 16 f.). Besides the Todas and Nāmbūtiris, several S. Indian tribes perform this mock marriage, such as the Badagas, Billavas, and Komatis, while among the Pallis and Vāniyans the dead bachelor is solemnly married to the *arka* plant (*Calotropis gigantea*) (V. N. Aiya, *Travancore State Manual*, 1906, ii. 259; Thurston, i. 117, 256 f., iii. 334, v. 197, vi. 22, vii. 315). Among the Chins of Upper Burma, if, before the great contracting ceremony is completed, either party dies, the rites are continued with the corpse, which is kept unburied until the rite is finished; in this they probably follow the custom well established among the Chinese (*Gazetteer Upper Burma*, ii. pt. ii. 303; J. J. M. de Groot, *Rel. Syst. of China*, 1894, ii. 800 ff.; J. H. Gray, *China*, 1878, i. 216 ff.).

6. Possession by spirits.—Possession by evil spirits or demons is of two kinds:

'The theory of embodiment serves several highly important purposes in savage and barbarian philosophy. On the one hand, it provides an explanation of the phenomena of morbid exaltation and derangement, especially as connected with abnormal utterance, and this view is so far extended as to produce an almost general doctrine of disease. On the other hand, it enables the savage either to "lay" a hurtful spirit in some foreign body, and so get rid of it, or to carry about a useful spirit for his service in a material object, to set it up as a deity for worship in the body of an animal, or in a block or stone or image or other thing, which contains the spirit as a vessel contains a fluid: this is the key to strict fetishism, and in no small measure to idolatry' (Tylor[2], ii. 123).

These two varieties of spirit possession can be traced in Indian beliefs.

(*a*) *Abnormal or disease possession.*—In the first place, we have cases of abnormal possession. Certain persons are supposed to be specially liable to spirit possession, thus defined by a native writer:

'The men most liable to spirit attacks are the impotent, the lustful, the lately widowed, bankrupts, sons and brothers of whores, convicts, the idle, brooders on the unknowable, gluttons, and starvers. The women most liable to spirit attacks are girls, young women who have lately come of age, young widows, idlers, whores, brooders on the unknowable, irregular or gluttonous eaters, and all sickly women. Women are specially liable to spirit attacks during their monthly sickness, during pregnancy, and in childbed; and men, women, and children are all apt to suffer when, dressed in their best, they go to gardens or near wells. Intelligent and educated men and healthy intelligent women are freer than others from spirit attacks' (*BG* xxii. 813).

Demon possession thus accounts for various abnormal states of mind and for the phenomena classed as hysteria. Hence patients, particularly women, suffering in this way require special pro-

tection, or it is necessary to expel the demons by whom they are possessed.

In Cochin, among the Eravallars, if a pregnant woman dreams of dogs, cats, or wild animals coming to attack her, she is believed to be possessed by demons. An exorcist, or 'devil-driver,' is called in, who makes a hideous figure on the ground representing the demon, sings, beats a drum, mutters spells, burns frankincense, and waves round the head of the patient an offering of food for the demon, on receiving which he leaves her (A. K. Iyer, i. 45 f., 107; Thurston, ii. 73, 214). In the Panjāb, a woman after childbirth is specially liable to the attacks of demons, and has to wear an iron ring, made, if possible, out of an old horse-shoe, and to keep a fire burning near her (*PNQ* iii. 81). For the same reason, at the puberty rites of a girl, offerings are made to demons (A. K. Iyer, i. 146). The same is the case with people at various crises of their lives, such as the bride and bridegroom, the mourners, and the corpse-bearers at funeral rites. Such persons are protected by various charms and amulets (see CHARMS AND AMULETS [Indian], vol. iii. p. 441 ff.).

(*b*) *Conciliation by gifts of food*, etc.—Attempts are often made to conciliate demons on such occasions by throwing food for them by the roadside or in the house.

In the Himālaya, food is waved round the head of a possessed person and left out on the road by night, any one touching it being liable to spirit attack (*PNQ* iii. 73). When a birth occurs in the family of a Chitpāvan Brāhman, cooked rice, on which a dough lamp is placed, is laid in a corner of the street (*BG* xviii. pt. i. 113 f.). When the Reddis of Bijapur disturb the field spirits at the first ploughing, pieces of coco-nut are thrown on each side of the plough track; and at a Brāhman funeral in the Deccan a man carries a winnowing-fan full of coco-kernel which he scatters abroad (*ib.* xxiii. 147, xviii. pt. i. 149). The Kūkī priest, in cases of sickness, prescribes the appropriate victim, and eats its flesh, throwing what he cannot eat as an offering into the jungle (E. T. Dalton, *Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal*, 1872, p. 46).

(*c*) *Expulsion of spirits by flagellation.*—Especially in the case of attacks of the hysterical kind, the patient is soundly beaten, until the demon speaks through him or her, and promises to depart.

'If the devil should prove an obstinate one and refuse to leave, charm they never so wisely, his retreat may generally be hastened by the vigorous application of a slipper or broom to the shoulders of the possessed person, the operator taking care to use at the same time the most scurrilous language he can think of' (Bishop R. Caldwell, writing of the Tinnevelly Shanars, in Ziegenbalg, 164). In the Deccan one plan of scaring a demon is for the exorcist to take the possessed person before an idol, seize him by the top-knot, and scourge and abuse him until the Bhūta says what offering or penance will satisfy him (*BG* xviii. pt. i. 292). The tortures inflicted on supposed witches and other possessed persons have resulted in death or serious injury (*NINQ* iii. 202 f.; N. Chevers, *Manual of Medical Jurisprudence for India*, 1870, p. 546 ff.; for further accounts of exorcism by flagellation, see Crooke, i. 99, 155 f., ii. 34; cf. Frazer, *GB*[2] iii. 127 ff., 215 ff.). In Car Nicobar true ceremonial murders of men, women, and even children have been performed for the public benefit by organized bodies, because the victims are considered dangerous or obnoxious to the community; the murdered persons are charged with possession by an evil spirit as illustrated by their propensity to witchcraft, incendiarism, homicide, failure to cure diseases, or theft; but the root cause is that the victim is believed to be possessed by a demon, and hence dangerous; his limbs are broken, he is strangled, and his corpse is flung into the sea (Sir R. Temple, 210).

(*d*) *Expulsion of disease spirits.*—The evil spirits most generally feared are those which bring disease. To their agency are attributed epidemics in general, especially cholera, plague, or smallpox, and maladies which are unforeseen or those which indicate spirit possession, such as fits, fever, rheumatism, colic, and the like. Such spirits are often got rid of by transference, the spirit being compelled or induced to remove to another village or to some distant place.

In the Panjāb, if the fever spirit be detected, the officiant goes at night to a graveyard, brings home some earth, lays it near the patient, and next day suspends a string from an acacia tree, on which it is believed that the spirit hangs itself; or a string is wound in seven strands from toe to head of the patient, and then it is tied round the tree, in the hope of conciliating the tree spirit which causes the fever spirit to depart (*PNQ* i. 40). In Upper Burma, when children fall ill, an egg, some of the child's hair, and some sweetmeats are placed on a little boat and consigned to the river, which carries away the spirit; by a later conception this is supposed to be an offering to the water Nāt or spirit (*Gazetteer*, ii. pt. i. 29 f.; cf. Frazer, *GB*[2] iii. 97 ff., 105 f.). A very common method is to convey the disease by means of a scape-animal from the infected area. In Berār the cholera spirit is expelled by yoking a plough, and driving it round the village to form a sacred circle, which foreign and hostile spirits cannot pass; a fowl and a goat are sacrificed and buried in the ground, and near them the beam and plough-yoke are fixed, daubed with red lead, and worshipped; a cart is then dragged containing the image of Marī, the disease goddess, from her shrine, to the village boundary, where the image is worshipped, and a buffalo calf is sacrificed and buried (*NINQ* iv. 206 f.). In the Telugu country the scape-animal is a buffalo, and, as the image of the goddess is carried in procession, people flourish sticks, swords, or spears, and cut up limes and throw them into the air in order to induce the hungry spirits to seize them and thus be diverted from attacking the man who bears the image (*Bull. Madr. Mus.* v. 130).

7. Possession by spirits of the exorcist.—The exorcism of evil spirits by a professional exorcist has been reduced to a system, and prevails widely in all parts of the country, particularly in S. India. In N. India the medium is known as Bhagat (Skr. *bhakti*, 'fervent faith'), Syānā, 'the wise one,' Ojhā (Skr. *upādhyāya*, 'teacher'); among the hill tribes of Central India as Baigā, Bhomkā, Parihār, or Demano; in the Deccan as Jantā, 'the knowing one,' or Devṛishī, 'holy saint.' He is distinguished from the Mantrī, who learns by orthodox methods the charm formulæ (*mantra*) from a teacher (*guru*), by the fact that he does not undergo special training, but works through the inspiration of a familiar spirit or guardian, which enters him when he works himself up into the proper state of ecstasy. This ecstatic state occurs on various occasions and for various purposes. His special province is the expulsion of various kinds of disease; but he also becomes possessed at death rites, when he identifies and announces the pleasure of the spirit, at name-fixing, when he decides the proper name of the child, and at other domestic and religious rites. The medium in his ecstatic state is seized with revolting cramp-like contortions and muscular quivering, head-wagging, and frantic dancing, which usually end in complete or partial insensibility. When Sir C. A. Elliott witnessed a séance,

'the man did not literally revolve; he covered his head well up in his cloth, leaving space over the head for the god to come to; and in this state he twisted and turned himself about rapidly, and soon sank exhausted. Then, from the pit of his stomach, he uttered words which the bystanders interpreted to direct a certain line of conduct for the sick man to pursue. But perhaps the occasion was not a fair test, as the Parihār strongly objected to the presence of an unbeliever, on the pretence that the god was afraid to come before so great a *ḥākim* [official]' (*Settlement Rep. Hoshangābād*, 1867, p. 120). Compare the account by Capt. W. L. Samuells, in Dalton, 232 f., quoted above, vol. ii. p. 488 f.

(*a*) *Tabus imposed upon the medium.*—The medium is subject to numerous tabus.

The god 'would leave his head' if either a cow or a Brāhman attended the rites, thus proving their non-Aryan origin. The Kotā medium must not speak directly to his wife or to any other woman for three months before the rite; he may not sleep on a mat or blanket; at the feast he must have no congress with his wife (Thurston, iv. 10 f.). In the Deccan he loses his power if his lamp goes out while he is eating, and thus leaves him exposed to demon assault; if he happens to hear a menstruous woman speak; if any one sweeps his room; if the name of any spirit is mentioned. Should any such events occur, he must stop eating and fast during the remainder of the day. He must avoid certain vegetables and fruits, and must never eat stale or twice-cooked food. If he be a Musalmān, he must not eat a special kind of millet, or food cooked by a menstruous woman (*BG* xxiv. 418).

(*b*) *Methods of identifying spirits by the medium.*—The medium uses varied methods of identifying the spirit which has seized his patient.

In the Panjāb he waves corn over the sick person, and, making a heap for each suspected demon, keeps on dropping grains that on which the last falls indicating the offender (*NINQ* i. 128). The Berār medium hangs a string over a wood fire and repeats spells; when the smoke touches the string, the appropriate formula is indicated (*PNQ* ii. 170). The Kāchārī medium lays out thirteen leaves, each assigned to a special god, and, hanging a pendulum from his thumb, lets it move; when it touches a particular leaf, that deity must be propitiated (Dalton, 85). In the Gujarāt an officiant tied charmed threads round the house, drove a charmed iron nail into the ground at each corner and two at the door; the house was purified; a Dev, or orthodox god, was installed, and before his image was placed a drawn sword, a lamp lit with butter, and a second lit with oil, while the medium continued to mutter charms for forty-one days, and occasionally visited the cremation ground to make propitiatory offerings to the offended spirit. In another case the spirit was actually expelled, and buried under lime, salt, mustard, lead, and stones, to prevent him from 'walking'; and, as an additional precaution, a charmed iron nail was driven into the

ground. Fumigation of the patient with the smoke of pepper and dogs' dung, as a means of inconveniencing the demon, was also recommended (A. K. Forbes, *Rās Mālā*, p. 657 ff.).

8. Shamanism.—Such methods naturally develop into the practices which have been roughly classified under the head of Shamanism (*q.v.*), though this term is often applied to demonology in general. Bishop Caldwell recognizes various points of contact between the systematized methods of exorcism known as 'devil dancing' and 'devil driving' in S. India and the Shamanism of High Asia: the absence in both of a recognized priesthood; the recognition of a Supreme God to whom, as he is too kindly to do them harm, little worship is offered by the people; the absence of belief in metempsychosis; the objects of Shamanistic worship being not gods, but demons, which are regarded as cruel, revengeful, capricious, and are appeased by blood sacrifices and wild dances; the medium exciting himself to frenzy, and pretending, or supposing himself, to be possessed by the demon to whom worship is being offered, and whilst in this state communicating to those who consult him the information he has received (*Dravid. Gram.*[2], 1875, p. 580 ff.).

Performances of this kind are uncommon in N. India, except in the Himālaya and among other hill and forest tribes. In Kumaun, when a person believes himself to be possessed by a demon, he calls his friends to dance it away; the dance goes on daily for as long as six months in some cases, and, as an additional precaution, large fires are kept alight (Oakley, 207 f.). When the Garos do devil-driving, it is in the name of their god Kalkamā, who holds in his hands the spirits of men; sacrificial stones are erected to him, and are smeared with the blood of the animal victim (Playfair, 82). The methods in use in S. India, where the system has been more fully elaborated, are of the same kind, and need not be more fully described. The basis of the performance is that the officiants, in dress, weapons, and ornaments, impersonate the demon whom they desire to propitiate and cause to depart. (See illustrations of such performers among the Parayans and Panans of Cochin, in A. K. Iyer, i. 83, 178. Full details will be found in the writings of Bishops Caldwell and Whitehouse already quoted, and in A. C. Burnell, 'The Devil Worship of the Tulavas,' *IA*, 1894.)

Blood-drinking.—The most loathsome incident in these rites is when the medium, in order to bring himself into communion with the deity or demon, and thus gain inspiration, drinks the blood of the sacrificed victim.

The low-caste Mādiga who impersonates the demon Vīraveśin or Potnrājā, 'buffalo king,' kills the sacrificial goat by strangling it with his teeth and tearing the throat open (Oppert, 461, 476). The same rite is performed by other mediums of the same class (*Bull. Madr. Mus.* v. 165 f.; Thurston, iv. 187; A. K. Iyer, i. 311). In N. India similar rites are found among the Tāntrik mediums, as when, at the Bhairava festival in Nepāl, a band of masked, yelling devils beset and torture the buffalo victim, drink the blood, and eat pieces of the raw, bleeding flesh (*PNQ* iii. 165; cf. the account in H. A. Oldfield, *Sketches from Nepal*, 1880, ii. 345 ff.). In some cases in S. India the victim is slightly wounded, and forced to eat rice soaked in its own blood; if it eats, the omen is good, but in any case the victim is slain (*Bull. Madr. Mus.* v. 173). The blood is used as a charm, as at Trichinopoly, where clothes soaked in it are hung on the eaves of the houses to protect the cattle from disease; or it is smeared on the doorposts of the shrine, or collected in a vessel and laid before the goddess for her refreshment (*ib.* v. 173, 141, 164).

9. Worship of Guardians.—Particularly in S. India, the chief reliance for protection against demons is placed in the Guardians. These are, first, the Grāmadevatā, or local village-deities; secondly, the leaders of the hosts of evil spirits, who, by appropriate conciliation, can be induced to keep their demon bands under control, and prevent them from doing injury to mankind.

(*a*) *The Grāmadevatā.*—The Grāmadevatā, 'gods of the village,' or, as they are called in N. India, the Dihwār (with the same meaning), are generally non-human spirits, though their ranks are sometimes recruited from those of human origin. They are often identified with the Earth Mother or with the wider host of Mothers (Mātā), the worship of whom prevails widely in W. India. (For Mother-worship, see A. Barth, *Religions of India*, 1882, p. 202 n.; Bishop Whitehouse, in *Bull. Madr. Mus.* v. 116 ff.; Monier-Williams, *Brahmanism and Hinduism*[4], 1891, p. 225 ff.) The connexion of this worship of the female powers with the matriarchate is not clearly established in India. But women are generally supposed to be more susceptible than men to spirit influence, and are mysterious beings charged with supernatural energy (Westermarck, i. 620, 665 ff.). Hence we find women participating in demon propitiation. The Orāons believe that women, known as Bisahī, control the terrible Bhūta known as Dāyan. The woman who desires to acquire this power strips off her clothes (see above, vol. iii. p. 447), wears a girdle of broken twigs taken from a broom, and goes to a cave, the resort of the Dāyan. There she learns spells (*mantra*), and at each séance puts a stone into a hole. If at the end of a year the hole is full, she has become an expert, and can take away life and restore it. If the hole be only partially full, she has the power only of taking away life. Every year she is obliged to sacrifice a black cat and pour its blood into the hole. She and the Dāyan alone can set the Bhūta in action, and to these all diseases are attributed. When a child dies, any Bisahī in the village is charged with causing the death (*MASB* i. 144).

As examples of these village guardians we have Chaṇḍkī or Chaṇḍkāī, the low-caste Hindu guardian in the Deccan, who lives in marshes and attacks children. To appease her an image is made of earth taken from the banks of a river; offerings are made to it, and it is finally thrown into water (*BG* xxiv. 416). The field guardian of the Reddis of Bijapur lives in a stone under a sacred tree, which is smeared with red lead, and offerings are made before beginning ploughing (*ib.* xxiii. 147). Darhā is the guardian of the Birhors of Bengal, and is represented by a piece of bamboo stuck slantwise into the ground (Risley, i. 138). Naturally such village guardians are often embodied in the boundary stone. The chief object of worship of the Dāngs of Khāndesh is Simariā Dev, the boundary god, the Sewanriyā of the Bhuiyārs (*BG* xii. 601; Crooke, *TC* ii. 93). The worship of boundaries (*sīmanta-pūjā*) is part of the orthodox marriage rite (*BG* xviii. pt. i. 129). In Tanjore the Ellai-kal, or boundary stone, is the subject of remarkable worship (*Bull. Madr. Mus.* v. 117 f., 166 f.).

(*b*) *The demon Guardians.*—In S. India the chief of these is Aiyanār, 'honourable father,' or, as he is also called, Śāsta or Śāstra, 'ruler' (Oppert, 505). Mounted on a horse or elephant, he rides sword in hand over hill and dale to clear the land from evil spirits; any one who meets him and his demon troop dies at once; when he is not riding, he appears as a red-coloured man, wearing a crown, with lines of sacred ashes (*vibhūti*) on his forehead, and richly dressed; he has two wives, Pūranai and Pudkalai, who are worshipped with him (Oppert, 505; *Bull. Madr. Mus.* v. 118; A. K. Iyer, i. 312 f.). In the Himālaya the demons go about on horses, in litters, or on foot, led by Bholanāth; death seizes any one meeting them; Airi patrols the land with his dogs (*JASBe*, 1848, p. 609; Crooke, i. 262 f., 280; cf. the European legend of the Wild Huntsman, the Orion of Greek legend, Wuotan of Germany [Frazer, *Pausan.* v. 82; Grimm, iii. 918 ff., 941 f.]).

The Deccan guardian is Vetāla, who also appears as a goblin tenanting dead bodies (see the *Vetāla-pañchaviṇśatika* included in Somadeva, *Kathā-sarit-sāgara*, tr. C. H. Tawney; and Sir R. Burton, *Vikram and the Vampire*, 1870). He is represented in human form, but his hands and feet are turned backwards, his eyes tawny green, his hair standing on end; he holds a cane in his right hand and a conch-shell in his left; when he goes his rounds, he is dressed in green, and sits in a litter or rides a horse, while his attendants follow, holding lighted torches and shouting (*BG* xviii. pt. i. 291, xxiv. 415). In the villages, as a guardian, he occupies a stone smeared with red paint, the top roughly carved into a man's face; but more usually he resides in the pre-historic stone circles scattered over the hills, the centre stone representing the demon, and the surrounding pillars his attendants (*ib.* xviii. pt. i. 291, 553, pt. iii. 347, 388, xxiv. 415).

Like him is Bhairava or Bhairon, who seems to be in origin an old earth-god, the consort of the Mother. In his form as Kāl Bhairava he cures diseases caused by demons (*ib.* xi. 461, xiv. 73, xviii. pt. i. 289). As Bahiroba he is widely revered, and the Dhāngars of Sātāra bury his image with the rich men of the tribe to protect them from evil spirits (*ib.* xi. 461, xiv. 73, xix. 105).

In N. India, where the belief in demons is less intense, the local village-deities, and, in particular, Hanumān, the monkey-god, are installed as guardians at the foundation of every settlement.

10. Periodical or occasional expulsion of evil spirits.—The periodical or occasional expulsion of evil spirits is as common among many Indian tribes as it is among other primitive races (Frazer, *GB*[2] iii. 39 ff.).

This is often done at the close of the harvest season, which is regarded as a period of licence. About harvest time the Karenni of Upper Burma take a piece of smouldering wood from the house fire, place it on a bamboo, and carry it ceremonially outside the village; they are unable or unwilling to explain the object of the rite, but they say that it keeps off fever and other sickness from the house (*Gazetteer*, i. pt. i. 530). Among the Taungthas of the E. frontier there is a general cleaning up of the village after an epidemic, the place being surrounded with a cordon of fresh-spun white threads, and the blood of sacrificed animals scattered (T. H. Lewin, *Wild Races of S.E. India*, 1870, p. 196 f.). The people of Lower Burma expel the cholera demon by scrambling on the house roofs, laying about them with bamboos and billets of wood, drum-beating, trumpet-blowing, yells, and screams (C. J. F. S. Forbes, *British Burma*, 1878, p. 233; Shway Yoe, *The Burman*, 1882, i. 282, ii. 105 ff.). Similar harvest-rites are found among the Ho and Mundāri tribes in Bengal and those of the N.W. frontier (Dalton, 196 f.; J. Biddulph, *Tribes of the Hindoo Koosh*, 1880, p. 103). At the annual

Maler feast the priest scatters rice; all persons supposed to be possessed with devils scramble for it, and are finally cured by drinking the blood of a sacrificed buffalo (Dalton, 270). The Kandhs practise a similar rite at seed-time (W. Macpherson, *Memorials of Service*, 1865, p. 357 f.). In Bengal, during the Holi spring festival, people light torches and fling them over the boundary of the next village, the custom often giving rise to riots (*PNQ* iv. 201). Even among many of the higher castes, like the Prabhūs of Bombay, in order to expel evil spirits at a marriage, a servant rises early and sweeps the house, gathers the sweepings into a basket, lays on it an old broom, a light, some betel, and four copper coins, and waving the basket before each room says: 'May evil go, and Bali's kingdom come!' She then drives the master of the house to the door, and, warning him not to look back, places the sweepings on the roadside and brings back the coins (*BG* xviii. pt. i. 252 f.). In Upper India the Divālī, or feast of lights, is the occasion for observances of the same kind, the lamps scaring demons, and a regular rite of scaring poverty or ill-luck from the house being performed (*IA* xxxii. [1903] 237 ff.; *NINQ* v. 125; Crooke, ii. 188 f., 295 f.). Often these rites take the form of a mock combat or a tug of war, in which one party represents the good, and the other the evil, spirits, arrangements being made that the former shall be victorious. The Burmese Nāts are propitiated by a tug of war, the victorious side being supposed to get better crops; and if, after the contest, rain happens to fall, the efficacy of the appeal is placed beyond question; this is also done in seasons of drought (*Gazetteer Upper Burma*, ii. pt. ii. 95, 279, iii. pt. ii. 64). Among the Aos of Assam, at a festival held in August, there are tugs of war lasting for three days between the young men and unmarried girls of each clan (*khel*) (E. A. Gait, *Census Rep. Assam*, 1891, i. 244). In Aḥmadnagar, in April–May, the boys of one village fight with slings and stones against those of another; it is believed that the non-observance of the rite causes failure of rain, or, if rain falls, a plague of field rats; a fight duly waged is followed by plentiful rainfall (*BG* xvii. 722 f.; cf. the Greek λιθοβολία and αἰσχρολογία [Farnell, *CGS* iii. 93, 99; J. E. Harrison, *Prolegomena*, 1903, p. 155; Crooke, ii. 320 f.]).

11. Gaining control of a demon.—In the rites of Black Magic, a demon, if he can be brought under the control of a medium or magician, plays an important part; he may be used as a protector by his master, or his owner may let him loose to work mischief on those whom he desires to injure. The magician, by the use of spells (*mantra*), can often induce him to enter some receptacle, and he thus becomes a marketable commodity.

'When the sale of a Bhūt has been arranged, the Ojhā hands over a corked bamboo cylinder which is supposed to contain him. This is taken to the place, usually a tree, where it is intended that he should in future reside; a small ceremony is performed, liquor being poured on the ground, or small mounds (*piṇḍa*) erected in his honour, and the cork is then taken out, whereupon the Bhūt is supposed to take up his abode in the place chosen for him. His function is to watch the crops and guard them from thieves, and, if any one should be hardy enough to steal from a field thus guarded, he is certain to be stricken by the Bhūt, and in a few days will sicken and die' (E. A. Gait, *Census Rep. Bengal*, 1901, i. 198). Among the Pulluvans of Madras, 'a man who wishes to bring a demon under his control must bathe in the morning for forty-one days, and cook his own meals. He should have no association with his wife, and be free from all pollution. Every night, after 10 o'clock, he should bathe in a tank or river, and stand naked up to the loins in water, while praying to the god whom he wishes to propitiate, in the words: "I offer thee my prayers, so that thou mayst bless me with what I want." These, with his thoughts concentrated on the deity, he should utter 101, 1001, and 100,001 times during the period. Should he do this, in spite of all obstacles, and intimidation by the demons, the god will grant his desires' (Thurston, vi. 231). In Mysore, among the Hasulas and Maleyas, jungle tribes, when a man dies, his spirit is supposed to be stolen by some one else's devil, who is pointed out by the astrologer, who divines by throwing cowrie-shells or rice. The heir, then, as a measure of precaution, redeems the spirit by offering a pig, fowl, or other gift; and he promptly shuts it up in a pot, where it is periodically supplied with drink and food to prevent it from 'walking' and doing mischief (B. L. Rice, *Mysore*, 1897, i. 214; cf. 'The Fisherman and the Jinni,' Sir R. Burton, *Arabian Nights*, 1893, i. 34 ff.; *PNQ* ii. 170). The power of a demon is believed to rest in his hair, and, if a man can succeed in cutting off the topknot of a Bhūt, the latter will be his slave for life (*NINQ* iii. 180). In Travancore, Kuttichchāttan, the boy imp, if fed, watches the property of his owner; the master of such a demon possesses infinite powers of evil; but these, if wrongly exercised, recoil upon him, and cause him to die childless and after terrible physical and mental agony (N. Subramhaniya Aiyar, *Census Rep.*, 1901, i. 303). Siddharājā, the great Chalukya king of W. India, is said to have performed his acts of heroism by aid of a demon which he subdued by riding a corpse in a cemetery (*BG* i. pt. i. 174).

12. Relation of demonology to orthodox religion.—From Vedic times the gods ever war against the demons (A. Macdonell, 156 ff.). Kṛṣṇa slays the demoness Pūtanā; Tṛṇāvartta, the whirlwind demon; Ariṣṭa, the bull demon; Keśin, the horse demon (F. S. Growse, *Mathura* [3], 1883, pp. 55, 62). Many gods and goddesses take their cult-titles from their conquest of demons; Devī as Mahiṣa-mardinī, Indra as Vṛtrahan, Viṣṇu as Kaiṭabhajit and Madhusūdana. The scenes of these ghostly combats are still shown, like the gloomy cave at Yān in Kanara, whence Śiva dislodged the demon occupant; the water which flows from hot springs is the blood of the Rākṣasas slain by some deity, or such wells are the haunts of demons which, if not conciliated, bring disease (*BG* xv. pt. ii. 355, xiv. 373; L. A. Waddell, *Among the Himalayas*, 1899, p. 203). This opposition between the worker by magical arts and the priest who works by the aid of the gods is one of the primary facts of Hinduism (Sir A. C. Lyall, *Asiatic Studies* [2], 1907, i. 101 ff.). Even among some of the forest tribes the supremacy of the god over the demon is admitted; but, as already stated, no clear distinction can be drawn between god and demon. The Orāons believe that their tutelary deity, Pāt, controls all the Bhūts, except the Dāyan; and the Kannikans of Madras will not worship the demon Chāthan at Cranganore because he is a rival of the local orthodox god (*MASB*, 1906, i. 142; A. K. Iyer, i. 143).

But, as a matter of fact, this opposition between demonolatry and the orthodox religion is little more than nominal, and popular Hinduism consists of a veneer of the higher beliefs overlying demon-worship, the latter being so closely combined with the former that it is now impossible to discriminate the rival elements. This combination is especially apparent in S. India, where Brāhmanism appeared at a comparatively recent period and was forced to come to terms with the local Dravidian beliefs. In particular, in the Tamil districts, the demon cultus has been elaborated under Brāhman guidance, as is shown by the ceremonial washing of demon images, elaborate processions in their honour, and other forms of an advanced species of worship. While the original Grāmadevatā are, as a rule, female, here their male consorts tend to acquire a more prominent position. Aiyanār, for instance, has become entirely independent, occupies a shrine of his own, and has a special festival, and sacrifices are made to his attendants, Maduraivīran and Mūnadian. As a concession to Brāhman feeling, blood sacrifices are falling into abeyance, and, when these are offered to a goddess, she is often veiled, and a curtain is drawn during the blood-sacrifice to Aiyanār, or the offering is made not to him but to one of his attendants (Bishop Whitehead, *Bull. Madr. Mus.* v. 160). In some places Brāhmans are beginning to act as priests to the village goddesses; but the slaying of victims is left in charge of the low-caste priests; and Brāhmans who serve in village shrines are regarded, among their own body, as holding a distinctly lower position than those who are engaged in secular pursuits (*ib.* 127 f.). The fusion of the two faiths usually manifests itself in the acceptance by the orthodox gods of the demons as their followers or assistants. This is particularly noticeable in the Śākta and Śaiva cultus, Vaiṣṇavism having little sympathy with the cruder rites of demonism. The village goddesses tend to become Śaktis, or manifestations of the female energy of Nature; Śiva himself has, as one of his cult-titles, Bhūteśvara or Bhūteśa, 'lord of demons'; his son Gaṇeśa or Ganpati takes his name as lord of his father's attendant demons (*gaṇa*); in the Karnatak, Aiyanār is identified with Harihara, a duplex figure embodying Śiva and Viṣṇu.

The corrupt Mahāyāna form of Buddhism current in Tibet and the Himālaya has largely adopted Shamanistic beliefs, drawn from the Animistic devil-dancing cults of the Bön, resembling in many

ways the Taoism of China, and reinforced from Indian Tāntrik beliefs (L. A. Waddell, *Buddhism of Tibet*, 1895, pp. 19, 34, 477; Sir H. Yule, *Marco Polo*, 1871, ii. 61 f.).

This process of the absorption of demonolatry by orthodox Hinduism naturally results in the decrease of the former, as intelligence, education, and the active missionary efforts of the orthodox priesthood extend. This is admitted by several native writers. One, speaking of Bengal, states that the numbers of the Bhūts have largely been reduced; fifty years ago there were as many millions of demons as there are men at the present time; characteristically, he seems to attribute this reduction in numbers to the facilities now offered by railways of visiting Gaya and other places for the purpose of performing the obsequial rites which appease the angry spirits of the dead (*NINQ* iii. 199). From Bombay we learn that in Kolhapur some of the most dreaded evil spirits have recently disappeared—the Brāhman ghosts having left the country because they dislike the cow-killing permitted by the British Government; the Muhammadan demons because pork is now freely eaten; only the low-caste spirits are left, and their influence has become much reduced (*BG* xxiv. 421). Even in Cochin and Travancore, the homes of demon-worship, it is said to be gradually giving way to Hinduism, as represented by the cults of Siva, Subrahmaṇya, and Gaṇpati or Gaṇeśa (A. K. Iyer, i. 311).

LITERATURE.—The cults of the demons and evil spirits of India have been as yet imperfectly studied, because many of these rites are repulsive, and performed in secret, and thus do not readily come under the observation of Europeans, while they are offensive to many students of Hinduism belonging to the higher and learned classes. The material, which is of great extent and complexity, is scattered through the anthropological literature of India, some of which has been quoted in the course of this article. It is most abundant in S. India. Much information will be found in the *Census Reports*; the *Manual of the Administration of the Madras Presidency*, 1885–93; the *Bulletins of the Madras Museum*; the *District Manuals*, esp. that by W. Logan on *Malabar*, 1887; general treatises, such as E. Thurston, *Castes and Tribes of S. India*, 1909; V. N. Aiya, *Travancore State Manual*, 1906; B. L. Rice, *Mysore*, 1897; F. Buchanan, *A Journey through Mysore, Canara, and Malabar*, 1807; L. K. Anantha Krishna Iyer, *The Cochin Tribes and Castes*, vol. i. (all published), 1909; P. Percival, *The Land of the Veda*, 1854; S. Mateer, *The Land of Charity*, 1871; R. Caldwell, *Compar. Gram. of the Dravidian or South-Indian Family of Languages*[2], 1875, in which and in B. Ziegenbalg, *Genealogy of the South-Indian Gods*, 1869, the work of the former writer on the Shāṇārs of Tinnevelly is reproduced; G. Oppert, *The Original Inhabitants of Bharatavarṣa or India*, 1893; Sir M. Monier-Williams, *Brahmanism and Hinduism*[4], 1891; in A. K. Forbes, *Rās Malā*, 1878, is reproduced the *Bhoot Nibundh or the Destroyer of Superstitions regarding Daimons*, by Trivedī Dalpatrām Dāyā, issued in an Eng. tr. in 1850. To these may be added special monographs, such as P. Dehon, S.J., 'Religion and Customs of the Uraons,' in *Mem. As. Soc. Bengal*, i. (1906); A. C. Burnell, *The Devil Worship of the Tulavas*, reprinted from *IA*, 1894; H. Whitehead, 'The Village Deities of Southern India,' in *Bull. Madr. Mus.* v. (1907); M. J. Walhouse, 'On the Belief in Bhūtas—Devil and Ghost Worship in Western India,' in *JAI* v. (1876) 408.

W. CROOKE.

DEMONS AND SPIRITS (Jain).—Superhuman beings, according to the Jains, fall into two categories—the denizens of hell (*nārakas*), and the gods (*devas*). A sub-division of the latter distinguishes good and bad gods (*daivī*, and *āsurī gati*); the bad gods are also spoken of as *kudevas* or *kadamaras*. Demons would come under the two heads *nārakas* and *kudevas*, and ghosts under that of *kudevas*. It must, however, be kept in mind that, according to the Jains, neither the state of a god nor that of a demon is permanent, but both have their individually fixed duration, which may extend to many 'oceans of years.' The state which a soul may attain in the scale of beings and the duration of this state—his individual lot—depend on the merits and demerits (*karma*) of the soul; when the allotted time is over, the soul will be re-born in some other state according to his *karma*. A god may be re-born as a hell-being, but the latter will be re-born as an animal or a man only.

The *nārakas*, or hell-beings, have a demoniacal nature, but they cannot leave the place where they are condemned to live, nor can they do harm to any other beings than their fellow *nārakas*. The souls of those who have committed heinous sins are on death removed in a few moments (see DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD [Jain]) to one of the seven nether worlds which contain the different hells (see COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY [Indian], § 4). There the soul of the condemned is fitted out with an enormous body of a loathsome shape comparable to that of a plucked fowl. The hell-beings possess superhuman mental powers (*avadhi*); they avail them, however, only to find out their enemies and to fight each other. In addition to the pains produced by the wounds they inflict on one another and by the tortures they have to undergo in some hells, the hell-beings continually suffer from extreme heat or cold, the intolerable stink, and the horrid sounds which prevail in the hells, and they can never appease their hunger and thirst. The *nārakas* do not die, however much they are mangled; but their wounds close at once like a furrow in water. They die at their allotted time after a miserable life, which may extend, in the lowest hell, to 33 oceans of years.

The remaining demons and the ghosts are contained in the two lowest sub-divisions of the gods: the *bhavanavāsins* or *bhaumeyakas*, and the *vyantaras*. The lowest class of the *bhavanavāsins* (*i.e.* gods who live in palaces) are the *asurakumāras* or simply *asuras*. They reside in mansions of their own below the surface of the earth, in the upper half of *Ratnaprabhā*, the highest of the seven nether worlds. As in Hindu mythology, the *asuras* may be good or bad; but there are fifteen extremely wicked *asuras*—Ambariṣa, etc.—who administer tortures in the three uppermost hells; in a former life they had delighted in wanton cruelty. The remaining classes of *bhavanavāsins*, *nāgas*, etc., seem to be demi-gods rather than demons.

The *vyantaras* include demons, goblins, ghosts, and spirits, who live on, above, or below the earth. They are divided into eight classes, viz. *kinnaras*, *kimpuruṣas*, *mahoragas*, *gandharvas*, *yakṣas*, *rākṣasas*, *bhūtas*, and *piśāchas*, all of which occur almost identically in Hindu mythology. The last four classes contain demons and ghosts, but they are not demoniacal as a whole. There are even among the *rākṣasas* good ones, adorers of the *tīrthakaras*, who may take *dīkṣā*, etc. In narratives the demoniacal character is usually indicated by an epithet, e.g. *duṣṭa-vyantara*. Generally speaking, the notions of the Jains on demons, ghosts, etc., are very much the same as those of the other Hindus; but the position of the superhuman beings has been, in many regards, altered by the efforts of the Jains to introduce systematical order into the mythological conceptions current at the time when their religious teachings were reduced to a definite form.

LITERATURE.—Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra*, chs. 3 and 4 (tr. *ZDMG* lx. [1906] 309 ff.); Vinayavijaya's *Lokaprakaśa*, 1906, 9th and 10th sargas.

H. JACOBI.

DEMONS AND SPIRITS (Japanese).—1. **Ghosts.**—'The difficulty,' says a Japanese writer, 'of collecting materials for an article about ghosts is that there are so many of them.' Ghosts and ghost-stories are too numerous to admit of tabulation or classification. There are certain traditional forms which they are supposed to assume. They are mostly of the female sex, are clad in white flowing robes which conceal the

absence of legs, and dishevelled hair hangs loosely over their shoulders. As a rule they are supposed to bear some resemblance to the living original, but this is not invariably the case. The ghosts of the wicked bear on themselves the marks of the punishments they are enduring in the invisible world: they appear with one eye, or three eyes, with a long tongue protruding beyond their lips, or with a long flexible neck like that of a serpent. These corporeal peculiarities are supposed to be the results of the *karma* of a previous existence. The Japanese ghost is not generally malicious: there are times, however, when he can exhibit an amazing amount of perverse and wicked ingenuity.

Dr. T. Inouye, who has devoted much thought to the question of ghosts, summarizes their appearances as follows. (1) They are commonly seen in the twilight or at dead of night when everything is black and indistinct. They appear, (2) as a rule, in lonely or solitary places; or (3) in houses recently visited by death, or that have long been deserted, in shrines, temples, graveyards, or among the shadows of willow-trees. It is very rarely that a ghost appears to a group of persons; apparitions are mostly vouchsafed to single individuals, and especially to persons out of health, feeble in body and mind, deficient in knowledge, and impressionable. There is nothing specially new in Inouye's conclusions: they are given here to show that the Japanese ghost is very much what the ghost is supposed to be elsewhere.

2. Warnings of approaching death.—It is common among temple folk in Japan to say that at the moment of death the soul will often go to the temple to give notice of its death. On such occasions, a jingling or rattling sound is heard by the temple-gate or in the main hall of worship, and it is held that whenever these sounds are heard they are invariably followed by the announcement that a parishioner, male or female, has died. The man from whom the present writer obtained his information warned him that these stories must not be looked upon as mere idle tales. The thing is of constant occurrence, now as in the past. Two stories from *Tōno Monogatari* will illustrate this point.

A certain rich parishioner of a temple in the township of Tōno, in the province of Rikuchū, had long been confined to his bed with a disease which was known to be incurable. One day, however, the incumbent of the temple was surprised to receive a visit from the sick man, who was welcomed with the greatest cordiality, and regaled with tea and cakes. After a long and pleasant conversation, the visitor rose to take his leave. A novice followed him to the front gate. The old man, passing through it, turned suddenly to the right and disappeared mysteriously from sight. The servitors in the temple were in the meantime making the discovery that the cakes had been left untouched and the tea spilled on the mats. Several persons afterwards asserted that they had seen the old gentleman walking mysteriously down the street. The man died that evening, and the family maintained that he had been lying unconscious on his bed all day. The spilling of the tea is characteristic of many of these stories: it seems to be the proper thing for the Japanese ghosts to do.

Another very pretty story comes from the lonely mountain village of Shimo Niigawa, on the banks of the Karobe in Etchiu. The wife of a carrier, living with her husband and son, near to a mineral spring, fell into the river, as she was returning after dark on a moonless night from the spring, and was drowned. Husband and son were awaiting her return at home, very anxious because of the lateness of the hour. Finally, they concluded that, owing to the darkness, she had decided to stay the night somewhere, and would return the next morning. As the boy lay dozing on his bed he was awakened by something tugging at his hand. Seeing nothing, he went to sleep again. But the tug at his hand came again, and the touch was like that of his mother's hand. Then he called his father, and, striking a light, found that the place upon which the strange fingers had closed was covered with blood. The next morning his mother's dead body was found among the rocks in the river bed. The palm of her hand was all torn and bleeding. Evidently, in her fall, she had made a wild grab at some stone or tree, and injured it.

3. The limbs of a ghost.—While the common ghost, and especially the stage-ghost, is generally conceived as a head and shoulders ending off in vague draperies, the following story of the Haunted House of Yotsuya will show that underneath the vague draperies a real man is supposed to exist.

The house in this story was haunted by a troublesome and noisy ghost who allowed the inmates no rest at night. The landlord could find no tenant though the rent was ridiculously low. At last a man, tempted by the cheap rent asked for the otherwise desirable residence, determined to face the ghost and lay him if possible. He shut himself into the house at night and awaited the ghost's arrival. At the wonted hour he came. He was not, however, a terrible ghost at all. When he found that the man showed no disposition to run away he became quite gentle and opened his grief. In the days of his flesh he had been a fighting man, and had had the misfortune to lose his leg as the result of one of his battles. The severed limb lay buried beneath the house, and a one-legged ghost in the realm of the spirits was an object of ridicule. He had long haunted the house for the purpose of recovering his lost limb, but unfortunately he had never yet succeeded in persuading any mortal to listen to his plaint. The man promised to give his assistance, and, instructed by the ghost, proceeded to dig at a certain spot beneath the house. Presently, there arose from the hole a misty shape, a fleecy cloud, in appearance like the leg of a man which drifted off, and joined itself to the body of the ghost. 'Thank you,' said the happy ghost, 'I am satisfied now.' And he ceased to haunt the house. The story shows that the Japanese ghost is thought of as being the exact spiritual counterpart of the material man.

4. Ghostly counterparts of material objects.—The Japanese ghost rarely (if ever) appears naked. He appears sometimes in his grave-clothes, but very frequently in the ghostly counterparts of the clothes which he habitually wore in his material life. He often has a spiritual sword, and has been known in stories to commit murder, *e.g.* strangling, with the ghostly counterparts of material objects, such as a rope or a piece of tough paper.

A Kyōto story, dating from the Kyōhō era (A.D. 1716–1735), tells of a murdered woman who was buried along with her new-born infant, the latter not being truly dead at the time of interment. Prompted by maternal instinct, the ghost of the woman escaped from the tomb and went into the city to buy food for her infant. Two or three times she appeared at a certain shop and purchased some rice-jelly. On each occasion she was served by a different member of the family—by an apprentice, by the mistress, and finally by the master. The sadness of her face impressed itself on the memory of each, and each had a distinct recollection of having seen the woman take out of her purse the proper sum of money and lay it down on the mat before her. In each case, when, after the departure of the woman, they went to take up the money, it had disappeared and could nowhere be found.

It is evident that the Japanese ghost is thought of as surrounded by ghostly counterparts of all the objects that surround him in this world—in other words, there is, in the Japanese mind, a spiritual world which is the exact counterpart of the material world in which we live.

5. Close connexion between the two worlds.—These two worlds are looked upon as being very closely connected. The spiritual world lies as near to the material, and is as closely interwoven with it, as the spirit of man is with his body. The link of connexion is never broken, and the Japanese ghost feels the same keen interest in the welfare of his family, province, or country that he felt when alive.

There are many stories to illustrate this: for example, one recently published by Viscount Tani in the *Kokumin Shimbun*, of a certain Hamada Rokunojō, a *samurai* of the Tosa clan, who, having been beheaded (A.D. 1674) with his whole family on account of embezzlement of provincial funds, appeared to his judge on the day following the execution, to relieve himself of an important message which oppressed his mind. In many stories, the constant persecutions of a stepmother worry her hated stepson into a monastery, where he can have no further influence over the family finances. A pious priest of Hieizan, who had spent many years in the continuous recitation of the Hoke Kyō, edifies (or annoys?) the community by continuing the same practice in the darkness of the tomb. The ghost of a murdered man gives no rest to judges, councillors, or kinsfolk, until he has secured the acquittal of a wrongfully accused person and the arrest of his own guilty brother.

These are but a few instances out of the many ghost stories with which Japanese literature and folk-lore abound. Whether the tales are true or not does not matter. The important thing is that they all illustrate the constant belief of the

Japanese in the reality of the spirit world, and in the constant and close interest which its denizens take in the concerns of men.

6. Effects of this belief on conduct.—'Are you not ashamed,' says a kind-hearted husband, in one of Tokutomi's novels, to his spiteful wife,—'are you not ashamed to stand before the family *ihai* [tablets of the dead], when you have been treating your own brother's child with such cruelty?' There can be no doubt that the belief in the continued interest taken by the dead in the concerns of the world they have left behind them has exerted in the past, and still exerts, a great influence on the moral conduct of the individual Japanese. The influence is fostered by the presence on the domestic shrine of the tablets of the dead, by the observances on death-days and other anniversaries of the dead, by the ceremonies, joyous and otherwise, of the Urabon Festival, by the many lustrations of the Shinto rites, and by the practice, observed in private households as in the great affairs of State, of announcing to the spirits of the deceased, as matters that must touch them closely, any events of importance that have taken place in the family circle or the country. When the second Tokugawa Shōgun, Hidetada, wished to change the succession in his family, he was only dissuaded from his designs by the consideration of the fact that he would have to notify the change by some messenger sent expressly to the realms of the dead. Imperial messengers are constantly being sent to announce some event to the spirits of the Imperial Ancestors, and the Shōkonsha shrines which, during the present reign, have been erected in Tokyo and elsewhere, to the memory of the patriot dead who have died for sovereign or country during the Meiji period, represent the enlargement by design of an old belief that has always been present in Japan under one form or another. The spiritual world of the Japanese is no longer bounded by the narrow limits of the province. Like their patriotism, it has become Imperial: for what lies outside the bounds of the Empire the Japanese have but little concern.

7. The spirits of material objects.—The Japanese ghost differs from ours in conception. It is not, as with us, just the spiritual *portion* of a man, separated at death from the body. It is the *whole man* spiritualized, the exact, immaterial counterpart of the material man. Every material object (*e.g.* money, as we saw above) has this spiritual counterpart, and there has from the earliest times been a tendency to personify the spiritual counterparts of material objects, especially things remarkable for beauty, majesty, age, and the like. We hear occasionally of the ghost of a teapot, a badger, or the like; the poetic imagination of the Japanese has peopled her wilds with gods or spirits of the mountain, the cascade, the tree, the well, the river, the moon, and above all, the sun. The indigenous Japanese cult is threefold. It is nature-worship, ancestor-worship, and, as a corollary to the latter, ruler-worship.

8. The spirits of animals.—If man has a spiritual counterpart to his material self capable of leaving the latter and of continuing its existence apart, and if the same can be said of plants, mountains, and other inanimate bodies, it stands to reason that the same qualities ought, logically, to be attributed to the animals. All animals are, in Japanese popular thought, thus endowed with spiritual counterparts, and some more conspicuously than others. Foxes, badgers, bears, and the like are able not only to appear before the eye in the spiritual counterpart of their own material shape, but even to enter into the bodies of men and other animals, and to speak and act through them.

The fox.—The fox is the hero of a thousand stories. He has, *e.g.*, been known to change himself into a tree. In a legend from Nara we read of a Shinto priest from the Kasuga shrine who, having lost his horse, went into the forest to search for it. He was astonished to see a giant cryptomeria in a place where none had stood only a few days before, and, in order to make sure that he was not being bewitched, discharged his arrow against the tree. The next day the tree had disappeared, but on the place where it had stood there was a poor little dead fox with an arrow through its heart. Again, the fox has been known to turn into a woman, not only as a temporary disguise, but permanently; and there is a popular play known as the *Shinoda no mori*, or 'Forest of Shinoda,' which turns entirely on the supposed marriage of a man with a vixen who had assumed the form of a young woman. The plot has an extremely sad and tragic dénouement. The story of the midwife who was tricked by a fox into assisting at the accouchement of his wife is also a favourite one which may be found in many districts.

The cult of the fox, whilst probably indigenous to Japan, is also found in China, and many of the fox-legends are probably importations. When the fox can find a human skull, and put it on its head, and then worship Myōken, the polar star, it obtains its power of assuming the human form. It is very fond of assuming the shape of a beautiful maiden, and chooses the twilight for the exercise of its witchery. The witchery of a fox is rarely of a malicious kind. It has indeed been known to deal swift and sharp retribution to men for acts of injustice and cruelty, but it is, as a rule, mischievous rather than spiteful, and there are not a few instances in which the fox has shown great gratitude. There are no stories which tell of the fox requiting good with evil; but it never omits to requite evil with evil.

A story from Kai tells of a *samurai* who shot at a fox with intent to kill. He missed his aim, but the fox did not forget the hostile intention, and when the *samurai* got home he found his house on fire. On the other hand, a story from Ōmi tells of the gratitude of the fox to whom the priests had shown kindness; and the great Nichiren, who had a very tender heart for animals, was said to have two familiar and attendant foxes who accompanied him everywhere, predicting the future, and warning him of coming dangers. A story is also told of a certain Yasumichi, who held the office of Dainagon and resided at Takakura, near Kyōto. The grounds surrounding his mansion were so full of foxes that they became a nuisance to the neighbourhood, and Yasumichi was minded to get rid of them. He appointed a day for a great fox-hunt; but, on the evening before, a fox appeared to him in the shape of a handsome boy, and, in the name of the whole tribe, promised the best of behaviour if only Yasumichi would spare them. Yasumichi did so, and never repented of the bargain.

For further stories relating to the power of metamorphosis ascribed to the fox, as well as for similar stories relating to other animals, the reader is referred to M. W. de Visser's excellent treatises on the 'Tengu,' the 'Fox and Badger,' and the 'Cat and Dog,' in Japanese folk-lore, appearing in vols. xxxvi. and xxxvii. of the *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan*.

9. Possession by foxes and other animals.—What we have hitherto said has related to the supposed power of the fox and certain other animals of bewitching men by assuming phantom bodies. In fox-possession, the spirit of the animal intrudes itself into the body of a man or woman, in such a way that the intruding spirit exercises a control, more or less absolute, over the person in whose body it resides. This power is ascribed not only to the fox, but to the dog, the monkey, the badger, and the serpent. Strange to say, these beliefs are more prevalent in Kyūshū and S.W. Japan than in the North and North-eastern districts, and it seems not unnatural to ascribe them to Malay rather than to Chinese or Mongolian influences. The following is a list of the names commonly given to these forms of possession, together with the localities in which they are said to be especially found:

Name.	Locality.
Kitsune-tsuki, 'fox-possession'	No definite locality.
Nekogami, 'cat-god'	,, ,,
Tanuki-gami, 'badger-god'	,, ,,
Inugami, 'dog-god'	Bitchū, Awa, Tosa, and parts of Kyūshū.

Name.	Locality.
Sarugami, 'monkey-god' . .	Shikoku.
Hebigami, 'serpent-god' . .	Iyo.
Tōbyō (meaning unknown) . .	Bitchū, Bingo.
Hinomisaki ,, ,, . .	,, ,,
[These two are forms of *Kitsune-tsuki*.]	
Ninkō, 'human fox' . . .	Izumo.
Izuna, ,, ,, . . .	Shinano.

[*Oni-tsuki*, or 'demon-possession,' in the strictest sense of the term, and possession by Tengu, are omitted here, as they will be discussed later on. The reader is again recommended to study de Visser's illuminating pages.]

10. Oni.—This is the name given to a certain class of supposed beings of hideous aspect and Herculean strength. They often assume the human form, with the addition of a pair of bull's horns, and a tiger's skin thrown around their loins. These two special symbols denote, so it is said, that they came into the world of men through the *kimon*, or 'spirit-gate,' which, following the arrangement of the Japanese zodiac, is situated in the *ushi-tora* ('bull-tiger') direction (see below).

The word *oni* is said to be of Chinese origin, and to denote 'hidden' or 'secret.' It is therefore connected in idea with the Japanese *kakureru*, 'to go into concealment,' used of the death of eminent persons, and it is thus plain that the primary conception of the *oni* is that they are the spirits of the dead. The oldest purely Japanese term seems to have been *mono* ('the beings,' an euphemism based on the idea of *de mortuis nil nisi bonum*); *arakami*[1] or *araburukami* ('wild spirits'), and *shikome* ('ugly women'), appear to have been used later, and later again we get the word *mononoke* ('spiritual beings'). Many Japanese will say that *mono* or *mononoke* are essentially evil beings, but there seems to be no inherent reason for such a supposition. A still more modern word is *bakemono* ('beings possessed of magical powers'). These words show the beliefs of the Japanese regarding the dead. Death is liberation from the trammels of fleshly existence. The dead, therefore, possessing greater freedom, have larger powers than the living, though their existence is hidden from our eyes. They are the *kishin* or the *kami*, dwelling in the dark regions of *yomi*. But there are many different types of *oni*, and some of them, unable to rest in the dull peace of Elysium, turn to more active employments. In the *Kojiki*, the *yomotsu shikome* drive Izanagi out of Hades; and the *araburukami*, changing himself into a bear, is slain by a celestial thunderbolt discharged by Takemikadzuchi.

11. The oni as modified by Confucianism and Buddhism.—The introduction into Japan of Chinese and Indian influences brought with it certain modifications of the *oni*. The *Kojiki* itself is a book largely influenced by China; it is, therefore, possible that the idea of the *yomotsu shikome* may not be a purely Japanese one. To Buddhism is certainly due the idea which makes of the *oni* the attendants of the god of Hell, Yama. In a story in the *Ujijūi Monogatari* they appear as fairies, amidst surroundings which are almost German.

An old woodcutter, who has a large wen upon his right cheek, is overtaken by a storm and compelled to pass the night in a hollow tree. Unintentionally, he becomes a spectator of the revels of the *oni*, who dance around his tree. The old man, who is a good dancer himself, joins in the dance, and, after a very delightful night, promises to come again to his new-made friends. The *oni* are a little doubtful as to his sincerity, and take the wen off his right cheek as a pledge. When he returns, he becomes an object of envy to his neighbour, who is also a woodcutter, and who has also a wen, but on his left cheek. The neighbour determines that he will also try his luck, and takes his place in the hollow tree to wait for the *oni* dance to commence. But he is not a good dancer, and the *oni* lose their tempers. They drive him out of the dance ring, and, as he flees, one of them takes the wen which they had taken from his predecessor and throws it at his right cheek, where it sticks. Thus the man returns home with a wen on either cheek.

Some of the tricks ascribed to the *oni*, such as the stealing of a lute belonging to the Emperor Murakami (A.D. 947–968), which is afterwards mysteriously lowered by invisible hands from a high tower, and so restored, seem to suggest a credulity that was easily imposed upon. When a woman disappeared from a public park in Kyōto, being last seen walking hand in hand with a man, and when a search made for her resulted only in the discovery of a pair of arms and a leg, the police of the period (A.D. 885–889) were probably very glad to be able to plead that it was the work of the *oni*. An oil-pot, rolling of its own accord along the streets, and entering a house, where it kills a young girl, ought to satisfy the most exacting of spiritualistic séances.

12. The word oni as applied to living persons.—Whilst *oni* corresponds roughly to the *ki* of Confucianism, or to the *gaki*, or inhabitants of the Buddhist Prêtaloka, it is also sometimes metaphorically applied to living people. Thus we get *oni-musha*, 'a fierce warrior'; *oni-shōgun*, 'a daring general'; *oni-kage*, 'a spirited horse.' A beautiful but hard-hearted woman is an *oni*, an ugly, evil face is *oni-zura*, and there is a phrase, *oni no jūhachi*, which suggests that the devil was a handsome enough fellow in his youth.

13. Adaptations of Indian stories.—The Japanese *oni* is sometimes conceived of as playing the part of Māra, the Tempter, who so constantly comes between Buddha and his disciples, and who is the enemy of truth. More frequently he is the Yakṣa or Rākṣasa of Indian demonology. It has been conjectured that the *Onigashima* of the popular Japanese story is the Yakṣadvīpa of the Jātakas. In the same story, the *onitaiji*, or attack on the demons, is said to be an adaptation of Rāma's invasion of Ceylon, as given in the Mahābhārata.

14. Tengu.—We now come to the consideration of the mysterious beings known as *tengu*. The popular explanation of this term is 'heavenly dog'; but the word also appears as *tenko*, 'heavenly fox,' and *tenkō*, 'heavenly light.' The Buddhist explanation of the word *tengu* is 'light and darkness,' 'freedom and non-freedom,' 'enlightenment and error.' Thus considered, the *tengu* is a being in whom are united both sides of these antitheses. A similar interpretation makes *ten* to be the heavenly *mantra* which dominates the Vajradhātu, or Diamond World, and *gu* to be the earthly *mantra* which rules in the Garbhadhātu, or Womb World. The *tengu* participates in the nature of both worlds.

Shintoist and Confucianist writers, Baron Tsuda, for example, do not hesitate to denounce the *tengu* as nothing but figments invented by a crafty priesthood for the purpose of deceiving an ignorant people. It is, nevertheless, interesting to speculate on the sources from which the conception of these fabled creatures came. The *tengu* is frequently found in Chinese literature, and it may perhaps be said that the idea of these beings came from a close observation of animals in their native haunts. The Buddhist monks of old generally built their temples in the recesses of solitary mountains, and one of the commonest of the titles bestowed on the founder of a temple or sect is that of *kaisan-shōnin*, 'the venerable opener of the mountain.' Japanese legend connects all the great *kaisan*, e.g. Saichō, Kōbō, Nichiren, etc., with stories of the *tengu*, and the favourite haunts of these creatures are famous temples, such as Hiyei, Kurama, Atago, Kompira, Ōmine, Ontake, Ōyama, Miyōgi, Akiha, and Nikkō. The frolicsome antics of animals who believe themselves to be absolutely unobserved by human eyes might easily give birth to legends of

[1] In the days of the anti-Christian persecutions, Christian emblems and books were occasionally saved from desecration or destruction by being shut up in shrines dedicated to supposed *arakami*, where they were safe, owing to the superstitious fears of the people. The present writer has been told of a crucifix which was thus treated; also of a copy of the Christian Scriptures.

tengu and other weird beings. There would also be ground for imagining that some of the staider of the brute creation were re-incarnations of *yamabushi* and other pious recluses.

15. Garuḍa.—Undoubtedly the *tengu* are connected with the Garuḍa of Buddhist mythology. *Tengu* will appear as priests, riding on foxes, carrying feather fans, or even swords like *samurai*; but their commonest form is that of a bird of prey not unlike an eagle or a vulture.[1] It is a safe generalization to make, that, whenever a *tengu* is represented with the beak and claws of a bird, or with wings to fly with, the prototype is the Garuḍa. When the *tengu* takes some other form, *e.g.* a shooting star, a white badger, and so forth, the original conception is to be looked for, not in India, but in China. But, whether Indian or Chinese, the *tengu* are always subject to the sacerdotal power of the Buddhist priesthood. Some have been Buddhist priests before their present incarnation; some become converted as *tengu*, and so procure re-birth as members of the order. They can hypnotize men into seeing many things that have no existence, but their power does not last for more than a week. When the Sabbath Day comes, their power comes to an end.

16. Tengu-possession.—*Tengu*-possession differs in kind from that by *oni*, or any of the bewitching animals. There is no mischief in it, and no devilry. When a man is obsessed by a *tengu*, he merely becomes preternaturally learned or solemn, reading, writing, or fencing with a skill that would not be expected from him.

17. Exorcism.—When a man is possessed by a *tengu*, exorcism is of little importance. For possession by evil spirits, foxes, badgers, and the like, there are many forms of exorcism in vogue, the sect of Nichiren being especially noted for its labours in this kind of healing. The most famous place near Tokyo is at the village of Nakayama, where, at a certain temple belonging to the Nichiren sect, periodical retreats are held for the purpose of driving out evil spirits of all kinds (see an art. on 'Buddhistische Gnadensmittel,' in the *Mitteilungen der deutschen Gesellschaft für Natur- und Völkerkunde Ostasiens* [vol. v., Tokyo, 1907]).

18. Spirits of the house, etc.—Spirits have much to do with the Japanese conception of the house. No building can take place without a reference of some sort to them. But this is a large subject, and will be more conveniently treated in connexion with the house.

LITERATURE.—In addition to the authorities quoted in the text of this article, the present writer has drawn mainly upon three sources, all Japanese:

(i.) The *Journal of the Tokyo Anthropological Society*.

(ii.) *Tsūzoku Bukkyō Shimbun*, a weekly journal published under the auspices of the reforming school of Buddhists, also in Tokyo.

(iii.) *Tō-a no Hikari* ('The Light of the Far East'), the organ of the Tokyo Philosophical Society.

A. LLOYD.

[1] It is to be noticed that there are *ōtengu*, 'big *tengu*,' with red faces and long human noses; there are also *kotengu*, 'small *tengu*,' with beaks. These are also known as *karasut*, 'crow *tengu*.'

DEMONS AND SPIRITS (Jewish).—There can be no hesitation in saying that the existence of spirits was, during most periods of Jewish history and in most places, regarded as incontestable. Yet this statement is capable of being modified in no small degree. It has been stated, on the one hand, that demonology obtained so strong a grasp of the popular mind as completely to fetter it with superstition and to stifle all higher aspirations; that religious teachers and thinkers were themselves not free from these ideas; and that this belief obscured and in many ways detracted from the value of their ethical teachings. On the other hand, this has been too categorically denied by writers who hold diametrically opposite views. As might be expected, the truth lies in the golden mean. The human mind and soul are capable of accommodating simultaneously opinions which are not only inconsistent, but even mutually exclusive. It is just because man does not always trouble to disentangle his thoughts and to harmonize them that he is willing to retain the incongruent. Consequently a whole-hearted belief in the supremacy of the Godhead need not necessarily exclude an acknowledgment of the working of other powers. To arrive at the conclusion that one or the other of these beliefs must be rejected requires considerable progress along the path of mental reasoning.

The belief in spirits during post-Biblical times was a legacy from earlier periods (see esp. the 'Assyr.-Bab.' and 'Hebrew' artt. on the present subject). What Chaldæa, Arabia, and Egypt gave to Canaan underwent substantial change, and received additions from internal and external sources. In Palestine itself, Galilee[1] may be singled out as being the centre where demonology was strongest, but this must not by any means be taken to exclude other parts. Many causes contributed to the diffusion of these ideas. The ever-growing intercourse with the Greek and Roman world, produced by commercial and political circumstances, can scarcely have failed to make the Jews acquainted with many new forms of spirits. The Jews from the Diaspora who re-visited their native land cannot have returned entirely empty-handed, and foreign ideas must have found a fruitful soil in those parts where religious influences were weakest to counteract them. By a people naturally given to syncretism, dryads and satyrs would easily be associated with *shēdîm* and *s^e'irîm*. Moreover, the intercourse between the coastland of Palestine and the Ægean and Cypriote ports must have led to an interchange of ideas as well as of commodities. But, without going so far afield as Greece, there were enough territorial influences at hand to account for many foreign elements in Jewish demonological beliefs and practices.

A complete list of the various forms of demons may be seen in *JE*, art. 'Demonology.' The scope of the present article is to furnish suggestions which may in some cases account for their existence. While frankly admitting the origin of a large number to be purely superstitious, there are yet many for which other explanations must be sought. The area to be considered is immense, and references of great importance occur in all branches of literature—Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha, New Testament and Patristic writings, and Talmudic and Rabbinic works of all ages, including Halakha, Haggada, and Qabbala. On account of this wide area, great care must be exercised in drawing conclusions. Demons occurring in late books must be traced to their earliest sources. An isolated reference in the *Shulḥan 'Arûkh* (1555) requires investigation as to whether it be a mediæval invention or a lingering survival of a primitive superstition. Secondly, references must be examined to see whether they are the utterances of individuals or genuine examples of popular belief; and distinctions must be drawn between local and general beliefs, between Semitic and non-Semitic, and between Jewish beliefs and those borrowed by Jews from their neighbours in European countries. A requirement, more vital than any of the foregoing, is the exercise of careful analysis in selecting Talmudic material. It is absolutely necessary to assign each authority to its proper local and chronological category; that is to say, evidence which applies to Babylon is inadmissible for Palestine; that which is found to occur in Galilee cannot be used to prove argu-

[1] Cf. H. Grätz, *Gesch.*[4], Leipzig, 1888, iii. 282.

ments for Judæa; and the same care must be exercised in respect of chronology.

In investigating Talmudic evidence as to spirits, the reader will notice, at the outset, different attitudes adopted by the Rabbis in dealing with this question. In some cases the reality of demons seems to be taken for granted absolutely; in others it seems, with no less certainty, to be denied. Stories occur in which both these attitudes may be traced simultaneously. The reason for this may be found if the nationality of the respective teachers be sought. It has already been stated that Galilee was the centre of Palestinian demonology, and it will almost invariably be found that *Galilæan* teachers *accepted*, while *Judæan* teachers *rejected*, the existence of spirits. The numerous instances which the NT furnishes would have been impossible save in Galilee; there is a strong similarity between these and those adduced by Galilæan Rabbis. The same must be said of those Rabbis who came from Mesopotamia. As they were brought up in surroundings in which superstition was rife, their teaching was tinged by a belief in spirits, and in comparison with them the clarity of Palestinian teaching stands out in bold relief.

Justin Martyr (*Dial.* i. 85) accuses the Jews of employing amulets and conjurations to no less an extent than the heathen. The evidence of R. Simon b. Yoḥai, a Galilæan Tanna of the 2nd cent., is equally conclusive for Galilee. Thus Bab. *'Erubhin*, 64*b*, states:

'The Master says: "We do not pass by food (which is lying in the street, and which may have been used for protection against spirits)." R. Yoḥanan in the name of R. Simon b. Yoḥai says: "This decision applies only to the earlier generations, when the daughters of Israel were not practised in all arts of magic (פְּרוּצוֹת בִּכְשָׁפִים); but nowadays, when the daughters of Israel are indeed practised in all magical arts, this does not apply. It has been taught that one should pass by loaves, but not small pieces." R. Asi said to R. Ashi: "Do they, then, not use small pieces also for this purpose?"' [Note that none of these Rabbis is a Judæan. Simon b. Yoḥai was a Galilæan, and R. Asi and R. Ashi were Babylonians.]

The difference between Judæa, on the one hand, and Galilee and Babylon, on the other, may be demonstrated by the story related about Zonin and the Palestinian Aqiba in Bab. *'Abōda Zārā*, 55*a*:[1]

'Zonin said to R. Aqiba: "Both of us know that there is no reality in idols, but how is it that we see men going to them lame and returning sound?" He replied: "I will relate to thee a parable. There was once in the city an honest man, with whom all the inhabitants would deposit their money without witnesses. One man, however, would always do so before witnesses. On one occasion he forgot and omitted the witnesses. Then said the wife of the honest man to him, Now we can deny him; but he replied, And indeed since he is foolish, shall we lose our faithfulness?" So also is it with chastisements (*i.e.* diseases). When they are sent upon man, the precise limits of their duration are specified; they are adjured and warned at what moment, by what physician, and by what drug they are to leave the patient. When the time arrives for the diseases to depart, and it happens that the sufferer is at the (heathen) temple, the diseases say: "By rights we should not go, but shall we prove unfaithful to our oath for the sake of a fool?"'

These and similar anecdotes, which are to be found in the same place, show that the Pal. Rabbis placed no reliance in spirits and conjurations. It should be noted that R. Aqiba (A.D. 50–135) says of himself elsewhere (*Sem.* viii.; *M. K.* 21*b*): 'The people of the south know Aqiba, but whence should the people of Galilee know him?' It was in Galilee that the people believed in possession by evil spirits and in the actuality of demons (*e.g.* NT references), whereas in Palestine the views of Aqiba prevailed.

One of the favourite forms of procuring intercourse with spirits was by spending the night in a cemetery. In connexion with this practice, reference should be made to Jer. *Terumoth*, i. fol. 40*a*, outer column, line 29; *Giṭṭin*, vii. beginning, fol. 48*b*, outer column (ed. Krotoschin, 1866), and Bab. *Ḥagiga*, 3*b*, near end. In all these cases invocation of spirits is mentioned: *e.g.* הַמְקַטֵּר לַשֵּׁדִים, he who burns incense to the *shēdîm*, and he who passes the night by the graves in order to enter into communion with an unclean spirit. These customs are strongly condemned, and are viewed as an indication of insanity (*i.e.* one who participates is a שׁוֹטֶה). With these passages may be compared the story in *Levit. Rabba*, xxvi. 5:

R. Berakhya in the name of R. Levi relates that a *kohen* and an Israelite were possessed by a demon and went to a skilled physician, who prescribed for the Israelite, but left the *kohen* neglected. The latter asked the reason, and the physician replied: 'He is an Israelite, and is of those who spend the night at the graves; but thou, who art a *kohen*, dost not act thus, therefore I left thee and prescribed for him.'

This story illustrates the difference between the ignorant and the learned classes; it should be contrasted with the statements of Athenagoras (*Legatio pro Christianis*, chs. xxiv., xxvi., xxvii.), to whom demons were a vivid reality.[1]

Probably the earliest demons are those originating from the movements of celestial bodies and from natural phenomena. To the former, of course, belong Bab. and, later on, Persian examples. Similarly the sand-storm in the desert may be safely held to account for some of the aspects of the Arabic *jinn*. So, too, Ps 91[6] 'the destruction that wasteth at noonday' may not improbably refer to the burning heat of midday. The development of this idea may be found in Bab. *Pesaḥim*, 111*b* ff., where the same word *qeṭebh* occurs.

Inasmuch as the functions of religion were, among the Jews, very wide, the scope of the teacher's activity extended to many branches which would not to-day be considered as belonging to the true sphere of religion. He legislated for social as well as for religious matters; the daily intercourse between man and his neighbour was the object of his attention. Consequently, when there are found quasi-religious references to spirits, in connexions which seem very remote from religion in its modern signification, it must be remembered that the word has been greatly restricted in the process of time. In turning back to those spirits which may perhaps have their origin in natural phenomena, the foregoing must be borne in mind. Thus in *Pesaḥim*, 111*b*, to which reference has been made, the following statement occurs:

'From the first of Tammuz to the sixteenth there can be no doubt as to their actuality; after that date it is doubtful. They may be found in the shadow of ivy which is stunted (not a yard high), and in the morning and evening shadows which are not a yard high, but chiefly they may be found in the shadows of a privy.'

The Gemara does not particularize the spirits mentioned in the passage cited, which follows references to many varieties of spirits. There cannot, however, be much doubt that the *qeṭebh m^erîrî*, or spirit of poisonous pestilence, is meant, although the passage might refer generally to *shēdîm*, for this spirit is described a few lines earlier in the Gemara:

'The *qeṭebh m^erîrî* is of two kinds; one comes in the morning, the other in the afternoon. The former is called *qeṭebh m^erîrî*, and causes mealy porridge to ferment (lit., it appears in a vessel of mealy porridge and stirs the spoon). The latter is the pestilence which destroyeth at noonday; it appears like a sieve on the horns of a goat, and it turns like a sieve' (*ib. supra*).

It would not seem a very rash assumption to regard this spirit as the development and personification of midsummer heat. Tammuz is elsewhere stated to be the height of summer, e.g. *Shab.* 53*a*, where a popular proverb is quoted to the effect that even in Tammuz the donkey feels the cold. The fact that attention is drawn to those shadows which afford insufficient protection from the rays of the sun, and the stress laid on the evil effects of proximity to a privy, render this view more prob-

[1] The Gemara is attempting to account for God's tolerating idols and superstitions, and for the fact that spirits do sometimes accomplish cures.

[1] It may be mentioned, incidentally, that the term for possession by a demon is כְּפָה, כְּפָא. The spirits are said to have been created on Friday afternoon before Sabbath; see *Gen. Rabba*, vii. 7; *Pirqe Aboth*, v. 9, where they are included in the category of mythical phenomena.

able; so also does the mention of the action of heat on food and on animals (cf. the danger of sleeping under the rays of the moon [*Pes.* 111*a*, near foot]).

Closely allied to spirits which are embodiments of natural phenomena are those which affect man in his daily life. In the Gemara on the tenth Mishna of *Pesaḥim* many are mentioned. Under the guise of demons, they teach lessons in cleanliness, sobriety, care, and economy. For instance,

'Reš Laqiš says: "Whosoever does one of the following four things risks his life, and his blood is on his own head, namely: he who performs his natural functions between a palm tree and a wall; he who passes between two palm trees; he who drinks borrowed water; he who passes over spilt water, even if his own wife has spilled it in his presence."'

It is unnecessary to show what points underlie these warnings, which are, moreover, still further discussed in the Gemara; but it is well to note that the form of the warning has changed somewhat. The demon is implied, but not actually expressed. Similar instances are the following:

'The Genius (איסרא = Pers. *izad*; so Goldschmidt, in his tr. of Jer., p. 711[1]) of sustenance is called Cleanliness; the Genius of poverty is called Dirt.' R. Papa says: 'A man should not enter a house in which there is a cat, barefooted. Why? Because a cat kills and devours serpents, and serpents have small bones; should one of these bones enter his foot, it could not be dislodged and would become dangerous. Others say that a man should not enter a house in which there is no cat, by night. Why? Because a serpent could, unknown to him, become attached to him.'[1]

One of the peculiarities of the Hebrew language, as compared with Greek, is its paucity of abstract nouns. Although Aramaic, especially that dialect in which the Talmud is composed, has a far larger vocabulary than Mishnic Hebrew, yet it cannot be denied that the mind of the Jew preferred nouns of a concrete meaning. This fact deserves recognition when considering demonology. The vocabulary contained no word which could adequately render such terms as 'dirt,' 'infection,' 'hygiene,' etc., and in dealing with scientific terms it was, and is still, a matter of extreme difficulty to find suitable translations. This fact will be evident to any one who attempts to render into classical or even Mishnic Hebrew a piece of philosophical prose which could be turned into classical Greek with facility. Consequently the personification of a quality is sometimes to be disregarded, and the underlying principle must be extracted. It might be urged that the Greek no less than the Hebrew people had its demons; but other circumstances, which will readily suggest themselves, have to be taken into account. Instances of this kind are the following:

In *Yoma*, 77*b*, reference is made to the demon שִׁיבְתָא, whose name also occurs in *Ta'anith*, 20*b*, where the kind actions of R. Huna are enumerated. *Shibtā* clings to the finger-tips and afflicts people, especially young children, who eat with unwashed hands. R. Huna was acquainted with this demon, and used to place a jar of water ready, saying, 'Whosoever wishes, let him come and wash his hands so as to avoid the danger from the *Shibtā*.' Kohler (*JE*, art. 'Demonology,' p. 517, foot) associates *Shibtā* with croup. In the same way the *Shulḥan 'Arûkh* preserves an early reference to the evil spirit which clings to a man's unwashed finger-tips, and urges the necessity of washing them. It is scarcely conceivable that the evil spirit in this case can have any other meaning than dirt—a word for which the Heb. language does not contain an appropriate equivalent.

It is possible that the demon *Lilith* (see Is 34[14]; *'Erubhin*, 18*b*, 100*b*; *Gen. R.* xx.) belongs to this category. Adam is said to have married Lilith in addition to Eve, and filled the world with *shēdim* and demons of every description, which she bore him. Then, seized with jealousy of Eve's children, she attacks and attempts to slay newly-born infants. The story recalls the myth of Latona's anger against the children of Niobe, but perhaps the Lilith idea is a personification of the perils which beset women in child-birth.

Kohler (*loc. cit.*) enumerates many instances of demons of disease; e.g. *ruaḥ ṣerada*, catalepsy; *ruaḥ palga*, headache; *ben nᵉfilim*, epilepsy; *ruaḥ qardeyaqos* (καρδιακός), melancholy; for all of which suitable Heb. equivalents are lacking; it cannot be from pure choice that demonology was called upon to furnish descriptive titles.

There are cases in which demons and spirits are cited as playing pranks of a harmless or even amusing character, comparable to those of fairies and kelpies in folk-lore. The fact that such stories are found in most abstruse portions of the Gemara supports the idea above suggested. Children accompanied the Rabbis and listened to their discussions, and a story of the marvellous and supernatural may have been purposely introduced in order to stimulate wandering wits or as a reward for diligent attention.

On the other hand, it cannot be denied that in many cases the demon is of a purely superstitious nature, e.g. *Berakhoth*, 6*a*:

'It is taught: Abba Benjamin says, "Were mortal eye capable of seeing everything, it would be impossible for any human being to exist on account of the Mazziqim ('Harmers')." Abbaye says, "They are more numerous than we, and surround us as the mounds of earth (thrown up by the plough) surround the furrow." R. Huna says, "Each of us has a thousand on his left, and a myriad on his right." Rabba says, "The jostling at lectures is due to them, weariness of the knees is due to them, the wearing out of the clothes of the Rabbis is due to their rubbing, tottering feet are due to them. Whoever wishes to know them, let him take sifted ashes and strew them round his bed, and in the morning their traces will be seen as of the footprints of a cock. He who wishes to see them must take the after-birth of a black cat, the daughter of a black cat, the firstborn of a firstborn; let him burn it with fire, pound it up, and smear his eyes therewith; then he will see them. Let him cast them into an iron tube and seal them with an iron seal-ring, lest they steal aught. Let him keep his mouth (perhaps the mouth of the tube) closed, lest he be injured. R. Bibi b. Abbaye did this, but he suffered injury; so the Rabbis prayed for him, and he was cured."'

This extract contains both the playful and the superstitious elements, but it is very hard to observe the distinction. It is also a matter of no small difficulty to determine how far the belief in demons was actual or superficial, or, if actual, whether good, innocuous, or definitely harmful. It is to be regarded as an evil thing for a man to regulate his conduct by his belief in spirits, but great objection cannot be raised to a bare acknowledgment of their existence. A child's life would be empty without fairy stories; even to-day the personification of the spirit of Christmas festivity receives good-natured toleration. Religious thinkers belonging to most heterogeneous schools of thought accept angelology and demonology as a necessary concomitant of religion. The presence of both is essential to that mystic element from which no religion is or should be entirely divorced. But the force of the imaginative faculty becomes baneful when it invades the sphere of reason and subverts reason itself. It is almost impossible to establish a hard and fast rule in these cases.

The demonology of the Qabbala, and also of the later Rabbinic writings, is extremely interesting. Many beautiful *Minhagim* of Jewish ceremonial are derived from Qabbala, which assumes a mystic connexion between things terrestrial and celestial, and symbolically identifies the form with the matter.

The prayer at the blowing of the ram's horn on New Year's day makes the notes of the *shōfar* into angels ascending to the Divine Throne, while inability to blow the *shōfar* is due to the *yēṣer ha-rā'* ('evil inclination, lust') which intercepts man's holy thoughts and robs him of *kāwwānāh* ('devotion') and ability to produce a note. So, too, on Friday night, when a man returns from the synagogue to his home, which is prepared to receive the Sabbath bride in peace and love, two good angels accompany him and bless him, while the evil angel is constrained to say Amen. But, if the man's thoughts are not properly attuned, and if the reception of the bride is neglected, the good angels sorrowfully depart and the evil angel prevails.

In such cases the spirits are to be explained as graphic representations of the frame of mind of the man, poetically expressed, and with these the δαίμων of Socrates may be compared; it is in such circumstances undoubtedly that the prophylactics suggested by the Rabbis were meant to apply. The recital of verses of Scripture, especially of the

[1] In this case, although the demon has become completely rationalized, the warning is addressed to a man's common sense, and not to his fear of the supernatural. Yet it must be borne in mind that Papa, a Bab. Amora (A.D. 300–375), was noted for his belief in demons. Cf. especially the יהי רצון recited at the end of a *massekhta*.

Psalms, and the observance of *tᵉphillin*, *mᵉzûzā*, and *ṣîṣith*, were intended to prove a balm to a troubled mind, and to divert distraught fancies, but not to have a therapeutic effect on the body.[1]

Nevertheless, the belief among mediæval Rabbis as to the actuality of spirits seems to have been real. Maimonides and Ibn Ezra form very striking exceptions (cf. Ibn Ezra on Lv 17^7, and contrast Naḥmanides quoted by Kohler, *loc. cit.*; cf. also Rashi on Dt 32^{24} and Job 5^{17}).

Summary.—(1) Belief in the existence of spirits cannot be denied, but (2) it was largely limited to Galilee and Babylonia. Palestine, on the whole, was free from it, and (3) in some cases other explanations must be sought: (*a*) natural phenomena, (*b*) absence of terms for abstract nouns, (*c*) the occasional root of social and other precepts in man's fondness for the supernatural, (*d*) playful spirits and fairy stories, and (*e*) the action of mysticism on the pious mind. (4) It is difficult to estimate the extent to which credence was given to the actuality of spirits and to which this belief influenced personal conduct.

LITERATURE.—M. Grünbaum, *Neue Beiträge zur semitischen Sagenkunde*, Leyden, 1893; L. Blau, *Altjüd. Zauberwesen*, Strassburg, 1898; K. Kobler, art. 'Demonology,' in *JE* iv. 514. A. Kohut, *Angelologie und Dämonologie in ihrer Abhängigheit vom Parsismus* (1896), is the chief work. Talmudic references may be consulted in Rodkinson's tr. (New York, 1901), or preferably in L. Goldschmidt (text and tr., Berlin, 1897).

HERBERT LOEWE.

DEMONS AND SPIRITS (Muslim).—Besides the gods to whom they devoted a regular cult, the ancient Arabs recognized a series of inferior spirits, whom they conciliated or conjured by magical practices. In this matter, as in others, Muhammad preserved the ancient beliefs by adapting them to the new religion, in such a way that it is impossible to distinguish which elements in his teaching are sprung from his inward conviction and which are simply a concession to the doctrine of his compatriots. To these notions—Muhammad's inheritance, so to speak—are added outside elements, Jewish and Christian, themselves derived from Chaldæa and Parsiism. It seems impossible to give a precise account of the doctrine of the Qur'ān on the subject of spirits, for even the very earliest commentators are hedged around with innumerable traditions, which it is anything but easy to criticize. It may be said, however, that the Qur'ān traces out all the main divisions of the system: angels, servants of Allah; Satan and his horde who animate the images of false gods; lastly, the *jinn*, some of whom are believers, some unbelievers. If it indicates the existence of several categories of angels, it nevertheless names only two, viz. Jabrīl and Mikā'īl; for Hārūt and Mārūt are fallen angels with a Satanic rôle.

However, just as Judaism, under the influence of the Qabbala, multiplied its list of spirits, and Christianity set up in battle array its armies of angels and demons, Islām also found in this belief and in the magic struggle for the favour, or against the attacks, of spirits an element of reaction against the cold, aloof unity of Allah. From Judaism and Christianity Islām learned the names of spirits not known before, and it gave them definite forms, in descriptions which grew in bulk during the favourable stages of anthropomorphism and the *haushiya*, and then gained in coherence under the influence of Mu'tazilitism. This doctrine we shall discuss in a few lines.

Islām recognizes three classes of living beings higher than man: angels (*malak*, plur. *malā'ika*); demons (*shaiṭān*, plur. *shayāṭīn*); and *jinn*. The essential and common characteristic of these beings is that they are formed from one single substance, instead of from a combination of substances like the human body.

[1] Compare *Sanh.* x. 1, where incantations over wounds are forbidden. He who practises these has no share in the world to come, for he has doubted God's omnipotence.

Among these spirits, the front rank is occupied by the angels; they are Allah's bodyguard, and do his will and obey his word. According to Kazwīnī (i. 55), 'the angels are beings formed from a single substance, endowed with life, speech, and reason.' Authorities are not agreed as to the characteristics that distinguish them from demons and *jinn*; according to some, they differ in their very nature, just as one species of terrestrial animal differs from another; others are of opinion that the difference is only in contingencies, or relativities, such as are contained in the notions of complete and incomplete, good and bad, etc. The angels are essentially sacred, untouched by the guilt of passion or the stains of anger. They are in constant attendance upon the commands of Allah. Their food is *tasbīḥ* (the recitation of the formula 'Glory to Allah!'), and their drink is *taqdīs* ('Allah is holy!'). Their occupation is to repeat the name of Allah, and all their joy is in his worship. Allah created them and gave them diverse forms, that they might fulfil his commands and people the heavens. The prophet said: 'The heavens crack, and cannot but crack, for there is not a hand's-breadth of space to be found in them without an angel bending or prostrating himself before Allah.'

The Arabic word *malak*, the general word for angel, means 'sent,' and is a Jewish loan-word. It has lost its true form *mal'ak*, which survives, however, in the characteristic form of the plural *malā'ika*. The exact pronunciation was as in pre-Islāmic Arabia, as we know from a verse of Abu Wajra, quoted in the *Lisān al-'Arab* (xii. 386), where it is necessary to the metre. But a certain number of angels had special names, which will be mentioned later on, partly derived from the Qur'ān. It seems useless to quote all the verses of the Book where angels are mentioned; we shall therefore notice only the most interesting.

The greatest of the angels—those honoured by all the others as dearest to their Lord—are the four throne-bearers of Allah (*ḥamalat al-'arsh*), whose number will be doubled on the resurrection day. Their duty is, besides, to praise Allah and implore him on behalf of true believers. Muslim legend gives them the form of the four beings who passed into Christianity with the Apocalypse to symbolize the evangelists: man, bull, eagle, and lion. This legend defines further the relations established by their form between each of them and a class of living beings on earth: the first angel is humanity's intercessor before Allah; the second pleads for domestic animals; the third for birds; and the fourth for savage beasts.

The cherubim (*karūbiyūn*) are angels who are absolutely absorbed in the holiness of Allah; their function is to repeat the *tasbīḥ* ('Glory to Allah!') unfalteringly all day and all night. They seem to inhabit a secluded part of the sky, where they live in peace, far removed from the attacks of the devil, 'Iblīs.

There are four angels who have a distinct personality and are each known by a separate name: Jabrīl (Gabriel), Mīkā'īl (Michael), 'Azrā'īl, and 'Isrāfīl. Authorities class these in a special group: these four archangels will be the last to die at the end of the world. Jabrīl (or Jabrā'īl, Jibrīl, and sometimes Jibrīn) is, above all, the angel of revelation (*'amīn al-waḥī*): he was the messenger sent by Allah to the prophets and particularly to Muhammad. His formidable appearance would overawe men, and so he has to appear in disguise to the prophets. Muhammad entreated him to reveal himself to him as he really was, and Jabrīl consented; but, when he appeared,

immense, and covering the whole horizon with his wings, the Prophet fainted away. Even the inhabitants of the sky were alarmed by him. When Allah sent him to deliver the Word to a prophet, they heard a noise like the dragging of chains over rocks, and so terrible that they swooned. When Jabrīl approached them, they recovered their senses, and asked what the Lord had said to him: 'The Truth' (*al-Ḥaqq*), replied the angel, and all repeated: '*Al-Ḥaqq, al-Ḥaqq!*' This function of Jabrīl is explained in Arabic by terms analogous to those mentioned above: he is the 'guardian of holiness' (*ḥāzin al-quds*), the 'faithful spirit' (*ar-rūḥ al-'amīn*), the 'holy spirit' (*ar-rūḥ al-quds*); in which terms we see a borrowing from Christianity. He is also the 'supreme confidant' (*an-nāmūs al-'akbar*), and the 'peacock of the angels' (*ṭā'ūs al-malā'ika*). His rôle, however, is not restricted to the carrying of revelation.

A tradition says that, when the Prophet asked him to reveal all his power, Jabrīl answered: 'On my two wings I bore the country of the people of Loth, and carried it up into the air so high that its inhabitants could no longer hear their cocks crow; then I turned it upside down.'

It is also said that he has assistants who watch over the welfare of the world. Schwab (*Angélol. héb.*, 1897, p. 91) notices some characteristics of his various functions. The most simple descriptions give him six huge wings, each composed of a hundred little ones; he has also two other wings which he uses to destroy rebel cities. But later texts show Jabrīl provided with sixteen hundred wings, and covered with saffron hairs; a sun shines between his eyes, a moon and stars between every two hairs. He enters the Sea of Light (*Baḥr an-Nūr*) three hundred and sixty times every day; and every time he comes out of it a million drops fall from his wings, and form the angels called 'Spiritual' (*Rūḥāniya*), 'because they spread abroad spirit, peace, and perfumes' (*ar-rūḥ w'ar-rāḥa w'ar-rīḥān*). Jabrīl was created five hundred years after Mīkā'īl. He is named three times in the Qur'ān (ii. 91, 92, lxvi. 4); but he also appears under other names (ii. 81, 254, v. 109, where he is the annunciator to Mary; xvi. 104, xxvi. 193, liv. 5, etc.). In ii. 92, Mīkā'īl (in the form Mikāl) is mentioned after Jabrīl, to reply, the commentaries say, to the Jews, who regarded the former as their ally and the latter as their enemy, and gave this as a pretext for rejecting the revelation brought to Muhammad by Jabrīl (Ṭabarī, *Tafsīr*, i. 330).

Mīkā'īl (Michael) is the angel charged with providing food for the body, and knowledge and prudence for the mind. He is the supreme controller of all the forces of Nature. From each of his eyes there fall a thousand tears, from each of which Allah creates an angel with the same form as Michael. Singing praises to Allah until the day of judgment, they watch over the life of the world; these are the *karūbiyūn* (cherubim). Being Michael's assistants, they control the rain, plants, and fruits; every plant on the earth, every tree, every drop of water, is under the care of one of them. The earliest traditions locate Michael in the seventh heaven, on the borders of the Full Sea (*al-Baḥr al-Masjūr*), which is crowded with an innumerable array of angels; Allah alone knows his form and the number of his wings. Later on, however, the descriptions become more precise: his wings are of the colour of green emerald; he is covered with saffron hairs, and each of them contains a million faces and mouths, and as many tongues which, in a million dialects, implore the pardon of Allah; from a million eyes that weep over the sins of the faithful fall the tears from which Allah formed the cherubim. Michael was created five hundred years after 'Isrāfīl. The conception that arises from the representation of the forces of Nature in the form of angels distributed throughout the world is decidedly pantheistic; it was developed in a most curious manner by late Arabic traditions which have been summarized by Kazwīnī (i. 62 f.). As we might have expected, a *ḥadīth* was the origin of this idea:

Around each man appeared a hundred and sixty angels 'flitting round him, like flies around a pot of honey on a summer day'; these are the Agents of Beings (*Maukūlāt al-Kā'ināt*). They are the forces of nutrition, and endow the inert food introduced into the body of man with the power of becoming flesh, bone, and blood. They have to watch that the organism preserves what is necessary to it and gets rid of superfluous matter; that each organ plays its part and not the part of any other. The whole mysterious development of life is thus put into the light fingers of heavenly workmen.

To these we must add still another angel called the Spirit, or the Breath (*ar-Rūḥ*), which may well be only a new form of Jabrīl. To him and to his incarnations Allah entrusted the duty of bringing motion to the heavenly spheres and the stars, and of animating the sublunary bodies and living beings. Just as he can make the heavenly bodies perform their revolutions, he can also stop them in their course—with Allah's permission.

The third of the angels of definite personality is mentioned in the Qur'ān (xxxii. 11) under the name of *malaku 'l-maut*; but tradition calls him 'Azrā'īl.

After Allah created the angel of death, 'Azrā'īl, he kept him hidden for a time from the other angels. When he showed him to them, they all fell into a faint which lasted a thousand years. This terrible being, who plays so important a part in the existence of the world, and who is everywhere at once, is only a passive agent of Allah's will; Allah holds death in his hands. Muslim writers insist on this fact; for it was possible to believe, on the other hand, that the terrible angel of death himself executed the decrees which Allah had inscribed upon the 'Well-guarded Tablet of Destiny' (*al-lūḥ al-maḥfūẓ*); but this is not the case. 'Azrā'īl does nothing without the express command of Allah. He knows nothing but what Allah tells him. He receives from Allah the leaves upon which the names of those who are about to die are written. It is only in details that the traditions differ. According to some, the guardian angel comes and warns 'Azrā'īl that the man under his care is approaching his last moments. The angel of death notes the name of the dying man in his register, with a white mark in the case of a believer, with a black mark in the case of others. But he waits until a leaf falls from the tree that is by the throne of Allah (*'arsh*) with the dying man's name inscribed on it. According to others, this leaf falls from the tree forty days before the death of the man, who is living upon the earth during this interval but dead in the sky. Still another account is that an angel sent by Allah brings to 'Azrā'īl the list of men who are to die during the year: this message no doubt comes to him on the 'night of destiny' (*lailat al-qadar*), which is at the middle of the month Sha'bān, and during which the pious man, rapt in prayer, may see, across a hollow of the sky, the leaf on which his name is written falling from the tree.

All our authorities agree in believing that the angel of death is present wherever a man is ceasing from life, and this presence is anthropomorphized in stories the wide diffusion of which proves its popularity: the story, *e.g.*, of the proud king and the beggar is world-wide (Ṭabarī, Ghazāli, Mūstatref, etc.). Some explain this multiple presence by saying that the angel of death has assistants (*'a'wān*) who make the man's soul rise up to his throat, whence 'Azrā'īl comes and takes it. Others represent the terrible angel in the form of a vague, formidable being, whose feet rest upon

the borders of the world; his head reaches the highest heaven, and his face looks towards the Tablet of Destiny. But this description did not seem satisfying, and writers accordingly give him seventy thousand feet and four thousand wings, while his body is provided with as many eyes and tongues as there are men in the world. Every time a being dies, one of these eyes closes, and at the end of the world only eight eyes will be open, since there will be only eight beings alive—the four archangels and the four throne-bearers. Azrā'īl has four faces, each of which is reserved for a special class of beings: the face on his head is for prophets and angels, that on his chest is for believers, that on his back for unbelievers, and that on his feet for the *jinn*.

The angel of death consigns the souls he has seized to the angels of compassion (*malā'ikat ar-raḥma*) or to the angels of punishment (*malā'ikat al-'adhāb*), according as they are believers or unbelievers; but certain authors say that it is the angels assisting 'Azrā'īl who themselves carry off the soul with gentleness or roughly. It is also said that 'Azrā'īl, with Allah's permission, calls the souls, and they come and place themselves between the two first fingers of his hand. Lastly, according to still others, 'Azrā'īl gathers the believing souls together, with his right hand, in a white silk cloth perfumed with musk, and sends them to the farthest summits of heaven (*al-'aliyyīn*), while the souls of unbelievers are crowded into a rag coated with tar-water and launched into the depths of hell (*as-sijjīn*).

No man can escape 'Azrā'īl; it is impossible to cheat him even by being instantly transported by magical means to the very ends of the earth: 'Azrā'īl is there in an instant. This is seen in the story of Solomon and the young man who was carried to China by his *jinn*; this popular story is found everywhere (Ṭabarī, Ghazāli, Wolff, *The 1001 Nights*, Mūstatref, etc.). The Qur'ān commentators, however, insist on the amicable relations which Solomon vowed with 'Azrā'īl, though he had started by fainting at the sight of the angel in his true shape.

'Isrāfīl is, according to the formula given by Kazwīnī, the angel who brings the orders of Allah to their proper destination, and who puts the soul into the body. He is the angel of whom the Qur'ān speaks without naming him (vi. 73, lxxx. 33, etc.), and who is to sound the trumpet of the last judgment (*ṣūr*). 'The master of the trumpet (*ṣāḥib al-qarn*),' says a *ḥadīth*, 'puts the trumpet to his lips, and, with gaze fixed upon the throne, waits for the command to blow. At the first blast, the blast of terror (*nafḥat al-faz'*), everything will perish in the heavens and on the earth, except what Allah wills,' *i.e.*, according to different opinions, except the eight angels mentioned above, or only the four archangels, who will perish in the following order: Jabrīl, Mīkā'īl, 'Isrāfīl, and, last of all, the angel of death. After forty years passed in *Barzaḥ*, 'Isrāfīl will be re-born and will sound the second blast, the blast of resurrection (*nafḥat al-ba'th*): all the souls, gathered together in the bell of his trumpet, which is as vast as the heavens and the earth, will fly like a swarm of bees to the bodies they are about to animate. While this is the essential function of 'Isrāfīl, it is not his only function. When Allah wishes to give a command to men, he orders the Pen (*qalam*) to write upon the Tablet of Destiny (*lūḥ*). This he gives to 'Isrāfīl, who places it between his eyes, and transmits it to Mīkā'īl. Mīkā'īl gets the command performed by his assistants, who represent, as mentioned above, the forces of Nature. Authors describe 'Isrāfīl under a form borrowed from a *ḥadīth* of 'A'isha, repeating the words of Ka'b al-'Aḥbār, *i.e.* the Jewish tradition. 'Isrāfīl has four wings: with the first he closes up the East; with the second the West; with the third he covers the earth; and with the fourth he veils his face before the Almighty Power of Allah. His feet are under the seventh world, while his head reaches up to the foot of the throne. A late and strange story (Wolff, p. 14) shows him weeping so copiously at the sight of hell that Allah has to stop his tears because they threaten to renew the Flood of Noah.

After a dead man has been placed in the tomb, and his friends have left him, and he has heard the sound of their retreating steps, two formidable angels, Munkar and Nakīr, come and sit by his side, and ask him: 'What say you of this man (*i.e.* Muhammad)?' The believer (*mu'min*) replies: 'I bear witness that he is the prophet of Allah and his servant.' Then the two angels show him the place which he might have occupied in hell, and, on the other hand, the place which he will gain in paradise. The false believer (*munāfiq*) and the unbeliever (*kāfir*) will reply to the same question: 'I do not know; I said what the others said.' Then the two angels will beat him with iron rods so that he will utter a cry which will be heard by men and *jinn*. According to other traditions, the questions will be asked by a special angel, called Rūmān, who, if necessary, will deliver the dead person over to the punishment of the two angels of the tomb. Others, again, say that the angel placed in charge of the departed will question him, and at the sound of his voice the tomb will contract, almost crushing the man dwelling within it, until the first Friday of Rajab. The believer who dies on a Friday is exempt from the questioning at the tomb. The name of these two angels is derived from a root *nakar*, 'to deny'; we here find the parallelism dear to Hebrew traditions, and the presence of the initial M in one of the names—two souvenirs of Parsiism and Ancient Persia.

Man is guarded night and day by the *ḥafaẓa* angels, 'who protect him from *jinn*, men, and Satans,' and who register all his actions. These angels are four in number, two during the day, and two during the night. Some writers admit the existence of a fifth angel, who remains beside men constantly. The two angels stand by the side of the man, one at his right hand and the other at his left, or one in front of him and the other behind; by night they take up their position one at his head and the other at his feet. The day-guardians change places with the night-guardians at the rising and the setting of the sun. These hours are dangerous in themselves, being the times when the *jinn* roam about, but they become much more dangerous to man because it is then that the change of the guard of the *ḥafaẓa* takes place. If the believer makes haste to begin the morning prayer (*ṣubḥ*), and the evening prayer (*maghrib*) at the very earliest opportunity, the angels who have to depart from him leave him safe from the *jinn*, against whom the sacred ceremonies protect him, and ascend to heaven, bearing witness to Allah of the faith of his worshipper. Before he has finished his prayer, the other two guardians come and stand by his sides. But it is not only to the machinations of the *jinn* that man is exposed: 'Iblīs is on the watch for him by day, and his son during the night. This very simple arrangement has also been complicated by the traditionalists of later times. To the four guardians already known they added six others: one of them holds the man by the tuft of hair which Muslims wear on the top of their heads, and drags him one way or the other according as the man shows humility or pride. Another stays in front of his mouth to prevent the serpent from entering it. Two others protect his eyes; and the last two, placed on his lips,

listen only to the words which he pronounces in prayer.

On the *ḥafaẓa* devolves the duty of writing down the actions of men; the one on the right hand keeps an account of the good deeds, and the one on the left of the bad. These registers will be a witness on the judgment day. When the man performs a good deed, the angel on the right hand immediately writes it down; when he commits a sin, the same angel begs his companion not to write it down, but to give the sinner respite—six or seven hours, according to the writers—during which he has time to repent. Some commentators even allow that a compensation may be arranged, and that every good action effaces a bad one. Unbelievers also are said to have guardians (Qur'ān, lxxxvi. 4).

When the *ḥafaẓa* see that the man over whom they had charge has died, they do not know what to do, and they pray to Allah, who tells them to go to the grave of the deceased and repeat the formulæ of adoration (*tasbīḥ*, *takbīr*, *taqdīs*), which, on the judgment day, will be counted among the merits of the deceased.

These angels are mentioned several times in the Qur'ān, into which they have been introduced by Christian tradition. In lxxxii. 11, they are called *kirām kātibīn*, 'noble writers,' indicating their rôle as overseers of human actions; in vi. 61 they are called *ḥafaẓa*; but in xiii. 12 they are at the same time called *mu'aqqibāt*, 'those who relieve each other.' This last expression is puzzling in its form, and the commentators, trying to explain it, say that it is a perfectly logical double plural, and that the second verbal form *'aqqaba* here stands for the third form *'āqaba*. The Qur'ān (l. 17) uses the word *raqīb* to denote the guardian angel of men, and Ṭabarī (*Tafsīr*, xiii. 68, line 16) shows that Qur'ān xiii. 12 was read by 'Alī ben-Ka'b with the following variants: 'he has in front of him *mu'aqqibāt*, and behind him a *raqīb*.' There may be some connexion between these terms and those referring to the two stars which, during the course of the year, appear, one in the East and one in the West, at twilight and at dawn, and the observation of which serves as a foundation for a division of the year into twenty-eight *manāzil* or *'anwā*—a division which is very fruitful in popular practices. The belief in guardian angels, then, over and above Christian traditions, might become connected with an astral cult.

In the crowd of angels who have no special character, certain authors distinguish the 'pious travellers' (*as-sayyāḥūn*) who scour the country with the intention of frequenting only the gatherings where the name of Allah is being repeated. They then ascend to Allah, who questions them, and, on their evidence, pardons his fervent worshippers the faults they may have committed. According to a passage in Ibn al-Athīr (*Lisān al-'Arab*, xii. 386), none of these angels could enter any place in which there was an image or a dog.

We cannot explain the circumstance that has drawn the names of Hārūt and Mārūt from the anonymous crowd of spirits into the broad daylight of the Holy Book (Qur'ān, ii. 97). Traditions have developed rapidly to explain their history, and since the 9th cent. they have been copiously explained by commentators (Ṭabarī, *Tafsīr*, i. 3402).

Two angels having incurred the wrath of Allah have been thrown into a well in the town of Babylon, where, loaded with chains, they will teach mortals the art of magic until the end of the world. In order to punish them, Allah has commanded them to teach this accursed science; but they have to warn those who consult them that they are rebels, and to advise them not to imitate them. According to a *ḥadīth* of 'A'isha, a woman came to her when the prophet was away, and told her that, being uneasy about the absence of her husband, she had consulted a sorceress; carried away at a gallop by two black dogs (one of the ordinary disguises of 'Iblīs), the two women had arrived at the edge of the Babylonian well, where the two fallen angels had put the inquirer in possession of magical powers, from which she was coming to ask the prophet to deliver her.

Who are these two angels, and what was their crime? This is not the place to study in detail the different versions which are prevalent in Arabic literature, or to show how, among the late writers, Kazwīnī, for example, the legend has, under Mu'tazilite influence, been contracted into an account of a more serious kind, but deprived of characteristic details. We shall give here the chief traits of the most fully developed legend, which seems to be the most ancient.

The first men in the world soon gave themselves up to all kinds of debauchery and crime. The angels who looked on at these horrors from the heights of heaven were surprised at the gentleness of Allah. 'Be more tolerant,' he said to them; 'if you were exposed to the passions which agitate men, you would soon commit all their crimes.' The angels protested, and begged Allah to put them to the test; and he consented. They chose two of the most noble and pure among them, Hārūt and Mārūt, who descended to earth. Allah allowed them to live there in their own way, and prohibited them only from polytheism, theft, adultery, wine, and murder. All went well until one day, when a woman came before them; whether by chance or chosen as judges, they had to decide in a quarrel which had arisen between her and her husband. This woman was beautiful; she excited the desire of the two angels. Tradition gives us her name; 'she was called Zaḥara in Arabic, Baidūḫt in Aramaic, and 'Anâhīd in Persian' [*i.e.* Venus]. She set conditions on her favours: according to some, she asked her lovers the word which enabled them to ascend to heaven every day, obtained it, made use of it, and remained attached to the firmament in the form of the planet Venus (Zaḥara), while the two angels remained prisoners on earth for having misused the sacred word. According to other traditions, she commanded them to worship an idol, or she made them drink wine, the intoxication of which led them to murder a beggar who was passing. In any case, Allah called or recalled Venus to the sky, and punished the culprits. On the intercession of Solomon, Idris, or some other good personage, he let them choose between a terrestrial punishment and an everlasting chastisement. They chose the former, and were chained in the well of Bābel, which, according to some, is Babylon of Chaldæa; according to others, a place in Demāvend, famous for its magical traditions. We may mention, as a strange variant of this story, the tradition that the two angels who brought magic to men were Mīkā'īl and Jabrīl.

This legend may have reached Muhammad through Rabbinic traditions, especially according to the version which shows the woman tempter ascending to heaven with the password of the two angels, and remaining there in the form of the planet Venus. Geiger (*Was hat Mohammed a. d. Judenthume aufgenommen?*[2] Leipz. 1902, p. 107 f.) mentions a tradition in which the two angels are called Shamhazi and Azaël (Schwab, p. 209); the daughter of the earth who seduces them is referred to under the name of Aster (='star'; see Schwab on the word 'Biduk'). But we must seek the origin elsewhere; it is in connexion with the cult of Mithra and Anahita that we again come across the names of the two spirits, Haurvatāt and Ameretāt—not to mention the tradition on the Chaldæan origin of magic (cf. vol. i. p. 796[a]).

Paradise and hell are peopled with spirits whose exact description has not been given by any writer. At the entrance to paradise there is sometimes placed an angel called Riḍwān, whose name is probably a rough interpretation of a passage in the Qur'ān (iii. 13). We do not know in what class to place the *houris* (*ḥūr al-'ain*), who are said to share with other women the society of the blessed, and who, shining and pure, are exempt from physical suffering, like all the inhabitants of paradise (Qur'ān, xliv. 54, lii. 20, lv. 56 f., lvi. 22, etc.).

The teaching is much clearer in regard to hell. It is guarded by a terrible angel Mālik, assisted by *sbires* (*zabaniya*), who in their turn have guardians (*ḥafaẓa* or *ḫazanat jahannam*) at their command. These *sbires* are nineteen in number, *i.e.* equal to the number of letters in *bismillāh* (*bismillāhi-r-raḥmani-r-raḥīmi*='in the name of Allah, the Compassionate, the Merciful'). People escape from them by reciting this formula. Mālik stirs up the fire which burns the reprobates, and replies to their complaints with jokes; but he is milder in the case of believers guilty of mortal sins, who, according to the prevailing theory, will one day get free from hell by the intercession of Muhammad. He is mentioned in the Qur'ān (xliii. 77).

We have already seen that 'Iblīs was the wicked angel, who, assisted by his son, tempts mortals

He was cursed for refusing to prostrate himself before Adam, created from clay, when he had been created from fire (Qur'ān, xxxviii. 77 f.). Allah cursed him, calling him 'stoned' (*rajīm*). He has command of the unbelieving *jinn*, who are his agents with men.

The orthodox doctrine, as we have just seen, is very chary of hints as to the names of the spirits. But, in imitation of the Jewish Qabbala and under the influence of conjuration formulæ, the Muslim practice has developed this nomenclature in a peculiar way, as it had commented on the supreme name of Allah in his ninety-nine secondary names. Thus there is formed an interminable list of names of angels in *-'īl*, and of names of *jinn* in *-ūs*, which fill all the works on magic. Without entering into details, it may be useful to recount here a *ḥadīth* which Kazwīnī mentions (i. 59), following 'Ibn 'Abbās:

Each of the seven heavens is inhabited by a group of angels, who are engaged in praising and worshipping Allah. 'Those who inhabit the lower heaven which encircles the earth have the form of cows, and are under the command of an angel called 'Isma'īl; in the second heaven dwell eagles under the angel Miḫā'īl; in the third, vultures under Sā'adiyā'īl; in the fourth, horses under Ṣalṣā'īl; in the fifth, *houris* under Kalkā'īl; in the sixth, young boys under Samaḥā'īl; in the seventh, men under Rūbā'īl.' Lastly, beyond the veil which closes the heaven, angels, so numerous that they do not know each other, praise Allah in different languages which resound like crashing thunder.

In a word, the ancient beliefs of the pagan Arabs have been preserved by peopling the Muslim world with *jinn*, who, for the most part, are the servants of 'Iblīs. See more fully under art. ARABS (ANCIENT), vol. i. p. 669 f. But, under the influence of Judaism and Christianity, the new religion has also acquired an army of angels and demons, whose history cannot be clearly given without touching on the critical study of the *ḥadīths*.

LITERATURE.—F. A. Klein, *The Religion of Islām*, London, 1906, pp. 64–67, 87; T. P. Hughes, *Dictionary of Islam*, London, 1895, *passim*; M. Wolff, *Muhammedanische Eschatologie*, Leipzig, 1872: Kazwini, *Kosmographie*, ed. Wüstenfeldt, 1849, i. 55–63.

GAUDEFROY-DEMOMBYNES.

DEMONS AND SPIRITS (Persian).—Demonology plays a prominent part in the religion of Persia because of the pronounced dualistic tenets of Zoroastrianism. The opposing forces of evil and good are believed to be in constant warfare until the last millennial cycles of the world preceding the day of judgment, when perfected man shall, by the aid of the heavenly hosts, overcome the power of evil (*druj*) for ever, and righteousness (Av. *aša*) shall reign supreme.

The general designation for 'demon' in the Avesta is *daēva*, the same word as the later Persian *dīv*, 'devil,' and it is etymologically identical with Skr. *dēva*, 'deity,' Lat. *dīvus*, 'divine,' although diametrically opposed in meaning. This direct opposition between the Indian and the Persian terms is generally ascribed to a presumed religious schism in pre-historic times between the two branches of the Indo-Iranian community; but there is considerable uncertainty about the interpretation, and the solution of the problem has not been rendered easier by the fact mentioned below—that the names of two Hindu deities who appear as demons in the Zoroastrian system have recently been found in ancient inscriptions discovered in Asia Minor.

As the Avestan word *daēva* is masculine in gender, the demons in Zoroastrianism are commonly conceived to be of the male sex; but there is a large class of she-devils or female fiends, *drujes*, derived in name from the feminine abstract *druj*, lit. 'deceit,' the essence of evil in the Avesta, a word comparable with the neuter *drauga*, 'falsehood,' 'lie,' in the Old Persian inscriptions. Besides these she-demons there are numerous other feminine personifications that embody the elements of sin as much as do their masculine counterparts.

In numbers, according to the Avesta, the hosts of evil are legion (*Yt.* iv. 2). The Gāthās speak of the demons as 'the seed sprung from evil thought, deceit, and presumption' (*Ys.* xxxii. 3), and for that reason they are elsewhere described as being 'the seed of darkness' (*Vend.* viii. 80). Their creator was Ahriman, who brought them forth to wage war against heaven and earth, as is told in the Pahlavi *Bundahišn* (i. 10, xxviii. 1–46); and Plutarch (*de Is. et Osir.* xlvii.) rightly interpreted the spirit of Zoroastrian demonology when he described Ahriman as having caused a number of demons equal in activity to the Divine forces created by Ormazd to bore through (διατρήσαντες) the world-egg in which Ormazd had placed his four-and-twenty 'gods' (θεούς). Zoroaster's mission was to banish these diabolical creatures from the world, and it is easy to understand why the Avesta should picture the entire body of fiends as taking flight in dismay before him (*Ys.* ix. 15).

The demons are naturally thought of as spirits or bodiless agents (Av. *mainyava daēva*, 'spiritual demons' [*Yt.* x. 69, 97; *Vend.* viii. 31, 80]), though sometimes they are conceived of as having human shape (*Ys.* ix. 15) in order to accomplish better their fiendish ends. Their purposes are best achieved under the cover of darkness, but their heinous deeds are checked by the rising of the sun (*Yt.* vi. 3 f.). Their favourite haunt is in proximity to whatever is vile or foul, and they lurk, especially as spooks or goblins, in the vicinity of *dakhmas*, or towers of silence. In certain regions they were believed to be more numerous than in others, the whole province of Mazandaran, south of the Caspian Sea, being supposed to be especially infected by their presence. This legendary association with that territory is as old as the Avesta, and it appears throughout the Pahlavi writings, as well as in the *Shāh Nāmah* of Firdausi (Av. *daēva Māzainya*, Pahl. *Māzanīkān dēvān*, Pers. *dīvān-i Māzandarān*). The same tradition was perpetuated in Manichæism, as is proved by allusions to Mazanian demons in the Manichæan texts lately discovered in Eastern Turkestan (see F. W. K. Müller, 'Handschriftenreste aus Turfan,' ii. 18, 19, *ABAW*, Anhang, 1904). The baneful influence of all these ministers of evil could be averted in various ways, and one of the books of the Avesta, the *Vendīdād* (*Vidaēvadāta*, 'Law against Demons'), is devoted almost entirely to providing man with the means of ridding himself of their power.

As might be imagined, the multitudinous host of evil spirits lacks order and organization. It is, therefore, somewhat difficult to divide them into sharply defined bands, but a rough distinction between the masses may be recognized. At the head of the host stands Aṅra Mainyu, or Ahriman, 'the Enemy Spirit,' the prince of darkness personified. The chief characteristics of Aṅra Mainyu, or Angra Mainyu, as he is termed in the Gāthās, have been discussed in a separate article (see AHRIMAN), and need only to be designated here as maleficent in the extreme. Next in power to Ahriman stand six arch-fiends as eminent commanders of the legions of sin. Then follows a confused horde of wicked spirits framed to bring misery and distress into the world. These two bands in their broad grouping will be considered in turn.

The sixfold group of arch-fiends that are gathered as aides about the standard of Ahriman and form the council of hell (cf. *Yt.* xix. 96; *Dīnk.* ix. 21. 4; *Bd.* xxviii. 7 ff. and xxx. 29) are portrayed in Zoroastrian literature as endowed with various evil

qualities and as discharging multifarious diabolical functions. Their names are Aka Manah (Evil Thought), Indra, Sauru, Nāoṅhaithya (parallel with three Indian deities), Taurvī and Zairicha (personifications respectively of overpowering hunger and deadly thirst), and, lastly, Aēšma, the demon of fury, rapine, lust, and outrage. The fact that three of these demoniacal names are identical with gods in the Indian pantheon has been alluded to above, but their figures on the whole are not really sharply defined, though their malign characters are several times alluded to in the passages which enumerate them (*Vend.* x. 9 f., xix. 43; *Bund.* i. 27, xxviii. 7–12, xxx. 29; *Ep. Mān.* I. x. 9; cf. also *Dāt.* xciv. 2; *Dīnk.* ix. 34). Reference has likewise been made to the fact that in the inscriptions of the Hittite kings of the 14th cent. B.C., recently discovered by Winckler at Boghaz-keui in Asia Minor, the names Indra and Nāsatya—the latter noteworthy by its Indian form (with *s*) in contrast to the Iranian form Nāoṅhaithya (with *h*)—appear as divinities and not as demons. Until the full connexion of the passages in these inscriptions is made known by the discoverer, it appears premature to theorize in regard to the possible bearing of the allusions upon the mooted question of the presumed Indo-Iranian religious schism. The mention may be merely a direct reference to Indian deities without having any immediate connexion with Iran.

Of all the sixfold group of arch-fiends, the most clearly defined is the assaulting and outrageous demon *Aēšma*, whose name has been thought to be reflected as *Asmodæus* in the Book of Tobit (see F. Windischmann, *Zoroastr. Studien*, Berlin, 1863, p. 138; A. Kohut, *Jüd. Angelologie und Dämonologie*, Leipzig, 1866, p. 75; F. Spiegel, *Erân. Alterthumskunde*, Leipzig, 1877, ii. 132; E. Stave, *Einfluss des Parsismus auf das Judentum*, Haarlem, 1898, p. 263; J. H. Moulton, 'The Iranian Background of Tobit,' in *ExpT* xi. [1900] 258; for the opposing view, see Ginzberg, in *JE* ii. 217–220).

By the side of these six arch-demons there are named in the Avesta and supplementary Zoroastrian texts more than fifty other demons, personifications of evil forces in the world (for the complete list, see Jackson, *op. cit. infra*, pp. 659–662). It will suffice to mention a few of these, such as *Tarōmaiti*, 'Arrogance'; *Mithaoxta*, 'False Speech'; *Āzī*, 'Greed' (a demon that is preserved likewise in Manichæism [cf. Müller, *op. cit.* pp. 13, 14, 15, 18, 20, 22, 23, 53]); *Vīzareša*, or the fiend that drags the souls of the wicked to hell; *Būšyāstā*, a typification of inordinate sleep and sloth; *Astō-vīdātu*, who divides the bones at death; *Apaoša*, 'drought'; *Zemaka*, 'winter'; and a score or more of personified malignant forces.

The special cohort of fiends (*drujes*), as already noted, is headed by the *Druj* paramount, or the feminine embodiment of deceit and falsehood, who draws in her train a ribald crew of followers, corporeal and incorporeal, entitled in the Avesta *dregvants*, or *drvants*, 'the wicked.' Foremost among these agents in exercising pernicious activity is the *Druj Nasu* (cf. Gr. νέκυς), 'corpse-fiend,' the veritable incarnation of pollution and contagion arising from the decomposition of a dead body. Of a similar character in the Avesta is *Ithyeja Maršaona* (*Vend.* xix. 1, 43, xviii. 8; *Yt.* vi. 4, xiii. 130), the same as *Sēj* in the Pahlavi texts (*Bund.* xxviii. 26; *Dīnk.* ix. 21. 4, vii. 4. 37), a form of wasting decay and decrepitude that creeps on unseen. Peculiarly malign in her influence is another fiend, *Jahī*, 'harlot' (cf. *Yt.* iii. 9, 12, 16), who embodies the spirit of whoredom destructive to mankind; while little better are the seductive *Pairikās*, 'enchantresses' (the late Persian *Peris*) and their male partners, *Yātus*, 'sorcerers.'

Among demoniacal monsters is *Azhi Dahāka*, 'the Serpent Dahāka,' a tyrant out of whose shoulders grew two snakes from a kiss imprinted between them by Ahriman. Throughout Zoroastrianism this hideous being is represented as the personification of the thousand years of oppressive rule over Iran by the Babylonian Empire in early days; and he appears equally in the derived demonology of Manichæism (cf. Müller, *op. cit.* pp. 19, 37), as well as in Armenia (above, vol. i. p. 800), while his name, with the signification of 'dragon,' is even found in Slavic (Berneker, *Slav. etymolog. Wörterb.*, Heidelberg, 1908 ff., p. 36). A dozen other execrable creatures in the diabolical list might be mentioned as agents of Ahriman in his warfare against the kingdom of Ormazd, but the list is already long enough to prove the important part which demonology played in Zoroastrianism.

It should, however, be noted that there were yet other demons in Zoroastrianism whose names are not found in the extant Iranian literature. Here belong Khrūra, the son of Ahriman (al-Bīrūnī, *Chron. of Ancient Nations*, tr. Sachau, London, 1879, pp. 108, 398), and Mahmi, whom Eznik (*Against the Sects*, tr. J. M. Schmid, Vienna, 1900, p. 109) describes as revealing to Ormazd the secret plans of Ahriman (for the place occupied by Iranian demons in pre-Christian Armenia see above, vol. i. p. 779 f.).

LITERATURE.—For fuller details and more extensive bibliographical material, see **A. V. Williams Jackson**, 'Die iran. Religion,' in Geiger-Kuhn's *GIrP* ii. [Strassburg, 1901] 646–688. For material relating to the discovery in Asia Minor of inscriptions with the names of the Indian deities Indra and Nāsatya, who appear as demons in Zoroastrianism, see **H. Winckler**, in *Mitteilungen der deut. Orientgesellschaft*, 1907, no. 35; and cf. the discussions by **Ed. Meyer**, in Bezzenberger-Kuhn's *Zeitschr. f. vergleich. Sprachwissenschaft*, xlii. [1908] 1–27; **Jacoby**, in *JRAS*, 1909, pp. 721–726, 1910, pp. 456–464; and **Oldenberg**, *ib.* 1910, pp. 846–854. The most recent material in regard to the occurrence of Zoroastrian demons in Manichæan writings will be found in the discoveries made by the German Imperial Expedition at Turfan in Eastern Turkestan (see **F. W. K. Müller**, 'Handschriftenreste in Estrangelo-Schrift aus Turfan,' in *ABAW*, Anhang, 1904, and other later publications now being issued in the same series).

A. V. WILLIAMS JACKSON.

DEMONS AND SPIRITS (Roman).—The Romans and Latins, and the races of Italy who were nearest of kin to them, appear to have possessed but little in the nature of mythology or folklore before they passed under the spell of the Hellenic culture. The early Italic conception of the supernatural power had not much about it that was definite or personal. There was a vague consciousness of a Divine influence (*numen*) which worked in different spheres and with different manifestations; but the allotment of distinct departments to clearly conceived personages, more or less superhuman, and the gradation of these personages to form a hierarchy, were alien to primitive Italic thought and feeling. In the earliest form of belief, only two classes of beings were intermediate between the human and the Divine. These were the souls of the dead, and certain spirits who attended on the lives of individual human beings.

We shall first deal with these attendant spirits, who, when attached to men, bore the name *genius*, and, when they guarded women, had the title of *juno*. These creations are racy of the soil of Italy, and the faith in them was less affected by contact with the Greeks than any other article of indigenous Italic religion. It hardly needs to be said that the history of culture affords innumerable parallels to this notion of an invisible personality, separable from, yet closely attached to, the life of the visible man. The *fravashi* of the Persians and

the *ka* of the Egyptians were not unlike, and the Greeks viewed the *psyche* in a somewhat similar fashion. Even barbarous peoples often abstract from the individual some striking characteristic or characteristics which they contemplate as belonging to a more or less spiritual person distinct from the man himself. Such a concept is the *genius*, and the power which was at first isolated from the man himself by the Italic tribes, and treated by them as mysterious and in some sense supernatural, was the power of propagating the race. This appears clearly in the expression *lectus genialis*, applied to the marriage bed, which was originally always placed in the *atrium* of the old Roman house. The corresponding power in the case of the matron is her *juno*, and the later goddess Juno is merely a generalization and a glorification of the separate *junones*. That no parallel god emerged on the male side is an anomaly of a common kind. In the *genius* were also embodied all faculties of delight, so that phrases such as *indulgere genio*, 'to do one's *genius* a pleasure,' and *defraudare genium*, 'to cheat the *genius* of an enjoyment,' were common. But the intellectual qualities which we denote by the borrowed word 'genius' never specially pertained to this ancient spirit, though *ingenium* lies very close to *genius* by its structure. The *genius* and the *juno* were at first imagined not only to come into existence along with the human beings to whom they were linked, but also to go out of existence with them. Yet they could exercise strong control not only over the fortunes, but over the temperaments of their companions. There was undoubtedly a sort of fatalism connected with the belief in spirits. The Greeks often conceived that a particular *tyche*, or 'fortune,' accompanied the lives of men in a similar manner, and therefore they usually represented *genius* by τύχη. But occasionally δαίμων is viewed exactly in the light of the Roman *genius*. In a well-known passage (*Ep.* II. ii. 188), Horace does not hesitate to call the *genius* a god, though he at the same time declares him to be subject to death. The snake was the common symbol of the *genius* and the *juno*; hence the pairs of snakes which are painted on the walls of many houses at Pompeii. It was not uncommon to keep a tame snake in the dwelling, and the superstitious believed that the *genius* was incorporated in it. Simple altars were erected to the spirit, and offerings were made to him.

In course of time the ideas attached to the *genius* were in many respects changed and expanded. By a sort of logical absurdity, *genii* of the great gods were invented, and shrines were erected to the *genius* of Juppiter and others, while any collection of human beings gathered together, in a city, for instance, or a gild (*collegium*), or a camp, might have its attendant spirit. Thus a *genius publicus* was worshipped at Rome. But the imagination that things or places not connected with men were thus companioned—an imagination involved in such phrases as *genius sacræ annonæ* or *genius loci*—sprang up only in a late age. In the Imperial time, the severance between the Emperor's *genius* and his tangible personality had many notable consequences, and subserved some political purposes. Augustus was able to allow the veneration of his *genius* to become part of the public worship of Rome without flouting Roman prejudice, though he was compelled (officially) to confine the deification of his person to the provinces. When it became customary for oaths to be taken by the Emperor's *genius*, it was possible to introduce a secular punishment for perjury, which had previously been left to the Divine vengeance.

When Eastern religious influences spread over the Western part of the Roman Empire, and new developments in philosophy aided these influences in transforming culture, old ideas concerning the *genius* underwent contamination. The *genius*, which had been supposed to die with the man, was now held to be identical with the soul which survived the body. Hence on the later tombstones this name sometimes describes the spirit of the deceased. Servius, the commentator on Virgil, tells us that the vulgar did not clearly distinguish between *genii*, *lares*, and *manes*. This confusion had been helped by learned speculation from the time of Varro onwards. We must, therefore, now consider Roman and Italic beliefs concerning the state of the dead.

That a cult of the departed existed from primitive times is clear from many indications. The earliest form of the Roman calendar notes several purificatory ceremonies for the appeasement of the ghostly world. The vanished spirits were not without an influence over the living which was to be dreaded. The month of February took its name from one of the deprecatory observances (*Februa*). Each family in the community had its special concern with the ritual. The ghosts were supposed to approach some openings in the earth, to which the name *mundus* was given. Such was the spot called *Terentum* or *Tarentum* in the Campus Martius, and another place in front of the temple of Apollo on the Palatine. The ceremony called *lustratio* ('purification'), which was performed for the newly-born child, for the army in the field in times of superstition and panic, and for the whole assemblage of past and present warriors every five years (when the censors were said *condere lustrum*), seems to have had its origin more in fear of the unregarded dead than in any sense of sin in face of the offended gods; and the ornament called *bulla* worn by the Roman child appears to have contained charms originally intended to ward off ghostly anger, to which the young were specially exposed. Ancient scholars believed that the worship of the *lares*, or household spirits, was one form of the cult of the dead, and, till recently, they were followed by the moderns. There is, however, much evidence to show that the veneration of the *lares* began outside the house. The earliest mention of them is in the ancient hymn of the Arval Brothers, where they appear amongst the protecting divinities of the fields. Originally each house possessed only one *lar familiaris*, and the use of *lares* to mean 'a household' is not earlier than the late Republic. It is possible that the *lar familiaris* was at first the mythical founder of the separate family, just as each *gens* had its mythical ancestor. But the existence from early times of *lares* in every *compitum*, or quarter of the city, and of *lares permarini* and other *lares* connected with localities, points the other way. And the worship connected with them was joyous in character, not funereal. The scholars who identified the *lares* with the departed souls were influenced, perhaps, by a supposed but improbable connexion between *lar* and *larva* (which is the name for an unsatisfied and, therefore, dangerous ghost), and by the primitive custom of burying the dead within the house of the living. The phrase *di manes*, which is familiar to us on Roman tombstones, appears to have been the earliest applied to the general divinities who ruled the world of shades. Their appearance in Roman religion must have been comparatively late. The term *manes*, properly 'good' or 'kindly,' is euphemistic, like the name *Eumenides*, given to the Greek Furies. The application of *manes* to disembodied men is secondary, especially when the word indicates a single ghost. Yet, from an early time, the ancestors in the other world were deemed to be in a sense Divine, and were called

divi parentes. The *lemures* are the same as the *larvæ*, the spirits with whom, for whatever reason, the living find it hard to maintain a permanent peace. The name is connected with *Lemuria*, a purificatory ceremony held at Rome in the month of May.

When the West was invaded by the religions of the East, including the Christian, and when philosophy, especially in the hands of the Neo-Pythagorean and Neo-Platonic schools, developed much mystical doctrine about things Divine, the belief in beings who were more than men and less than gods became universal. The whole world now abounded in demons of limited power for good or evil. The testimony to this persuasion is scattered broadcast over later literature, from Apuleius onwards, and over the remains of Imperial art. The deified emperors were like the Greek ἥρωες, and to them the name *divi*, which had in earlier days not been distinguished from *dei*, was appropriated. Magic and astrology blended with the faith in demons, which, when Christianity prevailed, were regarded as wholly bad, and were identified with heathen divinities. The minds of men were laden with a burden of which they were not relieved till rationalism sprang out of the Reformation movement.

LITERATURE.—Information on the subject may be obtained from the articles on 'Inferni,' 'Genius,' 'Lares,' and 'Manes,' in Smith's *Dict. of Antiquities*[3], London, 1890–1; in the *Dict. des Antiquités* of Daremberg-Saglio[3], Paris, 1886 ff.; and in Roscher's *Lex. der Mythologie*, 1884 ff. The work of Wissowa on Roman Religion in Iwan Müller's *Handbuch der klass. Alterthumswissenschaft*, Munich, 1892 ff., is important. For the cults of the dead, Warde Fowler's *Roman Festivals*, London, 1899, and his Gifford Lectures, entitled *The Religious Experience of the Roman People*, London, 1911, may be consulted; and for the later belief in demons, Dill's *Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius*, London, 1904. Many illustrations are to be found in Frazer's *GB*[2], 1900.

J. S. REID.

DEMONS AND SPIRITS (Slavic).—There is abundant evidence of the persistence of the belief in demons and spirits among the Slavic peoples even to the present day, especially in districts where primitive ideas and customs have not yielded to the advance of civilization. Popular imagination traces the agency of supernatural beings in every part of the surrounding world—house and home, field and forest—and sees in every nook and corner the possible hiding-place of an invisible spirit, which, however, may on occasion assume a visible form. In seeking to classify these beings under leading categories, it is often difficult to determine which of them are to be regarded as products of the animistic stage of thought, and which, on the other hand, should be described rather as demons, demanding the prayers, offerings, and worship of human beings. As to the various classes of demons themselves, such as dream-spirits and spirits of disease, domestic spirits and Nature-spirits, it is likewise no easy task to draw distinct lines of demarcation between them.

The origin of demonic beings is explained in a cosmogonic legend of dualistic character, which, it is true, belongs to a relatively late period, and is derived from a foreign source.

According to this story, which is widely known among the Slavs, the Evil principle existed from the first, and quite independently of the Good. As a result of the combined work of both—God and Satan—the world itself came into being. Satan, in the form of a water-fowl, made his way to the bottom of the primal ocean, and in his beak brought up rock and sand, with which materials God then framed the world. Satan, however, secretly retained in his mouth a portion of the sand, and made therewith all the rugged and inaccessible places—mountains, crags, morasses, straits, and barren lands. Satan then tried to drown God, who, fatigued with the effort of creation, was now asleep, and to this end he dug holes in the surface of the earth, and caused floods to gush forth therefrom: thus arose great waters and abysses, into which, however, Satan himself was at length thrust by the power of God. Moved by envy of the Deity, Satan also essayed the work of creation, and noxious plants and animals are the result of his efforts. Desiring to form a retinue for his own service such as would correspond to the angelic hosts of God, he was advised by the latter to wash his hands, and to allow the water to drop from his fingers behind him. From these drops sprang an innumerable multitude of evil spirits, who own him as their head. It is believed in Russia that the same thing takes place whenever a person engaged in washing himself lets the water drip around him.

According to another form of the legend, good angels and demons were produced from a stone upon which blows were dealt by God and Satan respectively. Satan's arrogance and the growth of his retinue induced him at last to make an open revolt, with the result, however, that the archangel Michael hurled the wicked host from the celestial battlements. The ejected demons fell between heaven and earth; one remained in the air, another in the forest, a third in water, etc., while the rest sank down into the under world. This explains why demons have their secret habitations in all places—in the air, in woods, waters, and the like. It is a popular belief that the conflict between the Good and the Evil principle still endures, and manifests itself in thunder and lightning. The thunderstorm is brought about by the thunder-god—Elijah or Michael—who pursues the evil host with a bolt of fire. Every object injured, every person or animal killed, by the lightning-flash affords unmistakable evidence of the fact that some evil demon was fleeing before his heavenly pursuer, and had sought shelter in the neighbourhood of the person or animal or object struck, and that, while the Divine missile destroyed the cowering demon, it did not spare the innocent object that chanced to be near. Thus arose the belief that a human being killed in a thunderstorm wins salvation, as also the notion that the wood of a tree shattered by lightning contains a powerful counteractive to the work of evil spirits.

The people of Little Russia explain the genesis of demons by another myth, which, however, is not nearly so widely known as that which we have just sketched. According to them, evil spirits are the children of Adam. Our first parents, it is related, had twelve pairs of children, but on one occasion, when God came to visit them, Adam tried to conceal half of his offspring from the Divine eye. The children who were thus hidden were transformed into demons.

Although many demons are destroyed in their warfare against God and good men, yet their numbers are not diminished. On the contrary, their ranks are always being reinforced, either by marriages amongst themselves, from which issue new generations, or by sexual intercourse with human beings. Further, their numbers may be recruited by the human children who become demons—a transformation which takes place when a child is cursed by its parents, or dies unbaptized, or when it is taken away by the demons and a changeling (*q.v.*) left in its place. The powers of evil also gain possession of all who die a violent death, such as suicides and children overlain in sleep; hence the idea that it is dangerous to try to save a person in the act of committing suicide, or one who is drowning, etc., as the devil will feel himself wronged in being balked of his expected victim, and may take vengeance upon the rescuer.

The demons are believed to come into touch with human life in various ways. They injure man by causing accident and disease, or they give him help and protection. A common idea is that a demon sits upon the left shoulder of every human being, ready to take possession of him at any moment of weakness, and it is therefore advisable that when a person yawns he should guard his mouth by making the sign of the cross, and so prevent the fiend from gaining an entrance into his body. But, if an individual makes a compact with the devil, signing over his soul in a document subscribed in his own blood, the devil undertakes on his part to serve the man in every possible way, and especially to make him rich. In the course of ages Satan has taught mankind many crafts. It was from him that people learned the arts of iron-working, brewing, and distilling, as also the use of tobacco. He was the discoverer of fire; he built the first mill and the first waggon. The arts of reading and writing were acquired from him. Moreover, when Satan is in a good humour, he finds amusement in plaguing human beings; he likes to beguile the belated traveller from the right way, to worry the driver by causing a breakdown in the middle of the road, or to play tricks upon a drunk man. He may appear under the disguise of a

friend or a lover, and it is even believed that he can serve his minions by taking their place in the ranks of the army. It is also said that, when he wishes to gratify his lust, he visits witches in the form of a flying fiery serpent; such, for example, are the *Letavitsa* of the Huzules and the Polish *Latawiec*, which sometimes assume the form of a man, sometimes that of a fascinating maiden.

It is with witches that the evil spirits and demons have their most active intercourse. At certain seasons, and especially on the principal feast days of the Church, the witches fly away to the meeting-places of the demons, where they drink, dance, and wallow in debauchery. The demons on their part are ready to abet the witches in carrying out those magical operations which, according to popular notions, require the support of supernatural agency. Such, for instance, are the machinations by which the sorcerer causes untimely births, incites love, sows dissension among friends—anything, in a word, which does mischief to mankind. The transactions are performed in the name of the evil spirit, and, when they are followed by an adjuration, this usually takes the form of an appeal 'to the host of unclean spirits conjointly with Satan,' praying that they will work harm to the person the sorcerer has in view. Such an adjuration of the infernal spirits implies, of course, that the sorcerer has by word and action taken the final step in his abandonment of the Christian faith and of all that the Church counts virtuous and laudable. He takes the cross from his neck and tramples upon it; he avoids the use of sacred words, and declares himself an apostate from Christ and His saints. A person who has thus given himself to Satan has something forbidding in his very appearance; it is believed that he no longer washes himself or combs his hair. In Little Russia, a woman who desires to become a witch goes at midnight to some river, whence the evil spirit comes forth to meet her. But she must previously have trodden a saint's image under foot, and removed the cross from her neck.

According to the popular superstition,—reflected also in the language of incantations,—the evil spirits dwell somewhere in the North or West, in a 'nocturnal' land, while the good angels are in possession of the realm lying to the East. The region peopled by demons is dark, shrouded in mist and cloud, and lies deep down in an abyss. Another belief, and one which is widely diffused, is that the hosts of Satan live in a subterranean region, whence they issue forth upon the world at the bidding of their prince; or in deep waters, unclean places, dense forests, and marshes, where the sun never shines. Bushes of elder and willow by the water-side are in some localities believed to be the favourite haunts of demons. They leave their lurking-place in the vicinity of water on the 6th of January, *i.e.* Epiphany, when the priest blesses the water; they then migrate to an abode in the meadows. In Passion-week, again, when the meadows are consecrated, they pass into trees and cornfields, and then, at the festival on the 1st of August, they leave the apple-tree—which is consecrated on that day—and return to their own element. Another favourite resort of demons is the cross-roads (*q.v.*), where evil spirits come together from all quarters of the world. The mill and the uninhabited house are also well adapted to supply a lodging for demons. They like to tarry in the neighbourhood of a spot where treasure is concealed. On Easter Eve and the Eve of St. John, when the bracken is supposed to flourish, the demons endeavour to prevent the blossoms, which possess extraordinary magical virtues, from falling into the hands of human beings. At the hour of noon they muster at their favourite spots on the banks of lakes and rivers, and it is therefore dangerous to linger in the open at that time. There is, indeed, a special midday-demon, the *Běs poludennyj*. It is believed that the spirits retire from the earth and return to Hell in the middle of November, only, however, to resume their expeditions in spring, when Nature re-awakes from her winter sleep.

Hell, the nether lake of fire and smoke, is, in a special sense, the home of these evil spirits. Here *Lutsiper*, with his wife and attendants, swims and sails about, torturing the souls of the dead. The place of eternal fire is depicted as a bathroom or stove, in the heat of which the souls are tormented. The belief in hell-fire and the discovery of iron have conspired to foster another notion, viz. that the demons are smiths. In Russian incantations we find mention of three such demonic smiths, the three being brothers. The idea of a triad of fiends is also current in the folk-lore of other Slavic countries. The oldest demon of all, *Lutsiper*, is very frequently referred to as *Herod*—a name which probably denotes both the murderer of the innocents and the slayer of John the Baptist. Other names applied to the devil are 'the hetman' (of his hosts), Judas, Velzevul (*i.e.* Beelzebub), and Satan. According to the legends, the chief of the infernal forces is bound with a chain, which, however, in consequence of the sins of men, wears thin, and would long ere this have given way altogether, but for the fact that, in virtue of Christ's resurrection, it is restored at every Easter-tide to its original strength.

In addition to the demons named above, we find here and there a large and powerful female being, whose figure, embellished with many a fantastic feature, plays a great part in Slavic legendary lore. This is the *Baba-jaga* (Russ.), *Jedza* (Pol.), or *Ježibaba* (Slovak), a hideous old beldam, whose children are the evil spirits, or who, as the 'devil's dam,' sends forth her subject spirits into the world. She is said to steal children for the purpose of gratifying her craving for human flesh; to fly in company with the spirit of death, who gives her the souls of the dead for food; and to stir up storm and tempest in her flight. The legends also tell that she has teeth and breasts of iron, with which she rends her victims, and that her home is in a far-distant forest.

Among other Slavic names applied to evil spirits may be mentioned the following: *čert* (Bohem.), *čort* (Russ.), *czart* (Pol.); *djavol* (Russ.), *djabel* (Bohem.); *běs*, *vrag* ('adversary'), *lukavyj* ('the crafty'), *kutsyj* ('short-tail'), *nečistyj* ('the unclean'), *dedjko* ('grandfather'). The last-mentioned (Little Russian) epithet is applied to both the domestic spirit and the devil, and in this it resembles the Bohem. *diblík*, i.e. 'house-goblin' (cf. *dáblík*=*diabolus*, as also the Bohem. *spiritus* [=Lat. *spiritus*], Slovak *pikulík*, which corresponds to the O. Pruss. *pickuls*). This is one of the numerous facts which indicate that heathen demonology and the Christian conception of the devil coalesced in the idea of a single 'unclean power.' In order to avoid giving offence to the demon by uttering his name, the people refer to him simply in the third person, as 'he' or 'himself.'

The demons are represented also as capable of assuming human form, and as having the qualities and propensities of human nature. It is to be noted, however, that such anthropomorphic demons show in every case some peculiar feature which distinguishes them from mankind. Thus, the demon's body may be black, or covered with hair; or he may have a horn, or a tail. In many instances he is remarkably small. Occasionally he can be recognized by his red and fiery eyes, or by the absence of some prominent organ of the body, such as an eye or an ear; or, again, by the resemblance of his feet and ears to those of a domestic animal. A lame person, or one without eyelashes, is suspected of being a demon. The water-spirit often appears in human form, and his real nature is then recognizable only by the water that oozes

from his hair and clothes. The devil, again, has a special liking for music, and dances to it. He is likewise fond of drinking and card-playing. Demonic beings have strong erotic tendencies; one of their common manœuvres is to waylay women and girls, or, again, to appear before a young man in the guise of a beautiful and alluring maiden. It may also be mentioned that some demons even demand food, but, as immaterial beings, may be put off with mere odours and fumes.

Demonic beings stand in awe of things connected with the Church, and consecrated objects generally; and these accordingly are the most potent amulets against their evil practices. Of such prophylactic articles the most important is the cross; and everything that bears that symbol shares its power. Other effective expedients are found in sacred tapers, incense, holy water, and the consecrated palm. A person who wishes to clear his house of evil spirits resorts with all confidence to prickly plants, as well as to the fern and garlic. In Servia, rubbing the breast with garlic is practised as a means of protection against a spirit that flies about by night. It is also believed that the demons have an aversion to wheat and flax, as the consecrated wafer is prepared from the former, and holy oil from the latter. The glowing firebrand is in all cases a powerful specific against demonic agency.

Those demons and demonic spirits which make their abode in human beings—the witch, the vampire, the demoniac—have also the power of assuming an almost endless variety of form. When pressed hard by a thunderstorm, they may change into a cat or a goat. Innumerable stories are told of their having been seen in the shape of a horse, a pig, a dog, a sheep, a mouse, a hare, a bird, a peacock, a hen, a magpie, a butterfly, a fiery serpent, or even a ball of yarn. The Servian sorceress, the *Vještitsa*, harbours a demonic spirit, which leaves her during sleep, and, flying among the houses in the shape of a bird or a butterfly, feeds upon the people—especially children—whom she finds asleep, tearing out and devouring their hearts. The *Jedogonja* of the Serbs, again, may remain invisible. The *Jedogonja*-spirits are said to fight with one another among the mountains, their missiles being huge boulders and uprooted trees. Upon their influence depends the state of the weather, and thus also the fruitfulness of the soil.

A special instance of demonic metamorphosis is found in the Slavic *werwolf*—the *Vlkodlak* (Bohem.), *Vovkulak* (Lit. Russ.), *Vukodlak* (Serbo-Croat.), *Vlŭkolak* (Bulg.). The werwolf is a man who can change himself into a wolf, or who has really become a wolf by the enchantment of a witch. The belief in such transformations has been widely current for centuries; as far back as the 13th cent., eclipses of the sun and moon were attributed to the werwolf. The werwolf figures largely in legend. A person who has the power of changing at will into a wolf always shows some point of difference —*e.g.* in his birth or in his appearance—from other people. It is believed that his father was a wolf, and that he himself was born into the world feet first. In the upper part of his body he resembles a human being, while the lower part suggests the wolf. He has also a wolf's teeth and heart. To become a werwolf is a matter of no great difficulty. One need only drink a little water taken from the footprints of a wolf, or turn over a fallen tree, and then put on a wolf's skin; on the night thereafter the werwolf appears, bringing terror to man and beast. In some districts of Bulgaria it is believed that the *Vlŭkolak* is a spirit which has been formed from the blood of a murdered man, and that he haunts the scene of the murder, and causes the place to become arid.

Among all the Slavic peoples, and especially among the Serbs, the werwolf is often confounded with the *vampire* or *upir* (Serv. *vampir*, Lit. Russ. *upyr*). The vampire is the soul of a dead man, which comes forth out of the grave for the purpose of working injury upon the living. The Serbs believe that impious people, and especially witches, become *Vukodlaks* after death, and drink the blood of sleeping persons. When an unusually large number of deaths take place in a village community, the calamity is attributed to the *Vukodlak*. Word passes from mouth to mouth that the ghostly evil-doer has been seen as he moved around with the mortcloth upon his shoulders. The people then go to the churchyard for the purpose of identifying his grave. They take with them a foal, and the grave upon which the foal stands still is opened, and the body taken out and impaled with a stake of blackthorn or hawthorn. In other districts similar measures are resorted to when the people seek to deliver their homes from the nocturnal visits of the vampire. In Russia, for instance, a stake of aspen or maple is thrust into the corpse, or else the grave, of the person upon whom suspicion has fallen. In some districts the corpse is burned, or the blood-vessels severed below the knee. Besides the vampire of the dead, however, who finds pleasure in tormenting sleeping persons by night, we hear also of a living vampire, viz. the witch, a being endowed with demonic power, who is able to kill people, to bring disease and misfortune, and to cause stormy weather. Moreover, all ungodly persons, and all who have been cursed by their fellow-men, or have died by violence, become vampires. We hear also of vampires who were originally children begotten of mankind by the devil, or children who died unbaptized. In point of fact, any ordinary individual is liable to the repulsive transformation after death; if an unclean animal or bird—dog, cat, magpie, cock—springs casually over his dead body, or if he is not buried according to the ordinary ritual of the Church, he thereby becomes a vampire. The vampire can be recognized in the grave by the fact that his corpse does not decay, but retains a ruddy colour in the face, and has the mouth smeared with blood. His limbs bear marks which show the gnawing of his own teeth. When at length he begins to drink human blood, he assumes the form of an animal, or, indeed, of an object of any kind. We may also note here that, according to a popular superstition in Little Russia, every witch is subject to an *upyr*, who was born with her and with whom she cohabits.

To the same class of tormenting spirits belong the *mora*, *mura*, or *mara* (Russ. and Pol.), *marucha* (Russ.), *kikimora* (Russ.), *morava* (Wend. and Bulg.); cf. the Germ. *Mahr* or *Mahre*, Eng. 'mare,' 'nightmare.' They might be described in almost the same terms as the vampire. They, too, are the souls of living men, which leave their bodies by night, and visit sleepers for the purpose of tormenting them. In Russia and Bulgaria, however, the *mora* is thought to be the soul of a child that has died unbaptized, or has been cursed by its parents; or it is a spirit which dwells in the cemetery and makes itself visible to people as a ghastly black spectre. Popular superstition invests it with certain features which distinguish it from ordinary human beings. The soles of its feet are flat, and its eyebrows meet. A child who at birth has visible teeth, or one who, having been taken from his mother, commences to suck again, eventually becomes a *mora*. A similar development is expected in the case of a child whose mother during pregnancy happens to go out of her room just as the clock strikes the hour of noon. Further, should anything that conflicts with the tradition of the Church take place during baptism, the child being

baptized is thereby doomed to become a *mora*. It is also believed that a witch can voluntarily make herself a *mora*. The characteristic pursuit of a *mora* is to plague her sleeping victims with bad dreams and oppression of the chest, while she is sucking blood from their breasts. During the visitation the sleeper is incapable of speech and motion. But the *mora* does not confine her evil practices to human beings; she likewise torments domestic animals, draining them of milk and blood. Nevertheless, it is not a difficult matter to rid oneself of the cruel attentions of the *mora*. All that is necessary is to offer her a gift of some eatable substance, such as bread, salt, or butter. An effective means of keeping her at bay is to place beside the sleeper some such object as a double triangle (the so-called '*mora's* foot'), a mirror, a broom, a steel article, etc.

The further we trace the *mora* or *kikimora* towards the East, the more does she shed her distinctive characteristics and become identified with the household spirit and the Nature-demon, to which are ascribed the traits which belonged originally to her. She has now become an inmate of the house, revealing her presence by her nocturnal movements; she converses with people, puts them into a state of terror and causes disquiet, ravels the work of the sewer or spinner, sits spinning upon the stove, or busies herself with tasks that belong to the housewife. She is a little old woman, and lives behind the stove. When the inmates of the house wish to rid themselves of her presence, they sweep the stove and the corners of the room with a besom, and speak the words: 'Thou must go away from this place, else thou shalt be burned.' In some parts of Russia the *moras* are believed to be repulsive-looking dwarfs, who may be found as crying children among the fields. In Siberia the *kikimora* has become a forest-spirit.

Analogous to the *mora* is the nocturnal demon which is known among the Slovaks, Poles, Serbs, and Russians as the *nočnitsa* ('night-hag'). When a child suffers during the night from some unknown ailment, tossing about and crying, the trouble is set down to the *nočnitsa*, who torments the child by tickling it or sucking its blood, or disturbs its sleep by her mere touch. The liability to such disturbance is attributed to the mother's having neglected to bless her child the evening before. In external appearance the night-hag remains very indistinct; she is simply a female demon who wanders around in the darkness of night. In some localities the *nočnitsas* are supposed to form a group of twelve sisters. It should be noted, moreover, that a similar name, *polunočnitsa*, i.e. 'the midnight-woman,' is sometimes applied to the Virgin Mary. In the Government of Archangel people safeguard themselves from the *nočnitsa* by drawing a circle round the cradle with a knife, or placing the knife within the cradle, or by putting an axe, a doll, and a spindle beneath the floor, or by driving a piece of wood into the wall. The incantations accompanying these actions always contain an expression of the wish that the 'nocturnal *nočnitsa*' will no longer play pranks with the child, but seek to find amusement in the things thus offered her. Sometimes an oblation of bread and salt is made to her, part of it being rubbed upon the head of the fretful child, and the rest placed under the stove. The hag who torments children by night is also known in Russia by the names *kriksy* (cf. *krik*, 'scream') and *plaksy* (cf. *plakat*, 'cry'). In Bulgaria a corresponding part is played by a frightful wood-hag called *gorska makva*, whose head somewhat resembles that of an ox. Among the White Russians the belief has been traced that the nocturnal spirit produces illness in children from within, having first found his way into their bodies.

This superstition introduces us to the *demons of disease* strictly so called. Certain diseases are commonly believed to emanate from demonic beings who have found an entrance into the body of their victim, and thence proceed to torment him. This holds good in particular of fevers, epilepsy, insanity, and plague. Among the White Russians, when the nature of the malady cannot be determined, it is supposed that the patient is tormented by an 'unclean power.' In such cases the body of the afflicted person is rubbed with a piece of bread, which is then carried to a cross-way by night; here the *Dobrochot* (a pet-name for the demon, especially the domestic spirit) is entreated to accept the offering thus made, and to absolve the sick man. Those engaged on an errand of this kind must not cross themselves. Here we have a vestige of the cult of the dead; sometimes, indeed, it is said in so many words that the offering is intended for the dead. There are occasions upon which an individual may very easily fall into the power of the demon of disease. Such an occasion is birth, together with a certain period thereafter, lasting usually until the child is baptized. It is imagined that the unclean spirits swarm round the house of the mother, and resort to every possible means of working injury both to her and to her child.

The demon of *fever* is believed to be one of the three, seven, twelve, or seventy-seven so-called *Lichoradka*-sisters (*lichoradka* = 'fever'). In order to secure her good graces the people speak of her by such endearing epithets as 'god-mother' and 'aunt.' She wanders over the whole world, causing illness wherever she goes, and is represented either as an ugly, lean, naked, and hairy beldam, or as a young and beautiful nymph. Offerings are presented to her with a view to warding off her attacks. If the infection has come by way of the earth, an oblation of corn is made at the particular spot. But the gift is more frequently cast into the water. The fever-patient himself cuts an egg into seventy-seven pieces, which he then throws into a river as he utters the words: 'Ye are seventy-seven; here is a portion for each of you; eat, and meddle not with me.' When the festival commemorating the dead is celebrated in White Russia, the *Lichoradka* gets a share of the feast. Among other measures adopted in battling with the disease, the following is of special interest. An attempt is made to deceive the demon in such a way as will prevent her recognizing the sick person when she returns to attack him again. The patient's name is changed; his face is covered with a mask, and words are written on the door to say that he is not at home. Another expedient for scaring the demon is to fire a gun. The diseased person is made to eat bitter and fetid things, or he is fumigated with some evil-smelling substance, in order to render the demon's sojourn within the body as uncomfortable for herself as possible. The most reliable prophylactic of all, however, is a certain incantation in which occurs an interesting story about the origin of the *Lichoradka*-demons. According to this incantation, they are the daughters of Herod, and the oldest and most ferocious of all is the one on whose account John the Baptist was put to death. At the command of their father they issue forth from their subterranean home to plague the inhabitants of the earth.

A frequent disguise of the demon of *pestilence* is the figure of a woman—'the black woman' of the Bulgarians (in Russia, the *Morovaja panna*, *čuma*, or *cholera*; in Servia, the *kuga*), but it may also take shape as a bird or an animal—a cat, horse, or cow. The *Morovaja panna*, clothed in white and

with dishevelled hair, travels by night from place to place, making her journeys either by waggon or upon the back of some one whom she compels to carry her. Her breath and her touch are fatal to human beings, and she feeds upon the bodies of those whom she slays. The most effective means of warding off her attacks is a furrow traced secretly and by night round the village, with a plough guided by women who are naked or clothed only in a shirt, as the pest-hag dare not cross such a furrow. In many districts the demons of pestilence are believed to be three sisters. A widely current notion is that the afflicted person has in some way given offence to the demon of disease, whose resentment finds vent in the disorder. In such a case it is incumbent upon the invalid to ask forgiveness of the demon. In Russia, for instance, one who is ill with smallpox is taken to another in like case, and makes obeisance to the latter, saying: 'I ask forgiveness, spirit of smallpox; absolve me, daughter of Athanasius, if I have behaved rudely towards thee.' The same purpose is served by speaking of the demon under endearing names, and thus regaining her favour.

Mental derangement, 'possession,' affords one of the clearest instances of the sojourn of a demon in a person's body. Such, for example, is the *ikota* or *klikušestvo* malady prevalent in Russia—a state of supposed demoniacal frenzy which can be induced by the machinations of a witch. At her command the evil spirit takes up his abode within the body of his victim, and makes his presence known by giving vent to abnormal sounds, such as neighing, barking, and the like. The sufferer may be relieved by the use of consecrated objects or the adjurations sanctioned by the Church, or, again, by putting on harness, or by dipping in holy water at the feast of Epiphany. There is, however, another theory of the origin of lunacy: the disease is sometimes attributed to an evil spirit (forest demon, etc.), which of no set design simply flies past a person.

The truculent spirit of pestilence resembles in outward appearance the personified figure of Death—the Bohemian *Smrtná žena* or *Smrtnice*. The latter also is a woman, haggard and dressed in white, who walks beneath the windows of a house in which some one is dying. If she sits down at the head of the bed, the last hope of recovery is gone, but, if she places herself at the foot, the invalid may get well again. The people believe that they can drive away the demon by putting crosses or saints' images upon the bed; but they are ready, on the other hand, to admit that Death is deaf to prayer. In Little Russia and Moravia it is thought that Death lives under the earth, in a room lit by innumerable candles, some of which are just being lit, and others upon the point of going out. The candles stand for human lives, over which Death holds sway. This attribute of power over human life belongs both to the spirit of Death and to the goddess of Fate.

The whole course of a man's life, from its first hour to its last, is pre-ordained at his birth by the *goddesses of Fate*. This belief, inherited from Greek and Roman mythology, seems to have been prevalent among the Southern and Western Slavs. In the written documents of these peoples, as far back as the 12th cent. A.D., we find mention of these goddesses and of the sacrificial festivals instituted in their honour. Among the Eastern Slavs, on the other hand, the belief in three Fates who control the lives of all human beings does not appear ever to have had any outstanding vogue. Here, in fact, their function was taken over by the *Dolja* (the *Sreća* or 'Fortune' of the Serbs)—a personification of the good or evil fortune of the individual.

When a birth occurs, the newly-born child is visited in the night-time by the three Fates (Serb and Sloven. *Rodjenice, Sudnice, Sudjenice*; Bohem. *Sudičky*; Bulg. *Roždenici, Orisnici*)—beautiful, richly-attired, diaphanous maidens. They ordain the destiny of the child, and determine the manner of its death. It is generally believed that the decisive forecast is that pronounced by the one who speaks last. In order to induce the Fates to assign a favourable destiny to the child, gifts and offerings are presented to them. Among the Southern Slavs and Bohemians these presents are in the form of food—bread, salt, or wine—placed on the table, or, it may be, in hollows among the rocks, as it is believed by the Slovenians that the *Rodjenice* live in rocks and mountains. In Bulgaria, on the evening upon which the visit of the *Orisnici* is expected, it is customary to partake of a special supper, after which three pieces of bread are placed at the head of the newly-born infant, in the hope that they may prove an acceptable offering to the august visitors. It may be incidentally mentioned that the Virgin Mary is sometimes confounded with the goddess of destiny.

The *Dolja* is, so to speak, a family heirloom which descends to a person from his parents. It accompanies him throughout his whole life; it sleeps with him in the cradle, nor does it desert him when he removes to another locality. It resembles the domestic spirit in so far as it works on behalf of its protégé from morning till night; it takes care of his children, does its best to make his land fruitful, brings him corn from other people's fields, promotes his success in fishing, guards his cattle, and, in a word, secures his good fortune and prosperity in every way. On the other hand, the *Dolja* of an unfortunate man, which in Russia is also called *Běda*, 'distress,' *Gore*, 'misery,' or *Zlydni*, 'ill luck,' is a good-for-nothing creature, which dozes idly amongst moss, or tries in every possible way to mar whatever prosperity the man enjoys. In most cases a person's subjugation to the *Zlydni* is an indication that his present employment does not accord with his true vocation. It is sometimes stated that the attendant spirit advises its protégé to choose another pursuit, promising that, if he does so, good fortune will never desert him. The *Dolja* is generally supposed to have the form of a human being, but it should be noted that it need not be of the same sex as the person to whom it belongs. Occasionally, however, its figure is that of an animal—a dog or a cat. It lives under or behind the stove, as is usually the case also with the household spirit. A good *Dolja* may be persuaded by prayers and sacrificial gifts to attend faithfully upon a person. Thus a bride who is setting out for the marriage ceremony prays that the good *Dolja* will sit beside her in the carriage, and that the unfavourable *Dolja* may perish in water. In White Russia the bride says: 'Come out of the stove in the form of a flame and go with me, leaving the room by the chimney.' Young women who wish to be married make pottage, and ask the *Dolja* to take supper with them. A rarer form of the superstition is that there is but one all-embracing *Dolja*, on whom depends the prosperity of every human being. This universal *Dolja* is depicted as an old woman, and as living sometimes in a miserable hovel, and sometimes in a splendid palace. The lot of the newly-born child is determined by the character of the place in which the *Dolja* happens to be residing at the hour of birth.

We proceed next to treat the belief in domestic spirits, the *Domovojs* or *Domoviks*. Many elements in this form of superstition suggest that the being who is worshipped as a household god is really the spirit of the ancestor, or founder of the family, who,

though long dead, still attends to the interests of his descendants. Here and there we find a survival of the belief that all who die in any particular house become its domestic spirits. At the festivals held in commemoration of ancestors, honours are paid to the household spirit as well. In point of fact, the latter is often called *Ded*, or (in Galicia) *Didko*, 'grandfather,' and those who have seen him describe him as a little old man with grey hair and a long beard, clad in old-fashioned garments and resembling in outward appearance the existing head of the family. With the last-mentioned characteristic is connected the designation of 'landlord,' Bohem. *hospodáříček*, sometimes given him; cf. the idiomatic use of 'himself.' In certain localities he is referred to as 'the one who lives on the stove,' as the stove is his favourite resort. Although he is not a Christian, he does not like to be spoken of as a 'devil'—an appellation which may enrage him, and incite him to take revenge by visiting with a disease the person applying the term to him. Consequently people are careful not to offend him in this way, even avoiding the use of his right name. It is sufficient to refer to him as 'he' or 'himself.' When any one has fallen ill in consequence of having insulted the household spirit, prayer is made for him thus: 'Perhaps the invalid has uttered foolish words and slighted you, or kept the cattle-shed unclean: forgive him.'

Every house has its *Domovoj*, who has also a wife and even a family. He engages in such tasks as devolve upon the painstaking head of a house. He bestirs himself by night, and people have even seen him as he moves about the yard with a light in his hand, seeming always to have something to do. Strange noises, movements of doors, mysterious voices, etc., heard during the night, are all attributed to him. He is of a merry and facetious disposition, and many of his actions are but manifestations of his good humour. The cleanliness and good order of the establishment are his great aims. A strange *Domovoj*, on the other hand, causes nothing but mischief and inconvenience, and every effort is made to dislodge the intruder. People believe that, in guarding the house, the true *Domovoj* often comes into conflict with some alien household spirit; and it may also be mentioned that he protects the household against the violence of forest-spirits and witches.

When the domestic spirit finds anything about the house not to his liking, he manifests his displeasure in various ways. He indulges in all kinds of violence; throws utensils upon the floor, annoys people and animals in their sleep, and may even destroy the whole place by fire. Like the *mora*, he leaps upon the sleeper, pressing upon him and causing difficulty in breathing. A person with hairy hands who touches the *Domovoj* in the darkness may expect something good to befall him, but to touch him with a smooth or cold hand is a presage of ill-luck. It is believed generally that when something unusual is about to take place in the household, the *Domovoj* gives warning thereof by letting himself be seen, by his movements, or by his faint utterances. We may observe in passing that the Wends believe in a spirit whose special function it is to convey the message of death. This is the *Božaloshtsh*, 'God's plaint,' a little woman with long hair, who cries like a child beneath the window.

When a person moves into another house, or migrates to another district, he prays the household spirit to accompany him. An offering of bread and salt is placed somewhere for the spirit's acceptance, and the head of the house appeals to him with the petition: 'I bow before thee, my host and father, and beseech thee to enter our new dwelling; there shalt thou find a warm place, and a morsel of provender which has been prepared for thee.' In some localities the housewife heats up the stove of the old house, then draws out the glowing brands, which are to be carried to the new residence, and finally, turning towards the recess at the back, utters the words 'Welcome, grandfather, to the new home!' Occasionally we come upon the belief that, if the old house falls into ruins, or is destroyed by fire, it is a sign that the domestic spirit has never left it. On other occasions likewise, the goodwill of the household spirit is usually secured by means of sacrificial gifts. A dyed egg or other portion of food is placed in the yard for his use, prayer being made at the same time for his friendship. Part of the evening meal is left upon the table in the belief that the *Domovoj* will come in the night and eat it. In the evening, again, broth is placed on the stove, and a meal of eggs on the roof, for the purpose of inducing him to take more interest in the fortunes of the house. Before Lent the head of the house invites the *Domovoj* to supper by going into the yard and bowing towards the four cardinal points, while the meal is allowed to remain on the table during the succeeding night.

In Russia the household spirit is known also by other names, which vary according to the place in which his activity seems to focus. When he lives in the cattle shed, he is called *Chlevnik*; in the yard, *Dvorovoj*; in the drying-kiln, *Ovinnik*; in the bathroom, *Bannik*. A vital condition of successful cattle-rearing is that the *Chlevnik* should have a liking for the cattle, so that he will not molest them by night. The breeder must accordingly try to discover, or else guess, the particular colour of cattle which his *Chlevnik* favours, or the particular place where he wishes the cattle-shed to stand. When an animal is purchased and brought home, it is thought advisable to present an offering of food to the spirit, with the prayer that he will give the new-comer a good reception, guard it from mishap, and provide it with abundant food. In many districts we find the *Domovoj* and the *Chlevnik* included in the group of ill-disposed spirits, and every effort is made to expel them from the homestead, either by striking the walls and corners and sprinkling them with holy water, or by placing upon the roof an overturned harrow or a magpie that has been killed. In the province of Archangel, when the women enter the cattle-shed in the morning, they entreat the *Chlevnik* to go out by the window. The *Bannik* lives in the bathroom, behind the stove or under the seat. It is dangerous for any one to go there alone in the evening or by night, as the spirit who presides there may work him harm. When the inmates of the house bathe, they leave a little water in the bath, and a little soap upon the bench, as it is believed that the *Bannik* and other domestic spirits will wish to bathe a little later. To ensure the prosperity of the bath-room, a black hen is buried under the threshold as a sacrifice. As regards the *Ovinnik*, again, the people beseech him to grant them a successful threshing. He is solicitous that the drying-kiln should not be heated on the great festival-days. Should this be done he may take revenge by destroying the building with fire. When the workers have completed some task in the drying-house, they thank him for his faithful service. Those who desire to be on amicable terms with him drop the blood of a cock round about the kiln.

What has been said above regarding the household spirit applies more particularly to Russia. Among the Western and Southern Slavs, however, a less important place is assigned to him. Here, in fact, he has acquired the attributes of a protective and ministrant spirit. The Galician *didko*,

the Bohemian *šetek* ('old one'), *hospodářiček*, and *skřítek*, the Wendic *kobud* ('goblin'), the Polish *skrzat*, and the Slovakian *škrat* are each of them ready to give their services on condition that the person requiring help will make a compact with them, or summon them by incantations, or present oblations of food to them. But there are other ways of securing the good offices of such demons. Thus, a man may give a written undertaking assigning to the demon his own soul, or one of his relatives, or some part of his body. The spirit is invoked either under the stove-pipe or at cross-roads. He may also be brought forth from an egg; the egg of a black hen is carried about in the left breast for seven days, after which period the demon comes visibly out of the egg. The spirit, who has the appearance either of a boy or of a little old man, bestows money and corn upon his protégé, protects his property, and fodders his cattle. The Polish *skrzatek* is a winged creature which supplies corn, and, when flying about in the vicinity of houses, steals children. Its Wendic counterpart is the *plon*, a dragon in the form of a fiery sphere; a common saying about a rich man is: 'He has a *plon*.' The *plon* may assume various shapes, and the proper place to confer with him is the cross-roads. The flying dragon *smok* appears in the folklore of all the Slavic peoples. Another widely prevalent idea is that every house has its own 'lucky serpent,' which has its habitat under the floor or the stove, and brings wealth to the house. Among the Bohemians and the Wends it is believed that the house has both a male and a female serpent, the former representing the head of the house, the latter his wife. The death of either of the serpents presages the death of the corresponding human individual. Similarly the Bulgarians have their *stihija* or *tolosom*, a household spirit in the form of a serpent. The *škrat* of Slovenian folklore dwells in woods and mountains —a belief which indicates that this demon was originally a forest-spirit: cf. the *Serat*, or *Schrat*, of the Germans.

This brings us to the domain of *Nature-demons*, and here we have, first of all, the large group of *forest- and field-spirits*. In Russia the forest-spirit is named *Lješyj*, or *Lješovik*, 'wood-king,' in Bohemia, *Hejkal*, or 'the wild man.' In outward appearance he resembles a human being, but his skin and hairy body betray his real nature. The hair of his head is long and his beard is green. Other points that differentiate him from mankind are his solitary eye and his lack of eyebrows. He has the power of changing his size at will, showing himself sometimes as large as a tree and sometimes no taller than grass. He can also transform himself into an animal, his favourite disguise being the shape of a wolf. He is said to retire under the earth during winter. The beasts and birds of the forest are subject to him, and he frequently drives them in huge flocks from one wood to another. In guarding his own particular forest, he sometimes comes into conflict with the demons of other forests and with the water-demon, and the battles that ensue become manifest to man in the falling of trees and the shriek of the storm. The forest-spirit likes to lead people out of their way, enticing them to follow him, and taking them to some dangerous spot. He also kidnaps children, leaving changelings of his own family in their place. Should he happen merely to pass a person, the latter may sicken with disease; nay, one has only to tread upon his footprint and a like unfortunate result follows. The forest-spirit makes his presence known by all kinds of sounds: he laughs, claps his hands, and imitates the cries of various animals. When a person calls and an echo follows, the demon is supposed to be answering him. One of his favourite amusements is swinging on trees.

The hunter and the herdsman depend for their success upon the good-will of the forest-spirit, and accordingly they offer sacrifices to him and beseech him to make them prosperous. For his acceptance the hunter sets bread and salt upon the trunk of a tree; the herdsman, in order to induce the spirit to keep the wild beasts from his cattle, promises him a cow. If a huntsman will pledge his soul to the demon, the latter will give in exchange success in the chase. The man who desires to make such a bargain turns towards the north, and prays the demon to enter into a covenant of friendship with him; the demon may then show himself favourable to the man's prayer. The White Russians speak of their forest-spirit as *Onufrius*, and in fact they frequently give saints' names to the spirits of the fields and the meadows. It should be noted here that the patron saint of the woods is St. George, and that all wild animals are subject to him.

Besides the male forest-spirit, there are also numerous female spirits of the woods—the Bohem. *Divé ženy*, the Polish *Dziwożony* and *Mamony*, 'wild women.' They, too, resemble human beings in appearance, as also in their manner of life. They are represented as women of enormous stature, with long hair and large breasts. They have their abode in mountain caverns. They are very fond of taking human children in exchange for their own ugly, large-headed offspring, or they simply steal the children. The forest-nymphs, on the other hand, are fair and fascinating creatures, lightly garbed and covered with leaves. They like to dance, and will continue dancing with a man till he dies, unless he happen to know how to free himself from their toils, as, *e.g.*, by turning his pocket inside out. It is believed that a person who accidentally intrudes upon their invisible dancing parties is doomed to die. It sometimes happens that a man marries a wood-nymph, but such a union is very easily dissolved, and, unless the man is all the more circumspect, his spirit-wife may vanish without leaving a trace behind. In certain localities it is supposed that these forest-maidens are human children whom some one has cursed, and that they can deliver themselves from the curse only by marriage with a human being.

The characteristics of the forest-spirits are almost without exception ascribed likewise to the Servian and Bulgarian *Vila* and the Russian *Rusalka*. With regard to the *Vilas* (Bulg. *Samovila*, *Juda-Samovila*, *Samodiva*) the belief still survives that they are the souls of deceased children or virgins. They are beautiful, white-robed, light-footed damsels, who dwell in woods, mountains, and lakes, and fly in the clouds. They too are noted for their dancing and exquisite singing. They have been observed washing their garments and drying them in the sun. They have a considerable amount of intercourse with mankind, and in popular legend they sometimes even intermarry with men. They are represented in folk-songs as the adopted sisters of popular heroes. Should a person excite their resentment, especially by intruding upon their *kolo*-dance, they take revenge by shooting the unfortunate man with their deadly arrows. It is believed among the Bulgarians that blindness, deafness, and apoplexy are the work of the *Samovilas*. The state of the weather depends to some extent on them, as they have the power of causing tempest and rain. In many districts the people offer sacrifices to the *Vilas* in the form of flowers, fruits, or garments, placed upon trees or stones.

What has been said of the *Vilas* holds good, for the most part, also of the Russian *Rusalkas*—deli-

cate female beings who live in forests, fields, and waters. These likewise are souls of the dead, mainly of unbaptized children, and women who have died by drowning. Among the Little Russians and the Slovenians they are sometimes called *Mavki*, *Mavje*, 'the dead.' They are said to solicit human beings for crosses, in the hope that these sacred objects may deliver them from the curse under which they lie. With their ravishing songs in the night they draw people irresistibly into their power, and then tickle them till they die. Another of their means of allurement is the *ignis fatuus*. The Wends, we may note in passing, think that the *Blud*, 'will-o'-the-wisp,' is itself the soul of an unbaptized child. When the crops begin to ripen, the *Rusalkas* find their favourite abode in the cornfields. They have it in their power to bless the earth with fruitfulness. It is also said that they take pleasure in spinning, and that they hang their clothes on trees. During Whitsun-week—a period which in many districts is dedicated to them and to the souls of the departed in general—they come to women in visible form, requesting gifts of shirts and clothes, and such garments are accordingly presented to them by being placed upon trees. The week after Pentecost was in ancient times called 'the week of the *Rusalkas*.' At that season is held 'the escort of the *Rusalkas*,' a procession in which a straw doll representing the *Rusalka* is carried out of the village, then torn to pieces and thrown into the water. This ceremony has been explained as symbolizing the expulsion of the *Rusalkas* from the place, in view of their propensity to inflict damage on the ripening grain. But in all probability the practice was originally connected with the Spring festival. The name *Rusalka*, and the conception of the *Rusalka* festival, had their origin in the Græco-Roman solemnity called 'Rosalia,' 'dies rosae,' observed in spring in memory of the dead. The design of commemorating the dead may still be traced in certain ideas associated with the *Rusalka* festival, as, *e.g.*, in the belief that a person who does not take part in the memorial function for the dead, and does not offer sacrifice to them, thereby becomes liable to the vengeance of the *Rusalkas*. It should also be mentioned that, just as the name *Rusalka* is derived from 'Rosalia,' so the word *Vila* has been explained as a survival from another memorial festival for the dead observed among the Romans, viz. the 'dies violae.'

In some districts a distinction is drawn between forest *Rusalkas* and water *Rusalkas*. The latter have their abode in rivers and cascades; they disport themselves upon the surface of the water, and comb their long hair upon the banks. They also prowl after bathers, and bathing is therefore avoided during the *Rusalka* festival. Similar traits are popularly ascribed to the 'water-man' (Russ. *Vodjanoj*, *Morskoj tsař*; Sloven. *Povodnji*; Wend. *Vodny muž*, *Nyks*; Bohem. *Vodník*, *Hastrman*; Pol. *Topielec*, *Topnik*), and also to the 'water-people,' as it is believed that the water-man has a family—a wife, 'the water-woman,' and children—and even cattle. Every body of water has its presiding demon, who dwells in a magnificent palace far below. A water-spirit can make a new lake for himself, passing out of his old resort in the form of a brook. His favourite haunt is in the vicinity of mills, but, as mills and weirs block his way, he often destroys them in his rage. When any one is drowned, the water-man is the cause, and it is dangerous to rescue a drowning person, as one thereby provokes the animosity of the demon. The souls of those who have died by drowning are immured in his house. He is said to marry women who have been drowned and girls who have been expatriated. He has, in fact, a special liking for inveigling women into his toils. He plays all sorts of pranks with people; he chases the traveller, or seats himself upon the cart of the belated waggoner; and the victims of his jocularity, fearing his resentment, generally submit without resistance. His power is at its height in the middle of the day, and it is at that time that the female water-wraith of the Wends comes forth from the water. In Bohemia people tell how he dances on clear moonlit nights. He sometimes indulges in strong drink, and, when drunk, makes an uproar and jumps about, thus disturbing the ordinary flow of the stream. It not seldom happens that the water-spirit and the forest-spirit have fierce encounters with each other. When the wife of the water-spirit requires the midwife, he applies for human help. He gives timely warning of coming floods to those with whom he is on friendly terms. Millers and fishermen seek to win his goodwill by sacrifices. For his use the miller casts fat, swine's flesh, or a horse into the water. In former times, when a mill was built, it was the custom to present a live offering —sometimes even a human being—to the water-man. The fisher tenders him salt, bread, tobacco, and the first fish of his catch. The bee-keeper tries to win his good graces by oblations of bees and honey. As the water-man is lord over all aquatic birds, the goose-herd undertakes to make him the offering of a goose in the autumn. We may here draw attention to the curious fact that among the White Russians those who desire success in fishing invoke the aid of Neptune. This classical name was no doubt introduced among the people from literary sources, such as chap-books. The water-man is thought to resemble a human being. Sometimes he is represented as an old man, with a green beard and with green clothing, sometimes as a mere stripling. But he may always be recognized by the water that flows from the border of his garments. He has other forms of disguise at command, however, and may assume the appearance of some known person, or of an animal, such as a dog, a horse, a fish, or a frog. We hear also of a peculiar class of water-spirits which in one half of their body are human, while in the other they resemble a fish or aquatic animal. Such are the Little Russian *Faraony* (the warriors of Pharaoh who were drowned in the Red Sea), *Boginky*, *Memoziny*, *Meljuziny*; the Slovenian *Morske deklice*; and the Bulgarian *Stija*. The last-named are remarkable for their long hair, which they sometimes employ to choke those who fall into their power.

We have already mentioned that the middle of the day ranks in popular superstition as the most congenial time for the demons. In point of fact, imagination has fabricated a special figure to represent midday—the white-robed 'noon-wife,' who walks abroad among the cornfields, usually during the midday interval in which the people snatch a little repose. The *Pshesponitsa* of the Wends and the *Poludnitsa* of the Poles take care that no one shall be in the fields at that hour. They try to puzzle any one they meet with difficult questions and riddles; and, if he cannot answer them satisfactorily, they kill him, or infect him with disease. The 'noon-wife' keeps watch over the fields, protects the crops, especially the flax, against thieves, and threatens with her sickle children who pull up the corn. The sickle is also the symbol of another noon-tide fiend among the Wends, the *Serp* or *Serpyšyja*, who kills children with it when they steal the peas. At midday the Bohemian *Polednice* fly about in field and wood, and come into the neighbourhood of human dwellings. Their flights are accompanied by wind and

storm. Their practice is to steal little children whose mothers have negligently left them by themselves. The Russians likewise have a *Poludnitsa*, or *Zitna matka*, the protectress of the cornfield, who, especially at the season when the corn begins to shoot, perambulates the balks. She also molests children whom she finds idly strolling among the fields, and in Northern Russia parents warn their children against going amongst the rye lest the *Poludnitsa* burn them. In Bohemia the *Polednice* is supposed to be the spirit of the midday bell, and to live in the belfry. Of a somewhat similar character is the Moravian *Klekanitsa*, who stalks around after the evening chimes, and entraps the children whom she finds still out of doors.

In many parts of the Slavic world we find, besides the 'noon-wife,' a male 'midday spirit,' who in Bohemia is called *Polednı́ček*, and among the Wends *Serp*, while there is also a special field-spirit, the Russian *Polevoj*. The *Polednı́ček* is a little boy in a white shirt, who at midday passes from the forest into the fields, and punishes those whom he finds doing damage there. He calls to people by their names, and those who follow his call he leads to the far-off hills. The *Polevoj* or *Polevik*, on the other hand, is a personification of the tilled land, and his body is therefore black, like earth, while his hair is the colour of grass. The people think that the spirit of harvest, who is also known as *Ded*, resides in the last gathered sheaf, which is accordingly dressed to look like a doll, and is borne in festive procession to the landlord.

We come, finally, to the Nature-demons whose sphere of action is the air. In Bohemia there is a special spirit of the wind, *Vetrnice* or *Meluzina*, 'the wind-mother,' a white, barefooted being. When the wind roars, the people say that the *Vetrnice* is sobbing, and to comfort her they throw bread and salt into the air for her food. Her voice is believed to bear prophetic import. In Russia likewise we find the 'wind-mother,' and also the 'wind-father,' while the Wends speak of a 'wind-king.' The wind is thought to proceed from the demon's breathing or his movements. Then there is a group of 'wind-brethren'—sometimes four, sometimes twelve—who dwell at the ends of the earth, and who are constantly blowing against one another. With these wind-brethren have been confounded the four angels or evangelists borrowed from the sphere of Christian ideas, and supposed to live in the four quarters of the globe. In Russia we still find sporadically the belief that the wind, and especially the whirlwind, emanates from evil spirits, and that the devil is the chief commander. In the tempest and whirlwind it is believed that Satan himself or the soul of a witch is speeding along, and, if a knife be thrown into the gust, it will inflict a wound upon the hurrying spirit. When the demon is pursued by the thunderstorm, he may transform himself into an animal or a human being. An idea current among the Wends is that the whirlwind is really an invisible spirit, who may be seen, however, by pulling off one's shirt and looking through the sleeves. In certain Russian incantations the whirlwind is spoken of as the captain of the winds, who are personified as evil spirits, and he is styled 'Whirlwind, the son of Whirlwind.' His aid is implored by such as seek by magical means to arouse a responsive affection in the breasts of those they love. In Russia even *frost* is represented by a spirit. He is depicted as a grey-haired, white-bearded old man, wearing a snow-covered fur and shoes of ice. At Christmas he receives offerings of pottage, and is invited to partake of the Christmas fare, in the hope that he will not expose the grain to damage by frost.

Our discussion would remain incomplete without some reference, finally, to the fact that in the popular mind, more particularly in Russia, certain days of the week are personified. We have already had under consideration an analogous phenomenon, viz. the development of the 'Rosalia,' the memorial festival for the dead, into the personified *Rusalka*. In popular poetry, moreover, we find that the naive imagination has invested with human attributes certain important dates in the year, such as Christmas (*Rizdvo* or *Koljada*, from Lat. *calendæ*) and Christmas Eve (*Karatshun*, *Kratshun*; cf. Lat. *colatio*); in Russia, indeed, the latter term has for some reason or other come to signify the evil spirit. The days of the week similarly personified are Friday (*Pjätnitsa*, which is also known by the Greek name *Paraskeva*) and Sunday (*St. Nedelja*). With dishevelled hair, and bodies covered with sores, these two spirits are said to travel from village to village—a fancy which implies that women who perform such work as sewing or spinning on Friday or Sunday really wound the day with the articles they use. The spirits punish those who thus injure them, while, on the other hand, to those who observe these days, they show favour by helping them in their household duties, promoting the growth of their flax, enhancing the fertility of their land, and, as the protectresses of women, rendering assistance to married people. It was a custom among Bulgarian women not so very long ago to make offerings of bread and eggs to Friday. It only remains to be said that the ideas relating to those female personifications of days have been greatly influenced by the worship of the Virgin Mary and other patron saints, and therefore really belong to a sphere of thought which lies outside the belief in spirits and demons in the stricter sense.

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V. J. MANSIKKA.

DEMONS AND SPIRITS (Teutonic).—The ancient Teutons, like almost all other primitive peoples, believed that the whole surrounding world of Nature was alive with demons and spirits. This belief has survived from one of the primitive stages of religious thought till the present time, or has in the course of ages given rise to new phantoms of the human mind. The operations and occurrences observed in the natural world were all attributed to these imaginary beings. The primitive mind did not represent such existences as having any definite shape; it was only in a later phase of reflexion that they were invested now with animal, now with human, forms. Even such forms, however, were not the purely natural ones; the spirits were figured sometimes as very small, sometimes as enormously large. The next step was to endow the imaginary beings with a new class of activities, borrowed from the human sphere, and in this way was at length evolved the myth. The spirits of wind, water, and air were supposed to hold sway in Nature, while the spirits of vegetation, disease, and fate interfered in human life. They were thought of at first as existing in multitudes, but in course of time single spirits were disengaged from the mass. With the rise of the belief in the soul, the demons were sometimes invested with a soul-like nature; the souls of the dead were believed to survive in them. This explains why it is difficult—often, indeed, impossible—to distinguish between spirits and beings of soul-like, or rather ghost-like, nature. Nowhere has the action of religious syncretism been more powerful than in the fusion of the belief in spirits and the belief in

souls. Thus, *e.g.*, the demons of the wind coalesced with the moving host of souls, and the worship once accorded to the latter was transferred to the former. Hence arises our uncertainty as to whether Wodan-Óðin was originally a wind-demon or a leader of the soul-host.

While demons or spirits had their origin in the surrounding world and the phenomena of Nature, the belief in the soul was suggested by occurrences in the sphere of human life. Animism, the belief in the soul as a separate entity, arose out of the world of dreams, while Manism, the belief in the continued existence of the soul and the worship of the dead based thereon, originated in the phenomena of death. Ideas regarding the dream-soul are found in endless variety among all the Teutonic tribes. Thus, the soul, equally with the body, was an independent entity, and might leave the body and wander about in the interval of sleep. It was supposed to have its seat in various parts of the body—the blood, the heart, the kidneys, the liver, or the head; but it might also reside in the breath or the shadow; a man without a shadow had sold his soul. The soul could readily assume various forms; it sometimes appeared as an animal (serpent, weasel, toad, etc.), sometimes as an *incubus* (goblin, mare, troll) or other noxious being. In this way arose the ideas of the werwolf, the *fylgja* (see below), or attendant spirit, and the witch. Among the Northern Teutons a person who allowed his soul to wander was called a *hamrammr*, 'one who can change his shape.' This vagrant soul sees what is hidden from the bodily eye; it can look into both the past and the future. It was this belief which in great measure gave rise to the Teutonic conception of prophecy. When the soul was out of the body, moreover, it was endowed with active powers of abnormal character; it could work injury or bring benefit to other men, and accordingly the powers of magic were transferred to it. Persons who could at will thus cause their souls to leave their bodies, whether in sleep or in a trance, were regarded as magicians.

The powers of the dream-soul, however, were as nothing compared with those ascribed to the soul of the dead. The Teutons thought of the latter as a grasping, maleficent being, which returns to its place, claims its former possessions, and takes vengeance upon any one who withholds them. It was the abject fear of the returning soul and its evil powers that prompted the numerous duties which, according to primitive Teutonic ideas, the survivors owed to the dead (see artt. ANCESTOR-WORSHIP [Teut.] and ARYAN RELIGION). These various duties arise out of the belief that, unless the dead are treated with due honour and respect, they will return and do harm to the living. This superstition was once universal, and is not yet finally eradicated from the mind of any of the Teutonic peoples. There is probably no district in the whole Teutonic area where the people are entirely free from the belief in ghosts and haunted places. Persons who in their lifetime were regarded as wizards, or who had died an unnatural death, would, it was believed, come back for the express purpose of injuring the living. When such injury showed itself, the bodies of the malevolent beings were exhumed and burned, or transfixed through breast and heart with a stake, so that they might be held fast in their graves. Throughout the Middle Ages impalement was still practised as an apotropæic penalty for such crimes as rape or the murder of a relative (cf. Brunner, *Ztschr. d. Savigny-stiftung für Rechtsgesch.* xxvi. [1905] 258 ff.).

The souls of the dead had their times of moving abroad, and courses by which they fared. It was a universal belief among the Teutons that wind and storm were the hurrying host of the dead. What leaves the body at death is the breath, and the breath was therefore the soul or spirit. But wind—agitated air—is also breath. When the breath leaves the body, it unites with other souls, and joins the soul-host. It was a widely diffused idea that a wind arose when any one was hanged; the spirits were coming for their new associate. The departing soul goes to the 'wöden her, da die bösen geister ir wonung hân.' As early as the time of Tacitus (*Germ.* 43), the Harii, with their painted bodies and black shields, used to imitate by night the 'raging host.' Belief in this raging host—or, as it was variously called, the wild hunt, Holla's troop, Perchta's host, the Norse *gandreid*, 'the spirits' ride,' *Aasgaardsreia*, 'Asgard's chase,' or *Hulderfolk*—is not even yet extinct. In certain places, and above all at cross-roads (*q.v.*), the spirit-host rouses itself to special activity, and at certain seasons it manifests itself. The principal time for this manifestation was the long winter night in the season of Epiphany, as, among the Teutons, the festival of Christmas had taken the place of the ancient heathen festival of the dead. It was believed that at such times the souls of the dead took part in the celebration and feasting. Special dishes and special cakes were dedicated to the souls of those who had died in the foregoing year. At no other season of the year were superstition and popular divination so rife. All manner of figures and masquerades were resorted to in personating the spirits. This was the feast of Yule (Goth. *jiuleis*, A.S. *giuli*, O.N. *jól*). The more vehement the rush of the spirit-host in the wind, the more bountiful would be the ensuing year, and accordingly offerings were made *til árs*, 'for a good, fruitful year.' As regards locality, the spirit-host manifested itself most frequently over battlefields. The slain were believed to continue their strife in the air. This belief finds expression in the Hildensage, according to which she summons the fallen Vikings every morning to renewed warfare on the island of Hoy in the Orkneys (Snorri Sturluson, *Edda*, i. 434). Popular belief also gave the spirit-host a leader—Wode or Wodan, a word which is a collective form for the 'raging host' (cf. Eng. *wood*, Scot. *wud*, 'mad'). In process of time Wodan was deified, and in some Teutonic countries came to be regarded as the supreme god.

Among the Teutons the belief in the soul gave rise to a great variety of demonic and legendary beings. From the superstition that the soul could leave the body in sleep or in the trance arose in particular the conception of *incubi*—souls that went forth to afflict and torment others in their sleep. The natural phenomenon at the root of this idea is the nightmare, which the physiologist traces to a congestion of the blood during sleep. The imaginary being to which this distressing condition was attributed is known by a great many different names, the most widely diffused of which is of the form *mare* (O.H.G., A.S., and Scand. *mara*; Germ. *Mahr* or *Mahre*; English 'nightmare'). In Central Germany the term *Alp* has come into use; in Upper Germany we find *Trude*, *Schrat*, *Ratz*, *Ratzele*, *Doggele*; in Western Germany, *Letzel*, *Trempe*; and in Oldenburg, *Walriderske*—all applied to the nightmare, and frequently used also to designate the witch. The *incubi* 'ride upon human beings,' and may actually torture them to death. In the Middle Ages persons who were suspected of injuring their fellow-men in this way were frequently prosecuted at law. Not only human beings, however, but also animals, and even trees, might be the victims of the *mare*. She afflicted people by squatting on the breast; she sucked the milk of women and cows; she wreaked such malice upon horses that

in the morning they were found bathed in sweat and with their hair all awry. She found her way into the sleeper's room by the keyhole, or through a crack, and these were also her only possible means of exit. If the sleeper awoke and held her in his grasp, all that he found was a straw, but, if he spoke the name of the person who had been thus tormenting him, he discovered a naked woman.

Among those who could cause their souls to pass out of their bodies and injure others was the *Hexe* of the Western Teutons (A.S. *hægtisse*, O.H.G. *hagazussa=strio, furia*), the Scandinavian *trold*, the English 'witch.' These terms, however, had a wider application, and denoted also those who dealt in any way with magic, especially of a maleficent kind. It was really in virtue of their magical powers that the *Hexen* could disengage their souls from their bodies, and they were therefore also called *zcûnriten* (M.H.G), *túnriður*, 'hedge-riders,' or *kveldmyrkriður* (O.N.), 'night-riders.' In these excursions they could assume an endless variety of form: they might take shape as a whale, a bear, a raven, or a toad. Bad weather, thunder, and hail were generally attributed to them. According to the Old Icelandic sources, they used to bring themselves into the ecstatic condition by means of incantations, and then launch forth the storm. In later mediæval times they were frequently brought to trial for causing bad weather. But their power of working injury extended to many other things; they induced diseases, and especially lunacy, they killed people, they filled the land with vermin, and caused the cows to give red milk, or none at all. The belief in witchcraft found among all the Teutonic peoples was reinforced during the Middle Ages by the Oriental belief in the devil. The witch was now supposed to be in league with the Evil One; she was one who had sold her soul to him and received the gift of magic in exchange. Thus arose the belief in the witches' meetings on the so-called Brockelsbergs, where the hags abandoned themselves to love-making with the devil. From this again sprang the discreditable trials for witchcraft, which lasted till the 18th century. It was also commonly believed that witches continued their nefarious practices even after death, and, when indications of such activity appeared, their bodies were exhumed and either burned or impaled.

Closely related to the trolls and witches were the Norse *Völves* (O.N. *völur*). These likewise were sorceresses, but they used their magical powers as a means of intercourse with the dead, and in order to acquire knowledge regarding secret things and the future. To their peculiar trade belonged the magic wand, the magic chair, and other accessaries; while they had a retinue of boys and girls to chant their magic songs and so induce the trance in which the souls of the *Völves* left their bodies. These human *Völves*—the 'wise women' of other Teutonic peoples—were held in great veneration; in the winter nights of the season, when the spirit-host swarms around, they travelled from steading to steading, and were everywhere received with ceremony. Women thus endowed with prophetic vision were supposed to exercise their powers even after death. The Eddas often tell of men and gods who visited the grave of a *Völva* for the purpose of obtaining knowledge of the future. Thus Óðin, for instance, rides to such a grave, awakes the *Völva* from the sleep of death, and receives from her the interpretation of Balder's dreams (*Baldrsdraumar*).

A male counterpart to the witch is the *werwolf*, *i.e.* man-wolf. This was a superstition current among all the Teutonic peoples (O.H.G. *werwolf*, A.S. *werewolf*, O.N. *vargulfr* or *ulfhamr*), and is found far beyond the limits of Teutonic lands. The werwolf was a human soul which roamed about in the shape of a wolf, and wreaked horrible cruelties upon other human beings. A person who chooses, or is forced, to wander about in wolf's form has the power of falling asleep at will. Then he passes into a wolf's skin, which he fastens with thick coils of gold, and in this disguise he kills every person and animal he meets. According to popular belief, in which the werwolf still plays a part, the creature was bullet-proof, but, when wounded by a shot or a severe blow, it reverted to human form. The enchantment could be dissolved also by pronouncing the name of the person who had assumed the disguise, or by throwing a piece of steel or iron over the creature. A supernatural being of similar maleficent powers—a second counterpart to the witch—was the *Bilwis*, whose season of special activity was Walpurgis Night. This was a creature of soul-like character, which flitted through the fields, and wrought havoc to the crops with the sickle upon its great toe. When the people found their corn laid, or the ears stripped, they blamed the *Bilwis*; such work was the 'Bilwis-reaping.' It had its abode in trees—the 'Bilwis-trees'—at which gifts of children's clothing were offered by way of disposing the *Bilwis* to protect the children against disease.

Besides the souls which wander forth in dreams and trances, however, the souls of the dead played a great part in Teutonic folklore, presenting an endless variety of form and action. Among the various Teutonic peoples these spirits bear different names, and the fear of the returning dead is often reflected in the very nomenclature. Thus the O.H.G. *gitrôc*, A.S. *gidrôg*, O.N. *draugr* are connected with the root **dreugh*, 'to hurt'; other terms for such haunting spirits are Germ. *Gespenst* (O.H.G. *spanan*, 'entice,' 'deceive'), Dan. *genganger* (Icel. *apturgaungur*, 'one who walks again'), Eng. 'ghost' (A.S. *ghæstan*, 'terrify'). This belief in the haunting presence of the dead survives to-day with a scarcely abated power of legend-making, and in modern spiritualism it would seem to have entered on a new lease of life. The ideas popularly held regarding the returning spirits are certainly somewhat vague. The ghost is sometimes thought of as invisible, and able to make its presence known only by voice or action; sometimes it is supposed to appear as a human being or an animal (*e.g.* the fiery dog, cat, horse, serpent, toad, and the like). In some districts it was considered wrong to kill certain animals, such as toads and snakes, since they were the living homes of hapless souls. But, on the other hand, animals thus possessed by souls might work injury to human beings, and this belief gave occasion to the common mediæval practice of subjecting animals to trial and punishment (cf. von Amira, *Tierstrafen u. Tierprozesse*, Innsbruck, 1891). The belief that the departed soul might survive in the body of an animal gave rise to the supposition that certain animals had the gift of prophecy, and, as it was assumed that they had also the faculty of speech, it was possible to converse with them—above all with birds—as with human beings. Souls might also survive in plants: thus the oak which sprang from the mouth of a king slain in battle, and the rose and lily which grew on the grave of lovers, were really the abodes of the departed souls. The belief that the dead pass into trees was very common; the guardian tree and the tree of life associated with individuals or families were the abodes of tutelary or ancestral spirits, and were thus often made the recipients of gifts and offerings, while the act of damaging trees was a crime demanding the severest penalties.

The belief in the soul gave birth to a large number of fabulous beings. One of these was the Norse

fylgja ('following spirit'), which attended a person either as his soul or as his guardian spirit. As a soul, it took the form of an animal; while, as a tutelary spirit, it was a female being who appeared, especially in dreams, to its protégé, and warned him of danger or urged him to action. The *fylgjas* sometimes come singly, sometimes in troops. After a person's death his attendant spirit passes to his heirs, and in this way occasionally becomes a family-*fylgja*. The Norse *valkyrs* differ so far from the *fylgjas* in that they are almost always found in groups, and especially in groups of nine. The battle-maidens of the ancient folklore, frequently mentioned both in the southern and in the northern sources (cf. Dio Cass. lxxi. 3; Flav. Vopiscus, *Vita Aurelii*, 37; Paulus Diaconus, i. 15; Saxo Gramm. i. 333 ff., 361, etc.) become *valkyrs* (A.S. *wælcyrza*, O.N. *valkyrja*) after their death. They are armed with helmet, shield, and lance; they ride through air and sea; the manes of their horses shed dew and hail upon the earth. Their appearance presages war and bloodshed. In Norse poetry they are closely associated with Óðin; they are his maids, his 'wish-maidens' who carry out his commands, who strike down in battle the heroes destined for Valhöll, and bear them thither, where at the banquets they foretaste the mead for the *einherjar*. The group of wish-maidens also included *Brynhildr-Sigrdrífa*, who disobeyed the commands of her lord by giving the victory to another king, and was in consequence pierced with the 'thorn of sleep' and surrounded by a flame until such time as Sigurðr should awake her and set her free. It is a moot point whether the *Norns*, the 'Fates' of Norse mythology, who have many features in common with the *valkyrs*, should be regarded as souls or as demons. A similar ambiguity attaches to the *elves*, who are sometimes represented as souls, sometimes as purely demonic beings. Both the name and the idea of these products of religious phantasy are common to all the Teutonic race; O.H.G. *der alp* (pl. *elbe*), or *das alp*, also *diu elbe*, A.S. *ælf* (pl. *ylfe*), O.N. *álfr* (pl. *álfar*) are applied to both male and female beings living in the earth, the air, the sea, the hills, etc. They are often associated with the *Asir* (*æsir ok álfar* is a favourite Norse expression, and Anglo-Saxon has a cognate phrase), and, like the latter, embrace the entire multitude of soul-like powers at work in Nature. In later, and especially English, forms of superstition, the elves possess a Proteus-like character, and show a preference for animal shapes. They are sometimes regarded as helpful to man, but sometimes also as capable of injuring him, and accordingly both good and bad elves are recognized among the Northern Teutons. Snorri Sturluson (*Edda*, i. 18) classifies them according to their domiciles as 'elves of light,' who are whiter than the sunbeam and live in the air, and 'elves of darkness,' who dwell in the earth, and are blacker than pitch. From the elves of light the sun takes his name of *álfröðull*, 'elf-ray.' Their head is the sun-god Freyr, whose abode is Álfheim, 'the realm of the elves.' The 'elves of darkness' are sometimes all but identified with the dwarfs, and this explains why the deft-handed smith Völundr (Wieland) is called 'lord of the elves.' In M.H.G. poetry the king of the elves is Alberich, who found his way to the West Franks as Oberon. In England, owing to the influences of the Irish belief in fairies, superstition dwelt mainly on the bright and beautiful elves, who thus became objects of popular favour. A similar development took place in Scandinavia, where, especially in Sweden, the elves were thought of as comely maidens, who live in hills and mountains, hold their dances on the green sward, and by their ravishing songs draw the traveller to destruction. Further, the elves are sometimes *incubi*; and thus the Germ. word *Alp* has been used only in this sense from the 16th century. The *Elfen* of German poetry are really of English origin, having been introduced into Germany towards the end of the 18th century by the translation of Shakespeare.

The elves of ancient times are often identical with the *wights* (Goth. *vaihts*, fem., O.N. *vættr*, fem., O.H.G. *wiht*, neut.). The conception of the wight likewise developed on various lines according to locality. In Old Norse superstition *wights* were tutelary spirits who had their abode in groves, hills, and waterfalls, and were able to dispense fortune or misfortune to human beings. In German folklore they were vivacious spirit-like creatures who assisted men in their work, and demanded gifts in return. To the same class of soul-like, or demonic, beings must be assigned the *dwarfs* (O.H.G. *twerg*, A.S. *dveorh*, O.N. *dvergr*). Their abode, however, was confined to a particular place, and their field of activity was similarly circumscribed. Popular imagination depicted them as diminutive old men—sometimes deformed—with large heads and long white beards. They lived in mountains or under the earth, and were thus known as the 'Unterirdische,' 'hill-folk,' 'earth-dwellers.' They shunned the light of day, for the sun's rays would transform them to stone. Among their possessions is the tarn-cap or magic hood which enables them to become invisible at will, and endows them with supernatural powers. Their principal occupation is smith's work; their forge is situated within the hills, and accordingly dwarf-legend flourishes most profusely where there are ore-bearing mountains, and where mining is carried on. In the Norse poetical literature all weapons of a superior kind, especially swords, are the handiwork of dwarfs. But Thor's hammer, Frey's ship *Skiðblaðnir*, Óðin's ring *Draupnir*, Sif's golden hair, Freyja's necklace *Brísingamen*, and other articles of ornament are also products of their skill. Such arts, however, are not their only characteristic; they are distinguished also for craft and cunning. They are often thought of as united in a realm of their own, with a dwarf-king (Laurin, Heiling, Alberich) at their head. As lords of the mountains they are possessed of immense treasures, from which they draw to reward such persons as pledge themselves to their service. See, further, art. FAIRIES.

An elfish origin is to be assigned to the *household spirits*, who protect the home, and bring it good fortune and wealth. They were frequently regarded as having an animal form, especially that of a serpent or a toad, and they lived under the threshold, in the roof-beams, or on the hearth, at which places it was usual to present offerings of milk or other food in a dish. The household spirit is also met with as a mannikin with the figure of a dwarf, and in this form is known under many different names: thus the A.S. *cofgodar*, 'house-gods,' survive as *Kobolds*, or goblins; the Germans have also the *Butze*, the *Hütchen*, while in England we have Puck (Scot. 'brownie,'), and in Scandinavia the *Gardsvor* ('house-guardian'), *Tomte* ('house-spirit'), and *Nisse*. In many places it is still believed that these household spirits are the souls of deceased ancestors or other relatives.

Superstition assigned a guardian spirit not only to the house, but to the *ship*, in which he was known as the *Klabautermann* (Germ.). He dwelt in the mast, and the sailors believed that he was a child's spirit which had come into the vessel in the felled tree of which the mast was made. The *Klabautermann* warned the sailors by certain noises of any imminent danger, assisted them in their work, and, like the domestic spirit, received

payment for his services in the form of gifts. If the ship went down, he flew away, but first bade farewell to the steersman. Miners likewise had their guardian spirit, the *Schachtmandl* ('shaft-mannie'), who assisted them in the workings, and showed them where the good ore was to be found.

Another form of superstition current among all the Teutonic peoples was the belief in the demonic beings which live in rivers, brooks, and wells, in forests, in the waving cornfields, in the moving air, and within and upon the mountains, and which in many cases are hardly distinguishable from the ghostly creatures already dealt with. Imagination represented them as of human or superhuman dimensions, and as of human or animal form, according to the magnitude of the natural facts associated with them. At an early period, however, popular imagination had detached these spirits from their original habitat, and, as in the case of the dwarfs, had invested them with all manner of fabulous features and incidents, so that the natural facts which suggested them cannot always be identified in detail, and only the general form remains. This is specially true of the *giants*, who, like the dwarfs, were favourite subjects of popular poetry. But, while the dwarfs were personifications of the bountiful powers of Nature, and are therefore thought of as well-disposed towards mankind, the giants represent Nature in her hostile aspects, and thus came to be regarded as the destroyers and devourers of men. That nearly all the more impressive phenomena of Nature were personified as colossal beings of this kind, is shown by the Norse genealogy of the giants (*Fornaldarsögur* ii. 3 ff.). To the family of *Fornjót* ('the old giant') belong the following, as his children or children's children: *Hlér*, the boisterous sea; *Logi*, the wild-fire; *Kari*, the tempest; *Jökull*, the glacier; *Frosti*, cold; *Snær*, snow; *Drífa*, the snow-drift, and other effects of a severe winter. Similar gigantic beings were with special frequency suggested by mountains. Almost every mountain peak and range was a petrified giant or a seat of giants: *e.g.* Pilatus in Switzerland; Watzmann in the Bavarian highlands; Hütt, the queen of the giants, in the Tyrol, etc. The Norwegian *Jötenfjeld*, 'giant-range,' was the home of the giants. Hence the giant was called *bergbúi* ('mountain-dweller'), or *bergjarl* ('lord of the mountain'), and, in fact, the Germ. *Riese* had originally the same meaning (O.H.G. *riso*, A.S. *wrisil*, O.N. *risi*, all cognate with Gr. *ῥίον*, 'peak'). The strength of these mountain-giants is expressed in the O.H.G. *duris*, A.S. *ðyrs*, O.N. *þurs* (Skr. *turas*, 'strong,' 'powerful'); their size in the O.H.G. *Hüne* (Celt. *kunos*, 'high'); their rapacity in the O.H.G. *etan*, A.S. *eotan*, O.N. *jǫtunn*, 'the devourer.' See, further, art. GIANTS.

Certain other classes of demons, however, differ from those just referred to in that they are never dissociated from their original haunts. Among these are the *forest-spirits*, who are connected with the yearly renewal and decay of Nature, and thus, like the field-spirits (see below), become spirits of vegetation. These demons remain quiescent in the woods during winter, but awake to activity with the re-birth of Nature. In the spring the people used to carry home young trees and green shoots, in which the demons were supposed to live, and plant them near their houses, as it was believed that persons who came into contact with the branches absorbed the fresh energies of the re-awakened spirits. But the forest was likewise the abode of supernatural beings of a more independent type, and principally female in form—the 'feminae agrestes, quas silvaticas vocant' (Burchard of Worms, *Decreta*, Cologne, 1548, p. 198[b]), who appear suddenly, yield themselves to their lovers, and then as suddenly vanish. These are the 'wild maidens,' the German *Moos-*, *Holz-*, and *Buschweiber*, the *Fangen* and *Saligen*, the Swedish *skogsfrúar* (wood-nymphs), and the Danish *askefruer* (ash-nymphs) of present-day superstition. Their bodies are usually covered with hair, their faces wrinkled; they have hanging breasts and dishevelled hair, and are often clad with moss. It is a common notion that they are chased by the storm-giant, the Wild Hunter, Wode, or the giant Fasolt, and that they seek refuge among men, liberally rewarding those who succour them. These wood-nymphs are also endowed with occult powers, especially the power of curing disease—a belief originally suggested by the medicinal properties of plants found in the woods. The forest-spirits, however, are sometimes males, mostly of gigantic size, and always of the same hideous appearance as the females.

There are many points of resemblance between the forest-spirits and the *field-spirits*. The latter likewise were originally spirits of vegetation, which popular imagination first of all detached from their native sphere, and then elaborated in detail. Field-spirits grow with the stalks of grain, and become visible when the wind blows across the cornfields. The long ridges or 'backs' of the tilled land suggested the animal shape ascribed to these spirits. They are known by many different names, as *e.g.* in Germany, *Kornwolf*, *Roggenhund* ('rye-dog'), *Haferbock* ('oat-goat'), *Rockensau* ('rye-sow'), *Bullkater* ('tom-cat'), in Sweden, *Gloso* ('glow-sow'), in Norway, *Herregudsbuk* ('the Lord's goat'), etc. Sometimes, again, the field-spirits were of a human type; hence the *Kornmutter* ('corn-mother'), the *Rockenmuhme* ('rye-aunt'), the *Roggenalte* (especially in Denmark), and, in male form, the *Alte* ('old one'), or the *Gerstenalte* ('barley-gaffer'). The 'grass-demon' lived in meadows, the 'clover-mannikin' in clover-fields. When the corn was cut, the spirit flitted from one swathe to another. The person who cut or bound the last sheaf caught the 'old one,' the 'corn-mother,' etc. That sheaf was formed into some kind of figure, and presented with due ceremony to the landlord; then a dance was held around it. The ears of the last sheaf were carefully stored in the barn until the next seed-time, and then used for the purpose of stimulating the spirit of vegetation to renewed activity. But that could be secured only by killing the old spirit, and this was done by binding up a cock with the last sheaf, and then letting it loose and chasing it through the fields, till at last it was overtaken and killed. As the spirit of vegetation was believed to be in the people who happened to pass by while this ceremony was being performed, they were seized and bound by the reapers, and had to buy themselves off with a gift.

A still greater fertility of invention is exhibited by the Teutonic belief in *water-spirits*. Almost every body of water—spring and river, pond and lake, marsh and cascade—was imagined to be the abode of a spirit. These spirits varied in size as dwarfs, men, or giants, according to the extent of the masses of water with which they were associated, while fancy lent them sometimes human, and sometimes animal, shapes. Here and there they were supposed to be the souls of the dead. Departed souls were associated very specially with fountains and wells, which accordingly were regarded as resorts of the leaders of the soul-hosts, such as Frau Holle and the Wild Hunter; hence, too, the widely prevalent belief that the souls of the newly-born came from such places. On similar grounds arose in primitive times the custom of treating fountains and wells as places of divination. The spirits who haunted such places were marked out from others by their prophetic gift and their

supernatural wisdom. One of the water-spirits thus endowed was the Norse *Mimir*, into whose waters Óðin had put his eye in pledge in order to gain wisdom, and to whose knowledge he resorted when he desired light upon the future. The demons who resided in rivers, streams, and seas were in the main hostile to mankind; they tried to seize men and drag them down into the watery kingdom, and were therefore propitiated with offerings, frequently, indeed, with human sacrifices. Such hostile spirits are known to the various Teutonic peoples by variants of the name *nix* (Germ. *Nix* [masc.] or *Nixe* [fem.], Eng. *nick*, also *nixie*, Norw. *nökk*, Swed. *nækk*). The *nix* was fish-like in the lower half; the upper part, or sometimes the head only, was of human shape. He wore a green garb, and his teeth were also green. He lived with his family at the bottom of rivers and lakes. The female *nixies* were noted for the beautiful singing by which they allured human beings into their toils. They sometimes intermarried with mankind. The male *nix* was occasionally armed with a hook, with which he dragged people under the water; he was accordingly also called *Hakenmann* ('hook-man'). In Denmark the water-spirit is known as *Havmand* ('sea-man,' cf. 'merman,' 'mermaid'); in Sweden as *Strömkarl* ('river-man'); in Norway, the land of waterfalls, we find the *Grim* or *Fossegrim*, as the spirit of waterfalls; in Iceland, the *Skrimsl* ('monster'), *Vatnskratti* ('water-wraith'), and *Margýgr* ('sea-monster').

The Old Norse mythology gave great prominence to the water-demons Ægir and his wife Rán. Ægir, whose name is connected with Goth. *ahva*, 'water' and Gr. ὠκεανός, was the spirit of the calm still sea—one with whom the gods were on hospitable terms. His consort Rán—or Sjörán, as she is still designated in Swedish folklore—was of an entirely different nature. She was the man-stealing demon of the sea, a hag who had no heart in her body, and who lay in wait for sailors with her net, or tried to grasp the ship with her arms, and drag it down to the depths. Of similar character were her nine daughters—personifications of the surging billows—who during the storm offered their embraces to the seamen, and, like their mother, pursued the ship. The Miðgarð-serpent—the snake-shaped monster which coils itself round the earth—and the Fenris-wolf, which contends with Óðin at the annihilation of the world, as also Grendel and his mother, who lived in swamps by the sea, and at night stole men from the palace of the Danish king, Hróðgâr, are also frequently included among the sea-demons.

Throughout the entire Teutonic race, as we have seen, there prevailed the belief that all the natural elements were ruled by spirits, and that the good and evil fortunes of human life proceeded from soul-like, or spirit-like, beings, friendly or hostile to man. Demons and spirits caused rain, tempest, and thunderstorm. Demons pursued the sun and the moon, and brought about solar and lunar eclipses. They promoted or hindered the growth of vegetation. Disease and pestilence were their evil work. They hovered around human beings on all the important occasions of life: at birth, when they sought to gain possession of the child; at marriage, when they were specially active in mischief-making; and at death, when they endeavoured to draw the living after the dead. Savage man sought to guard himself against their machinations by all manner of ritual devices, which have left their traces in the manners and customs of the present day. He shot at them, he lit fires, he hung up glittering objects, he uncovered certain parts of the body, he avoided stepping on the threshold under which they lived, and performed endless other actions for the purpose of protecting himself or driving them away. The ideas underlying such practices, thus brought down by the Teutons from the earliest ages, are found to correspond with ideas which prevail among the primitive races of the present day.

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DEMONS AND SPIRITS (Tibetan).—The Tibetan lives in an atmosphere charged with malignant demons and spirits; and the great practical attraction of Buddhism for him is that it can protect him, so he is led to believe, against most of these supernatural enemies. Yet it should be remembered that in the higher Hindu civilization of India the ostensible object of the Brahmanical sacrifice was also to chain the demons.

The great majority of the Tibetan demons are of a non-Buddhist character. A considerable proportion of the aboriginal evil spirits have been adjusted by the Lamas to the type of somewhat analogous bloodthirsty demons in the later Tantrik Buddhism of India, and these are to be coerced or propitiated on the lines of the Indian ritual. But the larger number demand the rites of the pre-Buddhist religion to which they belong, namely, the Bon (see TIBET). These spirits are mainly personified natural forces and malignant ghosts, but several are animistic and fetishes, and all are saturated with sacrificial ideas.

The word for 'spirit,' namely *lha*, is that which is adopted for the gods of the Brahmanical and Indian Buddhist pantheon. It is applied generally to those aboriginal gods who are supposed to live in the sky, even though they be unfriendly to man. The demons, or *rDud* (pronounced *düt*), are always evil genii or fiends of an actively malignant type; Māra is considered one of them. These indigenous spirits may be broadly divided into the following eight classes:—

(1) Good spirits (*Lha*), mostly male, white in colour, and generally genial, though the war-god (*sGra-lha*) is as fierce and powerful as the greatest fiend. The countryside gods (*Yul-lha*) and the fairy guardians (*Srung-ma*) have been made defenders of Lamaism. (2) Ghosts and goblins (*Tsan*), all male, red in colour. These are usually the vindictive ghosts of discontented disembodied priests. They especially haunt the vicinity of temples. (3) Devils (*bDud*), mostly male, black in colour, and very malignant. The most malignant of all are *'Dre* (or *Lha-'dre*), male and female, or literally 'father' and 'mother.' They are persecutors of Lamaism, and cannot be properly appeased without the sacrifice of a pig. (4) Planet fiends (*gDon*), piebald in colour; producing diseases. Fifteen great ones are recognized. (5) Bloated fiends (*dMu*), dark purple in colour. (6) Ghouls and vampires (*Srin-po*), raw-flesh-coloured and bloodthirsty. (7) King-fiends (*rGyal-po*), the 'treasure-masters' (*dKor-bdag*), usually white in colour, the spirits of apotheosized heroes. (8) 'Mother' furies (*Ma-mo*), black-coloured she-devils. They are the disease-mistresses (*nad-bdag*), and are sometimes the spouses of certain of the above demons. The twelve *bStan-ma* (pronounced *Tänma*) especially inhabit the snowy ranges.

Many of the above are local genii, fixed to particular localities. Of these the most numerous are the 'earth-owners' (*Sa-bdag*), truly local spirits inhabiting the soil, springs, and lakes, like the *nāgas* of the Hindus. Others more malignant, called *gÑan*, and believed to cause pestilential disease, infest certain trees, rocks, and springs, which are avoided in consequence or made into shrines for propitiatory offerings. They are believed by the present writer to represent the spirit of the gigantic wild sheep, the *gÑan* or *Ovis ammon*, which, according to early Chinese accounts, was worshipped by the Tibetans, and the horns of which are offered on the cairns at the tops of the passes. At every temple or monastery the local spirit is represented as an idol or fresco within the outer gateway, usually to the right of the door, and worshipped with wine and occasionally with bloody sacrifice; and it is given a more or less honorific name. One of the fiercest of the country fiends is *Pe-kar* (not *Pe-har*, as spelt by some writers), who has been adopted as a special protector of monasteries by the Yellow-hat sect of Lamas. There are also the 'house-god,' the ancestral gods, and the personal spirits or familiars, good and bad, of the individual.

The representations of these spirits at their shrines, or on altars, or in their masks at the sacred plays portray them in human form, though some of them may have the head of a beast or bird, and they are pictured by the Tibetan artists as clad in the costume of the country. The local spirits sometimes may be represented by mere sticks and stones.

Living sacrifice is not offered to these spirits nowadays, but the dough effigies of animals which are offered indicate, in the opinion of the present writer, the prevalence of animal sacrifice in pre-Buddhist days. The animals most commonly represented in this way are the dog, sheep, and yak. Actual blood and the brains and flesh of animals slain by butchers in the ordinary way are frequently offered in bowls made out of human skulls, as in Indian Śaivite rites.

Of the special implements used in Tibetan demon-worship an important one is the three-cornered dagger called *pür-pa* or *pür-bu*. This is used by the priests to stab and drive off the demons, or to impale them when it is stuck into the ground. What appears probably to be a Buddhistic variation of this worship is the feast offered in charity to the devils from time to time. The spirits are summoned by the blowing of human thigh-bone trumpets and the beating of skull drums and gongs, and are afterwards dismissed in an imperative way.

The evil spirits of Indian Buddhism bear the following names in Tibetan, the latter being usually the literal etymological translation of the Sanskrit names:

Sanskrit.	Tibetan.	Sanskrit.	Tibetan.
Preta	Yi-dvag.	Unmāda	sMyo-byed.
Kumbhāṇḍa	sGrul-'bum.	Skanda	sKyem-byed.
Piśācha	Sa-za.	Chhāyā	Grib-gnon.
Bhūta	'Byung-po.	Rākṣa	Srin-po.
Pūtana and Katapūtana	Srul-po (= 'rotten') and Lus Srul-po.	Revati-graha and Śakuni-graha	Nam-gruī gdon and Byai gdon.

These, as well as the other deities of Indian Buddhism, are usually represented by Tibetan artists in conventional Indian dress, in contradistinction to the indigenous deities.

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L. A. WADDELL.

DÉNÉS.—A most important aboriginal group of tribes north of Mexico. Owing to the great temperamental disparity of its component parts, it affords an excellent field for the study of psychic peculiarities and the gradual development in opposite directions of the mental faculties. Within the bosom of that great American family are to be found extremes in more ways than one. We have the fierce Apaches in the south, and the timid Hares in the north, while the industrious Navahos of Arizona are in as strong contrast to the indolent, unæsthetic Dog-Ribs and Slaves of the Canadian sub-arctic forests. All its tribes, however, are more or less remarkable for their pronounced sense of dependence on the powers of the invisible world. Religious feeling and its outward manifestations pervade their whole lives, though by some careless travellers they have been regarded as destitute of any religion.

The Dénés, also improperly called **Athapascans**, from Lake Athabasca, the habitat of one of their tribes, are divided into Northern, Southern, and Pacific Dénés. The Northern Dénés, whose ranks are now reduced to about 19,390 souls, people the wilds of Canada from the Churchill River, and almost from the Northern Saskatchewan, up to the territory of the Eskimos. In British Columbia, the immense coniferous forests and snow-capped mountains, extending from 51° 30′ N. lat. to the northern confines of the Province, and beyond as far as the wastes claimed by the above-mentioned hyperborean aborigines, are also their patrimonial domain. Their best known tribes within that area are the Loucheux (5500 souls) in Alaska, the Yukon Territory, and the lower Mackenzie; the Hares (600), their neighbours in the east; the Slaves (1100), west of Great Slave Lake, from Fort Simpson to Fort Norman; the Dog-Ribs (same population), east of the latter, as far as Back River; the Yellow-Knives (500), a somewhat licentious tribe, to the north-east of Great Slave Lake; the Chippewas (4000) and Caribou-Eaters (1700), the first representatives of the stock in the north who ever came into contact with the whites; the Nahanais (1000), on the Stikine and, in the same latitude, east of the Rocky Mountains; and the Carriers (970), who, with the Babines (530) and the Chilcotins (450), constitute the South-western Dénés. The well-known Apaches (6068) and the numerous Navahos (27,365) form the Southern branch of the family (cf. APACHES and NAVAHOS). As to the Pacific Dénés, they consist of unimportant tribes, or remnants of tribes, scattered throughout N. California, Oregon, and Washington. Their present aggregate does not come to more than 900 souls.

When in their original state, the Dénés are eminently a nomadic race of hunters and fishermen. Nowhere, except in British Columbia, have they anything like villages or any elaborate social system. Father-right was primitively, and has remained to a great extent, the fundamental law of their society. The father of a family is con-

sidered its fountain-head, its natural chief, and the controller of the children, who, after marrying, stay with him, unless the mental superiority and better circumstances of another paternal relative claim them for his own followers. They soon form groups of kindred families, over which he presides as patriarch or head of the band. These aggregates are then the social unit, the family not being recognized as such. His power, however, is very limited: directing the movements of the band, giving orders for camping, and, occasionally, very gentle reproof are about the sum-total of his prerogatives. His influence, of course, depends greatly on the number of his suite, and their efficiency as hunters. Hence it is the Dénés' ambition to have as many children as possible, especially of the male sex. Polygamy was in honour among all the tribes. While some unimportant men had but one wife, the majority had two, and the lodges of the chiefs might contain from two to eight. D. W. Harmon ('A General Account of the Indians on the East Side of the Rocky Mountain,' in *Journal of Voyages*, N.Y. ed. 1903, p. 294) cites one who had eleven, with more than forty children, and W. H. Dall (*Travels on the Yukon and in the Yukon Territory*, p. 111) speaks of one who had 'at least eighteen wives.' A few cases of polyandry were also found among the Sékanais, a Rocky Mountain tribe.

Five methods of contracting marriage may be said to have obtained among the Northern Dénés. Marriage by mutual consent was exceedingly rare before the advent of the missionaries. Some such arrangement can, however, be placed to the credit of a few mountain tribes. 'Will you pack my beaver-snares?' the dusky youth would ask of the object of his choice. A hesitating 'Perhaps' would seal her fate, and, without further ado, the couple would thenceforth become man and wife. Wooing the bride's parents, that is, working for them and endeavouring by every possible good office to become acceptable to them, was proper to the South-western Dénés (cf. CARRIER INDIANS). The most common gateway to sexual intercourse east of the Rockies was wrestling. Two young men would publicly wrestle for the possession of a maiden, and the same took place in connexion with any married woman as well. No husband could ever consider himself secure in the company of his wife, as he was liable to see her any day snatched away from him by a stronger man. So much so, indeed, that S. Hearne, the first author to give us any satisfactory account of the eastern tribes, asserts (*A Journey from Prince of Wales's Fort to the Northern Ocean*, p. 104) that 'a weak man . . . is seldom permitted to keep a wife that a stronger man thinks worth his notice.' He adds that some professional wrestlers 'make almost a livelihood by taking what they please from the weaker parties, without making them any return' (*ib.* 105). A fourth way of contracting marriage was even more suggestive of savagery. A man would simply seize by the hair and drag to his tent the object of his passion. Finally, occasions were not wanting when women were bought as so many chattels, and cases are also on record when the same object of traffic was later ravished by wrestling from her quondam purchaser, the unfortunate creature being thus a passive party to transactions whereby she was 'married' according to the two different methods obtaining in her tribe.

From this it will be inferred how exceedingly low was the position that the woman occupied in primitive society. She was merely a drudge, the factotum of the household, a slave to her husband, buffeted even by her own male children, fond of them though she invariably was. Her fate was more satisfactory among the Navahos; and, by reason of the rank to which she might occasionally succeed, among the South-western Dénés, life was also accidentally made bearable for her, though in private life most of the menial work of the family still fell to her lot. It goes without saying that, with such loose systems governing the relations of the sexes, divorce followed in many cases as a matter of course, especially when the union had not been cemented by the birth of any children.

Indiscriminate as these matrimonial affairs apparently were, blood-relationship was always a bar thereto. But among the tribes who had adopted mother-right as their law controlling succession to rank and property, agnates were not recognized as relatives. A child hardly cared for his father, and took no notice whatever of his kindred through the male line. Hence first cousins on the father's side were considered strangers to one another, and as such very generally intermarried. On the other hand, even very distant relatives on the maternal side still call themselves brothers and sisters, as the case may be. This applies also to the members of the same clan, wherever this social organization prevails. Primitively, all marriages were strictly exogamous, the gentile tie being considered even more binding than blood-relationship. In the case of widows, the prescriptions of the levirate were scrupulously obeyed by all the tribes, and they had to marry the surviving brother of their late husband.

The dread which a woman in her catamenial periods, or immediately after parturition, inspired in a man can hardly be exaggerated. Such a creature was—indeed, continues to be—regarded as the very incarnation of evil. As soon as the first symptoms of that momentous change in the female organism appeared, the maiden was until a late date, and is still in many tribes, sequestered from the company of her fellow-Dénés. A little hut was built for her on the outskirts of the village, or some distance from the tepees of the migrating party, where she dwelt until her menses were well over, away from the gaze of the public, and visited only by some female relative, who brought her, in small birch bark vessels which nobody else could touch, the meagre fare of dried fish and water which custom prescribed for her, to the exclusion of any nourishing food, especially that derived from any large animal freshly killed. So portentous of evil was her condition deemed, that all contact, however indirect, with the living creation was denied her. Hence eating, while in her impure state, of the flesh of any game was reputed to entail a deliberate insult to all the representatives of the same species, which would infallibly take their revenge by keeping away from the traps or arrows of her relatives. She could not follow in the trail of her male companions for fear of incapacitating them for the chase; she must abstain from bathing or washing her feet in lakes or rivers, lest she should cause the death of the fish they contained. Hearne goes even so far as to say that in his time (1782) 'women in this situation are never permitted to walk on the ice of rivers or lakes, or near the part where the men are hunting beaver, or where a fish-net is set, for fear of averting their success' (*op. cit.* 315).

On her return from the hut of her first menstruation, the maiden wore, during the following three or four years, a kind of veil made of the strands of a long fringe ornamented with beads, passing over her face and resting on her breast. This Hearne supposed to be 'a mark of modesty' (p. 314). It served the same purposes as the *prætexta* of the Romans and the long outer garment of the Jewish virgins mentioned by Josephus (*Ant.* VII. viii. 1), being a badge of puberty and a sort of public notice that the wearer was marriageable. To this was added a bone tube to drink with and a two-

pronged comb to scratch her head, thereby avoiding immediate contact between her head and her fingers.

So deleterious were believed to be the emanations from the menstruating woman, that the tabu of which she was the object extended even to the contact with any weapon, or implement, designed for the capture of animals. Captain G. Back records the 'consternation' and hasty flight of a poor woman who had unwittingly trodden on her husband's gun—an offence which the explorer declares (*Narr. of the Arctic Land Expedition to the Mouth of the Great Fish River*, p. 124) did not usually meet with any lighter punishment than 'a slit nose or a bit cut off the ears.' The same legal uncleanness attached to a new mother, and a like sequestration followed, which was then protracted to a month or five weeks after child-birth. During that period the father would not, as a rule, see his child.

Speaking of legal uncleanness, we must not forget to mention that some such state was also supposed to be consequent on the shedding of human blood. Hearne relates that, after his Déné companions had massacred over twenty inoffensive Eskimos, all those immediately concerned in the affair considered themselves debarred from cooking either for themselves or for others. Before every meal they painted their upper lips and the greater part of the cheeks with red ochre. They would not drink out of any other dish or use any other pipe than their own, nor would those who had had no hand in the massacre touch the murderer's dish or pipe. This, as well as the abstaining from many parts of the game they ate, was regularly followed for an entire season, after which 'the men, without a female being present, made a fire at some distance from the tents, into which they threw all their ornaments, pipe-stems, and dishes, which were soon consumed to ashes; after which a feast was prepared, consisting of such articles as they had long been prohibited from eating; and, when all was over, each man was at liberty to eat, drink, and smoke as they pleased; and also to kiss their wives and children at discretion,' which they had previously been forbidden to do (*op. cit.* 206).

Much married as the Dénés usually were, they regarded continence as essential for success in certain undertakings. No hunter would ever dream of leaving for any important trapping expedition who had not first separated *a toro* from his wives for quite an extended period. Did he succeed in capturing a beaver or a bear, he would carefully see to it that no dog—an unclean animal—should be permitted to touch any of its bones. The skull and molars, especially, were reputed sacred, and were invariably stuck up on the branches of a tree or, more commonly, on the forked end of a tent-pole. The fear lest an unclean animal—dog, fox, or wolf—might profane the same by contact therewith was the reason prompting those precautions. Should such a dreadful contingency occur, the hunter immediately desisted from exerting himself in any way, being firmly persuaded that all his efforts towards trapping any game of the same species would prove futile.

To understand these superstitions and most of those relating to menstruating women, we must remember that, in the Déné cosmogony, all the present entities of Nature were originally endowed with human-like faculties. Even trees spoke and fought, and the fowls of the air and the animals of the earth were men like ourselves, though distinguished by potent faculties which we do not possess. These wonderful powers, though now somewhat attenuated, are supposed still to exist in the brute creation. A share of them possessed by a few privileged individuals constitutes what we call magic. This is the connecting link between man and beast, and also the means whereby one may commune with the world of spirits, and by whose aid a person is enabled to succeed in his quest after happiness and the necessaries of life. Hence the sympathy or antipathy which may exist between hunter and hunted, according to the way in which the former treats the latter. The language of the best Christianized Déné has retained to this day unequivocal traces of these zootheistic ideas. If unsuccessful in his hunt after game, the modern Déné will not say: 'I had bad luck with this or that animal,' but: 'Bears or beavers,' as the case may be, 'did not want me.' The spirits, which have their seats in the various parts of the universe and are co-existent with them, are good or bad, or rather noxious or friendly to man. The evil spirits, on the occasion of breaches of the moral law, or the neglect of the traditional observances, attack man and dwell in him, causing thereby madness, fits, and other nervous disorders, disease, and death. The kindly spirits manifest themselves to him during his sleep, or suddenly in the woods or elsewhere, under the shape of the particular entity—animal, sun, celestial phenomenon, etc.—with which they are so intimately connected that to the Indian mind mundane being and indwelling power are almost one and the same. This manifestation is a token of their wish to act towards him as protecting genii, in return for some consideration shown to their present concretized forms or symbols. These are the personal totems (*manitous*), the only ones known to the unadulterated Dénés (cf. TOTEMISM). The adopted party will thenceforth show his regard for his protector by not suffering the particular being in which it resides to be lightly treated or abused in any way; by exposing in his lodge its spoils (if an animal, or its symbol, if a heavenly orb, etc.), or carrying on his person a reminder of it in the shape of its tail, a feather flowing from his head-dress, etc. In times of need the Déné will secretly invoke the aid of his *manitou*, saying: 'May you do this or that to me!' Before an assault on his enemies, or previous to his hunt, he will daub its symbol in red ochre on his bow and arrows, or sing out in its honour a rude chant consisting of a single phrase repeated *ad infinitum*. Magic and song, in the mind of the American native, have a most intimate correlation, and few important attempts to influence the spirits one way or another are unaccompanied by loud chanting and the noisy beating of drums. Should his appeal for help be heard, he will give expression to his gratitude by burning, or throwing into the water, any piece of property on hand, goods or clothing, or in later times tobacco.

In the North this was the only kind of sacrifice known to the Dénés. At times it took a propitiatory or rogatory character, being intended to obtain favours or avert calamities. The personified elements, especially wind with the tribes dwelling on the banks of the large Northern lakes, were the most common beneficiaries of such offerings, unless we add thereto another class of spirits, which have some resemblance to the *genii locorum* of the Romans. These were believed to haunt places prominent for some natural peculiarity—the steepness of a hill, the magnitude or striking appearance of a rock, etc. It was usual for any wayfarer passing by such spots to offer a stone to the spirit or its materialized form. A custom similar to this can be traced to the wastes of Tartary (cf. Huc, *Souvenirs d'un voyage dans la Tartarie*, Paris, 1850, i. 25 f.), and the Déné practice may even be compared with the prayer-machines set up on some mountain-tops in far-away Tibet.

Instead of quietly revealing itself in a dream or a vision, the *manitou* occasionally prostrated the

Déné to the extent of depriving him of his senses. In such accidents the bystanders would never recognize a mere cataleptic fit. They would insist that the mind of the smitten individual had been attracted by some powerful spirit, with which it was communing. To them any kind of fainting malady was much the same as epilepsy to the Romans. It was a *morbus sacer*, denoting mysterious influences. Swooning is still called by the Carriers *ne-kha-uthézœt*, or the attack of a spirit. When loud chanting, enhanced by louder beating of drums, had succeeded in breaking the spell, the soul of the patient was supposed to return from the spirit world, and he was looked upon with a veneration bordering on awe. Henceforth he was regarded as possessed of the mysterious powers over Nature, and the spirits controlling it, which we call magic, and his ministrations were resorted to whenever it was a question of counteracting the influence of the evil spirits which cause disease and public calamities. In a word, he was a regular shaman, and the religious system of which he had become the chief representative was the shamanism of the north-eastern Asiatic races in almost all its purity (cf. SHAMANISM). Among the Navahos of the South this is still at the base of the religious edifice; but commiscegenation with alien stocks and the influence of environment have notably modified it by the addition of rites and elaborate ceremonies based on the remembrance of the many adventures of their culture heroes (cf. NAVAHOS).

The functions of the shaman will be found fully explained in the article SHAMANISM. Suffice it to say here that they were seven-fold among the Northern Dénés. Shamanistic conjuring with that particular American race was curative, preventive, inquisitive, malefic, operative, prestidigitative, or prophetical. A rôle which was perhaps proper to the profession in the North was that of father confessor. Auricular confession of personal delinquencies to him who might be represented as the nearest aboriginal equivalent of a priest—though he could not strictly be called by such a name for the lack of any regular sacrifice or cult—was one of the religious institutions of the primeval forests of northern Canada. Of the shaman among the Western Dénés, Harmon wrote as early as 1820:

'When the Carriers are very sick, they often think that they shall not recover unless they divulge to a priest or magician every crime which they may have committed, which has hitherto been kept secret. In such a case, they will make a full confession, and then they expect that their lives will be spared for a time longer. But should they keep back a single crime, they as fully believe that they shall suffer instant death' ('An Account of the Indians living West of the Rocky Mountain,' in *Journal of Voyages*, N.Y. ed. 1903, p. 256 f.).

The present writer had recorded the same custom long before he saw the old trader's volume. On the other hand, in the course of his *Trad. ind. du Canada nord-ouest*, p. 418 f., E. Petitot gives a Chippewa (Eastern) text furnished him in 1863 by an old shaman of Great Slave Lake, of which the following is a partial translation:

'The man who is sick as a consequence of his sins . . . sits by the shaman, to whom he confesses his misdeeds. The shaman asks him many a question, reprimands him in order to draw out the sins he conceals. . . . Finally, the patient having confessed everything, the shaman brings down on him the Far-off Spirit, his own familiar, which, entering into the sick man, takes away his sins, whereupon disease immediately leaves him.'

The greatest importance was attached to dreams. It was through the medium of dreams that most of their communications with the invisible world took place, and to this day the Dénés consider dreaming as a token of occult powers over Nature and man. For this reason they are loth to wake up any sleeping person, as he or she may just be enjoying a dream, that is, communing with the spirits. Anybody talking in his sleep is *nolens volens* regarded as a great sorcerer or shaman.

Though the spirits are much more in evidence than any other hidden power in the Déné theogony, they were not without the notion of a Supreme Being governing the world and punishing the wicked. In the West, the nature of this ruling principle was not very clear, though it was generally recognized as the great controller of the celestial forces—wind, rain, and snow. Thunder they still firmly believe to be a gigantic bird of the eagle genus, the winking of whose eyelids produces lightning, while the detonations are due to the flapping of its wings. That this Deity was, indeed, paramount and personal in the estimation of those Indians is made evident by the usual formula of their oaths. *Yuttœre sœtit'sâ*: 'That-which-is-on-high heareth me,' and *Yuttœre nalh œdœsni*: 'I say it in presence of That-which-is-on-high' (the Celestial Power), are forms used by the old Carriers to this day. The new generation has another name for the Supreme Being, based on more adequate knowledge due to the missionaries.

The majority of the North American Indians attribute the work of creation to a prodigious hero, of a human nature, but exceedingly powerful, generally more or less tricky and not too scrupulous, whose many deeds and miraculous adventures furnish the subject-matter of endless tales. This is the culture hero of the Americanists, the *Œstas* of the Western Dénés, who borrowed his personality from the N. Pacific coast tribes, and the *Yīmantūwiñyai*, 'the One who is lost across the ocean,' of the Hupas, the principal tribe of the Pacific group of Dénés. But the Eastern Dénés know of a God who is Creator as well as Ruler of the universe. He is, however, less spiritualized with them than the chief Deity of their Western kin, since they lend him human attributes. *Inkfwin-wetay*, 'He that sits on the zenith,' is the name by which the Hare Indians know him, and, according to Petitot, that tribe makes him trine: father, mother, and son. The father is in the zenith, the mother in the nadir, and the son travels incessantly from the one to the other. The father by his mere volition made the earth and all it contains, after which he lit the celestial orbs, the sun and the moon—most of the stars and constellations were originally inhabitants of our own globe—at the prayer of his son, who, having perceived the earth during one of his voyages, sang out: 'O my Father who sittest on high, do light the heavenly fire, for on that small island (the earth) my brothers-in-law (men) have been wretched for a long time' (Petitot, *Monographie des Déné-Dindjié*, p. xxiii).

Most of the tribes have also a tradition pointing to the extinction of mankind by water, with the exception of the Wise One, among the Eastern Dénés, or *Œstas*, the chief legendary hero of the Western tribes. In the legends relating these events the musk-rat and the beaver, two animals famous for their nimbleness and skill, are said to have been instrumental in reconstructing the earth, after it had been destroyed through the submersion of its highest mountains.

The sacredness of the number seven among the Jews is a matter of common knowledge. That number is among the majority of the American aborigines replaced by four; but both seven and four yield in sacredness to the number two in the legends and traditions of the Western Déné tribes.

By the side of, and in opposition to, the Supreme Being of the nation is, according to Petitot, a counterpart of our devil in the theogony of the North-eastern tribes. If we are to believe that author, the knowledge of such an entity preceded the advent of the missionaries, and it was called 'the Bad One,' 'the Forsaken One,' 'He that passed through heaven,' etc., according to the

various localities. The older Carriers call him to-day by the first-mentioned name; but the present writer is inclined to believe that they owe this notion to intercourse with the whites.

No tribe worshipped the Deity in any way; no cult of any kind, sacred dances or public prayers, obtained in the North. The only dance whose object was not mere recreation took place in connexion with an eclipse (cf. PRODIGIES AND PORTENTS [Amer.]). But in the South the Navahos have elaborate rites and know of public praying, though their requests are addressed more to the personified elements and their culture-heroes, or semi-deified ancestors, than to any Supreme Deity.

As to man, he is believed to be made up of a perishable body and a transformable, and therefore surviving, soul—if this be the proper word for an element which is perhaps as much the effect as the cause of life. The name given it by most tribes literally means in the West 'warmth.' Yet it is to-day used to designate the principle of life, while the Eastern Dénés have for the soul animating the body words varying according to the dialects, though almost all of them are the counterparts of the Lat. *spiritus*. Analogous terms serve in the West to express not the vital principle, but the outward sign of life, breath, and, by extension, life itself.

Besides this principle, or physical condition, there is *ne-tsen*, man's shadow, usually called 'second self.' This is a reflexion of the individual personality, invisible in time of good health, because then confined within its normal seat, the body, but which on the approach of sickness and death wanders out of its home, and roams about, seldom seen but often heard. Its absence from its proper corporeal seat, if too prolonged, infallibly results in death.

Finally, *ne-zul* in the Déné psychology may be said to represent the soul or surviving principle after death. Strictly speaking, the word refers to the impalpable, dematerialized remnants of one's individuality, or a transformed self adapted to the conditions of the next world. That world is very generally believed to be situated underground, and watered by a large river, in which the shades catch small fry for their subsistence, visiting their nets in double canoes—a craft otherwise unknown in N. America. Their condition there seems to be unequal, inasmuch as those who have not received the last funeral rites according to the customs of their tribes are constantly wandering, fed on mice, toads, fœtuses, and squirrels, or even cast into the waters of the big river instead of being ferried across, while others are reported to be playing on the grass, or dancing to the tune of a song, the main burden of which is the words *lhe'qa t'sethine*, 'we sleep separated from one another,' *i.e.* 'there is no more any matrimonial union between us.'

Metempsychosis was strongly believed in by the Eastern Dénés. Petitot writes in his *Monographie des Déné-Dindjié*, p. xxx:

'I have been unable to eradicate from the mind of a certain girl the persuasion that, before her birth, she had lived under a name and with features unknown to me, nor could I prevent an old woman from claiming the child of her neighbour, under the pretext that she recognized in him the migrated soul of her own late son. I am personally acquainted with several such cases.'

The art. CARRIER INDIANS makes it clear that such notions were not confined to the East. Yet, we must add that the Western Dénés now seem to have entirely discarded them, while the beliefs connected with menstruating women, the spirits, and shamanism still lurk in the minds of many, and are openly professed by a few. With others they are at best obsolescent. This re-incarnation of the soul did not always result in a mere exchange of bodies of a similar kind. The author just quoted further says that he has known a poor mother who was lamenting because an old shaman had assured her that she had seen her dead son walking by the shore of the lake under the form of a bear. He adds: 'It is seldom that we see any man of influence die without hearing soon after his former companions claim that they have seen him metamorphosed into a bipedal caribou, a bear, or an elk.'

The original mode of disposing of dead bodies in the North seems to have been by enclosing them within rough cratings made of small logs crossed at the ends, which were raised from 3 ft. to 7 ft. above ground on stout poles or posts. Any object which might have belonged to the deceased either accompanied him in his final retreat or was cast into the water, burnt, or hidden in the branches of trees. Sometimes the remains were concealed within trees hollowed out for the purpose, or naturally hollow through age and decay; but in the East it was much more usual simply to abandon them where they fell. They were never buried, except among the Chilcotins, a South-western tribe, while their neighbours, the Carriers and the Babines, cremated them, after the custom of the coast Indians.

Such were the Dénés when first met by the whites. The Apaches were the first representatives of the nation to make the acquaintance of the pale-faced strangers, in the persons of the Spaniards of Mexico. In the North, their first contact with our civilization occurred in the vicinity of Hudson Bay, where the Fur Trading Company named after that inland sea established posts, from one of which Arthur Dobbs wrote in 1744 the earliest printed reference to the race which has come to the present writer's knowledge. In 1771–72, Samuel Hearne, one of the traders, reached the Arctic Ocean in the company of a large band of Eastern Dénés, who then perpetrated the unprovoked massacre of Eskimos already mentioned. Then came Alex. Mackenzie, who, in 1789, descended the noble stream now known under his name, and in 1793 penetrated as far west as the Pacific Ocean, always accompanied by a few Northern Dénés, who did not succeed in securing him a peaceful reception at the hands of all the new Déné tribes. About 1811, the Yellow-Knives repeated on the poor Eskimos the exploit of Hearne's companions, killing some thirty of them near the mouth of the Coppermine River, and two years later a party of Rocky Mountains Dénés, acting under provocation, destroyed Fort Nelson, on the Liard River, and murdered its inmates. Ten years thereafter (1823), the Dog-Ribs and Hares, long oppressed by the Yellow-Knives, fell upon them unawares and cut off a large number of them. Then came the visits of the Arctic explorers, Sir John Franklin, Captain G. Back, and Dr. King, Thomas Simpson, Sir John Richardson, etc. The dates attached to their respective works in the following bibliography are safe indications of the epochs of their travels among the Dénés.

Finally, we have the missionaries. The Catholics reached Isle-à-la-Crosse in 1845, Lake Athabasca in 1847, Great Slave Lake in 1852, Peace River in 1858, and the Lower Mackenzie in 1859. Father Petitot, a prolific ethnographer, was the first minister of the gospel to visit Great Bear Lake, which he did for the first time in the course of 1866. The missionaries were almost everywhere well received, and readily made numerous proselytes: 1859 saw the establishment of the first Protestant mission at Fort Simpson, on the Mackenzie, after which outposts were started among the Loucheux Indians west of the Rocky Mountains. Today practically the entire nation in the North is Christian, about nine-tenths having adopted the Catholic faith, and the remainder the Protestant.

See HUPAS and NAVAHOS for Central and Southern Athapascans.

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A. G. MORICE.

DEOGARH—(Skr. *deva-gaḍa*, 'fort of the gods').—A town in the Santāl Parganas of Bengal, lat. 24° 30′ N., long. 86° 42′ E., containing the famous temple of Baidyanāth (Skr. *vaidya-nātha*, 'lord of physicians,' an epithet of Śiva). By a folk etymology the place is connected with one Baijū, a member of a Dravidian tribe, who by one account was a Gwālā, or cowherd, by caste. It is said that he was so disgusted with the laziness and indifference of the Brāhman priests of the shrine, that he vowed that he would daily, as evidence of his contempt for them, strike the image of the god with his club. One day, as he perpetrated this insult, the idol spoke and blessed him because he, though not a worshipper, had resented the carelessness of his priests. When asked to claim a boon from the god, Baijū prayed that he might be known as Nātha, 'lord,' and that the temple should be called after his name. The request was granted, and the shrine has since been known as that of Baijnāth.

It has been suggested without any valid reason that the legend implies some connexion between the present cultus and the rites of the Dravidian tribes. According to the Hindu legend, the selection of the site was due to the demon Rāvaṇa, king of Laṅkā or Ceylon, who in the epic of the Rāmāyaṇa is the ravisher of Sītā, wife of Rāma. It is said that he got possession of a famous *liṅgam* of Śiva to aid him in his fight with Rāma, and on his way south halted to purify himself at the site of Deogaṛh. Finding no water, he dashed his fist into the ground and formed the existing Śivagaṅgā lake. But, when the *liṅgam* was set down, seeing the place to be fair, it refused to move further with Rāvaṇa, and has been there ever since, known by the name of Mahādeva Rāvaṇeśvara, 'lord Rāvaṇa.' The same story is told to account for the position of many other sacred images in India (Cunningham, *Archæological Survey Reports*, viii. 143 ff.; Oppert, *Original Inhabitants of Bharata-varṣa*, 1893, pp. 137, 375).

The early history of the shrine is obscure. When the British occupied the country, they tried, but with ill-success, to manage the endowments and collect the offerings of pilgrims. Finally it was made over to the present priests, who are known as *ojhā* (Skr. *upādhyāya*, 'teacher'). In front of the temple is a remarkable structure, consisting of two massive monoliths supporting a third stone of similar shape and size. It is known as the Swinging Platform (*dolā-mañchā*), and was possibly originally used in the rite of swinging the idol. The chief temple is that of Śiva, and close by is a later shrine of his spouse, Gaurī, 'the yellow or brilliant one,' which is joined to that of her consort by festoons of gaudy-coloured cloth, thus typifying the union of the god and the goddess. At the back of the god's temple is a verandah in which suppliants for his favours—recovery from disease, the blessing of children, and so on—make their vigils. With the usual catholicity of modern Hinduism, the chief shrines are surrounded by those of the lesser gods—Rāma and Lakshmaṇa representing Viṣṇu in this Śaiva atmosphere; Sūraj Nārāyaṇ, the sun-god; Sarasvatī, goddess of learning; Manasā, the snake-goddess; Hanumān, the monkey-god; Kāla Bhairava, god of destruction; and Annapūrnā, 'she who gives wealth in grain.' But all these shrines bear marks of neglect. To illustrate the fusion of Islām with Hinduism, Gait (*Census Report Bengal*, 1901, i. 176) remarks that 'Muhammadans are often seen to carry sacred water to the shrine of Baidyanāth, and, as they may not enter the shrine, pour it as a libation on the outside verandah.'

LITERATURE.—Sir W. Hunter, *The Annals of Rural Bengal*[4], 1871, p. 191 ff.; Bradley-Birt, *The Story of an Indian Upland*, 1905, p. 311 f.; *JASBe* lii. pt. i. 164.
W. CROOKE.

DEONTOLOGY.—*Deontology* is the science of ethics. The term seems to have been used first by Jeremy Bentham. Apparently he wished to distinguish by it between duty and the principles of morals and legislation—which is the subject of an earlier work, dealing with the principles that men had to assume in their relations to each other. In deontology he evidently had in mind the principles of duty as distinct from those of prudence and interest. The work by this name, however, was posthumous, and was incomplete before his death. The term has not come into general usage. It serves, however, the purpose of distinguishing clearly between the science of mere custom and the science of obligation. The one studies actual practices; the other tries to ascertain the actions which ought to be performed as distinguished from those that may actually be done.

JAMES H. HYSLOP.

DEOPRAYĀG (Skr. *deva-prayāga*, 'the divine place of sacrifice').—A village in the Gaṛhwāl District of the United Provinces of India, situated in lat. 30° 10′ N., long. 78° 37′ E., at the confluence of the rivers Alaknandā (*q.v.*) and Bhāgīrathī. Below the village the streams now united take the name of Ganges (*q.v.*), and this is regarded as one of the five sacred places of pilgrimage on the way to the higher Himālayan peaks. The principal temple is dedicated to Rāmāchandra. It is built of large blocks of cut stone piled on each other, bulging in the middle and decreasing rapidly towards the summit, which is surmounted by a white cupola. Over all is a square sloping roof, composed of plates of copper, crowned above with a golden ball and spire. The image of the god, about six feet high, carved in black stone, but painted red except the face, is seated opposite the door, and under the eastern portion of the cupola. Before the idol is a brazen image of Garuḍa, the mythical vulture, half man, half bird, on which Viṣṇu rides. The chief rite at this holy place is ablution, which takes place at the sacred confluence of the two rivers, in basins excavated in the rock at a level a little lower than the surface of the current, which is here so rapid as to sweep away any person daring to bathe in it.

LITERATURE.—Atkinson, *Himalayan Gazetteer*, iii. [1886] 199 ff.
W. CROOKE.

DEPRAVITY.—See HOLINESS AND SIN.

DERVISH (*darwīsh*).—A Pers. word signifying 'mendicant' (corresponding with *bhikṣu*, the name borne by the Brahman in the fourth stage of his existence), applied, in Persian and Turkish and thence in European languages, to the ascetics of Islām, whose Arab. name is *zāhid*, which appears to mean originally 'satisfied with a little,' in ac-

cordance with the usage of this phrase in the Qur'ān (xii. 20). Its connotation does not appear to differ from that of *ṣūfī* (*q.v.*), 'wearer of wool,' a term applied by the early Islāmic writer Jāḥiẓ († A.H. 255 [= A.D. 868], *Ḥayawān*, i. 103) both to those Muslim ascetics and to Christian monks, who, in order to indulge their laziness, pretend to disapprove of labour and wage-earning, and make their mendicity a means of obtaining the reverence of their fellows. Most Muslims, indeed, take a less cynical view of the ascetic, who is supposed to abandon his possessions before taking to the mendicant life, in the belief that they stand between him and the attainment of the higher life. And, though many dervishes are mendicants, this is by no means the case with all; the bulk of the members of Orders belong to the labouring and trading classes. In Arab. literature the name first occurs (in the form *daryūsh*) as the epithet of one Khālid, who in the year A.H. 201 (=A.D. 816) endeavoured to organize the citizens of Baghdad for the suppression of anarchy. In Pers. literature of the 5th and 6th cents., and even later, the dervish is a holy man who has overcome the world; and in S. Arabia it is said to be used in the sense of *shaikh* as a term of dignity. In general, we may distinguish between *ṣūfī* and dervish as between theory and practice; the former holds a certain philosophical doctrine, the latter practises a particular form of life. The latter is called in some countries by the Arab. name *faqīr*, 'poor man' (plur. *fuqarā*); to those who are members of associations the name *khwān*, for *ikhwān* ('brethren'), is sometimes applied.

The practice of asceticism, and the wearing of wool in indication of it, are, of course, as early as the time of Muhammad, and far earlier; according to the most authentic accounts, the Prophet himself gave little encouragement to asceticism, which rarely suits the plans of statesmen and warriors. But the notion of religious exercises in addition to those prescribed by the ordinary ritual, culminating in ecstasy, meets us early in the history of Islām; and with this went theories of states and stages in the religious life which belong to the subject of Ṣūfiism.

It is not till the 6th cent. of Islām that we hear of actual Orders of ascetics; attempts which are made to trace them further back are mythological. In the 6th cent., however, they commenced, and in the 7th they are familiar. The unity of an Order is constituted by a special form of devotion, whereby its members endeavour to induce what spiritualists call 'the superior condition'; it usually consists in the repetition of religious formulæ, especially the first article of the Muslim creed, and each Order has its *dhikr*, as this process is called; other religious exercises of the same sort bear the titles *wird* and *ḥizb*.

The first founder of an Order is supposed to have been 'Abd al-Qādir (*q.v.*) of Jīlān, who died A.H. 561 (=A.D. 1166); but that founded by Aḥmad al-Rifā'ī, who died A.H. 578 (=A.D. 1182), was nearly contemporaneous. Of both these persons we possess biographies, and, indeed, in the case of the former a series of works, chiefly homiletic in character. In general, the founders of Orders are historical personages; some have left works, and in other cases there are authoritative treatises, revealing the mysteries of the Order, though, perhaps, in most cases these can only be acquired through oral instruction, and by persons who have undergone probation.

The founding of Orders has gone on steadily since the 6th cent. of Islām; and their enumeration is no easy matter, since it is difficult to distinguish between independent and branch Orders. Von Hammer enumerated 36, of which 12 were supposed to have existed before the rise of the Ottoman empire, and 24 to have sprung up after that event; the former number includes some that are mythical, whereas the latter is too small. The most interesting, in some ways, is the Bektashi Order, which appears to be a syncretism of Islām with Christianity, and which (according to G. Jacob, who has made a special study of it) retains many vestiges of Christian doctrines and rites. Next after this comes the Naḳshabandī, which is wide-spread; the Maulawiyyah, Rifā'iyyah, and 'Isawiyyah also play important rôles, while some political importance is ascribed to the Malāmiyyah. In certain provinces of the Ottoman empire there is a shaikh *al-ṭuruq*, or head of the Orders, who is responsible to the Government for their conduct.

The acts which enter into the life of the member of an Order are in part disciplinary, in part devotional. The devotional acts take the form of a service, called *ḥaḍrah*, which with certain communities is daily, with others weekly; probably the form which it most commonly takes is that of the repetition of formulæ, especially *la ilāha illa 'llahu*, a vast number of times with various differences of intonation, occasionally to the sound of music; elaborate rules are given in some of the books belonging to the Orders, regulating the bodily motions which should accompany the production of each syllable. *Ḥaḍrahs* familiar to visitors to the Nearer East are those of the Maulawī dervishes in Pera, who move in circles to the accompaniment of music; of the Rifā'ī dervishes in Scutari, who, first sitting, and then standing on their right and left feet alternately, and bending sideways, repeat the formula of the Unity. The same may be seen in Cairo. At the service of the Jahriyyah dervishes in Tashkent, visited by Schuyler (*Turkistan*, New York, 1876, i. 158–161), the repetition of the formulæ was accompanied by a violent movement of the head over the left shoulder towards the heart, then back, then to the right shoulder, then down, as if directing all movements to the heart. Indeed, the directions in the books of the sects imply the use of the heart in pronouncing the formula of the Unity, though the process seems scarcely intelligible. In most of the performances the motions gradually accelerate as they proceed, and different forms of ecstasy have a tendency to be produced.

Besides these services, various forms of discipline are prescribed to neophytes in many of the Orders. One of these is 'solitude,' *khalwah*, a discipline of the Khalwatīs, who are called thereafter, and who are ordered to recite long prayers in complete solitude, for which cells are provided in the monasteries (called *takiyyah*, or *zāwiyah*). With the Maulawīs the aspirant has, it is said, to serve 1001 days in the kitchen of the Order. With some other Orders the discipline consists, like the devotion, in trials of the power to recite the formula of the Unity a vast number of times with the least expenditure of breath, and promotion is made dependent on the attainment of a certain standard in this matter.

The members of the Orders are also distinguished by certain peculiarities in their attire, whether in shape, substance, or colour. Great importance is attached to the head-gear, and the number of *tark*, or gores, of which it is composed. This word in Arabic signifies 'abandoning,' and the number is said to symbolize the number of worldly vanities abandoned by the dervish. Some Orders wear gaiters; some carry stones in their belts, said to signify hunger; the Maulawīs are distinguished by a wide skirt (worn at their services) called *tannūr*, 'oven,' indicative of the oven of misfortune whence the head has been withdrawn.

'The sheikhs of the Orders wear robes of green or white cloth; and any of those who in winter line them with fur use that kind

called *petit gris* and zibeline marten. Few dervishes use cloth for their dress. Black or white felt called *'abā*, such as is made in some of the cities of Anatolia, is most usual. . . . Generally all the dervishes allow their beards and mustachios to grow. Some of the Orders still wear long hair' (J. P. Brown, *The Dervishes*, p. 214).

On the tombs of some of them are mystic signs.

In general, the dervishes are credited with mystic powers, and as early as the 7th cent. of Islām we are informed of various wonders which the Rifā'is could perform: they could eat living serpents and go into burning furnaces, of which they extinguished the fire. Some of their wonders seem to have puzzled Lane, the author of *Modern Egyptians* (London, 1846). Oman, in his work on the Muslims of India (*Brahmans, Theists, and Muslims of India*, London, 1907, p. 323 ff.), describes a fire-bath undergone by a Sayyid, trusting to the power of Ḥusain; he had apparently taken care to drench his feet with water before walking over the coals, but those who attempted to do it, not knowing how, were severely burned. Other travellers who have witnessed these miracles can often give an explanation: the serpents with which the 'Isawis play have their venom removed; similarly, in the ceremony of the *Doseh*, practised by the Egyptian Sa'dīs, whose shaikh rode over the backs of the devotees, it appears that the horse had been carefully trained, and it was arranged that he should step nowhere where serious injury could result. It is, of course, possible that in some of these cases there is no conscious imposture, and hypnotism accounts for anything that is wonderful; but in many places the holy man appears to be a low form of conjurer. The biographies of the founders of the Orders have a tendency to embody many manifestations of supernatural power; but it is probable that, like those admitted into the lives of Christian saints, they are thought to be edifying rather than historical.

The Orders of dervishes seem at an early period to have acquired a definite form of organization, of which the nucleus is the *zāwiyah*, or 'retreat'; such a place is usually built by or for the founder of the Order, and is inherited by his successors, who in most cases are his actual heirs. As the Order spreads, other *zāwiyahs* are erected, which, however, maintain a filial relation to the parent institution; *i.e.* the presidents of the former are appointed from the latter. The name *shaikh* is properly applied exclusively to the founder of the Order; his successors are *khalīfs*, i.e. 'substitutes'; it was on this principle that the successor of the Sudanese Mahdi was known in Europe as the Khalīf. The non-official members of the Order are called 'disciples' (*ṭalabah* or *murīdūn*). The head of a dependent *zāwiyah* is called *muqaddam*; the revenues are in charge of a trustee, or *wakīl*.

Membership of an Order does not necessarily interfere with the normal duties of life; the dervishes of Egypt are said to belong mainly to the class of small shopkeepers. The performances are thought, however, by some observers to have a tendency to produce insanity, or, at any rate, nervous affections. Begging is in theory forbidden by some Orders, but is usually permitted, and certain dervishes carry a bowl or wallet for the purpose.

French writers hold that the underlying idea of most of the Orders is the reclamation of the Islāmic world, and the eventual expulsion of Europeans at least from Asia and Africa; whereas another suggestion, which is perhaps nearer the truth, is that they are all in origin revivalist, not so much with the object of injuring Europeans as with that of increasing the faith of Muslims. Some systematic classifications of the Orders we owe to a number of French writers, partly employed by the French Government to investigate this important element in their African possessions.

LITERATURE.—J. P. Brown, *The Dervishes*, London, 1868; A. le Chatelier, *Les Confréries musulmanes du Hedjaz*, Paris, 1887; L. Rinn, *Marabouts et Khouan*, Algiers, 1884; O. Depont and X. Coppolani, *Les Confréries religieuses musulmanes*, Algiers, 1897; G. Jacob, *Die Bektaschijje*, Munich, 1909 (*ABAW*, 1 Kl. xxiv. iii.), Taufiq al-Bakrī, *Bait al-Ṣiddīḳ* (Arabic), Cairo, 1323 A.H.

D. S. MARGOLIOUTH.

DESCARTES.—**1. Life and writings.**—René Descartes was born on 31st March 1596. It seems to be well established, in spite of rival claims, that the place of his birth was La Haye, in Touraine, not far from Poitiers. At eight years of age he was sent to the famous College of La Flèche, recently established by the Jesuit fathers and endowed by King Henry IV. The eight years passed at La Flèche had a profound influence on Descartes' future life, and he always spoke of his instructors with the deepest gratitude. After leaving school, young Descartes, who was provided with a moderate competency from his father, proceeded to travel, though he first of all spent some time in Paris, where he found his lifelong friend Père Mersenne, who had been seven years his senior at La Flèche. On the commencement of the Thirty Years' War, Descartes volunteered for service with Prince Maurice of Nassau, then in Holland. But, while serving as an unpaid soldier, he did not lay aside his studies, and, indeed, at this time wrote certain fragmentary works, most of which are lost, such as Reflexions entitled *Cogitationes Privatæ*—discovered comparatively lately in the Library at Hanover. Amongst these early works may also be mentioned the *Compendium Musicæ*, which was not intended for publication, but was brought to light after its author's death. Of those enumerated in an inventory found after Descartes' death are: (1) *Some Considerations on the Sciences*; (2) a paper on *Algebra*; (3) reflexions called *Democritica*; (4) observations entitled *Experimenta*; (5) a treatise begun under the name of *Præambula: Initium sapientiæ timor Domini*; and (6) another called *Olympica*. Descartes' biographer, Baillet, who wrote very soon after his death, mentions yet another work entitled *Studium Bonæ Mentis*, which was addressed to a friend,—very probably Mersenne,—and which was largely biographical. In the *Cogitationes* he tells of his 'conversion' in the year 1619, when with the army in its winter quarters at Neuberg, on the Danube. Smitten with remorse for sins committed, he resolved to follow after the ways of Truth, and also to make a pilgrimage to the shrine of Our Lady of Loretto.

Descartes, on quitting Maurice's army, volunteered to serve with Maximilian, Duke of Bavaria, and chief of the great Catholic League, in his warfare with Frederick, the Elector Palatine, who had been crowned at Prague in 1619. But, as far as we can judge, the young soldier was much more occupied with his speculations than with the profession which he had taken up. Indeed, it seems very doubtful whether he actually fought at the battle of Prague, which decided the Elector Frederick's fortunes. With the Elector his children fled, and, curiously enough, one of them was Elizabeth, just four years old, Descartes' future correspondent and friend. During these exciting years the events took place which are so well described in the biographical portion of the *Method*, where Descartes tells of the mental struggle through which he passed in making up his mind as to the course he was to pursue in his future life. It was at this time that he decided to sweep away the opinions which up to that time he had embraced, so that he

'might afterwards be in a position to admit either others more correct, or even perhaps the same when they had undergone the scrutiny of Reason.' 'I firmly believed,' he said, 'that in this way I should much better succeed in the conduct of my life, than if I built only upon old foundations, and leant upon principles which in my youth I had taken on trust.'

After the battle of Prague, Descartes joined the Bavarian army once more; but it was not long before he gave up military service and started upon his travels. After nine years' absence he returned to Paris, where he was accused of favouring the secret society known as the Rosicrucians. Descartes' father put him in possession of the property to which he was entitled, and he found himself in consequence in easy circumstances. He started off on further travels almost at once, and made his way to Switzerland and then to Italy, where he redeemed his promise of making a pilgrimage to Loretto. On his return journey he made scientific investigations in regard to the height of Mont Cenis. Once more he returned to Paris; and he is said to have set aside a former inclination for the gaming table, and applied himself to serious reflexion. Finally, he decided to settle in Holland, where he believed peace and quiet as well as liberty of conscience were to be had.

In 1636, Descartes determined at last to publish, and the book known as *The Method of rightly conducting the Reason and seeking Truth in the Sciences* appeared, along with the *Dioptric, Meteors, and Geometry*, termed 'Essays in this Method.' It was written in French, unlike many others of his recent treatises, in order that it might be read by any of his countrymen who chose to do so. Its conclusions had long been cogitated, and they express the mature result arrived at by one who desired to know not only *what*, but also *why*, he believed. It is a simple and sincere record of personal experience, a 'Pilgrim's Progress' of the human soul. It was not the first important book written by Descartes. Of extant treatises we have the *Regulæ ad directionem ingenii*, written almost certainly during his earlier life, but left incomplete, and also a treatise called *Le Monde*, which was never published; but the *Method* has a place possessed by no other of Descartes' works in the estimation of posterity.

Descartes' next work was almost equally famous, *Meditations on the First Philosophy*. The *Meditations* is a study of Truth in its highest aspect. It is not, like the *Method*, a charming biography and philosophy of life: it is a more profound study of the facts of existence, and an exposition of Descartes' system in all its fullness. In this book he deals with the great question of Philosophic Doubt that was always in his mind, and discusses its relationship to true Knowledge. He asked for criticism, and found plenty of opposition to his views. There were in all seven formal 'Objections' collected from men distinguished in their several lines, and these 'Objections' were dealt with *seriatim* by the author.

The first 'Objection' was by Caterus, a Dutch theologian and an appreciative reader, who represented the standpoint of the Church; the second and sixth were collected from various sources, and represent the point of view of 'common sense'; the third is by Hobbes. By him, as by Gassendi, the fifth objector, we have the materialistic or 'sensational' standpoint clearly set forth, and in his reply Descartes gives an interesting exposition of the Cartesian idealism, which he opposes to that doctrine. Arnauld, the fourth author of 'Objections,' on the other hand, is by no means so hostile as Hobbes and Gassendi, and to him Descartes replies with suavity and consideration. He is simply concerned about the application of Cartesian principles to the doctrines of theology and morality. His sympathies are with St. Augustine, and he holds that we must *believe* what we cannot *know*. The last 'Objections,' by the Jesuit father Bourdin, are too elaborate for us in these days to follow with interest. The 'Objections and Replies' are, however, deserving of perusal, since they present very clearly the difficulties that occur in accepting Descartes' doctrine, and the arguments that may be used in their defence.

The next treatise written by Descartes was the *Principles of Philosophy*, published in Latin in the year 1644. In this book its author enunciates the same doctrines that he set forth in the *Method* and the *Meditations*. He praises his mistress Philosophy in no stinted terms. 'Philosophy is like a tree of which Metaphysics is the root, Physics the trunk, and all the other sciences the branches that grow out of the trunk.' But, having once more established his ground-work, he goes on to deal with the general principles of Physics, with the nature of body, the laws of motion, the phenomena of the heavens, and all pertaining thereto. He sets forth his theory of vortices, discusses the Ptolemaic and Copernican systems, and that other which he more or less favoured, the system of Tycho Brahe. He also discusses the nature of springs, tides, etc., and believes that the principles of geometry and mechanics are shown to be capable of supplying a satisfactory key to all the phenomena of Nature, and that no other principles can take their place. Descartes' theory of vortices is especially interesting. He represents the whole of the planetary system as being carried round the sun in a sort of vortex, while the various satellites of other planets move in lesser vortices within this vortex; the earth is in a sense at rest, as a man might be at rest who is in a boat. But, while expounding this possible doctrine, the writer shows the extremest caution, and guards himself against the suspicion of unorthodoxy by pointing out that he is merely describing what might be termed a 'working theory' of the world.

It must not, however, be thought that Descartes was merely a theorizer, to the neglect of practical experiments. In Amsterdam he frequently visited the butchers' shops to find material for his investigations in anatomy, and physical experiments were constantly being made by him. One notable example of the latter is to be found in the famous experiments made upon the barometric principle, on the mountain Puy-de-Dôme in Auvergne, which were carried out by Pascal and his brother-in-law Perier, but which, it seems clear, had been suggested by Descartes.

Descartes had many controversies during his residence in Holland, most of them with Protestant divines. In Utrecht, Voetius, Rector of the University, was a keen antagonist, and Regius, or Le Roy, was first of all a supporter and then an opponent. Descartes was ever ready to enter upon these controversies, but his quarrels sometimes ended happily. 'There is nothing in life sweeter than peace,' he is reported to have said; 'hatred can be useful to none; I should not refuse the friendship even of Voetius if I believed it to be offered in good faith.' A dispute with Fermat, the mathematician, was a famous one, and it was carried on by his followers after Descartes' death.

There was little romance in the philosopher's life. He was never married, though he had a child to whom he was devoted, and who died young. He had, however, a great friendship, which lasted from the year 1640, with the Princess Elizabeth, known as the 'Queen of Hearts,' daughter of Frederick, Elector Palatine, and Elizabeth, daughter of James II. of England. Princess Elizabeth was then living at The Hague, where her parents held a miniature exile court with their lively family of boys and girls. Descartes' letters to the young Princess are serious in tone, and nearly all are on philosophic questions, to which Elizabeth applied her mind with the greatest strenuousness, and to good effect, for her questions are put and her criticisms are made with great discrimination and understanding. The correspondence is very interesting to students of Cartesianism.

Another friendship formed by Descartes in later life was with Queen Christina of Sweden, the daughter of the great Gustavus; and it was she who caused him to travel to Sweden, where he met his death. In 1648, Descartes had visited his native land for the last time. He was pressed to go, but when he arrived he found Paris wholly occupied with the political agitation of the Fronde; and all he could say of those who invited him was that he 'would regard them as friends who had bidden him to dine with them, and when he arrived he found their kitchen in disorder and their saucepans upset.' When Queen Christina's invitation to Sweden arrived through the French Ambassador Chanut, Descartes' inclination was to refuse it, lest misfortune should befall him in this expedition also. However, Queen Christina was very pressing, and Descartes' admiration for her was unbounded, so that at length he consented to take the long journey. First of all, however, he had to see that his latest book, the *Passions of the Soul*, which was written to prove that all the

various psychological manifestations may be rationally explained by purely mechanical causes, was safely placed for publication in Elzevir's hands. Then he left the 'dear solitude of Egmont' for his new home. But his days in Stockholm were destined to be short. The exigeante young Queen was not only occupied in endeavouring to establish an Academy of which she intended to make Descartes director, but she also desired to be instructed in philosophy at five o'clock in the morning, and Descartes was in the habit of meditating in bed until late in the day. The result was what might have been anticipated in a bitterly cold climate. He fell ill of an inflammation of the lungs after nursing his friend Chanut through the same illness, and he died on 11th February 1650, at the age of fifty-four. He was buried at Stockholm, but later on, in 1666, his body was removed with considerable difficulty to Paris and laid in the church of Ste. Geneviève du Mont. In 1819 the remains were removed to the church of St. Germain-des-Près, where they now are. Descartes died in the faith of his forefathers, but it was not long before serious suspicion fell upon his teaching, and his works were placed upon the Index. Clerselier, his friend and one of the translators of his works, who after Descartes' death wrote a panegyric on his virtues, records that amongst his last words were these: 'My soul, thou hast long been held captive; the hour has now come for thee to quit thy prison, to leave the trammels of this body; suffer then this separation with joy and courage.'

In addition to the works mentioned above, there was published after his death an unfinished work entitled *La Recherche de la vérité par la lumière de la nature*, an interesting dialogue upon Cartesian principles between three friends in a country house. Another very short work is his *Notæ in Programma*, which was written in refutation of his opponent Regius (Le Roy).

2. **System of philosophy.**—It is true in more than a traditional sense that Descartes is the father of Modern Philosophy, for in him the modern spirit came into existence. His was an age when men were confronted with the new conception of Nature and of man, and were led to new methods of investigation. The great upheaval which we call the Reformation brought about a form of individualism which ended in a reaction against the new standards—judged to be as arbitrary as the old. But the real work of the Reformation had already been brought about in Protestant and in Roman Catholic alike. Man learned to be *himself*, and was no longer restrained by artificial bonds. The spirit of investigation was everywhere, all phenomena of Nature were of interest, and all men tried to obtain exact knowledge, and thereby to strengthen their powers of originality and self-reliance. The 17th century—the century in which Descartes lived—was the period in which science became a reality, and in which the scientific spirit became the spirit of the land. Historically, too, it was a time of turmoil and change. A career of bloodshed on the part of the House of Valois had been ended by the assassination of Henry III., and on the accession of Henry IV. religious warfare was brought to a conclusion: his death was an inexpressible loss to the French nation.

Descartes' work in the midst of this time of unrest and ferment was that of a great systematizer. He took all those new ideas that had come into being and endeavoured to bring them into a definite, concrete, and comprehensible system. In rejecting the old dogmas of the Schools, the New Learning came to provide something better able to satisfy the inquiring mind; it brought with it certainty of its own results. The world had become of infinite importance and interest, and it was necessary that the knowledge of it, and also the knowledge of man, should be certain and definite. The problem, then, that Descartes had to deal with was how to work out a system which should reconcile two sides, now come into prominence—the spiritual and the physical, the soul and the body, the point of view of orthodoxy and the point of view of science; and it is because this is a modern question which is before us even in the present day that the Cartesian philosophy is a modern philosophy. Descartes' attempt to bring about this reconciliation was the first of many on similar lines. His object was to arrive at certainty—a certainty which he believed could be reached only by following definite rules laid down by his *Method*, and by beginning with the Doubt which is the absolute essential before any successful quest after Truth is made—'de omnibus dubitandum est,' as he expresses it. This doubt must be applied to all those inherited traditions and beliefs which form, to his mind, a mass of incongruous opinions; we must ruthlessly reject what cannot be justified to ourselves as truth; we must free ourselves from all prejudice and uncertainty. And yet this philosophic doubt is in nowise scepticism, but the doubt that precedes true knowledge.

Descartes' system of philosophy was thus, above all, a method, and the interesting thing about this method is that it presented itself to him as his life-history might. The order of his experiences was simply the order of his method writ large. This is what makes the immortal little book called by the name of the *Method* a masterpiece of spiritual biography, as an account of moral and mental development, as it is also a masterpiece of direct and simple style. It was in his quiet room, in that cold winter with the army on the Danube, that Descartes first awoke to the fact that man is not to seek happiness here or there, for it is only to be found within him. The world and he, the spirit and the body, mind and matter, are really one. Traditions, hypotheses, assumptions of all kinds should go, and we must build again from the foundation. This may sound easy, but nothing is more difficult, and in Descartes' opinion there are only a few who should undertake the task, and those who do so must be modest and ready to accept with humility what is given them. He then states certain rules to be followed—rules which simply make for accuracy and thoroughness of thought: 'Do not accept what is not clearly known, divide your difficulties into parts so far as possible, work your way up from the easy to the more complicated—above all, omit nothing.' Such rules would seem to be rules of common sense, but they mean an accuracy of method such as no immediately preceding philosophic thinkers had dreamed of as necessary.

Knowing at last what his method of science must be, Descartes boldly attacks the great question of the foundation on which thought is based. On what does all this reasoning rest? It rests on the knowledge of self. One proposition alone cannot be doubted by man, and that is that he exists, inferred from the fact that he possesses consciousness—*Cogito ergo sum*, as he puts it in his immortal phrase. Descartes saw clearly that in order to think he must exist. His philosophy turned on the fact of his personal existence. The senses may indeed mislead us, and we cannot place absolute confidence in what has even sometimes deceived us; but, however much I may have been deceived, the fact remains that I am—I as a thinking being.

'I had the persuasion that there was absolutely nothing in the world, that there was no sky, no earth, neither minds, nor bodies; was I not, therefore, at the same time persuaded that I did not exist? Far from it; I assuredly existed, since I was persuaded. But there is I know not what being, who is possessed at once of the highest power and the deepest cunning, who is constantly employing all his ingenuity in deceiving me. Doubtless, then, I exist, since I am deceived, and let him deceive me as he may, he can never bring it about that I am nothing, so long as I shall be conscious that I am something.'

This is clearly a great step forward; it signifies that a new phase in philosophy has been entered on, a change of front as great as the Kantian transformation of a later date, which in a measure it foreshadows. 'I think' is present in all our ideas and even in doubt itself. We are brought back from the external and unrelated facts of consciousness to the basis of Truth on which all

other truth is founded. We have arrived at the conception of thought as the groundwork of all knowledge. Further on in the *Meditations* he says that in thought is found that which properly belongs to the self.

'This is alone inseparable from me. I am—I exist; this is certain; but how often? As often as I think; for perhaps it would even happen, if I should wholly cease to think, that I should at the same time cease to be. I now admit nothing that is not necessarily true; I am, therefore, precisely speaking, only a thinking being, that is, a mind understanding a reason—terms whose signification was before unknown to me.'

In this we have a firm foundation on which we can build, setting aside the old disputations of the Schools as to 'substances' and 'qualities.' Understanding or reason is for the first time made the basis in a philosophic comprehension of the world as it presents itself to us. Descartes says that the outside world is not perceived in its true signification by the senses or imagination, but by the mind alone.

'They [outside things] are not perceived,' he says, 'because they are seen and touched, but only because they are understood,' that is, rightly comprehended by thought. 'I readily discover,' he goes on, 'that there is nothing more clearly apprehended than my own mind.'

Having got so far, he goes on to apply his method; he shows how, when the mind is cleared of all preconceived notions and prejudices, what is known must be known clearly and distinctly. This signifies that we must now apply ourselves to making our knowledge absolutely certain, so that we may be sure that we are ascertaining what is truth.

'I am certain that I am a thinking thing, but do I not therefore know what is required to render me certain of a truth? In the first knowledge there is nothing that gives me assurance of its truth except the clear and distinct perception of what I affirm, which would not indeed be sufficient to give me assurance that what I say is true, if it could ever happen that anything I thus clearly and distinctly perceived should prove false, and, accordingly, it seems to me that I may now take as a general rule, that all that is very clearly and distinctly apprehended is true.'

With the attitude of doubt the so-called secondary qualities, dependent as they are on the relations of one object to another and to the sentient subject, are naturally first brought under the ban of criticism. These qualities do not appear to be fixed in any object. What remains secure is, however, what possesses the two attributes of extension and capacity of motion; and hence Descartes appeals to the truths of the mathematical sciences. Even they, however, might be false; some malevolent being may be all the while deceiving us in what we accept as truth. Hence we must reject even these apparent truths and fall back upon our own minds. Here again we find modes of consciousness in feeling, willing, imagining, etc., 'so that I must also abstract from these and concentrate upon myself as I am, without borrowing in any way from elsewhere.' In this way we reach Descartes' thinking substance, which, as he points out, is present and is affirmed, even as it denies or doubts; and on the other hand we have the external object as extension.

Descartes maintains that amongst the ideas that are clear and distinct we must recognize that of God as a Perfect Being of whom we have a clear and distinct conception. The idea of God cannot, he says, be derived from our limited existence; its origin must be in one who contains all in Himself. From the idea of perfection he infers the existence of it in God as its originator. The *idea* of perfection involves *existence*; and this is the so-called ontological argument which is so frequently brought forward by later philosophers. But, if such a God exists, we have a guarantee that we cannot be deceived, for such a perfect Being could not deceive us, and therefore we may accept the teaching of our consciousness. The errors of the atheists—no small class at the time, if Mersenne is to be believed—are by Descartes said to be due to their anthropological ways of looking at God, and to their forgetting the fact that, while men's minds are finite, God is infinite.

It is thus evident that Descartes considered that in his essence man is a thinking and unextended being who has a clear and distinct idea of body as an extended and unthinking thing, and thus that man as mind is absolutely distinct from body, and may exist without it. It is this dualistic conception of mind and body that constitutes the difficulty in forming any adequate conception of the universe according to Cartesian principles. The question arises as to how we can possibly reconcile the two sides—the outside world, or extension, as Descartes called it, on the one hand, and intelligence, or Thought, on the other—for the qualities of the object are reduced to bare extension, and those of the subject to bare thought. As a matter of fact, Descartes introduced this new view of the outside world as extended, that is, as that which occupies space and has length, breadth, and depth; and it was to this extension that he applied the mathematical reasoning for which his name is famous. And confronting it we have the Intelligence, Thought, or Reason which apprehends this external matter. This is also a profound philosophic conception. But the difficulty comes when we try to explain how the one side acts upon the other. We have before us two entities, one of which is passive and inert, and yet is acted on by a unifying intelligence endowing it with those relationships which make it comprehensible by us; while, on the other hand, we have the mind, which is wholly immaterial and spiritual. How is the transference effected from the natural to the spiritual? How does the physical action convey anything to the perceiving mind? Doubtless there was in Descartes' mind a solution of the difficulty. He would have considered that there is a unity to be found in thought; but, if this is so, the idea is by no means clearly worked out. Indeed we have but intimations of it which are only comprehended in the light of later developments in thought. The mind is conscious of the infinite as having in it more reality than the finite substance.

'Our consciousness of God is prior to our consciousness of self. For how could we doubt or desire, how could we be conscious that anything is wanting to us, and that we are not altogether perfect, if we had not in ourselves the idea of a Perfect Being in comparison with whom we recognize the defects of our nature?'

Though there is no doubt that Descartes' system was a dualistic one, the progress made by him in his search after truth was immense. He took knowledge as the one great and important fact, and sought out its elements as best he could. He played a notable part in the great discovery which meant so much in his age, that the world is governed by law. It has been said of him that 'he established liberty of mind and sovereignty of reason.' In his writings he brought the whole of Nature within the reign of law, and showed how both the starry heavens and the earth beneath are governed by the same inevitable physical law. He showed also how such views are consistent with a philosophic outlook. Perhaps one of his greatest claims to our gratitude rests on his work in Mathematics (see below), that is to say, not in his well-known discoveries in Geometry and in the development of the application of Algebra to the solution of Geometrical problems, important as these might be, but, in the large sense of the term, in his scientific work; for Mathematics in those days included all the immense amount of work done in the direction of Physics, Astronomy, Optics, Physiology, and the other branches of science. Descartes was not an investigator of the type of the present day—a patient observer of a mass of phenomena from whose careful examination

some results might be deduced. He had his theories well defined before he began his work, and laid them down in what we should consider a dogmatic fashion. But, this granted, he applied himself to examine man in all his aspects. In Physiology, for instance, he forms his theory, and then enunciates it, explaining how the human body might be and might act. A great deal—indeed most—of what he tells us about the physiology of the body, though very interesting and in a degree enlightening, is not correct in the view of later investigation. But then Descartes has the credit of maintaining the theory of the body as a machine, a very complicated machine of course, but one which acts as a machine. He narrated what he knew to be true about the machine, and also what he considered was probably true, and formed the whole into a system which was perfectly clear and intelligible to those who had only the facts presented before them. In our view, many of these 'facts,' both physical and physiological, are to the last degree absurd, but still it was better to have a comprehensible theory such as he gives than nothing at all. That is to say, it was better to have a principle capable of verification or subsequent alteration than to remain in the confusion of the theories of the day. He pictured a physical world in which everything was explained—springs, rivers, mines, metals, seas—sometimes explaining facts that were not facts at all. He also pictured, in his works *de Homine* and *La Formation du fœtus*, a wonderful machine-man carrying on all the processes of digestion, circulation, growth, sleep, etc., and endowed with sense-perception and ideas, memories and passions, just as though it were a complicated clock. To him to know the beginning of things, and the laws that govern action, was to know the whole, for the operation of physical law, once set in motion, can clearly explain the rest. This same principle is to be found in the most advanced theories of the day, as Huxley, in writing on the automatism of animals, tells us. Huxley declares that Descartes' physiology, like the modern physiology of which it anticipates the spirit, leads straight to materialism. On the other hand, by the fact that it is based on conscious thought, it is as true to say that it leads us directly to the idealism of Berkeley and Kant. As a matter of fact, we see, by the way in which the Cartesian philosophy developed, that, if in the one direction it made for a materialistic system, in the other it brought about the conclusion that all the knowledge we can have is a knowledge of our states of consciousness. But the first step taken was that represented by the pantheism of Spinoza. The Infinite alone is affirmative, the finite only is in so far as it is not; and so we are led on to the denial of the finite, and then the absolute unity swallows up all difference in itself.

In his last published treatise, the *Passions de l'âme*, Descartes shows how the various psychological manifestations may be explained by purely mechanical means. He sets forth there the differences between soul and body; thought pertains to soul, and heat to body. The soul cannot give heat to the body, or we should not have death: a dead man, in Descartes' view, is just a broken watch. After explaining how this wonderful machine, when wound up, acts, he considers the thought pertaining to the soul, *i.e.* the actions of our will which directly proceed from and depend on it, and the passions which are the various kinds of perception found in us. 'The soul from its seat in the gland in the middle of the brain spreads abroad throughout the body by means of the spirits, nerves, and even blood, which last, participating in the impressions of the spirits, can carry them by the arteries into all the members.' If the image which is unified in the gland inspires fear, and has relation to what has formerly been hurtful to the body, the passion of fear is aroused, and then the passions of courage and the reverse, according to the temperament of the body, or strength of the soul. Passions are thus caused by the movement of the 'spirits,' and bring with them certain movements of the body. The will, however, unlike the passions, is always free; the action or will of the soul can only be indirectly affected by the body, while the passions depend absolutely on the actions which bring them about, and are only indirectly affected by the soul, excepting when it is itself their cause. The soul, however feeble, may indeed obtain absolute power over the passions, although with difficulty. The reason may give us a just appreciation of the value of good and evil, and our good judgment regarding them enables us to resist the influence of our passions. 'If we clearly saw that what we are doing is wrong,' he says in the same book, 'it would be impossible for us to sin, so long as we saw it in that light.' Will and intellect must be united in the perfect man, as they are united in God. Here also we are met with the unexplained difficulty as to the action of mind on matter. How the movement of the passions can be altered by reason is a question which is not answered.

[3. **Services to Mathematics.**—From the time of the Greeks until that of Descartes, practically no new results had been obtained in Geometry, though Algebra had been greatly advanced, notably by Cardan and Vieta. Descartes made great progress in Algebra, and gave new life to Geometry by the introduction of the powerful analytical method.

Descartes was not the first to realize that a curve might be defined as the locus of a point whose distances from two given straight lines are connected by some known law, but he was the first to see that the points in a plane are completely determined by their co-ordinates and conversely. This was largely due to the introduction of negative co-ordinates. As a necessary consequence, he saw that several curves might be drawn with the same axes, and their intersection found algebraically. After this, their tangents were easily determined, though Descartes' own method was indirect, and applicable only to curves with an axis of symmetry. On this axis he found the centre of a circle touching the curve at any given point, and then found the tangent to the circle at the point of contact. He defines the tangent as the limiting position of the secant.

Descartes classifies curves according to the relation of the velocities of the lines moving parallel to the axes, by whose intersection he conceives the curves as generated. If these velocities are 'commensurable' (*i.e.* if y is an algebraical function of x as in conics), the curve is 'geometrical'; if not (as in the cycloid), it is 'mechanical.' This is roughly equivalent to the Newtonian division into algebraic and transcendental curves. In order further to classify the 'geometrical' curves he discusses a problem, due to Pappus, which may roughly be enunciated as follows: 'To find the locus of a point the product of whose perpendiculars on m straight lines is proportional to that on n others.' Where $m=n=1$ we have a straight line, where $m=3$, $n=1$, a parabola. This was known to the ancients, who had also conjectured that $m=n=2$ gave a conic. Descartes classed curves where neither m nor n exceeds 2 as of the first *genre*; where neither exceeds 4, as of the second *genre*, and so on. Thus one *genre* corresponds to two of our degrees. He also discussed curves which are the loci of a point whose distances from the fixed points are interdependent, in particular the Cartesian ovals, where the product of the distances is constant.

The foregoing work is found in the first two books of the *Géométrie*; the third book is algebraic. It is important as introducing our modern index-notation, and the use of the last letters of the alphabet for variables (Vieta had used the vowels), and the first for constants. Descartes also used negative quantities and indeterminate co-efficients freely, and was the first to realize the advantage of taking all the terms of an equation to one side. The book is mainly occupied with the theory of equations. It shows how to construct an equation with given roots, to determine from the signs of the co-efficient a limit to the number of positive and negative roots, to increase or multiply the roots of a given equation by a given quantity, to eliminate its second term, and so on. It is proved that the number of roots of an equation is equal to its degree. Solutions of cubic and quartic equations are given, and Descartes believed that his method could be extended to those of higher degrees.

Descartes' Mechanics is largely inaccurate, but very suggestive, being the first systematic account of the universe on mathematical principles. Of his ten Laws of Motion the first

two correspond to Newton's first Law, while the other eight are incorrect. But, by his recognition of the mutual independence of the resolved velocities of a moving particle, he rendered invaluable service to Dynamics.

His work is throughout characterized by great originality and boldness of thought. It is generally in a condensed form, and meant rather to be suggestive than rigidly logical, but it is none the less important as the foundation of all modern Mathematics.—J. B. S. HALDANE.]

LITERATURE.—The tercentenary of Descartes' birth was celebrated at the Sorbonne on 31st March 1896, and in the beginning of the following year arrangements were made for issuing a new edition of his works under the direction of Charles Adam and Paul Tannery (Léopold Cerf). This admirable work is now completed, though not in the lifetime of Tannery. In it we have, as far as possible, a complete edition of Descartes' works in the tongues in which they were written, and with his invaluable correspondence carefully edited and arranged. The final volume is a biography by M. Adam, *Descartes, sa vie et ses œuvres*, 1910. The early editions of the collected works were two Latin texts—one by Elzevir in 9 vols., Amsterdam, 1713, another published in 7 vols. at Frankfort, 1697. Then there is Cousin's Fr. ed. in 11 vols., Paris, 1824–26. This includes the correspondence. The main source of our information about Descartes' life comes from the *Vie de Descartes*, written by Baillet in 1691 in two large vols.; of this a short abridgment was made, and issued in English in 1692. A modern life of Descartes (*Descartes, his Life and Times*) was published, London, 1905, by Elizabeth S. Haldane. Foucher de Careil published various manuscripts which he discovered in the Library at Hanover. The *Method, Meditations*, and part of the *Principles* were translated into English by J. Veitch, London, 1879, and an Eng. ed. of Descartes' Philosophical Works by E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross has been issued (1911) by the Cambridge University Press.

The Literature on Descartes and Cartesianism is enormous; the following works may be mentioned: J. Millet, *Hist. de Descartes avant 1637*, and *depuis 1637*, Paris, 1867–1870; F. Bouillier, *Hist. de la philos. cartés.*, Paris, 1854; A. Foucher de Careil, *Descartes et la princesse Palatine*, Paris, 1862, also *Descartes, la princesse Élisabeth et la reine Christine*, Paris, 1879; J. P. Mahaffy, *Descartes*, in Blackwood's Philosophical Classics, 1880; N. Smith, *Studies in Cartesian Philosophy*, London, 1903: Alfred Fouillée, *Descartes*, Paris, 1903; Louis Liard, *Descartes*, Paris, 1882; see also the various *Histories of Philosophy*, such as that of Kuno Fischer (Eng. tr., London, 1887); E. Caird, art. 'Cartesianism,' in *EBr*[9]; J. Iverach, *Descartes, Spinoza, and the New Philosophy*, Edin. 1904; Huxley deals with Descartes' teaching in his *Lay Sermons*[6], London, 1877, and elsewhere.

E. S. HALDANE.

DESCENT TO HADES (Ethnic).

1. Introductory.—Myths or legends of visits paid by mortals or immortals to the under world for some definite purpose are of common occurrence, and some are of remote origin. They are intimately connected with primitive and savage man's ideas of death and of the dead, joined to his affection for those who have been severed from him by death.

Before a separate abode of the dead was imagined, and while yet they were believed to exist in the grave or to hover round their old haunts, a living man saw—in dreams, in trances, or in hallucinations—the dead, and believed that they had come to him, or that his spirit had gone forth to join them for a time. So, when a separate land of the dead became an article of primitive belief, men believed that they visited that land in dreams or trances, or those who had been given up for dead but had revived told how they had been to the Other-world and had been permitted to return and resume their earthly life. Preconceived notions of the nature and scenery of that world coloured such dreams, but these in turn gave support or added to current ideas regarding it. There was nothing improbable in such dream or trance visits, since the nature of death is never really comprehended by savages, and the division between life and death is slight, universal folk-belief telling of the restoration to life of the dead or dismembered (see *CF*, chs. iii. iv.).[1]

But, in considering the origin of mythic descents to Hades, primitive and savage affection for the dead must also be taken into account. Generally the savage fears the dead or their spirits, but in individual cases affection often overcomes fear, and gives rise to the wish to see and commune with them. Hence it also influences the dreams of the living. And, the division between life and death being slight to the primitive mind, while it was also believed that the soul of the dying or recently dead could be recalled, affection would easily suggest that, if men could go in dreams to the Other-world, they might go there in their waking state to rescue the dead. From possibility to fact, from the 'might be' to the 'had been,' was an easy step to the primitive mind. Thus accounts of visions of the Other-world easily passed into tales of visits there, because in dreams the savage believes not merely that he is a passive witness, but that his soul is projected from his body and actually goes to the place of which he has a vision. Stories of actual journeys to Hades to bring back a dead wife, lover, or friend were perfectly credible, because generally the entrance to it was well known or had a local situation, though the road was often difficult and dangerous.

Examples of such ways or entrances are copious in Polynesian and Melanesian belief, and there are also W. African, Eskimo, and Ainu instances. In Italy and Greece there were many local entrances to Hades—some of them the scene of mythical descents. Mediæval Christianity also knew several entrances to purgatory or hell, *e.g.* volcanoes like Etna (cf. Tert. *de Pœnit.* 12); the cave in an island of Lough Dearg in Ireland, known as St. Patrick's Purgatory; the 'vale perilous' in the kingdom of Prester John, etc.; and the belief is found in Brittany, where it is thought that hell can be reached by a journey (Le Braz, *Légende de la mort*[2], Paris, 1902, i. pp. xxx, xxxix). Cf. also local entrances to a subterranean fairy-land.

Dream or trance visits were probably the first subjects of story or myth,[1] but they must soon have been succeeded by tales of actual descent. Other motives besides the rescuing of, or speaking to, the dead (doubtless suggested by these) are found—to seek a boon, or to satisfy curiosity—while in some of the higher religions the object occasionally is to enlighten the dead or to free them from torment. In early times, as in actual savage life, there must have been many stories of visits to Hades by named, but more frequently by unnamed, heroes or heroines. But, with the advance of religious ideas, the stories were usually told of semi-divine heroes or divinities, as many examples show (see below). All such stories and myths of descent are paralleled by similar tales of ascent to a heavenly region (see BLEST, ABODE OF THE [Primitive and Savage], § 8; Hartland, *Science of Fairy Tales*, 1891, p. 224 f.; Scott, *Demon. and Witchcraft*, ed. 1898, p. 29; Görres, *Die christl. Mystik*, 1842, bk. v. ch. 5).

Tylor (ii. 48) maintains that descent to Hades was suggested to 'the ancient myth-maker, who watched the sun descend to the dark under world, and return at dawn to the land of living men.' But, though this natural phenomenon may have coloured later myths, it was rather man's dream experiences which suggested the tales. Some writers connect the myths of Ištar and Tammuz, of Dionysos and Semele, of Orpheus and Eurydice, with the myth and ritual of the death and revival of a divinity of vegetation, fertility, etc., and find their origin in these. J. E. Harrison (*Prol. to Study of Greek Rel.*[2], Camb. 1908, p. 603) says: 'Anyone who realizes Orpheus [whom she regards as a historical personage] at all would feel that the intrusion of desperate emotion puts him out of key. Semele, the green earth, comes up from below, year by year; with her comes her son Dionysos, and by a certain instinct of chivalry men said he had gone to fetch her. The mantle of Dionysos descends on Orpheus' (cf. also *CGS* ii. 651; Tiele, *Actes du vme Congrès intern. des Orient.* ii. 1. 495). This is to reverse the order of things. Precisely similar tales are told elsewhere of personages in no way connected with vegetation, while Eurydice, unlike Semele, does not rise again. Such tales doubtless existed in Babylonia and Greece, and they would easily become part of, and give precise form to, the myths of vegetation-divinities who were thought to die and come to life again. But it is certain that the latter belief did not originate the tales themselves. For another theory connecting them with supposed death and renewal in rites of initiation, see Van Gennep, *Les Rites de passage*, Paris, 1909, p. 131.

2. Dream or trance visits.—Catalepsy and trance are hardly distinguishable by the savage from death. Hence those who revive from them are

[1] Cf. also the myths of Attis, Zagreus, Osiris, etc.

[1] In Jewish and Christian legend both Hades and Heaven are often visited or seen in vision.

thought to have died and come to life again; and, in many cases, their minds being haunted by the current ideas of Hades, they relate as actual visits of the soul there what has been experienced in dream (Tylor, ii. 48). Such trance visits of the apparently dead are also known at higher levels, where detailed stories of the visit—all greatly alike—are told (Plato, *Rep.* x.; Pliny, *HN* vii. 52; Aston, *Shinto*, 1905, p. 181; Scherman, *Gesch. der ind. Visionslitt.*, Leipzig, 1892, p. 91 ff.; Aug. *de Cura pro mortuis*, 12; Greg. the Great, *Dial.* iv. 36). Or the dream experiences may occur in ordinary sleep, or accompany the hallucinations of illness. In some cases they have assumed the stereotyped form of a folk-tale. A Maori woman told, on returning to consciousness, how her spirit descended to *Reinga*, the place of the dead, exactly like this world. Her father's spirit commanded her to return and look after her child, and to beware of eating the food of *Reinga*. She was pursued, on leaving, by two spirits, but escaped them by throwing down a root which they stayed to eat. Then her spirit rejoined her body (Shortland, *Trad. and Sup. of the N. Zealanders*, 1856, p. 150; for another tale see his *Maori Rel. and Myth.*, 1882, p. 45). In a story from the Hervey Islands the spirit of a man apparently dead descends to Hades, but by a stratagem he escapes being eaten by the hag Miru, its ruler, who bids him return to earth (Gill, *Myths and Songs of the S. Pacific*, 1876, p. 172). In a Japanese story Ono-no-Kimi died and went to Hades, but was sent back by its ruler because his allotted time was not exhausted (Hearn, *Unfamiliar Japan*, 1894, i. 68). Many stories of dream visits to the land of the dead are found among the American Indians, with elaborate descriptions of that land, based on current beliefs, and telling of the dangers of the way, the narrow bridge spanning the river of death, and the life of the spirits (Schoolcraft, *Ind. Tribes*, Philad. 1853–6, iii. 233; Tanner, *Captivity and Adventures*, N.Y. 1830, p. 290, etc.).

Savage medicine-men very commonly claim the power of sending their spirits during a trance into the under world. Thus the Eskimo *angekok* is securely bound and, during a dark séance, visits the *torngak*, or spirit, in Hades. He then appears unbound and gives an account of his visit (Crantz, *Hist. of Greenland*, 1820, p. 269). In Melanesia a wizard sent his soul during a trance to *Panoi* (Hades), where it spoke with the dead about whom their friends were anxious, and professed to be able to bring them back to earth. This is a common belief in all the islands of the group. Burlesque parodies of these and other tales of descent exist (Codrington, *The Melanesians*, Oxford, 1891, p. 277). Sorcerers in Borneo who have visited the under world will show a piece of wood or stone given them by the spirits there (*L'Anthrop.*, Paris, x. [1899] 728; cf. ANCESTOR-WORSHIP, vol. i. p. 429[a]). Among the Karens, necromancers claim the power of going into the unseen world to bring back the *la*, or soul, of a sick man when it has wandered away (Mason, *JASBe* xxxiv. 201). In Siberia the shaman is supposed to conduct the souls of the dead to the lower world and there secure for them a favourable welcome by gifts of brandy (Radloff, *Aus Sibirien*, Leipzig, 1884, ii. 52 f.). For a Chinook instance of the souls of shamans visiting Hades to recover the soul of a sick man, see CHINOOKS, vol. iii. p. 562.

Visions of Hades were doubtless known to the ancient world, and they may have suggested an artificial introduction of them for religious or other ends. Thus, at the sanctuary and cave of Trophonius in Lebadeia, the inquirer, after a due ritual, descended to an underground region, where he was perhaps shown scenic representations of Hades, or, under the influence of mephitic vapours or narcotics, fell into a trance and experienced in dream what he deemed to be realities. These experiences, to judge from the vision of Timarchos, were visions of the Other-world, of Tartarus and Elysium (Plutarch, *de Gen. Socr.* 21 ff.; Paus. ix. 39. 5 ff.). But a literary use was also made of tales of such dream experiences, and there are many accounts of descents to Hades or visions of the Other-world, *e.g.* the visit of Odysseus, Plutarch's stories of Thespesius and Antyllus (*de Tard. Just. Div.*; Euseb. *Præp. Evang.* xi. 36), the visit of Æneas, Lucian's story of Cleodemes (*Philops.* 25), as well as burlesque accounts of descents to Hades—that of Dionysos in the *Frogs* of Aristophanes, and that of Menippus told by Lucian (see also Rohde, *Psyche*, Freiburg, 1894, p. 289). The scenes of Hades, as described in Homer, were reproduced by Polygnotus on the walls of the Lesche at Delphi (Paus. x. 28. 4).

A late Egyptian demotic papyrus of the Ist cent. A.D., but probably representing a story of far earlier date, tells how the high priest of Memphis, Setne Khamuas (*c.* 1250 B.C.), descended, under the guidance of his son, Si-Osiri, to the *Tê* or *Duat*, where he saw the judgment of souls and the various halls of Amenti, or Hades, and the state of the dead there (Griffith, *Stories of the High Priests of Memphis*, Oxford, 1900, p. 45 ff.). In Hinduism and Buddhism there are many stories of visions of hell or of visits paid there, perhaps based on actual visions induced by meditation and asceticism, and shaped in accordance with the current dogmatic beliefs. They served to buttress the latter, and were perhaps regarded as reminiscences of actual experiences in a previous existence. In other instances they are told of people who fell into a trance, or whose souls were summoned too soon to the Other-world and were then permitted to return to the body (Scherman, 91 ff.). In later Parsiism the *Book of Ardā Vīrāf* (ed. Haug and West, Bombay, 1872) relates how this pious Parsi priest was selected by lot to take a narcotic, so that his soul might go, while he was still alive, from this world to the next and bring back a report of the fate of souls. The bliss of the righteous and the tortures of the wicked are described in detail, and the book is still read and firmly believed in by all classes of the Zoroastrian community. Several editions of it exist in both prose and verse. In later Judaism the authors of such works as the *Book of Enoch* (ed. Charles, Oxford, 1893) and the *Book of the Secrets of Enoch* (do. 1896) describe visits to Sheol and to the various heavens, with their different divisions for the righteous and the wicked. There can be no doubt that most of these narratives, especially where they describe the punishments of sinners and the bliss of the righteous, served the purpose of teaching a dogmatic eschatology and of urging men to live righteously.

The same phenomena are met with in the history of Christianity. There are records of genuine visions of the Other-world such as have been experienced by the devout or imaginative in all ages, and based on recollection of what had been heard or read, as Tertullian shows of a female visionary known to him (*de Anima*, 9). Of such a class are the visions of SS. Perpetua and Saturus, with their reminiscences of passages in canonical or apocryphal Scriptures (Robinson, *Passion of S. Perp.* [*TS*, Cambridge, 1892, i. pt. 2]). But there are also innumerable literary versions of visionary or actual visits to hell, purgatory, and paradise, perhaps based on these, but in many cases borrowing from pagan or Jewish sources. This is most marked in the description of the various divisions of Hades (found in Egyptian, Oriental, and Jewish instances), and in the frequent mention

of the narrow and dangerous bridge of the under world, an early instance of which occurs in the *Dialogues* of Gregory the Great (iv. 36; see also art. BRIDGE). The prototype of all these visions, to which Dante gave immortal form, is found in the *Apocalypse of Peter* (*c.* A.D. 100–150), on which many later visions are based. These stories (which, with wearisome iteration, tell how the seer or visitor or, in some cases, the soul of the dead person raised to life by an apostle or saint[1] was led through the regions of torment, of purgatory, or of paradise) were highly popular in the Middle Ages, when there existed a passionate desire for exact details of the Other-world, and they were used to enforce dogmatic teaching. But they were burlesqued as early as the 11th cent., and also in later times in the *fabliaux*, by the troubadours, and by Rabelais, who helped to discredit them (Wright, *S. Patrick's Purgatory*, 1844, p. 47; Lecky, *Hist. of Europ. Morals*[9], 1890, ii. 232; Rabelais, bk. ii. ch. 30). Their scenes were also reproduced by art, *e.g.* on the walls of ancient Greek churches, just as Dante's poem affected Italian painting from the time of Orcagna onwards (see Henzey, 'Les Supplices de l'Enfer d'après les peintures byzantines,' *Ann. de l'assoc. pour l'encourag. des études grecques*, Paris, 1871, p. 114 ff.). The cave of Trophonius had also its double in the Irish St. Patrick's purgatory, exploited from at least the 12th or 13th century. After ritual preparation, the pilgrim was allowed to enter, and, in the windings of the cavern, under the influence of its hot vapours, he fell asleep. In most cases his dreams took the form of preconceived notions of purgatory, but this was not always the case, and sometimes the pilgrim perished in the cavern (Wright, 139, 153, 135). Possibly some scenic representations may have been used, and there seems to have been actual bodily experience of pains and torments which remitted some of the future penalties. Several literary accounts of visits and visions at this famous spot, beginning with that of the descent of Owain in 1153 by Henry of Sawtrey (of which English and French versions exist [D. Laing, *Owain Miles*, Edin. 1837; Marie de France, *Poésies*, ed. Roquefort, Paris, 1820, vol. ii.]), had a great vogue in Europe.

In the Norse Elder Edda the 11th or 12th cent. *Sólarlióðh*, ascribed to Sæmundr, describes a son's vision of his dead father, who tells him of his death, and how he at last reached the place of torment, and saw the tortures inflicted there on various classes of sinners. Then he describes the joys of heaven. Pagan and Christian ideas are curiously intermingled, as if the poet had held the two faiths at once, or was a heathen with glimpses of Christianity (Vigfusson-Powell, *Corp. Poet. Boreale*, Oxford, 1883, i. 202 ff.).

3. Descent to rescue a dead relative.—This series of stories is one of the most pathetic in all mythology, showing man's instinctive belief that love is stronger than death, while the savage examples are quite as touching as those from higher levels. Of the savage legends, the most numerous versions occur among the Amer. Indians, Polynesians, and Melanesians.

A Wyandot story tells of a brother who went to the land of souls to recover his sister. He met an old man, who gave him a calabash in which to put her spirit. After some failures he captured her, and hastened back to earth. There he summoned his friends to witness the revival of the dead body, but a woman opened the calabash, and the spirit flew back to the land of souls (Schoolcraft, ii. 235). There are numerous variants of this tale, and generally, through curiosity or the breaking of a tabu, the soul escapes (see Dorman, *Prim. Superst.*, Philad. 1881, p. 43; Lafitau, *Mœurs des Sauv. amér.*, 1724, i. 402; Charencey, *Le Folklore dans les deux mondes*, Paris, 1894, p. 280 ff.; *NR* iii. 530 f.; BLEST, ABODE OF THE [Prim. and Savage], vol. ii. p. 685[b]). In some cases a woman's spirit is allowed to return to her husband without his visiting the land of souls, but again he loses her, or he himself dies through breaking a tabu (*2 RBEW* [1883] 103; *NR* iii. 531).[1] Tales of the latter class are analogous to those of the Dead Mother or Wife cycles (*CF*, p. 42 f.; Sandys' tr. of Ovid's *Metam.*, Oxford, 1632, p. 354; cf. the Maori tale, § 2 above). In a Polynesian tale a woman fell into *Avaiki*, or Hades, and her husband descended to release her from the captivity of the spirits. He heard her crying in the hut where she was imprisoned, and, going to her, bade her escape. He remained, imitating her voice, and then fled. The spirits pursued, but he, catching his wife in his arms at the chasm which led up to earth, escaped with her just in time (Gill, 221 ff.). A beautiful Maori story tells of Pané, who died of love for Hutu. Hutu prayed to the gods, who showed him the way to *Reinga*, telling him not to touch the food offered him there. He amused the spirits by making them sit on the top of a tree fastened by a rope to the ground. When the rope was let go, they were shot up into the air. Finally, Pané appeared, and took her place by Hutu's side on the tree. When the rope was freed, it caught in the creepers far above, up which Hutu escaped with her to earth (Clarke, *Maori Tales*, 1896, p. 1 ff.; cf. p. 126 for a story of a chief who went to *Reinga* to recover his dead wife). In Melanesia such stories are common. A woman descended to *Panoi* to see her dead brother, first giving herself a 'death-like smell.' She was supposed to be a ghost, and conversed with her brother, who bade her touch no food there lest she should be permanently detained. Again, a wizard, descending in the spirit, took with him a man who wished to recover his wife. He begged her to return, but she said it was impossible, and gave him an armlet for remembrance. He seized her hand, and tried to drag her away, but it came off and her body fell asunder, for in *Panoi* ghosts have a substantial frame (Codrington, pp. 227 f., 286). For other S. Pacific tales, see Bastian, *Allerlei aus Volks- und Menschenkunde*, i. 8, 111 ff.

At higher levels these tales are told of gods, and have become myths. In early Japanese mythology the goddess called 'the Female-who-invites' died and went to *Yomi*, or Hades. Her brother-husband, the Male-who-invites, followed her there and invited her to come back. She told him he had come too late, as she had eaten of the food of Hades, but that she would consult its deities. Meanwhile he was not to look at her. Impatient at her absence, he lit one of the teeth of his comb and found her rotting. He thus put her to shame, and she sent the Ugly Female of Hades to pursue him; but he stayed her by casting articles behind him which changed to food, which she stopped to eat.[2] She then sent the Thunder Deities and warriors in pursuit, but he smote them. Finally, she pursued him herself, but he blocked the way with a great rock. The goddess is now the Great Deity of Hades (*Kojiki*, tr. Chamberlain, Suppl. to *TASJ* x. [1883] 34 ff.).

In Babylonia, the poem describing the Descent of Ištar into *Aralû*, or Hades, contains elements of ancient origin, and presents several problems for solution. Ištar demands entrance to 'the land whence there is no return.' She has come to weep over heroes who have left wives, over wives taken from husbands, and over the only son (Tammuz) taken away before his time. By order of Allatu, she is stripped of her dress and ornaments at each of the seven gates, and then struck with disease. There is now desolation on earth, life dies away, and the gods lament her disappearance. Ea creates Uddushu-namir, and sends him to *Aralû* to demand the Water of Life as a preliminary to the release of Ištar. Allatu is compelled to cause Ištar to be sprinkled with it. She is led back, and at each gate her clothing and ornaments are restored to her. The story, as connected with Tammuz, must have described his restoration by means of the life-giving water at the instance of Ištar, come in quest of him—an incident enacted in the Tammuz ritual. But this is not set forth in the poem, though there is an obscure reference to Tammuz at the end, in the form of ritual directions to mourners, to whom the poem appears to have been addressed. Pure water is to be poured out for Tammuz. The poem as it stands may have been derived from two myths, one telling how Ištar rescued Tammuz from the dead (since his restoration was annually

[1] See 'Acts of Thomas,' 'Hist. of John,' in Wright, *Apoc. Acts*, 1871, ii. 23, 149; Budge, *Gods of the Egyptians*, 1904, i. 268; 'Preaching of Andrew,' 'Story of John,' in Lewis, *Myth. Acts of Apostles*, 1904 pp. 7, 163.

[1] Cf. the Greek myth of Protesilaus and Laomedia.

[2] This is the *Märchen* formula of the Transformation Flight, already met with in a Maori instance, § 2.

celebrated), the other telling of the rescue of Ištar from Hades at the intervention of the gods. The present poem bears more abundant traces of the latter myth than of the former, though it also hints at a descent for purposes of rescue; Ištar descends violently, and threatens to break down the gates (see Talbot, *TSBA* iii. 118 ff.; Sayce, *Rel. of the Ancient Bab.*, 1887, p. 221 ff.; Jastrow, *Rel. of Bab. and Assyria*, Boston, 1898, pp. 563 ff., 588 f.; see *ERE* ii. 315[b]). The recovery of Tammuz by Ištar is also suggested by the fact that there was a Greek myth telling how Aphrodite (Ištar) went down to Hades to redeem Adonis (Tammuz) from Persephone (*Apol. of Aristides*, § 11). At the sanctuary of the Syriac Aphrodite sexual relations with the priestesses representing her were believed to ransom one from Hades, as Adonis had been freed from it (Euseb. *Vita Const.* iii. 55; Bousset, *Hauptprobleme der Gnosis*, Göttingen, 1907, p. 72).

The so-called prayer of a Navaho shaman has a certain likeness to the Ištar myth. It is a kind of prayer-spell, describing the action of the gods as the shaman desires them to act. He fears his soul may be detained by sorcery in the under world. The war-gods are therefore to descend and rescue it from the 'underground witch.' They pass gate after gate, sentinel after sentinel, of the lower world, by magical means, and there find the suppliant's soul. Returning through chamber after chamber, they bring it back to him, so that 'the world before me is restored in beauty' (Matthews, *Amer. Anthrop.*, 1888, i.).

The Greeks had several descent-myths, that of Orpheus being the best known, thanks to Vergil's version. After the death of Eurydice her image haunted him, until he determined to seek her in Hades. He descended there, and the sweet notes of his lyre enchanted its denizens. Pluto and Persephone were moved to pity. Eurydice would be restored on one condition—that Orpheus should precede her and not look back till they arrived on earth. Just before reaching the fatal limit, his love overcame him. He looked round and lost her for ever (Verg. *Georg.* iv.; Paus. ix. 30. 4–6; Apollodorus, i. 3. 2).

The Orphic poem Κατάβασις εἰς Ἅιδου has not survived, but it may have had for subject the descent of Orpheus. Foucart thinks it was a ritual poem containing instructions for the dead in Hades, like the Orphic tablets engraved on sheets of gold, and the Egyptian *Book of the Dead* (*Recherches sur l'origine et la nature des mystères d'Eleusis*, Paris, 1895, p. 7; cf. also Dieterich, *Nekyia*, Leipzig, 1893, p. 128 ff.).

Dionysos, as certain myths taught, was also said to have descended to Hades to bring back Semele, and, according to local Argive tradition, he descended through the Alcyonian lake, Polymnus having shown him the way. His return from Hades was annually celebrated there, and in all probability the myth had become fused with that of his resurrection (Paus. ii. 31. 2, 37. 5; Apollod. iii. 5. 3). Another myth told how Alcestis, the wife of Admetus, having willingly died in his stead, was delivered by Herakles, who, seeing the grief of her husband and people, descended to Hades to rescue her from death. In a variant of the myth, Persephone was her rescuer (Apollod. i. 9. 15; Hyginus, *Fab.* 50; Eurip. *Alcestis*). Another myth—the subject of a lost poem of Hesiod—related that Theseus agreed to assist Pirithoos in carrying off Persephone from Hades. They descended there, but, according to one version, were outwitted; for, expecting to receive gifts, they sat down on the chair of Forgetfulness, to which they were held fast by coils of serpents. Herakles caused the release of one or both when he descended to fetch Cerberus (Paus. ix. 31. 5, x. 29. 2; and for a euhemerized version, see i. 17. 4, and Plut. *Thes.* 31, 35; *Epit. Vat. ex Apollod. Bibl.*, ed. Wagner, Leipzig, 1891, pp. 58, 155 ff.). Cf. also the myth of Castor and Pollux. For the Pythagorean descent, see Rohde, 456; Dieterich, 129.

In Scandinavian mythology descent-myths are connected with Balder's death. Hermodr offered to descend to Hel to recover Balder. Taking Odin's horse, he travelled for nine days through dark valleys till he reached the river Gjöll, crossed by a bridge covered with gold and guarded by Modgudr. After some delay she permitted him to cross, and at last he reached the place of the dead and saw Balder. He begged Hela to permit Balder's return, but she made his release conditional upon all things mourning his loss. Hermodr obtained Balder's ring as a token of remembrance, and returned to the gods. All things were begged to mourn, and all did so save the witch Thok (=Loke), who said she would weep with dry eyes and Hela would keep her prey (Dasent, *Prose or Younger Edda*, Stockholm, 1842; see also § 4).

In Hindu mythology a descent-myth is told of Kṛṣṇa, who went to the kingdom of Yama and demanded the dead son of his pupil Sāndīpani. After having conquered Yama in fight, he accomplished his purpose (*Harivaṁśa*, v. 4913 ff., in Scherman, p. 64). Not quite parallel, but showing the possibility of rescuing a dead person from Hades, is the story of Yama's marriage to Vijaya. He cautioned her not to go near the southern part of his domain; but curiosity tempted her, and there she saw the wicked, including her mother, in torments. She told Yama she would leave him unless he consented to release her mother, but this took place only after the due performance of certain ceremonies (Wilkins, *Hindu Myth.*[2], Calcutta, 1900, p. 83 f.). In a Tibetan Buddhist legend, Maudgalyāyana learns from his father that his mother is in hell. At once he sets out, and descends deeper and deeper. The doors open before him, and none of the demons opposes him. When he finally discovers her, he offers to take her place; but this is refused. Finally, Buddha is appealed to, and he visits hell, with the result that all the sorrowing beings are re-born in heaven. The mother is still subjected, for her sins, to certain torments; but, at the exhortation of her son, she feels shame, and advances by re-birth till she reaches the god-region where her husband is (Scherman, 80 ff.; and for a Chinese parallel, Edkins, *Chinese Buddhism*, 1880, p. 225 ff.). In a Chinese tale the Buddhist Lo Pah, on passing into paradise at death, realized that his mother was in hell. He at once descended there, and by his virtues and intercessions succeeded in rescuing her (*Asiat. Journal*, xxxi. [1840] 211).

4. Descent to obtain a boon, etc.—Some examples from the lower culture may be cited first. In an Eskimo tale a man, to obtain luck, is advised by his mother to raise a stone and descend through the opening to the under world, where he will receive a piece of sealskin which will ensure good luck (Rink, *Tales and Trad. of the Eskimo*, 1875, p. 461). In an Ainu story a youth defrauded of his heritage went to Hades to get his father's help. He arrived at a village and saw his father, but (in accordance with Ainu belief) could not make himself heard by the spirit until he entered another spirit and spoke through him. His father told him he had left him a share, and with this information he returned to earth, and his brother assigned a portion to him (Batchelor, *Ainu of Japan*, 1892, p. 228). The Esthonian epic relates how its hero found, in the cave leading to Hades, three girls who enabled him by magic to overcome Sarvik, its lord. Later he penetrated farther and reached the gates of Porgu (Hades), where its hosts advanced to meet him at a river of pitch crossed by a bridge. He defeated them, conquered Sarvik once more, and returned to earth with his treasures (Kirby, *Hero of Esthonia*, 1895, i. 100, 124). In the Finnish *Kalevala* its hero Wäinämöinen, after long travel through a forest, induced the maiden who acts the part of Charon to ferry him over to *Tuonela* (Hades), where he desired to

learn certain magic words from its wise lord. By avoiding the beer of *Tuonela* he was able to return and describe on earth the horrors he had seen (Schiefner, *Kalewala*, Helsingfors, 1852, rune 16). A Japanese myth tells how the deity Oho-na-mochi went to Hades to seek counsel of its lord, whose daughter he married. The lord of Hades tried to compass his death by setting him tasks, but, after help from his wife and a friendly mouse, he finally escaped with the treasures of the god, and forced him to give the advice he sought (Aston, 106; *Ko-ji-ki*, 71 ff.). This myth of descent includes some common *Marchen* formulæ. Herodotus (ii. 122) relates an Egyptian story of Rhampsinitus (Ramses III.) to the effect that he descended to Hades and played at dice with Demeter (Isis), sometimes winning, sometimes losing, and that he ascended, bringing with him as a gift from her a napkin of gold.

This tale is not corroborated from the monuments or texts. Possibly it is a distorted form of the myth of Thoth's winning the five days of the epact from the moon at a game of dice (Plut. *de Isid.* 12). Sayce suggests that the myth may have been affixed to the name of Ramses in consequence of a representation on his temple of his playing at dice with a woman (*Ancient Emp. of the East*, 1883, p. 92). The dead played at a game with counters, and the story of Setne tells how, having descended into the tomb of Neneferkaptah in order to obtain his magical book, he played a game at draughts with him and was beaten, but eventually escaped with it by magical means (Griffith, 13 ff.).

A Hindu myth in the Kaṭha-Upanishad tells how Nachiketas, delivered by his father to death, remained without food in the kingdom of Yama, who granted him fulfilment of three wishes. Nachiketas then desired his restoration to life and reconciliation to his father, the knowledge of the sacrificial fire, and the knowledge of the nature of death. Yama offered him gifts if he would forego the last wish, but he was insistent and it was granted to him (Oldenberg, *Buddha*, London, 1882, p. 55). The visit of Odysseus to the shades to inquire of the ghost of Tiresias (*Od.* xi.), and the descent of Æneas to speak with his father Anchises (*Æn.* vi.), are well-known poetic examples of seeking a boon from the world of the dead. The myth of Psyche, related by Apuleius in his *Metamorphoses*, tells how, among the tasks exacted of her before she recovered Eros, was that of going down to Hades to bring back from Persephone a box of beauty. Through innumerable perils, and sustained by the love of Eros, she succeeded and returned to earth, where she opened the box, to find, not beauty, but a deadly sleep. The myth of the descent of Herakles to bring the dog Cerberus from Hades (one of the labours exacted by Eurystheus) is mentioned by Homer, who says that Hermes and Athene escorted him (*Od.* xi. 626, *Il.* viii. 367). But the myth was later amplified, and we learn how he descended by the entrance near Cape Tænarum. After many exploits, including the liberation of Theseus, he demanded permission from Pluto to carry off the hound. This was granted provided he did it without weapons. On the shore of Acheron he met Cerberus, and, seizing him by the throat, ascended with him to earth, showed him to Eurystheus, and then returned with him to Hades (Apollod. ii. 5. 12).

Those who have seen a parallel between the labours of Herakles and the adventures of the Bab. Gilgameš, and a possible derivation of the former from the latter, point to the likeness between the journey of Herakles to Hades and that of Gilgameš beyond the limits of the world, through dangers and darkness, across the ocean and the Waters of Death (probably connected with the River of Death in *Aralû*, or Hades), to the paradise of Ut-napištim, that he might learn from him the secret of immortality (Sayce, *Rel. of Anc. Egypt and Bab.*, 1902, pp. 436 ff., 446; *ERE* ii. 316ᵃ; Jastrow, 516). In another Bab. myth, the purpose of which may have been to show how a god superseded the ancient goddess of Hades, a conflict having arisen between the gods and Eresh-kigal, goddess of Hades, Nergal was chosen to descend to the under world. He arrived there, passed through gate after gate (fourteen in all), dragged the goddess from her throne, and would have slain her. But she begged for mercy, and offered to become his wife and to give him dominion in Hades, which he accepted (Winckler-Abel, *Der Thontafelfund von El-Amarna*, Berlin, 1891, iii. 164; Sayce, 288, 428).[1]

In Scandinavian myth, Odin, in order to discover the cause of Balder's evil dreams, rode down to Niflhel, till he reached the hall where mead was standing brewed for Balder. He roused the Sibyl from her barrow by spells, and learned from her the tidings of Balder's fate (Vigfusson-Powell, i. 181 ff.). For Celtic myths of visits to the under world (or to Elysium) to obtain the gifts of civilization, see BLEST, ABODE OF THE (Celtic), § 7. Mandæan mythology presents an interesting myth of the descent of Hibil Ziwā, before the creation of the world, to the lower realms, in order to forestall the revolt of their rulers against the powers of light. He descends in the might of the great Raza (an embodiment of the mysterious Name) to the seven worlds of darkness (not, of course, the regions of the dead).

In each world to which he descends he remains for many thousands of years, unknown to and unseen by its lord. Finally he reaches the seventh and lowest world, and speaks to its lord, the giant Krūn. Krūn partially swallows him, but Hibil cuts his inwards to pieces and is disgorged, and obtains from him a pass and seal-ring by which the might of the opposing demon will be brought to nought. Then he ascends, sealing the doors of each world so that none can pass through. In the fourth world he takes the form of its ruler and obtains by craft the Memrā and Gemrā, the strength of the world of darkness. By a similar change of form he learns the secrets of the third world, and obtains its magic mirror. Then he leaves it, taking with him Ruhā, daughter of its lord, pregnant with Ur, the demon who is to oppose the worlds of light. Finally, after sealing all the doors of the worlds, he returns to the light kingdom, and is hailed with joy. The remainder of the myth describes his repeated unseen visits to the imprisoned Ruhā and Ur, his robbing Ur of his magical talismans, and his final overpowering of him (Brandt, *Mand. Schriften*, Göttingen, 1893, p. 138 ff.). The story is full of well-known folk-tale formulæ, and, while the descent through seven worlds recalls that of Ištar, the main incident is based on that of Marduk's strife with the dragon of chaos, Tiamāt (cf. Brandt, *Mand. Rel.*, Leipzig, 1889, p. 182). Another myth relates how Māndā d'Hayyē descends to the lower worlds and conquers Ruhā and Ur. Afterwards Ruhā and her sons assemble on Mt. Carmel and plan a revolution against the powers of light. Māndā appears among them in their own form, whereupon they desire to make him their ruler. He agrees on condition that they reveal to him the secrets of their mysteries. When they have done this, he manifests himself in his true form and overpowers them (Brandt, *Mand. Rel.* 34, 38; Norberg, *Codex Nasaræus*, 1815–6, i. 223).

For a Buriat instance of descent to seek a boon, see *ERE* iii. 9ᵃ, and for a Quiché myth of two heroes descending and overcoming the lords of the under world, *ib.* 308ᵃ.

5. Descent out of curiosity.—This motive is occasionally met with. In an Ainu example a youth, learning that a certain cave led to Hades, entered it, and, after passing through darkness, found himself in a beautiful land where he saw many of his friends and relatives. On his return he met a spirit descending, which proved to be that of a dear friend who had just died (Batchelor, 226; cf. a variant in Chamberlain, *Aino Folk-tales*, 1888, p. 42, where the visitor is ignominiously treated and never wishes to see Hades again). Several Norse tales, reminiscent of earlier pagan beliefs, describe the adventures of mortals who set out to seek the Land of Living Men, part of the older under world (for these see BLEST, ABODE OF THE [Teutonic], § 4; and for Amer. Ind. instance, *ERE* iii. 230ᵇ).

[1] Jastrow (586) thinks that it may originally have been told of Nergal that, like Tammuz, he was *carried off* into Hades.

6. Descent to free the damned.—The freeing of a soul in pain in Hades has already been found in Hindu instances. This idea, as well as that of the general release of the damned or the amelioration of their tortures, is a natural outgrowth of existing legends of rescue from Hades, but it occurs mainly in Eastern instances. Several myths of this kind are found in Hindu and Buddhist mythology.

In the *Rāmāyaṇa* (vii. 21 f.), Rāvaṇa enters hell, and, as he enters, the darkness flies away, and the damned, whom he desires to free, experience an unexpected happiness. He encounters Yama in fight, and would have been worsted but for the help of Brahmā, to whose will Yama bows and leaves Rāvaṇa victor. In the *Mahābhārata* (xvii. 3–xviii. 4), Yudhiṣṭhira is subjected to a last test by the gods. When he reaches heaven, he learns that his relations are in hell, and beseeches the gods to let him share their dwelling. 'What is heaven without them? Only where they are is my heaven.' He is conducted thither, and, on his coming, a cool wind arises and the torments cease. He refuses to leave hell, since his presence makes its denizens happy. Now the gods appear, and he learns that all he has undergone is but a trial of his faith. For a descent of Viṣṇu with similar results to the damned, see Dubois, *Hindu Manners*, Oxford, 1897, p. 706. In other cases, those who have transgressed slightly and are sent to hell suffer only formally because of their virtues, and are given an opportunity to free the damned, *e.g.* Janaka in the *Padma Purāṇa* (Wilson, *JRAS* v. 295).

In the *Lalita Vistara*, at several moments of Buddha's existence—when he descends from heaven, on his journey to Bodhimaṇḍa, and at Benares—a marvellous light is said to have been projected from his body which lit up by its splendour the 3000 worlds, caused all evil, suffering, and fear to cease, and filled all beings with joy. This extended even to the hell Avichi, the region of the *pretas*, and the kingdom of Yama. Darkness was dissipated, and all beings there suffering from thirst and hunger, or other torment, found themselves free from pain and were filled with great joy. At Buddha's birth he prophesies that, in order to destroy the fires of hell, he will cause the rain from the great cloud of the law to fall, and all beings there will be glad. At that moment the sufferings of all in Avichi and the kingdom of Yama were appeased (*Lal. Vist.* 51, 240, 257, 341, 79, 80, in *AMG*, vol. vi., Paris, 1884). The North Buddhist legend of Avalokiteśvara, 'he who shows the damned the way to Nirvāṇa,' furnishes a striking instance of this group of descent-stories. It was said in the *Saddharma-Puṇḍarika* (c. 24) that he would bring all misery to an end, including the torments of Yama's kingdom. To effect this, he visits the hell Avichi as a glorious prince clad in light, and frees the victims from their pains. Mild air takes the place of flames, the cauldron of boiling water in which men suffer bursts, and the sea of fire becomes a pool with lotus flowers. Hell becomes a place of joy, and Yama shows him reverence. The saving work is pursued in the city of the *pretas*, where Avalokiteśvara frees its denizens from torments and, granting the gift of right knowledge to the damned, leads them as Bodhisattvas to the Sukhāvatī world (Cowell, *JPh* vi. [1873] 222 ff.; for a Tibetan legend of a similar kind, see Rockhill, *Land of the Lamas*, 1891, p. 331 f.). In a Chinese Buddhist myth, the soul of the goddess Kwanyin visits hell in trance, and by her invocation of Amitābha a rain of flowers falls, the implements of torments break, hell is changed to Paradise, and the damned return to earth. The lords of hell desire to hear this mighty prayer, and their wish is granted on the stipulation that all souls attain to redemption. At this point she awakes from her trance (Eitel, *Three Lect. on Bud.*, 1871, p. 31; de Groot, *AMG* xi. [1886] 188 ff.). In a Tibetan myth, as soon as a new Tathāgata descends to the under world and sounds the mussel-trumpet (=proclamation of the sacred doctrine), all who hear its sound are saved and go to the heaven Tuṣitā (Scherman, 66, note 2).

In other instances the belief in metempsychosis is utilized to show the experiences of the narrator in a former state. While in hell, a Brahman experiences a sudden cessation of torture and a joy as of paradise. This is caused by the arrival of a king, Vipaśchit, who has committed a small fault. Having expiated it, he is bidden to go to heaven; but the damned beg him to remain as his presence relieves their miseries. Yama and Indra beg him to go, but he demands that his virtues may ransom sinners from hell. He is raised to a higher state, and the narrator and others in hell attain a new existence free from torture (*Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa*, xiii ff., in Scherman, 38 ff.).

In later Judaism similar ideas were current, sometimes in connexion with the Messiah. Thus in *Bereshith Rabba*, regarding the appearance of Messiah at the gates of Gehinnom, it is said:

'But, when they that are bound, they that are in Gehinnom, saw the light of the Messiah, they rejoiced to receive him, saying, He will lead us forth from this darkness, as it is said (Hos 13[14]), "I will redeem them from hell, from death I will set them free," and so says Isaiah (35[10]) "The ransomed of the Lord will return and come to Zion." By "Zion" is to be understood Paradise; and in another passage, "This is that which stands written, We shall rejoice and exult in Thee. When? When the captives climb up out of hell, with the Shechinah at their head"' (Weber[2], 358; Bertholdt, *Christologia Judæorum*, Erlangen, 1811, p. 170 ff.).

In *Yalkuṭ Shim'oni* the godless are rescued from hell by the righteous dead and pass to eternal life, while in the *Zohar* the righteous or the patriarchs are said to descend to hell to rescue sinners from the place of torment (Gfrörer, *Jahrhundert des Heils*, Stuttgart, 1838, ii. 77, 184; Weber[2], 343).

Later Muhammadan theology describes how the righteous souls intercede for their brethren detained on the bridge which passes through hell to Paradise. They are sent to hell to see if any there have faith, and finding such they bring them out. These are then washed in the Water of Life and admitted to Paradise (*JThSt* vi. [1904] 35).

In Gnosticism (save in the case of Marcion [Iren. *adv. Hær.* i. 27. 3]) the descent of Christ to Hades (see next art.) is transformed, and shows the influence of pagan myths of a deliverer. The Divine Æon descends not to Hades, but to the dark earth-world to conquer the world rulers and to spoil them of spiritual souls imprisoned in bodies. As He passes through the spheres of the heavens He is invisible, or takes the form of these rulers, and so deceives them or robs them of their might (Iren. i. 23. 3, i. 30. 12; Hippol. viii. 10; cf. *Ascension of Isaiah*, 10[3]–11[18]). Through Gnosticism the later form of the orthodox descent idea, especially in the tradition of the binding of Satan, may have received a pagan colouring. Gnosticism knew also of a descent of the Divine Æon out of the Pleroma to rescue the fallen Sophia (Iren. i. 4. 1 f.), and, in the teaching of the Valentinian Theodotus, He, on His return from earth, transfers the souls of the righteous in the 'place of rest' to a higher region, the place of Sophia (Clem. Alex. *Excerpt. ex Theod.* c. 18).

In various Christian documents the idea of the transference of souls from the place of punishment to a place of bliss, at the prayer of saints on earth, is found, e.g. *Acts of Paul and Thecla*, § 28; *Passio Perpetuæ*, § 7; and *Test. of Abraham*, § 14. In the *Apocalypses of Paul and of the Virgin*, in which they visit hell, they and the angels and saints pray for remission of tortures to the lost. Christ descends and announces that on the Lord's day or on the day of Pentecost this will be granted.

7. In many European folk-tales a visit is paid by a mortal (1) to a subterranean fairy-land to rescue a stolen person, to capture a treasure, etc., or (2) to a land below the earth or the sea ruled by a mysterious personage. The subterranean land is doubtless a reminiscence of the old pagan under world, and the submarine region the old mythic world of sea-divinities (*CF* 44; Scott, *Minstrelsy*, 1839, p. 195 f.; Wright, 85, 87). Folk-tales also recount visits to the Christian hell, where the visitor usually outwits the devil (Le Braz, ii. 337; Dottin, *Contes et légendes d'Irlande*, 1901, p. 164; Larminie, *W. Irish Folk Tales*, 1893, p. 188).

8. The tabu regarding not eating the food of Hades has been found in several of the tales and myths cited, and it also occurs in stories of visits to fairy-land, as well as in many other myths and eschatological beliefs.

Pluto secretly makes Persephone eat seven seeds of a pomegranate, and she is then bound to him in Hades (*Hom. Hymn to Dem.* 399). In Egyptian belief the dead who ate and drank the food and water offered them by a goddess could not return without special permission (Maspero, *Études de myth. ég.*, Paris, 1893, ii. 226). On the Orphic tablets buried with the dead, they are bidden to avoid a certain well in Hades (Dieterich, 86). Those who visit Yama's kingdom as guests are bidden not to eat his food (Muir, *Orig. Skr. Texts*, 1858–72, v. 320). For Teutonic instances, see *ERE* ii. 709[b], and for a Chinook example, iii. 562[b]. The same tabu applies to the visitor to Fairy-land, the classic example being found in the ballad of *Thomas of Erceldoune*. See also Tylor, ii. 47 ff. Scott, in 'Wandering Willie's Tale,' *Redgauntlet*, ch. 12, speaks of the visitor to hell refusing 'the devil's arles, for such was the offer of meat and drink.'

The result of breaking the tabu—detention in Hades, etc.—is derived from primitive and savage notions regarding food. To eat the food of a strange tribe establishes kinship with them (see COVENANT). Hence to eat the food of gods, ghosts, or fairies makes the eater one with them, and he must remain with them (cf. the Bab. myth of Adapa [Jastrow, 550]; the 'Navajo Mountain Chant' [Mathews, *5 RBEW*, 1887, in which the hero is forbidden to eat animals' food lest he become an animal]; Parker, *More Austr. Legendary Tales*, 1898, p. xi, where the native belief is noted that for a child to touch fungus growing on trees is to make him liable to be spirited away by ghosts).

The tabu imposed on Orpheus—not to look back

—is frequently found both in ritual and magic, especially in under-world rites (see CROSS-ROADS), and may be explained by the idea that man may not gaze with impunity on what pertains to a supernatural plane, lest it harm him or force him to join the under-world ghosts.

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DESCENT TO HADES (Christ's).—**1. Summary.**—The *Descensus Christi ad inferos* is an article in the doctrinal tradition of the entire Christian Church, but the several main divisions of the Church, viz. the Eastern or 'Orthodox' (§ 2), the Roman Catholic (§ 3), the Lutheran (§ 4), and the Reformed Churches (§ 5), differ greatly from one another in their Confessional interpretations of the doctrine. Moreover, while in Protestantism generally the older views have in modern times been abandoned, yet not a few theologians have essayed to interpret the doctrine on fresh lines (§ 6). These attempts at reconstruction, it is true, fail to find justification either in Scripture (§ 7) or in early Church tradition (§ 8). Nevertheless, the idea of the *Descensus* is well worthy of our interest, as its original meaning, which is not identical with any of the Confessional views (§ 9), is bound up with certain fundamental conceptions in the primitive Christian interpretation of Christianity, and probably asserts itself here and there in the NT as a presupposition in the minds of the writers (§ 10). The endeavour to trace the idea to influences from non-Christian religions is thus quite unwarranted (§ 11). The *Descensus* belongs in fact to a group of primitive Christian conceptions which are inseparable from views then current but now abandoned, and which accordingly can now be appraised only in a historical sense, *i.e.* as expressions of Christian beliefs which, while adequate enough for their time, have at length become obsolete (§ 12).

2. The doctrine in the Greek Church.—In the Greek, or rather the Eastern or 'Orthodox' Churches the two wrongly so-called Ecumenical Creeds which contain the clause 'descendit ad inferos,' viz. the *Symbolum Apostolicum* and the *Symbolum Athanasianum*, are not recognized, while their own Creed, the so-called *Nicæno-Constantinopolitanum*—the third of the 'Ecumenical' Symbols—makes no mention of the *Descensus*. This explains why even the more elaborate catechetical manuals emanating from these Churches sometimes ignore the doctrine altogether (*e.g.* Konstantinos, Κατήχησις, Athens, 1868, p. 46 f.). None the less, however, is the *Descensus* an element in the Eastern tradition. Even discounting the testimony of the *Confessio orthodoxa* of Petrus Mogilas (i. 49 [Kimmel, *Libri symbolici ecclesiae orientalis*, Jena, 1843, p. 118 f.]), and the wholly unauthoritative *Confessio Metrophanis Critopuli* (Kimmel, *Appendix libror. symbol.* etc., Jena, 1850, pp. 73–76), which both show a leavening of Western thought, and whose statements regarding the *Descensus*, therefore, may have been framed under that influence, we have the less questionable evidence of genuinely Eastern Church catechisms of the present day, as also of recent expositions of the Eastern theology.[1]

In the 'Orthodox' tradition the *Descensus*, *ἡ εἰς Ἅιδου κάθοδος* (Androutsos, p. 211), is universally regarded as an act of the soul of Jesus, occurring during the interval in which His body rested in the tomb, and belonging to the *munus regium*—His soul, however, still maintaining its unity with the Godhead or Logos. Other elements universally recognized are the triumph of Christ 'over Hades,' or 'over death,' which ensued as a result of His *Descensus*, His preaching of salvation in Hades, and His deliverance of certain spirits held captive there. Moreover, it is only in appearance that there is some dubiety as to the persons to whom Christ preached and brought deliverance (cf. Androutsos); for such dubiety arises purely from consideration of the difficult passage in 1 Peter, which, together with Ac 2^{27}, Eph 4^{9}, and other texts, is usually cited as the Scripture authority for the doctrine; and it is agreed by all—even by Metrophanes Critopulos (cf. p. 75: *εἰς αὐτὸν ἤδη πιστεύσασιν*)—that the tradition limits the deliverance effected by Christ to the OT saints who believed in the Messiah. Nay, Makarios duly rejects as unwarranted every attempt to widen this limit, and Androutsos, in whose judgment the 'most probable' hypothesis is that the deliverance was restricted to the OT saints, states explicitly: *καθόλου δὲ ἡ δόξα, ὅτι ὑπάρχει καὶ μετὰ θάνατον ἐπιστροφὴ καὶ σωτηρία, προσκρούει πρὸς τὰς θεμελιώδεις τοῦ Χριστιανισμοῦ ἀληθείας* (p. 211).

It must, nevertheless, be admitted that the 'Orthodox' tradition shows here some ambiguity and inconsistency. This arises from the prevailing views regarding the destiny of the soul after death. As regards the state of the soul in the period between the particular judgment which follows immediately upon death and the universal judgment at the Last Day, the theology of the Eastern Church, when not dealing with the *Descensus*, recognizes two alternatives: the souls of the dead either enter a provisional state of salvation, viz. Paradise (Lk 23^{43}), Abraham's bosom (Lk 16^{22}), or the Kingdom of Heaven (Mt 25^{34}, Lk 13^{29}, 2 Ti 4^{18}, 2 P 1^{11}); or they go to the provisional place of punishment, *i.e.* Hades (Lk 16^{23}), Gehenna (Mt $5^{22.\ 29f.}$), or 'the furnace of fire' (Mt $13^{42.\ 50}$), from which there is a possible transition to Paradise before the Last Day. But, when the *Descensus* is expressly in question, Hades is manifestly regarded as the habitation of *all* departed spirits (cf. Kalliphron, p. 58: *εἰς τὸν Ἅιδην ἤτοι τὸ κατοικητήριον ἁπάντων τῶν ἀπ' αἰῶνος τεθνεώτων*). Now, if Paradise be simply one of the sections of Hades, existing as such before Christ's descent into the lower world, one fails to see what advantage or deliverance His action wrought for the OT saints. But, if it was the deliverance from Hades which first secured the entrance of the saints of old into Paradise, then the 'Abraham's bosom' of Lk 16^{22} cannot be identical with the 'Paradise' of Lk 23^{43}, and we ask in vain what it really is. Finally, the union in Paradise mentioned in Lk 23^{43} is assuredly not to be thought of as transient merely, for it is impossible to think of the glorified Christ as remaining permanently in the provisional state of salvation.

3. Roman Catholic doctrine.—These obscurities are avoided by the Roman Catholic doctrine (cf. Wetzer-Welte, *Kirchenlex.*^{2}, Freiburg, 1882–1903, vi. 124–139, and the literature given there). The *dogma declaratum*, it is true, is simply that Christ—as is affirmed by the *Apostolicum* and the *Athanasianum*—'descendit ad inferos' in the interval between His burial and His resurrection, and that in this *Descensus* His soul 'per se, non per potentiam tantum descendit' (*Conc. Senon.*,

[1] Cf. Philaret, *Longer Catechism*, quest. 213–216, in *Bibliotheca symbolica*, ed. P. Schaff, ii. (New York, 1890) 477 f.; Bernardakis, Ἱερὰ κατήχησις, Constantinople, 1872, p. 122; Kalliphron, Ὀρθόδοξος ἱερὰ κατήχησις, Constantinople, 1880, p. 58; Macaire (Makarios), *Théologie dogmatique orthodoxe; trad. par un Russe*, Paris, 1859–60, ii. 195 ff.; Androutsos, Δογματική, Athens, 1907, pp. 211–214).

anni 1140; Denzinger, *Enchiridion symbolorum*[10], Freiburg, 1908, no. 385). The Symbol of the fourth Synod of Toledo (633) certainly supplements the stereotyped Article with a clause expressing the purpose of the Descent, viz. 'ut sanctos, qui ibidem tenebantur, erueret' (Hahn, *Bibliothek d. Symbole*[3], Breslau, 1897, p. 236), but that Symbol cannot be regarded as doctrinally binding upon the Catholic Church as a whole, while the *Catechismus Romanus*, which deals very fully with the *Descensus* (i. 6, quæst. 1–6), has only a 'high dogmatic, but no primary symbolic authority' (*Kirchenlex*[2]. xi. 1055). There is, nevertheless, no manner of doubt that every Article in which the modern catechisms agree with the *Catechismus Romanus* is to be claimed as Catholic doctrine in the sense of *dogma formale* (*ib.* iii. 1884). Hence the official Catholic doctrine of the *Descensus* is as follows.[1]

The scene of the Descent is laid in the place 'in quo animae sanctorum ante Christi domini adventum excipiebantur' (*Cat. Rom.* i. 6. 3), *i.e.* the forecourt of Hell (Deharbe, qu. 231, etc.), the *limbus patrum* (Simar, i. 538; *Compendio*, p. 79), or the *sinus Abrahae* (Lk 16^{22}, *Cat. Rom., loc. cit.*). For 'antequam Christus moreretur et resurgeret, coeli portae nemini unquam patuerunt' (cf. He 9^{6-8}; *Cat. Rom., loc. cit.* qu. 6). It was into this *limbus patrum*, accordingly, that Christ in His Spirit—not 'per potentiam tantum,' but 're et praesentia' (*Cat. Rom., loc. cit.* qu. 4)—descended, in order to manifest His power and glory even in the under world (Deharbe, qu. 233. 2; *Cat. Rom., loc. cit.* qu. 6: 'ereptis daemonum spoliis') and to comfort and deliver the souls of the just held captive there, *i.e.* to take them to Heaven (*Cat. Rom., loc. cit.* qu. 3 and 6; Deharbe, qu. 233. 1, and 241). All this is probably clear enough to the laity; but the theologians of the Roman Catholic Church encounter difficulties in regard to Christ's repose in the sepulchre, and the passages Lk 23^{43}, Ac 1^{3}, and 1 P $3^{19f.}$. All Catholic theologians solve the first difficulty in the same way as the *Cat. Rom.* with the help of Scholastic logic solves it:

'Christo jam mortuo, ejus anima ad inferos descendit ibique tamdiu mansit, quamdiu ejus corpus in sepulchro fuit; eadem Christi persona eo tempore et apud inferos fuit et in sepulchro jacuit, propterea quod, quamvis anima a corpore discesserit, numquam tamen divinitas vel ab anima vel a corpore separata est' (qu. 1).

A second difficulty arises from the fact that in Lk 23^{43} the place in which Christ tarried after His death and on the day of His burial is given as 'Paradise.' Now, clear as is the distinction drawn by many theologians, in harmony with the *Cat. Rom.*, between *Limbus* (which involves no 'poena damni' but only the 'carentia visionis Dei' [cf. Loofs, *Symbolik*, Tüb. 1902, i. 270] and in which, according to the *Cat. Rom.* [*loc. cit.* qu. 3], the fathers 'sine ullo doloris sensu, beata redemptionis spe sustentati, quieta habitatione fruebantur') and the *Gehenna damnatorum*, the former is nevertheless a part of the *inferi*, of Hell. Is it permissible then to locate 'Paradise' in Hell (cf. *Kirchenlex*[2]. vi. 130)? Many theologians have done so without misgiving (cf. Martin, ii. 93: 'forecourt of Hell,' *sinus Abrahae* or *limbus patrum*, also simply called 'Paradise'); but sometimes a distinction is made between *paradisus inferior* and *paradisus superior* (=Heaven). The *Cat. Rom.*, whose interpretation is adopted by *Kirchenlex.*[2] vi. 135 and Simar (*Dogmatik*, i. 538), expounds the matter more felicitously thus:

'Christi aspectus clarissimam lucem captivis attulit, eorumque animas immensa laetitia gaudioque implevit; quibus etiam optatissimam beatitudinem, quae in Dei visione consistit, impertivit. Quo facto id comprobatum est, quod latroni promiserat illis verbis Luc. 23, 43.'

Here, accordingly, the *limbus patrum*, which after the liberation of the fathers is left absolutely empty, has, in virtue of Christ's presence, become Paradise even before their departure—has been 'transformed, so to speak, into a heaven' (*Kirchenlex.*[2] vi. 135).

With this particular point, however, is connected a third difficulty. Christ did not ascend to Heaven till forty days after His departure from *Limbus*, and only then 'did He take with Him to Heaven' the souls of the just whom He 'had liberated' from that place (Deharbe, qu. 241). Where, then, were the souls of the fathers during these forty days? For attempts to answer this question the curious may be referred to *Kirchenlex.*[2] (vi. 136).

The greatest difficulty of all is presented by 1 P $3^{19ff.}$ (cf. 4^{6}). This is not one of the passages traditionally cited in support of the *Descensus*; the usual *dicta probantia* are Ac $2^{24. 27. 31}$, Eph 4^{9}, Ro 10^{7}, Mt 12^{40}, Hos 13^{14} (cf. 1 Co $15^{54f.}$), Sir 24^{45} ('Penetrabo omnes inferiores partes terrae, et inspiciam omnes dormientes, et illuminabo omnes sperantes in Domino'), Zec 9^{11} ('Tu quoque in sanguine testamenti tui emisisti vinctos tuos de lacu, in quo non est aqua'). Augustine, indeed, in a celebrated letter (*ad Evodium*, *Ep.* clxiv., *al.* xcix.; Migne, *PL* xxxiii. 709–718), which in many passages reads like a modern treatise on the *Descensus*, emphatically denies that the two Petrine passages bear upon the subject at all (*op. cit.* 5. 15, p. 715, and 7. 21, p. 717). He explains 1 P $3^{19ff.}$ as referring to a preaching of the pre-existent Christ to the contemporaries of Noah who were overwhelmed in their sins (*loc. cit.* 6. 17, p. 716), and applies 4^{6} to a preaching of the gospel in this life to the spiritually dead (7. 21, p. 717 f.). And this, or a similar, explanation is adopted, with approval, by many mediæval theologians, including Thomas Aquinas, who writes (*Summa*, 3. 52, 2 *ad* 3):

'His qui in carcere conclusi erant viventes, scilicet in corpore mortali, quod est quasi quidam carcer animae, spiritu suae divinitatis veniens praedicavit per internas inspirationes et etiam externas admonitiones per ora justorum' (cf. *ib.*: 'Qui increduli fuerunt Noe praedicanti').

At present, however, the exegesis which—largely under the influence of Hundhausen (*Das erste Pontificalschreiben des Apostelfürsten Petrus*, Mainz, 1873)—finds most favour is that which makes the earlier passage ($3^{19f.}$) refer to the *Descensus*. The unbelieving contemporaries of Noah, accordingly, are supposed to be mentioned only by way of example, and the statement that Christ's preaching in the under world was vouchsafed even to such *unrepentant* souls in the place of *perdition* is narrowed down to mean that His preaching was made known to the condemned without a special *Descensus* to them at all, or, in other words, that the effects of the *Descensus* extended also to the lost (Simar, i. 539 ff., following Hundhausen, p. 350). Now this modification of the sense of 1 P $3^{19f.}$ brings it into harmony with a view which Aquinas (*Summa*, 3. 52, 2*c*) had advanced without reference to that passage:

'per suum effectum (*not*: per suam essentiam) Christus in quemlibet inferorum descendit; in infernum damnatorum habuit hunc effectum, quod descendens ad inferos eos de sua incredulitate et malitia confutavit.'

Certain catechisms, again, come to terms with 1 P $3^{19f.}$ in a very simple fashion, by amending

[1] Besides the *Cat. Rom.*, cf. G. Bareille, *Le Catéchisme romain, ou l'enseignement de la doctrine chrétienne*, Montréjeau, 1907 ff., ii. 386–403; J. Deharbe, *Grosser Katechismus*, Regensburg, New York, and Cincinnati, 1896; *Grosser Kat. für sämtliche Bistümer Bayerns*, Regensburg, 1904; *Kath. Kat. f. d. Diöcese Trier*, Trèves, 1888; *Kath. Kat. f. d. Bistum Mainz*, Mainz, 1886; *Kath. Kat. f. d. Bistum Paderborn*, Paderborn, 1892; *Kat. d. kath. Religion, herausg. auf Befehl d. hochwurdigsten Herrn Dr. K. J. v. Hefele, Bischofs v. Rottenburg*, Freiburg, 1889; *Cat. du diocèse de Paris*, Paris, 1897; *Compendio della dottrina cristiana ad uso dell' arcidiocesi di Torino*, Turin, 1893; cf. Th. Hub. Simar († as archbp. of Cologne, 1902), *Lehrb. der Dogmatik*[4], 2 vols., Freiburg, 1899, i. 538–541; K. Martin († as bishop of Paderborn), *Lehrb. d. kath. Religion*[15], 2 pts., Mainz, 1873, ii. 92 f.

the language of Scripture to make it suit Catholic dogma. Thus, after expounding the doctrine of the Descent to the *limbus patrum*, they cite the passage in question in the following form: 'He was put to death according to the flesh, but in soul He went to the spirits who were in prison, and preached, *i.e.* proclaimed redemption to them' (*Grosser Katechismus f. d. Bistümer Bayerns*, p. 75; *Paderborner Kat.* p. 93; similarly, though not quite so crudely, Deharbe, qu. 231, and *Trierer Kat.*, p. 26). It is a singular fact that Aquinas (*Summa*, 3. 52, 2*c*) speaks also of an 'effectus' of the *Descensus* upon the souls in *Purgatory*: 'illis qui detinebantur in purgatorio spem gloriae consequendae dedit'; and in a special *quæstio* (3. 52, 8) he even discusses the problem whether Christ, in virtue of His *Descensus*, delivered souls also from Purgatory, and solves it as follows:

'Si qui inventi sunt tales, quales etiam nunc virtute passionis Christi a purgatorio liberantur, tales nihil prohibet per descensum Christi ad inferos a purgatorio esse liberatos.'

The strange thing is that Aquinas should think of souls as being in Purgatory at the time of the *Descensus*; for the Catholic doctrine is that all who have died in original sin (which could not be absolved before the death of Christ) are in *Hell*. Even the *sancti patres* who believed in the Messiah, and who, according to Aquinas (3. 49, 5 *ad* 1), had cancelled their actual sins by their faith and works, must be regarded as having been in Hell, or, at least, in the 'fore-court' thereof, by reason of their original sin; and it is believed even today that, when the children of Christian parents die unbaptized, and thus have not been cleansed of original sin, they go to Hell—to a region, it is true, resembling that in which the *patres* dwelt, viz. the *limbus infantium* (Loofs, *Symbolik*, i. 269). Unless, therefore, there have been exceptions to this rule of doctrine (the Innocents whose festival occurs on the 28th of December need not be regarded as forming an exception, since their baptism of blood would avail instead of baptism by water, and they could accordingly go to the *limbus patrum*), or unless a great migration from Hell to Purgatory took place at the instant of Christ's death—a theory likewise not easy to accept—we must believe that Purgatory was as empty before the death of Christ as the *limbus patrum* was after His Descent.

4. **Lutheran doctrine.**—The doctrine of the *Descensus* set forth in the Formula of Concord, and thus regarded by orthodox Lutherans as bearing the seal of their Church, is of a peculiar character. It cannot be understood without a retrospective glance at Luther himself. We must, however, distinguish between his real theological view and his presentation of the subject in his popular discourses. As a theologian Luther of course (*a*) adhered at first to the Catholic tradition (*Psalmenvorlesung* of 1513–15, Weimar ed. iii. 103. 20; 317. 37). But (*b*) he could not continue to hold this view after asserting that the faith of the 'fathers' is identical with our own (cf. *Predigten über 1 Mosis*, 1527, Weimar ed., 100. 4: 'vides Adamum Christianum fuisse ut nos'; Erlangen ed. [German], 33. 99). He had come to believe (cf. J. Köstlin, *Luthers Theologie*², Stuttgart, 1901, ii. 341)—even (see below) before 1522 (at Amsdorf, 13 Jan. 1522; Enders, *Briefwechsel Luthers*, Calw and Stuttgart, 1903, iii. 269–271)—that the 'fathers,' like departed believers in Christ, continue until the resurrection in a perfectly happy sleep of the soul, since they are, so to speak, enclosed and safeguarded in the belief in God's word as in a bosom ('Abraham's bosom,' Lk 16²²; *Kirchenpostille*, Erl. ed.², 12 f.). Similarly, he thought that the souls of the wicked in the state of death are tormented by their unbelieving evil conscience until they are cast into Hell at the Last Day; and with reference to the 'Hell' of Lk 16²³ he writes:

'The hell mentioned here cannot be the true Hell, which will come into being at the Last Day. . . . But it must be a place where the soul can live, and where it has no rest: therefore it cannot be a real locality. We judge, therefore, that this hell is the evil conscience—without faith and the word of God—in which the soul is buried and confined until the Last Day, when the person, body and soul together, will be cast into the real bodily Hell.'

A view of the *Descensus* corresponding to these ideas regarding the sleep of the soul had already been set forth by Luther in the *Operationes in Psalmos* of 1519–21:

'Anima Christi secundum substantiam descendit ad inferos . . . dolores mortis et inferni pro eodem ego habeo. Infernus enim est pavor mortis, id est sensus mortis, quo horrent mortem et tamen non effugiunt damnati, nam mors contempta non sentitur estque velut somnus. . . . Christus sicut cum summo dolore mortuus est, ita videtur et dolores post mortem in inferno sustinuisse, . . . ita . . . ut caro quidem ejus requieverit in spe, sed anima ejus infernum gustaverit' (Weim. ed. v. 463, 18 ff.; Erl. ed. *Opp. exeg.* xv. 15, 378 f.).

Luther still adhered to this theory in 1530 (*Enarr. in ps. 10*, Erl. ed. *Opp. exeg.* xvii. 125 f., cf. 124; [Germ.] xxxviii. 145 f., cf. 144); and, in fact, if we would set forth his own distinctive view of the subject, we must keep these thoughts before our minds. There is nothing to suggest that he ever abandoned the belief that the true Hell has no existence until the Last Day; he seems to have remained constant to the opinion to which he gave utterance in 1526:

'That there exists a special place in which the souls of the condemned now reside—as artists paint and belly-gods preach it—I regard as mere delusion, for even the devils are not yet in Hell' (*Expos. of Jonah*, Weim. ed. xix. 225; Erl. ed. [Germ.] xli. 378).

But he was not quite certain that the conception of the *Descensus* corresponding to this idea was final and exhaustive, and, accordingly, (*c*) while he had in 1523 sought to expound the Petrine passages on impossible lines, and in a sense which ignored the *Descensus* (*Auslegung d. 1 Petrusbriefes*, Weim. ed. xii. 367 f., 375 f., Erl. ed. [Germ.] li. 458 ff. 467; in a second form, Erl. ed. lii. 152 f. 162), we find that subsequently, in his lectures on *Genesis* (*c.* 1537)—which, it is true, do not survive in a verbally authentic form—he takes account of the hypothesis that the verses may throw light on the Article 'descendit ad inferos' (Erl. ed. *Opp. exeg.* ii. 222). He deems it possible that Peter was thinking of a preaching of the *mortuus Christus* to *mortui* of the time of the Deluge, but believes that this was restricted entirely to 'infantes et alios quos simplicitas sua impedivit, ne possent credere' (*loc. cit.*). (*d*) A little later Luther seems to have made a further advance. In 1543, according to Melanchthon's statement (*Corp. Ref.* v. 58), he was disposed to think—with Melanchthon himself—that Christ's preaching in Hades, as referred to in 1 Peter, might have effected the salvation of the nobler heathen; while in an edition of his lecture on *Hosea*, issued with his own consent by Veit Dietrich in 1545 (Letter of 16th Oct. 1545 [de Wette, *Luthers Briefe*, Berlin, 1825–56, v. 761]), he gives—if, that is to say, he ever read this edition of his lecture—his sanction to a similar exegesis (Erl. ed. *Opp. exeg.* xxiv. 330), which, however, is not found in the transcriptions of the lecture of 1524 (Weim. ed. xiii. 27) revised by Dietrich in his edition. In any case, Luther was far from certain that the views of the *Descensus* which went beyond the position stated above (in *b*) were correct. Hence, in 1544—and here we have his last utterance on the subject, though again not authentic in its verbal transmission—(*e*) he pronounced a 'non liquet' upon all conjectures that would add to the simple fact of the sojourn of Christ's spirit *in inferno*:

'Quid anima fecerit in inferno, multi multa disputant, an spoliaverit inferos et liberaverit suos qui ante ipsum in sinum Abrahae congregati fuerant, nihil attinet quaerere et rimari curiosius' (*in Gen.* [Erl. ed., *Opp. exeg.* x. 219]).

In his popular discourses Luther joins hands with the artists, whose pictures of the *Descensus* portray Christ—in the only way in which He can be portrayed, *i.e.* in the body—as going down 'with a banner in His hand,' appearing before Hell, dislodging Satan, taking Hell by storm, and carrying away those who are His (cf. Erl. ed. [Germ.] xix.[2] 41). Thus, in order that 'children and simple folk' might attain to a clear idea of Christ's triumph over Hell and Satan—a fact which must become part of their receptive faith—Luther did not hesitate repeatedly (cf. even the short form of the Ten Commandments, 1520 [Weim. ed. vii. 217 = Erl. ed. [Germ.] xxii. 8], and elsewhere, *e.g.* in the *Hauspostille* [Erl. ed. [Germ.] v.[2] 1–17]), and notably in an Easter sermon preached at Torgau on the 13th of April 1533 (Erl. ed. [Germ.] xix.[2] 40–54), to speak of the *Descensus* as if 'the Lord Christ—the entire person, God and man, with body and soul, undivided—had journeyed to Hell, and had in person demolished Hell and bound the Devil' (cf. Erl. ed. [Germ.] xix.[2] 44 f.). But these expositions are obviously clothed in the language of popular metaphor, and there is not the slightest doubt that Luther was aware of their exoteric character. He makes this quite clear in the exordium of his Torgau discourse:

'And it pleases me well that, for the simple, it [the Descent] should be painted, played, sung, or spoken in this manner (*i.e.* as represented by the artists), and I shall be quite content if people do not vex themselves greatly with high and subtle thoughts as to how it was carried out; for it did not take place in the body at all, as He remained in the grave for three days' (Erl. ed. [Germ.] xix.[2] 41).

It is instructive to note, as bearing in the same direction, what Luther adds to the words quoted above regarding the Descent of the whole person: 'Please God, the banner, doors, gate, and chains were of wood, or of iron, or did not exist at all' (*op. cit.* p. 45). Yet these utterances in the Torgau discourse, notwithstanding their unmistakably exoteric and metaphorical cast, came at length to be formulated as dogma. Owing, in some unexplained way, to local controversies regarding the Descent (F. H. R. Frank, *Theol. der Concordienformel*, iii., Erlangen, 1863, p. 418 ff.), the framers of the Formula of Concord (and even of its forerunner, the so-called Book of Torgau) deemed it necessary to insert a special Article (ix.) 'de Descensu Christi.' Their ostensible purpose in so doing was merely 'simplicitatem fidei in symbolo apostolico comprehensam retinere' (J. T. Müller, *Die symbol. Bücher d. evang.-luth. Kirche*, stereotype ed., Gütersloh, 1882, p. 696. 1). But when, in Art. ix., with a reference to Luther's Torgau discourse, they declare: 'Simpliciter ergo credimus quod *tota persona*, Deus et homo, post sepulturam ad inferos descenderit, Satanam devicerit, potestatem inferorum everterit, et diabolo omnem vim et potentiam eripuerit' (*ib.* 696. 2), it is clear that the statement has behind it the whole argumentation of Art. viii. on the 'Communicatio idiomatum' (*ib.* 697. 3).

Lutheran orthodoxy, in maintaining (in opposition to the Reformed theology: see § 5 below), as an element of the true doctrine, that the *Descensus* was an act which, occurring after the ζωοποιηθῆναι and immediately before the Resurrection, involved the *entire* person of Christ, and belonged to the *status exaltationis*, was simply proceeding upon the lines laid down by the Formula of Concord. But, in seeking to establish these positions, it appealed to the Petrine passage (1 P 3[19]) which was not cited by that Formula, asserting that the preaching of Christ was a 'praedicatio (verbalis!) elenchtica,' and therefore a 'triumphum agere' (Hollaz, in H. Schmid, *Die Dogmatik d. evang.-luth. Kirche*[4], Frankfort, 1858, § 38, note 21). In so doing, however, it also makes a complete surrender of the '*simplicitas fidei*,' as its Christology compelled it to qualify the 'descendit' by the phrase 'secundum humanam naturam,' for 'secundum divinam naturam jam ante in inferno per dominium omnia replens erat' (Quenstedt, in Schmid, *op. cit.* § 38, note 23). On a closer view, in fact, the 'descendit' becomes more attenuated still, since, according to the doctrine of Christ's omnipresence, His humanity is—after His exaltation, at all events—wherever His Divinity is. The 'supernaturalis *motus* non localis' (Hollaz, in *loc. cit.* note 22) is thus merely the first phase of the non-local *ubiquitas corporis*. According to the Tübingen school, indeed, the humanity of Christ was not to be separated from His non-local omnipresent Divinity, even at the beginning of His rest in the grave, or at any time, in fact, after His *conceptio* (Dorner, *Gesch. d. prot. Theol.*, Munich, 1867, ii. 788 ff.).

5. Reformed doctrine.—If the Lutheran doctrine may be regarded as a modification of the Catholic—and it can be explained only by reference to the latter—the view of the Reformed Churches, so far as a single generic view of the question may be attributed to them, is characterized by a complete abandonment of the Roman dogma. It is true that Zwingli, in his first discourse at Berne (*Werke*, ed. Schuler and Schulthess, Zürich, 1828–1842, ii. 1. p. 211), kept close to the Catholic interpretation, asserting that the pious who lived before Christ and believed in the coming Messiah were delivered from Hades; and that later (*Fidei expositio* 7 [*Werke*, iv. 49]), while of opinion that the 'descendit' of the *Apostolicum* signifies only that Christ really died ('inferis enim connumerari ex humanis abiisse est'), he still clung to that view, which rests upon a peculiar exegesis of 1 P 3[19f.]. Leo Jud, again, in his Catechism of 1534, finds no more in the 'descendit' than 'vere mortuus est': 'He died and was buried—went to Hell indeed, *i.e.* He really died' (A. Schweizer, *Die Glaubenslehre der evang.-ref. Kirche*, ii., Zürich, 1847, p. 349). Then Calvin, while deeming it an error to take the 'descendit' as equivalent to 'sepultus est' (*Inst.* 1536 [*Opp.* i. 70: 'haec particula de descensu . . . minime superflua']; emphatic repudiation in *Inst.* 1539–54 [*Opp.* i. 529] and 1559 [*Opp.* ii. 375]), nevertheless characterizes the Roman view as a 'fabula' not only in *Inst.* 1536 (i. 69 f.) but also later (*Inst.* 1539–54, 7. 27 [i. 529 f.]; 1559, 2. 16, 9 [ii. 375 f.]); the idea that the souls of the dead are confined in a prison he regards as simply 'childish' (1559, 2. 16, 9 [ii. 376]). From 1536 to 1559 the only meaning which he drew from the Petrine passages—without applying them to the *Descensus* at all—was as follows:

'virtutem redemptionis per Christum partae exhibitam et plane manifestatam esse eorum spiritibus qui ante id tempus defuncti fuerant.' 'Fideles,' he believes, 'tunc plane et praesenti aspectu perspexerunt ejus visitationem; contra reprobi . . . nullam sibi spem residuam tunc planius agnoverunt' (*Inst.* 1539–54, 7. 27, p. 530; cf. 1536, p. 70, and 1559, 2. 16, 9, p. 376).

To Calvin's mind the true sense of the article 'descendit ad inferos' was this:

'Christum afflictum a Deo fuisse ac divini judicii horrorem et severitatem sensisse, ut irae Dei intercederet ac ejus justitiae nostro nomine satisfaceret' (*Inst.* 1536, p. 69; cf. 1559, 2. 16, 10, ii. 376: 'Nihil actum erat, si corporea tantum morte defunctus fuisset Christus, sed operae simul pretium erat, ut divinae ultionis severitatem sentiret, quo et irae ipsius intercederet et satisfaceret justo judicio; unde etiam eum oportuit cum inferorum copiis aeternaeque mortis horrore quasi consertis manibus luctari').

Calvin is thinking here, not of the experiences through which Jesus passed after His death, but of the agonies of soul which preceded it. To challenge this interpretation on the ground that

it conflicts with the sequence of the Symbolical clauses, he regards as frivolous:

'Ubi enim quae in hominum conspectu passus est Christus exposita fuerunt, opportune subjicitur invisibile illud et incomprehensibile judicium quod coram Deo sustinuit' (*Inst.* 1559, 2. 16, 10, p. 376 f.).

In the Reformed Churches of the succeeding period, as is shown by F. Wendelin (*Systema*, 1656, p. 719, in Schweizer, ii. 350), the views of Leo Jud and Calvin took precedence of all others, though in varying measure:

'Per descensum nihil aliud significari nisi sepulturam, pii et docti viri nonnulli approbant; plerique orthodoxorum intelligunt dolores infernales quos in anima sua Christus sensit' (F. Wendelin, *loc. cit.*).

With regard to the latter point the Reformed theologians often differ from Calvin in not restricting Christ's endurance of the *dolores infernales* to His earthly life. In both statements it is of course implied—in opposition to the Lutheran theory—that the *Descensus* belongs to the *status exinanitionis* or *humiliationis* (*Westminster Larger Catechism*, qu. 46, 49, 50). Among the formularies which adopt the distinctively Calvinistic view are the Geneva Catechism (E. F. K. Müller, *Bekenntnisschriften d. ref. Kirche*, Leipzig, 1903, p. 122 f.: 'horribiles angustias intelligo quibus Christi anima constricta fuit') and the Heidelberg Catechism (qu. 44 [Müller, p. 694: 'unspeakable distress, agony, and horror, which He suffered in His soul, and previously']). The *Westminster Larger Catechism* sets forth the Calvinistic view—without mention of the 'Descent' however—in qu. 49, while in qu. 50 it supplements this by speaking of Christ 'as after His death . . . continuing in the state of the dead, and under the power of death,' and expressly adds that this 'hath been otherwise expressed in these words,—*He descended into hell.*' But most of the Reformed Confessions give no explanation of the *Descensus* at all. The Anglican XXXIX Articles of 1563 likewise discard that portion of Art. iii. (Müller, p. 506: 'nam corpus usque ad resurrectionem in sepulchro jacuit; spiritus, ab illo emissus, cum spiritibus qui in carcere sive in inferno detinebantur fuit, illisque praedicavit, quemadmodum testatur Petri locus') which in the XLII Articles of 1552 followed the statement 'Christus est credendus ad inferos descendisse.'

6. Modern interpretation and re-statement.—In the Greek and Roman Churches the formulated doctrines of the *Descensus* dealt with above (§§ 2 and 3) have maintained an all but absolute predominance since mediæval times; of the few divergent tendencies the more important are mentioned by Dietelmaier (*Hist. dogmatis de Descensu*², Altorf, 1762, pp. 128–139, 144–153, 179). Within the pale of Lutheranism, again, a great variety of views gained a footing at the very outset. Luther himself advocated more than one interpretation (cf. § 4); Johannes Agricola, in his *Christliche Kinderzucht*, propounded views similar to those afterwards maintained by Calvin (cf. G. Kawerau, *Joh. Agricola*, Berlin, 1881, p. 72), and with these views, again, Joh. Aepinus of Hamburg († 1553) incorporated the theory that the *Descensus* was really a vicarious descent of the Spirit of Jesus into that *infernum* in which sinners deserve to suffer until the Final Judgment and the inception of Gehenna fire (F. H. R. Frank, *Die Theologie der Concordienformel*, 4 vols., Erlangen, 1858–65, iii. 397–415); many others have approximated to the position of Aepinus (Frank, p. 415 f.), while Joh. Brenz († 1570), in the interests of the *ubiquitas corporis Christi* and the non-local character of 'Heaven' and the *infernum*, was inclined to favour a spiritual theory of the *Descensus*—an interpretation which amounted to little more than the notion that the crucified Christ is *supposed by human beings* to have gone down to Hell and to have utterly perished (Frank, pp. 418–420; for other theologians, cf. Frank, pp. 416 f., 420–424, and for Urbanus Rhegius and Matthesius, Dietelmaier, p. 179 f.). From the issue of the Formula of Concord till after the middle of the 18th cent., however, the view formulated in that document prevailed generally within the Lutheran communion (cf. Dietelmaier, pp. 170, 180, 204–209). In the Reformed Churches neither of the Confessional views referred to in § 5 ever gained a position of absolute supremacy. As a matter of fact, it was in this section of the Church—in which the serious study of historical questions was entered upon earlier than among the Lutherans—that the certitude of the Confessional interpretations was first shattered. Besides the great theologian G. J. Vossius († 1649), two renowned English scholars, John Lightfoot († 1675) and John Pearson († 1686), succeeded in undermining the confidence hitherto placed in the formulated views, and for these thinkers the *Descensus* meant no more than the sojourn of the Spirit of Jesus in the realm of death. Then in the period of the Illumination the dogma largely lost its earlier signification, nor did the theology of post-Illumination times restore it.

But a fresh theory of the *Descensus* was advanced, and found favour in many quarters. The distinctive feature of the new interpretation was that it associated the preaching of Christ in Hades with a possible offer of salvation after death to all who had been denied the opportunity in this life. The κηρύσσειν of 1 P 3[19] was regarded as a preaching of the gospel; the contemporaries of Noah (v.[20]) were supposed to be referred to only as examples, or as abnormally depraved, and it was thus inferred, *a majore ad minus*, that, if salvation was proffered to such as these, a similar invitation must be granted to all who have not been called, or called effectually, in this life. To a certain extent recourse was had also to a hypothesis with which Augustine was acquainted (*Ep.* clxiv. 4. 13; Migne, *PL* xxxiii. 714), viz. that a knowledge of the salvation wrought by Christ must have remained in the realm of death ever since His preaching there. The present writer is unable, so far as regards the countries outside Germany, to trace the rise of this now widely diffused idea; considerable information on the subject is given by C. Clemen, '*Niedergefahren zu den Toten*,' Giessen, 1900, p. 215 ff. In Germany certain theologians—above all, J. L. König (*Die Lehre von Christi Höllenfahrt*, Frankfort a.M., 1842), E. Güder (*Die Lehre von der Erscheinung Jesu Christi unter d. Toten*, Berne, 1853), and Clemen (*op. cit.*)—have given their support to this re-statement of the *Descensus* doctrine, or at least (thus Clemen) of what is supposed to be its religious bearing. These new ideas have found their way even into the precincts of Lutheran orthodoxy, and have become incorporated in a peculiar manner with other modifications of orthodox (=Lutheran) tradition (cf. *e.g.* Alex. von Oettingen, *Lutherische Dogmatik*, ii. 2, Munich, 1902, pp. 140–148). The theory which would affirm the possibility of an offer of salvation after death must, in our judgment, be conceded, and indeed many modern writers of the most diverse theological tendencies give it their approval (cf. König, p. 204 ff., Clemen, p. 212 ff.); but whether the theory can be legitimately combined with the *Descensus* as presented in Scripture (see below, § 7) or in the tradition of the Church (§ 8) is another question.

7. Re-statement compared with Scripture.—Of the various passages of Scripture which have at one time or another been appealed to in support of the *Descensus* those drawn from the OT need not be discussed here, as it is only by an obsolete

exegesis that references to Jesus Christ could be found in them. Nor do the NT passages—Mt 12[40], Ac 2[27], Ro 10[7] and Eph 4[8-10]—speak of a *Descensus* of the nature implied by the 'Orthodox,' Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinistic, or 'modern' interpretations; these passages, or some of them, point at most to a sojourn of Jesus, or of His soul (Ac 2[27]), in 'Hades.' We shall have an opportunity below (see § 10) of gauging the significance of this datum. The only passages which need be considered here are 1 P 3[19ff.] and 4[6], which are very generally regarded as the *loci classici* for the *Descensus*, though, as we have already seen, Augustine and Aquinas (cf. § 3), Calvin (§ 5) and—for many years at least—Luther as well (§ 4), denied that the verses in question refer to the subject at all.

1 P 4[6] must certainly be surrendered. For, while Augustine's idea that the νεκροί is equivalent to *infideles* (*Ep.* clxiv. 7. 21 [*PL* xxxiii. 718])—an exegesis adopted by Luther (*Epist. S. Petr. ausgelegt*, 1523 [Erl. ed. [Germ.] li. 468])—is undoubtedly wrong, Luther is as certainly right in saying (*loc. cit.* p. 467): 'He (St. Peter) adds further that they (the νεκροί) are judged according to man in the flesh. But they are not in the flesh; hence it can be understood only as applied to living persons.' If this reasoning be conclusive, and the application of the passage to the *Descensus* thus shown to be wrong, other points of difference among expositors may be left out of consideration here. The only correct explanation, in the present writer's opinion, is that which takes the νεκροί to signify those who were dead when the Epistle was written, but who in their lifetime had—as the εὐηγγελίσθη shows—a knowledge of the gospel: just because they have died, and have not remained alive until the Parousia, they are 'judged in the flesh,' *ipsa morte carnis* (Augustine, *Ep.* clxiv. 7. 21 [*PL* xxxiii. 718]), but they live to God πνεύματι. This agrees with the whole train of thought which sets out from 3[17] and reaches its middle point in 4[1]; for the emphasis is laid upon the idea that the dead, though it has been their lot κριθῆναι σαρκί, nevertheless ζῶσι κατὰ θεὸν πνεύματι.

The case of 1 P 3[19f.] cannot be so easily disposed of. Of the various interpretations applied to this passage, not a few find no reference to the *Descensus* in it either.

We have one example of this when the clause ἐν ᾧ (sc. πνεύματι) πορευθεὶς ἐκήρυξεν is assumed to refer to the pre-existent Christ (I.). Such is the interpretation of Augustine (cf. § 3), J. C. K. v. Hofmann (*Die heilige Schrift d. NT*, vii., Nördlingen, 1875, p. 124–134), and A. Schweizer (*Hinabgefahren zur Hölle*, etc., Zürich, 1868), who thinks that (I.*a*) the πνεύματα to whom Christ preached were the people of Noah's time, and that these are spoken of as πνεύματα ἐν φυλακῇ because they 'in ignorantiae tenebris claudebantur' (Aug. *Ep.* clxiv. 5, 16 [*PL* xxxiii. 715]), or because they were ἐν φυλακῇ when the Epistle was written (v. Hofmann, *et al.*). Another form of this interpretation is that of F. Spitta (*Christi Predigt an die Geister*, Göttingen, 1890), that (I.*b*) the ἐν φυλακῇ πνεύματα are the angels whose fall (Gn 6[2]) was a theme of such profound interest in the Jewish apocalyptic literature and in certain Christian circles of the early centuries (cf. 2 P 2[4]). Similarly, the idea of the *Descensus* is surrendered by the interpretation which refers the clause πορευθεὶς ἐκήρυξεν to the period *after* the Resurrection (II.). This exegesis is certainly untenable in the form represented by Luther, viz. that (II.*a*) Christ after His Ascension comes in the Spirit (*i.e.* in preaching) to the spirits (*i.e.* spirits or hearts of men), who are as disobedient as the contemporaries of Noah (Erl. ed. [Germ.] li. 458–460); but in the form given to it by F. C. Baur (*Vorlesungen ü. d. neutest. Theologie*, Leipzig, 1864, p. 291)—that (II.*b*) those to whom Christ preached were the fallen angels (cf. 1 Ti 3[16]: ὤφθη ἀγγέλοις)—it still finds adherents (M. Lauterburg, *PRE*[3] viii. 201, l. 21 ff.). But a new interest gathers around the passage when the πορευθεὶς ἐκήρυξεν is understood to indicate an event which occurred in the interval between Christ's death and His resurrection (III.). The theories based on this exegesis fall into two main classes, corresponding to a twofold explanation of ἐκήρυξεν. If the word be taken to mean a preaching of salvation (III.*a*), then the verse asserts that during the interval in question Christ proclaimed salvation to the generation destroyed by the Deluge. But, if ἐκήρυξεν be interpreted as implying only an 'elenchtic proclamation' (III.*b*), we have a view which seems to approximate to the position of Lutheran Orthodoxy (cf. § 4).

Which of the above five exegetical theories still advocated to-day (I.*a*, *b*, II.*b*, III.*a*, *b*) is the most probable is a question which each must decide for himself; to seek to prove that any single one is exclusively correct were a hopeless task. The present writer has a considerable preference for the first form of explanation (I.), and especially for that of Spitta (I.*b*), though he hardly shares the confidence with which the latter scholar refers the ἐκήρυξεν to the commination uttered, according to the Book of Enoch (xii. 4, ed. Fleming and Radermacher, Leipzig, 1901, p. 34 ff.), over the fallen angels by Enoch: so many ideas of like nature must have been current in Apostolic times. But, even if either of the interpretations specified in III. is the right one, *i.e.* if we are to postulate a preaching of Christ in the interval between His death and His resurrection, yet 1 P 3[19f.] gives as little warrant for the 'modern' conception of the *Descensus* as for that of the Lutheran Orthodoxy. Both theories, in fact, alike the Orthodox Lutheran, which does not harmonize with the ἐν ᾧ (=ἐν πνεύματι), and the modern, are in conflict with the indisputable fact that the only people mentioned in v.[20] as those to whom Christ preached are the contemporaries of Noah. To assume that the latter are mentioned only by way of example, and that the preaching of salvation, or of judgment, was heard by *all* ἀπειθήσαντές ποτε, is certainly unwarranted. As regards the whole passage, in fact, only one thing is certain, viz. that, if it speaks of the *Descensus* at all, whether in the sense of interpretation III.*a* or in that of III.*b*, it presents an altogether unique conception of the event—unique not only with respect to the Confessional interpretations (§§ 2–5) and the 'modern' theories, but also with respect to the traditions of the early Church. The conception of the *Descensus* current in the early Church proceeded on entirely different lines (see § 8) and arose independently of 1 P 3[19f.] Prior to the time of Clement of Alexandria (*Strom.* vi. 6. 45, ed. O. Stählin, Leipzig, 1906, p. 454, 14 ff.) and Origen (*in Joann.* vi. 35, ed. E. Preuschen, Leipzig, 1903, p. 144, 15 ff.), this passage, so far as we know, was never referred to in connexion with the *Descensus*; while Irenæus, who often speaks of the *Descensus*, and brings many Biblical passages to bear upon it (cf. *adv. Hær.* v. 31. 1, Massuet [ed. Harvey, Cambridge, 1877, ii. 411]), and who, moreover, was acquainted with 1 Peter and regarded it as authentic (*op. cit.* iv. 9. 2 [ii. 170]), never quotes the passage at all, nor, in dealing specially with the *Descensus*, does he even allude to it.

8. Re-statement compared with early Church tradition.—It is absolutely certain that the early Church tradition regarding the *Descensus* moves in an orbit quite apart from the 'modern' treatment of the conception. As regards the Western Baptismal Confession, it is well known that the 'descendit ad inferos,' which does not occur in the early Roman Symbol (Hahn, *Bibliothek d. Symbole*[3], Breslau, 1897, p. 22 ff.), makes its first appearance in the Symbol of Aquileia by Rufinus (Hahn, p. 42, cf. note 63; Caspari, *Quellen*, ii. [Christiania, 1869] 46, note 133; also F. Kattenbusch, *Das apostol. Symbol*, ii. [Leipzig, 1900] 895 ff.). In the Eastern Confessions (not, however, in the Baptismal formulæ) the clause appears somewhat earlier, viz. in the Fourth Sirmian formula of 359 (Hahn, § 163: καὶ εἰς τὰ καταχθόνια κατελθόντα), the kindred formula of Nice of the same year (Hahn, § 164), and the Constantinopolitan formula of 360 (Hahn, § 167). But, long before these Confessions saw the light, the *Descensus* was already part of the Church tradition, alike in the East and in the West. This appears, to begin with, from the circumstance that among the things 'quae testatissima veritate de Christo conscripta sunt' Augustine places the fact

'quod apud inferos fuit' (*Ep.* clxiv. 5. 14; cf. *ib.* 4. 12: 'Christo ad inferos descendente,' and 2. 3 '[Christum] . . . venisse in infernum satis constat, . . . quis ergo nisi infidelis negaverit fuisse apud inferos Christum?'); but in point of fact the idea of the *Descensus* can be clearly traced through Clement of Alexandria (cf. § 7), Tertullian (*de Anima*, 7 and 55, ed. Reifferscheid, Vienna, 1890, p. 308, 14 and 387 ff.), and Irenæus (*adv. Hær.* iii. 20. 4, Massuet [ed. Harvey, ii. 108]; iv. 22. 1 [ii. 228]; iv. 33. 1 [ii. 256]; iv. 33. 12 [ii. 267]; v. 31. 1 [ii. 411], and Ἀπόδειξις, *TU* xxx. 1. p. 42), to Justin (*Dial.* 72, ed. Otto, 1876–81, ii. 260) and one of the 'presbyters' of Irenæus (cf. *adv. Hær.* iv. 27. 2 [ii. 241]). Now, what significance did these Fathers attach to the idea? In answering this question it will be well to begin with the popular account of the *Descensus* given in the second part (*i.e.* the so-called *Descensus*) of the *Gospel of Nicodemus*, which probably belongs to the 4th cent. A.D. (*Evangelia apocrypha*², ed. Tischendorf, Leipzig, 1876, pp. 322 ff. and 389 ff.). Here it is told in most dramatic style how Christ after His death came to Hades, set free the OT saints, and took them to Heaven, while He cast Satan, who desired to detain Him in Hades, into Tartarus (Gr. text, cap. vi. p. 329; Lat. text B, cap. viii. p. 429; somewhat differently Lat. text A, cap. vi. p. 400: 'tradidit eum inferi potestati'). According to this account, therefore, there are two elements in the *Descensus*, viz. Christ's deliverance of the OT fathers from Hades, and His victory over Satan. The latter is not found in the earlier sources, being a mythological expansion—traceable as far back as Origen (*in Gen.* hom. 17. 5, ed. Lommatzsch, Berlin, 1831–48, viii. 290)—of the NT conception of Christ's victory over Satan combined with Ac 2²⁷; the former—the deliverance of the saints—corresponds to the tradition which can be traced back to Justin's time. And that this conception of the *Descensus* may be regarded as distinctively that of the early Church is corroborated by the following facts. (1) Irenæus (in all the passages quoted above) and Justin (*loc. cit.*) give Scripture proofs of the view in question, and they also cite an OT (apocryphal) passage as follows: 'Commemoratus est Dominus, sanctus Israel, mortuorum suorum qui dormierant in terra sepultionis, et descendit ad eos evangelizare salutem, quae est ab eo, ut salvaret eos' (Iren. iii. 20. 4 [ii. 108]; cf. A. Resch, 'Ausserkanon. Paralleltexte zu d. Evangelien,' *TU* x. 1 and 2, p. 372 ff.). (2) It is evident that Celsus, the pagan adversary of Christianity, was acquainted with this view; according to Origen (*c. Celsum*, ii. 43 [ed. Koetschau, Leipzig, 1899, i. 166]), he speaks of Christ thus: *μὴ πείσας τοὺς ὧδε ὄντας ἐστέλλετο εἰς ᾅδου πείσων τοὺς ἐκεῖ.* (3) Marcion's conception of the *Descensus* is obviously a characteristic travesty of that recognized by the Church; thus, according to Irenæus (*adv. Hær.* i. 27. 3 [i. 218 f.]), Marcion taught:

'Cain et eos qui similes sunt ei, et Sodomitas et Aegyptios et similes eis et omnes omnino gentes quae in omni permixtione malignitatis ambulaverunt, salvatas esse a Domino, cum descendisset ad inferos, . . . Abel autem et Enoch et Noe et reliquos justos et eos qui sunt erga Abraham patriarchas, cum omnibus prophetis et his qui placuerunt Deo, non participasse salutem. . . . Quoniam enim sciebant, inquit, Deum suum semper tentantem eos, et tunc tentare eum suspicati, non accurrerunt Jesu neque crediderunt annuntiationi ejus; et propterea remansisse animas ipsorum apud inferos dixit.'

Moreover, we cannot appeal to Rufinus as a witness against the theory that the conception of the *Descensus* thus travestied by Marcion was the accredited doctrine of the Church. It may well be that Rufinus did not know what to make of the 'descendit ad inferos' in his own Symbol. His first remark regarding it is: 'vis verbi eadem videtur esse in eo, quod sepultus dicitur,' while, further on, along with other passages of Scripture, he incidentally refers to 1 P 3¹⁹, which, as he thinks, tells us 'quid operis [Christus] in inferno egerit' (*Comm. in Symbol.* cap. 18 and 28 [Migne, *PL* xxi. 356 and 364]). After all, it is quite true that the Article 'descendit ad inferos' bears essentially the same meaning as the people of that day found in the Article 'sepultus est.' Christ went to Hades, according to the beliefs of the age, precisely because He died and was buried: 'Christus Deus,' says Tertullian, 'quia et homo, mortuus secundum scripturas, et sepultus secundum easdem, huic quoque legi satisfecit, forma humanae mortis apud inferos functus' (*de Anima*, 55 [ed. Reifferscheid, i. 388, 1–3]). We must not forget that Jews as well as Greeks regarded the grave and Hades as identical; the *Didaskalia Apostolorum* contains a passage—one, moreover, of quasi-Symbolical character—which brings Christ's liberation of the OT saints into immediate connexion with His death:

'qui crucifixus est sub Pontio Pilato *et dormivit*, ut evangelizaret Abrabam et Isaak et Jakob et sanctis suis universis tam finem saeculi quam resurrectionem quae erit mortuorum' (vi. 6, 23. 8; ed. Funk, *Didascalia et Constitutiones Apostolorum*, Paderborn, 1905, i. 382).

9. Original signification of the doctrine.—We proceed to ask whether the conception of the *Descensus* thus recognized by the early Church—the conception which has been preserved most faithfully in the Orthodox Eastern Church, and still looms through the Roman Catholic doctrine, but which differs radically from the formulated views of the Protestant Churches, as also from the 'modern' interpretation of the *Descensus* as a preaching to unbelievers—was the original. But this really leads to the antecedent question whether the view shown to have been held by Tertullian, Irenæus, and Justin can be traced still further back. In Hermas (*Simil.* ix. 16. 5) we find the theologoumenon: **οἱ ἀπόστολοι καὶ οἱ διδάσκαλοι οἱ κηρύξαντες τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ** *κοιμηθέντες . . . ἐκήρυξαν καὶ τοῖς προκεκοιμημένοις.* Clearly, therefore, Hermas knew nothing of a 'Descensus Christi ad inferos' in the sense ascribed to it by Tertullian, Irenæus, and Justin. The present writer is, nevertheless, convinced—with J. B. Lightfoot and other scholars—that an idea of the *Descensus* very similar to that held by these Fathers can be traced even in Ignatius. Speaking of the prophets, the latter says that they had hoped and waited for Jesus Christ, *ἐν ᾧ* (*sc.* Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ) **καὶ πιστεύσαντες ἐσώθησαν** . . . ὑπὸ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ . . . **συνηριθμημένοι** *ἐν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ τῆς κοινῆς ἐλπίδος* (*Philad.* v. 2, ed. Lightfoot, Lond. 1889, ii. 262 f.), while the same thought is found in *Magn.* ix. 2 (ii. 131), which speaks of Christ and the prophets thus: *ὃν δικαίως ἀνέμενον,* **παρὼν ἤγειρεν αὐτοὺς ἐκ νεκρῶν.** Nor does the present writer doubt that these ideas of the *Descensus* likewise underlie the thought of Ignatius when he speaks of Jesus Christ as the *θύρα τοῦ πατρὸς, δι' ἧς εἰσέρχονται Ἀβραὰμ καὶ Ἰσαὰκ καὶ Ἰακὼβ καὶ οἱ προφῆται καὶ οἱ ἀπόστολοι καὶ ἡ ἐκκλησία* (*Philad.* ix. 1; Lightfoot, ii. 274). Are we to assume, then, that the ideas of Ignatius regarding the deliverance of the OT saints from Hades were identical with those of Tertullian and Irenæus? The present writer is of opinion that they were not quite identical. In order to become convinced of this we must first examine the eschatological beliefs of Irenæus and Tertullian. Here Tertullian is the clearer of the two. He says, quite unmistakably, that 'no one enters Heaven before the end of the world': 'nulli patet coelum, terra adhuc salva, ne dixerim clausa, cum transactione enim mundi reserabuntur regna coelorum' (*de Anima*, 55 [ed. Reifferscheid, i. 388. 17 ff.]). Until the Last Day, therefore, the dead are in an intermediate state; the universal law is that all the dead, Christians included, pass after death into Hades: 'omnis ergo anima penes inferos,

inquis? Velis ac nolis, et supplicia jam illic et refrigeria. Habes pauperem et divitem' (*ib.* 58; i. 394. 9–11). The allusion to Lk $16^{19ff.}$ shows that Tertullian located 'Abraham's bosom' (v.$^{22f.}$), likewise 'apud inferos.' But he was also aware that the souls of martyrs pass immediately into 'Paradise': 'nemo enim peregrinatus a corpore statim immoratur penes Dominum *nisi ex martyrii praerogativa, paradiso scilicet, non inferis diversurus*' (*de Res. Carn.* 43, ed. Oehler, Leipzig, 1851–53, p. 973; cf. *de Anima*, 55 [Reifferscheid, i. 389. 3]: 'tota paradisi clavis tuus sanguis'). Nor does Tertullian appear to deny that even the patriarchs saved by Christ—the 'appendices dominicae resurrectionis'—tarry in Paradise till the 'transactio mundi' (*de Anima*, 55 [Reifferscheid, i. 388. 21 ff.]). What then is Paradise? A 'locus divinae amoenitatis recipiendis sanctorum spiritibus destinatus' (*Apol.* 47 [Oehler, p. 145]), to be distinguished from that Hades which contains the souls of most of the dead, as an 'aliud et privatum hospitium' (*de Anima*, 55 [Reifferscheid, i. 388. 29]), yet in the last resort clearly a section of the 'inferi,' identical with the 'sinus Abrahae,' where 'expectandae resurrectionis solacium capitur' (*ib.*). Irenæus, who, it must be confessed, appears not to have fully mastered the heterogeneous mass of traditions before him, held a view essentially the same (cf. L. Atzberger, *Gesch. d. christl. Eschatol. innerhalb d. vornicän. Zeit*, Freiburg in B., 1896, p. 238 ff.). But he seems to think of the πνευματοφόροι (*i.e.* truly spiritual Christians, martyrs, and other specially mature believers) who enjoy in Paradise a foretaste of ἀφθαρσία (*adv. Hær.* v. 5. 1 [ii. 331]) not merely—with Tertullian—as 'spiritus,' but also, perhaps on the authority of 1 Co 5^4 (a passage which he often cites [cf. Harvey, ii. 521])—as endowed with what we may call provisional bodies (cf. what is said, *op. cit.* p. 330, about Enoch and Elijah). Now, we see at once that, with respect to the views of Irenæus and Tertullian, the same questions urge themselves upon us as arose in connexion with the recognized doctrine of the Eastern Church (see above, end of § 2). According to the beliefs of the two Fathers regarding Paradise, all that Christ could accomplish on the occasion of His *Descensus* was—to put it somewhat crudely—to place the OT saints in a better region of Hades. Did Ignatius too share this view? And is this the original idea of the *Descensus*? The former question—little as Ignatius says of the matter—may, as we think, be answered in the negative. What Christ did for the prophets, according to Ignatius (*Magn.* ix. 2), was: **ἤγειρεν αὐτοὺς ἐκ νεκρῶν.** Was Ignatius thinking here of a bodily resurrection, and of what is narrated in Mt $27^{52f.}$? T. Zahn (*Ign. v. Antiochien*, Gotha, 1873, p. 598 f.) believes that he was. But the hypothesis is belied by the first of the Ignatian passages already quoted (*Philad.* v. 2), according to which the prophets are συνηριθμημένοι ἐν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ τῆς κοινῆς ἐλπίδος, *i.e.* they look forward, exactly like the Christians, to the ἀνάστασις σαρκός. It is certainly possible that Ignatius agreed with Irenæus in believing that prophets and patriarchs had acquired provisional bodies. But the true sense of the Ignatian references, as the present writer thinks, leaves us free either to accept this theory or to assume that, like Tertullian, he was thinking only of the 'spiritus' of the prophets. Perhaps his cogitations had never brought him face to face with the alternative; for it is obvious that in his eyes the essence of the matter was that Christ had vouchsafed to the OT saints the same salvation as Christians had obtained. What then, according to Ignatius, is the position of Christians with respect to death? So far as he himself was concerned, he does not look forward to a sojourn in Hades; he hopes, at his approaching decease, to win God (Θεοῦ ἐπιτυχεῖν, *Rom.* i. 2, ii. 1, etc.), to go to the Father (*ib.* vii. 2), to be united to Christ (*ib.* vii. 3; cf. E. von der Goltz, *Ign. als Theologe*, Leipzig, 1894, p. 38). Do these words imply that Ignatius, as one about to become a martyr, longed for the 'prerogative' (cf. Tertullian's phrase quoted in preced. col.) of 'statim penes dominum esse'? Such an interpretation seems quite at variance with the manner in which he speaks of himself elsewhere. He must have supposed, accordingly, that, although Christians will not attain the resurrection of the body until the Last Day, yet they do not fall under the bondage of death, *i.e.* Hades, but pass through the gate of death to eternal life. It is clear that, according to Ignatius, that which Christians experience immediately after death was imparted, in virtue of Christ's descent, also to the OT saints. That these reflexions of Ignatius are of a more primitive character than those of Irenæus and Tertullian appears probable from the fact that they exhibit a higher degree of self-consistency, and are in perfect accord with ideas suggested by Jn 8^{51} and $11^{25ff.}$ (cf. 11^{24}). But this priority is also capable of proof. First of all, it is worthy of note that the phrase ἤγειρεν αὐτοὺς ἐκ νεκρῶν used by Ignatius is found in later statements regarding the *Descensus* which are unquestionably independent of him. In the *Acta Thaddaei*, written *c.* A.D. 250, Christ is referred to in these terms: ἐσταυρώθη, καὶ κατέβη εἰς τὸν ᾅδην, καὶ διέσχισε φραγμὸν τὸν ἐξ αἰῶνος μὴ σχισθέντα, καὶ ἀνήγειρεν νεκρούς· καὶ κατέβη μόνος, ἀνέβη δὲ μετὰ πολλοῦ ὄχλου πρὸς τὸν πατέρα αὐτοῦ (Euseb. *HE* i. 13. 20, ed. E. Schwartz, Leipzig, 1907, i. 96). The ἐγείρειν, indeed, is still found in the *Gospel of Nicodemus* (viii., p. 330). Another important point is that Tertullian and Irenæus expressly oppose the theory that Christians do not go to Hades (cf. Kattenbusch, *op. cit.* ii. 902 ff.). Of his opponents on this point Tertullian says: 'qui satis superbe non putant animas fidelium inferis dignas' (*de Anima*, 55 [Reiff. i. 388. 7]); 'In hoc, inquiunt, Christus inferos adiit, ne nos adiremus; ceterum quod discrimen ethnicorum et christianorum, si carcer mortuis idem?' (*ib.* 55 [Reiff. i. 388. 10 ff.]). Irenæus, again, censures those within the Church (cf. *adv. Hær.* v. 31. 1: 'qui putantur recte credidisse') who believe 'interiorem hominem ipsorum derelinquentem hic corpus, in supercoelestem ascendere locum' (*adv. Hær.* v. 31. 2 [ii. 412]). Now, the real innovators here are not those who were thus assailed by Irenæus and Tertullian, and whose views, it may be added, were still at work in the time of Pelagius (cf. Loofs, *Dogmengesch.*^{4}, Halle, 1907, p. 421), but these Fathers themselves. Finally, the older view still asserts itself in the thought of Irenæus: 'Ecclesia . . . multitudinem martyrum . . . praemittit ad patrem' (*adv. Hær.* iv. 33. 9 [ii. 263]), and, in fact, the belief that the martyrs and saints are even now with Christ long survived throughout the Western Church, as also —though with manifold inconsistencies—in the East.

Thus the most primitive, or, at least, the earliest traceable, element in the conception of the *Descensus* would seem to be the belief that Christ, having descended into the under world after His death, delivered the OT saints from that necessity of being confined in Hades which was thenceforward abrogated in the case of believers, and conveyed them to the Heaven which all believers have hereafter the right to enter.

10. Relation of doctrine to primitive Christian ideas.—That in this most primitive, *i.e.* earliest traceable, view we have reached the primordial element of the doctrine is rendered probable by the fact that the view in question is closely connected with certain important and, indeed, central ideas in primitive Christianity. Reference can be

made here only to a few points. (1) This earliest phase of the conception shows not the slightest influence of that high esteem accorded, from the days of the Apologists, to the pious heathen who lived before Christ; it numbers with the Church of God only the *saints of the Old Covenant.* (2) It does justice to the primitive Christian conviction that Christ was the πρωτότοκος ἐκ νεκρῶν (Col 1[18], 1 Co 15[20]), the One who brought life (Paul, John, 1 P 1[3], Heb., Ac 4[2] 13[32ff.] 17[31]). (3) It ignores the distinction between the Resurrection and the Ascension of Christ, and, indeed, with not a few primitive Christian documents (cf. *Barnab.* xv. 9, ed. Harnack[2], Leipzig, 1878, p. 66, and Harnack's note), treats the two as one. We may well wonder, indeed, that the opponents of the bodily resurrection of Jesus have never appealed to this conception of the *Descensus, i.e.* the ἐγερθῆναι ἐκ νεκρῶν of the patriarchs and their entrance into Heaven with Christ—though there are, of course, arguments which would tell against such a procedure. Even the relatively late *Gospel of Nicodemus* allows no time at all for the bodily resurrection of Christ, and that event is made known to the world, not by His appearance, but by the preaching of those who have come with Him from Hades (xi. 332; Lat. text A, 406 f.; B, 431).

Another link of evidence for the antiquity of the conception set forth in § 9 is that traces of it are found in the NT. Not certainly in 1 Peter; for, as will be seen from all that has been said, if the much-canvassed passages in that work refer to the *Descensus* at all, they would indicate a view which is quite unique and finds no support in the tradition of the early Church. The Pauline Epistles, again, in spite of Ro 10[7] and Eph 4[9], have in our opinion as little to say of the *Descensus* as Ac 2[27. 31]: all that these passages imply is the sojourn of Christ in Hades which, in the minds of the writers, was necessarily involved in His death. It is possible, however, that the belief in the *Descensus* is presupposed in Rev 1[18] (ἔχω τὰς κλεῖς τοῦ θανάτου καὶ τοῦ ᾅδου); while Jn 8[56] (Ἀβραὰμ ὁ πατὴρ ὑμῶν ἠγαλλιάσατο ἵνα ἴδῃ τὴν ἡμέραν τὴν ἐμήν· **καὶ εἶδε καὶ ἐχάρη**) —a passage which, as we think, still awaits a satisfactory exegesis—becomes intelligible when it is taken to refer to Christ's presence in Hades. It is true that the saying, as put into the mouth of Jesus, would thus involve a violent anachronism. But is an adequate exposition of, *e.g.*, Jn 6 possible except on the hypothesis of similar anachronisms?

We are on surer ground in saying that the idea of the *Descensus* was known to the author of Hebrews. Thus, of the OT saints whom he cites in ch. 11 as witnesses of faith he says expressly: οὗτοι πάντες . . . οὐκ ἐκομίσαντο τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν, τοῦ Θεοῦ περὶ ἡμῶν κρεῖττόν τι προβλεψαμένου, **ἵνα μὴ χωρὶς ἡμῶν** τελειωθῶσιν (11[39f.]); then in ch. 12 he assumes that even now the heavenly Jerusalem contains not only the ἐκκλησία πρωτοτόκων (Apostles and other believers of the first generation), but also the πνεύματα δικαίων τετελειωμένων (12[22f.]). Now these δίκαιοι τετελειωμένοι must also include the heroes of faith mentioned in ch. 11. Until Christ came, however, the way into the holy place was not open to them (cf. 9[8]: τοῦτο δηλοῦντος τοῦ Πνεύματος τοῦ Ἁγίου, μήπω πεφανερῶσθαι τὴν τῶν ἁγίων ὁδὸν ἔτι τῆς πρώτης σκηνῆς ἐχούσης στάσιν). Christ alone, who τελειωθεὶς ἐγένετο πᾶσι τοῖς ὑπακούουσιν αὐτῷ αἴτιος σωτηρίας αἰωνίου (5[9]), can have opened to them the holy place; through His death our πρόδρομος (6[20]) entered the holy place, εἰς αὐτὸν τὸν οὐρανόν (9[24]); ἐνεκαίνισεν ἡμῖν ὁδὸν πρόσφατον καὶ ζῶσαν, διὰ τοῦ καταπετάσματος, τοῦτ' ἔστι τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ (10[20]). In all these passages, no doubt, the writer is thinking primarily of Christ's *sacrificial* death, but do his words not gain in clearness when we assume that he had also the *Descensus* in his mind?

Finally, it seems to the writer to be beyond question that the idea of the *Descensus* underlies Mt 27[51-53]. It has been aptly observed by Resch ('Ausserkanon Paralleltexte z. d. Evangelien,' *TU* x. 1 and 2, 1893–94, p. 362) that the *Gospel of Nicodemus* indicates the sense in which the opening of the graves and the resurrection of saints narrated in these verses was understood, since it is hardly possible to doubt that the writer of the First Gospel favoured a similar view. We might even ask, indeed, whether the rending of the καταπέτασμα in Mt 27[51] is not simply a mythical representation of the thought expressed in He 10[20], viz. that Christ set open the way into the holy place διὰ τοῦ καταπετάσματος.

11. Hybrid origin of doctrine excluded.—The Johannine writings, the Ep. to the Hebrews, and Mt 27[51-53] belong, however, to the latest stratum of the NT. That the conception of the *Descensus*, as set forth in § 9, was current in the earlier Apostolic period must, in view of the fact that the Pauline Epp. are silent regarding it, and that there is no trace of it in Hermas (cf. p. 660[b]), be regarded as improbable. But from what was said in the foregoing paragraph we must recognize the presence of the idea in the later Apostolic period. This fact, and, still more, the fact that the idea of the *Descensus* is connected with primitive Christian-Jewish views of Hades and eternal life (cf. also § 10), are sufficient, as we think, to negative the theory that the belief was in part generated by non-Jewish and non-Christian influences—ideas from alien religions. Such a mixed origin has been ascribed to it by not a few modern scholars (cf. Clemen, *Religionsgesch. Erklärung d. NT.*, Giessen, 1909, pp. 153–156; H. Zimmern, *KAT*[3], pp. 388, 563; H. Gunkel, *Zum religionsgesch. Verständnis d. NT.*, Göttingen, 1903, p. 72; O. Pfleiderer, *Das Urchristentum*[2], Berlin, 1902, ii. 288, also *Das Christusbild des urchristl. Glaubens in religionsgesch. Beleuchtung*, Berlin, 1903, pp. 65–71; A. Meyer, *Die Auferstehung Christi*, Tübingen, 1905, pp. 10 and 80; W. Bousset, *Hauptprobleme d. Gnosis*, Göttingen, 1907, pp. 255–260; Percy Gardner, *Exploratio Evangelica*[2], London, 1907, pp. 263–74; and others). But the many and various parallels that have been pointed out are—as parallels—anything but convincing; the similarities are nothing like so many as the differences, and the hypothesis that these exotic ideas exerted an influence upon the genesis of the *Descensus*-idea not only remains unproved, but is in the highest degree improbable.

12. Specifically early Christian character of doctrine.—The conception of the *Descensus*, as defined above (§ 9), must accordingly be recognized as a specifically Christian idea which goes back to the later decades of the primitive Church, and as such it has a strong claim upon our interest. The conception, in fact, holds a quite peculiar position, for it is the sole vestige of primitive Christian thought which, independently of the Bible—with marked modifications and variations, indeed,—still retains a place in the tradition of all the main divisions of the Christian Church. Even so, however, the modern mind cannot bring to it more than interest; we cannot now accept it as part of our faith. The Jewish-Christian beliefs regarding Hades and the sojourn of the soul therein, as also those regarding Heaven, which underlie the idea of the *Descensus*, belong to a cosmology which even the most determined *laudator temporis acti* cannot now accept. The conception, moreover, is really inseparable from these underlying beliefs, and, when the latter crumble away, nothing of the former remains. We can appraise the doctrine of the *Descensus* only in a historical sense, *i.e.* as a conception which brings into strong relief the primitive Christian conviction

that the resurrection of Jesus Christ was something altogether *new*, and which with its naive imagery graphically expresses not only the connexion between the Old and New Testaments, but also the original element in the new covenant. In fact, the *Descensus*-idea embodies in its own manner the very same thought as is expressed in the words of Ignatius, *Philad.* ix. 2: *ἐξαίρετόν τι ἔχει τὸ εὐαγγέλιον, τὴν παρουσίαν τοῦ σωτῆρος, κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, τὸ πάθος αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν ἀνάστασιν· οἱ γὰρ ἀγαπητοὶ προφῆται κατήγγειλαν εἰς αὐτόν, τὸ δὲ εὐαγγέλιον ἀπάρτισμά ἐστιν ἀφθαρσίας.* But precisely this manner of expression is one of the most antiquated and assailable elements with which the tradition of the Christian Churches is still encumbered. It were fitting, therefore, that the Churches distinguished as Evangelical should omit the Article 'descendit ad inferos' from their programmes of instruction in Christian doctrine and worship.

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DESCENT OF MAN.—See EVOLUTION.

DESIGN.—See TELEOLOGY.

DESIRE.—The inner nature and outer scope of human desire are such as to raise important questions concerning man's relation to the world and his estimate of his own life therein. In both a theoretical and a practical manner, desire proposes certain questions for philosophy: on the one side, it is asked whether man can desire aught but the pleasurable; on the other, it is questioned whether his attitude toward desire should be one of acceptance or rejection. Just as perception establishes a theoretical connexion between the mind and the world, so desire elaborates a volitional relation between the soul and Nature, so that man is led to wonder whether, like the animal, he could silently take his life for granted or, self-conscious and self-propelled as he is, should question the authority of natural desire over him. Owing to the problematic nature of desire, it becomes necessary to inquire concerning the exact psychological type and ethical worth of this human function; to this constructive work must be added critical considerations drawn from æsthetics and religion. Thus we must investigate what desire really is, and in what way, and to what extent, it is supposed to exercise sway over the human soul.

1. Psychology of desire.—The nature of desire is such as to place it between instinct and volition; it is superior to instinct inasmuch as it is a definite and conscious form of activity, while it is inferior to volition because it is not propelled by a disinterested, impersonal idea. Belonging to the emotional process, desire has the nature of active feeling; all feeling tends to arouse activity in either mind or body, so that desire may be regarded as feeling plus activity—a process according to which a painful want is satisfied or a pleasurable experience retained. Nevertheless, desire is related to both cognition and volition; but, where pure intellection and pure conation work directly in relating the ego to its object as idea or act, desire follows an indirect path, which involves instinctive and personal considerations. In a certain sense, the position of desire in consciousness is exceptional, for the reason that acts are usually performed directly, while ideas are entertained in a purely mental manner not coloured by desire; in contrast to these more staid forms of cognitive and conative activity, desire expresses a condition of intensified human interest.

(*a*) The *volitional* factor in desire occasions a problem whose nature is expressed by the question, Does one always desire pleasure? If desire were purely affectional, it could easily be pointed out that desire is ever related to the pleasurable, aversion to the painful; but the presence of conation spoils the simplicity of this hedonic arrangement, and makes necessary one that is more extensive and complicated. Perceiving the influence of the will's activity, Aristotle was led to say: 'There are many things, so to speak, which we should choose on account of something else than pleasure' (*ἅπαντα γὰρ ὡς εἰπεῖν ἑτέρου ἕνεκα αἱρούμεθα πλὴν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας* [*Eth. Nic.* x. 6]). In contrast to Aristotle's eudæmonism, J. S. Mill urged a hedonism on the basis of which he insisted upon identifying desire with a sense of pleasure:

'I believe that desiring a thing and finding it pleasant, aversion to it and thinking of it as painful, are phenomena entirely inseparable, or rather two parts of the same phenomenon; in strictness of language, two different modes of naming the same psychological fact: that to think of an object as desirable (unless for the sake of its consequences), and to think of it as pleasant, are one and the same thing; and that to desire anything, except in proportion as the idea of it is pleasant, is a physical and metaphysical absurdity' (*Utilitarianism*[10], 1888, p. 66).

This dogmatism on Mill's part may be explained by observing that, where desire is viewed in independence of pleasure, the invalidity of the hedonic argument is at once demonstrated; for the ability of the ego to transcend pleasure and pain as determinants of action is a preliminary proof of idealism. On the psychological side, it is apparent that, where desiring an object indicates a volitional decision in favour of it, as worth while, still this does not mean emotional delight in it as something pleasurable. The later hedonism of Sidgwick admits this, and its author, in his anxiety to escape the egoistic implications of the older hedonism, declares:

'What I am concerned to maintain is that men do not *now* normally desire pleasure alone, but to an important extent other things also' (*Methods of Ethics*[6], London, 1901, i. ch. iv. § 4).

In identifying the pleasurable and desirable, the hedonist has confused desire in its active condition with the passive experience of delight, but the human mind is so constituted that it can choose other than delightful experiences. From the evolutionary standpoint, desire is related to pleasure, aversion to pain, upon the basis of the hedonic law which declares that the pleasurable is indicative of the beneficial in the organism, the painful of the harmful.

'Every pleasure,' says Herbert Spencer, 'increases vitality; every pain decreases vitality. Every pleasure raises the tide of life; every pain lowers the tide of life' (*Data of Ethics*, New York, 1893, § 36).

But the claim that the pleasure-giving is equivalent to the life-increasing, the pain-giving to the life-decreasing, is based upon purely biological considerations, and is discussed by Spencer in the chapter entitled 'The Biological View'; when he advances to 'The Psychological View,' as this is involved in the evolutionary plan, he repudiates the original hedonic scheme, by claiming that

man submits to guidance, not by simple, but by representative, feelings, whose ends are far removed from the sense of bodily benefit or injury (*ib.* § 42). The evolutionary conception of conduct is thus called upon to admit the presence of something like a disinterested play of consciousness, whereby man, emancipated from purely biological principles, chooses either pain or pleasure according to his idea of what has worth for the will.

(*b*) The *cognitive* factor in desire appears first of all in the presence of a presentative element which involves the idea of an object or end, so that cognition as well as conation tends to separate desire from the realm of purely instinctive feeling. As Sully says, 'where there is no knowledge, there can be no desire' (*The Human Mind*, ii. 196). Such knowledge consists in the memory of former pleasurable experiences which we would have repeated, or the idea of similar feelings which we could realize. The perceptible appreciable result to be obtained by activity in the direction of the desired object distinguishes desire from instinct, which functions immediately without the idea of an end. As Bergson has expressed it, 'there are things instinct alone finds, but it never seeks them' (*L'Evolution créatrice*[6], 1910, p. 164). On the cognitive side, desire consists in knowledge of an object rather than merely some pleasurable experience with its qualities, where one reads a book or listens to an opera, not merely for the attendant pleasure of the perusal or the performance, but for the sake of having read such a book or having heard such an opera. Desire is satisfied, not merely by pleasure, but by means of a conscious experience with an object, such as a foreign country which one visits. With its broad interests, the intellect transcends immediate pleasures, and advances to the idea of thrill which is afforded by contact with reality. In this way, art, which necessarily demands the disinterested, may mean more to the mind than actual life, just as tragic art, with its constant suggestion of pain and defeat, may be more entertaining than the comic, with its ideas of happiness and success. Through his desire for intellectual excitement, man has demonstrated his ability to rise above pleasure, just as he has shown that to perform acts peculiar to his will is of more value to him than to entertain pleasurable emotions. Desire thus involves an ideal as well as a purely cognitive element, for by its very nature it contrasts the actual condition of the ego with an ideal state of mind; the present as given, with the future as the not yet attained. This reference to the future is indicative of the difference between desire and pleasure; for, where pleasure is necessarily contemporaneous, desire is ever anticipatory, so that, as pleasure enters, desire departs. One desires pleasure when he does not possess it, but, when pleasure comes, the delight in it dispels the mere desire for it. In this way arises the larger question concerning happiness, which is sometimes conceived of as the possession of the good, sometimes as the pursuit of it.

(*c*) In addition to the conative and cognitive in desire, there is a third element, without recognition of which the problem of desire cannot be sufficiently presented; this is the *egoistic*. Desire indicates a form of activity streaming forth from the ego, while it is aimed at a form of experience calculated to affect the ego's condition. In themselves, both action and thought possess an impersonal character, since they relate to causal and substantial forms of reality found in the outer world; desire, however, makes use of these fundamental forms of mental reality only so far as they are of personal interest to the ego which desires to direct its faculties of conation and cognition in some particular channel. Desire is so identified with personal interest that æsthetical and religious systems which counsel man to avoid desire do not fail to advise him to neglect self. As to the relation of man to the world about him, desire makes use of an egoistic form of expression whereby instinct becomes conscious and voluntary. The fatality that may attach to such a personal exhibition of instinctive traits was portrayed by Balzac in his philosophic story, 'The Magic Skin,' which, as a token, had power to confer any desire, but which itself dwindled with the gratification of the wish until at last it destroyed the possessor—a suggestion that one must desire even though the desiderative life will eventually destroy itself.

2. Ethics of desire.—Where the psychology of desire ends, the ethics of desire begins — in the idea of value. With its egoistic and emotional limitations, desire cannot serve as an ethical norm, for it has already been shown to be incapable of accounting for impersonal volition and ideation. Nevertheless, desire may become a determinant of value, because, where one does not necessarily desire the pleasurable, he does desire what he deems valuable. 'Man,' said Nietzsche, 'is the valuing animal as such' (*Genealogy of Morals*, tr. Hausemann, 1897, ii. § 8), and the valuational in him may be attributed to the desiderative element in his nature. In this way, value becomes subjective; instead of adhering to a thing as one of its properties, instead of belonging to the moral principle as one of its attributes, value is relative to human desire. From this subjective point, Chr. v. Ehrenfels has declared:

> 'We do not desire things because we recognize a mystical, unintelligible essence of value in them; but we attribute value to them because we desire them' (*Syst. der Werttheorie*, vol. i. § 1).

Basing value upon desire, Ehrenfels follows Brentano in asserting that 'one can feel pleasure and pain without desiring; and, second, one can desire without feeling pleasure or pain' (*ib.* § 5). Having made value to consist of something subjective, he seeks to show how, in valuing a thing because of its desirability, we are not exchanging absolutism for egoism, for we are able to erect the idea of an absolute concept of value upon a psychic and subjective basis (*ib.* § 16). Value thus stands for a relation between an object and a subject, according to which the subject actually desires the object, or would desire it were it not convinced that the object existed for it (*ib.* § 21). The empiricism and eudæmonism of this view have been criticized by F. Krueger, who substitutes for the idea of actual desire that of a relatively constant desire (*Der Begriff des absolut Wertvollen*, ch. iii. 1). As Ehrenfels had clung to realism in desire, Krueger seeks to advance towards idealism. It is possible, however, to advance a stage beyond the point of view which regards value as the relatively constant desire of the subject. Desire contains not only the egoistic element, but the impersonal factors of cognition and conation whereby the moralist may secure a conception of the supreme good conceived neither eudæmonistically nor rigoristically, but in a valuational manner.

The attempt to idealize desire, that it may be elevated to the plane of the valuable, is quite in keeping with the inner nature of desire, with its perpetual contrast between the real and the ideal, the present and the future. At the same time, the mingling of pain and pleasure in desire—pain as to the given condition, pleasure with regard to a conceivable one—is only another phase of the idealizing tendency in all desire. At first view, desire seems to be but a natural principle, at one with the will to live and the struggle for existence, its inner nature consisting apparently in the conscious voluntary choice of the fundamental striving of all life. Thus viewed, human values are only human

desires directed towards an end. But in the moral consciousness of man the actual desire cannot be accepted as an ethical norm, whence arose idealism in conduct; and yet it is suggested that, were man truly man, the intelligible rather than the empirical ego, then the spontaneous desires of the human heart would represent genuine values of spiritual life. Man as a *valeur* lives according to idealized desires, so that, where Nature originates through organic striving and instinctive activity, reason continues this preliminary work by creating subjective values, whose essence consists in that which would be desired by man in his moral perfection. Inasmuch as ethics must begin with man as he is, it finds it necessary to express this idea of value by means of rectitude and duty. As a result, ethics, like psychology, cannot advance beyond the limits of mediocrity in man, who through desire is put in a condition of sufficiency, wherein interests take the place of ideals, and man transcends Nature only to the degree of elaborating the idea of the human species, and not that of internal spiritual life. This defect in the psychologico-ethical view of man is made up by the æsthetico-religious one, according to which desire is repudiated.

3. Æsthetics of desire.—In the artistic world, human desire is not accepted in its immediacy, but is subjected to spiritual scrutiny. Where the constructive mood of æsthetics prevails, desire is increased by the perception of beauty, which Stendhal (1783-1842) defined as 'a promise of happiness' (Nietzsche, *op. cit.* iii. § 6); where the critical mood is uppermost, beauty is regarded as the dwindling of desire in the form of disinterested contemplation. One is aphrodisiac, the other anti-aphrodisiac, in its effect upon desire. Even among the Greeks there was no lack of antipathy towards the desiderative in æsthetics, and it was in this spirit that Plato condemned the poet, not only because his imitative art yielded an inferior degree of truth, but because the excitement he aroused expressed an inferior part of the soul—the passionate rather than the reflective. This criticism he applied to the drama especially (*Rep.* 604-5). Aristotle conceived of art as having the function of cleansing the soul from such desires as cause distress by virtue of their occupancy in and sway over the soul; accordingly, he defines tragedy as the imitation of an action where the effect is produced by men acting and through pity and fear effecting a purification of such passions (*δι' ἐλέου καὶ φόβου περαίνουσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν* [*Poet.* ch. vi. 2]). Modern æsthetics has met the problem of desire upon a basis more psychological, while it has been less rigorous than was Hellenism in its judgment of the desirable in beauty. The general effect has been to place the disinterested in the position of the desiderative, which idea was first formulated by Kant, although Burke's *The Sublime and the Beautiful* (1756) and Baumgarten's *Æsthetics* (1750-58) showed him where beauty might be found. Kant seeks to indicate the possibility of a feeling-judgment, or taste; the latter he describes by saying:

'Taste is the faculty of judging of an object by an entirely disinterested satisfaction or dissatisfaction' (*Critique of Judgment*, tr. Bernard, 1892, § 5).

In Kant's mind, desire is fatal to beauty, as to virtue also; hence his insistence upon the disinterested in æsthetic feeling.

Schopenhauer was more voluntaristic, more pessimistic; hence, his doctrine of desire is more severe.

'All willing springs from want, hence from need, hence from suffering. The satisfaction of a wish may end it, but for every one that is satisfied there remain at least ten which are denied; further, desire lasts long, while its demands are infinite; the satisfaction is short and scantily meted out. . . . Therefore, so long as our consciousness is filled with will, so long as we are thronged by desires, with their perpetual hopes and fears, so long as we are the subject of willing, there can be no lasting happiness or peace for us. . . . Thus the subject of willing is ever stretched upon the revolving wheel of Ixion, pours water into the sieve of the Danaids, is the ever fruitlessly pining Tantalus' (*Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, § 38).

This constant condition due to human desire is relieved from time to time by æsthetic contemplation, in whose ecstatic moments the subject, raised above the desiderative, enjoys the stillness of the will to live:

'It is the painless condition which Epicurus prized as the highest good, as also the condition of the gods; for we are for the moment delivered from the shameful striving of the will, we celebrate the Sabbath of the forced servitude of willing, while the wheel of Ixion stands still' (*ib.*).

Wagner follows Schopenhauer in postulating renunciation of desire as the most perfect æsthetic condition, although he finds it hard to explain how the particular art of music, which involves the highest excitation of the will, can consist with the state of stillness demanded by the æsthetic ideal (cf. Beethoven, *Schriften u. Dichtungen*[3], Leipzig, 1898, v. 9, p. 72). In the *Ring des Niebelungen*, Wagner indicates a double doctrine of desirelessness: first, in Siegfried, whose superabundance of power raises him above want; secondly, in Wotan, who learns to relinquish the gold of baneful desiring (cf. *Siegfried*, Act ii.; *Rheingold*, Sc. iv.). In contrast to these æsthetic attacks upon desire, based upon a dread of the will to live, other Schopenhauerians consider beauty as consisting in an excess of the natural function of willing. Nietzsche thus criticizes Schopenhauer and Wagner, and returns to the views set forth by Stendhal, as also by Flaubert.

'Stendhal,' says he, 'a not less sensual but more happily constituted nature than Schopenhauer, lays stress on a different effect of beauty: beauty promises happiness. With him the very stimulation of will (interest) by beauty seems to be the fact' (*op. cit.* iii. § 6).

In this positive treatment of desire, Nietzsche is followed by Sudermann, whose literary art constantly repudiates all restraint. With Sudermann, this affirmation of desire is carried out consciously and with apparent sincerity, and, instead of following the animal instinctiveness of Maupassant, he uses the sensual with the aim of inculcating an egoistic ethical doctrine. Much the same may be said of George Moore in distinction from Oscar Wilde, because Moore employs the sensual for the purpose of developing a trans-traditional morality (J. Huneker, *Overtones*, New York, 1906, iv. 2). This contradiction between the two views of desire is due to a difference in interpretation of the ego and its position in the world-whole. Those who believe in the reality of spiritual life are inclined to eliminate desire by removing the ego from the field of activity, while those who are aware of no beyond know no reason why man should do aught but further the native tendencies towards self-realization. But, even where the ego's desires appear to be the most obvious things in experience, the artistic consciousness distrusts desire as something tending to delude the mind which appeals to the stillness of the inner life. This occasional elevation in art is the rule in religion.

4. Desire and religion.—Since spiritual religion consists in a detachment from the world of impressions and a repudiation of immediate impulses, it is necessary to consider its relation to desire. With various religions, the attitude towards desire is determined in accordance with their general attitude towards the world. Thus Taoism, which regards reality as something empty of content and wanting in attributes, upholds the repression of desire; Buddhism, with its acosmic tendency, urges its complete extirpation; Christianity, while not wanting in this critical attitude towards the natural in both man and the world, advises one to train the desires.

The leading principle in Taoism is that of emptiness and inactivity, wherein the dialectical superiority of the Tao consists (*Tao Teh King*, tr. Legge, 1891, chs. 11, 37). Accordingly the man of Tao seeks by the repression of desire to reduce himself to this kenotic condition; hence the sage seeks to withdraw the mind from external impressions like colours, tones, flavours, and the like (*ib.* ch. 12). This course of repression is further called 'returning to the root'—a teaching which calls attention to the tendency on the part of all forms of vegetable life to return from their full-flowering to their original condition. 'This returning to their root is what we call the state of stillness,' says Lao-tze, who counsels the disciple to produce this state to the utmost degree (*ib.* ch. 16). The man of Tao is considered 'different from ordinary men, in that he has so repressed his desires as to have become infant-like and primeval. "I am like an infant, which has not yet smiled," says he. The mind is that of a stupid man; I am in a state of chaos' (*ib.* ch. 20, cf. chs. 23, 28). Inasmuch as 'the Tao does nothing for the sake of doing it,' the Taoist is without desire, inactive, and simple (*ib.* ch. 37).

Buddhism treats desire in its major rather than its minor premiss, by discussing it in 'The Noble Truth Concerning Suffering' (in the *Mahāvagga*, tr. Davids and Oldenberg, Oxford, 1881, i. 1). This truth is fourfold. It is based upon the individual's attachment to life, to his desire for continued existence and happiness; the resulting suffering is removed by detachment from desire, the way of which lies along the eightfold path wherein is found the destruction of sorrow (cf. 'Dhamma Kakka,' tr. Davids, *SBE* xi. [1900], §§ 5–8). With Buddhism, desire is repudiated because it leads to delusion, and he who would find reality must detach himself from objects of sense. See, further, the next article.

Where Hellenism indulged the idea of desire in the enjoyment of life and the elaboration of the beautiful, it did not fail to express some sense of regret for life in the world of sense. Like the Cynics before them, the Stoics set themselves against desire and extolled a rigorous course of conduct, the spirit of which was ἀπάθεια, or cultivated indifference. Such in general was the attitude of the opposite school of Epicurus, who praised ἀταραξία, or passive pleasure, as the highest moral condition (Diog. Laert. x. 136). Where Erdmann (*Hist. Philos.* tr. Hough, 1898, § 97, 4) seeks to identify these ideals, Windelband (*Hist. Philos.* tr. Cushman, New York, 1906, § 47) believes the likeness to be but superficial. The former is the virtue of ethical indifference to all passions; the latter is passionlessness which is based upon the perfect satisfaction of all desire. On this account, it was looked upon, by both Epicureans and Cynics, as acquired only through a limitation of desire (*ib.*). It was in this spirit that Horace wrote his famous epistle beginning 'Nil admirari prope res est una' (*Ep.* I. vi.), while Seneca expressed the same apathetic sentiment in his 'sine admiratione' (*de Vita Beata*, iii. 3). In dealing with desire and aversion, Epictetus adopts the same attitude, counselling man to cease desiring things beyond his power (iii. 24). Marcus Aurelius rehabilitates Horace's 'nil admirari' with his own ἀθαύμαστον, whereby, like Maximus his master, he ceased to wonder at anything (i. 15). See also the 'Greek' article, below.

While Christianity does not attack desire upon the same cosmological grounds as Taoism, Buddhism, and Stoicism, it does not fail to relate the function of desire, which it condemns, to the world, which it repudiates. In the great value-judgment of the Gospels, 'What doth it profit a man, to gain the whole world, and forfeit his life?' (Mk 8^{36}), the principle at work is that of detachment from the world. On the psychological side, this is expressed in terms of will, where it is declared, 'Whosoever would save his life shall lose it' (ὃς γὰρ ἐὰν θέλῃ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ψυχὴν σῶσαι ἀπολέσει αὐτήν [Mk 8^{35}]). But, with more direct reference to desire, ἐπιθυμία, it may be said that, when the NT writers assume an attitude towards it, this is always a deprecating one, for it is looked upon as equivalent to lust. This was the view of Christ in His comment upon the Seventh Commandment—πᾶς ὁ βλέπων γυναῖκα πρὸς τὸ ἐπιθυμῆσαι (Mt 5^{28}). St. Paul connects desire with passion, and likens the desiring mood to the habits of the Gentiles, πάθος ἐπιθυμίας (1 Th 4^{5}); St. Peter speaks of the believer as one who has escaped the corruption in the world through desire—ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ (2 P 1^{4}); and St. James speaks of the tempted man as one who is drawn away by his own desire—ὑπὸ τῆς ἰδίας ἐπιθυμίας (Ja 1^{14}). St. John relates these forms of the mind to the world, and thus tends to give a dialectic of desire. In this way, the content of the world is likened to desire in both a sensuous and an intellectual form: πᾶν τὸ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, ἡ ἐπιθυμία τῆς σαρκὸς καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν (1 Jn 2^{16}); the lust of the flesh and the eyes is thus repudiated by Christianity, which aims at detaching the ego from the immediate world, that it may find its true place in the world of spiritual life. This doctrine of detachment from life is now under discussion in religious circles where Mysticism prevails.

While current thought accepts desire as a fact of experience and develops it according to ethics, religion, like art, refuses to take it for granted and tends to repudiate it altogether. Such a tendency appears in Wagner's view of religion (cf. above); in Tolstoi's conception of Christianity, as developed in *My Religion* (tr. H. Smith, New York, 1885), where asceticism mingles with sympathism; in Villiers de L'Isle-Adam, whose *Axël* (Paris, 1890) involves 'the rejection of life at the moment when life becomes ideal' (J. Huneker, *Iconoclasts*, New York, 1908, p. 357); and in Ernest Hello, who attacks desire under its armour of the pride of life (cf. *L'Homme*[3], Paris, 1894, *Le Siècle*, do. 1896). More after the Russian manner, J. K. Huysmans, who passed from the sensual to the spiritual, has revealed an august world-withdrawal whose path is indicated in *En Route* (Paris, 1895), while its result is elaborated in *La Cathédrale* (Paris, 1898), where Durtal, the hero, cloistered at Chartres, glorifies the inner life, 'la vie contemplative,' which he contrasts with 'la vie active' (*op. cit.* 28, ch. v. p. 125, ch. xi. p. 330). Huysmans, who mentions Hello (*ib.* ch. vi. p. 138), reveals the same combination of Catholicism and Mysticism that guided the former to his striking attitude towards human desire. The economic interest, which to-day predominates, tends to forbid the artistic disinterestedness and religious renunciation which seek to neutralize desire, so that the present age might well be called the age of desire.

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CHARLES GRAY SHAW.

DESIRE (Buddhist).—There is no more intimate, more radical self-expression of the conscious individual than that which is conveyed by the term 'desire.' It is the one genuine subjective register of character. A man is known by his works, but he knows himself by his desires. When these emerge, if they do emerge, in action, external limitations

of environment and opportunity permit only a distorted output of the ideal act, which had taken shape in the creative flame of desire. Religion and ethics are therefore deeply concerned with desire. *A fortiori*, whether Buddhism is considered to be religion, or ethics, or both, desire should bulk very largely in its doctrines, and the attitude of those doctrines towards it should be held crucial in our judgments respecting them. Buddhism faces the phenomenon of desire as frankly and as critically as other systems, and perhaps even more so; and this is because it is essentially psychological, and does not start from the external universe and its first or final cause, but with the heart of man.

Discounting the remoter and immaterial planes of existence (*rūpa-loka* and *arūpa-loka*), the world of earth, with its purgatories and its nearer heavens, is, by Buddhism, conceived and named in terms of desire. It is *kāmā-vachara*, the sphere of *kāma*, i.e. desire understood simply as wishing for what is pleasant; and *kāma-loka*, 'world of desire'—*kāma*, according to the commentators, includes both desiring (*kāmetīti kāmo*) and that which is desired (*kāmiyatīti kāmo*). Now, as might be expected, in Buddhist philosophical treatises the universality of desire is dealt with as a natural phenomenon, and is neither praised nor condemned, while, with respect to the life of laymen, *kāma*, that is, natural desires and the enjoyment thereof, is not, as such, condemned. In the oldest narrative of the birth of the Buddha (*Dīgha-Nikāya*, ii. 13; *Majjhima-Nikāya*, iii. 121), it is written that his mother, a lady of pure and virtuous life, was living before his birth in the enjoyment of the five modes of sense-desire (*pañcha kāmaguṇā*, i.e. of sights, sounds, odours, tastes, and contacts). Again, in the *Siṅgālovāda-suttanta* (*Dīgha*, iii. 180ff., called by R. Childers 'The Whole Duty of the Buddhist Layman'), the Buddha does not warn the young layman off a single form of natural desire or enjoyment, but only against vicious or wanton desires. For those who had left the world and devoted their lives to holiness and missionary work, the case was different. The *kāmas* were for them constant sources of danger, and were likened to burning coals, knives, snakes, dry bones, dreams, and other perilous and disappointing objects ('Psalms of the Sisters' [*Therīgāthā*], London, 1909, p. 144 f.). They belonged to the pursuit of sensuous pleasures and the life of the world. An abdicating king might say: 'I have enjoyed human *kāmas*; it is time to seek after celestial *kāmas*' (*Dīgha*, iii. 60). But, for one who was aiming at the highest goal, there was really nothing to choose between either human or celestial desires and objects of desire. The word *kāma* was dropped from his vocabulary. But he did not therefore cease to desire, for, though his *quo vadis* was different, he aspired to a goal none the less, and, if he obeyed the injunctions of his Order preserved in its scriptures, he pursued this end with greater ardour and singleness of purpose than he had ever felt over worldly objects.

If, in the earliest version of those scriptures surviving, viz. the Pāli *Pitakas*, natural desire and its objects—in a word, the *kāmas*—are usually mentioned in terms of depreciation, it must be remembered (1) that the Pitakas were compiled by *religieux*, and that the greater part of the Suttas are discourses addressed to *religieux*; and (2) that Buddhism started as an evangel of protest, reform, and regeneration against worldliness and superstition, and evangels do not compromise. But it is characteristic of this gospel that it does not seek to quench earthly desires (*manussaka kāmā*) by heavenly desires (*dibba kāmā*).

In the first place, the *summum bonum* of arhatship, of complete emancipation of heart and mind, could be won only in this earthly region of the *kāma-loka*, with the single exception of the remotest sphere of the *arūpa-loka*, where it was believed that some mortals attained *parinibbāna*, i.e. completion of perfected life and final death, who here, on their way to perfection, had not lived to touch the highest 'Path and Fruit' (*e.g.* *Dīgha*, ii. 200; *Saṁyutta*, v. 346, etc.); yet this *parinibbāna* is never recorded as a climax and glorious consummation, but rather as an epilogue to the life here below of those who, in a 'world of desire,' and in virtue of unworldly desire, had attained to the assurance of victory in spiritual evolution (*nibbāna*).

Secondly, whereas the Buddhist *Dhamma* is essentially a method for diverting and transforming the natural phenomenon of desire, it held up, before those whose quest was for the highest, no supramundane place as the proper object of desire, nor before any one did it hold up a superhuman being or person in that light. It is true that re-birth in 'heaven' is frequently proclaimed as the natural inevitable result of virtue in this life—this to laymen and to those of the Order who were spiritually babes. But it is virtue and goodness that are shown as desirable, rather than promotion hereafter, in the reconstituted life. Those who were judged as ripening to perfect emancipation aimed only at an impersonal goal, having no relation to time or space (*Milinda*, ii. 105, 186), but regarded, positively, as a blissful consciousness of salvation, liberty, mastery, insight, and peace (C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Psalms of the Early Buddhists*, vol. i. p. xxxvii).

At the opposite extreme of these aspirations, which might be called the *vis a fronte*, Buddhism places, as the driving power *a tergo*, the world's great burden of ill, as fed by the constant working of unregenerate and uncontrolled desire, called 'thirst' or 'craving' (*taṇhā*, Skr. *tṛṣṇā*). This religio-philosophical term is another illustration of the immense significance of the vital phenomenon of desire in the Buddhist consciousness; and its scope embraces the whole of human desires, in so far as these are attracted by life itself, or by the idea of its extinction. There are three modes or channels of *taṇhā*: *kāma-taṇhā*, desire for what is sensuously pleasant; *bhava-taṇhā*, desire for becoming or life hereafter; and *vibhava-taṇhā*, desire for the extinction of becoming. *Taṇhā* in general is defined as 'concerned with repeated becoming' (lit. 're-birth-ic,' *punobbhavikā*), 'associated with pleasure and passion' (*nandi-rāga-sahagatā*), and 'delighting in various objects' (*tatra-tatrābhinandinī* [*Vibh.* 101, 365; *Saṁyutta*, iii. 26]). It was only when set on 'the Paths, the Fruits, *Nibbāna*,' that the desire, which had been called *taṇhā*, became the aspiration and the purpose called *sammā-saṅkappa* and *dhamma-chhanda*. 'For, as there is no inducement,' writes the commentator (*Attha-sālinī*, 347), 'to a mosquito to alight on a ball of iron heated in the sun, so these [goals] by their radiant glory do not attract *taṇhā*.'

The person of the Buddha, however, as an object of desire, lent warmth and colour to aspirations after impersonal goals. Not once only in the world's history, but from time to time through cycles of involution and evolution, do Buddhists hold that mankind may hope for a day when 'the desire of all nations shall come,' who will in love and wisdom satisfy their yearnings. The conditions and order of his advent are considered by the canonical books in the light of a natural law. Buddha-epochs were not equidistant in time, but they happened when, amid an ignorant and erring majority, there were some who would understand the message of salvation.

'As on a crag, on crest of mountain standing,
A man might watch the people far below,
E'en so do Thou, O Wisdom fair, ascending,
O Seer of all, the terraced heights of truth,
Look down, from grief released, upon the nations
Sunken in grief, oppressed with birth and age.
Arise, thou hero! Conqueror in the battle!
Thou freed from debt! Lord of the pilgrim-band,
Walk the world o'er, sublime and blessed Teacher!
Teach us the Truth—there are who'll understand'
(*Dialogues*, ii. 32; *Vin. Texts*, i. 86 f.).

The faith and devotion evoked by the person of the Buddha and by the nature of his doctrine are also usually described in terms of satisfied desire, namely, *pasāda, pasanna*, the passages being too numerous to quote (but cf. *Saṁyutta*, v. 381, with *Buddhist Psychological Ethics*, 174 n.). Nevertheless, the desire itself for a Buddha, and for the salvation he should bring, is expressed in terms of altruistic desire for the good and happiness of all men. It is 'out of compassion for all creatures, for the advantage and the welfare and the happiness of gods and men,' that a Buddha arises,

'Who from all ill and sorrow hast released
Me and so many many stricken folk'
(*Therīgāthā*, 157; cf. *Dialogues*, ii. 111; *JRAS*, 1906, p. 241).

Mediately therefore, in the desire for the Buddha, the impersonal desire for universal good, as well as the desire for personal salvation, finds expression.

For those who, as converts, were sufficiently won by the *Dhamma* to devote their lives to it, a career of mental and moral training was prescribed, which, judging by the terms employed, called into exercise the emotional and volitional, no less than the intellectual, faculties. The exercises might be in the expansion of a concept or sentiment—suffusion, irradiation (*pharaṇā*), they called it—or in concentration of attention and will (*samādhi, jhāna*, etc.), or in control of consciousness, recollection, self-collectedness (*sati-sampajañña*), and so on. In no case, however, was the training to be carried on with cool impassivity, except in certain advanced stages. The sincere student is constantly described as being aglow or ardent (*ātāpī*), strenuous or earnest (*appamatta*), full of energy and endeavour (*viriya, vāyāma, ussoḷhi*), and filled with eager active desire (*tibbachhanda*); but the emotional side of consciousness is not encouraged, except in intimate connexion with the conative or volitional. The term *chhanda*, for instance, which is as unmoral as our own 'desire,' but which, like 'desire,' is sometimes used with a sensual or passional import, is more allied to will than *kāma* is, and is explained by commentaries as meaning *kattukamyatā*, 'desire-to-do.' Few subjects, indeed, are of greater interest in Buddhist culture than this evolution of *chhanda*. For instance, *dukkha*, the generic term for 'ill,' 'misery,' or 'pain,' is said to be 'rooted' in *chhanda* (*Saṁyutta*, iv. 328), as, indeed, are 'all states of consciousness' (*Aṅguttara*, iv. 339). On one occasion the end of the Buddha's system of holy living is called the removal of desire (*chhanda-pahāna* [*Saṁyutta*, v. 272]). Yet this is stated to be accomplished by certain exercises in which *chhanda* is called into play. 'What then,' is an inquirer's comment, 'would you put away desire by desire?' And the Thera replies to the Brahman: 'Was there not desire, effort, thought, deliberation in your mind, when you set out to find me in this garden? And now that you have found me, is not all that abated?' Again, a homely simile of the ass who does not make himself into a valued cow by walking after the herd saying 'I, too, can bellow,' serves to show that the criterion of a genuine student is his displaying eager active desire (*tibbachhanda*) for the highest virtues and the most advanced mental development (*Aṅguttara*, i. 229). Finally, the Buddha is represented in the *Ākaṅkheyya-Sutta* as showing how seventeen pious ways in which a *bhikkhu* 'might desire' (*ākaṅkheyya*) may severally be satisfied ('Buddhist Suttas,' *SBE* xi. 210 ff.).

Hence in Buddhist ethics, desire is, as such, not only not immoral, but an indispensable instrument for attaining higher (no less than meaner) ends; it becomes a source of danger only when the object of desire is such as to give no lasting satisfaction to desire when it is attained.

And hence it is strictly in accordance with the spirit of the older writings, if with an added tinge of intense emotion, when the author of the *Milinda Questions* declares that *Nibbāna* is to be realized, not by quiescent meditation, or in hypnotic trance, much less by mortification of desire, but by rational discontent, strong anguish, and longing, followed by a forward leap of the mind into peace and calm, then again by a vibrating zeal, in which the aspirant 'strives with might and main along the path,' and so on.

It had been the fate of Buddhism, before the authorities quoted above became accessible, to become for the general English reader synonymous not only with pessimism but with the 'extinction of desire.' And the error still persists. This is largely due to the fact that the earliest translators of the canonical works of Buddhism were not English, or, if English, were lacking in psychological training. The anthologies of the *Dhamma* and *Sutta-Nipāta* were rendered into English prose by those veteran Indologists, Max Müller and Fausböll, and between them they render no fewer than sixteen Pāli words, which really mean sensuous, or vicious, or unregulated desire, by the one unqualified word 'desire.' St. Hilaire, Burnouf, and Foucaux do much the same disservice with the one over-worked word *désir*. Warren (*Buddhism in Translations*, Camb. Mass., 1896) is no better; yet see his Index, *s.v.* 'Desire' ('desire = lust'). This slovenly usage partly justifies writers of more general and comparative treatises in arriving at sweeping but erroneous conclusions (*e.g.* Crozier in *Hist. of Intellectual Development*, London, 1897–1901). But it were undesirable to impoverish our ethical and religious concepts by making over to such terms as *taṇhā* all the moral as well as the immoral implications in desire. After all, it was in response to a desire, a yearning, an impulse, a resolution, that the founder of Buddhism is represented as having renounced the world and dedicated his life to the service of his fellow-men. See also art. LOVE (Buddhist).

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C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS.

DESIRE (Greek).—**I. Socrates and the pre-Socratics.**—The beginning of ethical investigation in ancient Greece is usually assigned to Socrates. And, no doubt, Socrates did in a special manner direct men's attention to ethical principles and concepts, and give the impulse to the further study and elaboration of the philosophy of morals. He it was also who, by his rigorous insistence on self-control (ἐγκράτεια) as the supreme virtue, gave special prominence to the twofold nature of man—a higher and a lower nature, with the tendency on the part of the lower (the desires) to usurp the mastery; thereby initiating a point of view that was to dominate Greek philosophy henceforth, definitely formulated for all time by Plato. Moreover, he himself could 'scorn delights and live

laborious days' better than any man of his time, so that he could not only teach robust ethical doctrine by precept, but show it also by example. But, long before the time of Socrates, the subject of desire had thrust itself upon men's notice, and from of old precepts had been ennunciated for the practical regulation of life, even though it were only from the prudential standpoint of Hesiod (see his *Works and Days*), the Gnomic poets, and the Seven Wise Men. This explains the existence of Orphism and Pythagoreanism, which—religious more than philosophical—had the highest welfare of the individual at heart, and organized a system, distinctly mystical, for the purification of the soul and the cultivation of the higher life. This was avowedly ethical in its character, and, being cathartic, had the subjugation of the desires and the development of the spiritual nature as the basal principle. But, apart altogether from the poets and the moralists and the mystics, the pre-Socratic philosophers, who are usually represented simply as devotees of physics and physical speculation, were, many of them, also ethicists; and the ethical teaching of Heraclitus of Ephesus, in particular, and of Democritus of Abdera, forms an interesting side of their philosophy. Sir Alexander Grant does them less than justice when he says:

'The moral doctrines of these early philosophers . . . seem to belong rather to the personal character of the men than to the result of their systems' (*Ethics of Aristotle*, i. 103).

Nevertheless, the great impulse to ethical analysis and ethical thinking came from Socrates: an epoch in Greek philosophy was marked when, under the sanction of the god at Delphi, he insisted in the way that he did on the principle 'Know thyself' (γνῶθι σεαυτόν); and the question of desire found its first impressive handling in his greatest disciple Plato, in the true Socratic spirit.

2. Plato.—(1) In his psychological analysis of human nature, Plato regarded the soul of man as consisting of three parts—the rational (τὸ λογιστικόν), the fiery or spirited (τὸ θυμοειδές), and the appetitive (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν).

There is a great temptation to interpret this as an anticipation or foreshadowing of the modern psychological threefold division of mental processes into intellection, feeling, and conation or volition. But, when we remember that each soul, according to Plato, had its own distinct habitation in the body—the rational soul being situated in the head or cranium, the spirited soul in the breast or thorax, and the appetitive soul in the belly, below the diaphragm—and when we remember, further, that the three souls are represented as having their counterparts in the Ideal Republic—the first being embodied in the philosophical guardians of the State, the second in the soldiers, and the third in the artisans and husbandmen—we see that the Platonic psychology is a good way removed from anything to be found in the psychologies of the present day.

Between the three souls, or three parts of the soul, there is a distinction of native authority or value. The rational soul, being immortal, is naturally supreme, placed where it is in the body (viz. in the commanding position of the head) in order to guide and control the others. The spirited or courageous soul is the seat of ambition, honour, and the like, and is indispensable for high achievement in any sphere, and is by nature ancillary to reason, though, on occasion, it may require restraint. But the third soul is that which needs careful watching and curbing—viz. the appetitive or lustful soul, the seat of desire, of inordinate passion, and, therefore, pre-eminently of lawlessness and insubordination. This is the 'black' horse of the allegory of the Charioteer in the *Phædrus*, which requires to be kept in by bit and bridle, and to which the whip has to be unsparingly applied until it is subdued and tamed. It is also the 'many-headed monster' of *Republic*, 588 C. From the place that the appetitive soul occupies in the body (below the diaphragm), it is in close proximity to the liver, which (according to Plato) is the organ of imagination, issuing oracles in dreams and acting as a mirror registering the wishes, commands, and reprobations of the rational soul, thereby encouraging, warning, and, if need be, terrifying the recalcitrant transgressor, with the design of checking him in his wayward course.

This doctrine of desire is clearly of an ethical character, and is specially suited to ethical purpose. It is not so much a complete logical analysis of the notion, or even a systematic psychological exposition of the subject, as a suggestive statement of the hierarchy of principles in human nature (for the different souls, though separated locally by Plato, may be interpreted in that way), with an appreciation of their various functions and a grading of them according to worth. It is, above all, an enforcement of the truth that, for the highest health and welfare of the individual, the desires must be strictly and rationally controlled: it is of their very nature to tend to transgress limits, to usurp authority; and this, if unchecked, means moral shipwreck and disaster (see APPETITE).

In *Philebus*, however, a psychological analysis of desire in one of its aspects is essayed—viz. when it is declared to presuppose a bodily want that has been gratified and the memory of the gratification comes in to arouse expectation of future gratification. In this, two salient points in the phenomenon are clearly noted: (*a*) that, until a want is gratified, we experience only uneasiness, not desire; and (*b*) that desire depends upon memory or recollection.

(2) But Plato's doctrine of desire goes deeper than this: it penetrates to the very centre of man's being, to what may be specifically designated his natural spiritual wants. The highest form of desire is represented as philosophical Love or Eros, which is inseparably connected with the Platonic theory of Ideas and the doctrine of Reminiscence (ἀνάμνησις). The object of this kind of desire is set forth in the *Phædrus* as the Beautiful, as Beauty Absolute, the super-celestial Divine essence, which is reached by the individual here through the mediation of the perception of beauty in objects of sense, especially in the beauty of bodily form, as seen in beautiful youths; and, in the *Symposium* (211 C), the mode of ascent is declared by Diotima to be as follows:

'To begin from the beauties of earth and mount upwards for the sake of that other beauty, using these as steps only, and from one going on to two, and from two to all fair forms, and from fair forms to fair practices, and from fair practices to fair notions, until from fair notions he arrives at the notion of absolute beauty, and at last knows what the essence of beauty is. This, my dear Socrates, said the stranger of Mantineia, is that life above all others which man should live, in the contemplation of beauty absolute.'

In the *Republic* it is set forth as the Good, which is the supreme transcendent Idea, permeating being, and giving meaning to intelligibles and opinables alike in the realm of Knowledge. In the *Timæus*, the Good is identified with God; and, as 'likeness to God' (ὁμοίωσις Θεῷ) is the chief end of man, according to *Theætetus*, the ultimate object of man's highest desire is the Deity. Nor is 'the Deity' a mere abstract term to Plato; it expresses the ideal of holiness, as well as of knowledge or contemplation; so that, in the assimilation of the Divine by man, character no less than intellect is involved. But, in order to become conformed to the great Ideal, the soul needs to be purified, and purification is a thing of degrees, so that κάθαρσις becomes the leading note, and κάθαρσις 'effected by personal effort in a Cosmos governed by God'—a doctrine which is, as J. A. Stewart expresses it (*The Myths of Plato*, p. 352), 'the great contribution made by Plato to the religious thought and practice of Europe.' Hence, in *Protagoras* (349, 359 A), 'holiness' (ὁσιότης) is added to the four cardinal virtues; Socrates in Xenophon called it 'piety' (εὐσέβεια). With this is specially to be

associated the Platonic eschatology (for purification does not cease at a man's death), where the soul is represented as finally purified through a series of metempsychoses—as seen, for instance, in the *Republic*, in the myth of Er, the son of Armenius, and in the doctrine of Eros, with its essentially elevating and purificatory character, as described in the *Phædrus* myth.

(3) In line with this is Plato's proof of the immortality of the soul (see *Phædo* and *Symposium*), drawn from men's universal longing or desire for continued existence and for the everlasting possession of the Good—a proof that became popular in Western Christendom through St. Augustine's acceptance of it, and which finds its poetical expression in English in Addison's 'Cato' and in Tennyson's 'The Two Voices.' The argument here is that the soul continues to live hereafter because men everywhere cling to life 'together with good' and shrink from death; the presupposition being that whatever crops up as a general craving among mankind indicates a natural want of man and has its truth thereby established. With this may be joined an attractive Platonic thought regarding the future life and men's desire of knowledge and of virtue. In *Cratylus* (403, 404) the dead are represented as continuing in willing subjection to Hades, the god of Death, because of their thirst for knowledge and their desire of being made better. They find that with Hades is true Wisdom—he has experience and is the great Philosopher; and, as his wisdom charms them, and as association with himself betters them, they cling to him as disciples to a master. Thus desire is seen to be a stronger bond than necessity: necessity *coerces*, desire *constrains*.

3. Aristotle.—(1) In the analysis of desire as given in *de Anima*, Aristotle uses the term 'desire' (ὄρεξις) generically, including in it, as species, spiritedness or passion (θυμός), appetitive desire (ἐπιθυμία), and wish (βούλησις). Of these three, wish (βούλησις) attaches to the rational part of man, and the other two to the irrational (iii. 9. 432*b*, 5). When, again, he enumerates and arranges in due order the functions or faculties of the soul (vegetative, sentient, conative, noetic—passive and active), there is one function that he specifies as the orectic or conative faculty (τὸ ὀρεκτικόν), which sometimes he brackets along with the sensitive faculty (τὸ αἰσθητικόν), and sometimes gives an independent position subsequent to it (ii. 3. 414*a*, 31); but, either way, he bases desire on sensation. With regard to all the faculties or functions, however, it is to be remembered that the independence ascribed to any one of them is only relative: each has its place in a graded system arranged in the order of implication, the higher presupposing the lower (though not reversely)—'the earlier form always exists potentially in the later' (*de An.* ii. 3. 414*b*, 29). Aristotle is very insistent on the unity of the soul; so that the faculties are not absolutely separate, as if each were self-contained.

But it is in the *Ethics*, in connexion with will, that we have Aristotle's fullest handling of desire; and, putting the two accounts together, we obtain the following summary.

Will is the desire (ὄρεξις) of something regarded as a good, *i.e.* as bringing satisfaction or pleasure to the person desiring it—which is what Aristotle designates βούλησις. But, obviously, if there is an object towards which desire is directed and upon which it is set, this implies an ideal or conceptual element in the process—some notion of what the object desirable and desired is: in other words, it involves imagination or representation (φαντασία). Further, inasmuch as between desire as a psychical state and the attainment of its object there is an interval of time interposed, this indicates that there is need of means for the realization of the desired object, and, consequently, need of deliberation with a view to choice—especially when more than one set of means appear competent to effect the end. This process of deliberation in connexion with means, and having reference to 'things that are within our own power' (τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν), Aristotle calls βούλευσις. When deliberation is completed, choice or determination ensues. This is προαίρεσις, which is regarded by Aristotle as distinctive of man, marking him off from the lower animals. In choice after deliberation ὄρεξις again appears; for the individual identifies himself not only with the end, but with the means necessary to effect the end. Hence, deliberate choice is inseparably conjoined with desire, and is termed βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις.

From this brief analysis it is evident that Aristotle connects desire very intimately with will; maintaining, indeed, practically, that there can be no will without desire. Desire is the moving power in the whole conative process, indispensable alike to its origination and to the keeping up of the interest in the end until it is realized. This active or movent character of desire marks it off from emotion, which is a species of feeling and is subjective, although emotion may very readily ally itself with desire, and thereby give an added intensity or vigour to it.

(2) It is evident, further, that, according to Aristotle, in the determination of right conduct (and here comes in the ethical bearing of the psychological doctrine) desire and reason act together—neither is sufficient by itself. Hence, προαίρεσις, or choice, may equally well be described as reason motived by desire (νοῦς ὀρεκτικός), or as desire guided by understanding (ὄρεξις διανοητική, *Eth. Nic.* vi. 2). The doctrine of 'the practical syllogism' brings this out distinctly.

This syllogism is denominated 'practical' for two reasons: first, because it deals with men's actions (πράξεις), not with their mere thinking or reasoning as logically correct; and, secondly, because it attaches to the practical or moral, not to the theoretical, reason. Being a 'syllogism,' however, it has a specific formal character—it is expressible as conclusion, and necessary conclusion, from premisses, although it is not maintained that moral actions, in the case of 'the plain man,' are always *consciously* thus formulated by him. If there is an unconscious spontaneous logical reasoning of the plain man, there is equally an unconscious spontaneous moral reasoning; but, when analyzed by the philosopher, both reasonings may be found to be only the unsophisticated form of what may be philosophically generalized and expressed in scholastic phraseology and assimilated each to the other.

In the 'practical syllogism,' we are dealing with end and motive—with the generalized expression of the object of desire and of the means by which it may be attained. The procedure whereby we accept an end and work towards it through desire and intellection is clearly of the nature of syllogistic reasoning, though the conclusion of the procedure is not a definite theoretical consequence satisfactory to the logical reason, but an action, or series of actions, necessitated by the principle that we adopt. It is a matter of 'principles,' of living moral principles, not of abstract propositions; and hence the conclusion is not abstract but practical, and embodied in human conduct.

And so, in the practical syllogism, Aristotle aims at giving syllogistic form to action—at analyzing the process that underlies moral conduct, so as to bring out its rational character. In making choice with a view to action, one proceeds upon a general principle—the principle, namely, that a man ought to do or not to do a certain kind of thing. That is the major premiss of the resultant action. The minor premiss is the perception that such and such a particular action is or is not of the kind in question. Then follows, as natural consequence, the doing or not doing of that particular action. The great implication in the practical syllogism is that, if one accepts a principle as a guide of life, one is bound to accept whatever action or course of action that principle dictates. For example, if I allow that I ought to pursue my own highest good, then I commit myself to accepting whatever conduces to the furtherance of that end, and to behaving accordingly. On what ground, however, the principles that I accept as competent to guide me in life rest, Aristotle does not always determine in the same way. Sometimes he says that they are intuitive—I perceive them to be self-evident and, therefore, beyond the need of proof. At other times he bases them on experience; and, still again, on moral character. The last of these is clearly not fundamental. Moreover, intuition and experience are not contradictory.

Whether or not the 'practical syllogism' is fully expressive of what exactly takes place in moral action (action of a voluntary agent, responsible for his choice, and, therefore, for his conduct), it serves admirably to emphasize the fact that intellection and desire enter into deliberative volition and choice, and that we cannot explain the phenomenon without taking account of both, and of both acting in unison, 'like the ball and the socket in the organic unity of the joint' (οἷον ὁ γιγγλυμός [*de An.* iii. 10. 433*b*, 22]).

(3) Over and above this psychology of desire, with its application in ethics, Aristotle also recognizes desire as a movent power in the higher reaches of ontology and cosmology. For God to him is, first and chiefly, the Prime Mover of the universe, the Source of all motion in the world, 'Himself unmoved the while.' He is the object of desire (ὀρεκτόν) as well as of intellection (νοητόν) to the universe. As otherwise expressed, God, as the unmoved eternal active principle, moves the heavens as the beloved one moves the lover: He is the attractive force, the final end, of all existence —'the final cause, then, produces motion by being loved, and, by that which it moves, it moves all other things' (*Met.* xii. 7. 1072*b*, 4).

This, though metaphorically expressed, is no myth, as Stewart (*Myths of Plato*, p. 355) would make it out to be: it is the measured and subdued enunciation of the grand ontological conception that God necessarily *is* and is good, and that the cosmos, which, in Aristotle's view, exists from all eternity as a cosmos (and not as mere 'matter'), is not self-centred and absolutely independent, but is eternally dependent on and derived from the Deity; it exists because it is turned over towards the Divine; it has no being apart from Him. It is thus emphatically asserted that the world is not fully explicable on merely mechanical principles: Mind is the ruling factor, and so the explanation of existence, to be satisfactory, must be teleological.

4. Stoics and Epicureans.—(1) We get back to a purely ethical and practical consideration of desire when we turn to the Stoics. Desire was a topic of supreme consideration with them: indeed, their doctrine of desire may almost be said to have constituted their philosophy. According to them, it is man's great characteristic that he was made to be virtuous. He is a being endowed with rational insight into the true values of things, and with power over his own inclinations and impulses. He can despise pleasure, he can scorn wealth, he can sit absolutely loose to everything that is not under control of his own will,—to fortune and to fame, even to death itself,—and can find his freedom only in his love of virtue and his abnegation of the desires. A man should have only one great desire, and that is the desire of virtue, of a noble life, of pure and upright character; all else is 'indifferent,' and, if surrendered to, would sap his moral vigour and degrade his nature. 'In the world, but not of it,' should be his motto; and to be master of his own soul, supreme in the realm of his motives and intentions, is the only end that is worth pursuing. The principle underlying this was precisely that which Kant reproduced in modern times when he said: 'There is nothing in the world which can be termed absolutely and altogether good, a good will alone excepted' (opening of the *Grundleg. zur Metaph. d. Sitten*). To submit to any other desire but that of virtue seemed to the Stoics to be elevating what is contingent and beyond one's power — extraneous, therefore, to one's will (which alone is in one's power)—to a place which it has no right to occupy, and which, if allowed to it, can only spell ruin. Consequently, everything that is not love of virtue is, to the Stoic, to be resisted. The desires are, one and all of them, perturbing; and it is characteristic of the wise man that he is calm, unperturbed, emotionless—he is self-sufficient (αὐτάρκης), independent of and above every non-rational spring of action: 'The view taken is everything; and that rests with yourself. Disown the view, at will; and, behold, the headland rounded, there are calm, still waters, and a waveless bay' (Marc. Aurel. *Med.* xii. 22). The desires are not simply weaknesses, they are 'contrary to nature'; they should be not merely controlled, but eradicated.

The ideal man, then, to the Stoics was a very impassive being—the embodiment of stern virtue, shorn of emotion and desire. The same might be said of the ideal man of the Cynics (*q.v.*), from which the Stoic conception was originally drawn: only, in Cynicism the mastery of the desires was accompanied with a contempt for social conventions and for mental culture that was abhorrent to the Stoic.

(2) It was different with the ideal man of the Epicureans, whose *summum bonum* was pleasure. And yet the Epicureans were keenly alive to the ethical danger that lurked in the desires. For, although pleasure was to them the ultimate end of action, and so the object of desire, they quite clearly recognized the tendency of the desires to outrun discretion and, if uncontrolled, to deprive a man of that calm and peaceful state of mind (ἀταραξία) which was his goal. Consequently, they could counsel, and Epicurus himself did counsel: 'If you wish to make Pythocles happy, add not to his riches, but diminish his desires.' But in this they differed from the Stoics, that, whereas the Stoics counselled the impossible task of eradicating the desires, the Epicureans, like Plato and Aristotle, counselled moderating and directing them. The desires, they saw, are a part of human nature, and, therefore, legitimate springs of action, but only if they are kept under rational control. Some of them, they said, are natural and necessary; others are natural, but not necessary; and others still are neither natural nor necessary. And they recognized a distinction of worth amongst them, the goods of the mind being to them of greater value than those of the body. Hence, their Hedonism could assume a robust character.

'Says Epicurus: "When I was sick, I did not converse about my bodily ailments, or discuss such matters with my visitors; but continued to dwell upon the principles of natural philosophy, and more particularly how the understanding, while participating in such disturbances of the flesh, yet remains in unperturbed possession of its proper good. And I would not," he adds, "give the doctors a chance of blustering and making ado, but let life go on cheerily and well"' (Marc. Aurel. *Med.* ix. 41).

5. The Neo-Platonists.—'Back to Plato' was the cry of the Neo-Platonists; but not back to Plato through disowning Aristotle or refusing to be influenced by him. On the contrary, Plotinus himself owed much to Aristotle, and some of the greatest of the Neo-Platonic teachers (*e.g.* Porphyry) were among the most eminent of the expositors of Aristotle. The Neo-Platonists were essentially religious philosophers and mystics, and the purification of the soul and its gradual deliverance from sense and matter was their supreme aim. Hence, they laid special stress on that part of the teaching of Plato which dealt with κάθαρσις, and, taking into their system Orphism and Pythagoreanism also, in so far as they served their purpose, they advocated a mode of living which, if consistently pursued, would lead to the abnegation of the world and the absorption of the individual in the Divine. The great end of all was to get away from the trammels of the body, which was regarded as by nature vile, as both a clog and a prison-house to the soul, and the source of sin and ugliness. 'True waking,' said Plotinus (*Enneads*, iii. 6. 6), 'is a true rising up from the body, not with a body.' There was a dualism here which was never fully overcome in the Plotinian or Neo-Platonic monism. To be united to a body at all was regarded as a descent for the soul, a degradation, a fall—it is a separation, though not

absolutely complete, from its original source, the Universal Soul or *Anima Mundi*, and has to be made good by an ascent or return. The steps by which this is done are the various virtues, which, according to Porphyry and the later Platonists, form four degrees in the path of perfection and self-accomplishment.

'And first there is the career of honesty and worldly prudence, which makes the duty of the citizen [Civic or Political virtue]. Secondly, there is the progress in purity which casts earthly things behind, and reaches the angelic height of passionless serenity [Cathartic virtue]. And the third step is the Divine life, which by intellectual energy is turned to behold the truth of things [Theoretic virtue]. Lastly, in the fourth grade, the mind, free and sublime in self-sustaining wisdom, makes itself an "exemplar" of virtue, and is even a "father of gods" [Paradeigmatic virtue]' (W. Wallace, *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind*, Oxford, 1894, p. xx).

Not yet, however, has the soul, in its efforts to get free from matter and the thraldom of the desires, reached its highest aim. That aim is union with the Absolute, undisturbed contemplation of the One, the Ineffable Being, when subject and object are identical. This is obtained, not through practical virtue or through intellectual cognition (though these prepare for it), but by non-rational ecstasy, or spiritual trance,

'by the suspension,' says Porphyry (*Sententiæ* 26), 'of all the intellectual faculties, by repose and the annihilation of thought. As the soul learns to know sleep when slumbering, so it is in ecstasy, or the annihilation of all the faculties of her being, that she knows that which is above existence and above truth.'

Thus are the desires effectually vanquished by mysticism: in absolute union with God (ἕνωσις), desire is not.

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DESTINY.—See FATE.

DETERMINISM.—See NECESSITARIANISM.

DEUTSCH-KATHOLICISMUS.

—1. Character of the movement.—*Deutsch-Katholicismus* is the name given to a movement of reform that sprang up within the Catholic Church in Germany about the middle of the 19th century. The object of the movement was to establish a type of Catholicism which should be in harmony with modern thought, leaving the individual in perfect freedom in matters of doctrine and in the expression of his religious views, and so far take account of the patriotic sentiments of the Roman Catholics of Germany as to permit the use of their mother tongue in the services of the Church. These aims were in some respects similar to those of Febronianism in the 18th cent., which strove to make the Catholic Church in Germany independent of the Roman curia by putting an end to the sponsorship exercised over it by the latter. The 'German-Catholic' movement, however, took a course different from that of the Febronians, inasmuch as it neglected the politico-ecclesiastical factor, which had eventually proved the decisive factor in the conflicts regarding the resolutions of the Ems Congress (1786); and this difference between the two reforming enterprises finds outward expression in the circumstance that, whereas the movement which disturbed the closing years of the 18th cent. found its leaders in the German archbishops, the schism of the so-called 'German Catholics' had not a single active supporter in the higher ranks of the clergy.

One of the vital elements in the situation which gave rise to 'German Catholicism' was contributed by the rise of Ultramontanism, *i.e.* of that movement in the Roman Catholic Church which, after the frightful disasters experienced by that Church during the French Revolution, looked to the Jesuits for its rehabilitation, made common cause with that Order, and sought to disseminate the type of religion characteristic thereof. In the period following upon the restoration of the Jesuit Order in 1814, Ultramontanism had made headway in Germany as in other countries, but it had also aroused opposition in a corresponding degree. Although the immediate occasion of the rise of 'German Catholicism' was given by the protest made against the proceedings of an individual bishop, yet this protest really sprang from the broader grounds of a fundamental contrast with the Ultramontane form of religion; and it was to this difference that the schismatic movement owed all the vigour which—for no long time indeed—it was capable of putting forth.

Another potent influence in the rise and development of 'German Catholicism' was contributed by the progressive tendencies of the day. The reactionary policy pursued by the various governments of Europe after the Napoleonic wars was incompetent to quell the wide-spread liberal movement instigated by the great Revolution. On the contrary, the disposition to break away from the bonds of authority and the leading-strings of patronage, and the striving after liberty to mould life and conduct on lines independent of hoary convention, asserted themselves and gained ground in every department of human experience—in politics, in social relationships, and even in the province of scientific research. As the Roman Catholic Church, however, is inherently conservative, and was not merely antipathetic to such longings, but was inclined rather, under the influence of the recently revived Jesuit Order, to seek the path of deliverance from the prevailing welter of things in a return to the principles of the Middle Ages, it could not fail to come into conflict with the liberal spirit that was making itself felt even within its own pale.

'German Catholicism' appeared first of all as simply the criticism of an incident in practical religious policy, viz. the exhibition of a relic as

an object of devotion. Very soon, however, it drew the whole course of ecclesiastical procedure and religious doctrine within the range of its strictures. Eventually it took the decisive step of organizing its adherents in communities, thus placing them in the position of schismatics. That the whole course of this development was traversed within the term of a few weeks was due to the fact that those who identified themselves with the movement were already alienated from the Church of Rome, and that the bishops who had to deal with the rising lost no time in lengthy deliberations, but proceeded at once to administer penalties of such severity as to drive the refractory elements into open rupture.

2. Origin and development.—The immediate occasion of the schism was the exhibition of the seamless robe of Christ which belonged to the Cathedral Church of Trèves. The 'Holy Coat' was regarded by that Church as its supreme treasure, and had been exhibited previously at special seasons as an object of reverence. When Bishop Arnoldi of Trèves, ignoring the doubts cast upon the genuineness of the relic, repeated the solemnity in 1844, a most extraordinary sensation was aroused. He certainly scored a great triumph in bringing vast multitudes of pilgrims to the city, and so far the affair formed an effective demonstration of the power of Catholicism. But, on the other hand, such a method of strengthening Christian belief gave great umbrage to many. Those within the Roman fold who took objection to the bishop's action found a champion in a priest named Ronge, who, in an open letter to Arnoldi, first published in the *Sächsische Vaterlandsblätter*, urged a vigorous protest against what he called a *Götzenfest*, an idolatrous celebration.

Johannes Ronge was born on the 16th of October 1813, at Bischofswerda in Silesia, and was trained and eventually ordained as a priest at Breslau. He served for a time as chaplain at Grottkau, but had been suspended on account of certain publications, and was now a teacher at Laurahütte in Upper Silesia. Having neither inclination nor aptitude for the clerical office, he had become utterly alienated in spirit from the Catholic Church, and, as he refused to retract his letter when called upon to do so, he was sentenced to degradation and excommunication by his superior, the bishop of Breslau, on the 4th of December 1844. This act of censure, however, failed to reduce him to submission; its actual effect, indeed, was to stimulate his refractory disposition to its full manifestation. He challenged the claims of the Roman hierarchy in numerous pamphlets and articles, and what was at first a criticism of the proceedings at Trèves became at length an all-round attack upon the authority of the Catholic Church and its leading institutions.

About the same time a Catholic priest named Czerski had arrived at conclusions similar to those of Ronge, though quite independently. Johann Czerski was born on the 12th of May 1813, in Western Prussia. While attending the Seminary at Posen, he passed through severe mental conflicts, but at length took office in the Cathedral Church of that town. While in this position he made a profound study of the Scriptures, with the result that he became quite unsettled regarding the fundamental institutions of the Roman Catholic Church—the primacy of the Pope, the hierarchy, auricular confession, the sacrifice of the Mass, etc. With such doubts in his heart he was transferred to the position of vicar at Schneidemühl, where, as a matter of fact, the congregation was no less critically disposed towards Catholicism than he was. It was, however, a purely personal matter which at length brought him into direct conflict with ecclesiastical authority; he was suspended from office in consequence of his relations with a young woman. But his congregation remained loyal to him, and when, renouncing his office, he abandoned the Roman Catholic Church altogether, they followed his example (19th October 1844). A few months later, sentence of degradation and excommunication was passed upon him.

Ronge's challenge found considerable support throughout large sections of Catholicism in Germany. He travelled widely as an agitator, exerting himself to maintain the movement and organize his followers. The first congregation of the new sect was constituted at Breslau. But even in the operations preliminary to this step the seceders felt themselves faced by the difficulty of finding a common basis for the heterogeneous elements in the 'Universal Christian Church,' as its adherents called it at first. Nor was this embarrassment one of a merely incidental and transitory character; on the contrary, it indicated a real and inherent weakness of the whole movement, asserting itself whenever an attempt was made to unite the communities which sprang up in large numbers throughout the country. For the purpose of effecting such a union, a Conference, attended by 31 delegates from 15 congregations, was held at Leipzig, from the 23rd to the 26th of March 1845. The proceedings of this Conference are given in the official report, *Die erste allgemeine Kirchenversammlung der deutsch-katholischen Kirche* (Leipzig, 1845), edited by R. Blum and F. Wigard. It was here decided that the name of the new cause should be *Deutsch-Katholicismus*, with the Bible as its doctrinal basis: a short Confession was also adopted. It was made a proviso, however, that neither Scripture nor this Confession was to rank as an external authority, but that they were to be regarded as standards only in so far as they harmonized with rational thought. The verification of Christianity in a life of Christian love was set forth as the prime duty of the members. It was resolved to retain the sacraments of Baptism and the Lord's Supper (under both kinds), but to have done with the Papacy, the hierarchy, auricular confession, the celibacy of priests, the adoration of saints, relics, and images, indulgences, pilgrimages, etc.—in a word, to effect a thoroughgoing separation from the Roman Church and its distinctive institutions. In the order for public worship, the liturgy of the Mass and the use of the Latin language were discarded. The constitution of the new church was to be Presbyterian, and General Assemblies were to be regularly called.

Such was the ground-plan for a new religious body, but the plan presently met with opposition within the community itself. The abandonment of the Apostolic Confession gave umbrage to the 'German Catholics' at Berlin, and led to a separation there. Czerski himself was dissatisfied with the resolutions of the Conference, as he had been thwarted in his endeavour to obtain Confessional recognition of the Divinity of Christ, Ronge's influence on the other side proving too strong. This difference, however, did not lead to a breach, as Czerski gave way and simply claimed the right to adhere to his own position. But, while imminent disintegration was thus avoided, no genuine inward harmony was attained, and the movement became even more revolutionary. The adherents of Ronge, in fact, drawn together as they were by the most diverse motives and interests, formed an aggregate so heterogeneous that every attempt to secure a basis of union came to nought. It was maintained that even the Leipzig Confession was not to be held as binding, and there was a general desire to discard everything of the nature of dogma; but, of course, no real progress towards unity could be made on such negative lines, and it still remained impossible to define the scope and aim of the new church, as the visible embodiment of that religion of liberty which had lain so long under the tyranny of dogma. The outcome of this vagueness and indecision was that many Roman Catholics, who, while favourably disposed to a broader conception of Christianity, were by no means ready to relinquish Christianity itself turned away from 'German Catholicism,' and that some who desired to have no further dealings with Christianity allied themselves with the new movement. Ronge's incapacity to grapple with this critical state of affairs soon became evident to all, and, as there was no leading spirit to step into his place, the cause soon lost all its attractive power. After 1847, indeed, Ronge was a spent force in public life. He died at Vienna in 1887; Czerski, in 1893.

3. The 'Friends of Light' (*Lichtfreunde*).—The subsequent development of 'German Catholicism' reached its final stages in close connexion with the history of the 'Friends of Light'—a parallel movement among Protestants which had sprung up in 1841. In that year certain Evangelical clergy in the Prussian province of Saxony instituted a society which claimed for its members the right of unrestricted scientific investigation and of complete freedom in personal development. They called themselves *Protestant Friends*, but were popularly known as *Lichtfreunde*, which became their accepted designation. Their meetings were thronged; the number of divines resorting to them constantly increased; teachers also began to attend, and soon the laity followed. As the leaders of the movement were clergymen of the National Church, collision with the ecclesiastical authorities was inevitable. In 1840 the consistorium of Magdeburg reprimanded a minister named Sintenis for having spoken of prayer to Christ as a superstition. Sentence of deposition was passed upon G. A. Wislicenus of Halle and J. Rupp of Königsberg, while others, such as W. E. Baltzer and A. T. Wislicenus, anticipated formal dismissal by voluntarily abandoning their office. In all these cases the point at issue was essentially the same, viz. whether and how far an incumbent might be permitted to take an independent attitude towards the doctrine and the order of public worship recognized as statutory in the National Church. The claim of liberty was obviously against the law as commonly interpreted. These conflicts, however, were a matter of profound significance for the whole Evangelical Church of Germany, as the clergymen in question did not stand alone, but were supported by larger or smaller groups of members. The process of subjecting the clerical offenders to ecclesiastical discipline was followed by secessions from the Established Church, and dissident congregations were formed in Königsberg, Halle, Magdeburg, Nordhausen, Halberstadt, Hamburg, and other places.

4. Relations between the 'Friends of Light' and the 'German Catholics' down to 1858.—These two bodies soon developed intimate mutual relations. The fact that the one originated within Protestantism and the other within Catholicism did not constitute a ground of difference, as it lay in the very nature of both movements to attenuate all the peculiar elements of the creed, and to deprive them of the value generally assigned to them. Both were at one in their demand for freedom and progress, and in both the more radical section, which aimed at disengaging religion from the prevailing ecclesiastical conditions, gained the upper hand. Between the two, accordingly, there existed an essential affinity, and it was due to something more than tactical considerations that they showed a tendency to come together. The growth of this tendency was greatly hastened by the circumstance that both bodies suffered alike from the coercive measures of the public authorities; it was, in fact, persecution from the side of the various governments which brought about their union.

The governments of the different States regarded 'Free Protestants' and 'German Catholics' alike with suspicion, seeing in both an embodiment of the revolutionary spirit which made itself felt throughout Germany in the early forties of the 19th century. The practical expression of this antipathy took many forms, and every method of repression permitted by the legal systems of the several States was resorted to. In some cases the new sects were treated as illicit religious associations, while in others the designation 'religious associations' was denied them; in many districts they were simply let alone; in others they were proceeded against with all the rigours of the law. The Revolution of 1848 put an end to this state of affairs, and gave complete liberty of action to the 'Friends of Light' and the 'German Catholics' alike. The immediate effect of the change, in the case of the former at least, was a notable increase in the number of their congregations. This was more particularly the case in Middle and North Germany, and here it became evident that the dissentient cause found its most fruitful soil in urban populations. Another characteristic phenomenon was that the membership of the various congregations was subject to frequent and sudden fluctuations, while the lines of demarcation between 'Free Protestants' and 'German Catholics' became more and more unsettled. These facts render it difficult to obtain accurate statistics regarding the numerical strength of the movements. We must restrict ourselves to the statement that, according to the most reliable authorities, the combined membership of the two bodies during the period of their greatest vogue, *i.e.* about the middle of the 19th cent., may be reckoned approximately at 150,000. The closeness of the relations between the two may be gauged by the fact that the third 'German Catholic' Council and the third 'Free Protestant' Conference met in the same house in Leipzig on the same day of May, 1850. It was at this session also that the governments began to revert to their policy of persecution. When the agitation aroused by the Revolution of 1848 had died down, the legislatures of the various German States made it their express aim to suppress all liberal tendencies in State and Church, thus inaugurating the 'period of reaction.' As both the 'Friends of Light' and the 'German Catholics' lay under suspicion, and were regarded as illegal societies and as sources of danger to the State, the governments resorted to every available means to render impossible the continued existence of these bodies. The first blow in the revived policy of repression was struck on the occasion of the double Convention at Leipzig in 1850. Just as the proceedings were about to begin, the police appeared upon the scene and broke up the meetings, and within the next few years all the States of Germany adopted measures for which this incident provided an example. The ruthless procedure of the Prussian government in particular provoked the indignation of its victims. Even the religious services of the Free Congregations were interrupted by soldiers. Such of the official acts of their ministers as had an important bearing upon civil life were not recognized by the legislature, so that, for instance, marriages performed by them were treated as mere illicit unions. They were forbidden to celebrate the Lord's Supper, to prepare candidates for confirmation, or to officiate at funerals. This policy of persecution, however, was finally abandoned when Prince Wilhelm of Prussia (afterwards Emperor Wilhelm I.), in consequence of the illness of his brother, Friedrich Wilhelm IV., assumed the regency in 1858. Thereafter the 'Friends of Light' and the 'German Catholics' were able to maintain and develop their position without let or hindrance from the authorities.

5. 'German Catholics' and Free Congregations after 1858.—In 1859 the majority of the two bodies brought the friendly relations long subsisting between them to a focus in a corporate union, thus forming the 'Association of Free Religious Communities' (*Bund freier religiöser Gemeinden*). A biennial Conference of representatives from the various congregations was instituted; but the resolutions of this Conference have the validity of 'counsels' merely, and apply only to questions of organization. The individual congregation accordingly has absolute freedom in the management of

its own affairs, as is meanwhile guaranteed by the constitution of the society, which provides that 'freedom to act in all religious matters according to one's own increasing knowledge' shall be one of its own accepted principles. The object of the society is set forth as 'the promotion of a practical religion independent of dogma.' In 1899 the Union embraced 24 congregations with an aggregate of 17,000 members. Twenty-four congregations with some 5000 members remained outside the Union. The majority of the original 'German Catholic' communities joined the *Bund*, and many of these keep alive the memory of their origin by continuing to use the old name, either by itself or in conjunction with the designation *frei-religiös*. Amongst other appellations still in use are 'Christian Catholic,' 'Free Christian,' and even 'Free Evangelical-Catholic Church.' It is no longer possible, therefore, to draw a sharp distinction between 'German Catholicism' and the Free Religious Communities. It is only in the kingdom of Saxony that the former has chosen to maintain its independence in an organized form. 'The German Catholic Church in the Kingdom of Saxony' has a membership of about 2000, and is represented in Dresden, Leipzig, and Chemnitz by fairly large congregations.

We learn from these figures that the movement which originated in the early forties of the 19th cent. embraces at the present day a very insignificant portion of German Protestantism. The new society soon lost its better educated adherents, and it now appears to find its main support amongst working people who have left the State Churches. The Free Religious Communities form the residual elements of an initially powerful movement, and now to their cost find themselves upon the horns of a practical dilemma. On the one hand, they must renounce all definite formulation of doctrine, in order to avoid falling back into the dogmatic Christianity which they condemn in other Churches; while, on the other hand, for the work of instruction, of preaching, and of gaining new members, they cannot well do without distinct principles expressive of their actual religious beliefs. In consequence of this embarrassment, the Free Religious Communities show great diversity in practice. Some still make use of the Scriptures in religious instruction; some still maintain their adherence at least to Christian ethics; but there are others who have abandoned all connexion with Christianity whatever, and take their stand upon a basis of naturalism and atheism. The one point of uniformity amongst these communities is that they all alike repudiate the existing Christian Churches, whether Evangelical or Roman Catholic. Great diversity likewise prevails in their ceremonial. They still to some extent celebrate the Christian festivals, but always with a change from their original significance. The Lord's Supper continues to be observed in many congregations, but Baptism has been set aside. The course of religious instruction is brought to a close by a sort of confirmation, or 'initiation of the young' (*Jugendweihe*), which forms the gateway to full membership in the community. In this ordinance the candidates for confirmation give a pledge that they will seek truth, do right, and strive after perfection. Thus the Christian element still persisting in these communities is no longer the vital factor for them, and their past history goes to show that in course of time they will eliminate it altogether.

LITERATURE.—F. Kampe, *Gesch. d. religiösen Bewegung d. neueren Zeit*, 4 vols. (Leipzig, 1852–1860). For further literature, see C. Mirbt, 'Deutschkatholizismus,' in *PRE*[3] iv. (1898) 583–589, and his art. 'Lichtfreunde,' *ib.* xi. (1902) 465–474 (cf. xvii. pt. ii. [Berichtigung]); Drews, 'Die freien religiösen Gemeinden d. Gegenwart,' in *ZTK* xi. (Tübingen, 1901) 484–527; G. Tschirn, *Zur 60 jähr. Gesch. d. freireligiosen Bewegung* (Bamberg, 1904–1905).

C. MIRBT.

DEVADATTA

DEVADATTA.—A Śākya noble, probably a cousin of the Buddha, who joined the Order in the 20th year of the movement, but held opinions of his own, both in doctrine and in discipline, at variance with those inculcated by the Master. He received a certain amount of support, both within the Order and from laymen, but seems to have remained quiet till about ten years before the death of the Buddha. At that date he asked the latter to retire in his favour, and, being refused, started a new Order of his own. It is curious that these dissensions, and this final rupture, which must have had so important an influence on the early history of the Buddhist community (we find traces of them a thousand years afterwards), should receive so slight a notice in the earliest documents relating to Buddhist doctrine. Devadatta is not even mentioned in the *Sutta Nipāta*, or in the collection of longer Dialogues (the *Dīgha Nikāya*). In the other three collections of Suttas he is a few times barely referred to, in the discussion of some ethical proposition, as an example. In the minds of the editors of these collections the doctrine itself loomed so much more largely than any personal or historical matter, that Devadatta and his schism are all but ignored; but in the oldest collection of the rules of the Order (in the Pāli *Vinaya*), under the head of 'Schism,' a chapter is devoted to the final episode in Devadatta's life. Our discussion of the matter will therefore be most conveniently divided into: (1) the *Vinaya* account, (2) the isolated passages in the early books of doctrine, and (3) the later notices.

1. The Vinaya account.—This is in the 18th *khandhaka* (chapter) of the *Sutta Vibhaṅga*, relating to dissensions in the Order.[1] It commences with an account of the circumstances under which six young men of the Sākya clan, one of whom was Devadatta, entered the Order together.

This must have been in the 20th year of the Buddha's ministry, as is shown by a comparison of *Theragāthā*, 1039, with *Vin.* ii. 286. The latter passage tells us that Ānanda (one of the six) attained *arhat*-ship in the year of the Buddha's death; the former states that he had been 25 years in the Order before he did so. Twenty-five years before the Buddha's death brings us to the 20th year of his ministry.

Throughout the passage in question the details given concern the others. At the end it is stated that, whereas each of the other five soon attained to some particular stage of the religious life, Devadatta attained to that magic power and charm which a worldly man may have.[2] There follows another episode having no relation to Devadatta, and then a third.

As usual, no intimation is given as to whether we are to suppose any interval of time between these episodes, but the very absence of continuity in the narrative would seem to imply that the editors supposed that there was.

The third episode introduces Devadatta considering whom he could win over so as to acquire gain and honour. He decides on Ajātasattu, the Crown Prince of Magadha, and accordingly goes there and practises his magic arts upon the Prince. These are quite successful; and Devadatta, dazed with prosperity, aspires to lead the Order. This is revealed by a spirit to Moggallāna, who informs the Buddha; but the latter, in reply, merely discusses the character of an ideal teacher. He then proceeds to Rājagaha, where the brethren inform him of Devadatta's prosperity. In reply, the Buddha discourses on the text that pride goeth before a fall, and concludes with a verse on honour ruining the mean man.[3]

In the next episode Devadatta asks the Buddha, in the presence of the king, to give up to him the

[1] *Vin.* ii. 180 ff., tr. T. W. Rhys Davids and H. Oldenberg, in *Vinaya Texts*, iii. 224 ff. (*SBE* xx. [1885]).

[2] *Pothujjanikā iddhi.* On the exact meaning of this technical phrase, see the passages collected and discussed by the present writer in *Dialogues of the Buddha*, i. 88, 273; ii. 6.

[3] *Vin.* ii. 188; recurs at *Aṅguttara*, ii. 73; *Saṁyutta*, i. 154, ii. 241; *Milinda*, 166; *Netti*, 131.

leadership of the Order, on the ground that the Buddha is now an old man. He is refused, and a formal act of the Chapter of the Order decrees that in future, whatever he may do, Devadatta shall be considered by the people as acting or speaking, not as a member of the Order, but for himself alone. Then Devadatta incites the Crown Prince to kill his father, and to help him (Devadatta) to kill the Buddha. The various attempts, all of which are unsuccessful, are described in detail.

There follows an episode in which Devadatta, with four adherents, whose names are given, lays before the Buddha five points to be incorporated in the rules of the Order. They are: (1) that the *bhikkhus* should dwell in the woods, (2) that they should live entirely by begging, (3) that their clothing should be exclusively made of cast-off rags, (4) that they should sleep under trees, and (5) that they should not eat fish or meat.

The existing rules were more elastic. It will be sufficient here to state roughly that: (1) *bhikkhus* were not to dwell in the woods during the rainy season—it was considered unhealthy; at other seasons they might wander about, or dwell in hermitages in hills or forests, or in huts put up for them in parks, or the like; the only restriction was that they should not dwell in the houses of the laity; (2) they might beg, or accept invitations, or live on food provided at the residences for *bhikkhus*; (3) they might receive presents of clothing, made either personally to one *bhikkhu* or generally to the Order; (4) they might sleep anywhere except in houses of the laity, and even there they might stay for a limited period, if on a journey; (5) they might accept any food given, but not fish or flesh if specially caught or killed for the purpose of the meal. The five points recur at *Vin.* iii. 171, and are therefore probably correct.

The five points were rejected. Devadatta rejoiced, and told the people that, whereas Gautama and his *bhikkhus* were luxurious and lived in the enjoyment of abundance, he and his would abide by the strict rules of the five points. Five hundred of the younger *bhikkhus* accepted tickets that he issued, and joined his party. The success of the schism seemed assured.

The following and final episode introduces Devadatta, surrounded by a great number of adherents, discoursing on his doctrine. Sāriputta and Moggallāna, the principal disciples of Gautama, are seen approaching. On seeing them, Devadatta exults, and, in spite of a warning from Kokālika, he bids them welcome, and they take their seats. Devadatta continues his conversational discourse till far on into the night. Then, feeling tired, he asks Sāriputta to lead the assembly while he rests. Devadatta falls asleep. Sāriputta leads the talk on the subject of preaching, and then Moggallāna leads it on the subject of *iddhi*. Next Sāriputta suggests that those who approve should return to the Buddha, and most of the assembly do so. Kokālika awakes Devadatta, points out what has happened, and says, 'I warned you.' Then hot blood comes forth from Devadatta's mouth. Sāriputta, on his return, proposes that the renegades who had come back should be readmitted to the Order. This Gautama declares unnecessary, and the chapter closes with edifying discourse. First, we have a parable of elephants who ate dirt and lost their beauty and died. Just so will Devadatta die. Then the eight qualifications of one worthy to be an emissary are pointed out. Next, the eight qualifications of Devadatta, which doom him to remain for an æon (*kappa*) in states of suffering and woe, are given. Finally, another paragraph gives three reasons for the same result.

It is probable, from the details, that the eight have been elaborated out of the three, no doubt to make Devadatta's qualifications parallel in number with those of Sāriputta, the ideal emissary.

2. Isolated passages.—In *Majjhima*, i. 192 a Suttanta is dated as having been delivered shortly after Devadatta went away. Not a word is said about him; but the discourse discusses the object of religion, which, it is said, should be cultivated, not for the sake of gain or honour, not for the sake of virtue, not for the sake of mystic concentration, not for the sake of knowledge, 'but has its meaning, its essence, its ideal in emancipation of mind.' The objects here rejected are precisely those for which, in the *Vinaya* passages, Devadatta is said to have striven. At *Majjhima*, i. 392, a Jain is urged to put Gautama on the following two-horned dilemma (*ubhato-koṭikaṃ pañhaṃ*): 'Do you say that one ought to speak words pleasant to others? If so, did you make the statement about the inevitable fate about to befall Devadatta?' The puzzle is easily solved, and on general grounds (without any reference at all to Devadatta). This passage is important, because it shows that, before the time when the Dialogues were composed, and *a fortiori* before the time when the *Vinaya* account arose, the episode about the future fate of Devadatta was already in existence, and was widely known in the community, and even outside of it.

The *Milinda* (p. 107 ff.) has a greatly altered and expanded version of this 'double-horned dilemma'; and it is probable that the whole of the dilemma portion of that interesting work is based on the scheme of the dilemma in this Suttānta.

The *Saṁyutta* (at ii. 240–242) has the episode of honour bringing ruin to the mean man, in the same words as *Vin.* ii. 188, but divided into two stories; and at i. 153 it puts the concluding verse of that episode into the mouth of the god Brahmā. At ii. 156 Devadatta and his followers are called 'men of evil desire.' In four passages[1] the *Aṅguttara* has, word for word, episodes occurring in the *Vinaya* account. Besides those, it discusses at iii. 402 the statement about the fate that will inevitably befall Devadatta; and at iv. 402 ff. it discloses a view held by Devadatta that it was concentration of mind (and not the ethical training of the 'Aryan Path') that made a man an *arhat*. This is the only one of these isolated passages in the oldest books which really adds anything to our knowledge of Devadatta. In the later books of the Canon there are two or three more references to him. Thus the episode at *Vin.* ii. 198 recurs at *Udāna*, v. 8, and that at *Vin.* ii. 203 at *Iti-vuttaka*, no. 89, and at *Udāna*, i. 5, Devadatta's name is included in a list of eleven leaders in the Order who are called *buddha*, 'awakened.' This is the only passage in the Canon which speaks of Devadatta with approval; and it doubtless refers to a period before the schism. Lastly, in *Vin.* i. 115 it is said that Devadatta, before the rule to the contrary had been promulgated, allowed the local chapter of the Order, when the *Pātimokkha* was being recited, to be attended by laymen.

H. Oldenberg has shown, in the Introduction to his edition of the *Vinaya*, that the work, as we now have it, is composed of material belonging to three periods, the oldest of which goes back nearly, if not quite, to the time of the Buddha. The chapter analyzed above belongs to the latest of those periods. The episodes found also in other parts of the Canon belong to the earliest period. The summary at the beginning of this article is based exclusively on such episodes.

3. The later notices.—In books later than the Canon, the above story of Devadatta is often told or referred to, and with embellishments which purport to add details not found in the earlier version. Such additional details must be regarded with suspicion: many are insignificant, some are evidently added merely to heighten the edification of the narrative, all are some centuries later than the alleged facts they, for the first time, record. It will be sufficient to mention a few of the most striking.

The *Mahāvastu*, iii. 176, and the *Mahāvaṁsa*, ii. 21, give contradictory accounts of Devadatta's parentage. Had these two traditions (the one handed down in the Ganges valley, the other in Ceylon) agreed, the evidence might have been accepted. The *Milinda* (at p. 101) states that Devadatta was swallowed up by the earth; and

[1] *Aṅ.* ii. 73 = *Saṁ.* ii. 241 = *Vin.* ii. 188; *Aṅ.* iii. 123 = *Vin.* ii. 185; *Aṅ.* iv. 160; and again 164 = *Vin.* ii. 202.

(at p. 111) that, at the moment of his death, he took refuge in the Buddha. Both traditions were accepted in Ceylon in the 5th cent. A.D. (see the commentary on the *Dhammapada*, i. 147). A statement of Fa Hien (Legge's tr., p. 60) shows that the first of these traditions was still current in India at the end of the 4th cent. A.D. The same authority (p. 62) tells us that there were still, at that time, followers of Devadatta who paid honour to the three previous Buddhas, but not to Gautama. This is possibly confirmed by Yuan Chwāng, more than two centuries later, and in another locality; but Watters (ii. 191) thinks that the pilgrim himself may have supplied the name Devadatta. Yuan Chwāng elsewhere (Watters, i. 339) credits Devadatta with the murder of the nun Uppala-vaṇṇā; but we have no confirmation of this unlikely story, and it depends probably on a Chinese misunderstanding of some Indian text. We have two 5th cent. biographies of Uppala-vaṇṇā, and it occurs in neither.

LITERATURE.—*Vinaya*, ed. Oldenberg, London, 1879; Rhys Davids and H. Oldenberg, *Vinaya Texts*, Oxford, 1881–85 (*SBE* xiii., xvii., xx.); *Theragāthā*, ed. Oldenberg and Pischel (*PTS*, 1883); *Aṅguttara*, ed. Morris and Hardy (*PTS*, 1885–1900); *Saṁyutta*, ed. Léon Feer (*PTS*, 1884–1898); *Milinda-pañho*, ed. Trenckner, London, 1880; *Netti*, ed. E. Hardy (*PTS*, 1902); Rhys Davids, *Questions of King Milinda*, Oxford, 1890–94 (*SBE* xxxv., xxxvi.), *Dialogues of the Buddha*, Oxford, 1899, 1909; *Majjhima Nikāya*, ed. Trenckner and Chalmers (*PTS*, 1887–1902); *Iti-vuttaka*, ed. Windisch (*PTS*, 1890), and tr. J. H. Moore, New York, 1908; *Mahāvastu*, ed. Senart, Paris, 1897; *Mahāvaṁsa*, ed. Geiger (*PTS*, 1908); *Travels of Fa Hien*, tr. J. Legge, Oxford, 1886; T. Watters, *On Yuan Chwang's Travels in India*, ed. Rhys Davids and S. W. Bushell, London, 1904; *Com. on the Dhammapada*, ed. H. C. Norman (*PTS*, 1906). See also H. Kern, *Manual of Indian Buddhism*, Strassburg, 1896 (=*GIAP* iii. 8), pp. 15, 28, 38 ff., where other references to later notices may be found.

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DEVAYĀNA.—This term in ancient Vedic thought and speculation denoted the path or paths leading to the gods, elsewhere the road which the gods themselves were wont to traverse in their descent or ascent between heaven and earth. In the earliest literature of India it formed part of the recognized terminology of the priests and poets; and it passed through a long course of development and refinement, during which it gained clearness of definition, and was brought into relation with other movements of religious thought. In a lower, more literal, and mechanical sense, *devayāna* was also the car or vehicle (*yāna*) of a god; but no special significance or importance seems to have attached to this use of the word. The correlative to *devayāna*, 'the way of the gods,' was *pitṛyāna*, 'the way of the fathers'—a term which assumed importance only in the later speculation, and perhaps was consciously invented on the analogy of the former word, to express an inferior path or progress, at a time when *devayāna* became specialized and appropriated to the conception of a higher or the highest degree of bliss.

Hence in origin at least both terms belong to a lower stratum or form of religious belief, and are conceived in a material or semi-material sense. The term *pitṛyāna* especially answered to the primitive and wide-spread conception of the life after death, which pictures it as a meagre continuation of the present, reproducing the conditions and occupations of a worldly existence, where the ancestors dwell in weal or woe according to their deserts, but where all is more or less unreal and speculative, and the prospect exerts no determining influence on the actions or conduct of the present. In India, however, almost from the very beginning, the term *devayāna*, so soon as it was interpreted in the human sphere of the fortunes and destinies of men, was conceived apparently in a higher and more ethical sense, and for the most part connoted Divine escort, companionship, or guardian care, on a road which had its termination in a paradise of blessedness and good; the elements and conditions of which conception were necessarily contributed by earthly experiences, and the pleasures enjoyed were those of earth, renewed, however, in a more or less etherealized and exalted form in fellowship with beneficent and righteous gods. The travellers by the *pitṛyāna* attained only a lower goal, where the superhuman associates were at the best the gods of the lower world, but where the company was for the most part those mortal men who had preceded them on the path. These all shared the same colourless and temporary existence, from which they eventually returned to tread the same cycle of renewed birth, life, and death, in this world. Thus finally, with the growth of speculation with regard to the future, and of the consciousness of merit and demerit attaching to conduct and involving reward or penalty, the ways of the gods and of the fathers were brought into association with the great Indian doctrines of *saṁsāra*, 'transmigration,' and inevitable *karma*; and were incorporated into the rich store of Indian beliefs that had reference to the life beyond the grave.

The earliest conception of a 'path of the gods' is to be found in the hymns of the Rigveda. There apparently it is always associated with Agni, the divine priest and intermediary between gods and men. Agni—both the sacrificer and the sacrificial flame—bears the offerings to the gods, and conducts the gods to receive the offerings which are prepared for them. He knows the path that leads to the gods, and is the messenger and guide thereon:

'Knowing the ways by which the gods go, thou (Agni) hast become the unwearied messenger, the bearer of oblations.'[1]

The path trodden by the gods, and on which the sacrifices were borne to the heavenly world, became later the road by which the sacrificer himself ascended to the company of the gods. This extension or development of the thought of the *devayāna* was early made, probably in connexion with the practice of burning the dead. The soul, released from the body, which was consumed by the fire and returned to its earthly elements, was carried on high in the smoke and flame, on a fiery path whereon was consummated that purification from earthly taint which the fires of the funeral pyre had begun.

Śat. Brāhm. i. 9. 3. 2: 'That same path[2] leads either to the gods or to the fathers. On both sides two flames are ever burning: they scorch him who deserves to be scorched, and allow him to pass who deserves to pass.'

The way was thus prepared for the philosophical development which the doctrine received in the Upaniṣads and later systems of Indian thought and teaching. The purification which the soul underwent to fit it for the communion and company of the gods was conceived as a process not completed in one act or at one time, but carried on through a series of graduated stages or degrees; and it was only at its close that the emancipated soul was admitted to the fullness of bliss.

The earliest enumeration of the 'stations' on the two paths is found in the *Chhāndogya Upaniṣad* (v. 10. 1):

'Those who know this (*i.e.* the so-called doctrine of the five fires, and the fate of men after death, with regard to which Śvetaketu Āruṇeya has been obliged to confess ignorance [v. 3. 1–5]), and those who in the forest follow faith and austerities (*vānaprastha*) enter into the flame, from the flame to the day, from the day to the bright half of the month, from the bright half of the month to the six months of the sun's northward movement, from the six months to the year, from the year to the sun, from the sun to the moon, from the moon to the lightning.'

Thence they are led to Brahman; and it is further

[1] Rigv. i. 72. 7, cf. ii. 2. 4 f., *al.*; Atharv. iii. 15. 2, etc.; and, for the paths between heaven and earth, which Agni knows (Rigv. vi. 16. 3, x. 98. 11, etc.), see Macdonell, *Vedic Mythology*, Strassburg, 1897, p. 88 ff.

[2] *i.e.* the funeral fire; see *SBE* xii. 267 and note; and cf. *Śat. Brahm.* xiii. 8. 3. 4.

explained that this is the way of the gods, from which there is no return (cf. iv. 15. 5):

'But they who living in a village (*gṛhastha*) practise sacrifices and almsgiving, enter into the smoke, from the smoke to the night, from the night to the dark half of the month, from the dark half of the month to the six months of the sun's southward movement. But they do not reach the year. From the months they go to the world of the fathers, from the world of the fathers to the ether, from the ether to the moon. . . . Having dwelt there as long as a remnant (of good works) yet exists (*yāvat sampātam*, "till their good works are consumed" [Müller]), they return again, by that way by which they came, to the ether, from the ether to the wind. Having become wind, the sacrificer becomes smoke; having become smoke, he becomes mist; having become mist, he becomes cloud; having become cloud, he rains down. Then is he born as rice and corn, herbs and trees, sesamum and beans. Thence the escape is beset with most difficulties. . . . Those whose conduct has been good will quickly attain some good birth, the birth of a Brāhman, or a Kṣatriya, or a Vaiśya; but those whose conduct has been evil will quickly attain an evil birth, the birth of a dog or a hog or a Chaṇḍāla' (v. 10. 3–7).

The same description, with minor variations and in a somewhat briefer form, recurs in *Bṛhad. Up.* vi. 2. 15 f. For the year, however, on the *devayāna* is substituted the Devaloka, 'the world of the gods.' In the stations of the *pitṛyāna* the ether is omitted, and progress is made direct from the world of the fathers to the moon. The omission, however, is apparently merely accidental; for, when the merit of their good works is exhausted, they are said to return again to the ether, from the ether to the air, from the air to the rain, from the rain to the earth.

'And when they have reached the earth they become food, they are offered again in the fire of man, and thence are born in the fire of woman. Thus they rise up towards the worlds, and go the same round as before.'

It is not easy to determine which of these two versions is the earlier. They are probably to be traced back to a common original, which has been slightly modified in the course of transmission in different schools of Vedic learning. The form of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* most closely and formally identifies itself with the doctrine of transmigration and the theory of a satisfaction rendered upon earth for all past deeds, after which a new career is entered upon. There underlies both, however, the ancient Vedic conception of retribution or felicity after death, in another world, from which there was no necessary return to an existence upon earth—a conception which was more or less definitely combined with and accommodated to the teaching with regard to a new life upon earth. The latter, in its origin at least, was probably derived from external sources, but was adopted into the Brāhmanical system and elaborated in the philosophical schools (see artt. TRANSMIGRATION, UPANIṢADS).

In the later literature also reference is frequently made to the two paths, and the essential difference between them is emphasized, viz. that of a permanent or a merely temporary deliverance from the conditions of an earthly life, e.g. *Bhāg.-Gītā*, viii. 23–26:

'I will declare the time, O descendant of Bharata, at which devotees (*yogin*) departing from this world go, never to return or to return. The fire, the flame, the day, the bright fortnight, the six months of the sun's northern movement, departing in these, those who know the Brahman go to the Brahman. Smoke, night, the dark fortnight, the six months of the sun's southern movement, departing in these, the devotee attains the lunar light and returns. These two paths, the bright and the dark, are deemed to be eternal in this world. By the one a man goes never to return, by the other he returns again.' Cf. *Praśna Up.* i. 9, 10, where the paths are termed southern and northern; *Muṇḍ. Up.* i. 2. 10, 11, iii. 1. 6; *Anug.* 20 (*SBE* viii. 314, 316), etc.

It is evident that the stations themselves are artificial, and are made artificially to correspond, those of the *devayāna* indicating regions of progressive knowledge and light, those of the *pitṛyāna* successive regions of darkness and decay. Occasionally, in passages which are probably later and prompted by individual speculation or fancy, other stations are added or substituted for those of the *Bṛhad.* or *Chhānd.*; *e.g.* in *Kauś. Up.* i. 3, from the fire, the world of Agni, the path of the gods leads through the world of Vāyu (wind, air) to the world of Varuna, and thence through the worlds of Indra and Prajāpati to the world of Brahman.

The same Upaniṣad essays an explanation of the fact that the moon appears as a station on both paths. On the *devayāna* it occupies a place beyond the sun, intermediary between that and the lightning, but is in no way distinguished from the other stations. On the *pitṛyāna*, however, it is the final resting-place, or place of sojourn, from which the return to earth begins. The author of the *Kauś. Up.* appears to regard the moon as a testing-place or opportunity of trial, the future being determined by the degree of knowledge which the disembodied soul is proved to possess. The wise find a permanent home; the ignorant are dismissed to a new earthly existence which is graduated according to their deserts.[1] That all souls after death are received into the moon is an ancient and widely accepted view, and probably accounts for the position which the moon occupies as a station common to the two paths.

Provision is also made for those who are ignorant of the ways, *i.e.* for out-castes who have no knowledge of the gods and no capacity or right to study the scriptures. Elsewhere, however, this 'third place' appears to be conceived as a lot of punishment or degradation reserved for the wicked. To the philosophical thought of India the two conceptions are not incompatible, and the latter, indeed, is almost necessarily an accompaniment of the former.

'Those who know neither of these paths become worms, birds, and biting things.'[2]

A further question much discussed had reference to the qualifications necessary for those who on the higher path attain to light and immortality. The primary qualification was universally admitted to be knowledge, *i.e.* knowledge of the supreme or Brahman. Difference of opinion, however, appears to have existed on the one question as to the degree of knowledge the possession of which would admit to the *devayāna*. With regard to those who have lived in the two last *āśramas* as *vānaprasthas* or *sannyāsins*, there is no doubt: they tread the path of the gods. In the case of *gṛhasthas* the *Chhānd. Up.* appears to draw a distinction between those who know the secret doctrine of the five fires, and those whose life proceeds in the routine of ordinary sacrifices. The former after death go to the flame, etc., and finally reach Brahman. The latter are destined for the *pitṛyāna* and a return to earth. The *brahmachārin*, in a state of pupilage, to whom the knowledge of the Brahman had not yet been communicated, was naturally excluded from the highest path. A later representation, perhaps more liberally inspired, or to which the conception of the sphere of the *brahmachārin's* life had become definitely widened, conceded this also, and, entirely in harmony with later developments of thought, laid the emphasis not on status, but on behaviour and a life of meditation and devotion.[3]

[1] *Kauś.* i. 2. The passage is difficult, and perhaps corrupt. Max Muller renders: 'All who depart from this world go to the moon. In the former (the bright) half, the moon delights in their spirits; in the other (the dark) half, the moon sends them on to be born again. Verily, the moon is the door of the Svarga (heavenly) world. Now, if a man objects to the moon (is not satisfied with life there), the moon sets him free. But, if a man does not object, then the moon sends him down as rain upon this earth,' etc. (*SBE* i. 273 f.; cf. Deussen, *Sechzig Upanishads*, Leipzig, 1897, p. 24).

[2] *Bṛhad. Up.* vi. 2. 16, cf. *Chhānd.* v. 10. 7 f., Śaṅkara on *Ved. Sūt.* iii. 1. 18, who explains that, in the case of those who are destined for the 'third place,' the appropriate sacrifices have not been offered, and therefore they return to life in new bodies which are constituted from inferior ingredients (*SBE* xxxviii. 123–25, cf. 121 f.).

[3] *Anug.* 31. 7 f.: 'a Brahmachārin . . . who is thus devoted, who is concentrated in mind and continent, conquers heaven, and reaching the highest seat does not return to birth'; cf. Rāmānuja on *Ved. Sūt.* iii. 3. 32, who declares that all those who practise meditation proceed on the path of the gods, without

The same question of qualifications for the higher path, the path that led to Brahman without return, was considered in relation to the doctrine of the *yoga* (*q.v.*). *Bhāg.-Gītā*, viii. 24 f. appears to suggest that the immediate destiny of the *yogin*, or ascetic, depends upon the time of death, whether in the light or dark half of the year, the northern or southern progress of the sun (*SBE* viii. 80 f.). Rāmānuja, however, rejects this inference, and asserts that the text enjoins on all *yogins* the duty of daily meditation on the two paths, quoting in proof of his contention the words that follow: 'no *yogin* who knows these two paths is deluded' (*ib.* viii. 27). The text, therefore, has no reference to the time or season of the year at which death takes place (*SBE* xlviii. 472 f.).

A further and final development of doctrine took place in harmony with the teaching of the Vedānta, and the importance attached to knowledge of the highest Brahman, the supreme knowledge (*parā vidyā*), as the one avenue of escape from attachment to the world and the possibilities of re-birth. Those, on the other hand, who were possessed only of the lower degree of knowledge (*aparā vidyā*), the knowledge of the Brahman *saguṇa* ('endowed with qualities'), were still entangled in the snares of delusion, and liable after death to a return to earth. It became, then, necessary to find a link of connexion between the new metaphysics which exalted the secret esoteric wisdom, and the older authoritative teaching of the two ways. It was not possible, however, to deny that those who possessed a knowledge of Brahman even in an inferior degree departed on the *devayāna*, the path of the gods, or to consign them to a lower destiny; for all such the scripture declared that there was no return. A solution of the difficulty was found in the doctrine of the *kramamukti*, 'emancipation by steps or stages.' The question is discussed by Śaṅkara on *Ved. Sūt.* iii. 3. 29 (*SBE* xxxviii. 231–235; cf. *ib.* 124 f.), where he explains that a twofold meaning underlies the phrase 'going on the path of the gods.' In the case of those possessed of the highest knowledge, the knowledge of the unqualified Brahman (*nirguṇa*), it is a mere phrase; for they are already in union with Brahman, and have no need to move on any path to reach that end. But all who have only the knowledge of the qualified Brahman (*saguṇa*) advance on that road. And, since it is said that they attain to Brahman and do not return, it must be that in union with the (*saguṇa*) Brahman they eventually win perfect enlightenment and gain the highest knowledge. During this period of probation and imperfect knowledge the soul is in possession of complete bliss and unrestrained capacities of will power, etc. (*aiśvarya*). As it approaches the highest light, it finds itself, assumes a 'new form,' and is truly and finally set free. This is the doctrine of the *kramamukti*. And it is further explained that all thus enter into absolute and final emancipation at the end of the world-cycle.[1]

A variety of the teaching concerning the paths, which is merely an elaboration of the doctrine of the two roads, and remained without further significance or development, postulated four paths from earth to the gods, which were explained as corresponding to four forms of sacrifice. Both the reference and the interpretation are given by Baudhāyana:

'Some teach a fourfold division of these sacred duties. The text, however, "Four paths," etc. (*Taitt. Saṁh.* v. 7. 2. 3) refers to sacrificial rites, *iṣṭis*, animal and Soma sacrifices, and *darvihomas* (offerings made with a *darvī*, or sacred ladle). The following declares that "Four paths, leading to the world of the gods, go severally from the earth to heaven"' (Baudhāy. ii. 6. 9 ff., cf. 29; *Āpast.* ii. 9. 23. 5).

The context suggests that the conception of the four paths is not unconnected with the doctrine of the four *āśramas*.

An isolated passage in the *Bṛhad. Up.* (iv. 4. 9) describes the path to the Svargaloka as marked out in varied colours:

'On that path (to the Svargaloka) they say that there is white or blue or yellow or green or red; that path was found by Brahman, and on it goes whoever knows Brahman, and who has done good, and obtained splendour.'

The colours are the same as those of the veins (*hitā*; *ib.* iv. 3. 20), and the conception has therefore in all probability a physiological basis. Neither in this instance, however, nor in that of the four paths of the *Taitt. Saṁh.* and Baudhāyana was any inference drawn or further development sought. And it remains doubtful how far any connexion is to be traced between the ideas underlying these texts and the formal doctrine of the *devayāna*.

Parallels to the latter doctrine of roads traced out between earth and heaven by which the dead souls pass and repass are to be found in many of the religions of the nearer and further East. They are present in the eschatological teaching especially of Babylon and Egypt.[1] Similar conceptions are presupposed in the dream of Jacob (Gn 28[12 ff.]).[2]

LITERATURE.—This is indicated in the article.

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DEVELOPMENT (Biological).—Development is the 'becoming' of the individual organism, the attainment of a specific form and structure, and of the not less characteristic associated faculties. The starting-point is usually a fertilized egg-cell—a new unity formed from the intimate and orderly combination of paternal and maternal inheritances. The fertilized ovum divides and re-divides, the daughter-cells or blastomeres are arranged in germinal layers, differentiation sets in, and an embryo is built up. This is embryonic development. At a certain stage, differing greatly in the different types, the egg is 'hatched,' and the embryo emerges from the egg-envelope—sometimes like a miniature of the adult, as in the case of a chicken; sometimes very unlike the adult and adapted to a different kind of life, as in the case of caterpillar and tadpole. Thus there may be a larval development. The embryo is the quiescent stage within the egg membrane; the larva is free-living and able to feed for itself. As long as the realization or expression of the inheritance goes on, as long as differentiation and integration continue, we may speak of development, but mere increase in size is not development, and it is very difficult to decide where to put in the stop. Thus some would say that development includes all the normal changes of form and structure that occur throughout life, and that the breaking-down in old age is as much part of development as the building-up in youth. Others put in the stop when the limit of growth is reached, but the brain may go on developing long after that, though in mammals there seems to be no increase in the number of brain-cells after birth. Moreover, there are many fishes and reptiles that show no limit of growth. Others, again, put in the stop when the specific characters begin to be well defined, but that would exclude much that can be fairly called development, *e.g.* the changes associ-

restriction (*SBE* xlviii. 650–652); also on iii. 1, 17 f., iv. 3. 1 ff., where the two paths are discussed, and are said to be dependent respectively on knowledge and works (*SBE* xlviii. 594 f., 744 ff.); see also Śaṅkara, *locc. citt.*

[1] Cf. also Rāmānuja on *Ved. Sūt.* iv. 4. 1 f. (*SBE* xlviii. 755 ff.); Deussen, *Allg. Gesch. d. Philos.*, Leipzig, 1908, i. 3. p. 608 ff. The *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* contains a suggestion or pre-intimation of the same theory: 'When that god is known, all fetters fall off, sufferings are destroyed, and birth and death cease. From meditating on him there arises, on the dissolution of the body, the third state, that of universal lordship (*aiśvarya*); but he only who is alone is satisfied' (*Śvet. Up.* i. 11).

[1] See, *e.g.*, F. Cumont, *Les Religions orientales*, 1906, p. 152 f., and the references there given; E. A. Wallis Budge, *Egyptian Heaven and Hell*, London, 1905, *passim*, etc.

[2] Cf. A. Jeremias, *Das AT im Lichte des alten Orients*[2] Leipzig, 1906, p. 372 ff.

ated with sexual maturity. The fact is that, in studying development, we are considering the living creature in its time-relations, and definition is a matter of convenience. In the present article we propose to restrict ourselves for the most part to the problems of embryonic development.

Let us state very briefly some of the outstanding facts of development. We know that the germ-cells, and their nuclei in particular, form the physical basis of inheritance—the means, at least, of development; that a genetic continuity is kept up from generation to generation by a lineage of unspecialized germ-cells, which do not share in body-making; that this accounts for like tending to beget like; that fertilization implies an intimate and orderly union of two individualities, condensed and integrated for the time being in the ovum and the spermatozoon; that the spermatozoon, besides being the bearer of the paternal half of the inheritance, acts as a liberating stimulus to the ovum, and introduces into the ovum a peculiar little body, the centrosome, which plays an important part in the subsequent division of the fertilized egg-cell. We know that the mode of all development is by the division of nuclei and the segregation of the living matter into unit-areas or cells, each presided over by a nucleus; that differentiation comes about very gradually, the obviously complex slowly arising out of the apparently simple; that paternal and maternal characteristics—so far as the nuclei of the germ-cells bear these—are distributed in exact equality by the nuclear or cellular divisions, and that the paternal and maternal contributions thus form the warp and woof of the web which we call the organism, though the expression or realization of the bi-parental heritage varies greatly in individual cases. In many cases the parental contributions seem to include ancestral items which may find expression in development or may lie latent. We know that development is a regular sequence of events which requires, stage by stage, an appropriate external environment; that there are continual interactions between the developing organism and its environment; and that there are continual mutual adjustments of the different constituents of the developing organism. In certain aspects the development appears like the building-up of a mosaic out of many independently heritable and independently developable parts; in other aspects it appears as the expression of an integrated unity, with subtle correlations between the parts, and with remarkable regulative processes working towards an unconsciously predetermined end. We know also that in a general way the individual development of organs often progresses from stage to stage in a manner which suggests a recapitulation of the steps in the presumed racial evolution.

It may be said that the data for the study of development are threefold, viz. (*a*) embryologists have worked out the sequence of stages in the development of a large number of types; (*b*) experimentalists have shown in a variety of instances that particular changes in the external conditions are followed by particular changes in the developing organism; and (*c*) students of heredity have distinguished various modes of inheritance which obtain, such as 'blended' and 'Mendelian.' The facts known in regard to development are many and various, as we have briefly indicated, and they are continuously increasing in precision and penetration; yet it seems doubtful whether we have got much nearer an understanding of development since the days of Aristotle, to whom facts were so few. It seems as if his *de Generatione* remained the most important contribution to the subject. How little light we have that he had not in regard to the deep problems of development, such as those suggested by the following questions: How are the heritable characteristics of the race summed up potentially within the minute germ-cells? How do they gradually find expression in the individual development, so that what we call differentiation results? What is the nature of the compelling necessity that mints and coins the chick out of a drop of living matter? What is the regulative principle of the ordered progress which, by intricate and often strangely circuitous paths, leads to the fully-formed organism?

From reflexion on these general questions the scientific mind always turns, sometimes too quickly, to concrete investigation, it may be of the humblest sort, with the results of which the theory of development must be consistent. Thus there are numerous inquiries into the external factors of development, such as light, temperature, oxygen, osmotic pressure, and the chemical composition of the medium. Experiments are devised which alter or remove one factor at a time, and the significance of the factor is inferred from the resulting changes, transient or permanent, in the developing organism. It appears that each germ is adapted to develop in an appropriate environment, that changes in this environment may occur without permanent prejudicial effects on the organism, but that the latitude of endurable change varies greatly for different types, some being much less plastic than others. It appears that some of the environmental factors, like oxygen and water, are analogous to nutrition; that others, like the osmotic pressure or the presence of calcium salts in the water, are conditions of embryonic coherence; that others, like light and heat, are accelerants and inhibitants; and that particular combinations of factors are required as the 'liberating stimuli' of particular characters in the developing organism. It does not appear, however, that we can speak of the environmental factors as being in any other sense directive.

A second kind of inquiry asks, What in point of fact goes on in the development of the fertilized egg-cell? We know that there is an expression of the inheritance: that is just another spelling of the word development; but what processes are known to occur? This is an inquiry into the physiology of development, which is still a very young department of science, too young for safe generalization. It is also difficult to disentangle the physiology of growth from that of development, yet every one is agreed that mere growth is not development. What processes are known to occur? (*a*) We know of various sets of chemical changes significant in different ways. Thus, to cite three different cases, the fermentative changes in seeds make the legacy of nutritive reserves available; the anabolic formation of nuclein-substances seems to bring about cell-division; the diffusion of the products of internal secretion certainly affords the liberating stimulus to certain previously unexpressed parts of the inheritance, for instance in adolescence. (*b*) We know also of a continuous succession of cell-divisions. That, indeed, is how all development goes on. The original idea of Roux, that there is qualitative nuclear division, shuffling the pack of inherited qualities, has been given up in favour of a more plausible view suggested below. (*c*) We also know a little of even subtler processes—of protoplasmic movements within the developing germ, and of apparent attractions towards specific parts. (*d*) There are also phenomena of surface-tension and capillarity, etc., which seem to be rather parts of the vital machinery of growing than implicated in the essential secret of progressive differentiation.

A third line of investigation concerns the initial structure of the germ, and one result stands out—that in many cases the egg-cell contains pre-formed, sometimes pre-localized, organ-forming substances, whose removal involves the absence of a corresponding structure, should development proceed. Thus, the old view of the ovum as homogeneous and isotropic has given way before experimental proof of heterogeneity. It may be that, in the heterogeneous, anisotropic cytoplasm of the egg, there is the foundation of the progressive differentiation that follows, and it may be, as Driesch and Boveri suggest, that the dividing nuclei—each a microcosm—are differently stimulated to expression in different areas of the cytoplasm, and that they thus call forth new differentiations in these, in ever-increasing complexity of action and reaction.

Another line of investigation inquires into the mutual influences of the parts of the developing organism. An egg divides into a ball of cells (or blastomeres), and it seems reasonable to suppose—what experiment confirms—that the prospective value of a particular blastomere depends on its position in the whole. In the development of a colony of polymorphic Hydroids, such as Hydractinia, it is probable that the prospective value of any young polyp—whether it is to become nutritive, reproductive, or sensory—depends, in part at least, on its position in the whole. Similarly, in the development of an embryo, it is probable that there are subtler than spatial correlations between the developing cells or groups of cells. Driesch has especially emphasized this idea of the mutual stimulation of developing parts, but further research is necessary before we can securely estimate the action of parts upon one another. This, indeed, brings us right up against one of the distinctive riddles of development—that there is, on the one hand, so much inter-dependence of parts, and yet, on the other hand, so much power of self-differentiation.

In regard to the question so often asked, whether we can understand development in terms of chemistry and physics, the scientific answer must be that we cannot at present in the very least describe embryonic development—that wonderful individual unpacking of a racial treasure-box—in terms of chemistry and physics. There are chemical and physical processes going on, of course, which reward study, but a knowledge of them does not help us greatly to understand the result. There is nothing known in regard to development that is at variance with the conclusions of chemistry and physics, but we cannot give a physico-chemical rendering of the observed facts. Nowhere is the autonomy of Biology clearer than here. Driesch in particular has done great service in showing that mechanistic formulæ will not suffice when we come to deal with organic development, notably when we consider the localization of the various successive steps of differentiation. But many who are at one with him on that point are unable to follow him in his constructive hypothesis of an entelechy which exerts a directive influence on the transformations of energy that go on in development.

LITERATURE.—Hans Driesch, *The Science and Philosophy of the Organism* (Gifford Lectures at Aberdeen), 2 vols., London, 1908; J. W. Jenkinson, *Experimental Embryology*, Oxford, 1909 [a very able treatise, with a philosophical discussion]; W. Roux, *Vorträge und Aufsätze über Entwickelungsmechanik der Organismen*, i., Leipzig, 1905; E. B. Wilson, *The Cell in Development and Inheritance*, London and New York, 1900; Aristotle's *de Generatione*, tr. Pratt, Oxford, 1911. See also literature at end of art. BIOLOGY.

J. ARTHUR THOMSON.

DEVELOPMENT (Mental).—**1. Introduction.**—During and after the period of bodily growth and development, from infancy to adult life, the individual gradually acquires and completes his mental powers. The study of mental development has as its aim to determine the conditions which govern this gradual process, and its successive stages both for the mind in general and for the special functions or capacities. It has been remarked that, while some of the lowest animals are born 'grown up,' being able from the first to secure food for themselves and otherwise to live a life similar to that of their parents, the higher we ascend the scale of animal life the longer is the period of immaturity, infancy, or development which the individual undergoes. This is not a mere accident: the length of infancy has a *direct* relation to the height achieved by the animal's species in the evolutionary scale, in other words, to the complexity of its structure and functions, the variety of its adaptation to environment, and especially the degree of plasticity, or power of modifying behaviour, which it possesses. The argument applies equally to the physical and the mental aspects of evolution.

Comparative tables show that the ratio of the period of immaturity to that of length of life, which in man is 25 : 75, or 1 : 3, is an increasingly small fraction as we descend the scale: thus elephant, 1 : 4; horse, lion, 1 : 6; dog, 1 : 8; cattle, 1 : 9; cat, 1 : 10; rabbit, 1 : 11; guinea-pig, 1 : 12 (A. F. Chamberlain [after Hollis and Bell], *The Child*[2], ch. 4). The same differences may be observed within the human race itself: the young savage, or barbarian, Papuan, Fuegian, Bushman, Eskimo, is adult, and begins to take a man's or woman's part in the tribal work, at from 10 to 12 or 13 years; while, within civilization, the date of perfect maturity has been progressively advancing to 21, 25, and even to 30 years for complete mental development. It must be supposed that the ordinary forces making for evolution have determined this increasing length of infancy and immaturity; it has the following advantages: (1) Completed growth means rigidity; the more firmly a structure is organized, the more completely a habit is fixed by the organic mechanism, the more difficult is it for either structure or habit to be modified to suit new conditions; hence longer infancy means more gradual and therefore more effective adaptation to the general environment. (2) Completed development means completed adaptation to a number of *special* forces in the environment; the period of development is that during which selection occurs among the forces to which adaptation is to be made; thus longer infancy means ultimately more specialized adaptation to, and greater control over, the environment. (3) The main value of mental as contrasted with physical development is to give the individual a mastery of the means of economizing behaviour—by selective attention, by language, by technical skill, by thinking, abstraction, and reason—the mastery of those varied means of summarizing experience which the race has in its evolution perfected: such powers cannot be transmitted by physical heredity, but must be re-acquired by each individual by imitation or education: the longer development corresponds, therefore, to the greater refinement of the race in these products of experience. (4) In regard to physical structures as well as to mental achievements, the individual must by exercise and activity *acquire* even those functions for which it has a congenital disposition: the simple structure does not become the complex organization, without effort on the individual's part. This is true whether or not the individual is supposed to pass through the same stages of growth as those by which its ancestral line has come down from simpler life-forms (recapitulation theory). Hence, the higher the evolution of the race, the longer must be the period occupied by the individual in reaching its race-type (K. Groos, *Play of Animals*, ch. 2, Eng. tr., London, 1898; Chamberlain, *op. cit.*; E. Claparède, *Psychol. de l'enfant*[3], chs. 2 and 4).

2. Relation of development to evolution.—The recapitulation theory, once accepted as almost a truism, has recently met with much criticism. It has been applied to mental development most frankly and fully by Stanley Hall and his school. According to these writers, there are three ways in which the individual reveals the story of his race. (1) There is the actually observed correspondence between the stages and order of development and those of race-evolution ('recapitulation'). (2) There is the occasional appearance, even in adult normal life, of mental forms which are echoes of primitive mental stages; these occur more especially in states of mental weakness, fatigue, exhaustion, illness, the drug-psychoses, sleep, hypnosis ('reverberations,' 'reminiscences'). Our souls, like our bodies, represent the organized experiences of past ancestors: fears,

affections, thoughts, which appear even in quite healthy states, may be 'rudimentary spectres' (Stanley Hall) due to survivals from distant ages of man. (3) A given individual may show arrest of mental (as well as of physical) development, stopping short at a stage which the race in general has long since passed; in such a case we have a 'reversion,' or an atavism (*q.v.*), in which the characteristics of remote ancestors dominate, in the child's development, those derived from his parents or near ancestors. The mind, like the body, thus consists of segmentary divisions or strata derived from different periods of evolution: the older strata are naturally those which are most fixed and uniform throughout a race (*e.g.* the primitive instincts); the more recent strata are more variable in the different individuals (*e.g.* the forms of intellectual development); again, the older strata represent the foundation from which the more recent have been derived, and on which, therefore, the latter must be built up by the individual: hence not only *does* the individual, as a matter of fact, tend to develop along racial lines, but also parents and teachers *ought* to encourage and strengthen this tendency, in order to secure adequate and proportional development of all the different powers ('culture-epoch theory').[1]

The recapitulation theory has been defended (1) in the stages at which the different senses mature; (2) in the stages at which accurate discrimination of the different qualities within the same sensory group appears; (3) in the appearance of the different instinctive activities; (4) in the play activities of children; (5) in the successive objects of imitation which children select for themselves; (6) in the stages of intelligent behaviour, and in the development of abstract thought; (7) in the development of emotion; (8) in language. The principle has been greatly over-driven by its supporters, and probably the correspondence in question is limited to the broad general lines of development and evolution respectively. Special objections apply to the culture-epoch theory both as an interpretation of the facts of observation and as a basis of educational reform, but in the course of its discussion many valuable suggestions have been made. The child is not mentally, any more than physically, a mere miniature adult; its powers do not differ merely in quantity from those of the adult; they differ also in proportion and in kind.

Nature and nurture.—The question is still very far from settled as to the respective influence in development of factors which are present in the individual at birth, and of factors which come from the environment and operate from without. The arguments for the former, in the case of mental development, are: the tendency of the individual to reach the type or standard of his race, mentally as physically; the remarkably close resemblances which the adult individual shows to his parents and nearer ancestors, in character as in body—a resemblance which is still greater, it is said, between parent and child when both are considered at the stage of infancy or childhood; and the phenomena of atavism, so far as they are certified. Such facts suggest that, as the bodily germ-cell contains elements, or at least conditions, by which the future growth of the individual bodily organism is determined along definite lines, with definite limits, and definite proportions between the parts, so the mind, or perhaps we should say the brain as the basis of mind, also has its development pre-determined from the first. In support of this the statistical observations of Galton, Pearson, Heymans, and others have been adduced on the resemblances and correlations between the mental capacities of individuals and those of their parents or other members of their family.

The result of Galton's observations on the prevalence of eminence and genius in different families may be placed in this form: that the chances of an eminent man having an eminent relative are as 1 to 4, while the chances that an ordinary man, or a man chosen at random without reference to eminence, will have an eminent relative are as 1 to 250. That this is not due to opportunity or to social influences he argues by a comparison between the adopted sons of Popes and the real sons of gifted men. Again, if both parents are artistic, the probability of a child being artistic is 2 to 1; while, if neither parent is artistic, the probability of the child being so is 1 to 4. Another and later statement shows that, while 35 families, of a certain relatively high degree of eminence or capacity in the fathers, will contain at least 6 sons of the same capacity, as many as 5000 families of average or mediocre ability in the fathers will be required to furnish the same number of sons of that higher degree of eminence (F. Galton, *Hereditary Genius*, London, 1869, *Natural Inheritance*, London, 1889. For further references, see J. Arthur Thomson, *Heredity*, London, 1908).

Again, Karl Pearson dealt with families statistically in regard to such characteristics as intelligence, vivacity, conscientiousness, popularity, temper; he had previously compared them in regard to such physical characters as the colour of hair, size and capacity of skull, stature, etc. The application of the correlation-formula may be simply explained in this way, that if every two brothers had always the same stature, or the same colour of hair, then the correlation-index would be 1·00; if there were no law whatever, so that in one case the two brothers might be equally tall, in another the one tall and the other moderate, in a third the one tall and the other short, then the index would be 0·00; while, conversely, if there were such a law that in every case of two brothers one was tall and the other short (of course in exact proportion), then the index would be −1·00. The index Karl Pearson found for the colour of the hair was 0·54, for the skull 0·49, for the stature 0·51; while for the mental characters the average correlation was 0·52, in other words, practically the same as the physical index. These are comparatively high degrees of correlation, and suggest that the same cause has been operative in both classes of cases considered in the statistical measurement. Now, it is quite obvious that post-natal conditions have nothing to do with the colour of the hair or with the size of the skull; hence it is equally unlikely, he argues, that the environment has anything to do with the intelligence, or vivacity, or temper of the individual. Later, more particular and accurate tests gave similar results, although the correlations were not quite so high; in any case, the brother of a bright child is much more likely to be bright than the brother of a dull child; brightness or dullness of intelligence is derived from the parents and is not due to education or environment, and not only is it the *general* mental character that is inherited in this way, but even quite special characteristics (K. Pearson, *Nature*, lxv. [1901] 118, also Huxley Lect. for 1903 in the *Trans. Anthr. Inst.* p. 179 ff., and *Biometrika*, ii. [1903] 357, and iii. [1904] 131; Heymans, *Ztschr. f. angew. Psych.* i. [1907]. On the whole question, see E. L. Thorndike, *Educational Psychology*, New York, 1903, ch. 6).

On the other side, Loeb and his school are able to produce an increasing mass of evidence showing that the development of the bodily organism, since it can be enormously modified by changes in the environment, is to a large extent directly due to the action of external forces. Hence the mental development may be a product of environment and opportunity rather than of innate factors. Thus, the conclusions of Galton and Pearson, for example, are insecure so long as we do not and cannot exclude the environmental influence: just as children of healthy parents tend to have healthy bodies because of the sufficient and proper food which their parents (*because of* their healthiness) are able to provide them, so the children of mentally gifted parents tend also to be mentally gifted, because of the immensely greater stimulation which they receive from the conversation, the life, the surroundings of their parents, and their parents' friends; it is a question not of innate, but of external, conditioning. See, further, art. HEREDITY.

3. **Relation of mental to physical development: periods of development.**—It has been shown (see BODY AND MIND, BRAIN AND MIND) that the development of the mental powers is in intimate

[1] See the Herbartian Ziller's *Allg. Pädag.*[2], Leipzig, 1884, p. 215 ff., and *Grundlegung zur Lehre vom erzieh. Unter.*[2], do. 1884, and the criticisms of K. Lange, *Apperzeption*[9], do. 1906, p. 142 f.

relation with that of the bodily organs, and especially the brain.

The term 'development' is here used in a wide sense to cover both growth and development proper; strictly it is preferable to confine the term 'growth' to the increase in size or amount, while 'development' is reserved for increase in organization and connexion of parts; but these processes occur simultaneously in physical development, and it is extremely difficult to draw any line between them in mental expansion.

The stages of physical growth and maturity have been used to delimit the periods of childhood generally; broadly, we may take four periods of seven years each: (1) *childhood*, from birth to 7 years (about the time of the completion of the second dentition); (2) *the period of girlhood or boyhood*, from the 7th to the 14th year; (3) *the period of adolescence or youth*, from the 14th to the 21st year; and (4) from the 21st to the 28th year, by which time the mental development, as well as the skeletal growth, is approximately completed. The first period is also divided into *infancy* (the first two years, to completion of first dentition) and *childhood proper* (to the 7th year).

(1) Characteristic of the first period are the development of the senses, which at first are extremely imperfect; rapid body and brain growth; the acquirement of the fundamental motor co-ordinations—walking, grasping, climbing, etc.—and the acquirement of speech; emotions are readily excited, but are of short duration; the prominent instincts are the self-preservative ones, 'experimentation play,' and imitation. (2) The second period is marked by a slower bodily growth; the brain is relatively fixed in its size and weight before the middle of this period, but undergoes rapid development or organization during the latter part of it; the important physiological changes that occur towards the middle of the period are accompanied by susceptibility to emotional excitement; the individual is easily fatigued; bodily and mental habits are being formed and fixed; the beginnings of abstract thought and of self-consciousness present themselves: action is co-ordinated with reflective intelligence and thought. (3) In the third stage there is, again, at the beginning, a rapid advance in bodily growth followed by another period of slow growth to its completion at about 21; there is a strengthening of the social consciousness; greater interest is shown in adults and their work; it is also the period of idealism, of romance, and generally of great emotional and social development—'storm and stress'; the mental powers begin to be definitely fixed and proportioned; even play takes a more serious form—in tests of endurance, self-control, skill, and ability. (On this important period, see Stanley Hall's *Adolescence*, and art. ADOLESCENCE, vol. i. p. 101). (4) The last period referred to is that in which the general mental character is finally hardened or set. (On the periods of childhood, see the historical summary in Chamberlain, ch. 4, and Claparède, ch. 4, par. 1). The development of the brain is peculiar in this respect, that at birth it bears a higher proportion relatively to the rest of the body, and to its adult value, than any other organ. While the weight of body of the newly born infant is to that of the adult as 1 to 20, the corresponding ratio in the case of the brain alone is 1 to 3·8 (see the tables given in H. H. Donaldson, *Growth of the Brain*, London, 1895, chs. 2 and 5). Nearly the full weight of the brain, however, and therefore its completed 'growth,' is reached between the 7th and the 10th year, whereas the full stature is not attained until about the 21st year, and the body may go on increasing in weight till the 50th year or later. On the other hand, the brain after the 7th year undergoes changes of great importance in its organization; growth is replaced by development, in the proper sense of the word, although there has also been some degree of development during the earlier stages.

According to Flechsig's discoveries, the *sensory* areas of the brain are the first to show functional maturity, that is, they are the first whose connecting fibres acquire the medullary-sheath (*Localisation der geistigen Vorgänge*, Leipzig, 1896). The earliest fibres to be functionally perfect are those which lead from and to the large region of the brain, which he calls the area for 'body sensation,' including under this broad term both the internal sensations, conveyed from the viscera, muscles, etc., and the external, conveyed from the skin (organic, kinæsthetic, pain, touch, and temperature sensations, sensations of position); these connexions begin before birth, and are completed in the first few months after birth. Within this region it is the fibres connected with the internal organs, and with the extremities, that are first completed; then follow those connected with the trunk, and with the special muscles that are afterwards used for speech. They convey the great masses of sensation with which the feelings and emotions, and also the sense of self, are directly correlated (H. Beaunis, *Les Sensations internes*, Paris, 1889). It may be concluded that these impressions are the earliest which the child is capable of receiving, and the first to be connected into systematic perceptions. Next in order of development are the fibres connected with the smell-centre, and probably those of the taste-centre; third are those which lead to and from the sight area, which do not begin to show the medullary-sheath until after birth; while those of hearing come last. Outside the more or less sharply defined areas of the brain, from which these fibres derive, are those which Flechsig, after Meynert, names the *association areas*, the two chief areas being the large occipital zone, and the pre-frontal zone. It is noticeable that these are all much later in completing their connexions than the sensory zones, and that their connexions are almost entirely of the intra-cerebral type; that is to say, they pass between the different parts of the cortex within a hemisphere or from one hemisphere to the other; these are hardly present at all in the third month of life, but continue to form for several years afterwards.

Flechsig holds, from a comparison between his anatomical researches and the results of clinical and pathological observation, that the sensory zones 'mediate' not only sensations proper, but also those mental forms which are based upon groups or combinations of similar sensations; for example, tactual space-perceptions, and perceptions of auditive series such as those involved in the appreciation of spoken words. With the large association-area in the hind part of the brain are correlated such perceptions as involve combinations of heterogeneous sensations, associations, and memories; in other words, ideas of external objects, of the *meaning* of words, and all forms of higher knowledge. Injury to, or destruction of, these regions leads to an entire loss both of visual and of auditory memory, and the state which has sometimes been called *apraxia*, or *agnosis*, that is, an apparent inability not only to name familiar objects or to recognize them when seen, but even to use them when placed in the hand; yet at the same time power of sensation appears to be intact. The general term 'intelligence' might fitly be used to cover the mental faculties which are lost in such a case. On the other hand, the pre-frontal region, standing in the closest relation with the area for the tactual, kinæsthetic, and organic sensations, is that which runs parallel with the development of the will, character, and self-consciousness; the one certain fact about injury to it is that there is a loss of interest, spontaneity, power of concentrating the attention, in short, a general depreciation of the character.

The close relation between normal development of the brain and normal mental capacity, between abnormal development or one-sided development and genius, between defective development and imbecility, etc., have been referred to elsewhere (BRAIN AND MIND); modern appeals for improved hygiene in schools, medical inspection of children, feeding of necessitous children, special classes for defective children, and the avoidance of over-strain, have their ground or justification in the intimate correlation between the development of the body and that of the mind; and, needless to say, in the case of the child, even more than in that of the adult, the health of the mind is mainly dependent upon that of the body.

4. **The conditions of development.**—It has already been pointed out that it is difficult to say how far development proceeds from internal, and how far from external factors. It may be urged that, just as a child will reach a certain pre-determined *height*, provided that it obtains adequate food and exercise and is protected from injury, and as no amount of extra feeding or exercise will enable it to go beyond this height, while under-feeding, under-exercise, and injury will make it fall below

it, so it is in the case of the mind. The child is born with the possibility of so much mental capacity, so much 'intelligence,' or retentive memory, so acute a sense of sight or hearing, etc.; care and practice will enable it to reach these fixed limits, but not to pass beyond them, while neglect and want of exercise may keep it far short of them. The conclusion is that the function of the teacher or parent is limited to the providing of the necessary *material* for development, that the amount and the direction of the development are, however, determined already by the nature which the child has received at birth. It is probable that the two most important factors in the question are, on the one hand, the *activity* of the child, which is partly a matter of congenital faculty, and partly a matter of healthy nutrition; and, on the other hand, *opportunity* of exercise and practice. The child who is constantly moving about not only improves his health in general, but also puts himself within reach of varied stimuli by which his mental powers are evoked, and in the course of time developed; while the sluggish child does not come so much within reach of stimulation, and therefore has a relatively slower development. Opportunity includes both the ordinary social and educational advantages or disadvantages, and especially those factors which depend on the health, culture, and economic position of the parents. Nature determines that the fundamental instincts shall appear in a certain order, and each contribute its share to the complete development; but, if stimulation and exercise are not provided, any instinct, when it appears, will remain undeveloped, and therefore the whole mental growth will suffer a certain amount of distortion.

Play and imitation.—The principal *internal* conditions of development are the two 'instincts,' if they may be so called—play and imitation. *Play* in the wide sense includes all activities or tendencies which do not contribute to the immediate needs of the organism, which are spontaneously carried out, and which give pleasure in their operation apart from any result derived from them. The natural view of play is such as is expressed in Spencer's surplus energy theory, viz. that play is the outcome of the excessive amount of stored nervous energy in the young, the exercise of which is not required for the organic needs, or of the tendency or faculty of imitation, according to which the child in its play imitates adult activities (*Principles of Psychology*[2], 1872, vol. ii. pt. 8, ch. 9). The theory with which Groos (*Play of Animals* and *Play of Man* [Eng. tr., London, 1910]), Baldwin (Pref. to Groos' *Play of Animals*), and others seek to replace this is that play has a biological function, viz. that of *preparing* the immature individual for the activities of adult life, without exposing it to danger such as would be implied if it had to acquire the same experience apart from the parent's protection. There is in each of the mental powers (or in each of the relative centres of the brain) a tendency to expression or exercise, and, long before there is real need for such powers, this exercise is obtained through play; thus the plays of children follow roughly the stages of the race evolution, as Hugh Miller suggested (*My Schools and Schoolmasters*). The corresponding instincts and interests develop successively in the child's mind; as they develop in their order, each in turn seeks, as it were, for self-expansion or expression, and this takes the form of play. A specially important feature of play is that it prepares the way for intelligence, or, rather, it is the means by which intelligence gradually comes to replace instinct, both in the race and in the individual; the more fixed and limited the environment of an organism is, the more rigid are its instincts, the less developed is its nervous system, and the less is its power to adapt itself to changes in the environment; on the other hand, the more varied the environment, the less rigid, although perhaps more numerous, the instinctive tendencies are, and the greater the ultimate development of the intelligence; play enables the instincts to be sufficiently exercised without dominating the development as a whole. In general, then, play is a preparation for the adult life; hence, the higher the physical and also the mental development ultimately achieved, the longer, as a rule, is the period of play; this, according to Groos, is the object, the biological function, of youth; animals do not play because they are young, but they have a period of youth in order to play. This play includes the *simple experimentation* of the child, as that of the infant when exercising its muscles and its senses upon the objects around it; thus it obtains experience of the qualities of objects, and at the same time strengthens and develops its own active powers. Nature has provided ample means for this experimentation-play in the pleasure which the child manifestly obtains from it, and which is, here as elsewhere, the correlative and index of action which is for the benefit of the organism. Next follow those plays by which the organism as a whole is strengthened physically, and by which the memory is organized and experience consolidated; finally, plays in which the higher mental powers, as well as the wider social instincts, are brought out and exercised. The following is Groos' classification of the plays of the child (*Play of Man*):—

	Examples.
I. Playful experimentation:	
(*a*) With the sensory apparatus.	Experimentation with noises, tones, tastes, colours, forms, etc.
(*b*) With the motor apparatus.	Movement of its own body, moving plays, destructive and constructive plays, throwing plays.
(*c*) Playful use of the higher mental powers.	
1. Experimentation with the mental powers, memory, imagination.	Illusion and recognition plays; imaginary tales, etc.
2. Experimentation with the feelings (physical pain, mental suffering, surprise, fear).	Games involving tests of endurance, pain; tales involving surprises and perils, dangerous situations, etc.
3. Experimentation with the will.	Experimentation or play involving control of reflex actions or of habits.

II. Playful exercise of impulses of the second or socionomic order; (*a*) fighting plays (physical and mental tests, rivalry, teasing, hunting plays, etc.); (*b*) love plays; (*c*) imitative play (imitation of movements, dramatic imitation, constructive imitation, and inner or artistic imitation); (*d*) social play.

As to *imitation*, it also, like play, is a universal tendency in normal childhood,[1] and indeed in all young animal life; both imitation and play differ, as Groos points out (*op. cit.* p. 2), from ordinary instincts, in the fact that they have not a specific stimulus, or a specific reaction, but are called out by any kind of stimulus, and involve a reaction which varies with the stimulus calling them out. The essential conditions of imitation are (1) some sort of interest (*rapport*), by which the attention of the young animal is caught and held by an older animal; (2) the perception of some movement in the older animal; (3) the experience of some reflex or inborn tendency towards the same movement in the young. Thus imitation is always based partly on innate powers, partly on the social conditions, and partly also on the development of the senses and powers of perception. There is a gradual change in childhood (*a*) in the type of objects or persons whom the child seeks to imitate, in the interest which it feels for different personalities,

[1] Idiot children, as a rule, neither play nor imitate (Sollier, *Psychol. de l'idiot et de l'imbécile*[2], Paris, 1901, ch. 5).

and the attraction of its attention by them; (*b*) in the complexity of the actions imitated; (*c*) in the fidelity of the imitation, the earlier actions being more limited and more faithful copies, the later being more spontaneous, original, and dramatic in their form (cf. the development of children's ideals with age in Earl Barnes, *Studies in Education*, ii. [1902], and a recent study by Varendonck, in *Arch. de psych.*, no. xxviii., July 1908). The biological function of imitation is, like that of play, to prepare the individual for adult life, while he is being protected from the dangers that might otherwise lie in acquiring such experience. The child, imitating its parents, its teachers, or its friends, acquires the habits of expression and of action which they already have, and also—a more important matter—acquires their habits of emotion, their mental attitudes. Imitation thus becomes a form of heredity, replacing physical heredity, bringing the same advantages more rapidly, and at less cost. The child tends through it to resemble its parents, not only physically but also mentally (Baldwin, *Mental Development*, p. 332 ff.).

5. The original activities.—The child is born with a complex nervous structure, by which adequate response is provided to a large number of stimuli from the environment, in the form of reflex, automatic, and instinctive actions. Some of these actions are carried out before consciousness, and therefore, presumably, before mind is present, or at least active; and even in later development we still find that a large part of the work of the body is carried on reflexly or automatically, and without the intervention of consciousness. The question arises as to the relation between consciousness on the one hand, and reflex activity on the other, in development. It is still sometimes argued that consciousness has no biological function, and that the whole mental development is simply a result of, and therefore sequent to, the bodily and cerebral development itself, which in its turn is determined by purely physiological and physical forces. H. Ziegler, A. Bethe, J. Loeb, J. P. Nuel, and other 'modernists' in Comparative Psychology would entirely exclude the use of consciousness (not merely the word, but the thing) from biology. On the other side, it is held that consciousness is, or exercises, a controlling power by which the reflexes present, or provided for, at birth are organized into higher combinations, and modified on the ground of experience (Lloyd Morgan, *Introd. to Comp. Psychol.*, ch. 11, London, 1894; *Animal Behaviour*, London, 1900); and, again, that the reflex actions themselves are a product of conscious effort in the ancestors of the individual (Wundt, *Physiol. Psychol.*[5], Leipzig, 1903, iii. 278 ff.). Thus consciousness or mind is now and has been in the past the main force making not merely for mental, but also for physical development and evolution. There is a law of economy by which every action, as it is repeated, becomes less and less of a conscious action, until in the end it may be purely automatic; the value of this is that the energy of consciousness, or the physical energy underlying consciousness, is thereby set free for other activities; wherever an action is resisted, or is prevented by any cause from issuing in its ordinary way, there consciousness is immediately present; wherever a new circumstance arises which requires a different reaction from any provided by the reflex or automatic systems, there again consciousness arises; on the other hand, the less resistance there is the smoother the action, the more familiar the situation the less is consciousness directed towards it. Consciousness thus represents the 'growing point' of the organism; correlated with it are changes in the central nervous system, and in the body as a whole, which ultimately become the basis of organized intelligence and will (cf. J. Jastrow, *The Subconscious*, London, 1906, pt. 2).

The special activities and powers involved in the process of mental development may be classified as follows: (1) the physiological reflex actions; (2) the sense-organs, sensations, and sensory reflexes; (3) perception, in relation to the primary attention-reflexes; (4) instinctive behaviour; (5) feelings and emotions; (6) will; (7) memory, its conditions and varieties; (8) imagery and imagery types; (9) language and abstract thought.

(1) *Physiological reflexes* are those connected with the circulation of the blood, the respiration, the digestion, and other processes of bodily metabolism; of these it is not necessary to treat in this connexion, since they are entirely removed from the control of the child's consciousness, except so far as they are liable to modification by emotion, to which reference will be made later. These processes take place at a much more rapid rate in the infant than in the adult.

'The metabolic activities of the infant are more pronounced than those of the adult, for the sake, not so much of energies which are spent on the world without, as of energies which are for a while buried in the rapidly increasing mass of flesh.' It is 'a metabolism directed largely to constructive ends' (M. Foster, *Text-book of Physiology*[5], 1891, p. 1544).

(2) *Sensations.*—The normal child is provided at birth with the external apparatus for all classes of sensation, and these are connected, through nerve fibres, with the central organs in the brain; but, as has been remarked above, this connexion is not functionally complete for a considerable time after birth. The child at first is deaf, is 'light-shy,' is insensitive to odours, and to a large extent to taste, so that the sense of touch and perhaps the muscular sense are the only ones which at birth show certain indications of activity. According to the tests which have been made, the sensitiveness in general increases very rapidly in the first few years, reaching its maximum development probably about the 10th year, after which there is a decline in sensitiveness proper, although the power of discrimination remains capable of great improvement thereafter (J. A. Gilbert, *Studies from Yale Psychol. Lab.*, 1893, 1894; E. Meumann, i. 102 ff.). The sensorial reaction-time also improves in rate during the first 10 or 12 years of life, after which there is, apart from special training, a gradual dulling. The different qualities of each sense become capable of discrimination in a regular succession, which, according to some observers, follows that of their supposed evolution in the race.

The development of visual sensation may be taken as an illustration of the problem and of the obstacles to its solution. There is very great difficulty in determining whether a child has or has not a power to perceive and distinguish different colours. Even where speech is appealed to, the results are by no means conclusive. The earliest attempt to determine the order in which the different visual sensations are arrived at was that of Preyer in 1882 (*op. cit. infra*, ch. 1). The tests were begun in the third quarter of the second year of life, and continued to the fourth year. He found that the colours yellow and red were those which were most constantly and accurately named, or picked out when the names were given, while green and blue came last; by the beginning of the 4th year the child could name all but the very dark or light shades correctly. With a similar method Miss Shinn (*op. cit. infra*) found that her subject (a little girl) was successfully trained to name all the colours correctly, before the end of the second year. By a special method, appealing to the preference of the child, as shown by its selection of one from a pair of colours, Baldwin (*Mental Development*, pp. 39, 50) concluded that a child of 9 months can distinguish all the colours, and has a distinct preference for blue. The above were individual studies. From a thorough collective test on children, boys and girls, from birth to 7 years, by a 'matching' method, Garbini (*Arch. per l'antrop.* xxiv., Florence, 1894) concluded that a child begins to develop the power of discrimination between *light* and *dark* during the first month of life; and to distinguish different objects by their shade or brightness in the second month; it is not till the middle of the second year that he has any perception of colour, and then it is *red* which is first marked out; *green* begins to be added about the end of the second year, and *yellow* in the

course of the third year, while it is not till the fourth that he can distinguish such colours as *orange, blue, violet*, etc. In the fifth year the different shades of the same colour become easily distinguished, but the colour vision is still relatively imperfect until the end of the sixth year. Thus the order of development is red, green, yellow; then orange, blue, and violet. With regard to the power of naming, he found that 2 per cent of the children in their sixth year cannot name any colour, and that only 35 per cent can name the six main colours given above; the power to name a colour accurately seems to follow, in about a year's space, the power to distinguish the colour in question. Ziegler, in 1905 (*Inaugural Dissertation*, Zürich, n.d., but c. 1905), tried, with more accurate methods, to determine the degree of colour sensibility in 200 children, one half boys and one half girls, at the age of beginning school life in the Munich schools. The 'matching' method gave a distinct preference in accuracy of matching to *orange, violet, blue*, and *yellow* in that order, *red, grey*, and *green* being relatively less accurately matched. *Black* and *white* were invariably correctly placed. It does not, of course, follow that the order of correctness in matching corresponds to the order of development; on the contrary, it may be concluded that the colours were preferred on account of their æsthetic value, their novelty, etc. In the naming method (the child giving the name) the order of correctness was *black, white, red, blue, green, yellow*, with *violet* and *orange* last; the darker shades of colour on the whole were better named than the lighter, presumably because they were more familiar to the children; none of the boys could name *orange*, and only 5 per cent of the girls. Every one of the tests employed brought out the fact, already suggested by other observers, that girls have a much more accurate sense of colour than boys. Neither Garbini nor Ziegler found that any one of the children they examined was colour-blind (in a total of 750); in adults, as is well known, colour-blindness occurs much more frequently among men than among women; in the former case the frequency is variously given as from 1 to 5 per cent. It is probable that by properly devised means of training, the colour sense of children might be greatly developed, and thereby their general mental capacity greatly improved.

(3) The development of *perception* from sensation takes place through the exercise of the sensory reflexes, which play a large part in the process of attention. Thus a child does not at first see objects either as clearly, as distinctly, or as proportionately as the adult. In the earlier months it sees no colours, but only light and shade; it has no means of determining the distance at which any seen object is; it is unable to fix an object so as to obtain a clear image of its outlines and details; it is unable to determine, and indeed has no conception of, the third dimension; objects are probably seen as blotches of light and shade merely; it has no power of distinguishing a real from a reflected or imaged object; in short, it can hardly be said to have any perceptual or object-consciousness at all, through sight (Preyer, *op. cit.* ch. I). All these powers are gradually acquired through exercise and the resulting co-ordination of the movements of the eyes with the visual sensations. The three sets of muscles in question are those of *accommodation*, by which the object is clearly focused; of *fixation*, by which the object is brought into the centre of the retina—the part of the eye which is most sensitive to form as well as to colour; and of *convergence*, by which binocular vision is determined, and the two eyes are guided so as to obtain single vision of solid objects. These co-ordinations are only acquired, as has been said, through exercise; and it is therefore extremely important that a child should be given all possible opportunities of exercising its ocular muscles from the very first. It is interest—*instinctive* interest in the first place—that calls forth movements; and, where objects of interest are not presented, the exercise fails to take place. This is an illustration of the importance of environment in deciding development.

The following gives some idea of the dates at which these powers are finally achieved, according to Preyer and others (cf. Kirkpatrick, *op. cit. infra*, ch. 4). The protective reflex closing of the eyes when bright light falls upon them is present almost immediately after birth; also the pupillary reflex (adaptation to increase or decrease of light); the blinking reflex, when an object is brought close to the eye, is not immediately present, but occurs after a few weeks; atypic or independent movements of the two eyes and the eyelids (*e.g.* one eye remaining fixed while the other moves, or the eyes being turned downwards while the eyelids remain fixed) occur occasionally until the beginning of the second month; voluntary fixation is not complete until about the end of the first quarter year; voluntary and accurate convergence according to the distance of objects is not perfect even before the end of the second year; the interpretation of visual impressions and their co-ordination with bodily movements are not established till much later.

This history really describes the origin of the visual perceptions of space in the child; the question whether the idea of space is innate or acquired is impossible to answer, because it is wrongly put. The child is not born with a ready-made idea of space which it merely applies to experiences derived from the senses (Kant), but neither is its idea of space a product of sensations and of associations formed between the images derived from the sensations: it is a result of inter-action between sensations, feelings and desires, impulses and movements, to which in each case the 'disposition' is congenital, but which are only realized and combined through the acquired experience of the child (cf. Wundt's 'psychic synthesis,' and Stumpf's 'synergy'). The evidence from the born-blind, who have been enabled, by an operation, to see in later life, is conflicting. It does not prove that they at first see only colours and brightness, not things or objects, as Preyer argues. It is true, however, that they are entirely unable to appreciate distance (see B. Bourdon, *La Perception visuelle de l'espace*, Paris, 1902, ch. 13, for a complete account of these observations, up to that date). A similar 'synergy' of sensations, feelings, and attention-reflexes goes to form the tactual perceptions (extent, hardness and softness, sharpness and bluntness, etc.) and the auditory perceptions (rhythm, tone-interval, melody, speech, etc.).

(4) An *instinctive action* is a response evoked in direct relation to a perception of some kind, while a reflex action is called out by a simple sensation or by a purely physiological stimulus. The difference is mainly one of degree, although there is undoubtedly a much greater power of control, and liability to modification on the ground of experience, in the instinctive than in the reflex action (see discussion on 'Instinct and Intelligence' in *Brit. Journ. of Psychol.* iii. pt. 3 [1910] by Myers, Lloyd Morgan, Carr, Stout, and Macdougall). The following is a classification of the instincts shown by the child, modified from that given by E. A. Kirkpatrick (ch. 4): (1) individual instincts; (2) social, including (*a*) the gregarious instinct, the instinct to *be* with others, (*b*) the co-operative instinct, to *act* with others, (*c*) play, (*d*) imitation, (*e*) expression and communication, and (*f*) more complex instincts such as the collective, destructive, and creative instincts. Such an instinct implies three things: a need on the part of the child (organic sensation, feeling, impulse), an object capable of satisfying this need, and some consciousness on the part of the child of the meaning of the object in relation to the want or need. It is the want or the interest which determines the direction of the attention towards the object. Thus the child's whole interest is absorbed at first by the needs of food and of rest; its grasping and food-taking instincts are the first to express themselves; the giver of food, and articles used in connexion with its food, are the first objects which it learns to distinguish and recognize; later the needs of its sense-development cause interest in objects for the mere sensations they give, bright lights and colours, loud noises and musical tones, etc. At this stage the instinct of play appears, especially of experimentation play and of movement play. In its early years the child is naturally self-centred; it is biologically of advantage to the race that the individualist instincts should be strong at this time. Accordingly, its wants are strongly expressed and vigorously insisted upon. Yet there is no conscious idea of the self, as opposed in interest to other persons, until from the fourth or fifth year, when selfishness in the strict sense of the word begins to appear, controlled, however, by the equally instinctive desire for social approval. The constant desire of the normal child to be with others, especially other children, his shyness towards strange elders, but ready acceptance as playmates of other children, about his own age, seen for the first time; his eagerness to accompany the adults of his family in all their goings and in all their activities; his constant repetition of the

actions of adults in his play; his treatment of animal pets, younger children, dolls, etc.—are illustrations of the force of the social instincts and of their part in the development of the social consciousness. Later, the individualist and social instincts combine in (i.) the impulse of self-display, adornment, etc.; (ii.) the impulse to co-operate with others for common ends, in games, or in school and household or farm work; (iii.) the impulse of competition and rivalry, which tends to the rapid development of the physical and mental powers; (iv.) with expanding imagination, the sympathetic feelings arise, and the impulse to help, to defend, to support others, which reaches its height in the unselfish idealism of adolescence. The progressive appearance of these instincts, as also those of play, imitation, emotional expression and speech, determines a gradual change in the interests of the child, and this in its turn reacts upon its intelligence and character. (On the development of *instinct*, and its relation to *interest*, etc., see Kirkpatrick and E. Claparède, *opp. citt.*)

(5) *Feelings and emotions.*—It has been recognized that the affective life of the child is proportionally much more extensive than that of the adult; as judged at any rate by his expressions, the child's feelings are both more vivid and less enduring than those of the adult; impressions when they reach consciousness at all are felt more keenly and are responded to more actively and strongly. This is true both of pleasures and of pains. On the other hand, the feelings are not so permanent; the child passes rapidly from one mood of feeling to its opposite—from laughter to tears, from anger to pity. It may be questioned, however, whether the actual feelings are as strong as they appear.

Preyer has argued that the child's life is one of intense feeling, and that in it pain predominates over pleasure, being in fact the necessary stimulus to development; against this it may be urged: (*a*) that the feelings are not in general intense, but that their apparent expression is really an instinctive or reflex act, which is not accompanied by so many internal changes as occur in adult life, and hence is not reflected in the conscious life to the same extent as in the adult; (*b*) that, owing to the short duration of the feelings and other factors, pleasure predominates largely over pain even in the youngest child, with normal health; and (*c*) that pleasure is a stronger driving force than pain in development, as in evolution. The general happiness of healthy children, their constant play and activity, their capacity for deep and prolonged sleep, are all indications that this is the truer view of the case. Many signs also—their easy recovery from wounds, rapid forgetfulness of injury, etc.—prove that the young child has a much lower degree of sensibility to physical pain than the adult.

A full description of the expressions of the different feelings and emotions, as observed in the child from birth onwards, is to be found in Preyer, ch. 6. The classical account, for animals and man alike, is Darwin's *Expression of the Emotions* (London, 1872). That even so complex expressions as laughter and blushing are congenital, and not acquired by imitation, is shown in Sir A. Mitchell's *About Dreaming, Laughing, and Blushing* (Edin. and London, 1905). Such facts do not, however, solve the question whether the 'expression' is called out by an actual feeling, or whether the feeling is the reverberation in consciousness of the expression, which it thus succeeds in time, and which is directly evoked by the perception of the situation (Lange-James theory). The latter, at least, is probably true genetically.

An interesting question is as to whether the child has *innate* fears or dislikes of particular objects; for example, fear of the dark, of wind and storms, of animals, etc.; or whether these fears can be reduced to the simpler ones, viz. those of intense stimuli, of novel stimuli, or the like; or whether they are due to adult suggestion. Stanley Hall attributes such fears to reminiscences, emerging in the child, of the experience of its ancestors at far distant dates, by whom, for example, dark was feared because of the animals and enemies attacking in it; so, wind and storms were feared during the tree-life of man's ancestry, while wild animals in the same way must have been to primitive man, as to the still more remote ancestors, objects of terror. It must be said, however, that the evidence for such instinctive fears of definite objects or classes of objects is by no means convincing (cf. Stanley Hall, *Adolescence*, vol. ii. ch. 10, which contains a general statement of the author's position; the detailed evidence in regard to child-emotions is collected in numerous reports, by himself and his collaborators, published in the *Pedagogical Seminary* and in *AJPs*).

(6) *Development of the will.*—The outward life of the child begins, as we have seen, in reflex, instinctive, and automatic activity undetermined by conscious motives, although in many of the more complex forms an accompanying or controlling consciousness must be supposed to exist. The term 'impulse' may be used for those phases of the mind by which such actions are preceded, or which they accompany; such an impulse does not involve any idea of the nature of the action to be done, or of more than the immediate means by which it is to be brought about. Thus the impulse to expel an unpleasant food, or *any* food when the child is satiated, does not involve any idea of the advantage to the organism which the expulsion brings, or of the muscular actions by which it is carried out; but there probably is some consciousness of the position of the food in the mouth, and the parts of the tongue touched by it, etc., and it is by this sensation that the action is definitely initiated; it is probably only at a later stage that the muscular sensations themselves become conscious. The impulse, then, is simply the motor aspect of a sensation which is toned with feeling, positive or negative, the action itself lying as a whole outside consciousness. Such impulses may be supposed to accompany all those actions by which the organism is in early life protected from dangerous stimulation, and by which objects of advantage to it are brought towards the body, into the mouth, etc.; thus these impulses are always in connexion with some need of the organism, either prolonged as in the case of hunger, or momentary as in the case of physical pain. A second stage of development is arrived at when (*a*) the individual begins to select stimuli or sensations on the basis of personal interest, built up by experiences; (*b*) when memory occurs of the movements by which these sensations have been automatically or reflexly responded to; and (*c*) when, under the influence of the subjective combination and synthesis of sensations in perception, the movements also begin to be co-ordinated and controlled. This is the stage at which impulse begins to be replaced by motived action, that is to say, by *will* in some at least of its lower forms.

(*a*) The selection of sensations is at first provided for by the needs of the organism, as has been indicated above, and in this sense *will*, as Höffding suggests (e.g. *Problems of Philosophy*, Eng. tr., N.Y. 1905, p. 55, *Outlines of Psychol.*, Eng. tr., Lond. 1891, sect. 4), is the fundamental fact in mental life, and is present from the very beginning; later, however, and very early in life, the selection begins to be determined on the ground of previous experience; that is to say, the child begins to seek out those impressions which have previously given it pleasure, and not merely to react upon impressions that have arrived of themselves. Correlatively with this, it begins to avoid consciously those impressions which have been already experienced as painful, and also to neglect or inhibit impressions which have proved indifferent to it, not being accompanied by any positive or negative feeling tone. In this development *perception* gradually arises through the combination of sensations of the same or different classes with each other, or with sub-conscious memory images; in this way one impression gradually becomes a sign or symbol of a number of others, and especially the visual impressions come to represent or stand for the tactual impressions to which they had ordinarily led, and which may be reproduced to some slight extent in memory, on the arrival of the visual impressions themselves.[1] The pleasure or pain originally attached to the *direct* impression is now

[1] On this, see W. James, *Principles of Psychology*, 1891, vol. ii. chs. 17 on 'Sensation,' 19 on 'The Perception of Things,' and esp. 20 on 'The Perception of Space.'

transferred to the *indirect*, as when the child shows pleasure at the sight of a rattle, after experience of the agreeable noise which the rattle gives in its hands, or shows pleasure at the sight of its food, before the actual tasting of it. It is unnecessary that conscious memory of the former experience should arise, and in the vast majority of cases such memory probably does not arise; there is simply a transfer of feeling, and in consequence a transfer of action from a direct impression to a more indirect one uniformly connected with the former. It is in the case of these indirect impressions that interest gradually develops, and that conscious and individual selection begins to take place.

(*b*) The movements themselves enter consciousness partly as muscular and tactual experiences,[1] partly also as visual experiences—in the case of those movements which the child can see itself carrying out. As soon as the memory begins to be able to 'fixate' such consciousness, the child learns to modify its actions, or to choose between various possible actions, in response to sensations, through remembering the success or failure of the previous reactions.

(*c*) In the co-ordination of movements there are two steps—the inhibition of unessential movements, and the reinforcement and connecting together of series of necessary movements. Reflex action is excessive, uneconomical, and generally contains a large number of movements not required for the removal of the particular stimulus (H. Ebbinghaus, *Grundzüge der Psychol.*, pt. i., Leipzig, 1897, p. 124); for example, the movements of a young child when irritated by a pin in its clothing. With the development of perception, the movements become more limited, are brought more under the control of consciousness, until in a particular case the necessary act is carried out in the shortest time, and with the minimum of effort. It must be supposed that in this case the *impulse* has come to be associated with the special action, which has been constantly repeated in every experience of the kind; while those actions which were unessential, and therefore were not repeated, or not always repeated, are less firmly connected with the impulse, and become finally detached from it. Corresponding with this limitation in simpler cases, there is the forming of chain actions, or series of actions, in more complex cases—for example, in learning to walk; the several movements necessary have come, through exercise and through conscious effort, to be gradually cemented to each other, so that later, without conscious effort, the one tends to follow the other in the same order as that in which they were acquired (see Preyer, ch. 11). Consciousness still retains a grasp, as it were, of the whole group of movements, as is shown when any resistance is met, or any error occurs; but it does so only in a general way, covering a larger and larger span in its grasp, as skill and practice increase (J. Jastrow, *op. cit.*, chs. 3 and 4).

The terms 'habit' and 'practice' refer to the forming and cementing of such co-ordinations. When out of several possible ways of doing a thing, or of acting, *one* has actually been adopted, then, if the situation is repeated, the former action *tends* to be adopted again, merely from the fact of its earlier occurrence. The same is true of a connexion or series of actions. The greater the number of times the action has been done, the stronger the tendency to repeat it. This is *habit*, the primary and universal condition of all mental development. Since will consists, as we have seen, in selective activity, it is formally opposed to habit; but, in reality, neither it nor any other higher mental power is possible except on the basis of habit. Walking, running, listening, looking, smelling, tasting, dressing, speaking, and hundreds of other skilled actions, which form elementary parts of more complex, voluntary, and deliberate actions, are in us habitual acts become unconscious and mechanical through repetition. Adults and children differ widely in the rapidity with which a habit is formed, in the tenacity with which it is retained, and in the promptness with which it is exercised. With age the power to form new habits slowly declines, and also the power to resist or overcome habits when formed. To some extent this is due to the decreasing vitality of the nervous system, but mainly to the fact that habit corresponds to the organizing of connexions between different parts of the cerebral system: the greater the number of these, and the greater their strength or firmness through repetition, the less the likelihood of a new associative connexion being formed or old ones broken up (see James, *op. cit.*, ch. 4; Ebbinghaus, *Grundzüge der Psychol.*, pt. ii., Leipzig, 1902, p. 672). The development of the will is also conditioned by the general changes both in the intensity of *feelings* and in the objects to which they attach. At first, as we have seen, the child's feelings are entirely determined by its organic needs; later, repetition and instinctive experimentation and play bring new experiences of pleasure and of pain, not so directly connected with the requirements of the organism; the objects of such feelings are retained in memory, and the thought of them, or the perception of them, forms new motives of action; the actions are governed by ideal rather than by direct sensory motives. (On the development and influence of feeling, see T. Ziegler, *Das Gefühl*, Stuttgart, 1893.)

The most direct indication of the nature of an individual's will is to be found in the characteristics of his *attention* (*q.v.*). Neither will nor attention, however, is to be regarded as a *general* power, which can be directed indifferently upon this or that impression or action, or can be moved from one to the other. They are simply general names for a class of particular phenomena, which possess certain features in common. The characteristic of acts of attention is that a part of the field of consciousness is selected from the rest, becoming clear and distinct, persisting longer than it otherwise would, and thereby becoming more adequately known, and tending to realize itself more effectively in action. The means by which this change is effected are either *external*, as when the senses are focused upon the impression, irrelevant movements inhibited, and the like; or *internal*, as when convergent associate ideas are called up from past experience. The underlying conditions are the intensity of the impression or idea itself, the strength of the interest to which it corresponds, the feeling aroused, and the development of the muscular system by which the focusing or 'fixating' and controlling of impressions is effected. In all these respects the child undergoes a gradual development. A distinction is familiarly drawn between *spontaneous* or natural, and *voluntary* or acquired, attention; the former is supposed to be characteristic of the child, the latter a product of education.[1] These are not, however, differences in attention itself; they are differences only in the interests which lie behind the act of attention.

Thus interests are either *primary*—those provided by the innate instincts of the child—or *secondary*—those due to the acquired experience and reflexion which life and education call out.

[1] On the whole question of the nature of our consciousness of movement, and its function in mental development, see Wundt, *op. cit.* ii. 474 f., 536 f., iii. 307 f.

[1] Th. Ribot, *Psychol. of Attention*, Eng. tr., N.Y. 1889 ([3]Chicago, 1896).

It is, therefore, natural that voluntary attention to objects which are primarily without interest in themselves should succeed the more elementary expressions of attention in child life. It is also clear that, where an individual is incapable of prolonged primary attention, he will be incapable of the education which voluntary attention presupposes. This occurs, for example, both in idiot and in imbecile children, and to a certain extent causes typical differences between normal individuals also. Wherever, owing to the weakness or disease of the brain or nervous system, sensation is less vivid, or movement less rapid and less vigorous, or instincts and feelings less strong, there the attention will be correspondingly difficult to catch or to hold, with resulting defect in mental development. Ability to work for continuous spells, and ability to profit by discipline, to appreciate rewards and punishments, depend mainly upon the power to focus and retain impressions long enough to associate them with one another, and to compare them with similar experiences in the past.[1]

A second typical difference in attention is that between *concentration* and *distribution*; the term 'concentration' refers to the effect which attention usually has of narrowing or limiting consciousness, or at least effective consciousness, to some small portion of a real or ideal situation; the mind is absorbed by some particular interest, and impressions or ideas that would otherwise have stimulated feeling and action are kept on the verge of consciousness, or entirely repressed. The familiar illustrations of absence of mind on the part of men of genius will readily occur as an instance. Concentration or specialization is thus a condition of effective mental progress. 'Distribution' of attention, on the other hand, refers to the power to appreciate and attend to a number of *diverse* impressions or ideas simultaneously; it is in many respects a valuable power, as, for example, in the teacher, who must, while his main attention is given to his subject, also have regard to the positions and actions of the different children in the class; the conductor of a choir, the director of an orchestra, and the organizer generally, are other instances of the same ability. It is immaterial, for our present purpose, whether there is any real division of attention in a given moment, or whether distribution depends rather on rapid alternations of the attention from one fact to another. In the normal individual, concentration and distribution are inverse to one another; the greater the one, the less the other. But concentration does not necessarily mean intensity, nor does distribution necessarily mean that the different impressions attended to at the moment are ineffectively appreciated. It obviously depends upon education and training to what extent distribution can be carried. Children, and animals also, show great concentration where the primary instincts are involved, but defective concentration in the case of secondary interests; one of the chief problems of the teacher is to increase the concentration-value of the latter. Some children are never able to acquire this power to the normal extent, and in consequence remain all their lives an easy prey to distraction.

A third typical difference is in the *steadiness* or *fluctuation* of the attention. Meumann uses the term 'fixating attention' for the former of these types; it is that which is able to keep away side impressions and ideas, and to take in only the impressions that are directly before it; in this way it represents an *objective*, observing, recording type of mind: thus a picture, a sentence, any group of materials, when attended to, is appreciated *as it is*.

[1] Sollier, *loc. cit.*

The 'fluctuating' type, on the other hand, is liable to be caught both by sensory impressions and by memories or ideas which are not directly connected with the object presented; hence it tends to transform the material given to it, taking a superficial outline view, passing rapidly from the object to its meaning or associations: it is a *subjective* or imaginative type. In childhood the latter is much more frequent, and, in fact, may be regarded as a characteristic child form of attention; the power to see or hear things as they are is one which has to be acquired by education (Meumann, i. 499 ff.).

(7) *Memory.*—In memory, three phases or functions must be distinguished—immediate memory (as illustrated by 'learning by heart'), retention, and reproduction or recognition; these three phases are subject to different conditions, and vary independently of each other in different individuals, and at different stages of mental development. *Immediate memory* has been shown to improve steadily with age (as tested, for example, by the number of syllables or words which can be reproduced after a single exposure, or by the length of time required to learn a given number of syllables or words by heart), and Meumann has found that even into late adult life this capacity is capable of great improvement through practice.[1] The method of memorizing also changes with age, the young child depending entirely on mechanical association between the different members of the series tested, the adult depending more and more upon associations of meaning, upon rhythm and other forms of grouping. On the other hand, *retentiveness*, as measured by the rate of forgetting, or the amount forgotten after a given interval, reaches its maximum about the 10th or 12th year of life, and decreases slowly but steadily from that time onwards (E. Meumann, *Exper. Pädagogik*, i. 170 f., and esp. p. 192). That is to say, young children have greater difficulty in *learning* than older children; with practice an individual may improve in this faculty almost, if not quite, up to middle age; at the same time, children *retain* what they have learned for a longer time and more accurately than the adult under the same conditions. The fact that memories which go back to early childhood (earlier than the 5th year) are relatively rare, the fact that children who have become deaf before the 5th year tend to lose the power of speech they may already have acquired (from the lapse of the auditory memories, and inability to acquire new auditory impressions), that children who have become blind before the 5th year, and even to some extent up to the 7th year, rapidly lose their visual memories, and rarely, if ever, in after life have visual dreams, and the corresponding phenomena in the case of amputated limbs (J. Jastrow, W. James [see M. de Manacéine, *Sleep*, London, 1897, ch. 4])—all these facts correspond accurately with the incomplete development of the cerebral connexions before the end of the 5th year. Finally, *reproduction*, that is, the rate, accuracy, and fertility of association and of voluntary memory, in which there are strong individual differences, tends to improve with age and with practice continuously up to about the 50th year.

A much-debated question is how far training or practice in one field of memory is transferable to another—a question closely connected with that as to whether memory is a general power or faculty, or simply a combination of particular experiences which are somehow stored in the brain of the individual. In the latter case it is obvious that memorizing any particular material, while it in-

[1] In the general improvement there are occasional retardations, *e.g.* at the age of 10 to 12 (girls) and 12 to 14 (boys). Girls are in advance of boys till about 16, when the latter overtake and pass them. It is said that the young profit less than adults from practice, but that any gain is more permanent.

creases the amount we are able to recall, and through association of ideas makes it easier to learn *similar* material, still does not add to our stock in any other field, or help us to acquire such more easily. Exercising the visual memory improves that memory itself, but does not improve the auditive memory, without special practice in it also. The greater number of observers decide against such transfer of improvement, or the possibility or value of 'formal training'; on the other hand, some recent studies (Meumann, Winch, etc.) seem to show that a very substantial gain can actually be transferred, whatever the interpretation of it may be. The interpretation to which most of the facts point is a training of the *attention*, that is, of the nerve-centres and muscles which are involved in the accurate and ready uptake of an impression, and its retention in the field of observation; and those muscles also by which the control or suppression of distracting impressions, and the reinforcement of associative impressions, are carried out. Such capacities can undoubtedly be transferred—for example, from one kind of *visual* material to any other—and, as the experiments show that the transfer is greatest with a material similar to that in which the improvement has been actually acquired, this entirely harmonizes with the above suggestion. The practical conclusions are: (*a*) that much of what a child learns at school and afterwards forgets is not necessarily pure loss—the exercise in learning is to a great extent at least transferable to later occupations; (*b*) the use of purely mechanical and meaningless materials, for the formal exercise of the senses, and especially of the memory, seems to be 'indicated' as a pedagogical method by the experimental results.

(8) *Imagery and imagery types.*—Fechner, Galton, Charcot, and other more recent observers have given ample evidence that individuals in adult life differ widely, and in certain typical forms, as regards the sensorial material in which their 'thinking' is carried on; the *visualist* dealing mainly in images derived from optical experiences; the *auditive* in images of sound derived from acoustic experiences; and the *kinæsthetic* or *motor* type in images, memories, or even 'nascent sensations' repeating the tactual and muscular experiences of the past. 'Thinking,' however, has two broadly different senses, according as it means *picture-thinking*, as in reverie, or *word-thinking*, as in abstract reasoning or scientific work. Much of our important thinking is done by means of words as signs or representatives of experiences, without employing the actual memory pictures of the experiences themselves. The majority of individuals are probably of a mixed type, both for picture and even perhaps for verbal thinking; but the enormous predominance of visual experiences in our lives compels all of us to use visual memories to a large extent, while the methods of school teaching, and the necessary use of the ears and vocal muscles in speech, render most of us of an acoustic-motile type in word-thinking. Again, the majority of individuals are probably unable to give to their favourite field of imagination such an exclusive exercise or training as is necessary to develop purity of type; a boy who is articled to an architect, and who is by nature an auditive, must cultivate visualizing or fail in his profession. It seems to be proved that in children, perhaps owing to the method of education, auditive imagery predominates in the early years, but is more and more displaced in importance by visual imagery as age increases; again, that even in the case of visual imagery the vividness and 'warmth' of imagery decrease with age; thus, according to one report (Miss Calkins) at least 9 per cent of students have very little or no colour imagery; while in the average scientist, according to Galton, the power of visualizing appears to have been entirely lost; abstract thought tends to weaken imagery—in other words, verbal tends to replace picture- or object-thinking. The following are some of the indications by which the type of a given individual can be determined with some degree of accuracy; at the same time they illustrate the functioning of the different characteristics.

(1) The object-type can be determined by observing to what extent the descriptions of visual scenes in literature are realized by the individual, or dialogues and conversations in plays and novels (auditive), or the extent to which deeds and feats of skill reverberate, so to speak, in the individual's organism in reading accounts of them; and how far organic sensations and memories accompany the reading or the hearing of affecting or emotional passages in literature, etc.; also by the trade or occupation which is preferred by an individual, his hobbies, the kind of games, physical and mental, in which he indulges, his tastes in art or in literature, and especially his creative powers in these fields.

(2) The verbal type is indicated: (*a*) by the way in which an individual sets about learning by heart a poem or passage in a book; whether he does so by frequently repeating the passage over, aloud or half aloud (*kinæsthetic*), or whether he translates the printed words into inner speech (*auditive*), or learns it by steadily fixing the eyes upon it and reading it over (*visualist*); in the last case the subject is usually able accurately to refer to the page in the book, when recalling the passage, seeing it printed up before his mental vision; he can readily find the passage in a book where he has left off reading, and can refer for any desired passage to the page on which it occurs. (*b*) The various slips that are made in speaking or writing are good indications of whether the subject is thinking in auditive or in visual words, the former confusing words with a similar sound, the latter confusing words with a similar appearance. (*c*) In syllables or meaningless material, the visualist retains the consonants more accurately, the auditive the vowels: and again the visualist's errors tend to be those of omission, while the auditive's tend to be errors of order or of position. (*d*) The visualist can with great ease read backwards a series of impressions laid to heart, since they are, as it were, printed up before his mind, while the auditive or kinæsthetic has great, or at least greater, difficulty in doing the same; the one takes a short, the other a long time to accomplish the feat, if it is possible at all. (*e*) Segal (*Arch. f. d. gesamte Psychol.* xii. [1908]) adds the following signs: the visualist frequently shuts his eyes and covers them when recalling a memory: his recall is slower than that of the auditive; usually the latter remembers the material in groups, while the visualist remembers parts singly and separately. But visualists retain poetry or prose more accurately than others, and do not repeat parts already given, while auditives and kinæsthetics reproduce more rapidly, but in less quantity, and often with unconscious repetitions. When he does not repeat the material in its proper order, it is with the last few words or syllables that the auditive begins; and when the task is accomplished, the material as a rule disappears at once out of his memory, unless he re-learns it frequently.

In regard to the importance of these differences for mental development, it should be remembered that the question is never one of an exclusive use of a single class of imagery; it is merely a question of the predominance of one over others; but occasionally there occur cases in which one or other form of imagery is completely lacking. Normally, however, every one is both an object-thinker and a word-thinker, at different times, and uses in the former case alike visual, auditive, and motor imagery. Nevertheless, it is true that in children object-thinking predominates greatly over verbal thinking until about the age of 14, when, in civilized life, word-thinking begins to occupy a larger space: thus, when a child under 14 is reading or listening to speech, it tends to fill out the meaning of the words, to 'body' them out concretely in its mind, to a much greater extent than the adult does. It has been pointed out that, while the majority of adults are visualists in object-thinking, the majority are also acoustic-motile in word-thinking. Children probably use a greater variety of kinds of imagery than adults. Nevertheless, it will be found that in mental work one of the classes or forms predominates over the others. Since education appeals increasingly to visual perception, it follows that a child whose natural type is the auditive one has little opportunity of perfecting this type till after school-life is over; hence in general the type is uncertain until the age of 16

or so. There is throughout a higher prevalence of pure visualists among girls than among boys. It is of course clear that a child will learn more easily, more quickly, and retain for a longer time material learned through his special and dominating form of imagery; and conversely, that the teacher will naturally teach, and will best teach, by the use of *his* special form. Hence a certain amount of consideration is necessary in school work, both to the type of the child and to the type of the teacher. On the other hand, as has been remarked, the average child is of a mixed type, and the average teacher also; while under modern conditions familiarity with different media is essential for all. The conclusion is that the teachers should try to convey knowledge of any subject by as many senses as possible, and that care should always be taken to determine whether apparent incapacity in a child to learn a particular subject (*e.g.* geography) is not due rather to a deficiency in the imagery to which appeal is made than to dullness or inattention. (A full account of recent work on this subject is to be found in E. Meumann, *Exper. Pädagogik*, i., esp. p. 435 f.)

It is a matter of dispute how the power of abstraction, and thinking in general, are related to imagery; there can be no doubt that, genetically, the concrete image precedes the abstract, or symbolic, thought, and that in general a training of the imagination is of great value in preparation for scientific thought and practical reasoning (see A. Binet, *L'Intelligence*, Paris, 1903; E. Meumann, *Intelligenz und Wille*, Leipzig, 1908). On the general subject of the psychological nature of thought and its relation to imagery, see the discussion by Titchener of the work of Ach, Binet, Bühler, Messer, and Watt, in his *Experimental Psychology of the Thought Process*, N.Y. 1909.

(9) *Language and abstract thought.*—Many lines of evidence both from race psychology and from individual psychology go to prove that the language of its parents is in no sense whatever innate in the child, and that none even of the conditions which have led to the differentiation of its parents' language from other languages is innate. (On this question, see L. W. Stern, *Helen Keller*, Berlin, 1905.) What is really innate is the instinct of expression, and the various special forms which this instinct takes—facial, vocal, gesture, etc. As it is certainly on these that language has, racially, been built up, so in the child they precede all knowledge of language. As illustration of the former point, experience shows that any child can learn any language whatsoever, provided it is brought up among a people speaking that language; and that no child has any special difficulty even in learning the language which is most remote in its sounds, signs, or grammar from the language of its parents. Again, it is known that the most complex thoughts and emotions are equally well expressible in any mode of language whatsoever, including under this not merely speech and ordinary gesture languages, but even such highly artificial languages as those taught to deaf-mutes, etc. The stages at which a child acquires the language of its environment may be stated as follows:[1] (1) the reflex and instinctive expressions of emotion on the child's own part; (2) the imitation of the sounds made by its parents and others in their speech; (3) the frequent repetition of signs and sounds—complexes found pleasant to itself; on the receptive side: (4) the gradual discrimination of the sounds heard in the speech of its parents; (5) the association between a particular sound and the object to which it is referred by the parents; (6) the formation of an idea of the meaning or connotation of the words, derived from these associations (apperception); and (7) the gradual correction of such ideas by experience. The conditions of development are keen auditive perception on the part of the child, opportunity of hearing varied speech in its environment, and freedom to exercise its linguistic powers, in play or otherwise, as it seems inclined.[1]

The relation of writing to speech may be touched upon here. Evidence shows that the child is ear-minded before it is eye-minded, and that it is able to learn by ear much more rapidly and more tenaciously than by sight; people among whom there is a large percentage of illiterates are frequently, as Borrow noticed among the Portuguese (*Bible in Spain*, ch. i.), brilliant and correct speakers; the probability is that the child would profit if in this respect its development were assimilated to the evolution of the race, so that (for example) writing and reading were not taught until it had reached about its 10th year. By this time it might have acquired two or more languages by the ear alone, and would probably for the future have a much more easy command of its speech than children ordinarily acquire under our present system (Chamberlain, ch. 5).

6. Abnormalities of development.—*Defective children.*—Where there is an actual loss of one or more of the senses, whether through injury or defect of the sense-organ, or from lesion of the central organ in the brain, the resulting defects are due rather to lack of material (*e.g.* deaf-mutism) than to any defect in the mental powers themselves, and can be compensated by adequate training, as the celebrated cases of Laura Bridgman and Helen Keller show. Apart from these cases, defective children may be grouped in the following classes: backward children, the feeble-minded, imbeciles, idiots, and the demented. The last are those who, through injury in childhood to the central nervous system, or through a disease of that system both congenital and progressive, gradually lose any acquired mental faculty they may possess, and therefore not only fail to develop further, but actually regress, perhaps to a purely instinctive or even reflex and automatic or vegetative level. *Idiocy*, on the other hand, springs from a lesion or defect of the cerebrum, either congenital or occurring in early childhood, carrying as its consequence a lowered general vitality, and especially a lowered sensitiveness and power of movement, as a consequence of which the individual is almost or entirely unable to acquire the education which is regarded as the standard in his country and position. In this there may be all degrees, depending upon the extent of the injury, and the period of life at which it occurs. In *imbecility*, there is not, as a rule, any marked physical or

[1] On the development of language in the child, see Sully, ch. 5; Preyer, ch. 16 ff.; W. Ament, *Die Entwicklung von Sprechen und Denken beim Kinde*, Leipzig, 1899, p. 213; Chamberlain, ch. 5; and Ament, 'Fortschritte in Kinderseelenkunde,' in *Arch. f. d. gesamte Psychol.* ii. (1904).

[1] The following is Stern's classification of the stages in the development of language from the point of view of the forms and structure of speech: (1) the beginning of the development of speech by means of *articulate sounds* (end of the 1st year); (2) 2nd year (1st quarter), *substantive stage*: the child uses substantives only as names for concrete persons and things; (3) *stage of action*: verbs appear for the designation of concrete activity in the present and in the immediate future (2nd quarter of this year); (4) *first questioning stage*: questions about the *names* of objects (3rd quarter); (5) *first sentences* (synthetic): conjunctives; negative sentences (end of the 3rd quarter of year; (6) *relation and quality stage*: adjectives and adverbs (4th quarter of the year); (7) sentences with an object (end of the 4th quarter year); (8) use of numbers, inflexions, past tense (4th to the 5th quarter year); (9) *second questioning stage*: questions as to the where, how, and whither (3rd year); (10) pronouns become numerous (2nd quarter of 3rd year); and (11) *questions as to why* (in the 3rd year). Stern points to a very remarkable parallelism between the stages by which the normal child acquires its language, and the stages by which Helen Keller, beginning at the end of her 7th year, acquired precisely the same form of development through the finger-alphabet which Miss Sulivan began to teach her at that age (*op. cit.* p. 34 ff.).

even cerebral defect; on the contrary, imbeciles are frequently of great vitality, and of full physical development; nevertheless the existence of some functional defect of the brain is proved by the peculiar instability of their mental character, and, as a result, the difficulty which there is in extending their education, mental and moral, up to the standard of the time. These classes may be grouped together as abnormal; their differences from their fellows are so great, and in their outcome unfit them to so great an extent for participation in social life, that no one would seek to rank them with either normal children or normal adults. On the other hand, the *feeble-minded* and the *backward* represent a class which is, as it were, on the lower edge of the normal group; they are simple variations, on the negative side, from the average, corresponding to the specially talented and gifted on the positive side. The backward child is one who is much slower in development than his neighbours, and in consequence falls below the standard of his years; at school he is placed along with children three or four years younger than himself. The feeble-minded, or simple defective, again, is not only slow, but unable at any time, or under any conditions, to overtake the average child in education; he can, however, be taught a simple trade, and by special methods can be brought to a level of intelligence and of morality by which he is enabled to take a place among his fellows.

Various suggestions have been made as to the most prominent symptom by which the *degree* of defectiveness can be estimated: ability to acquire the power of speech (Esquirol, who divided idiots and imbeciles into five classes, according to degree of facility which they were able to acquire in this respect); the presence or absence of primary and secondary instincts (Dubois, etc.). Almost certainly the most valuable of these is that on which Sollier lays chief stress—the power of attention. The inability of the idiot or imbecile child to learn (whether language, industrial work, or moral habits) depends primarily on the two characteristics of his attention—its low intensity, or strength, or degree of concentration, and its instability, or liability to distraction and dissipation. The spontaneous attention (still less the voluntary attention) of the idiot cannot be caught, except for a few objects associated with its most fundamental physical needs: (1) because, owing to the disease of the brain, its sensations are excessively blunted or dulled, and (2) because for the same reason its organs of movement, on which the possibility of attending depends, are also imperfect in the highest degree. In the lowest degree of idiocy there is no possibility of attention; in the second degree (simple idiocy), the attention is with difficulty and occasionally held by a few objects; in the latter case, by efforts which strengthen the sensitiveness, or which build up associations between the few objects that are apprehended and the corresponding actions, some degree of education may be accomplished; in the former none is possible. On the other hand, in the case of the imbecile, it is not so much the intensity of the attention as its stability that is at fault; it is flighty, intermittent, unable to be retained for any length of time by a single object; hence memory is weak, impressions do not remain long enough before the mind to be retained; associations are not formed between separate sense-qualities or between perceptions and actions; sustained action and serial thought are alike impossible. The lower instincts, however, are usually sufficiently strong to give the sensations and perceptions which appeal to the imbecile considerable attention-value; hence education is possible to a relatively high degree, through the direction and control of this attention by the teacher. Imbeciles may learn to speak, although they rarely learn to write or read; and the ability to speak does not with them carry the power of concentrated and deliberate thought or reflexion. On the moral side, Sollier divides these defectives by the terms *extra-social*, which he applies to the idiots, and *anti-social* which he applies to the imbeciles. The former, as the term implies, is essentially a solitary, unable to come into relation with, or to understand any of the purposes of, his fellows; he neither imitates nor plays with others, and, while entirely incapable of appreciating moral standards, nevertheless remains for the most part passive, inert, and therefore harmless. The imbecile, on the other hand, having the lower instincts strongly, and the higher weakly (or not at all), developed, is governed almost entirely by selfish motives, without being able to appreciate either the feelings of others, their duties, or their rights; he has intelligence enough to pick up and appreciate the evil, but not the good, around him, and for the most part is on that account a constant danger both to his fellows and to himself. In the case of the backward and simple or weak-minded child, the attention is also defective; the reaction time is slower, the span or width of a single act of attention is narrower, the stability is for the most part less than in the average child. In the case of the idiot, the defect is primarily due to an organic lesion of the brain, and in the imbecile to a functional defect (see art. DEGENERATION), but in the backward child the defect may ordinarily be found in some somatic physical weakness, in the digestive or other internal system, by which the brain is relatively poorly nourished, and in consequence both functions more feebly and develops more slowly than in the average child. The evil can to some extent be remedied by physical regimen, and the great danger in such cases is that of intensifying the disease by over-pressure in school work. There can be no doubt that, where it is possible, such children ought to be treated separately from others—in separate classes, or still better in separate institutions. Binet, Decroly and Degand, and de Sanctis have worked out series of standard mental tests by which the degree of defectiveness in a child of a given age can be diagnosed in a simple and rapid, but adequate, way. It is natural that some difficulty should be experienced at first in arriving at such a series, appealing to the different mental powers in the order of their development, which shall be agreed upon by a sufficiently representative number of observers; but, when it is successfully accomplished, it will form a most useful basis of reference, both in the initial determination of the grade of a child and in estimating the degree of progress which may be attained under any particular system of training and education (see A. Binet and T. Simon, *Année psychologique*, xi. [1905], xiv. [1908], xv. [1909]; O. Decroly and J. Degand, *Arch. de psychol.* ix. [1910]; de Sanctis, *Année psychologique*, xii. [1906]. These tests are also discussed in Meumann, i. 387 ff., and are illustrated in G. M. Whipple, *Manual of Mental and Physical Tests*, 1910).

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DEVIL, DEVIL-WORSHIP.—See Demons and Spirits.

DEVIL'S ADVOCATE.—See Advocate.

DEVĪ PĀTAN (*Devī-paṭṭana*, 'city of the goddess Devī').—An ancient village in the Gondā District of Oudh, supposed to be one of the oldest seats of the Śaiva cultus in Northern India. Legend connects the establishment of the cult in this place with Karṇa, the hero of the Mahābhārata epic; but it is more probable that the existing remains belong to the time of Chandragupta II., of the Imperial Gupta dynasty, who restored the old sacred places at Ayodhya, and perhaps did the same service for the petty shrine of the goddess of the pre-Aryan races, who had been adopted into Hinduism. A temple is said to have been erected in the beginning of the 15th cent. by Ratannāth, the third in descent from the famous Gorakhnāth, the deified saint, whose worship has spread all over the Nepāl valley and many other parts of India. Its importance was sufficient to attract the attention of the iconoclast Aurangzīb, who partially destroyed it. This temple seems to have been dedicated to Śiva, and when repaired was converted into the present building, where the service of the Mother-goddess in the form of Pārvatī or Durgā is conducted. The religious fair in connexion with the shrine takes place early in the spring, and is largely attended by pilgrims from the Plains and the lower slopes of the Himālaya. Benett, describing the fair in 1871, writes: 'Some 20 buffaloes, 250 goats, and 250 pigs were sacrificed daily at the temple. Under the altar a large hole was dug and filled with sand, which was changed twice a day, and the old sand buried; all the blood was thus absorbed. There was no filth lying about, and no stench.'

Literature.—Führer, *Monumental Antiquities and Inscriptions in the North-Western Provinces and Oudh*, Allahabad, 1891, p. 302 f.; Benett, in *Oudh Gazetteer* (1877), i. 367 ff.

W. Crooke.

DEVOTION AND DEVOTIONAL LITERATURE.—*Introductory*.—In a general sense, devotion has frequently been regarded as co-extensive with, or at least as embracing, the entire field of facts relevant to religion. Sometimes the attitude of the human *will* towards the Divine (howsoever conceived), which is a common feature of all religions, and the dominant characteristic in every religion of the spirit, has been illegitimately isolated and its true function distorted; consequently 'devotion' and 'religion' have often been used as synonymous terms. Aquinas writes: 'Devotio nihil aliud esse videtur quam voluntas quaedam prompte tradendi se ad ea quae pertinent ad Dei famulatum' (*Summa*, II.² lxxxii. 1). But surely this definition is too wide in scope. Even where devotion has not been confused with religion, it has commonly been cited as a synonym for worship —'whatsoever men worship for religion's sake' (Tomson's marg. note [*NT*, 1576]). But, while devotion suffuses all genuine religion, and will find expression normally in a form of worship directed towards an object or objects conceived as spiritual, unseen, or Divine, it certainly ought not to be defined as 'an object of religious worship.'

The idea of devotion is expressed in a concrete manner by the devotee—one set apart for a unique purpose, dedicated by a vow to the service of a deity; and perhaps we may best define devotion as the inner, intimate, essential side of worship. It is the attitude of the worshipping soul towards God; or, more widely viewed, the self-dedication 'to a deity, or to any one invested in thought for a time with some of the qualities or claims of a deity.' In its higher reaches it calls into play the entire forces and resources of man's personality.

Devotion, then, involves the deliberate movement of the will towards the object of worship.

'Devotion signifies a life given, or *devoted*, to God. He therefore is the devout man who lives no longer to his own *will*, or the *way* and *spirit* of the world, but to the sole will of God, who considers God in everything, who serves God in everything, who makes all the parts of his *common* life parts of piety, by doing everything in the name of God, and under such rules as are conformable to His glory' (Law, *Serious Call*, Lond. 1898, ch. i.).

In the theistic religions, especially in Christianity, where the bloom and fragrance of devotion are incomparably rich, the definite and full determination of the will towards Deity is the first step in the direction of a devout life. The higher experiences of the consecrated life are unattainable apart from the initial and insistent self-dedicatory act. The will of the individual is wholly determined towards the being or beings conceived as Divine, and, apart from this ardent attachment, devotion, strictly speaking, cannot exist. It is thus marked off from religion narrowly defined as 'a propitiation or conciliation of powers superior to man' (J. G. Frazer, *GB*², 1900, i. 63) by this spontaneous self-committal.

'True devotion springs from the will; it is the choice and the love of the highest good manifested to the soul, and, wherever the will of man is found choosing, and adhering to, the highest known ideal of good, there you have the true child of God' (C. Bodington, *Books of Devotion*, London, 1903, ch. ii.). Or, as Thomas à Kempis expresses it, great devotion consists 'in giving up thyself with all thy heart to the Divine Will, not seeking the things which are thine own, either in small or in great, either in time or in eternity' (*Imitation of Christ*, bk. iii. ch. xxv.).

In this self-determination of the soul both intellectual and emotional appetites are present in varying degree; no movement would be possible apart from desire; the intellect by itself, as Aristotle pointed out, moves nothing. Some conception of the end of devotion is necessary before the heart and the affections are yielded in free spontaneity to their Divine objective. Thus, in all religions which create and foster the devotional spirit—notably in the Christian religion—the soul intensely, sincerely, and lovingly desires, and moves in faith, reverence, and purity of intention towards, communion with God. Even the pagan Mysteries and the most ancient sacrificial feasts bear witness to this fact.

1. This approach of the soul towards the Divine, with its definite, conscious experience of the Divine presence, is seen in the distinctive exercises and practices of devotion. These are infinite in variety, but primacy must be given to prayer.

'Devotion,' writes William Law, 'is neither *private* nor *public* prayer, but prayers, whether private or public, are particular parts or instances of devotion' (*Serious Call*, ch. i.).

Without attempting any survey of the various forms prayer has assumed in the history of religions, we may mark its unfailing and universal characteristics throughout the devotional life of the varied races and generations of mankind. Remembering the true saying of Kierkegaard—that a heathen who heartily and ardently prays to an idol prays in reality to the true God, but he who outwardly and impersonally prays to the true God

in reality prays to an idol—we see that the value of the external observance depends on the internal disposition of the suppliant. Prayer must be pure and ingenuous, for the devout life must be free from any element of sophistication. Where prayer is viewed so largely and so generally, sometimes so exclusively, under the aspect of petition or request, it is obvious that its possible perils are very great. Material wants and mundane considerations obtrude themselves, while the spiritual needs are crowded out, forgotten, ignored—sometimes even unrecognized. But, though not without its dangers, the act of asking a boon of the Unseen, if it be the sincere expression of the spiritually enlightened, is an act which not only describes the fervent longing of the human soul, but also suggests the intimacy of a genuine spiritual communion. It is an aspect of the great passion to establish communication with the Divine or with God, which expresses itself in an outgoing of the human spirit towards the object worshipped and adored. As such, it is an infallible mark of the devout soul wheresoever placed, in crude and elementary religious environment as truly, though not as fruitfully, as in realms of high spiritual culture and attainment. In its more advanced phases, it becomes not merely a spiritual intercession, but passes in a sublime elevation of soul from soliloquy to silence, from spiritual striving to contemplative calm. The higher reaches of the devotional life are sacred to the prayer of 'quiet' and the prayer of 'union' which Madame Guyon describes in her *Autobiography* (Eng. tr., London, 1897) as 'emptied of all form, species, and images.'

2. Allied to and often commingled with prayer is the act or exercise of **praise**—the tribute of homage which the human renders to the Divine. The relation between prayer and praise is so intimate that, in experience, it is found that instinctively and imperceptibly the one is constantly passing over into the other. This is as notable in the hymns of the Veda, which embody 'some of the earliest religious conceptions of the Hindus' (M. Williams, *Hinduism*, London, 1901, ch. ii.), as it is in the Jewish Psalms or in the spiritual songs of the Christian Church; and, although perhaps these are all primarily adapted to worship in an institutional ceremonial sense, they yet express with true poetical passion the personal devotional life of their particular age. The outward dissimilarities are undoubtedly great; the Vedic hymns were 'addressed to certain deifications of the forces of Nature' (M. Williams, *op. cit.* p. 23); a post-exilic theology is implicit in the Psalter; but under all the outward forms of 'temple festivities, processions, and ceremonial' there is present and discernible the thrill of the individual soul, as, in reverence and thanksgiving, homage and gratitude, it prostrates itself before the Divine.

We may certainly affirm that beneath all external expressions, which, of course, reflect the particular sentiments (sometimes, it may be said, immature, and even repugnant, to a developed moral sense) of a people, age, or religion, the elements we have noted are all present in the act of praise. They differ, it is true, in emphasis and in the degree of intensity by which they are sustained; but it may be doubted if any one of them is ever entirely absent. From the manner in which they are present and the mode in which they are combined, the exercise of praise as a personal outburst in East and West does appear ultimately to result in a qualitative distinction, *i.e.* to be different in kind. It may, indeed, be regarded as an established fact that the place of praise in the devotional life is seen most clearly and recorded most completely in religions where the subduing and overwhelming sense of Divine holiness, love, and beneficent energy prevails, and in which the soul's searching sense of guilt is finally submerged—not merely in mercy, but in victorious grace.

In illustration of this, we may note the contrast presented between the attitude of the devout Buddhist, who embalms his lord Gautama 'in the richest and sweetest mythology known to man' (A. M. Fairbairn, *Philos. of Chr. Rel.*, London, 1902, p. 243 f.), and the attitude of the devout Jew towards God, as expressed in the superb and richly varied praise of the Synagogue liturgy (cf. T. K. Cheyne, *Book of Psalms*, London, 1888, p. 118). This contrast is further heightened by a consideration of Christian hymnody, in which, from the ψαλμοί, ὕμνοι, ᾠδαὶ πνευματικαί (Eph 5^{19}) of the early Christians to the sacred lyric or hymn of the Church to-day, the holiness and grace of God are conspicuously honoured and celebrated as much in private devotion as in public worship.

3. The act of **adoration**, the prostration of the soul in profound reverence, utmost affection, highest love, is usually associated with the outburst of gratitude or thanksgiving addressed to a deity. As one ascends in the scale of religions, the ethical and spiritual meaning of the adoring soul becomes more significant, and gleams and glows like sunshine. Where worship was addressed directly to elemental forces of Nature (as in the hymns of the Veda), or where the objects of worship were characterized by a dull, dry formalism (as in Roman religion to a considerable extent), or where a 'brilliant gaiety,' passing often into hilarity and levity (as among the Greeks), was subtly united with sacred offices and exercises (cf. F. Granger, *The Worship of the Romans*, London, 1895, p. 271), it is clear that the outward semblance of adoration could not conceivably denote the rich and profound spiritual significance which is so manifest a content of the reverent honour given by the devout Christian to the sacred and adorable Trinity.

The sentiment of adoration is seen at its highest only where the idea of God is marked by supreme moral and ethical excellence. Thus, in China, even where there prevails a persistent worship of ancestors which aims at the maintenance of friendly relations with the spirits of the dead, or a devotion to Shang-ti and popular divinities, adoration occupies no high place in the desire of the worshippers. In Christianity, on the other hand, devotion seems impossible apart from adoration, and manifests itself as markedly, and perhaps more truly, in the awe and austerity of the Puritan conception of the relation of the soul to God as in the Roman Catholic devotion to saints and images, the Eucharistic elements, the Cross, and the Sacred Heart—the latter cult, indeed, possibly taking its rise from *The Heart of Christ in Heaven towards Sinners upon Earth* (1645), a writing of the great Puritan theologian, Dr. Thomas Goodwin.

4. All the classics of devotion announce the cultivation of the **meditative mood** as indispensable to the devout life. And, although there is a great gulf between the *Meditations* of the saintly Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius, or the Indian mystic for whom contemplation (*dhyāna*) takes the place of prayer, and the devout Christian for whom meditation is the 'eye of the soul' which enables him to see 'the light that never changes' (Aug. *Confess.* bk. vii. ch. x.), in all alike there is the recognition that 'the most sublime object of thought' demands the deliberate and definite concentration of man's whole soul in a 'current of contemplative feeling.'

Recollection is the act which is the precursor of pure spiritual contemplation; and this drawing together of the forces of the inner life, 'each man's conversation with himself,' to use the expression of Lacordaire (*Lettres à des jeunes gens*, Paris, 1862,

p. 204 ff.), is the prelude to meditation proper, which Ruysbroeck defines as 'a concentration of all the interior and exterior forces in the unity of the spirit and in the bonds of love' (*L'Ornement des noces spirituelles*, tr. M. Maeterlinck, Brussels, 1900, bk. ii. ch. iv.).

Meditation or active contemplation is then 'a long process of internal quietude, of abstraction from sense, and of absorption in reason,' by which the human soul is attuned to the Divine; and the soul exercised thereby has, among other spiritual possessions, 'the power of seeing into eternity' (*Theologia Germanica*, 14th cent.). By this interior process of meditation the whole personality is raised to a higher level, for the act of contemplation sounds 'the abysmal deeps of personality,' and releases mysterious spiritual forces otherwise hidden and unknown. Of this, William Law writes in 'The Spirit of Prayer':

'There is a root or depth in thee from whence all these faculties come forth as lines from a centre, or as branches from the body of a tree. This depth is called the centre, the fund, or bottom, of the soul, for it is so infinite that nothing can satisfy it or give it any rest, but the infinity of God' (*The Liberal and Mystical Writings of W. Law*, ed. W. Scott Palmer, London, 1908, p. 14).

Only the spiritually strenuous and purposeful can accomplish this, for it is not merely 'the yielding to an instinct, the indulgence of a natural taste for reverie.'

'All the scattered interests of the self have here to be collected; there must be a deliberate and unnatural act of attention, a deliberate expelling of all discordant images from the consciousness—a hard and ungrateful task' (E. Underhill, *Mysticism*, London, 1911, p. 374).

Spiritual meditation is, indeed, a difficult thing. St. Teresa, who finally achieved so much in this respect, confessed that, when she first made the attempt, she felt the impossibility of collecting her thoughts and fixing her attention; and it was not until more than fourteen years had passed that she was able to practise meditation without the aid of a book.

Boehme, in his *Dialogues on the Super-sensual Life* (ed. Bernard Holland, London, 1901, p. 56), describes the process of meditation as the cessation of individual activity, and urges the direct and steadfast fixing of the eye upon one point:

'For this end, gather in all thy thoughts, and by faith press into the Centre, laying hold upon the Word of God, which is infallible, and which hath called thee. Be thou obedient to this call, and be silent before the Lord, sitting alone with Him in thy inmost and most hidden cell, thy mind being centrally united in itself, and attending His will in the patience of Hope.'

This is a blessed foretaste of the supernal satisfaction—of the *vita contemplativa*.

5. Again, devotion is expressed, not only in the loving fulfilment of all those duties commonly named 'religious,' but more particularly and appropriately in definite spiritual exercises. In that great devotional classic, *The Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius* (Eng. tr., London, 1880), the spiritual development of the individual is shown to be dependent upon the rigorous training to which the powers of the mind, heart, and will are subjected. After retirement into solitude and a season of quiet contemplation, in which the soul listens only to the 'whispering silence,' the exercised spirit passes on, in absorbed intensity, to the various methods and rules by which the desired goal is to be attained. The value of the rules and exercises lies in the fact that, when followed in docility and fidelity with whole-hearted abandonment, the soul is led to the end for which it was ordained by God. They are rules which become 'more and more authoritative by constant obedience.'

'The number, length, and nature of the exercises are to be adapted to the age, capacity, and inclination of the person in retreat, so that no one may be overburdened, and all may find what is suitable to their wants' (Bodington, *op. cit.* 130).

All forms of spiritual exercise, whether such as are involved in the 'ladder' of mystic states and perfections of Neo-Platonic mysticism, the method of Persian Ṣūfiism, or the way of Christian mysticism, are aspects of self-discipline—of the *vita purgativa*. Self-discipline, strenuous and prolonged, has always been deemed an essential factor in devotion; and the devout of all ages have insisted upon the renunciation of self. Whether it is the Christian mystic who speaks of self-surrender, or the Indian mystic who teaches that the illusion of the finite can be overcome only by entering into the universal life, or the Ṣūfī who practises detachment from all that is not God that the heart may give itself for its only work—meditation upon the Divine Being—a deliberate self-abandonment is demanded by each alike, though the nature of that abandonment is variously interpreted and differently enforced. Perhaps the asceticism of our Lord (Clem. Alex. *Strom.* iii. 6) supplies us with the key to a true understanding of the place and power of self-discipline. It does not appear that *poverty*, as such, is a necessary inevitable mark of self-renunciation (Jerome, *c. Vigilant.* 14), though it is true that the life of Jesus was lived under conditions of poverty. But poverty may, in specific instances, be the *sine qua non* of a genuine self-oblation; and assuredly *almsgiving* has very generally been regarded as an indispensable exercise of the devout. In this connexion it should be noted, however, that by modern thought greater possibilities of a positive character, tending towards an energetic social devotion, are being disclosed to the devout soul who sees, with vision preternaturally sharpened, the passionate and heroic service of man in wider ways than formerly, as no mean expression or exemplification alike of self-sacrifice and of the worship and service of God.

Supremely essential is a sincere and utter detachment from earthly things, apart from which there can be no true self-abnegation, and no high spirit of devotion. This ideal has perennially cast its spell over the minds of devoted men; many attempts have been made to realize it, not the least significant—despite the inevitable limitations of their conception—being that of the 'Brethren of the Common Life' (*q.v.*), under the inspiration of Gerard Groot and Florentius. The importance of the ideal has never been questioned by the devout. According to St. Francis of Assisi, poverty is

'a treasure so high excelling and so divine that we be not worthy to lay it up in our vile vessels; since this is that celestial virtue whereby all earthly things and fleeting are trodden underfoot, and whereby all hindrances are lifted from the soul so that freely she may join herself to God Eternal (*Fioretti*, ch. xiii.).

The essence of self-discipline has been said to be 'self-simplification'; this can be attained only by the soul viewing with sacred indifference the superfluous, deceptive, or vain things of earth. Thus, it comes to be seen that inward not outward poverty is the indispensable thing; the goal of the devout soul is, like the Kingdom of Heaven, attainable only by 'the poor in spirit.' It is in such essential vital detachment, according to St. John of the Cross, that

'the spirit finds quiet and repose, for, coveting nothing, nothing wearies it by elation; and nothing oppresses it by dejection, because it stands in the centre of its own humility: for, as soon as it covets anything, it is immediately fatigued thereby' (*Ascent of Mount Carmel*, tr. David Lewis, London, 1906, bk. i. ch. xiii.).

Fasting, 'a piece of devotion whereby the primitive believers effected very great things' (Anthony Horneck, *The Crucified Jesus*, London, 1685, ch. iv.), has been persistently taught, encouraged, and practised as a form of self-renunciation and a method of self-discipline. Fasting may be partial or complete. As practised among the Oriental peoples, it usually took the form of total abstinence from both food and drink; and, according

to Robertson Smith (*Rel. Sem.*², London, 1894, p. 434), it is almost certain that such fasting was designed especially with a view to the partaking sacramentally of holy flesh. We may well believe this to be the fact, inasmuch as the sacrificial rites of all nations express in their devotional aspect the surrendered self of the creature to the Creator. It does not seem open to doubt that all ancient sacrifices were related to the basal belief in the possibility of communion with the Deity; and the discipline of fasting as a preparation to the partaking of a sacrifice which involved some kind of Divine fellowship was the prescribed method of the Oriental peoples. If it is true, as has been affirmed, that 'both the idea of sacramental worship and the forms under which it is performed by the Christian Church are the almost universal heritage of mankind' (W. R. Inge's Essay in *Contentio Veritatis*, London, 1902, p. 279), it will not be regarded as a singular thing or strange survival that the concurrent act of fasting should appear with perennial persistence. And further, if a vital communion with the Unseen is conditioned by a transparent sincerity of will and intention, fasting may well have approved itself as a sign of, as well as a means towards, such self-discipline of the soul. Especially might this be expected in the Christian Church, where the avowed aim of the faithful is to be 'one with the Lord and He with us,' and the devout person seeks to present himself a reasonable, holy, and living sacrifice to God (Ro 12¹). The custom of fasting before communion certainly finds its explanation, if not its justification, not so much in 'the practice of the universal Church' as in the acknowledged need of self-disciplinary exercise for those who would worthily and reverently prepare themselves for the receiving of the Lord's Supper.

'Let us,' says Jeremy Taylor, 'receive the consecrated elements with all devotion and humility of body and spirit; and do this honour to it, that it be the first food we eat and the first beverage we drink that day, unless it be in case of sickness or other great necessity; and that your body and soul both be prepared to its reception with abstinence from secular pleasures' (*Holy Living*, London, 1649, ch. iv. sect. x.).

It is admitted that such fasting 'is not a duty commanded by God,' but it is undeniably a custom which has commended itself to many of the most devout. In the more general sense, fasting has been endured by the devout almost universally; and by many saints it has been ardently embraced as a valuable means towards the discipline and conquest of self—urged often by an inner necessity of the spirit. It cannot be denied that, as a spiritual exercise, evoking, training, and shaping the mysterious potentialities of the soul, fasting under its various forms does effect in many instances most fruitful spiritual developments, and justifies itself as a 'gymnastic of eternity.'

6. In this connexion we note that **spiritual raptures and ecstatic experiences** of peculiar significance follow, though not invariably, the self-disciplinary exercises of the devout. Catherine of Siena and Catherine of Genoa may be cited as types of devout souls who constantly resorted to the discipline of fasting, and experienced the enrichment of life which ecstatic states confer. The saints, however, do not adopt fasting or any other spiritual exercise as a means of artificially producing or inducing 'ecstasy.' This spiritual state and 'dazzling obscurity,' while it has affinities with the 'ecstasy' of philosophic communion and exaltation,—the crown of the mystical teaching of the Neo-Platonists,—must be carefully distinguished from all those extraordinary forms of ecstasy which at different periods have been sought for successfully by barbarous orgiastic worship or by rude and crude rites of initiation. Jacob Boehme, describing the hard battle he waged against the desires that belong to the flesh and blood, and his attempt to enter wholly into the Love of God, says:

'Now, while I was wrestling and battling, being aided by God, *a wonderful light arose within my soul.* It was a light entirely foreign to my unruly nature, but in it I recognized the true nature of God and man, and the relation existing between them, a thing which heretofore I had never understood, and for which I would never have sought' (F. Hartmann, *The Life and Doctrines of Jacob Boehme*, London, 1891, p. 50).

Here, obviously, the 'ecstasy' was of an illuminative character; this constituted its inner grace and spiritual value. But 'ecstasy,' according to Richard Rolle, may take the form of 'being ravished out of fleshly feeling,' 'and on this manner saints sometimes are ravished to their profit and other men's learning; as Paul ravished to the third heaven' (*The Fire of Love*, ed. Lond. 1896, bk. ii. ch. vii.). The essential mark, however, of this spiritual ecstasy would seem to be a supreme and overwhelming joy in the possession of a new knowledge gained not as the prize of toiling thought, but 'in the upper school of the Holy Ghost.' Certainly such 'ecstasy' is no more the product of human sagacity than it is the fruit of an assumed or pretended sanctity.

7. This leads to a consideration of the fact previously stated, that, as devotion springs primarily from the movement of the individual will towards the Divine, such movement being expressed in the various activities already noted, the supreme phase of devotion passes from the service of God, expressed in manifold ways, into those solemn elements of religious feeling which distinguish by their intensity and seriousness **communion with God.** 'I sought,' says Jacob Boehme, 'only for the heart of God, therein to hide myself' ('Aurora,' *Works of Jacob Boehme*, Eng. tr., London, 1764, p. 237). This is no mere 'morbid condition of mental emotion,' but the end desired with an incorruptible sincerity by all devout persons at all times. Among the Greeks, for example, one secret of the attractiveness of the Eleusinian Mysteries lay in the fact that the esoteric symbolism employed therein ministered, not to a sickly dreaming, but to a magnificent desire for an intimate spiritual communion with Deity. Similarly the Christian mystics, in their spiritual exercises and disciplined employments, sought, with all their fiery strength, the path which afforded close, indeed immediate, access to God—through Christ to God. This 'subjective intensity' of the mystic, though not without its dangers, witnesses to the zeal with which they pursued their quest. Thus, if the communion of man with God is to be attained, the devout soul, whether inside or outside the Christian Church, has always seen that the Divine life, potential or actual, within him must be tended with 'an intense solemnity and energy.' To the Christian, devotion is based on the certainty of communion between God and man through Christ. It springs from a faith in Christ (or, to use Luther's word, a 'right trust') which involves ultimately, if it does not embody presently, a moral union with Christ; and there is no devotion comparable for a moment with the devotion of utter penitential humility which is offered up by the soul that has found the new life in Christ and is entrenched in that reality of regeneration which is the certainty of its so great salvation. As Christ is the perfect means whereby the soul of man may realize itself in full and unclouded communion with its Creator, so the practice of devotion has gathered and drawn from the human life of the Lord—that consummate achievement of stainless communion—not only its supreme ideal and heroic standard, but its rarest and most precious power. 'Non comprehenditur Deus per investigationem sed per imitationem.'

We must, in our devotion, as Thomas à Kempis urges, copy the life and conduct of our Lord, 'if we wish to be truly enlightened, and to be delivered from all blindness of heart' (*Imitation of Christ*, bk. i. ch. i.). Neither must the call to fellowship with the Saviour's sufferings be evaded or disobeyed, nor the eyes closed to the imperative demand for 'mediatorial ministries.' The passivity of Quietism can never be the ideal of the devotional life.

'With Him the corner-stone,
The living stones conjoin;
Christ and His Church are one,
One Body and one Vine'
(Wesley, *Hymns on the Lord's Supper*, no. 129).

In sacrificial service, not less than in sacramental worship, the devout soul shares in the joyous travail of the spiritual Kingdom, sustained by the effectual irresistible energies of the Holy Spirit of God.

8. Devotional literature is the outcome, the record, or the expression of a vital devotion. Devotion may exist and manifest its presence without any attempt to express itself in literary form; but every true book of devotion involves the pre-existence of a true devotion. Spurious devotional works and morbid or maudlin books on devotion, whether marked by grandiloquent language or spiritual insipidity, may generally be detected by their atmosphere of moral enervation, or an accompanying suggestion of mental paralysis. The genuinely devout man is unconscious of his devotion; and all the great devotional classics, even those most intimately personal, are marked by the absence of anything approaching, in sinister guise, either a baleful self-consciousness or the hesitating sentiment of the feeble or the dull. They are in the highest degree self-revealing, often introspective, but they show no traces of self-posturing. The Bible is undoubtedly the greatest and most influential book of devotion in the world; it not only bears all the infallible marks of a deep and developing devotion, but it possesses, in a pre-eminent degree, the power of awakening and sustaining the devotional life of all who read and use it aright. But, outside the Holy Scriptures, all the great spiritual books of devotion owe their position and power to their possession of the characteristic marks already mentioned. The incomparable *Imitatio Christi*, *The Pilgrim's Progress*, Augustine's *Confessions*, with their power to 'stimulate the heart and mind of man to approach unto God,' Anselm's *Meditations*, Andrewes' *Private Prayers*, breathing indeed a 'pure and primitive devotion,' Francis de Sales' *Spiritual Letters*, and Baxter's *Saints' Everlasting Rest*, are among the most spiritually moving books in the world. The great books of devotion elude our attempts to classify them, though we may trace affinities and mark divergencies. They all owe their existence to the spirit of conspicuous devotion which marked the lives of their authors; and, although respectively they exhibit the fashions of a particular age and reflect pre-eminently the spiritual needs and satisfactions of their own special time, they owe their persistent power to the presence in them of an unconscious self-revelation of spiritual insight, and the faculty of inducing and begetting a deeper devotional life in those who wisely read them. They unlock the door to the rich inheritance of the saints; they unveil inconceivable spiritual mysteries, as they lead the wondering soul to the Christ in whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge. Where may the growth, development, and perfection of the life that is hid with Christ in God be found more surely or sweetly expounded than in Jeremy Taylor's *Golden Grove*, his *Holy Living* and *Holy Dying*; Law's *Serious Call*, *Spirit of Prayer*, and *Christian Perfection*; Samuel Rutherford's *Letters*; *The Spiritual Guide* of Miguel de Molinos; or Walter Marshall's *Gospel Mystery of Sanctification*—a book too little known and read? The devotional life of thousands has been established and enriched by books so widely divergent in many respects as the *Sermons* of Bernard of Clairvaux, where the 'illuminative way' is described with searching insight as the rising to the love of God with heart, mind, and soul; Tauler's *Sermons*; the *Theologia Germanica*; A. Baker's *Holy Wisdom*; Louis of Granada's *Sinners' Guide*; Scupoli's *Spiritual Combat*, in which, despite obscurities and perversities, there burns steadily 'the lamp of fire within the earthen pitcher'; Pascal's *Thoughts*; the *Journal* of George Fox; and the mystical *Devotional Works* of John Norris. Perreyve's *Journée du malade*, Gratry's *Meditations*, with their striking and suggestive sincerities of thought, Scougal's *Life of God in the Soul of Man*, and Milman's *Love of the Atonement* all unite to disclose to the expectant soul some of the august possibilities of faith, prayer, and sacrifice. The work of Alphonsus Rodriguez, *On Spiritual and Religious Perfection*, in which 'our greatest, or rather, our only business,' the union of our souls with God by love, is set forth with arresting ardour and spiritual knowledge; the *Poems* of George Herbert and his *Priest to the Temple*, burning with the sacred passion for holiness; *Hymns on the Lord's Supper* by John and Charles Wesley, in which, assuming discretion and discrimination on the part of the reader, the fervour of an intense rapture fills the soul with unalloyed joy; and the *Christian Year* of John Keble—must be named as occupying distinct and honoured places in the impressive library of devotional literature, although, of course, they do not 'unite all great attributes in an equal degree.'

In the realm of devotion, doubtless, new heights wait to be scaled, untrodden territories allure the intrepid spiritual explorer, and vast spiritual tracts are yet to be surveyed; thus, while we hold steadfastly to the precious devotional gains of the past, we believe that greater works than these may be achieved by the soul following the Supreme Spiritual Director who guides into all truth.

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W. MAJOR SCOTT.

DEW.—The cooling of the ground causes, during clear nights, a deposit of some of the atmospheric moisture held in suspension during the day. It was not till 1814 that the main facts of the process of the formation of dew were established. Mention of Wells' famous theory—a perfect example of the inductive method—is in point, since primitive speculation upon the origin of dew has joined with observation of its value to plant-life in attaching to it various ideas of spiritual mystery and various uses in ritual.

In the OT the origin of dew is one of the mysteries of creation;[1] the deposition of dew is gentle, sudden, and invisible;[2] its evaporation in the sun is a metaphor for speedy departure or disappearance.[3] Early observation, of course, distinguished dew from rain, but noted their connexion.[4] Both drop from the clouds 'by the knowledge' of Jahweh.[5] The closer connexion of dew with mist and fog naturally involved some confusion in both language and observation. This is of some importance in the Biblical and post-Biblical literatures.

'The spirit of the dew has its dwelling at the ends of the heaven and is connected with the chambers of the rain, and its course is in winter and summer; and its clouds and the clouds of the mist are connected, and the one passes over into the other.'[6]

The old Jewish literature is enthusiastic on the subject of dew. It is a constant symbol for invigoration and vivification, fertility, blessing, prosperity, richness, and resurrection.[7] Jahweh promises that He will be 'as the dew unto Israel.'[8] The youthful warriors of the royal Messiah are compared, for numbers and freshness, and perhaps brilliance (see also below), to the dewdrops from 'the womb of the morning.'[9] The simile was borrowed by Milton (*Par. Lost*, v. 746 f.) for his description of the angelic hosts. The withholding of dew is a dire calamity, and one of the most terrible of curses.[10] We have here, in fact, the best illustration extant in folklore or literature of the pastoral and agricultural importance of the dew-fall. That importance is greatest in Eastern countries which have no irrigation to supplement an insufficient water-supply, and where every drop of moisture counts. But in Palestine the genuine dew of spring and winter is of far less importance than the night-mist of summer. This is not dew, but moisture condensed in the air before it reaches the ground. It is brought from the sea by the west winds, and for abundance and consistency may be compared to a Scotch mist. Cheyne, following Neil,[11] who analyzed the phenomenon, is of opinion that the *tal* ('sprinkled moisture' of the OT; EV 'dew') signifies in the majority of cases not dew proper, but this characteristic night-mist.[12] Such mists from the sea have an extraordinary influence on vegetation,[13] more in accordance with the OT descriptions than that of dew.[14] But the same term is employed, and the two phenomena were hardly differentiated.

From the two facts that it is ground-moisture, and that it bears upon life and growth, early thought developed various ideas. In connexion with the belief that growth in plants is dependent on the influence of the moon, Frazer notes that, since dew falls most thickly on cloudless nights, the inference that such deposit in particular and all moisture in general were caused by the moon was a clear result of primitive observation. Alcman says that Dew is a daughter of Zeus and the Moon. Greek and Latin folklore regarded the moon as the great source of moisture, and the sun as the great source of heat.

'As the humid power of the moon was assumed to be greater when the planet was waxing than when it was waning, they thought that timber cut during the increase of the luminary would be saturated with moisture, whereas timber cut in the wane would be comparatively dry. Hence we are told that in antiquity carpenters would reject timber felled when the moon was growing or full, because they believed that such timber teemed with sap; and in the Vosges at the present day people allege that wood cut at the new moon does not dry. In the Hebrides, peasants give the same reason for cutting their peats when the moon is on the wane; "for they observe that if they are cut in the increase, they continue still moist and never burn clear, nor are they without smoke, but the contrary is daily observed of peats cut in the decrease."'[1]

It is possible that the fact of plants growing more during the night than during the day was known at an early date. The contrast between the light of the moon and the torrid force of the sun is obvious. Plutarch observes that

'the moon, with her humid and generative light, is favourable to the propagation of animals and the growth of plants; while the sun, with his fierce fire, scorches and burns up all growing things.'[2]

Equally natural is the inference that things grow with the waxing, and decrease with the waning, of the moon. The deposition of dew on plants corroborates such observations, and introduces another line of thought. The connexion of moisture with life and growth is most strikingly proved by vegetable phenomena. Hydrostatic turgor is the essential condition of growth. Pliny's remark shows the extension of the principle to animal processes:

'Even the blood of men grows and diminishes with the light of the moon.'[3]

Thus, primitive philosophy views the moon

'as the great cause of vegetable growth, first, because the planet seems itself to grow, and second, because it is supposed to be the source of dew and moisture.'[4]

A contributory inference is the connexion of the changes of the moon with the monthly periodicity of women.[5] The Ahts and Greenlanders, like the majority of primitive peoples, regard the moon as male. The latter people believe that the moon is able to impregnate women. Girls are afraid to look long at it; no woman will sleep on her back, without first spitting on her fingers and rubbing the spittle on her stomach.[6]

The symbolism of the last-cited practice may be compared with several scattered facts. The cosmology of the Hindus, in its theory of the marriage of heaven and earth, employed the very obvious symbolism of rain as the impregnating fluid; and the soul, as the male and life-giving principle, *puruṣa*, descends in the form of rain and re-issues from men as the germ.[7] This notion of the philosophers of the Upaniṣads is but a crystallization of the general connexion of moisture with life.[8] Such ideas are in flux, and constantly passing into each other; but a tendency is clearly observable to regard dew as a sort of heavenly seed, fertilizing earth and its products, and stimulating growth.

The union of sky and earth, which results in the propagation of plant-life, is a world-wide theory; and sympathetic ritual is extensively employed to

1 Job 38^{28}. 2 2 S 17^{12}, Dt 32^{2}. 3 Hos 6^{4} 13^{3}.
4 Mic 5^{7}. 5 Pr 3^{20}.
6 Enoch (ed. Charles, Oxf. 1893) 60^{20}.
7 Dt 32^{2}, Is 18^{4}, Ps 110^{3}, Dt 33^{13}, Gn 27^{28}, Ps 133^{3}, Is 26^{19}.
8 Hos 14^{5}. 9 Ps 110^{3}. 10 2 S 1^{21}, 1 K 17^{1}, Hag 1^{10}.
11 *Palestine Explored*, pp. 129–151. 12 *EBi*, s.v. 'Dew.'
13 Cf. the δρόσος ποντία of Greece (δρόσος = 'shower' as well as 'dew'). For Syrian countries, see E. W. Lane, *Arabic Lexicon*, *s.v.* 'Ṭallā'; *Qur'ān*, ii. 267. J. G. Frazer (*Totemism and Exogamy*, 1910, i. 168 f.) describes their importance for the coast lands of Australia.
14 'The drops of dew,' Job 38^{28}; the saturation of Gideon's fleece, Jg $6^{37f.}$; the traveller's head soaked with 'dew,' Ca 5^{2}; 'showers on the grass,' Mic 5^{7}.

1 Frazer, *GB*², 1900, ii. 158 f., who quotes Plut. *Qu. conv.* iii. 10. 3; Macrob. *Saturn.* vii. 16; Roscher, *Ueber Selene u. Verwandtes*, 1890, p. 49 ff.; Pliny, *HN* ii. 223, xx. 1; Aristotle, *Probl.* xxiv. 14; Sauvé, *Folklore des Hautes Vosges*, 1889, p. 5; Martin, in Pinkerton, *Voyages and Travels*, 1808-14, xvi. 630.
2 *de Is. et Osir.* 41. 3 *HN* ii. 221. 4 *GB*² ii. 159.
5 Crawley, *Mystic Rose*, 1902, p. 197.
6 G. M. Sproat, *Scenes and Studies of Savage Life*, 1868, p. 206; H. Egede, *Descrip. of Greenland*², 1818, p. 209.
7 Max Müller, *Psychological Religion*, 1893, p. 154.
8 Crawley, *Idea of the Soul*, 1909, pp. 223, 229.

ensure and expedite it. It is, however, probable that some of the agricultural customs included in the general practice by which individuals or couples 'roll' over the fields[1] are not survivals of a ritual of sympathetic intercourse, but simply express the intention of rubbing the fertilizing dew into the ground. In Russia, for instance, the spiritual person of the priest is rolled over the sprouting crop.[2] In Holland there is still practised a custom of 'fertilizing' the crops by actual sexual intercourse. It takes place at Whitsuntide and is significantly called *dauwtroppen*, 'dew-treading.'[3] Here there is perhaps a combination, natural enough, of the two methods. Rolling in the dew may be practised for various reasons.

In Spain the custom still exists among country folk of rolling naked in the dew of the meadows on Midsummer Day. It is regarded as being preventive of skin-diseases. The same custom, with the same reason, is found in Normandy, Périgord, and the Abruzzo.[4] The vivifying power of a liquid generated under conditions of mystery is a sufficient reason for its use in medicinal and other magic. Attached to this use is a natural ascription of purifying power. It is worth noting that a good deal of the dew referred to in folklore and by poets is not dew, but water evaporated from leaves, and that this water is peculiarly pure. The people of Java are fond of washing the hair in dew to prevent greyness.[5] The custom of washing the face with dew on May morning for the promoting of beauty is still common in Europe. In Nias, dew is employed medicinally, especially by the 'priests.' A 'spiritual' power is ascribed to it.[6] In the Moluccas, various medicines are prescribed to be taken not in water but in dew.[7] Among the Thompson Indians, part of the course of training undergone by boys at puberty, by way of acquiring a guardian spirit, is rolling naked in the dew, or washing the body with branches covered with dew.[8]

Kruijt is of opinion that in East Indian belief dew is regarded as the sweat of the earth, and that its magical powers may be thus explained. Certainly the Poso word for 'dew' also connotes 'sweat'; but the general considerations referred to above and the special connexion of impregnatory power are more probable reasons, though sweat in folk-belief and custom possesses magical properties of invigoration.

In connexion with vegetation, the idea of dew is crossed with ideas of magical bloom, and even of magical food, no less than of seed. The very ethereal quality of the liquid state of dew seems to invite such focusing of analogies. Thus, in the old English custom of gathering 'May,' the blossom of the hawthorn, and the dew from the grass, and bringing them home with music,[9] the dew may be regarded as the spiritual analogue of the blossom. In the German May Day processions of the peasant youth, the dew is swept off the grass with a 'May-bush.'[10] The miraculous bloom or seed of the fern which appears on Midsummer Eve, according to European folklore, is liable, when being gathered, to vanish 'like dew on sand' or mist in the air.[11] This is not a merely descriptive, but an effective, analogy.

1 *GB*² ii. 208 f.
2 W. Mannhardt, *Mythol. Forschungen*, 1884, p. 341.
3 Van Höevell, in *Internat. Archiv f. Ethnographie*, viii. (1895) 134.
4 *GB*² iii. 297, quoting O. Acevado (letter in *Le Temps*, Sept. 1898) and Lecœur (*Esquisses du bocage normand*, 1883–87, ii. 8); de Nore (Chesnel de la Charbouclais), *Coutumes, etc., des provinces de France*, 1846, p. 150; Finamore, *Credenze, usi e costumi abruzzesi*, 1890, p. 157.
5 A. C. Kruijt, *Het Animisme in den Indischen Archipel*, 1906, p. 47.
6 Kruijt, *loc. cit.*
7 *Ib.*
8 J. Teit, 'The Thompson Indians of British Columbia,' in *Amer. Mus. of Nat. Hist.*, 1900, p. 317.
9 Dyer, *British Popular Customs*, 1876, p. 257.
10 *GB*² i. 217, quoting Kuhn and Schwartz, *Norddeutsche Sagen*, 1848.
11 *Ib.* iii. 341 ff.

The dew, in other words, is the concrete concomitant of the spiritual substance. It may be conjectured that the miraculous power, conferred by fern-seed, of discovering hidden treasure is derived from the jewel-like scintillations of dew-drops.

A good illustration of such homologies between the concrete and the spiritual is to be seen in the OT account of manna and its deposition. Like fern-seed, it came with mystery, and, like fern-seed, it was to be gathered according to rule. Its invariable antecedent was the dew, and, in the same way as it apparently crystallized out of the dew in the wilderness, so we may imagine the idea and the story of it to have crystallized out of the fluid notions concerning dew.

'At even,' says Jahweh, 'ye shall eat flesh, and in the morning ye shall be filled with bread. . . . And it came to pass at even, that the quails came up, and covered the camp: and in the morning the dew lay round about the camp. And when the dew that lay was gone up, behold, upon the face of the wilderness there lay a small round thing, as small as the hoar frost on the ground. And when the children of Israel saw it, they said one to another, It is manna (What is this?): for they wist not what it was.'[1] When the sun waxed hot, it melted. It was 'like coriander seed, white,'[2] or the colour of bdellium.[3] The connexion with dew is more precisely noted in the second account: 'And when the dew fell upon the camp in the night, the manna fell upon it.'[4] After eating the corn of the promised land, the Israelites found that the manna automatically ceased.[5] It was 'the corn of heaven'; 'angels' food' (RV 'the bread of the mighty'), and from heaven it was 'rained down.'[6] As was the case with the quails, and the water, and with the preservation of clothes, manna was a magical detail of a magically supported existence in the wilderness. The writer of Deuteronomy actually rationalizes it into moral instruction—'manna, which thou knewest not, neither did thy fathers know; that he might make thee know that man doth not live by bread only, but by every thing that proceedeth out of the mouth of the Lord doth man live.'[7] Significantly enough, the people found it unsatisfying, and they murmured: 'We remember the fish, which we did eat in Egypt for nought; the cucumbers, and the melons, and the leeks, and the onions, and the garlick: but now our soul is dried away; there is nothing at all: we have nought save this manna to look to'; 'there is no bread, and there is no water; and our soul loatheth this light bread.'[8]

The whole account, with its significant analogies, is important as illustrating the psychological process by which a concrete idea may take shape from visual perception aided by imagination. Fern-seed, which sparkles like fire, and vanishes like dew, is, we suggest, an imaginative product of dew, as elusive as its source; manna, we suggest also, is equally an imaginative product of dew, developed along another line—that of the ideas of food stimulated by starvation. Coming after or upon the dew, an ethereal light food from heaven, the food of angels, easily passing into intellectual pabulum, it is as elusive as dew in its behaviour and as unsatisfying in its results. But it supports life miraculously for those who are in a state of supernaturalism. Most certainly it is erroneous to base the story of manna upon such actual phenomena as the secretions of the *Tamarix mannifera* or other plants.[9] The comparison with coriander seed amounts merely to its standing for the *essence* of bread.[10]

These ideas may be more closely illustrated. The people of Halmahera hold that dew is the food of spirits.[11] In Minahassa it is said that the first man fed on dew.[12] Further, an essentially spiritual connexion is claimed for dew. The people last cited believe that the final end of the soul of man is to be merged in dew. The Balinese hold that the soul returns to earth, after being dissipated into the air by the cremation of the body, in the form of dew.[13] The Toradja belief is that the soul dies eight or nine deaths before it finally changes into water and disappears in mist.[14] The

1 Ex 16^{12-15}.
2 Ex 16^{31}.
3 Nu 11^{7}.
4 Nu 11^{9}.
5 Jos 5^{12}.
6 Ps 78^{24-25}.
7 Dt 8^{3}.
8 Nu $11^{5.6}$ 21^{5}.
9 Crawley, *Idea of the Soul*, 228 f.
10 Wilkinson, *Anc. Egyptians*, 1878, i. 177.
11 Kruijt, *op. cit.* 47.
12 *Ib.*
13 *Ib.* 47.
14 *Ib.* 163.

following beliefs are particularly significant. The Sea Dayaks report that souls die seven times after the death of the body.

'After having become degenerated by these successive dyings, they become practically annihilated by absorption into air and fog, or by a final dissolution into various jungle plants not recognized by any name.' [1]

The Olo-Ngadju and other peoples of the East Indian Islands speak of the souls of the dead as passing into plants. The Mualang Daraks say that the soul after a time dies, and then descends upon the rice in the form of dew. The more souls there are to descend upon it, the richer is the rice-harvest.[2] In reference to manna, it may be noted that the East Indians believe that, if the soul of the rice be absent, the grain has no nutritive property; a man may eat it but will never be satisfied.[3] The soul of the Lushai turns into water, and evaporates as dew. If dew falls on a man, his child will be a re-incarnation of the dead.[4]

Here the ideas of moisture in relation to life, and of unindividualized haze or mist, out of which individual forms are precipitated, meet again in dew. Thus, while the Hill Toradjas believe the soul to pass into a cloud, the Samoans believe it to be 'the daughter' of 'vapour of the land' which forms clouds; and the Tracey Islanders say that the first man was created out of vapour.[5] Thus the descent of the soul to earth and its ascent, after the death of the body, to heaven have been, in the evolution of religious thought, not only compared to, but identified with, the rise and fall of the dew. The identification has served the complex purpose of explaining the process of dew-formation and that of the nutritive physiology of plants, and incidentally the origin and end of the soul of man. The Gorontalese of Celebes apply an instructive analogy to the relations of the four souls of man. The greatest of these resides in the brain, and is 'like the sea.' Part of it is separated in the form of moisture and produces dew. The ascending dew is *rahmani*; this is the second soul, *njawa rahmani*, residing above the heart. The dew which ascends to the sky is *rohani*, the third soul, 'lustre of breath,' residing in the heart; the dew which descends as rain is *djasmani*, the fourth soul, 'soul of the body,' residing in the whole body.[6] This account illustrates the spiritual potentiality of the idea of dew.

There was a special development of the ideas of dew in both the Athenian and the Hebrew religions.

(1) In Athenian mythology, Herse (Dew) and Pandrosos (All-dewy) are daughters of Cecrops and Agraulos. A rite, termed 'Αρρηφορία or 'Ερσηφορία, was performed in honour of Athene. Little is known either of Herse or the rite which seems to bear her name, or of Pandrosos.[7] The statement of Moeris, that the ἀρρηφόροι 'carried dew to Herse' in the *Arrhephoria* is uncorroborated.[8] But the *arrhephoroi*, or *hersephoroi*, are verified as 'maidens trained in the service of Athena, and living near the temple of Athena Polias.'[9] In the *Arrhephoria* they 'brought a mysterious offering by an underground passage from the temple of Aphrodite ἐν Κήποις,' not to Herse, or to Pandrosos, but to Athene. Farnell concludes that

'the fruits of the earth appear to have been in some way consecrated' to Athene. 'It is also evident that at Athens she came into some contact with the earth-goddess. . . . To reconcile her cult with Athena's, it may well have happened that the latter goddess was given two of her titles,' namely, Pandrosos and Herse.

Pandrosos is thus no individual spirit, nor originally an epithet of Athene, but an epithet of the Earth Goddess, in reference to her dewy covering and its connexion with the growth of the crops. The ceremony embodying this connexion was transferred to the centralized deity of Attica—Athene. The dew-carriers are mentioned in inscriptions,[1] but there is no such verification of the existence of Herse. She is apparently a mere name, developed from the terms 'Ερσηφόροι and 'Ερσηφορία.[2] But it is a question what these terms themselves imply.

The story of Erichthonios being given to the three sisters, Herse, Pandrosos, and Agraulos, to nurse, Pandrosos alone being faithful to her trust, is explained by Miss Harrison as an ætiological myth, invented to account for the rite of *Arrhephoria* or *Hersephoria*. The scholiast on Aristoph. *Lysistrata*, 64, observes: 'Some say, on account of the α, it is ἀρρηφαρία, because maidens carry "nameless things" (ἄρρητα); others, on account of the ε, ἑρσηφαρία, because maidens walk in procession in honour of Herse, daughter of Cecrops.' The terms δρόσος and ἕρση are also used for the young of animals, such as lambs and sucking pigs.[3] A remarkable feature of the *Thesmophoria*, another ritual performed by women alone, and also in connexion with the fertility of the crops, was the casting of pigs into μέγαρα or ἄδυτα, underground chasms, and the bringing out of the rotten flesh, presumably the following year. These services were performed by the *thesmophoroi*, and the flesh was used, as in many agricultural customs, as a magical fertilizer of the fields. Miss Harrison suggests that the ἕρσαι or δρόσοι 'carried' by the *hersephoroi* were young animals, and that they were used in a manner and for a purpose similar to those of the *Thesmophoria*.[4] The *Arrhephoria* is certainly associated with the *Thesmophoria* and *Skirophoria*, and it is in accordance with the principles of myth-formation that, as she suggests, both the name Herse and the story of Erichthonios should have been invented to explain a rite that had become mysterious.

Preller, on the other hand, had regarded Herse as a Dew Goddess—a personification of the Dew.[5] Later German scholars regard her as a nymph of the same class as Auxo and Thallo—personifications of the 'growth' of the crops.[6] No reliance is to be placed on the scholiast's reference to ἄρρητα. Any 'mysterious,' that is, ritual, object—even a branch laden with dew—might be styled ἄρρητον, just as much as a young animal or its flesh. And the word ἕρση has the forms ἕρρη and ἄρρη, hence ἀρρηφορία and ἐρρηφορία. ἕρση as a 'young thing' is a metaphor, *a priori* later in origin than a primitive agricultural ritual, and therefore unlikely to be the original meaning of the name of the ceremony. The scholiast on Aristophanes says: 'Maidens walk in procession in honour of Herse'; there is here no mention of dew, but he may have known that the maidens carried branches laden with dew, and omitted to mention the fact, branch-carrying being a regular detail of processions.

Ottfried Müller suggested that the *arrhephoroi* carried simply leafy branches wet with dew, symbolical of a petition for a supply of dew during the heat of summer.[7]

Thus we have a ceremony similar to the wide-spread European custom of carrying May boughs dipped in dew.[8] In these and in the Athenian custom there may have been a magical demand for dew rather than a prayer for it, but the branch is the important object, the focus of the demand for growth and fruitfulness of the crops; and the dew may be merely an accessary. This explanation, on the whole, seems the most probable. Herse may be unreal as a deity, but the fact remains that the Athenian mythologists, if not the Athenian priests, actually personified the Dew, while the *hersephoroi* certainly carried something in procession. Though unverified, Moeris' statement may have hit the truth, and what they carried may have been dew. Here it is possibly significant that the *arrhephoroi* carried their offering from the temple of Aphrodite ἐν Κήποις. The dew-laden branches may have grown in the gardens of the goddess of procreation, and possibly the generative symbolism

1 Perham, in H. Ling Roth, *The Natives of Sarawak*, 1896, i. 213.
2 Kruijt, *op. cit.* 383 f.
3 *Ib.* 145.
4 *Census of India*, 1903, i. 225.
5 *Ib.* 383; G. Turner, *Samoa*, 1884, p. 282 f. See also Crawley, *Idea of the Soul*, 228 f.
6 Kruijt, *op. cit.* 13.
7 Frazer, *Pausan.* ii. 344 f., gives the known facts.
8 *s.v.* 'Ερρηφόροι (ed. Koch, 130).
9 Farnell, *CGS* i. 289.

1 *CIA* iii. 319: 'Ερσηφάραι.
2 J. E. Harrison, *Mythol. and Monuments of Anc. Athens*, 1890, p. xxx.
3 Cf. Æsch. *Agam.* 141; Artemis is kind to the δρόσοι of fierce creatures.
4 *Op. cit.* xxx ff.
5 *Gr. Mythol.*[3] i. 173.
6 Roscher, *s.v.* 'Herse.'
7 Daremberg-Saglio, *s.v.* 'Arrhephoria.'
8 *GB*[2] i. 196 ff.

of dew was a factor in the ritual (see above). The dew would thus serve to impregnate the fields.

In the case of Apollo *Hersos* at Vari, the epithet seems to be of the same character as *Pandrosos*.

(2) The post-Biblical literature and ritual of the Hebrews show an interesting development of the ideas of the OT concerning dew. The Book of Enoch, after describing the dwelling of the spirit of the dew, and the connexion between its clouds and the clouds of the mist,[1] speaks of 'winds coming from the middle of the twelve portals'; these bring 'beneficial dew of prosperity'; from other portals, 'hurtful dew' emerges, accompanied by locusts and other calamities.[2] So the Rabbinical writings state that 'in the sixth heaven, Makon, there are treasuries of hurtful dews and of beneficial dewdrops.'[3] A prayer is offered between *Pesaḥ* and *Shābû'ôth* that God may preserve the people from the hurtful dews.[4] The two loaves of bread 'waved' on *Shābû'ôth* are a symbolic petition to the Ruler of heaven and earth and the four winds, to withhold the unpropitious winds and dews.[5] As for the dew of blessing, thus fluctuating between the material and the moral, it is said that, since the destruction of the Temple, no dew of unmixed blessing falls[6]—apparently on account of the cessation of the tithes and the heave-offering.[7] Dew falls as a heavenly gift, and by the merit of no man.[8] Yet only on account of Israel does dew come as a blessing upon the world; on account of Jacob or of Job.[8] God promised Abraham under an oath never to let dew cease to bless his descendants, and therefore the words of Elijah could not stop its fall.[10]

The Dew of the Resurrection is a remarkable concentration of these ideas, originating chiefly from a passage of Isaiah: 'Awake and sing, ye that dwell in the dust: for thy dew is as the dew of herbs, and the earth shall cast forth the dead.'[11] The passage, 'Thou, O God, didst send a plentiful rain, thou didst confirm thine inheritance, when it was weary,'[12] was interpreted to refer to an incident at the giving of the Law:

'When God appeared amidst the trembling of the earth on Sinai, life fled from the people of Israel and from all the living people in the land of Israel; and the angels said: "Dost Thou desire to give Thy Law unto the dead or unto the living?" Then God dropped the dew of Resurrection upon all, and they revived.'[13]

This Dew of the Resurrection is stored up in '*Arabot*, the highest heaven;[14] and by it the dead are revived.[15]

In the modern Hebrew liturgies *Geshem*, 'rain,' and *Ṭal*, 'dew,' have an important place, though the prayers for them are 'regarded rather as an affirmation of the Divine control of the seasons.'[16] On the first day of Passover, *Ṭal* is substituted for *Geshem*. On this and other occasions for *Ṭal*, the reader of *Musaf* puts on the white shroud and cap, as on the Day of Atonement. The Talmudists decided that the actual prayer for rain—'Give dew and rain for a blessing upon the face of the earth'—should be introduced only at the inception of the rainy season. The melodies accompanying *Geshem* and *Ṭal* are various throughout Europe, and are distinguished by a quaint charm.[17]

LITERATURE.—K. Kohler, L. N. Dembitz, F. L. Cohen, in *JE*, *s.vv.* 'Dew,' 'Geshem'; T. K. Cheyne, art. 'Dew,' in *EBi*; J. Neil, *Palestine Explored*, 1882; E. Hull, art. 'Dew,' in *HDB*; J. G. Frazer, *GB*², 1900, *Pausanias*, 1900; L. Preller, *Griechische Mythologie*³, 1872–75; Roscher, *s.v.* 'Tau'; L. R. Farnell, *CGS*, vol. i. [1896]; J. E. Harrison, *Mythol. and Monuments of Ancient Athens*, 1890; A. C. Kruijt, *Het Animisme in den Ind. Archipel*, 1906.

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[1] En. 60²⁰.
[2] 78ff..
[3] *Ḥag.* 12*b*.
[4] *Lev. R.* 28.
[5] *Ib.*; *Suk.* 37*b*.
[6] *Śōṭa* ix. 12.
[7] *Shab.* 32*b*.
[8] Jerus. *Ta an.* i. 63*d*; *Ber.* v. 9*b*.
[9] *Gen. R.* 66.
[10] Jerus. *Ta'an. l.c.*; Bab. *Ta'an.* 3*a*, *b*.
[11] Is 26¹⁹.
[12] Ps 68⁹.
[13] K. Kohler, in *JE*, *s.v.* 'Dew.'
[14] *Ḥag.* 12*b*.
[15] Jerus. *Ber.* v. 0*b*, *Ta'an.* i. 63*d*.
[16] L. N. Dembitz and F. L. Cohen, in *JE*, *s.v.* 'Geshem.'
[17] *JE*, *locc. citt.*

DHAMMAPĀLA.—This epithet means 'Defender of the Faith'; it has been chosen as an honorary title by Buddhist kings, and as their name in religion by members of the Buddhist Order, but laymen do not use it. As a royal title it has been traced only in N. India and Burma (*Buddhaghoṣuppatti*, 11, 21); as a name for *bhikkhus* it has been fairly prevalent in India and Ceylon from the 6th cent. B.C. down to the present day. A Dhammapāla is included among the *theras* ('elders') contemporary with the Buddha, to whom are ascribed the poems preserved in the *Therīgāthā*; and several others are mentioned as the authors of minor works of later date. The only one who played an important part in the history of the religion is distinguished from the others by the special title of *Āchariya*, 'the Teacher.'

In the colophons to those of his works that have so far been edited we find two statements: (1) that he claimed to have followed the traditional interpretation of his texts as handed down in the Great Minster at Anurādhapura in Ceylon; and (2) that his life was spent at the Badara Tittha-Vihāra. And from the *Sāsana-vaṃsa* (p. 33) we learn that this place was in the Tamil country, not far from Ceylon. It would seem, therefore, that Dhammapāla was educated at the same university as Buddhaghoṣa, and that he was a Tamil by birth and lived and wrote in South India.

The first of these conclusions is confirmed by the published works of the two writers. They have very similar views, they appeal to the same authorities, they have the same method of exegesis, they have reached the same stage in philological and etymological science (a stage far beyond that reached at that time in Europe), they have the same lack of any knowledge of the simplest rules of the higher criticism. So far as we can at present judge, they must have been trained in the same school.

As to the second point—the birth and life of Dhammapāla in South India—we have a curious confirmation from outside. Yüan Chwāng visited Kāñchīpura, the capital of the Tamil country, in A.D. 640. The brethren there told him that Dhammapāla had been born there.

'He was a boy of good natural parts which received great development as he grew up. When he came of age, a daughter of the king was assigned to him as wife. But on the night before the ceremony of marriage was to be performed, being greatly distressed in mind, he prayed earnestly before an image of the Buddha. In answer to his prayer a god bore him away to a mountain monastery some hundreds of *li* from the capital. When the brethren there heard his story, they complied with his request and gave him ordination.'[1]

It is true that the English translators of Yüan Chwāng use the Sanskritized form of the name (Dharmapāla). This would not necessarily show that the Chinese pilgrim applied the story to a person different from our Dhammapāla; for both he and his translators frequently give the Sanskritized form (which they imagine to be more correct) for Pāli names of persons and places. But Yüan Chwāng adds the title *Phusa* (that is, *Bodhisattva*). This shows that he applied the story to the teacher of his own teacher, a Dharmapāla who had been a famous dignitary of the university of Nālandā in North India, and who must have flourished at the end of the 6th century. To him he would naturally and properly apply this title, which was used among the Mahāyāna Buddhists in a sense about equivalent to our honorary degree of D.D.

But it is much more probable that the Kāñchīpura *bhikkhus* told the story of their own distinguished

[1] Watters, *Yuan Chwāng*, ii. 226.

colleague, and that the pilgrim, who knew nothing of him, misapplied it.[1] In any case the two scholars are quite distinct. Their views differed as widely as those of a Calvinist and a Catholic; one wrote in Pāli, the other in Sanskrit; one was trained at Anurādhapura, the other at Nālandā; and the Pāli scholar was about a century older than the Sanskrit one, the one having flourished in the last quarter of the 5th cent., the other in the last quarter of the 6th.

The *Gandha-vaṃsa*, a very late librarian's catalogue, enumerates (p. 60) 14 works ascribed to Dhammapāla. Even the bare names are full of interest. Whereas Buddhaghosa commented on the five principal prose works in the Canon, seven of Dhammapāla's works are commentaries on the principal books of poetry preserved in the Canon, two others are sub-commentaries on Buddhaghoṣa's works, and two more are sub-commentaries on commentaries not written by Buddhaghoṣa. This shows the importance attached, at that period in the history of the orthodox Buddhists, to the work of re-writing in Pāli the commentaries hitherto handed down in the local dialects, such as Sinhalese and Tamil.

In his own commentaries, Dhammapāla follows a regular scheme. First comes an Introduction to the whole collection of poems, giving the traditional account of how it came to be put together. Then each poem is taken separately. After explaining how, when, and by whom it was composed, each clause in the poem is quoted and explained philologically and exegetically. These explanations are indispensable for a right understanding of the difficult texts with which he deals. The remaining three works are two commentaries on the *Netti*, the oldest Pāli work not included in the Canon, and a psychological treatise.

Of these 14 works by Dhammapāla, three (the commentaries on the *Therīgāthā* and on the *Peta-* and *Vimāna-vatthus*) have been published in full by the Pāli Text Society; and an edition of a fourth, his comment on the *Therigāthā*, is being prepared. Hardy and Windisch, in their editions of the texts, have also given extracts from his comments on the *Netti* and the *Iti-vuttaka*.

It is evident, from Yüan Chwāng's account of his stay in the Tamil country, that in Dhammapāla's time it was preponderatingly Buddhist, and that of the non-Buddhists the majority were Jains. It is now all but exclusively Hindu. We have only the vaguest hints as to when and how this remarkable change was brought about.

LITERATURE.—*Gandha-vaṃsa*, ed. Minayeff, *PTS*, 1886; *Buddhaghoṣuppatti*, ed. J. Gray, London, 1892; *Sāsana-vaṃsa*, ed. M. Bode, 1897; T. Watters, *On Yüan Chwāng*, ed. Rhys Davids and S. W. Bushell, London, 1905; *Therīgāthā Commentary*, ed. G. Muller, 1892; *Peta-vatthu Commentary*, ed. E. Hardy, do. 1894; *Vimāna-vatthu Commentary*, ed. E. Hardy, do. 1901.

T. W. RHYS DAVIDS.

DHARMA.—Sacred law and duty, justice, religious merit. This is one of the most comprehensive and important terms in the whole range of Sanskrit literature. Indian commentators have explained it as denoting an act which produces the quality of the soul called *apūrva*, the cause of heavenly bliss and of final liberation. In ordinary usage, however, it has a far wider meaning than this, and may denote established practice or custom of any caste or community. One of the six systems of philosophy, the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*, expressly professes to teach *dharma*. The special manuals of the sacred law, of which the Code of Manu is the most familiar example, are called *dharmaśāstra*, 'lawbooks,' or *smṛti*, 'records of tradition.' Dharma personified is the god of justice and judge of the dead. Adharma, the god of injustice, is his adversary. The ordeal of Dharma and Adharma consists in drawing lots from an earthen vessel. One lot contains a white figure of Dharma, and the other a black figure of Adharma. In Buddhism, Dharma is one of the three members of the trinity (*triratna*, 'the three jewels'): Buddha, the law, and the priesthood. The worship of Dharma, which is largely prevalent in Western Bengal at the present day, appears to be a remnant of Buddhism. See *Census of India*, 1901, vol. vi. p. 204; cf. LAW AND LAWBOOKS (Hindu).

J. JOLLY.

[1] This question is discussed at length by E. Hardy in *ZDMG* li. (1898) 100-127.

DHINODHAR.—A sacred hill in Western India situated in the State of Cutch. A ridiculous legend explains the name to mean 'the patiently bearing,' because the saint Dharamnāth, weighed down by the load of his sins, determined to mortify the flesh by standing on his head upon some sacred hill. Two hills burst asunder under the weight of his iniquities; but Dhinodhar stood the test, and thus gained its name. The saint founded a monastery here and established the order of the Kanphaṭā, or 'ear-pierced' Jogīs. The stone on which the saint is reported to have done penance is smeared with vermilion and venerated, and the head of the community when he comes to worship is received with adoration by the people of the neighbourhood and by pilgrims who flock to the holy place.

LITERATURE.—*Bombay Gazetteer*, v. [1880] 220.

W. CROOKE.

DHYĀNA (Pāli *jhāna*).—**1. Meditation, or dhyāna, in Sanskrit.**—This is a religious practice which presupposes a life in retirement, and concentration of mind upon a single thought. In the Rigvedic period we find penance (*tapas*) or bodily mortification,[1] but in the Upaniṣad or post-Upaniṣad religious schools the idea was transferred from body to mind, until it took the form of *dhyāna*, which began with a meditation on the sacred syllable *Om*. The object, method, and other details of meditation vary in different schools, but we may safely say that it has been and is the universal method of the mental culture of all Indian religious schools. The use of the word *dhyāna*, too, is not very definite even in the Upaniṣads themselves. Sometimes it is different from *yoga* (concentration), which is a general term for such practices, or synonymous with it, or sometimes it is a part of the *yoga* practice. See art. YOGA. We shall here limit ourselves to the idea of *dhyāna* in Buddhism.

2. Dhyāna and samādhi.—In Buddhism *dhyāna* forms an important factor in religious practice. First of all, we must clearly distinguish *dhyāna* (meditation) from *samādhi* (absorption), for a confusion of the two terms often leads to hopeless misunderstanding. Generally speaking, meditation on an object becomes absorption when subject and object, the meditater and the meditated, are so completely blended into one that the consciousness of the separate subject altogether disappears. To attain Arhat-ship is to reach the tranquil state of *samādhi* without being affected at all by outward environment and inward sinful thought. An Arhat is accordingly called the *Samāhita* ('tranquil'). *Samādhi* forms the fourth factor of the Five Forces (*bala*) and the Five Faculties (*indriya*); the sixth of the Seven Constituents of Bodhi (*bodhyaṅga*); and the eighth of the Noble Eightfold Path (*mārga*).[2] To attain *samādhi* is therefore the sole object of Buddhists, and *dhyāna* is one of the most important means leading to that end. The common classification of *dhyāna* into four degrees (see below) probably prevailed already in the pre-Buddhist period. At any rate the mention of the fourfold *dhyāna* in the *Mahābhārata* (XII. cxcv. 1), the counting among heretics of

[1] *e.g.* Rigv. x. 109. 4, 154. 2, etc.

[2] See *Mahāvyutpatti*, §§ 41-44; and Childers, *Pali Dict.* 1875, *s.v.* 'Bala,' 'Indriya,' 'Bojjhaṅga,' and 'Magga,' and cf. art. SAMĀDHI.

those who regard each of the four *dhyānas* as the state of Nirvāṇa in the *Brahma-jāla-sutta*, and the reference to a Ṛṣi, senior to the Buddha, practising the eight *samāpattis* (four *dhyānas* and four *ārūpyas*) in the *Jātaka*, seem to point to the fact that the practice of the four *dhyānas* was common to both Brahmans and Buddhists. It was the Buddha's part to adapt it by adding some further steps to the four *dhyānas*.[1]

3. Religious practices preliminary to dhyāna.—*Dhyāna*, as stated above, is divided into four degrees in Buddhism. Even the first and lowest of the four *dhyānas* corresponds in its quality to a state higher than the sixth of the eight constituents of *yoga* (*yoga-aṅga*). To reach the first *dhyāna* several preliminary practices are needed. These correspond to the first five constituents of *yoga*. First of all one has to keep precepts and rules (*śīla*) laid down by the Buddha (*yama* of the *yoga-aṅgas*); secondly, to keep one's body and mind pure and serene, living in solitary retirement away from the people, in a forest or a cave (*niyama*), and sitting cross-legged, always thinking on a religious subject (*āsana*). There are several methods of preparatory meditation, according to the ability of the meditater. We shall give a few examples. A quick-tempered novice should practise the meditation on love (Pāli *mettā-karuṇā-bhāvanā*), in which he is to regard all sentient beings as his parents or brothers, desiring their happiness and welfare, as all the good he would seek for himself. A novice who needs concentration of attention should practise at first the method of counting the number of his inspirations and expirations (Pāli *ānāpāna-sati*, corresponding to the *prāṇāyāma* of the *yoga-aṅga*). Another novice whose impure desire is hard to suppress should meditate on the impurity and impermanence of the human body (Pāli *asubhā-bhāvanā*). Another novice whose mind is stupid should practise self-culture by meditating on the Twelve Chains of Causation. In this way a Buddhist should give himself to some kind of meditation at the outset. Ten *kasiṇas*,[2] ten *anussati*,[3] four or six *anussati-ṭṭhānas*,[4] in fact, the processes of the so-called *kamma-ṭṭhānas* (analytic meditation), are all preparatory to the practice of the right *dhyānas*.

4. Details of the four meditations.—When one gets accustomed to a concentration of mind amounting to a suppressing of the senses, one gradually attains the state of ecstasy, which is often compared with the feelings of a debt being paid off or of a prisoner being released (e.g. *Sāmañña-sutta*). Roughly speaking, this state of ecstasy is *dhyāna*, yet in it we have still four successive states. (*a*) The first *dhyāna* is a state of joy and gladness born of seclusion, full of reflexion and investigation, the meditater having separated himself from all sensuality and sin. (*b*) The second *dhyāna* is a state of joy and gladness born of deep tranquillity, without reflexion and investigation, these being suppressed; it is the tranquillizing of thought, the predominance of intuition. (*c*) In the third *dhyāna* the meditater is patient through gladness and the destruction of passion, joyful and conscious, aware in his body of that delight which the Arhats announce, patient, recollecting, glad. (*d*) The fourth *dhyāna* is purity of equanimity and recollection, without sorrow and without joy, by the destruction of previous gladness and grief, by the rejection of joy and the rejection of sorrow.[1]

Childers (p. 169) explains the four states with reference to the process of meditation:—'He concentrates his mind upon a single thought. Gradually his soul becomes filled with a supernatural ecstasy and serenity, while his mind still reasons upon and investigates the subject chosen for contemplation; this is the first *jhāna*. Still fixing his thoughts upon the same subject, he then frees his mind from reasoning and investigation, while the ecstasy and serenity remain, and this is the second *jhāna*. Next, his thoughts still fixed as before, he divests himself of ecstasy, and attains the third *jhāna*, which is a state of tranquil serenity. Lastly, he passes to the fourth *jhāna*, in which the mind, exalted and purified, is indifferent to all emotion, alike of pleasure and of pain.'

This has been very conveniently summed up by Pāli commentators as follows:—'The first *jhāna* is accompanied by reflexion (*vitakka*), investigation (*vichāra*), joy (*pīti*), gladness (*sukha*), and attention (*chittekaggatā*); the second *jhāna* is accompanied by joy, gladness, and attention; the third *jhāna* is accompanied by gladness and attention; the fourth *jhāna* is accompanied by indifference (*upekha*).'

The four thus form progressive steps of meditation in which we can go up step by step. Each of the first three is further divided into three orders—initial (*paritta*), medial (*majjhima*), and final (*paṇīta*); the fourth *dhyāna* alone is the immovable state, free from all the eight troubles—inspiration, respiration, reflexion, investigation, sorrow, pleasure, pain, and joy.

The Buddhist cosmological arrangement of *Rūpa-loka* (world with form), divided into sixteen heavens, is made to suit those who have attained the four *dhyānas*, and who can freely enjoy the heavenly life either before or after death. The state of *samādhi* resulting from each of the four *dhyānas* determines one's position in the heavens, which are generally assigned as follows:—

Rūpa-loka-heavens.[2]

1. Brahma-pārisajjā devā		First Dhyāna heavens.
2. Brahma-purohitā	,,	
3. Mahābrahmā	,,	
4. Parittābhā	,,	Second Dhyāna heavens.
5. Appamāṇābhā	,,	
6. Ābhassarā	,,	
7. Paritta-subhā	,,	Third Dhyāna heavens.
8. Appamāṇa-subhā	,,	
9. Subha-kiṇṇā	,,	
10. Vehapphalā	,,	Fourth Dhyāna heavens.
11. Asañña-sattā	,,	
12. Avihā	,,	
13. Atappā	,,	
14. Sudassā	,,	
15. Sudassī	,,	
16. Akaniṭṭhā	,,	

5. The effect of meditation.—The aim of meditation is the attainment of Arhat-ship, perfect enlightenment, which possesses the following merits. (*a*) Extinction of desire (*taṇhā*). The fickle thought and indulgence of physical power produce sin and illusion, which are the chief obstacles to the acquisition of Arhat-ship. The complete annihilation of sinful thought, *i.e.* the state of the fourth meditation, will lead to perfect enlightenment, the highest aim of the Buddhist. The first three *dhyānas* therefore belong to *sekho* (the first seven grades of the Holy Paths), while the fourth belongs only to an *asekho*, i.e. an Arhat.

(*b*) Consolidation of knowledge (*ñāṇa-dassana*). The practice of *dhyāna* will naturally lead to the easy concentration of the mental faculties on a certain thought, and strengthen special functions proper to the consciousness. The right understanding of the Four Noble Truths (*ariya-sachcha*), the cultivation of the four *appamaññā*,[3] etc., can

[1] *Dīgha-nikāya*, i. 36–38, 45–46; *Lalita-vistara*, ed. Mitra, p. 147.

[2] Childers, *s.v.* It is a mystic meditation in which one reduces the universe to any of the ten predominant ideas, viz. earth, water, fire, air, ether, blue, yellow, red, white, black.

[3] Childers, *s.v.* 'Kammaṭṭhāna.' It is a remembrance of Buddha, *dharma*, *saṅgha*, precepts, gifts, gods, breaths, body, death, and nirvāṇa.

[4] Childers, *s.v.* It embraces recollections of Buddha, *saṅgha*, *dharma*, precepts, gifts, and gods.

[1] Rhys Davids, *Buddhism*, London, 1899, pp. 175–176.

[2] Buddhist cosmology assumes the existence of three heavenly worlds: (1) *Kāma-loka* (world of love), consisting of six grades; (2) *Rūpa-loka* (world of form), in sixteen grades; and (3) *Arūpa-loka* (world without form), in four grades. The last can be enjoyed only by one who has reached Arhat-ship. See, further, art. COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY (Buddhist).

[3] *Appamaññā* is the unlimited exercise of the qualities of friendliness (*mettā*), compassion (*karuṇā*), goodwill (*muditā*), equanimity (*upekhā*).

be attained only by the practice of *dhyāna*. Especially the all-important *appamaññā*, which is common to Buddhism and the *yoga* philosophy, can be exercised only by the medium of *dhyānas*. In short, the attainment of knowledge cannot be perfectly accomplished, according to the Buddhist theory, without practice of meditation.

(*c*) Acquisition of superhuman faculties (*iddhi*). There are six supernatural powers (*abhiññā*), viz. various magical powers (*iddhividhā*), divine ear (*dibbasota*), divine eye (*dibbachakhu*), knowledge of the thought of others (*parachittavijānana*), knowledge of the former existences (*pubbenivāsānussati-ñāṇa*), and knowledge which causes the destruction of human passion (*āsavakkhayakara-ñāna*). These may be perfected by meditation. The *Yogins*, too, expect *vibhūti* (superhuman faculties) by means of meditation.

(*d*) Enjoyment of the peace of *dhyāna*. Meditation gives the tranquillity of rest. The dying Buddha is said to have sunk in meditation and passed all its steps forward and backward, till at last he reposed at the fourth meditation, and then went into the Great Decease (*Parinibbāna*).[1] *Dhyāna* is practised by one with the purpose of cultivating oneself, but at the same time with the aim of reposing oneself in peace, utilizing the result of it. Therefore it is sometimes called the 'practice of great enjoyment' (cf. *Brahmavihāra*).

6. Development of the idea of meditation.—*Dhyāna* in primitive Buddhism is a means of attaining *samādhi*. In the Mahāyāna school its scope has been very much widened. The *dhyāna-pāramitā*, the fifth of the six *pāramitās* (perfections) is only the way for the Bodhisattvas or Mahāyānists, but not for an Arhat or Hīnayānist. One of Nāgārjuna's works[2] enumerates sixteen kinds of *dhyāna* confined to Bodhisattvas. Asaṅga's *Yogāchārabhūmi* mentions nine *dhyānas*, and again subdivides them into thirty-nine.[3] Further, in the *Laṅkāvatāra sūtra* (ch. 2), *dhyāna* is divided into four: (1) *bālāpichārika*, 'practised by ordinary persons'; (2) *arthapravichaya*, 'contemplating of objects'; (3) *tathatālambana*, 'meditating on Truth'; (4) *tathāgata*, 'meditation of Buddha.' The four *dhyānas* of primitive Buddhism as well as those of the Yogins are all included in the first category, the remaining three being a development in the Mahāyāna schools.

The ideal of early Buddhism is the equilibrium of morals (*śīla*), meditation (*dhyāna*), and knowledge (*prajñā*); but in later Buddhism the balance was not supposed to be an important feature for a Buddhist, and meditation came to have more weight than the other two factors, until in China and Japan there arose a sect, the Zen (Japanese for *dhyāna*), in which it is the most essential part of the entire teaching. This sect has been gaining ground more and more, especially among the upper classes. See art. ZEN.

LITERATURE.—The literature has been indicated throughout the article. M. ANESAKI and J. TAKAKUSU.

DIGAMBARAS.—The Digambaras, also called Digvasanas, form one of the two branches of the Jains. The name, lit. = 'clothed in the quarters of the sky,' designates them as naked monks, in contradistinction to the monks of the other branch of the Jains, the Śvetāmbaras, who wear white clothes. There is very little difference between these two branches as regards the creed; indeed, one of the most authoritative books of the Digambaras, the *Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra* by Umāsvāti, is also one of the standard books of the Śvetāmbaras, and its author most probably was a Śvetāmbara.

[1] Cf. Warren, *Buddhism*, Camb., Mass., 1896, p. 109 f.
[2] Nanjio, no. 1181. [3] *Ib.*, no. 1170, ch. 43.

The peculiar tenets of the Digambaras are the following. (1) Perfect saints (*kevalins*), such as the Tīrthakaras, live without food. (2) The embryo of Mahāvīra, the last Tīrthakara, was not removed from the womb of Devānandā to that of Triśalā, as the Śvetāmbaras contend. (3) A monk who owns any property, *e.g.* wears clothes, cannot reach Nirvāṇa. (4) No woman can reach Nirvāṇa. Though, therefore, the difference in matters of belief between the two sects is, from our point of view, rather trifling, still the division between them is very marked. The following points deserve to be specially noticed. The Digambaras disown the canonical books of the Śvetāmbaras, and contend that they have gradually been lost during the first centuries after the Nirvāṇa of Mahāvīra; accordingly they have no canonical books of their own. In consequence of their having, in early times, separated from the other sect and developed independently of it, the Digambaras have an ecclesiastical as well as a literary history of their own, and have religious ceremonies, especially with regard to the laity, which differ from those of their rivals.

As regards the origin of the Digambara sect, it is ascribed by the Śvetāmbaras to Śivabhūti, who started the heretical sect of the 'Boṭikas' in 609 after the Nirvāṇa, or A.D. 83. This report is denied by the Digambaras; they maintain that they have preserved the original practices, but that, under the eighth successor of Mahāvīra, Bhadrabāhu, a sect with laxer principles arose; and that this sect, which was called that of the Ardhaphālakas, developed 136 years after Vikrama, or A.D. 80, into the present sect of Śvetāmbaras (*ZDMG* xxxviii. [1884] 7 ff.).

The Digambaras are most numerous in Southern India, where they must have held an important position in the early centuries of our era; for in the literature of the Dravidian people the influence of Jainism is admitted by the specialists. It may be mentioned that the Digambaras have an extensive literature of their own, chiefly in Sanskrit, which goes back to a greater antiquity than that of the Śvetāmbaras, if we except the canonical books of the latter. For further details, the reader is referred to the art. JAINISM. H. JACOBI.

DINKA.—1. Geographical distribution and organization.—The Dinka are a congeries of independent tribes spread over a vast area, stretching from Renk in the north (scarcely 300 miles south of Khartum) to within 100 miles of Gondokoro, and reaching many miles to the west in the Bahr el-Ghazal Province. All these tribes call themselves *Jieng* or *Jenge*, corrupted by the Arabs into *Dinka*; but no Dinka nation has arisen, for the tribes have never recognized a supreme chief, as do their neighbours the Shilluk, nor have they ever been united under a military despot, as the Zulus were united under Chaka. They differ in manners and customs and even in physique, and are often at war with one another. One of the most obvious distinctions in habits is between the relatively powerful cattle-owning Dinka and the small and comparatively poor tribes who have no cattle and scarcely cultivate the ground, but live in the marshes in the neighbourhood of the Sudd, and depend largely for their sustenance on fishing and hippopotamus-hunting. Their villages, generally dirty and evil-smelling, are built on ground which rises but little above the reed-covered surface of the country. The members of these poor tribes call themselves Moin Tain, *i.e.* 'Tain people,' *tain* meaning a piece of dry ground in the midst of the marshes; and, although many quite distinct tribes live in the marshes and lead the life this habitat entails, their cattle-owning neighbours

speak of them all as Moin Tain, just as they speak of themselves by their tribal names, *e.g.* Agar, Bor, Aliab, and Shish.[1]

As there has been room for considerable modification in the development of those common ideas which lie at the root of the social organization and religious beliefs of all Dinka, the writer of the present article indicates the source from which his information was obtained, whenever there is any probability that a custom is not universal among them. The information is derived principally from members of the following tribes: (1) the Shish, living near Shambe in the region of the Sudd; and (2) the Bor Dinka and the Chiro and Ngong Nyang tribes of the Moin Tain, living some 20 to 30 miles to the south of the Sudd. He has also had the opportunity of discussing various matters with some very intelligent Niel Dinka from the neighbourhood of the Khor Adar, near Melut, north of Kodok; with the Nok Dinka of the neighbourhood of Lake No; and with some Agar Dinka from the Bahr el-Ghazal Province serving in the Xth Sudanese Battalion.

Each community is largely autonomous, under the leadership of a chief or headman (*bain*), who, though primarily a spiritual ruler, controls the village with the help of the elders. The actual authority exerted by the *bain* varies enormously; in many communities he is little more than the local magician, but in one community in each tribe he is the hereditary rain-maker, the most important man in the tribe, who is consulted and deferred to on every occasion, and whose wish is law. Except among the Tain tribes, cattle form the economic basis of Dinka society; they are the currency in which bride-price and blood-fines are paid; and the desire to acquire a neighbour's herds is the common cause of those inter-tribal raids which constitute Dinka warfare.

2. Totemism.—The Dinka tribes are divided into a number of exogamous clans which the Bor Dinka call *ut*, the Tain and Aliab *gol*, and the Shish *deb*. The meanings of these words cannot be discussed here, though it is significant that among the cattle-owning tribes these same terms are also used for the cattle kraals of their clans. The Dinka are totemistic, and the large majority of their clans speak of certain animals as their 'ancestors,' *kwar* being the word used by the Tain tribes. Usually the *kwar* has nothing to do with a man's personal name (one man whose name signified hyæna had a crocodile as his *kwar*), but, in the words of one of the writer's Tain informants, it is the 'animal who is the spirit (*jok*) of the clan (*gol*).' Further, *ruai*, the ordinary word meaning 'related,' is used when speaking of the bond between a man and his *kwar*, i.e. they are *ruai*, 'relatives.' No man injures his *kwar* animal, but all respect it in various ways. Sometimes the *kwar* is a plant, as among some Agar and Shish clans, who treat the totem plant with much the same reverence as is commonly shown to the totem animal. Besides these fairly typical totem ancestors, there are clans whose totems (*kwar*) do not belong to the animal kingdom; thus the Mai clan of the Bor Dinka have fire as their totem, and in this case there is no story of direct descent from fire. Certain clans have as *kwar* heroes to whom more than human wisdom is attributed, or who came among them under circumstances that betoken that they are superhuman. The clans are usually designated by the name of their (reputed) first human ancestor; comparatively few are spoken of by the name of their animal, though there is a Niel (snake) clan, and even a Niel tribe, in the neighbourhood of the Khor Adar Dinka.

[1] The writer takes this opportunity of expressing his thanks to the Rev. Archibald Shaw, in charge of the C.M.S. station at Malek, for his invaluable help among the Tain and Bor Dinka, whose language he speaks fluently; to him he is indebted for the translation of the majority of the Dinka words and phrases in this article. No attempt has been made to do more than to reproduce very roughly the sound of the Dinka words. In pronouncing *c* and *j* a Dinka presses the tip of his tongue into the gap left by the removal of his lower incisor teeth, and it seems doubtful whether there is a true *s* sound in Dinka, so that 'Shish' might be written (probably with a nearer approach to accuracy) 'Chich' or 'Twich.'

Most of the Dinka clans whose *kwar* is an animal derive their origin from a man born as one of twins, his fellow-twin being an animal of the species which is the totem of the clan. Sometimes the association is not quite so close, in which case the totem animal usually lays certain commands upon one of the members of the clan, offering in return certain privileges. Commands and privileges alike show the close relationship existing between the animal and the man to whom he speaks, who is traditionally looked upon as the ancestor of the clan. Although children take their father's totem, they respect their mother's totem animal or plant, and an animal may be avoided for several generations for this reason. Thus, a man whose paternal grandmother had the poisonous snake *anong* as totem said that, if he saw any one kill a snake of this species, he would bury it, because it was the *jok* of his father's mother. Further, it is customary for men and women to avoid eating their spouses' totem animal.

The following information concerning the origin of their totems was obtained from men of the Ngong Nyang tribe. It will be noted that the clans are not called by the name of their totem animal, but by that of their legendary human founder.

Gol ē Mariak.—This clan has as totem the snake (*niel*). Long ago a snake came into the hut of a man named Mariak, and there gave birth to its young. The snake spoke to Mariak, telling him not to hurt it or its children: 'If you see a man hurt one of my children, tie the mourning band of palm-leaf round your head.' Another informant who belongs to this clan said that his snake would come into his hut at night and talk to him. He declared that this did not occur in a dream, but that the snake really entered his hut, and he offered it boiled fish or hippopotamus meat, turning this out on the floor of the hut for the snake to eat. He said that he occasionally sacrificed a goat to his snake and made offerings of goats' milk. Another Ngong Nyang man gave the following account of his conduct towards snakes of the *aro* species, his mother's totem animal. If he saw one of these snakes in the forest, he would sprinkle dust on its back, for otherwise the snake might upbraid him for lack of friendliness. If the snake were angry and tried to bite him, dust sprinkled on its back would propitiate it; but, if he could not appease it and it bit him, he and the snake would both die. If the snake bit a man of a strange clan, the man would die, but not the snake, for the snake and the folk of foreign clans are not related (*ruai*). His children show the same reverence for this snake as he does, and so also do all descendants of one Nyal, with whom the snake first made friends. Nyal was sleeping in his hut when a snake (*aro*) crept in, and, seeing him sleeping, slipped in between his body and the ground for warmth. Nyal woke up, but the snake did him no harm. Then Nyal took some fat and put it upon the snake's tongue, which so pleased it that it stayed in the hut many days. Nyal fetched a *tiet* (on whom see below, § 4), and 'the snake went into the throat of the *tiet*,' and said: 'I do not desire any evil; do you give me fat like this, and I shall be well pleased.'

Gol Akōn Chang Jūrkwait.—Akōn Chang Jūrkwait was the name of the boy born to one Nyanajok Alērjok as one of twins, his fellow-twin being an elephant. The boy was brought up in the village in the usual way, but the elephant was turned loose in the jungle.

Gol ē Luel has the crocodile for totem. Long ago Luel found the eggs of a crocodile; he put them in his canoe, and, when he reached home, buried them under the floor of his hut. One night, as the eggs were on the point of hatching, the old crocodile came and scratched them up, and then led the young to the river. Before leaving the hut, the crocodile said to Luel: 'Do not hurt us, and we will not hurt you. Wear mourning on your head and stomach for the crocodile, if any of you see another man kill one.' A man of this clan will not hesitate to swim in the river even at night, for the crocodiles will not hurt him.

Gol ē Yukwal ē Lukab ē Lerkwē has the hippopotamus as totem.

Gol ē Yichol has the lion as totem, the founder of this clan having been the twin-brother of a lion. One Chol, a man who lives in Yelakort village, belongs to this clan. When others have to barricade themselves in their houses, he can sleep out in the open. When a lion kills game, it calls to Chol at night, who goes out next morning and finds the meat; and, when he kills a hippopotamus, he leaves some of the meat in the forest for the lions. If Chol were not of the party, no one would touch a lion's kill, for to do this would offend the lion, who would then attack them; but, if Chol were with them, no one would hesitate to take the meat. If a lion suffered from a splinter of bone or portion of gristle becoming wedged between its teeth, it would roar round the hut in which Chol lay, until he came out and removed the source of its discomfort.

Similar beliefs occur among other Dinka tribes. The Ramba clan of the Niel tribe derives its name from that of an ancestor

who was born as one of twins, his fellow being a snake called *Gor*. Gor was placed in a large pot of water, but he soon died; so a bullock was killed, and the body of Gor was prepared for burial by being smeared with dung and wrapped in the skin of the sacrifice. This was at Anako, where there is still a shrine to which sick people go in order to sacrifice. A Shish man having as totem the poisonous snake *anong* said that, though this snake might bite him, the wound would give him little trouble, and he would certainly not die, as would men of other clans.

The Niel Dinka have a number of stories concerning animal ancestors which refer to a time when animals and men who had long been associated together in groups began to separate. When each class began to go its own way, it was thought well that men should know which animals had been their particular friends.

One of these stories relates that once, long ago, a woman lay sleeping, when a hyæna ran up and leapt over her. Some of her people wanted to kill the animal, but others restrained them, saying that it was there for some wise purpose. When her child—a boy—was born, he limped like a hyæna, so he was named *Den*, which is one of the names of the hyæna, and his descendants have the hyæna as their totem animal.

According to the Niel, all Dinka recognize two kinds of lions, viz. man-eaters, which are not considered relations even by men of the lion totem; and a cattle-eating variety, which the lion men believe to be of one blood with themselves. The lion people occasionally feed the cattle-killing lions. They kill a sheep and cut it into joints, which are placed upon an old bullock skin, taken a little distance from the village, and left there. The clansmen pray that the lions may come and eat; but, if the food has not been taken after a few hours, it is eaten by the men themselves. Man-eaters are killed without scruple, when opportunity occurs. Fox men feed their totem animal, throwing down fragments of meat on the outskirts of the village; and hyæna men treat hyænas in the same way. It is said that formerly it was a common practice to expose pieces of meat where the totem animals could find them, and that sacrifices were offered to them; these customs, however, seem to be observed no longer, though it is alleged that they might still be performed in times of great difficulty and danger.

The writer has no record of plant totems among the Tain Dinka, but there is a tree called *rual*, bearing fruit supposed to resemble a woman's breast (the Sudanese Arabs call it *Abu shutūr* for this reason). Among the Agar and Shish Dinka this tree is considered an ancestor, and is treated with the respect shown to other totems. Two Agar men, whose mothers had *rual* as their totem, would neither come into any contact with the tree nor use its fruit as a ball, as other clans would do. If they disregarded this prohibition, their eyes would become inflamed. Among the Shish Dinka there is a clan, or perhaps a family, which claims descent from a girl who was twin to a gourd plant. Its members do not care to drink from a newly made gourd-vessel, and apparently do not grow gourds, or, if they grow them at all, do so sparingly.

The account given above, of the reciprocal favours conferred by lions and by Chol of the lion clan, raises the question whether all folk of this clan possess the powers exercised by Chol and enjoy the same privileges. The writer was not able to investigate this matter among the Tain Dinka, but some Niel Dinka gave the fullest details of how they would leave flesh in the jungle for their carnivorous totem animals, without receiving any corresponding favours from the latter. This suggests that Chol was regarded as possessing certain powers not shared by all his clansmen, an idea which is strengthened by information given by some Agar Dinka from the Bahr el-Ghazal, one of whom said that his totem (which he called an ancestor) was a small bird, *amur*, which damages the corn crop. No doubt *amur* is one of the small birds called *dura*-birds in the Sudan, thousands of which infest the corn fields, where they do much damage. When these birds become dangerous to the unripe crop, the informant's grandfather would take a head of *dura*, some porridge made from the old crop, and two sheep, one black, the other white. The white sheep was killed and the meat given to the men of other clans; the black sheep was thrown into the river with the porridge and the unripe head of *dura*. Although the sheep was not tied up, it was said to sink immediately, for the 'river people'[1] took it. The man who makes the porridge does not taste it, nor does he eat of the flesh of the sheep given to the other clans. This ceremony prevents the birds from injuring the crop. It is performed by one man only, who is head of the clan, and who would teach the procedure to one of his sons, or perhaps to a brother.

Among the Dinka living in the neighbourhood of the Khor Adar there are certain clans which do not trace their descent to an animal, but to a human being possessed of super-human or non-human qualities.

Long ago, men and women of the 'river people' would sometimes come out of the river, marry, and settle down in the neighbouring villages. The description of the coming to land of one of the 'river people' is curiously like the birth of a child; the river becomes agitated, and the waters rise up around a human being whose umbilicus is joined by a cord to a flat object beneath the water. The cord is cut, and bullocks are killed and thrown whole into the river; then the river man or woman is brought, with more sacrifices, to the village. Their descendants should sacrifice on the bank, throwing a live cow into the river, after giving it a pot of milk to drink, into which the old and important men of the clan have spat. At the present day the men of the Faiyer clan of the Denjol tribe, who trace their descent from a river man, do no more than throw the head and bowels of a bullock into the river, cooking the meat and eating it themselves.

The Boweng clan of the Niel Dinka appear to have the river for their totem.

Long ago a party coming to the river saw a beautiful girl called Alek borne up by the water and carried on to the bank. She accompanied them to the village, but, when they tried to touch her, she became liquid as water; so, taking bullocks and cows, the villagers escorted her back to the river, where they sacrificed the cattle. As they did this, the girl disappeared into the river, taking a calf with her. At the end of the rains, the Boweng clan still take a cow and her calf and a bullock, and kill the latter on the river bank, while the cow and calf are thrown alive into the river, which takes them away, so that they are never seen again.

There is some evidence that, when a clan is particularly strong in a given locality, its members tend to forget that their totem is but one among many, so that they may show annoyance if other folk do not treat it with respect.

The Shish in the neighbourhood of Shambe said that the first people to settle there were snake men, and that for some time they formed the majority. After a time the crocodile clan became powerful, and, because its members killed and ate snakes, the men of the now weakened snake clan left the country and went to live among a group of Aliab Dinka, where they were free from the horrible odour of cooked snake's flesh. More recently a Shish family, belonging to a clan that does not eat the fish *shur*, left their own tribe and went to live at a place called Dot, among a group of Bor Dinka who also respect this fish.

Besides these clans with more or less typical animal ancestors (totems), certain groups of people, often larger than a clan, revere particular objects which they also speak of as their 'ancestor.' A stone called Madwich, which the Tain say fell from the sky within the past twenty years, is an example of this. The group that reveres Madwich is smaller than a clan, for its cult appears to be limited to members of a part of the Pariak clan (of one of the Tain tribes), whose totem is the snake (*niel*).

A youth of about twenty, who was named Madwich after the meteorite, said that his father sacrificed many oxen when the stone fell, though the rest of the village did not concern themselves so deeply, and that at the present time his family alone pay constant attention to Madwich. The stone, which is now at Pariak village, fell before his birth, but after that of his elder brother. When it fell, 'every one,' including his parents and even the dogs, except his elder brother, became *muol*. This word is applied to the possession of a *tiet* by a spirit; perhaps it has a slightly different meaning in this instance; at any rate, the fact that the informant's elder brother did not become *muol* was taken to show that he was 'a child of the stone.' When the stone fell, a few men and many cattle died of a disease called *abut puo* (lit. 'swelling of the heart'), which was considered to be due to the *jok*, and sacrifices were offered in the usual way. The coming of the meteorite Madwich is said to have been prophesied by a *tiet* called Jalang, who was killed during an Arab raid; and the stone itself was thought to have the powers and attributes of an animal ancestor. Thus it might make men ill in order that a sacrifice might be offered, and it would communicate its wishes through a *tiet* in the usual way, asking that a bullock should be killed.

Another meteorite, said to have been found near the Tain village of Agho, is called Dek, and is regarded as the 'ancestor' of the two clans Jakchir and Chulil living in the village, whence have sprung settlements which in turn have given rise to other

[1] On the river people, see, further, pp. 710[b], 711[a].

villages, the inhabitants of which together constitute the Chiro tribe. All the Chiro clan revere Dek, though their members have animal totems of the usual Dinka type.

Some of the Bor Dinka speak of Lerpiu as their *kwar*; but this is an example which is very far from typical, for Lerpiu is both a spear which fell from the sky six generations ago, and a spirit immanent in every rain-maker of the Bor tribe, and is one of the most powerful of their *jok* (see below, § 4). It is clear that Lerpiu is not homologous with the ordinary Dinka totems; in his spear form he corresponds with the meteorite Madwich. His adherents, the family in whose succeeding generations he is immanent, have the elephant as their totem.

Finally, there is evidence that, apart from meteorites and other unusual *kwar*, some of the clans of the Tain Dinka have, or had, more than one totem.

The members of the Chiro, Ngong Nyang, and Pariak tribes consider the fish *rechol* an ancestor, telling the usual story that their ancestor was born as a twin of the fish, the latter being taken to the river, where he instructed mankind that, in spite of the relationship existing between them, they might catch and eat his descendants. There can be no doubt that the relationship still acknowledged as existing between the fish and the members of these tribes is but the shadow of the normal totemic relationship that formerly existed; nevertheless the rings that Apuot threw into the river (see below) indicate that, shadowy as the relationship is, it is not utterly ignored in practice.

It will be noted that all these examples of unusual 'ancestors' are said to have fallen from the skies. The absence of stone in the Dinka country (perhaps this applies only to those tribes living near the Nile) would easily lead the Dinka to seek a supernatural origin for any fragments they might find, while the importance of rain and the reverence they pay to Dengdit who is above, as well as the striking appearance of a falling star, could scarcely fail to suggest to them that so strange an object had come from the skies. Once this view is entertained, it is but natural that the marvellous objects should be spoken of by the most holy term known, namely that applied to the revered animal ancestors of the tribe.

3. The worship of Dengdit.—The Dinka are a deeply religious people. They worship a high god, Dengdit, lit. 'Great Rain,' sometimes called Nyalich, and a host of ancestral spirits called *jok*. The name Nyalich is the locative of a word meaning 'above,' and, literally translated, signifies 'in the above.' It is not used, however, except as a synonym for Dengdit, and the common beginning of the prayers of the Tain and Bor Dinka is *Nyalich ko kwar*, 'God and our ancestors.' This phrase indicates the two main elements of their religious faith and their relative importance, for there is no doubt that Dengdit (Nyalich) is greater than the *jok*. It was he who created the world, and established the order of things, and it is he who sends the rain from the 'rain-place' above, which is especially his home. Nevertheless, in the ordinary affairs of life the *jok* are appealed to far more than Dengdit, and in some cases in which the appeal is nominally made to Dengdit, its form seems to imply that he has been confused with the *jok*. Among the Tain tribes there is a word *ram* or *aram* which is called out to the new moon, and seems to be an expression of greeting or praise, or perhaps is used to deprecate anger.

It will be convenient to consider the worship of Dengdit and the cult of the *jok* separately, though it must be realized that they constantly touch, and even overlap, each other. The Southern Dinka (to whom the following specially refers) do not appear to use set forms of prayer, but seem to ask in ordinary simple sentences that their immediate want may be granted. They also have a number of hymns which are sung when an ox is slaughtered to avert drought or sickness; but, as Mr. Shaw informed the writer, men sing them when doing light work, and lately during a severe thunderstorm every one joined in lustily to appease the elements. They also burst into one of these songs when bidding farewell to the Sirdar who visited them recently. The following songs collected and translated by Mr. Shaw were composed by the *tiet* Wal of Bang village, who asserts that his spirit is Deng, *i.e.* Dengdit (see below, § 4). It must be noted that in Dinka hymns Dengdit habitually speaks of men as ants (*aichuk*).

Deng Wa ka loin te lar ror
Deng Wa ka loin te lar ror
Bainh achi a lalech
Muka Wa apuoth a muk we lienkwa
Muka Deng apuoth a muk we lienkwa.
'Father Rain falls into a solitary place.
Father Rain falls into a solitary place.
The Lord was in untrodden ground.
Hold the Father well, He holds our few souls.
Hold the Rain well, He holds our few souls.'

In a variant of this hymn 'Creator' is substituted for 'Rain' in the second and fourth lines. In the next two hymns it is clearly the Creator who speaks.

Aichungdia gau gut ko thain ye thar
Aichungdia gau gut ko thain ye thar
Cha gwobdia ye ran
Cha gwobdia yen e nhyor e gau-o.
'My ant hoes the marsh grass and rests hand on hip.
My ant hoes the marsh grass and rests hand on hip.
Have I not given of my substance to man?
Have I not given of my substance to the spikes of the marsh grass, alas!'

Ye yenga bi dol?
Y'aichung e wang k'aichung e rie
Yenga bi nong bai?
Man aichung nhom
Ye yenga bi dol?
Y'aichung e wang k'aichung e rie
Aichuok a lo ne Deng nhom
Ko bainh e rec aken tuol
Chamku yai
Bainhdan e rab aken tuol
Chamku yai.
'Who will laugh?
The cattle-ant and the ant of the boat (*i.e.* the Cattle Dinka and the Tain Dinka).
Who will possess a homestead?
Unite the ants to a head.
Who will laugh?
The cattle-ant and the ant of the boat.
The ants have gone to Rain (as their) head
And the Fish-lord has not appeared.
Let us worship.
Our Dura-lord has not appeared.
Let us worship.'

The majority of Dinka have no legends of the origin of Dengdit, but they say that long ago he became angry with his wife Abuk, and in his wrath sent the bird *atoich* to sever the path between heaven and earth which had existed till then. In this account, as well as in one obtained by Major S. Lyle Cummins from the Nek Dinka of the Bahr el-Ghazal Province (*JAI* xxxiv. [1904] 157–158), Dengdit figures as a god, without beginning and with no expected end; but among the Niel Dinka he appears as a less remote being who at one time ruled his tribe in human guise, and so approximates to the superhuman ancestors described in the section on totemism (above, § 2). The Adero clan of the Niel Dinka have the rain (*deng*) as their totem, the reason being given as follows:

The first ancestor of the clan appeared from the sky as a young woman pregnant with her first child. The people reverentially formed a circle round her, killed bullocks, and then rubbed her from head to foot with the belly fat. Next they built a hut for her, but were so frightened that it was not like other *tukl*, for the door was omitted, or in some other way it was made difficult for her to leave it. In about a month her child was born, yet no one came to help her. Then she called to the people, who brought one white cow, one spotted cow, and one bullock: she told them to sacrifice these and then to come back to her. They found her nursing a marvellous babe with teeth like an adult, and whose tears were blood. Then the mother said to them: 'This is your *bain*, look after him well, for I can stay with you no longer.' As she spoke, the rain came down in torrents, and therefore the boy was called Deng (Rain) or Dengdit (Great Rain). He ruled them for a long time, and, when he was very old, disappeared in a great storm.

Offerings are made to Dengdit at certain shrines—perhaps they might be called temples—which seem to be scattered all over the Dinka territory. Most Dinka tribes have one shrine in their territory, and this is certainly the case among the Shish and Agar. Probably these differ little in appearance from the shrine of Lerpiu served by Biyordit (see below, § 5). It is true that neither Shish nor Agar made any mention of the existence of an *akoi* bush near the shrine, but perhaps too much stress should not be laid on this negative evidence, and a photograph of the great shrine at Luang Deng shows that this consists of three ordinary looking *tukl*. According to the Agar informants, one *bain* at Luong Ajok near Rumbek is in charge of a hut bigger than an ordinary *tukl* which is surrounded by a fence. This is called *luak* (not to be confused with a cattle *luak*); it is not a tomb, nor has any one been buried near it. The door is always shut, and may not be opened even by the *bain* (the high priest of the shrine and the rain-maker of the tribe) unless a sacrifice is made and milk is spilt in front of the door. In the shrine at Luong Ajok there are stools of copper and brass, shields, spears, sticks of rhinoceros horn, and a number of clay pots. All these things belong to Dengdit, who long ago came to earth bringing them with him. One morning the people found the *luak* built, and the stools and other things inside it, and decided that Dengdit alone could have done this, and that it was his place. Dengdit still lives in this shrine. The Shish say that there is a hut called *luak* sacred to Dengdit at Lau, within which are certain sacred spears and an iron rod, and a pot full of oil hangs from the roof; Dengdit is always there. The great ancestral rain-making ceremony of each tribe takes place at one of these shrines, as does the harvest ceremony held after the cutting of the *dura*; here, too, the Agar install their new rain-maker.

The shrine at Luang Deng[1] is one of the holiest existing among the Dinka, who visit it in large numbers. One of the three *tukl* is the house of Dengdit. The door is always kept shut, its guardians being certain men (and women?) who are regarded as being especially the servants of Dengdit. Only they may enter the shrine, but a man desirous of offspring may take cattle and offer them to Dengdit, asking that the desire of his heart may be granted. The door of the shrine is opened when one of the animals brought for Dengdit is slaughtered, and, looking in through the doorway, the worshipper sees in the darkness of the shrine, in spirit form, the shifting shapes of men and animals and even of abstract qualities—happiness, hunger, satisfaction, cattle-sickness—and among them he may see the eyes and umbilicus of a man. No sacrifice is made until Dengdit has sent a dream to the keeper of the shrine instructing him to accept the offering, so that worshippers are nearly always kept waiting for a few days. It is very rare for a sacrifice to be refused; but, if a man be dismissed without being allowed to sacrifice, he will soon die, or disease will attack his people. As the worshipper approaches, he is accompanied by two servants of the shrine, one on either side. A spear specially kept for the purpose is used for killing the victim, and the spirit of the animal goes to join the other spirits in the shrine.[2] Before the worshipper leaves the shrine, one of the servants of Dengdit takes dust from the holy precincts, and, mixing it with oil, rubs it over the body of the worshipper. Sometimes a material object such as a spear may be given to the man as a sign of favour and a guarantee that he will obtain his wish. Offerings such as pieces of tobacco may be thrown upon a low mound of ashes which has arisen in front of the shrine from the cooking of many sacrifices. The contents of the large intestine of the victim are scattered about and over this mound, and near it the worshippers thrust the branch of a tree called *akoch* into the ground. It did not appear that any attention was paid to the fate of this branch, though it was said that it might take root and grow.

Among the Shish, certain men who lived long ago were spoken of as 'the sons of Dengdit,' though this expression must not be considered to imply any physical relationship; it seems that the Shish considered these 'sons' as spirits who came from above to possess certain men who became known by their names—Walkerijok, Majush, Mabor, and Malan. Each of them is regarded as the ancestor of one of the Shish clans and has become a powerful *jok* of the usual type (for worship at their graves, see § 4).

4. The worship of the dead.—Every human being has within him two souls. The *atiep*, which leaves the body in sleep and whose wanderings are the common source of dreams, resembles, or perhaps may take the form of, the shadow. The second 'soul' is by no means so well defined as the *atiep*; it is sometimes called *rol*, and sometimes *we*. The writer could not learn anything definite about the *rol* during life; it may be connected with the vegetative functions of the body, but after death it remains with the body in the grave. In this article it is the *atiep* that is meant whenever the word 'spirit' is used to refer to the spirit of a dead man. The *atiep* of a father, mother, or ancestor may at any time ask for food in a dream. A man will then take *dura* flour and mix it with fat in a little pot which he places in a corner of his hut, where it is left until the evening, when he may eat it or even share it with any one belonging to his clan, but with no one else (Tain). If food were not provided, the *atiep* might, and probably would, make the dreamer or his wife and children ill. It was stated everywhere that the customs observed after a death, especially the death feasts, were held to propitiate the *atiep* of the deceased and to prevent it from sending sickness or misfortune on the survivors. Sometimes the spirit of a person recently dead is spoken of as *jok*, but this term is generally reserved for the spirits of long dead and powerful ancestors. Thus the spirit of the founder of any clan is a *jok*, and the spirit of the animal ancestor is a specially powerful *jok*. The matter was summed up by a Tain man as follows: 'The *atiep* of my animal [ancestor] is a *jok*, the *atiep* of my mother is a human spirit (*atiep*); [the spirit of] my mother is also a *jok*, but [the spirit of] my animal [ancestor] is a *jorndit* (a very great *jok*), and would be angry if food for it and my mother's *jok* were put together.' Although the *jok* may send sickness, death, and misfortune, when annoyed or neglected, they are the guardian spirits of the house and the clan, taking constant interest in the doings of their descendants, and being ever ready to help them. From this point of view there is a certain amount of confusion between the *atiep* of the recent dead and the *jok* of long dead and powerful ancestors. It seems that, although the former are not specially invoked for aid in difficulties, they are considered to take an active interest in their descendants, and probably all that is said concerning the lovingkindness and power of the *jok* applies in a lesser degree to the *atiep*.

The *jok* know when a child is born, and protect it from the very beginning, though a man does not tell his child about the *jok* until it is well grown, perhaps not till about the age of ten. The *jok* on both sides of the family protect the child, coming to its assistance in any sudden danger. In adult life, when invoking the *jok* at a time of stress, a man calls upon the *jok* of his ancestors, regardless whether the appeal be to the spirits of his own or his mother's clan. Thus, when harpooning a hippopotamus, the word usually spoken is *jongawa*, 'O *jok* of my ancestors!' The *jok* hear the invocation and come to their descendant's assistance, entering his body and giving strength to his arms, and leaving him only when the spear has been flung and danger is over, for a man's *jok* are ever near him in enterprise or peril. Sometimes the appeal is made specially to the *jok* in animal form. Thus Bol, a man of the Mariak clan of the Ngong Nyang

[1] According to prevailing views, this shrine is situated in Nuer territory, though it was formerly held by Dinka, and there are Dinka priests at the shrine. The writer believes the distinction drawn between Dinka and Nuer to be erroneous, and that the Nuer are simply a tribe of Dinka differing no more from other admittedly Dinka tribes than these do among themselves.

[2] In answer to a question it was said that, if a man died near a shrine, his spirit would go there, but not if he died far off.

tribe, when about to cast his harpoon at a hippopotamus, would say: *Ayub lil ajong ē gol Mariak ē jongdiena niel abwordie*, 'Strike, O spirit of my clan, my spirit the snake!'

Men and women who are able to see and to communicate with the spirits (*atiep* and *jok*) are called *tiet*. Their power is attributed to a spirit, always, we believe, an ancestral spirit, that is immanent in the *tiet*; and, as the spirit on the death of the *tiet* will generally take up its residence in the body of a near relative, the office tends to become hereditary. Often a *tiet* will explain to a relative that, after his or her death, the spirit will come to him; and a change of manner, trembling fits, and periods of unconsciousness are regarded as signs that the spirit has taken up its new abode. The powers of the *tiet* are most commonly directed to discover what should be done in cases of sickness, *i.e.* he indicates what *jok* is responsible for the illness, and what must be done in order that the patient may get well; but he also gives advice concerning lost cattle and other accidents of daily life. The amount of influence exerted by the *tiet* varies enormously.

The *tiet* of a Malek village was an old woman of whom it was openly said that she was little good. On the other hand, Wal, an Aliab Dinka living in the village of Bang, exercises enormous influence not limited to his fellow-tribesmen; for, although his spirit only came to him in 1907, Bari and Nuer alike come to consult him and pay the strictest attention to his commands. Wal is a man of about fifty, differing in no obvious external character from his fellows, though deference is shown him in that, however dense the crowd round him, he is never jostled. Wal says that his spirit is Deng, which appears in one aspect at least to be identical with Dengdit, and at the present time he is certainly the most important factor in the spiritual life of the Aliab and neighbouring tribes. Some men of the Chiro tribe said that, if another stone like Madwich (see above, § 2) were to fall from the sky, it would be called Deng, because the spirit Deng had come to the *tiet* Wal in Bang village. Wal is most anxious to make clear his adhesion to the Government, and even goes so far as to state that his spirit is 'red' (as Europeans are) and came from Khartum, which all the black tribes regard as the home of the white man. He is certainly opposed to bloodshed, and has lately condemned the participators in a quite insignificant brawl, in which but little blood flowed, to an elaborate ceremony of atonement, the essential part of which is that two goats are killed, the flesh of one being eaten, while the other is cast into the bush. Wal asserts that this is not a revival of an old custom, but a new form of sacrifice dictated by his spirit; and this was certainly the opinion of those with whom the writer discussed the subject.

Although Mitterrutzner (*Die Dinka-Sprache in Central-Africa*, Brixen, 1866) accepts the view adopted by the early missionaries, that the word *jok* can be adequately rendered by 'Satan' or '*der Teufel*' (*op. cit.* esp. p. 57), this is incorrect, and the relation of the *jok* to sickness and death is in outline somewhat as follows. The spirits of the old and mighty dead (*jok*) and of the recent dead (*atiep*) exist in and around the villages in which their descendants live. *Jok* are more powerful and energetic than *atiep*, and sometimes have special shrines built for them. They are also thought to have their habitat in the earth in the immediate neighbourhood of these shrines. *Atiep* are at their strongest immediately after death, and, although funeral feasts are held for no other reason than to propitiate them lest they should cause sickness and death, they become gradually weaker, and in a very few generations may safely be forgotten. *Jok*, on the other hand, retain their strength and energy, and require to be freely propitiated by sacrifices. Nor are the sacrifices offered to them on stated occasions sufficient. They accept these, but also make known their wants by appearing to their descendants in dreams, and demanding that a bullock or other animal shall be killed; or they may appear to a *tiet* and command him to deliver their message. If their demands are disregarded, they send sickness or bad luck, and matters can be remedied only by sacrifice. There may be no preliminary dream or vision before the *jok* sends sickness; in fact, the routine treatment of all sickness is to make offerings to the *jok* (or Dengdit, when he and the *jok* are confused) in the hope that they will remove the sickness for which they are held responsible. So, when the illness runs a fatal course, it is the *jok* who are considered responsible for the death. The following account given by the Shish shows how the sacrifice to the *jok* is conducted:—

When a man is ill, a bullock or one or more sheep or goats are killed as a sacrifice to the *jok*. The animal or animals should be provided by a near relative, and should be killed by a married man with children, preferably the father of a large family. Some of the meat is left over night in the house of the sick man, for the *jok*. In the morning it is brought out and eaten by the clansfolk, but the fat is collected in a pot, and again left in the house, for one night, for the *jok*. Next day this is cooked by the old women, who eat it with the old men. The blood of the sacrifice is left to dry on the ground, and is afterwards buried in front of the house near the place where the animal was killed.

Even childlessness may be attributed to the displeasure of the *jok*, and in those cases in which the husband does not attribute this to his own impotence a *tiet* may be consulted. The *tiet* often says: 'Give more cows to your father-in-law,' the idea being that this will appease the *jok* of the wife's family, who, the *tiet* can see, are angry. Or the *tiet* may prescribe an offering to the *jok* to be made by the other side of the family, for the *jok* of the husband's family may be angry if the woman's brothers have been sneering at her husband for not begetting children. Incest angers the *jok* and thus causes barrenness; and a girl guilty of this offence will have no children, even should she marry, until she has owned her sin, when her lover will be forced to provide a bullock to be sacrificed in atonement. The youth's father kills the bullock, and the girl's father takes some of the contents of the large intestine and smears it on his daughter's abdomen and that of her partner, thus removing the taint of sin and rendering her capable of bearing children.

Shrines raised to ancestral spirits fall into two classes: (1) grave shrines, and (2) shrines erected by order of a spirit (*jok* or *atiep*), or on account of the appearance of a spirit in a dream, or built to provide a new home for a spirit. Grave shrines do not appear to be common, though the writer has records of the graves of the founders of four of the Shish clans that have become shrines. These are the graves of the so-called 'sons of Dengdit' already referred to. These four men are to some extent regarded as culture heroes, for they taught men how to grow *dura* and to fish. It is said that formerly huts were built over their graves; these have decayed, but even now a ceremony is held at each grave after the *dura* is cut. In every case, only the people descended from the founder take part in this, though their wives, who of necessity belong to other clans, accompany them. There is no resident guardian at any of the shrines, but at the yearly sacrifice one man, in whom the ancestral spirit is immanent, kills a sheep or a bull, and smears its blood and the contents of the large intestine upon the grave, before the assembled descendants of the hero. The flesh is boiled, all eat thereof, and great care is taken not to break the bones, which are thrown into the river. Shrines of the second class appear to be found in all Dinka villages. The worship at one of them in the Shilluk village of Tonga near the Shilluk-Dinka boundary is especially interesting, because it clearly indicates the hereditary nature of the priesthood that these shrines call into existence, and also because it shows that the *jok* on the maternal side are regarded with the same awe and affection as those of a man's own clan. The shrine is within the yard of an ordinary Shilluk homestead. It consists of a few long, roughly trimmed sticks thrust into the ground, from which are hung a number of beads, small gourds, snuff-boxes, and fragments of sheep bones. On the ground is a heap of ashes, the remains of the fires at which sacrifices have been cooked, and frag-

ments of the skulls of sheep killed at the shrine. By the side of the ashes there is a faggot of sticks placed upright, supporting a gourd in which food had once been placed.

The shrine is served by one Agwer, whose grandmother, a Dinka, was made ill by an ancestral spirit, Deng,[1] in order that offerings should be made to him. As the offerings accumulated, a shrine came into existence; in fact, a *tiet* seems to have ascertained that Deng wished his descendants to make repeated sacrifices to him at Tonga. At the present day offerings are made frequently by sick folk, descendants of Deng, and a ceremony is said to be held at the beginning of every rainy season.

Another shrine, existing at the Chiro village of Malek, consists of the trunk of a small tree thrust into the ground; the main branches have been broken off short, and part of the vertebral column and horns of a goat have been attached to them. There are also several pieces of rope, of the kind attached to hippopotamus harpoons, and several small gourds, while a number of fragments of hippopotamus bones lie at the foot of the post. The origin of this shrine is as follows.

About three years ago the children of Apuot, the *bain* of the village, sickened, but it was not until they had been ill for about four months that the *jok* of Balit, the ancestor who sent the sickness, appeared to the *tiet* in a dream and demanded that a goat should be given him. The *tiet* told Apuot to raise up a post and to kill a fat he-goat. The post was prepared, a hole was dug, the goat's throat was cut, and the blood and contents of the gut were collected and buried in the hole. Then the post was thrust into the centre of the hole, and earth was thrown in and pressed down. The meat was cut into pieces, boiled, and eaten. The bones were not broken, but were placed on the ground round the post and left there for a month, after which all were thrown into the river, except the skull and backbone, which were put upon the post. The *tiet* was given the skin. At the time of the sacrifice Apuot threw four small pieces of meat in four directions, apparently towards the cardinal points, and then placed them on the ground round the stick, saying: 'O my grandfather, I have made a sacrifice for you, do not let my children be sick any more.' Apuot himself carried the bones to the river, and at the same time threw into the water a small iron bracelet which he took from the arm of one of the sick children. These things were cast into the river because Ran, the father of Balit, was twin with the fish *rechol*, for whom the things were intended. The hippopotamus bones at the foot of the post were placed there by a brother of Apuot, after he had speared one of these animals. He did this in order that the spirit of his ancestor might help him to kill other hippopotami. The ground round and under this post is in a special sense the habitation of the *jok*, and, even if the sickness had not occurred, it would still have been necessary to prepare a habitation for the *jok*, where men might come to invoke their assistance before going fishing or hippopotamus-hunting, or before starting on a journey. In the last event the traveller puts his right hand flat on the ground near the post, and says: 'Grandfather, I am going away, take care of me, do not let me be sick.' Before going fishing or hippopotamus-hunting, a man takes his harpoons to the wife of the *bain*, who rubs them with oil made from hippopotamus fat, and pours some of the oil on the ground at the foot of the post.

Another form of shrine, called *bŭor*, is found in the Tain villages near Bor. The construction of the *bŭor* is very simple. No chamber is made; a hole about a foot deep is dug and filled up with mud, in which the horns are fixed, for only the horns, and not the skull, are used.

One of these shrines was raised by Der in his new village of Arek for the *atiep* of his father Anet, to live in 'just as a house,' for the spirit knows of the wanderings of its people and moves with them. This was done at the instance of a *tiet*, who said that, if this were neglected, Der and his children would sicken, and perhaps die. The shrine itself consists of a mound of mud, at one end of which are fixed the horns of a bullock, while in front of this there is one of the pickets to which cattle are commonly tethered.[2] The bullock providing the horns was sacrificed by Der, who explained aloud that he was making a place for the *atiep* of his father Anet. The bullock was killed by having a spear plunged into its heart, and small pieces of all the organs and parts of the animal were scattered on the ground for the spirits of the dead. At each new moon some *dura*, a few drops of new milk, and a little butter, are placed upon the shrine at sunset. The shrine is repaired whenever necessary, without sacrifice or any ceremony.

Bŭor are found in all the Tain and in some, at least, of the Bor villages, but usually they do not resemble the back of a bullock, the mud being built into a more or less circular mound flattened above. A stick or young sapling, 6 or 8 ft. tall, is thrust into the ground near the horns, and a cattle-rope is hung from this. Among the Tain Dinka the sons of a dead man will procure a bullock and build a *bŭor* whenever possible, the widow making the mud mound, in which the sons plant the horns of the bullock. This is done not only to propitiate the spirit of the dead, but as a resting-place for his spirit (*atiep*). There is often the greatest confusion as to whether these *bŭor* are built for Dengdit or for the *jok*; in fact, the two are often spoken of and treated as if they were identical. As an example of this confusion, reference may be made to a *bŭor* at Arek village meant to secure the help of the *jok* in fishing and in harpooning hippopotami. When a fishing or hunting party is about to start, they take some *dura*, dip the grains in a bowl of water, roast them, and, when cold, scatter them upon and around the *bŭor*. In spite of this, the *bŭor* is often said to belong to Dengdit, and the usual explanation is given of the cattle rope, namely, that Dengdit will see the empty halter and know that an animal has been sacrificed.

Besides the numerous offerings to the *jok* already mentioned, certain annual sacrifices are made to them, of which the following are examples.

The Bor Dinka sacrifice one or more young goats at the beginning of each wet season, in order that the *jok* may not injure the cattle in the *luak*, the horns and legs with the dried skin adhering to them being hung up within the entrance to the *luak*. The Shish make an annual sacrifice to the *jok* and also to the 'river people,' who, as already indicated, must be considered as a special form of *jok*. This sacrifice is made by every householder, for, if any omitted to perform it, his *dura* crop would be poor, and his cattle would sicken or die. Each householder kills a sheep and allows the blood to soak into the ground; the flesh, which is boiled in front of the house, is eaten, care being taken not to break the bones, which are collected and thrown into the river. As he kills the animal, the housefather says: '*Jok*! this is your right.' Pieces from different parts of the sacrifice are boiled in a pot and left outside the hut during the night; in the morning the contents are scattered round the house, when the dogs and birds soon dispose of them.

The sacrifice to the 'river people' takes place after the rains, when the people leave their inland settlements to come down to their dry-season abodes on the river bank, and before they build any houses or cattle kraals. The members of each clan kill a sheep soon after they reach the river, cutting its throat before sunrise, on the bank, so that the blood flows into the river, into which the sheep is thrown as soon as it is dead. This sacrifice is held in order that the 'river people' may not send sickness to men or cattle, and it is also said to please Dengdit.

Belief in the guiding and protecting influence of the *jok* is perhaps the only part of their eschatology which is common to all Dinka, and is so well defined that it can be definitely formulated; the examples already given of the action of the *jok* and the sacrifices offered to them make their action and power reasonably plain as far as they relate to humanity. In other words, while the relation of the *atiep* to the living is tolerably well known, the very opposite is the case in regard to the *rol* or *we*, for its condition excites none of the interest which is felt in the *atiep*. The generally accepted view with regard to the *atiep* of the old and mighty dead (*jok*) has been indicated already. The *atiep* of the recently dead are usually thought to frequent the villages and houses of their descendants, taking an interest in their doings and moving about with them. Certain of the burial customs, which provide for the welfare of the dead, are modified in the case of old influential men, increasingly lavish funeral feasts being provided for important men such as *bain*, the avowed purpose of all funeral ceremonies being to propitiate the dead man, lest he should send sickness and misfortune on the

[1] Deng is a common Dinka name, and must not be confused with Deng, the spirit of the *tiet* Wal (above, p. 709[a]), or with Dengdit.

[2] The whole structure presents a certain resemblance to a bullock sunk in the earth, so that only the back projects; but the writer could not learn that this resemblance was intentional, though a Dinka whom he met at Omdurman, where he had lived for a long time, said that in his country mud representations of cattle were erected over the graves of powerful men.

living. Apart from the funeral and mourning feasts, *atiep* are not given sacrifices unless they appear to their descendants or to the *tiet* in dreams and ask for them.

Side by side with this doctrine of the *atiep* and its corollary that the spirits of the dead everywhere surround and mix with the living, there is another, which, if it were accepted and applied logically, would be incompatible with the first. According to this belief, the *atiep* leaves the neighbourhood of the body at the time of its burial, and passes above to the place of Dengdit. The spirits that reach Dengdit do not lose their power of returning to the earth, for it is a common belief that *jok* may pass to and from this earth to Dengdit, while one of the commonest Dinka beliefs is that the *jok* come to the dying to take their *atiep*. Among the Niel Dinka the *jok* come in the (spiritual) form of the animal ancestors (totem animals) of each man at his death and take his spirit to Kok, the place of Dengdit between earth and sky, whence comes the rain. The men who gave this information were perfectly convinced that every Dinka had some animal relative which would come to him at death, and they stated that some men had seen them as they lay dying.

It is possible to obtain a hint of another phase of Dinka eschatology by considering their habit of pouring a little water or *merissa* (native beer) on the ground before drinking. According to some Nok Dinka who did this after a long and thirsty march, the water poured out was for the dead. The Shish denied that *merissa*, purposely spilt on the ground, was for the benefit of the dead, but said that, when a man died, he would find in his grave all the *merissa* he had poured out and the food he had thrown on the ground. It is, however, possible that this belief may be due to Arab influence.

According to the Shish, the 'river-people' are also *jok*, and they can be seen by *tiet*, for 'land and river *jok* have the same origin,' and 'some *jok* are in the river, some on land.' It must, however, be admitted that many Dinka seem to look upon the 'river people' as distinctly mysterious beings, whom they do not regard as *jok* in the ordinary sense of the word.

5. Rain-makers and rain-making.—The rain-makers of the Dinka tribe are called *bain*, but it seems that not every *bain* is a practising rain-maker, though, in theory at least, all are potential rain-makers. The men commonly spoken of as the 'chiefs' or 'shaikhs' of the Dinka tribes are actual or potential *bain*, but there does not appear to be any tendency for village chiefs to attempt to emulate the rain-maker, or for quack practitioners to appear, for the successful rain-maker has within him the spirit of the great rain-makers of the past, and all recognize the futility of competing with him. Further, the existence of a powerful and successful rain-maker naturally leads those who live within his sphere of influence to leave all such matters to him. Thus a successful rain-maker attains to very great power, and would be consulted about all important affairs, for the spirit of a great ancestor that has come down to him through a succession of rain-makers ensures that he is far-seeing, and wiser than common men. A *bain* should not drink *merissa*, lest he get angry and quarrel with the men of his village. Although the authority of a *bain* is great, it is not absolute, for one *bain* foretold the defeat of his people at the hands of the Government, and entreated them not to fight; yet his people fought and were defeated.

The Shish said that the name of the spirit immanent in their rain-maker (who lived at Lau) was Mabor. This, as has been stated in § 3, is the name of one of the four 'sons of Dengdit.' It was obvious that to the Shish of Shambe (some miles from Lau) the personality of the rain-maker was entirely submerged in that of the spirit immanent in him, so that, when they spoke of Mabor, the dominant idea in their mind was that of the ancestral spirit of this name working through the body of the man in whom it was immanent.

The Shish do not specially protect their rain-maker from a violent death, and he may even take part in warfare; for no doubt is felt that, if he be killed, the ancestral spirit will pass to a suitable successor. But an important rain-maker is not allowed to die of old age or as the result of chronic lingering illness; for, if this occurred, sickness would attack the tribe; there would be famine, and the herds would not yield their increase. When a rain-maker feels that he is getting old and infirm, he tells his children that he wishes to die.

Among the Agar Dinka a large grave is dug, and an *angareb* is placed in it, upon which the rain-maker lies on his right side, with a skin under his head. He is surrounded by his friends and relatives, including his younger children, but his elder children are not allowed near the grave, at any rate towards the end, lest in their despair they should injure themselves. The *bain* lies upon the *angareb* without food or drink for many hours, generally for more than a day. From time to time he speaks to his people, recalling the past history of the tribe, how he has ruled and advised them, and instructing them how to act in the future. During this time he takes no food. At last he tells them he has finished, and bids them cover him up; earth is thrown into the grave, and he is soon suffocated. Although the above information was obtained from a number of Agar Dinka, there is little doubt that with minor variations it applies to all the Dinka tribes.

The Niel Dinka said that they strangled their *bain* in his own house, having first prepared his grave. They would then wash the corpse and kill a bullock in front of the house, skinning it immediately and making an *angareb* of the skin. This is placed in the grave, and the body is laid upon it, a cell being built over the *angareb* so that the earth does not come into contact with the body. Even if the *bain* were quite young, he would be killed if it was thought that he was dangerously ill. The Niel take every care to guard the *bain* from accidental death, for, even if he should die suddenly as the result of accident, some sickness would surely occur, though his son or a near blood relation would immediately succeed him. It would be a far more serious matter if the *bain* were to die of illness, but this had never happened; indeed, the writer's informant (whose father and paternal uncle had both been killed in the appropriate manner) pointed out that this would prevent any of his sons (*i.e.* presumably any relative) from becoming *bain* in his turn. The writer believes that all tribes sprinkle milk on the grave, while some bury a bullock, or even a cow, with their *bain*, and it is probable that all place some property in the grave.

The following information was given by Biyordit, an old but still active man, the rain-maker of the Bor tribe, who [1911] has the greatest influence over all the Bor and Tain Dinka:

In each of the eight rain-makers who preceded Biyordit there was immanent a great and powerful spirit called Lerpiu, now immanent in Biyordit, who says quite simply that at his death Lerpiu will pass into his son. Near a hut belonging to Biyordit there is another *tukl*, constituting a shrine, in which the *jok* of Lerpiu is thought to reside more or less constantly. Within this hut is kept a very sacred spear, also called Lerpiu, and before it stands a post called *rit*, to which are attached the horns of many bullocks sacrificed to Lerpiu. Behind the hut there is a bush of the kind called *akoi*, which must not be cut or damaged in any way, but which strangers are allowed to

approach without the least ceremony. The *akoi* bush is clearly the least sacred part of the shrine, yet its presence is essential, for the *jok* leaves the hut to come to the *akoi* during the great rain-making ceremony, and the slight sanctity of the *akoi* at other times is well explained by the absence of the *jok*.

The rain ceremony consists of a sacrifice to Lerpiu, to induce him to move Dengdit to send rain. It is held in the spring (about April), when the new moon is a few days old. In the morning two bullocks are led twice round the shrine, and are tied to the *rit* by Biyordit: then the people beat drums; and men and women, boys and girls, all dance round the shrine. Nothing further is done until the bullocks urinate, when every one who can get near the beasts rubs his body with the urine. After this all except the old people go away. Presently the bullocks are killed by Biyordit, who spears them and cuts their throats. While the sacrifice is being prepared, the people chant: 'Lerpiu, our ancestor, we have brought you a sacrifice: be pleased to cause rain to fall.' The blood is collected in a gourd, transferred to a pot, put on the fire, and eaten by the old and important people of the clan. Some of the flesh of one bullock is put into two pots and cooked with much fat; this is left near the *akoi* for many (perhaps ten) months, yet it is said not to smell unpleasantly, and is ultimately eaten by people who have no cattle of their own. The food in the pots near the *akoi* is said to be for the *jok*, but the meat from the other bullock is eaten on the same day. The bones of the sacrifice are thrown away, but the horns are added to those already attached to the *rit*.

Besides the great rain-making ceremony performed at a central shrine, some tribes offer a sacrifice for rain in each settlement. Among the Shish this takes place before, or at the beginning of, the rainy season.

The old men of the settlement (*bai*) kill a sheep, thanking and praising Dengdit; the animal is bisected longitudinally, and that half which is away from the ground is cut into fragments and cast into the air as an offering to Dengdit. As they fall upon the ground, so they are left, and are soon eaten by dogs and birds. The blood of the sacrifice is allowed to soak into the ground, but the remainder of the meat is boiled and eaten, the bones, which must not be broken, being buried in the skin for seven days, and afterwards thrown into the river. Some *dura* is boiled, and this is thrown into the air and left lying upon the ground in the same way as the flesh of the sacrifice was left.

6. Sacred spears.—Mention has already been made of certain spears kept in the shrines of Dengdit. One of the spears in the Shish shrine at Lau is of the form named *bit* by the Dinka, and is called *bit yat*. Another spear with the usual leaf-shaped blade is called *ton yat*, and the iron rod is named *len yat*. These spears and the iron rod are described as playing an important part in the great rain-making ceremony held in the *luak* at Lau, and when the time comes to replace them an elaborate ceremony is performed. Long ago Dengdit ordered the *bain* Mabor to get the finest spear he could, and to put it in his shrine at Lau. This command was said to apply not only to the *ton yat*, but also to the *bit yat* and *len yat*, and all these are renewed periodically, by order of Dengdit, who, in a dream, indicates that the spears are getting old and that new ones must be provided. It seems that a new *ton yat* is brought to the *luak* about every tenth year, a white sheep being killed with the new spear by the *bain* as an act of consecration. Some of the blood is left on the blade for three days, after which it is washed and oiled. Certain old men and women, near relatives of the *bain*, boil and eat the flesh of this sacrifice in the courtyard of the *luak*, after which they wash their hands and throw the bones, none of which has been broken, into the river. The sacredness of the old spear appears to be transmitted to the new by thrusting the former into the earth by the side of the sacrifice, after which it is given to a son or other near relative of the *bain*.

7. Oaths.—In small matters the Shish affirm 'by Nyalich.' To swear a binding oath a man goes to the blacksmith and licks his hammer; then, putting it on the ground, he says: 'If I have done this thing, may I die!' Any one swearing falsely would certainly die within a couple of days. An Agar Dinka will swear by licking his iron bracelet and saying what he has done or not done, and that he is prepared to die if he is not speaking the truth. Another oath is to place a spear or stick on the ground and jump over it, saying: 'By Dengdit, I have not done this thing; if I have, may my spear be speedily put on my grave!' This refers to the Agar custom of putting a man's spear, bracelets, and shield upon his grave for seven days. The most terrific oath of all is to go to the shrine (*luak*) of Dengdit and swear by it.

8. Blessings and curses: the evil eye.—The Dinka firmly believe in the efficacy of both blessings and curses, and that people and cattle can be 'overlooked.' The following information was obtained from Tain Dinka living south of the Sudd, but it probably holds good over a much wider area. The blessings and curses of strangers are of little effect (it must be assumed that this does not apply to great and powerful men), but the words of kinsfolk are powerful for good or evil. There is a special word *lou* meaning 'to speak bad words about a man's body'; and a father, by saying his son shall be ill, can cause him to sicken. So, too, a man's relatives may curse him if he does not give them the bullock which is their due when he builds a cattle-shed soon after his marriage. A parent's blessing is held to be so efficacious that it may cure illness, the power for good being the will (*atiep*) of the loving father or mother. When a boy is to be blessed, he squats on the ground; and his father, standing by him, carries first his right thigh and then his left over his son's head. Then he spits on his scalp and blows into his ears and nose; next he spits on his own hands and rubs them over the boy's scalp, and, again spitting on them, smears spittle on the boy's chest and the nape of his neck. Finally, he picks up dust, and rubs some on the boy's chest and back, throwing away the remainder into the air. When a man is about to bless an ailing daughter, her mother brings a gourd of water, into which the man, his wife, and the girl's brothers and sisters and paternal aunts all spit, and her father sprinkles the water over the girl's body. Nothing further is done for eight days, but on the ninth day a male goat or sheep is tied up; when it urinates, the girl's breasts and back are anointed with the urine, while the relatives who spat into the bowl pray that she may be cured. Her brothers take the goat, throw it on the ground, cut its throat, and leave the body lying for people of other clans to eat. Any one can 'overlook' (Tain *kwan*) another who is not a very close blood relation, at any time when his victim is not looking him straight in the face. To *kwan* any one is always a voluntary action, and, though a thin or poor man may *kwan* a well-conditioned or rich man, this is not necessarily due to covetousness. A great man can make people ill without seeing them, by desiring it in his heart, and for sickness produced in this way there is no cure.

9. Magic.—Magic appears to play a comparatively small part in the spiritual life of the Dinka; probably this is to be attributed to the dominating influence of the cult of the *jok*, which constitutes the working belief of the people. In spite of this, auxiliary magical processes may be used in order to increase the efficacy of a sacrifice. Thus, it is not uncommon for a goat to be killed as a direct appeal to the *jok* before hippopotamus-hunting. The Tain Dinka of Malek village select a 'red' he-goat or sheep because the hippopotamus is 'red,' and take it to the Sudd in a canoe, where they cut its throat with a spear, because the animal they are hunting can be killed only with a spear. (The usual method of killing a sheep or goat is by a blow on the head.) Its blood is allowed to run into the river, while some is smeared on the blades of the harpoons. As soon as it is dead, it is thrust under the Sudd where the hippopotami are, its mouth being tied up so that it

may not do any damage with its teeth. The man with the harpoon prays to his *jok* as he approaches the animal, and the ceremony after its death is simply an offering of part of the flesh to the *jok*. Any one may provide the goat, but only three men—Apuot the *bain*, and two others—may cut its throat; if any other were to officiate, his action would be absolutely without effect.

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C. G. SELIGMANN.

DIOGENES.—See CYNICS.

DISCIPLES OF CHRIST.—A religious body located chiefly in the central and western portions of the United States. The originator of the movement was Thomas Campbell, a minister of the Seceder Presbyterian Church in the north of Ireland, who came to America in 1807, and was assigned to ministerial work in the Presbytery of Chartiers, in Western Pennsylvania. Keenly sensitive to the evil results of sectarian divisions, he used his efforts to unite the scattered groups of Presbyterians in such common work and worship as should allay in some measure the strife of rival factions. But so little were the churches of the period prepared for the practice of comity that he was censured by the Presbytery for his conduct, and, although upon appeal the Synod declined to affirm the judgment of the Presbytery, he found it desirable to sever his connexion with the Church of his fathers. But his earnest labours in behalf of unity led to the formation of a group called the 'Christian Association of Washington' (Pa.), and, soon after, he published a document called the 'Declaration and Address,' in which he pleaded with his brethren of all Christian bodies to abandon whatever religious doctrines and practices were unscriptural and divisive, and to seek the peace of the Church by the realization of the Lord's prayer (Jn 17[11. 21ff.]) for the oneness of His people. He was afterwards joined by his son Alexander, who had been trained for the ministry in Ireland and at Glasgow.

In studying the problem of Christian unity these men determined that they would propose to their religious neighbours the elimination of human additions to the primitive and simple gospel. This seemed to them a sufficient platform for a united Church. Their purpose was the restoration of the early Christian society as the means of realizing Christian oneness. They included in their programme all the essential elements of the Apostolic faith, spirit, and service. They held strongly to the great evangelical beliefs of the historic Church. They sought to make the teachings of the NT authoritative in their procedure. In compliance with this ideal they decided that the practice of infant baptism and of affusion must be abandoned. The movement grew, and soon the first congregation was established at Brush Run, Pa. (4th May 1811).

The Reformers, as they called themselves, were active in the dissemination of their views. Such leaders as the Campbells, Barton W. Stone, and Walter Scott were effective advocates of the new message. The adoption of immersion in the interest, as they believed, of Christian unity brought them into sympathetic relations with the Baptists, and in 1823 Alexander Campbell began the publication of a monthly called *The Christian Baptist*. For a time it seemed probable that the union of the two bodies would be effected. The Reformers were actually received into the fellowship of the Redstone Baptist Association, and later into that of the Mahoning Association, official organizations of the Baptists in Western Pennsylvania and Ohio. But the union was never complete. Each of the groups suspected the other and at times made counter-charges of unsoundness of views. Separation took place, and gradually the Reformers, or Disciples, as they usually called themselves, went their way as a separate body. At Bethany, W. Va., in 1840 Campbell founded Bethany College, the first of many schools organized by the Disciples. The movement grew rapidly in the States of West Virginia, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Kentucky. Campbell travelled widely, preaching and holding debates on such themes as related to the Primitive Church and the necessity of its restoration. The formative influences of his early training, the Lockian philosophy, the Covenant theology of Holland, the reformatory preaching of the Haldanes in Scotland and Ireland, and a profound sense of the scandal and disaster of divisions in the Church, were made evident in all his utterances. His power was widely felt, both among his own brethren and in other communions, and outside the Church. As a result, a large company of vigorous and aggressive preachers and teachers became identified with the enterprise, and its progress was rapid.

With the growth of churches the first interest in the idea of Christian unity gave way somewhat to the seemingly more definite and practical effort towards the restoration of early Christian usages. The weekly observance of the Lord's Supper, the immersion of adults as the only method of baptism, the organization of churches after the congregational order, with elders or bishops, and deacons, the rejection of all speculative discussion of the work of the Holy Spirit, and the emphasis upon the importance of the Scriptures in conversion were outstanding features of the new message. Close communion was never practised, but it was understood that only the immersed should be admitted to the churches.

In the development of so vigorous a body it was inevitable that controversy should have a pronounced part. Both with their religious neighbours and among themselves the Disciples have held earnest and prolonged controversy. Tendencies to literalism and legalism have not been wanting, but they have yielded slowly to the spirit of inquiry and progress. The creation of new educational foundations, the maintenance of an aggressive journalism, the organization of missionary and philanthropic agencies, and the encouragement of an effective evangelism in the churches have increased the numbers, intelligence, and consecration of the Disciples, until at the present time they are fifth among the great evangelical bodies of America; have a considerable constituency in England and Australia; have important missionary interests in China, India, Japan, Africa, the Philippines, Mexico, and the West Indies; and maintain efficient State and District organizations in nearly all sections of the United States and Canada.

The Disciples have desired from the first to be known only by NT names. They speak of their churches as 'Christian Churches,' or 'Churches of Christ.' These names they hold in common with all believers, and claim no exclusive title to them. Their worship has always been marked by simplicity, though there is an increasing effort to impart dignity to the services.

On the themes of advancing Christian thought,—the value and results of the historical method of Bible study, the contributions of modern scientific and philosophical labours to the religious life, the awakening of the social and civic conscience, the extension of missionary effort, and the adoption of higher educational standards—the Disciples have passed through the usual throes and differences of opinion incident to the development of most sections of the modern Church. But the progress has been

steady, and the future is promising. Particularly are the Disciples awakening to the realization of their historic task—the earnest effort to promote both by testimony and practical labours the unity of the people of God.

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HERBERT L. WILLETT.

DISCIPLINE.

DISCIPLINE (Buddhist).—This subject may best be discussed under four different heads: (1) discipline of the laity by the clergy; (2) discipline of the novices by members of the Order; (3) discipline as carried out by the Order, in Chapter assembled, against individual members of it; and (4) self-discipline.

1. Discipline of the laity.—The Buddhist doctrine did not recognize either a deity who can punish or a soul to be punished, and denied to the members of the Order (the *bhikkhus*) any priestly powers by which penalties in the next life could be mitigated or increased. Any disciplinary proceedings against the laity, therefore, were necessarily of a simple character. There are words in Pāli for 'instruction,' 'discussion,' 'training,' and 'self-restraint'; but there is no word covering the same ground as 'discipline.' The ideas of confessional or father-confessor, of absolution, inquisition, and church-membership are wanting. The word 'Buddhist' was not invented till many centuries after the rise of what we call Buddhism. By approving wholly or in part the doctrines of the new movement, a layman did not join any new organization or sever himself from any other. When Sīha, the Licchavi general, an adherent of the Jains, became converted by the Buddha, he was expressly enjoined by the Buddha himself to continue his support of the Jain community (*Vinaya Texts*, ii. 115). The only action of a disciplinary kind adopted by the early Buddhists towards laymen is described in *Vinaya Texts*, iii. 118 ff. It is called 'the turning down of the bowl' (*pattassa nikkujjana*). In case a layman, in any one of five ways,[1] endeavours to do harm to the Order, or speaks in disparagement of the Buddha, the Doctrine, or the Order, then it is permitted to the *bhikkhus* 'to turn down the bowl' in respect of that layman—that is, to refuse to accept a gift of food from him. If in any of the same five ways a *bhikkhu* should endeavour to do harm to a layman, a Chapter should compel him to beg pardon of that layman (*ib.* ii. 355 f.). The layman could have the ban removed by a Chapter by confessing his error and asking for forgiveness (*ib.* iii. 124). No mention of this ceremony of turning down the bowl has been found except in the earliest period, and it is now quite obsolete. Of any formal discipline of laymen in knowledge of the faith we hear nothing; and there was no custom corresponding to the *Arcani Disciplina* (*q.v.*) of the early Catholics. The *bhikkhus* are described as willing to talk over with laymen in an informal way any points of doctrine they wished to discuss. A large number of cases of this informal teaching are given in the books.

2. Discipline of novices.—One of the main objects of the founders of the various Orders that existed in India in the Buddha's time was to provide, by the establishment of the Order, for the preservation and propagation of the founder's teaching. There were then no books and no publishers. The novices and the younger members of the Order learnt the statements of the doctrine (the *Suttas*) by heart, and the older members expounded and discussed them, and cross-questioned the novices on their knowledge. It was necessary for such an Order to have rules. These the novices learnt, and the elders discussed. Among the early Buddhist literature, thus handed down to us, there are manuals used for the discipline of the novices in the Doctrine, in the Poetry, in the psychological Ethics, and in the Canon Law. The majority of the Abhidhamma books are of this nature. The *Parivāra* ('Supplement') to the *Vinaya*, which occupies the fifth volume of Oldenberg's edition of the text, consists entirely of a number of questions on the Canon Law, and was evidently used in the teaching of novices. The *Khudda-* and *Mūla-sikkhā* ('Short and Advanced Manuals') are somewhat later examples of the same thing. These studies and the personal attendance on his teacher occupied most of the time of the novice. If a novice tried to prevent the elder *bhikkhus* from receiving alms, if he devised mischief against them, if he prevented their finding a lodging-place, if he abused them, or if he caused division among them, then his teacher might interdict him from entering certain parts of the common residence (explained as meaning the bedroom or the sitting-room he has frequented [*Vinaya*, i. 84]). In ten cases of grievous misconduct, a novice may be expelled by his teacher (*ib.* i. 85). No other disciplinary proceedings are mentioned.

3. Discipline in the Order.—The Buddhist Order was a democracy. There was no vow of obedience and no hierarchy. The administration of the business of the Order was carried out locally by a Chapter on which each member of the Order (each *bhikkhu*) resident in the locality had a seat. The senior member presided as *primus inter pares*, and decisions were made by vote of the majority of those present. Should any member of the Order have committed, in the opinion of any other member, any breach of one of the regulations, the latter could bring forward, at the next meeting of the Chapter, a resolution on the subject. If the resolution was carried, the offending member remained for a fixed period under suspension. The suspension could be removed by a similar resolution when the offender had acknowledged his offence. In four cases of grave moral delinquency—murder, theft, impurity, and a false claim to extraordinary spiritual pre-eminence—the penalty was expulsion from the Order. The lawbooks give numerous cases which throw light on the question whether some particular act does or does not amount to a breach of any one of the 227 main rules of the Order, or of any one of the explanatory by-laws subsidiary to those rules. But they afford no evidence as to how frequently recourse was actually had, in the early years of the movement, to such disciplinary proceedings by a Chapter. Meetings of the Chapter are still held in Siam, Burma, and Ceylon for business purposes, for the recitation of the Rules,

[1] The details of these five ways are given below in the section on 'Discipline of novices.'

for admission of new members, etc. Whether disciplinary proceedings are still used, and, if so, how frequently, is not known. In other countries the ancient rules have fallen altogether out of use, and we have no information as to any disciplinary proceedings that may have been substituted for the formal acts of the Chapter (see, further, art. CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS [Buddhist]).

4. **Self-discipline.**—There were three codes of ethics in early Buddhism—one for the lay adherent, another for a member of the Order, and a third for those, whether laymen or mendicants, who had entered upon the Path to *arahat*-ship. People joined the Order for a variety of reasons—to earn a livelihood, for a life of literary peace, to escape the troubles of the world, from dislike of authority, or even (as Nāgasena says to King Milinda) out of fear of kings.[1] Some were converted men before they joined the Order; the majority were not. They were expected, in addition to their literary studies, to devote themselves to an elaborate system of self-discipline in ethics and psychology, leading up to what were regarded as the highest truths—those constituting the *samādhi*, the insight of the higher stages of the Path.[2] The existence of this system is the most characteristic feature of Buddhist discipline (see art. HĪNAYĀNA).

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DISCIPLINE (Christian).

1. **Definition and aim.**—Church discipline is that body of measures which have been employed in the Christian Church to secure its own purity and the spiritual well-being of its members by the punishment of offenders against its constitution and teachings. The authority for such procedure is based (1) upon the very nature of the Church as a select body with a code of its own; (2) upon express commands of Christ; (3) upon Apostolic precepts and examples afforded in the history of the Apostolic Church. The Church, as an institution endowed with the quality of holiness and entrusted with the deposit of revealed truth, is bound to keep itself free from corrupting elements which might taint its purity and thwart its activity in training its members and in bearing witness to the world. As it concerns the offender, discipline is intended (1) to reclaim him from error of doctrine or impurity of life, so that, if possible, his soul may be saved; or (2) to cut him off, as a withered branch, from the body of Christ and all participation in its benefits. In the development of the Canon Law, such punishments were termed either medicinal (*pœnæ medicinales*) or strictly penal (*pœnæ vindicativæ*). The former are corrective and reformatory; the latter, while, according to canonists, they do not wholly exclude this idea, are mainly concerned with the vindication of the majesty of the law and the removal of all danger to the Church from contagion.

After the Apostolic age and from the close of the 2nd cent., Church discipline found expression in the unformulated system of Penance. To this were added, from the 4th cent., the Canons of Councils, local and ecumenical; from the 7th the Penitential Books; and later the collections of Canon Law culminating in the Decretals of Gratian, about 1150. Beginning with Constantine's reign, severe civil penalties were executed upon dissenters from the Church's formulated standard of doctrine. The Arians, who refused obedience to the Nicene statement, were banished, and their books burnt. Although such penalties were inflicted by the civil ruler, they received the approbation of the Church. The legislation concerning the discipline and punishment of dissenters reached its culmination, so far as the Church was concerned, in the tribunals of the Papal and Spanish Inquisitions (1215, 1478). This body of legislation was extended to include witchcraft and all kinds of *maleficium*, especially after the bull of Innocent VIII., *Summis desiderantes* (1484).

The Reformers continued to insist upon ecclesiastical discipline, and, in their hands, it found its most strenuous application in the codes of Geneva and the disciplinary books of the Elizabethan Puritans of Scotland and the Westminster Assembly. As to the seat of authority for the exercise of Church discipline, the theory has been, and is, that the Church exercises discipline over her own members and within her own sphere. To use the expression current in the Middle Ages, she wields the spiritual sword (*gladium spirituale*), or, to quote a Protestant symbol (the Scottish *First Book of Discipline*, ch. ix.), she 'draws the sword which of God she hath received.' But, in fact, not only has the distinction between the Church and the State as agents to punish ecclesiastical offences (*delicta*) not always been clearly defined, but the Church has not restricted herself to her sphere, and, indeed, has expected the State to aid her in the maintenance of her discipline. From 325 onwards the Universal Church gradually came to approve civil penalties for ecclesiastical offences. The Latin Church, through the Inquisition, the culminating procedure in her disciplinary activity, not only pronounced suspects guilty of heresy, but imprisoned them, ordered their houses to be burnt and their goods confiscated, and turned them over to the civil authorities, knowing that their punishment would be death. In the Protestant Churches of Zürich and Geneva, among the Protestants of England and Scotland, and during the Colonial period in the United States, the same confusion prevailed, although in its application the legislation was much less destructive than during the Middle Ages. It has remained for more recent times to make the line separating the ecclesiastical and civil realms more distinct, even to the complete separation of Church and State, in some Protestant lands.

2. **Discipline in the Apostolic Church.**—Pure as is the operation of the Holy Spirit, and spotless as is the ideal Church, the bride of Christ, it was predicted by Christ that offences would arise (Mt 18[7]). Such offences were manifested in the earliest days of the Church's history. The Apostles themselves remained conscious of weaknesses and faults. Peter denied Christ (Mt 26[69ff.]), and was condemned by Paul at Antioch (Gal 2[11ff.]). Paul says, 'I buffet my body' (1 Co 9[27]), calls upon the Christians to whom he wrote 'to mortify their members' (Col 3[5]), and in Ro 7 indicates that a constant war goes on in the Christian between the appetencies of the flesh and the will of the Spirit. 'In a great house there are not only vessels of gold and of silver, but also of wood and of earth; and some unto honour, and some unto dishonour' (2 Ti 2[20]). Here the Apostle has in mind persons 'reprobate concerning the faith,' whom he compares to Jannes and Jambres (3[8]).

The Church's right to exercise discipline was definitely conferred when Christ empowered His Apostles to bind and loose (Mt 18[18]). He also indicated the measures to be resorted to when an offence became known. If a brother was found guilty of a fault, he was to be privately admonished by a single person; then, if necessary, by several in company; and finally, if reproof was still

[1] *Milinda*, i. 50.
[2] Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, i. 190–192.

ineffectual, the offender was to be publicly rebuked before the congregation. In case he was still obdurate, he was to be treated 'as the Gentile and the publican' (vv.[15-17]).

After the Resurrection, the Apostles exercised the function of discipline, and warranted it by precepts. The duty of feeding the flock and ruling in the Church (Ac 20^{28}, He 13^{7} etc.) implied this function. Special rules of practice were issued by the council of Jerusalem (Ac 15). The offences condemned were both errors of doctrine and faults of conduct against the pure laws of Christian living.

The first cases of discipline—the appalling deaths of Ananias and Sapphira (Ac 5)—are so extraordinary that no one but an extreme advocate of Church prerogative would find in them a precedent for the Church to follow, although they are referred to as examples of just punishment, not only in the Middle Ages, but by Calvin. It is true that, in the case of Sapphira, Peter announced her death; but the punishments must be looked upon as the unusual act of God, designed to make a lasting impression upon the Church. To another category belong the cases which occur in the writings of Paul and John. John (2 Jn $^{10f.}$) took the position that heresy was a sufficient ground for refusing companionship with the offenders. Paul combined the two categories when he called upon the Thessalonian Christians to withdraw themselves 'from every brother that walketh disorderly, and not after the tradition which they received of us' (2 Th 3^{6}). Heresy he pronounced a gangrene (2 Ti 2^{17}, cf. Tit 3^{10}), and he admonished the Corinthians to exclude from their companionship brethren who were extortioners, fornicators, revilers, idolaters, drunkards, and covetous (1 Co 5^{9-13}). He excommunicated the member of the Corinthian congregation who had committed incest with his mother-in-law (1 Co 5, 2 Co 7), and 'delivered unto Satan' Alexander and Hymenæus (1 Ti 1^{20}). He also invoked the anathema against 'any man that loveth not the Lord,' and against the Judaizing teachers who might preach another gospel than that he preached (1 Co 16^{22}, Gal 1^{8}). In the case of the Corinthian offender, Paul states that his purpose was that his 'spirit may be saved in the day of the Lord Jesus,' and, in the case of Alexander and Hymenæus, that they 'might be taught not to blaspheme.'

It is evident that it is possible, from these statements of the NT, for a Church hierarchy, if it be so disposed, to justify the resort to the most rigorous methods of disciplinary constraint, and to reduce Church government to a mere contrivance to exact implicit mechanical obedience to a system of ecclesiastical enactments, forgetting that the Church is a training school to exercise discipline in the spirit of love and for the education and correction of the weak and offending.

3. The ante-Nicene practice (A.D. 100–313, the date of Constantine's edict of toleration).—In this period a strict system of discipline was practised, but the punishments were prescribed and executed by the spiritual authorities, and had nothing to do with civil constraints. There was no precise code, and the practice differed in different parts of the Church, for example, as between N. Africa and Rome. The two marked features are the development of the system of penance and the issue of disciplinary canons by councils. The distinction which came to be made between venial and mortal sins also had an important bearing upon the exercise of discipline.

In his *de Pudic.* ch. 19 ('Ante-Nic. Fathers,' Amer. ed., iv. 97), Tertullian enumerates seven mortal offences for which, if committed after baptism, there can be no restoration in this world or hope in the world to come—murder, idolatry, theft, apostasy, blasphemy, fornication, adultery. For these Christ will not act as pleader (*horum ultra exorator non erit Christus*). Those who commit such offences cease to be sons of God. For other sins committed after baptism, certain penances or compensations were prescribed, such as fasting, prayer, and almsgiving. Origen (as quoted by Friedberg, p. 209) states that only for manifest sins (*peccata evidentia*) were offenders cast out from the Church—giving as the reason, lest the wheat be plucked up with the tares. Towards the end of the period, the penitential system came to recognize four classes of penitents—weepers, hearers, kneelers, and standers (*flentes, audientes, genuflexi, consistentes*). These were within the pale of the Church (*intra ecclesiam*) as opposed to the excommunicate. They were forbidden certain forms of pleasure, ornaments of dress, connubial intercourse, etc., and they were especially required to devote themselves to prayer, almsgiving, fasting, etc. The usual duration of this period of penance was three or four years, though it might be abbreviated at the will of the Church authorities.

The schisms which broke out in the Church, such as those of Novatian, Miletus, and the Donatists, were a revolt against a tendency to relax the rigours of discipline, and arose for the most part over the question of the restoration of the lapsed. The N. African Church, led by Tertullian, refused restoration to those who had denied the faith in times of persecution; Cyprian at first took the same ground, but later receded from it in view of the great number who had given way in the Decian-Valerian persecution, and granted to the penitent the communion in the hour of death. The Roman Church was lenient with this class of offenders.

The Synods which were held at the close of this period—Elvira, Arles, and Ancyra—passed severe disciplinary canons. The Spanish Synod of Elvira (see A. W. W. Dale, *The Syn. of Elvira*, Lond. 1882) in 81 canons punished with anathematization the denial of the communion, and lesser penalties. Murder, idolatry, and especially unchastity have a large place given to them. For example, a wife guilty of adultery, without precedent provocation given by the husband, is denied communion even in the hour of death. Those guilty of extravagance in dress may after three years be restored to the communion, and gamblers after one year. The worship of idols by a baptized adult is pronounced a *crimen capitale*, and the offender is excluded permanently from the communion.

4. From 313 to 1215 (from Constantine's edict of toleration to the establishment of the Inquisition).—With the alliance of the Church with the State, a new practice was developed in regard to the treatment of ecclesiastical offences. The State itself passed disciplinary regulations for certain of them, and executed punishments. Worldly penalties, such as confiscation of goods, banishment, mulcts of money, death, and later the loss of individual freedom, came to be approved by the Church as penalties for offences within the realm of religion (see Hinschius, iv. 803-814; Friedberg, 210; Hergenröther, 546 ff.). Carrying over to the new order the ideas which the office of Pontifex Maximus implied, Constantine claimed authority, as universal bishop, over the external affairs of the Church. He and his Imperial successors exercised the right not only of proceeding against heretics, but, as in the case of Theodosius, of designating who they were. The Theodosian code counted as a public crime every offence against religion, on the ground that such offences brought injury to all (*in omnium fertur injuria* [quoted by Friedberg, 209]). The following are the chief steps in the history of Church discipline in this period of 1000 years:

(1) As worldliness crept into the Church after Constantine's identification with it, offences of moral conduct were given less prominence, and offences were emphasized which were committed against the Church as a corporation and against its doctrinal code as formulated by the Councils, and held by the common opinion of the Church.

(2) Constantine punished departures from the Nicene statement by burning the books of the Arians and banishing Arius himself. His sons at one time punished Athanasius and his followers, at another favoured them.

(3) The Ecumenical Councils, beginning with the Nicene (325), passed, in addition to their doctrinal decrees, canons providing rules of administration and discipline. The Athanasian Creed pronounced anathema upon those refusing its precise definitions of the doctrine of the Trinity, and excluded them from the possibility of salvation.

(4) While the Emperors, from Gratian and Theodosius to Justinian, were proscribing paganism by penalties increasing to the penalty of death, Imperial rescripts were placing Christian heretics under the civil ban. Theodosius the Great, at the close of the 4th cent., pronounced those who held to the Nicene statement Catholic Christians, and all others heretics. In 15 different enactments he deprived the latter of all right to the exercise of religious usages, excluded them from civil office, and threatened them with fines, banishment, confiscation of goods, and—as in the case of the Manichæans, Audians, and Quartodecimans—with death.

(5) The code of Justinian not only regulated all

kinds of ecclesiastical affairs, but in certain cases gave even criminal jurisdiction to the bishops (see Pfannmüller, *Die kirchliche Gesetzgebung Justinians*, Berlin, 1902, p. 82 ff.).

(6) The penalty of death was executed for the first time for ecclesiastical offences at Trèves in 385, when the Spanish bishop Priscillian and six others, including a noble matron of Bordeaux, were put to death. All the bishops present except Theognistes approved the sentence. Ambrose and Martin of Tours disapproved of it, the former, however, being opposed to the death sentence altogether. Leo I. (440–461) definitely advocated the death penalty for heretics. Henceforth the only parties to oppose it were the dissenting sects, such as the Donatists.

(7) Notable cases of discipline are not wanting in the administration of high ecclesiastics. Chrysostom was deposed for rebuking the extravagance and vices of the Imperial court of Constantinople (404). Ambrose excluded Theodosius from the church of Milan till he had made expiation for the wholesale execution in Thessalonica (390). Synesius excommunicated the governor of Pentapolis for his merciless oppressions (409).

(8) The most important influence on the discipline of dissenters exercised by any churchman was that of Augustine. At first inclined to restrict discipline to spiritual measures, he changed front during the controversy with the Donatists. Quoting our Lord's words in the parable, 'Compel them to come in,' he expounded them to include physical measures. He did not go as far as distinctly to advocate the penalty of death, but his exposition became the chief authority for the Schoolmen, including Thomas Aquinas, in favour of the death penalty for heretics.

(9) During the 7th and 8th centuries, penitential codes came into use, prescribing penalties for all sorts of offences against religion and the Church, beginning with those of Columban († 615), and Theodore of Tarsus († 690). A forerunner of these writers was John Scholasticus († 578), whose *Syntagma* with its 68 canons was confirmed by the Trullan Synod of 692. An idea of the penances prescribed by Theodore of Tarsus may be formed from one example. A priest who drank to excess and vomiting had to do penance for 30 days, a layman for 15 days. False canonical codes were referred to by the Paris Synod (829).

(10) The Isidorian Decretals, dating from the middle of the 9th cent., authorized the Church to take cognizance in her discipline not only of specifically ecclesiastical offences (*delicta mere ecclesiastica*), but also of offences of a mixed character (*delicta mixta*). For certain Church dignitaries the decisions of the Church tribunal were final.

(11) Special legislation was enacted for clerical offences. Among the more notable acts was the so-called Canonical Rule (see Hatch, *Growth of Ch. Institutions*, London, 1887, ch. ix.). The ministry had become not only a profession, but a lucrative profession. The clergy hawked and hunted, were extravagant in their retinues, drank, and committed other excesses. One of Charlemagne's capitularies (802) called upon the clergy to live 'according to the canon.' Later a semi-cloistral mode of life was introduced among them, one reason given being that the clergy thereby 'might avoid the company of women,' as at the Roman Council of 853.

(12) The Canon Law was definitely incorporated in the collections of Regino († 915), Burchard of Worms († 1025), Anselm of Lucca († 1086), Cardinal Deusdedit (*c.* 1087), and Ivo of Chartres († 1116). These imperfect works gave way to the monumental production of the Camaldulensian monk, Gratian, who taught canon law in the convent of St. Felix, Bologna, in the middle of the 12th century. His work, whose original title was *Concordantia canonum discordantium*, became the manual in its department, as the *Sentences* of Peter the Lombard became the manual in the department of theology. It was greatly augmented with the supplements added by the Orders of Gregory IX., Boniface VIII., Clement V., and John XXII. Although full of forgeries and errors, as has been shown by Döllinger-Friedrich (*Das Papstthum*, Munich, 1892), it remained the undisputed code in Western Christendom till the Reformation, regulating life from the cradle to the grave. Its decrees have in part been superseded by the canons and decrees of the Council of Trent.

(13) As vicar of Christ and undisputed head of Latin Christendom, the Pope became, as the Middle Ages advanced, the supreme disciplinarian, and his decisions kept Christendom, especially England, in a constant ferment.

(14) The greater punishments which came into general use in the Church were the anathema and the interdict, to which is to be added suspension from the priesthood. Two forms of anathema, the minor and the major, are distinguished by Wetzer-Welte, quoting Gregory IX., but they differ only in the degrees of solemnity with which they are pronounced. The anathema excludes from the communion and all public services of the Church except preaching, and from all the public suffrages of the Church, but not necessarily from private intercessions. If the sentence still rests upon the offender at death, it excludes from burial in consecrated ground. Martin V. in his *Ad evitanda* (1418) made a distinction between *excommunicati tolerati* and *excommunicati vitandi*. From the latter all religious intercourse whatever is to be withheld, and, as far as feasible, all commercial dealing (see Hergenröther, 568 ff.). Perhaps no excommunications surpass in execration that pronounced by Clement VI. (1346) against Louis the Bavarian:

> 'Let him be damned in his going out and his coming in! The Lord strike him with madness and blindness and mental insanity! May the heavens empty upon him their thunderbolts, and the wrath of the Omnipotent burn itself into him in the present and the future world! May the universe fight against him, and the earth open to swallow him up alive!' (Mirbt, *Quellen d. Papstthums*[2], Tübingen, 1901, p. 153).

The interdict was extended to a community of persons or territory. There are different degrees of punishment involved in the sentence, but in general it involves the denial of the sacraments of the Eucharist, Ordination, and Extreme Unction, public services of the Church, and the rite of burial in sacred ground. Among the notable cases were the interdicts fulminated over Scotland (1180), England (1208), the sacred cities of Rome by Adrian IV. (1155), and Jerusalem (1229) on the occasion of the crusade of the excommunicated Emperor, Frederick II.

5. From 1215 (the Fourth Lateran Council) to the Council of Trent.—There are three important points which stand out in the further history of discipline before the Reformation. (1) The doctrine of Penance underwent a radical change (see K. Müller, *Der Umschwung in der Lehre von der Busse während d. 12ten Jahrh.*, Freib. 1892; Schaff, *Ch. Hist.*, vol. v. pt. i. p. 729 ff.). Confession to the priest and satisfaction by doing the penances prescribed by him were made necessary for absolution. The acts of satisfaction are penal acts which serve like medicines for spiritual wounds, and also as a compensation to God for offences. So Alexander of Hales and Thomas Aquinas taught. The priest is the judge of what the act of satisfaction shall be. Among the more notable cases of public penance were those of Henry II. after Becket's death, and Raymund of Toulouse. This

system of discipline under the direction of the priest became obligatory for every Christian in the world. The crusades offered a vast opportunity for the exercise of Church discipline and penance.

(2) The tribunal of the Inquisition, established by Innocent III. at the 12th Ecumenical Council (1215), was intended to meet the peril of heresy and to extirpate it. With Gregory the Great († 604) heresy ceased to be known in Western Europe for four centuries. At the end of the 11th cent. slight traces of it appear at Goslar, Mainz, Cologne, Strassburg, and other places. They as quickly disappeared, but suddenly in the 12th cent. heresy sprang up in different parts of Europe, from Milan to Antwerp, and from the Pyrenees to Bremen. In his Laws of 1238, Frederick II. gives a list of 19 different heretical sects. The chief of these were the Cathari and the Waldenses. In 1163 a Synod of Toulouse compared heretics to serpents concealing themselves in the grass. Innocent III.'s predecessor, Lucius III., at the Council of Verona (1184) joined with Frederick Barbarossa in a public demonstration in the Cathedral, that they would make it their common cause to extirpate heretical depravity. Princes were ordered to take an oath to support the Church in punishing offenders, upon pain of forfeiting their dignities. The Synod of Toulouse (1163) had called upon princes to imprison heretics and confiscate their goods. The Third Lateran (1179) extended the punishments to defenders of heretics. By the third canon of the Fourth Lateran (1215) all princes were again enjoined to swear to protect the orthodox faith, on pain of losing their lands; and to all taking part 'in the extermination of heretics' was offered the indulgence extended to the Crusaders in the Holy Land. All who in any way supported heretics were to be excommunicated and excluded from receiving their natural inheritance. This portentous organization was further perfected at the Council of Toulouse (1229), and by Innocent IV. in his bull *Ad exstirpanda* (1252), which prescribed torture as a means of extorting confession of crime. No heretic was to be punished till convicted by the ecclesiastical tribunal, but, once convicted, the secular arm was under obligation to punish the offender by destroying his domicile and refuge, even though it were underground, by confiscating his goods, and by putting him to death. Innocent III. declared that, as treason was punished, so much more should punishments be meted out to those who committed the greater crime of blasphemy against God and His Son. Secular princes were to draw the sword against them (see quotation in Schaff, *Ch. Hist.*, vol. v. pt. ii. p. 518, together with Hurter's exposition of Innocent's views). Innocent summoned Christendom to a crusade against the heretics in Southern France, promising 'those who fought for the soul and for God' the same rewards as he promised to those who ventured their lives to rescue the Holy Sepulchre.

In vain is the plea made that the Church did not execute heretics or immediately pronounce the decree of execution. It immured them for life, and it threatened with exclusion from the sacrament and from heaven princes and magistrates who refused to execute the death penalty upon them. The Catholic apologist, Vacandard, is compelled to say that at times the sacred tribunal actually passed sentence of death. It is strange, in view of the words of Popes and councils, that Catholic writers, like Ph. Hergenrother (*Kathol. Kirchenrecht*, 541), should assert not only that it is not within the Church's province to execute the death penalty, but that it cannot call upon the State to execute it. An inquisitor like Bernard Guy represented the temper of his time when he said in his famous manual that heresy could be exterminated only as heretics were burnt.

To this extreme form of Church discipline the Schoolmen gave full theological justification. Thomas Aquinas, resting upon the authority of Augustine, asserted that 'heretics were not only to be separated from the Church by excommunication, but from the world by death' (*Summa*, II. pt. 2. 11 [ed. Migne, iii. 109]). 'As falsifiers of coin are to be put to death, much more should they be put to death who are guilty of the more wicked act of corrupting the faith. The heretic the Church delivers over to the secular tribunal to be put out of the world.'

The Spanish Inquisition, formally sanctioned by Sixtus IV. (1478) and accepted by his successors in its essential features, is even more noted in history for its ingenious devices and severity in disciplining heretics than the papal tribunal established in 1215. Pastor and Funk both agree, as against Hefele, that it was primarily not a State institution, but the creation of the Pope (Schaff, *Ch. Hist.*, vol. v. pt. ii. p. 539 ff.).

(3) The third important chapter in the history of Church discipline in this period was the famous assertion of Boniface VIII., in the bull *Unam sanctam* (1302), that both swords are in the hands of the Pope, and that it is altogether necessary to salvation to be obedient to the Roman pontiff. This assertion, confirmed by Leo X. on the very eve of the Protestant Reformation, sufficiently justifies the Church in the use of any means whatsoever that it may select to carry on its work and maintain its authority. Down to the 14th cent., the theory had been that the Church's jurisdiction stops with those who are baptized by its ritual. But papal pamphleteers, after the death of Boniface VIII., like Augustinus Triumphus († 1328), extended it to the whole heathen world. A voice as if proclaiming a new era, Marsilius of Padua, in his *Defensor pacis* (1324), argued that the disciplinary prerogative of the Church was only suasive, not penal. But the Church did not listen to him, and the Council of Constance (1415) re-affirmed the doctrine that heretics should be burnt ('puniendi usque ad ignem'), and carried out the affirmation in the sentences against Hus and Jerome of Prague and the bones of Wyclif. The papal crusades against the Cathari were repeated against the Hussites, and Savonarola was burnt with the approbation of Pope Alexander VI. One of the charges made by Leo X. against Luther was that he asserted that it was against the will of the Holy Spirit that heretics should be burnt.

The Council of Trent nowhere mentions the penalty of death for heretics, but neither it nor any Pope since has expressly rejected the severe disciplinary policy exercised by the Church for centuries. The disciplinary element in penance was re-affirmed by the Council of Trent, even to the use of indulgences.

6. The Reformers and the Protestant Churches.—Three things, made prominent by the Reformers, were adapted to reduce the value of Church discipline and to limit the application of a disciplinary code: (1) the principle emphasizing the immediate responsibility of the Christian to God; (2) the authority of Scripture as the supreme rule of life; (3) the insistence upon preaching as the chief element in the power of the keys—a view which passed into the Augsburg (Schaff, *Creeds*, iii. 59) and other Protestant Confessions. Instruction and persuasion through the sermon were destined, to a considerable extent, to take the place of punitive discipline. Another consideration adapted to limit the application of discipline was the abolition of the confessional, and the substitution of repentance of heart for penance with its system of outward satisfactions imposed by the priest. There was a wide divergence between the Lutheran and the Calvinistic Reformations in the prominence given to discipline, growing out of the attitude of Luther and Calvin respectively. Luther had no genius for administration, and felt little confidence in discipline. Calvin was a born administrator, and in theory advanced discipline to almost as high a place as it had held in the

mediæval Church, but with a wide difference in practice.

(1) *The Lutheran Church.*—Luther was inclined to be satisfied with preaching, Christian instruction, and the dispensation of the two sacraments as the means for preserving the purity of the Church and extending her influence. He had little to say about discipline as a system, and never set forth a clear theory of the relation of Church and State. He was violent enough in his judgments against the Anabaptists, Münzer, and the Protestant anarchists, and against the Swiss, but he never worked out a system of discipline. The *Augsburg Confession* (pt. II. art. vii.) condemns the 'violent excommunications' of pontiffs, and their attempt to take from Emperors their prerogatives and transfer them to themselves. It insists that the two powers are not to be confounded, and at the same time that the Church in her own sphere is sovereign. The exercise of her rightful power no more interferes with civil government than the art of singing does. The *Schmalkald Articles* (iii. 9) reject the major excommunication, but retain the minor, which is to be used against manifest sinners, excluding them from the Lord's Table till they give proof of amendment. This power of excommunication inheres in the body of the Church. Later in the 16th cent. it was left to the Lutheran consistories, the pastor having only the prerogative of announcing the sentence. In the 17th cent. there was a movement to establish or re-establish a system of discipline by J. V. Andreæ, who had been in Geneva, the younger Quistorp of Rostock, and others, by the appointment of a body of elders for each congregation. Spener also wrote of discipline as a possible means of reviving piety. These suggestions came to nothing. At the present time the State exercises so large an authority in appointing ministers and enforcing baptism that discipline is almost a lost art in the German Lutheran Churches.

(2) *The Reformed Churches.*—(*a*) Zwingli and Œcolampadius left the right of excommunication to the State. In Zürich the Reformation was carried out by the magistrates; and heretics and Anabaptists were executed. Zwingli, so far as we know, did not protest against this punishment. The *First Helvetic Confession* provides for excommunication and for reinstatement in case of repentance; but, without making a clear distinction between the two realms, puts the authority to pass sentence in the hands of those 'who are appointed thereto by the servants of the Word and the Christian magistracy.' The State is to take positive measures to root out blasphemy and punish blasphemers, and to promote the spread of the principles preached in the pulpit. The *Second Helvetic Confession* (xxx. [Schaff, *Creeds*, iii. 305 f.]) makes it the duty of the civil magistrate 'to defend the Church of God and the preaching of the truth, to cut out all impiety, superstition, and idolatry, to draw the sword against all malefics and blasphemers, and to coerce all heretics who are heretics indeed.'

(*b*) The practice of the large body of the Reformed Churches was determined by Calvin's treatment in his *Institutes* (bk. iv. ch. 12) and by the Genevan code, the *Ecclesiastical Ordinances*, which were largely the work of Calvin's hand. It must not be overlooked that in minor particulars the execution of the Genevan legislation differs from Calvin's theory as laid down in his *Institutes*. Calvin's carefully arranged form of Church government involved a rigid discipline. He proceeded on the principle that 'no house can be preserved in proper condition without discipline.' Otherwise Christians would live like rats in the straw. Discipline is the only remedy against a dreadful desolation in the Church. Its purpose is threefold—to keep the Church in a sound condition, to protect its members against taint, and to bring the offender, if possible, to repentance. Following closely on Mt 18[15ff.], admonition precedes excommunication, which is the last resort of the ecclesiastical power. Calvin declared that, as sound teaching is the soul of the Church, so discipline is its sinews (*disciplina pro nervis est*). The elders, twelve in number, appointed from the Little Council, were expected to live in different parts of Geneva, in order that they might the better perform their functions as overseers. It was their duty to watch over the moral and religious fidelity of the people, and to make at least once a year a visitation of every household. With the pastors they constituted the consistory, which met once a week and sat upon complaints made against high and low. They fixed penalties for offenders, such as payments of money for non-attendance at Church. Greater offenders were turned over to the civil power for punishment. Watchmen were appointed to report persons who failed to go to Church. This system has been likened by Catholic historians (*e.g.* Funk, *Kirchengesch.*[4], 1902, p. 438) to the tribunal of the Inquisition. Calvin's theory of the relation of State and Church cannot be discussed here. It is evident, however, that, in abandoning the mediæval mistake whereby the Church arrogated to itself authority over the State, he went too far in the other direction to suit our modern ideas. He was right in declaring that ministers must confine themselves to the spiritual sword, which is the word of God (*Inst.* IV. ii. 4). The State he treated as a Christian institution established to defend the Church, and to punish religious as well as political and moral offences. Thus not only sedition and adultery were punished by death in Geneva, but also blasphemy, heresy, and idolatry, the justification for such punishments being derived from the Old and New Testaments. The most notable of the many condemnations was the burning of Servetus upon the two charges of blasphemy against the doctrine of the Trinity, and insulting reprobation of infant baptism. Calvin himself acted as prosecutor. The Reformer, however, seems to have had some idea of the coordinate relation of the two realms, and insisted, at the risk of his life, upon excommunication as the sole prerogative of the Church. In the famous case of the excommunicated Berthelier (1553), who had been reinstated by the civil authority in the church, Calvin declared that he would die rather than acknowledge the principle of State interference.

(*c*) The Protestant Church of France, adapting itself to its position in the State, adopted Calvin's discipline in a modified form, but also declared that the magistrates are appointed of God to suppress crimes against the first as well as against the second table of the Decalogue (*Gallican Conf.* xxxix.).

(*d*) The Anglican *Thirty-Nine Articles* commended excommunication (xxxiii.), but are not clear in defining the tribunal before which a person should come before being received back into the communion of the Church, the words running 'received into the Church by a judge that hath authority thereunto.' By virtue of the supreme headship of the Church in England inhering in the sovereign, discipline for Church offences was exercised by the civil authority. This principle was not combated by the Puritan party in Elizabeth's reign, but only the application of it whereby they suffered for disobedience to the Act of Uniformity.

(*e*) In Scotland and among the Puritan churches

the rigorous discipline of Geneva found its most genial soil, so that Puritanism and Presbyterianism are synonymous in the popular mind not only with severity of Christian living, but with severity of censure upon those who depart in faith or ethical practice from the accepted standard. The Scottish symbols, and the Westminster standards which took their place after 1648, alike enunciate the close relation between Church and State whereby the State punishes a certain class of religious offences, and also lay great stress upon strict supervision over the lives of Church members and a rigorous system of censure. The *Book of Common Order* and the *First Book of Discipline*, as well as the *Form of Government and Directory of Worship* of the Westminster Assembly, state at length the rules of judicature and of trial. To these is to be added the *Order of Excommunication and of Public Repentance*, commanded to be printed by the Scottish Assembly in 1569 (see Dunlop, ii. 701–745). Knox, the faithful disciple of Calvin, laid down in the *Scottish Confession* of 1560 the principle of the relation of Church and State, when he declared that to civil rulers 'chiefly and most principally the conservation and purgation of religion appertains,' and that they are appointed for the maintenance of the true religion and for suppressing idolatry. This principle was fully embodied in the *Westminster Confession* (xxiii.), which declares it to be the duty of the civil magistrate to 'take order that unity and peace be preserved in the Church.' He 'hath power to call synods and to provide that whatsoever is transacted in them be according to the Word of God.' This principle was carried out in the relation which the Assembly sustained to Parliament. One of the main complaints of the Millenary Petition in 1603 concerned Church discipline. The petitioners begged 'that men be not excommunicated for trifles and twelve-penny matters' (see Gee and Hardy, *Documents*, London, 1896, p. 509 ff.).

To the subject of the Church's exercise of discipline by its own tribunal, the *Westminster Confession* devotes a whole chapter (xxx.), and prescribes three forms of punishment—admonition, suspension from the Lord's Supper for a time, and excommunication from the Church. The reasons for the exercise of discipline are given in a more quaint and attractive form by Knox in the *Book of Common Order* (ch. vii.), and in the *Order of Excommunication* (ch. iii.). In the latter it is stated 'that, as it would be a work both uncharitable and cruel to join together in one bed persons infected with pestilent and other contagious and infective sores, with tender children or such as were sound, so it is no less cruelty to suffer amongst the flock of Christ such obstinate rebels . . ., for a little leaven corrupteth the whole mass.'

Offences coming before the Church court for censure are enumerated in the Scottish *Book of Discipline* (ch. ix.), and include 'accursed papisterie,' which exposed those who were infected with it to excommunication. This is reasserted in the *Order of Excommunication* (Dunlop, 709). The Kirk-session, consisting of the minister and elders, meeting once a week, had as one of its functions to determine and judge causes and administer admonition to licentious livers, for 'by the gravity of the seniors, the light and unbridled life of the licentious must be corrected and bridled' (*First Bk. of Disc.* x.). The sentence of excommunication was to be announced by the minister in the public audience of the people in the words:

'We having place in the ministry . . . draw the sword granted by God to His Church, that is, to excommunicate from the society of Christ Jesus, from His body the Church, from participation of sacraments and prayer with the same, the said N.'

(*f*) In America, during the Colonial period, the discipline within the Churches of Puritan and Presbyterian lineage was strict, and throughout the colonies, even in New Amsterdam under Peter Stuyvesant, the magistrate joined in exercising oversight over strictly ecclesiastical affairs. The notable exception was Rhode Island, founded by Roger Williams, who before his banishment denied the right of the civil authority to punish offences against the first table, and who in his exile gave memorable expression to the principle of religious liberty. In the New England colonies, especially Massachusetts, the close alliance of Church and State involved not only such acts as the calling of synods by the legislature and the collecting of taxes for the support of the Established Church, but acts of Church discipline culminating in the banishments of Anne Hutchison (1638) and Roger Williams (1636), the public execution of four Quakers (1659–61) in Boston, and the execution of nineteen persons accused of witchcraft in 1692. With the adoption of the American Constitution, the Churches, including the American Presbyterian Assembly (1789), adopted modifications of their constitutions, making them conform to the principle of the complete separation of Church and State. The Assembly of that year altered in a fundamental way ch. xxx. of the *Westminster Confession*. For similar modifications by British Presbyterian Churches, see art. CONFESSIONS, in vol. iii. p. 878[a].

In recent times the tendency among Churches using the English tongue is to forego as far as possible the right of discipline, preferring to trust almost wholly to the effect of the public exposition of the truth from the pulpit and to the conscience of the church-member. There is also a tendency to avoid the exercise of discipline upon ministers of the gospel in the matter of doctrinal belief. The recent trials of Professor William Robertson Smith in Scotland (1877–81) and Professors Charles Briggs and Henry Preserved Smith in the United States (1892–94), and their exclusion for supposed heretical views, awakened wide-spread attention, and have raised the serious question how far liberty of opinion should be tolerated in a minister when it is accompanied by devotion to Christ and the interests of His Church.

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DISCIPLINE (Jewish).—The State under the Mosaic system being a theocracy, every offence was necessarily ecclesiastical, and its punishment a disciplinary measure. Besides the compulsory sin-offering (Lv 4[1ff.]), the penalties imposed by the Pentateuch are fines, loss of property, flagellation, 'excision' (Gn 17[14], etc.), and death. But, among the offences of which Mosaism takes cognizance, some are ecclesiastical in the stricter sense. They are, chiefly, idolatry, sacrilege, the appropriation of holy things, and the ministration of a priest when in a state of Levitical impurity. A priest's

daughter, moreover, who gave herself to prostitution was regarded as 'profaning her father,' and was to be burnt to death (Lv 21[9]). The unintentional trespasser in the matter of holy things had to make full restitution to the sanctuary, and to pay an additional fifth of the value (Lv 5[14ff.]). Death was the penalty for sacrilege (Nu 1[51], etc.); and the defiled priest had to wait until the evening, and then bathe, before resuming the duties of his office (Lv 22[6]). Those who disobeyed imperilled their lives (*ib.*). A notable instance of sacrilege being thus punished is that of Nadab and Abihu (Lv 10[1ff.]). The Israelite who ate leavened bread at the Passover, or consulted wizards, was punished with 'excision' (Ex 12[15], Lv 20[6]); the Sabbath-breaker was stoned (Nu 15[32ff.]); the worshipper of Molech was liable both to 'excision' and to the death penalty (Lv 20[2f.]).

A totally different kind of discipline was the self-imposed austerity of the Nazirite, who, in virtue of his vow, abstained from wine and strong drink, remained unshaven, and conformed to the laws of Levitical purity in all their rigour (Nu 6[1ff.]).

For the purpose of stamping out idolatry the theory of the ban was brought into use. A person, animal, or thing, set apart or devoted to God, was known as *ḥērem*, i.e. banned, or tabu, and could not be sold or redeemed (Lv 27[28ff.]). Idolatrous emblems and the cities of the seven Canaanite nations, with their inhabitants and contents, were *ḥērem*, and were to be destroyed (Dt 2[34] 3[6] 7[5], Jos 6[17]). He who appropriated 'devoted things' was, so to speak, infected, and became *ḥērem* in his turn; he incurred the death penalty (Dt 7[26], Jos 7[25]). A like doom overtook the idolatrous Israelite (Dt 13[6ff.]). Idolatrous Israelitish cities, with their spoil, were to be burnt, and the cities to remain an everlasting ruin (Dt 13[12ff.]).

By the time of Ezra disciplinary practice had become much less severe. Ezra invokes a general assembly of the Jews in order that they may purge themselves from the evil of intermarriage with their idolatrous neighbours; the property of those who refuse to attend is to be 'devoted,' and they themselves 'separated from the congregation' (Ezr 10[7f.]). There is no question here of a death penalty, and the use of the comparatively mild term 'separated' indicates a mitigation of disciplinary rigour. Ezra's action, however, seems to be a connecting link between the Pentateuchal procedure and the system of excommunication of the Talmudic régime. Under that system the term *ḥērem* changes its meaning, and now signifies the ban, not the thing banned. It is the technical term for excommunication, the most formidable weapon of the Jewish Church.

Excommunication, however, though the chief, was not the only disciplinary measure in use among the Jews. The voluntary asceticism of the Nazirite had its counterparts in post-Biblical times. Thus a man would take a vow, even registering it in a deed, to abstain, for a term or for life, from certain forms of self-indulgence. Gambling was a favourite subject of such a vow. The penalty for violation of the vow was often severe, extending even to bodily mutilation. Another self-imposed penance was fasting. A man would bind himself to fast on certain days of the week either for a definite period or for life. Further, the mediæval community or congregation would make enactments (*t*ᵉ*ḳānôth*) against various offences, disobedience to which was punished by fines, exclusion from synagogal office, or refusal of the privilege of reading from the scroll of the Pentateuch during service, or of participation in some other religious rite. The imposition of a fine on the elder D'Israeli by the Spanish and Portuguese congregation in London was the immediate cause of his withdrawal from the synagogue. Disobedience to a *t*ᵉ*ḳānā* might also be visited with imprisonment (the Jews often had their own prisons in the Middle Ages). An offender might be denied Jewish burial, or his body consigned to a special section of the cemetery set apart for notorious evil-doers. Sentence of death was also passed upon flagrant transgressors, more particularly upon informers. The execution of the sentence in such cases necessarily required the consent of the Government, by whose officials it was carried into effect. Another disciplinary expedient was public denunciation in the synagogue, recourse to which was sometimes had in the case of the most venial offences—for extravagance in dress, for example, on the part of women. Nevertheless excommunication continued to be the most effective disciplinary agent of the synagogue for 2000 years.

The ban of the Synagogue falls under three categories, known respectively as *n*ᵉ*zîfā*, *niddûi*, and *ḥērem*. The first lasted seven, the second thirty days. In Babylonia the periods were one day and seven days respectively. *N*ᵉ*zîfā* was the penalty for slight offences, especially insult to the religious authorities. As regards *niddûi*, the ban was removed at the termination of the prescribed period if the offender made due submission, the formula being: 'Thou art absolved; thou art forgiven.' If he was recalcitrant, the punishment was renewed for a second and a third period. If he was still contumacious, excommunication in the third degree (*ḥērem*) was pronounced, which continued for an indefinite period, but might be revoked at the will of the authorities. Before sentence was pronounced, the culprit was thrice publicly exhorted to submission and repentance in the synagogue, on Monday and on the following Thursday and Monday, those being the days when the Law was read and the congregation was numerous. When this exhortation proved unavailing, the ban was pronounced in the offender's presence with the words: 'N.N. is excommunicated'; or, in his absence, with the words: 'Let N.N. be excommunicated' (cf. the expression 'anathema maranatha' in 1 Co 16[22], the second word of which is perhaps a corrupt reading for *mûḥrām 'attā*, 'thou art excommunicated'). Those on whom *n*ᵉ*zîfā* was pronounced were compulsorily confined to their houses, and forbidden to engage in business or pleasure. Those under *niddûi* were forbidden all social intercourse save with their wives and children. They could not make up the quorum for public worship (*minyān*), but they might attend the synagogue for prayer and listen to religious discourses. They had to wear mourning, and were forbidden to bathe, to cut their hair, or to wear shoes. It is said that there was a special entrance into the Temple reserved for excommunicated persons, and men greeted them as mourners. If *ḥērem* were pronounced, the offender might not teach; nor might he be supplied with food beyond what was required for bare sustenance. His wife might be excluded from public worship and his children from school. If his offence was heresy, and he died impenitent, no funeral rites might be performed for him, and a stone was placed on his coffin.

The offences punishable by *niddûi* are drawn from every department of the religious and ethical domain. Maimonides (*Hilkoth Talmud Torah*, 6.14) enumerates twenty-four examples drawn from the Talmud; but his list is obviously not exhaustive. A few typical examples may be given: desecrating the second day of the festival (though it is a purely Rabbinical institution); unnecessary use of the Divine Name; ill-treatment of children by the parent, so that they are made to break the command 'Thou shalt honour thy father and thy mother';

the neglect by a slaughterer of cattle (*shôḥēṭ*) to show his knife to his Rabbi so that it may be declared fit for its purpose on ritual and humanitarian grounds; business partnership between a divorced couple; selling to a Gentile land immediately adjoining the property of another Jew without indemnifying the latter for consequent injury.

Probably owing to the example of the Church, excommunication among the Jews became more drastic and more far-reaching in the Middle Ages. The catalogue of offences visited with the penalty was enlarged, the disabilities it imposed increased in number, and the right of pronouncing it extended from the Rabbinical authority to the congregation (*ḳāhāl*). Synods met at various times to formulate new ecclesiastical rules, all of which were enforced by the threat of excommunication. Thus the famous Synod of Worms, convoked in the 11th cent. by R. Gershon of Mayence, declared polygamy forbidden, and placed under the ban those who disobeyed this decision. On the other hand, the offences denounced by the congregation were often trivial, and resort to excommunication in their case was less justifiable. Thus the penalty became a terrible engine of oppression in the hands of ill-instructed men, who were free to give effect to their own ideas of right and wrong, unrestrained by the moderating influence of trained and educated minds. The decrees of excommunication pronounced by the congregation operated within the entire district over which it exercised jurisdiction, and, until formally repealed, through all generations. They followed the offenders even after they had severed themselves from the congregation and had removed to another district.

In some of its features the Jewish ritual of excommunication in the mediæval period bore a close likeness to that adopted by the Church. The excommunicated person, if his case was a bad one, was literally banned 'with bell, book, and candle.' Led into the synagogue, he was placed beside the reader, who stood at the ark, the most sacred part of the building, with a scroll of the Pentateuch in his arms. Inflated bladders were placed on a bier, candles were lighted, and sackcloth and ashes strewn at the offender's feet. Then the horn (*shôphār*) was sounded, the candles were extinguished, and the bladders burst—all to strike terror into the culprit's heart. Finally came the pronouncement of the excommunication: 'In the name of God, of the tribunal of Heaven and of earth, we solemnly ban and excommunicate the sinner N.N. May all the curses of the Law rest upon his head, and this excommunication cling to the 248 members of his body!' Whereupon all present, including the culprit, answered 'Amen.'

The history of excommunication in the Jewish Church is chiefly a catalogue of more or less distinguished persons banned for heresy, or some cognate offence against authority. Breaches of the religious law were frequently visited with the penalty; but we hear less of them in this connexion than of contumacy and unorthodox teaching. That excommunication was employed to fight Christianity at its inception is to be gathered from Lk 6^{22} and 9^{22}, and from other passages in the New Testament. The first undoubted instance of the imposition of the ban given in the Talmud, though we read of possibly earlier threats of it, is that of the sage Akabya ben Mahalalel (a contemporary of Jesus [?]), whose sin consisted in persisting in a view of the ritual law opposed to that of the majority of the Sanhedrin. At this period the President of the Sanhedrin was invested with the power of excommunication, and a famous President at the beginning of the 2nd cent. was Gamaliel II., a man of sterling but imperious character. A notable victim of his overbearing temper was his own brother-in-law Eliezer ben Hyrcanus, a Rabbi of great learning and influence, upon whom Gamaliel imposed lifelong excommunication for an offence similar to that of Akabya. Gamaliel calls Heaven to witness that his severity has for its motive not a lust of power, but zeal for the Divine glory; and there is no question that his protest is sincere. But it is of such stuff that Torquemadas are made, and from such zeal that the evils they produce are wrought. Certainly this truth did not escape the attention of the Talmudic doctors; and when, in the same century, Judah the Holy threatened to place R. Meir under the ban, a resolute spirit—Bar Ḳappara—himself a member of the Sanhedrin, strenuously protested. It would seem, indeed, that excommunication became increasingly rare in Palestine from this time forward, flagellation being substituted for it in the case of insubordinate Rabbis. In Babylonia, however, to which the centre of gravity of Jewish life was now being shifted, the old disciplinary system was maintained, at least in principle. How often it was put into practice it is impossible to say. Only three cases are recorded, so that its mere terrors possibly sufficed to keep the rebellious in order. There were certainly Rabbis who prided themselves upon never having pronounced sentence of excommunication upon a colleague; the very act of pronouncing it was punishable with the ban. It is even recorded that a Rabbi would first put himself under the ban before imposing it upon others, so that he might remember to release them when he set himself free. But this considerate temper was by no means general, and the consequences were sometimes grotesque. Two Rabbis would excommunicate each other, and the difficulty was to know which of the two sentences was the valid one. The absurdity of such proceedings and the evil consequences generally of excommunication moved Maimonides (12th cent.) to utter a warning note.

'The Rabbi,' he said, 'has the undoubted right to punish insults to his office by excommunication; but it does not consort with his dignity to exercise this right frequently. Better that he should let the insults of coarse men go unnoticed, as the wise Solomon has said, "Take not heed unto all words that are spoken; lest thou hear thy servant curse thee"' (*op. cit.* end).

Maimonides himself was the innocent cause of increased resort to the ban. Opposition to his theological teachings broke out into active violence after his death, and the anathema was pronounced against all and sundry who should read his *Guide* or the Introduction to his *Yad*. The Rabbis of the opposing school followed suit, and excommunicated those who denounced the Master. The quarrel not only grew fiercer as time went on, but widened in scope. The ban was now directed against preachers who interpreted the Scriptures allegorically, and against all persons under 25 who engaged in the study of Greek philosophy, or of any natural science except medicine.

In Amsterdam, in the 17th cent., Uriel Acosta, having made his submission to the Synagogue after excommunication for heresy, was placed under the ban a second time on repeating his offence. Again recanting, he was again absolved; but his conflict with the authorities had unhinged his mind, and, after an attempt upon the life of his denouncer, he died by his own hand. A more illustrious heretic, Spinoza, paid with excommunication for his philosophical speculations in the same century and in the same city. He made no attempt at recantation or submission; the decree which drove him out from the Jewish community secured additional effectiveness from his self-imposed banishment and alienation. Cf. artt. ACOSTA, SPINOZA.

Nor was philosophy the only heresy. The mystical doctrine of the Ḳabbālā, which represented the other pole of Jewish thought, was equally anathema. Shabbathai Ṣebi, the pseudo-Messiah, also of the 17th cent., was put under the ban as much for his Ḳabbalistic teachings as for his Messianic pretensions. His followers long outlived him

—they still survive in Turkey; and the sentence pronounced against their founder was renewed for their punishment at intervals for a century and a half. Dabbling in the Ḳabbālā brought not merely impostors, but also great teachers, under the ban. Indeed, the more eminent the Rabbi, the more surely does he seem to have been marked out as a fit subject for excommunication; and, on the other hand, the more obscure the Rabbi, the more ready he was to excommunicate. 'The sword and shield of ignorance and deceit'—thus a Jewish writer characterized the ban. Even to show brotherly feeling for the Karaites was an offence visited with disciplinary measures, as the famous Nachman Krochmal of Lemberg was to learn, less than a century ago. Naturally, the sect of the *Ḥasidim*, who exalted mysticism above conformity with the Rabbinic Law, were banned as heretics. Heresy, moreover, meant anything that was new, however innocent or positively advantageous to the Jewish cause. Thus the Synagogue, or rather its representatives in certain places, declared some of its best friends anathema—a Dr. Frankl, for example, who fifty years ago desired to found in Jerusalem an asylum for children on modern lines, and, a little later, even Sir Moses Montefiore, who advocated the teaching of European languages in the schools of the Holy City. Nor has such disciplinary procedure been quite unknown in England in recent times.

A species of excommunication was launched by the orthodox Rabbinate in 1842 against the West London Synagogue, which had just been established on principles antagonistic to the Talmudic theory of the divinity of the Oral Law. The faithful were warned against using the Prayer Book of the new congregation, and against communion with them in 'any religious rite or sacred act.' Members of the congregation were denied Jewish burial. After protracted negotiations, the ban was removed seven years later.

At the present time excommunication is virtually extinct among Jews in civilized countries. More than a century ago the famous Paris Sanhedrin, convoked by Napoleon I., anticipated matters by virtually declaring the rite of excommunication obsolete. It is significant that a note to the chapter on the ban in the latest editions of the *Shulḥan Arukh*—the authoritative text-book of orthodox Judaism—declares that the prescriptions set forth in that chapter have no longer any validity (*Yorē Deah*, sect. 334). Even the most devoted adherent of the Rabbinic Law is forced to admit that these severe disciplinary measures are at once superfluous and contrary to the spirit of the age. Self-preservation is obtainable by milder and more rational means in these days of emancipation and equality. Moreover, the Jew imbued with the modern spirit recognizes, as fully as does his Gentile brother, that severity, when exercised by a religious body, defeats its own purpose by hardening the offender in his offence and confirming him in his heresy. It is a glaring self-contradiction, seeing that a Church, which necessarily claims to be the Divine representative, should have, as its first characteristic, the Divine qualities of mildness and leniency. Thus the ban has again and again served the cause of irreligion, instead of militating against it. Moses Mendelssohn (18th cent.), the protagonist of the modern Jewish temper, has well expressed this view:

'Excommunication and proscription,' he says in the introductory pages of his *Jerusalem*, 'are directly contrary to the spirit of Religion. What!—shut out a brother who would share in my edification and lift his heart with mine to God! If Religion permits itself no arbitrary punishments, least of all can it use this spiritual torment which, alas, only they can feel who are truly religious. . . . Every society, it is urged, has the right to exclude; why not a religious society? My answer is that this is just where a religious society forms an exception. Subject to a higher law, no society can exercise a right which is directly opposed to its fundamental aims. To excommunicate a dissenter, to expel him from the Church, is like forbidding a sick man the dispensary. It is to repulse the patient whose need of medicine is all the greater because he is not conscious of his need, but deems himself in good health.'

In fairness, however, to the Synagogue, a distinction must be drawn between the needs of modern times and those of the past. There were occasions when the duty of safeguarding the existence of the community, and even of the religion, seemed to justify resort to excommunication. It possessed terrors which every other disciplinary expedient lacked. It seemed to be the only means of enforcing respect for authority and obedience to its injunctions. It supplied an effective weapon for preserving morality, personal and public, and it often averted ill-will and persecution at the hands of the general population, by preventing internal disputes from obtaining the publicity of the secular courts. Under threat of excommunication, Jewish litigants would bring their quarrels for adjustment to the *Bêth Dîn* (the Ecclesiastical Court) or to the *Ḳāhāl* (the Congregation), instead of taking them for settlement to the magistrates. But these considerations do not excuse the action of certain Rabbis, of the mediæval period more particularly, who resorted to excommunication as an easy means of crushing their personal opponents. Nor, in the case of heresy, do they avail against the objection raised by I. H. Weiss (*Dor Dor*, v.), that excommunication, even when actuated by the purest motives, did more harm than good by rending Jewry in twain at a time when concord and union were its greatest need. Moreover, as he adds, instead of extirpating the evils at which it aimed, it often rooted them deeper. The heretic, who might have been won back by lenity and forbearance, was strengthened in his heresy, and still further estranged, by severe methods.

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DISEASE AND MEDICINE.

DISEASE AND MEDICINE (Introductory and Primitive).—Of the two methods, the 'direct' and the 'interpretative,' by which we can study the beliefs of different peoples as regards the methods of communication, diagnosis, and treatment of disease, each has its difficulties. To 'interpret' the beliefs of a people from observation of their practices is always a dangerous procedure. The same practices may exist among widely distant peoples; yet we can never safely conclude that they are the expression of precisely the same beliefs, or that apparently identical be-

liefs have the same meaning and have been reached by the same lines of development. Take as an example certain conceptions of the cause of toothache.

In the Banks Islands, says Codrington (*The Melanesians*, Oxford, 1891, p. 193), there was 'a young woman of my acquaintance' who 'had a reputation for power of healing toothache by a charm which had been taught her by an aged relative deceased. She would lay a certain leaf, rolled up with certain muttered words, upon the part inflamed; and, when in course of time the pain subsided, she would take out and unfold the leaf, and show within it the little white maggot that was the cause of the trouble.' We turn now to the Ainus of Japan. 'For toothache a nail is heated to white heat and held on the affected tooth for a few seconds. This is said to kill the insects which are supposed to be the origin of the malady' (J. Batchelor, *The Ainu and their Folklore*, London, 1901, p. 293). Lastly, in ancient Assyria and among the modern Arabs of Mesopotamia, toothache is attributed to a worm.

It would be tempting to suppose that the notion of worms or insects being the cause of toothache has had the same origin in Melanesia, Japan, and Asia Minor; but all modern anthropological research points to the danger of drawing such a conclusion from a single thread of evidence. We can hope to arrive at the relationship between individual beliefs only by carefully comparing the entire cultures among which they are found; we can hope to arrive at the ultimate meaning and origin of a belief only by observing and 'directly' questioning the peoples among whom it is found, and especially neighbouring and more primitive peoples who may reasonably be considered as connected, by race or by environment, with them. On the other hand, it is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain, by the 'direct' (or questioning) method, the beliefs of a people in relation to such a subject as disease. For its ideas are apt to be nebulous and in a state of flux; old *practices* often persist, but receive a changing explanation as in course of time the beliefs of the community develop; even old *beliefs* may be preserved and unreflectingly maintained, despite the fact that they are logically inconsistent with the newer beliefs which an advancing civilization or the adoption of a foreign culture brings with it.

In the face of these difficulties, we shall confine ourselves in this article mainly to the study of disease among definite primitive peoples. We shall examine specific instances instead of working with uncertain generalities. Such a study will show us how illness has been attributed first to personal (human or demonic) and later to Divine resentment, as the ideas of human magic, of interference by evil spirits, and of godhead have gradually developed. Comparing primitive and more advanced peoples with one another, we shall see how treatment becomes more complex as different diseases are allotted to different evil spirits, demons, or gods. Different medicine-men are invoked; definite remedies become attached to definitely recognized diseases. Many practices, employed even by the most primitive peoples, are continued, but are regarded in quite another light as civilization advances. They are found to have a good effect, although the original cause for their application is no longer believed in. Thus massage, or counter-irritation, and often steam are employed by many primitive peoples with the object of driving out the evil matter or spirit or the demon of the disease from the patient's body. The evil is kneaded, stamped, or pounded out of the body; or it is rubbed in a definite direction—usually from the part affected towards the feet, where it escapes; or cuts are made in the skin, causing some flow of blood. Again, the conviction felt by the patient that the medicine-man is able by his actions to control the evil spirits of disease is responsible, more than any other factor, for the success of primitive therapeutics. So, too, among the most advanced communities, despite their changed beliefs, massage, hydrotherapy, and, at all events until recently, venesection persist as useful practices. As regards suggestion, it is open to question how far the most modern treatment, or the most 'specific' drug, can restore the patient to health, unless he has been induced to believe in its efficacy. Among primitive peoples, knowing the name of the evil spirit, using archaic language, summoning medicine-men from another tribe, are frequently important factors in effecting a cure. Among ourselves, a physician is held of slight account who cannot give a *name* to his patient's illness; he still writes his remedies in a dead language; and his reputation is apt to be greater abroad than at home. Although the medicinal aspect of treatment has come more and more to the front, in no part of the world can the magical aspect be said to have altogether disappeared.

1. Australia.—Turning now to various primitive peoples in order to study their practices (and, so far as is possible, their beliefs) in regard to the causation and treatment of disease, let us first examine the native Australians, who have been studied with considerable care by Spencer and Gillen (*The Native Tribes of Central Australia*, London, 1899, *The Northern Tribes of Central Australia*, do. 1904), by W. E. Roth (*North Queensland Ethnography*, Bulletin 5, Brisbane, 1903), and by Howitt (*The Native Tribes of South-East Australia*, London, 1904).[1] Among these peoples disease is attributed to some evil magic prepared by one man who wishes to harm another. A widely spread method of causing disease is for the sorcerer to take an *irna*, a stick or bone less than a foot long, sharpened at one end, the other end being usually tipped with porcupine-grass resin (S.-G.[a] 534). Any native may act as a sorcerer. He goes away into the bush with his *irna*, which he places in the ground, muttering some such curse as 'May your heart be rent asunder!', 'May your head and throat be split open!' Then he goes back to his camp, returning later to fetch the *irna*, which he hides somewhere near his camp. He bides his time until he can get near enough one night to distinguish his victim without being himself observed.

'He then stoops down, and turning his back towards the camp takes the *irna* in both hands and jerks it repeatedly over his shoulder, muttering the same curses again' (S.-G.[b] 458).

This pointing of the *irna* causes disease, and even death, unless the evil magic which has proceeded from the point of the *irna* can be removed. Usually a string is attached to the wax end of the *irna*, and this the sorcerer often burns in the fire to ensure the death of his victim. There is general agreement, among Europeans resident in primitive communities, that natives are extraordinarily open to suggestion, so far at least as the transmission of disease is concerned. A man who believes that magic has been exercised upon him 'simply lies down, refuses food, and pines away' (S.-G.[a] 537). The writer was assured, during his stay in the Torres Straits, that it was sufficient if a man recognized as having magic power made a slight movement towards another who was aware that the former owed him a grudge. The victim would then go home, refuse food, and become seriously ill. This pointing with the bone extends, with variations, throughout Australia. In some cases a spear is used with a human bone attached to it (R. § 139 f.); in others a human fibula is used (H. 358), often along with human fat (*ib.* 361), which the medicine-men are believed to be able to abstract from other victims and to use as a powerful aid (*ib.* 367). In place of the bone, stones may be employed (S.-G.[b] 467; H. 378); pieces of quartz, especially in the crystalline form, are believed to be capable of projecting magic towards the victim

[1] For brevity's sake, we shall refer to these books as S.-G.[a], S.-G.[b], R., and H. respectively.

(H. 357, 365; R. § 114). Certain stones may, from their mythical history, be exceedingly powerful (S.-G.[b] 472, 469). A dead man's hair made into a girdle or worn in a necklace, lengths of opossum string (R. § 131), a dead man's head-band (S.-G.[a] 538), a knout made of strands of vegetable fibre ([b] 469), a woman's head-band (*ib.* 465), are also powerful objects for evil magic. Ant-hills are similarly employed; a curse is muttered into an ant-hill, which is then secretly brought back to the camp, pounded, and scattered over the ground in the camp to which the victim belongs (*ib.* 466).

There is little specialization of function among most of the Australian tribes in the causation of disease; any man can magically affect another. It is more particularly in the treatment of disease that special 'medicine-men' play a part (S.-G.[b] 479). These may wear special emblems, and be compelled to submit to certain regulations in diet and training (*ib.* 485). The medicine-man may suck or knead the affected part (H. 380, 384). He may merely lay on his hands (*ib.* 382), or make passes (S.-G.[b] 484), or he may suck at or bind round the patient strings of human hair or opossum fur (R. §§ 155, 156). His object is commonly to produce from the patient's body the bone or the stone which the patient's enemy has employed against him (S.-G.[b] 480; H. 379, 384); he sometimes produces a bit of quartz or charcoal, or a marble, and often spits out blood somehow obtained from his own mouth after prolonged sucking. In some cases the patient is bled (H. 385), or is treated with herbs, etc. (*ib.* 384). Or it may be enough for him to place a woman's head-band upon his stomach, whereupon the evil magic passes into the band, which is thrown away into the bush (S.-G.[b] 474).

There are several minor features also described by observers of the Australians; but the above may be considered to be typical of this people generally, and will suffice to show broadly their attitude towards disease. It is clear that disease is commonly regarded in Australia as an evil sent by one man to another, which is transmitted through the magic influence of pointing some such object as a bone, a stone, or a piece of quartz. It enters the body in that form, and in the same form the evil must be withdrawn from the body.

2. Torres Straits.—Now let us turn to the Torres Straits, between Queensland and New Guinea. Here, too, the belief in the power possessed by individuals in causing disease is accepted. It is probable that in his heart each native knows that he cannot cause disease in another; nevertheless, he is always in terror lest some enemy may have the power of causing it in himself. In Murray Island, certain families were credited with influence over the growth of bananas, coco-nuts, or yams; others were supposed to direct the movements of sharks; many erected stone images in their gardens to protect their food. There arose a belief in disease as the sequel to robbery or some similar crime, and in the value of certain stones or marks as an indication and assurance that disease would follow if the objects protected by such signs of tabu were disturbed.

In Murray Island the writer obtained a description of a species of sorcery, called *maid*, which was formerly inflicted by any of the older men, in cases of hatred (*maid urkerlam*) or adultery (*maid koskerlam*). Finding his victim alone, the avenger takes up a chance stone, and, pronouncing over it some magic words (*zogo mer*) in a half-whisper, spits once or twice on it, and hurls it with great force to strike the back of his enemy. The latter falls to the ground, breathing heavily, and loses consciousness. The assailant and certain relatives who have accompanied him now close in on the prostrate body of the victim, and belabour it with their clubs. They then rub the body with a mixture of herbs and coco-nut oil, and give the victim coco-nut milk to drink. The assailant, while rubbing him, tells him to go up a coco-nut tree and to fall down from it, breaking his leg; or he orders him to be bitten by a centipede (*esi*), which will produce fatal blood-poisoning; or he may tell him to go to a certain point in the island, and then to return home and die. The avenging party now withdraw to a short distance, leaving the man's knife and some bananas and coco-nuts beside him. When he awakes and begins to wonder what has happened to him, one of the hiding party takes up a stone and hits a tree near the terrified man. This makes him start, forget his bruises, and rush home, where he lies thirsty and comatose for some days. Then (according to the order of his assailant) he will say to his wife: 'I think I shall go up that coco-nut tree.' He goes up, falls down, breaks his leg, and perhaps dies. As the informant said, 'He no go up himself. Medicine [*i.e.* the magic ceremony] make him go up.'

A third feature in the Murray Islander's attitude towards disease consists in his treatment of it. A special group of men, the *lukup zogo le*, are concerned in curing disease. The sick man is placed on the sand-beach; his eyes are closed; no one may see the approach of the *lukup zogo le.* As he comes near, previously anointed with coco-nut oil by his attendant, he halts, and, spitting or blowing on his hands, performs a series of movements with them, as if he were sweeping something from himself towards the patient. The doctor firmly fixes his gaze upon the patient throughout these actions. Then he makes some movements of the leg and further movements of the arms. Finally, he shouts the word 'Sirar' in a shrill voice and rushes off to the sea, accompanied by the sick man. Some few hours after bathing, the *lukup zogo le* visits the patient in his hut and rubs him down with a decoction of herbs, sea-weed, and coco-nut oil. This massage is repeated daily if necessary, until the patient recovers (*Camb. Exp. Torres Straits,* v. 320–326, vi. 222–240).

3. Melanesia.—These three characteristics—the belief that sickness is a result of disregarding a tabu, the use of suggestion and interference with memory in causing injury or disease, and the more elaborate ceremonial in treatment of sickness—indicate a more advanced state of culture than exists throughout Australia generally. We may trace this state among the neighbouring people of New Guinea, in the Bismarck Archipelago, in the Solomon Islands, in the Banks Islands, and in the New Hebrides; it is a Papuo-Melanesian attitude towards disease. Thus, according to Seligmann (*The Melanesians of British New Guinea*, Cambridge, 1910), 'one or more . . . men who were sorcerers would follow their intended victim to his garden. . . . There he would be speared and clubbed, and, when dead [*i.e.* unconscious], cut to pieces. One end of a length of rope is then looped round the dead man's hand or knee, while the opposite end is steeped in certain "medicine" (*gorto*).' The medicine passes along the rope and revives the victim. He is at first dazed, and does not know where he is or what has happened to him. He is told that he will die shortly, but he at once loses memory of this. He manages to crawl back to his village, where his friends realize what has occurred by his silly, feeble condition, although the victim can give no account of what has befallen him (*op. cit.* 170). At Savo, Guadalcanar, Malanta, and at Florida, in the Solomon Islands, the victim is met in solitude by his assailant, who 'seizes him, bites his neck, stuffs . . . [certain] magic leaves down his throat and knocks him on the head with an axe, but not so as to kill him.' The

charmed leaves make the victim forget the name of his assailant. He goes home, and dies two days later (Codrington, 206). In Lepers Island, New Hebrides, the assailant, after having overcome his victim, shoots a little charmed material at his head by means of a bow and arrow, whereupon he can remember nothing of the scene, but goes home to fall ill and die. His friends, seeing the wound, know what has happened to him (*ib.* 207).

In the central part of New Britain (Neu Pommern), Bismarck Archipelago, property is protected by tabu signs which, if disregarded, will cause headache, sores, etc., on the trespasser or the thief. If grasses are charmed and laid on the tree stems, madness will ensue. A human bone placed on the spot whence an object was stolen will cause the thief to waste (R. Parkinson, *Dreissig Jahre in der Südsee*, Stuttgart, 1907). In the Solomon Islands the disregard of tabu marks is similarly believed to result in disease.

Among the Eastern Papuo-Melanesians of New Guinea we find a further development of the view that disease is due to some emanation from the sorcerer. At Bartle Bay, for instance, disease can be caused 'by means of a "sending" projected from the body of the sorcerer or witch. . . . The "sending" is most commonly projected from the body of a woman, and after her death may pass to her daughter, or with her spirit or shade (*aru*) pass to the other world.' At Gelaria, in the same region of New Guinea, the 'sending' is called *labuni*. *Labuni* exist within women. They are said to wear petticoats, which, however, are shorter than those worn by the women of the district. They 'produce disease by means of a sliver of bone, or fragment of stone or coral, called *gidana*, which they insert into their victim's body. A fragment of human bone or a man's tooth is a specially potent *gidana*' (Seligmann, 640 f.). The *gidana* is thrown by the *labuni* at about sixty yards' distance; only the 'spiritual' part is said to enter the victim's body. The process of removing the spell can be performed only after the woman who sent the *labuni* has been appeased by presents. The treatment is usually undertaken by a man, and consists in rubbing the body until the *gidana* is extracted in the form of a material lump, which is sucked out through the closed hands of the masseur.

This notion of the discharge of an independent emanation or spirit from a living person, which itself lives as a petticoated individual, probably led to a further development in which disease is attributed to the influence of an evil spirit. Amongst the Roro-speaking peoples of New Guinea there is 'an ill-defined but real belief in demon-producing spiritual agencies controlled by a sorcerer' (Seligmann, 291). In the Gazelle Peninsula, New Britain, the most powerful of evil spirits is called *Kaia*; it dwells in high trees, dark caves, and other inaccessible places which are held sacred. Any one profaning one of these sacred places invites sickness or death. *Kaia* manifests itself in the form of a snake (P. A. Kleintitschen, *Die Küstenbewohner d. Gazellehalbinsel*, Münster, 1906, p. 337). So, too, in the New Hebrides, spirits are the chief objects of veneration; a sick man always attributes his illness to a spirit which he has offended by trespassing on some spot or profaning some object belonging to it, or which some enemy has invoked to bring illness (Codrington, 184).

In the Banks Islands, on the other hand, sickness is generally attributed to the resentment, not of evil spirits, but of ghosts of the dead. Also in Florida (Solomon Islands) it is a *tindalo*, i.e. a ghost of the dead,

'that causes illness; it is a matter of conjecture which of the known *tindalos* it may be. Sometimes a person has reason to think, or fancies, that he has offended his dead father, uncle, or brother. In that case no special intercessor is required; the patient himself or one of the family will sacrifice, and beg the *tindalo* to take the sickness away; it is a family affair.' But, if he is uncertain of the ghost, if, for instance, his child is sick, he will summon a doctor, a *mane kisu*, to decide. 'The doctor called in will . . . chew ginger and blow into the patient's ears and on that part of the skull which is soft in infants, will call on the name of the *tindalo*, and beg him to remove the sickness' (Codrington, 194 f.). If this proves unsuccessful, another *tindalo* is addressed, or another *mane kisu* is summoned. The latter may undertake to get his own *tindalo* to intercede with the *tindalo* that is causing the illness.

Thus we are able to trace in Oceania a development, along two directions, of ideas as to the causation of disease. In the one, disease is attributed to some interference on the part of the dead. Probably this belief, traces of which appear even in Queensland (R. § 114), is correlated with the growth of the cult of the dead, which is so complex in certain parts of Melanesia. Thus, according to Seligmann (*op. cit.* 12 f.), one of the distinguishing characteristics of the Western Papuo-Melanesians, ranging from Cape Possession to Orangerie Bay, is the close association of certain institutions with the shades of the dead, whereas the Eastern Papuo-Melanesians show no fear of the visitation of the deceased, and no fear of supernatural beings. They attribute disease, as we have already seen, to the discharge of a spirit from a living person, thus closely agreeing with the general Australian view.

The other line of development in Oceania consists in the attributing of disease to an offended spirit, which has to be propitiated by sacrifice. This conception finds a far higher development in Polynesia. In Samoa, for example, disease was considered due to 'the wrath of some particular deity.' The high priest of the village ascertained the cause, and ordered some sacrifice on the part of the patient, *e.g.* a canoe or a piece of land. Or a confession was obtained from every member of the patient's family as to the crimes each had committed or the curses he had uttered in a moment of anger against the patient or some other member of the family (G. Turner, *Samoa*, London, 1884, p. 140). In Tahiti, again, the sickness of chiefs was attributed to the anger of the gods. 'Whole fields of plantains and a hundred or more pigs' would be taken to the temples, where prayers were offered up (W. Ellis, *Polynesian Researches*, London, 1831, i. 349). In Polynesia generally, disease was supposed to be a visitation from the gods.

'When a person was taken ill, the priest or physician was sent for; as soon as he arrived, a young plantain-tree, procured by some members of the family, was handed to him, as an offering to the god; a present of cloth was also furnished, as his own fee. He began by calling upon the name of his god, beseeching him to abate his anger towards the sufferer, to say what would propitiate him, or what applications would afford relief' (*ib.* iii. 37). Indeed, the medicine administered (*e.g.* powder or infusion of vegetable matter, hot baths, etc.) was 'considered more as the vehicle or medium by which the god would act than as possessing any power itself to arrest the progress of the disease' (*ib.* 47).

In Hawaii the medicinal herbs employed were believed to have been obtained many generations ago, by a man named Koreamoku, direct 'from the gods, who also taught him the use of them' (*ib.* iv. 335).

Thus, starting from the rude Australian belief that disease was sent by one individual against his enemy, we have reached the high Polynesian conception of illness as the result of sin against the gods. Instead of employing a medicine-man to remove the stone or bone which had entered the victim, the latter relies for his recovery mainly on prayers and sacrifices offered to the offended god. Throughout Oceania the various practices we have described are combined with therapeutic measures, the most important of which, alike in the causation and in the treatment of disease, unquestionably is suggestion. Massage, with or without the external application of herbs, is a very common treatment

prescribed. Bleeding is occasionally resorted to. Trephining was practised in the Polynesian Islands, and is met with in certain more western islands, *e.g.* Loyalty Island, Duke of York Island, Neu Mecklenburg (New Ireland), and in the Gazelle Peninsula of New Britain, for the relief of severe headache and epilepsy. Hot baths are often employed in Polynesia and in other islands, *e.g.* the Solomon Islands, the patient being wrapped in a cloth and seated over a pile of heated stones, which are covered with herbs and leaves. Fractured bones are set with splints of bamboo. Herbs are pounded, made into decoctions, and administered to the patient internally. Sometimes they are merely warmed in a coco-nut shell over the fire, and the steam therefrom, being applied to the patient, is expected to drive away the pain or the disease. Especially in Melanesia, into which the areca has been introduced from the Malay Archipelago where it is similarly valued, betel nut, betel leaves, and lime are considered powerful medicinal substances, both for internal and for outward application.

We have attempted to trace in vague outline various stages in the attitude of different Oceanic peoples towards disease. But, as we have already pointed out (p. 724[a]), a people, when passing to a higher plane, does not discard the beliefs of the lower, but carries them with it, perhaps adapting them to suit its further development. Thus the Hawaians, although they attribute disease to the gods, nevertheless believe that a sorcerer may be employed by a man to bring disease or death to his enemy. Consequently presents are made to the god, not only to appease his anger, but also to turn the disease back to the person who sent it (Ellis, *op. cit.* iv. 293). So the Samoan, despite his belief that disease is due to the wrath of a deity, protects his property by various tabus. For example, he may suspend a stick horizontally from one of his trees; this expresses 'the wish of the owner that any thief touching it might have a disease running right across his body, and remaining fixed there till he died' (Turner, *op. cit.* 186). Or he may bring some pieces of clam shell, 'erecting at the spot three or four reeds tied together at the top in a bunch like the head of a man' (*ib.*). This was recognized as expressing a wish that the thief might be seized with ulcerous sores. Thus punished, the thief would confess and make a present to the owner, who would send him in return some native herb as medicine.

We have already drawn attention to the Australian belief in the potency of human bones as a cause of disease. It is also met with in various parts of Melanesia and New Guinea. In the Banks Islands, where, as we have seen, illness is attributed to the ghosts of the deceased, a piece of human bone, belonging to the corpse of the ghost whose services are required, is applied to a fragment of food stolen from the victim. The whole is then 'charmed,' and allowed to decompose or to burn. In the same islands and in Florida (Solomon Islands) a piece of bamboo is stuffed with leaves, a dead man's bone, and other magical substances. The aggressor covers up the open end of the bamboo until he meets his foe, when he opens it and lets fly the magic influence against him (Codrington, *op. cit.* 204). So, too, among the Roro-speaking peoples of New Guinea (Seligmann, *op. cit.* 289) there is a widely spread belief that parts of newly dead bodies are of value in the preparation of charms, and amongst the Eastern Papuo-Melanesians about Milne Bay (*ib.* 551) sorcerers are supposed to open graves of the dead and to eat their bodies.

From the powers over disease attributed to the human dead we may pass to those attributed to living animals, chief among which is that of the snake. The most potent of evil spirits in the Gazelle Peninsula of New Britain preferably manifests itself in the form of a snake. The man who wishes to injure another cuts up sea snakes and mixes them with leaves, roots, lime, and something—*e.g.* hair, blood, or footprints—connected with the victim. He places the whole in a short piece of bamboo, mutters secret words over it, and throws it into the sea, or buries it in the bush (Kleintitschen, *op. cit.* 343). In Pentecost Island (New Hebrides) delirium is attributed to a *mae*, a mysterious snake, which can be removed from the patient if he sits over the smoke of a heated coco-nut husk into which the medicine-man has breathed his charm (Codrington, *op. cit.* 200). If the *mae* snake took away a piece of food into the place that was sacred to a spirit, the man who had eaten the rest of the food would become ill as the fragment decayed. Among the Roro-speaking tribes of New Guinea disease is commonly attributed to snakes and to certain magical stones. The sorcerer is thought to be able to extract a deadly stone from the black snake, and this stone kills every person who touches it. Even the sorcerer, it is said, takes care not to come into immediate contact with it. In order to obtain a snake-stone, the sorcerer fasts in the bush alone for a fortnight, his food being limited to roasted bananas. He is particularly careful to avoid the sight of women. Sooner or later he dreams of the whereabouts of a very poisonous snake. Protecting his limbs by means of bandages, he proceeds to find and then to worry the snake, and 'as it glides away, it exposes a small stone,' which he picks up by thrusting against it a kind of fishing-spear provided with numerous closely set points. It is dropped from the spear into a bamboo tube. The snake-stone is described as being the size of a filbert, and red-hot, hissing and losing its power if dropped into salt-water. The snake can be sent by the sorcerer to bite his victim, if it has been allowed to smell the clothes or some other object belonging to the latter (Seligmann, *op. cit.* 28).

The charming of any objects belonging to the victim is believed to play so important a part in producing disease, not only in Oceania, but over the greater part of the world, that it is only natural for primitive man to take every care lest cuttings from his hair, parings from his nails, refuse from his food, his expectoration, excretions, footprints, or clothing pass into the hands of his enemy. In New Britain, for example, one or other of these objects (*panait*) is used by the sorcerer (*papait*), who murmurs an incantation over it, burns it with lime, and blows it from his hand into the air (Parkinson, *op. cit.* 118). In Tana (New Hebrides) a sorcerer, on seeing a discarded banana-skin, will pick it up and wear it all day in a leaf hanging round his neck, thus frightening every one into thinking, 'He has got something; he will do for somebody by and by at night' (Turner, *op. cit.* 320). In Florida (Solomon Islands) a man could make another ill by secretly taking a morsel of the latter's food, and throwing it into a spot which was the known habitat of a certain ghost of the dead.

4. Malay Archipelago.—Let us now pass to another people culturally and physically most closely related to the Polynesians, among whom, in consequence, we may expect to find disease attributed to gods or spirits, and cured by the offering of prayer and sacrifices to them—the inhabitants of the Malay Archipelago. Thence it will be possible to pass to the Malay Peninsula, and to trace the native ideas of disease westward to the Indian, and northward to the Mongolian, peoples.

Among the various tribes, and in the various

islands of the Malay Archipelago, there is considerable diversity in their beliefs; but, generally speaking, their spiritual world may be described as inhabited by the souls of animals (*e.g.* hawks, fowls, pigs, etc.), by spirits of the river, home, etc., and by the gods of thunder, harvest, life, death, etc., one of whom may be supreme over the rest. Consequently, of the two main causes attributed in this region to disease, evil spirits are one; and the treatment consists in effecting the departure of the evil spirit either by the persuasions of prayers and sacrifices or by the more cogent means of magical charms (Timor, Celebes, Bali, Java, Sumatra). The ceremony is often attended with much noise of gong- and drum-beating. Commonly, *e.g.* in Borneo, Ceram, Timor Laut, Buro (cf. Frazer, *GB*², 1900, iii. 97 f.), the evil spirit or the disease—for it is difficult to separate cause from effect—is induced to enter a well-provisioned model boat, which is made to sail down the river, carrying its noxious burden out to sea. This custom of sending away the disease down river extends throughout the Malay Peninsula to Burma, Siam, Annam, and even to Ceylon. Among the Milano of Sarawak the ceremony is performed in the following way:

The medicine-man (*orang bayoh*), having decided which spirit (*antu*) is responsible for the disease, returns home and prepares a log of sago palm cut in the image of that *antu*. This image, or *dakan*, may be enclosed in the model of a house or a boat. The patient's room is decorated with coloured cloths, flowers of the areca palm, and leaves fantastically plaited to represent objects, especially birds. A swing of rattan is erected, and plaited leaves connect it with the receptacle containing the *dakan*, so that the spirit may enter the latter after having been summoned by the *orang bayoh* to the swing. Several people may successively mount the swing, swaying their bodies in every possible attitude, to the sound of drums played in the background. Himself swaying on the swing, the *orang bayoh* recites 'almost in a monotone an incantation in the old language, addressed to the spirit, begging him to come down and take the sickness out of the patient's body' (Lawrence and Hewitt, *JAI* xxxviii. [1908] 391). 'The whole incantation is a succession of appeals . . . to the spirits, who come gradually nearer and nearer until the chant addresses them as if they were just outside the house, and finally as though present in the room' (*ib.* 408). At length the medicine-man falls from the swing apparently insensible; and after recovery he crosses to the patient, muttering incantations, sprinkling yellow rice, and waving over him an areca flower. Whenever the swing is unoccupied, an areca flower is hung across it. Finally, the patient himself may be transferred to the swing, and now, when the long-besought spirit is declared to be present, the patient and the *orang bayoh* proceed to enter the boat or house, the latter spitting betel-nut juice on the *dakan*, pouring water over it, and then sprinkling the drops over the patient's body, still murmuring incantations. Next day the *dakan*, provided with *padi* and yellow rice and adorned with areca flowers, is taken in procession to a stream, where it is left to rot in its receptacle, except when the receptacle takes the form of a boat. In that case, the boat is decorated with flags, manned with a crew, and armed with cannon all of pith, and it is made to float down the river or towed out to sea. No Milano, save the *orang bayoh*, will dare to touch the *dakan* after the performance of this ceremony. Generally there is a 'sound, logical connection between the sickness and dakan used,' the spirits of the water being responsible for dysentery, those of the air for headache and fever, those of the jungle for malaria, swellings of the legs, and other diseases attendant on jungle life (*ib.* 393).

This account is interesting as showing the complexity of the ritual which may be attained in endeavouring to drive the evil into a boat, which is then floated out to sea. The ceremony in one form or another is spread, as we have stated, throughout the Malay-peopled countries; it is also found in the Solomon Islands, which perhaps it reached with the advent of the areca or betel-nut from Malaysia. The above account is also interesting, inasmuch as it introduces certain new features—the use of the swing in driving out the disease, the transference of the disease (or evil spirit) to an image, the swooning of the medicine-man, and the attribution of different diseases to different spirits or causes.

In some cases a more simple and less public form of treatment is observed. The *dakan*, after having been incarnated by the spirit (*antu*), is taken by the medicine-man into the jungle, or hung on a tree, *i.e.* in the air, or placed in the river, according as the spirit's real home is jungle, air, or water (*ib.* 390). In Amboyna a white cock is used, with which the patient is rubbed. It is then placed on a model boat and sent out to sea (Frazer, *GB*² iii. 99).

The swooning of the medicine-man brings us to another important feature in the cure of disease among primitive peoples. So far as we have considered the mental state of the individual at all, it has been that of the patient, not that of the doctor. It is true that in certain parts of New Guinea and Melanesia the medicine-man finds that his magic is more efficacious if he enters upon it in a fasting state or in other ways maltreats himself. But probably in these peoples there is not that mental instability which is to be found among the Malayan races, leading, under provocation, to loss of consciousness, auto-hypnosis, or other forms of change in 'personality,' such as are exemplified in running *amok* and in *látah*. The altered mental state of the medicine-man during his treatment of disease is well exemplified in the second of the two main ideas in regard to disease which prevail in the Malay Archipelago. One of these ideas we have already considered, viz. possession or visitation by an evil spirit. The other idea, also wide-spread throughout this region, extending to Burma, the Andaman Islands, Tibet, and Northern Asia (Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, 1873, i. 437), is that disease is due to a wandering of the soul. Just as in death the soul has finally left the body, so in sickness it is temporarily absent; therefore it has to be pursued and caught by the medicine-man. The writer happened to see this ceremony of catching the wandering soul during a chance evening stroll along one of the long verandahs of a house in Sarawak, Borneo. It has been picturesquely described elsewhere (Hose and McDougall, *JAI* xxxi. [1901] 184), and may be thus summarized:

The medicine-man, after chanting several verses with closed eyes, receives, in a dreamy state, his war-coat, shield, and sword (*parang*) from the hands of an assistant. With a short wand he sprinkles water on his *parang*, and then on each of the patients ranged before him. A young fowl is handed to him. Before cutting off its head, he prays its soul to take a message to the supreme god to remove all sickness and to preserve the people from harm. Then, waving the bird over each patient and murmuring some archaic formulæ, he kills it and sprinkles its blood over the patients. With a second fowl in his hand, he describes the wanderings of his own spirit, how he has to cross a great river, where finally he meets with the soul of one of his sick patients. He lays his fingers on the head of one of the patients, and at that moment the patient's soul is believed to re-enter his body. At the same time he ties a piece of rattan cord round the patient's right wrist, to confine the soul to the body. The same performance is repeated in the case of the other patients, and then the medicine-man, after further chanting, during which his own soul is returning to his body, ties a piece of the string round his own wrist. The second fowl is now killed, and the blood-stained *parang* is wiped on the arm of the patient, and is used to cut off the ends of the wrist-string. The chanting continues, until suddenly the medicine-man gives a slight stagger and recovers consciousness. During the ceremony he had been heedless of his surroundings; and, from experiments which the writer knows to have been made at other times on such medicine-men, the claim is probably correct.

The use of strings in the cure of disease (from which perhaps the unthinking use of ligatures was derived) extends over other parts of Oceania (*e.g.* Queensland) which we have already studied. In the Gazelle Peninsula of New Britain, threads are prepared and are charmed in order to cure and to prevent disease. For the former purpose, they are worn round the affected part; for the latter, round the neck (Parkinson, *op. cit.* 119).

In the Banks Islands, a charm consisting of 'a bit of human bone, a fragment of coral, a splinter of wood or of an arrow by which a man has died,' is bound up with leaves and placed in the victim's path to strike him with disease. This charm, called *talamatai*, depends for its efficacy on the tying and binding tight with fibre (Codrington, *op. cit.* 204). The use of archaic incantations is also common in these parts. Frequently, words which are not understood are borrowed from other tribes. We have already stated that a man may

recognize his inability to cause disease, yet may fear the existence of that power in others. So, frequently a tribe may consider another tribe specially versed in the causation or treatment of disease, and may use its language or summon members of it to its aid.

In the Malay Archipelago, bits of wood, stones, or rags are sometimes drawn out of the patient's body, as demonstrating the cure of the disease. The medicine-man's chest will often contain curiously twisted roots, knotty sticks, pebbles, coloured marbles, pieces of quartz, etc., many of which, he claims, are revealed to him as medicines by benevolent spirits in his dreams. It is said that by means of the quartz crystal the medicine-man can diagnose the disease, see the soul, and catch it in its wanderings (Ling Roth, *Natives of Sarawak and British N. Borneo*, London, 1896, i. 273). Possibly this is another example of the susceptibility of the Malayan to auto-hypnosis (crystal-gazing).

Another important feature of Malayan medicine consists in the prominence of women doctors. There are instances of this feature throughout Oceania, but in certain parts of the Malay Archipelago it reaches its highest development. It is stated that in Borneo, for instance, at least in the past, a certain class of medicine-men, on adopting their profession, were emasculated, dressed in women's clothes, and thereafter treated as women (Ling Roth, *ib.* i. 270, 282). At the present day many cures in that country are undertaken by women, and most of the spirits invoked by the medicine-men receive the prefix *ini*, 'grandmother'—perhaps in accordance with the former importance of womanhood in the treatment of disease.

In the Malay Archipelago, betel-nut and pepper are the common outward remedies for almost any disease. Turmeric, honey, spices, and onions are taken internally. Cholera is treated by rubbing with *kayu putih* oil, and by water from certain sacred jars. Bleeding is practised; cupping is common—usually by means of a bamboo cane, the air within which is exhausted either by suction or by lighting a fire at the upper end. A wound may be cauterized by burning with a red-hot wire. A patient may be exposed to the smoke of a fire lighted below a bamboo grating on which he sits.

5. Malay Peninsula.—Coming now to the Malay Peninsula, we find that diseases become more distinctly personified as demons. Each disease *is* (not, is *caused by*) a different demon; the demons all arise from the thunder-god, who sends them by the winds, because of the sins of the people. There are ape-demons, black-dog-demons, tiger-demons, jungle- and river-demons, any one of which may cause disease. Certain new features, possibly of Indian or Chinese origin, begin to make their appearance here. Amulets now become important. Women obtain protection from disease by wearing combs, with inscribed patterns on them, and the patterns cause the disease-bearing wind to fall to the ground until the wearer has passed. A Semang woman may possess twenty or thirty such combs, which apparently depend for their efficacy on the particular pattern that they bear. The men's 'talismans are . . . incised on the quivers and charm-holders' (Skeat and Blagden, *Pagan Races of the Malay Peninsula*, London, 1906, i. 423). There is supposed to be some connexion between these patterns and the flowers which the good god, Ple, at one time allotted as remedies for the various diseases. The diseases were also thought to be laid by the winds on the parasitic plants of trees, between death and burial of the victims. Now, so runs the legend (which, however, must be accepted with caution), as new diseases have arisen since Ple dwelt on earth, and since the vegetable kingdom then apportioned by him to different diseases is exhausted, such illnesses as smallpox and cholera 'have no rest, but, as soon as they have killed one man, fall straightway upon another even before the soul of the first has left the body' (*ib.* ii. 212). Among the Mantra (of Malacca) also amulets are much in use: they are made of pieces of turmeric or other substance, strung on a shred of bark, and worn round the neck, wrists, or waist. The Sakai have bamboos decorated with magical patterns, which are kept from the public gaze (*ib.* ii. 252).

Incense is used in the Malay Peninsula. The Blandas of Selangor exorcize the evil demon by burning benzoin and invoking the spirits (*hantu*) of tigers or elephants or monkeys to enter the medicine-man's body. The patient lies on his back within a shelter of *nibong*-palm leaves. As soon as the spirit enters the medicine-man, he brushes the patient seven times from head to foot with certain leaves, repeating an incantation which evidently is intended to expel the demon from the body. Among the Sakai the invalid is similarly beaten with leaves, after a censer of burning benzoin has been swung over his couch. The object here is to drive the demon within a cage which is suspended over the head of the patient (*ib.* ii. 257).

Trees also assume more importance. Disease may be cured by removing roots and stumps which are suspected to be the home of the demon, and by casting saplings into the jungle so that evil spirits may accompany them.

Among all the peoples of Eastern Asia sticks are of great value for the treatment of and protection from disease. Thus among the Ainus the demons of disease are propitiated by making them what is called *inao*. An *inao* is a whittled wand; groups of *inao* are collectively called *misa*. They are sometimes worshipped as messengers to the gods; sometimes they are regarded as offerings to the gods; or they may be regarded as mere charms. 'So, when a person falls sick, the elders often meet together and make *inao* of this [willow] tree. After they have been worshipped they are taken out to the sacred place and stuck up among the *misa*' (J. Batchelor, *op. cit.* 88). Sticks of elder about four feet high are set up in a village for protection from a prevailing epidemic (see art. AINUS). So, too, in the Andaman Islands, when an epidemic occurs, the medicine-man, who is called *ōko-paiʻad* (lit. = dreamer), brandishing a burning log, bids the evil spirit retire, and plants before each hut stakes painted in stripes with black bees' wax, the smell of which helps to keep the demons at a distance (Man, *JAI* xii. [1883] 97). In the Malay Archipelago, sticks with fine shavings attached also play a similar part. Among the Tibeto-Burman peoples, a kind of arbour is erected before the sick man's house, made of grass and boughs supported on four poles, round which are hung little balls of split cane rolled tightly together. Strands of cane are stretched round the house from this arbour. The demons cannot pass through this barrier, consequently those already inside the house cannot be assisted by others from without (Shakespear, *JAI* xxxix. [1909] 378 f.).

6. Africa.—In Africa illness is commonly attributed either to the machinations of an enemy or—more usually perhaps—to resentment on the part of the ghost of a dead man owing to the disrespect with which he has been treated. In West Africa, apparently, it may even be one of the sick man's own spirits which thus vents his annoyance on the body (Tylor, ii. 130). Almost universally, before treatment is begun, the name of the ghost must be discovered. Among the Nandi, this takes place by divination. Some near relative is sent for, who takes four (for a woman, three) stalks of the castor-

oil plant or of millet, and tries to stand each upright in a fragment of pot containing water, which is placed near the patient's bed. As he takes each stalk, he calls on one of the deceased relatives of the patient by name. When one of the stalks stands erect, he exclaims, 'I have got thee, O medicine-man,' and the patient solemnly kicks it over with his big toe. The stalks are distributed in various places in or around the house; a little mud or sand mixed with the water is smeared on the forehead and throat of the invalid; 'the rest, together with some eleusine grain, beer, and milk, is sprinkled between the bed and the door and also thrown outside the house,' the relative beseeching the ghost to depart in return for the food which is being offered it (A. C. Hollis, *The Nandi*, London, 1909, p. 69). Among the A-Kikúyu (W. Scoresby Routledge, *With a Prehistoric People, the Akikuyu of British East Africa*, London, 1910, p. 263) such divination is practised by arranging a number of counters in equal heaps and observing the remaining unit. Among the Baganda small pieces of buffalo- or cow-hide are cast (J. Roscoe, *JAI* xxxii. [1902] 40). Among the Bangala on the Upper Congo River the *ñanga*, or medicine-man, addresses questions to the patient to discover what particular *bwete*, or spirit, is causing the disease. He beats his drum, talks excitedly, and chants various incomprehensible phrases before the patient. 'The lilt of the metre together with the rhythm of the drum make the patient sway to and fro and have a hypnotic effect on him.' His body jerks and twitches, as he is now plied with questions by the *ñanga*. In this way the cause of the illness is found out (J. H. Weeks, *JAI* xl. [1910] 425). In the Sudan the writer received a description of a similar divination by means of music; the rite, which is known as *zar*, is said to be employed even in Cairo, among women. The patient is visited several times by the practitioner, who wears a different coloured dress and sings a different incantation at each visit. Ultimately one dress or incantation is discovered which presumably by its action on the demon causes the patient to swoon. This knowledge having been obtained, the patient is seated astride a live sheep, and the same dress and incantation are employed again. After the patient's second swoon the sheep is killed, the blood is smeared over her, and the meat is partly sacrificed, partly given her to eat.

The use of animals in the cure of disease is a characteristic feature throughout Africa. Thus among the Hottentots, the hand of a sick patient is introduced within the leg of an ox, which is then killed and eaten by married people who have children. A child recently recovered from a severe illness is dragged through an arch over which an ox is made to stand. The ox is killed, and eaten only by married people who have children (Frazer, (*op. cit.* iii. 405). Among the Bondei, a white chicken is tied to the head of the bed-post; and later, when it has grown to a fowl, it is taken to a tall tree, killed, and eaten. The medicine-man and patient, on their return, take care not to look behind them (Dale, *JAI* xxv. [1896] 219). In these cases it appears that some good influence is derived by eating an animal which has been brought into contact with a person recently affected by disease.

But, generally speaking, the animal is used only for the transference of the disease to it. Thus, in Bechuanaland, a king after an illness seats himself on an ox stretched on the ground, the head of which is then held in water until it dies of suffocation. To cure a headache, a man will sometimes beat a lamb or goat until it falls down, with the object of transferring to it his pain (Frazer, *op. cit.* iii. 14). A Guinea negro will tie a live chicken round his neck to cure disease (*ib.*). In such cases the animal or bird is generally driven away or killed. In the Upper Congo, the *mieta* (spirits), 'when they are troubling a family, can be driven into animals by the *ñanga ya bwaka* ['medicine-man of the mat'], and killed by him' (Weeks, *op. cit.* 378). Of all the *ñanga*, this 'medicine-man of the mat' was the most powerful. On his arrival at the sick-house, he put stakes into the ground, and, by tying a mat round them, made an enclosure, in which he sat speaking to the various *mieta*, answering 'himself in assumed voices, pretending he was holding a conversation with them' (*ib.* 383). 'A string was tied from the roof of his clients' house to one of the stakes in his mat enclosure, and the end of the string dropped inside. From this string there dangled dried plantain leaves, twigs, etc.' (*ib.*). When he was tired he shook the leaves—a signal for the lads sitting outside the enclosure to start beating their drums, and for the folk to sing their chorus. Thus he would spend several days in trying to find out which of the *mieta* was troubling the family. Finally, he makes

'a terrific noise inside the mat, as though he were fighting for his life. Shouts, screams, derisive laughter, whacks, thuds, and smacks proceed from the interior of the mat, and at last the *ñanga* rushes out, panting and sweating profusely, holding in his hand a bleeding head [really the head of a rat or lizard, but believed by the people to belong to a mysterious animal dug up from within the mat], and declaring that he has killed the animal that was possessed by the spirit that was troubling the family' (*ib.* 384).

So in Uganda, the evil spirit, which is supposed to dwell at the top of the centre hut-pole, is caught by raising a buffalo's or cow's horn, within which shells are placed so as to make a squeaking noise when the horn is shaken, which is supposed to be the spirit of the horn. When the evil spirit is thus caught, the horn is simply covered with a piece of bark-cloth, placed in a water-pot, and thrown into the river or burnt in the jungle (Roscoe, *JAI* xxxi. [1901] 125 f.).

In addition, of course, to the determination of the particular spirit causing the disease, and to the transference of it to an animal, other therapeutic measures, some of considerable complexity, are prescribed by the medicine-man. Among the Bondei, dieting is common: certain objects of food are tabued. Among the Bageshu (Roscoe, *JAI* xxxix. [1909] 187), 'sometimes herbs are rubbed over the sick man and buried in the path. It is believed that the first person who steps over the herbs will contract the disease. . . .' In the Upper Congo, cupping is often practised, usually by sucking a horn placed over the skin. Massage is a common treatment, often terminated by the pretended extraction of a small object—a palm-nut, stone, or piece of iron—from the patient's body. Enemas and fomentations are also used. Rheumatic pains in the limbs are relieved by tying certain medicines to a brass rod, which is then worn by the patient. Knotted strings are tied round the sufferer's wrists and feet. Among the people of British Central Africa (Stannus, *JAI* xl. [1910] 285), many children's illnesses are treated by boiling certain leaves in water and holding the child over the medicated vapour-bath. Bleeding is arrested by the powdered bark of an astringent tree. Internal remedies are only sparingly used. The treatment of snake-bite is by ligature.

Among the A-Kamba (British East Africa) the medicine-man's gourd commonly contains pebbles, hard seeds, nuts, and such objects as the bone of a lion's paw, a cock's spur, pieces of porcupine quills, etc. He also carries various powders, *e.g.* a grey powder made from certain trees, and believed to be an antidote to magic and poison; a white powder called *iga* (also used by the A-Kikúyu, and called by

them *ira*); a blackish mixture prepared from some tree, and used to cure swellings of the limbs; a dark medicine contained in a gazelle's horn, which is of value when pointed at the abdomen of a woman in labour; and a medicine which, when mixed with water, is given internally for diarrhœa (C. W. Hobley, *Ethnology of A-Kamba and other East African Tribes*, Cambridge, 1910, p. 100). The A-Kikúyu sew up sword-slashes and spear-stabs. Their *chembu* is made of castor-oil, sheep fat, honey, goat's milk, water of various streams in Kikúyu, urine of a male and female goat and sheep, magumo wool, and the milky sap of wild figs. A little of this mixture placed on the penis cures hæmaturia; it is also good for a cough. Indeed, it will revive a dying man if he be touched with it on the forehead, tongue, navel, buttocks, and toes, and if some be passed five times round his head. Other Kikúyu medicines are made from seeds, leaves, roots, and from the ashes of roots and barks. They are usually kept in the form of a dry powder, and are applied by touching the patient much in the manner described. Expectoration plays an important part in the ritual of treatment, the patient at the same time exclaiming, 'I expel what is bad' (Routledge, *op. cit.* 262; Hobley, *JAI* xl. [1910] 448).

7. Central and S. America.—Among the Indians of America we naturally look for those characteristics in their attitude towards disease which we have met with in Eastern Asia and Malayo-Polynesia (see 'American' section of this article, below). As regards S. America, in South Chili the medicine-man is dressed as a woman, and the great nervous excitement, followed by a state of coma or trance into which he is thrown, forcibly recalls the shamanistic condition existing in Asia and Malaysia. But there is one striking feature in S. America which is on a distinctly lower plane of culture, viz. the persistent attribution of disease to material objects. Thus, among the Araucanos of Chili, the principal god, formerly called Pillan, the thunder-god, was served by malignant spirits called *Huecuvus*, who could transform themselves into any shape and produce invisible wounds by means of invisible weapons. All disease is attributed by them to evil spirits, which produce an invisible wound or introduce some foreign body within the victim. Not only Divine beings, but the living and the dead, may, as malign spirits, assume a form, *e.g.* snake, ant, or lizard, which may produce disease (R. E. Latcham, *JAI* xxxix. [1909] 346). Consequently diseases are treated first by discovering their source, and then by expelling the harmful substance from the body. In Central Brazil the 'good' medicine-man finds the poison which has been sent to the victim by the 'bad' medicine-man, and lays it in water, thus rendering it harmless. The sorcerer may have obtained some hair or blood from the victim, which he then mixes with the poison of wasps, ants, and other insects, prepared with oil and certain resins in a calabash. But, if he cannot obtain blood or hair, he poisons a twig or a woollen thread. He then introduces this into the victim's house, or shoots it with an arrow into a tree near where he lives. The twig is supposed to wound the victim; and so the 'good' medicine-man sucks the wound until the twig (or woollen thread) appears, and then he spits it out. Tobacco-narcosis is a very common mode of treatment, the medicine-man blowing tobacco smoke over the patient's body, kneading it with great force, while the medicine-man's groans and lamentations resound through the village. At length he begins to suck, and ultimately expectorates the cause of the illness (K. von den Steinen, *Unter den Naturvölkern Zentral-Brasiliens*, Berlin, 1897, p. 300).

Similarly, in Paraguay the witch-doctor is supposed to have the power of introducing beetles into a man's stomach. So, when a man is ill, he summons the medicine-man, who, to an accompaniment of rattles and the excited singing of his assistants, spits on and sucks at the patient's stomach until at length he produces a beetle, a palm-nut, or a fish-bone. The witch-doctors usually wear ear-disks faced 'with bright pieces of glass or bits of polished tin' (S. H. C. Hawtrey, *JAI* xxxi. [1901] 291).

LITERATURE.—This is given throughout the article. The only general book known to the writer, Max Bartels' *Die Medizin der Naturvölker* (Leipzig, 1893), cannot be strongly recommended.

C. S. MYERS.

DISEASE AND MEDICINE (American).—As certain aspects of primitive medicine will be treated in art. MEDICINE-MEN, the present discussion will be limited to the consideration of disease itself from the various points of view of the American aborigines' ideas, customs, ceremonials, etc., connected with its prevention, relief, and cure. Among a race as widely scattered as the American Indians, and occupying, for long periods of time, all kinds of environments—from the Arctic north to the tropical south, from the seashore and coastal regions to the high plateaus and mountainous areas of the continent, island regions like the Caribbean, arid plains like those of the south-western United States and parts of south-western South America, the thick forests and well-watered lands in some other directions, the valleys of the great rivers and the basins of great lakes—the prevalence of diseases, the susceptibility to them, the methods of treatment, and the psychological reaction to the general situation were naturally subject to considerable variation.

1. American Indians a comparatively healthy race.—At the time of the Columbian discovery, the Indians were, on the whole, a healthy people, and, in spite of the effects of intertribal wars and their attendant evils, were holding their own in point of numbers, or, as some authorities believe, were even increasing in population, especially in some parts of the continent. Our knowledge of diseases among the American Indians, before the coming of the whites, is not very satisfactory even for the semi-civilized peoples of Mexico, Central America, and Peru; for many of the uncivilized tribes of both North and South America the data at hand are scanty indeed. Where direct statements of early explorers, missionaries, pioneers, and colonists are lacking, certain inferences can be made from the mention of diseases in myths and legends and cognate folk-lore material. Dr. Hrdlička, our best and most recent authority on the matter, says (*Bull. 30 BE*, pt. i. [1907] p. 540):

'The condition of the skeletal remains, the testimony of early observers, and the present state of some of the tribes in this regard, warrant the conclusion that on the whole the Indian race was a comparatively healthy one. It was probably spared at least some of the epidemics and diseases of the Old World, such as smallpox and rachitis, while other scourges, such as tuberculosis, syphilis (precolumbian), typhus, cholera, scarlet fever, cancer, etc., were rare, if occurring at all. Taking into consideration the warlike nature of many of the tribes and the evidence presented by their bones (especially the skulls), injuries, etc., particularly those received by offensive weapons, must have been common, although fractures are less frequent than among white people.'

Since contact with the whites, a marked decrease in numbers has taken place nearly everywhere, the causes of this diminution being 'the introduction of diseases (particularly smallpox), the spread of alcoholism, syphilis, and especially tuberculosis . . . and increased mortality due to changes in the habits of the people through the encroachment of civilization.' Certain tribes, however, are now beginning to show a slight increase in population, and Dr. Hrdlička thinks that, 'as more attention is paid to the hygienic conditions of the Indians, an increase comparable with that in whites may be

expected in many sections.' The writer of the present article has pointed out several cases of such increase in his art. 'Indians, North American' in *EBr*[11], xiv. 452. Mixed bloods are said to suffer, more than the pure bloods, from 'many disorders and diseases known to the whites,' but the evidence in this matter is by no means convincing.

2. Epidemics, etc.—As has been already noted, epidemics of disease appear to have been rare in pre-Columbian America. According to Dr. H. U. Williams (p. 342), the New World, up to the period of its discovery and occupation by the whites, offered a marked contrast to the Old in the fact that 'the American race, during its sojourn of some thousands of years apart from the rest of mankind, developed a surprisingly small number of infections peculiar to it.' Concerning certain epidemics and wide-spread outbreaks of disease contemporaneous with the settlement of various parts of the continent by Europeans, it is still somewhat doubtful whether the infection in question came from Europe (by way of white people, or, possibly, through Indians who had been taken to Europe) or was of native origin. An interesting example is the epidemic among the Indians of New England in 1616–1620, of which a critical study has recently been made by Dr. Williams. This pestilence, which was accompanied by great mortality among the Indians, from Cape Cod to the Penobscot, and sporadically outside these limits, but from which the English seem to have been mostly immune, may have been a variety of the 'bubonic' plague prevalent in London during the early years of the 17th cent., and transferred to America by sailors, colonists, or returning Indians. It could hardly have been smallpox, as some have thought; this disease raged among the Indians later on (*e.g.* in 1633). The idea that it may have been carried to the Indians by certain shipwrecked French sailors held captive among them is also to be considered. The European settlers of the period were prone to regard such calamities as visitations of God, just as many Indian tribes looked upon them as the work of evil spirits, etc. The idea also prevailed among the Indians that epidemics of diseases unknown before the advent of the whites were in some way let loose among the natives by the English and other white peoples. Interesting on this point is the following extract from Winslow's *Good News from New England* (1624), cited by Dr. Williams (p. 345):

'Here let me not omit one notable, though wicked, practice of this Tisquantum (Squanto); who to the end he might possess his countrymen with the greater fear of us, and so consequently of himself, told them we had the plague buried in our store-house; which, at our pleasure, we could send forth to what place or people we would and destroy them therewith, though we stirred not from home. Being, upon the aforenamed brabbles, sent for by the governour to this place, where Hobbamock (an Indian) was and some other of us, the ground being broke in the midst of the house, whereunder certain barrels of powder were buried, though unknown to him, Hobbamock asked him what it meant. To whom he readily answered: That was the place, wherein the plague was buried, whereof he formerly told him and others. After this Hobbamock asked one of our people, whether such a thing were, and whether we had such a command of it. Who answered No; but the God of the English had it in store, and could send it, at his pleasure, to this destruction of His and our enemies. This was, as I take it, about the end of May 1622.'

Ethically, at least, some of the English and some of the Indians were not far removed from one another.

There has been much discussion of the question whether syphilis is of pre-Columbian origin in America, or has been introduced from Europe since the discovery. Dr. A. S. Ashmead (*Amer. Journ. Dermat.*, 1908, pp. 226–233) is convinced of its pre-Columbian origin, and Dr. F. Grana identifies it with the Peruvian *huanti*; Dr. Iwan Bloch (*Intern. Amerik.-Kongr.* xiv. [1904] 57–79), from historical and osteological evidence—he has recently also published a volume on the subject—is another believer in the pre-Columbian theory, which is also shared by E. G. Bourne, the American historian, who considers the legend of the culture-hero Guahagiona and his sores 'conclusive evidence that syphilis had existed in the West Indies long before the coming of the Spaniards' (*Proc. Amer. Antiq. Soc.*, N.S., xvii. [1906]). Drs. Tello and Palma of Peru, who have studied the question, seem also to share the opinion that syphilis is pre-Hispanic in Peru, citing in evidence certain representations of the effects of the disease in anthropomorphic pottery, etc.; so also R. D. Wagner and Dr. Capitan, the French anthropologist (*Journ. Soc. des Amér. de Paris*, N.S., vi. [1909]). Dr. Lehmann (*Globus*, xcviii. [1910] 12–13) is of opinion that the evidence in Tello and Palma does not settle the matter satisfactorily, and Dr. Hrdlička is by no means convinced of the prevalence of syphilis in pre-Columbian America. The exact character of the Peruvian *uta*, the Columbian and Paraguayan *buba*, and some other diseases, all of which may possibly on some occasions be mistaken for syphilis, is not yet clearly decided. The idea of syphilis-infection of man from the llama—a belief occurring in certain regions of South America—is not sustained (in man and in the llama the disease is comparatively rare now in Peru). Leprosy, according to Dr. Ashmead, was introduced into America from Spain. There are other interesting S. American diseases that call for further investigation, such, *e.g.*, as the Ecuadorian *huicho*, which seems to have some analogies with the African 'sleeping sickness.'

Among a number of American Indian peoples (*e.g.* the Oregonian Klamath) there are general dances and like ceremonies carried out for the purpose of avoiding or driving away epidemics and outbreaks of disease. Some of the Indians of the south-western United States tried to 'capture' the spirit of smallpox during an epidemic of that disease, and similar procedures are reported from elsewhere.

3. Conceptions of the nature, source, etc., of disease.—Under this head could be cited illustrations of all manner of ideas, from the most natural and simple to the most far-fetched and complicated, or even metaphysical. On this point Dr. Hrdlička remarks (*Bull. 30 BE*, pt. i. [1907] p. 837):

'The causation and the nature of disease being to the Indian in large part mysteries, he assigned them to supernatural agencies. In general, every illness that could not plainly be connected with a visible influence was regarded as the effect of an introduction into the body, by malevolent or offended supernatural beings or through sorcery practised by an enemy, of noxious objects capable of producing and continuing pain or other symptoms, or of absorbing the patient's vitality. These beliefs, and the more rational ones concerning many minor indispositions and injuries, led to the development of separate forms of treatment, and varieties of healers.'

Among the American aborigines one finds examples of the attribution of disease and illness in man to his own misdeeds and sinfulness, to his neglect of his ancestors, to violations of innumerable kinds of tabus and prohibitions, to the malevolence or ill-will of the dead, to the touch of ghosts, to the actions of the wind and the moon, to the machination of enemies through magic and witchcraft, etc., to the desire for revenge of the animal world ill-treated by man, to temporary loss of the soul, to the introduction of foreign objects into the body, to the shadows of certain other people (*e.g.* mourning widows and widowers), to women (particularly when menstruating), etc. For certain special diseases and pathological conditions very curious reasons are sometimes given. Some of the names of diseases and terms relating to or describing their symptoms are interesting psychologically. In Tsimshian the

term for 'having epileptic fits' really signifies 'like a bear'; and the word for 'crazy' means 'like a land-otter.' The Chinook term for 'rheumatism' means lit. 'tired all over'—quite an expressive name. In Kutenai the general term for 'sick' is *sānitlqōinē*, lit. 'bad-bodied he is'; the corresponding word for 'well' being *sūkitlqōinē*, 'good-bodied he is.' The term 'sick' is applied in a number of Indian languages to denote emotions and the like. Thus in the speech of the Mosquito Indians the term for 'angry' signifies lit. 'liver-sick'; in Haida, 'downcast' is 'heart-sick,' etc. By the Mosquito Indians the liver is regarded as the seat of emotional life; among the Kutenai and many other Indian tribes it is the heart. With some of them, unless the heart can be touched or struck, the efforts of the shaman to injure or kill a man turn out useless. Certain tribes believe that diseases are 'shot' into the body (*e.g.* 'pains' with some Californian tribes).

4. Ceremonials, magic and religious, in relation to disease and its cure.—The employment of magic rites and formulæ, of religious or semi-religious ceremonials, ritual and other performances, for the purpose of preventing or curing diseases of various sorts is common in all regions of the globe, especially among uncivilized peoples, and the aborigines of America are no exception to the rule. These rites and ceremonies vary, from the simple procedures of the 'medicine-men' and 'medicine-women,' shamans, or sorcerers, who by rude incantations and noise-making with rattles, drums, etc., sought to drive away disease, or by laying on of hands, sucking, tricks of legerdemain, and the like, pretended to extract noxious objects from the body of the patient, to the more elaborate and highly developed ritual activities of 'medicine-societies' carried out sometimes for the benefit of an individual, or a whole family, and again on behalf of the entire community. The whole wide range is occasionally to be found within the limits of a single linguistic stock. Thus we have the crude rites of the lowest Athapascan tribes of Alaska and north-western Canada, on the one hand, and, on the other, the complicated system of the 'night chant' of the Navaho, who are of the same lineage; in like manner, also, the simple procedures of the shamans of the barbarous Utes and Shoshones, the lowest representatives of the Uto-Aztecan stock, contrasting with the rites and ceremonies of the Aztecs of ancient Mexico and their semi-civilized kindred, who mark the highest limit attained by this people. And S. America, while not exhibiting, perhaps, such extremes of diversity within one and the same stock, shows equal variety, if one compares the barbarous and completely uncivilized tribes of the Brazilian, Peruvian, and Venezuelan forests with the ancient Peruvians. Healing ceremonies of great interest occur among many American Indian peoples; the best known and those described in greatest detail belong to some of the Plains tribes and peoples of the Algonquian stock. As Dr. Hrdlička remarks (*Bull. 30 BE*, pt. i. p. 838):

'Among most of the populous tribes the medicine-men of this class (the priest-healer type) were associated in guilds or societies, and on special occasions performed great healing or "life- (vitality-) giving" ceremonies, which abounded in songs, prayers, ritual, and drama, and extended over a period of a few hours to nine days.'

There also existed among some tribes

'large medicine-societies, composed principally of patients cured of serious ailments. This was particularly the case among the Pueblos. At Zuñi there still exist several such societies, whose members include the greater part of the tribe and whose organization and functions are complex. The ordinary members are not actual healers, but are believed to be more competent to assist in the particular line of diseases which are the specialty of their society, and therefore may be called by the actual medicine-men for assistance. They participate also in the ceremonies of their own society' (p. 838 f.).

The curative ceremonies of such people as the Navaho, when employed for the benefit of individuals, are both prolonged and costly, being exceedingly elaborate both in ritual and in paraphernalia. According to Dr. G. A. Dorsey (*ib.* p. 229):

'Among the non-Pueblo tribes of the S.W., especially among the Navaho and Apache, the extended ceremonies are almost entirely the property of the medicine-men, and must be regarded as medicine-dances. Many of these are of an elaborate and complicated nature, but all are designed for the restoration of the sick. In these ceremonies masks are often worn, and complicated and elaborate dry-pictures are made, both these features probably having been borrowed from the Pueblo tribes.

Some of these great 'medicine' ceremonies have gathered about them practically all the ritual lore and legend of the tribe, and serve as a general outlet for the observance and dramatic sense of all the people. The great *Midē'wiwin*, or 'grand medicine society,' of the Algonquian Ojibwa and related tribes is described in detail by Hoffman (*7 RBEW* [1891] 143–300); the medicine-men of the Athapascan Apache by J. G. Bourke (*9 RBEW* [1892] 443–603); the esoteric fraternities of the Zuñi by Mrs. Stevenson (*23 RBEW* [1904]); the Cherokee medicine-men and their sacred formulæ by Mooney (*7 RBEW* 301–397); the secret societies of the Kwakiutl by Boas (*Rep. U.S. Nat. Mus.*, 1895); the organizations of the Algonquian Cheyenne by Dorsey (*Anthr. Publ. Field Columb. Mus.* ix. [1905]); the 'mountain chant' of the Navaho (*5 RBEW* 379–467), and the great 'night chant' of the same people, by Matthews (*Mem. Amer. Mus. Nat. Hist.*, N.Y., vol. vi. [1902]). For other N. Amer. Indian tribes much valuable information will be found in the various monographs of Boas (Eskimo and peoples of North Pacific coast), Dixon and Kroeber (Californian tribes), Kroeber, Wissler, Lowie (tribes of the Great Plains), etc. For general information concerning the American Indian shaman, the article of Dr. R. B. Dixon (*JAFL* xxi. [1908] 1–12) is of importance. From some points of view, the ceremonials of the Navaho are the most remarkable of American healing-rituals. For S. America, we have not much accurate and detailed material of a reliable character concerning the rites and ceremonies of the secret societies having to do with 'medicine.' The best is to be found in the recent works of Koch, Nordenskiöld, Ehrenreich, Hawtrey, Guevara, Latcham, etc. Some data are also contained in the writings of certain of the early missionaries, explorers, and historians, such as Charlevoix and others. Concerning the great 'night chant' of the Navaho, a ceremony lasting nine days, Dr. Matthews says (*Amer. Anthrop.* ix. [1896] 50):

'The principal purpose of this great ceremony is to heal the ailing man or woman, who defrays all the expenses of the ceremony; but the occasion is used, also, to implore the gods for various temporal blessings, not only for the sick man, but for all who participate in the work, with their friends and relations. This ceremony, like nearly all ceremonies, ancient and modern, is connected with a myth or legend (several myths, indeed, in this case), and many of the acts in the ceremony are illustrative of the mythic events.'

He also observes further:

'In them we find a nocturnal vigil analogous to that of the mediæval knight over his armour; we find a vigil in which men and gods, or the properties that represent the gods, alike take part; we find evidence of the belief in a community of feeling and interest between gods and men, and we have an instance of a primal feast in common or love-feast closely resembling certain ceremonial acts performed among ourselves to-day.'

5. Games and gaming implements as preventives and as remedies for disease.—That games among savage and barbarous peoples have certain preventive and curative rôles with regard to disease as well as other afflictions and calamities of mankind is not at all surprising, especially if one takes the view of their magic and religious origin expressed by Stewart Culin in his monograph on 'Games of the North American Indians' (*24 RBEW* [1907]). Among the Sacs and Foxes (Culin, p. 448 f.) the

game of ring and pole was played about the house, because 'people believe there is a spirit of sickness, Apenaweni, always hovering about to get into the lodges, and this game is encouraged in order to keep it away.' The employment among the Kwakiutl Indians of Vancouver Island of a sort of 'bean-shooter' (Dr. Newcombe calls it 'the figure 4 dart-shooter') in a medical ceremony is thus described (Culin, p. 761, quoting Newcombe):

'Among the Kwakiutl of the Nimpkish tribe, this is called *Hendlem*. In use a small stick is placed across the top of the pliant side-pieces, and is shot to some little distance by pressing on the trigger-piece, which is horizontal to the figure 4. The figure is held in front of the body with both hands, with the short end of the trigger downwards, and the perpendicular stem of the 4 horizontally. It is frequently used when children are sick, and small sticks are shot in different directions to chase away the spirit supposed to be causing the sickness. It was used as lately as two years ago at Alert Bay. Sets of four of this instrument are employed by grown-up people—relatives of the sick. The sticks are left lying about after the performance, but the guns are burned when done with. This goes on for four nights in succession. The noise of the two flexible sides coming together when the stick is ejected is supposed to aid the good work. At night the four shooters are left loaded near the sick child, to scare the ghost or spirit. They are also used as a game by children.'

This is an interesting example of the employment of the same implement or instrument in a children's game and in a 'medical' procedure. Rings or hoops, similar to those used in the hoop and pole game, are used in certain 'medicine' ceremonials by the shamans of the Oglala Dakota Indians (Culin, p. 435) for the purpose of aiding in the cure of the sick. On the first day of the healing rite of the Navaho, known as *Yebitchai*, similar gaming rings are made. These rings were used to touch the mouth and other parts of the patient's body, and were afterwards rolled out of the lodge. Of the 12 rings used in this ceremonial, as described by Col. J. Stevenson (*8 RBEW* [1891] 239), 'three were afterwards taken to the east, three to the south, three to the west, and three to the north, and deposited at the base of piñon trees.' We are further informed: 'The rings were placed over the invalid's mouth to give him strength, cause him to talk with one tongue, and to have a good mind and heart. The other portions of the body were touched with them for physical benefit.' Culin (p. 437) reports having seen 'actual practical game rings' used in ceremonies. Naturally, where the beginnings of the priest and the doctor are found together in the primitive shaman, the implements and objects in ceremonial use must often be the same or very similar. And the lines between 'games' and other more or less ceremonial performances are not always very marked; indeed, the former are not infrequently made a part of religious or quasi-religious observances—and this is not at all peculiar to the aborigines of the New World.

6. Medical operations, surgery, etc.—Some of the performances of the American 'medicine-men' belong rather to the field of jugglery and legerdemain than to that of operative therapeutics. Others have, doubtless, more of a religious or mystical than of a medical significance. There are, however, a number that may justifiably be classed as relating to the beginnings of medical operations and surgery as we understand them. The range of these among even quite primitive tribes may be seen from Father Morice's article (see Lit.) on the surgery of the Dénés, an Athapascan people of British Columbia, where items relating to bleeding, burning, blistering, treatment of broken limbs, deformities, uterine troubles, child-birth, cataract, etc., are briefly considered, some new and interesting facts being reported. Some of the procedures in vogue are as follows:

Blood-sucking is in use both as a general practice and as a special procedure for wounds, cuts, bites, and stings of animals and insects, particularly those of a poisonous nature, including wounds due to arrows and other weapons that have been tipped with deadly substances, snake-bites, abscesses, etc.

Blood-letting by means of flint-knives, arrow-heads, etc., was practised by the ancient Peruvians and Mexicans, and is also reported from a number of uncivilized tribes, such as the Central Californian Indians, the Kwikpagmiut of the Yukon (Alaska), certain tribes of the Isthmian region of Central America, the Brazilian Carayá, etc. The place of venesection differs according to the trouble, and varies with divers peoples. Bartels (p. 269) notes that for headache the Carayá incise the veins of the forehead; the ancient Peruvians cut into the veins of the root of the nose, the Indians of Honduras the veins of the leg or the shoulder; for troubles in the upper part of the body, certain Californian tribes practised venesection on the right arm, and on the left arm when the limbs were affected. Certain Indians of the Isthmian region are said to have practised venesection by shooting small arrows from a special bow into various parts of the patient's body until a vein was opened.

Scarification and kindred procedures are wide-spread over primitive America, ancient and modern, the implements used being knives, sharp pieces of stone, bits of shell, pieces of flint or obsidian, thorns, fish-spines, teeth of animals; some tribes have developed special implements for the purpose, as, *e.g.*, the Carayá of Brazil.

Cauterization with cedar-bark is practised by several tribes of the North Pacific coast (*e.g.* Bilqula, Twana) for rheumatism and other diseases of a like order; by some Southern-Californian tribes with a hot coal for syphilis; by some Central American peoples with hot ashes and heated leaves for wounds, etc.; by the Choctaws and certain Nicaraguan tribes. Many North American Indian peoples practise cauterization for obstinate sores, etc.

Bone-setting is accomplished quite cleverly by a number of tribes all over the continent, particularly the Siouan Winnebagos, the Creeks of the south-eastern United States, some of the peoples of the North Pacific coast, and certain of the Brazilian tribes; splints and bandaging are employed especially by the Bilqula, Creeks, Winnebagos, and others.

Amputation does not seem to have been generally practised among the American Indians, even such peoples as the Creeks and Winnebagos, who were skilful in bone-setting, seldom or never resorting to it.

Trephining was in use in ancient Peru, as indicated by the crania from various pre-Columbian burial-places, and a special study of these has been made by Muniz and McGee (*16 RBEW* [1897] 3–72). Dr. Hrdlička (*Bull. 30 BE*, pt. i. p. 838) says: 'The highest surgical achievement, undoubtedly practised in part at least as a curative method, was trephining. This operation was of common occurrence, and is still practised in Peru, where it reached its highest development among American tribes. Trephining was also known in quite recent times among the Tarahumare of Chihuahua, but has never been found north of Mexico.'

For the purpose of *stopping bleeding* of a dangerous sort, many American tribes used down of various birds (Haida), mineral and plant substances (Dakotas, Winnebagos), hot ashes (for nose-bleeding); and the Brazilian Carayá (Bartels, p. 286) are credited with the use of bindings for the limbs. With the whites the use of gunpowder for stopping blood has come into practice with many tribes all over the continent. According to Hrdlička (*loc. cit.*, p. 837), '*antiseptics* are unknown, but some of the cleansing agents or healing powders employed probably serve as such, though undesignedly on the part of the Indians.'

7. Materia medica, etc.—In both the procedures of individual shamans and the more elaborate and extensive ceremonies, such as those carried out by the Navaho, etc., a large number of 'fetishes,' charms, amulets, and the like are employed, and the principles of *similia similibus* and sympathetic magic are appealed to in innumerable ways, sometimes with exceeding skill and cunningness. Dr. Hrdlička (*l.c.*, p. 836) says:

'The fetishes used are peculiarly shaped stones or wooden objects, lightning-riven wood, feathers, claws, hair, figurines of mythic animals, representations of the sun, of lightning, etc., and are supposed to embody a mysterious power capable of preventing disease or of counteracting its effects.'

Of real materia medica, animal and mineral substances are comparatively rarely employed. Dr. Hrdlička (p. 837) says:

'Animal and mineral substances are also occasionally used as remedies. Among South-western tribes the bite of a snake is often treated by applying to the wound a portion of the ventral surface of the body of the same snake. The Papago use crickets as medicine; the Tarahumare, lizards; the Apache, spiders' eggs. Among the Navaho and others red ochre combined with fat is used externally to prevent sunburn. The red, barren clay from beneath a camp-fire is used by White Mountain Apache women to induce sterility; the Hopi blow charcoal, ashes, or other products of fire, on an inflamed surface to counteract the supposed fire which causes the ailment.'

The oil, grease, etc., of certain animals are used for external and internal application, often as antidotes—thus, among certain tribes of Central Mexico, scorpion-oil for scorpion-bites; among

the Caribs, snake-oil for snake-bites. Among the Yamamadi and neighbouring tribes of Brazil (Bartels, p. 120) we meet with the curious custom of plastering the affected portion of the patient's body all over with feathers. Some of the Southern-Californian Indians used pills of wild dove's dung as a remedy for gonorrhœa. Pounded charred bones are in use by the Kutenai for sore eyes. The great mass of primitive remedies, however, come from the plant-world—roots (most commonly), twigs, leaves, bark, flowers and seeds (rarely)—and are most frequently employed in the form of a decoction, made from either the fresh or the dry plant (sometimes from its powder). The 'doctrine of signatures' and similar ideas controlled a good deal of the botanical medicine of the aborigines of America, which reached its height with such peoples as the ancient Mexicans, as may be seen from Father Gerste's monograph on the subject, where the data in the old historians, are carefully brought together. In the warmer and tropical regions of America numerous vegetable gums and balsams, the use of many of which has passed over now to the white population as well, were employed for medical purposes, for stopping bleeding, curing and cleansing wounds, etc. The number of plant-remedies in use even among the uncivilized tribes is often quite large. Among the Californian Karok, 13 species of medicinal plants were reported; among the Twana and neighbouring tribes of the State of Washington, 18; among the Ojibwa (according to Hoffman), 56; the list of Schoolcraft, representing several N. American tribes, contains 89; of the plants known to the Moqui or Hopi, according to Hough (*Amer. Anthrop.*, 1898), 45 are employed for medical purposes—there being probably not over 160 indigenous species in the environment. As Bartels (p. 209) notes, the Indians possess quite a large number of plant-remedies for diseases and troubles of the eyes. Abundant emetics and astringents are also provided. Plant-remedies are in vogue for the treatment of cuts, burns, bruises, wounds, bites, stings, and stomach-ache and kindred ills, diseases of the respiratory tract, and nasal troubles, in the form of poultices and plasters (often of hot leaves), decoctions, lotions, and inhalations. With the Cherokee Indians the plants furnished all the remedies as against the animal world, which inflicted diseases upon mankind. The formulæ of the medicine-men of this interesting Iroquoian people have been recorded by Mooney, and they form a body of data of great importance for the study of primitive medicine in its incantational and invocational aspects. With the sowing and gathering of medical plants there are sometimes connected certain rites and ceremonies, as, *e.g.*, is the case with the 'medicine tobacco' of the Crow Indians of the Siouan stock. Interesting also is the sacred *tule* pollen in use among the Apache, known as *hodentin*, and 'given or applied because of its supposed supernatural beneficial effect.' Many plants 'are employed as remedies simply for traditional reasons, without any formulated opinion as to their modes of action' (Hrdlička, p. 837).

8. Drugs, narcotics, etc.—In connexion with puberty-rites, 'man-making' ceremonies, and performances of a kindred nature, certain narcotic and stupefying substances were employed among tribes representing all stages of culture all over the continent. In the *huskanaw*-ceremonies carried out on boys at the age of puberty among the Virginian Indians, the subjects were stupefied by a decoction of *Datura* ('jimson weed'). A variety of *Datura* was used by the shamans of the Californian Yokuts to induce religious frenzy. This was done also, in all probability, by those of the Indian tribes of the south-western United States (Navaho, Hopi, etc.) who are acquainted with the properties of the *Datura*. Various tribes of the Gulf States employed in their ceremonial purifications the 'medicine' known as the 'black drink,' a decoction made from the leaves of the *Ilex cassine*. This 'medicine' figures in the great *Busk*, or annual green-corn thanksgiving ceremony of the Creeks. According to Hall (*Rep. U.S. Nat. Mus.*, 1885), the Creeks were in the habit of preparing and drinking it before council-meetings, because they believed that 'it invigorated the mind and body and prepared for thought and debate.' In various regions of North, Central, and South America several kinds of tobacco furnished medicine for divers diseases. Pipe-smoking for asthmatic troubles is reported from the Dakotas, Winnebagos, Creeks, and other tribes; in several parts of Mexico, tobacco was used for similar purposes, and likewise against rheumatism. Among the Ipurina Indians of Brazil, incurable sick people are completely narcotized by tobacco and thrown into the river. In South America, tobacco was chiefly used in the form of snuff, and, according to McGuire (*Bull. 30 BE*, pt. ii. [1910] p. 768), 'there is some evidence that the plant was chewed in Central America.' McGuire (p. 768) says:

> 'Tobacco was cultivated in most tribes by the men alone, and was usually smoked by them only; among the Iroquois and some of the Pueblos trade tobacco was not smoked in solemn ceremonies. At times both priests and laymen smoked plants or compounds that were strongly narcotic, those using them becoming ecstatic and seeing visions. To the Indian the tobacco-plant had a sacred character; it was almost invariably used on solemn occasions, accompanied by suitable invocations to their deities. It was ceremonially used to aid in disease or distress, to ward off danger, to bring good fortune, to generally assist one in need, and to allay fear.'

The general use of tobacco all over America was much furthered when many of the European colonists devoted themselves to the planting and sale of this plant. Its fame as a medicine was really the first basis of its popularity when introduced into the Old World. Among some Indian tribes the planting, cultivating, and harvesting of tobacco had many religious or semi-religious rites and ceremonies attached to them. According to Simms (*Amer. Anthrop.*, N.S., vi. [1904]), as cited by McGuire (p. 768),

> 'the planting of medicine tobacco is one of the oldest ceremonies of the Crows, consisting, among other observances, of a solemn march, a foot race among the young men, the planting of seed, the building of a hedge of green branches around the seed-bed, a visit to the sweat-house, followed by a bath and a solemn smoke, all ending with a feast; when ripe, the plant was stored away, and seeds were put in a deerskin pouch and kept for another planting.'

In S. America a number of plant-juices were employed for the purpose of making more or less intoxicating or stupefying drinks, used on ceremonial occasions, etc.; and 'getting drunk' was not infrequently a common and regular occurrence, on festival occasions, with certain Brazilian and Paraguayan tribes. In N. America, according to Dr. Hrdlička (p. 837), 'among the tribes who prepare *tiswin*, or *tesvino*, particularly the Apache, parts of a number of bitter, aromatic, and even poisonous plants, especially a species of *Datura*, are added to the liquid to make it "stronger"; these are termed medicines.' Certain Californian tribes made drinks from *manzanita* berries, and the Pima and other tribes of the Arizonian region manufactured an intoxicating liquor from the fruit of the cactus. Among many tribes of ancient and modern Mexico, a decoction of *peyotl* (*Anhalonium lewinii*), a small variety of cactus, had, and still has, a very extensive use; so also in the region of the United States north of Mexico. According to Mooney (*Bull. 30 BE*, pt. ii. p. 237), it was 'formerly and [is] still much used for ceremonial and medicinal purposes by all the tribes between the Rocky Mountains and the Gulf of Mexico, from Arkansas river southward, almost to

the city of Mexico.' The Nahuatl *peyotl* corresponds to the Kiowa *señi*, Comanche *wokowi*, Tarahumare *hikuli*, etc. Under the incorrect title of *mescal* it is well known to the whites, and has been even used for psychological and medical experimentation.

The 'eating of mescal buttons' takes place during ceremonies of considerable length among the Kiowa (where they have been studied by Mooney), Comanche, and other tribes. With these peoples, 'it is rather a ceremony of prayer and quiet contemplation. It is usually performed as an invocation for the recovery of some sick person; it is held in a *tipi* specially erected for the purpose, and begins usually at night, continuing until the sun is well up in the morning.' Women, as a rule, do not take part in the ceremony proper, but 'occupy themselves with the preparation of the sacred food and of the feast in which all join at the close of the performance.' 'At some point during the ceremony the sick person is usually brought in to be prayed for, and is allowed to eat one or more specially consecrated *peyotls*.' Mooney says further: 'The number of "buttons" eaten by one individual during the night varies from 10 to 40, and even more, the drug producing a sort of spiritual exaltation differing entirely from that produced by any other known drug, and apparently without any reaction. The effect is heightened by the weird lullaby of the songs, the constant sound of the drum and rattle, and the fitful glare of the fire.' The Tarahumare and some other Mexican tribes have a *peyotl* dance. The effects of 'mescal buttons' have been studied experimentally by Havelock Ellis (*Pop. Sci. Mo.* lxi. [1902] 57–71), and, as Mooney notes (p. 237), 'tests thus far made indicate that it possesses varied and valuable medical properties, tending to confirm the idea of the Indians who regard it almost as a panacea.' Father Gerste (pp. 68–69) records its use, not only as a sort of panacea for fatigue, etc., but also as a means of obtaining hallucinations, which were then taken for messages from the gods, and prophecies of the future. The Chichimecs, according to Sahagun, consumed large quantities of *peyotl*, and they believed that 'it gave them courage, took away all fear during battle, rendered them insensible to hunger, thirst, etc., and preserved them from all dangers.'

The 'mescal button' or 'mescal' here described is not to be confounded with the mescal (food and intoxicating drink, the latter post-Columbian) produced in this region from the agave.

9. Inventions for use in 'medicine.'—Besides the vast number of amulets, charms, and talismans, of which some account is given in art. CHARMS AND AMULETS (Amer.), a few 'inventions' of a medical or quasi-medical order, in use among American Indian peoples, deserve mention here. Such are, *e.g.*, a sort of respirator of fine woven grass used by the Kwikpagmiut Eskimo of Alaska (Bartels, p. 222) to prevent the smoke from getting into the lungs of the people in the 'sweat-house'; the scarification-implements of fish-teeth made by the Carayás of Brazil (p. 267), which are of peculiar interest; the bone and horn tubes used by several North American tribes (Navaho, Ojibwa, Creek, Siouan peoples) for scarification, blood-sucking, and similar procedures. Note may be taken here also of the litters for the sick and wounded among a number of tribes (*e.g.* Dakotas); and the snow-spectacles of the Eskimo.

10. Hygiene, sanitation, etc.—The idea that 'cleanliness is next to godliness' was wide-spread among many American Indian peoples, as their frequent bathing, and other cleansing procedures, the very common use of the 'sweat-house' (accompanied often by elaborate ceremonials), the washing of the sexual parts, and the attention to the body during menstruation, after *coitus*, etc., abundantly indicate. Some of the tribes lowest in intelligence, apparently, are very careful to bathe frequently and thoroughly—the process beginning with the new-born infant, which, even in the cold north, is immediately plunged into the water; the mother also cleansing herself as soon as possible. This treatment of child and mother is discussed at some length in the works of Ploss and others who have written in particular of menstruation and of childbirth among primitive peoples. Fasting, bathing, and sprinkling ceremonials are found accompanying the great religious performances as well as the smaller, and they are also to be met with in connexion with preparation for and participation in games, which have often a more or less religious character. Of the Tsimshian Indians of British Columbia, who are sun-worshippers, Boas says (*5th Rep. on N.W. Tribes of Canada*, 1889, p. 50):

'Men make themselves agreeable to the deity by cleanliness. Therefore they must bathe and wash their whole bodies before praying. For the same reason they take a vomitive when they wish to please the deity well. They fast and abstain from touching their wives, if they desire their prayers to be successful.'

It is evident that many tabus, among the American Indians, no less than among primitive peoples in other parts of the globe, are of this hygienic, or quasi-hygienic nature. Sometimes, as among the Tsimshian (Boas, p. 50), when a special object is to be attained, 'to make the ceremony very successful, their wives must join them; if the wife should not be true to the husband, the effect of the fasting is destroyed.' Bathing and cleansing appear also frequently, and sometimes elaborately, in connexion with mourning rites and ceremonies connected with the handling and disposal of the dead. The use of water reaches its maximum, perhaps, with the ancient Mexicans, who 'washed the soul.' The 'purification' of the soul as a means of curing the body of disease was in vogue among a number of the peoples of ancient Mexico, as Father Gerste notes (p. 18). Water was regarded as a remedy *par excellence*, because 'it cured the body by washing the stains of the soul.'

The use of the bath (with some tribes daily) as a hygienic or medical procedure, often complicated with religious or mystical ceremonies, was wide-spread in all parts of primitive America, the water used having added to it sometimes (*e.g.* among the Dakotas) certain decoctions of plants—occasionally for the purpose of irritating the skin. Some Indian tribes, like the Hopi or Moqui, and the Pueblos, avoided cold baths altogether; others, like the Pimas and some tribes of Lower California, preferred them. With quite a number of tribes (Dakotas, Creeks, Ojibwa, Klamath), especially in the Rocky Mountain region, hot baths were followed immediately by cold, the individual rushing at once from the 'sweat-house' and plunging into the nearest stream. Cold baths for fever were in vogue among many tribes, and the Huastecs of Mexico even submitted smallpox patients to this procedure, thereby greatly increasing the mortality from that disease. The Moqui, when suffering from fever (Bartels, p. 134), 'used to lie down in the cold water until they got well or died'—a sort of 'perpetual bath,' as the author remarks. Similar practices are reported from the Winnebagos. Aspersion with cold water is resorted to by several tribes. Among the tribes of the Columbia region and the North Pacific coast, many are very fond of hot baths, and the institution of the 'sweat-house' or primitive 'steam-bath' is wide-spread all over the continent, from the uncivilized tribes of the Plains and the Rocky Mountain regions to the more or less civilized Aztecs of ancient Mexico, with their *temezcalli*, etc. The Mayan peoples, likewise, had their *tuh*. In Mexico, Central America, and the Pueblo region, the 'sweat-houses' were more imposing constructions, but over a large part of the continent they were simply made of willows or the like, large enough to contain a single individual, the steam being produced by pouring water over heated stones. The structure usually had a temporary covering of skins and blankets. The body was sometimes scraped before leaving the sweat-house, and some of the Eskimo are said to 'rub themselves after the bath with grass and twigs.' According to Henshaw (*Bull. 30 BE*, pt. ii. p. 661) sweating was practised among the American aborigines for three different purposes: (1) as a purely religious rite or ceremony for the purpose of purifying the body and propitiating spirits; (2) as a medical

practice for the cure of disease; (3) often as purely social and hygienic—'a number of individuals entered the sweat-house together, apparently actuated only by social instinct and appreciation of the luxury of a steam bath' (p. 662). As a religious ceremony it was used by warriors before going forth, by hunters previous to departing for the chase, by boys and girls at puberty, and by all sorts of people in time of danger, or before undertaking special exploits, etc. Moreover, 'among the Plains tribes all priests who perform ceremonies have usually to pass through the sweat-house to be purified, and the sweating is accompanied by special rituals' (p. 661). The ceremonials of the sweat-house with some tribes are elaborate and complicated, especially where there is a village or a general *temezcalli* or *estufa*. Nelson informs us that, among the Alaskan Eskimo, the *kashim* used for the sweat-bath was 'the centre of social and religious life in every village.' With most tribes also the construction of the sweat-house 'was attended with many rules and observances.'

Massage was practised in various ways by numerous American peoples (rubbing, pressure with hands or feet, etc.). Purifications of various sorts, including fasting, bathing, taking various 'medicines,' were in vogue among many tribes, previous to participation in games and other more or less ceremonial performances. Culin (*op. cit.*) refers to such 'medicines' in connexion with the foot-races of the Tarahumare, the ball-games of Zuñi, Cherokee, Ojibwa, Choctaws, Mohawks, etc. Care regarding the satisfaction of natural necessities is reported from a number of American Indian peoples. According to Joest (*Int. Arch. f. Ethn.* vol. v. Suppl., 1893), the Caribs and Arawaks, who live near rivers, etc., go thither for such purposes. Otherwise, they go to some distance from the village, scratch a hole in the sand, and carefully cover up their excrement, cleansing themselves with sand. Concerning the Carayá Indians of Brazil, Ehrenreich (Bartels, p. 261) remarks on

'the feeling of decency of these savages exhibited in their manner of defecating, which is of culture-historical interest. It is done as far away as possible from the village. A hole is made in the sand. The individual sits over it with outspread legs, hiding the upper part of his body behind a mat. The excrements are always carefully buried.'

Certain North American Indians also are very careful in the matter of relieving themselves, always doing so out of the public way, and not in view of any one.

Some of the food-tabus of American Indian peoples have at least a *prima facie* hygienic value. Careful regard for the purity of water is evident both in the Pueblo region of the south-western United States and from the early accounts of the semi-civilized peoples of ancient Mexico.

Ehrenreich reports the Carayá Indians of Brazil (cited by Bartels, p. 238) as inquiring of every stranger, 'Have you catarrh?' and permitting him to enter their cabin only after assuring themselves that there is no danger from tuberculosis—a disease upon the increase among them, and of whose infectious character they are fully aware. But this is post-European. Among the Indians of northern Mexico individuals suffering from contagious or infectious diseases are abandoned by their fellows, who, however, place water and wild fruits within easy reach before leaving (Bartels, p. 242). The ancient Aztecs, according to Gerste (p. 18), had the same fashion of treating severe cases of disease, where death might be expected. The family of the patient carried him to the highest point of some near-by mountain, placed beside him food and a vessel of water, and left him to himself, for death or cure, as the case might be, after forbidding all persons to go near him. The segregation of the patient in order to keep away evil spirits, etc., was in vogue among many tribes. Some, like the Winnebago Indians of Wisconsin and the Mosquitos of Honduras, went so far as to surround the bed of the sick with poles on which were hung various animals, or to hedge him in with painted sticks, allowing no one but the 'medicine-man' to approach the spot (Bartels, p. 244). Hygienic motives may also enter here in part, as also in the case of the abandonment of persons suffering from contagious or infectious diseases. Here perhaps ought also to be mentioned the fact reported by Dr. Farabee of the very primitive Macheyengas of eastern Peru, that they 'are more afraid of the disease from which he died than of the dead man.'

11. Personification and forms of disease.—The disease or sickness is often given some special form and recognized as having the shape of some object or creature, whose expulsion by the shaman or other qualified person, with or without the accompaniment of primitive music, incantations, conjurer's tricks, and similar devices (the evil object is frequently 'sucked out' by the medicine-man), is followed by relief or cure, temporary or permanent. Such procedures are known all over America, from Alaska to Patagonia, and from Greenland to Brazil. The representation of the disease as a piece of bone is wide-spread; common also is the conception of it as a piece of stone or some similar object. The claws of such animals as the bear, the spines of the porcupine, etc., likewise figure in the same way. Living creatures, corporeally or spiritually, constitute the disease-cause with many American tribes, having in some way or other, of themselves, or through the machinations of shamans or other evil-disposed individuals, been introduced into the body of the patient. The Sioux Indians, like some of the tribes of Central Mexico, personify disease as a worm; the Klamath and certain of the Sioux as some sort of insect; some Indians of Central Mexico as a large ant; the Klamath, Karok, and other Californian tribes of the north as a frog; and the Dakotas as a tortoise. Another common personification is a snake. The Twana, Chimakum, and Klallam Indians of the State of Washington believe that certain diseases are caused by a wood-pecker pecking at the heart of the person affected. Even quite large animals are believed by some Indian tribes to make their way into the human body and cause disease and sometimes death. Such are the bear and deer among the Dakotas; the squirrel among the Twana and neighbouring tribes; the porcupine among the Sioux; the otter among certain tribes of the North Pacific coast region (some birds figure here also, of considerable size). Among the Twana, Chimakum, and Klallam it is believed that evil-minded shamans or sorcerers can send into the body of a man a bear, which eats at his heart and so causes him to become sick (Eells, *Ann. Rep. Smiths. Inst.*, 1887, pt. i.). Among the Nutka Indians of Vancouver Island, according to Boas (*6th Rep. N.W. Tribes*, 1890, p. 44),

'the cause of sickness is either what is called *māyatlē*, i.e. sickness flying about in the shape of an insect and entering the body without some enemy being the cause of it; or the sick person has been struck by sickness thrown by a hostile shaman, which is called *menu'qcitl*. Their ordinary method of removing disease is by sucking and singing over the patient.'

12. Prognostics, etc.—Devices for the prognostication and prophesying of the issues of diseases of various sorts are reported from many American tribes. Among the Kutenai Indians of south-eastern British Columbia, according to Boas (*5th Rep.* p. 46), 'if the hands of a dead man (before the body is buried) are closed so firmly that they cannot be opened, it indicates that the

tribe will be healthy and strong and free from disease.' The Indians of Michoacan (Bartels, p. 168), in Central Mexico, believe that, if the leaf of a certain plant, when placed on the sore place of the body, stays there, the man will recover; if it drops off, his death is certain. The Mayas of Yucatan are said to have used a crystal for purposes of prognostication. In other parts of the continent the medicine-men, the priests of the Mayas, used to cast lots in order to determine what offering should be made for the restoration of the patient to health.

13. **Transference of disease, 'scape-animals,' etc.**—The idea of curing a sick person by transferring the disease or illness with which he is afflicted to some other creature, animal or human, is met with in various regions of primitive America. Some of the Nahuas or Aztecan peoples of ancient Mexico (Gerste, p. 47) had the custom, in cases of violent fever, of fabricating a little dog of maize-flour, which was then placed on a maguey-plant in the public way; it was believed that the first passer-by would carry off the disease, and thus enable the patient to recover. In like manner, certain Peruvian coastal tribes used to expose on the public road the clothes of the sick man, in the belief that any passer-by who touched them would take the disease upon himself and so relieve the patient.

14. **The animal world as the cause of disease.**—A typical American Indian legend of the origin of disease is that of the Cherokee reported by Mooney, and given at length in art. CHEROKEES (vol. iii. p. 505). According to this myth, the animals became so offended and outraged at the carelessness of man and the invasions of their rights on the part of mankind that they held a council and determined to obtain revenge by each of them inflicting some disease upon their human oppressors. This they did, the smallest as well as the greatest providing his share. This is why the incantations and rites of the Cherokee medicine-men are so full of references to animals, and why each disease is represented as being caused by some one of them (the interesting details will be found in Mooney's monograph upon this subject). As a result of the action of the animals, the legend goes on to state, all the plants held a council and resolved to present man with remedies for all the diseases inflicted upon him by the former. Thus it happens, also, that for every disease brought about by the animals, there is a remedy to be found in the plant world. The idea of the origin of disease from the animal world obtains among many other American tribes as well, and the doctrine sometimes suggests comparison with the modern scientific theories as to the microbe origin of many human diseases. Among the Klamath Indians of Oregon, birds such as the wood-pecker, the lark, the crane, and various sorts of ducks are believed to be the causers of disease. With them also the otter is made responsible for smallpox.

15. **Natural phenomena as causes of disease.**—With some American Indian peoples, the shadow of another person is often harmful. Among the Shushwap of British Columbia (Boas, *6th Rep.* p. 92) widows and widowers, while observing mourning regulations, 'must avoid letting their shadows fall upon a person, as the latter would fall sick at once.' Similar beliefs prevail among the Bilqula (*7th Rep.*, 1891, p. 13). Lightning, the moon's light, etc., are sometimes supposed to cause illness. The Klamath Indians seem to have believed that the wind had something to do with the causation of disease. In some of the incantations of these Indians the west wind, in particular, is represented as 'blowing disease' out of its mouth; the rainstorm also 'calls up' disease.

16. **Human beings as causers of disease.**—Besides enchantment, witchcraft, sorcery, and other active procedures of medicine-men and medicine-women, by means of which sickness or disease is caused in another individual or transferred to him, there are other ways in which men and women may infect one another or bring about a condition of ill-health. As may be seen from the abundant data in Ploss's *Das Weib*, the menstruating woman is often regarded as a disease-bringer or a disease-causer, and her segregation is justified for that reason. Among the Songish Indians of Vancouver Island, according to Boas (*6th Rep.* p. 22), 'menstruating women may not come near sick persons, as they would make them weak.' The maximum theory of woman's responsibility for disease is met with among the Chiquitos of Bolivia, concerning whose 'medical code' Charlevoix states (Gerste, p. 45) that 'it consists of two prescriptions,—first, to suck the part of the body of the patient affected, and, second, to kill some woman, since women are responsible for all the misfortunes of mankind.' Among the Shushwap Indians of British Columbia, according to Boas (*l.c.* p. 90), 'women during their monthly periods are forbidden to cook for their families, as it is believed that the food would be poisonous.' Among the causes of disease or sickness given by the shamans of the Shushwap (p. 94) are 'that a woman passed by the head of the patient, or that the shadow of a mourner fell upon him.' Ideas cognate, more or less, with the 'evil eye' superstitions of the Old World are met with in various parts of primitive America. The shamans of many tribes (*e.g.* Shahaptin, Klamath, and other peoples of the Oregonian-Columbian region) are believed to be able to 'shoot' diseases from their eyes. Against these instances of maleficent human beings may be cited cases of *twins as disease curers*. As already noted in art. CHILDREN (vol. iii. p. 526), several American Indian tribes, particularly in the North Pacific coast region, believe that twins are gifted with the power of curing diseases.

Thus, among the Kwakiutl (Boas, *5th Rep.* p. 51), twins, who are thought to be transformed salmon, 'have the power of curing diseases, and use for this purpose a rattle called *K'oāqaten*, which has the shape of a flat box about three feet long by two feet wide'; among the Nak·ómgylisila (*6th Rep.* p. 62), 'twins, if of the same sex, were salmon before they were born. . . . The father dances for four days after the children have been born, with a large, square rattle. The children, by swinging this rattle, can cure disease and procure favourable winds and weather.'

17. **Soul and disease.**—In primitive America a great variety of ideas as to the relationship of the soul to disease and kindred phenomena of the human body prevailed. Indeed, we meet with all grades—from the simple belief of the Arawakan Macheyengas of eastern Peru, who, according to Dr. W. C. Farabee (*Proc. Amer. Antiq. Society*, N.S., xx.), think that the soul 'has nothing to do with life, sleep, disease, or death,' to the elaborate and quite metaphysical doctrines of some of the tribes occupying higher cultural stages, where life, sleep, disease, and death have often to be interpreted in relation to the existence of a plurality of souls, constituting sometimes a hierarchical series. Among the Indians of the North Pacific coast regions there are some (for example, certain tribes of the Fraser River, in British Columbia) who believe in the existence of 'several souls, the loss of one of which causes partial loss of life, *i.e.* sickness, while the loss of all, or of the principal one, entails death'; but, according to Boas (*Bull. 30 BE*, pt. ii. p. 617), the idea that the 'life' is associated with the vital organs (blood, breath, etc.), the loss of which causes death, 'is not strongly developed among the American aborigines.' The Hidatsa Indians of the Siouan stock,

like the Fraser River tribes, believe in a plurality of souls, as do a number of other American peoples. The doctrine of souls and of disease among the Chinook Indians has been discussed by Boas (*JAFL*, 1893, pp. 39–43). Here there are said to be two souls, a larger and a smaller; when a man is sick, it is because the latter has left his body, and he recovers when the shaman or medicine-man has caught the soul and returned it to him. In various parts of America the devices for 'soul-catching' are sometimes detailed, with extensive ceremonial, ritual, etc. Among the Tlinkit, Haida, and Tsimshian Indians, according to Boas (*5th Rep.* p. 58),

'their art consists in extracting the sickness or in finding and restoring the soul of the sick person. In trying to find it, three or four shamans sing and rattle over the sick person until they declare they have found the whereabouts of his soul, which is supposed to be in the possession of the salmon or *olachen* (candle-fish), or in that of the deceased shaman. Then they go to the place where it is supposed to be, and by singing and incantations obtain possession of it, and enclose it in a hollow carved bone. Then mountain-goat tallow, red paint, eagle-down, and other valuable objects are burnt, and the soul held over the fire. The bone is then laid upon the sick man's head, the shaman saying, "Here is your soul. Now you will be better and eat again." Sometimes the soul is supposed to be held by a shaman, who is paid for returning it.'

The soul of an individual can be removed from his body through the 'magic' of his enemies, their more powerful *orenda*, to use the term of Hewitt, and can be brought back only by the exercise of the same practices of a higher order or a greater cunning. Among the Songish Indians the lower sort of shamans, or *sïōua*, who are generally women, are able to cure such diseases as are not due to the soul's absence from the body. The higher class of shamans, or *squnäām*, are able to see the soul and to catch it when it has left the body and its owner is sick. A man becomes a *squnäām* by intercourse with supernatural powers in the woods, where he acquires a guardian spirit, 'called the *tl'k'āyin*, corresponding to what is known as the *tamanowus* in the Chinook jargon, and "medicine" east of the Rocky Mountains.' The method of procedure of the *squnäām* in disease-curing and soul-catching is thus described by Boas (*6th Rep.* 30):

'When he returns from the woods, the shaman is able to cure diseases, to see and to catch souls, etc. The best time of the day for curing disease is at nightfall. A number of people are invited to attend the ceremonies. The patient is deposited near the fire, the guests sit around him. Then they begin to sing and beat time with sticks. The shaman (who uses no rattle) has a cup of water standing next to him. He takes a mouthful, blows it into his hands, and sprinkles it over the sick person. Then he applies his mouth to the place where the disease is supposed to be, and sucks at it. As soon as he has finished sucking, he produces a piece of deer-skin or the like as though he had extracted it from the body, and which is supposed to have produced the sickness. If the soul of the sick person is supposed to be absent from the body, the shaman sends his *tl'k'āyin* (not his soul) in search. The *tl'k'āyin* brings it, and then the shaman takes it and puts it on the vertex of the patient, whence it returns into his body. These performances are accompanied by a dance of the shaman. Before the dance the *sïōua* must give a name to the earth, which else would swallow the shaman. When acting as conjurer for sick persons, he must keep away from his wife, as else his powers might be interfered with. He never treats members of his own family, but engages another shaman for this purpose. It is believed that he cannot cure his own relatives. Rich persons sometimes engage a shaman to look after their welfare.'

Shamans are able to make people sick, no less than to cure them of illness. The Nutka Indians, according to Boas (*6th Rep.* p. 44), have the following curious belief as to the cause of sickness:

'The soul has the shape of a tiny man; its seat is in the crown of the head. As long as it stands erect, the person to whom it belongs is hale and well; but, when it loses its upright position for any reason, its owner loses his senses. The soul is capable of leaving the body; then the owner grows sick, and, if the soul is not speedily restored, he must die. To restore it, the higher class of shamans, called *k·ok·oatsmaah* (soul-workers), are summoned.'

Among the Kwakiutl Indians (p. 59):

'If a man feels weak and looks pale, the seer (shaman) is sent for. He feels the head and root of the nose of the patient, and finds that his soul has left his body.'

The soul is caught again at night by the shaman to the accompaniment of incantations, etc., as already described for the Songish. Among the Shushwap the bringing back of the soul is an elaborate performance. Among the Bilqula (Bellacoola) the following belief obtains (*7th Rep.* p. 14):

'The soul is believed to dwell in the nape. It is similar in shape to a bird enclosed in an egg. If the shell of the egg breaks and the soul flies away, its owner must die. Shamans are able to see and to recover souls. By laying their hands on the nape of a person they are able to tell whether his soul is present or whether it has left the body. If the soul should become weak, they are able to restore it to its former vigour. If a person swoons, it is believed that his soul has flown away without breaking its shell. The shaman hears its buzzing wings, which give a sound like that of a mosquito. He may catch and replace it in the nape of its owner. If the soul leaves the body without breaking its shell the owner becomes crazy.'

Unlike many other Indian tribes, the Bilqula believe that the art of shamanism is a direct gift of the deity called Snq, obtained during illness, and not procurable by means of fasting, praying, etc. Among the Chilliwack, according to Hill-Tout (*Rep. on Ethnol. Surv. of Canada*, 1902, p. 9), the shaman sends his own soul out to catch the soul which has escaped from the body of his patient. Among the Twana Indians, who have the practice of 'soul-catching,' the reason given for its performance at night is that night on earth corresponds to day-time in the spirit-world. Among the Klamath Indians of Oregon, the treatment of the sick takes place in the winter-house in complete darkness.

18. Ghosts or spirits of the dead and disease.—An opinion met with among many of the aborigines of America is that, in some way or other, the ghosts or spirits of the dead are responsible for the diseases and sicknesses that afflict mankind. Among the Kwakiutl of Vancouver Island, to see the ghosts of the dead, when they re-appear on earth, entails sickness and death (Boas, *5th Rep.* p. 43); with certain Siouan tribes, to touch them or be touched by them as they move unseen through the air has the same effect. Many peoples, however, believe in an active rôle of these spirits in afflicting human beings with disease; this sometimes amounts to taking possession of the body or of some part or member of it. Among the coast Salish (Boas, *ib.* p. 52), it is believed that 'the touch or the seeing of ghosts brings sickness and death.' So, also, with the Songish (*6th Rep.* p. 28), who believe that

'their touch causes sickness. They make those who have not regarded the regulations regarding food and work mad. Their touch paralyzes man. When one feels afraid, being alone in the woods or in the dark, it is a sign that a ghost is near.'

The following is reported by Boas (*6th Rep.* p. 61) from the Kwakiutl:

'The sight of a ghost is deadly. A few years ago, a woman, who was wailing for her mother, suddenly fell into a swoon. The people first believed her to be dead, and carried the corpse into the woods. There they discovered that she continued to breathe. They watched her for two days, when she recovered. She told them that she had seen two people enter the house. One of them had said: "Don't cry; I am your mother's ghost. We are well off where we live." She had replied: "No; I mourn because you have left me alone." Then she had fallen into a deep swoon.'

This explanation of swooning, fainting, and similar states is common all over primitive America. Among the Shushwaps (p. 93), 'when a person faints, it is a sign that a ghost pursues him.'

19. The hereafter of those dying from sickness and disease.—Among the American Indians, one frequently meets the idea that those dying by violent deaths, women dying in childbirth, and people whose death is due to sickness or disease go to certain special abodes in the hereafter. Thus the Tlinkit, according to Boas (*5th Rep.* p. 47),

'believe that the soul, after death, lives in a country similar to ours. Those who have died a violent death go to heaven, to a country ruled by Tahit; those who die by sickness (also women dying in childbed) go to a country beyond the borders of the

earth, but on the same level. It is said that the dead from both countries join during the daytime. I believe that this idea, which is also held by the Haida, must be ascribed to Eskimo influence.'

A special heaven for women dying in childbed is met with elsewhere among uncivilized tribes; also in ancient Mexico.

20. **Disease and the gods and demons.**—The conception of disease as the work of deity or of demons has not yet vanished altogether from the minds of the civilized Christian peoples of the globe, and it is strongly entertained by many tribes of American Indians representing practically all grades of culture in the primitive New World. The Iroquoian Onondaga, *e.g.*, believe that the evil demons known as *Hondoi* cause both disease and misfortune among men and women, but, when appeased by dances and other ceremonies and by offerings of food, tobacco, and the like, they become friendly and protect them from sickness and disease, as well as from witchcraft. In the dances and kindred ceremonials of the Iroquoian 'medicine-societies,' women masked, representing these disease-demons with distorted human faces, are employed. The secret medicine-societies of the pagan Seneca have recently been studied by A. C. Parker, himself of Iroquoian descent. These societies serve for the healing of disease and the furtherance of well-being in the broadest sense. In a Tsimshian myth (Boas, *5th Rep.* p. 50) 'the master of the moon,' the pestilence (*Haiatiloq*), appears as a powerful deity—something ascribable to the influence of the neighbouring Kwakiutl. The Sacs and Foxes believe that the spirit of sickness, *Apenaweni*, hovers about, seeking entrance into the lodges of the Indians. Among the Nez-Percé Indians there is a general ceremony, lasting from 3 to 7 days, carried on by all the men of the community who are between 18 and 40 years of age, with the object of conquering *Mawish*, the spirit of fatigue (Bartels, p. 235); and the Indians believe firmly that by means of it they ensure themselves great bodily strength and capacity for resistance to fatigue.

Water-demons are sometimes credited with keeping the souls of men, and thus causing various diseases and sicknesses. Examples of this are the *Tšakan* of the Mexican Coras, described by Preuss, and the *Pujio* of the Indians of the Bolivian-Argentinian border-land, of which an account is given by Boman (*Antiq. de la rég. and.*, vol. i. [1908]). In the case of the Pujio, a rather complicated offering is made, after which the soul is called back. The soul is also called back when one is 'frightened to death.' Among the Ipurina Indians of Brazil, persons whose recovery from illness or disease is not expected, and upon whom all the arts of the shaman have been exercised in vain, are devoted to *Inkisi*, 'the great water-snake,' a prominent figure in their mythology. Ehrenreich thus describes their actions in this matter (cited in Bartels, p. 248):

'If there are any sick people who are beyond anything but the help of the Snake, one of the shamans proceeds to the river to call the Water-Spirit. After all accompanying him have disappeared, the Spirit comes forth, and asks first after what gifts have been brought. If he is satisfied with these, he declares himself ready for the reception of the sick man. The latter is stupefied with tobacco and thrown into the river, on the bottom of which he falls "with a dull thud," and wakes up. The Water-Spirit takes him into his house and restores him. The method of cure is not clearly given, but the recovered patient remains for ever in the realm of the Water-Snake, and lives there happily and gloriously, with no desire to return to earth. The accidentally drowned find the same reception, while those already dead on earth are rejected. Moribund people are often hurried into the next world by the clubs of the shamans.'

21. **Disease as punishment.**—The conception of disease as punishment for the known or unknown sins and offences of the individual, the family, or the community is wide-spread, and is not confined to any particular stage of culture, either in the Old World or in the New. Primitive America furnishes a number of interesting examples. The breaking of tabus, and the disregarding of various other religious or semi-religious commandments and regulations, are believed by tribes all over the continent to be followed by punishments which often take the form of some sickness or affliction of body or mind, or of both together. The breaking of food-tabus, in particular, is thought to bring diseases of various sorts on the guilty; likewise, the non-observance or neglect of the customs and ceremonies relating to menstruation, puberty, childbirth, *coitus*, etc. The Mayas of Yucatan and the Aztecs of ancient Mexico, both representing the highest reaches of primitive American civilization, believe that certain diseases were sent upon the individual, etc., in consequence of sin; the former holding also that it sometimes was for sins unconfessed. This topic is discussed by Preuss in his article on sin in ancient Mexican religion (see Lit.). It appears that the Aztecs believed diseases and misfortunes of many sorts to be due to the sinful nature of man. Sacrilege and offences against the State were punished by the gods. Tezcatlipoca, *e.g.*, sent leprosy, sexual diseases, gout, skin diseases, dropsy, etc. Father Gerste (p. 19) says on this point that, in cases of severe illness or grave diseases, the 'doctor' told the patient that he must have committed some sin, and kept questioning him until he confessed some offence—very old, perhaps, and almost forgotten. The principle of medication here was to purify the soul first, and then the body might get well. Certain Central American peoples, of the Mayan stock, had practically the same ideas and method of procedure by confession, etc.

22. **Special and protective deities of shamans, etc.**—Among not a few tribes, especially those belonging to the ancient civilized peoples of Mexico, Central and South America, the 'doctors,' 'medicine-men,' etc., had their special protective divinities. Such, *e.g.*, were, among the Aztecs and closely related peoples, *Toçi*, the great, ancient mother, particularly friendly to women-doctors and midwives, who figured in the ceremonials in her honour; *Xilonen*, a goddess to whom a young maiden was offered in sacrifice; *Tzapotla tenan*, or 'the mother of Tzapotlan,' to whom was attributed the discovery of the medicinal resin called *oxitl*, and who was specially worshipped by male 'doctors'; *Ixtlilton* (also called *Tlaltecuin*), god of song, dancing, games, etc., into whose temple sick children were taken, to dance (if they could) before his image, and drink of the holy water preserved in the sanctuary. The deities Tlaltecuin, Xochicauacan, Oxomoco, and Cipactonal especially were credited with the beginnings of medical art. Among the Mayas, the culture-hero, Itzamna, is said to have been the originator of medicine; the same thing is said of Xmucan and Xpiyacoc among the kindred Quichés of Guatemala. The culture-hero, as primal shaman, appears also in S. America, *e.g.*, in the Yurupari legend reported by Stradelli from the head-waters of the Orinoco. The Guarayan (Bolivia) Abaangui prepares the first *chicha*, or intoxicating drink, from maize. Many myths relate that the 'medicine' was received directly or indirectly from the gods themselves or their representatives, the Twins, who figure so conspicuously in the mythologies of the south-western United States, etc.; the 'transformers' of the North Pacific coast; or such animal-deities as the coyote in the Rocky Mountain region and among the Plains tribes. Hoffman has recorded the great Ojibwa myth of the transference to man by the culture-hero, Manabozho, of the 'grand medicine.' Cushing has also published the Zuñi account of the teaching of 'medicine' to the first

men by the Twins, who are the chief culture-figures in Pueblo mythology.

23. Human sacrifice as a cure for disease.—The sacrifice of animals, etc., as a more or less religious ceremonial in connexion with the ritual of 'medicine' is known from various regions of the globe, where the process of getting well in body is carried out on lines similar to getting well in mind, and maintaining harmony between man and the powers beyond and above him. In this way human sacrifice sometimes occurs. Some of the Indian tribes of ancient Mexico, according to Orozco y Berra, cited by Father Gerste (p. 19), used, in cases of very grave illness of the father or the mother, to kill the youngest child as an expiatory sacrifice.

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A. F. CHAMBERLAIN.

DISEASE AND MEDICINE (Assyro-Babylonian).—The chief difficulty in treating of the subject of diseases in Babylonia is to separate the ideas of magic from medicine proper in the native methods of healing. The Assyrian physician never shook himself entirely free from the more supernatural side of his profession, and, apart from the magical incantations for the sick, even the more scientific medical texts depend largely on 'white magic.' The latter consist, for the most part, of short material recipes on which much of our knowledge of the Assyrian pharmacopœia rests, but they also prescribe spells to be used simultaneously with the administration of drugs. It is therefore clear that, although many of the recipes in use were efficacious from a purely medical standpoint, they were frequently combined with a series of chanted *abracadabra* of more value to the anthropologist than to the student of medicine.

The present inhabitants of the plains of Mesopotamia and the hills of the neighbourhood are probably liable to the same diseases as their ancestors were some thousands of years ago, and we may therefore start on this hypothesis. Sudden plagues, of which cholera is one of the most appalling in its effects, are met with at all periods of the history of this country:[1] dysentery, typhoid, and like diseases, common to all countries where the drainage is of a casual nature; smallpox and similar pests; malaria, particularly in the swamps of Babylonia; and such other ailments as are common to all mankind without distinction of locality. Particularly, too, must be mentioned the peculiar skin-eruption known variously as the 'Baghdad boil,' or 'Mosul (or Aleppo) button,' and the various forms of ophthalmia common to Eastern peoples. Naturally there are many forms of sickness on the cuneiform tablets that we cannot identify with certainty until our knowledge of the medical literature is more advanced.

The principal causes to which sickness was ascribed were the visitation of some god or goddess, the attack of a devil, and the machinations of sorcerers.[1] Demoniac possession was firmly believed in, and it is for this reason that the priest was as likely to be called in to help a patient as the real doctor. The whole of the cuneiform incantations are full of the belief that some god, demon, or ghost is plaguing the sick man, and must be expelled before the patient can be healed; and similarly we may presume that the so-called Penitential Psalms have their origin, not in the remorse of the suppliant, but in his actual physical malady, which he believes to be due to some supernatural blow. The medical texts are often explicit on this point: 'When (a man) is smitten on his neck, it is the hand of Adad; when he is smitten on his neck, and his breast hurts him, it is the hand of Ištar on the necklace.'[2] 'When a man's temples pain him, and the neck muscles hurt him, it is the hand of a ghost.'[3] 'When a ghost seizes upon a man, then mix (various substances) together, anoint him (with them), and the hand of the ghost will be removed.'[4]

There is little doubt that sickness, as understood among the Assyrians, may be reckoned to be due to breaches of the savage tabu. The man so attacked has transgressed a ban; indeed, much of the incantation series known by the name of *Šurpu* deals with long lists of possible uncleanness which has caused the patient's malady, the word used being *mamit*. In one tablet there is a categorical list of as many as one hundred and sixty-three *mamit*, or tabus, each severally described briefly in one line, and the magician is supposed to repeat all these, as it is hoped that he will thereby light on the correct cause of the trouble, diagnose his case properly, and show that he possesses a knowledge of the cause of the sickness. That physical ills were held to be the result of incurring some tabu of uncleanness is quite clear from certain *mamit* of the Third Tablet, which are as follows:

To go before the Sun-god when '*ātsûr* [*i.e.* under a tabu] (l. 114), to touch a man when one is under a tabu, or to pray in the same state (ll. 115, 116), or to hold converse, eat the bread, or drink the water of one under a tabu (ll. 117–119), or to drink what he has left (l. 120); or, in the Second tablet, to go before a man under a tabu, or to have a man under a tabu come before one (ll. 99, 100), to sleep on the bed, sit on the chair, or to eat or drink from vessels, belonging to such a man (ll. 101–104).

According to modern ideas, many of these might be merely an unintelligent development of the principle of infectious diseases (which will provide an explanation in part), but the first three show distinctly that there are other principles in question. The savage tabu of 'uncleanness' is here in a later dress, and sickness is considered as the result of a breach of this very intricate belief. For, if the man for whom the series *Šurpu* provides a means of relief be not really and obviously physically ill, there is no reason for the existence of such a series; we cannot suppose that a man called in a priest to relieve him from the obscure tabus which he might have incurred, unless there was some unusual physical condition demanding it.

[1] Joshua the Stylite (ed. Wright, Camb. 1882, p. 17) says, 'as all the people had sinned, all of them were smitten with the plague' in the year of Alexander. The destruction of Sennacherib's army (2 K 19^{35}, Is 37^{36}) must have been due to some such cause.

[1] For these, see art. CHARMS AND AMULETS (Assyr.-Bab.).
[2] S. 951. [3] S. 1063. [4] K. 4075; cf. K. 4609 b.

Just as we may presume the 'unwitting' tabus (in whatever way the word שְׁגָגָה may be translated) of the OT to have manifested themselves in some physical way, so must we suppose that an Assyrian would not have recourse to a priest-physician unless absolutely driven by pain or fear. Sickness is due to a demoniac or Divine influence, and it is well known that a savage fears to incur a breach of tabu from some ill-defined sense of danger from god or devil; it is clear, therefore, that the Assyrians had the same terror in their minds when they edited the *Šurpu*-series for the benefit of sick men. The sorcerer must discover—or trick the powers into believing that he has discovered—the tabu which the patient has transgressed, and he can then proceed to cleanse the man from his breach, and lift the ban from him.

The principal god connected with healing is Ea, but it is his son Marduk who is appealed to by the physician as intermediary with the higher power. Marduk, when called on for help, is supposed to repair to his father to ask him for his advice as to what the sick man must do to be healed. This episode is constantly repeated in cuneiform incantations for the sick; indeed, to such an extent was it recognized as the usual procedure that it is frequently inserted in these texts in one line containing abbreviations of the three principal sentences, thus: 'Marduk hath seen'; 'What I'; 'Go, my son.' The full formula is as follows:

'Marduk hath seen him (the sick man), and hath entered the house of his father Ea, and hath said, "Father, headache from the under world hath gone forth."[1] Twice he hath said unto him, "What this man hath done he knoweth not; whereby shall he be relieved?" Ea hath answered his son Marduk, "O my son, what dost thou not know, what more can I give thee? O Marduk, what dost thou not know, what can I add unto thy knowledge? What I know, thou knowest also. Go, my son, Marduk. . . ."'

Then follows the actual prescription for the patient. This method of bringing in a Divine episode is nothing more than a development of the principle of the Word of Power, which tradition demands shall be one of the sorcerer's most potent aids in spell-working. A scene is represented on certain of the magical plaques which is apparently intended to portray the sick man and the forces arrayed against him: the celestial powers, demons, protecting gods and spirits, the sick man on his bed, etc., form an interesting picture (see Frank, *LSSt* iii. 3).

Now, this Word of Power, so generally recognized in all magic, consists in its simplest form of the name of some Divine being or thing invoked against the power of evil which the physician is expelling. Hence many of the Assyrian incantations end with the line, 'By Heaven be ye exorcized! By Earth be ye exorcized!' and numerous gods are invoked in the same way.

Two other concomitants to the exorcisms are necessary to the exorcist: first, the knowledge of the name or description of the devil which is being expelled; and, second, some material with either medicinal or magical value whereby the cure may be effected. The former is as necessary as the Word of Power for a complete incantation; when the wizard has a knowledge of the name of his foe, or, in the case of demons, a full description of the ghost attacking the man, he has assumed some considerable influence over him which will finally bring him entirely into subjection. The genesis of such a belief is to be sought in the same source as the collateral superstitions where portions are collected of the hair, nails, or footprint-dust of any one whom the enchanter wishes to bewitch, or the waxen figures made in the victim's likeness. It is enough if something belonging to the person, not necessarily concrete, has been secured, and the name is considered as an equivalent for more tangible evidence, such as nail-parings.

[1] This is the only variation in the formula, being the first line of the tablet.

The Assyrian sorcerer is compelled to recite long lists of ghosts or devils when he is trying to conjure the evil away from his patient. The idea is that, since obviously he cannot obtain the more fleshly portions of his foe as he might do in the case of a human enemy, he shall mention, in place of this, the name or powers of all possible evil spirits, and ultimately, by his much speaking, hit on the correct identification of the demon, who will then admit the magician's superiority. Hence we find in the Assyrian texts such constantly recurring phrases as, 'Whether thou art an evil spirit, or an evil demon, or an evil ghost, or an evil devil, or an evil god, or an evil fiend, or sickness, or death, or phantom of night, or wraith of night, or fever, or evil pestilence, be thou removed from before me';[1] or even longer descriptions of ghosts of people who have died unnatural deaths, or who have been left unburied, and whose only hope is to torment the living until they perform the necessary rites to give them peace.[2]

The third and last element of the incantation is some drug, to which in early times a magical, Divine potency was attributed, or some charm or amulet, or, in the broadest sense, some material which will aid the physician in his final effort. The simplest is pure water, which was frequently sprinkled over the patient as a cleansing medium, and this is easily intelligible. One incantation (*WAI* ii. 51b, line 1 ff.) runs thus: 'All that is evil, . . . [which exists in the body] of N. [may it be carried off], with the water of his body, the washings from his hands, and may the river carry it away downstream!' There seems also to have been some principle of enclosing the possessed man in a ring of flour or other powder spread in a circle on the ground, as a kind of *ḥērem* through which spirits could not break. For instance, after an 'atonement' ceremony has been made, the wizard fumigates the man with a lighted censer, and then throws away the 'atonement' (in this case a kid) into the street; he then surrounds the man with flour,[3] as a magic circle through which no evil demon can pass to injure him. In another incantation the sorcerer says of certain figures which he has made:

'On their raised arm I have spread a dark robe,
A variegated cord I have wound round their hands, I have placed tamarisk (and) palm-pith,
I have completed the *uṣurtu* (magic circle), I have surrounded them with a sprinkling of lime,
With the flour of Nisaba (the corn-god), the tabu of the great gods, I have surrounded them,
I have set for the Seven of them, mighty-winged, a figure of Nergal at their heads.'[4]

The tamarisk (or some allied species of tree) was held aloft in the hand during the priest's exorcism; one of the rituals prescribes this to the magician, who says, during his ceremonial:

'The man of Ea am I, the man of Damkina am I, the messenger of Marduk am I, my spell is the spell of Ea, my incantation is the incantation of Marduk. The ban of Ea is in my hand, the tamarisk, the powerful weapon of Anu, in my hand I hold; the date-spathe (?), mighty in decision, in my hand I hold.'[5]

On one of the late Hebrew magical bowls discovered at Niffer there is the figure of a man rudely

[1] See Thompson, *Devils and Evil Spirits of Babylonia*, London, 1903, i. 16–17, ll. 153 ff.

[2] *Ib.* xxiv ff., also *Semitic Magic*, p. 7 ff.

[3] Tablet XI. of the *Ašakku*-series (Thompson, *Devils*, ii. 35). This is probably the meaning conveyed by *amelu šudti kusurrâ eṣir*, and not as the present writer has translated it in the passage. See also Thompson, *Semitic Magic*, p. lvii ff.

[4] Zimmern, 'Ritualtafeln,' in *Beiträge zur Kenntnis*, etc., ii. 109. The curious may see much about these magic circles in the Middle Ages in Francis Barrett, *The Magus*, 1801, p. 99 ff., or even what is believed about them at the present day by certain who dabble in the 'occult,' in Mathers' *Book of Sacred Magic*, 1898, p. xxxvii.

[5] *Utukku*-series, Tablet III. l. 204 (Thompson, *Devils*, i. 23). The word translated 'tamarisk' is *GIS.MA.NU*, undoubtedly some form of tree, the Assyrian equivalent being *eru*, probably the Syriac *'arâ'*.

drawn, holding up the branch of some tree in his hand.[1] From Sozomen[2] we learn that, when Julian was about to enter a temple in Gaul, the priest, in accordance with the pagan custom, sprinkled water upon him with the branch of a tree, doubtless symbolical of a purificatory rite. It is possible that we may see some such ceremony prescribed in the Assyrian cleansing rite :

'Perform thy goodly incantation and make perfect the water thereof with priestcraft, and with thy pure incantation do thou cleanse (the man ?); and take a bundle of twigs (?), pour the water thereof on it, and the laver (or water) that cleanseth the temple of the gods,' etc.[3]

The comparison is, however, uncertain, as we have no right to assume that in this case the water was sprinkled upon the sick man ; but Sozomen's anecdote is of value as showing that branches were used in sprinkling water.[4] There is, however, a parallel to the Assyrian rite in another tablet,[5] where Ea says :

'Take a bundle of twigs (?) and take water at the confluence of two streams, and perform thy pure incantation over this water, and cleanse (the man) with thy pure exorcism, and sprinkle the man, the son of his god, with this water, and bind his head with. . . .'

Of other mystic plants, we find the *piri'* (which is probably the Syr. *per'ā*, St. John's wort), the *balti* (which may be the Syr. *bal*, the caper), and the *ḫulâ* (prob. the Syr. *ḥlā*, the fleabane) all used to hang up on the doors of houses when a ceremony was going on, as a prophylactic against demons.[6] The first-named, the St. John's wort, has always had great power in magic. 'Gathered on Midsummer Eve, or on Midsummer Day before sunrise, the blossoms are hung on doorways and windows to preserve the house against thunder, witches, and evil spirits.'[7] The number of plants which occur in the medical and magical texts is very large ; but, unfortunately, they are difficult to identify, and the lexicographical tablets which give the names of hundreds do not really afford much clue.

Before proceeding to the medical recipes, we have to notice that peculiar method of healing, used by all savages, and known in modern times as 'sympathetic magic.' It is quite unnecessary here to go into the various forms in which this occurs in modern witchcraft ; it is enough to take as a text the homœopathic 'hair of the dog that bit one,' and quote some of the cuneiform texts in which this method is employed.[8] The best-known examples occur in the *Šurpu*-series, where the magician recites various formulæ over a clove of garlic, a date, a flock of wool, some goat's hair, etc., pulling each in pieces and burning it as he does so. As he destroys each, so will the sickness depart. One quotation of an incantation will show the method :

'As this date is cut, and cast in the fire,
The devouring flame consumes it,
Never to return to its reft branch,
Nor grace the board of god or king ;
So may the ban, the tabu, the pain (?), the woe (?),
The sickness, the agony, the sin, the misdeed, the wrong-doing, the iniquity,
The sickness which is in my body, my limbs, my muscles,
Be cut off like this date,
So may the devouring flame consume it,
The tabu go forth, and I behold the light !'[9]

This is the most marked form of sympathetic magic, but the principle is used obviously in much of the cuneiform priestcraft, and it occurs in various forms in the examples given in this article.

The name of the physician proper was *asû*, but, as the treatment was frequently of a magical nature rather than purely medical, it was oftener the *ašipu*-priest than a doctor who was called in to heal a sick man. The *ašipu* is the magician who can release the patient from the tabu under which he lies ; the same word occurs in Hebrew under the form *aššâph* ; and the name in Assyrian for the incantation is *šiptu* (from the same root).[1] He claims in his exorcism that he has come supported by the power of Ea, Damkina, and Marduk :

'The man of Ea am I, the man of Damkina am I, the messenger of Marduk am I. The great lord Ea hath sent me to revive the . . . sick man ; he hath added his pure spell to mine, he hath added his pure voice to mine, he hath added his pure spittle to mine, he hath added his pure prayer to mine ; the destroyer(s) of the limbs, which are in the body of the sick man, hath the power to destroy the limbs—by the magic of the word of Ea may these evil ones be put to flight.'[2]

Similarly, when the priest comes into the house of the patient, he declares that he is aided by several gods :

'When [I] enter the house, Šamaš is before me, Sin is behind [me], Nergal is at [my] right hand, Ninib is at my left hand ; when I draw near unto the sick man, when I lay my hand on the head of the sick man, may a kindly spirit, may a kindly guardian angel stand at my side ! Whether thou art an evil spirit or an evil demon, or an evil ghost, or an evil devil, or an evil god, or an evil fiend, or sickness, or death, or phantom of night, or wraith of night, or fever, or evil pestilence, be thou removed from before me, out of the house go forth ! (For) I am the sorcerer-priest of Ea, it is I who [recite] the incantation for the sick man.'[3]

He completes the spell of the Third Tablet of the same series with the words :

'O Ea, King of the Deep, [turn thou ?] to see ; I, the magician, am thy slave. March thou on my right hand, help on my left ; add thy pure spell to mine, add thy pure voice to mine, vouchsafe (to me) pure words ; make fortunate the utterances of my mouth, ordain that my decisions be happy. Let me be blessed where'er I tread, let the man whom I (now) touch be blessed. Before me may lucky thoughts be spoken, after me may a lucky finger be pointed. O that thou wert my guardian genius, and my guardian spirit ! O Marduk, who blesseth (even) gods, let me be blessed where'er my path may be ! Thy power shall god and man proclaim, this man shall do thy service, and I, too, the magician thy slave.'[4]

Armed with these heavenly powers, the priest might exorcize any of the demons which assail mankind, and one of the commonest methods of treatment among the priestly gild was an 'atonement.' The word used is *kuppuru* (the noun is *takpirtu*), the same as the Heb. כִּפֶּר, as was pointed out by Zimmern ('Ritualtafeln,' p. 92). The idea in the Assyrian method is that the demon causing the sickness is to be offered a substitute for his victim, and hence a young pig or kid is taken, slaughtered, and placed near the patient. The devil goes forth at the physician's exorcism and takes up its abode in the carcass of the substitute, which can then be made away with, and the baneful influence destroyed. This is fully laid down in one of the magical texts against the *ašakku* (provisionally translated 'fever'), where it is told how Ea, the lord of the incantation, in showing a method of treating the sick man, lays a kid before Marduk, saying :

'The kid is the substitute for mankind,
He giveth the kid for his life,
He giveth the head of the kid for the head of the man,
He giveth the neck of the kid for the neck of the man,
He giveth the breast of the kid for the breast of the man.'[5]

Instead of the kid, the substitute might be a sucking-pig, and the directions are to put it at the head of the sick man,[6] take out its heart and put it above that of the patient, and [sprinkle] its blood on the sides of the bed ; then the carcass

[1] Hilprecht, *Explorations in Bible Lands*, Edinburgh, 1903, p. 447.
[2] *HE*, bk. vi. ch. vi.
[3] Thompson, *Devils*, ii. 143 ; *Semitic Magic*, 213.
[4] In King's *Babylonian Magic and Sorcery*, p. 95, at the end of one of the 'Prayers of the Raising of the Hand,' we find the direction, 'In the night before Ištar thou shalt sprinkle a green branch with pure water.'
[5] *Ti'i*-series, Tablet P (Thompson, *Devils*, ii. 95 ; *Semitic Magic*, 212).
[6] *Utukku*-series, Tablet B, l. 72 (Thompson, *Devils*, i. 137).
[7] Frazer, *GB*[2] iii. 333 ff. See art. CHARMS AND AMULETS (Assyr.-Bab.).
[8] The whole question is thoroughly gone into in Frazer's *GB*[2] i. 9 ff.
[9] Zimmern, 'Šurpu,' in *Beitr. zur Kenntnis*, etc. i. 29.

[1] On the *ašipu*-priest, see Zimmern, 'Ritualtafeln,' p. 91.
[2] *Utukku*-series, Tablet III. l. 65 (Thompson, *Devils*, i. 9).
[3] *Ib.* l. 141 ff. (Thompson, *Devils*, i. 15 ; *Semitic Magic*, xxiv.).
[4] *Ib.* l. 260 ff. (Thompson, *Devils*, i. 27 ; *Semitic Magic*, xxiii.).
[5] Tablet N, col. iii. l. 37 ff. (Thompson, *Devils*, ii. 21 ; *Semitic Magic*, 211). The reader is referred to Frazer's *GB*[2] for many similar instances of the transference of ills to animals.
[6] This is rather doubtful, owing to a mutilated line in the text.

must be divided over the man, and apparently spread upon him. The ritual continues with a purification by pure water and fumigation by a censer (as in the story of Tobit), and ends:

> 'Place twice seven loaves cooked in the ashes against
> the shut door, and
> Give the pig in his stead, and
> Let the flesh be as his flesh,
> And the blood as his blood,
> And let him hold it;
> Let the heart (which thou hast placed on his heart)
> be as his heart,
> And let him hold it. . . .'[1]

The migration of demoniac influence to the pig is closely paralleled in the story of the Gadarene swine (Mk 5).[2] The Indian Muslims of the present day who come to Abdulkadir, the largest mosque in Baghdad, to make a pilgrimage and offer sacrifices, 'vow that if a man who is ill begins to recover he shall go to the shrine.'

> 'He is stripped to the waist. Then two men lift a lamb or a kid above his head, and bathe his face, shoulders, and the upper part of his body with the blood. While the butcher kills the animal the sheik repeats the first sura of the Koran. They also wrap him in the skin of the animal.'[3]

The 'twice seven loaves' is paralleled in the Seventh Tablet of the *Šurpu*-series: when a man has incurred a certain tabu, seven loaves of pure dough are to be taken, and, after various ceremonies, the magician makes an 'atonement' for the patient, and puts his spittle on the 'atonement' as symbolical of the removal of the tabu from the man to the substitute. The loaves are then to be carried into the desert to a 'clean place,' as in the Levitical ritual, and left under one of the thorn bushes growing there. At the present day in the Hejaz, if a child is very ill, its mother will take seven flat loaves of bread and put them under its pillow, giving them in the morning to the dogs.[4] Another exorcism gives directions more fully; Marduk is advised by Ea to take a white kid of Tammûz:

> 'Lay it down facing the sick man,
> Take out its heart, and
> Place it in the hand of that man;
> Perform the Incantation of Eridu.
> (The kid whose heart thou hast taken out
> Is unclean [?] meat wherewith thou shalt make
> an atonement for this man.)
> Bring to him a censer (and) a torch,
> Scatter it (the kid) in the street.'[5]

But the Assyrians did not confine the 'atonement' ceremonies to the carcasses of animals; they had other methods for ridding a sick man of his devil, notably that of inducing the incubus to leave the human body to enter a little figure fashioned in the likeness of the patient. The magician took various herbs, put them in a pot of water, sprinkled the sick man with them, and made 'atonement' for him; he then modelled a dough image of his patient, poured out his magic water on him, and fumigated him with incense. Then, just as the water trickled away from his body, the pestilence in his body was supposed to trickle off, the water being caught in some receptacle beneath, and poured forth abroad that the sickness might be dissipated.[6]

Sympathetic magic was likewise called in as an aid in other cases. A sickness-tabu might be removed by the use of charms made of black and white hair, just as they are among modern savage tribes. Three examples from different peoples will be ample to show how closely the Babylonian methods resemble those of other nations.

> In India the 'fairy-women' take three different coloured threads and knot them twenty-one or twenty-two times, and when the work is finished it is fastened to the neck or upper arm of the patient.[1] Among the Malays it is customary to make little images of dough of beasts, etc., and to place them on a tray with betel-leaves, cigarettes, and tapers. One of the tapers is set on a silver dollar, with the end of a parti-coloured thread inserted between the dollar and the foot of the taper; this thread the patient holds during the repetition of the charm. The disease-devil is supposed to enter the images, and as soon as this has happened the magician looses three slip-knots and throws them away.[2] Among the modern Persians, O'Donovan saw a similar method for removing fever; a khan spun some camel's hair to a stout thread, and folding it three times on itself spun it again. He tied seven knots therein, blowing on each one, and this was to be worn on the patient's wrist, a knot being untied each day. When the last knot was loosed, the thread was to be thrown in a ball into the river.[3]

The prescription, as given in Assyrian, in the Sixth Tablet of the *Šurpu*-series runs as follows:

> 'He hath turned his [steps?] to a temple-woman (?), Ištar hath sent her temple-woman (?), hath seated the wise-woman on a couch (?) that she may spin a white and black wool into a double cord, a strong cord, a mighty cord, a twi-coloured cord, on a spindle, a cord to overcome the ban: against the evil curse of human ban, against a divine curse, a cord to overcome the ban. He (she) hath bound it on the head, hand, and foot of this man; Marduk, the son of Eridu, the prince, with his undefiled hands cutteth it off, that the ban, its cord, may go forth to the desert to a clean place.'[4]

Or again, in the case of headache, a method is recommended, as usual, by Ea to his son Marduk:

> 'Take the hair of a virgin kid, let a wise woman spin (it) on the right side, and double it on the left, bind knots twice seven times, and perform the Incantation of Eridu, and bind the head of the sick man, and bind the neck of the sick man, and bind the soul of the sick man, and bind up his limbs.'[5]

Without going further afield into details of comparative magic, it is worth mention here that the same superstition is still believed in at Mosul, close to the mound of Nineveh. A recipe for fever was given the present writer by a boy employed on the excavations, in which the physician, in this case a shaikh, takes a thread of cotton and ties seven knots in it, putting it on the patient's wrist. After seven or eight days, if the fever continues, he must keep it on; if the fever passes, then he may throw it away.[6]

In one of the Assyrian charms for ophthalmia, black and white threads or hairs are to be woven together, with seven and seven knots tied therein, and during the knotting an incantation is to be muttered; the strand[7] of black hair is then to be fastened to the sick eye, and the white one to the sound eye.[8] Or in another case (for a disease of the eyes called *amurrikanu*) 'pure strands of red wool, which by the pure hand of . . . have been brought . . . bind on the right hand.'[9] A parallel to the untying of the knots in the modern charms quoted above is prescribed in one of the Assyr. tablets published by King (*Bab. Magic and Sorcery*, p. 58, l. 99 ff.); the priest must say over the sick man 'Ea hath sent me' three times, and then untie the knot which has been tied; and the man must go home without looking behind him.

We may now for the moment leave the magical side of the physician's art for the more scientific study of drugs and their administration. The efficacy of medicine on an empty stomach was well recognized by Assyrian doctors, and the prescriptions constantly end with directions for such a procedure:

> 'Bray these seven plants together, and put them in fermented

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[1] Tablet N, col. ii. l. 42 ff. (Thompson, *Devils*, ii. 17; *Semitic Magic*, 208). Or for the fifth and seventh line translate with Fossey (*Recueil de Travaux*, new series, x. 183), 'qu'ils (les mauvais démons) s'en emparent.'

[2] On the custom of sacrificing sucking-pigs among the Greeks, see *AJPh*, 1900, p. 256.

[3] Curtiss, *Prim. Sem. Rel.*, Lond. 1902, p. 205 f.

[4] Zwemer, *Arabia*, Edin. 1900, p. 283.

[5] Tablet XI. of the series *Asakku* (Thompson, *Devils*, ii. 33; *Semitic Magic*, 203).

[6] Tablet 'T,' l. 30 ff. (Thompson, *Devils*, ii. 107; *Semitic Magic*, 159, lii); cf. Skeat, *Malay Magic*, Lond. 1900, p. 347.

[1] Ja'far Sharif and G. A. Herklots, *Qanoon-e-Islam*, Madras, 1895, p. 262.

[2] Skeat, *Malay Magic*, p. 432; see also p. 569.

[3] *Merv Oasis*, Lond. 1882, ii. 310. For other instances, see Frazer, *GB*[2] i. 397.

[4] Zimmern, *Beiträge zur Kenntnis*, etc., p. 33.

[5] *Ti'i*, Tablet IX. l. 74 (Thompson, *Devils*, ii. 71; *Semitic Magic*, 166).

[6] 'Folklore of Mossoul,' *PSBA*, 1900, p. 80.

[7] The meaning of the Assyrian word is uncertain.

[8] *WAI* iv. 29[a], 4, C. i. 15.

[9] Haupt, *Akkad. u. sum. Keilschrifttexte*, Leipzig, 1881–82, xi. ii. 45.

drink; at the approach of the star in the morning let the patient drink them without eating, and he will recover.'[1]

Not only this, but the use of the enema also was well known, the directions being quite explicit:

'An enema (*ḫuš*) of oil thou shalt make, and introduce *per anum*.'[2]

For stomachic troubles there were many remedies. Pains were treated with a mixture of 'salt of the mountain' and *amanu*-salt pounded together and put in fermented liquor, which was to be drunk on an empty stomach, used also as an enema, and sprinkled upon the patient;[3] or a mixture of the *nuḫurtu*-plant and seven corns of *ši-ši*, similarly to be used as a draught and an enema.[4] As a simpler method, the patient was to sit on his haunches and let cold water flow on his head;[5] or the physician was to lay his head lower than his feet, and knead or stroke the back gently, repeating the formula: 'It shall be good.'[6] If the patient have colic and his stomach will not retain its food, and there is flatulence, the prescription is to bray up together ½ *ḳa* of date-juice, ½ *ḳa* of cassia juice with oil and wine, three shekels of purified oil, two shekels of honey, and ten shekels of the *ammi*-plant. The patient is to drink this before the rising of the *Enzu*-star in the morning, without eating; and then this is to be followed by a draught and an enema of ½ *ḳa* of *ŠI-ḲA*, with which he is also to be sprinkled.[7] If there are internal pains—the Assyrian being in this case, 'When a man's inside eats him'—he is to be given *ḫaltappanu*-plant and salt pounded up and dissolved in water or fermented drink, or simply *ḫaltappanu*, or *tiyâtu*, or *ŠI-ŠI*. in fermented drink.[8] When the patient's internal organs burn and he is constipated, let him drink a medicine of garlic and cummin,[9] or the pounded rind of green *il* (a plant) mixed with swine-fat.[10] Remedies are prescribed when 'garlic, leeks, beef, pork, and beer are unretained by a man,' and 'in his belching the gall is withheld (?).'[11] For what the Assyrian doctor describes as 'the food being returned to the mouth' the head and breast were to be bound and certain drugs eaten in honey, mutton fat, or butter, while the patient was to be kept off certain food for three days, and was not allowed to wash.[12] For liver complaints, garlic was prescribed,[13] or cassia drunk in beer, or large draughts of beer or 'wine-water.[14] In the case of jaundice, of which the symptoms are given fully, the physicians were not so hopeful of recovery; but some prescriptions seem to have been potent:

'When a man's body is yellow, his face is yellow and black, the root of his tongue black, *aḫḫazu* ('seizer') is its name; thou must bake great wild *mušdimgurinna*, he shall drink it in fermented drink. Then will the *aḫḫazu* which is in him be silent.'[15]

In constipation, the patient drank a mixture of green garlic and *kukru*-rind in fermented drink, followed by dates in swine-fat or oil; or another prescription is cypress-cones pounded up and mixed with fermented drink. If, in addition to constipation, 'his inside is much inflamed,' the prescription is a decoction of *ḫaltappanu*-plant, sweet reed, *ballukku*-plant, and cypress administered as an enema. An enema is also prescribed when a man is constipated after heavy eating and drinking, and his inside is 'angry.'[16] In the case of drunkenness, the following remedy is given for the morning after:

'When a man has drunk fermented drink and his head aches and he forgets his speech, and in speaking is incoherent, and his understanding is lost, and his eyes are fixed, bray (eleven plants) together and let him drink them in oil and fermented drink before the approach of Gula in the morning before dawn, before any one kisses him.'[1]

Venereal diseases are prescribed for in various tablets;[2] the colour of the urine was also observed in diagnosis.[3]

It is curious to see how persistently the old beliefs survive among the Arabs of Mesopotamia of to-day. Toothache is still attributed to a worm, and the writer heard this story on good Mosul authority, that a man with toothache had only to fumigate his aching teeth with the smoke from dried *withanifera* (*solanaceæ*), and the worm would drop out of his mouth. This is a belief not confined to the Arabs, occurring, as it does, among other peoples,[4] and it certainly dates back to several centuries B.C., for we find a Babylonian tablet describing the genesis of this tooth-worm:

'After Anu [had created the heavens],
The heavens created [the earth],
The earth created the rivers,
The rivers created the canals,
The canals created the marshes,
The marshes created the Worm.
The Worm came and wept before the Sun-god,
Before Ea came her plaint:
"What wilt thou give me to eat,
What wilt thou give me to gnaw?"
"I will give thee ripe figs,
And sweet-scented . . . -wood."
"What are your ripe figs to me,
Or your sweet-scented . . . -wood?
Let me drink amid the teeth,
And let me rest amid the gums (?),
Of the teeth will I suck the blood,
And destroy the strength (?) of their gums (?);
So shall I hold the bolt of the door."
"Since thou hast said this, O worm!
May Ea smite thee with the might of his fist."'

The incantation prescribed for the toothache is:

'Thou shalt do this: Mix beer, *sakilbir*-plant, and oil together. Repeat the incantation three times thereon, and put in on the tooth.'[5]

Just in the same way as the tooth has a semi-medical, semi-magical incantation prescribed for it, so do we find similar texts for the heart and eyes. For some form of 'heart' medicine the following incantation is given:

'The heart-plant sprang up in Makan, and the Moon-god [rooted it out and]
[Planted it in the mountains]; the Sun-god brought it down from the mountains, [and]
[Planted it in] the earth; its root filleth the earth, its horns stretch out to heaven.
[It seized on the heart of the Sun-god when] he . . .; it seized on the heart of the Moon-god in the clouds,
It seized on the heart of the ox in the stall,
[It seized on the heart of the goat] in the fold,
It seized on the heart of the ass in the stable,
[It seized on the heart of the] dog in the kennel,
It seized on the heart of the pig in the sty,
[It seized on the heart of the] man in his pleasure,
It seized on the heart of the maid in her sleeping-chamber,
[It seized on the heart of N.], son of N. . . .'[6]

Magan or Makan is supposed to be the Sinaitic Peninsula, and it is there that the *Hyoscyamus muticus* grows. The Arabs call it the *sakrān* ('drunken'), from its intoxicating effect; it has long spikes very much like the fox-glove, only purple in colour, which may be compared with the 'horns' mentioned in the incantation. It seems quite possible that the Assyrians may have had a knowledge of its existence and properties; at any rate, the name 'heart-plant,' coupled with its provenance, Sinai, another description given of it, is suggestive.

In certain cases of ophthalmia, the prescription is carefully led up to by a description of the cause of the blindness:

'The eye of the man is sick, the eye of the woman is sick. The eye of man or woman is sick—who can heal (him)? Thou shalt send them to bring pure *KU-SA* of the date-palm; chew (*te-ḫi-pi*) it in thy mouth, twist (*te-pi-til*) it in thy hand: thou shalt bind it on the temples of the man or woman, and the man or woman shall recover . . .'

1 Küchler, *Beitr. zur Kenntnis der assyr.-bab. Medizin*, p. I, ll. 2–3.
2 *Ib.* p. 39, l. 44.
3 *Ib.* p. 5, l. 31.
4 *Ib.* l. 32.
5 *Ib.* p. 3, l. 13.
6 *Ib.* ll. 14–16. There are some other points in this prescription not yet intelligible.
7 *Ib.* l. 26 ff.
8 *Ib.* p. 5, l. 1 ff.
9 *Ib.* p. 23, ll. 17–18.
10 *Ib.* l. 19.
11 *Ib.* p. 43, ll. 1–2.
12 *Ib.* p. 25, ll. 36–38.
13 *Ib.* p. 43, l. 14.
14 *Ib.* p. 53, l. 70; 55, l. 71.
15 *Ib.* p. 61, ll. 26–27.
16 *Ib.* p. 7, ll. 10–11, 15–16, 17–20.

1 Küchler, *loc. cit.* p. 33, l. 51 ff.
2 *e.g.* Rm. ii. 312; cf. Rm. ii. 315.
3 S. 516.
4 Cf. Skeat, *Malay Magic*, p. 359.
5 See the writer's copy in *Cun. Texts from Bab. Tablets*, 1903, pt. xvii. pl. 50 (Thompson, *Devils*, ii. 160).
6 Küchler, *loc. cit.* p. 9.

'The wind blew in heaven and brought blindness (*simme*) to the eye of the man: from the distant heavens it blew and brought blindness to the eye of the man; unto sick eyes it brought blindness. The eye of this man troubleth; his eye is hurt(?) (*a-ša-a*); this man weepeth for himself grievously. Nâru hath seen the sickness of this man, and (hath said), "Take pounded cassia, perform the Incantation of the Deep, and bind up the eye of the sick man." When Nâru toucheth the eye of the man with her purê hand, may the wind which hath afflicted the eye of the man go forth from his eyes!'[1]

Similarly, the sting of a scorpion is treated with an incantation against the poisonous creature, to be recited while anointing the hurt:

'Her horns stretch out like those of a wild bull,[2]
Her tail curls like that of a mighty lion,
Bêl hath made a house—when he maketh fast the enclosure,
When he breaketh the wall of lapis-lazuli,
May the little finger of Bêl carry it off,
May it carry off the water . . . (*i.e.* collected by the inflammation)!'[3]

It is a little uncertain what the text actually means, but it seems as if the patient puts the scorpion in the model of a house, which Bêl is supposed to have made, and, after fastening the door, he takes it out with his little finger by a hole in the wall.

Another prescription for scorpion-sting is to mix in oil of cedar various substances that have been brayed up, and anoint the wound.[4] For snake-bite the wounded man was to peel willow root and eat it, or drink a potion of *ŠI-ŠI* plant in fermented liquor.[5]

The 'Baghdad boil,' or 'Mosul button,' was apparently as troublesome in ancient times as it is to-day. A tablet exists in the British Museum, giving the omens for what follows from the 'button' appearing on certain parts of the body.[6] A case of the boil appears to be referred to in an astrological report to the king of Assyria:

'Concerning this evil of the skin, the King, my lord, hath not spoken from his heart. The sickness lasts a year: people that are sick all recover.'[7]

The boil is popularly supposed to last for a year.

Prescriptions are found for diseases of all parts of the body: the tongue and lips[8] (K. 9438), the nails and fingers (K. 10464), the hands and feet (K. 9156), or the neck (K. 3687); 'if a man's ears "sing"' (*išagguma*) (K. 9059); 'if a man's breast and *MAŠ-ḲAPl* hurt him' (K. 10726); 'when a man has palpitation (?*ṣiriḫti*) of the heart and his heart . . . [holds] fire(?)' (K. 8760). If a man's left side hurts him (*usammamšu*), then 'water and oil, heaven and earth—Incantation, repeat seven times and rub (*tumašša'*, Arab. تمسح) his left side, and repeat the following incantation over his side and he will recover' (K. 8449). Two tablets (KK. 2413 and 11647) give rites and ceremonies for a woman during pregnancy. (On stones used for conception, see Oefele, *ZA* xiv. 356, and compare the Hebrew 'stones of preservation' against miscarriage called אבן תקומה.) There is a long series called by its first line, 'When a man's brain holds fire,' in which the various symptoms are carefully described, such as neuralgia of the temples, blood-shot and weeping eyes, etc. (see the present writer's tr. in *AJSL*, Oct. 1907). The following are specimens (Tablet ii. K. 2611, col. ii. l. 8 ff.; *Cun. Texts from Bab. Tablets*, 1906, vol. xxiii. p. 43): 'When a man's right temple hurts him and his right eye is swollen and weeps tears, it is the hand of a ghost or the hatred of a goddess against (or for) his life; mix *siḫu*-(tree), *arganu*-(tree), *bariratu*-(tree), one shekel of "river-foam," *dilbat*-plant, ginger(?) in ground meal, steep it in beer (and) bind on as a poultice.' Similarly, when the left temple and eye are afflicted (col. iii. l. 1), the physician must bray together dates from Dilmun, thyme, and cedar-sap in oil of *gir*, and apply them before the patient breaks his fast. If the patient, in addition to the neuralgia, vomits, and his eyes are inflamed, it is the 'hand of a ghost,' and the remedy is to calcine human bones and bray them, and then rub them on the place with oil of cedar (l. 5).

These instances might be multiplied, even from the texts which are already published; but there are many tablets on this subject in the British Museum which still remain to be copied. When this is done, it will be possible to speak with less uncertainty about the methods employed by the Assyrian physicians.

Hitherto nothing has been found in the cuneiform texts to confirm the statement of Herodotus (i. 197) that the Babylonians were wont to bring sick folk into the market-place for the advice of any that might suggest a remedy. Both the magical and the medical series go far to show that the profession of medicine was well organized and systematic, although it may well have been that the poorer folk did what Herodotus relates; but, again, if any comparison can be made between ancient and modern Semites in this respect, the deformed, maim, halt, and blind were probably to be found in the *sûḳ* of every town begging alms of every passer-by, and this perhaps is what Herodotus saw. The profession of the doctor carried with it grave responsibilities, even as far back as the time of Ḫammurabi. One has only to read the list of fines to which a surgeon was liable if he accidentally inflicted unnecessary damage on a patient in treating him.

The more human side of the healing art is shown in the cuneiform correspondence. Several letters from the physician Arad-Nanâ relating to his patients are extant, dating from the 7th cent. B.C., and, inasmuch as he is writing to the king in every case, we may presume that he is the Court physician whom the king has in these instances allowed to visit certain of his staff. That this may well be so is shown by an astrological letter (No. 18 of the writer's *Reports of the Magicians and Astrologers*), which, in addition to giving the formal report, adds, 'Bêl-epuš, the Babylonian magician, is very ill; let the King command that a physician come and see him.' The following specimens will throw some light on the professional skill of Arad-Nanâ (we append Johnston's translations, *JAOS* xviii. 162 ff., which are the best that can at present be made of a most difficult subject):

'To the King, my lord, thy servant, Arad-Nanâ. A hearty greeting to the King, my lord! May Adar and Gula grant health of mind and body to the King, my lord! All goes well in regard to that poor fellow whose eyes are diseased. I had applied a dressing covering his face. Yesterday, towards evening, undoing the bandage which held it (in place), I removed the dressing. There was pus upon the dressing about the size of the tip of the little finger. If any of thy gods has put his hand to the matter, that (god) must surely have given express commands. All is well. Let the heart of my lord the king be of good cheer! Within seven or eight days he will be well' (S. 1064; see Harper, *Assyr. and Bab. Letters*, Lond. 1909, no. 392).

Similarly in K. 519: 'With regard to the patient who has a bleeding from his nose, the Rab-*MUGI* reports: "Yesterday, towards evening, there was much hæmorrhage." These dressings are not scientifically applied. They are placed upon the alæ of the nose, oppress the nose, and come off when there is hæmorrhage. Let them be placed within the nostrils, and then the air will be kept away, and the hæmorrhage restrained. If it is agreeable to my lord, the King, I will go to-morrow and give instructions; (in the meantime) let me hear how he does' (Harper, no. 108).

As an example of death from a wound, an incident related in a late Bab. letter (*c.* 400[?] B.C.) is worth quoting, although the translation of some of the words is not certain.

'. . . In a brawl(?) I heard that [So-and-so, whom] the noble(?) smote, when he was smitten fell sick of a suppuration(?). He did not understand it, (and) it enlarged and spread, so that he died therefrom.'[1]

It is clear, therefore, from the texts which we possess, that Assyrian medicine was worthy of being held in high repute, and, although its trend towards magic detracts much from its science, it was probably a worthy forerunner of the methods in vogue during the Middle Ages.

LITERATURE.—F. Lenormant, *La Magie chez les Chaldéens*, Paris, 1874 (Eng. tr. *Chaldean Magic*, 1878); A. H. Sayce, *Hibbert Lectures*, London, 1887, *Religions of Ancient Egypt*

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[1] *WAI* iv. 29*, 4, C. ii .6 ff.
[2] The translation of the first line preceding this is uncertain. The last line, which has been omitted here, runs (according to the copy in Bezold's *Catalogue of the Kouyunjik Collection*), 'May he smite a great fist upon the man(?)!'
[3] Rm. ii. 149. [4] K. 7845. [5] S. 1357.
[6] Virolleaud, *Babyloniaca*, Paris, 1906, i. 91.
[7] See the writer's *Reports of the Magicians and Astrologers*, Lond. 1900, no. 257.
[8] Something equivalent to unilateral paralysis appears to be mentioned on the tablet Rm. ii. 143: 'When a man's lip *kuppul* to the right and he [cannot] speak.' *Kuppul* is perhaps to be referred to the Hebrew root כפל, 'to double.'

[1] See the present writer's *Late Babylonian Letters*, Lond. 1906, no. 114.

and Babylonia, Edinburgh, 1902; L. W. King, *Babylonian Magic and Sorcery*, London, 1896; H. Zimmern, *Beiträge zur Kenntnis der bab. Religion*, Leipzig, 1896–1901; C. Fossey, *La Magie assyr.*, Paris, 1902; Oefele, 'Materialen zur Bearbeitung bab. Medizin,' 1902, etc. (*Vorderasiatische Gesellschaft*, vi. etc.); F. Küchler, *Beiträge zur Kenntnis der assyr.-bab. Medizin*, Leipzig, 1904; M. Jastrow, *Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, Boston, 1898 (*Die Religion Babyloniens und Assyriens*, 1902 ff.); R. C. Thompson, *The Devils and Evil Spirits of Babylonia*, London, 1903–4, *Semitic Magic*, London, 1908.

R. CAMPBELL THOMPSON.

DISEASE AND MEDICINE (Celtic).—The classic authority is the statement of Cæsar in his *Gallic War*. The terror of disease, and the art and science of healing, came within the sphere of religion among the Celts. The nation was religious: 'Natio est omnis Gallorum admodum dedita religionibus.' All matters connected with religion were submitted to the judgment of the Druids. They were the 'medicine-men' as well as the teachers and the priests of the Celts: 'atque ob eam causam, qui sunt affecti gravioribus morbis . . . aut pro victimis homines immolant, aut se immolaturos vovent, administrisque ad ea sacrificia Druidibus utuntur.' The principle of life for life was recognized (cf. art. BLOOD-FEUD [Celtic], vol. ii. p. 725): 'quod, pro vita hominis nisi hominis vita reddatur, non posse aliter Deorum immortalium numen placari arbitrantur' (*de Bell. Gall.* vi. 16).

1. Gods of medicine.—The God of healing is identified by Cæsar with Apollo, who held the place of honour next to Mercury: 'post hunc, Apollinem et Martem et Jovem et Minervam. De his eandem fere, quam reliquae gentes, habent opinionem: Apollinem morbos depellere . . .' (*ib.* vi. 17). The Druidic doctrine of immortality emphasized the value of life and health, and gave Apollo at this period a higher position than Mars.

'regit idem spiritus artus
Orbe alio; longae (canitis si cognita) vitae
Mors media est' (Lucan. *Phars.* i. 456 ff.).

Several Celtic deities of healing have been identified with Apollo. One appears as a presiding deity of healing springs and health resorts. The name occurs sometimes on inscriptions as *Borvo*: 'Deo Apollini Borvoni et Damonae' (at Bourbonne-les-Bains in the Haute-Marne). Other forms are *Bormo*, in Central France, *Bormanus* in Provence, *Bormanicus* in Spain. This deity is associated sometimes with *Damona*, as at Bourbonne-les-Bains and Bourbon-Lancy in Saône-et-Loire; sometimes with *Bormana*, as at Aix-en-Diois in the Drôme. The word is akin to the Welsh *berwi*, 'boil,' and has reference to the hot springs (Rhys, *Celtic Heathendom*, p. 25 f.; Anwyl, *Celtic Religion*, p. 40).

Another deity was *Grannos*. In an inscription at Horberg in the Haut-Rhin, he is called 'Apollo Grannos Mogounos.' The name Grannos has been connected with the Skr. word *ghar*, 'glow,' 'burn,' 'shine.' It is considered equivalent to the 'Posphorus' of the Dacian inscription: 'Deus Bonus Puer Posphorus Apollo Pythius.' Apollo, the dispenser of light and warmth, was regarded as the repeller of disease. The name is associated with several hot springs. The old name of Aix-la-Chapelle, or Aachen, was *Aquæ Granni*. Inscriptions to him have been found at Graux in the Vosges and at Granheim near Mengen in Württemberg. The stream which receives the hot waters of Plombières in the Vosges is called *Eaux Graunnes*. Grannos was identified with Asklepios and Serapis by Caracalla (Dio Cassius, lxxvii. 15). The other name Mogounos in the Horberg inscription appears in the old name of Mainz, *Moguntiacum*. The word Mogounos points to the *bonus puer* of the Dacian inscription (Rhys, *op. cit.* p. 22).

The name *Maponos* occurs in inscriptions in the north of England. The Armthwaite inscription reads: 'Deo Maponi' (*Mon. Hist. Brit. Inscr.* 121). It is the old Welsh *mapon*, now *mabon*, 'boy' or 'male child.' The name is therefore identical in meaning with the *bonus puer* of the Dacian inscription from Carlsburg in Transylvania. The witness to the Celtic god of healing stretches across Europe along the line of the Celtic advance (Rhys, p. 21). The memory of Grannos is still preserved in the Auvergne at the Festival of the Brands on the first Sunday in Lent. Fires are lighted in every village. The ceremony of the Grannasmias takes place after a dance round the fire. A torch of straw called *granno-mio* is lighted at the fire, and carried round the orchards. The old Gaulish deity, in his aspect as the sun-god, is invoked with song:

'Granno, mo mio!
Granno, mon pouère!
Granno, mo mouère!'

('Granno, my friend . . . my father . . . my mother!'). It is considered by Pommerol to be a survival of solar worship, and the rite illustrates Rhys's derivation of the name (*Antiquary*, xxxviii. [1902] 80).

An altar found near Annecy is dedicated to a deity *Virotutes* or *Virotus*: 'Apollini Virotuti.' Rhys tentatively suggests that the word may be compounded of a Gaulish equivalent for *vir* and *tutor*, and may mean 'man-healing' or 'man-protecting' (*op. cit.* p. 21).

A bas-relief at Munich represents Apollo Grannos associated with *Sirona*. Sirona is connected with the Irish *sir*, 'long.' The two deities represent the ever young sun-god and the old goddess, and may be compared with Apollo and his mother Leto in Greek mythology. The hero Mabon mab Modron of the story of Kulhwch and Olwen is probably the same deity, Maponos. Mabon and Modron are suspected of being the exact equivalents of Grannos and Sirona (Rhys, p. 29). An inscription from Wiesbaden reads: 'Apollini Toutiorigi.' The name Toutiorix means 'king of the people,' and expresses the same thought as the title ἀρχηγέτης given to Apollo as 'leader,' in Greek mythology. The name appears transmuted and transformed in Theodoric, and the mythical legends associated with Dietrich of Bern belong more to Toutiorix than to the historical Theodoric the Ostrogoth (Rhys, p. 30).

The *Brigit triad* in Irish mythology holds a place of honour among the Celtic gods of medicine. The Irish god, the Dagda, had three daughters—Brigit, the poetess and seer, worshipped by the poets of ancient Erinn; Brigit, the patroness of healing; and Brigit, the patroness of smiths. This points to a Goidelic goddess, Brigit, who corresponded to the Minerva of whom Cæsar says, 'Minervam operum atque artificiorum initia tradere' (*op. cit.* vi. 17). She has also been identified with the *Brigantia* of the inscriptions, from whom the Brigantes took their name (Rhys, p. 74). Brigit has also the attributes of the ancient goddess of fire (Whitley Stokes, *Mart. of Oengus*, p. 1). The hymns in honour of St. Brigid and the legends attaching to her name suggest that she has stepped into the place occupied by the Brigit of Irish mythology. In the hymn *Brigit be bithmaith*, she is addressed as 'flame golden, sparkling' (line 2), and asked to guard against disease: 'May she win for us battles over every disease!' (Irish *Liber Hymnorum*, H. Bradshaw Soc., 1897, ii. 39). In the story of the visit of the three disciples of Brigid to Blasantia (Piacenza), they are preserved from the effects of a drink of poisoned ale by reciting this hymn (*ib.* ii. 37). The story illustrates not only the healing craft of Brigid, but the memory of her ancient fame among the Celts of Italy. It is perhaps due to the same tradition of

Celtic heathenism that as late as the middle of the 18th cent. human blood was considered in Italy to be a cure for apoplexy (*Antiquary*, xxxviii. 205).

The 'cauldron of renovation' is represented as a talisman of healing in the Welsh story of Branwen, the daughter of Llyr: 'The Irish kindled a fire under the cauldron of renovation, and they cast the dead bodies into the cauldron until it was full, and the next day they came forth fighting-men as good as before, except that they were not able to speak' (*Mabinogion*, ed. A. Nutt, p. 39). This cauldron of regeneration had been brought up out of a lake in Ireland and given to Bran, son of Llyr (*ib.* p. 31). It is equivalent to the cauldron of the Dagda in Irish legend, one of the treasures of the Tuatha Dé Danann. It was called the 'undry' cauldron, for it was never empty (Rhys, p. 256 f.). It was brought from the mythical Murias, some place beneath the sea. The fire beneath the cauldron was fed by nine maidens (*ib.* p. 373). In the Taliessin verses of the *Mabinogion* it is represented as the cauldron of sciences, from which Gwion received three drops. It is with this cauldron that Caridwen was associated (*Mabinog.* pp. 295, 307). In the early tales underlying the Quest of the Holy Grail the healing qualities of the Grail or Cauldron rather than its gift of fertility may have been emphasized (A. Nutt, *Studies in the Legend of the Holy Grail*, London, 1888, p. 57).

2. **Diseases and their cure.**—Among the diseases which have left a lasting impression on Celtic tradition is the *buidechar*, 'yellow plague.' It is probable that it was the occasion of the composition of the *Lorica* of Gildas:

'ut non secum trahat me mortalitas
hujus anni neque mundi vanitas.'

The first outbreak of this disease was in 547 (Irish *Lib. Hymn.* i. 206, ii. 243). Ireland was especially subject to it in the 7th century. The hymn *Sen Dé* of Colman was written against it. 'Colman mac Ui Cluasaig, a scholar from Cork, made this hymn to save himself from the Yellow Plague' (*ib.* ii. 12). Gillies (*Gaelic Names of Diseases*, pp. 10, 23) states that he is unable to identify it. It could scarcely be yellow fever: 'probably it was typhoid, or perhaps typhus under its known aspect of bilious fever.'

Much of the folk-lore of disease may be traced back to the magic and medicine of Celtic heathendom. The healing powers of the *ash-tree*, whether the true ash or the mountain ash, are to be attributed to its association with ancient Celtic and Norse deities. In a Leicestershire wart-charm it is addressed:

'Ashen-tree, Ashen-tree,
Pray buy these warts of me.'

The 'shrew-ash' in Richmond Park recalls an old cure for lameness and cramp in cattle by boring a hole and enclosing a live shrew-mouse in the tree. In this there is an echo of the ancient magic of exchange or transference of disease. In the case of the wart-charm, a pin is stuck in the tree, then in the wart, finally in the tree again (*Antiquary*, xlii. [1906] 423). A curious example of the practice of exchange of disease occurs in the *Martyrology of Oengus*:

'Fursa once happened to visit Maignenn of Kilmainham, and they make their union and exchange their troubles in token of their union, to wit, the headache or piles from which Fursa suffered to be on Maignenn, and the reptile that was in Maignean to enter Fursa' (*Mart. Oeng.*, ed. Whitley Stokes, p. 45).

The first of August was dedicated to Lug, the Sun-hero. This festival, known in Wales as *Gwyl Awst*, was transferred in Brecknockshire to the first Sunday in August. Early in the morning a visit was paid to the Little Van Lake in the Beacons, to greet the expected appearance of the Lady of the Lake. She has been regarded as a goddess of the dawn, who returned at times to converse with her children. The eldest of them was named Rhiwallon, and had been instructed by her in the virtues of herbs. He was the founder of a family of physicians in South Wales. The physicians of Myddvai, as they were called, were attached to the house of Dynevor. Their ancestor was of mythical descent, and may be identified in the *Triads* with Rhiwallon of the broom (yellow) hair. He was thus invested with a solar character (Rhys, p. 423).

Folk-medicine consists partly in charms, partly in superstition, partly in a real knowledge of herbs. It rests ultimately on the religious ideas of Celtic heathenism. Witchcraft and medicine were different aspects of Celtic priestcraft in its better sense. The priests, if they were the sorcerers and wizards of their people, were their healers also.

Among the plants and herbs associated with Celtic medicine, the *mistletoe* takes the first rank. It was the sacred bough of the Druids, the gift of the Divine oak-tree, the gift of the Celtic Zeus himself. The Celtic Zeus was 'the Blazer of the mountain-top,' and the great stone-circles mark the sites sacred to him. A story of the Irish hero Diarmaid makes mention of the tree, the well, the pillar-stone, and the stone-circle consecrated to the Celtic Zeus.

'He saw, right before him, a great tree laden with fruit. . . . It was surrounded at a little distance by a circle of pillar-stones; and one stone, taller than the others, stood in the centre near the tree. Beside this pillar-stone was a spring-well, with a large round pool as clear as crystal' (Rhys, p. 188).

These sanctuaries in ancient days were places of healing, as well as places of worship. In the *Tripartite Life* of St. Patrick the idol of Cenn Cruaich, covered with gold and silver, was surrounded by a circle of twelve other idols, covered with brass. Even in the 7th cent. these had nearly disappeared. They represent the primitive pagan sanctuary of the Goidels. The name *Cenn Cruaich*, 'Head *or* Chief of the Mound,' when transmuted from Goidelic to Brythonic, re-appears in the old place-name *Pennocrucium* on the Watling Street. The site is at Stretton, not far from its modern representative Penkridge in Staffordshire (Rhys, p. 203; *North Staff. Field Club Transactions*, vol. xlii. pp. 116–118).

The mistletoe, the gift of the Celtic Zeus, was the all-healer (*olliach*: 'omnia sanans' [Pliny, *HN* xvi. 95]). It was cut at a New Year Festival with peculiar ceremony—a priest in white, a golden sickle, two white oxen. 'The oxen were sacrificed, the sacrificial meal followed. The mistletoe had great life-giving powers. It healed unfruitfulness in man and beast, and was a protection against poison' (Grupp, *Kultur der alt. Kelten u. Germanen*, p. 149).

Another plant mentioned by Pliny is the *Selago*, which has been identified with the Savin-tree, a species of juniper, and with the club-moss. It had to be plucked stealthily. Bread and wine were offered, and the priest with bare feet and white robe drew near, and, putting his right hand through the left fold of his tunic, gathered it without using a knife. Like the mistletoe, it was then placed on a white cloth. For healing purposes the plant was burnt, and the fumes were regarded as beneficial for the eye (Grupp, *op. cit.* p. 150).

A similar ceremony was followed at the gathering of the *samolus*, whether the brook-weed (*Samolus valerandi*) or the watercress. It was gathered fasting, with the left hand, and with averted face. The *centaury* was also used as a cure (Grupp, p. 151). The *St. John's wort* and other plants were burnt or hung over the door to keep off disease. The St. John's wort (*Hypericum perfoliatum*) is known as *chasse-diable*.

Inscriptions and folk-lore have preserved the traditions of the gods of healing and the healing craft among the Celts.

The deities honoured in different localities would have their own peculiar rites, their own special gifts. Juvavius was a deity who gave his name to Salzburg. Alaunus also occurs in certain place-names. Some of the goddesses had healing power. Stanna was the companion of Apollo Stannus. Minerva Belisama and Sulevia were associated with Apollo Belenus. Alauna was the consort of Alaunus (Grupp, pp. 159–162). There is still much to do in grouping together the facts preserved in the folk-lore of herbs and healing, with a view to learning more of the ancient cult of the local gods of medicine.

The folk-lore of Ireland is rich in its memories of old-time medicine. Dianceeht, a member of the Tuatha Dé Danann, may almost be regarded as the Irish god of medicine (cf. CELTS, iii. 285[a]). A magic cauldron of renovation was ascribed to him. The methods of the Irish witch-doctors still form part of the home medicine in country districts to-day. *Snails* pounded in salt were prescribed as a dressing in an Irish MS of 1450. They were still used for that purpose in Staffordshire at the close of the 19th century. *Urine* was in common use for eye-disease and jaundice; *dung* was prescribed by Wesley in his *Primitive Physic*. In Ireland, as in England, these remedies were administered, to the recitation of certain charms (Wood-Martin, *Elder Faiths*, London, 1902, ii. 160–205). The *rag-offerings* tied to trees and bushes in the immediate neighbourhood of holy wells are still met with in many parts of Ireland, especially in the west. They are thought by some to have a reference to the transference of disease to the tree-spirit (*ib.* ii. 84). *Saliva* was also in use as a salve. A part of the cure of epilepsy in 1450 was the *burying of a young cock alive* (*ib.* 188).

A more normal system of healing is traceable in the Irish *sweat-houses*, which were in use as a hot-air cure until the 19th century. These sweat-houses were generally of the beehive shape, covered with clay, with a low entrance. They were heated with turfs, like a brick-oven, and the patient was shut in for a given time. The bath was followed by a plunge in a pool or stream near by. This was the usual cure for rheumatism.

A custom clearly connected with medicine among the Irish was the *couvade*. On the birth of a child, the father was obliged to take to his bed and submit to a vicarious process of nursing at the hands of the doctor and nurse. The custom was widely spread throughout the world in primitive times, especially among races where kinship was reckoned through the mother. At the same time it is a custom which witnesses to the responsibility of fatherhood even under conditions which exalt the privilege of motherhood (Wood-Martin, *op. cit.* ii. 40). See art. BIRTH (Introduction), vol. ii. p. 635.

In the legendary history of the invasion of Ulster by the Fir Bolg, the adult males were *en couvade* and unable to defend the kingdom of Conchobar against the enemy. The defence was made in heroic manner by Cúchulainn and his father only. Rhys (p. 622) refers to this incident as the 'distress of the gods and the sun-hero's aid.' Cf. art. CÚCHULAINN CYCLE.

The Ultonian *couvade* lasted five nights and four days, in accordance with the use of the number 'nine' in the reckoning of time among the Celts. It was called *cess noinden Ulad*, 'the Ulster men's sickness *or* indisposition of a week' (*ib.* p. 363). There is a significant correspondence between the Ultonian *couvade* and the Phrygian idea of the hibernating of the gods. Rhys would place the origin of Aryan myth within the Arctic circle. He sees in the labours of Cúchulainn the sun-hero a mythical witness to the period during which the sun in the ancient home of the Aryans remained above the horizon (*ib.* p. 633). Would not the *couvade*, or 'distress of the gods,' be a trace of the short period during which the sun remained wholly below the horizon, the period mythically preceding its re-birth and re-appearance in the heavens? The Ultonian *couvade* does not explain the origin of the custom, but only the application of a primitive usage to the explanation of the annual birth of the sun-god just within the Arctic circle.

LITERATURE.—J. Rhys, *Celtic Heathendom*[3], London, 1898; E. Anwyl, *Celtic Religion*, London, 1906; Charles Squire, *Mythology of Ancient Britain and Ireland*, London, 1906; Gillies, *Gaelic Names of Diseases*, Glasgow, 1898; G. Grupp, *Kultur der alten Kelten und Germanen*, Munich, 1905; P. Joyce, *Social Hist. of Ancient Ireland*, London, 1903, ch. xviii.

THOMAS BARNS.

DISEASE AND MEDICINE (Egyptian).

—1. From the diagnostics of the Egyptian papyri we can distinguish—even identify, in many cases—about 250 different kinds of diseases, and the Ebers Papyrus alone describes 170 varieties. Many of them are the common ills of all humanity, and we cannot even say that they were of more frequent occurrence in the Valley of the Nile than elsewhere: complaints of the stomach, the bowels, the bladder, the respiratory organs, the head, the sinuses of the face, inflammation of the teeth, headache, coryza, ordinary fever, varices, epilepsy, and nervous ailments. Other diseases seem, by comparison with modern Egypt, to have been specially prevalent,—asthma, angina pectoris, anæmia, hæmaturia,—but it cannot be decided whether the chief cause of this is the race or the country. Some are certainly connected with hygiene (or rather its absence), with feeding, and with habits. Skin diseases, smallpox (cf. Elliot Smith's investigations of the mummies in *Annales du service des antiquités de l'Egypte*, Paris, 1900 ff., and *Bulletin de l'institut égyptien*, Alexandria, 1862 ff., *passim*; and Maspero, *Momies royales*, Paris, 1886, p. 532), the infinite variety of parasitic diseases, *e.g.* 'Arabian elephantiasis' (=the 'crocodile disease' of the ancients), worms, and *pyorrhœa alveolaris* are the several consequences of these in varying degrees. In the same way, it was to the manners and customs that the Egyptian woman owed her long list of infirmities as described in the Egyptian treatises from the XIIth dynasty—flux, menstruation, metritis, dysmenorrhœa, erosions, pustules, prolapsus of the vulva, and cancerous tumours. It was, finally, the combined operations of Nature—water, winds, climate—and of the Egyptian's negligence that produced the terrible frequency of ulcers, Nile boils, carbuncles on the breast and legs, and especially the appalling array of eye-troubles, among which are seen all the varieties known at this day: styes, specks, ectropion, blepharitis, leucoma, lippitude, hydrophthalmia, staphyloma, conjunctivitis, purulent ophthalmia, and many more. Such lists as these do not prove the unhealthiness of a country, but rather show the degree to which the knowledge of classical Egypt had advanced in diagnostics and therapeutics; and the close resemblance between ancient and modern Egypt in this respect justifies the conclusion, in agreement with Herodotus (ii. 77) and against Pliny (xxvi. 1), that the Nile Valley was a very healthy country, where the length of life, in spite of the opinion of Chabas ('Prétendue longévité des Egyptiens,' in *Bibl. égyptol.* ii. [1905] 181), was probably in excess of that of the average man of the present day; where the general health was much better than in Greece or Italy, for example; and where, as a rule, the great scourges that so often laid waste the rest of the ancient world—endemic diseases such as malaria—were unknown.

A classification of man's ills so minute leads, even at first sight, to the postulation of ideas already far removed from 'primitive savagery.' This impression is confirmed by the fact that neither the mythology of classical Egypt nor its theologies attribute any special disease to any definite gods. We seem to see in the whole the mark of a considerable scientific and moral advance on the rest of contemporary society. If, however, the pure therapeutics of Egypt witnesses to a relative but very real perfection, on the other hand the Egyptian ideas on the causes and nature of disease exhibit conceptions, even in the historical period, much more akin than one would at first believe to those of 'non-civilized' peoples. At the same time we find that, owing to the special conditions under which Egyptian civilization was formed, this per-

sistent characteristic of the early ages has produced on the rôles of gods, kings, and priests in this connexion systematic views that are capable of finally reaching lofty and noble conceptions.

2. We read in Clement (*ap.* Orig. viii. 41) that, when any part of the body was sick, the demon to which that member belonged was invoked. In a somewhat imperfect form this explains the traditional view of the Egyptian on the nature of disease. It was always regarded as the work of demons, spirits, *jinn*, ghouls, vampires, or spirits of the dead (see DEMONS AND SPIRITS [Egyp.]). They insinuated themselves into the individual by the nostrils, mouth, or ears, and devoured the vital substance. The means by which they surprise man, their constant efforts to do so as they prowl around him unceasingly, and the manner in which they perform their destruction inside his body offer no special interest for the history of religion, though the numerous formal texts describing these peculiarities may interest the specialist in Egyptological science. Compared with other human civilizations the notions on this subject are essentially the same as we find in classical religions, such as the Chaldæo-Assyrian (cf., *e.g.*, *PSBA* xxviii. [1907] 81), or among modern savages all over the world.

The idea that the power of spirits—the causes of disease—increases peculiarly at certain hours of the day, and particularly at certain seasons of the year, is shown by the papyrus of lucky and unlucky days; and, if this idea is found equally among numerous non-civilized and semi-civilized races, and is the product, in Egypt as elsewhere, of experimental pseudo-observation, yet Egyptian astrology has greatly strengthened the initial data by explaining this periodical virulence by fixed rules, based on the influences of dates of the calendar (*q.v.*) and on mythological history. On such days 'numerous harmful germs permeate the clothing,' because the struggle neutralizes the power of the good gods, who are too busy to protect man, or because great evil influences are seen to be re-commencing in this world.

On 19th Tobi and 5th Pashns, the germs 'penetrate the clothing'; then 'infection steps in and causes death.' On 17th Tobi, the anniversary of great cataclysms, any sexual intercourse predisposes to being 'devoured by infection.'[1] Those born on 4th Paopbi are liable to death by 'marsh' fever. The 14th of Athyr is dangerous because it is the anniversary of the 'lesion' of the 'majesty of this god.' This last peculiarity is important to observe. Since disease was the result of the attack of a 'spirit' (or of a demon or the dead), it was of the same type for every one, and every one was exposed to it.

The veterinary papyri show that Egyptian thought conceived of animals' diseases as due to the same causes as those of men, and the same mixture of medical and magical practices was applied to both, just as the same collection of writings might contain both the art of curing men and that of curing beasts.

The question as to whether the dead suffer illness is difficult to settle. They certainly suffer hunger and thirst—which were regarded by the Egyptians as things existing *by themselves* and due to harmful spirits. They could die 'the second death,' which logically supposes the possibility of attacks of illness. Finally, the precautions taken that the dead may remain in good health (*udzai*) in the other world assume the contrary possibility of illness. We have, however, no decisive texts on this point. It is probably reasonable to hold that the Egyptian dead were believed to be exposed, in certain conditions, to the same dangers of spirit-attacks as the living.

What held true of animals and men also held of the rest of the world, and therefore of the gods; we know of a great number of cases where their constitution, which did not differ in qualities or in nature from that of other beings, suffered various ills, and had to submit to the intrusion of 'evil spirits.' Epigraphic texts and papyri have left us definite evidence. Every one knows how Rā had to die because a serpent bit his heel; Isis suffered from a mammary phlegmon after the birth of Shu and Tefnut; Horus was stung by a scorpion, had dysentery (London Papyrus), and an anal weakness (see Oefele, *Vorhippokratische Medizin*, 64). The sky-god himself saw his eyes, the Sun and Moon, affected by sudden diseases, attributed to the attacks of evil spirits, and this was one of the numerous ways in which eclipses were explained.

[1] On the dangers and harm resulting from connexion with women in the various religious, magical, etc., acts of Egyptian life, see art. MAGIC (Egyp.).

Even eliminating the cases of doubtful authenticity, the official religion recognized positively that the national gods were not exempt from disease. The medical literature of the temples preserves the deposit of prescriptions used in such and such a case of indisposition by ailing gods. A remedy of this kind had been composed 'by the invalid Rā' (Ebers Papyrus, xlvi.), and there were remedies to cure fever 'in gods and men.' There was nothing, essentially, to protect the highest beings from the ills common to all. But here, as elsewhere, their quality of godhead was derived from their superior ability to concentrate their energies (see DEMONS [Egyp.]), and to contrive defences which made them triumph in the struggle. They were able to find or compose prescriptions and formulæ which, in the special case of disease, brought them out of their trouble. The revelation of the secrets of their art or magic, granted only to those men who were their heirs or ministers, is the very foundation of Egyptian medicine. It unfolds at once its characteristics, its history, and, above all, the gradual formation of its knowledge.

The warfare against disease, taught by the gods (or stolen from them), proceeded of necessity and above all from magic (gaining support gradually from medicine properly so called), since it started originally with exorcism. It is accompanied, therefore, by spells and incantations, with all their accessaries, such as fumigation, aspersions, imperative gestures, etc. The knowledge of secret names at first played its usual part, and the doctor of ancient Egypt was a magician-priest, entering upon a struggle with an adversary—to discover the name of the demon causing the illness, to find by secret knowledge the name of a god who had helped in a fight against the same demon in a similar case, and to force the demon to flee. This he accomplished either by disguising himself as the conquering god and imitating his actions, or by summoning this god to his aid, or by employing the relics, talismans, and means of defence which the latter had invented. (These three methods probably constitute three successive phases in the original history of primitive Egyptian therapeutics.) As usual, 'alliteration,' or play on the sound of the words spoken, had its share in all this.

Take a case of the momentary loss of sight, *e.g.*, which was cured by adjuring the crocodile; not only did people think that the same remedy which had saved the eye of the heavens (=the sun), when the crocodile tried to devour it, would also save man, and therefore use the same formula; but at the same time they made a play of words on *shu*, 'blind,' and *shu*, the ostrich-feather held by the operator while making the disease return to the crocodile supposed to have sent it.

The belief that the forces and armies of good and evil beings were grouped, like the astral forces, in the four regions of the world produced the further practice of a fourfold pronouncement of the formulæ of spells and exorcisms preceding or accompanying the giving of the material medicine (*e.g.* Ebers Papyrus, ch. 108). Therapeutics was, therefore, at this stage an operation by which the gods were subjugated by the various processes of magic, 'contagious' or mimetic.

The fundamental nature of this original art of healing was a mark of the Egyptian's struggle against disease right down to his last days. In

spite of all the gradual attenuation of magic in favour of pharmaceutical and actually experimental science, therapeutics remained closely bound to Divine influences, both in its staff of officials and in the composition of its didactic treatises. The remedy proper never entirely supplanted the ritualistic and conjuratory part of the process.

The pharmacopœia proper also suffered this general influence. A great proportion of the substances owed their supposed virtues to the magical powers of the beings or things from which they sprang, or to their supposed mythological connexion with a certain god or spirit. The pharmacopœia of curative and harmful plants is related, in origin at least, and often to the very end, to the theory of 'spirits' causing and protecting from diseases; and the Egyptian ideas on this point are found faithfully represented in the list of thirty-six magical plants of Pamphilus (*de Simplicium medicin. facultatibus*). Finally, it is natural that the magical virtues of certain objects against disease have perpetuated, in Egypt as elsewhere and for the same reasons, the use of amulets (cf. CHARMS AND AMULETS [Egyp.]).

3. For the understanding of Egyptian ideas on disease and the methods of conjuring it, it is essential to study the formation of the books relating to it. The gods having known better than any other beings how to organize a defence, it was their ministers (or their possessors) who had the exclusive monopoly of magico-medical cures, revealed as these were by the gods or seized from their secret powers. The original fetish-doctors, then, had as their inevitable successors priest-doctors; and the growth of knowledge was, above all, a mechanical growth, by the union into collective classes, of the 'arts and mysteries' at first scattered over as many sanctuaries as there were originally independent gods. The primitive connexion between the spirits of gods and protection against disease was likewise the cause of the particular manner in which the books relating to diseases and their cure were composed, and of their double character, in the historic period, of traditional compositions and compilations pure and simple, innocent of all attempts to make a harmonious general whole on a rational plan. Further, there is nothing more opposed to an understanding of them and to the exegetical method than to maintain (like Erman, *e.g.* in his *Religion* [Fr. ed., 1907, p. 226]) that the attribution of such and such a chapter of prescriptions to a certain god or fabulous king is an artifice of the editor and indicates a late date. The observation of diseases and the supposed knowledge of the names or forces to be adjured or driven off were the fruit of experience and of magical prescriptions acquired from the very earliest days of Egypt by its pre-historic 'fetishists'; and the final tradition which in the Græco-Roman period attributed to Hermes Trismegistus (Clement, *Strom.* vi. 4) the composition of six books of medicine (on the forty-two hermetical books) reproduced exactly the belief of classic Egypt in its last stages, representing Thoth as the god who invented the formulæ necessary for giving remedies their power against diseases (cf. Pietschmann, *Hermes Trismegistos*, Leipzig, 1875, pp. 20–45 ff.).

The sacred library of the proto-historic Egyptian temple became the depository of the lists of diseases and their cures, and the evidence of historical times in this regard is fully in accord with the reality of the facts, when it speaks of the library that was at Heliopolis, 'the hall of rolls,' and the prescriptions found in the temple of Ptah at Memphis (cf. Wilkinson, *Manners and Customs*, 1878, ii. 355, 358), or when the inscriptions of the 'library' of the temple of Edfu mention the presence of books there 'for turning aside the cause of disease' (cf. Mallet, *Kasr el Agouz*, Cairo, 1909, p. 24).

The gradual formation of medical treatises properly so called came about in the same way as that of the various compositions forming the annals of the sacerdotal calendar in Egypt, its tales of feasts (see FESTIVALS [Egyp.]), its Books of the Dead, and its 'books' of the different sciences. The important sanctuaries gathered together small local collections, and later on made exchanges with each other of the collections thus obtained. They usually proceeded by simple juxtaposition. To the body of information relating to a certain disease generations gradually joined on the ancient prescriptions of different provincial 'wisdom,' and grouped around a book on eye-diseases, internal complaints, and ulcers all the cures and all the diagnostics—often contradicting each other—obtained by these combinations. The part of the body or the disease stated in the title of the work, having served as the basis for the work of compilation, did duty also as a 'rallying sign' for all works on any analogous subject, without distinction of date or origin. This is the explanation of the common sections that are found in papyrus after papyrus—parts common to the Leipzig Papyrus and those of London and Berlin, or to the latter and the Reisner Papyrus of California, and so on. Those common parts show the common origin of our papyri, and their character of compilations from much older writings. The manner in which the very scanty remains of the XIIth dynasty treatises were composed shows that these processes of compilation, so evident in the XIXth dynasty papyri, had been employed long before. And this fact, in conjunction with a study of grammar and language, leads us to conclude that the Egyptians were stating an absolutely historical truth when they attributed the additions of these great works on diseases to the Memphite kings or to the first legendary dynasties of the Thinites. As leading priest in his kingdom, the king was naturally versed in the magico-medical art of healing, and this was formally said of the most ancient kings; *ἰατρὸς γὰρ ἦν*, said Manetho (*apud* Africanus) of Athotis. Such an attribution to the Pharaohs of a charge to maintain the health of their subjects agreed in every point with their nature as sons of gods, and with their function, which was, above everything, to continue and maintain the work of the good gods, the founders of Egypt (*ἰατρικήν τε ἐξέσκησε καὶ βίβλους ἀνατομικοὺς συνέγραψε* [Manetho, *apud* Eusebius]).

Being logically devoted to everything that was very ancient and so brought him a little nearer to the Divine origin of all that is good on earth, the Egyptian made scarcely any change in the basis or the form of the knowledge thus obtained; he was always eager to show how the new recension of one of these 'ancient books of knowledge beneficial to man' was attached to the origins of national history. And, indeed, criticism has proved that the Theban manuscripts proceed directly from the proto-Theban, and the proto-Theban from still earlier types. The books that had grown too old materially were piously copied. In the actual body of texts relating to a certain disease, the work of generations consisted in inserting glosses, in slightly retouching, or in supporting the efficacy of a certain formula by extolling in the margin its proved excellence (Ebers Papyrus, lxix. 17, xxxv. 18; and Reisner Papyrus, *passim*), or by telling how it had once cured such and such a mighty personage, prince or king (Ebers Papyrus, lxiv. 4, lxvi. 15). The re-copying or re-modelling of several ancient versions in circulation led the scribe to note the variants in the texts used in composing the new edition, or to insert—rather unskilfully and such as they were—the scholia of his predecessors (cf. the excellent, and unfortunately still unique, work on the Ebers Papyrus considered from this point of view, by Schäfer, *Commentationes de Papyro Medicinali Leipsiensi*, Berlin, 1892). The most serious material changes, then, were not in the idea held of disease, or in the manner of defining or conjuring it, but in the increasing of the means combined for this last purpose. This happened very rarely by the invention of new remedies, but usually, and much more mechanically, by joining to the old writings new treatises from other localities, but equally ancient. These were dismembered, and their substance was joined on according to the diseases enumerated. A work, *e.g.*, devoted to 'abscesses on all the members' became the nucleus round which gathered

everything that could be found in the various temples of the nature of formulæ relating to abscesses. Thus it happened that there were sometimes a dozen methods of curing one disease, and sometimes contradictory methods—*e.g.* there occurred side by side, in the same compilation, an explanation of diseases based on an anatomy in which the human body possesses twelve great blood-vessels, and another founded on the assumption that it has forty. It was not, then, that the number of remedies actually increased in Egypt throughout the ages; there was rather the diffusion among a greater number of Egyptians of one and the same material which had formerly been embodied in a multitude of petty provincial theories. A general invocation at the end to the god of the place of compilation was enough, in the compiler's opinion, to guarantee a sort of unity to the work composed in this way.

The whole result was, as we may see, far from equal to a treatise of synthetic—not to mention philosophic—character on disease or diseases. It would nevertheless be inaccurate and unfair to see in such works (as does Pierret, *Dict. d'arch. égyp.*, Paris, 1875) nothing but a collection of pharmaceutical prescriptions.

4. Religious and traditional bases so solid and so closely bound up with national beliefs and institutions have necessarily supported a structure whose characteristic lines have remained almost intact throughout the whole existence of Egypt. The science of disease was marked, to the very end of Egyptian history, by its original characteristics: it was, above all, associated with the world of the gods, and with their ministers; it was traditional and formalistic.

Thus the rule not to use remedies that the masters have not taught is to be explained not so much by the will of the legislator, looking to the social interest, as by the belief in the connexion between the virtues of the remedies and the magic teaching of the gods; and the same explanation helps us to understand the non-responsibility of the doctor in a case of death, if he had observed the rules of canonical therapeutics (Diod. i. 82). The assertion that physicians were paid from the public treasury is simply a misunderstanding in the classics, but a misunderstanding which exactly agrees, leaving out of account inexact terms, with historical truth. Born originally in the 'fetish-hut,' the science of healing fixed its abode in the temple. The masters remained the ministers and interpreters of the gods, and the series of *mastabas*, hypogees, stelæ, and statues show that, from the Memphite Empire to the Ptolemys, the great doctors—those of Pharaoh, *e.g.*, the *Sunu oiru* (=chief physicians)—were at the same time high ecclesiastical dignitaries.

Just as the teaching remained religious, the art of healing in its three great branches (symptomology, therapeutics, and pharmacopœia) remained equally impregnated with animistic and magical concepts; thus the classical doctor continued to prepare his own medicines, like the sorcerer of primitive times, and it was held as a fact that in complicated drugs each element acted on a special part of the organism, or, rather, on the evil specially infecting that part; numerous ingredients were considered curative specially for reasons of sympathetic or contagional magic (chiefly animal substances, skin, oils, and the horrible 'coprotherapy'). And yet the universal reputation of Egyptian medicine, and the very real perfection of its equipment, diagnostics, metrology, and healing processes are, on the other hand, as certainly incontestable facts (see an excellent popular account in Erman, *Life in Anc. Egypt*, tr. Tirard, London, 1894). The distinction of a nation of superior endowment, like Egypt, is precisely the ability to substitute, gradually and without sudden breaks, the conception of the natural healing effect for the unexplained magical effect; and, as science and magic-religion both proceed, essentially, from experimentation, it happens in many cases that only the interpretation of the mechanism of the energies, and not the remedy itself, is evolved. Such as it is, with its original flaws, its lack of theoretical views, its crying errors, its childish complication, and its naive formalism, the Egyptian science of healing nevertheless constituted from the very beginning a system several thousand years in advance of the rest of human society. It retained this pre-eminence as long as Egypt existed. The testimony of Homer (*Il.* iv. 229), the admiration of the Persians (Herod. iii. 1 and 132), the fame and reputation of Egyptian medicine under the Saites and the Ptolemys, and the reputation in Rome of the Alexandrian school can only be mentioned at present. Such enduring fame is an explanation of the fact that the medicine of Greeks and Arabians, successors of the Copts, has given a great deal of the ancient Egyptian medicine to our school of Salerno, *e.g.*, or to any other of our ancient seats of medical knowledge in the Europe of the Middle Ages and down to the time of the Renaissance.

5. The development of Egyptian science succeeded in giving a more distant and lofty character to the priest-doctor's sources of information. But it never completely suppressed the primitive notion of *direct* Divine intervention in cases of illness. We find gods of healing in Egypt as everywhere else; and, similarly, the great scourges—plagues or other great epidemics, *iatu*—are recognized as sent by the gods.

Egypt, however, strikes an original note, in regard to this last point, in the very restricted part played by the idea that great calamities come from the gods, though this idea was known (it may have been less familiar, however, than in the classic East, on account of the proverbial healthiness of the climate). We find mention in Manetho (Müller, *FHG* ii. 539) of the plague which devastated the country in the reign of Semempses, and a connexion is assumed in the text between this scourge and the great sins committed by men. But such statements are very rare in the Egyptian texts. The point is worth noticing, in contrast with other organized religions, for the understanding of the conception formed by the Egyptian of the general rôle of his gods. In the case of individual sicknesses, on the other hand, historical Egypt is already too far removed from the 'non-civilized' stage to establish any connexion between such and such a bodily complaint and the violation of a *tabu*; we ought to notice, moreover, that the idea of disease sent as a punishment by the gods, who either cause it themselves directly or leave the sinner defenceless against the spirits of disease, is quite foreign to the Egyptians. Texts of later date, like the hermetical books, in which mention is made of those 'divine statues which send us disease or heal our pains *according to our deserts*' (Menard, *Hermes Trismegiste*, 1885, p. 146), seem to be somewhat imbued with Greek or Asiatic conceptions. Disease might, however,—at least in popular cults,—be the direct punishment for a *personal* offence against a deity, but this is of course quite different from the conception of an infraction of moral rule (see ETHICS [Egyp.]; and, for offences against the 'goddess of the Summit,' see Maspero, *RTr* ii. [1883] 118–123).

Several, if not all, of the gods who had composed the first means of battling with disease continued to grant or reveal directly to men the means of healing; and the majority of the sanctuaries, to which numerous worshippers journeyed, for their oracles (see DIVINATION [Egyp.]) or on annual pilgrimages, retained the privilege of miraculous cures. The temples of Isis at Coptos, of Min at Panopolis, and, in general, all those temples in which the medical books locate the marvellous discovery of writings in connexion with the teaching of remedies (Hermopolis, Lycopolis, etc.) were the places where the gods were themselves able to rout, with a single blow, the infirmities of the human body. We must add to this list a great number of smaller provincial sanctuaries, the local

gods of which, though very humble, had special powers (Assuân, Gurneh, etc.).

Survivals of these innumerable places of miraculous cures in ancient Egypt are seen in the topographical coincidences with various saints' graves of the Coptic Church—having the same privilege—and, after Muhammad, with all the tombs of Musalmān *shaikhs* which have succeeded to the veneration of ancient days for these places.

Towards the latter days of history, political events tended to group the most important of these centres of medicine round the capitals of Upper and Lower Egypt, and the infiltration of Persian and Hellenistic ideas added new elements to the rôle of the gods against disease.

6. The means used by the gods in such cases to instruct or heal patients are not well known in general. Several texts say that, under the influence of Greek ideas, the custom spread in Egypt of going to sleep inside the precincts of the temples of the gods of healing, or near the supposed tombs of those celebrated historical personages whom legend gradually confused with mythical kings and the gods of healing (see DIVINATION [Egyp.]). This is the case for Imhotep (cf. Psherenptah stela). Invalids were informed of their remedies oftenest in dreams, as is proved by a certain number of allusions in the epigraphical monuments, by the accounts in popular tales, and by the witness of Diod. i. 25. Direct cure, following upon a prayer, and without divinatory revelation, is not formally entertained except in Herod. ii. 65, according to whom sums of money equal in weight to a half or a third of the sick child's hair (?) were vowed to the gods in case of recovery, or a promise was made to buy a beast for the temple herds. The sudden inspiration of the doctor enlightened by Divine grace and working διὰ τῆς ἰδιὰς δεισιδαιμονίας is not a very Egyptian trait, and may be due to foreign influences (cf. Berthelot, *Alchimistes grecs*, 1890, p. 226). The essentially native form of miraculous cure by the intercession of the god appears to have been worked chiefly by the direct application of the healing fluid, either by the priest who carried the Divine relics, the *nibsau*, or, in important cases (demoniac possession, epilepsy, and the like), the god himself. The famous Stela of Bakhtan is a familiar example of this type of curing by exorcism worked by a Divine statue. The adjuration of the demon of disease, his overthrow, and his departure from the body of the princess, are merely an instance of a practice current in all the religions or 'semi-religions' in which there is a 'dispelling of demons.' It is more interesting to note the manner in which the statue of a god was supposed by the Egyptians to be capable of possessing the necessary power. The Egyptian text proves that this power was possible only to a 'secondary' statue of the god—one of those animated, for a special series of activities, by an 'energy-soul' of distinct name. It derived its chief power from the 'essential' statue of Khonsu, the statue which contained the magic soul of the god and made his will known by movements of its head (see DIVINATION [Egyp.]). This famous statue never left Thebes; it kept the best of the Divine substance there, and consented to detach and lend its healing forces only to such and such a one of its doubles, 'by bestowing upon it (by the nape of the neck) its protective fluid *at four intervals*' (which is a very valuable indication of the antiquity of the magical conception). Apparently, then, the power against disease did not belong to all the 'doubles' of a god. It was the privilege of the one image in which dwelt the 'true name,' and this assumes that power against demons was a part of the ultimate reserve of the personality of a being.

Finally—the primitiveness of the practice of exorcism by statues being a traditional survival—we may hold that, at the end of a long period of evolution, the views of the Egyptian upper classes on disease often came near to really lofty conceptions. Though, as everywhere, sorcery, the bastard child of primitive religion, preserved the rudeness of the 'dispelling of spirits' of primitive days, still the fight for healing, while maintaining its character of Divine teaching, became more and more natural and scientific. If, indeed, it attributed a large share to the supernatural intervention of the gods, it also gave an important place to Divine *inspiration*, guiding the man of science. Thoth-Hermes, in his various names and multiple capacities, inspires sacred medicine with a higher knowledge of human infirmities, without, however, assuming the absence of resources founded on therapeutics. The priest-doctor of the later ages of Egypt is a noble figure, resembling that of the magnificent portrait left by Cheremon (*FHG* iii. 497). And between the magic idol (or fetish) of the first healers of Egypt and the Thoth-Hermes of the end there is the same distance (and the same long way laboriously traversed) as between the anthropophagous Osiris of the Pyramid Texts and the Græco-Egyptian Osiris, who gives a seat at his table of honour in Paradise to the poor beggar 'who had not had his share of happy days on this earth.'

LITERATURE.—There is no monograph treating the subject synthetically. A great number of details and partial theories are found scattered throughout the bibliography of Egyptian medicine. Mention may be made, amongst the works and articles treating more specially the ideas discussed above, of: **H. Brugsch**, *Über die medicinische Kenntniss der alt. Ägypter*, Brunswick, 1853; **F. J. Chabas**, *Œuvres*, 1903, vol. ii, *Bibl. égyptol.* ii. 173, and *La Médecine des anciens Egyptiens*, Châlon-sur-Saône, 1861; **G. Maspero**, *Revue Critique*, 1893, ii. 69, *Histoire*, ii. (Paris, 1895) 214–220, 238, 281, *PSBA* xiii. 501–503, xiv. 312–314, *Études mythol. archéol.* iii. (1901) 289, 301, *Journal des Savants*, Apr. 1897 and Feb. 1898, *Journal des Débats*, 28 Feb. 1906; **Mallet**, *Kasr el Agouz*, Cairo, 1909; **E. Naville**, *Sphinx*, xiv. (1910) 137; **F. Oefele**, *Archiv f. Parasitologie*, iv. (1901) 481, v. (1902) 461, *OLZ* ii. 26, v. 157, vi. 375, *ÄZ* xxxvii. (1899), 55, 140, *Wiener Klinische Wochenschrift*, 1899, no. 47, *Prager Mediz. Wochenschrift*, 1899, nos. 24–29, and especially 'Geschichte der vorhippocratischen Medizin, in the *Handbuch der Geschichte der Medizin*, i., Jena, 1901; **W. Wreszinski**, *Der grosse medizinische Papyrus des Berliner Museums*, Leipzig, 1909; and **J. G. Wilkinson**, *Manners and Customs*, ed. London, 1878, ii. 354–358.

GEORGE FOUCART.

DISEASE AND MEDICINE (Greek and Roman).—Disease and its treatment by rational medical means belong to the domain of scientific medicine. The help of the gods was sought in illness and accidents by purely religious means—by prayer, sacrifice, and, above all, the institution of incubation. The gods granted their assistance either directly, by a miracle of healing, or indirectly, through the medium of an oracle of healing. The subject will be fully treated in the artt. HEALTH AND GODS OF HEALING, INCUBATION.

ED. THRAEMER.

DISEASE AND MEDICINE (Hindu).—**I. Disease.**—The earliest view of disease in India was that all morbid and abnormal states of body and mind for which no special reason was assignable were due to the attacks of demons. In the medical charms of the *Atharvaveda*, the earliest medical book of India, the diseases are constantly addressed as demoniacal beings. Thus Fever, a demon who makes men sallow and inflames them like fire, is implored to leave the body, and is threatened with annihilation if he should not choose to do so. 'O Fever,' says another charm, 'thy missiles are terrible; from these surely exempt us.' Itch (*pāman*) is called Fever's brother's son. The malevolent spirits of disease were regarded as specially dangerous to children. Thus infants were liable to be attacked by Naigameṣa, a demon

with a goat's head, who is mentioned in early Sanskrit literature, and represented in an old sculpture found at Mathurā. Jambha, another Vedic godling of disease, was supposed to cause the trismus of infants. A 'dog-demon' attacking boys is said to mean epilepsy, or perhaps whooping-cough. Another ancient superstition attributed the origin of dropsy to Varuṇa, the god of the waters, who binds the guilty, *e.g.* liars and false witnesses, with his terrible snake-bonds, *i.e.* dropsy. Elves and nightmares, called *Apsaras* and *Gandharvas*, were believed to pay nocturnal visits to men and women. Disorders of the mind were also very generally ascribed to possession by a demon (*bhūta*), even in scientific works on medicine such as the manuals of Charaka and Suśruta. When the belief in transmigration took hold of the Hindu mind, it furnished a new explanation of the origin of disease. Diseases and infirmities were traced to sins and offences committed in a previous birth. According to this doctrine of the 'ripening of deeds' (*karmavipāka*), a mortal sinner will have leprosy in a future birth; a Brāhman-killer, pulmonary consumption; a drinker of spirits, black teeth; a calumniator, a stinking nose; a malignant informer, stinking breath; a thief of food, dyspepsia; a thief of horses, lameness; a poisoner, a stammering tongue; a usurer, epilepsy; an incendiary will be born a madman; one who kills a cow or steals a lamp will be blind, etc. (see *Viṣṇusūtra*, ch. xlv.). Most of these punishments in a future life are symbolical. As a consequence of these beliefs, religious penances were performed, for instance, by lepers in order to atone for the heinous sins in a former existence to which their illness was attributed. A more rational theory of disease was found in the idea that worms gave rise to morbid conditions—a universal belief which may perhaps be viewed as the first germ of the modern bacillus theory. Headache and ear and eye diseases, as well as intestinal diseases, were attributed to worms; worms in children and in cattle also find special mention in the hymns of the *Atharvaveda*. The ancient physician Jīvaka (see below) is alleged in the Buddhist scriptures to have cured a patient by making an incision in his head and pulling two worms out of the wound. The medical Sanskrit works derive the origin of internal diseases principally from a wrong mixture of the three humours (*tridoṣa*) of the human body—wind, bile, and phlegm; and thus distinguish between wind, bile, and phlegm diseases.

Of particular diseases, *fever* is perhaps the most important. It is called in the medical works the 'king of diseases,' and appears to have been already the most dreaded ailment at the time of the composition of the *Atharvaveda*, the symptoms mentioned suggesting true malarial fever. This corresponds with modern statistics, according to which nearly two-thirds of the deaths in India are due to fever. *Leprosy* is said to consist of eighteen varieties, seven heavy, and the remaining ones light. It is evident, however, that true leprosy became confused with various skin diseases. *Small-pox* (*masūrikā*) is first mentioned in mediæval medical works. The *plague* is not mentioned in Sanskrit medical works, and seems to be of recent importation in India.

2. **Medicine.**—Folk-medicine in India is closely connected with sorcery. 'The most primitive witchcraft looks very like medicine in an embryonic state' (Sir Alfred Lyall, *Asiatic Studies*, 1st ser., 1907, p. 118). The earliest collection of charms found in the *Atharvaveda*, which is reckoned as one of the four Vedas, though it never attained the same degree of sanctity as the other three, probably because it contains incantations for destroying an enemy, the idea of injuring another, be he even an enemy, being opposed to the spirit of Hinduism. In the medical charms of the *Atharvaveda* and of the *Kauśikasūtra*, the diseases, and frequently the curative agencies as well, are addressed as supernatural beings (see above). The remedies applied are based, in many cases, on a rude kind of homœopathic or allopathic principle. Thus the yellow colour of a patient affected with jaundice is sent where it naturally belongs—to the yellow sun and yellow birds—the patient being seated on a couch beneath which yellow birds are tied. The hot fever is sent to the cool frog, who may be supposed to find it enjoyable. Dropsy, the disease sent by Varuṇa, the god of the waters, is cured by sprinkling water over the patient's head by means of twenty-one (three times seven) tufts of sacred grass, the water sprinkled on the body being supposed to cure the water in the body. A coral spear-amulet is used to counteract pains that seem as if from a spear—either rheumatism or colic. White leprosy is cured by applying black plants. Red, the colour of life and blood, is the natural colour of many amulets employed to secure long life and health. Amulets, mostly derived from the vegetable kingdom, are used a great deal, the idea being that the supposed curative substance has to be brought into contact with the body. The sores, tumours, and pustules apparent in scrofulous diseases are conjured to fall off, or fly away, because they were supposed to have settled like birds on the afflicted person. The cure of wounds and fractures is effected by incantations which have been compared by A. Kuhn with the Merseburg charm of German antiquity. Flow of blood is charmed to cease by a hymn which seems to indicate the use of a bandage or compress filled with sand. There are many charms for the cure of the poisonous bites of snakes, also charms directed against poison not derived from serpents. Water and fire are viewed as excellent remedies for many diseases; thus a Vedic charm declares: 'The waters verily are healing, the waters cure all diseases.' Fire is especially invoked in charms against mania, and sacrifices to the god of fire, burning of fragrant substances, and fumigation are amongst the principal rites against possession by demons. Some of the herbs used in medicine seem to owe their employment as remedies to their names only, not to any real curative properties possessed by them. The charms of the *Atharvaveda* have been fitly compared with the sacred formulæ of the Cherokees, and other spells current among the Indians of North America. On the other hand, they must be acknowledged to contain a fairly searching diagnosis of some diseases, as, *e.g.*, of malarial fever with its accompanying symptoms, such as jaundice, headache, cough, and itch.

The second period of Indian medicine is the Buddhist period, ushered in by Jīvaka Komārabhachcha, the contemporary of Buddha himself, of whom the most wonderful cures are reported, and whose name indicates that he was particularly famous for the treatment of children's diseases. The canonical books of the Buddhists contain a number of medical statements. The famous Bower MS, written in the 5th cent. A.D., and called after an English traveller who discovered it at Mingai in Central Asia in 1890, contains three medical treatises, one of them being a spell against snake poison, said to have been applied with success by Buddha himself when a young pupil of his had been bitten on the foot by a cobra. Buddhist kings founded hospitals for men and beasts, and appointed regular physicians. The famous Buddhist convent at Nālanda in Bihār, of which some ruins remain, had ample accommodation, in the 7th cent. A.D., for 10,000 students of philosophy and medicine.

The third period produced the now current Sanskrit treatises of Charaka, Suśruta, Vāgbhaṭa, Mādhavakara, Vaṅgasena, Hārīta, Bheḍa, Vṛnda, and others on medicine in general or on particular subjects, such as pathology, fever, infantile diseases, *materia medica*, etc. Charaka is said to have lived at the court of the Buddhist king Kaniṣka (*c.* A.D. 120); the great work of Suśruta is said to have been re-cast by the celebrated Buddhist sage Nāgārjuna; Vāgbhaṭa was himself a Buddhist. The connexion of the modern period of medical science in India with the Buddhist epoch is thus established, and the high stage of development reached by it seems to date, in the main, from the Buddhist time. The *materia medica* in these works embraces an immense number of drugs belonging to the mineral, vegetable, and animal kingdoms. There are special works on pharmacy and chemistry, containing ingenious processes of preparation, especially of quicksilver and other metallic medicines, which were prescribed internally as well as externally. Indian surgery, as represented in Suśruta and Vāgbhaṭa, can boast of the practice of lithotomy and laparotomy, and of operations performed in cases of cataract, piles, disease in the uterus, for forming new ears and noses (rhinoplasty, which seems to have been borrowed by European surgeons from India), etc., with more than a hundred different surgical instruments. Indian medical works and doctors were exported into Arabia, and Charaka and Suśruta may be found quoted in the writings of Rāzī (*c.* A.D. 900) and other eminent Arabian doctors. Many medical Sanskrit texts were translated into Tibetan, and again from Tibetan into Mongolian and other languages of Central and Northern Asia. On the other hand, it appears probable that the physicians of India at an earlier period learnt a great deal from the Greeks, especially in the field of surgery, their own knowledge of anatomy being too limited to admit of the performance of difficult surgical operations. Moreover, the ancient superstitious notions were retained by them. Thus a certain form of smallpox, which is treated with cold applications, is personified as Śītalā, 'the cold deity,' and is to be worshipped with a prayer in which it is declared that, whenever a person afflicted with smallpox addresses the deity as 'Śītalā, Śītalā,' the eruptions will at once disappear from his skin, and that this goddess possesses a rain of ambrosia for those tormented by pustules. Seven forms of this disease are described, which survive in the seven smallpox sisters, including Śītalā, whose worship is very common in N. India. The more aggravated forms of mental diseases are attributed to possession by a demon, and the cure is to be effected by propitiating the devil with oblations in a fire lighted in a temple, and with gifts consisting of eatables, an umbrella, etc. Infants are particularly liable to be attacked by a demon, the symptoms described pointing to lockjaw. The treatment of snake-bites includes the recitation of charms. When a child is born, various religious ceremonies take place, such as the offering of oblations in a fire kindled for the purpose, with a view to protecting mother and child against the attacks of demons. The prognostics of disease depend in the first place on various omens, such as the appearance and dress of the messenger come to summon the physician, and the objects or persons seen by the latter on his way to the patient. The Indian physicians (*kavirājas*) of the present day, who belong to the Vaidya caste in Bengal, and to Brāhman castes in most other parts of India, have naturally been losing ground owing to the introduction of European scientific medicine into India; nevertheless they continue to be consulted by the common people, who also still adhere to the popular superstitions of old. Various godlings of disease in nearly all parts of India are worshipped with offerings of milk, flowers, fruits, sweets, rice, betel-nuts, and sometimes a goat. When a child becomes dangerously ill with smallpox, it is sometimes carried to an image of Śītalā, and bathed in the water which has been offered to the goddess, some of which it is given to drink. There are also incantations for almost every disease—headache, toothache, fever, dysentery, leprosy, madness, burns, scalds, snake-bites, etc. In S. India devil-dancing is very common. Whenever the 'doctor' attending a sick person finds that the malady will not yield to his remedies, he certifies that it is a case of possession, and the exorcizer is then called in to expel the demon. The malignant spirits, the supposed authors of a plague, are tempted to pass into the wild dancers and so become dissipated, the devil-dancers being also thought to become gifted with clairvoyance and a power of delivering oracular utterances on any subject of common interest. See, further, DISEASE AND MEDICINE (Vedic).

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DISEASE AND MEDICINE (Jewish).—I. *DISEASE.*—1. Biblical.

—Three initial stages may be traced in the perennial consideration of this subject. Disease—so it was held—is sent from the Deity; it is therefore a punishment for sins committed; that is, every one who suffers from disease has previously done some wrong for which he is atoning by his bodily afflictions. It is obvious that this case is completely covered by the larger and more general question of evil, as dealt with, for example, in Job. Yet, although the Book of Job might be said finally to solve the problem as far as contemporary thought was concerned, inquiry re-asserts itself after a brief interval.

In the investigation of Biblical examples of sickness consequent on sin, care must be taken to exclude those cases where the punishment takes the form of a violent or unnatural death. These are included in the larger category of evil. Thus the case of Korah (Nu $16^{29ff.}$) and that of the disobedient prophet (1 K $13^{11f.}$) do not apply, but the death of Bathsheba's first son (2 S 12^{14}) or the smiting of the Egyptian firstborn (Ex 12^{29}) might certainly be cited. It is also important to differentiate cases where the sinner himself is smitten from those where the punishment falls vicariously on others who may be innocent, but whom the sinner loves more than himself. To the former category belong the punishments of leprosy meted out to Miriam (Nu 12^{10}) and Gehazi (2 K 5^{27}); to the latter, the death of Abijah, son of Jeroboam (1 K 14^{12}), for the death of the child meant the destruction of Jeroboam's fondest hope—the foundation of a dynasty. Further, as a corollary to the latter class may be mentioned those cases in which the community suffers from disease because of (*a*) general and (*b*) individual trespass. The community would seem to be punished because it participates actively or even passively by not rejecting the criminal, for in the absence of duly appointed officials it is every one's duty to take the law into his own hands. It is also suggested that the knowledge that the commission of a certain action may involve others in disease and pain may act upon the evil-doer as a deterrent.

An enumeration of all the cases in the Bible

where disease is a punishment is unnecessary. It may suffice to mention a few examples where it is inflicted as a retribution for sin. In some cases leprosy is the means of chastisement: thus Miriam (Nu 12[10]), Gebazi (2 K 5[27]), and Uzziah (2 Ch 26[21]) were smitten with this disease for slander, avarice, and presumption respectively. Shameful diseases are the result of foul crimes or irreverence (*e.g.* 'Er and Onan, Gn 38[7] etc.; the Philistines, 1 S 5[12f.]); Pharaoh (Gn 12[17]) and his household were afflicted with plagues on account of the abduction of Sarah; Abimelech and all his house (Gn 20[18]) were smitten with barrenness for the same cause; the Sodomites were struck with blindness (Gn 19[11]) for their attack on Lot; and, finally, Job's sickness is ascribed by his friends to his sinfulness. Gluttony was punished by gastric plague and death at Kibroth-hattaavah (Nu 11[34]), and in the *Tōkhēḥāh*, or Rebuke chapters (Lv 26[14] etc., Dt 28[15] etc.), various diseases are enumerated which will inevitably follow disobedience to God's word.

Turning to the NT, we may trace the same tendency. Thus (1 Co 11[30]) those who receive communion in an unworthy manner suffer disease in consequence. Further, there is the opposite case of apparently undeserved blindness (Jn 9[1ff.]), as an explanation of which the possibility of sin *in utero* used to be suggested; and, finally, there are the instances where disease is said to be due to Satanic agency or demoniac possession (Lk 13[16], Mk 9[17], Lk 11[14]).

That diseases follow sin may also be inferred negatively from such passages as Ex 15[26] ('if thou wilt surely hearken to the voice of the Lord . . . the diseases which I put on the Egyptians I will not put on thee,' cf. Dt 28[60]); or the Fifth Commandment, where longevity is the reward for obedience to parents; or, in a more general way, Lv 18[5] ('Ye shall keep my statutes and my judgments by doing which a man shall live').[1]

Although these and similar instances are capable of being classified under various different heads and of being arranged in other ways, yet it is by no means clear that alterations would produce any re-adjustment of ideas with reference to the theory of disease. It is not safe to dogmatize or to differentiate between the attitude of the Pentateuch and the Prophets; it is unwise to establish distinctions of time or place, because in no subject is there greater scope for inconsistency. The human mind hovers between the Scylla of ascribing disease to the work of the Deity, and the Charybdis of making disease accidental and so independent of Divine control, by which circumstance Divine omnipotence would be impugned. The 'golden mean' may offer a workable compromise, but it will not often bear philosophic investigation. The Semites, as has often been shown, identified cause and effect. *Pe'ullāh* means both reward and the deed which merits the reward. *Ḥaṭṭā'th* means both sin and sin-offering. The children who mocked the prophet were devoured by bears (2 K 2[23]), and the irresistible conclusion to be drawn was *post hoc ergo propter hoc*. The writer of the Books of Kings views history purely from the standpoint of morals; happiness and misfortune, health and disease, are the result of previous conduct; and insistence on this theory was the sole justification for the study of history. The adoption of this attitude was conducive to a belief in free will, since man thus had the power and choice of avoiding disease, while the opposite theory, which made disease fortuitous, led to predestination. To such an extent did the theory that conduct alone is responsible for disease prevail that Asa (2 Ch 16[12]) is blamed because 'in his disease he sought not the Lord but the physicians.'

The Deity, then, is the source of evil as well as of all good, since He is omnipotent. Yet already in early times it was felt to be impious to ascribe misfortune and disease directly to the Godhead. Hence all manner of expedients were adopted to avoid such a position. In the Books of Samuel 'the spirit of God' is responsible for good and happiness, while sickness and ill were wrought by 'a spirit from (רוּחַ מֵאֵת) God.' This was largely developed in the Targums (cf. Memra, Logos, etc.). There is no escape from attacking Divine omnipotence, if disease is independent of the Godhead. Still disinclination to ascribe disease to God grew and gained strength from the earliest times. The example of Korah's sons is a case in point. All the guilty parties gather together, the innocent are warned to withdraw from their company, and finally (Nu 26[11]) it is stated: 'notwithstanding, the sons of Korah died not.' Still stronger instances occur which afford negative proof. The wicked cannot involve the righteous in disease and death, but the righteous can, conversely, deliver the wicked. Ten good men can save Sodom (Gn 18[32]); punishment extends to the third and fourth generation 'of them that hate me,' while loving-kindness prevails to the thousandth generation (Ex 20[5. 6]). The *Middath ha-Raḥamîm* (attribute of mercy) conquers the *Middath had-Dîn* (attribute of justice). Finally, the teaching of Job and of Ezekiel established the idea of individual responsibility, and the doctrine that suffering and disease are not necessarily the consequence of wrong-doing.

2. Rabbinical.—In considering Rabbinic literature it will be found that the same tendencies may be traced and the same stages observed. We are brought back to earlier views such as may be found in the Pentateuch and Former Prophets, and, seemingly, the teaching of Job and Ezekiel is completely gone. It will, therefore, suffice to adduce a limited number of instances. In the first place, slander is responsible for many diseases: this may be seen most clearly in *Lev. Rabba* xviii. 4 (ed. E. Schraentzel, Stettin, 1863, p. 29, fol. 15*a*, outer col. lines 1 ff.):

'There was *ḥārūth* (engraving) on the tablets of stone [Ex 32[16]]. Read not *ḥārūth* but *ḥērūth* (freedom). Freedom from what? . . . from chastisements . . . R. Simeon b. Yoḥai says, at the hour when Israel stood at Sinai and said (Ex 24[7]) "All that the Lord hath said we will do and obey," there was not among them either one with an unclean issue or a leper or cripple or blind or dumb or deaf or mad: concerning that hour is it said (Ca 4[7]): "Entirely fair art thou, O my companion, neither is there blemish in thee." When they sinned, not many days passed when there were found among them those with unclean issues and lepers. About that hour it is said (Nu 5[2-4]), "And they dismissed from the camp every leper, etc." Henceforward Israel was liable to issues and leprosy. R. Huna . . . says . . . leprosy came for slander . . . to teach thee that plagues come only in consequence of slander. . . .' [The whole passage should be studied.]

In the *Mekhilta* on Ex 23[8] (ed. I. H. Weiss, Vienna, 1865, p. 106*a*, top) acceptance of bribes is said, on the basis of the Scriptural verse, to lead to blindness:

'Every one who accepts money to pervert justice (or even to execute justice) will not leave the world until he is bereft of his eyesight. According to R. Nathan, one of three things will befall him: he will lose his knowledge of the Torah, so that he will declare unclean clean, or declare clean unclean, or he will be in need of human aid, or he will lose his eyesight.'

A similar thought is expressed in the parallel passage in *Siphre* to Dt 16[18] (ed. M. Friedmann, Vienna, 1864, §144), towards the end of the section. The *Mekhilta* to Ex 15[26] (fol. 54*a*) should also be regarded. This thought may be followed in a more extended form in Bab. *'Erukhin* fol. 16*a*, where R. Joḥanan (quoted by R. Samuel b. Naḥmani) says:

[1] See Manasseh ben Israel's *Conciliator* (tr. E. H. Lindo, London, 1842), question 89, p. 138, question 104, p. 164; see also pp. 20, 114, and question 139, p. 228.

'Plagues come for seven sins, for bloodshed, perjury, unchastity, pride, embezzlement, pitilessness, and slander, as it is said (Ps 101[5]), "him who slanders his neighbour secretly, him will I cut off. . . ."'

The following verses are then cited to prove each case respectively: 2 S 3[29], 2 K 5[23. 27], Gn 12[17], 2 Ch 26[16], Lv 14[36. 55]. See also *Aboth* v. 11 (Singer's *Prayer Book*[6], London, 1900, p. 200):

'Seven kinds of punishment come into the world for seven important transgressions. If some give tithes and others do not, a dearth ensues from drought, and some suffer hunger while others are full. If they all determine to give no tithes, a dearth ensues from tumult and drought. If they further resolve not to give the dough-cake (Nu 15[20]), an exterminating dearth ensues. Pestilence comes into the world to fulfil those death penalties threatened in the Torah, the execution of which, however, is not within the function of a human tribunal. . . . At four periods pestilence grows apace: in the fourth year, in the seventh, at the conclusion of the seventh year, and at the conclusion of the Feast of Tabernacles in each year; in the fourth year, for default of giving the tithe to the poor in the third year (Dt 14[28-9]); in the seventh year, for default of giving the tithe to the poor in the sixth year; at the conclusion of the seventh year, for the violation of the law regarding the fruits of the seventh year; and at the conclusion of the Feast of Tabernacles in each year, for robbing the poor of the grants legally assigned to them' (*i.e.* gleanings, forgotten sheaves, corners of the field [Lv 19[9], Dt 24[19]]).

The death of women at childbirth is due to three sins,

'because they have been negligent in regard to their periods of separation, in respect to the consecration of the first cake of the dough and in the lighting of the Sabbath lamp' (Mishn. *Shabb.* ii. 6 [Singer's *Prayer Book*, p. 121]).

The effect of sin (*yēṣer hā-rā'*) on man and on the creation generally is to cause great disfigurement, and mysterious diseases are due to sin. The passage from *Bereshith Rabba* and elsewhere dealing with this point may be studied in F. R. Tennant's *Sources of . . . Original Sin*, ch. vii. ff.

Finally, R. Ami says:

'There is no death without sin, and there is no chastisement without crime' (Bab. *Shabb.* 55*a* foot). This passage should be carefully studied.

Outside the immediate range of the Talmud and Midrashim the idea may be traced frequently; *e.g.* Sir 31[22] (p. 24, ed. Strack, Leipzig, 1903): 'In all thy actions be modest, that no misfortune befall thee'; or Judah hal-Levi's *Kitāb al-Khazarī*, pt. ii. § 58:

'It was one of the wonderful traits of God that His displeasure for minor transgressions was shown on the walls of houses and in the clothes, whilst for more grievous sins the bodies were more or less severely stricken' (p. 119, ed. Hirschfeld, 1905: see the whole paragraph).

II. *MEDICINE.*—Connected with the question of disease is the question of cure. The function of the priest as physician is clearly laid down in the Pentateuch; he enjoys far greater authority than the surgeon mentioned in Ḥammurabi's *Code*, probably because his sphere of treatment was more limited: in Assyria surgical operations seem to have been undertaken more commonly. The Rabbis declared that it was a positive commandment (מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה) for a man to get himself cured, on the basis of Ex 21[19] (see also Rashi, *in loc.*). Healing as a result of special prayer occurs repeatedly in the Bible. According to the Rabbis, all healing is a miracle, and repentance will effect a cure. Thus Bab. *Nedarîm* 41*a* declares:

'No sick man can recover from his disease until his sins are forgiven . . . greater is the miracle performed to a sick man by his restoration to health than that wrought to Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah (Dn 3[12ff.]). For their fire was earthly and any mortal could quench it, whereas that of the sick man is from heaven and defies human hand' (see also further).

So, too, the Palestinian Rabbis denied that demons could cause or cure disease (see DEMONS AND SPIRITS [Jewish]), for disease came from God without reference to their agency (see also S. Schechter, *Fragment of a Zadokite Work*, Cambridge, 1910, p. 1, ch. xiv. p. 12, line 3). On the other hand, a man must not avoid sin on that account alone.

'A man must not say, "I will abstain from forbidden foods in order to strengthen my body and avoid disease, but in order to do the will of my Father in heaven."'

The technical nature of cures recommended by the Rabbis does not fall within the scope of the present article. Cures by *prayer* were frequent. See Mishn. *Berakhoth*, v. 3 (p. 10, ed. Staerk, Lietzmann's series, Bonn, 1910):

'R. Ḥanina b. Dosa used to pray over the sick and used to say, "Such a one will live," "Such a one will die." They said to him, "Whence knowest thou?"; he replied, "If my prayer is fluent in my mouth, I know that it will be received." . . .'

Reference may also be made to רְפָאֵנוּ (Singer's *Prayer Book*, p. 47; partly also on p. 16, § 8 of no. 58 of Lietzmann's series, *Altjüd. Gebete*, Bonn, 1910); to בִּרְכַּת הַגּוֹמֵל (p. 148 top); to the שִׁמּוּשׁ תְּהִלִּים, or therapeutic use of Psalms (see also art. CHARMS AND AMULETS [Jewish]); and to the extremely beautiful prayer before reciting the Psalms in cases of sickness.[1] The prayer deserves careful study. It must be observed that, although the Rabbis fully believed in the efficacy of prayer, they did not, as the Christian Scientists do, deny the existence of disease or the power of drugs. The Essenes, for example, according to Philo, joined the care of the body to that of the soul by avoiding cities: 'just as foul air breeds disease, so there is danger of contracting an incurable disease of the soul from . . . bad associations' (*Quod omnis probus liber*, § 12, cited in *JE* v. 227, foot, inner column).

The principle of 'measure for measure,' fitting the punishment to the sin (מִדָּה כְּנֶגֶד מִדָּה or בְּמִדָּה שֶׁאָדָם מוֹדֵד בָּהּ מוֹדְדִין לוֹ), was strongly held by the Rabbis, as may be seen from the extracts cited above, but, in spite of this, the solution of the problem was found in the theory of יִסּוּרִין שֶׁל אַהֲבָה, 'chastisements of love' ('whom the Lord loveth he chasteneth'), and this is, of course, the real solution of the whole problem of evil: man's inability to realize that what is to him evil or misfortune need not in reality be so. See Mishn. *Berakhoth*, ix. 5 (p. 17, ed. Staerk, Bonn, 1910, Lietzmann's series):

'בְּכָל מְאֹדֶךָ בְּכָל מִדָּה וגו׳ 'With all thy might [read not מְאֹדֶךָ but מִדָּה]; for every measure (good or evil) which He meteth to thee, thank Him.'

Misfortune is not necessarily evil, nor is disease necessarily the outcome of sin. Man cannot always distinguish good from evil, and his mind has not the power of perception, beyond a certain well-defined limit. 'From the mouth of the Lord shall there not proceed both evil and good?' (La 3[38]). 'I the Lord make peace and create evil' (Is 45[7]). The inability of man to comprehend the Divine scheme for the government of the universe leads him to erroneous conclusions as to the nature of evil and the origin of disease. This was the generally accepted conclusion.

LITERATURE.—*JE*, art. 'Medicine'; art. CHARMS AND AMULETS (Jewish) in the present work; Hamburger, art. 'Krankheiten'; Maimonides, *Guide*, chs. on the 'Evils,' pt. iii. etc. (see Friedländer's tr., London, 1904); S. Schechter, *Aspects of Rabbinic Theology*, London, 1910, ch. xiv. etc.; C. G. Montefiore, art. 'Retribution,' in *JQR*, vol. v., July 1893; F. R. Tennant, *Sources of . . . Original Sin*, Cambridge, 1903, ch. vii. etc.; S. Levy, 'Doctrine of Original Virtue,' in *Orig. Virt. and Other Studies*, London, 1907; F. Weber, *Jüd. Theol.*[2], Leipzig, 1897.

HERBERT LOEWE.

DISEASE AND MEDICINE (Persian).—The doctrines concerning bodily diseases and their treatment by medical art form a very considerable part of the Avestan system. In strict accordance with the dualistic conception of the universe, bodily disease and its treatment by medical art correspond exactly with sin, regarded as a spiritual malady, and its treatment by religious exercises conceived as an ethical or spiritual medicine. Similarly, owing to the dualistic division of the universe into a good and an evil creation, all bodily diseases are expressly declared to be creations of the Evil Spirit (see under art. DUALISM). In *Vend.* xxii. Ahura Mazda declares that Aṅra Mainyu created 99,999 diseases (a fanciful number, like that of the Hindu

[1] Both of the last-named items may be seen at the end of Heidenheim's ed. of the Psalms, Roedelheim, 1865.

gods), which are variously estimated, however, as 90,000 in the Gujarati translation, or as 10,000 (*Bund.* ix. 4), or even as low as 4333 (*Dīnkarṭ*, ed. Peshotan, vol. iv. cap. 157. 41, 43). A considerable number of names of diseases are preserved in various parts of the Avesta, and have been carefully collected and discussed, especially by Geiger in his *Ostīrān. Kultur*; but most of the names are decidedly obscure, and little improvement has been made since Geiger's study; even Bartholomae's great lexicon throws no further light upon the terms used.

It is fairly certain, however, that we may find in them fevers (*tafnu*, *dazhu*), and diseases of the head (*sārastī*, *sārama*). As skin diseases were and still are a special scourge of the Iranian countries, we naturally expect to find mention of leprosy, and as a matter of fact this dread disease apparently (in spite of de Harlez's striking argument to the contrary) is indicated by the term *paeso vītareto tanus* (*Vend.* ii. 85; *Yt.* v. 92), probably 'leprosy which segregates the body' (cf. Pahlavi *pēsēh*, Pazend *pīsk*, Mod. Pers. *pes*, Kurdish *pīsī*). In *pāman* (*Yt.* xiv. 48) we may see either leprosy, according to the general interpretation, or itch (S. E. Duhash), which is probably also indicated by *garenu*. Among other terms, more or less obscure, the identification of which is largely conjectural, *vāvereshī* (*Yt.* xiii. 131) probably indicates a venereal disease; *tafnu . . . tanuye zoishnuye* (*Vend.* vii. 173) may be puerperal fever; *skeṅda* (*ib.* v. 160) may indicate a rupture; *aghōsti* (*ib.* vii. 145) and *vazemnoasti* (*ib.* xx. 9, 11) most probably signify rickets and caries of the bone; *duruka* (*ib.* xx. 14, 20) almost certainly calculus; *kurugha* (*ib.*) seems to be the Modern Persian *kurū*, carbuncle (Houtum-Schindler, *ZDMG* xxxvii. [1883] 54 ff.). In *āstairya* we seem to have the name of some eruptive disease, like smallpox or measles. Among a number of hitherto quite unidentified terms, three beginning with *azh-* in all probability refer to diseases caused by snake-bite.

The origin of the art of medicine as recorded in the Avesta is supernatural, and associated with the name of the hero Thrita, who, according to the *Vendīdād*, was the first physician, 'the first of those heroic, active, benevolent men, with magic power, brilliant, powerful, before the giving of the Law, who made the various diseases cease.' He besought Ahura Mazda for a remedy against poisons (*vish-citrem*, or perhaps 'eine von Giftpflanzen stammende Arznei' [Geiger]), and a metal knife (for surgical operations). Ahura Mazda narrates that he gave him thousands and millions of medical plants, among them the mysterious *gaokerena*, the later *gōkart* tree, the source of all medicines (*Vend.* xx. 1–17). The Yashts appear to confound this Thrita with Thraētaona, whose name seems to be a patronymic derived from the former—for his *fravashi* is invoked against diseases. Darmesteter quotes Hamza as stating that Farīdūn (*i.e.* Thraētaona) was the inventor of medicine, and adds that the Modern Persian amulets against disease bear the name of Farīdūn (see CHARMS AND AMULETS [Iran.], vol. iii. p. 449a). Moreover, the genius Airyaman (apparently the personification of prayer) is also intimately connected with the medical art. Ahura Mazda calls him to come and expel disease and death (*Vend.* xxii., xxiii.). Later on, in the Pahlavi *Dīnkarṭ* he becomes the tutelary genius of physicians, to whom he gives miraculous help to cure men's bodies. As we shall see, prayer was always regarded as the most efficacious of remedies.

The commonest term to indicate indifferently 'medicine,' 'healing,' 'medicaments,' or 'physician,' is *baeshaza*, corresponding to the Skr. *bhishaj*, *bhēshaja*. In Pahlavi we find this word as *beshaj*, but more commonly under the curiously inverted form *bijishak*, as in Modern Persian and in the Armen. words *bzhishk*, 'physician,' and *bzhshkel*, 'heal.'

The Avesta attributes great importance to the threefold division of medicine according to the means employed: *kereta*, the knife; *urvara*, herbs; *maṅthra*, formula—as we should say, surgery, medicine, and prayer. This is also the well-known division of the Greeks: Pindar, speaking of Asklepios, says (*Pyth.* iii. 91–95):

. . . τοὺς μὲν μαλακαῖς
ἐπαοιδαῖς ἀμφέπων,
τοὺς δὲ προσανέα, πί-
νοντας, ἢ γυίοις περάπτων πάντοθεν
φάρμακα, τοὺς δὲ τομαῖς ἔστασεν ὀρθούς.

As Pindar gives the first place to ἐπαοιδαί, so the Avesta esteems the cure by prayer or conjuration the best of all; so that the prayer-physician (*maṅthro-baeshaza*) is called 'the physician of physicians.' In fact, the Maṅthra Spenta, or sacred formula, is personified and invoked as a genius: 'Heal me, O Maṅthra Spenta, O brilliant one!' It is Ahura Mazda himself who speaks, and promises thousands of camels, oxen, and sheep (*Vend.* xxii. 7–10). This *maṅthra* is not prayer in our sense, but a conjuratory formula, as employed so often among Eastern peoples. Homer, too, shows it as employed together with surgical treatment:

ὠτειλὴν δ' Ὀδυσῆος ἀμύμονος, ἀντιθέοιο,
δῆσαν ἐπισταμένως· ἐπαοιδῇ δ' αἷμα κελαινὸν
ἔσχεθον (*Od.* xix. 456–8).

There is an excellent specimen of these conjuratory formulæ in *Vend.* xx. 7: 'I conjure thee, disease! I conjure thee, death! I conjure thee, burning! I conjure thee, fever! I conjure thee, headache! . . . I conjure thee, smallpox (?)!' There is a striking analogy between these conjurations and those employed by the Akkadians (Lenormant, *Chaldean Magic*, Eng. tr., 1877, pp. 4, 20, 260). These formulæ, as with the Greeks and Hindus, may, like so many other elements in the Avesta, be derived from an earlier population (perhaps Turanian) absorbed by the Aryans.[1] The genius of metals, Khshathra Vairya, is said to have given the first physician, Thrita, a knife with a golden point for surgical operations (cf. *Vend.* xx. 3). Careful instructions are given for the training and examination of surgeons and physicians, based on the principle of *experimentum in corpore vili*. The candidate is to practise, not on a Mazdæan, but on a *daēva*-worshipper, that is, the follower of any other religion. Should he operate upon one such with fatal result, and again a second and a third time, he is declared incapable for ever of practising either medicine or surgery. Should he persevere and injure a Mazdæan, he is held guilty of a crime equivalent to homicide. After three successful experiments, however, he is considered a fully qualified medical man (*Vend.* vii. 95–104). A serious view was taken of a physician's duties: he must make all speed to visit his patients; if the disease attack one at nightfall, he must hasten to arrive by the second watch; if at the second watch, he must arrive by midnight; if during the night, then by daybreak (*Vend.* xxi. 9–11). The fees of the physician are minutely regulated according to the rank of the patient. A priest pays only by liturgical prayers and blessings. The payment for the various chiefs of a household, a village, a clan, or a province, are respectively an ass, a horse, a camel, and a yoke of four horses; whilst, for the wives, female animals corresponding are required. It would appear that later on these fees were changed into monetary payments: the Pahlavi commentator estimates the prayers paid by the priest at 3000 *stīrs* (Gr. στατήρ), whilst the yoke of four horses is valued at 70 *stīrs*. It may be remarked that the Avestan physician was also a veterinary surgeon, for a scale of charges is also fixed for the treatment of cattle, great and small (*Vend.* vii. 105–117), and it is distinctly said that the same means must be employed for the cure of a rabid dog as for one of the faithful (*ib.* xiii. 97–99).

Turning now to the later Pahlavi literature, we find the whole subject of the art of medicine most fully and systematically treated in an interesting tractate incorporated in that encyclopædic work, the *Dīnkarṭ*, and forming ch. 157 of bk. iii. printed in vol. iv. of Peshotan's edition (Bombay, 11 vols., 1874–1910). It is by far the most considerable chapter of the whole work. It falls into

[1] An amusing remark by a more recent Parsi commentator quoted by Darmesteter (note to *Vend.* vii. 120) is thus naively expressed: 'He may not cure, but *he will do no harm!*'

four distinct parts: (1) medicine, (2) the medical man, (3) diseases, (4) remedies.

It is curious to remark that Hindu medical science also distinguished the 'four feet' (*pāda*) of medicine, which, however, were reckoned as: the physician, disease, medicine, the nurse; while Hippocrates has a threefold division: *ἡ τέχνη διὰ τριῶν, τὸ νόσημα, ὁ νοσέων, καὶ ὁ ἰητρός* (*de Morb. Vulg.* i. 1).

The author begins by defining the basis or foundation (*būn*) and the necessity of medicine, which is, of course, owing to the action of the Evil Spirit. He next distinguishes between spiritual and material medicine, and again between general and individual medicine—the former apparently applying to the maintenance of the public health, and the latter to that of individual patients. It is curious that, whilst on the whole following the medical system of the Avesta as above described, the *Dīnkarṭ* recognizes *five*, instead of three, means of healing, viz. formulæ, fire, herbs, acids, and the knife. Another interesting distinction is that of prophylactic medicine (or hygiene, as we should say) for the preservation of health, and curative medicine for the healing of disease. In accordance with this, two kinds of practitioners are also distinguished: the *drūīstopat*, 'master of health' (as we might say, officer of health), and the *bijishak*, 'healer,' or doctor. In the section specially devoted to the physician several questions are treated. The supreme chief of corporal medicine is the Sovereign (*i.e.* the king); of spiritual medicine, the *Zarathustrōtema*, or supreme high priest. The matter (*māto*) on which the physician exercises his art is defined to be, for the spiritual physician, the human soul endowed with a body; for the corporal physician, the human body endowed with a soul. The reciprocal action of body and soul is then discussed with considerable skill, and corresponds pretty much with our idea of *mens sana in corpore sano*. The description of a perfect physician of the body is worth quoting:

'He should know the limbs of the body, their articulations; remedies for the disease; should possess his own carriage and an assistant; should be amiable, without jealousy, gentle in word, free from haughtiness; an enemy to disease, but the friend of the sick; respecting modesty, free from crime, from injury, from violence; expeditious; the right hand of the widow; noble in action; protecting good reputation; not acting for gain, but for a spiritual reward; ready to listen; having become a physician by favour of Aryaman; possessed of authority and philanthropy; skilled to prepare health-giving plants medically, in order to deliver the body from disease, to expel corruption and impurity; to further peace and multiply the delights of life' (§ 19).

The regulations for the probation of the medical candidate are the same as those we have quoted from the Avesta, whilst, as for fees, the treatise simply refers to the sacred text. In the third part we meet the statement that there are two fundamental maladies, denominated *faraēbūt* and *aībībūt*, which seem to indicate rather some forms of moral evil, but their explanation is extremely obscure, although the words occur in several treatises. The Evil Spirit (*Ganāk Mīnōi*) is the cause of all evils, both of soul and body—for the former, of every kind of vice and evil passion; for the latter, of cold, dryness, evil odour, corruption, hunger, thirst, old age, pain, 'and all other causes of malady and death.' The number of diseases is given as 4333; their names are simply those of the Avesta in a slightly altered form. One interesting division of maladies is that which divides corporal diseases into voluntary (such as venereal disease) and involuntary (such as fevers); whilst the diseases of the vital principle (*jano*) are distinguished as vices tending forward (*e.g.* passion and anger) and those tending backward (*e.g.* idleness).

The fourth and last part of the treatise may be styled therapeutic. The number of remedies derived from the vegetable kingdom is said to be seventy, and they are divided again into those which are by nature beneficent, and those which of their nature are poisonous, but may be so treated as to become medicinal. As an example of the former is given the myrobalan of Cabul—the only plant which is mentioned. The miraculous (*rajdato*) trees, the *Gōkart* and the white *Hōm*—here clearly distinguished from one another—are referred to as sources of healing. Health is next divided into two kinds—health of the soul and health of the body; and the various oppositions between the powers of the former and certain vices co-existent and yet hostile are detailed at length. In the whole passage we have a well-sustained distinction between the *hamēstarīk* (diametrically opposed, contradictory, excluding the opposite) and the *brātarvato* (co-existent but hostile); and the passage entirely confirms the sense of this latter difficult word which the present writer propounded in the *Academy*, xxvi. [1884] 397. A similar distinction is then made between the elements of the body and the hostile forces, cold and dryness, produced by the Evil Spirit—a veritable *bellum intestinum* between the four elementary qualities as described by Galen and other early medical writers. Curiously enough, however, with the Iranians the position of dryness and moisture is reversed, dryness and cold being together reckoned among evil qualities—an inversion, no doubt, to be explained by the rarity and consequent vast importance of humidity in ancient Iran. The action of the blood, of food, and of moderation are next explained, as well as the necessary interdependence of spiritual and corporal medicine.

An interesting question is that of the relations between Iranian medicine and that of India and Greece. The researches of Haas (*ZDMG* xxx., xxxi.) and Müller (*ib.* xxxiv.) have conclusively shown the great influence exercised by Greek medicine on the Hindus, and a question of the latter writer deserves our attention here:

'A fact which concerns not Indianists, but rather students of Middle-Persian and Arabic literature, is this—it may be deduced from the Arabic texts that it is worth while inquiring by what road Indian medical literature reached the Muhammadans. We know that Indian tales reached the realms of the Chalifs through the Pahlavi: is it not therefore obvious to suppose the same road for medical science?' (see also J. Jolly, 'Medicin,' *GIAP* iii. 10, pp. 17–19).

We have indicated above certain parallelisms between Iranian medical theories and those of the Greeks, though none of them can be considered very decided. History, however, bears out the probability of such influence of Greek medicine upon Persian. Greek physicians are to be found at all epochs at the courts of Iranian sovereigns. Such was the case even under the Achæmenians: we need cite only Demokedes under Darius I., the famous Ctesias, and Apollonides mentioned by the latter. Spiegel thinks it probable that in populous cities foreign physicians often competed with native ones. Under the Sasanians, too, we find Greek physicians at the royal court, and Spiegel is of opinion that Indian physicians made their way there also (*Eran. Alterth.*, Leipzig, 1878, iii. 582).

LITERATURE.—W. Geiger, *Ostīrān. Kultur im Altertum*, Erlangen, 1882, pp. 391-399; L. C. Casartelli, *Traité de médecine mazdéenne traduit du Pehlevi et commenté*, Louvain, 1886, also *La Philosophie religieuse du mazdéisme sous les Sassanides*, Louvain, 1884 (Eng. tr., Bombay, 1889); S. E. Dubash, *The Zoroastrian Sanitary Code*, Bombay, 1906—a skilful attempt, by a highly qualified Parsi medical man, to bring the Avestan medical and hygienic system into correlation with modern European medical science, and 'to show my educated co-religionists how well the laws of the Vendidad, enacted for the preservation of health and for the observance of the purity of things, are in harmony with the laws of hygiene and the principles of the science of medicine.'

L. C. CASARTELLI.

DISEASE AND MEDICINE (Teutonic).—

1. Disease.—Nothing made so powerful an impression upon the feelings of primitive man as the phenomena of disease and death. Whether the end came as the inevitable result of a prolonged

struggle, or whether it befell with startling suddenness in the heyday of life—in either case the terror-stricken mind was forced to face the question as to the cause and origin of the dread occurrence.

Death from loss of blood and death by strangulation were of course more or less familiar incidents of the chase and of war. But what mysterious power was it that suddenly opened the veins within the body, and brought a comrade's life to an end by hæmorrhage; or, again, obstructed the air-passages from within, and thus caused the hale and hearty youth to perish by suffocation, convulsively clutching at his throat? The inmates of the smoky turf-cabin had often felt this malign power at work, as it squatted—crushing and squeezing—on breast and throat, and had awaked with screams of terror and bathed in perspiration: it was the dreaded *alp* (incubus, nightmare), who had all but strangled them to death. By night likewise they were seized by that frightful something which resides in the body permanently, and thus differs from the *alp* that comes by night, or even in the midday slumber, yet speedily withdraws again. The unwelcome visitations of the incubus must have made a profound impression on their victims; and it was an experience of similar character which now and again befell them in spring, when the storm was raging outside, and alternate chills and burnings seized them, causing the shiver of fever, tormenting them in sleep with wildly-rushing dreams, and at length bringing them in their delirium to the experience of things which, as their house-mates affirmed, no one else had perceived: the fell work, surely, of gruesome creatures, invisible, but to feeling all too real, which hemmed them in, prowled after them, fell upon them like stealthy foes—the spirits and demons of disease, which the causal instinct, with its unconsciously creative tendency and its power of stimulating the imagination, depicted in endlessly varied forms, corresponding to the observed phenomena accompanying the affliction. A special object of misgiving was the unseen, though living and potent, entity which dwelt in friend and foe alike, which passed from the body at death and left it behind, *i.e.* the soul, as primitive man was always obsessed by the suspicion that departed souls still pursued their friendly or hostile activities in the shadowy host of disease-spirits.

Among the Teutons the souls of the dead were believed to join the great demonic host which, comprising elves, 'mares,' *Truden*, *Schrate*, and trolls, swept along in the train of Woden and Holla: winged creatures who appeared everywhere, and had their home in the savage forest. On occasion the disease-demons assumed bodily shape, showing themselves in every variety of form, and appearing in the disease itself as worm-like threads that creep under the skin, or as actual worms living in wounds and sores, or being discharged therefrom. The idea of the wriggling worm as the embodiment of the disease-demon was widely current among the Teutons. The demon was supposed to emerge from the worm in the form of some winged being, or of an ugly, crawling, slimy toad.

Next in importance to the incubi, or spirits of the dead, who afflicted the survivors with horrible nightmares, or consorted with them lasciviously in dreams, and who, in the form of some animal, often forced their way to the fireside through holes and cracks (cf. O.N. *mara kvalði*, 'the torment of the mare,' *mara trad*, also *cauche-mar* [*cauche*, from Lat. *calcare*, 'to tread'], 'the walk of the mare'), it was the horde of *alps*—creatures fabricated by the imagination from the nightmare—the *Elben*, the race of elves (A.S. *ælf-cynn*), who, as noxious demons practised their wicked magic (A.S. *ælf-siden*) upon mankind, especially in attacks of fever. They were the personal causes of the so-called elf-disease, which injures mankind as 'elf-shot' (A.S. *ylfa gescot*, O.N. *alfskud*, Danish *elverskud*), striking the skin (A.S. *on fell scoten*), the flesh (*on flæse scoten*), the blood (*on blod scoten*), or the limbs and joints (*on lid scoten*); or as the less injurious elf-breath, which, when merely blown (O.N. *alvgust*, A.S. *ælfblæst*, Swed. *elfveblast*) upon human beings, caused a swelling of the limbs; or even as a voracious sucking (A.S. *ælf-sogoþa*) of blood or marrow or bone; or as some other vagrant affliction (O.N. *álfa-volkum*, 'elf-roll,' cf. 'walk') which falls upon a person in its flight. When a man fell a victim to such an 'onfall' (A.S. *on-feall*), his neighbours said 'the elves are upon him.'

Besides these, however, there were numerous other noxious spirits ill-affected towards mankind, as may be inferred from the personal cast of many of the ancient names applied to particular diseases, as, *e.g.*, *Nessia*, *Nagedo*, *Stechedo*, *Troppho*, *Crampho*. Touching-demons caused dysentery, lymphangitis, and anthrax; stroking-demons (cf. 'moon-struck'), face paralysis and mental derangement; burning-demons, blisters and gangrene; biting-, pinching-, scratching-, and bruising-demons, skin-affection like cancer, extravasation of blood, itch, freckles, or phlegmonous inflammation, but they could also affect the body internally, and give rise to ulcers in the stomach (O.H.G. *magobizado*). As tearing-demons they produced gnawing pains in nerves and muscles; as striking-demons they afflicted men with apoplexy and epilepsy, with blindness and mumps; as pushing-demons they brought on hiccup, and the *nösch*, which presses upon the heart and the womb; as pricking-demons they were the cause of pneumonia and pleurisy, with their accompanying pains in the side, and also of sunstroke; as choking-demons they caused disorders which constrict the throat (croup, diphtheria); as binding-demons, rickets and phimosis; as gripping-demons (*hardgreip*, *widgreip*), the swoonings and spasms of uræmia, eclampsia, and epilepsy; as blowing-demons, disorders of the eyes (especially blennorrhœa in the newly born) and the blisters of anthrax, as also smallpox and plague, though these, no doubt, were sometimes figured as dragons and griffins rushing hither and thither, and killing people with the poisonous fumes they exhaled.

Human beings were also exposed to the aggressions of certain repulsive creatures of diminutive size, such as the *dwarfs*, who caused monstrous births, local paralysis, lunacy, mumps, and similar diseases (*e.g.* idiocy, apoplexy, herpes), produced convulsions, molested people at night by crushing and stifling, and, in particular, brought about baneful fevers (thus A.S. *dweorg* practically means an attack of fever). Evil-disposed demonic *Schelme* (cf. Scot. 'skellum') smote man and beast with pestilence, conveying influenza (O.H.G. *skalmo*, *skelma*) and the 'black death' in fetid effluvia—an idea which reveals a glimmering sense of the danger of infection, as does also the notion of the 'Schelmenbeine' in starveling cattle, the 'Pestschelme' being supposed to take material shape in these.

Demons of disease dwelling in forests were also regarded as the less noxious *Schrate* (goblins) and *wights*, and were personified as *Düsel* (stupors), or as 'yellow hags,' yellow-bellied *Sälden*, who knit yellow vestments with yellow needles—the yellow smock-frocks which they throw over the bodies of their victims as jaundice (*Gelbsucht*), or as red skin (*Pellmergen*) in erysipelas, or as tumid skin (*Schwellmergen*) in local dropsy. This idea, as implying the personification of local affections, reveals a some-

what more advanced conception of disease, which must have coexisted from the outset with the demonistic view, the latter applying more particularly to acute and chronic infectious diseases, and the whole brood of 'nervous' disorders. The demonistic view of disease has a direct link of connexion with the NT conception of demons in the Gothic word *dáimônareis*, and at length culminates in the mediæval theory of possession by devils (A.S. *dēofolsēoc* and *dēofolsēocnes*).

2. Medicine.—In the practice of healing, likewise, a simple empiricism no doubt prevailed among the ancient Teutons from the first, though naturally the evidence of this fact has almost entirely disappeared. But this experimental therapeutics became almost inseparably combined with demonistic conceptions and modes of thought.

A wound was first of all cleansed and bound up with vulnerary herbs. If the bleeding was profuse, the sore was sprinkled with the dust of dried plants, and the bandage was tightened. But, as this did not always prove effective, recourse was had to the 'more potent' remedies—of which we shall speak below—as preventives, and this mode of treatment was presently applied in all cases and 'for all cases'; *i.e.* it became customary to use such remedies at the very beginning of the treatment, as unexpected and apparently causeless contingencies might supervene in the process of healing—complications as mysterious as they were dangerous, such as inflammation, erysipelas, diphtheria, hospital gangrene, and lock-jaw; in short, all those concomitants of bodily injuries which are now traced to infection. These unwelcome manifestations were regarded as 'gruesome companions,' the personified influences of malicious denizens of the world of spirits and demons, though they might also be due to the machinations of evil-disposed human beings who were able to move the demonic realm and make it subservient to their will. Moreover, there was always the possibility that the invalid had in some respect neglected the claims of religion. He might have fallen short in performance of his duties towards the friendly deities of his people, so that they had sent the injury as a punishment, or had given to the wicked elves, whom they generally held in check, that permission to work injury of which they so fiercely availed themselves. For all such possibilities timely and rapid measures had to be taken. Horror lowered upon primitive man from all sides, and it was the part of wise counsellors—both men and women, but, in all that related to disease, more especially women—to soothe the terror-haunted soul.

Diseases of supernatural origin, and, in fact, all painful things that could not be traced forthwith to sensible causes, might be Divine punishments, from which the sufferer could be absolved only by expiation—by the bloody or unbloody sacrifice. The sacrificing priest secured his people against the demons of plague. Odin himself, however, is the master-magician, the 'magic-father' (O.N. *galdro-father*); as the sun-god he scatters the nocturnal swarm of the 'night-goers' (*nihtgenga*); he is the mighty elf-dispeller, the scourge of the *alps* (*grœti alfa*). Nevertheless, it was also the custom to offer sacrifice to the *alps* themselves (*alfablot*), who were often well-affected towards men, and had some knowledge of the plants that must be dug on moonless nights. The cult of Eir, the special goddess of healing, is of relatively late origin; she was the personification of the gentle hand of woman in nursing the sick (O.N. *eira*, 'to care for,' 'nurse'). But Odin still held his place as the supreme god of healing, and the healing 'touch' of 'Wodan's finger' was long the prerogative of English and Frankish kings—descendants of Odin—as a cure for scrofula and struma ('king's evil'). At an earlier date the power of curing disease was ascribed to the god Thor, the great preserver in times of sickness and danger, the destroyer of evil spirits. But Odin the Wise knew all the secrets of the magic which counteracts the work of demons: 'succouring oracles of healing' (*Hávamál*, 11, 9), 'long, powerful runes of life' (*Rigsþula*, 44), 'succouring staffs and protective runes' (*Sigrdrifumál*, 5 and 9), and 'staffs full of healing virtue' (*Hávamál*, 145).

Here we come upon the most important element in the healing magic directed against the demons of disease, viz. the *spell*, which was inscribed on rods, pieces of bark, or the skin, as, *e.g.*, the hand, of the invalid, and which might be whispered, spoken, chanted, or shouted. All the ancient Teutonic languages furnish numerous examples of such spells or charms—more especially formulæ for the healing of wounds, the staunching of blood, and the prevention of swelling and mortification. Thus, Hartmann von Aue tells how, after a wound had been bandaged, Gawan, faithful to ancient Teutonic custom, uttered the spell: 'Zer wunden wundensegen.' Again and again in the 'blood-charms' we find the phrases: 'stant plot fasto,' 'verstand dû, bluotrinna.' Nor are other possible contingencies forgotten; thus 'dyn stekent, dyn swillent, dyn killent, dyn vulent, dyn stinkent, dyn swerent, dyn rennent sholt laten'—a spell which calls for uninterrupted convalescence. But the folk-medicine of the ancient Teutons comprised similar spells for many other ailments. Thus we find charms for worms, designed to expel the *nesso* (worm) with *niun nessinchlinon* ('nine little worms') from the marrow, through veins, flesh, and skin, and so out of the body;[1] or to kill it, or cause it to drop from the sore in the form of maggots. There were also fever-charms, used for destroying or expelling 'ritten'; charms for fracture and dislocation, spoken while the injured limb was being stroked or rubbed, and supposed to help the disconnected bones to re-unite; charms for the eye, which arrested runnings, swelling, pain and dimness in that organ; charms for convulsions, curing epilepsy, 'wild shot,' gout, obstruction of bowels, colic (*bermuoter*), 'cold pains,' and 'irregular' gout; charms for consumption, curing all forms of wasting disease; charms for swelling, which removed intumescences (*e.g.* wens) and swollen glands (*kyrrill*); charms for the teeth, which destroyed the worms of toothache and caries; birth-charms, which were uttered before the knees of a woman in labour, and helped to usher the child safely into the world and bring away the afterbirth (as, *e.g.*, in the *Edda*, they were 'sung vigorously' for Börgny by Oddrún, supported by the birth-runes 'painted on hands and joint-bandages' as 'health-marks').

Sometimes the expedients employed took the form of slips of bast inscribed with formulæ similar to the foregoing (*zouborgiscrib*), and suspended in little boxes (*plechir*) around the invalid, or bound upon the diseased part (*ligaturæ*); while they were also used as prophylactics, as amulets for the 'breaking of sickness.' But charms were likewise of avail for the transference of diseases to another place, and for conveying them to animals and trees ('branch-runes,' 'which must be learned by any one who would be a physician,' [*Edda*]). Charms were spoken or chanted in gathering medicinal and magical herbs, in making decoctions, and in other proceedings, such as passing or creeping through split trees; they were uttered over an unconscious invalid, or while a

[1] Cf. the celebrated O.H.G. 'Munich worm-charm,' which will be given in full in the art. MAGIC (Teutonic).

rune-embellished gold ring was being moved in a circle round his wound; probably also when an iron or bronze ring was fixed round a limb as a prophylactic against demons, and even in jumping through the solstitial fire, the smoke of which the leaper tried to catch and retain in his clothes as a protection against fever.

The practical parts of these various expedients, and many other actions of the same kind, were, no doubt, frequently—perhaps more frequently—employed without spells, the place of the latter being gradually taken by new manipulations, articles of clothing, and other paraphernalia, *e.g.* wooden masks, hats, cloaks, bags with the most fantastic contents, such as talons, claws, nails, hair, small bones and similar trumpery—the stock-in-trade of the witch-doctor (shaman, medicine-man) all over the world. Such objects as images of the gods were dipped in water in order to endow it with special remedial virtues; cakes were baked in the form of the powers of healing, and then eaten; wooden arms and legs were hung up in temples or groves as votive offerings, while magic stones, with or without runic writing (stones of life), were worn as amulets.

Such were the 'medical' ideas, practices, and devices by which the ancient Teutons sought to cure existing disorders and to secure themselves against possible injuries to health. But even those remedial measures which might at first sight seem to be purely natural were in many cases conjoined with a superstitious element. Thus, when applying a rolling massage to the abdomen for troubles in that region, the 'doctor' would have in his hand a beetle or some such creature, into which the disease, or the demon causing it, was supposed to pass; while, in trying to dislodge the demons of pain from certain parts of the body by fumigating them with the incense of narcotic herbs, the operator softly uttered a spell, or chanted a magic verse. The demonistic theory of disease was itself of empirical origin. Even here a slight though real element of fact underlies all that is merely fanciful, and it was only as a secondary phase that it unfolded that riotous luxuriance which took shape finally as an imaginary host of disease-demons encompassing mankind. These demons were the outcome of what might be called observation of pathological symptoms, which found its materials in all manner of deformities in men and animals; such deformities, again, adding fresh matter to the ideas born of the nightmare, and constantly confirming them by apparently positive evidence—just as the intestinal or external parasite seemed to corroborate the personifying animistic theory of disease. The parasitical theory of disease is thus intimately related to the demonistic.

The anti-demonic incantation was usually regarded as appertaining specially to the individual, who used it to protect himself against, or deliver himself from, some particular demon; while the bloody sacrifice performed by the tribal priest was designed to guard the whole tribe against surprise attacks by the host of disease-spirits. But we also find incantations of an almost general character used as safeguards against possible onsets of demons—against 'whatever elf it may be' (*sy þæt ylfa þe him sie*). All conceivable combinations of the supernaturalistic therapeutics of magic and the physico-chemical therapeutics of manipulation and pharmacy have been evolved in the course of centuries, nor can it even yet be said that, in the folk-medicine of the Teutons or other races, the purely natural standpoint has finally carried the day.

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DISEASE AND MEDICINE (Vedic).—*Limitation of the subject.*—The distinction between charms for the cure of disease (*bhaiṣajyāni*) and other charms is frequently evanescent. They approach with special closeness the charms to secure long life (*āyuṣyāṇi*, cf. Magic [Vedic]) on the one hand, and the charms of exorcism (cf. Witchcraft [Vedic]) on the other. Moreover, charms for easy childbirth, for abortion, and for the promotion or destruction of virility might properly be classed among them, but are in fact classed regularly among the rites pertaining to women (*strī-karmāṇi*, cf. Magic [Vedic]). Instead of attempting any theoretic distinction, it seems best to follow the Hindu classification, and treat in this article only charms of the type contained in the *bhaiṣajya*-chapters (xxv.–xxxii.) of the *Kauśika Sūtra*, reserving the related charms for the articles cited above.

1. Sources.—The chief source for our knowledge of the beliefs relating to disease in Vedic times and of the practices based upon them is the Atharvaveda. Of hymns or parts of hymns intended to secure the cure of more or less sharply defined diseases, the Atharvan *Saṁhitā* contains something over a hundred. The practices by which these were at one time accompanied are given in the *bhaiṣajya*-chapters of the *Kauśika Sūtra*.

It cannot, of course, be always confidently asserted that the practices there described are identical with those employed when the hymns were composed. But that the statements of the ritual are, in the main, based upon a good understanding of the hymns is shown by the flood of light that the study of the ritual has thrown upon the interpretation of the hymns (cf. the history of their interpretation which is given in the Commentary to pages 1–48 of Bloomfield's 'Hymns of the Atharva-veda,' *SBE*, vol. xlii.). That the treatment of the hymn in the ritual is secondary is sometimes too hastily assumed. Thus vi. 44 is clearly a charm against *āsrāva* (diarrhœa) and *vātīkāra* (production of wind in the intestines), but *Kauśika* xxxi. 6 is supposed to rubricate it in a remedial rite against slander. The position of the rite in the *Kauśika* shows that it is intended for the cure of some disease, and, if the commentator is right (as he most probably is) in saying that it is to be employed 'in case of slander,' this means only that the origin of the disease *vātīkāra* is ascribed to the evil speech of an enemy (cf. below, for disease originating from curses, evil eye, and sorcery)—a naive, but not improbable, conception. On the other hand, both the materia medica of the *Kauśika* and its therapeutic practices—slight as these are—seem more advanced than those of the *Saṁhitā* itself. In some cases also the connexion between the rite and the hymn is so superficial that there can be no doubt of the secondary mechanical adaptation of the one to the other. In such cases it is usual to assume that the rite has been made to fit the charm. In view, however, of the great conservatism that in general controls such practices, and the probable pre-historic origin of certain Atharvan charms (cf. Bloomfield, 'The Atharva Veda,' p. 61, and the literature there cited), the opposite possibility deserves more consideration. In the present state of Vedic studies, at all events, we can seldom hope to do better than understand an Atharvan hymn as the *Kauśika* understood it.

Taken together, the two sources furnish a better

picture of primitive medicine than has been preserved in any literature of so early a period. Further interest is added to the subject by the fact that these medical charms are the germ from which the later Hindu medicine was evolved. The stage of its development represented in the medical *Śāstras* implies several centuries of evolution from the standpoint of the *Kauśika*, and is now known (through the discovery of the Bower MS.) to have been attained previous to the 5th cent. of our era. The relation of the later medicine to the Atharva is recognized by the Hindus themselves, who regard the Yajurveda as an 'after-Veda' (*upaveda*) of the Atharva. Hindu medicine in turn has, through the Arabs, left its effect upon European medicine.

Other Vedic texts, owing to the purpose of their composition, do not have occasion to handle the phenomena of disease in the same concrete fashion, and to the same extent. Apart from the addition of details of a similar nature, their chief contribution consists in a picture of the general attitude of their authors and users towards disease. Into this picture as a background the details of the Atharva fit with perfect harmony. The difference between the hieratic texts (the Rigveda in particular) and the Atharva is neither a difference in time, nor a difference in enlightenment between the adherents of these Vedas. It is rather the difference in attitude of the priest and the physician (each liberal enough to employ on occasion the resources of the other) when brought face to face with disease.

2. The Atharvan practice of medicine.—(1) *Knowledge of anatomy.*—The Atharva evinces a very thorough knowledge of what may be called the coarser anatomy of the human body, naming its various external subdivisions, and many of its internal organs. Thus ii. 33 is a long list of the parts of the body from which the disease is to be torn; similar lists occur also in ix. 8, x. 2, and xi. 8. Beyond this knowledge, which was to a great extent a pre-historic acquisition (cf. O. Schrader, *Reallex. d. indogerm. Altertumskunde*, 1901, *s.v.* 'Körpertheile'), the Atharva can hardly be said to go. The apparent distinction between veins and arteries in i. 17. 3 is offset by the occurrence of the same words in vii. 35. 2, with the more general sense of 'internal canals,' meaning entrails, vagina, etc.—showing how vague were the ideas held with regard to such subjects. The isolated statement of ix. 8. 10, 'what is diseased shall become urine,' may be mentioned as an accidental approximation to a partial truth. To be noted, however, is the fact that the Hindu theory of the constitution of the body of three elements—bile, phlegm, and wind—does not appear in the early Atharvan texts. *Vātīkṛtanāśanī* of vi. 44. 3 cannot be urged as proof to the contrary, as it means, not 'destructive of (diseases) produced by the wind in the body' (*vātakṛtanāśanī*), but 'destructive of that which has been made into wind.' Evidently, from its association with diarrhœa, it refers to wind in the intestines. The later theory, which appears first in the *Svapnādhyāya*, Atharv. Par. 68, is, of course, familiar to the commentators, who endeavour to foist it upon the *Kauśika*.

(2) *Theory of the origin of disease.*—The popular mind is ever ready to see in disease the manifestation of the will of a supernatural power. To the Atharvan this power was generally one of the hosts of demons by which he believed himself surrounded. How slight was the distinction made between disease and possession may be seen from a hymn like Atharv. ii. 4, which is directed against disease and demon alike. Compare also v. 23. 2, where Indra is invoked to destroy the worms in a child, and it is immediately declared that all the *arāti* (certain female demons) are slain. It is also clearly implied by the fact that the *Kauśika* contains, among its remedial practices, ceremonies which consist merely in the driving away of the demons that are causing the disease (cf. xxv. 22–36, xxxi. 3–4); in providing the patient with an amulet to resist their attacks (xxvi. 26 f., xxvii. 5 f., xxviii. 7); or in spells to dissipate and remove the harm they have done (xxvi. 29–32, xxviii. 9–11).

These demons of disease are generally vague in outline and indefinite in number, and are known by the names *piśācha*, *rakṣas*, *atrin*, and *kaṇva*. Of their various pernicious activities, it may be noted that the *piśācha* devour the flesh of their victims (Atharv. iv. 36. 3, v. 29. 5); the etymology of *atrin* points in the same direction, while the *kaṇva* prey especially upon the embryo (ii. 25. 3). Other unnamed demons (*ib.*) are suckers of blood and takers away of fatness, while in xix. 36. 6 figure the dog-like she-demons that recall the dog-demon of epilepsy (*Āpastambīya Gṛhya Sūtra*, xviii. 1) and the dog-like *gandharvas* of Atharv. iv. 37. 11. Another class of beings to whose influences diseases are ascribed are the *gandharvas* and their consorts the 'mind-bewildering' *apsaras* (cf. Atharv. ii. 2. 5, iv. 37, xix. 36. 6). Insanity in particular is ascribed to their influence (cf. vi. 111. 4, also Rigveda x. 11. 2; Pischel, *Vedische Studien*, i. [1889] 188, and the statement of *Tāittirīya Saṁhitā*, iii. 4. 8. 4: 'The *gandharvas* and *apsaras* render mad him that is mad'). The *rakṣas*, too (Atharv. vi. 111. 3), can steal away one's senses. In Atharv. v. 29. 6 f. is indicated one way in which the demons obtain possession of their victim—by entering him with his food. It is with this possibility in view that *Kauśika* xxvi. 10 orders as a hygienic precaution that the sacks of grain belonging to the sick man shall be surrounded with a ring of heated pebbles. As the Atharva makes but slight distinction between demon and human sorcerer, it is not surprising to find the latter causing disease (Atharv. i. 28, iv. 28, xix. 39. 1) or diseases attributed to magic (iii. 7. 6; for methods of thus producing disease, cf. art. WITCHCRAFT [Vedic]), curses, or the evil eye (ii. 7, v. 15 and 16, vi. 96. 2, xix. 35. 3, and *Kauś.* xxvi. 35, xxix. 15–17).

Theoretically the diseases themselves are demons, and in some cases, e.g. *viṣkandha* and *saṁskandha*, it is impossible to decide whether the word should be considered the name of a demon or of a disease. But the personality of disease-demons is rarely strongly marked, and none of them is exactly comparable with the later smallpox goddess Śītalā. The closest approach is to be found in *takman* (fever), the Atharvan name for the disease known to the later medicine as *jvara* (cf. esp. the hymn v. 22, in which he is adjured to go elsewhere; and i. 25, vi. 20, and vii. 116, in which he is offered homage). Certain scrofulous sores called *apachit* are supposed to move of their own volition, as they fly through the air and settle upon their victim. So much is this the case, that earlier interpreters understood the word as the name of a noxious insect. As in other popular systems of medicine (cf. A. Kuhn, in *Kuhn's Zeitschrift*, xiii. 49 ff. and 113 ff.), a number of diseases are ascribed to the presence of worms (practically a form of demon [cf. above]) located in various parts of the body, and most fantastically described (cf. Atharv. ii. 31 and 32, v. 23, with numerous parallels in other texts to be cited below).

Less frequently the Atharva ascribes a disease to one of the greater gods, and then often as a punishment for sin. Varuṇa sends dropsy to punish crime, especially falsehood (cf. Atharv. i. 10. 1–4, ii. 10. 1, iv. 16. 7, vii. 83. 1–4, xix. 44. 8; once also, i. 25. 3, the *takman* is said to be his son

[*i.e.* sent by him], and in vi. 96. 2 [a charm employed by *Kauśika* to heal the dropsy, but probably originally of a wider scope] the prayer is to be 'freed from the toils of Varuṇa, the foot-fetter of Yama [Death], and every sin against the gods'). Certain sharp pains are ascribed to the spear of Rudra (*Kauś.* xxxi. 7); the arrow of the same god causes tumours (Atharv. vi. 57); the *takman* and the *kāsikā* (cough) are his weapons (xi. 2. 22), and in xi. 2. 26 he is said to send the *takman*. A ceremony to his children, the Maruts (*Kauś.* xxvi. 24), serves as a cure for leprosy. Diarrhœa is connected in i. 2 with the arrows of Parjanya (the rain-god), and lightning (Agni) is regarded in i. 12 as productive of fever, headache, and cough. Takṣaka, a serpent-god, is worshipped in *Kauś.* xxviii. 1, xxix. 1, xxxii. 20 (charms to cure the bites of poisonous reptiles).

The supposed hereditary nature of some disease seems implied in the name *kṣetriya* (the interpretation is disputed), but even it has demons that produce it. Finally, the *śamī*-tree is supposed to have some evil influence on the hair (cf. Atharv. vi. 30. 2 f., and *Kauś.* xxxi. 1).

(3) *The diseases treated.*—The identification of the diseases treated in the Atharva is difficult in the extreme. In the first place, there is nothing that can be called diagnosis in our sense of the term. The practitioner is concerned merely with the troublesome symptom; of the cause of the symptom, the disease itself, he knows nothing. Sometimes the symptom, e.g. *jalodara* ('water-belly'), is definite enough to enable us to identify the disease; more frequently it is not, *e.g.* the terms *apachit* ('sores') and *akṣuta* ('tumours') must have covered a great variety of afflictions from the most harmless to the most malignant. In the next place, the *Kauśika*, as a rule, does not state the disease for which its charms are intended. This important item is left to be inferred from the hymn rubricated. Unfortunately the hymns often combine the most varied diseases; extreme instances may be found in ii. 33, ix. 8.

The commentators (of much later date) endeavour to supply this deficiency. Their statements, however, are not only frequently contradictory, but are also evidently affected by their knowledge of the later Hindu medicine. As an example of the way they work may be taken Keśava's statement that *Kauś.* xxx. 13 is a cure for dropsy, heart-disease, and jaundice. Both the ritual and the hymn rubricated (vi. 24) are plainly concerned primarily with dropsy; this disease is frequently complicated with heart-disease, which is, therefore, mentioned in the hymn. But in i. 22 (a cure for jaundice) heart-disease is also incidentally mentioned. Keśava seems to have reasoned that, since the cure for jaundice (i. 22) cured heart-disease, therefore another cure for heart-disease (vi. 24) must also cure jaundice! Finally, there are many obscure terms both in the *Saṁhitā* and in the *Sūtra*.

The most dreaded disease was the 'fever' especially predominant in the autumn (*viśvaśārada*). Its later name *jvara* does not occur in the Atharva, where it is known as *takman*, a name which conversely is confined to this Veda. To it especially are devoted i. 25, v. 22, vi. 20, vii. 116; and to its specific, the *kuṣṭha*-plant (*Costus speciosus*), v. 4 and xix. 39; incidental mention of the disease is found in i. 12. 2, iv. 9. 8, ix. 8. 6, xix. 34. 10, 39. 1 and 10. The *Gaṇamālā*, Atharv. Par. 32, gives a long list (cf. *Kauś.* xxvi. 1 n.) of hymns that encompass its destruction. This list, *takmanāśanagaṇa*, is made by taking the first five hymns cited above, and adding to them the hymns against *kṣetriya* (ii. 8 and 10, iii. 7), against *yakṣma* (iii. 11, vi. 85 and 127), various panacea-hymns (ii. 9, iv. 28, v. 9, vi. 26 and 91, ix. 8), and a hymn (vi. 42) originally intended to appease anger—heat forming the *tertium comparationis*. The symptoms described are alternation between heat and cold, delirium, return of the fever either (at the same hour) every day, or every third day, or omitting every third day. Associated with it are jaundice, certain red eruptions (v. 22. 3), headache, cough, spasm, and itch (*pāman*), the last being its brother's son (v. 22. 12).

Yakṣma (also *rājayakṣma*, *ajñātayakṣma*, to which *Taitt. Saṁ.* ii. 3. 5. 1–3, 5. 6. 4–5 add *pāpayakṣma*) seems to have in the Atharva (cf. ii. 33, iii. 11, v. 29. 13, vi. 127. 3, ix. 8, xix. 36 and 44) no narrower signification than 'disease.' With this accords the statement of *Vāj. Saṁ.* xii. 97 that there are a hundred varieties of *yakṣma*. The employment of its hymns in the *takmanāśanagaṇa* implies either a disease of marked febrile symptoms or (preferably) such an indefinite meaning. So also does the fact that *Śāntikalpa*, xxiii. 2 employs *yakṣmopaghāta* as a synonymous name for this *gaṇa*, while other texts have the form *yakṣman*, congenerically adapted to *takman*. Zimmer (*Altindisches Leben*, 1879, p. 375 ff.), in accord with the later medicine, sees in it a pulmonary disease. But a variety of *yakṣma*, called *jāyenya* (*Taitt. Saṁ. l.c.*), is probably identical with the Atharvan *jāyānya*; for *jāyānya* is associated with *yakṣma* in Atharv. xix. 44. 2, and called *rājayakṣma* by Keśava at *Kauś.* xxxii. 11. All this will be correct if *yakṣma* means simply 'disease,' and still in harmony both with Dārila's statement (*loc. cit.*), that *jāyānya* is some species of tumour (*akṣata*), and the fact that both etymology and the ritual point to *jāyānya's* being a venereal disease. Venereal disease (*grāmya*) is treated in *Kauś.* xxvii. 32 f., while the hymn there rubricated deals with *ajñātayakṣma* and *rājayakṣma*. Sāyaṇa's statement, that consumption produced by sexual excesses is meant, is evidently an attempt to harmonize the ritual with the meaning of *yakṣma* in the later medicine. Here may be added the mention of 'abscesses' (*vidradha*, vi. 127, ix. 8. 20); 'scrofulous swellings' (*apachit*); and the similar, but harder, 'closed tumours' (*akṣata*, vi. 25 and 57, vii. 74. 1–2, 76. 1–3). Leprosy (*kilāsa*) is the object of two hymns (i. 23 and 24). Keśava also assigns to its cure the practice (*Kauś.* xxviii. 13) with the *kuṣṭha*-plant, which Dārila, supported by the *Gaṇamālā*, declares to be a cure for fever. Keśava's statement has probably no deeper basis than the fact that *kuṣṭha* in the later language means leprosy.

Kṣetriya is another term of uncertain meaning. The Atharvavedins regularly explain it as 'inherited disease,' though 'chronic disease' has recently been suggested by Jolly. No description of its symptoms is given. As in the case of *yakṣma*, the inclusion of its hymns (ii. 8 and 10, iii. 7 [cf. besides ii. 14. 5]) in the *takmanāśanagaṇa* suggests either a disease of marked febrile character or a general term for disease. Even if, as is most probable, the word means 'hereditary,' there is no reason to believe that the designation was accurate.

Easily identified, on the other hand, is dropsy (*jalodara*). To its cure i. 10, vi. 22–24 and 96, and vii. 83 are devoted. In vi. 24 it is associated with heart disease—an instance of good diagnosis. The mention in the same hymn of pain in the eyes, heels, and front part of the foot refers to the characteristic puffing of these parts. Heart-disease (*hṛdyota*, *hṛdayāmaya*) is mentioned only incidentally (i. 22. 1, v. 20. 12, 30. 9, vi. 14. 1, 24. 1, 127. 3), and probably referred to any pain in the region of the heart. Paralysis (*pakṣahata*, lit. *hemiplegia*) is mentioned in the *Kauśika* itself (xxxi. 18), but the hymn rubricated is extremely obscure, and was probably not intended for this purpose.

Excessive discharges (*āsrāva*), and in particular diarrhœa (*atisāra* of the later medicine), have for their cure i. 2, ii. 3, and probably also vi. 44 (cf. above). There is perhaps an allusion to it in

connexion with fever in v. 22. 4. The opposite troubles, retention of urine and constipation, are the subject of i. 3 according to *Kauśika* xxv. 10 ff.; the hymn itself seems, however, to be entirely concerned with the first of these diseases.

Cough (*kās, kāsa*) is mentioned in connexion with fever (i. 12. 3, v. 22. 10–12), and is also the object of a separate ceremony in which vi. 105, vii. 107 are rubricated. *Balāsa* is variously interpreted as 'consumption' and as 'internal sores'; the assonance both with *kāsa* and with *kilāsa* is noteworthy, and strengthens both interpretations. The hymn in which it figures most prominently is vi. 14, rubricated by *Kauś.* xxix. 30 in a ceremony which Keśava terms a 'phlegm-cure.' This term cannot, however, be taken to indicate necessarily some throat disease, as it means any disease ascribed to an abnormal condition of the 'phlegm' in the technical sense of the later medicine (for Keśava's use of such terms cf. xxvi. 1 and 28). *Balāsa* is also mentioned in iv. 9. 8, v. 22. 11–12, vi. 127. 1–2, ix. 8. 8, 10, xix. 34. 10. In connexion with it (v. 22. 11) appears *udyuga*, perhaps 'spasm.'

Headache (*śīrṣakti, śīrṣāmaya*) is mentioned in i. 12. 3 and v. 4. 10, both times in connexion with fever, and also in ix. 8—an effort to enumerate all diseases. The practice of *Kauś.* xxviii. 13 is said by Dārila to be a cure for headache, while Keśava applies it in a broader fashion. Neuralgia (*visalyaka*) is mentioned in vi. 127, ix. 8. 2, xix. 44. 2; pain in the ribs (*pṛṣṭyāmaya*, inter-costal neuralgia?) in xix. 34. 10; rheumatic troubles are perhaps meant by *viṣkandha*, and *saṁskandha* (i. 16. 3, ii. 4, iii. 9. 6, iv. 9. 5, xix. 34. 5, 35. 1); with these may be associated *viśara* (ii. 4. 2), *āśarīka*, and *viśarīka* (xix. 34. 10). Some sharp internal pain is ascribed in vi. 90 to the spear of Rudra. Its exact nature is indeterminable, but the later medicine applies the same term to colic. A 'limb-splitting' disease (*aṅgabheda*) also occurs in xix. 44. 2, while two hymns (ii. 33, ix. 8) aim at eradicating pain and disease from all parts of the body. Pains in the eyes (cf. also v. 4. 10, 23. 3, vi. 24. 2, 127. 3) and ears may be especially mentioned. A separate charm for diseases of the eye (*alajī* occurs also in ix. 8. 20 as the name of some form of eye disease) is found in vi. 16 according to its manipulation in *Kauś.* xxx. 1–6. The parallelism of the hymn with v. 23 suggests that the pains in the eyes are ascribed to the presence of worms. For diseases ascribed to worms cf. above.

Of more external evils a 'flow of blood' (*lohita*, vi. 127, *vilohita*, ix. 8. 1, xii. 4. 4) means, perhaps, bleeding at the nose (cf. the association with diseases of the head in ix. 8. 1). A special charm against bleeding is i. 17 (rubricated at *Kauś.* xxvi. 10), to stop, according to Keśava, either an external or internal hæmorrhage, or excessive menstruation. Against the last of these troubles is directed the practice of *Kauś.* xxviii. 15, rubricating v. 6. The cure of wounds and fractures is the object of iv. 12 and v. 5 (rubricated at *Kauś.* xxviii. 5–6 and 14). Wounds or sores of unknown origin (*ajñātārus*) are healed with vi. 83. 4. In a snake-infested country like India cures for poison were sure to be in demand. For the poisonous bites of snakes the Atharva contains three charms (v. 13, vi. 12, x. 4), besides one (vii. 56) against the bites of scorpions and other poisonous reptiles, and another (iv. 6 and 7) against the poison of arrows. Internal poisoning does not seem to have been treated separately.

In certain forms of disease, *e.g.* mania, epilepsy, the distinction from possession is very slight. In case of possession, iv. 20 and 37, vi. 2. 2, or 52, or 111 (this last hymn speaking unmistakably of madness), or the *chātanagaṇa* (list of hymns for expulsion of demons) may be employed. In a rite against madness, *Kauś.* xxviii. 12, Atharv. v. 1. 7 is rubricated; epilepsy (*apasmāra*) is said by Keśava to be one of the diseases for which i. 22 is employed at *Kauś.* xxvi. 14–21. *Grāhi*, 'fit,' 'seizure,' is practically a she-demon (cf. ii. 9. 1, 10. 6, iii. 11. 1, vi. 112. 1, viii. 2. 12, xii. 3. 18). Another demon which seizes children is *jambha*—apparently a designation of convulsions or lock-jaw (cf. ii. 4. 2; *Kauś.* xxxii. 1–2).

The *Kauśika*, in accordance with its method of treating symptoms, has also cures for 'thirst' (xxvii. 9–13) and 'fright' (xxvi. 26 f.), which we should hardly class as diseases. The latter may be what we call nervousness, but V. Henry has no warrant for interpreting the former as dipsomania. Inauspicious marks (cf. art. PRODIGIES [Vedic]) on the body (*pāpalakṣaṇa*, xxxi. 1; *ariṣṭa*, xxviii. 15) are also treated as diseases. Keśava thinks that the ceremony to remove wrinkles (*Kauś.* xxv. 4 f.) has reference only to wrinkles in a young man, in whom they are portentous. The ceremony to stop the loss of hair (*Kauś.* xxxi. 28), employing two hymns, vi. 136 f., evidently composed for this very purpose, is to be ascribed to the same motive rather than to vanity. A person whose hair has come into contact with a *śamī*-tree is called *śamīlūna* ('cut by a *śamī*-tree'), and is supposed to be in danger of suffering some injury to his hair. For his benefit is the ceremony of *Kauś.* xxxi. 1, and the hymn rubricated seems to have had the same case in view.

Finally, a number of ceremonies are designated as panaceas (cf. *Kauś.* xxv. 4–5, 20, 21, 22–36, xxvi. 1, 34, xxvii. 5–6, 27, 34, xxviii. 8, 17–20, xxx. 17–18, xxxi. 5, xxxii. 3–4, 18–19, 26–27), though in some cases a more narrow interpretation seems possible.

(4) *The materia medica of the Atharvans.*—That the waters should be considered healing is most natural in virtue of both their cleansing and their cooling properties. So it is stated in Atharv. ii. 29. 6 that the waters give strength, and in iii. 7. 5 = vi. 91. 3 that they are remedial and expel disease (cf. also the passages from the Rigveda cited below). In the *Kauśika*, water is employed most frequently, either for its own sake (so the holy water in xxxi. 21) or as a vehicle for other remedies. To the waters are especially devoted the hymns, Atharv. i. 4–6, employed as a panacea at *Kauś.* xxv. 20, and vi. 22–24, employed as cures for dropsy at *Kauś.* xxx. 11–13. Of particularly great efficacy, however, is the water dug up by ants (cf. Atharv. ii. 3, vi. 100, and Bloomfield, *Am. Jour. Phil.* vii. 482 ff.). Hence earth from an ant-hill serves as an amulet, a drink, or an external application for the cure of diarrhœa, etc. (*Kauś.* xxv. 7), and of *kṣetriya* (xxvi. 43); and as an antidote for poison (xxxi. 26, xxxii. 6). There is the possibility of the patient's receiving sufficient formic acid (cf. art. CHARMS AND AMULETS [Vedic] for method of investiture) to act as a cathartic. In all these passages, except xxxi. 26, there is associated with it a lump of ordinary earth. The separate use of the latter as an emetic in *Kauś.* xxviii. 3 (so Dārila) is doubtful, as Keśava and Sāyaṇa understand the fruit of the *madana*-tree. Noteworthy is the fact that both the clod of earth and the ant-hill seem to be looked upon as growths (cf. their inclusion in the list of auspicious plants, *Kauś.* viii. 16). Similar remedies are earth from a mole-hill, to cure constipation (*Kauś.* xxv. 11), this material being selected because the animal makes its way through dark passages, and also because one of its names, *ākhukarīṣa*, is compounded with a word for 'excrement' (cf. *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, ii. 1. 1. 8); and earth from a bee-hive (xxix. 10), as an antidote to poison.

Plants are to the Vedic mind the offspring and the essence of the waters, the embodiment of their curative properties. Hence they, too, are implored to bestow remedies (cf. Atharv. vi. 96, and esp. the long hymn viii. 7 addressed to all plants, and used as a panacea at *Kauś.* xxvi. 40; cf. also the *oṣadhī-stuti* of the Rigveda cited below). The list of plants employed as remedies in the *Kauśika* is long, and comprises the following: in a number of passages (xxv. 20, xxvi. 40, xxvii. 5, 20, 33, xxix. 30, xxx. 8, 11, xxxi. 8) the prescription calls simply for 'auspicious trees,' that is, the trees enumerated in viii. 15. Of trees in this list are specifically prescribed: *palāśa*=*Butea frondosa* (xxv. 30, xxvi. 34), a tree of pre-eminent holiness because of its mythical associations (cf. art. CHARMS AND AMULETS [Vedic]); *kāmpīla*=*Crinum amaryllaceæ* (xxvii. 7, xxviii. 8); *varaṇa*=*Cratæva roxb.* (xxvi. 37; cf. same art.); *jaṅgiḍa*=*Terminalia arjuna* (xxvi. 43); *vetasa*=*Calamus rotang* (xxvii. 10). Other remedies figure in the list of auspicious plants (*Kauś.* viii. 16): *śamī*=*Prosopis spicigera* (xxviii. 9, xxxi. 1); *śamakā* (xxxi. 1); *darbha*-grass=*Poa cynosurides* (xxv. 37, xxvi. 30, xxvii. 23, xxxi. 2 [Com.]); also, after its use as sacrificial straw, *barhis* (xxv. 31); *dūrvā*-grass=millet (xxvi. 13); rice (xxix. 18; cf. also the use of porridges, below); and barley, *yava* (xxv. 17, 27, xxvi. 2, 35, 43, xxviii. 20, xxx. 17), efficacious because fancifully connected with *yavayati*, 'he separates.' Another plant not in this list, but evidently employed because of its holiness is the *soma*-plant (xxxi. 22).

Other plants owe their efficacy as remedies to their anti-demoniacal qualities (for these qualities cf. art. WITCHCRAFT [Vedic]): *iṅgiḍa*-oil (xxv. 30); *tila, taila*=sesamum and the oil made from it (xxvi. 1, 13, 43, xxvii. 33, xxix. 8); reed (xxvi. 27); *vīriṇa* and *uśīra*=*Andropogon muricatus* (xxv. 30, xxvi. 26, xxix. 24-26, xxxii. 13); hemp (xxv. 28, xxvii. 33); *khadira*=*Acacia catechu* (xxv. 23 f.); mustard (xxv. 23, 27, 31, xxx. 1 ff.; cf. also the *Āsurīkalpa*, Atharv. Par. 35); *trapusa*=colocynth (xxv. 23; also mentioned by Keśava at xxvi. 22, where it seems to be used principally for its colouring property). The use of wood from a club (xxv. 23) belongs to the same category.

A number of other plants owe their employment to more or less fanciful etymologies: *muñja*-grass =*Saccharum munja* (xxv. 6, xxvi. 2, 33, xxxii. 3), associated with *muñchati*, 'he loosens.' Leaves of the *paraśu*-tree, 'axe-tree,' are employed at xxx. 14 to cause sores to open, and wood of the *kṛmuka*-tree at xxviii. 2 to cure wounds inflicted by poisoned arrows, because *kārmuka* means 'bow.' Growth of the hair is promoted (xxxi. 28) by the *nitatnī*-plant, 'she that takes root,' with which are associated the *jīvī* (root *jīv*, 'to live') and the *alākā* plants. The *lākṣā* of xxviii. 5 seems to be a synonym for *arundhatī* of the hymn iv. 12, felt to contain *arus*, 'wound,' and the root *dhā*, 'to set,' and hence employed to cure fractures and wounds. Bunches of grass (*stamba*) are employed (xxix. 4) to confine (root *stambh*) the effects of poison; they are also added (xxxii. 3, 14) to water with which a patient is washed or sprinkled.

In addition are employed: lotus roots (*bisa*, combined with *āla* and *ula*, xxv. 18); *haridrā*= *Curcuma longa*, as a cure for jaundice (xxvi. 18) [because of its yellow colour], as an antidote to poison (xxviii. 4, xxxii. 7 [Com.]), or as a panacea (xxxi. 5 [Com.]). It is also prescribed, according to the commentators, in the cure for leprosy of xxvi. 22. As the cure consists merely in painting out the spot, *Eclipta prostrata* or indigo may be used instead. There is mention also of *pṛśniparṇī* =*Hemionitis cordifolia roxb.* (xxvi. 36); *pippalī*, pepper (xxvi. 38); black beans (xxvii. 14); *sadam-puṣpā* (xxviii. 7); *kuṣṭha* (xxviii. 13); *alābu*= *Lagenaria vulgaris* (xxix. 13 f.); *khalatula* (xxix. 15 f.); *karīra*=*Capparis aphylla roxb.* (xxix. 20); *śigru*=*Moringa pterygosperma* (xxix. 23); *śāka*= *Tectona grandis* (xxx. 4); *vibhītaka*-nut=*Bellerica terminalia* (xxx. 9); *nikaṭā*-plant (xxx. 10); *śamī-bimba*=*Momordica monadelpha* (xxxi. 8); *śīrṇa-parṇī*=*Azadirachta indica* (xxxi. 8); *priyaṅgu*= *Panicum italicum* (xxxii. 2). The commentators at xxv. 10 also mention, as instances of substances that promote micturition, camphor, *Terminalia chebula*, and *harītakī*.

The fragrant powders employed in xxvi. 29 are probably made from plants, and owe their efficacy to their fragrance, just as the use of liquorice (xxxii. 5) is due to its sweetness. On the other hand, the *pūtīka*-grass is employed (xxv. 11) in a cure for constipation, because of the offensive odour implied in its name.

Next in prominence to the plants are the products of the cow, which, as partaking of its holiness, are used either for their own efficacy, or as a suitable vehicle for other remedies: butter (*ājya* and *sarpis*, xxv. 4, 8, xxvi. 1, 8, 29–33, xxvii. 14, xxviii. 4, 13, xxix. 22 f., Com. to xxxi. 5 and xxxii. 7); curds (*dadhi*, xxvi. 13); milk (xxvi. 17, xxviii. 14, xxxi. 24, xxxii. 2); milk and butter (xxviii. 6); butter-milk (xxxi. 23). The hair of a red steer is employed (xxvi. 14), cow-dung (xxvi. 22), and cow-urine, the particular remedy of Rudra (cf. below), at xxxi. 11. The *pañchagavya* (five products of the cow), which afterwards becomes a potent panacea, is not yet concocted, though all its ingredients are in use. Its preparation and administration are described in one of the Atharvan Pariśiṣṭas, *Brahmakūrcha-vidhi*.

Food of any sort (xxviii. 12, 15, xxix. 16) may serve as a vehicle, but porridges (xxvi. 19, xxvii. 10, 31, xxviii. 3, 16, xxix. 15, Com. at xxxi. 5 and xxxii. 7), especially rice porridges (xxvi. 18, xxvii. 32, xxix. 27), are thus employed most frequently, or even separately administered. Honey (xxvi. 1, xxviii. 28, xxxi. 23) and fat (xxvi. 1) are also prescribed, and in xxxii. 1 the mother's breast serves as a vehicle for giving medicine to an infant.

A number of substances are applied, on account of their offensiveness, to sores, in the hope of inducing them to fly away: powdered shell and dog's saliva (xxx. 16); the scourings of teeth and pollen of grass (xxxi. 14 f.); rock-salt and spittle (xxxi. 17). Comparable perhaps is the administration of rotten fish in xxvii. 32. Of animals comparatively little use is made; the frog figures in a cure for fever (xxxii. 17), and yellow birds in a cure for jaundice (xxvi. 18), but in both cases the disease is to be transferred to them. The porcupine serves in xxix. 11 f. as an antidote to poison, because he is an animal not liable to trouble from snakes. For the same purpose also an unknown insect is employed as a representative of the mythical steed of Pedu (cf. Bloomfield, *SBE* xlii. 605 ff.). Also for mythical reasons are employed in xxxi. 18 ff. earth that a dog has stepped upon, and a louse from a dog (cf. *ib.* p. 500 ff.). Manufactured articles are employed chiefly as amulets (cf. below). There occur also: wood-shavings (xxv. 11); grass from a thatch (xxv. 37, xxvii. 3, xxix. 8, xxx. 13, Com. at xxxi. 2); old clothes and broom (xxviii. 2); bowstring (xxix, 9, xxxii. 8, 10); *pramanda*, tooth-wash (xxv. 11).

The efficacy of these remedies depends not entirely upon themselves, but also upon the method of their preparation and administration. In the first place, as in other magic performances, there is a quasi-religious performance (cf. art. MAGIC [Vedic]), and the remedies are regularly daubed with the leavings (*sampāta*) of the offering. There are other requirements besides: the offerings must

sometimes be made from *cornucopiæ* instead of a spoon (xxv. 30), or the medicine must be administered from *cornucopiæ* (xxviii. 8), or from a particular sort of cow's horn (xxxi. 6), or a red copper vessel (xxix. 19), or through a yoke (xxvii. 1), or with a pestle (xxix. 22); or must be prepared in a vessel of reed and stirred with a reed (xxvii. 10), or stirred with poisoned arrows (xxviii. 3); or the fire used must be a forest fire (xxix. 19), or made of birds' nests (xxix. 27); or built on a mat of reeds floating in water (xxix. 30). The place of the ceremony is not always a matter of indifference: one cure of dropsy (xxxii. 14) must be attempted at the confluence of two streams, other cures at the cross-roads (xxv. 30, xxx. 18), or in a ditch (xxvii. 4). The position of the patient (xxvii. 10, 25), the clothing and food of the celebrant (xxxi. 28), are also efficacious. So, too, is the time of the ceremony: thus that of xxvii. 21–25 must be repeated at sunrise, noon, and sunset. The time most frequently prescribed is *avanakṣatre* (xxvii. 29, xxviii. 5, xxx. 9 [Dārila], xxxi. 28, 'at the time when the stars fade away'). The purpose is clearly expressed in Atharv. iii. 7. 7: 'when the constellations fade away and when the dawn fades away, (then) shall he shine away from us every evil and the *kṣetriya*.' In one case (xxxi. 28), where the purpose is to secure (black) hair, the time is further defined as 'before the crows come.'

(5) *The Atharvan methods of treating diseases.*—Of practices of a real therapeutic value the *Kauśika* contains but little. The most delicate is the probing of the urethra, which seems to be prescribed (xxv. 15–16) for the relief of one suffering from retention of urine. It is instructive to observe that the discovery of this operation may be due to an attempt to carry out practically the statements of the hymn: 'I split open thy *pasas* like the dike of a lake,' and 'relaxed is the opening of thy bladder.' Originally, however, these were probably nothing but the usual statements of the conjurer that he was accomplishing what he wanted to accomplish. A similar instance (at a later period) of the evolution of a practical out of a magical proceeding may be seen in Dārila's comment on xxv. 12, where the giving of an enema is substituted for an operation, the symbolism of which should be transparent. The same hymn (Atharv. i. 3) harbours another practice, the real value of which may have helped the Atharvavedins in the cure of minor troubles. The urine is to come out with the sound 'splash,' and the ritual speaks also of the pouring out of water—a piece of symbolism to be attributed unhesitatingly to the time of the composition of the hymn. The sound of flowing water, however, does exercise a beneficial influence in such cases, especially when the trouble is of a nervous origin. A compress of sand is employed (*Kauś.* xxvi. 10) to stop the flow of blood, and the practice is indicated in the hymn itself (Atharv. i. 17. 4). In *Kauś.* xxviii. 3 an emetic is given to one wounded by a poisoned arrow. The application of leeches to sores is found in *Kauś.* xxx. 16, but accompanied by other ceremonies that one would expect to produce infection of the wound; and the same may be said of the breaking of pustules (xxxi. 10) by rubbing them against the door-post. In *Kauś.* xxxii. 24 a torch is applied to the bite of a serpent. The original intent must have been symbolic, but the result may have been some sort of cauterization.

Apart from these instances, the treatment is always magical. As usual in the Atharva, it is magic veneered with religion. The employment of a hymn is regularly accompanied with an oblation, perhaps even inserted in the elaborate framework of the New and Full Moon Sacrifice (cf. art. MAGIC [Vedic]); and it is this oblation, generally through the leavings of the offering, that gives efficacy to the ceremony. Of the hymns but little need be said, as all are accessible in translations.[1] They are prayers addressed to the gods, or to the disease, or to the remedy, with more or less explicit indication of what is wanted of them. Sometimes the author adopts a more confident tone, especially when he knows the name or lineage of the disease, or its remedy, and thus has them in his power. Then he states what he is doing, or orders the disease to depart. For, according to a well-known principle of magic, a verbal statement is an efficient symbolical imitation of an act.

The ceremonies are of greater interest. As the diseases are generally ascribed to a demon, the problem for the practitioner is the removal of this troublesome being. The methods of accomplishing this are in general either to propitiate or to exorcize the spirit, and in this we have the division into homœopathy and allopathy. In the one case, the demon is given what is most acceptable to him, as being of his own nature; in the other case, he is brought into contact with what is presumably the most repugnant to him.

Some ceremonies in which the exorcistic character is specially noticeable are: *Kauś.* xxv. 22–36, rubrication of the *chātanagaṇa* (list of expelling hymns); xxvii. 6, xxxii. 18, in which the cure is effected by the laying on of hands; xxviii. 11, in which a ring of magic powder is drawn round the house to prevent the return of the demon; xxix. 7, where the door is opened to facilitate the departure of the demon; and xxxi. 3, a curious ceremony in which the offering is made in a fire surrounded by a ditch filled with hot water, the potency of this ring having been increased by circumambulation. The apparatus seems to be a trap for the demons.

The methods by which the magical substance is brought into contact with the patient may next be noted. In cases where this constitutes the whole of the ceremony the references are in italic figures. Inhalation: wood is laid on the fire, and, according to vii. 28, the patient breathes the smoke. This is part of the ceremony for expelling demons (xxv. 23) and worms (xxvii. 17, 20, repeated at xxvii. 26, xxix. 30). Its use alone (xxv. 20 f.) as a panacea must also be simply exorcistic. Fumigation occurs at xxxi. 19 and 22. The breath of the performer is also efficacious (xxv. 9). The power in the laying on of hands has already been met with; hence it is not surprising to find that poison may be driven out (xxxii. 23) by rubbing the patient from head to foot. Rubbing is also prescribed (xxxi. 9) for sores and (xxv. 5) for wrinkles. There are many applications that must be smeared or rubbed on, as ointments (xxv. 4, xxviii. 6, 10, xxx. 5, xxxi. 9); other substances are either smeared over the whole body of the patient (xxvi. 18, 29, 36, xxviii. 13) or applied locally (xxv. 8, xxvi. 22, 34, xxix. 23, xxxi. 18, 26). All these applications seem intended to benefit the patient; but in another group of cases (cf. above) the purpose is apparently to drive sores away by applying to them the most offensive substances. Whenever any indication is given, the rubbing must be downwards, to drive the trouble into the part of the body where it can do least injury, and finally out of the feet. This rule, implied in Rigveda x. 60. 11–12, may be taken as universal; so also the precept (*Kauś.* xxviii. 13) that the rubbing must not be reversed. When this is done, its effect is destructive, and hence it is employed (xxix. 22) to kill worms.

Two other methods, *āplavana*, 'the pouring on,' and *avasechana*, 'the sprinkling on,' are distinguished also by the fact that the water in the former case contains the leavings of the offering,

[1] For such as are not included in Bloomfield's translation, cf. the Whitney-Lanman tr. of the Atharvaveda *Saṁhitā*, Harvard Oriental Series, vols. vii. and viii.

while in the latter case it is merely blessed with the hymn, unless, as in xxvii. 28, xxviii. 8, xxix. 30, there is a specific direction for the addition of the leavings. In either case the patient is wiped down (vii. 17) from head to foot, and given (vii. 26) some of the water to drink. The water may, of course, contain other substances also, and the position of the patient and the manner in which it is to be poured are also in some cases specified. Instances of the *āplavana* are xxvi. 41, xxvii. 4, 7, *34*, xxviii. 19, xxix. 26, xxxii. 3, 14; of the *avasechana*, xxv. 17, *37*, xxvi. *25*, 31, xxvii. 1, 8, 28, 29, 33, xxviii. 2, 5, *8*, xxix. 8, 9, 30, xxx. *8–10*, *13*, xxxi. 2, 28, xxxii. 4, 10, 15, 17. The two are sometimes combined (xxvi. 41, xxvii. 1, 4, and 7–8, xxxii. 3–4 and 14–15). In the last case hot water is used for the one, cold water for the other. Other methods of washing, chiefly of a more local nature, are xxv. 34, xxviii. 1, xxx. *11*, xxxi. 1, 11, 13. The leavings of the offerings are also put directly upon the patient's head (xxvi. 39, xxix. 19), or blessed substances are inserted in his nostrils (xxvi. 8, xxxii. 21). Frequently also the magic substance is given to the patient to drink (xxv. 7, 11, 18, xxvi. 1, 12–13, 14, 17, xxvii. 12, 29, xxviii. 1–4, 6, 14, 16, xxix. 8, 10, 11, 13, 18, 30, xxxi. 5, 6, 23–25, 26, xxxii. 2, 7) or to eat (xxvi. 18, xxvii. 31, xxviii. 9, 12, 15–16, xxix. 12, 15, 25, 27, 28, xxx. 3–6). In this way hot infusions (*jvāla*), prepared by plunging a burning or heated substance in water, are employed (xxvii. 29, 33, xxviii. 2, xxix. 8, xxx. 8, xxxii. 10).

The medicine may also be applied as an amulet. In this case the patient will have to drink a solution in which the amulet has been steeped for three days, so that he may be benefited more than would at first sight appear (cf. art. CHARMS AND AMULETS [Vedic], and add to the instances cited: *Kauś.* xxvi. 11, a potsherd from a ruin [?] to stop the flow of blood; xxvi. 21, hairs from the breast of a red steer, glued together and wrapped with gold wire, to cure jaundice; xxvi. 26–27, four stalks of white-blooming *Andropogon muricatus* [*vīriṇa*], or four pieces of reed, each burnt in three places, to cure 'fright'; xxviii. 7, *sadampuṣpā*-plant = *Calatropis gigantea*, in case of possession; xxx. 1, mustard for diseases of the eye; xxxi. 26, piece of an ant-hill, in case of poison; but the liquorice of xxxii. 5 is administered in liquid form, according to the commentators).

The transfer of a disease to another person is a wish most vigorously expressed in Atharv. v. 22. 4 ff. and vi. 26. 3. The ritual endeavours to accomplish this in xxvii. 9–13, in the interest of a person suffering from 'thirst.' More frequently the transfer is to an animal: fever to a frog (xxxii. 17), jaundice to yellow birds (xxvi. 18), madness to birds (xxvi. 33). The selection of the cross-roads for some ceremonies is doubtless to be connected with this idea, as is also the direction (xxxi. 10) for the rubbing of sores against the door-post (cf. also Atharv. xii. 2. 19, 20).

In addition to these general practices there are a number of symbolical acts adapted to the special situation, sometimes with a great deal of ingenuity, sometimes in the most banal fashion. As it is impossible to describe all these in detail, it seems best to present some typical examples of the whole process of an Atharvan cure.

Atharv. i. 12 is a prayer to lightning conceived as the cause of fever, headache, and cough. A man suffering from these diseases is given to eat fat, honey, ghī, and sesame oil that have been blessed with this hymn. The head of the patient is then covered with a turban of *muñja*-grass. This grass is not only connected by its name with the idea of loosening, but it is also a mythical home of lightning (Agni), from which the patient is planning to be released. He then takes in his left hand (this is inauspicious) a sieve containing parched grain (a symbol of the effect of the fever), and walks along, scattering the grain while he recites the hymn. He continues to advance, carrying in his left hand the sieve and the turban, in his right hand a bow-string and an axe. He is followed by the celebrant, and preceded by the latter's assistant—a measure of precaution. When some manifestation of the disease occurs (so that the presence of the demon is assured), he lays down the sieve and the turban (the abode of the cause of the disease), and the procession returns. On the way home he lays down the bow-string (to stop pursuit by the demon who has been exorcized). Ghi is blessed with the hymn and put up the patient's nose. Finally the priest mutters the hymn, while touching the patient's head with a bamboo staff that has five joints (and seems to serve as a conductor of the magic potency).

In a case of jaundice, the practitioner desires to banish the yellow colour to yellow objects, and to obtain for the patient a healthy redness, or, as the hymn puts it, 'to envelop him in every form and strength of the red cows.' Hence he puts the hair of a red bull into water, blesses it with Atharv. i. 22, and gives it to the patient to sip. Then he pours water over the back of a red bull, and gives that to the patient to sip. An amulet, prepared from the part of a hide pierced by a peg, is tied on the patient while he is sitting on the hide of a red bull, and he is also given milk to drink. Next the patient is fed with a porridge mixed with yellow turmeric, and he is daubed with the rest of this porridge and with another porridge from which he has not eaten. He thus acquires a yellow coating that can easily be removed. Certain yellow birds are then tied by their left legs to the foot of the couch, and the patient is washed so that the water will fall upon the birds (carrying the yellow coating of porridge with it). If these cry out, the patient must address them with the hymn. The patient is then given a porridge and told to step forth. Finally he is provided with an amulet of hairs taken from the breast of the red bull.

Much simpler is a cure for fever by heating an axe while muttering Atharv. i. 25, plunging it in water, and pouring the water thus heated over the patient. Leprosy may be cured in an equally simple fashion by rubbing the spot with cow-dung until it bleeds, and then painting it by rubbing in yellow turmeric, *Eclipta prostrata*, or indigo, blessed with Atharv. i. 23 and 24. Or a ceremony may be performed to the Maruts, in which all the ingredients are black.

3. Statements relating to disease in other texts.—In the Rigveda the interest naturally centres in the relation of the greater gods to disease. Among these Rudra may claim the first mention: the twofold aspect of this god is well summarized by the author of viii. 29, a *brahmodya*, or series of theological charades. Verse 5, to which the answer is 'Rudra,' runs: 'One holds a sharp weapon in his hand, is bright, potent, and has as his remedy the *jalāṣa*.' On the one hand, he is a malevolent deity armed with a 'cow-slaying,' 'man-slaying' missile, whose ill-will, if not deprecated, will bring injury and death to man and beast (cf. i. 114. 7, 8, ii. 33. 1, 4–6, 11, 14, 15, iv. 3. 6, vi. 28. 7, x. 169. 1). These are but general statements of the association of Rudra with disease which the Atharva (vi. 90, and passages cited above) expresses in concrete form. On the other hand, as the sender of disease, he is best qualified to cure it, and hence he is styled (ii. 33. 4) 'the most eminent of physicians.' His healing powers are mentioned with great frequency, as are also the choice and numerous remedies he holds in his hands. With them he is implored to remove disease and make all sound, both man and beast. His distinctive remedy, the *jalāṣa*, is shown by the Atharvan ritual to be cow-urine, the medicinal use of which goes back to Indo-Iranian times, as *gaomaēza* is prescribed in the Avesta (cf. Bloomfield, *Am. Jour. Phil.* xii. 425–429). For these aspects of Rudra, cf. i. 43. 4, 114. 5, ii. 33. 2, 7, 12, 13, v. 42. 11, 53. 14, vi. 47. 3, vii. 35. 6, 46. 2, 3; Atharv. ii. 27. 6.

The Aśvins are also divine physicians, but, unlike Rudra, they are invariably beneficent (cf. i. 34. 6, 89. 4, 157. 6, vii. 71. 2, viii. 9. 15, 18. 8, 22. 10, x. 39. 5; Atharv. vii. 53. 1). What is most characteristic of them is that, in addition to general invocations of their healing aid, stories are frequently told of their cures of particular individuals, which are not to be explained as merely myths relating to natural phenomena. They restored Chyavāna to youth and its powers (i. 116. 10, 117. 13, 118. 6, v. 74. 5, 75. 5, vii. 68. 6, 71. 5, x. 39. 4, 59. 1), and did the same for Kali (i. 112. 15, x. 39. 8); probably also the gift of a husband to Ghoṣā (i. 117. 7, x. 39. 3, 6, 40. 5) was preceded by a similar rejuvenescence. To Ṛjrāśva they restored his eyesight (i. 116. 16, 117. 17–18); for Viśpalā they provided an iron leg (i. 116. 15, 118. 8), to replace

the one she had lost in battle; while Parāvṛj was cured by them (i. 112. 8) both of blindness and of lameness. For the story of their cure, in conjunction with Sarasvatī, of Indra, cf. below. The methods of their cures are not indicated, but rather have the air of the miraculous. It may be noted, however, that honey is most closely connected with these gods (cf. Macdonell, *Ved. Mythol.*, 1897, p. 49), and also possesses medical efficiency (cf. above, including all cases of amulets).

In still another way Varuṇa is brought into connexion with disease. Disease is the punishment of sin, and Varuṇa is the moral governor κατ' ἐξοχήν. The connexion is particularly clear in i. 24. 9: 'Thy remedies, O king, are a hundred, a thousand. Let thy good will be broad and deep. Drive into the distance Nirṛti. Free us from the sin committed' (cf. also vi. 74 and x. 97). It may be taken as certain that the efforts to escape the fetters of Varuṇa and the constantly recurring prayer for forgiveness of sin are not all inspired by pure feelings of contrition and remorse, but are in part at least due to the desire to escape the payment of the wages of sin. The specific thing in connexion with Varuṇa's relation to disease is the fact that he, as the lord of the waters, sends dropsy in punishment for sin, and especially falsehood. This idea, unmistakable in other texts, is probable for the Rigveda (cf. i. 24. 8, where Varuṇa is the 'speaker away of the heart-piercing' demon; and Hillebrandt, *Varuṇa und Mitra*, 1877, p. 63 ff.), though it is not so clear as to be beyond the possibility of denial (cf. Bergaigne, *Religion védique*, 1878–83, iii. 155).

The healing power of the waters is also mentioned quite frequently. Rigv. i. 23. 16–24 is devoted to their praise; they are said to contain immortality and all remedies, and are besought to bestow their remedies and carry away sin (cf. also x. 9. 5–7, and note the frequency with which the waters appear in prayers for long life). In Rigv. vi. 50. 7 they are healing, and in x. 137. 6 they are healing and dispellers of disease.

It would, however, be a mistake to infer from such passages that the concept of the cause of disease is radically different in the Rigveda from what it is in the Atharva. The association with the Rakṣas is clear in iii. 15. 1, vii. 1. 7, 8. 6, 38. 7, viii. 35. 16–18, ix. 85. 1, x. 97. 6, 98. 12, 162. 1; furthermore, in x. 85. 31—a stanza to be recited when the bridal party passes a cemetery—is to be recognized the ascription of disease to the influence of the spirits of the dead. It is for this reason that the sun-gods (i. 35. 9, 191. 8–9, x. 37. 3, 100. 8) and Agni (i. 12. 7, 189. 3) and Bṛhaspati (i. 18. 2, x. 98. 3) are dispellers of disease—they being the great demon-slayers. The prayer for food that causes no disease (*anamivā iṣaḥ*, iii. 22. 4, 62. 14, x. 17. 8) may also be mentioned here as based on the idea of the disease-demon entering a man with his food. The goddess Apvā, a drastic embodiment of 'defecation from fear' invoked in x. 103. 12, may be classed as a disease-demon (cf. Atharv. iii. 2. 5, ix. 8. 9).

Medical charms are, of course, likely to call in the assistance of any and every god; but, apart from these, the explicit mention of healing in connexion with other deities than those mentioned is very sporadic, though doubtless it is conceived as included in a general fashion in their powers of giving long life and prosperity and of destroying demons. The Ādityas drive away disease (viii. 18. 10); Indra cures Apālā of skin disease and her father of baldness (viii. 80; for the treatment of this legend in the Brāhmaṇas, cf. Oertel, *JAOS* xviii. 26 ff.); the Maruts, as children of Rudra, have pure, salutary, and beneficent remedies (ii. 33. 13), which they are asked to bring from various places (viii. 20. 23 ff., cf. also v. 53. 14); Vāta gives remedies (i. 89. 4, x. 186. 1); for Soma, cf. i. 91. 12, iii. 62. 14, viii. 72. 17, 79. 2, ix. 97. 43, x. 25. 11; for Soma-Rudra, vi. 74; for Vāstoṣpati, vii. 54. 1, 55. 1; for the Dawns, x. 35. 6; for the All-Gods, x. 63. 12; for Yama, x. 14. 11; and the more general prayers for health among other blessings, iii. 16. 3, 59. 3, x. 18. 7, 37. 7.

The number of medical charms in the Rigveda is extremely limited. They are, however, of the same general type as the Atharvan charms, and most of them recur also in the latter collection.

Rigv. i. 50. 11–13 is a prayer to Sūrya to destroy heart-disease and dropsy, upon which Atharv. i. 22 has drawn. Rigv. x. 137 = Atharv. iv. 13 is a rather colourless panacea-hymn: the gods are to make alive again the man that has sinned; one wind shall blow him a remedy, another shall blow away his disease; the practitioner has come to the patient with weal and health, he has brought a remedy kindly and powerful, and is driving away the *yakṣma*; the gods, the Maruts, and all creatures shall protect the sick man, that he may be free from disease; the all-healing, disease-dispersing waters shall make for him a remedy; the performer touches him with his two hands, which confer immunity from disease. Rigv. x. 161 = Atharv. iii. 11 is a charm against *ajñātayakṣma*, *rājayakṣma*, and *grāhi*. The performer declares his power to bring back the patient even though he has gone into the presence of Death and the lap of Nirṛti. Comparable with this is the group of hymns Rigv. x. 57–60, the purpose of which is to recall the mind wherever it may have gone. The closing verses are: 'Here the mother, here the father, here life has come. This is thy refuge, come hither, O Subandhu, enter in. As men bind a yoke with a rope that it may hold indeed; so do I hold for thee thy mind, that thou mayest live, mayest not die, mayest not be harmed. As the great mother (Earth) here supports these trees; so do I hold, etc. From Yama, son of Vivasvant, have I brought back the mind of Subandhu, that thou mayest live, etc. Down blows the wind, down burns the fire, down milks the cow, down shall go thy disease. This hand of mine is rich in blessings, this hand richer still, this hand all-healing, this rubs auspiciously.' Subandhu ('good friend') need not have been originally a proper name, but it was felt to be so at least as early as the time of the Brāhmaṇas, which spin legends about his return to life.

Rigv. x. 163 = Atharv. ii. 33 is a charm of another type: 'From thine eyes, thy nostrils, thine ears and chin, from thy brain, from thy tongue, I tear out the disease of thy head.' The practitioner then proceeds to enumerate other parts of the body, concluding, to guard against any possible omission, with the statement that he tears the disease from the whole being of the patient.

Rigv. vii. 50 is a charm against poison—chiefly that of snakes—abounding in obscure words. Mitra-Varuṇa are to give protection, Agni is to burn it away, the All-Gods are to drive it away, and the rivers are to bestow remedies for it. Rigv. i. 191 is a charm for the same purpose, but more aggressive in its efforts to secure its ends. The beings at which it is directed are styled the 'unseen,' and seem to be chiefly scorpions and small venomous vermin; but doubtless the imaginary worms (cf. above) were also in mind. They are adjured to perish, they have been made visible to all, hence harmless. Their lineage (curiously exalted; Dyaus is their father, the Earth their mother, Soma their brother, and Aditi their sister) is known, hence they must be quiet. The sun grinds and burns them. The conjurer has put their poison on the sun, their poison-bag on the house of the keeper of spirituous liquor. The sun will not die, neither will their victims. Little birds and sparks of fire drink their poison without harm: twenty-one peahens and seven unmarried sisters handle it as if it were water; (*a fortiori*) the conjurer (and his clients), who has grasped the names of all ninety-nine plants that destroy poison, shall not be harmed. Finally, the conjurer, likening himself to the mongoose, which on coming down from the mountains proclaimed the powerlessness of the scorpion's poison, splits the creature with a rock, letting its poison flow to distant lands.

The couplet Rigv. viii. 48. 4–5 seems to be a prayer to guard against any nauseating or diarrhœtic effects of drinking *soma*. Finally, in Rigv. 10. 97 we have the *oṣadhīstuti*, or praise of the curative power of plants.

Mention of particular diseases is extremely rare in the Rigveda: *yakṣma* (x. 85. 31, 97. 11–13, 137. 4, 163. 1–6), with its compounds, *ajñāta°*-, *rāja°*- (x. 161. 1); [*a-yakṣma* (ix. 49. 1) is merely disease in general]; *vandana* (?) (vii. 50. 2); jaundice and heart-disease (i. 50. 11–12); heart-disease (i. 24. 8); *grāhi* (x. 161. 1); allusion to *pṛṣṭyāmaya* is made incidentally in a comparison (i. 105. 18). Extremely obscure are the epithets *aśipada* and *aśimida*, applied to the waters and streams in vii. 50. 4; they seem to mean 'not causing the diseases *śipa* and *śimi*,' of which no other mention is made. *Śipiviṣṭa*, however, occurs as the designation of an animal rendered unfit for sacrifice by skin disease (cf. J. Schwab, *Das altind. Thieropfer*, 1886, p. xviii), and as an epithet of Viṣṇu (*Kauṣītaki Brāh.* iv. 2; *Śāṅkhāyana ŚS.* xv. 14. 4; and A. Weber, *Über die Königsweihe, den Rājasūya*, Berlin, 1893, p. 125). Various bodily defects are more frequently mentioned; defects of sight seem especially feared (cf. *andha*,

anakṣa, kāṇa, mithūdṛś); defects of hearing (*badhira, abadhira*); lameness (*asreman, śroṇa*); loss of virility (*vadhri*).

It is neither possible nor desirable to treat at this length the whole of Vedic literature; but, as the omissions are no less important than the statements, it seems best to limit the treatment to certain texts as representative of the Yajurveda, the Brāhmaṇas, and Upaniṣads. For the Yajur texts the *Vājasaneyi Saṁhitā* has been chosen.

The whole system of sacrifice is an attempt to induce the gods to bestow prosperity, in which health is an important element. It is, however, a noteworthy fact that health is by no means so conspicuous an object of prayer as is wealth. Even when it is sought (cf. xxv. 14–23 = Rigv. i. 89), it is in general terms, thus resembling the charms for long life (*āyuṣyāṇi*) rather than the medical (*bhāiṣajyāni*) charms.

For such incidental prayers compare, in addition to prayers for strength, lustre, vigour, life of a hundred years, that occur *passim*, such formulæ as: iii. 17, 'O Agni, thou art protector of bodies, protect my body. O Agni, thou art giver of life, give me life. O Agni, thou art giver of splendour, give me splendour. O Agni, what is wanting in my body, that do thou fill out for me'; ix. 21, 'By sacrifice may my life succeed, my vital breath, my sight, my hearing, my back' (fuller lists in xviii. 29, xxii. 33); xiv. 17, 'Protect my life, my *prāṇa*, my *apāna*, my *vyāna*, my sight, my hearing: enrich my speech, quicken my mind, protect my being.'

For other formulæ of the same general type, cf. vii. 27, xv. 7, xvii. 15, xviii. 2, 6, xxii. 23, xxiii. 18, xxxvi. 1, xxxix. 1, 3. Compare also such prayers for the senses as i. 20, 'Thee for sight (I take)'; and ii. 16, 'Thou art protector of sight, O Agni, protect my sight.' Numerous parallels from other texts may be found under the words *chakṣus* and *śrotra* in the Vedic Concordance. More interesting are the verses xx. 5–9, containing benedictions on various parts of the body. In xx. 26 the blessed world is described as one 'where weakness is not found,' and in xii. 105 the speaker quits 'weakness, lack of strength, and sickness.'

The incidental statements of the relation of the gods to disease are on the plane of the Rigveda, and are frequently repetitions of that text. Varuṇa in xxviii. 35 is styled a healing seer (cf. viii. 23 = Rigv. i. 24. 8, and xviii. 49, xxi. 2 = Rigv. i. 24. 11). For the healing power of the waters, cf. iv. 12, ix. 6, xviii. 35, xxxvi. 12; for Bṛhaspati, iii. 29 = Rigv. i. 18, 2; for Savitar, xxxiv. 25 = Rigv. i. 35. 9; for Agni, ii. 20, xv. 37, xvii. 15; for Aśvins, xxvii. 9, xxviii. 7, 40, xxxiv. 47. Tvaṣṭar, the divine *artifex*, is more directly connected with the repair of the body than in the Rigveda (cf. ii. 24 = viii. 14 = Atharv. vi. 53. 3 and *Vāj. Saṁ.* xxxviii. 9).

Of more interest are the collections of *mantras* for ceremonies directly connected with disease. At the *sākamedha*, the third *parvan* of the *chāturmāsya*-sacrifice, occurs a *pitṛyajña* after which are employed four verses (iii. 53–56) of one of the Subandhu-hymns (Rigv. x. 57. 3–6), to keep the spirits of those engaged in the sacrifice from following the *pitṛs* on their return to the world of Yama. Another portion of the same sacrifice is the *Traiyambakahoma* to Rudra. The formulæ are found in iii. 57–61; their purpose is to propitiate the god, and so induce him to pass to other peoples without harming the sacrificers. Of similar nature is the *Śatarudriyahoma* at the *agnichayana*. The sixteenth book of the *Vāj. Saṁ.* is composed of its *mantras*. The concept of Rudra is essentially the same as that of the Rigveda, though worked out in fuller detail.

The *Sāutrāmaṇī* is a sacrifice originally intended to expiate the sin of excessive *soma*-drinking, which leads to a drunken discharge of the sacred liquid. The heavenly prototype of this ceremony is the cure which the Aśvins and Sarasvatī wrought upon Indra when he had been beguiled into *surā*-drunkenness by the demon Namuci. For the details of this story, cf. Bloomfield, *JAOS* xv. 143–163. The formulæ employed constitute books xix.–xxi. of *Vāj. Saṁ.* Of particular interest are: xix. 10, containing the name of the disease-demon; xix. 80–95, the detailed account of Indra's cure; xix. 12, 16, xx. 3, 56 ff., 75, 80, xxi. 13, 18, 29, references to the healing power of his physicians and their remedies; xix. 55, 62 = Rigv. x. 15. 4, 6, prayers to the *pitṛs* for health. (For the ritual, cf. A. Weber, *Über die Königsweihe, den Rājasūya*, pp. 92–106, and A. Hillebrandt, *Rituallitteratur*, 1897, p. 159.)

Anatomically interesting are the lists of various parts of the body: xix. 81–93, xx. 5–9, xxv. 1–9 (parts of the horse), xxxi. 10–13, xxxix. 8–10, and the statements relative to conception and birth (xix. 76). The theory of the vital breaths now begins to become prominent; but the whole of this question must be dismissed with a reference to A. H. Ewing, 'The Hindu Conception of the Functions of Breath,' *JAOS* xxii. 249–308.

Of names of disease few occur: *yakṣma* is disease in general (cf. the coupling of *ayakṣma anamīva*, i. 1, iv. 12, xviii. 6, and the mention of the hundred *yakṣmas*, xii. 97). This disease is also mentioned in the *oṣadhīstuti* (xii. 75 ff. = Rigv. x. 97). Its last verse (xii. 97) is, however, peculiar to the version of *Vāj. Saṁ.*, and mentions *balāsa*, *upacit* (= Atharv. *apachit*), *arśas* (hæmorrhoids), and *pākāru* (of uncertain meaning). *Apvā* occurs in xvii. 44 = Rigv. x. 103. 12, while *Viṣūchikā* (xix. 10) is an equally vivid name ('she that makes go in all directions') for the demon to whom are ascribed the nauseating and diarrhœtic effects of debauch. Heart-disease is mentioned in viii. 23 = Rigv. i. 24. 8; diseases of the eye, *arman*, in xxx. 11; skin-disease in xxx. 20; leprosy in xxx. 17, 21; various deformities in xxx. 10, 21, 22.

Physicians are recognized as constituting a profession (xxx. 10). An amulet is used by the Divine physicians (xix. 80) for the cure of Indra. Finally, iv. 3 is a formula addressed to ointment from Mt. Trikakud: 'Thou art the eye of Vṛtra (for mythology, cf. Bloomfield, 'The Myth of the Heavenly Eye-ball,' *Am. Jour. Phil.* xvii. 399–408), thou art the giver of sight, give me sight.'

In the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* there is very little material bearing on the subject. Incidental allusions to various parts of the body occur, among which may be noted the distinction between the senses of taste, sight, and smell, and their organs (v. 22). The processes of procreation and birth are also frequently alluded to in the effort to produce a mystical body for the sacrificer. There is likewise a great deal of talk about the 'vital breaths'—the way in which they may be established in the sacrificer, or may be cut short. The same is true of the various senses and the power of virility; and there is the constantly recurring effort to secure vigour, splendour, sharpness of sense, and the full term of life.

All of this is too general to be of interest in the present connexion. More concrete are i. 18, where the Aśvins are said to be the physicians of the gods; v. 34, where the Brahman priest is the physician of the sacrifice. Freedom from disease is expressly sought in viii. 10 and 11; the healing power of herbs is recognized in general in iii. 40, and in particular that of collyrium for the eye in i. 3. That disease may be produced by a curse is seen in v. 1 (deformity) and vi. 33 (leprosy). Madness is alluded to in vi. 33, and in v. 29 there is mention of a girl possessed by a *gandharva*. Varuṇa's fetters, as productive of dropsy in punishment for a broken vow, figure in the story of Śunaḥśepa (vii. 15 and 16). The origin of certain deformities is explained mythically in ii. 8. The closest approach to a cure for disease is found in iii. 19, where is imparted the knowledge that will enable one to preserve his sight to old age. In i. 25 is explained the way in which the Hotar

may cause the sacrificer to suffer from *rājayakṣma*, which here seems to mean some (scrofulous) disease of the neck.

An examination of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and *Chhāndogya Upaniṣads* shows that the chief interest of these texts in this connexion lies in their anatomical statements. Besides more isolated instances that occur *passim* may be noted the list of the parts of the horse (Bṛh. i. 1. 1); of the human body (ii. 4. 11); and the elaborate comparison of man with a tree (iii. 9. 28). There are also statements about the heart and its veins (Bṛh. ii. 1. 19, iv. 2. 3, 3. 20; Chhānd. viii. 6. 1 and 6); the structure of the eye (Bṛh. ii. 2. 3); the disposition of food in the body (Chhānd. vi. 5); the process of sleep and dreams (Bṛh. ii. 1. 16 ff., iv. 3. 7 ff.; Chhānd. iv. 3. 3); and the process of death (Bṛh. iii. 2. 11 ff.). All these statements are, however, connected with the theory of the 'vital breaths,' and appear to be entirely speculative.

With regard to the origin of disease may be noted the power of a curse to produce bodily ailments implied in the threat, 'thy head shall burst' (Bṛh. iii. 7. 1, 9. 26; Chhānd. i. 8. 8); the statement (Bṛh. iv. 3. 15) that the evil caused by waking a man while his spirit is abroad in dreams is hard to cure; and the mention (Bṛh. iii. 3. 1, 7. 1) of women possessed by *gandharvas*. Sickness is incidentally mentioned (Bṛh. iv. 3. 36, v. 11. 1; Chhānd. iv. 10. 3, vi. 15. 1, vii. 26. 2, viii. 4. 2, 6. 4). The itch (*pāman*) is the only disease specifically mentioned; and Raikva's scratching it off under a cart (Chhānd. iv. 1. 8) is probably a method of cure to be associated with the cases of transference cited above.

The full term of life is often promised as a reward for certain knowledge (Bṛh. i. 2. 7, ii. 1. 11 f.; Chhānd. ii. 11 ff., iv. 11 ff.); an *āyuṣya*-ceremony is also mentioned (Bṛh. vi. 4. 25). In Chhānd. iii. 16 are contained directions for the cure of any disease, by following which one may live 116 years.

A number of factors combine to prevent diseases and their treatment from figuring to a great extent in the *Śrauta* ritual. All connected with the sacrifice must be in good health: an animal victim must be free from blemishes, among which certain diseases (cf. J. Schwab, *Das altindische Thieropfer*, p. xviii) are included. If, after the selection of the horse for the Aśvamedha (*q.v.*), diseases develop in it during the year that must elapse before its sacrifice, an expiatory sacrifice is required, which varies (cf. A. Hillebrandt, *Ritual-litteratur*, p. 150) according to the disease. Bodily ailments are also sufficient to prevent a priest from being chosen to officiate at a sacrifice (cf. A. Weber, *Indische Studien*, 1868, x. 145 ff.); and it is expressly stated (*Āśvalāyana Gṛhya Sūtra* i. 23. 20) that the priest must refuse to officiate for a *yajamāna* who is suffering from a disease. Under these circumstances it is but natural that the possibility of sickness should receive scant consideration except in so far as it is subsumed under prayers for long life and the exorcism of demons. This tendency must have been helped by the popular origin of the medical charms. In spite of this origin, they passed, as did everything, under the influence of the priesthood; but in the main they were more adapted to incorporation in the simpler form of the *Gṛhya* rites, which presented the further advantage of not bringing the diseased (*i.e.* demon-possessed) person into a contact with the priests that might prove dangerous for them. Exceptional situations, of course, occur; *soma*-drunkenness is a sacrificial sin, and must be healed by a sacrifice; or, as at the *piṇḍapitṛyajña*, the lives of the participants may be exposed to special dangers against which precautions must be taken. But an examination of some of the *Śrauta* rites will show (cf. what was said of the *mantras* of the *Vājasaneyi Saṁhitā* above) that these are primarily concerned with the securing of wealth, progeny, and triumph over enemies, much more than with health, except as it is implied in prayers for protection and long life couched in the most general terms. Secondarily, however, the sacrifice may be adapted to the securing of various desires. Among these the cure of disease figures to a greater extent, though still overshadowed by other wishes.

In the ritual of the New and Full Moon sacrifice (cf. A. Hillebrandt, *Das altind. Neu- und Vollmondsopfer*, Jena, 1880) there is no allusion to the subject. In the animal sacrifice it may be noted that among the wishes that determine the choice of the tree for the *yūpa* there is none closer to our purpose (cf. Schwab, *op. cit.* p. 2) than *vīryakāma* and *chakṣuṣkāma* (cf. also the wishes that determine the length of the post in *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, xi. 4. 7. 1, and *Taittirīya Saṁhitā* vi. 3. 3. 5–6). At the *mārjana* (purification) is employed (cf. p. 122) a verse which has its parallel in a remedial charm (Atharv. vi. 96. 2). The connexion between the two uses is due to the connexion between sin and disease. There is a colourless prayer for long life at the offering of *pṛṣadājya* to Vanaspati (cf. p. 147), and the prayer after the last *upayāja* (p. 155) to the waters and plants is for spirit in one's heart, a soft skin, a son, and a grandson. The prayer to Varuṇa at the hiding of the spit (p. 162) is found also in a cure for dropsy (Atharv. vii. 93. 2), and the place required is somewhat similar in both rituals. The final worship of the *yūpa* (p. 164) also contains a prayer for long life. This sacrifice, however, possesses greater interest for anatomy on account of the details incidental to the cutting up of the animal (cf. p. 126 ff.).

At the *piṇḍapitṛyajña* prayers for long life also occur (cf. W. Caland, *Altindischer Ahnencult*, Leyden, 1893, pp. 7 and 10). More interesting are the attempts to call back the spirit after its communion with the *manes* (cf. above, and Caland, pp. 11 f., 178 ff., 243, and the statements that the leavings of this offering have medicinal effect, p. 191).

Of *soma*-sacrifices, the most interesting, the *Sāutrāmaṇī*, has been treated above. The *Rājasūya* contains, among its preparatory ceremonies, a number that served originally for the cure of diseases, which A. Weber (*Über die Königsweihe, den Rājasūya*, p. 5) rightly takes as an indication of the fact that this sacrifice has been built up on the basis of simpler popular practices. Thus *Maitrāyaṇī Saṁhitā* iv. 3. 1 has a ceremony against *kṣetriya*, including a sacrifice upon an ant-hill. *Kātyāyana ŚS* xv. 1. 23 states that the *pañchavātīya* is a cure for disease, and xv. 3. 39 that the *charu* for Soma-Rudra is a cure for leprosy. Prayers for long life are found (*Kāt. ŚS* xv. 5. 22; cf. *Śat. Brāh.* v. 4. 1. 1), also at anointing of kings (Weber, p. 49), and while touching a gold piece worth 100 *raktikā* (*Kāt. ŚS* xv. 6. 32). The recitation of the Śunaḥśepa-legend also forms part of this ceremony (cf. Weber, p. 49 ff.), for the purpose of releasing the king from the fetters of Varuṇa. The beating of the king may originally have been exorcistic, as he is assured that the beating leads him beyond death. At the *puruṣamedha* also a portion of the ceremony is (*Śāṅkhāyana ŚS* xvi. 13. 3) or may be (*Vaitāna ŚS* xxxviii. 1) devoted to the cure of the *yajamāna*.

By certain modifications a *Śrauta* sacrifice may be employed for the attainment of a special wish. The parallelism of these *kāmyeṣṭayaḥ* with Atharvan charms has been pointed out by Caland

(*Altindisches Zauberritual*, Amsterdam, 1900, p. viii). An idea of the range of the wishes sought may be obtained from such lists as *Kauṣitaki Brāhmaṇa* iv. containing twelve modifications of the New and Full Moon Sacrifice, of which none is intended for the cure of disease; or the much longer list of *Taittirīya Saṁhitā* ii. 1. 1. 1–ii. 4. 14. 5. In this are included sacrifices for one 'long ill' (*jyogāmayāvin*) that will make him live 'even if his spirit is gone' (ii. 1. 1. 3; 2. 7; 9. 3 [release from Varuṇa's fetter]; ii. 4. 2; 10. 4; 3. 11. 1, cf. also iii. 4. 9. 3); for one 'seized by Varuṇa' or for release from Varuṇa's fetter (ii. 1. 2. 1; 2. 5. 1; 3. 12. 1; 13. 1); for one who wishes to live his full term of life (ii. 2. 3. 2); for one who fears death (ii. 3. 2. 1); or in case cattle or men are dying (ii. 2. 2. 3); for one wishing virility (ii. 3. 7. 2) or power of his senses (ii. 1. 6. 2; 2. 5. 4; 3. 7. 2); for one wishing sight (ii. 2. 4. 3; 9. 3; 3. 8. 1 [even though blind he sees]); for one in fear of impotence (ii. 3. 3. 4); for one in fear of skin-disease (ii. 1. 4. 3; 2. 10. 2); for one who vomits *soma* (ii. 3. 2. 6); for one whose 'mind is slain, who is an evil to himself' (ii. 2. 8. 3 [for insanity, cf. also iii. 4. 8. 4]); for one who has been suffering long from an unknown disease [cf. *ajñāta-yakṣma* above] (ii. 1. 6. 5); for one suffering from *pāpayakṣma* (ii. 3. 5, containing the mythical account of the origin of *pāpayakṣma*, *rājayakṣma*, and *jāyenya* [cf. ii. 5. 6. 4], and the statement that for this purpose the sacrifice must be offered at the new moon in order that the sacrificer may fill out with it).

In the *Gṛhya*-rites the phenomena of disease appear more frequently, though still treated in a general fashion which contrasts unfavourably with the details of the Atharva. Sickness is a sufficient excuse for sleep at sunrise or sunset (*Āśvalāyana GS* iii. 7. 1–2), and disqualifies a *yajamāna* (*ib.* i. 23. 20); bodily pain also stops the recitation of the Veda (*Śāṅkhāyana GS* iv. 7. 38). At the *upanayana*, Agni is invoked as the physician and maker of remedies (*Hiraṇyakeśin GS* i. 2. 18, cf. Atharv. v. 29. 1). At the Srāddha also prayers for long life are employed (cf. Caland, pp. 26 and 43), and, according to *Hiraṇyakeśin* ii. 12. 9, the sacrificer, if over fifty, offers to the *pitṛs* some of his hair, with the request that they take nothing more. The reason is that he feels he is now on the down grade and desires to prolong his life as much as possible (other interpretations in Caland, p. 177). The prevention of disease and sorcery may also be attained, according to *Gobhila GS* iv. 6. 2, by the daily repetition of a formula. The Āgrayaṇa also, especially in its presentation in *Śāṅkhāyana GS* iii. 8, seems to be a rite to render the new food fit for use by driving out any demons that may be lurking in it (cf. the Āgrayaṇa Kāmyeṣṭi for an *annādyakāma* in *Kauṣitaki Brāhmaṇa* iv. 12). As a panacea *Śāṅkhāyana GS* v. 6. 1–2 prescribes an oblation of rice-grains and *gavedhukā*-grass (*Coix barbata*) with Rigv. i. 114; similarly *Āśval. GS* iii. 6. 3–4 six oblations of boiled rice with Rigv. x. 161 (cf. the directions for protection of the embryo in *Śāṅkh. GS* i. 21). Another way of securing health (*Āśval. GS* iv. 1. 1) is for an *āhitāgni* to leave the village when he is sick; the sacred fires will desire to return, and will consequently grant him health. This is clearly an adaptation of a popular practice.

Of special diseases: *Pāraskara GS* iii. 6 contains an interesting cure of headache by rubbing, while reciting a verse parallel with Rigv. x. 163. 1 = Atharv. ii. 33. 1. This verse is also employed at *Āpastambīya GS* iii. 9. 10 for the rubbing of a sick woman with lotus leaves and roots. When the pain is confined to one side of the head, a different formula is used, the wording of which suggests the ascription of the pain to worms. An elaborate cure for epilepsy, conceived as due to the attack of a dog-demon upon a child, is described (*Hiraṇyakeśin GS* ii. 2. 7. 1; *Āp. GS* vii. 18. 1; *Pāras. GS* i. 16. 24). With it may be compared the exorcism of the Vināyaka in *Mānava GS* ii. 14, giving many details of the symptoms (including dreams) and of the cure. An attempt to secure a child from all diseases (*kṣetriya* is particularly mentioned) is found at the *medhājanana* (*Hir. GS* ii. 3. 10; *Āp. GS* vi. 15. 4). For snake bites, cf. *Khādira GS* iv. 4. 1 = *Gobh. GS* iv. 9. 16; the ceremony consists merely in sprinkling with water while muttering a verse. Worms are similarly treated in *Kh. GS* iv. 4. 3 = *Gobh. GS* iv. 9. 19, while the following *sūtras* provide for their treatment in cows; cf. also *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* iv. 36. 1; *Āp. ŚS* xv. 19. 5. Other cures for cattle are *Āśval. GS* iv. 8. 40 (the cows are led through the smoke of a fire in which an oblation has been made; cf. *Hir. GS* ii. 3. 8. 10, and *Kh. GS* iv. 3. 13).

The *Rigvidhāna* deals frequently in cures for diseases, but not in a way to call for special comment (cf. i. 2. 5; 17. 8; 17. 9; 18. 4; 19. 1; 19. 3; 20. 3; 23. 7; 24. 3; 25. 5; 27. 1; 28. 4; 29. 2; 30. 4–31. 2; ii. 1. 3; 20. 3; 25. 10, 11; 26. 3; 33. 1–3; 34. 5; iii. 3. 2; 7. 6; 11. 3; 18. 5; iv. 1. 1–3; 9. 4–7; 16. 1; 19. 3–5).

The *Sāmavidhāna Brāhmaṇa* has among its *kāmyāni* a series of ceremonies of interest: when the children of one's wife die young (ii. 2. 1; the ceremony is described in art. CHARMS AND AMULETS [Vedic]); when one is seized by a demon (ii. 2. 2); for any disease (ii. 2. 3); in case of pain in a limb (ii. 3. 1, 2); for protection from snakes (ii. 3. 3).

LITERATURE.—In addition to the works cited, cf. **P. Cordier**, *Étude sur la médecine hindoue*, Paris, 1894 (additional passages from Upaniṣads); **V. Henry**, *La Magie dans l'Inde antique*, Paris, 1904, pp. 178–205; **W. Caland**, *Altindisches Zauber-ritual: Probe einer Uebersetzung der wichtigsten Theile des Kauśika Sūtra*, Amsterdam, 1900, pp. 67–107; **M. Bloomfield**, 'Hymns of the Atharva-veda,' *SBE*, vol. xlii. pp. 1–48 and commentary thereto, also 'The Atharva-veda,' in *GIAP* ii. 1, B, Strassburg, 1899, pp. 58–63 (with copious references to the earlier works on the subject). Since the writing of this article, the *kāmyā iṣṭayaḥ* have received a full treatment in **W. Caland**, *Altindische Zauberei: Darstellung der altind. 'Wunschopfer,'* Amsterdam, 1908.

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DISGUST is primarily a feeling in regard to the physically repulsive, and is therefore accompanied by actual or reproduced organic sensations. In 'moral' disgust, these sensations are suggested by analogy. The emotion of repugnance, which appears in disgust, abhorrence, detestation, and horror, is a particular feeling-attitude,[1] or disposition of the self, towards an object which stands in a special relation to the nature of the individual. The object which arouses the emotion is not the hostile as such, or the merely harmful; it is the unnatural—that which involves a perversion of nature. In other words, it is at variance with that primary fitness of things which is based on the essential nature of things. This is evident in the case of the morally repulsive. The abnormal prominence of the animal nature, desires which lead to misuse of functions, desires of any kind raised to an unnatural pitch, all arouse the emotion of repugnance. The same principle is at work when merely physical objects are concerned. Objects of this kind are 'natural' in their proper place, but they may be misplaced. This is the *rationale* of all physical repugnance. The characteristic expression of this emotion in conduct is the avoidance of all relations with the repugnant object. It thus serves to protect, not so much the life of the individual, as his distinctive nature.

LITERATURE.—**C. Darwin**, *Expression of the Emotions*, Lond. 1872, ch. xi.; **Th. Ribot**, *The Psychology of the Emotions*, Eng. tr. do. 1897, pt. II. ch. i.

D. IRONS.

[1] D. Irons, *The Psychology of Ethics*, Edin. and Lond. 1903, ch. i.

DISSENT.—See NONCONFORMITY.

DISTRIBUTION (of income).[1]—By the economic theory of distribution is meant the doctrine of the manner in which the products of industry are distributed among the factors producing them, viz. land, capital, labour, and enterprise.

1. The manner in which the distribution is made.—The products are distributed to the producing agents by one of them, viz. the employer, who takes the risk of the market, and, according to the price that he expects, guarantees their shares to the other agents as wages, interest, and rent. He gets his own share, viz. profit, as residuary legatee of the price. It is thus the price of commodities that pays all the shares. The price of a thing may be twopence or ten pounds; it pays for the whole past history of the thing as a commodity, from the landowner and the producer of the raw material in it, the capitalist or employer who took the risk of having it made, on through the course of its making and carriage, of commercial dealings with it, and shopkeeping, till it finally secures its twopence or ten pounds, and out of that pays them all. Thus a great many people have a cut even out of the twopence, and it may seem that some of them might be dispensed with; the money-lenders, perhaps, and the traders or middlemen, who have been called robbers and parasites on the 'real' producers. But the only share that any one takes is what he gets from a buyer who has need of his services; for the normal price of a commodity only pays those means of producing it which are necessary, and for which the spur of competition can find no better alternative.

The system is comparatively recent. Formerly the consumer was the sole or the chief employer of labour; there were few *entrepreneurs.* The present is called the 'capitalistic' system, not so much because capital has grown so huge and efficient, as because it is directed by an employing class. Real capital consists of all the fixed capital used in production and of the circulating capital, viz. raw materials and the real wages of labour. But nominal capital—money in the wide sense—is not merely the measure of real wealth. It has become the pivot on which the whole industrial system is swung, and the means by which capitalism is carried out; for it enables the employer to turn the forces of nature, labour, and real capital in one direction or another.

This was barely appreciated by the earlier writers on distribution; it was hardly time. In simplifying or generalizing their problems, as every science must, they supposed primitive conditions, and stated laws true enough in their way, but apt to mislead when applied to more complex conditions. The notorious example was the 'wages-fund' theory, which assumed that at any time there is a definite amount of capital in a country, and that the country must wait for the next harvest or so before addition could be made to the stock, especially to the stock of its circulating capital. That assumption is too remote from present conditions to be of use, and the problem is now simplified by making the opposite assumption. The nation is taken not as a lone island, but as part of the world, and the national income is taken as produced, distributed, exchanged, and consumed every day. Into this very fluid stream comes the employer to direct its course. His action is determined by the price that he expects, and it is distributed through him. He guarantees the other agents their shares, and takes the rest; he buys them out. If he is a contractor, he knows the price he will get, and what he can afford to pay the other agents. Or he may undertake the further risk of not knowing the price he will get; he may place an order for goods in view of a demand that he hopes to find or create. Or, *e.g.*, as a mining company, he may have to speculate at greater risk. His profit may be large, or it may be less than nothing, according to the price that he actually gets to cover his output.

[1] For Distribution of wealth, see art. WEALTH.

The employing function is very often associated with one or more of the others in the same person, or in a company, as when a lender, or a landowner, has to take part of the business risk, or when an employer uses his own capital and land, or is his own manufacturer, manager, or workman. But the functions are distinct, and receive much the same shares on the average as when they are exercised by different persons.

It is enough merely to mention that commodities which form the real national dividend are ultimately distributed not merely to their producers, but, through their producers, as payment for all kinds of services—from professional to domestic; and that, to provide a fund for the variety of public services, all shares are more or less tapped by taxation.

2. The shares.—In dealing with the relative amounts that go to the four factors in production, one course is to treat rent, interest, and wages as prices, and to follow out the consideration that, like all prices, they are determined by this, that each has a marginal quantity and quality which it just pays the employer to buy. The margins are not independent of one another, since the employer may substitute machinery for labour, one kind of labour for another, a cheap site requiring much capital for a dear one requiring less. And he expects a certain margin of profit for his own enterprise, short of which he would prefer to join the ranks of the employed. But, as data for an ethical judgment of the system, it is better to regard the shares more directly.

(*a*) *The share to land or nature.*—Economic *rent* comes out of the price of a commodity in respect of the superiority of the soil and site concerned in its production. The growing demand for food and raw material, houses and factories, requires the use of inferior natural conditions; resort is had to inferior lands and sites, and more capital and labour are put into those already occupied, though the return per unit is less. Since it must pay to use the inferior conditions, it more than pays now to use the better. The surplus is rent. Hence it does not need a system of landlord and tenant in order that there should be rent. When a farm is cultivated by its owner, it earns the same economic rent as if he had let it, for its produce brings the same price.

In respect of the amount that goes as rent, it is best, and it is the practice, to begin by regarding a farm or a town-block as having a value estimated from its selling price, or from its earnings capitalized. Thus the earnings are all profit and interest on the selling price; rent is not something additional, it is contained in the profit and interest. To separate it out is to make a fresh analysis, tracing now the stock to its origin, and distinguishing the part that is not due to the owner's capital and labour. Besides 'the natural and indestructible powers of the soil' and the suitability of the site, this part includes the improvements, *e.g.* road and rail, that are due to the capital of others. Some (*e.g.* Pierson, *Princ. of Econ.*, London, 1902, vol. i. ch. 2) include as yielding rent, and not interest and profit, all advantages that are due to capital permanently sunk in the land. But theoretically it is better, and for the purpose of special taxation it is usually the intention, to distinguish the advantages of land and site that are due to nature or to the expenditure of others, and not due to the expenditure of owners present or past. For urban lands it is

thought that from about 25 to 40 per cent of their annual value is rent, the higher figure being the estimate for London. Of the annual value of agricultural land in England, probably 23 per cent is pure rent (R. J. Thompson, *Journ. Roy. Stat. Soc.*, 1907, p. 610).

(*b*) *The share to capital.*—This must not only make good the capital that is consumed in producing the commodity, but pay *interest* on it as well. And it is the same with interest as with rent; capital need not be lent in order to earn interest. If the owners of real capital use it themselves, and use it equally well, it earns much the same interest as when the capital is borrowed, for its products get much the same price. A machine or other piece of real capital pays its costs out of its products; and, if it could produce them all at once, there would be no interest, for the price got for them in respect of the machine would just cover the cost of the machine. But to do its work the machine needs time. This involves other costs, *e.g.* repairs, insurance, and the risk of becoming obsolete; and these must be covered by the price of the products. But also the mere time must be paid for, and, the more time that is needed, the more the produce must pay. Interest is, therefore, a rate on the capital per unit of time; and it is paid because the time is necessary, like the power that works the machine, or like the need for repairs. One machine or process would be able to displace another equally economical in all other respects, if it made an economy merely in time. From this case of a machine and its working we may generalize regarding the interest on all capital, commercial as well as industrial, that claims a share in the national dividend; for the bulk of loanable capital is employed in the purchase and working of real capital. Interest, then, is the share of the price of commodities that goes to capital on account of the time that the capital needs to get its products and have them sold. The interest on capital that is borrowed, not for production but for consumption (*e.g.* a dwelling-house or a war-loan), does not concern us; it is not an additional claim to a share in the distribution of the dividend, but merely the exchange of one person's present claim for another's in the future that suits him better. It may be observed, however, that the rate of such interest follows the rate on productive capital, so far as it is pure interest, and not also a premium on the risk of loss, or an extortion from folly or distress.

It was a mistake to suppose that there must be a minimum rate of interest, below which the increase of capital would be checked, and the rate correct itself; for with the diffusion of wealth come prudence and the joy of possession. On the other hand, to prophesy that the rate must decline is hazardous, considering the demands for capital that may arise at any time to meet the increasing supply of it. But a normal rate over long periods it is quite possible to distinguish; and it is important to do so, in order to separate pure interest from the employer's share, from rent, and from gains and losses that are due to a rise or fall in the value of the capital itself. The distinction from the employer's share is already obvious, but to separate it from the other two we have to regard interest as a rate not on what the capital may have cost originally, but on its selling value. Then we can say that all capital, so far as it is used as capital, earns interest, and that competition keeps interest at a normal rate for different kinds of stock. This rate is that at which capital remains in the industry; rates are above and below the normal, and indicate the employer's profit and loss, when they tend to increase or diminish the supply of that kind of capital. When an owner or a valuator finds the average interest in a stock to be over or under the normal, he writes the capital value up or down to a figure at which the capital earns the normal rate for that kind of stock. Similarly with government and other stocks; it is the interest that is regarded as constant, and the owner's capital that is written up or down. The more a stock is an investment stock, the more this is apparent, and it is really the same with stocks that are more speculative. The interest on first-class securities is taken as the minimum of the normal rate. The minimum varies with the demand for such securities and their supply, and for different lengths of credit. But the average interest on loans for three months on these securities is conveniently regarded as the rate of pure interest, because all factors are eliminated but time. From 1844 to 1900 the average rate of the Bank of England was £3, 12s. per cent, and the market rate about 10s. less (Palgrave, *Bank Rate and the Money Market*, London, 1903).

(*c*) *The share to labour.*—The rest of the product goes to the living factors. The relative amount of it cannot be estimated without an adequate census of production, and, in particular, because the estimation of interest has to be made on the earning capacity of capital, and not on its cost. But the earning capacity of the living factors may be taken to be about five times that of land and capital together (Nicholson, *Strikes and Social Problems*, Lond. 1896, v. and vi.). The struggle between labour and capital does not lie here, however; a less figure need not imply any loss to labour, for the substitution of machinery for labour is to the ultimate advantage of the latter. The struggle is not of labour against rent and interest, for we have seen how these are already fixed and inevitable, but for the division of the share that goes to the living factors. Most directly it is between the share to the labour or enterprise of the employer, and the shares to the labour of all kinds that he hires.

The hired labour may be manual or mental, industrial or commercial, the labour of workman, clerk, or manager. And it is not of theoretical importance whether the *wages* are paid weekly or as salaries; for whether the employer pays before selling the product is immaterial, the essential thing being that the share is made a fixed cost, independent of the business risk. But, while it is the struggle between employer and employed that is most in evidence, the real struggle is deeper. As in all buying and selling we see competition in the higgling between buyer and seller, but behind, and entirely determining the average price, there is the more vital struggle of buyer with buyer and seller with seller, so it is in the labour market. This was wrongly expressed in the 'wages-fund' theory, which required a rise in the wages of one class of labour to be met by a fall in wages elsewhere. The theory was right in holding that the action both of the buyer and of the seller of labour is limited; but the limit is not capital but the price of the product. And it was also right in saying that the classes of labour are in mutual competition; but the force of each depends ultimately on its efficiency. This is partly obscured when the power of collective bargaining is strong in one class and weak in another, and it is to be hoped and expected that the lower grades will advance more rapidly than those requiring skill, intelligence, and managing ability; but progress and competition will continue to make the great difference. They will continue to determine the supply of labour at the different grades, and thus to make the differences in wages and salaries correspond with a difference in ability. It seems unjust that in almost any industrial group it is the most wearing and unpleasant labour that gets the smallest share of the product; but the unfairness cannot be charged to

the system of distribution, so long as efficiency is taken for the test of desert. For it is no part of the system itself that competition must be greatest at the bottom and least at the top, and that the hardest and most monotonous labour should thus have to rank as least efficient. A considerable part of the rise in the average wages of manual labour has been due to the rise in occupation.

'The constant tendency away from agriculture and the textiles, where the average earnings of all employed, either through the low relative wages of the male (as in agriculture), or the large relative employment of lower-paid women and children, are low, towards the more highly-paid engineering, mining, and building industries, has had the effect of increasing the average earnings of all employed in industrial occupations more rapidly than the earnings in the occupations taken separately. . . . The Standard of Comfort of the British wage-earner is now, on the average, not less than 50 per cent, and probably nearer 80 per cent, higher than that of his predecessor in 1850, and of this advance more than one-half has been obtained during the past quarter of a century' (G. H. Wood, *Journ. Roy. Stat. Soc.*, 1909, pp. 98, 101).

(*d*) *The share to enterprise.—Profit* is what remains of the price of the product after the employer has paid the other shares. There are all grades of enterprise, from those requiring little capital and ability to those requiring much, and ordinarily there is competition at all grades with other employing individuals or companies. The individual profit is frequently little more than the salary of a hired manager at the same grade, and, considering the number of failures, the average is possibly less.

'There is good reason to believe that the community gets its employing done for it more cheaply than it gets any other service, just because the speculation and the free life are very large elements in the real remuneration' (Smart, *The Distribution of Income*, p. 163).

The existence of the employer and his profit, which distinguishes the present system from its predecessors, has often been regarded as its defect; and Socialism (*q.v.*) is the view that this function should be undertaken by the State, and not by individuals or companies. The discussion on the question is beyond the scope of this article; but it may be repeated, on behalf of the present system, that many of the current economic evils are wrongly charged against it. The system of distribution would not be affected, for example, by any measures of taxation and expenditure that aimed at a better distribution of wealth; and the regulation of monopolies is an essential office of Government, which has given freedom from its old control only because it has found a more effectual substitute in competition. The most serious defects lie in competition itself; but the defects are not all inevitable, and they prevent the very efficiency which the system is meant to bring out. Cf. art. COMPETITION.

LITERATURE.—All the text-books in economics give a prominent place to distribution; several books are confined to the subject, the most distinctive being J. B. Clark, *The Distribution of Wealth*, London, 1900, and W. Smart, *The Distribution of Income*, Glasgow, 1899. Wages, interest, and rent have each a large literature; and the recent works on monopolies and trusts may be regarded as the special authorities on profits. In comparative statistics regarding wages, special reference may be made to the work done by Rowley and Wood, and for current comparisons there are the Reports of the Board of Trade mentioned under art. CONSUMPTION (Economic), to which has now to be added the corresponding Report on Wages and the Cost of Living in U.S.A. (1911).

W. MITCHELL.

DIVINATION.

DIVINATION (Introductory and Primitive).—By 'divination' is meant the endeavour to obtain information about things future or otherwise removed from ordinary perception, by consulting informants other than human. While mostly directed to foretelling coming events, it is not confined to this, but may seek to find out, *e.g.*, what is going on at home while the inquirer is abroad. Ancient as well as modern thinkers have repeatedly denounced it and exposed its fallacy; nevertheless it is still practised all over the world by the more backward races of mankind and by uneducated members of the civilized peoples. Even under the highest religions—Buddhism, Islām, Judaism, Christianity itself—diviners, like other magicians, have continued to flourish, although their arts form no part of the prevailing rites and beliefs, and, indeed, have been often and vigorously denounced by the leaders of religion. Like other pseudo-sciences, divination rests on very ancient and wide-spread convictions, inherited from lower levels of culture; and its great stronghold is in the utter inability of the undeveloped human mind to understand and appreciate a negative argument. No doubt wilful deceit on the part of diviners has done much to retain their hold on popular belief; but for the most part they have been the dupes of their own pretensions, and, like their consultants, have remembered successful predictions and forgotten unsuccessful ones.

Divination is a pseudo-science, and has a certain order and logicality in its structure, once its erroneous premisses are granted; although it must be remembered that the logic of uncivilized and semi-civilized man—or, for that matter, of our own children—is much less stringent than ours, and less quick to detect fallacies. Indeed, the whole argument for divination may be said to be based on a glaring fallacy of 'ambiguous middle.' To explain this, it is necessary to consider what train of thought may be supposed to have given rise to the beliefs under discussion.

Perhaps the first idea which suggests itself is that divination grew out of false induction. A savage, we may imagine, noticed a bird, for instance, behaving in a peculiar way, and soon afterwards met with some mishap. He put the two happenings together, did the same in several other cases, and came to the conclusion that such-and-such a movement on the part of a hawk or parrot meant that the observer was in danger of a bad fall, or would have no luck if he went fishing. That such a train of reasoning may often have taken place we do not deny; but we are of opinion that such a process would not be likely to lead to anything more than a miscellaneous series of omens, not a system such as divination often is among quite uncivilized races. Also it would result in the most arbitrary relations between omen and subsequent event; whereas between the sign and the thing signified there very often exists, allowing for uncivilized ways of thought, a perfectly

rational connexion, sometimes amounting to causality.

It seems, then, more likely that divination should be treated as a branch of sympathetic magic, and regarded as a deduction or series of deductions from a vaguely conceived principle of something like the uniformity of Nature. The reasoning may be thus paraphrased in our definite phraseology: like causes produce like effects; therefore this occurrence, which is like that other one, will produce a like result. The fallacy lies in the ambiguity of 'like,' and the reasoner's inability to differentiate between those things whose likeness to one another is real and essential and those which bear only an accidental or fanciful resemblance to one another. Thus, 'whistling for a wind' rests on the likeness between whistling and the rush of an actual breeze; while in the realm of omens, the Melanesian belief, that, if a non-domestic animal, entering the house,[1] makes any outcry, a death will ensue, seems to rest on the resemblance of the strange creature's cry to the wailing of mourners. How real the causal connexion is often felt to be is clear from the innumerable cases in all grades of civilization of avoidance or neutralization of bad omens—taking away the cause, that is, to prevent the effect. Thus the Manipuris, if they meet with a mole on a journey—a bad omen—try to kill it (Hodson, p. 132).

But this simple process is not in itself sufficient to account for all the ramifications of the diviner's art.[2] At least two main developments must be noted. The first is the elaboration of the supposedly causal or quasi-causal connexion between omen and event into a system, often very complex and intricate, of symbolism—a system, the gaps in which, as Tylor notes, are apt to be filled by the invention of new omens, arbitrarily, or on the analogy of those already existing. The second comes with the advance of religious belief and the growing importance of deities of one sort or another. Men come to think of omens as sent by them. A good example of this is the Dayak idea that the hawk, their chief omen bird, while it sometimes comes of its own accord to foretell the future, is regularly the messenger of Balli Penyalong, the Supreme Being.[3] Finally, it must be remembered that, although the chief source of divination is probably sympathetic magic, other ideas have contributed to the long list of omens.[4]

Divination may be roughly divided into two kinds: (*a*) 'automatic' divination, in which an omen is looked for and interpreted, so to speak, in its own right, with no thought of appeal to any supernormal power, god, or spirit; and (*b*) divination proper, in the strict etymological sense of the word, which inquires of some sort of a deity, generally by means of signs conceived of as being sent by him. But of many cases it is hard to say which category they fall under. Take the well-known method of divining by the Bible and key; we doubt if the people who use this method could say definitely whether they suppose the answer to be sent by God or to come from some quasi-magical power inherent in the book itself. The same applies to many such survivals; one is in doubt whether to consider them purely magical or affected by the current religion. For the purposes of this article, we shall classify divination according to the means employed, noting roughly the distribution of each.

1 For the ominous nature of such an occurrence in general, see below.

2 It should be noted that, although no people apparently is without some system of divination, the ruder tribes (*e.g.* the Australian blacks) have only very rudimentary ideas of it, and seem to use it but little.

3 Hose-McDougall, in *JAI* xxxi. 179.

4 See esp. § 7, on 'Divination from animals.'

1. Dreams.—That a dream may be in some way prophetic is a view held by all races at all times, and still popular, to judge by the numerous modern dream-books.[1] The simplest form is that the dreamer sees, as actually as if he were awake, what is being done or at least contemplated. A recent book[2] gives an excellent account of the way the Lenguas of the Paraguayan Chaco regard dreams. We quote a typical case:

> 'A spirit appeared in the form of a horned beetle, and, flying round the sleeper several times, eventually entered his body in the vicinity of the knee. The pain of its entrance was distinctly felt. The sleeper, awakening, noticed no mark or other sign of injury. The pain, however, was still slightly felt. What explanation could there be, according to the Indian's way of thinking, except that an actual beetle had entered, possessed by a spirit?'

The explanation usually given by savages is that the dreamer's soul, or one of his souls,[3] goes away from his body and sees the things he dreams of. Hence the reluctance among many uncivilized peoples to awaken a sleeper—his soul may be shut out, or an evil spirit get in, etc.

Another idea is that the temporarily liberated spirit visits the spirit world and there secures information. This, we gather, is the Ewe belief,[4] and it is frequently met with elsewhere. Or the revelation may be given by spirits visiting the dreamer. An excellent example of this is found in the skull-divination of the Torres Straits[5] natives. A skull, preferably that of a kinsman, is placed, after sundry honorific ceremonies, beside the pillow of the consultant. In his sleep he hears it speaking to him, with a sound like teeth chattering. The modern method of putting bridescake under one's pillow would seem to be a survival of an even cruder kind of magic. Finally, a god, not a mere ancestral spirit, may choose this method of sending an oracle, and in that case the dream is generally sought for by sleeping in a holy place—the Greek ἐγκοίμησις (see DIVINATION [Greek]). An example from lower culture is the N. Amer. Indian custom—found also among the Dayaks—of going to some solitary and more or less holy or haunted spot, to learn in a dream or ecstatic vision the identity of one's guardian spirit.

But, even with the simplest and crudest ideas of dream-divination, it soon becomes clear that all dreams cannot be taken literally. To enumerate all the methods of interpretation would be an endless task; perhaps the simplest case is that in which the dreamer dreams of something which, if actually seen, would be ominous: *e.g.* in certain parts of Australia, to dream of 'old-man' kangaroos sitting about the camp presages the advent, not of kangaroos, but of danger; and the kangaroo sometimes gives omens to men awake.[6] With the increasing complication of dream-interpreting, the services of a professional diviner become necessary. He may either dream himself, like the Melanesian *tatua qoreqore*,[7] or interpret other people's dreams, like the Nāga *maiba*.[8]

Distribution: world-wide. Typical cases are: literal interpretation (Sea Dayaks);[9] symbolic dreams (Malays).[10]

2. Presentiments may perhaps be noticed here, although they hardly amount to actual divination. The Zulus, for instance, believe that a man look-

1 See Aristotle, *De div. e somn.*, for an eminently clear-headed discussion of this belief.

2 W. B. Grubb, *An Unknown People in an Unknown Land*, 1911, p. 127 ff.

3 Men have several souls apiece, according, *e.g.*, to the Sea Dayaks.

4 Spieth, p. 564.

5 *Camb. Exp.* p. 361 ff.

6 Howitt, p. 400 ff.; cf. Hodson, p. 129: 'The Tangkhuls say that a man who is attacked by a buffalo will lose any lawsuit in which he happens at that time to be involved. They also believe that, if a man dreams that he is attacked by a buffalo, he will suffer similar misfortune.'

7 Codrington, p. 208.

8 Hodson, p. 129.

9 Gomes, *Seventeen Years among the Sea Dyaks*, 1911, p. 161.

10 Skeat, p. 532 ff.

ing for a thing sometimes 'feels internally a pointing' which will guide him aright; 'but if it is done by mere head-guessing . . . he generally misses the mark,' to quote a Zulu cited by Callaway.

Distribution: not specifically mentioned by most of our authorities, but may be presumed to be universal or nearly so.

From these cases, in which a man may almost be said to prophesy to himself, we turn to the large class of—

3. **Divination from bodily actions.** — Of the various involuntary movements and noises of which the human body is capable, perhaps sneezing is the one most universally regarded as ominous, and, in nearly all cases, as a bad omen. The reason is apparently that it is feared that the internal convulsion may disturb or drive out the soul.[1] Hence the common custom of blessing the sneezer, prevalent alike in civilized Germany (*Gesundheit!*) and among the Nandi (*Ko'-weit-in Asis*, 'God be good to you!') We cannot recall any non-classical examples of the idea that a sneeze is a sign sent to denote Divine approval of words or actions (see DIVINATION [Greek]).

A curious form of divination is the Melanesian *so ilo*. In this, the hands are rubbed above the head and a ghost (*tindalo*) invoked by a magic song. A cracking of the joints, variously significant according to the particular joint which cracks, is taken to be the spirit's answer (Codrington, 211). Other ominous signs are hiccuping, the twitching of an eyelid, and so on; but these omens are mostly trivial and not much regarded either by savages or by civilized races. The sneeze, stumbling,[2] and *so ilo* are the only really important ones we know of. Some voluntary actions are considered unlucky, and therefore avoided, by various races;[3] but this is hardly divination, nor is the idea that 'praise to the face is open disgrace'—very common among many peoples from Europeans downwards—properly germane to our subject.

Distribution: important cases given above; minor omens from bodily actions are world-wide.

All the above forms of divination depend upon a more or less normal condition; we now proceed to consider those which depend upon an abnormal state of body or mind, or both.

4. **Divination by ordeal** may be thus classed. Ordeals are of two kinds: either a suspected person (or the suspect and his accuser) is subjected to some process which would normally injure or endanger him; or the process is a magical one, with power to hurt the guilty, but not the innocent. Examples of the first class are the ancient European 'judgment of God' or 'wager by battle,' and the Gold Coast method of making, *e.g.*, a wife suspected of infidelity plunge her hand into boiling oil.[4] The innocent and wrongfully accused person is Divinely aided to win the combat, or protected against what would normally harm him or her. The author believes that this is the root-idea of judicial torture, at least among people so humane in general as the ancient Athenians. The idea probably was that an innocent man or a truthful witness would feel no pain.[5] Of the second class the Nandi and Masai furnish very instructive examples. Among the former,[1] the accused lays a skull at the accuser's door, saying: 'If I have done this thing, may this head eat me; if I have not done it, may it eat thee,' and one or the other dies accordingly. Among the latter,[2] the accused drinks blood, saying: 'If I have done this deed, may God kill me!' (*Ten ataasa elle-bae, naaar eng-Ai*); and, if guilty, he dies accordingly. These different methods, occurring among tribes so near to each other in territory and culture, warn us of the thinness of the party-wall between magic and religion. This *eng-Aï*, who punishes the guilty man in the latter case, is a genuine deity—a 'high god'; but in the corresponding ordeal of the neighbouring tribe, it is the inherent magical power of the skull (or the ghost), apparently, which 'eats' the false swearer. It is noteworthy that the Nandi diviners, who in other respects are exactly like their Masai confrères, are said to worship, not Asista, their 'high god,' but the ancestral spirits.[3] But the root-idea is the same in any case: guilt weakens the wrong-doer, robs him of his *mana* or of Divine favour, and so renders him an easy prey to any injury, natural or magical. This weakness extends to his agents, as in the Malay ordeal by diving, described by Skeat (p. 542 f.). In this, boys, hired by the parties to a suit, plunge simultaneously under water, with the result that the representative of the party in the wrong has to come up again at once, while the other is not inconvenienced. Such a belief as this indicates a people not without some advancement in moral ideas.

Distribution: Africa, *passim*; in Asia, *e.g.* among the Nagas; also in Melanesia and among Malays; formerly in Europe; not in Australia; traces in North America.

5. **Divination by possession** ('shamanizing').—Not only do spirits visit sleepers, but they often possess a diviner or priest, rousing him to a prophetic frenzy. This belief, while adopted by some higher cults, as that of Apollo (see DIVINATION [Greek]), is most characteristic of those races in whose religion the spirits of the dead are prominent. Thus, the shamans of the Tunguses in Siberia are possessed, not by Tengri Kaira Khan, or Erlik (the leading good and bad deities respectively), or by any of their emissaries, but by the ancestral spirits—the objects, one may conjecture, of an older cult. We translate a part of Radloff's vivid account:

> 'The individual marked out by the might of the ancestors for shamanhood feels a sudden faintness and exhaustion . . . a heavy weight presses on his breast and suddenly wrings from him violent, inarticulate screams.' (After wild paroxysms he sinks to the ground.) 'His limbs are wholly insensitive; he snatches whatever he can lay his hands on, and swallows aimlessly everything he gets hold of—hot iron, knives, needles, . . . afterwards casting up dry and uninjured what he has swallowed.'

Apparently this eccentric diet does him no harm. His only relief is to seize the shaman's drum and begin to 'shamanize': his chief danger is that he may resist the frenzy and die or go mad. Not till after this experience does he receive any instruction in his art from other shamans. He is able, by the help of the spirits, to foretell the future, besides exercising various priestly functions. There seems to be no doubt of the sincerity of some, at least, of these men, who continue to ply their art despite Governmental prohibition. 'I *must* shamanize,' said one of them to a traveller, 'both for my own sake and that of my people.'[4] What their actual state is during 'possession' we leave to physiologists to determine. The shamans of

[1] Tylor, i. 100 ff.; cf. Ellis, 203; the Ashanti believe a sneeze indicates 'something unpleasant or painful having happened to the indwelling *kra*.'

[2] *e.g.* among the Malays (Skeat, p. 553); also Græco-Roman (see special articles) and modern (see § 11, 'Survivals').

[3] Thus a Malay child is scolded if he lies on his belly—the almost universal attitude of a resting child—as this is considered unlucky; and sundry bits of table etiquette amongst the same people have a similar sanction (Skeat, p. 533 f.). Cf. the classical habit of entering a room right foot first.

[4] Ellis, p. 196 f., gives examples of both classes.

[5] Ellis, p. 201, remarks that a guilty woman will often confess rather than face the ordeal, as a beating hurts less than a badly scalded hand!

[1] Hollis, *Nandi*, p. 76. [2] Hollis, *Masai*, p. 345.

[3] So the Toda diviners are mostly possessed by foreign gods; and, in general, where a race's religion has advanced beyond the earliest stages, the diviners, like other magicians, represent the older and cruder forms.

[4] Stadling, in *CR*, 1901, p. 86 f.

Northern Asia use a drum in divining; but in some other cases the possessing spirits speak by the mouth of the wizard, as among the Tshi-speaking peoples,[1] whose priests are possessed, not by spirits, but by gods. Some similar cases will be considered in the next paragraph.

Distribution: Ural-Altaic races of N. Asia and Europe; N. America (see DIVINATION [American]); more or less modified forms common in Africa and elsewhere (*e.g.* Todas).

6. Necromancy.—Death increases rather than diminishes a man's magical powers, including his prophetic faculties. Hence we find the wide-spread practice (of which, indeed, shamanizing might be considered a variant) of consulting either the souls of the dead in general or the soul of a particular dead man, or his corpse. A very crude instance of the last comes from Central Australia. Tree-burial is largely practised among these tribes, and it is the custom to observe the direction taken by the liquid matter exuding from the corpse and flowing along the ground. If the stream flows, say, north, the slayer lives to the northward;[2] if it is short, he is close at hand; if long, he is far away. Skull-divination has already been noticed, and might be classed under necromancy. But we are chiefly concerned with necromancy proper, or the evoking and consulting of ghosts. This, as distinct from seeing a ghost casually in a dream, or meeting or hearing one unsought, which might happen to any one, is the task of a professional diviner or a priest. Thus the Zulu witch-doctor is visited by the *amatongo* (=*manes*) and their voices are heard giving answers. 'The voice,' says a native witness, quoted by Callaway, 'was like that of a very little child . . . it speaks above, among the wattles of the hut'—a clear case of ventriloquism. Among the Melanesians a *tindalo*, or ghost, comes on board a canoe, its presence being detected by a *mane kisu*, or diviner, and gives affirmative or negative signs in answer to the question, 'Shall we go to such-a-place?' The Ewe diviners summon a *tro*[3] in case of sickness, and from its answers—inaudible to profane ears—foretell the course of the disease, and so on. In most, if not all, cases, the spirits thus consulted are given offerings of various kinds to win their favour and induce them not only to foretell, but to make things turn out as the inquirer wishes (see Spieth, *l.c.*).

One curious case might be called either necromancy or ordeal. It comes from the Gold Coast, and is used when a creditor makes a claim on a dead man's estate, about which the heirs are doubtful. The claimant drinks water in which the corpse has been washed, swearing to the accuracy of his statement; if he is lying, the power (*sisa*) of the deceased will punish him.[4] This is an illustration of the difficulty of applying any rigid classification to a large and miscellaneous body of savage beliefs.

Distribution: in one form or another, world-wide. Typical instances are given above.

From men, living or dead, we pass to their surroundings, animate and inanimate. Beginning with the former, we find a large and interesting class.

7. Divination from animals.—(*a*) *Augury.*—The movements of birds or beasts are considered ominous in some degree by nearly, if not quite, all races. In some cases the reason is quite obvious. Thus the Melanesians have a bird which they call *wisi*, from one of its cries. This happens to mean 'No' in the local dialect, and the creature is thus able to answer questions—its other cries being taken to mean 'Yes.' But this is 'not seriously thought of' (Codrington, p. 221), and in the vast majority of cases the omen is symbolical, frequently needing a professional diviner to interpret it. Thus the Kenyahs of Sarawak have a method of divination worthy of Etruria, by which high-born augurs, after due ceremonies, sit in a leaf-shelter and watch a particular part of the sky for hawks, until the favour of Balli Penyalong is shown by one bird flying right, another left, and a third circling.[1] Why this should be a good omen is by no means clear; the symbolism of augury is a product of many generations, and mysterious, probably, even to the initiated. A more profitable question is, Why should animals give omens at all?—for, no doubt, the original idea is that the animals themselves gave answers, not that any god sent them.[2] Leaving the Kenyahs for a much more primitive people, we find a case which throws great light on the origin of the belief. A certain young member of the Yuin tribe had the kangaroo for his personal totem, by inheritance. Whenever this man saw an 'old-man' kangaroo coming towards him, he knew that he was being warned of danger.[3] The Kenyahs are not totemic; but the Ibans (Sea Dayaks), who are of the same family, have a sort of personal totem, the *ngarong*,[4] or 'spirit-helper,' who generally takes animal form. It is not unlikely, then, that the omen-animal or bird was originally some sort of a personal totem, or—since 'totem' is a word apt to be abused—a *manitou*, which gave warnings and advice, as friendly animals do in folk-tales of all countries. Originally only this one particular spirit-animal would give omens;[5] this would then be extended to all its species; and, finally, with the coming of more advanced religious views, they would be considered the messengers of a god, perhaps originally a theriomorphic one. We put forward this theory tentatively, however, recognizing its difficulties, such as the existence of augury among the Kenyahs, who apparently have not even the *ngarong*, and its non-existence in Torres Straits, where totemism flourishes.

It should be mentioned that men may be counted among omen-animals. We have already dealt with the omens a man may draw from his own actions; but he may also do things significant for others, though not for himself; *e.g.*, if twins are born, this, like almost all events a little out of the common, is held to be a good or a bad omen by various peoples; thus the Nāgas[6] hold that the birth of twins of opposite sex is unlucky. Again, the Masai[7] believe that if, on a journey, one meets a solitary wayfarer, the journey will be fruitless.

Finally, in augury, one cannot divide the ominous creatures simply into lucky and unlucky. The same bird or beast may give opposite omens according to the place where it is heard or seen. To take one example out of many, and again from the Masai,[8] the bird they call *tilo* (*Mesopicus spodocephalus*), if heard on the right, is good; if on the left, bad. If heard behind, on a journey, it means, 'Go on, you will be hospitably received.'

[1] Ellis, p. 191. Note that in a few cases (as the Masai [Hollis, p. 324 f.]) a frenzy is induced by an intoxicant or other drug.

[2] 'Death from natural causes' is a notion quite foreign to Australian blacks; all deaths are caused either by violence or by magic. Compare Marett, *Threshold of Religion*, 1909, p. 26.

[3] Spieth, p. 506.

[4] Ellis, p. 197 f. Note the primitiveness of this rite among a people who, according to Ellis, 'implicitly believe in the superhuman power of their gods,' and do not attempt to coerce them by any magic (194 f.).

[1] Hose-McDougall, p. 175 f.

[2] Both ideas persisted in late beliefs and speculations; see, *e.g.*, Stat. *Theb.* iii. 486-8 ('seu purior axis amotumque nefas et rarum insistere terris uera docent [alites]') for the former.

[3] Howitt, p. 400 f.

[4] *Nyarong*, in Hose-McDougall, p. 173; but this is said to be a misprint; Gomes, in *Athenæum*, 18th March 1911.

[5] The Ibans say that not all omen-birds, but only 33 of each kind, are the messengers of Singalang Burong, the hawk-god; the others do not give true omens, and are not, like the 33, immortal.

[6] Hodson, p. 134. [7] Hollis, *Masai*, p. 324. [8] *Ib.* p. 323 f.

(*b*) *Haruspicy*.—Not only living, but dead, animals can give omens, though the latter are for the most part intelligible only to professional diviners. Before passing to a consideration of these cases, it is well to notice that a dying animal is sometimes consulted. The Nāgas, for instance, sometimes kill a fowl and watch its death-struggles for omens. They also have a more economical, though less reliable, method, in which the fowl is held up by the wings. 'Should the animal cross its right foot over the left, the omen is good; the opposite, bad.'[1]

Perhaps the simplest case of what might loosely be called haruspicy is that given by Gomes.[2] The Sea Dayaks, he tells us, consider it a very bad omen if they find a dead animal in their fields; the crops will poison the owner if he ventures to eat them, unless some one with strong *mana* removes the tabu by ceremonially eating a little, and thus absorbing the evil influence into his own powerful person.

But in haruspicy proper we have to deal with a not very primitive type of religion. The slaughtered animal is regularly a sacrificial victim; the *haruspex* is generally not merely a diviner, but a priest, where such a distinction exists; and the entrails therefore contain the cryptic message, to be read by enlightened eyes, of a god. The method of reading is a more or less complex symbolism; thus, to find the internal organs in an unusual position—heart on the wrong side, or the like—means generally some disastrous upheaval.

Distribution: augury and haruspicy both in Sarawak; augury alone in Malay Peninsula and Melanesia; haruspicy alone among Masai and Nandi; both found, singly or together, in more or less complicated forms, in nearly all parts of the world.

8. Divination by mechanical means.—Of mechanical means of divination there is no end. We may divide them, very roughly, into: (*a*) *coscinomancy*, or devices akin to the modern *planchette*, and probably worked by unconscious muscular action; (*b*) *sortilegium*, or devices involving some kind of a game of chance, generally of simple form.

(*a*) Skeat (p. 536 f.) reports a simple case of *coscinomancy* among the Malays, which he himself saw. A kind of pendulum is made, with appropriate rites—charm and sacrifice—by thrusting a fish-spine through a lemon, and suspending it on a cord of seven different coloured strands. Questions are then put to it; it says 'Yes' by swinging, 'No' by staying still. The same people use a divining-rod, which vibrates in the presence of a thief; the Melanesians[3] use a similar rod in cases of illness, to discover which of the recently dead is 'eating' the patient. The stick vibrates at the right name. To take another illustration from Skeat (p. 538 ff.)—a thief may be discovered, after appropriate rites, by two people holding a bowl of water between their fingers. The names of suspected persons are presented to it in writing, and at that of the guilty man it twists around and falls. In all these cases, as in *planchette* writing, if we exclude deliberate cheating, we are left with the supposition that the diviner unconsciously moves his divining-machine in the way he is expecting, or perhaps contrary to his conscious expectation and even his conscious volition.[4] But the usual, so far as we know, the universal, explanation given by the lower races is that the movements are caused by some spirit which, to borrow the jargon of modern spiritualism, 'controls' the instrument. It may well be thought, however, considering the obvious antiquity of this and kindred modes of divination, that, before any definitely animistic belief came to prevail, the implement, being by virtue of proper ceremonies made 'big medicine,' had in itself the power to answer.

(*b*) Whether or not Tylor[1] is right in seeing in *sortilegium* the origin of all games of luck, it is so wide-spread and miscellaneous that we can do no more than give a few random examples, some of which, provisionally accepting Tylor's hypothesis, we class under the main forms of games of chance. (1) *Odd and even*.—This is used among the Masai and Nandi, whose diviners shake pebbles out of a buffalo-horn, and observe whether an odd or an even number results.[2] On the Gold Coast a similar method is used, with nuts for pebbles and without the horn.[3] (2) *The teetotum*.—The coconut, being a natural teetotum, is much used in the Pacific, both in games of chance, pure and simple, and for divination. Tylor (*loc. cit.*) gives examples of both. (3) *Dice and similar implements*.—Dice, as we understand them, are but little used among savages; but the underlying principle—something which, if thrown, may fall in any one of several different ways—is common enough. The most rudimentary form is perhaps the mangrove-embryo used by women in the Torres Straits[4] to determine the sex of an unborn child. It is thrown between the legs, backwards, and no notice is taken of which side it falls on, but merely of whether it flies straight or crooked—the first presaging a boy, and the second a girl. The same people have a folk-tale, in which the hero holds up his throwing-stick, 'and it fell in the direction of Daudai. "I will go there by-and-by; I think I will kill them all," he said.'[5] (4) A number of methods of mechanical divination have not, so far as we know, resulted in actual games. The most interesting is the magic drum of the shaman, the surface of which, in Lapland, was painted with various figures. A ring or bunch of rings was placed on the skin of the drum, which was then beaten with a horn hammer, 'not so much to make a Noise, as by the Drumming to move the Ring . . . so as to pass over the Pictures and shew what they seek after.'[6] Besides particular signs given by the pictures, the ring gave a good omen if it went sunwise, bad if it went *withershins*. A simpler omen is that found among the Nāgas. 'At Mao and Marām the issue of a hunting party is prognosticated by their success in kicking small pebbles on to the top of a monolith.'[7] More curious, because harder to explain, though it probably is a simple conjuring trick, is the Zulu divination by sticks or bones. The sticks, after proper ceremonies, rise up and jump about by way of saying 'Yes,' lie still for 'No,' and, if asked 'Where is so-and-so's ailment?' strike the questioner on the corresponding part of his body. And so on. The list might be extended indefinitely, but the principle is always the same: 'chance' is the working of some non-human power, who makes a die fall a particular way, or an odd and not an even number of pebbles jump out, or a particular man draw a particular lot, just as Athene makes the arrow of Pandaros miss its mark (*Il.* iv. 127 ff.).

Distribution: in one form or another, universal.

9. Divination from Nature.—(*a*) *Astrology*.—With the elaborate pseudo-science which grew out of the belief that the position and influence of the heavenly bodies more or less mould human affairs, we have nothing to do here; it is a product of

[1] Dr. Brown, *ap.* Hodson, p. 132. [2] *Op. cit.* p. 156.
[3] See Codrington, p. 210 ff.
[4] The writer has had personal experience of quite genuine performances of this sort on the part of a *planchette*.

[1] i. 78. [2] Hollis, *Masai*, p. 324, *Nandi*, p. 49.
[3] Ellis, p. 202. [4] *Camb. Exp.* p. 196. [5] *Ib.* p. 74.
[6] Scheffer, *Hist. of Lapland*, Eng. ed. of 1751, p. 29 f.; cf. *Anthropology and the Classics*, ed. Marett, Oxford, 1909, pp. 28, 30. It is not inconceivable that the pictures on playing-cards may owe their origin to some such magic figures as these.
[7] Hodson, p. 133.

comparatively advanced civilization, and involves real knowledge of pure and applied mathematics, far beyond the capacity of most savage races. The rudiments, however, of astrology, together with star-myths of varying complexity, are early and common. Thus the Malays, along with quite a complicated foreign astrology, with calendars and lucky and unlucky days, etc.,[1] have preserved such simple bits of symbolism as that a star near the moon means an approaching marriage. Among the Maoris the moon represents a besieged *pah*, and the stars the attacking force—their relative position indicating the result of the campaign.

(*b*) Other natural phenomena, such as earthquakes, lightning, etc., are everywhere held to portend something—usually misfortune. But it seldom goes beyond 'something.' Homer's remark on lightning, which indicates Zeus to be 'fashioning either great rain unspeakable or hail or snow . . . or, somewhere, the great mouth of bitter battle' (*Il.* x. 5 ff.), is a good summing up of the vagueness of the beliefs usually connected with these phenomena. They are too rare, comparatively speaking, and also too noteworthy in themselves, for a system of divination to be built upon them. They frighten rather than forewarn.

Distribution: traces everywhere; so far as we know, except for civilized peoples, nowhere very important or noteworthy.

10. Miscellaneous divination.—Finally, we may note one or two methods which cannot be classed under any of the above heads, but are interesting in themselves. (*a*) *Clairvoyance.*—This is not the place to ask whether any such power really exists. It is enough for our purposes that, *e.g.*, the Malays think it does, and some of them, according to Skeat, practise it. (*b*) In the Torres Straits[2] we get a good example of a not uncommon idea, that a small mishap of any kind is the forerunner of a greater one. Thus one of the natives, who was a skilled dugong fisher, returned empty-handed one day with his harpoon broken. Shortly after, three deaths occurred, to his great comfort, as it showed that his bad luck had been sent as an omen and was no fault of his own. (*c*) *Blood* is 'uncanny' and ominous. Thus a Sea Dayak,[3] finding a drop of blood on the floor-mats, will consider that a spirit has shed it, and that it is a very bad omen. (*d*) In general, any occurrence at all unusual is ominous; and a diviner, or some skilled person, is usually consulted.

11. Survivals.—The methods of which we have given examples belong to the lower stages of civilization. With political and religious advance one of two things happens: either some kinds of divination are taken into the State religion (Greece, Rome; see special articles) and the others become insignificant and even disreputable, like all magic; or, as in the case especially of Christianity,[4] the dominant faith declares against them all as either false or the work of evil spirits. The first beginnings of this we have already seen in a few instances. But the counter process, by which the higher religions degenerate into magic, must not be forgotten. Thus, the Jewish and Christian formula 'In the name of . . .' has been found in magical papyri (see Kenyon, *Brit. Mus. Papyri*, i. [1893] 65 f.; Heitmüller, '*Im Namen Jesu*,' 1903); a chapter of the Qur'ān is read as a charm during the Malay ritual of divination with a bowl of water, described above; Orphic and Mithraic rituals have been used for purely magical purposes; the Buddhist *Om maṇi padme hum* is often used as a charm and not a prayer. But, apart from this, popular belief dies hard; and, for example, in modern Europe we find all kinds of beliefs which are most probably relics of pre-Christian divination, little, if at all, affected by the official religion, except that they are often not definitely felt to be magico-religious. We give a few examples of both classes.

To the class of divination by mechanical means we must add, among peoples who possess sacred writings, or books for any reason esteemed to contain great wisdom (such as was attributed to the works of Vergil in the Middle Ages), a form of *sortilegium* which consists in opening such a book at random and taking an omen from the first passage met with. The prestige won for the Bible by the establishment of Christianity in Europe has resulted in the *sortes Biblicæ*, still used, we believe, among uneducated people.[1] Church festivals also have affected the popular beliefs in lucky and unlucky days, for how else can the bad reputation of Friday be explained? Astrologically it should be lucky, being the day of Venus, especially for marriages and the like; yet comparatively few people even to-day would care to be married on a Friday.

As to survivals pure and simple of ancient ideas about omens, wholly unconnected with Christian beliefs, their name is legion. The author gives a few personally known to him. A patient in a Plaistow hospital showed genuine instinct for sympathetic magic and divination by refusing to fasten on her wedding-ring when her emaciation made that desirable, because, 'if you bind up a ring you bind up poverty with it'; and the idea is common in the East End of London. Creaking furniture heralds a death in many places in Yorkshire; a bird flying into the house 'brings ill-luck with it,' in most parts of England; a stumble in going upstairs—this we cannot explain—presages a wedding. Astrology[2] and oneiromancy still flourish; Tylor mentions an instance of haruspicy in Brandenburg;[3] palmistry, known among the Malays, is common at every fair. Augury has perhaps a survival in the habit of bowing to magpies. Cf. Shakespeare's mention of them:

> 'Augurs and understood relations have
> By magot-pies . . . . brought forth
> The secret'st man of blood' (*Macbeth*, III. iv. 124–126).

Compare the custom of turning over the money in one's pocket on hearing the first cuckoo. So hardly does an ancient belief yield to either science or common sense.

LITERATURE.—On the subject in general, see **E. B. Tylor**, *Primitive Culture*[4], 1903, vol. i. For particular races the following will be found useful: **H. Callaway**, *Rel. Syst. of the Amazulu*, Natal, 1870; *Cambridge Anthropol. Exp. to Torres Straits*, 1901–8, vol. v.; **R. H. Codrington**, *The Melanesians*, Oxford, 1891; **A. B. Ellis**, *Tshi-speaking Peoples*, 1887; **T. C. Hodson**, *The Nāga Tribes of Manipur*, 1911; **A. C. Hollis**, *The Masai*, 1905, also *The Nandi*, 1909; **C. Hose and W. McDougall**, 'Men and Animals in Sarawak,' *JAI* xxxi. [1901] 173; **A. W. Howitt**, *Native Tribes of S.E. Australia*, 1904; **W. Radloff**, 'Das Schamanthum und sein Kultus,' in his *Aus Sibirien*[2], 1893, vol. ii.; **W. H. R. Rivers**, *The Todas*, 1906; **W. W. Skeat**, *Malay Magic*, 1900; **Spencer-Gillen**, *Native Tribes of Central Australia*, 1899, and *Northern Tribes of Central Australia*, 1904; **J. Spieth**, *Die Ewe-Stämme*, 1906.

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DIVINATION (American).—Throughout the two continents of America divination and prophetic utterance were and are generally practised by the priestly class (shamans and medicine-men) of the various nations and tribes which have inhabited them. The methods of divination in use did not vary much so far as the different divisions of

[1] See Skeat, p. 544 ff., for details.
[2] *Camb. Exp.* p. 361.
[3] Oomes, *op. cit.* p. 158.
[4] Buddhism is also hostile; among the Buddhist section of the Tunguses there is no shamanism, according to Radloff. The corrupt Buddhism of Tibet cannot be taken as typical.

[1] Tennyson's *Enoch Arden* gives a well-known example.
[2] Among us, as among the Malays, in two forms: (1) borrowed from the mediæval systems (Zadkiel, etc.); (2) popular, as in the belief, held by nearly every one except those who know anything of meteorology, that the weather depends on the moon.
[3] Compare divining from a sheep's shoulder-blade, well known from the references in Drayton and other writers. See Tylor, *passim*.

American nationality were concerned, nor did they display much dissimilarity from those in vogue among other barbarian peoples. In ancient or pre-Columban Mexico and Peru there was a college of augurs, corresponding in purpose to the *auspices* of ancient Rome, the alumni of which occupied themselves with observing the flight and listening to the songs of birds, from which they drew their conclusions, pretending to interpret the speech of all winged creatures. In Mexico the *calmecac*, or training-college of the priests, had a department where divination was taught in all its phases, and that the occupation was no mere sinecure will appear later. Among the less advanced communities the services of the diviner or seer were much in request, and the forecasting of the future became, sooner or later, the chief concern of the higher classes of medicine-men.

The methods adopted by the priests or shamans in the practice of divination scarcely differed with locality, but many various expedients were made use of to attain the same end. In the Peru of the Incas, besides those augurs who were supposed to interpret the songs of the feathered race, there were other castes who specialized in the various kinds of divination. Thus, some practised oracular methods in much the same way as did the priesthood in ancient Egypt and Greece. The idols became the direct mediums by which Divine wishes were disclosed or the future made clear. Necromancy was also extensively practised, the priests pretending to raise the dead, whose instructions they communicated to those who had consulted them. In the Mexico of the Aztecs, also, necromancy was in vogue, and the raising of the spirit of the Princess Papantzin, sister of the ill-fated Montezuma, who foretold the downfall of his empire and his own destruction, will be familiar to every reader of Prescott. To return to Peru, still other classes predicted by means of leaves of tobacco, or the grains or juice of coca, the shapes of grains of maize, taken at random, the appearance of animal excrement, the forms assumed by the smoke rising from burning victims, the entrails and viscera of animals, the course taken by spiders, visions seen in dreams, the flight of birds, and the direction in which fruits might fall. The professors of these several methods were distinguished by different ranks and titles, and their training was a long and arduous one, and undertaken in no mere spirit of flippancy. If their clients were deceived, it is safe to say that they themselves were as unconscious of deceit as is a modern physician who has wrongly diagnosed a case.

In considering the practice of divination and prophecy among the aboriginal peoples of America, it will be necessary to deal separately with each of the principal methods by means of which they are performed. These are (1) by observing the flight of birds; (2) by oracular and necromantic practices; (3) by means of hypnotism; (4) through the interpretation of dreams and visions, and by conditions of ecstasy produced by drugs; (5) by means of astrological practice; and (6) by the appearance of various objects.

1. By observing the flight of birds.—It has already been noticed that the Mexican and Peruvian priesthoods, or that class of them devoted to augury, made a practice of observing the flight of various birds and of listening to their songs. This observation of birds for the purpose of augury was common to other American tribes. The bird, with its rapid motion and incomprehensible power of flight, appeared to the savage as a being of a higher order than himself, and its song—the only hint of music with which he was familiar—as something bordering upon the supernatural, the ability to understand which he had once possessed, but had lost through the potency of some evil and unknown spell. Some great sorcerer or medicine-man alone might break this spell, and this the shamans of the tribe sought assiduously to achieve, by means of close attention to the habits of birds, their motions and flights, and especially to their song. 'The natives of Brazil regarded one bird in especial as of good augury,' says an early 18th cent. traveller, Coreal (*Voiages aux Indes occidentales*, p. 203). He does not state to what bird he alludes, but proceeds to say that its mournful chant is heard by night rather than by day. The savages say it is sent by their deceased friends to bring them news from the other world, and to encourage them against their enemies. Here, it would seem, we have an example of bird-augury combined with divination by necromancy. Coreal probably alluded to the goat-sucker bird, which, with the screaming vulture, some South American tribes—the Guaycurus of Paraguay, for example—suppose to act as messengers from the dead to their priests, between whom and the deceased persons of the tribe there is thought to be frequent communication.

A typical example of augury by bird-habit has come down to us in the account of the manner in which the Nahua of Mexico fixed upon the spot for the foundation of that city. Halting after years of travel at the Lake of Tezcuco, they observed perched on the stem of a cactus a great eagle with wings outspread, holding in its talons a writhing serpent. Their augurs interpreted this as a good omen, as it had been previously announced by an oracle; and on the spot drove the first piles upon which was afterwards built the city of Mexico-Tenochtitlan. The legend of its foundation is still commemorated in the arms of the modern Republic of Mexico, and on its coinage and postal stamps.

2. Oracular and necromantic methods.—We have already seen that the priesthood of Peru practised oracular methods of divination by 'making the idols speak.' Whether they accomplished this by ventriloquial arts or by the more primitive means of concealing one of their number, we do not know. But we know that the *piagés*, or priests of the Uapes tribe of Brazil, practise oracular divination by means of a contrivance known to them as the *paxiuba*. This is one of their most sacred symbols, and consists of a portion of a palm-tree about the height of a man, and some 10 cm. in diameter. By a device consisting of holes bored in the part of the tree beneath the foliage, its leaves are made to tremble by the breath of the priestly ministrant, and the sound so caused is interpreted as a message from Jurupari, their principal deity. Necromancy is also practised extensively by the Uapes Indians, a class of *piagés* being set apart for this purpose solely. Indeed, in most Indian tribes the shamans or medicine-men, or a portion of them, specialize in the art. A great similarity marks the methods of procedure of most American tribes, from the Eskimos to the Nahua. A circular lodge consisting of poles planted firmly in the ground is covered with skins or mats, a small hole only being left for the seer to make his entrance. After entering, he carefully closes the aperture, and proceeds to make his incantations. In a little while the entire lodge trembles and sways, the poles bend to breaking point, as if ten strong men were straining at them, and sounds, strange and supernatural, coming now from the depths of the earth, now from the air above, cause those who listen outside to tremble. At last the medicine-man cries out that the spirit he has invoked is present, and will reply to questions. Presents to the supernatural visitor are inserted beneath the skins, as a preliminary to consultation; and the spectators commence to interrogate the dread presence in fear and trembling. The replies received are, for sheer ambiguity, equal to the oracular answers of the pythonesses of ancient Greece. Converted Indians have repeatedly

averred that in performing this feat they were merely passive agents. But, as many of these barbarous seers excite themselves into a condition of permanent lunacy when under the influence, there is very little doubt that they are as much the victims of hallucination as are their hearers, although the taking of gifts and the occasional shrewd nature of their replies would seem to point to the possession of considerable powers of calculation.

3. **Hypnotic divination.**—Divination by hypnosis is no new art in America. Jonathan Carver, a British sea-captain who travelled among the Sioux in the latter end of the 18th cent., mentions it as in use among them; and J. E. Fletcher observed it among the Menominee about the middle of last century. In the 'Ghost Dance' of the Paviotso of Nevada (a ceremonial religious dance connected with the Messiah doctrine, which originated among that people about 1888 and spread rapidly among other tribes, through the agency of the pretended prophet, one Wovoka, a medicine-man who had lived among whites), hypnotic trances were frequently induced to enable the Indians to converse with their dead relatives, who were, it was said, to return to them, and sweep the earth clear of the whites in a great Armageddon. The movement was defeated, but survives to some extent in the 'Crow Dance' of the Cheyenne and Arapaho, in which prophecy by hypnotism is still practised.

4. **Dreams and visions.**—The business of divination by means of dreams and visions, it is hardly necessary to say, was almost completely in the hands of the priestly class in America, as is exemplified by the derivation of 'priest' in the native languages. By the Algonquians and Dakotas they were called *wakanwacipi*, 'dreamers of the gods'; in Mexico, *teopixqui* or *teotecuhtli*, 'masters *or* guardians of divine things'; in Cherokee, *atsilung kelawhi*, 'those having the Divine fire'; in Maya, *cocome*, 'the listeners,' etc. Nearly all messages supposed to be received from the supernatural came through the medium of dreams or visions, and those who possessed ability to read or interpret the dream were usually placed in a class by themselves. The medicine-men or shamans held it as an article of belief that the glimpse into futurity with which visions or dreams provided them was to be gained only by extreme privation and by purifying the vision through hunger or the use of drugs. To induce the ecstatic condition the Indians made use of many different mediums, such as want of sleep, seclusion, the pertinacious fixing of the mind upon one subject, the swallowing or inhalation of cerebral intoxicants, such as tobacco, the *maguey*, cocā, the *chucuaco*, the snake-plant *ololiuhqui*, the *peyotl* (these last two in Mexico), and the *cassine yupon*, and *Iris versicolor* (among the tribes in the southern parts of the United States). According to Hawkins, the Creeks had no fewer than seven sacred plants cultivated for this purpose, among them the *Ilex vomitoria* or *Ilex cassina* of the natural order *Aquifoliaceæ*; and the 'blue flag,' *Iris versicolor*, of the order *Iridaceæ*. 'The former is a powerful diuretic and mild emetic, and grows only near the sea. The latter is an active emeto-cathartic, and is abundant on swampy grounds throughout the Southern States. From it was formed the celebrated "black drink" with which they opened their councils, and which served them in place of spirits' (Brinton, *Myths of the New World*, Philadelphia, 1905, p. 315, note).

From dreams during the puberty-fast a person's entire future was usually divined by the shamans, his spiritual affinities fixed, and his life's course mapped out (see art. CALENDAR [American], vol. iii. p. 68[b]). The elaborate ceremonies known as 'dances' were usually adumbrated to the priests through dreams, and the actual performance was made to follow carefully in detail the directions supposed to have been received in the dream or vision. Many shrines and sacred places were also supposed to have been indicated to certain persons in dreams, and their contents presented to those persons by supernatural beings whilst they were in the visionary state. The periods for the performance of rites connected with a shrine, as well as other devotional observances, often depended on an intimation received in a dream. 'Visions' were also induced by winding the skin of a freshly-killed animal round the neck until the pressure on the veins caused unconsciousness, and dreams resulted, possibly from an overflow of blood to the head. Some tribes believed that the vision came to the prophet or seer as a picture, or that acts were performed before him as in a play, whilst others held that the soul travelled through space, and was able to see from afar those places and events of which it desired to have knowledge.

Numerous instances of the truly marvellous manner in which events have been foretold by American medicine-men are on record, and it is hard to believe that they do not possess the gift of clairvoyance in some degree.

In his autobiography, Black Hawk, a celebrated Sac chief, relates that his grandfather had a strong belief that in four years' time 'he should see a white man, who would be to him as a father.' Supernaturally directed, as he said, he travelled eastward to a certain spot, and there, as he had been informed in dreams, met with a Frenchman, who concluded an alliance on behalf of his country with the Sac nation. Coincidence is certainly possible here, but it can hardly exist in the circumstances of the narrative of Jonathan Carver. While he was dwelling with the Killistenoes (*i.e.* Cree), they were threatened with a famine, and on the arrival of certain traders, who brought them food in exchange for skins and other goods, their very existence depended. The diviners of the tribe were consequently consulted by the chief, and announced that the next day, at high noon exactly, a canoe would make its appearance with news of the anxiously looked-for expedition. The entire population came down to the beach in order to witness its arrival, accompanied by the incredulous trader, and, to his intense surprise, at the very moment forecast by the shamans, a canoe rounded a distant headland, and, paddling speedily shorewards, brought the patient Killistenoes news of the expedition they expected.

John Mason Brown has put on record an equally singular instance of the prophetic gift on the part of an American medicine-man (see *Atlantic Monthly*, July 1866). He was engaged several years previously in searching for a band of Indians in the neighbourhood of the Mackenzie and Coppermine rivers; but the difficulties of the search induced the majority of his band to return, until out of ten men who had originally set out only three remained. They had all but concluded to abandon their search, when they stumbled upon a party of braves of the very tribe of which they were in search. These men had been sent out by their medicine-men to find three whites, of whose horses, accoutrements, and general appearance the shaman had given them an exhaustive account ere they set out, and this the warriors related to Brown before they saw his companions. Brown very naturally inquired closely of the medicine-man how he had been able to foretell their coming. But the latter, who appeared to be 'a frank and simple-minded man,' could only explain that 'he saw them coming, and heard them talk on their journey.'

Under the heading of 'dreams and visions' may also be noticed the practice, common in some parts of the American continent, of attempting to pry into the future through gazing fixedly at some polished object, until semi-insensibility is attained by self-hypnosis. The Indians of Central America employed for this purpose (and still make use of) small shining stones made of hard polished sandstone, which they at times consult when dubious as to the future.

A case is on record where a Cherokee kept a divining crystal wrapped up in buckskin in a cave, occasionally 'feeding' it by rubbing over it the blood of a deer; and similar instances might be multiplied. At the village of Tecpan, Guatemala, Stephens and Catherwood saw a remarkable stone which had been placed on the altar of the church there, but which had previously been used as a divining stone by the Indians of the district. Fuentes, one of the Spanish historians of Guatemala, says of it: 'To the westward of the city there is a little mount that commands it, on which stands a small round building about six feet in height, in the middle of which there is a pedestal formed of a shining substance resembling glass, but the precise quality of which has not been ascertained. Seated

around this building, the judges heard and decided the causes brought before them, and their sentences were executed on the spot. Previous to executing them, however, it was necessary to have them confirmed by the oracle, for which purpose three of the judges left their seats and proceeded to a deep ravine, where there was a place of worship containing a black, transparent stone, on the surface of which the Deity was supposed to indicate the fate of the criminal' (Stephens, *Incidents of Travel*, ii. 149). Stephens found this 'stone' to be a piece of common slate, fourteen inches by ten. For purposes of divination it would probably have been covered with water.

5. Divination by astrological practice.—Divination by astrology was, of course, resorted to only in that part of America where the knowledge of the movements of the heavenly bodies had advanced beyond the elementary stage. Among the Aztecs the planetary influences were less powerful than the arbitrary signs they had adopted for the months and days. The nature of the principal sign in each lunar cycle of thirteen days gave a colour to the whole. The figures relating to succeeding days and hours modified this, however, and it was in coalescing these opposing forces that the art of the Aztec diviner lay. No event in life, of any consequence, was permitted to pass without consulting him. On the birth of a child he was summoned in haste. He ascertained the exact time of the event with exceeding care, and then proceeded to cast the infant's horoscope, the family standing by in trembling suspense the while.

6. Divination by means of various objects or practices.—Various other methods were in vogue by means of which the native priesthood attempted to forecast the future. For this purpose fetishes and small personal idols were often consulted. The grains of cocoa in the bottom of a drained vessel were 'read,' as the remaining leaves still are in many European tea-cups. The viscera of sacrificed animals were carefully examined for signs regarding the future. The course and shape of smoke, too, was keenly watched by the shamans of many peoples.

According to Fuentes, the chronicler of Guatemala (Stephens, *op. cit.* ii. 127), the reigning king of Kiche, Kicab Tanub, when informed by the ambassador of Montezuma II. that a race of irresistible white men had conquered Mexico and were proceeding to Guatemala, sent for four diviners, whom he commanded to tell him what would be the result of this invasion. They asked for time to discover the future fate of his kingdom, and, taking their bows, discharged some arrows against a rock. They returned to inform their master that, as no impression had been made upon the rock by the arrowheads, they must prognosticate the worst, and predicted the ultimate triumph of the white man—a circumstance which shows that the class to which they belonged stood in no fear of royalty. Kicab Tanub, dissatisfied, sent for the *priests*, obviously a different class from the diviners, and requested their opinions. From the ominous circumstance of an ancient stone—which had been brought from afar by their forefathers—having been broken, they also augured the fall of the Kiche empire.

Many objects, such as small clay birds, boats, or boat-shaped vessels, etc., have been discovered in sepulchral mounds in North America, and it is conjectured that these may have been used for purposes of divination. As any object might become a fetish, it is probable that any object might become a means of augury. The method employed appears to have been so to treat the object that the probable chances for or against the happening of a certain event would be discovered —much, indeed, as some persons still toss coins to 'find out' whether an expected event will come to pass or not. Portents, too, were implicitly believed in by the American races, and this branch of augury was, we find, one of the accomplishments of Nezahualpilli, king of Tezcuco, near Mexico, whom Montezuma consulted concerning the terrible prodigies which startled his people prior to the advance of the Spaniards upon his kingdom, and which were supposed to predict the return of Quetzalcoatl, the legendary culture-hero of Anahuac, to his own again. These included earthquakes, tempests, floods, the appearances of comets and strange lights, whilst mysterious voices were heard in the air—such prodigies, indeed, as tradition usually insists upon as the precursors of the downfall of a mighty empire.

LITERATURE.—M. C. Balboa, *Hist. du Pérou*, Paris, 1840; D. G. Brinton, *Myths of the New World*, Philadelphia, 1905, and *Nagualism*, Philadelphia, 1894; F. Coreal, *Voiages aux Indes occidentales*, pt. ii., Amsterdam, 1722; H. A. Coudreau, *La France équinoxiale*, vol. i. ('Études sur les Guyane et l'Amazonie'), Paris, 1887; A. C. Fletcher, *22 RBEW*, pt. ii., 1904; A. L. Kroeber, *Amer. Anthrop.* iv. no. 2 (1902); J. Mooney, *14 RBEW*, 1896; B. Sahagun, *Hist. gen. de las cosas de Nueva España*, lib. iv., lib. xiii. cap. 1, Mexico, 1829-30; H. R. Schoolcraft, *History, Condition, and Prospects of the Indian Tribes of the United States*, Washington, 1851-59; J. L. Stephens, *Incidents of Travel in Central America*, London, ed. 1854.

LEWIS SPENCE.

DIVINATION (Assyro-Babylonian).—The practice of divination entered very largely into the religious life of the Babylonians and Assyrians. Not only was it carried on by unofficial augurs and seers, whose services could be secured for a comparatively small fee by any one desirous of reading the future or of learning the interpretation of some portent which had been vouchsafed to him, but it also formed one of the most important departments of the national religion; and its rites were jealously guarded by a large and organized body of the priesthood. In fact, during the later periods of Assyr. and Bab. history it had become a highly complicated science. Every great temple had in course of time accumulated a store of recorded portents, with notes as to the events which had been observed to follow on them. As a result of their classification and study by the priesthood, there had been evolved an elaborate omen literature, comprising long series of tablets dealing with every class of augural phenomena. Thanks to the literary zeal of Ashurbanipal (668-626 B.C.), we possess a wealth of material for the detailed study of Bab. divination, since a considerable portion of the literary and religious texts of which he had copies made for his library at Nineveh were works on divination in its various forms. It is true that many of these have been recovered in a far from complete condition, but enough remains to indicate the important part which the prediction of future events played in both the official and the popular religion.

That the contents of these comparatively late texts may not only be regarded as representing contemporary beliefs, but may also be employed to illustrate the practice of earlier periods, has been amply demonstrated. The texts themselves in their present form are obviously the result of a gradual process of growth and accretion, and the series under which they have been arranged bear evidence of much earlier editing and redaction. Moreover, we possess a few similar texts dating from earlier periods; while the historical and votive inscriptions furnish data by means of which it is possible to trace some of the principal forms of Bab. divination back into the earlier period of Sumerian history. That the Semitic Babylonians expanded and developed the science was but natural; but there can be little doubt that they inherited many of their augural beliefs and practices from the earlier Sumerian inhabitants of Babylonia, whom they eventually conquered and absorbed. Thus already in the reign of Urukagina, king of Lagash (*c.* 2800 B.C.), we have evidence of the wide-spread practice of divination by oil. From augural texts of a later period (*c.* 2000 B.C.), we know that in this particular form of divination the procedure consisted in pouring out oil upon the surface of water, the different forms taken by the oil on striking the water indicating the course which events would take.[1] A professional diviner

[1] See *Cuneiform Texts in the Brit. Mus.* iii. pl. 2 ff., v. pl. 4 ff.; and cf. Hunger, 'Becherwahrsagung bei den Babyloniern,' in *Leipzig. Semit. Stud.* i. [1903] 1.

was naturally required to carry out the accompanying ritual and to interpret correctly the message of the oil, and Urukagina records that among the reforms he inaugurated was the abolition of certain exactions and fees which had been demanded in connexion with the practice, not only by the diviner himself, but also by the grand vizier and the *patesi*.[1] In the later Sumerian period we find that Gudea, when purifying Lagash before the erection of his temple, drove out the wizards and sorcerers, in addition to kindling a fire of aromatic woods. From this record it might perhaps be inferred that at this period divination was not officially recognized, were it not that Gudea himself expressly states that before starting upon his temple-building he consulted the omens and found them favourable.[2] Moreover, the elaborate vision in which the gods revealed their wishes to him with regard to Ningirsu's temple, and the far earlier vision of Eannatum (*c.* 3000 B.C.), in which Ningirsu encouraged him for battle,[3] prove that the study of dreams and their interpretation had been elaborated by the Sumerians. It is, therefore, possible to regard the later augural texts as incorporating earlier practices; and deductions drawn from their study may legitimately be regarded as of general application, and not as confined to a single late period.

In attempting to classify the great range of phenomena which formed the subject of Bab. divination, a convenient distinction may perhaps be adopted which has been drawn between voluntary and involuntary divination.[4] Under the former the diviner deliberately sought out some means of foretelling the future; under the latter he merely interpreted the meaning of portents, signs, or phenomena which, without being sought out, forced themselves on his notice or on that of his clients.

The principal method of voluntary divination was *hepatoscopy*, or divination by the liver of a sacrificial sheep. The diviner, termed the *barû*, or 'seer,'[5] after the due performance of the accompanying rites and the slaughter of the victim, exposed the animal's liver, and by an examination of its principal parts was enabled to predict the future. The chief parts of the liver which were examined in this way were the right and left lower lobes, the upper lobe and its two appendices (the *processus pyramidalis* and the *processus papillaris*), the gall-bladder, the cystic duct, the hepatic duct, the hepatic vein, and the 'liver gate' (*porta hepatis*).[6] The system of interpretation was based mainly on an association of ideas. Thus a swollen gall-bladder was regarded as pointing to an increase of power; on the other hand, a depression in the liver gate pointed to a decrease in power; signs noted on the right side were favourable, on the left side unfavourable, etc. Moreover, the markings on the livers, due to the subsidiary veins and ducts, were carefully studied and interpreted in accordance with their resemblance to the weapons or symbols of the gods. In the tablets of liver-omens, the predictions, as is usual throughout the omen-literature, are vague enough. But these vague indications were made to apply to very definite circumstances by means of questions addressed to the god before the sacrifice. This we gather from an elaborate series of prayers, addressed to Shamash, the Sun-god, during the reigns of Esarhaddon and Ashurbanipal, which throw an interesting light on the method of procedure.[1] The prayers contain appeals to the oracle on political matters. Definite questions were asked as to the course of future events within a specified time, and the priests answered the questions according to the omens presented by the sacrificial victims. The questions were framed with great ingenuity, so that all contingencies might be covered. The prayers also prove that scrupulous care was taken in the preparation of the victim and the recital of the accompanying formulæ, while it was also essential that the diviner, no less than the victim, should be free from any ceremonial impurity. It is interesting to note that, in these prayers to the Sun-oracle, the signs found in the victim are noted but are not interpreted. The roughly-shaped tablets on which they were written were actually used in the course of the ritual: they contain the appeal to the oracle and the oracle's answer as seen in the victim's liver. The question was first written out, and the tablet was placed before the god (cf. the Greek practice at Delphi); the god's answer was afterwards added in terms of the liver. For the diviner's interpretation of this answer to the king no doubt another tablet was employed.

Many of these oracle-tablets, especially those of Esarhaddon's time, contain appeals to Shamash to reveal the outcome of the military campaigns in which he was engaged. They also furnish evidence that the Assyrian king, doubtless following Babylonian precedent, consulted the oracle on every occasion of importance, such as the dispatch of an envoy, the giving of a daughter in marriage, the sickness of a royal relative, the appointment of a high official, etc. In the case of the Sun-oracles the answers received by the king have disappeared, but it is probable that they resembled certain oracles of Ishtar of Arbela, which the goddess vouchsafed to Esarhaddon,[2] obviously in answer to such questions as those addressed to the Sun-god. Here the oracles are composed in the first person, the speaker representing the goddess; but in each case the name of the priest or priestess who pronounced the oracle on the goddess's behalf is given.[3] The answers of the oracles which have been collected and preserved are invariably encouraging, and promise success to the king in somewhat vague and general phraseology. They are clearly happy omens that have been fulfilled.

The reason why the god of the oracle should reveal the future through the liver of the victim is not at first sight obvious. But it is certain that the liver, not the heart, was regarded by peoples in a primitive state of culture as the seat of life; and there is much to be said for the theory that the sacrificial animal on being accepted by the deity, was regarded as assimilated to him.[4] The soul of the animal was thus put in accord with the soul of the god, and, by reading the one, the diviner read the other. This theory also underlay the practice of hepatoscopy among the Etruscans, Greeks, and Romans (see 'Greek' and 'Roman'

[1] See King, *Hist. of Sumer and Akkad*, London, 1910, p. 183.
[2] *Ib.* p. 266 f. [3] *Ib.* pp. 124, 266.
[4] Cf. Jastrow, *Proc. Amer. Phil. Soc.* xlvii. [1908] 143 f., 646 ff. This distinction applies most satisfactorily to the two principal forms of official divination—hepatoscopy and astrology. It is not so clear when applied to some of the minor forms of divination (see below).
[5] For a discussion of the *barû* and his functions, in contradistinction to the *ašipu* and *zammeru* priests, see especially Zimmern, *Ritualtafeln für den Wahrsager, Beschwörer und Sänger*, Leipzig, 1896–1901, p. 82 ff.
[6] See Jastrow, *ZA* xx. [1907] 118 f., *Trans. Philad. College of Physicians*, xxix. (3rd ser.) 117 ff., *Harper Memor. Vol.*, ii. (London, 1910) 281 ff., and *Die Religion Babyloniens und Assyriens*, ii. 213 ff.

[1] Cf. Knudtzon, *Assyr. Gebete an den Sonnengott*, 2 vols., Leipzig, 1893.
[2] Cf. Rawlinson, *WAI* iv. pl. 61. In addition to Shamash and Ishtar, the other gods whose names are particularly associated with royal oracles are Ashur and Nabû. In Babylonia, Marduk's claim to supremacy in this, as in other departments of the national religion, was not contested.
[3] To one oracle a note is added, giving directions for its presentation to the king with accompanying ceremonial. It was to be recited to the king after precious oil had been poured out, offerings made, and incense burnt (cf. Strong, *Beiträge zur Assyriologie*, ii. [1894] 628, 639).
[4] See Jastrow, *Rel. Bab. und Assyr.* ii. 213 ff.

sections), who doubtless derived much of their augural lore from Babylonia.

No such theory underlay other forms of voluntary divination, such as *oil-divination*,[1] or divination by *arrows*,[2] or the *flight of birds*, etc. In all such cases (including possibly the flight of birds) the oracle was deliberately invoked, but there was no question of the instrument being assimilated to the deity. Each was merely a passive witness to the Divine will, which was made plain according to a traditional code having the sanction of the oracle.

The most important form of involuntary divination concerns the portents exhibited by *the heavens.* Eclipses, storms, and unusual atmospheric conditions would naturally be regarded from the earliest periods as manifestations of Divine anger, and their correct interpretation would be of the utmost importance to a race, however primitive. To go still farther, and trace a connexion between earthly occurrences and the movements of the heavenly bodies was a much later development, and undoubtedly followed the identification of the planets and principal fixed stars with the chief gods of the pantheon. Winckler's assumption that there was thought to be a perfect correspondence between heaven and earth, and that the occurrences on earth were merely a reflexion of heavenly phenomena (see STARS [Assyr.-Bab.]), is quite untrue for the earlier historical epochs, and is true only in a restricted sense for the latest periods of Neo-Babylonian speculation. The Neo-Assyrian astrological reports indicate what a careful watch was kept at that period by the royal astrologers for any indication of the Divine will, and the calendars of favourable and unfavourable days were but one result of the study which had been devoted to the astrological branch of divination. In most of the omens connected with both hepatoscopy and astrology the predictions refer to the general rather than to the individual welfare, in which we may see an indication of their official character.

Private and unofficial divination, to the continued existence of which the private letters of the later Assyrian period bear witness, bulks far more largely in the collections of augural tablets dealing with birth-omens, the interpretation of dreams, and of incidents in daily life. Monstrosities, human and animal, were naturally treated as significant, and future events were also predicted from minute variations in human infants and the young of animals. The class of general portents which were thought to foretell public disasters is well illustrated by an Assyrian copy of a list of forty-seven portents which preceded a conquest of Babylonia.[3] The phenomena from which the portents were derived may be classified under two headings: (*a*) rare natural occurrences, and (*b*) events which appeared to break some law of Nature. Under the first heading we have the fall of beams in houses, the outbreak of fire in sacred places, the appearance of wild beasts and birds in Babylon, a great flood at Borsippa, when the waters of the Euphrates rose within the precincts of Nabû's temple Ezida, and a flight of meteors or falling stars. Under events which appeared to be contrary to some law of Nature may be set the story of a decapitated head crying out, the occurrence of human and animal monstrosities, cases of incest and unnatural matings of animals, fruitfulness of the male in the case of a dog and of a male date-palm, unnatural growths and appearances of date-palms, and the appearance of evil spirits in sacred places. Under the last heading may also be set the appearance of honey on the ground at Nippur and of salt at Babylon, though these were doubtless natural secretions of the soil. The importance attached to such portents, affecting general and not individual welfare, is attested by the fact that in the Neo-Babylonian period chronicles of such events were compiled on the same lines as the historical chronicles and were regarded as of equal value and significance.[1]

The tablets of unofficial portents prove that almost every event of common life was capable of being interpreted as a favourable or unfavourable sign. But it should be noted that many of the events referred to on the tablets are to be taken as occurrences in dreams, though this may not be explicitly stated in the portion of the text preserved. In fact, the interpretation of dreams was one of the most important duties of the professional seer or diviner both in unofficial and in official life. Reference has already been made to the existence of this branch of divination in the earlier period, and the Assyrian historical inscriptions prove that the gods continued to adopt this method of sending encouragement to the king or of making known to him their wishes. The visible appearance of Ishtar, to encourage Ashurbanipal's army in Elam,[2] may be explained as a vision in sleep, and she probably did not appear to the king himself, but to a professional seer, as is definitely stated on another occasion when she sent the king a message. Such theophanies, accompanied by direct messages, were naturally of very clear and certain interpretation; but the meaning of most dreams was quite uncertain to the dreamer, for significance attached to the most minute points in the vision, and in every case it was necessary to have recourse to a highly trained diviner.

One of the most interesting classes of unofficial omens was drawn from the appearance of the various parts of the body during sickness, for the events predicted generally concerned the chances of the sick man's recovery, and they may thus be regarded as having something in common with the scientific study of disease. Not only were the sick man's colour and his cries and groans minutely noted, but such physiological phenomena as convulsions, epileptic movements, shivering from fever, and palpitations were carefully studied and made the subject of prognostication. It may be noted that many omen-texts which were formerly regarded as connected with births are rather to be connected with this class of divination.

There is evidence that the practice of various forms of divination, like that of Bab. astrology, was adopted by the Greeks after Alexander's conquest, and so survived under modified forms into the mediæval period. The mere fact that 'Chaldæan' was used by the Greeks as a synonymous term for 'astrologer' indicates the spread of the Babylonian astrological system, but there is also evidence that other forms of divination were practised by native diviners who had wandered to the coasts of Asia Minor and the West.[3] It is thus possible that more than one form of divination which has survived to the present day may be traced to a Babylonian origin.

LITERATURE.—In *La Divination et la science des présages* (Paris, 1875) F. Lenormant published a very able summary

[1] See above, p. 783b.

[2] This form of divination is referred to as employed by the Bab. king in Ezk 21^21ff.

[3] See King, *Cuneiform Texts in the Brit. Mus.*, London, 1909, xxix. 9, pl. 48 f.

[1] Cf. King, *Chronicles concerning Early Babylonian Kings*, London, 1907, i. 212 ff.

[2] Cf. *WAI* v. pl. v. line 95 ff. So, too, the god Ashur is said to have appeared to Gyges, king of Lydia, and to have commanded him to pay homage to Ashurbanipal (*op. cit.* pl. ii. line 98 ff.).

[3] See Hunger, 'Bab. Tieromina nebst griech.-röm. Parallelen' (*MVG*, 1909, p. 3).

of the subject, considering the period at which he wrote. Much new material has been published and classified by **A. Boissier** in his *Documents assyriens relatifs aux présages* (Paris, 1894–99) and his *Choix de textes relatifs à la divination assyr.-babylonienne* (Geneva, 1905, etc.); see also *Cuneiform Texts in the British Museum*, pts. xx., xxvii. f. and xxx. f. The fullest discussion is that by **M. Jastrow**, *Die Religion Babyloniens und Assyriens*, Giessen, 1902 ff., ii. 138 ff., 203 ff. For other references see the footnotes throughout the article.

LEONARD W. KING.

DIVINATION (Buddhist).—The art of divination was widely practised in India, as in Ancient Europe, at the time of the Buddha's birth. The early accounts of the latter event relate that eight Brahmans 'most versed in the science of astrology' were called in by the prince's father 'to examine carefully all the signs prognosticating the future destiny of his son' (Bigandet, *Life of Gaudama*², Rangoon, 1866, i. 46). Buddha himself, as was to be expected, when he became a teacher is invariably represented in the scriptures as discouraging and condemning divination and all allied arts. Although he personally was credited with foreknowledge, this endowment, in common with that of working miracles, etc., is regarded by Buddhists as the supernatural power (*irdhi*) inherent in every perfected saint, or *arhat*; and he is never represented as using this prophetic power for sorcery or soothsaying purposes. His chief right-hand disciple, however, Māudgalyāyana, is reputed in the scriptures of both divisions of Buddhism to have practised divination and sorcery, by means of which he is represented as having extended the popularity of that faith. For such pandering to popular prejudice he is reproved on several occasions by the Buddha, who is recorded to have said: 'That mendicant does right to whom omens, planetary influence, dreams, and signs are things abolished; he is free from all their evils' (*Sammāparibhājanīya sutta*, 2).

Nevertheless, divination was obviously too deep-rooted in the popular life to be eradicated; it is found at the present day flourishing among professing Buddhists of all sections, and among monks as well as the laity. It is not merely that foreign aboriginal methods of divination have been accorded a measure of recognition by Buddhism in its extension as a popular religion outside India to the Mongolian races, who have been inveterately addicted to divination and shamanism from the earliest times; positive elements of Indian astrology have been introduced by the Buddhist monks, who are now the chief astrologers for soothsaying purposes, not only in Tibet and Mongolia, but in Burma, Ceylon, and Siam. The grosser forms of divination remain for the most part in the hands of the laity or of the priests and priestesses of the pre-Buddhistic cults. But even some of these have been given a veneer of Buddhism by replacing in several instances the aboriginal cabalistic words of incantation by stereotyped sentences (*mantras*) in the Indian language, culled from the Indian Buddhistic scriptures.

Divination is sought after by the majority of professing Buddhists in matters of almost everyday business, as well as in the great epochs of life—birth, marriage, and death—or in sickness. It is primarily employed for the most part to ascertain the planetary influences which are lucky or unlucky, rather than those directly supposed to be caused by the demons (cf. DEMONS AND SPIRITS [Buddhist]), though the latter are usually regarded as the chief agents for executing the evil influence of the planets. The birth-horoscope of every individual, which is jealously treasured by himself, fixes the special planetary influences which are hostile throughout life. The intensity of such influence varies according to whether the planet in question is ascending or not. Then these personal unlucky days have to be compared with the general lucky or unlucky days for that particular day and week, and these again with those for that season and the elements, according to the varying positions of the planets at the time. The results, moreover, vary with the kind of business or adventure contemplated, which introduces another set of unlucky combinations. Thus an almost endless variation in the forebodings of luck or ill-luck is made possible; and this is to be sought out beforehand, and the evil duly avoided or counteracted. In this way is usually determined which is the right day and hour on which to commence any particular work, the right direction in which to set out on a journey, etc., the issue of any special business or matter of anxiety, or the interpretation of omens and dreams.

The methods of divination practised by Buddhist peoples appear to fall broadly into three categories, namely: (*a*) lots—the simplest, and generally performed by the people themselves; (*b*) astrology, for which learned adepts are necessary, usually the higher Buddhist priests; and (*c*) oracles, usually given by a priest or priestess of the aboriginal religion, seldom by a Buddhist monk.

Astrology is the more reputable form of divination practised by orthodox Buddhist monks, and from the preparation of the horoscopes and the worship prescribed therein the monasteries derive a considerable amount of their income. Among the 'Northern' Buddhists the presiding genius of the astrologers is the Bodhisattva Mañjuśrī. The oracles and professional soothsayers are almost exclusively confined to the followers of the pre-Buddhist religion of the particular country. A few isolated temples are famed for their oracles, in which the presiding divinity or demon, or, it may be, the spirit of a departed saint, is believed to inspire the officiating priest. More frequently the seer is a hermit who has gained a reputation as a prophet; but most commonly it is one of the numerous witch-doctors who is resorted to for an augury. These are of the class generally known as *shamans*, some of whom are women. They are usually illiterate, but possess a very shrewd and ready wit. They deliver their oracular response whilst in an exalted state, into which they work themselves by frenzied gesticulations. The office usually descends in the family. One of the commonest questions they have to answer is that relating to the source of the bewitchment or enchantment (Skr. *prabhāva*, Tib. *mt'u*) which is causing sickness to some particular person.

The Burmese, who may be taken as a type of the 'Southern' division of Buddhists, are fettered in the bonds of horoscopes and witch-doctors (see art. BURMA, § 19).

Amongst 'Northern' or Mahāyāna Buddhists divination is almost universal. In Chinese Buddhism it is only a little less prevalent than in that of Tibet and Mongolia, where it reaches its culminating point. Here the Indian astrological elements are largely mixed with the Chinese, and the oracular methods are of a more frankly shamanist type.

In Tibet, all three of the above-noted classes of divination are widely current. Those monks who practise the art of astrology for divination purposes are called *tsi-pa*, or 'calculators.' Each sect has its own *tsi-pa*, who are among the most learned and respected members of the monastery. The astrological methods follow the general lines already indicated; but the Chinese system of astrology largely predominates over the Indian, as has been shown in the specimens of actual horoscopes translated in detail by the present writer (*Buddhism of Tibet*, pp. 458, etc.). The combinations of unlucky portents are complicated by the introduction of a more complex system of

elements and cyclical animal-years and trigrams. In arriving at the calculations an important part is played by the famous mystic Chinese trigram, 'the eight *kwā*' (Tib. *par-k'ha*), on which the mysterious 'Book of Changes,' *Yi-king*, with its 64 hexagrams, is built up. A notable difference between the Tibetan and Chinese methods is that, while the former use only the trigrams for divination, the latter employ exclusively the derived hexagrams for this purpose.

The method by lot is the most popular and common of all, and for its practice nearly every layman is equipped with a pocket divination manual called *mó-pe*, by which the augury may be ascertained. This booklet, which the present writer has translated in great part, divides the results into different sections intended to cover all the events for which an augury is likely to be sought. The usual headings are 'Household,' 'Favours,' 'Life,' 'Medical,' 'Enemy,' 'Visitors,' 'Business,' 'Travel,' 'Lost Property,' 'Wealth,' and 'Sickness.' The lots are of various kinds, and include the following:—(1) Barley-corn or other grain, or pebbles or coins drawn from a heap, or a clutch of the rosary-beads; the last being perhaps the most common of all modes. (2) Dice upon a board on which are drawn geomantic figures with Tibetan references or symbolic animals, or a magic square with 9 compartments called the 9 *sMe-ba* (pronounced *me-wa*), or magic squares of 15 or 20, etc., numbered compartments, of Indian character, or consecutive lotus leaves numbered or inscribed, also derived from India. (3) Twigs—one of the forms of sorcery-divination is called 'the green twig spell' (*sNgo-sNgag*). This suggests to the present writer a parallel with the ancient Greek term for 'lot,' namely κλῆρος, from κλάδος, 'twig'; and the greenness of the twig seems to imply the living presence of the tree-god. (4) Cards on which geomantic figures or allegorical animals or signs are drawn or painted, with sentences to which Tibetan characters are assigned for reference. (5) Sheets or passages of the Buddhist scriptures drawn at random after an incantation. An official instance of divination by lot is seen in the selection in this way of the Dalai Lama by the 'Ordeal of the Urn' (see art. by present writer in *JRAS*, 1910, pp. 69-86), the result of which is believed to represent a direct expression of the Divine will. Indeed, some lamas go so far as to profess to determine by dice the particular region and state in which a deceased person has been re-born.

In all these operations the recital of Buddhist mystic formulæ (*mantras*) as magical spells or incantations plays an important part.

The oracle is a living institution in Tibet, largely resorted to by all the sects, reformed and unreformed. The monks of the yellow-cap and other sects who train as sorcerers (*sNgag-pa*, pron. *ṅag-pa*) do not practise oracular divination except for ascertaining the presence and identity of evil spirits supposed to be actually causing sickness or other harm, with the view of exorcizing them. The soothsaying oracle-giver is usually a follower of the aboriginal Bon religion, and, though attached to one of the great monasteries, is not considered to be a member of the brotherhood, and is allowed to marry. The leading exception is the State Oracle at Nechung near Lhasa, at present represented by a celibate monk of the yellow-cap sect, but his origin from a non-Buddhistic Mongolian source has been traced by the present writer in detail. He is given the title of 'defender of the faith' (*cho's-skyong*), and is consulted by the State on all great undertakings, and daily by the public. Among the other oracles not absorbed within the monastic order and retaining their aboriginal features, the most important is at Karmashar in Lhasa, which purports to be inspired by the devil. The dress and equipment of these priests and their frenzied bearing identify them with the Bon cult and the shamanist devil-dancers. They possess no literature, and deliver their sayings orally in cryptic oracular form. They are ordinarily resorted to for the interpretation of omens and dreams, as well as in matters of business and anxiety. Their implements include (1) an arrow (*dah-dar*), to which coloured silken rags are attached; (2) a magic mirror of metal, which reflects the future—a Taoist and Shinto feature. For their augury they may gaze into a bowl or pool of water, or observe the smoke of a sacrificial fire, or the entrails of animals sacrificed and sheep's droppings, or the lines on charred sheep's bones, such as shoulder-blades — an ancient Mongol custom. Women frequently are the recognized oracles in the country districts. In recording several of the ways in which divining was practised in Tibet, a mediæval Chinese observer wrote: 'Notwithstanding the variety of their methods of divination, and their unskilfulness in their mode of examining, they are quite frequently surprisingly accurate.' This criticism still holds good.

LITERATURE.—W. W. Rockhill, *JRAS*, 1891, pp. 235, etc.; Sir G. Scott ('Shway Yoe'), *The Burman*, London, 1882; L. A. Waddell, *Buddhism of Tibet*, do., 1895, and *Lhasa and its Mysteries*, do., 1905.

L. A. WADDELL.

DIVINATION (Celtic).—According to Justin (XXIV. iv. 4), the Celts were skilled beyond other peoples in the science of augury, and Pausanias is mistaken when (X. xxi. 2) he doubts the existence of the art of divination among them. The Celts practised all kinds of divination. It was by the flight of birds that the Gauls who invaded Illyricum were guided (Justin XXIV. iv. 4). It was by lot that the Hercynian forest was allocated to Sigovesus (Livy, V. xxxiv. 4). The coincidence of two names of countries was an omen that led the Gauls to found a town in Cisalpine Gaul (Livy, V. xxxiv. 9). The Gallic king Catumandus made peace with the people of Marseilles because of a dream in which Minerva appeared to him (Justin, XLIII. v. 5). In 218 B.C. the Galatæ allied with Attalus refused to go any further because they were frightened by an eclipse of the moon (Polyb. V. lxxviii. 1). Before engaging in battle, the Gauls used to consult the entrails of victims; and once, when the entrails announced a great defeat for them, they massacred their women and children in order to gain the favour of the gods (Justin, XXVI. ii. 2). According to Strabo (IV. iv. 5 [p. 198]), the sacrifices and augural practices of the Gauls were opposed to those of the Romans; the human victim, who was very often a criminal, was killed by a sword-stroke on the back, and the future was foretold from the way he fell, the nature of his convulsions, and the flow of blood, in accordance with an ancient and unbroken series of observations (cf. Diod. Sic. V. xxxi. 3). Artemidorus relates that in a certain harbour there were two crows that had their right wings tinged with white; people who were in litigation used to lay cakes on a board, each arranging his own in such a way as to avoid all confusion. The crows swooped down on the cakes, ate the one person's and scattered the other's, and the disputant whose cakes were scattered won the case (see Strabo, IV. iv. 6 [p. 198]). Vervain was used by the Gauls for drawing lots and foretelling the future (Pliny, XXV. lix. 106; cf. Servius on *Æn.* iii. 57). Hippolytus (*Philosophumena*, 25) mentions lots by pebbles and numbers among the Celts. The evil omens noticed by the Britons of the 1st cent. were of great variety: noises outside the curia; howlings in the theatre; the appearance of a buried city at

the mouth of the Thames; the Atlantic looking like a sea of blood; human forms left on the shore by the tide (Tac. *Ann.* xiv. 32).

Ornithomancy, haruspicy, and the other methods of divination were undoubtedly practised originally by the tribal chiefs. The Galatian king Deiotarus was renowned as an augur (Cic. *de Div.* i. 15 [26–27]; cf. ii. 37 [78]); he never began an undertaking without first consulting the auspices. Once, when he had started on a journey, he was turned back by the flight of an eagle; he broke off his journey, and so escaped harm. The British queen Boudicca drew a favourable omen from the course of a hare which she had concealed among her clothes and then set at liberty (Dio Cass. lxii. 6). At a very early period among the Celts there were priests whose duty was to foretell the future. Justin (XXXII. iii. 9) mentions haruspices at Toulouse who, in order to free the Tectosagi from an epidemic of pestilence, bade them throw the gold and silver they had got from the expedition of Brennus into the Lake of Toulouse. Diodorus Siculus (V. xxxi. 31) distinguishes the Druids and the bards from the soothsayers (μάντεις), who foretold the future by the flight of birds and by examining the entrails of victims; they enjoyed great authority. They are identical with the οὐάτεις (Gr. transcription of Lat. *vates*) of Strabo (IV. iv. 4 [p. 197]). They are often confused with the Druids (*q.v.*). According to Cæsar (vi. 13), the Druids interpret the will of the gods. The Druid Divitiacus used to predict the future partly by the observation of birds and partly by conjecture (Cicero, *op. cit.* i. 41 [90]). In the time of Tacitus, Gallic Druids announced that the burning of the Capitol presaged the approaching fall of the Roman Empire and the control of the world by the Transalpines (*Hist.* iv. 54). A scholium tells that it was after eating acorns that the Druids foretold the future (Usener, *Commenta Bernensia*, 1869, p. 33). Lastly, the priestesses of the Island of Sena, who were endowed with various magical powers, such as the power to rouse the sea and the waves by their songs, the power of changing into animals, and of curing otherwise incurable diseases, had knowledge of the future and foretold it to those who sailed to consult them (Mela, III. vi. 48).

There were women in Gaul in the 3rd cent. of our era who foretold the future. One of them warned the emperor Alexander Severus of his approaching end (Lampridius, *Alexander Severus*, 60). The emperor Aurelian consulted Gallic prophetesses on the future of his posterity (Vopiscus, *Aurelian*, 44). A female soothsayer who kept an inn at Tongres promised the Empire, it is said, to Diocletian (Vopiscus, *Numerianus*, 14).

Among the Irish, as known to us from the ancient pagan epics, divination was held in high esteem. It was practised by the Druids. The source of their predictions was often the observation of natural phenomena; the best known form was divination by the clouds, and the word *néladoir*, lit. 'one who studies the clouds,' was used to designate the soothsayers. But divination takes place very often with the help of various objects: a yew-rod marked with ogham characters; a wheel, which recalls the well-known symbol of a Gallo-Roman deity. The Druids also interpreted dreams and the cries of birds, especially the raven's croaking and the wren's twittering. Sometimes omens were taken from the howling of a dog, and from the form of a tree-root. In the *Togail Bruidne Dá Derga* we find a pig sacrificed in order to discover the future.

We have no direct information on divination among the ancient Britons. But the Cornish *teulet pren*, 'to throw wood,' means 'to draw lots'; the Welsh *coelbren*, 'wood of prediction,' means 'lot'; and the Irish *crann-chur*, 'to throw the wood,' means 'to consult the lot.' The etymological agreement of the three dialects proves that divination by pieces of wood, mentioned by Tacitus among the Teutons (*Germania*, x.), was practised equally by the Gauls and the Britons. See also art. CELTS, vol. iii. p. 300, § 4, and COMMUNION WITH DEITY (Celtic), vol. iii. p. 750, § 5; and art. FATE (Celtic).

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DIVINATION (Christian).—**I.** Divination was regarded by early Christian writers as a branch of magic. It was a danger to religious life, it excited a morbid curiosity, it led to needless anxiety, it held the will in bondage by destroying the sense of responsibility. St. Augustine sums up its dangers:

'Quae tamen plena sunt omnia pestiferae curiositatis, cruciantis sollicitudinis, mortiferae servitutis' (*de Doctr. Chr.* ii. 24).

Christ is the door (Jn 10⁹); 'neither knoweth any man the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal him' (Mt 11²⁷). 'The gates of the Divine Reason are rational, and they are opened by the key of faith' (Clement Alex. *ad Gent.* 1). And St. Clement adds the warning: 'Be not curious of ungodly shrines' (*ib.* 2). Divination is a practice which rests on occult methods, methods which had their place in primitive religion, but gave way to the higher methods of Jewish and Christian sacramentalism. This distinction of method was the guiding principle in the Christian view of divination. The diviner sees; he has an insight into Divine things. The Christian 'walks by faith, not by sight' (2 Co 5⁷); he has touch with God, but this touch is 'through the veil, that is, his flesh,' in the widest sense of the economy of the Incarnation (He 10²⁰). Divination is impatient to draw the veil aside.

Christianity, therefore, as the religion of the Incarnation, has discouraged rites and practices which set aside the limitations of the flesh, and are easily able to get beyond control. The subjective type of divination, whether in the form of psychic exaltation or prophetic ecstasy, necessitates a suspension of the intellectual energies. The 'sympathetic passivity suitable for the transmission of the Divine thought' produces a weakening or destruction of individuality, by means of 'ecstatic enthusiasm, deep sleep, sickness, or the approach of death' (Chambers's *Encycl.*, art. 'Divination,' iv. 19). Christianity, in its responsibility to strengthen human nature as a whole by keeping control over the different faculties by means of Divine grace, has kept divination and ecstasy in the background as a danger to the mind and the will. This control is emphasized by St. Paul: 'The spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets' (1 Co 14³²).

The history of Christian divination is the history of the subjection of divination to the control of authority. This principle is summed up by Gratian in reference to divination by lot, one of the practices which claimed for itself Apostolic authority (Ac 1²⁶):

'Sic et sortibus nichil mali inesse monstratur, prohibetur tamen fidelibus, ne sub hac specie divinationis ad antiquos ydololatriae cultus redirent' (*Corp. Jur. Canon.*, ed. Friedberg, 1879, pt. i.; *Decr. Grat.* p. ii. caus. xxvi. qu. ii. c. i.).

Such control was not a new thing in the exercise of religious authority. When Augustus assumed the office of Pontifex Maximus, he destroyed the magical books which were held to be of no weight, and preserved only the Sibylline books:

'quicquid fatidicorum librorum Graeci Latinique generis nullis vel parum idoneis auctoribus vulgo ferebatur, supra duo millia contracta undique cremavit; ac solos retinuit Sibyllinos' (Sueton. *Caes. Aug.* 81).

For the same reason, it is related that L. Petillius publicly burnt certain Greek books as endangering the religion of Rome:

'Graecos, quia aliqua ex parte ad solvendam religionem pertinere existimabantur, L. Petillius Praetor Urbanus ex auctoritate senatus per victimarios igne facto, in conspectu populi cremavit' (Valer. Max. I. i. 'de Religione,' 12).

And the reason assigned by Valerius Maximus applies equally to the history of Christian divination:

'Noluerunt enim prisci viri quicquam in hac asservari civitate, quo animi hominum a deorum cultu avocarentur' (Valer. Max. *ib.*).

And St. Augustine, although he himself confesses that the turning-point in his life was the opening of the 'Codex Apostoli' at the words (Ro 13[13]) 'non in comessationibus et ebrietatibus' (*Conf.* viii. 12), deprecates the practice:

'Hi vero qui de paginis evangelicis sortes legunt, et si optandum est ut hoc potius faciant, quam ad daemonia consulenda concurrant; tamen etiam ista mihi displicet consuetudo' (*ad inquisitiones Januarii* [*Ep.* LV. i. 20]).

2. Rabanus Maurus († 856) sums up the practice of divination in the early ages of the Church in his treatise *de Magorum Præstigiis*, collected from various passages in Augustine and Isidore of Seville, and quoted in the *Decretum* of Gratian under the name of Augustine (*Corp. Jur. Can.* pt. i. p. 1024). On the authority of Varro, divination was of four kinds: 'geomanticam, ydromanticam, aeromanticam, pyromanticam.'

Geomantia is defined as 'ars e terra vaticinandi' (Ducange, *Gloss. ad Script. med. et inf. Lat.*). It is recorded that the resistance of Padua to the arms of Eccelino de Romano in 1226 was foretold by this practice:

'quidam de carceratis sollicite perquirebant per sortes, ad quem finem vester exercitus deveniret. Et unus per puncta quaedam unius artis, quam dicunt nescio quam Geomantiam, dicere videbatur, quod Padua non poterat hiis temporibus capi' (Rolandini Patavini, *de factis in Marchia Tarvisina*, x. 11, *ap.* Muratori, *Rer. Ital. Script.*, Milan, 1726, viii. 319). The same chronicler refers to it again in the preparation made by Eccelino for his last campaign in 1259 (*ib.* xii. 2).

Hydromantia is described by Augustine, in reference to Numa, as an act of divining by water:

'ut in aqua videret imagines deorum, vel potius ludificationes daemonum, a quibus audiret quid in sacris constituere atque observare deberet' (*de Civ. Dei*, vii. 35).

This practice still survives in the water of silence and other ceremonies associated with Christmas Eve, Hallowe'en, St. Mark's Eve, and Midsummer Eve. A love-couplet quoted by Abbott from Salonica illustrates the practice:

'A lump of gold shall I drop into the well,
That the water may grow clear, and I may see my husband that is to be' (*Macedonian Folk-lore*, pp. 51–57).

Aeromantia is another practice of divination which, under the form of weather-signs, survives to-day.

Pyromantia has also its innocent adepts in the present day. Some see faces in the fire, some see strangers on the bars. So in Macedonia a flickering in the fire, a flaring in the candle-flame, betokens the coming of a guest (Abbott, p. 98).

Rabanus, again quoting Isidore of Seville (*Etym.* viii. 9), says: 'duo sunt autem genera divinationis: ars et furor.' Under 'ars' are the various methods of art magic which are practised by the diviner; under 'furor' the enthusiasm and ecstasy and frenzy which form the atmosphere most conducive to divination. The ecstatic condition may still be found, not only among the dervishes of the East, but in some professedly Christian sects in the West. Authority alone can exercise the control both in the practice of spiritual art and in the frenzy of the religious devotee.

Among the professors of divination referred to in the literature of the Church are *incantatores*, *arioli*, *aruspices*, *augures*, *astrologi*, *genethliaci*, *mathematici*, *horoscopi*, *sortilegi*, *salisatores* (Isid. viii. 9). The *incantator* divined by means of spells or incantations. He claimed to cure diseases, to bless or curse the crops, to influence the weather. Constantine in 321 endeavoured to control the practice by law (*Cod. Theod.* lib. ix. tit. xvi. 3). The interpretation of this law reads:

'Malefici, vel incantatores, vel immissores tempestatum, vel hii qui per invocationem daemonum mentes hominum turbant, omni genere poenae puniantur.'

In the words of Pliny (*HN* xxviii. 2), such spells were an insult to human wisdom: 'viritim sapientissimi cujusque respuit fides.' The writings of the Fathers, the canons of the Church, and the experience of our times prove how great a hold such practices have even among those who profess Christianity. It is to them that St. Paul alludes in Gal 3[1] 'O foolish Galatians, who hath bewitched you?' Liddell and Scott (*s.v.* βασκαίνω), quoting Theocritus, write: 'The charm was broken by spitting thrice' (Theoc. vi. 39). The *tempestarii*, storm-raisers or storm-quellers, are constantly referred to in the canons, the capitularies, and *pœnitentiaria* of the Councils, the Emperors, and the Bishops (Ducange, *Gloss.*, *s.v.* 'Tempestarii'). In Ireland such charms have been grafted into the religious customs of the people (Wood-Martin, *Elder Faiths of Ireland*, ii. 104–108). A spell against whirlwinds in Macedonia is this: 'Alexander the Great liveth, aye he doth live and reign.' Abbott (ch. xiii.) gives many examples of such spells and incantations.

The *arioli* were those who circled round the idol altars, uttering prayers, and making unhallowed offerings:

'Arioli vocati, propter quod circa aras idolorum nefarias preces emittunt, et funesta sacrificia offerunt' (Isid. viii. 9).

A law of 357 condemns the practice, and rebukes the curiosity which encourages divination: 'Sileat omnibus perpetuo divinandi curiositas' (*Cod. Theod.* lib. ix. tit. xvi. 4). The object of the rites of the *arioli* was to receive some response. This practice of 'raising the devil' is referred to by Tertullian:

'qui aris inhalantes numen de nidore concipiunt, qui ructando curantur, qui anhelando praefantur' (*Apol.* 23).

There may be some survival of this rite in the *Desiul*, or 'Holy round,' a circling sunwise round a rude stone monument or a well, and in the *Tuapholl*, or 'Unholy round,' which brings a curse. This cursing round was accompanied with incantations and the casting of cursing stones on the altar (Wood-Martin, ii. 51–57). The 'peccatum ariolandi' is condemned with the 'scelus idolatriae' in an Epistle of Stephen of Tournay (*Ep.* 120, *ap.* Ducange, *Gloss.*).

The *aruspices* are referred to in the laws of Constantine in 319 (*Cod. Theod.* lib. ix. tit. xvi. 1–2). The *aruspex* divined by means of inspecting the entrails of a victim offered in sacrifice. The decree does not destroy, but only regulates their practice. The *aruspex* must not go into private houses. He must be consulted only in the temple: 'aras publicas adque delubra'; and in the open light: 'libera luce tractari.' 'Superstitioni enim suae servire cupientes, poterunt publice ritum proprium exercere.' The Empire as well as the Church recognized the importance of keeping the practice of divination under control.

This practice still survives. The use of the shoulder-blade in divination is an art in itself, known as *omoplatoscopy*. The colour, the spots, the lines are all read by the expert. The breastbone of the fowl is used for the same purpose. This art flourishes still in Western Macedonia and Albania. In England the practice is remembered in the reading of the speal-bone. The breaking of the 'wishing-bone,' which many of us remember as a solemn diversion of our childhood, as enjoyable almost as the feasting on the fowl, is also to be traced to the same source. This use of the 'merrythought' is derived from the ancient use of the

cock in divination (Abbott, p. 97 f. ; Wood-Martin, p. 141).

Augury was of two kinds: 'ad oculos' and 'ad aures.' The divination was from the flight or from the song of birds. It was regulated by decrees of 357 and 358 (*Cod. Theod.* lib. ix. tit. xvi. 4. 6). There are many survivals of this kind of divination:

'A whistling maid and a crowing hen
Are hateful alike to God and men.'

The crowing of a cock out of hours, the hooting of an owl, the cawing of a crow on the house-top, are all regarded as uncanny. The pigeons which frequent the mosque of Bajesid in Constantinople and the Piazza of St. Mark's at Venice are looked on as birds of good omen. The geese in the cloister of the Cathedral of Barcelona may be a survival of the geese kept in old time in the Roman temple on the same site. The series of Dove-Bishops at Ravenna and the letting loose of pigeons at certain festivals, though now associated with the gift of the Holy Ghost, have doubtless a more ancient root in the rites of divination. A certain Hillidius delivered the people of Vieille-Brionde from a Burgundian raid by the leading of a dove: 'ut aiunt, commonitione columbae alitis incitatus.' And Gregory of Tours adds:

'Quod ne quis invideat confictum de columba, et homini praestitum Christiano, cum Orosius consulem Romanum, id est Marcum Valerium, a corvo alite scribat adjutum' (*de Mir. S. Juliani*, 7; Oros. iii. 6).

The magpie in England is still greeted with the rhyme:

'One for sorrow, two for mirth,
Three for a wedding, and four for a birth.'

And the flight to right or left is a survival of the augury 'ad oculos.' The swan was sacred to the children of Llyr. The word *drean*, 'wren,' is in Cormac's *Glossary* explained as '*Draói-en*, a Druid bird, a bird that makes a prediction.' He was the 'magus avium' in Irish hagiology. The stork, the starling, and the swallow also have their place in the folklore of divination. 'A dove from heaven' protected St. Moling at his birth.

'A madman and a fox (lived with him), also a wren and a little fly that used to buzz to him when he came from matins, till the wren hopped on it and killed it; and this killing by the wren was displeasing to him, so he cursed the wren, and said: "My fly. . . . Howbeit," says Moling, "but he that marred for me the poor pet that used to be making music for me, let his dwelling be for ever in empty houses, with a wet drip therein continually. And may children and young persons be destroying him!" Howbeit then, but the wren killed the fly. Then the fox killed the wren. The dog of the steading killed the fox. A cowherd killed the madman, namely, Suibne son of Colman' (Whitley-Stokes, *The Birth and Life of St. Moling*, Paris, 1906; Wood-Martin, ii. 140-150; Abbott, pp. 106-110).

Rhŷs tells the story of a bird-warning associated with the sunken palace of Bala Lake (*Celtic Folklore*, Oxford, 1901, p. 409). The common saying, 'A little bird has whispered it in my ear,' shows the continuity of tradition as to augury. Wood-Martin (ii. 143) gives a picture of a bronze instrument with bird ornaments, found in a bog near Ballymoney, Co. Antrim, which has been thought by some to be a divining-rod. It is not earlier than the 6th century.

The *astrologi*, *genethliaci*, and *mathematici* were all adepts in divination by means of the study of the stars. The term *mathematici* was a common one in the 4th cent.: 'quos vulgus mathematicos vocat' (Jerome, *Com. in Dan.* c. ii. 2). So also in the 1st cent. (*Didache*, c. 3). St. Augustine has frequent references to them: 'Jam etiam mathematicorum fallaces divinationes, et impia deliramenta rejeceram' (*Conf.* vii. 6). The title of the *Theodosian Code*, under which the practices of divination are regulated, is: 'de Maleficis et Mathematicis.' They are specially mentioned in edicts of 357, 358, 370, or 373. A decree of Honorius and Theodosius in 409 reads:

'Mathematicos, nisi parati sint, codicibus erroris proprii sub oculis Episcoporum incendio concrematis, Catholicae Religionis cultui fidem tradere, nunquam ad errorem praeteritum redituri, non solum urbe Roma, sed etiam omnibus civitatibus pelli decernimus' (*Cod. Theod.* lib. ix. tit. xvi. 12).

The *horoscope* had an important place in the divination of the *mathematici* and *genethliaci*. Isidore of Seville writes: 'Horoscopi dicti, quod horas nativitatis hominum speculantur dissimili et diverso fato' (*Etym.* viii. 9). In the Morocco crisis of 1911, a heading in the *Standard* of July 28, 'The Kaiser's Horoscope,' shows that there are still some who attach meaning to these practices.

The *sortilegi* were those who divined by lot or by the chance opening either of the Scriptures or of Virgil:

'qui sub nomine fictae religionis per quasdam, quas sanctorum sortes vocant, divinationis scientiam profitentur, aut quarumcunque scripturarum inspectione futura promittunt' (Isid. viii. 9).

The *sortes Sanctorum* were similar to the *sortes Vergilianæ* (*ap.* Spartian. *Vit. Had.* 5). Severus is said to have read his destiny in the line:

'Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento.'

Sometimes the answer was obtained by opening the book at random, sometimes by pricking the text with a pin. The practice was not regulated by the *Theodosian Code*. It was forbidden in a *capitulare generale* of 789:

'De tabulis vel codicibus requirendis. Et ut nullus in psalterio vel in evangelio, vel in aliis rebus, sortiri praesumat, nec divinationes aliquas observare' (*Op. Carol. Magn.* [Migne, *PL* xcvii. 187]).

The method of the *sortes Sanctorum* is given in a *Life* of St. Hubert of Liège (*c.* 714). After a fast of three days, two books were placed on the altar —a Book of the Gospels and a Sacramentary:

'Reseratum autem Evangelium hanc primum legenti sententiam obtulit: Ne timeas, Maria; invenisti enim gratiam apud Dominum. Liber etiam Sacramentorum in sui apertione hoc primum videnti objecit: Dirige viam famuli tui' (*ib.* p. 188, note).

The election of St. Martin to the Bishopric of Tours was decided by such a use of the Psalter:

'Unus e circumstantibus, sumto psalterio, quem primum versum invenit, arripuit. Psalmus autem hic erat: Ex ore infantium et lactantium. . . .' (Sulp. Sev., *de Vita S. Martini*, ch. 9).

The open practice of this mode of divination in the Church is illustrated on the occasion of the visit of Chramnus to Dijon (*c.* 556). The clergy determined to tell his fortune from each of the three Lections of the Gallican Mass:

'Positis clerici tribus libris super altarium, id est Prophetiae, Apostoli, atque Evangeliorum, oraverunt ad Dominum, ut Chramno quid eveniret ostenderet.' The three readings are then given (Greg. Tur., *Hist. Franc.* iv. 16).

In another case, three books were placed on the tomb of St. Martin:

'id est Psalterii, Regum, Evangeliorum: et vigilans tota nocte petiit ut sibi beatus confessor quid eveniret ostenderet.' This was in 577 (*ib.* v. 14).

The practice of learning by such means the character and administration of a newly elected Bishop became in early times an established Church custom. Ducange, in his *Glossarium* (*s.v.* 'Sortes Sanctorum'), gives illustrations from the *Lives* of Anianus of Orleans, Lanfranc, and others. It was known as the *Prognosticon*.

Another form of divination was also practised, known as *sortes per brevia*. In cases of doubt, papers were drawn, and the lot thus taken. In the *Chronicle of Cambrai*, it is recorded that the Bishops of Poitiers, Autun, and Arras claimed the body of St. Leger. The lot fell to the Bishop of Poitiers:

'tribus Epistolis, horum trium nominibus subscriptis, et confuse sub palla altaris obtectis, factaque in commune oratione, Pictavensi Episcopo ex iudiciis sanctum corpus deberi declaratum est' (*ib.*).

In Spain a similar kind of divination was known as *ensalmos* or *inpsalmum*. The *sortes Apostolorum* was a collection of pious sayings drawn up for this purpose. At the end are these words:

'Haec sunt Sortes Sanctorum quae nunquam falluntur, neque mentiuntur: id est, Deum roga et obtinebis quod cupis. Age Ei gratias' (Smith-Cheetham, *DCA*, art 'Sortilegy').

Charles Simeon sought for comfort in this way:

'It was not for direction I was looking, for I am no friend to such superstitions as the *Sortes Virgilianæ*, but only for support. The first text that caught my eye was Matt. xxvii. 32' (Chambers's *Encycl.*, art. 'Sortes Virgilianæ').

There is also a reference to the use of rods in the casting of lots in the *Lex Frisionum* (tit. 14. 1, *ap.* Ducange, *s.v.* 'Tenus'):

'Tunc unusquisque illorum septem faciat suam sortem, id est, tenum de virga.'

This kind of rhabdomancy was condemned by the Council of Auxerre in 578:

'non licet ad sortileges vel ad auguria respicere, nec ad sortes, quas Sanctorum vocant, vel quas de ligno aut de pane faciunt aspicere.'

The *sors de pane* refers to purgation by bread. The guilt or innocence of an accused was tested by the eating of bread. It was known as *corsned*:

'Si quis altari ministrantium accusetur, et amicis destitutus sit . . . vadat ad judicium, quod Anglice dicitur Corsned, et fiat, sicut Deus velit' (*Leges Kanuti Regis*, cap. 6, *ap.* Bromptonum; Ducange, *s.v.* 'Corsned').

The *salisatores* were those who divined by leaping:

'quia dum eis membrorum quaecunque partes salierint, aliquid sibi exinde prosperum seu triste significare praedicunt' (Isid. viii. 9).

It would also refer to what is popularly known as the 'jumps,' a twitching in the body. St. Augustine refers to it: 'His adjunguntur millia inanissimarum observationum, si membrum aliquod salierit' (*de Doctr. Chr.* ii. 20). There may be a trace of this in the *Life of St. Moling*:

'The cleric said to the Spectre: "Grant me a boon" . . . Then he bound that boon on the Spectre's hand. Thereafter he leapt his three steps of pilgrimage and his three leaps of folly. The first leap that he leapt, he seemed to them no more than a crow on the top of a hill. The second leap that he leapt, they saw him not at all. . . . But the third leap that he leapt, 'tis then he alighted on the stone-wall of the church . . . then he leapt from the stone-wall, and reached the church, and sat in his place of prayer. . . . After that he looked at the boy, and thus he was, with the glow of the anger and the fire on him, and the radiance of the Godhead in his countenance' (Whitley-Stokes, p. 16 f.).

3. Primitive Christianity would seem to have been more tolerant of divination than the more developed Catholic Christianity of the West. The evidence of the books of the NT points to this difference. It is in St. Matthew's Gospel alone that the Star is recorded (2^2), and that dreams are referred to as a means of revelation. The dreams of Joseph (1^{20} $2^{12. 13. 19. 22}$) and the dream of Pilate's wife (27^{19}) are an echo of the early belief in this form of divination in the Jewish-Christian Church. The only instance of the Divine lot is in the cradle of Christianity at Jerusalem, in the choice of St. Matthias (Ac 1^{26}). In the extension of Christianity the Gospel triumphs over divination. Simon the Sorcerer of Samaria (Ac 8^9), Elymas the Sorcerer of Cyprus (13^6), the woman with the spirit of divination at Philippi (16^{16}), the sorcerers of Ephesus (19^{19}), stand condemned in the records of the early mission outside Judæa. Occultism gives way before Sacramentalism, although faint traces of the primitive faith are recognizable in the stories of the 'shadow of Peter' (Ac 5^{15}), the handkerchiefs from the body of Paul (19^{12}), and the trances of Peter (10^{10}) and Paul (22^{17}, 2 Co 12^2). Witchcraft under the form of φαρμακεία is condemned in Gal 5^{20}, Rev 9^{21} 18^{23} 21^8 22^{15}.

In the sub-Apostolic ages there are a few references to the practice of divination. The *Epistle of Barnabas* links together μαγεία and φαρμακεία (xx. 1). St. Ignatius in his *Epistle to the Ephesians* also refers to μαγεία, and speaks of the one Bread of the Blessed Sacrament as the φάρμακον ἀθανασίας (xix. 2, xx. 2). Hermas calls a μαντεία a heathen practice (*Mand.* xi. 4). The *Didache* forbids it: οὐ μαγεύσεις, οὐ φαρμακεύσεις (c. 2); and again: τέκνον μοῦ, μὴ γίνου οἰωνοσκόπος . . . μηδὲ ἐπαοιδὸς μηδὲ μαθηματικός (c. 3). If the 'Two Ways' is an early Jewish-Christian document, this straight teaching against augury, incantation, and astrology implies a continuance of the practice among Eastern Christians.

This is supported by the evidence of Irenæus at the end of the 2nd century. The magical arts of Marcus coloured his sacramental rites as well as his teaching (*c. Hær.* I. xiii.). The followers of Simon Magus would appear to have grafted his magic into their Christianity.

'Igitur horum mystici sacerdotes libidinose quidem vivunt, magias autem perficiunt. . . . Exorcismis et incantationibus utuntur. Amatoria quoque et agogima, et qui dicuntur paredri et oniropompi, et quaecunque sunt alia perierga apud eos studiose exercentur' (*ib.* xxiii. 4).

The followers of Carpocrates practised the same art:

'Artes enim magicas operantur et ipsi, et incantationes, philtra quoque et charitesia, et paredros, et oniropompos . . . (*ib.* xxv. 3).

Dreams are here included with incantations and philtres.

Tertullian in his *de Anima* (c. 209-214) regards divination as a faculty of the soul:

'Dedimus enim illi . . . et dominationem rerum, et divinationem . . . Definimus animam . . . dominatricem, divinatricem' (ch. 22).

Dreams may be 'peculiare solatium naturalis oraculi' (*ib.* 46), but he points out their danger:

'Definimus enim a daemoniis plurimum incuti somnia, etsi interdum vera et gratiosa, sed, de qua industria diximus, affectantia atque captantia, quanto magis vena et frustratoria et turbida et ludibriosa et immunda' (*ib.* 47).

And of the magical arts in brief: 'Quid ergo dicemus magiam? quod omnes paene fallaciam' (*ib.* 57). This he wrote as a Montanist. As a Catholic (*c.* 197), in reply to a charge 'de sterilitate Christianorum,' he numbers among the critics of the Church 'magi, item aruspices, arioli, mathematici' (*Apol.* 43).

Clement of Alexandria refers to the practice of divination among the Germans. There were women among them who could foretell the future by looking into the whirlpools and currents and eddies of a river (*Strom.* i. 15). 'The inventors of these arts as well as of philosophy were nearly all Barbarians' (*ib.* i. 16). Origen more than once speaks of divination as a snare to the Christians of Egypt:

'Haec ergo omnia, id est, sive auguratio, sive extispicium, sive quaelibet immolatio, sive etiam sortitio, aut quicunque motus avium, vel pecudum, vel inspectio quaecunque fibrarum, ut aliquid de futuris videantur ostendere, in operatione daemonum fieri non dubito' (*in Num.*, hom. xvi. 7). He calls the 'opprobrium Aegypti' of his day 'observare auguria, requirere stellarum cursus, et eventus ex iis futurorum rimari, servare somnia caeterisque hujusmodi superstitionibus implicari. Idololatriae namque mater est Aegyptus' (*in Libr. Jes. Nave*, hom. v. 6).

The inscriptions of Eumeneia in the 3rd cent. show that the city was to a large extent Christian. But, as it was necessary to keep up the forms of the national religion, and as the 'courtesies of society and ordinary life, as well as of municipal administration, had a non-Christian form,' the 'spirit of accommodation' must have ruled in the religious life of the citizens (Ramsay, *Cities and Bishoprics of Phrygia*, vol. ii., Oxford, 1897, p. 504). The disciplinary canons of the Synod of Ancyra in 314 are an echo of this 'spirit of accommodation' of an early age. The 4th cent. tightened the reins of discipline as well as the definitions of the faith. The practice of divination was condemned by canon xxiii. (*al.* xxiv.):

'Qui divinationes expetunt, et morem gentilium subsecuntur . . . sub regula quinquennii jaceant' (*Decret.* p. ii. caus. xxvi. qu. v. 2).

The same need of discipline was recognized in the far West. The Synod of Eliberis (Granada) in Spain (between 314 and 324), in addition to many canons against idolatrous rites, has one canon forbidding women to frequent cemeteries: 'ne feminae in coemeterio pervigilent' (can. xxxv.). St. Jerome refers to the custom of resorting to cemeteries as a means of divining with the dead:

'sed sedens quoque, vel habitans in sepulcbris, et in delubris idolorum dormiens; ubi stratis pellibus hostiarum incubare soliti erant, ut somniis futura cognoscerent' (*in Is.* 65[4]).

The clergy were forbidden to practise divination by the Synod of Laodicea (*c.* 343–381):

'non oportet sacris officiis deditos vel clericos magos aut incantatores existere, aut facere philacteria' (can. 30, *ap. Decret.* p. ii. caus. xxvi. qu. v. 4).

Priscillian and his followers were accused of practising astrology. And his writings give some grounds for the accusation, though he clearly states how far he thought it right to go:

'Adtendi autem lunaris ideo cursus jubetur, non ut in eo observatio religionis sit, sed quia in ea quae videntur omnis homo vincitur et germana aelementis caro . . .' (*Priscill. Op.*, ed. Schepss, 1889, p. 78. 3 ff.; cf. F. Paret, *Prisc.* 1894, p. 144).

The Church of the 4th cent. was weakened by this 'curiosity' in the matter of divination. It had difficulty in detaching itself from the practice of the magical arts. At the close of the century Nicetas of Remesiana, a prominent Bishop of the old Latin Church of the Danube, writes:

'abrenuntiat inimico et angelis ejus, id est, universae magicae curiositati . . . renuntiat et operibus ejus malis, id est, culturis et idolis, sortibus et auguriis . . .' (Niceta, ed. A. E. Burn, Cambridge, 1905, *de Symbolo*, c. 1).

The Gallican Church seems to have been troubled by this curiosity in magic. It is referred to in the canons of Agde (506), Orleans (511), and Vannes (461 or 465). In a canon of the Synod of Auxerre (578), in addition to the *auguria* and *sortes Sanctorum*, mention is made of *characteres.* These were of the nature of charms:

'Phylacteria et Characteres diabolicos nec sibi nec suis aliquando suspendant, incantatores velut ministros diaboli fugiant' (Aug. *de Temp.*, serm. 163, *ap.* Ducange, *Glossar.*).

The Church of Spain also regulated the practice of divination. It is condemned in the *capitula* of Martin of Bracara (c. 72), and in can. 30 of the Council of Toledo in 633. But it survived throughout the West, and in the Carolingian Renaissance of discipline it required stringent treatment. In the *Decretals of Gratian* is a long extract from an unpublished capitulary which illustrates its danger under the Frank Empire:

'Episcopi eorumque ministri omnibus viribus elaborare studeant, ut perniciosam et a zabulo inventam sortilegam et magicam artem ex parrochiis suis penitus eradicent' (*Decr.* p. ii. caus. xxvi. qu. v. 12).

The Church of Rome expressed the judgment of the whole Church in the Council of 721 under Gregory II.:

'Si quis ariolos, aruspices vel incantatores observaverit, aut philacteriis usus fuerit, anathema sit' (*ib.* qu. v. 1).

LITERATURE.—*Corpus Juris Canonici*, ed. Friedberg, 1879; *Codex Theodosianus*, ed. Gothofred, 1736; Ducange, *Glossar. ad Scriptores mediæ et infimæ Latinitatis*, 1733; Smith-Cheetham, *DCA*, 1875; Chambers, *Encyc.*, 1889; G. F. Abbott, *Macedonian Folklore*, Cambridge, 1903; W. G. Wood-Martin, *Traces of the Elder Faiths of Ireland*, London, 1902.

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DIVINATION (Egyptian).

—From more than one point of view it seems impossible to bring Egyptian divination under the classifications in general use in the study of mantics; we cannot make either the ordinary definitions, or the purpose, or even—to a certain extent—the means employed fit in exactly. In fact, in this study, as in so many others, the Egyptians made no attempt to formulate a theory, or even to lay down general principles. In Egypt we find nothing corresponding to the didactic treatises on mantics composed by the Chaldæans and by the Hellenic world, nothing like the prodigious variety of means of divination of the Assyrians and Greeks, including the observation of almost every phenomenon of Nature, beings, and things. The observation of the ordinary aspects of the sky is confined to the realm of astrology; its unusual aspects (meteors, shooting stars, comets, zodiacal light, eclipses) are explained in advance by mythology, and do not require an interpretation from actual divination. There is no mention of the mantics of rain, winds, clouds, or smoke, etc., in the Egyptian texts, or of the twenty kinds of hydromancy, or of divination by 'palmistry.' In connexion with living creatures there is no ritual study of the movements or appearances of animals (ornithoscopy, ichthyoscopy, etc.); nor do we meet with haruspicy,[1] extispicy, or teratoscopy. There are no evidences in the Egyptian texts or monuments of cledonomancy, libanomancy, rhabdomancy, axinomancy, clairomancy, lithoboly, belomancy, knuckle-bones, dice, divining-rods, or, indeed, of any of the means of inquiry by the production of phenomena for interpretation.

When we apply to Egypt the classifications in general use for the mantics of other peoples, we find a certain number of divinatory processes mentioned by the ancient Greek and Roman authors, about which, however, it is very important to observe: (1) that they are of rare occurrence, or are employed only in popular superstitions and not by official divination; and (2) that they were introduced into Egypt at a late date, under the influence of Asia or of the Hellenic world.

To the first class we may assign the indications drawn from the flight of birds and encounters with serpents; *e.g.* the story of Alexander's expedition to the Great Oasis. This form of divination possibly belongs to Egypt, and the inscription of Hammamat (Erman, *ZÄ* xxix. [1891] 60) may be cited in its defence, in which a gazelle shows the spot in the desert where the stone of the royal sarcophagus is to be set up. But the incident was related rather as a miracle, and there is no ground for considering it a regular method of divination. The use of the divinatory vase seems equally unknown to the priests of the official cults, and the so-called magic consultation of Nectanebo is a legend of Greek origin. The divinatory vase certainly existed in Egypt in the last centuries of its history, and the demotic texts agree on this point with the Græco-Roman evidences; but it is very probable that this practice was imported from Persia, and in any case it was never employed by the court-priests, but only by magicians.

Apart from the reference in Gn 44[5] to the divining cup of Joseph, which may be a non-Egyptian adaptation, we know from the classics (Plin. xxxiii. 46; Plutarch, *de Iside*, lxi., lxiv.; Horapollo, i. 39, etc.) that this was a part of the cult of Anubis in particular; the god was invoked by means of a vase full of liquid or a flame; and the reading of the divinatory signs or images was performed through the medium of a child, on whom they worked by incantations and the laying on of hands. And thus, says Diodorus (xvii.), 'the soul foresees future events in the phantoms she herself creates' (cf. Virey, *Religion égyp.*, Paris, 1909, p. 227, and Ermoni, *Religion égyp.*, do. 1910, p. 122). The use of the child, because of its innocence, is a common practice in all magic, and is connected with the universal belief in the inferiority of a man who has committed a sin or has had sexual connexious, in the struggle against the spirits. Lefébure connects these methods of divination of the later period with analogous practices occurring all over North Africa (*Revue Africaine*, 1905, no. 257, p. 211), and conjectures with great probability (*Sphinx*, vi. [1902] 61) that the material process consisted in creating in the child's brain phantoms and images of Anubis and others, by means of hypnotism and looking at a shining object. We know, besides, that these processes persisted down to our own days in the Arabic world.

It is possible, then, to find in Egypt in the last centuries some of the processes of divination of the Mediterranean and Chaldæo-Assyrian world. The fact of their combination with innumerable popular superstitions tended to produce in the official cults a multitude of practices which do not really belong to the history of Egyptian divination.

With the above restrictions, it appears that the contents of Egyptian divination were essentially four: (1) the interpretation of dreams (*q.v.*), sought or unsought; (2) the reading of horoscopes (see STARS); (3) divinatory calculations made from the position and influences of the stars (*q.v.*); and (4) the manifestation, directly and plainly indicated, of the will of the gods themselves. This last branch includes (*a*) the movements of the sacred animals, (*b*) the responses of the 'prophetic statues,' and (*c*) the words spoken by the gods in their temples, *i.e.* oracles properly so called.

(*a*) The first group in the last class seems to have

[1] Herodotus and some modern authorities have confused veterinary examination to ensure the purity of sacrificial victims with examination for purposes of divination.

played a very limited part. Consultations of the bull Apis are known in the classics. Pliny (viii. 71) and Amm. Marcellinus (xxii. 14) relate that the omen was good or bad according as Apis accepted or refused the food offered by the worshippers, and that the sacred animal refused the offering of Germanicus. They also tell of prosperity or adversity being foretold for the country according as the bull chose to go into one or the other of two stalls.

There is little doubt that these superstitions are truly Egyptian and very ancient. But it is very doubtful whether, at the classical period, such manifestations were employed by the priests as means of divination; it is far more probable that they were simply popular superstitions, existing throughout all Egypt wherever sacred animals were kept in the temples, and that what the Greeks and Romans tell of Apis happened also in the case of the crocodiles of Ombos, and the rams of Elephantinē or of Mendes. It may have been due to the influence of the Greeks, who were accustomed to give importance to this very type of mantics, that these customs became embodied in the priestly cult, or at least were given a greater importance as methods of divination. In fact, dreams, astrology, and, in particular, the direct consultation, in definite language, of living images of the gods, had at an early period supplied the official religion of Egypt with methods of consultation far more convenient, more explicit, and more in keeping with the fastidious genius of the race; and it is to these classes that nearly all the known examples of Egyptian divination belong.

(*b*) Among the most characteristic processes in the consultation of statues is the designation of the Ethiopian sovereigns by the statue of Amon-Rā at Napata. The ancient authors had been struck with it (see esp. the account of Diodorus, iii. 5, and a corrupted version in the satirical writings of Synesius [*Works*, French tr. by Druon, Paris, 1878, p. 244]). The famous *stela* of Jebel Barkal, on which the election of Aspalut is recorded, is the most complete account of this practice accessible in the English language. After a number of ceremonies, too long to describe here (see Maspero, *Boulaq*, pp. 69, 336, and *Guide Cairo Museum*, ed. Dec. 1910, p. 215, Room S, West Side, no. 692), the candidates for the throne were brought before the statue of the god, which had been adjured to make its choice known. They filed past the idol, which remained motionless until it 'seized' the candidate it chose. The statue thereupon declared in formal terms that this was the king. The newly-elected monarch then entered the sanctuary, and was crowned by the god himself.

Recent Egyptological discoveries show that all the traits of this curious ceremonial were borrowed by Ethiopia from the divinatory ritual of Egypt. On the tomb of Nib Uônnaf at Gurneh (see Sethe, *ZÄ* xliii. [1906] 30 ff.) there is an account of the election of the high priest of Amon-Rā. The candidates were led before the statue of the god. They were all shown to it in turn, 'and not to a single one of them did it make the motion *hanu* [see below for the actual gesture] except, said the King, when I pronounced thy name.' Then, Nib Uônnaf being thus chosen, the statue conferred the power upon him by four magic passes. A second text, discovered later, proves that the custom was in existence even in the time of Amenhotep III., and it is quite logical to suppose that it goes back to a much earlier period; it may perhaps be even as ancient as the worship of the god himself.

The right of consulting the god is reserved, of course, to his people, *i.e.* to the king or the chief 'prophet' (a poor modern tr. of the word *honu*, which is, more exactly, a 'man belonging to some one'). The consultation does not take place at any time, but only, according to traditional etiquette, on one of the days of the holy image's 'going out' (*khāu*='assemblies,' 'processions')—in the case of the Theban Amon, *e.g.*, at 'his great festival of Apit.' There is a recognized place where it is allowable to present the divinatory request to the god, and even to interrupt the 'going out' of the god to question him. At Thebes it is the place called the 'silver pavement.' The priest approaches the shrine containing the statue and begins by an invocation (*âsh*) in court language. He then asks the statue if it is convenient for it to listen to such and such an affair. The terms used here also are traditional: 'O God of Goodness, my Lord,' is the beginning of the question. Then the case is stated: a theft has been committed; will the god help to find the stolen property and the culprits? A funerary monument has been robbed; does the god desire the punishment of the spoilers? Sometimes even more circumlocution is used: 'Lord, may we lay before thee a serious affair?' (*e.g.* among the Banis of the Great Oasis; see below). If the statue remains motionless, the request is refused, and the matter is dropped. If it consents to listen, it acquiesces (*hanu*) 'twice with decision.'

The actual gesture of consent is difficult to determine. Nearly all authorities admit that the statue 'shook its head.' The word *hanu*, always employed, without exception, in all the texts, for this method of divination, may, indeed, mean a shake of the head, according to the usual signification of the word in ordinary language. Amon-Rā of Karnak, in the long series of examples known to us, Amon 'Pakhoniti' of Memphis (cf. Pleyte, *PSBA* x. [1892] 41, 55), Amon 'Ta-Shoni' (*ib.*), Khonsu 'Nofirhâtep' of Thebes, Amenôthes I., king of the dead (cf. Erman, *SBAW*, 1910, p. 210), and the images of the Ethiopian Amon of Napata gave responses in this way (*hanu*). The same is true of Isis of Koptos (Petrie, *Koptos*, London, 1896, pl. xix. lines 11–13). There is doubt, however, in the case of Juppiter Amon of the Great Oasis (cf. Brugsch, *Reise nach der grossen Oase*, Leipzig, 1878, pl. xxii.), and the consultation granted afterwards to Alexander, on his famous journey to this sanctuary. But there is no decisive context to prove that it was the head rather than the arms that moved, and, as we have no remains of these portable statues, scientific reserve must be maintained on this material detail. The passage in the famous *stela* of Bakhtan, in which the king asks the statue of Khonsu 'to incline its face,' is nothing more than an ordinary expression in court language, meaning 'to be in a benevolent mood, or 'to consent gladly' to something. Finally, it will be observed: (1) that several passages in the inscriptions and papyri say that the statue performs *hanu* 'towards' some one hidden in the midst of a group or a crowd; (2) that, in many other circumstances besides interrogations proper, the statue 'seizes some one, or 'holds the string' (the ritual term for founding a temple), etc. These evidences, along with others too long to give here, justify us in assuming, with equal probability, that the *hanu* may have been a movement of the arm of a jointed statue, accompanied perhaps by a sound, a whistling, or a cry, of suitable strength. We have absolutely no exact details here, though we know that, in the case of oracles proper, the god spoke; but this Divine language is itself a matter for discussion. Maspero, in all the works in which he discusses these 'prophetic statues' (see Literature), holds that they were actual jointed dolls, with strings attached to their arms and heads, and that the officiating priest pulled a string for each response and each gesture. In his earliest works (cf. *RHR* xv. [1887] 159 ff.) he even seems to admit the existence of actual machinery, worked, when required, by fire or steam. The explanation that the statue had a jointed head seems to be generally accepted. It is a very ingenious and satisfactory hypothesis—but nothing more, for no single text or representation supplies formal proof.

Divination was the exclusive privilege of the 'essential' statue, just as were the possession of the fluid *sā*, and the gift of exorcism, of healing, of 'vital breaths,' etc.; and—probably for reasons of magic awe—the Egyptians *never* made a single representation to show what such a statue was. There is one portable figure of Min, it is true, nude and ithyphallic, carried on his shield and having his 'magic-case' with him, in a number of Theban representations of processions (Luxor, Medinet Habu, and Ramesseum). This statue suggests, at the very first glance, the idea of a string hanging from the neck to the ground—which would justify the theory of statues with movable heads. But it is doubtful whether this is a 'prophetic statue—from the very fact that they have dared to show it in bas-relief. We know, finally, that the sacred image was carried on the *bari*; and, even allowing that the *naos* was open during the consultation and that the statue was taken out of it and placed on the ground (cf. Pleyte, *PSBA* x. 43), it is difficult to see by what sort of mechanical means movements could be produced. All that we can state with certainty is that the idol indicated its wishes by a gesture, or by a gesture and a cry at the same time, and repeated twice.

After this sort of 'duty performance,' the king or the chief priest puts the question. The cases about which we know (from inscriptions, papyri, and ostraca) are of great variety (cf. Brit. Mus. Papyrus 10335; Mariette, *Catal. mon. d'Abydos*, Paris, 1881, no. 1225; Brugsch, *ZÄ* ix. [1871] 85; Erman, *SBAW*, 1910, pp. 344, 346 = Cairo Ostrakon 25242; Turin Papyrus 126, ch. 3; Erman, *Ägyp. Rel.* 186; Louvre Maunier Stela; Breasted, *Anc. Records*, iv. [Chicago, 1907] 317; Naville, *Inscr. hist. de Pinodjem III.*, Paris, 1883, p. 111). A consideration of all the questions submitted shows that the majority are judicial decisions, and that

they are entirely concerned with the people and things ruled over or possessed by the god; in short, that they are cases not of interpretative divination or divination of the future, but of the divination, for the immediate present, of the god's formal decision. This remark helps us to understand how the process of the Divine response by *hanu* tended to become a settled gesture, almost a piece of legal phraseology, the divinatory element of which in the end quite evaporated (see below).

The process of questioning is controlled by rigorous fixed rules. A series of definite questions are asked, each one bringing nearer, *ne varietur*, the solution of the difficulty. To each question the statue has to reply by 'yes' (*i.e.* by performing *hanu* 'twice with decision') or 'no' (*i.e.* by remaining unmoved). In certain cases, the final decision depends entirely upon the statue's gesture. Two pieces of writing are placed before it, the one saying that an accused person is guilty, the other that he is not guilty; and the statue is required to choose. To make quite sure, this test is repeated twice. The case of the steward Thothmes is an example of this kind, in which, twice over, 'the god refused to take the writing that declared him guilty, and took that declaring him innocent' (cf. a good tr. of this typical example in Breasted, *Anc. Records*, iv. 325).

This curious passage would lead one to suppose that, even although *hanu* means a shaking of the head, the statue certainly moved or stretched out its arm to take the writing. This evidence should be laid alongside of the various texts that seem to show that at the coronation of the king the statue of Amon-Rā put the crown on the new sovereign's head, as in Ethiopia (see below).

Taken in connexion with the indication of the Ethiopian kings and the Theban chief priests by the statue, these examples of judicial decisions throw light upon the philosophy of such proceedings. It is possible—and probable—that originally the gesture of the statue was actually divinatory, inasmuch as, though an indication was looked for from it that was the result, it is true, of solicitation, its exact answer or choice could not be foretold. In the earliest times the *hanu* of the statue was as impossible to anticipate with certainty as were the miraculous movements recorded in other inscriptions—the statue making a gesture of welcome or salutation, during a procession, as it passed before a court official (cf. Petrie, *Koptos*, pl. xix. line 11 f.), or, more frequently, before the prince who was destined one day to mount 'the throne of Horus,' and of whose future position as king of Egypt no indication had ever until then been made. The original nature of the process had a tendency gradually to become an operation in which the process of investigation, procedure, and inquiry was carried through more and more by human means, and the only uncertain element—*i.e.* the opinion, or the will, of the god—was reduced to the very restricted alternative of saying 'yes' or remaining motionless. Divination proper, thus reduced to the minimum of interpretative freedom, and confined to cases equally definite and real, became, by force of circumstances, rather a registration of the god's consent taken for granted in practice, and soon even simply a formality with practically no divinatory significance in it. This was almost certainly the nature of the Divine *hanu* in the cases of the election of the Ethiopian king and the nomination of the Theban chief priest; and similarly in the ratification of judicial sentences. This all serves to explain how, in the course of history, the Divine consent by a movement of the statue came to be the regular and necessary accessary of registration for all kinds of contracts, deeds of gift, marriages, wills, and even rescripts relating to funerary lots passed before the temple authorities, in which there was no kind of 'divination' to be seen—unless, indeed, we give that name to the desire (or would-be desire) to be quite certain, for the sake of the validity of these actions, that the spirit of the god was not opposed to them (cf. (1) the process in the Turin Papyrus 126; (2) Erman, *ZÄ* xxxv. [1897] 12, for the registration of a will; (3) Maspero, *Boulaq*, p. 336, for the registration of a funerary decree; and (4) what Breasted says in *Anc. Records*, iv. 325, about a special work on this series of *legal documents*).[1]

(*c*) From the known examples, it appears that the consultation of statues usually consisted in obtaining a series of acquiescings manifested by the *hanu*. We have seen, however, that movements of 'seizing' sometimes accompanied this manifestation of the god's will. There were also other movements of an analogous kind; *e.g.*, when the image of Khonsu consented to grant its magic power to one of the statues of Khonsu in order to drive off a demon, it is said that it 'made four passes of the magic fluid'—from which we may assume actual movements, no matter how rudimentary, of the arms or of an arm. In some of the cases cited above, it is formally stated that the *hanu* was accompanied by spoken words, sentences more or less brief, but practically forming a short discourse; this is the case in the election of the kings of Napata. It is, indeed, certain, from a number of other texts, that the gods spoke—not, of course, to the common herd of mortals, but to their sons and their ministers (*i.e.* to the members of the royal family and the high priests). The gist of the wishes they manifested thus was afterwards reduced to the form of a decree (*utu*), and engraved on the walls of the temple as 'the words of the god himself'; or their wishes were embodied in one of those rhythmical prose accounts, lyrical in character, which have been rapidly enriching the *corpus* of Egyptian historical inscriptions in recent times.

These oracles are of as many varieties as the consultations of the statues examined above. Sometimes the god himself, of his own accord and unsolicited, suddenly manifested his will, making his voice heard, in the silence of the sanctuary, to the king or priest coming into his majestic presence; and he would order a mission to Lebanon for wood for his house, for stones for his temples, for perfumes and rare trees for his altars and sanctuaries (cf. Erman, *ZÄ* xxxviii. [1900] 1; and Golenischeff, *RTr* xxi. 127). Sometimes the manifestation was less unforeseen: it might be the complement of a previous warning in a dream, a formal explanation of which the god was graciously granting by request; or it might be the answer to a passionate request of the king. To the last category belongs the discourse received by Hatasu in the temple of Deir el-Baḥari, when she came, after prayers and fasting, to seek a manifestation of the Divine will, and was ordered to send an expedition to the country of spices (cf. Naville, *Deir el Bahari*, London, 1898-1901, iii. 84). This famous example is a good specimen of the manner of proceeding. The other examples of the same type show that in no single case was the divination accompanied by ecstasy, religious frenzy, or hypnosis of the subject, and that the god never used mysterious language, or broken mangled words that were afterwards submitted to the interpretation of professional soothsayers. The statements made by the god were in clear and coherent terms. They were practical replies as to a fact, a decision to be taken, or the issue of a concrete imminent event. All the Egyptian precision and love of clearness are seen in these oracles, as we may call them. Seti I. implores the god, and is shown a place where he must make a well in the desert, while the god demands a sanctuary in exchange (cf. Breasted, *Anc. Records*, iii. 82); and orders, solicited or unsolicited, relating to the construction and repair of buildings (*e.g.* Mariette, *Karnak*, Leipzig, 1875, pl. xii. = Breasted, *Anc. Records*, ii. no. 606) appear to have held the chief place in these oracles—perhaps, indeed, just because these responses more than others were engraved on the walls of the buildings with which they were thus connected. Another kind of prediction which we find of more and more frequent occurrence is the foretelling of a prince's coming to the throne. Thothmes III. was informed by the god long in advance that he would one day be king of Egypt (Inscription of the year 23 at Wady-Halfa); and this prediction was confirmed later by the statue suddenly stopping in front of Thothmes, proclaiming

[1] On the question of illusion or fraud in the above processes, see Foucart, *Religion et art dans l'ancienne Égypte*, Paris, 1908, vol. i. ch. i. p. 37 ff.; Maspero, 'Les Statues parlantes,' in *JD*, 21st Dec. 1898.

him king, crowning him, and making him a speech (cf. Breasted, 'Coronation Inscription,' in *Anc. Records*, ii. 60, no. 140).

Such facts should be compared with those telling how the Divine statue proclaimed the king, appeared in public with him under its protection, and gave him his crown and diadems (*e.g.* Daressy, *Annales*, iii. [1903] 27 f. for Ramses II., and similar facts for the Thothmes, the Amen-hoteps of the XVIIIth dynasty, and Harmhabi). They seem to indicate that here we have, for historical Egypt, the continuation of an extremely ancient divinatory process. If we further consider the remarks of Breasted (*Anc. Records*, ii. 225) on the antiquity and persistence of the coronation ritual of Heliopolis, it is a possible assumption that the whole is a survival, made regular and ritual, of a much earlier state of things, and that, in pre-historic times, the accession of a chief was actually settled by divination, the idol (or, before it, the fetish) intervening by prophetic processes to indicate the man it desired to be its minister and to rule over men in its name. Such a view would modify our ideas on the origins of Egyptian monarchy, and should be considered along with the analogous customs to be found among numerous uncivilized races of the present day relating to the designation of kings or priests by divination.

The inscriptions of the classical period published in recent years show that the gods themselves gave direct orders by speeches, and it is beyond all doubt that consultation of the gods by the kings was of very frequent occurrence, and that divination was involved in the majority of important decisions. At grave junctures, *e.g.* when there was a conspiracy to frustrate, a treaty to arrange, or an expedition to command, the king asked help from the god, and he did not ask it in a sign or prodigy to be interpreted afterwards; he requested an answer in articulate language and exact terms. It is difficult to find a nobler tone in the ancient literature of the East than that of some of the inscriptions in which a king relates how he came to the temple to seek for Divine wisdom, stated his business before his ancestor, asked him what he ought to do, and turned away from this mysterious interview with face lit up and heart full of joy, because he had heard his god speak to him 'as a father to his son' (cf. *e.g.* Bouriant, *RTr* xv. [1896] 178; *Inscription of Thothmes IV. at Konosso*). This fine formula recurs in several inscriptions relating to consultations of the god by the king.[1]

To these examples of oracles of the Pharaonic period we may add, as having an Egyptian character and no foreign elements, the demotic inscriptions of Nubia, relating to the oracles of Isis of Philæ and Thoth of Pi-Nubs. The records that the 'chief of the temple held a consultation of the god' connect this method of divination with the official procedures already noticed (cf. Révillout, *Revue égyptologique*, v. nos. i.–ii., and *PSBA* x. 56–58). At the oracle of Dakke, held in great veneration by the Ethiopians and the Blemmyes, the statue of the god was consulted 'at the great feast' (*bo en lo*). Texts show that a consultation of this oracle was a recognized thing when a prediction of the circumstances favourable for the celebrated yearly journey of the statue of Isis of Philæ to the Blemmyes was desired. It is also an Egyptian custom that we find at Korti, when the chief priest of the temple leaves the choice of his successor in the hands of the god (cf. *Revue égyptol.* v. no. 111, for a series of examples of all these oracles).

It is very difficult to discriminate between what is Egyptian and what is foreign in the mass of examples of divination and sanctuaries having an oracle mentioned in connexion with Egypt by Græco-Roman authors. The same restraint must be observed as for the divinatory processes discussed above in the inquiry concerning the prophetic statues. As a rule, the recently discovered information of Pharaonic age tends to confirm for the majority of cases the actual national character of the modes of divination. Thus at the oracle of Bisu in the Thebaid (Herod. i. 182; Amm. Marcellinus, xix. 12), and at that of Heliopolis (Macrobius, *Saturn.* i. 30), the means of getting the future divulged consisted in reducing the questions to writing, according to carefully arranged formulæ. Such a method is fairly similar to what took place, as we saw above, in the judgment of the steward Thothmes, and the importance of the proper wording of the formulary noted by Pliny (xxviii. 3) and Juvenal (*Sat.* vi. 390) corresponds exactly with Egyptian formalism. But these formulæ, deposited under seal in the temple, and the replies given, also sealed, with the same ceremonial, are a method of Divine correspondence which the hieroglyphic inscriptions have not yet confirmed for the classic period. We know from Zosimus that in the reign of Constantine the government seized a number of oracles which were given into the hands of the Imperial police and involved a number of Egyptians in imprisonment and exile.

The cases of divination by incubation are the most complicated. If it is certain that the sanctuary of Ptah Sotmu in Memphis was giving oracles in the Pharaonic epoch to sufferers who came to consult it (see DISEASE [Egyp.]), and that the gods had been sending dreams, for long ages and almost everywhere, to reveal remedies to the patients who came to sleep in their temples, it is no less certain that the result of the combined influence of Asia and Greece was to extend and modify the essentials of these processes of divination, just as in the cases already noticed of prophecy by interpretation of inanimate things.

The famous oracle of Juppiter Amon of the Great Oasis deserves special mention. Although manifestly in decadence in the time of Strabo (xvii. 759), its advice was still held of great value in difficult questions (Juvenal, *Sat.* vi. 554). A study of the principal Græco-Roman authors who describe the manner in which the god made his will known (Ptolem. § 8 f.; *Scriptores rerum Alex. Magni*, ed. Muller-Didot, 1846, p. 37 f.; Arrian, *Anabasis*, iii. 4. § 5; Quintus Curtius, iv. 7; Ephippos, § 3; Strabo, vii. fr. 1; Diodorus, xvii. 51; Plutarch, *Alex.* 27; and especially Callisthenes, fr. 27 and 36) shows that it was in absolute conformity with the Egyptian rule: the statue of the god, the response by gesture and, if need be, by spoken words, the consultation by the high priest, and the questioning at the 'ceremonial going out' of the god (notice the passage of Strabo [vii. fr. 1] remarking indirectly that the responses of the oracle were given in conventional signs, διά τινων συμβόλων). We also find indirectly, from the evidence of Ephippos (§ 3), that the divinatory statue had a human form, and was provided with shoes, a mantle, and horns. This last trait—granting that the Amon of the Oasis is certainly a copy of the Theban Amon—helps to confirm the conclusion that the prophetic statue of Thebes had a ram's head. The most famous episode in connexion with this oracle was the visit of Alexander, who was summoned by Amon as his son and lawful successor upon the throne of Egypt. Maspero (*Ann. de l'École des Hautes Études*, 1897, pp. 1–32, 'Comment Alexandre devint dieu en Egypte') shows clearly that the deification of the great conqueror was carried through completely in accordance with the forms of the Pharaohs, in spite of the mistaken statements of Greek authors, who were ill-informed as to Egyptian procedure.

The consultation of statues by signs and oracles being entrusted to the priest in charge of the ordinary priestly functions led, of necessity, to the suppressing of professional soothsayers and seers filled with religious frenzy, divinatory ecstasy, etc. There was not even a set of officials whose duty it was to interpret dreams; this function was entrusted by the Pharaoh to some of his chaplains or secretaries. Finally, we know of no regular body of individuals charged with the execution of the rules of mantics as applied to time and space (cf. art. STARS [Egyp.], for a partial exception to this). It is true, of course, that innumerable trifling cases of divination in daily life engaged the attention of all classes, from the man in the street to the king himself. But these were dealt with directly, by individual

[1] As to the very difficult question of the *material method* by which the god spoke, Garnault (*Revue scientifique*, no. 21, May 1900, p. 643 f.) suggests ventriloquism; Maspero holds that the priest spoke by Divine inspiration in the name of the god—the most satisfactory theory in many instances. But in some cases the king alone, without the intervention of the priest, appears to have received the Divine response directly in his own soul.

intelligence, by an answer obtained from a book of magic, or by explanations sought from some private person celebrated for knowledge and sagacity—this last word being understood in its narrowest sense of a high degree of skill in magical studies. This practice of private divination (which must be carefully kept distinct from official divination) seems to have been of wide occurrence in Egypt in all periods. It presents cases of an infinite variety of application, but these will be more appropriately discussed under MAGIC (Egyp.).

LITERATURE.—There is no monograph on the subject. A good number of testimonies of classical authors, almost entirely neglected in Egyptological works, are gathered together in J. G. Wilkinson, *Manners and Customs*, ed. 1878, ii. 462–464, where, however, the actual facts are not stated from Egypt itself. An isolated branch—the study of prophetic statues—is treated by G. Maspero, in a great many publications (see esp. *RHR* xv. [1889] 159, 188; *RTr* i. [1882] 152; *JD*, 21st Dec. 1898 [speaking statues]; *Guide au Musée de Boulaq*, Paris, 1883, pp. 69, 336; *Études de Myth. et d'Archéol.* iii. [1901] 155, 220; *Annuaire de l'École des Hautes Études*, 1897). A short account is given in A. Erman, *Ägypt. Religion*², Berlin, 1906, p. 186. The rest of the important documents and articles on the subject have been mentioned in the article.

GEORGE FOUCART.

DIVINATION (Greek).—Of the beliefs with regard to divination held by the Hellenes at the time of their arrival in Greece we have no knowledge. That they practised it is highly likely; and it is inconceivable that the inhabitants of Knossos, Tiryns, Mycenæ, and the other centres of pre-historic culture had no belief in it; but definite information is entirely wanting. The most we can say is that certain ancient oracles very possibly date from pre-Hellenic times. We begin therefore with the feudal period of Greek history (? *c.* 1200 B.C.), of whose culture we know something from Homer.

1. In Homer.—Here we find for the most part 'independent diviners' (*divins libres*, to adopt Bouché-Leclercq's convenient terminology). The oracular shrines, so famous in later ages, are scarcely mentioned at all. One instance occurs of a private consultation at Dodona,[1] and Achilles mentions the wealth of the shrine at Delphi;[2] but no important oracles are mentioned as emanating from either. Agamemnon, for example, does not appear to have consulted any one but the seer Kalchas with regard to the Trojan war. The famous portent of the serpent and the nest of swallows is interpreted by him, and Odysseus bids the discouraged army 'wait awhile and see whether Kalchas prophesieth aright or not.'[3] So far, then, as divination is official and professional, it is the individual seer (μάντις, οἰωνοπόλος) and not any sort of priestly corporation, that we have to deal with. The μάντις is not, as a rule, an inspired prophet, but rather a craftsman (δημιοεργός), classed with leeches and carpenters in a famous verse of the *Odyssey* (xvii. 384, μάντιν, ἢ ἰητῆρα κακῶν ἢ τέκτονα δούρων). He practises seer-craft, μαντοσύνη, the later μαντική (τέχνη), as a doctor practises physic, and by the favour of the gods[4] he has more skill in it than ordinary men. But any one can interpret an omen on occasion, just as Patroklos, who is not a regular physician, on occasion heals the wounded Eurypylos. Of anything like possession or prophetic vision, apart from the interpretation of omens, we hear very little. The most famous instance is the 'second-sight' of Theoklymenos (*Od.* xx. 351 ff.), who suddenly sees the hall filled with the ghosts of the wooers of Penelope. The typical Homeric method of foretelling the future is by *the actions and cries of omen-birds* (οἰωνοί),[1] or sometimes of other animals, or by *portents* (τέρατα).

[1] *Od.* xiv. 327; cf. xix. 296. [2] *Il.* ix. 404. [3] *Il.* ii. 299 f.
[4] *Il.* i. 72. Plato, following the recognized classification, divides divination into μαντικὴ ἔνθεος and τῶν ἐμφρόνων ζήτησις τοῦ μέλλοντος (*Phædrus*, 244 B–C). The former is absent from Homer, practically, and has been ascribed (wrongly, we think) to the influence of Dionysos, by Bouché-Leclercq and others.

The former of these (ὀρνιθομαντεία, οἰωνοσκοπία) was always of more or less importance in Greece, although it never attained the imposing dimensions of Etruscan augury. In Homer, the omen-bird is generally an eagle, and always sent by Zeus, Apollo, or Athene.[2] Its actions are symbolical, and need no complicated augury for their interpretation. A characteristically transparent allegory is that given by the eagle in *Il.* xii. 200 ff.:

'For a bird appeared unto them as they strove to cross, even an eagle of high flight, upon the left, staying the folk; he bore a monstrous red serpent in his talons, alive still and breathing, that was not yet forgetful of strife, for it struck at the bird that held it upon the breast by the neck, writhing back. And the eagle dropped it from him to the earth, galled by the pain, and flung it down into the midst of the throng, and himself flew with a scream on the breath of the wind. And the Trojans shuddered when they saw the writhing snake lying in the midst of them, a portent of Zeus, the ægis-bearer.'

Here the eagle represents the Trojans, the snake the Greeks, and the discomfiture of the eagle indicates the result of the contest. That it is meant as an omen is shown by the species of bird —not all birds are ominous[3]—and by the unusual nature of the occurrence—it is called a portent (τέρας). It is seen on the left, *i.e.* the west, the quarter of darkness,[4] and so must be unlucky. A much simpler omen encourages Odysseus and Diomedes:[5]

'Unto them Pallas Athene sent a heron, on the right, near their path; they saw it not with their eyes through the mirky night, but they heard its cry. And Odysseus rejoiced at that omen (ὄρνις), and made prayer to Athene.'

In neither of these cases is the diviner strictly a professional. Polydamas, who interprets the first omen, is renowned as an augur, but he is present at the battle simply as a warrior, and only incidentally interprets omens and advises Hector. Odysseus is a favourite of Athene, but has nothing of the priest or wizard about him. The method of interpretation is of the simplest in these and all other cases in Homer; and Hector, who is by no means impious, is frankly contemptuous about the adverse sign.

Portents, strictly speaking,—*i.e.* ominous events of a miraculous nature,—are not very common in Homer. One has already been mentioned in passing. The omen of the serpent, interpreted by Kalchas, ends by the creature being turned into stone; but no one seems to deduce anything from this. The word τέρας, indeed, is used to mean any sign[6] from a god, whether miraculous or not, or any wonderful thing, like the ægis, which apparently Eris carries in *Il.* xi. 4. In any case, it is definitely from a god that the sign always comes; and this applies to the other forms of divination mentioned below. Of familiar spirits, animals which give signs of their own accord, and the like, we hear nothing in Homer.

Besides augury and portents, the most important omens are *dreams*. These are almost always definitely sent by a god, and usually speak in plain language. Generally also they are true, an exception being the 'baneful dream' sent by Zeus to deceive Agamemnon.[7] Usually the vision takes the form of a man or woman known to the sleeper

[1] Strictly, ὄρνις is 'a bird, in general,' οἰωνός, 'an omen-bird'; but the distinction is often neglected. οἰωνός also means an omen given by a bird, hence an omen in general; and ὄρνις was used in this sense.

[2] See Ameis on *Od.* x. 274. For the association of these three deities, cf. the repeated line αἲ γὰρ, Ζεῦ τε πάτερ καὶ Ἀθηναίη καὶ Ἄπολλον. The eagle is 'most perfect (*i.e.* most thoroughly ominous) of winged fowl' (*Il.* viii. 247, xxiv. 315).

[3] *Od.* ii. 182. [4] *Il.* xii. 239 f. [5] *Il.* x. 274 ff.

[6] Called in general σῆμα. A falling star is called τέρας (*Il.* iv. 76). The stock τέρας of later times, a monstrous birth, or a birth from a mule (see, *e.g.*, Plato, *Cratylus*, 393 B), does not occur in Homer.

[7] *Il.* ii. 5 ff. Zeus is, it would appear, the normal sender of dreams (*ib.* i. 63); and we hear of no other god who, so to speak, keeps dreams ready-made. The others appear themselves in sleep, or make and send phantoms.

(in this case, Nestor). However, the clear, non-allegorical language is not invariable, and there exists a class of dream-interpreters (ὀνειροπόλοι), but, we may safely assume, no masters of any complicated and wide-reaching science like that taught in later days by such men as Artemidoros. Part of their craft, it would seem, consisted in telling true dreams from false ones; so we gather from the apologue of the gates of horn and of ivory, in the speech of Penelope to Odysseus (*Od.* xix. 560). According to the geography of *Od.* xi., the 'folk of dreams' (δῆμος ὀνείρων) occupy a position beyond Ocean and near Hades; but such ideas have at least as much poetic fancy as genuine popular belief in them. What is important for our purposes to observe is that Penelope's dream is of the kind we have elsewhere noticed[1] as the simplest form of allegorical dream—a vision of an ominous happening. Incubation (see below) is unknown in Homer. One unusual example of a dream, or vision, not divinely sent, remains to be noted. As Achilles sleeps, the spirit of his dead and unburied friend appears to him (*Il.* xxiii. 62 ff.) to beg for speedy release from his homeless condition. But everything about this scene, including the *revenant*, is unusual, and even inconsistent with normal Homeric beliefs.

The occasional appearances of deities, who speak face to face with favoured heroes (Athene with Achilles and Odysseus, Hermes with Priam, etc.), are foreign to our purpose; but we may note, in passing, the peculiar occurrence which later Greece called φήμη, Homer ὀμφή or ὄσσα—the rumour which, coming from no one knows where, spreads through a crowd. This the Greeks always recognized as heaven-sent. We mention it to introduce a similar idea, found both in Homer and in later writers, namely, that the Divine will may be made known by means of the casual words of a mortal (κληδών). Of this we have a noteworthy example in *Od.* xx. 98 ff. Odysseus, about to take vengeance on the wooers, prays for Divine encouragement; a thunder-clap answers him, and is followed by a few words from a tired maid-servant, who curses the wooers for keeping her up all night to grind corn for their feasts. Later ritual developed and systematized this method at the oracular shrine of Hermes Agoraios in Pharai.[2] The consultant whispered his question into the god's ear, then stopped his own ears, went out, and, when he got beyond the market-place, listened for chance words from passers-by. These were construed into an answer. This form of divination (*cledonomancy*) remained popular at all periods. It appears in various forms, such as the puns on names (Ἑλένα—ἑλέναυς, ἕλανδρος, ἑλέπτολις, in the *Agamemnon*, 686 f.), and seems to have had this great advantage, that one could either accept (δέχεσθαι) or disregard an omen of this kind.[3]

Allied to cledonomancy is the omen from *sneezing* (*Od.* xvii. 541 ff.)—one of the large class of omens from involuntary human actions (παλμοί), elaborated in later times into a complicated system. In the Homeric instance, Telemachos' violent sneeze simply indicates Divine approval of Penelope's words. This idea lingers on to-day in Greece. If a sneeze is heard after any one has spoken, the sneezer is not only given the customary 'Good health to you!', but the words καὶ ἀλήθεια λέει, 'and he (the last speaker) tells truth,' are added.

Necromancy proper—the evoking of a ghost or ghosts—is not found in Homer. The nearest approach, besides the appearance of Patroklos' spirit, is in the visit of Odysseus to Hades (*Od.* xi.). Here the ghosts are certainly approached with regular necromantic rites, blood-offerings and the like, and the whole passage suggests something other than the normal Homeric idea of the dead as 'strengthless.' It may well be that, while the Achæan lords were not ghost-worshippers, their subjects were,[1] and that this bit of ritual has percolated up from lower levels of society. But even here the ghosts are not raised from their graves or called into the upper world; nor have they any prophetic powers, except Teiresias, who, by special grace, retains his old seer-craft or something like it. The only approach to the usual idea of a dead man's powers of divination is the foresight shown by some dying men, *e.g.* Hector.[2]

Such are the main forms of Homeric divination, to which Hesiod makes no addition, for his weather signs are simply crude meteorology, with nothing of magic about them.

2. Historic period.—We now pass to the historic period, which we may roughly divide into (1) the time of Greek development and political importance (8th to 4th cent. B.C.—First Olympiad to the death of Alexander), and (2) the decadence (from the 4th cent. onwards).

(1) *The period of political importance.*—In this period, besides the Homeric methods, several new forms of divination were introduced, which will be briefly discussed in their proper place; but the chief feature of it was the immense importance of the oracular shrines, and particularly of three—those of Zeus at Dodona, of Apollo at Delphi, and, later, of Zeus Ammon. The first of these is undoubtedly of great antiquity.[3] Homer[4] mentions its priestly tribe or caste, the Σελλοί 'of unwashen feet, sleepers on the ground'; and the way in which the oracles were given—by the sounds made by the sacred oak—suggests an ancient tree-worship, older than the cult of Zeus as we know it, and very possibly practised before the god was heard of. It remained respectable, though overshadowed by Delphi, until quite late times.

But the greatest of all oracles was the Delphic or Pythian. From very early times an oracle of some sort appears to have existed in this lonely and exquisitely beautiful place,[5] and, if we may trust the legends, it was held by Ge-Themis, possibly in conjunction with Poseidon. Inspiration was given by some sort of vapour rising from a cleft in the ground;[6] this is so well established by ancient evidence that we cannot doubt it, although modern researches have shown that no large chasm existed—in fact, thanks to the French excavators, any one can now see that for himself. But, whatever it was, it was enough to serve as evidence of the presence of a chthonian power, and it was held to inspire prophecies—possibly by means of dream-visions, the characteristic form of earth oracles. To this old and well-established shrine there came, at some period of which we have no definite knowledge, a Northern tribe,[7] who worshipped Apollo. Despite the non-chthonian character of this god, Delphi became Apolline henceforward. Under the management of the 'Holy Ones' (Ὅσιοι), it became the most important oracular shrine in Greece, and to some extent the official head-centre of Hellenic religion.

[1] See DIVINATION (Introductory), § 1, 'Dreams.'

[2] Bouché-Leclercq, ii. 399; Pausanias, VII. xxii. 2–3.

[3] Cf. Æsch. *Agam.* 1652 f.

AI. . . . οὐκ ἀναινομαι θανεῖν.
XO. δεχομενοις λέγεις θανεῖν σε . . .

[1] For a discussion of the whole question, see Rohde, *Psyche*[4], Tübingen, 1907, vol. i. ch. i.

[2] See DIVINATION (Introductory), § 6, 'Necromancy.'

[3] See Farnell, *CGS* i. 38 ff.; Bouché-Leclercq, ii. 277 ff.

[4] *Il.* xvi. 233 ff.

[5] See Farnell, iv. 180 ff., for an excellent discussion; but in our opinion he underestimates the part played by the natural advantages of the spot. The Greeks were extraordinarily sensitive to beautiful scenery, though not given to sentimentalizing about it.

[6] Cf. Plutarch, *de Defect. Orac.* 43.

[7] Crete also had a traditional connexion with Delphi; see Hom. *Hym. Apoll.* 388; Paus. x. vi. 7; Pind. *Pyth.* v. 52. A lion's head in Knossian style has been found at Delphi.

Several methods of divination were employed at one time or another, such as the μαντικαὶ ψῆφοι, which appear to have resembled the Zulu divining-sticks; but the usual procedure was by possession (μαντικὴ ἔνθεος). The Pythia or prophetess, after a draught of water from the underground spring Kassotis,[1] seated herself upon the tripod in the inner shrine, probably over the cleft, became inspired, and prophesied. The official interpreters (προφῆται) then reported her utterances, normally in hexameters.[2] The opportunity this gave for very liberal 'recension' of the inspired and probably quite unintelligible words of the Pythia is obvious; still, all oracles were supposed to come through her direct, as is shown by the common phrase ἡ Πυθία χρᾷ. The theory was briefly this: Zeus was omniscient, and Apollo was his favourite son and his confidant. Apollo, therefore, from time to time[3] made known his father's will or foreknowledge to such mortals as chose to consult him after due purification and sacrifice, employing as his medium the Pythia, who,[4] possessed much as a shaman is possessed (*plena deo*, in Vergil's phrase), spoke not her own words but those of the god. How much of all this the 'Holy Ones' believed, we cannot say; certainly the oracle had immense influence,[5] especially in religious matters, where it was, on the whole, conservative, except for its advocacy of Dionysiac worship and of hero-cults. In political matters it usually avoided any decided position, though it was philo-Spartan in the Peloponnesian war; and a certain vagueness and ambiguity in all fore-tellings of the future saved the god from the disagreeable position of a false prophet. In one respect, however, Apollo seems really to have acted as a useful Information Bureau. Founders of colonies regularly came to him for advice, and that advice was generally good. It may be, however, that here, as in the case of codes of laws supposed to emanate from Delphi (νόμοι Πυθόχρηστοι), the god did no more than give his approval to a course already decided upon.

The influence of Delphi, and the lesser influence of other oracles of Apollo (Klaros, Branchidai, etc.), had its effect on legend, as is shown by the persistent torturing of myths about ancient seers into making the latter sons or pupils of Apollo, and inspired prophets rather than augurs. The great bulk of the oracles, and their proverbial obscurity, called into existence a class of interpreters (ἐξηγηταί) whose business it was to reveal the god's meaning to the less sharp-witted public. It was recognized that to be a good exegete one must be something of a diviner; and, later on, in the nonage of Greek culture, the collection and interpretation of oracles in the light of a degenerate philosophy occupied such men as Porphyry.

But even Apollo did not extinguish the race of *divins libres*. The craze for knowledge of the future which was very noticeable during the Peloponnesian war produced a demand for oracles which was liberally met by the circulation of the prophecies (χρησμοί) of various ancient sages, such as Musaios—among them those of Bakis, of whom Aristophanes makes such delightful sport in the *Knights* and elsewhere. At Athens, especially, prophecies sprang up like mushrooms, and such ominous lines as the famous

ἥξει Δωριακὸς πόλεμος καὶ λοιμὸς ἅμ' αὐτῷ,[1]

with its no less terrifying variant λιμός, were in every one's mouth. Soothsayers of all kinds plied a lively trade. Nikias was especially dependent upon them, but no general crossed a river or entered the enemy's country without consulting the μάντεις attached to the army.

These official diviners practised an art unknown to Homer, namely, *haruspicy*. Whereas the Homeric heroes simply sacrificed and had done with it, in later Greek rites the victim was required to give a sign (by shaking its head when the libation was poured upon it) that the god accepted it, and the entrails[2] were inspected for signs of Divine approval or disapproval, especially before a battle. Indeed, there is more than one instance (notably at Platæa) of a general delaying action for a considerable time until at last a victim's entrails gave a favourable omen. *Empyromancy* was also practised, *i.e.* the observation of the fire consuming the sacrificial flesh. If it burned low or went out, it was a bad sign, and so on. This was not restricted to altar-flames. It is hardly too much to say that everything capable of being affected by a moderate-sized fire was scrutinized for signs at one period or another.[3] But most of these curious methods and most of the countless other forms of divination, of which we have no room even to give a list, were relatively unimportant, formed no part of any State religion, and were only here and there adopted by oracles. Haruspicy was the normal official method, and in important matters an oracle was consulted.

Dreams, however, deserve separate mention. The recognized medium of chthonian oracles,[4] they were opposed by the Apolline cult, but found a footing in the worship of medicinal heroes, especially Asklepios. The cult of heroes, indeed, grew very important at this period,[5] and Asklepios was particularly popular. His shrine at, or rather near, Epidauros—to-day one of the most interesting ruins in Greece—and many lesser shrines at Athens and elsewhere, healed the sick by means of incubation (ἐγκοίμησις, ἔγκλισις). The patient, after preliminary rites, slept in the temple, and in a dream was tended or advised—generally the latter—by Asklepios.[6] Here, of course, the medical knowledge of the priests (Ἀσκληπιάδαι) came into play. That it was considerable is clear, both from a number of votive offerings describing treatments which, even by modern standards, are quite scientific, and also from the rise of the Asklepiads of Kos to well-earned renown, especially in the person of their greatest member, Hippokrates. But, even apart from this, and despite the vogue of Delphi, several heroes, notably Trophonios of Lebadeia, gave oracles by dreams or visions.

Finally, as illustrating the extent to which divination at this time became a regular profession, despite the theoretical importance of individual inspiration, mention should be made of the great prophetic families—the Iamidai of Elis and the Melampodidai of Akarnania being the most famous.[7] Alongside of these families (or gilds)[8] of professional diviners, we begin to hear of that curious figure of later mythology, the Sibyl.

(2) *The decadence.*—In this period we have to notice, firstly, the weakening of tho Greek genius,

[1] See Farnell, iv. 188. The prophetic virtues of water from sacred springs were widely recognized.

[2] Other metres, and even prose, were used later; see Plut. *de Pythiæ Oraculis*.

[3] The oracle could be consulted only at certain seasons (ἐπιδημίαι) and on certain days.

[4] This was a regular Apolline method, *e.g.* at his ancient cave-shrine at Hylai on the Mæander.

[5] The more so as most gods had either no oracles or none of any importance. Hence we find Apollo consulted, for example, on a question affecting the worship of Demeter at Eleusis.

[1] Thuc. ii. 54.

[2] Especially the liver (hepatoscopy). See, for one example of many, Plut. *Vita Arati*, ch. xliii. Cf. DIVINATION (Assyr.-Bab.).

[3] See Bouché-Leclercq, vol. i., for a full treatment of this and other forms of divination, such as lecanomancy.

[4] Cf. Eur. *Iph. Taur.* 1259 f.

[5] It was, as we have seen, favoured by Delphi, so long as the monopoly of prophecy was not infringed.

[6] See Aristoph. *Plutus*, for a farcical description.

[7] Bouché-Leclercq. ii. 62 ff.

[8] The patronymic termination often connotes no more than this; cf. Ὁμηρίδαι, Ἀσκληπιάδαι.

and the consequent influence of foreign cults; secondly, the part played by philosophy in regard to the belief in divination; and, finally, the degeneration of the great national cults, and the consequent downfall of the official divination—oracular and otherwise—which formed part of them.

Of the foreign ideas which came in with the backwash from Alexander's conquests, the most noteworthy was the Chaldæo-Egyptian belief in *astrology*.[1] Somewhat modified by Greek ideas, it pervaded the whole of Western thought, and became the principal form of divination. This is not the place to go into details as to the methods employed, but a few salient points may be noted. Firstly, it was almost wholly novel. The idea of taking omens from the heavenly bodies or from such phenomena as lightning and shooting stars is old enough in Greece, but no elaborate system, and no idea of anything like planetary influences, had ever existed. This was the product of the sidereal cults of the East; it is a remarkable fact that the Greeks hardly worshipped the heavenly bodies at all.[2] Astrology—this is another noticeable fact—aided the late tendency to syncretism. Thus, joined with the popularity of the Eastern sun-gods, it helped to identify Apollo with Helios; Artemis was confounded with Selene; the ram-horned (and doubtfully Hellenic) Zeus Ammon with the sign Aries, and so on. Thirdly, astrology invaded all branches of divination to such an extent, that we find haruspices, palmists, etc., using terms borrowed from it, and tracing the influence of the stars in the formation of beasts' entrails and the like.

Philosophers of the decadence and of the period immediately preceding it (that in which Plato and Aristotle lived and wrote) were, on the whole, favourable to divination. Plato, at heart a mystic, while outspokenly contemptuous of the disreputable vendors of indulgences and oracles, was by no means adverse to beliefs in the supernatural, and, in fact, seems to have held that divination was not only possible, but a reality;[3] and his late followers, the Neo-Platonists, who constructed an elaborate system of δαίμονες on the basis of the *Timæus*, found therein a full and satisfactory explanation of oracles. Epicurus, indeed, whose system denied Providence and Divine interest or interference in human affairs, was hostile to the pretensions of diviners; but the Stoics passionately championed astrology, as evidence of their doctrine of Fate.[4] The degenerate and mongrel system, which goes by the name of Neo-Pythagoreanism, was freely credulous of all marvels, divination included, and produced its own inspired prophet, Apollonios of Tyana (*q.v.*).

Under pressure of foreign cults, including finally Mithraism and Christianity, the ancient State religions of Greece became gradually weaker; and this inevitably entailed a decline in the importance of the oracles, and of official diviners. Individualism also was rampant, as is shown by the popularity of the post-Aristotelian philosophies; and this meant that divination became more and more of a private affair. While it is wholly untrue that the oracles ceased at the coming of Christ,[5] it is a fact that by about 100 A.D. they were no longer of great importance;[6] indeed, quite apart from other causes, the political insignificance of Greece meant, sooner or later, the insignificance of her great religious institutions. Finally, Christian opposition for the most part stamped out pagan divination.

1 Bouché-Leclercq, ii. ch. vi.; cf. art. STARS (Greek).

2 Even the sun is unimportant, as is indicated by the extreme rarity of names such as *Heliodoros* or *Heliades* before the 3rd cent. B.C. The attempts made to identify any of the leading Hellenic deities (save Zeus, who is vaguely a sky-god) with celestial phenomena are without exception unsatisfactory.

3 Socrates had certainly been of that opinion before him.

4 *E.g.* Manilius, iv. 14 f.

5 The tale is an invention of Christian apologists, who considered oracles the work of evil spirits. Archæological evidence alone is quite conclusive against it.

6 See Plut. *de Defect. Orac.*, and *de Pythiæ Orac.*

There were, however, survivals. Astrology lingered on despite theological denunciations—political opposition it had already endured for centuries—and still survives. Oneiromancy, which had grown into a most complicated science, still retained a considerable hold on popular belief. Finally, the prophecies of the Sibyl or Sibyls—the number and names vary[1]—being in later times of Judæo-Christian origin, were hospitably received and ranked almost equal with the Hebrew prophets. 'The old man is Sibyl-mad,' says Aristophanes' slave of his master Demos; and in the Middle Ages her name was still held in reverence; 'Teste Dauid cum Sibylla.'

LITERATURE.—A. Bouché-Leclercq, *Hist. de la divination dans l'antiq.*, vols. i.–iii., Paris, 1879–1880; L. R. Farnell, *Cults of the Greek States*, Oxford, 1896 ff., esp. vol. i. (Zeus) and vol. iv. (Apollo). The former work gives a full bibliography of earlier writings.

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DIVINATION (Indian).—In India, divination has gone through two phases of development. Originally it seems to have been practised chiefly with the intention of obviating the evil consequences of omens and portents; in the later period, rather to ascertain the exact nature of the good or evil which those signs were supposed to indicate. Both phases presuppose the firm belief in omens and portents, which appears to be a common feature of primitive culture. In India this belief can be traced back to the Vedic Saṁhitās: birds are invoked to be auspicious, and certain birds, especially pigeons and owls, are said to be messengers of death (Nirṛti, Yama).[2] A great many details are furnished by later Vedic books, especially the *Adbhuta Brāhmaṇa*, which forms the last chapter of the *Ṣaḍviṁśa Brāhmaṇa* of the Sāmaveda, and the 13th chapter of the *Kauśika Sūtra* of the Atharvaveda.[3] The subjects treated in the 12 paragraphs of the *Adbhuta Brāhmaṇa* are, according to Weber's[4] enumeration: common incidents, diseases of men and cattle, agricultural calamities, loss of ornaments, earthquakes, phenomena in the air and the sky, miraculous happenings to altars and idols, electrical phenomena, monsters; in each case the god is named to whose province the particular incident belongs, and the *mantra*, or the ceremony for the expiation of the evil sign, is prescribed. The second treatise is similar to the first; but it differs from it in this, that in it the omens and portents are more specialized and more varied, and that the Brāhman who is to prescribe the remedy for them must belong to the Atharvaveda. The last point need not surprise us, for that Veda was largely engaged with occasional and optional practices, with charms and spells; hence the house-priest (*purohita*) of the king, who had to ward off the evil influences which menaced king and country, was required to be deeply versed in the secret lore of the Atharvaveda. Therefore all that refers to mantic and magic was naturally believed to come within the province of that Veda. The last contribution to it is the 72 *Pariśiṣṭas* (appendixes or paralipomena),[5] treatises on different subjects connected with the Atharvaveda. Some of them are of comparatively late age, since they betray an acquaintance with Greek astronomy. About a third part of this

1 See Bouché-Leclercq, ii. ch. iii.

2 Rigv. ii. 42, 43, x. 165; Atharv. vi. 27–29; cf. *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*, ii. 15. 14.

3 Both treatises have been edited, translated, and commented upon by A. Weber (*Zwei vedische Texte über Omina und Portenta*, Berlin, 1859, p. 313 ff.).

4 *Ind. Literaturgesch.*[2], Berlin, 1878, p. 76.

5 *The Pariśiṣṭas of the Atharvaveda*, ed. G. Melville Bolling and Julius von Negelein, Leipzig, 1909–10.

work deals with prognostics, especially from phenomena in the atmosphere and the heavens. Here we find divination in its later development, *i.e.* with the object of predicting future events. But the expiatory ceremonies and *mantras*, so characteristic of the preceding period, continued to be looked upon as important matter; thus the 67th *Pariśiṣṭa*, called *Adbhutaśānti*, is, on the whole, a metrical paraphrase of part of the *Adbhuta Brāhmaṇa* mentioned above.

The art of divination with which we have dealt as yet was part of the religion, especially of the Atharva priest, who was the orthodox soothsayer. There were probably already in early times soothsayers and fortune-tellers of no religious character (*naimittika*, *mauhūrtika*,[1] *sāmudrika*) who made single branches of prognostics their speciality. But the whole art of divination became independent of religion when Greek astronomy and astrology were introduced into India in the early centuries of our era. The astrologer possessed what was believed to be a real science of prediction, the accuracy of which was uncontestably proved in one branch of his science—the astronomical—and was, therefore, readily believed in in the other—the astrological one. For astronomy and astrology were in India, as indeed also in Europe till quite recently, but two branches of one science. And the Indian astrologer added to these two branches a third—the art of divination, hitherto practised by the Atharva priest. We shall call the latter natural astrology, in contradistinction to judicial astrology adopted from the Greeks. An accomplished astrologer or astronomer (*jyotiṣa*) had to know astronomy, judicial astrology (*horā*), and natural astrology.[2] Judicial astrology is subdivided into (1) nativity (*jātaka*); (2) prognostics for journeys, especially marches of princes in war (*yātrā*); and (3) horoscopy for weddings (*vivāha*). Natural astrology is treated in works which are called Saṁhitā. The best known Saṁhitā is the *Bṛhat Saṁhitā* of Varāha Mihira, written about the middle of the 6th cent. A.D., on which an extensive and very valuable commentary was composed by Bhaṭṭotpala in the 9th century.[3] The contents of the *Bṛhat Saṁhitā* may serve as a summary of the original Indian art of divination—of course, in its last stage of development. We therefore transcribe Varāha Mihira's enumeration of them (ii. 5, tr. H. Kern, *JRAS*, 1869):

'The course of the sun and of the other eight planets, and, during it, their natural and unnatural symptoms, their size, colour, and brightness of the rays, their shape, risings and settings, their roads and deviations, their retrograde and post-retrograde motions, the conjunctions of planets with asterisms, etc., as well as the respective consequences for the different parts of the globe; the course of Canopus, the course of the Seven Seers (Great Bear), the division of things as belonging to the domain of each planet, the same as appertaining to the domain of each asterism, the conjunction of the five planets in the figure of a triangle, etc., the planetary war, the conjunction of the five planets with the moon, the effects produced by the planets on the years presided over by them, the symptoms of pregnancy of the clouds, the conjunction of the moon with Rohiṇī, with Svāti, with Aṣāḍhā; the forebodings of instant rain, the conclusions to be drawn from the growth of flowers and plants as to the produce of trees and crops, the mock-sun, the halo, the cloudy line piercing the sun's disk at rising or setting, the wind, the meteors, the glow of the sky, the earthquake, the glowing red of twilight, the Fata Morgana, the dust rain, the typhoon, the cheapness or dearth of the products of the earth, the prognostics for the growth of corn, the banner of Indra, the rainbow, architecture, palmistry, the auspicious or ill-lucky movements of crows, the augural circle, the movements of wild beasts, of horses, the circle of winds, the good or bad signs of temples, of statues, the consecration of statues, the treatment of trees, the observation of the soil for finding veins of water, the lustration, the sight of wagtails, the allaying the influence of portents, miscellaneous matters, the anointment of a king; the signs of swords, of ornamental goldplates, of cocks, of tortoises, of cows, of goats, of horses, of elephants, of men, of women; reflections on womankind; the prognostics of boils, of shoes, of torn garments, of chowries, of umbrella-sticks, of couches and seats, the examination of jewels, the foretokens at a lamp, the good or bad signs of tooth-sticks, etc., such as occur in common life to everybody as well as to kings,—all these things have every moment to be considered by an astrologer with undivided attention.'

As the astrologer had thus appropriated all prognostics to himself that had belonged to the Atharva priest, he became the successful rival of the latter. This change must have set in during the 2nd or 3rd cent. A.D.; for Garga, an early predecessor of Varāha Mihira, had proclaimed:

'The king who does not honour a scholar accomplished in horoscopy and astronomy, clever in all branches and accessaries, comes to grief.' 'As the night without a light, as the sky without the sun, so is a king without an astrologer; like a blind man he erreth on the road' (*ib.* ii. 7. 9).

It is beyond the scope of the present article to enter into details about judicial astrology as taught by the Hindus; but it must be noticed that they have also adopted Muhammadan astrology, and treated it, under the name *tājika*, as distinct from the Greek astrology, or *jātaka*.

There are several branches of prognostics which seem early to have been cultivated by specialists, and in some degree to have become independent disciplines. To this category belonged the interpretation of dreams. The belief in the significance of dreams is already found in the Rigveda (viii. 47, 14 ff.); dreams indicating death are enumerated in the *Aitareya Āraṇyaka*, iii. 2, 4; the expiation of evil dreams is treated in *Kauśika Sūtra*, xlvi. 9 ff., and in the *Gṛhya Sūtras*. The 68th *Pariśiṣṭa* of the Atharvaveda, called *Svapnādhyāya*, deals with oneiromancy, and so do several Purāṇas in a chapter bearing the same name, and some separate works (see, further, art. DREAMS [Vedic]).[1] Interpreters of dreams, their dream-book, and its contents are frequently mentioned by the Jains.[2] Another important branch of prognostics is the interpretation of the marks of the body, including palmistry and physiognomy. It is an ancient discipline, for it is a tenet of the Buddhists that Buddha possessed the 32 lucky marks (*mahāpuruṣalakṣaṇa*) and the 80 minor marks. The art of interpreting bodily marks is called *sāmudrika*, and several works treating of it are extant; those who practise it are also called *sāmudrika*. Augury proper (*śākuna*) is, as we saw above, a very old branch of divination; it has been developed in the course of time. A very full dissertation on this subject is given by Eugen Hultzsch, *Prolegomena zu des Vasantarāja's Çākuna*, Leipzig, 1879.[3] Finally, it may be mentioned that sortilege was also practised in India; a specimen of this kind of divination is published by A. Weber, 'Über ein indisches Würfel-Orakel' (*MBAW*, 1859).

The Jains also practised the art of divination. According to them, it had eight branches (*aṭṭhaṅgamahānimitta* [*Kalpasūtra*, i. § 64]), which are specified in the commentary to the passage in question: *divya*, *utpāta*, *āntarikṣa*, *bhauma*, *aṅga*, *svara*, *lakṣaṇa*, and *vyañjana*; in another enumeration the same names are given, only that *svapna* is added, and *divya* is omitted. As far as can be judged from this division, the Jain system of prognostics must, on the whole, have been similar to that of the Hindus in general.

LITERATURE.—Besides the works quoted in the course of the article, see A. Hillebrandt, 'Ritualllitteratur,' *GIAP*, Strassburg, 1897, p. 182, and the literature quoted there, p. 184 f.

HERMANN JACOBI.

[1] The *mauhūrtika* is the predecessor of the astrologer proper. Chāṇakya, who wrote about 300 B.C., mentions the *mauhūrtika* (*Kauṭilīyam*, Mysore, 1909, p. 38), while Kāmandaki, a late adherent of Kauṭilya's school, speaks of *Hora-gaṇita-tattvavid* (*The Nītisāra*, by Kāmandaki, Calcutta, 1884, iv. 33).

[2] H. Kern, *Bṛhat Saṃhitā*, Calcutta, 1865, Preface, p. 26 ff.

[3] Edited, together with the text, in the Vizianagram series, 1895–97.

[1] For further details, see Pischel, in *ZDMG* xl. (1886) 111 ff.

[2] *Kalpasūtra* of Bhadrabāhu, ed. Jacobi, Leipzig, 1879, pp. 1, 74 (*SBE* xxii. 246).

[3] The whole text, *Vasantarāja Śakunam*, was edited in Bombay, 1884.

DIVINATION (Japanese). — **1. Definition.**— The Japanese for 'divination' is *ura* or *uranahi*. If we consult the 'Vocabulary of the most ancient Words of the Japanese Language' (*TASJ*, vol. xvi. pt. 3, p. 280), we find that, according to B. H. Chamberlain, the old word *ura* signifies: 'the back or hind part of anything, inside, the reverse; hence the heart, the mind, divination of things unseen, soothsaying.' The primitive meaning is clearly seen in present-day phrases: e.g. *te no ura* means the palm of the hand; *kimono no ura*, the inside of a coat; *ura no ie*, a back-house. From this we see that, for the Japanese, the idea of divination does not necessarily involve a prediction, but only the discovery of something hidden—present, past, or future. It may be employed not only to find out whether such and such an event will occur in the future, whether it will be lucky or the opposite, etc., but also to reveal the present will of the gods on such and such a point, and even to discover why a certain event—generally an untoward one—has occurred in the past.

2. Objects.—To get a good idea of the various objects of divination, we have only to look through the ancient Shintō documents, beginning with the *Kojiki*. Even in the very first pages of the sacred story we find divination playing a part in the life of the primitive couple: Izanagi and Izanami have produced badly-formed children; the cause is discovered by divination, viz. that in the marriage ceremony the woman had spoken first (see *Kojiki*, tr. B. H. Chamberlain, p. 22). An eclipse of the sun takes place; the gods have recourse to various magical processes in order to stop it, and among these is divination—employed, no doubt, to discover the will of the Sun-goddess (*ib.* 64). At a later period, one of the first emperors, Suinin, who had a son afflicted with dumbness, learns in a dream that his child will be able to speak if a temple is built to a certain god, who does not reveal his name; by a process of divination the sovereign discovers the identity of the god, and removes the curse (*ib.* 237 f.). Outside of these longer mythological tales, we see divination practised in innumerable other cases, especially in the *Nihongi*. It is employed to foretell the result of a military expedition (see *Nihongi*, tr. W. G. Aston, vol. i. pp. 121, 227, 237); to reveal the cause of plague, rebellion, and other public calamities (i. 152) or private misfortunes (ii. 102); to discover what person is to be entrusted with the cult of a god (i. 153, 177); what offerings must be made to the god (i. 178); whether the Emperor should make sacrifices in person or send a representative (i. 189, 190); why the Emperor's soup almost froze into ice one day (this was due to a case of incest in the court, i. 324); what place should be selected for building a tomb (i. 355) or a palace (ii. 95); what was signified by a mysterious ómen (ii. 59, 306). Finally, in addition to these cases officially reported in the ancient chronicles, we find divination constantly invoked in the life of individuals in more humble circumstances—from the maiden seeking to know when she will have a husband and what will be his name, to the person who is anxious to recover a lost possession or to find the track of a thief. In the poems of the *Manyôshiu*, which give us a very true and vivid picture of ancient Japanese civilization, divination is employed fairly often in the relations between lovers and married people (see these poems in Satow, 'Ancient Japanese Rituals,' *TASJ*, vol. vii. pt. 4, p. 446 ff., and in F. V. Dickins, *Primitive and Mediæval Japanese Texts*, Oxf. 1906, Romanized texts, pp. 125, 142 f., and Translations, pp. 204, 227 f.).

Divination was a regular process in certain essential points of Shintō worship: it was by divination that the priestess of the Sun was chosen at Ise (see esp. *Nihongi*, i. 176); that, more generally, the ceremonial purity of all those taking any part in religious rites was ascertained; that it was determined, at the great festival of the first-fruits (*Ohonihe*) held at the accession of the Emperors, from which provinces the sacred rice should be brought, what local persons should prepare it, etc. At court, a special divination took place annually, on the 10th of the 12th month, to find out what misfortunes were to be feared for the Emperor in the coming months, and to provide propitiatory measures accordingly.

3. General character.—Aston says (*Shinto*, 338) that, though the art may very probably have 'passed through a non-religious phase,' yet 'the cases met with in the oldest records are commonly associated, explicitly or implicitly, with an appeal for divine guidance'; and he quotes Hirata's definition of divination as 'respectfully inquiring the heart (*ura*) of the gods.' This view seems to exaggerate to a certain extent the religious side of divination at the expense of its magical aspect. In fact, in the most ancient documents, divination appears to be, above all, a mechanical process, the virtue of which resides in the ritual performances rather than in the will of the gods. A clear proof of this lies in the fact that the gods were no wiser than men in obscure affairs, and had themselves to resort to divination for light. As is shown by their name *Kami*, they are 'superior' beings; but their superiority is relative, and they are distinguished from men by a difference, not of nature, but only of degree. Therefore, they are not endowed, in the intellectual order, with the omniscience attributed by more advanced religions to their Deity. They are constantly in perplexity, and require the wisdom of a general assembly to guide them (see *Kojiki*, 63, 112, etc.).

The Counsellor-deity, Omohi-kane, who gives advice on these occasions, does not seem to be quite infallible: when the gods are deliberating on means of 'pacifying' the country which the future Emperor is to rule, Omohi-kane proposes that an ambassador—whom he himself selects—should be sent; the ambassador does not return; Omohi-kane chooses a second, who behaves in the same way as the first; he then finds a third, who is slain; and only after these three unsuccessful attempts does he finally succeed (*Kojiki*, 112 ff.). The gods in their celestial abode do not know what is happening on the earth: when they learn of the death of the third ambassador—the Pheasant—they do so only by means of the arrow that killed him flying to the plains of high heaven and falling bloody at their feet (*Kojiki*, 115). The gods, indeed, have no knowledge of the present, past, and future. Their first ambassador, Ame no ho-hi, made friends with Oho-kuni-nushi, whose submission he was sent to obtain; they do not know this fact. After three years, being uneasy at having received no news, they send Ame-waka-hiko, who straightway marries Shita-teru-hime, the daughter of Oho-kuni-nushi, and then devotes his whole energies to making the conquest for himself; they know nothing of this treason. It is not until eight years afterwards that they decide to send the Pheasant to try to get some news, and they have no more fore-knowledge of the accident of which he is to be the victim than they had of the former events (*Kojiki*, 113 f.). If their knowledge of material facts is thus limited, *a fortiori* they cannot guess what is taking place within hearts: when they curse the murderer of the Pheasant, their formula is conditional, because they do not know what his real intentions may have been (*Kojiki*, 115). It is for this reason—because they cannot penetrate what is hidden—that they have recourse to divination. In the case of the first children of Izanagi and Izanami, mentioned above, we are told that these two deities 'ascended to Heaven and inquired of their Augustnesses the Heavenly Deities,' and that then 'the Heavenly Deities found out by the great divination' an answer to their inquiry (*Kojiki*, 22); similarly, in the eclipse-myth we see 'the eight hundred myriad Deities assemble in a divine assembly' and 'perform divination.'

This procedure manifestly lowers the gods to the level of men, making one and the same fate hover over all. Primitive Shintō seems to admit, without naming it, a vague impersonal Power, like the *Moira* of Homer at the time before Zeus was the *Moiragetēs*. Later, the Japanese theologians, like the Greek poets, were very much embarrassed by this ancient idea, which flattered

neither the wisdom nor the power of their gods. Was it not strange, for example, that, on being consulted by the first couple, the greatest gods should show themselves unable to reply until they in their turn had appealed to some sort of superior intelligence? Hirata, who is always ingenious, tries to solve the question by comparing them to a prince who has entrusted a particular function to each of his servants, and who, on being asked for information on any point whatever, begs the questioner to apply to the person who is best informed on the subject; but this ulterior excuse of an apologist cannot efface the impression left on us by the texts. In a word, since gods as well as men must have recourse to divination, it is very probable that, in ancient Shintō, divination was an affair of magic far more than of religion.

4. **Various forms.** — (*a*) *Official divination.* — Having made this important point clear, we shall now examine the forms of this magical operation. We must distinguish between the official procedure, *i.e.* the 'Greater Divination,' and other minor proceedings. The 'Greater Divination' consisted in *omoplatoscopy*, a process which is met with not only among the Chinese and other races of the North-East of Asia, but also among certain Western peoples, like the ancient Germans, the Greeks ancient and modern, and even, down to within a recent date, the Highlanders of Scotland (the custom of 'reading the speal'). In primitive Japan, omoplatoscopy was practised by flaying the shoulder-blade of a deer over a bright fire and watching the cracks produced upon it by the heat. This was the form of divination resorted to by the gods in the circumstances already mentioned, and we find that it was under the special care of the god Koyane, the legendary ancestor of the Nakatomi, or hereditary corporation of priests representing the Emperor in his sacerdotal functions (see esp. *Kojiki*, 64, and cf. a variant in *Nihongi*, i. 82 f., which claims to give the mythical origin of the custom by telling how the god Koyane, at the command of the great god Takami-musubi, 'was made to divine by means of the Greater Divination, and thus to do his service'). Similarly, when we find the Emperor commanding a divination, which is then carried out by the Palace college of diviners, it is the 'Greater Divination' that is meant, though the text simply speaks of 'divination' without further epithet. This practice underwent modification very early by the substitution, in the place of the deer's shoulder-blade, of the tortoise carapace employed by the Chinese. This innovation was undoubtedly facilitated by the fact that the tortoise already held an important place in native Japanese mythology (*Kojiki*, 160; *Nihongi*, i. 113, 182, etc.).

The first reference to it is found in the *Nihongi* (i. 152): the Emperor Sujin, in the year 91 B.C., wishing to discover the cause of various calamities which had laid waste the country, decided 'to commit the matter to the Sacred Tortoise'; but this detail is certainly an anachronism, as indeed is the whole context in which it appears, for we find the Emperor attributing national calamities to his personal faults, in accordance with Chinese theory. As a matter of fact, the substitution must have taken place about the year 553, when some Koreans, of high repute in the art of divination, came to exercise their talents at the Japanese court. The *Nihongi* story shows us, at least, that the tortoise carapace was the usual means of divination at the time of its composition, *i.e.* in the 8th cent., and the *Engishiki* (10th cent.) mentions no other process in the descriptions of the official cult.

It was only in certain provinces that the deer's shoulder-blade of the primitive mythology continued to be employed. Just as the tortoise carapace was always used, it is said, in the island of Hachijō, where there were no deer or other large quadrupeds, but where the waters abounded in tortoises, the deer's shoulder-blade remained in use, long after the introduction of the Chinese custom, in certain villages; this survival is mentioned in old writings even at the end of the 17th cent. (see Satow, *loc. cit.* 453). It can, moreover, be observed even to-day among the Ainu (see N. G. Munro, 'Some Origins and Survivals,' in *TASJ*, vol. xxxviii. pt. 3 [1911], p. 46).

(*b*) *Secondary forms.*—Of secondary and non-official forms of divination the principal was *tsuji-ura*, or 'cross-roads divination.' We find in the poems of the *Manyôshiu* that it was employed chiefly by women and lovers. The persons having recourse to this form of divination went to the cross-roads at dusk (whence the other frequent name of *yufu-ura*, 'evening divination'), planted a stick in the ground, and then took the remarks of the passers-by as an answer to what they wanted to know. In this rite, the stick represents Funado, the staff which Izanagi drove into the sand when leaving Hades, in order to check the pursuit of the infernal deities (just as the American Indians use staffs to drive off the spirits of the dead), and which was afterwards transformed into a phallic god, a powerful preserver of life, granting protection from the diseases sent by the under-world demons, and at the same time filling the rôle of patron of travellers (see Revon, *Le Shinntoïsme*, 321). Still another method of *tsuji-ura* was practised by women. They went to the nearest cross-roads, and there repeated the following poetry three times:

Funadosahe	'Of Funadosahe,
Yufuke no kami ni	The god of the evening oracle,
Mono toheba,	When we ask things,
Michi yuku hito no	Ye who go along the way,
Ura masa ni se yo!	Deliver the oracle truly!'

[The first line is explained by the fact that the road-gods, and especially Funado, were regarded as *Sahe no kami*, 'preventive gods,' against disease and demons.]

While repeating these lines, the women drew a line of demarcation on the road and sprinkled rice; for rice, with the mysterious spirit it contains (*uga no mi-tama*), was a powerful agent against evil spirits, as is also seen in the custom of sprinkling it in the hut of a pregnant woman (see *Le Shinntoïsme*, 134, 303). After this was done, each of the women, turning towards one of the roads, passed a finger along the teeth of a box-wood comb that she held in her hand, and made it sound three times; this was a means of inviting the god to speak, the word *tsuge* meaning both 'box-wood' and 'inform me.' After this, they listened for the words of the first person who came within the space marked off by the enchanted limits, and drew an answer therefrom. The *tsuji-ura*, in these more or less complete forms, seems to have enjoyed popularity for a long time: it is mentioned in the *Oh-kagami*, 'the Great Mirror,' a famous pseudo-historical work of the 12th cent. (see Satow, 448); and a passage in the dramatist Chikamatsu Monzaemon (Dickins, *op. cit.*, Tr., p. 66) shows how much importance was attached, even so recently as 200 years ago, to the chance words spoken by people met on the street.

Connected with *tsuji-ura* we have *hashi-ura*, 'bridge divination,' in which the same processes were employed, but on a bridge instead of on an ordinary road. We may notice also *ashi-ura*, 'foot divination,' practised, according to a poem of the *Manyôshiu*, by a lover before the door of his house along with 'evening divination' (Satow, 447); but our information on this 'foot divination' is not sufficiently accurate, although it comes into one of the most ancient myths, viz. the dance of the god Ho-deri (*Nihongi*, i. 107; and cf. *Le Shinntoïsme*, 210). Still another variety is mentioned along with *tsuji-ura* in the *Manyôshiu* (Dickins, Tr., p. 66)—*ishi-ura*, or 'stone divination,' which consisted in foretelling the future from the apparent weight of a stone (*ishi-gami*, 'stone-deity') when lifted up. The following is a text

which, if it is not a simple imaginary divination according to the inspiration of the moment, may well contain one of the most ancient applications of this process:

'In the beginning, when the Emperor [Keikō, A.D. 71–130, according to traditional chronology] was about to attack the enemy [the *Tsuchi-gumo*, 'earth-spiders,' *i.e.* earth-cave-dwellers], he made a station on the great moor of Kashihawo. On this moor there was a stone six feet in length, three feet in breadth, and one foot five inches in thickness. The Emperor prayed, saying: "If we are to succeed in destroying the *Tsuchi-gumo*, when we kick this stone, may we make it mount up like a *kashiha* [oak] leaf." Accordingly he kicked it, upon which, like a *kashiha* leaf, it arose to the Great Void' (*Nihongi*, i. 195).

Other secondary forms of divination presented a local character. In the temple of Kasuga, to which belongs one of the chief rituals of ancient Shintō (*norito* no. 2), and in various other provincial temples, *mi-kayu-ura*, or 'divination by gruel,' was practised. The purpose of this divination was to find out what kinds of vegetables and cereals it would be best to sow for the year. It took place on the 15th of the 1st month, the date of the festival of *Sahe no kami* (see above). A pot was placed before the gods, and in it were boiled some *adzuki* beans (*Phaseolus radiatus*)—a little red bean whose colour served to suggest the idea of health, of victory over the demons of disease (people who visit Japan may see this used even to-day to colour sacred rice—the rice, *e.g.*, offered on the domestic altar at the annual Feast of Ancestors). When this gruel was cooked, 54 tubes of reed or bamboo were plunged into it, each bearing the name of one of the vegetables it was proposed to cultivate; next, the priests withdrew the tubes with chopsticks, and derived prognostics as to the good or bad crops to be borne by each particular kind of grain from the manner in which the grains of rice, mixed with the bean-gruel, went into the tubes. The peasants then sowed their seed according to these indications. An analogous, but less important, process consisted in arranging beans round the hearth very near the fire, and drawing omens from the manner in which they turned black or remained untouched (Satow, 418; Aston, 342). *Koto-ura*, or 'harp divination,' was another local form. It was employed at Ise to make sure of the purity of the priests taking part in the three great annual ceremonies, as also of the tables, vessels, and other objects employed to present offerings. The night before the ceremony, at midnight, a priest stood with a harp at one of the outer doors of the temple. Turning towards the temple, he prayed the Sun-goddess to give light on the point requiring elucidation. Then he struck the harp three times, each time uttering a loud 'Hush,' after which he asked all the gods to come down from the heavens to answer his question, pronouncing the following three-fold poetic formula:

Ahari ya!	'Ah! ah!
Asobi ha su to mausanu;	We do not merely amuse ourselves;
Asakura ni,	On to your splendid seat,
Ama tsu kami kuni tsu kami,	Gods of heaven and gods of the country,
Orimashimase!	Descend!
Ahari ya!	Ah! ah!
Asobi ha su to mausanu;	We do not merely amuse ourselves;
Asakura ni,	On to your splendid seat,
Naru Ikadzuchi mo,	Sounding Thunderbolt also,
Orimashimase!	Descend!
Ahari ya!	Ah! ah!
Asobi ha su to mausanu;	We do not merely amuse ourselves;
Asakura ni,	On to your splendid seat,
Uha tsu ohoye shita tsu ohoye,	Upper great elder brother and lower great elder brother,
Mawiri tamahe!	Deign to come!'

[We do not know who the two 'elder brothers' invoked in the second last line were.]

After this formula, the names of all the priests were called, and at each one the officiant asked: 'Is he clean or unclean?' He then struck the harp again, and, by a process which recalls certain rites of Polynesian sorcerers, tried to whistle by drawing in his breath; only if the whistle could be heard was the priest in question considered clean. The same rite was employed to settle the same question in regard to the people who had prepared the offerings, the offerings themselves, and the material utensils. Finally, the priest sounded his harp again three times, with a solemn 'Hush!' and sent the gods back to their own abode by reciting a formula of opposite meaning from the preceding one.

This curious ceremony, in which magic plays the dominant part, is not described in detail except in one work of the 12th cent.; but an 8th cent. document makes allusion to it, and Satow is right in thinking (*op. cit.* 450) that it is a pure Japanese custom.

Last in this class of local methods of divination we may mention 'cauldron divination,' which Aston quotes (p. 343) as employed to this day in a temple in the country of Bittchu. At the request of a member of their congregation, the priests recite a ritual, light a fire beneath a cauldron, and note the sound it produces: if it is like the bellowing of a bull, the omen is good.

Such are the processes, important and secondary, general and particular, of Japanese divination. A process which may serve as the transition between these indigenous systems and the Chinese methods gradually introduced is that known as *kitsune-tsukahi*, or 'fox-possessing.' A fox is buried alive, with only its head out of the ground; food is placed before it, which it cannot reach in spite of desperate efforts; when it dies, after this tantalizing torment, its spirit is supposed to pass into the food, which is then mixed with clay and formed into an image of the animal; the possessor of this fetish is regarded as endowed with marvellous divinatory power (W. Weston, *Mountaineering in the Japanese Alps*, Lond. 1896, p. 307). This cruel rite has a strange resemblance to another magical process, viz. that of the *inu-gami* ('dog-deity'), in which a dog is treated in almost the same way, its head being finally cut off, to be used afterwards in spells along with the furious spirit inhabiting it; and, if this rite of the *inu-gami* is of Shintō origin (see *Le Shinntoïsme*, 166), the same may be the case with that of the *kitsune-tsukahi*.

We have no precise information regarding *divination by birds*, which certainly existed in ancient Japan (Satow, 449)—we do not even know whether it resembled the Chinese system of bird-divination. On the other hand, there is no doubt as to the Chinese origin of such methods as *astrology*, introduced by Koreans in A.D. 675, when, as the *Nihongi* tells us (ii. 326), 'a platform was for the first time erected from which to divine by means of the stars,' and also geomancy (*Nihongi*, ii. 76, 126), cheiromancy, physiognomics, etc.

(*c*) *Isolated cases.*—After thus treating of the regular processes of divination, it is advisable to mention the individual and accidental recourse to various means of divination invented on the spur of the moment. Occurrences of this nature are very often found in the most ancient annals. To show the process to the life, it will be of interest to quote a passage from the *Nihongi*, relating to Jimmu Tennō, the legendary founder of the Japanese Empire:

'All the places occupied by the enemy [the indigenous race who had to be conquered] were strong positions, and therefore the roads were cut off and obstructed, so that there was no room for passage. The Emperor, indignant at this, made prayer on that night in person, and then fell asleep. The Heavenly Deity appeared to him in a dream, and instructed him, saying: "Take earth from within the shrine of the Heavenly Mount Kagu [a mountain in Yamato], and of it make eighty Heavenly platters [for rice]. Also make sacred jars [for

sake], and therewith sacrifice to the gods of Heaven and Earth. Moreover, pronounce a solemn imprecation. If thou doest so, the enemy will render submission of their own accord." The Emperor received with reverence the directions given in his dream, and proceeded to carry them into execution. . . . He caused Shihi-netsu-hiko [a fisherman whom he had with him as guide] to put on ragged garments and a grass rain-coat and hat, and to disguise himself as an old man. He also caused Ukeshi the Younger [a local chief who had joined his party] to cover himself with a winnowing tray, so as to assume the appearance of an old woman, and then addressed them, saying: "Do ye two proceed to the Heavenly Mount Kagu, and secretly take earth from its summit. Having done so, return hither. By means of you I shall then divine whether or not I shall be successful in founding the Empire. Do your utmost, and be watchful." Now the enemy's army filled the road, and made all passage impossible. Then Shihi-netsu-hiko prayed, and said: "If it will be possible for our Emperor to conquer this land, let the road by which we must travel become open. But if not, let the brigands surely oppose our passage." Having thus spoken, they set forth, and went straight onwards. Now the hostile band, seeing the two men, laughed loudly, and said: "What an uncouth old man and old woman!" So with one accord they left the road, and allowed the two men to pass and proceed to the mountain, where they took the clay and returned with it. Hereupon the Emperor was greatly pleased, and with this clay he made eighty platters, eighty Heavenly small jars and sacred jars, with which he went up to the upper waters of the River Nifu and sacrificed to the gods of Heaven and of Earth. Immediately, on the Asa-hara plain by the river of Uda, it became as it were like foam on the water, the result of the curse cleaving to them. Moreover, the Emperor went on to utter a vow, saying: "I will now make *ame* ['sweetness,' a sweetmeat made of millet, malted] in the eighty platters without using water. If the *ame* is formed, then shall I assuredly without effort and without recourse to the might of arms reduce the Empire to peace." So he made *ame*, which forthwith became formed of itself. Again he made a vow, saying: "I will now take the sacred jars and sink them in the River Nifu. If the fishes, whether great or small, become every one drunken and are carried down the stream, like as it were to floating *maki* [*Podocarpus*] leaves, then shall I assuredly succeed in establishing this land. But if this be not so, there will never be any result." Thereupon he sank the jars in the river. Their mouths turned downward, and after a while the fish all came to the surface, gaping and gasping as they floated down the stream. Then Shihi-netsu-hiko, seeing this, represented it to the Emperor, who was greatly rejoiced, and, plucking up a five-hundred-branched *masakaki* [*Cleyera*] tree of the upper waters of the River Nifu, he did worship therewith to all the gods. It was with this that the custom began of setting sacred jars [in the courtyard]' (*Nihongi*, i. 119–121).

In this one passage, and with a single point to elucidate, we have no fewer than four different processes of divination. The case of the famous Empress Jingō, the conqueror of Korea, is similar:

'Proceeding northwards, she arrived at the district of Matsura in the land of Hizen, and partook of food on the bank of the River Wogawa, in the village of Tamashima. Here the Empress bent a needle and made of it a hook. She took grains of rice and used them as bait. Pulling out the threads of her garment, she made of them a line. Then, mounting upon a stone in the middle of the river, and casting the hook, she prayed, saying: "We are proceeding westward, where we desire to gain possession of the Land of Treasure. If we are to succeed, let the fish of the river bite the hook." Accordingly, raising up her fishing-rod, she caught a trout.' And further on: 'The Empress returned to the Bay of Kashihi, and, loosing her hair, looked over the sea, saying: "I, having received the instructions of the Gods of Heaven and Earth, and trusting in the spirits of the imperial ancestors, floating across the deep blue sea, intend in person to chastise the West. Therefore do I now lave my head in the water of the sea. If I am to be successful, let my hair part spontaneously in two." Accordingly she entered the sea and bathed, and her hair parted of its own accord. The Empress bound it up parted into bunches [*i.e.* in manly fashion]' (*Nihongi*, i. 227, 228; cf. also 229, 237, 281).

(*d*) *Divination by lots.*—In addition to these unimportant but picturesque secondary means of divination, it remains to notice a method of very general character, but whose lack of originality renders it somewhat less interesting; this is divination by lots. We find it already mentioned in the *Nihongi* (ii. 257), which, in telling of a conspiracy formed in A.D. 658, says that the various conspiring princes 'divined the future of their treasonous conspiracy by drawing slips of paper.' Recourse was also had to sticks on which numbers were inscribed. Sometimes this method was preceded by prayers to the gods (Aston, 343); sometimes it constituted a purely magical process, as in the case of the above-mentioned conspiracy; and sometimes it was nothing more than a handy secular means of deciding something by chance, such as is constantly used by people to-day as far removed from religion as from magic; in Tōkyō, *e.g.*, at jinrikisha stands, the *kurumaya* often have at hand a bundle of cords of different lengths all tied in a knot, and use it to decide, when a passenger appears, which of them is to have the privilege of conducting him. But this form of divination, vulgar as it is, assumes a quite outstanding importance when we consider that the drawing of lots plays a dominant part in the divination founded upon the complicated Chinese diagrams of the *Yih-king*, the 'Book of Changes' (*Eki* in Japanese). This obscure book, indeed, just because of its divinatory character, was one of the first Chinese works to be introduced into Japan (in A.D. 553, according to the *Nihongi*, ii. 68; cf. 72, 306), and it became the basis of the system of divination in use at present. Takashima Kaemon, who was the most celebrated diviner in modern Japan, took this work as the foundation for his art; when he was only a student, he was put in prison for some youthful misdemeanour, and, having nothing but this ancient classic beside him, he discovered the secret of the meditations which brought success to his brilliant career. The present writer frequently had occasion to meet this diviner, to hear from his own mouth an account of his most ingenious consultations, and even to receive his lessons, and he can say that, if the principles of the system are doubtful, its individual results are often wonderful: the value of divination is in proportion to the skill of the diviner, and the lucky financier of Kanagawa, the able promoter of so many new schemes, was always a prudent man who could see far ahead. As Chamberlain says (*Things Japanese*, Lond. 1898, p. 112), Takashima, after studying the *Yih-king*, 'realized a fortune by obedience to its precepts'; but there are many Japanese, even in the highest grades of society, who also profited by his wide experience of men and things; one has only to read the *Takashima Ekidan* of Shigetake Sugiura (Tōkyō, 1893) to get a good estimate, from numerous examples, of the penetration of his mind and the wisdom of his counsel. The Japanese, moreover, even the educated classes, still hold divination in high esteem, although it is not officially recognized by modern Shintō, and have recourse to it frequently in all sorts of circumstances, from a wedding to a removal to another quarter of the town. At the University of Tōkyō, 15 or 20 years ago, the present writer had as colleague an old professor of the ancient school, who still adhered religiously to the tuft of hair of the feudal period; the last survivor of a perished race of *savants*, he was greatly esteemed by his colleagues as the only man capable of expounding the *Yih-king*. Among the people divination is correspondingly widespread; every quarter has its modest diviner working with his divining-rods and consulting his diagrams, and telling more or less skilfully how lost possessions may be found. The writer could give personal experiences in this connexion, but prefers to quote a little anecdote of Chamberlain's (*loc. cit.*), which shows both the popularity and the weak points of divination:

'A favourite dog of the present writer's was lost in November 1892, and all search, advertisement, and application to the police proved unavailing. Meanwhile, the servants and their friends privately had recourse to no less than three diviners, two of whom were priests. One of these foretold the dog's return in April, and another directed that an ancient ode containing the words, "If I hear that thou awaitest me, I will forthwith return," should be written on slips of paper and pasted upside down on the pillars of the house. It was the sight of these slips that drew our attention to the matter. The best of it is that the dog was found, and that, too, in a month of April, namely April 1896, after having been missing for three years and five months!'

5. Ordeals.—After thus analyzing the various

forms of Japanese divination, ancient and modern, we have still a special process of its application to investigate, viz. ordeals. This judicial divination is represented in ancient mythology by a well-known story giving a case of ordeal by fire.

The Heavenly prince Ninigi, having been sent by the other gods to earth to govern Japan, married Ko-no-hana-saku-ya-hime (the Princess-Blossoming-brilliantly-like-the-flowers-of-the-Trees); but she became pregnant after a single night, and the young husband was astonished; she then shut herself up in an underground hall (a *muro*, which here does duty for the *ubu-ya*, or lying-in hut, where the Japanese women used to retire for delivery), and set fire to the hall with her own hands, when on the point of delivery, in order to prove her innocence by the fire-test. 'If the child,' she said, 'with which I am pregnant be the child of an Earthly deity [*i.e.* of a god of the country], my delivery will not be fortunate. If it be the august child of the Heavenly deity [*i.e.* thy child and the descendant of the sun-goddess], it will be fortunate.' And the princess came out of the test victorious, after having brought into the world in the furnace three gods, one of whom was to be the ancestor of the first Emperor (*Kojiki*, 143 f.; cf. corresponding versions in *Nihongi*, i. 73, 85, 88).

This myth would seem to point to the existence of the fire-ordeal in the customs of the pre-historic period. In the historic period, however, it was essentially the boiling-water test that constituted judicial divination. First of all the *Nihongi* gives us an example which it assigns to A.D. 277:

A certain man, Takechi no Sukune, was slandered before the Emperor by his younger brother, Umashi-ushi no Sukune, and accused of wishing to overthrow the Emperor and seize his power. Takechi, who was at the time on a tour of inspection in the provinces, hastened to the capital to prove his innocence. 'The Emperor forthwith questioned Takechi no Sukune along with Umashi-ushi no Sukune, upon which these two men were each obstinate, and wrangled with one another, so that it was impossible to ascertain the right and the wrong. The Emperor then gave orders to ask of the Gods of Heaven and Earth the ordeal by boiling water. Hereupon Takechi no Sukune and Umashi-ushi no Sukune went out together to the bank of the Shiki river, and underwent the ordeal of boiling water. Takechi no Sukune was victorious. Taking his cross-sword, he threw down Umashi-ushi no Sukune, and was at length about to slay him, when the Emperor ordered him to let him go' (*Nihongi*, i. 257 f.).

A more important case was occasioned, in the beginning of the 5th cent., by the pretensions of high families who were attempting to increase their prestige by false genealogies. In the year 415, two Imperial decrees of Ingyō censured those powerful families who 'purposely lay claim to high family,' those bold functionaries who 'describe themselves, some as descendants of Emperors, others attributing to their race a miraculous origin, and saying that their ancestors came down from Heaven'; and the abuse reached such a pitch that the Emperor finally had recourse to the ordeal to remedy it.

'"Single Houses," he said, "have multiplied and have formed anew ten thousand surnames of doubtful authenticity. Therefore let the people of the various Houses and surnames wash themselves and practise abstinence, and let them, each one calling the gods to witness, plunge their hands in boiling water." The cauldrons of the ordeal by boiling water were therefore placed on the "Evil Door of Words" spur of the Amagashi Hill. Everybody was told to go thither, saying: "He who tells the truth will be uninjured; he who is false will assuredly suffer harm." Hereupon every one put on straps of tree-fibre, and, coming to the cauldrons, plunged their hands in the boiling water, when those who were true remained naturally uninjured, and all those who were false were harmed. Therefore those who had falsified their titles were afraid, and, slipping away beforehand, did not come forward. From this time forward the Houses and surnames were spontaneously ordered, and there was no longer any one who falsified them' (*Nihongi*, i. 316–317, and cf. *Kojiki*, 367 f.).

A gloss on this passage of the *Nihongi*, probably as ancient as the text itself, tells us that this ordeal, known to-day under the name of *yusaguri*, was then called *kugaduchi*, and adds valuable evidence of other varieties of usage at this period:

'Sometimes mud was put into a cauldron and made to boil up; then the arms were bared, and the boiling mud stirred with them. Sometimes an axe was heated red-hot and placed on the palm of the hand.'

The great prevalence of the custom is clearly shown by a complaint made to the Emperor, in the year 530, by an ambassador of Imna, a small kingdom in Korea, against a whimsical judge, who, in order to simplify his task, abused the ordeal:

'Kena no Omi is fond of setting the cauldrons for the ordeal by boiling water, and saying: "Those who are in the right will not be scalded: those who are false will certainly be scalded." Owing to this, many persons have been scalded to death by plunging into the hot water!' (*Nihongi*, ii. 22).

Still other forms of ordeal are noticed by a Chinese traveller, who visited Japan in the year 600, and, in describing both the means of torture employed to force the confession of criminals and the tests for the purpose of distinguishing the guilty from the innocent, gives the following exposition:

'In the trial of cases where a great wrong has been suffered, those who will not confess have their knees squeezed with a piece of wood, or have their necks sawn with the tight string of a very powerful bow. Or small stones are placed in boiling water, and the disputants are ordered to take them out. It is supposed that he who is in the wrong gets his hand scalded. Or, again, a snake is put in a jar, and they are made to take it out; it being supposed that he who is in the wrong will get his hands bitten' ('Ma-Twan-Lin's Account of Japan,' by E. H. Parker, in *TASJ*, vol. xxii. pt. 2, p. 42 f.).

This serpent-ordeal, which is also found among other peoples, *e.g.* the blacks of Africa, was certainly in existence in Japan in the primitive period. We are led to this conclusion by the tests to which Susa-no-wo subjects his future son-in-law, Oho-kuni-nushi, who is made to sleep in the hut of serpents, and then in the hut of centipedes and wasps; he would never have escaped if he had not had the help of the magic scarfs of princess Suseri; and Susa-no-wo ended by showing him high esteem, because, seeing him spit red earth mixed with *muku*-berries (*Aphananthe aspera*), he thought he was eating the centipedes themselves (*Kojiki*, 86 f.). Later on, and down to the present period, the tests of plunging the hands in boiling water and walking bare-footed over a bed of burning coals, with, however, special precautions, were employed as a means of rousing the piety of believers; but this is no longer ordeal. On the other hand, even in the 17th cent., Kaempfer observed a curious ordeal for forcing confession of a crime, which consisted in making the accused swallow, in a little water, a small piece of paper with drawings of ravens or other black birds upon it (Kaempfer, *Hist. du Japon*, Fr. ed., Paris, 1732, bk. iii. ch. 5, p. 51). Perhaps we may see here a faint recollection of the god of scare-crows, who appears in primitive mythology and was thought to know everything under the sun (see *Le Shinntoïsme*, 156).

6. Omens and dreams.—All that now remains to be treated is omens and dreams. These come under divination, even though in them we are not dealing, in principle, with processes involving the active initiative of man, but only with spontaneous facts, outside of man, for which he seeks an interpretation after they have occurred. Omens are often mentioned in mythology and ancient annals. Without speaking of omens that are looked for by those interested, and therefore belong to the class of divinations devised on the spot (*e.g.*, in *Kojiki*, 292, while two chiefs, on the eve of an expedition, 'hunted for an omen,' and one of them had climbed an oak, a furious wild boar uprooted the tree and devoured the man), we could give numerous examples of omens properly so called, *i.e.* independent of the human will. As a general rule, white or red animals, which were striking in virtue of their rarity and, further, harmonized with the favourite colours of a solar religion like Shintō, were regarded as of good omen (see, for white animals, *Nihongi*, i. 292, ii. 124, 174, 236, 237, 239, 252, 286, 322, 326, 352, 394, 410, 416; and, for red animals, *Nihongi*, ii. 337, 347, 351, 352, 357, 407, 409). But the Japanese also regarded as good omens, perhaps just when it suited them to interpret them as such, any parti-

cular occurrence whatever (*e.g.* an owl or a wren going into a lying-in hut [*Nihongi*, i. 277]). Earthquakes, storms, and floods were considered ill omens, foretelling war: they were the scourges calling on each other. Similarly, other extraordinary phenomena, such as the appearance of a comet (*Nihongi*, ii. 166, 167, 169, 333, 353, 364, 367), or a prolonged eclipse of the sun's light (*ib.* i. 238); strange incidents like a migration of rats from the capital (*ib.* ii. 226, 245), or the mysterious movements of a swarm of flies (*ib.* ii. 270); bad meetings, as with a blind man or a cripple, when starting on a journey (*Kojiki*, 238); disturbing incidents like a dog coming into a temple and laying down a dead hand (*Nihongi*, ii. 263); or, finally, unaccountable accidents like a leg-rest breaking with no apparent cause (*ib.* ii. 256), were all evil omens. It would be useless to attempt to study in detail all these and analogous cases, which are very numerous (see *Nihongi*, i. 227, 228, 320, ii. 59, 237, 239, 259, 266, 269, 276, 277, 293, 331, 359, etc.). Let us simply point out that this belief in omens is current to this day among the Japanese. Thus, at certain grave crises in her contemporary history, Japan has been seen more than once to turn anxiously towards the temple of the Sun-goddess, seeking for light on the future. At a critical point in the Revolution of 1867, the white horse of the temple of Ise escaped, and only returned after three days: from this it was concluded that the Imperial party would soon have the victory. During the Chino-Japanese war, the sacred horse disappeared for ten days: this foreign war, therefore, was to last three times as long as the previous civil war (rumour registered in the *Japan Mail* of 17th Sept. 1894, p. 2).

In the same way, dreams were always regarded as affording foresight, by a more or less skilful interpretation, of future events, or indications as to the future behaviour of the person interested. Take, *e.g.*, one of the oldest documents of Shintō, the *Tatsuta no Kaze no Kami no Matsuri* (ritual no. 4), which gives its proper legendary origin. For several years, some unknown gods had spoiled all the harvests, and the diviners had not been able to discover the culprits. Then the sovereign himself 'deigned to conjure them,' and they revealed themselves to him in a dream. They were 'Heaven's-august-Pillar's augustness and Country-august-Pillar's augustness,' the Wind-gods who support the firmament. They required certain offerings from him—the foundation of a temple at Tatsuta, and a liturgy—in return for which they promised 'to bless and ripen the things produced by the great august people of the region under Heaven, firstly the five sorts of grain, down to the last leaf of the herbs' (*TASJ*, vol. vii. pt. 4, p. 442 f.). We shall now take one of the most dramatic stories of the ancient chronicles:

The Emperor Suinin is betrayed by his wife, who, at the instigation of her accomplice, the prince of Saho, attempts to assassinate him during his sleep. 'So the Heavenly Sovereign, not knowing of this conspiracy, was augustly sleeping, with the Empress' august knees as his pillow. Then the Empress tried to cut his august throat with a stiletto; but, though she lifted it thrice, she could not cut the throat for an irrepressible feeling of sadness, and she wept tears, which fell overflowing on to the Heavenly Sovereign's august face. Straightway the Heavenly Sovereign started up, and asked the Empress, saying: "I have had a strange dream: a violent shower came from the direction of Saho and suddenly wetted my face; again, a small damask-coloured snake coiled itself round my neck. Of what may such a dream be the omen?"' And the Empress, seeing that it would be useless to deny the truth, confessed her treason of which the Emperor had been warned by this dream (*Kojiki*, 231 f.; cf. *Nihongi*, i. 171).

It would be easy to multiply examples of this kind, in which the ancient documents abound (see *Kojiki*, 165, 215, 237, 295; *Nihongi*, i. 115, 153, 155, 161, 165, 281, ii. 36). These divinations given by dreams were considered so natural that they were even attributed to animals, as the following story will show:

'There is a popular story that a long time ago there was a man who went to Toga, and spent the night on the moor. Now there were two deer which lay down beside him. When it was on the point of cock-crow, the male deer addressed the female, saying: "This night I had a dream, in which I saw a white mist come down copiously and cover my body. What may this portend?" The female deer answered and said: "If thou goest out, thou wilt certainly be shot by men and die, and so thy body will be smeared with white salt to correspond with the whiteness of the mist." Now the man who was spending the night there wondered at this in his heart. Before it was yet dawn, there came a hunter, who shot the male deer, and killed it. Hence the proverbial saying of the men of that day: "Even the belling male deer follows the interpretation of a dream"' (*Nihongi*, i. 290).

There is still one more form of divination, which plays an important part in ancient Shintō, namely, Inspiration (*q.v.*).

LITERATURE.—Sir Ernest Satow, in *TASJ*, vol. vii. [1889] pt. 4, pp. 445–452; W. G. Aston, *Shinto*, London, 1905, pp. 337–348; M. Revon, *Le Shinntoïsme*, Paris, 1905, Index, *s.v.* 'Divination.' For the texts: B. H. Chamberlain, *Kojiki*², Tōkyō, 1906; Aston, *Nihongi*, London, 1896; Revon, *Anthologie de la littérature japonaise*, Paris, 1910.
MICHEL REVON.

DIVINATION (Jewish).—**I. Introductory.**—In the present article the writer follows the same system as in art. CHARMS AND AMULETS (Jewish), in not attempting to fix chronological dates for the various forms of divination mentioned in ancient and mediæval writings. Without discussing here the wider meaning of magic in general, there is no doubt that magic is much older than any literary record, and that it has survived through ages, with comparatively few variations and modifications. The study of folk-lore has revealed the fact that to a surprising degree exact parallels with some of the most ancient forms of divination have been preserved to this very day, and a careful examination of the latest survivals throws light upon ancient practices which have hitherto remained in many cases obscure. It follows naturally that allusions in the Bible are only the oldest literary references to practices of magic and divination. The words denoting magical practices belong, no doubt, to the pre-Biblical period, when their original meaning may have already undergone some sort of change, although this is not very likely, as nothing is preserved with greater tenacity than magical terms and formulæ. It is thus futile to attempt, on the basis of Hebrew etymology, to fix in every case the precise meaning of these technical terms. It must also be pointed out that, though the practices in question are here classed as 'Jewish,' this by no means implies that they are of Jewish origin, but only that the knowledge of them has come to us through the medium of the Bible, and that they were doubtless employed by the Jews—in direct contradiction to the spirit and teaching of Judaism—especially during the older period of Jewish history.

Nothing could be more emphatic than Dt 29[29] ('The secret things belong unto the Lord our God: but the things that are revealed belong unto us and to our children for ever, that we may do all the words of this law'), but scarcely less emphatic is the condemnation of the heathen practices of divination found throughout the Bible. As late as the 2nd cent. B.C. we find Ben Sira protesting against this dabbling in mysteries (Sir 3[21f.]; cf. Bab. *Ḥag.* 13*a*, and *JQR* iii. [1891] 690–8). It is a noteworthy fact that Genesis and the books grouped under the name of the 'Former Prophets' (esp. Judges, Samuel, and partly Kings) are replete with practices of divination scarcely veiled; they represent a primitive state of mind and cult in which the heathen and the Jewish elements are strangely blended; one can follow up, as it were, the transition from one to the other, but the people do not yet clearly distinguish between them. The seer

and the prophet rank no higher at the beginning than the diviner and the soothsayer, and, from the information we are able to cull from the pages of the Bible, both seem to act in the same manner, one appealing to Baal, Dagon, and other gods, the other—the prophet and the seer—appealing to the God of Israel, whilst performing almost identical ceremonies and using similar practices. Samuel, Saul, Jonathan, David, Elijah, Elisha, and others are found using divination of various forms and degrees, and by a right interpretation of their practices much is explained. No real condemnation of these practices is found in the historical books, such as appears in the other four books of the Law, and in the fiery denunciations of the 'Later Prophets.' The prophets are always conscious of the heathen origin of these practices, and in the Apocryphal literature they are traced back to the fallen angel Shemhazai (see the legend in Eth. En. 8[3] [Charles]; and cf. Gaster, *Chron. of Jeraḥmeel*, 1899, p. 52, ch. xxv.). But no denunciation, however strong and severe, could prevail against the desire of peering into the future and of obtaining information from whatever source or by whatever means man might learn that which is hidden from him.

2. Biblical and post-Biblical references to divination.—The chief passages in the Pentateuch in which the practices of divination are mentioned are Dt 18[10f.], Lv 19[26. 31] and 20[6. 27].

(1) It will serve our purpose best to start with the *m^enaḥesh* (RV 'enchanter'), from the root *nāḥash*, which is of frequent occurrence in the Bible and in post-Biblical literature. The word is used by Laban (Gn 30[27]); it occurs twice (Nu 23[23] 24[1]) in the history of Balaam; and in 1 K 20[33] the Aramæan servants of Benhadad watch for a good omen (RV 'observed diligently'). The history of Gideon and that of Jonathan furnish us with two more examples of this mode of divination from the 'first word' spoken by the enemy (Jg 7[11. 13], 1 S 14[7ff.]), and also that of Eliezer at the well (Gn 24[14]), which they took as telling them of their future success. We shall meet with a similar kind of divination later on. In the following passages the word *m^enaḥēsh* can also mean only prognosticator from omens, and not 'enchanter' as RV: Lv 19[26], Dt 18[10], and 2 K 21[6] (2 Ch 33[6]). It is evidently of Western Aram. origin. It cannot be connected with *nāḥāsh*, 'serpent' or 'snake.' In the opinion of the present writer, there is no trace of serpent-worship among the Jews, or any of the nations with whom they came in contact. The transformation of Moses' rod into a serpent belongs to the category of magic and not to divination or worship; the brazen serpent in the wilderness was merely symbolical and a kind of protective charm, not an object of worship.

(*a*) A specific form of divination—by means of the *cup*—is found in the history of Joseph (Gn 44[5. 15]). To judge from later parallels, the practice must have consisted in filling a cup with water or wine, and gazing intently on the surface, till the beholder saw all kinds of images. The method of divining by cups has not been entirely lost. Allusions to it are made indirectly in the Talmud, where the princes (demons) of cups (*sarê ha-kos*) and egg-cups (*sarê beṣin*) are mentioned. This system of divination is alluded to in manuscripts in the writer's possession (Cod. 443, etc.), where, in addition to these two, the princes (demons) of the cup-like palm of the hand (*sarê ha-kaf*) and the princes of the thumb-nails (*sarê ha-bohen*) are mentioned. The method of divining from the palm of the hand is also described in an anonymous compilation (*Mifaloth Elohim*, Lemberg, 1865, no. 69), where it is used for finding the thief and the stolen article. All the formulæ given for the above-mentioned modes of divination from egg-cups, etc., are identical in all essentials with the latter.

Traces of divination by the cup and by finger-nails have been preserved, though no longer understood, in the ceremonies connected with the cup of wine and the lighted candle used at the outgoing of the Sabbath at the service called *Habdalah*, or the division between Sabbath and the weekday, the beginning of the week being considered as a very propitious time. When the blessing is said over the wine-cup filled to overflowing, the man performing the ceremony at a certain moment shades the cup and looks into the wine; and, when the blessing over the light is said, it is customary to let the light of the candle fall on the finger-nails and to look at them intently. There is no doubt these are remnants of divination. Other explanations have been suggested which are wide of the mark. Closely allied with this is the following practice: *To find out whether a man will survive the year.*—Take silent water from a well on the eve of Hosha'anah Rabba, fill a clear glass vessel with it, put it in the middle of a room, then look into it; if he sees therein a face with the mouth open, he will live, but, if the mouth is closed, he will die. This must be done in the hour of the domination of the moon. Some do it on the Day of Atonement, with a vessel filled with lighting oil instead of water (*Mifaloth*, 119).

Cup-like bowls with magical inscriptions found in Babylon and elsewhere seem to have been also used for divination, and not for purely therapeutic magic, as hitherto believed. The conjurer or person who wanted to divine, or to detect a crime, or anything of the past, present, or future, looked, no doubt, into the bowl filled with water or oil and divined from it, or the suspected person drank the contents, and according to the result was found innocent or guilty. There was a similar operation in the case of the woman suspected of adultery (Nu 5[12ff.]): a cup (earthen vessel) filled with water was employed; the mysterious power by which the guilt of the woman was to be detected was also a written inscription (though blotted out in the water of bitterness), without the addition of any of the names of demons or heathen gods, as in the Babylonian bowls; and the drinking of the water showed by its consequences her guilt or her innocence. It was an ordeal (*q.v.*) through the 'divining cup.'

Instead of peering into bowls filled with shining liquid, we find it recorded in Talmudic and later times that it was customary to gaze into brass or glass mirrors for the same purpose; and a distinct formula exists for crystal-gazing, or, as it is phrased, 'seeing the princes (demons) of the crystal (*sarê hab^edōlāḥ*).' This is distinctly different from throwing metal pieces into cups and watching the movements of the water, or divination by means of molten wax or lead poured into a cup filled with water by the conjurer who attends on the patient, in order to find out, from the shape which the wax or the lead assumes, the real cause of the illness—a universal practice among the nations of the Near East, Jews and non-Jews alike. The oldest example of this is found in the Alexander legend of pseudo-Callisthenes.

(*b*) Under the general term *niḥûsh* (from the same root *nāḥash*) fall also the various forms of divination by observation of signs not produced by any direct act of the diviner; Jewish tradition is unanimous on this interpretation of the term.

(α) *Augury* in a somewhat limited form is the first to be considered. There is no passage in the Bible which refers directly to the flight of birds, or to their peculiar movements on certain occasions; the passage in Ec 10[20] ('A bird of the air shall carry the voice') is metaphorical. In Talmudic times the science of *haruspicy* appears to have reached the Jews from the Arabs or some other people who coined the technical expression *ṭayyar* (cf. the Arab. root *ṭair* = 'bird,' and *mantiq al-ṭair*). It is especially the raven that is mentioned as a bird of omen. The reference to ravens in the history of Elijah (1 K 17[6]) is not explicit enough to allow us to draw any definite conclusions, but, on the other hand, Noah's sending the raven out

of the ark on a kind of errand of divination (Gn 8^{7}) no doubt lent colour to the belief so widely spread in the significance of the mysterious movements of the raven. In Bab. *Giṭṭin* 45*a* and the *Pesiḳta* 156*b*, Midr. Rabb. on Numb. sec. 19, 237*b*, and Midr. on Ec 10^{20}, divination from the flight of birds is described as the wisdom of Eastern sages. The raven by his croak warns Ilish of the danger which awaits him; one who understands the language of birds explains it to him; he takes the warning to heart, and escapes. The references in Talmudic literature are, however, not numerous enough to give us full insight into divination from birds. In the *Zohar* and in the *Tiḳḳunim* reference is often made to the twittering of birds as foretelling future events such as the death of man, etc. In Cod. Gaster 335 numerous mediæval texts have been collected, dealing with divination from the twittering of birds, and especially from the croaking of the raven. They belong mostly to the pseudepigraphical writings, and the Hebrew texts may be translations from the Arabic, though the original source may lie far back in ancient times. In Hebrew legends King Solomon was credited with the knowledge of the language of birds. He overheard a conversation between a swallow and its female, in which it boasted of being able to destroy the Temple with a kick of its foot, and, questioned by Solomon, said: 'Should I not boast before my wife?' (*Parables of Solomon*, ed. Constantinople, 1516). In another legend he is rebuked and humbled by an ant (*Maase Hanemalah*). A Hebrew tale older than the 12th cent. tells of a boy who was taught the language of birds, and was thereby able to solve some riddles and to foretell future events (Gaster, 'Fairy Tales from inedited Hebrew MSS,' no. iv. 'Story of the Young Man and the Ravens,' in *FL* vii. [1896] 242 ff.).

The dove is also mentioned occasionally as a bird of good omen; it is identified with the nation. Through the peculiar movement of a dove Abishai learns of the danger of David, who has fallen into the hand of the giants of Nob, not to speak of the dove sent by Noah after the raven on a similar errand, or of the dove as a symbol of the Holy Ghost in the baptism of Jesus (Gaster, *ZDMG* lxii. [1908] 232 ff. and 528 ff.).

(β) Ezk $21^{21\,(26)}$ 'he looked in the liver' refers to a kind of divination (*hepatoscopy*) not otherwise known among the Jews. This is not the place to discuss what this looking into the liver may mean, and whether the future was prognosticated from a special conformation of the liver or from the convulsions or spasmodic movements of the liver of the dying animal. This latter seems to be nearer the truth, for a peculiar kind of divination is still in existence which depends upon the twitching or convulsion of the separate portions of the human body. No doubt it is a direct outcome of the practice of looking into the liver or lungs of sacrificial victims for the purpose of divination, or a parallel to it. The convulsions or twitchings of the living took the place of those of the dying victim of old. A compilation similar to that which the Greeks ascribed to Melampus appears in Hebrew literature under the title *Sepher Refafoth*. It is found already in a manuscript of the 12th century (Br. Mus. Or. 2853, fol. 62*a*); Judah Hasid, Eleazar of Worms, and others mention it, and Elijah de Vidas prints it from old MSS (*Midr. Talpijot*, Lemberg, 1875, fol. 8*a*–*b*; see also Chwolson, *Ssabier*, St. Petersburg, 1856, ii. 266–272).

(γ) Ancient tradition also identifies *nāḥash* with *omens*. In the *Sifra* to Lv 19^{26} and in the *Sifrê* to Dt $18^{10\text{ff.}}$ it is stated that *nāḥash* means to see omens in such incidents as bread falling from one's mouth, or a staff from one's hand, or a snake crawling on the right side, or a fox on the left hand, or a fox's tail trailing across the road, or a raven croaking when a man starts on a journey. All these forebode evil to his enterprise; furthermore, those who listen to the twittering of birds or the squealing of a weasel, and those who deduce from a given star being in the ascendant that the time is propitious for an undertaking, practise divination. Star-gazing was also thus included under the term *nāḥash*, and these practices were called *darkê ha-Emorei* (the practices of the Amorites or heathen), and are condemned as idolatrous.

On account of their importance, we give here full references to all the passages on the ways of the Amorites in Rabbinical literature. These are: *Sifra*, ed. Weiss, p. 90; *Sifrê*, ed. Friedman, ch. 171 f.; Bab. *Ḥullin* 77; *Shabb.* 67*b*; Tosefta *Shabb.* vi., ed. Zuckermandel, pp. 117–119; *Sanh.* 65*a*–68; Jer. *Shabb.* vii. 2; *Yalḳuṭ. Sim.* i. fol. 169*c*-*d*, § 587; Maimonides, *Hilcot 'Aboda Zara*, ch. xi.; Jacob ben Asher, *Ṭur Yoreh de'ah*, ch. 179; and Karo, *Shulḥan 'Aruch*, ch. 179.

(δ) A peculiar kind of divination is the study of the shadow on the moonlit night of Hosha'anah Rabba; for, if a man loses his shadow on that night, he is sure to die in the course of the year (cf. Chamisso, *Peter Schlemihl*, tr. Bowring, London, 1878). Very likely the origin of this practice is found in the statement, 'For their shadow has departed from them' (Nu 14^{9}).

(2) *Meʿônēn* (RV 'who practises augury'), another kind of divination of which even tradition has not preserved a definite interpretation. One connects it with the root *'ayin*, 'eye,' and makes the *meʿônēn* to be 'one who conjures,' 'one who produces hallucinations' (*aḥizath 'enayin*); another seems to connect it with *'ānān*, 'cloud,' probably = 'one who studies the formation of the clouds'; but it is not explained for what purpose the clouds are to be studied. (*a*) It appears to the writer that the *meʿônēn* is the *weather-prophet* in the widest sense, not one who merely studied the clouds for some purpose of divination, but one who could affect the gathering of clouds, and their dispersal. That man was of the utmost importance to an agricultural people, for he could cause drought or rain, bring rich harvest, or complete failure with famine and starvation. Weather-makers figure in the literature of popular magic throughout the whole world, and it would therefore have been surprising to find so important a man missing among those ancient diviners and soothsayers. The law would never have condemned to death a man who merely looked at the clouds; he must be a man who could cause serious hardship, and perhaps lead people astray to false beliefs. Seen in this light, the various incidents in the historical books assume a new and most satisfactory complexion. Samuel at the time of the wheat harvest calls on the Lord to bring thunder and rain—a most inopportune time (1 S 12^{17}); here we have the very action of the *meʿônēn*. Then we have Elijah, who tells Ahab (1 K 17^{1}), 'There shall not be dew nor rain these years, but according to *my word*.' Ahab seeks him everywhere, evidently believing that it lay in the power of Elijah to make and unmake drought. It will now be easier to understand the sign of Gideon, who asked that the fleece of wool should on one night be found wet. 'If there be dew on the fleece only, and it be dry upon all the ground' (Jg 6^{37}), and *vice versa* (v.^{39}). These were the signs expected of the *meʿônēn*. Very likely the request of Joshua, that the sun and moon should stand still, and that a hail-storm should overtake the army of the enemy and destroy them (Jos $10^{12\text{f.}}$), Joshua appearing as a *meʿônēn*, and, finally, Elijah bringing down sheets of lightning in order to destroy the messengers of the king of Samaria (2 K $1^{10\text{ff.}}$), may be further echoes of a similar conception. Even the prophet Amos defines the

power of God in the sentence, 'I caused it to rain upon one city and not upon another' (Am 4[7]). In the Talmud we find the story of Naḳdimon ben Gorion and the twelve wells which are filled at his prayer by the appointed day, and the sun shining again although it had apparently already set (*Ta'anit*, fol. 19*b*–20*a*, Exempla no. 85; *Nissim*, fol. 19*b*; *Maase Buch*, no. 96), and the stories of Ḥoni ha-me'agel, Raba, and others who force rain to come down (Gaster, 'Beiträge,' in Graetz, *Ztschr. für jüd. Geschichte und Wissenschaft*, 1882 [and Bucharest, 1883, ch. xi. p. 79 ff.]).

(*b*) Of more importance would be the man who could foretell the weather for the coming year. R. Akiba (*Sifrê*, § 171) explains *me'ônên* to be the man who can foretell from the weather on the eve of the Sabbatical (seventh) Year [or rather on the eve of Shabuoth, Feast of Weeks] whether the year will be one of rain or drought, of plenty or scarcity. In the Talmud we find that from the form of the ascending cloud of smoke which rose from the altar in the Temple on the Day of New Year and subsequent few days the weather for the next year could be predicted, and that the weather of certain days was taken as prognosticating that of the next year (see Gaster, 'Jew. Weather Lore,' in jubilee number of the *Jewish Chronicle*, 1891, where the whole literature is given). The cloud of smoke was called Anan as the cloud of mist and rain. Transferred to the Kalendæ of January, this prognostication was attributed to Ezra (see Tischendorf, *Apocalypses apocr.*, Leipzig, 1866, Prolegomena, pp. xiii–xiv).

The *me'ônên* was the master of thunder and rain, as shown by Samuel and Elijah. The latter, moreover, has experience of wind and earthquake before the appearance of God (1 K 19[11f.]). Earthquake and lightning were further taken as premonitory signs of disaster. In Jewish literature, such brontologia and seismologia have been preserved under the title *Simanê ra'ashim ve-ra'amim* (Constantinople, n.d.). In Greek literature they were attributed to David (Fabricius, *Cod. Pseudep. VT*, Hamburg, 1713–33, p. 1162, and *NT*, do. 1703–19, i. 951–953; Gaster, *Lit. Pop. Rum.* 506).

(*c*) It is doubtful whether astrology and the observation of stars and planets come within the sphere of the *me'ônên's* activity. Here we encounter the special name 'star-gazers.' The knowledge of astrology, star-gazing, divination by constellations, and forecasting from the new moon is clear from Is 47[13], which exhibits a distinct difference between the *me'ônên*—the weather-prophet—and the real astrologer, whose observations were limited to the changes, conjunctions, and other positions assumed by the heavenly bodies. The phrase *hôb'rê shāmayim*, if it means 'dividers of heavens,' *i.e.* those who divide up the heavenly circle into a number of constellations and forecast the future from them, would correspond to the *gāz'rîn* in Dn 2[27] 4[7] etc. To this section belongs the horoscope and other astrological divinations dependent upon the changes of the calendar and the juxtaposition of days, and the conjunction of the stars and planets, as well as the lists of good and bad, ominous and propitious, days. This was attributed by Maimonides and Jacob ben Asher (*locc. citt.*) to the *me'ônên*, whom they confused with the astrologer. Reference should be made in this connexion to divination from the sudden appearance of stars and comets, *e.g.* Balaam's prophecy (Nu 24[17]), to which such Messianic importance has been attached ever since by Jews, Samaritans, and Christians. So, Josephus tells us (*BJ* VI. v. 3 [Niese, § 289]): 'There was a star resembling a sword, which stood over the city,' foretelling the impending destruction of the town. For the star in the NT (Mt 2), and the further development of the same idea in the Apocrypha, see R. Hofmann, *Leben Jesu n. d. Apokryphen*, Leipzig, 1851; Winer, *Bibl. RWB*, 1847, ii. 523 ff. A star appears at the birth of Abraham, and is interpreted as a portent of evil (*Chron. Jeraḥmeel*, xxxiv. 1). The appearance of many suns in the dream is found in the oracle of the 'Sybil of Tibur,' probably originally a lost Biblical apocryphon (Gaster, *JRAS*, July 1910, pt. iii. p. 609); cf. also the Song of Deborah (Jg 5[20]): 'The stars in their courses fought against Sisera.'

(3) *Ḳôsēm, ḳesem* (RV 'diviner,' 'divination').—(*a*) Taking the various passages together where this word occurs in the Bible, and also looking at the traditional interpretation, we find, in the first place, that the *ḳôsēm* was a *professional* diviner, trained in the art of *ḳesem*, unlike the previously mentioned diviners, who practised without any special professional training, and who thereby did not obtain any official standing. The *ḳôsēm*, on the other hand, was the professional (priestly) seer, 'seeing' in a state of trance or ecstasy brought about by one means or another, in which he spoke words of divination (oracles) concerning future events. This state of trance was brought about 'by bowing down to the earth [evidently like the attitude of Elijah, 1 K 18[42]], and crying aloud, or looking into a brass or glass mirror, or taking a stick in the hand and leaning heavily upon it, or striking therewith the ground, until he loses consciousness and talks' (*Ṭur*, *l.c.* ch. 179). In the Bible in many passages we find the *ḳôsēm* holding among the heathen the same position as the *ḥôzeh* or *rô'eh* among the Jews. But the Jewish conception of revelation is differentiated as the uncovering of the hidden by the grace and inspiration of God, from the heathen *ḳôsēm*, who is thought to have been inspired by an evil spirit whilst he himself was unconscious. That unconsciousness is brought about by action, for action characterizes this kind of divination, and action on definite lines. The *ḳôsēm* is not confined to Western Aramæan peoples; according to the Bible, the men of Moab, Midian, and, later on, the Philistines, had professional *ḳôs'mîm*. Balaam is the first mentioned; and it is clear, from the description given in Nu 24[4], that, after certain magical operations had been performed, such as building of altars, walking in a definite way, and using, no doubt, other means, he falls into a trance, or, as it is put there: 'And the man whose eye was closed saith: he saith, which heareth the words of God, which seeth the vision of the Almighty, falling down, and having his eyes opened [internal].' As far as can be judged, some tangible results were expected by Balak from the *ḳesem* of Balaam, such as a curse or blight, or a direct indication of the best means of overcoming the power which protected Israel. The *ḳôs'mîm*, together with the priests, were asked by the Philistines (1 S 6[2, 9]) to find out the cause of the plague, and they advised a divination by means of cows walking in a definite direction.

(*b*) The eldest tradition in *Sifrê* (*l.c.*) connects *ḳesem* also with *rhabdomancy*, i.e. divination by means of staff, rod, arrows, etc. In our opinion, the earliest example of this divination is Jacob's peeled rods (Gn 30[37ff.]), an incident which has remained very obscure in spite of all the commentators, who seem to have overlooked Gn 31[10, 12]—the vision of Jacob and the appearance of the angel. The peeling of the rods and putting them in the trough was an act of divination which was explained to him by the angel in his dream; for surely the peeling alone could not, even on the basis of physiological impressions, have had the result of producing so widely different marks as black sheep and goats, ring-straked, speckled, grisled, etc.—too complex a result to be expected from

one and the same impression. R. Moses of Coucy (1235) has preserved to us the description of an oracle or divination by means of peeled rods which were thrown into the air, and, according as the peeled or unpeeled side fell uppermost, success in marriage or the opposite was indicated (R. Joseph Karo, in his commentary to the *Ṭur, l.c.*). The appeal to the staff as an oracle we find in Hos 4^{12}. With some hesitation, one might also mention here the rod of Moses wherewith he was to do the signs (Ex 4^{17}), and which has been invested with miraculous powers by very numerous legends, and believed to have been a rod from Paradise (see *Chron. Jeraḥmeel*). Another rod from Paradise, used as a beam in the building of the Temple, fills an important rôle in the legend of the history of the Cross. The angel that appears to Gideon (Jg 6^{21}) also holds a staff in his hands, with which he touches the meat and the unleavened bread, and fire comes out from the rock. Elisha sends Gehazi with his staff to put it on the face of the dead child of the Shunammite, so that it may revive (2 K 4^{29}), and he tells him: 'If thou meet any man, salute him not; and if any man salute thee, answer him not again.' The spell is not to be broken, whilst the action is to be completed by the staff or divining rod. Of course, it is here a miracle to be performed through the grace of God.

From this time onwards we hear of the wand of the magician; and Rabbinical tradition demands that the *ḳôsēm* shall use, among other things, a staff or a rod (*Ṭur, l.c.*). Mention may be made also of the budding rod of Aaron, by which his selection was to be made manifest (Nu 17^{8}), to which numerous parallels exist. In most cases it is a withered rod or staff stuck in the earth, which unexpectedly buds and flourishes, and is thereby a sign to the penitent that his sin has been forgiven: *e.g.* the legend of Lot, who waters the rod with mouthfuls of water brought from Jordan at the bidding of Abraham; and the flourishing rod proclaims forgiveness of sin (Fabricius, *Cod. Pseud. VT* i. 428–31; Gaster, *Lit. Pop. Rum.* 284–86). Mediæval literature knows a similar legend about a sinner appealing to R. Judah Hasid, when the rod flourished (*Maase Buch*, and Tendlau, *Sagen*, 1873, no. 62; cf. the legend of Tannhäuser); and a similar selection of Joseph by the budding rod to take Mary as his ward is told in *Protev. Jacobi*, ch. 8 (ed. Tischendorf, *Evang. Apoc.*, Leipzig, 1853, pp. 15–19), and *pseudo-Matth.* (chs. iv.–viii. pp. 60–67), not to speak of the innumerable parallels in the Legends of Saints and in popular literature.

Throwing sticks into the air and watching the way they fall is still one of the many forms of *rhabdomancy*. To this kind of divination belongs the shooting of arrows, which is tantamount to sending a pointed stick high into the air and watching the direction in which it falls. It is as such an act of divination that the shooting of arrows by Jonathan is best explained (1 S $20^{20\text{ff.}}$). The shooting of arrows for the purpose of *ḳesem* is found in the history of Joash (2 K $13^{15\text{ff.}}$). The smiting of the ground seems to have been an accompanying ceremony. The use of the arrow in *ḳesem* appears also in Ezk $21^{21\,(26)}$. The fall of arrows was to indicate the road the king of Babylon was to take, for the arrows must have been shot straight up into the air and allowed to fall by themselves. In the legends about the fall of the Temple (Bab. *Giṭṭin*, 56*a*, Exempla no. 70), Nero is said to have shot arrows from the four corners, and, as they all fell into Jerusalem, it indicated to him the impending fall of the town. It is still an element in Oriental, notably Gipsy, fairy-tales for the hero to shoot an arrow into the air and go in quest of it, and where the arrow falls things await him—good or evil.

(*c*) Akin to these forms of divination would be the *tree oracle*—the shaking of the boughs in one direction or another being taken as prognostication of some future event. This must have been the meaning of the oak of Meonen (Jg 9^{37}). David heard in the noise of the shaking boughs of the mulberry tree (2 S 5^{24}) the sound of marching. In Talmudic times we find a special art of divination mentioned under the name of *siḥath dᵉḳālîm*, the language of trees. R. Yoḥanan ben Zakkai is mentioned as one who possessed this knowledge (see Bab. *Sukkah*, 28*a*). Abraham Gaon, who lived in the year 1140 of the Seleucid era (A.D. 829), could understand the speech of palms (*'Aruch*, *s.v.*, Sh. ii.). Through Arabic influences, special books of divination by means of palm trees or palm leaves (ascribed to Abu Iflah of Saragossa) have been preserved in Hebrew literature, in which the origin of this science is referred back to King Solomon (Cod. Gaster, 19, 329*b*, 523). Another species of divination mentioned in the Talmud and Midrash concerns the tree as a life token. At the birth of the child a tree is planted, and from its state of flourishing or decay one can divine the state of the man himself. By seeing the withering of Job's tree planted in their garden his three friends knew of his misfortune, and came to comfort him. Such trees were sometimes cut on the day of marriage, to be used as ornaments; the premature cutting of such a tree by a Roman general brought about, according to the Talmud, the war of Betar (Bab. *Giṭṭin*, 57*a*).

(4) *Ḥôbēr* (RV 'charmer').—Not much information is found in the Bible concerning the activity denoted by this name. The tradition in *Sifrê* (*l.c.*) which explains the *ḥôbēr* as one who could gather together (*ḥāber*, 'companion') huge or small animals according to his skill—for what purpose is not stated—throws an unexpected light on many incidents in the Bible which have hitherto remained obscure, in which we recognize now the work of the *ḥôbēr*, though not under that name. If a similar view is to be taken of him as of the *mᵉʿônēn* (weather-maker) he must have been a man who could bring or avert, foretell the coming or disappearance of obnoxious animals. His inclusion in the list in Deut. would thus be thoroughly justified; for to bring wild animals into the land or to draw them away would be a curse or a blessing to the people. To this category would belong the priests who were asked for by the Cutheans from the king of Assyria, to be sent from Babylon to Samaria in order to drive away the lions which infested the land (2 K $17^{25\text{-}27}$). The priest sent was no doubt considered to be a powerful diviner or charmer, a *ḥôbēr*. Similarly Elisha, upon whose curse two she-bears appeared and destroyed the children after they mocked him, acts as a kind of *ḥôbēr* (2 K 2^{24}). So also a certain man from the sons of the prophets (1 K $20^{35\text{ff.}}$), at whose bidding a lion kills the disobedient fellow-prophet, acts as a *ḥôbēr* who has power over animals for good or evil. In 1 K 13 we see the lion turning against the prophet (charmer) whose spell was broken through disobedience, although his power is still shown by the animal's standing quietly by the corpse next to the ass without hurting the latter. Going higher up the stream of Biblical tradition, we find Samson (Jg 14^{8}) tearing to pieces a lion, in whose carcass bees afterwards swarm, contrary to the nature of bees, which never hive in dead bodies. Samson is able also single-handed to catch three hundred foxes and put firebrands between their tails (Jg 15^{4}). Here we have an exact portraiture of a *ḥôbēr* (as interpreted by the present writer), one who is able to gather animals either for good or for evil purposes. According to later tradition, the presence of a pious man or reputed saint was sufficient to drive away obnoxious animals from a place. In the Temple area itself no fly was seen, nor did a wild animal ever hurt any visitor to Jerusalem (*Pirḳê Aboth*). The sanctuary took the place of the pious man in averting the evil of wild beasts (see Gaster, 'Beiträge,' ch. iv. p. 22 f., in connexion with the legends of Virgil, St. Patrick, etc.).

How far Beelzebub would fall within this cate-

gory would be difficult to state, but the Philistines attributed the plague of mice (1 S 6[4ff. 18]) to the presence of the ark, and they returned golden mice as a votive offering with it. Here the ark, in inflicting the plague, acted in a similar though opposite direction to the sanctuary (ark) in Jerusalem, which prevented a plague of vermin.

It is a remarkable fact that all the acts of divination mentioned hitherto are found among the ten plagues inflicted by Moses in Egypt at the bidding of the Lord, no doubt to bring home to the Egyptians, in the manner best understood by them, that all the acts of the enchanters, augurs, charmers, weather-makers, could also be performed by a man in the name of another power against whom their own diviners and charmers could not prevail. We have—with the addition of (*a*) the rods of Moses and Aaron turned into snakes—(1) blood, (2) frogs, (3) lice, (4) various animals, (5) plague, (6) boils, (7) hail storm, (8) locusts, (9) darkness, and (10) the death of the firstborn. These correspond, with the exception of the last, to which reference will be made later on, to the arts of the *mᵉnaḥēsh* (*a*), *mᵉʿônēn* (7, 9), *ḳôsēm* (1, 3, 5, 6) and *ḥôbēr* (2, 4, 8). These practices known in Egypt were strictly forbidden to be practised by the Jews, and were strongly denounced in Leviticus and Deuteronomy.

The process of elimination of deep-rooted practices and of transforming them in accordance with the spirit of Judaism, runs on parallel lines with those of the spread of Christianity and of Islām. Local practices and heathen ceremonies were adapted with slight changes to the new order of things; heathen gods became local saints, heathen practices became Christian in the Church. Similarly, the forbidden practices of the *mᵉnaḥēsh*, *ḳôsēm*, *ḥôbēr*, etc., were adopted and adapted to the spirit of Judaism, and they were practised by leading men—seers, priests, judges, etc.—in the name of the Lord God of Israel. And thus the people were slowly educated, until, with the establishment of the Temple in Jerusalem and the era of the great prophets, they broke finally with the past, and drove even the remnants of ancient superstition out of the Jewish worship and Jewish practice.

(5) *'Ôb, yiddᵉʿônî, dôrēsh el-hammēthîm* (RV 'familiar spirit,' 'wizard,' necromancer').—There still remains another kind of divination, which rests on the conception of Animism and the survival of the dead. No hint is given in the Bible whether it was a spirit of the dead or his material body which was sought after or inquired of. It is a fact that *'ôb* and *yiddᵉʿônî* always occur together except in the history of the woman of Endor (but even there in the same chapter Saul is mentioned as having destroyed [1 S 28[3]] familiar spirits and wizards) and Is 29[4], where the voice of the *'ôb* is described as coming from the ground. We must, therefore, conclude that these two were intimately connected with each other. *'Ôb* has the fem. pl. *'ôbôth*, whilst *yiddᵉʿônî* has the masc. pl. *yiddᵉʿônîm*—probably an indication of differentiation of sexes, one the female and the other the male. In Is 8[19] they are described as they 'that chirp and that mutter' (RV; better, 'conjurers who whistle and groan' [cf. Magical Papyrus Paris, where the god or the conjurer whistles and groans]), and are by the prophet connected with the dead (v.[19]). In both cases *dārash* ('to seek') and the alternative *sha'al* ('to inquire') are used. We find then that the *'ôb* and *yiddᵉʿônî* were things *made*. In 2 K 21[6] and 2 Ch 33[6], the Heb. וְעָשָׂה (RV wrongly 'dealt with') means 'and he made'; and Lv 20[27] must not be understood in the sense that men or women have in their body a familiar spirit, but that they are the possessors of an *'ôb*—evidently a material thing. The translation of *'ôb* as 'familiar spirit' is contrary to indications in the Bible. The woman of Endor is called distinctly *ba'alath 'ôb*, 'the possessor of an *'ôb*,' not 'one possessed by an *'ôb*.' She must first perform a certain ceremony, she is to use enchantment (*ḳesem*) in order to get the *'ôb* to work (1 S 28[8] 'divine unto me'), and only afterwards she asks Saul whom he wishes her to raise from the dead.

Now, it is a very remarkable fact that the *'ôb* does not occur in Genesis, in Joshua, in Judges, in 2 Sam., in 1 Kings, or in any of the latter prophets except Isaiah. Another word, equally mysterious, is used, viz. *tᵉrāphîm* [note that the word is plural, and *'ôbôth* and *yiddᵉʿônîm* occur also mostly in the plural form]. The *tᵉrāphîm* are mentioned in Gn 31[19. 34], but not in the other four books of the Pentateuch; then they occur in Jg 17[5] 18[14ff.], 1 S 15[23] 19[13. 16], 2 K 23[24], Ezk 21[21 (26)], Hos 3[4], Zec 10[2]; only in one case are they mentioned together with the *'ôbôth* and *yiddᵉʿônîm*—2 K 23[24], where they are said to have been put away by King Josiah. The *tᵉrāphîm* also were 'made,' *e.g.*, by Micah (Jg 17[5], where they are differentiated from 'a molten image and a graven image'), and they are also asked or inquired of (*sha'al*), like *'ôb* and *yiddᵉʿônî* (Ezk 21[21 (26)]); in Zec 10[2] they 'speak.' Laban is the first to mention them, and calls them his gods (Gn 31[30]); Rachel hides them (v.[34]) in the saddle-bag (RV 'camel's furniture'). King Nebuchadnezzar consults them (Ezk 21[21 (26)]: cf. the Parthian woman in Jos. *Ant.* XVIII. ix. 5 [344], who conceals the images of her gods which she worships in the house). All the evidence points to a Western Aramæan origin, whilst the *'ôb* and *yiddᵉʿônî* point much more to Egyptian origin; Is 19[3] connects them with Egypt. It is, therefore, perhaps not improbable that we have here two different names for practically the same object of divination, connected more or less with the dead body, or, to put it more clearly, a mummified body worshipped and used for divination. The story of Michal in 1 S 19[13. 16] leaves no room for doubt that the *tᵉrāphîm* so closely resembled life-like human bodies (mummies, not wooden images) that the soldiers could believe that David was sleeping in the bed. A legend in Jer. Targ. to Gn 31[19] relates that 'they used to slay the firstborn of a man and cut off his head, salted it, and embalmed it, and wrote incantations on a plate of gold, which they put under his tongue, and stood it up in the walls, and it spake with them; and unto such Laban bowed himself' (see also *Chapters of R. Eliezer*). Here we have the mummified head, which might be called *tᵉrāphîm* among the Western Aramæans, and *'ôb* and *yiddᵉʿônî* in S. Palestine, according to the sex of the mummy used for necromancy. In Bab. *Keritot*, 3*b*, we find that the necromancer burnt incense to the demon, and then questioned him. Rabbinical tradition (*Sifra*, par. 3, ch. vii.) says of the *'ôb* that he is the Pithom (Python) who causes the dead to speak through some part of his body, *sheḥi* (see also *Sanh.* vii. 7), and, furthermore, that necromancy was performed by means of the skulls of dead men—no doubt because the process of mummification had died out, and mummies were not easily accessible. The same holds good for the necromancy as practised by other peoples, in which the skull of the dead plays a prominent part. In this connexion the death of the firstborn of the Egyptians would appear in a new light.

The idea of a *familiar spirit* is of much later date; it was introduced at a time when belief in the existence of evil spirits became deeply rooted, and when it was supposed that it was in the power of man to conquer and subdue such spirits and force them to serve their master in any office to which he might choose to appoint them.

Solomon became a legendary master of the demons, or *shēdîm*. The Temple was built by *shēdîm* (*Giṭṭin*, 68*a*) at his command; and through his seal, on which the ineffable name of God was engraved, he could command the obedience of all the spirits. Here two sets of thoughts and beliefs have been blended, and Solomon's power was made to rest upon the knowledge and possession of the ineffable name of God with its tremendous

efficacy. The Apocryphal *Testament of Solomon* and the *Claviculus Solomonis* (Solomon's Key) teach how to obtain mastery over *shēdīm*. We find the history of a man having a *shēd* at his disposal (Bab. *Ḥullin*, 105*b*). *Shēdīm* could not be conjured up on Sabbath or holy days (*Sheelat Sheddim*, see Levy, *Neuhebräisches und chaldäisches Wörterbuch*, 1876, *s.v.* 'Shed,' iv. 510). Conversation with the *shēdīm* was considered a great art (*Sukkah*, 28*a*, see Zunz, *Gottesd. Vorträge*², 1892, p. 173). In a Jewish fairy-tale a man overhears the conversation of *shēdīm*, saves the king's daughter, and re-opens a well which had been stopped by their mischievous powers (*Exempla* no. 29, and Gaster in *FL* vii. [1896] 231). Nachmanides writes that pious Jews in Alemannia held *shēdīm* in servitude, who did their bidding and carried out orders (*Responsa of R. Sal. b. Adrot*, no. 414); see also Manasseh b. Israel, *Nish. Ḥayyim*, iii. ch. 12, fol. 113*b* ff.).

Men who were reputed to hold communion with the dead were probably believed to be able to quicken the dead temporarily or permanently. The fact that Elijah (1 K 17[17ff.]) and Elisha (2 K 4[20ff.]) each revived an apparently dead child, and that the mere touch of the bones of Elijah was sufficient to call a man back to life again (2 K 13[21]), seems to point in the direction of such belief. But the subject is very obscure, and later tradition does not help us to elucidate the problem. Real necromancy does not seem to have flourished among the Jews. So little was this the case, that none of the later authorities gives any further information about *'ôb* and *dôrēsh el-hammēthîm*, and about the *yiddᵉ'ônî* they tell us only that the man put into his mouth a bone of a certain animal called *yaddu'a*, which caused him to speak—which is, of course, a mere guess, or probably a misinterpretation of the use made of the bone of the dead (men and animals) for the operation of divination (see *Ṭur*, *l.c.*).

(6) Thus far we have dealt with the various kinds of divination of a heathen origin mentioned in the Bible, and practised by Jews at an early date, only after they had been stripped of their heathen garb and adapted to the teaching of Judaism. As the Law, however, condemned certain modes of divination, other means had to be found in full accordance with the true spiritual teaching of Judaism. The whole world was the creation of one God, and from Him alone the answer must come, and to Him men must turn at critical moments of their lives. The means by which the answer is to be vouchsafed is of a threefold character: by *dreams*, or by *Urim*, or by the vision of the *prophet* (seer). To such means did Saul resort (1 S 28[6]); and only when he found himself forsaken by those lawful means did he turn to the forbidden arts and go to the woman of Endor, the mistress of an *'ôb*.

(*a*) *Dreams*.—Of dreams there are abundant examples in Genesis and in the historical books, but none of the same kind in the other books of the Pentateuch. God came to Abimelech in a dream (Gn 20[3]); Jacob dreamt of the ladder (28[12ff.]), and again in connexion with his peeled rods (31[11]); Laban also is warned in a dream against attacking Jacob (31[24]). The forecasting of future events appears in Joseph's own symbolical dreams (37[5ff.]), as well as in the dreams of the butler and the baker in Egypt (40[5]), and the dream of Pharaoh (ch. 41), interpreted by Joseph as a solution granted by God. No reference to such prophetic dreams occurs elsewhere in the Pentateuch, although we have the statement (Nu 12[6]) that God speaks to prophets in a dream. Quite different is the character of the dreamer of dreams (Dt 13[1ff.]), rather a sinister personage, as in Jer 23[25-28. 32] 27[9], where diviners, dreams, and soothsayers are mentioned together (cf. also Zec 10[2]). The dream of the Philistine is understood by Gideon as foretelling future success (Jg 7[13]). The Book of Daniel is full of dreams and prophetic visions of the future, which border on the higher sphere of prophecy, or the direct revelation of the future by God through His prophet. This lies outside the immediate scope of divination, for the human initiative is practically eliminated; the prophet now acts simply as an agent selected by God, for His purpose, to carry His message to the people. The last time that God speaks to His chosen in a dream is to Solomon at Gibeon before the building of the Temple (1 K 3[5]), and immediately on its completion (9[3]); no other example after this is mentioned in the Bible—a fact of deep significance.

Apocryphal and apocalyptical literature is, however, full of such prophetic dreams. In the *Chron. of Jeraḥmeel* alone no fewer than eight or nine such dreams are recorded; the dreams of Methuselah and Enoch (ch. xxiii. p. 48, intr. lxxi); the dream of Pharaoh foretelling the birth of Moses (chs. xlii.–xlviii. p. 102, intr. lxxxvii.); the dreams of Naphtali (xxxviii. 3 and 6); the dream of Kenaz (lvii. 39, 40); the dream of Mordecai; Ahasuerus' dream; and the dream of Alexander the Great (lxxxv. 4 ff.; found also in Samaritan literature [*Abulfatḥ*]). Mention may be made also of dreams in the *Test. of the XII Patriarchs* (Charles): Levi, Jacob, Naphtali, and Joseph; the visions of Enoch in the Book of Enoch (lxxxiii.–xc. pp. 220–259 [Charles]), and the visions of Ezra in 2 Esdras. Later Jewish literature abounds in prophetic dreams sent to the people to warn them of danger, such as that in the legend of Bostanai the exilarch (*Seder 'Olam Zuṭṭa*).

The interpretation of dreams became a recognized art. Many examples are found in the Talmud of men who received payment for this function. Twenty-four interpreters are said to have practised at the same time in Jerusalem. A certain Bar Hadya is mentioned by name as one who shaped his interpretation according to the amount received.

Such interpretations are found in the Talmud (*Ber.* 56*a* ff.; *En Yaakob*, par. 110; Jer. *Ma'aser shēni* iv. 6), the *Exempla* of Rabbis (nos. 215–217), and *Maase Buch*, Amst., no. 28, fol. 7*b*. These form the basis of the Hebrew *Oneirokritika* which are ascribed to Joseph, Daniel, Hai (ed. pr. Ferrara, 1552), Saadya, etc., and published by Almuli in his *Pitron Ḥalomoth* (*Mefasher Helmin*, ed. pr. Lisbon (?) 149–; see Cod. Gaster, 383, 664, and 1087). Some of the sages ask that the answer should be given in the dream to their query, like Raba (Bab. *Menaḥot*, 67*a*) and R. Johanan (*ib.* 84*b*). He who sees an ill-omened dream fasts and recites a special prayer whilst the *kōhănîm* pronounce the priestly blessing during the service (Bab. *Ber.* 55*b*). A curious collection of 'responses from Heaven' exists in Jewish literature, dating probably from the 12th or 13th century.

(*b*) *Urim and Thummim* was another means of divining the future, explaining the past, declaring guilt and innocence, dividing land, and deciding the issues of war and peace. In accordance with the system pursued of concentrating every possible sacred or sacrificial action in the hands of very few, and thus of weaning the common people from such practices, the divination by means of the Urim and Thummim was reserved for the high priest. Only he, in his priestly robes and wearing the breast-plate called 'the breast-plate of judgment' (decision) (Ex 28[30]), could use the Urim for the purpose of obtaining an answer from God to his question. We cannot here enter fully upon the discussion as to what the Urim and Thummim may have been. These words occur altogether seven times in the whole Bible; and in two of these, Ezra and Nehemiah, as a remembrance of old (Ezr 2[63], Neh 7[65]). To the other five passages we must add two in which the practice is implicitly referred to (Jg 1[1] and 20[18], where the children of Israel went up to Bethel to inquire of the Lord, *i.e.* through the priest, who only could obtain the answer by the Urim and Thummim). The ephod consulted by David in Ḳ'eilah (1 S 23[9ff.]) was worn by the priest Abiathar. Evidently the reference is to the Urim and Thummim within the ephod, and similarly in 1 S 30[7ff.]; and probably the ephod in Hos 3[4] also means the oracle of the Urim and Thummim. In 1 S 28[6] we are told that Saul had inquired of the Lord 'by the Urim,' and only because he got no answer he went to the woman of Endor. In 1 S 14[18] Saul says to Ahijah, 'Bring hither the ark' (LXX, 'the ephod'), and in v.[41], when the guilty party is to be discovered, he says *hābāh tāmîm*, which must be read *hābāh tummîm*, i.e. Urim and Thummim; and then they cast lots, and Saul and Jonathan are first taken,

and afterwards Jonathan alone. This reminds us of the identical process in the case of Achan (Jos $7^{14ff.}$). Rabbinical writers identify the Urim and Thummim with the twelve stones of the breastplate, and explain these names as 'lighted up' and 'dark,' stating that the stones lit up or a light shone in them (according to some the letters stood out lighted up) in the case of a favourable answer, and that they remained dark at an unfavourable one. After the establishment of the sanctuary in Jerusalem by David, no further mention is made of this kind of divination by lots and by means of the Urim. That event was the turning-point in the whole history of Jewish worship and in the practice of divination.

Special mysterious powers were ascribed to the stones of the breast-plate, and from Epiphanius onwards the literature of *Lapidaria*, or 'stone books,' has grown continuously. Hebrew literature shows a variety of such *Lapidaria* (*Koḥot haabanim*). A number of unedited texts have been collected by the present writer in his Cod. 377, besides other MSS (Cod. Gaster, 337, 714; de Vidas, *loc. cit.* fol. 9*a*).

After the disappearance of the Urim and Thummim another inspired oracle took its place—the *Bible oracle* (the oral recitation of Biblical verses). Infants were asked to tell a verse to a man who met them quite unexpectedly, and from the verse which the child repeated innocently the questioner drew his own conclusions, for he saw in it the oracular answer to his query. We may look upon the passages referred to above under '*Mᵉnaḥēsh*' (Gn $24^{13f.}$, Jg 7^{11}, 1 S 14^{8-12}, and 1 K 20^{33}) as the oldest examples of divination from the opening words of the enemy or interlocutor. This is the origin of the Bible oracle (stichomancy) by means of a written and later on a printed book. It consists in opening the book and looking at the first verse that meets the eye as a means of divination, or in putting in a pointer, and the passage where the pointer rests is taken as full of significance and prognostication. Samuel used to inquire through 'the Book' (Bab. *Ḥullin*, 95*b*; cf. the *sortes Vergilianæ*). The Bible oracle leads to that of the *Shimmusha Rabba* (or that of selected portions of the Bible) known in the 8th or 9th century. In the *Shimmush Tᵉhillîm* the Book of Psalms is used as a means of divination (Cod. Gaster, 1094^e, and often printed with Book of Psalms; best ed. by W. Heidenheim).

At an indeterminate period in post-Biblical times a large number of magical ceremonies and practices of divination flowed into the stream of Jewish tradition, and it is often difficult to trace each of these elements to its proper source. All that was done was to copy and to borrow such material, and so change and mould it as to make it compatible with the special teaching of Judaism, though the line of demarcation between, *e.g.*, Jews and Muhammadans in these practices is so faint as to be often indistinguishable. Nowhere does this borrowing show itself more clearly than in the books for telling future events, or fortune-telling books (*Sifrê Goralot* [Amsterdam, 1700], *Urim Vethummim* [Dyrrenfurth, 1700], ascribed alternately to Hai-Saadya, Aben Ezra, Pokeah, 'Ibrim [Venice, 1657]; Cod. Gaster, 61, 213, 439; Aben Ezra, 35, 112, 465, 470, 471, 592, 594, 702; Saadya, 602, 679, 782, 1017, 1060, 1090). A thorough investigation of the origin and filiation of these books and their interdependence is still lacking (Steinschneider, *Die hebräischen Übersetzungen des Mittelalters*, § 533, pp. 867–71).

The hand and the face of man were also used for the purpose of divination. The *Zohar* (Exodus) already contained almost a complete treatise on physiognomics (*ḥochmath ha-parṣuf*), and the Hebrew version of the *Secretum* ascribed to Aristotle (ed. Gaster [contains in bk. xi. a treatise on physiognomy]) continued to spread and to fortify the belief in physiognomics among the Jews. Cheiromancy (*Ḥochmath ha-yād*, last ed., Warsaw, 1902) is found in many manuscripts and prints, and also in translations in the Hebrew-German (Cod. Gaster, 443, fol. 90*b* f.).

(*c*) *Rô'eh, or seer.*—The last form of divination to which Saul resorted was through the *nābî'*, the prophet, or rather the *rô'eh*, the seer, 'for he that is now called a prophet was beforetime called a seer' (1 S 9^9). He was expected to answer not only important questions affecting the safety of the king or nation, but also trivial inquiries about lost property, *e.g.* the asses of Kish (1 S $9^{20ff.}$). The seer was then acting as the Hebrew counterpart of the heathen *ḳôsēm* (like Balaam, etc.), who also claimed to 'see' and to be a 'seer' (Nu $24^{4.16}$). Samuel is consistently called the seer and not the prophet in 1 Ch 9^{22} 26^{28} 29^{29}; and other personages belonging to the period before the building of the Temple appear under the same names of *rô'eh* and *ḥôzeh*, which alternate with one another and are both distinguished from *nābî'*. The latter was, no doubt, considered as yet inferior to them; for we find the 'company of prophets' (1 S $10^{5.10.11}$), Saul turned prophet (10^{12}), and 'the sons of the prophets' (1 K 20^{35}, 2 K 2^3 etc.) all playing an inferior rôle to that of the *rô'eh*. Similarly the *nābî'* in the Pentateuch seems inferior to the *nābî'* of the time of the kings. He is more akin to a diviner. Abraham is called a *nābî'* (Gn 20^7), although he does not prophesy, but knows of Abimelech's dream. Aaron is appointed *nābî'* to Moses (Ex 7^1), certainly not as superior to him; seventy elders prophesy (Nu $11^{25f.}$), and Eldad and Medad do so in the camp, like the bands of prophets and Saul mentioned above. In Nu 12^6 God speaks to the *nābî'* in a dream. In Dt $13^{1.5}$ 18^{20} the *nābî'* is placed on the same footing as the dreamer of dreams (see above). The *nābî'* of Dt 18^{15} must therefore be taken in the same sense as the *nābî'* in all the other passages in the Pent., and loses the special significance attached to the name. It is noteworthy that Moses is called *nābî'* only after his death (Dt 34^{10}). Saul resorted to a *nābî'* for the purpose of learning what the future had in store for him (1 S 28^6), and therefore one is justified in including this *nābî'* among the diviners, like the *ḥôzeh* and *rô'eh*—the Jewish equivalent of the heathen *ḳôsēm*. But from the time of David onwards a change took place in the value attached to the name. The *nābî'* was no longer a man who could take any initiative, or answer questions put to him, but an inspired agent of God, selected by Him to send His messages to rulers and peoples.

With the prophets of the Second Temple prophecy had come to an end. Instead of it there was the *Bath Ḳôl*, i.e. the second voice, a kind of Divine echo heard within the precincts of the Temple or in answer to queries put to Heaven by the Rabbis (Bab. *Yoma*, 9*b*; *Sanh.* 11*a*; Jer. *Ber.* 3*b*).

The final stage of divination was by the use of the mysterious and ineffable Divine Name. This was a dangerous mode of divination; of the four great men who attempted to penetrate the Divine mysteries (*Ḥag.* 14*b*), only one, Aqiba, escaped unhurt. Practical *Qabbālā* is the final outcome of this mystical development, which has almost entirely driven out all the older forms of divination. From the time of the Essenes (2nd cent.) downwards magic and divination centre in the mystical names of God, angels, etc. Magical papyri abound, containing directions how to divine theft, or how to obtain a dream which would foretell the future. The most ancient book of this kind is the famous 'Sword of Moses' (ed. Gaster, London, 1896), a complete manual of such operations. Some of the formulæ and practices contained

therein have survived to the present day. Many a man in mediæval times was credited with insight into the future through the knowledge of this ineffable name.

The last stage in the development of the art of divination was reached when the place held in ancient times by the *ḳôsēm* or *mᵉnaḥēsh*, then by the *rô'eh* and *nābî'*, then by the scholar and sage, was finally taken by the *ba'al shēm*, the possessor of the ineffable wonder-working name of God. He is the exact counterpart of the *ba'alath 'ôb*, the female possessor of the *'ôb* (woman of Endor). He also could conjure the dead, foretell the future, and perform every possible miraculous deed. The legend of the *ba'al shēm* told in *Ma'ase Nissim* (see Tendlau, *Sagen*[4], no. 52, p. 25 ff.) makes him raise out of a cup Joab b. Zeruiah (King David's general). Practically the last link in this chain is the famous *ba'al shēm* (known as Besht [Ba'al Shem Ṭob]), the founder of the sect of the Ḥasidim at the beginning of the 18th cent., whose successors are the reputed wonder-working Rabbis of the Ḥasidim in Galicia and Eastern Europe.

But all these modes of divination have gradually disappeared. Only the Qabbalistic formulæ are from time to time resorted to and practised in addition to those borrowed from other nations; for in modern times, and especially in Eastern countries, the Jews follow the superstitions of the native population, and practise the same modes of divination for such lower purposes as to detect a thief, or to find out whether a woman will marry in the course of the year, whether her child will be a boy or girl, whether or not an undertaking will be successful. But there is nothing specifically Jewish about them.

LITERATURE.—As the writer of this article differs fundamentally in the interpretation of the Biblical terms on divination from all other scholars, he does not refer to any other article on this subject, or to any of the special books hitherto written on divination in the Bible. In addition to the references given in the text of the article itself, the following bibliography will serve the purpose of directing students to a vast field of hitherto scarcely explored literature. One name stands out prominently, that of M. Steinschneider, and his great work, *Die hebräischen Übersetzungen des Mittelalters*, Berlin, 1893 (notably § 539, p. 893 f.; § 541, p. 905; § 522, p. 849; § 533, pp. 867–71; § 575, p. 963 f.; and § 534, p. 871), contains the most reliable data on many of the subjects of the later period of Jewish literature, when it stood under the influence of Greek, Arabic, and mediæval Latin literature. Still even he left room for additional information. Some of it, especially MSS material, may be found in the bibliography to artt. BIRTH (Jewish) and CHARMS AND AMULETS (Jewish), in which very much matter referring to divination may be found. A few more books may be now mentioned here: M. A. Delrio, *Disquisitionum magicarum libri sex*, ed. Cologne, 1720, iii. p. 11 q. iv. s. 6, pp. 473, 478–480; Manasseh ben Israel, *Nishmath Hayyim*, ed. Amsterdam, 1652, bk. iii. chs. 4–29, fol. 101 f.; M. Güdemann, *Gesch. des Erziehungswesen und der Cultur der Juden*, Vienna, 1880, vol. i. p. 201, no. 2; M. Gaster, *Literatura Popularis Rumana*, Bucharest, 1883, pp. 324, 506 f., 517, 517*a*, 531, 532*a*; K. Krumbacher, *Geschichte der byzantinischen Literatur*[2], Munich, 1897, pp. 627–631 and *passim*; H. Diels, *Beiträge zur Zuckungsliteratur*, Berlin, 1908; Jacob Racah, *Kishurim le Yaakob*, Leghorn, 1850, fol. 24*a*–26*b*.

M. GASTER.

DIVINATION (Litu-Slavic).—A synopsis of the various means employed by the Prussians and Lithuanians to divine the future is given in the art. ARYAN RELIGION, vol. ii. p. 54 f. As grounds of their predictions they had—or still have—recourse to the flight and cries of birds; appearances in the sky and other natural phenomena; sacrifices, entrails, and blood; chance meetings, the rustling of the oak, fire and smoke, dreams; various happenings and utterances at weddings; wax, lead, glass, the foam of beer, amulets, sieve-turning, plants, and innumerable other things. One of the most ancient and widely-used accessaries of divination was *blood*, both of man and beast. When the Grand-duke Keistut of Lithuania was overthrown and taken prisoner by King Ludwig of Hungary in 1351, he made a treaty with the victor, pledging himself to embrace Christianity and desist from further troubling. This treaty was ratified by a rather curious Lithuanian oath, the preliminary to which was a blood-oracle:

'Et facta est haec promissio per regem cum tali iuramento: accepit enim bovem et in praesentia regis Ungariae et suorum fecit bovi duas venas incidi in collo, et, si sanguis ferventer exiret, bonum esse indicium futurorum; et largiter fuit sanguis effusus. Tunc rex Litowiae bovem fecit decollari et inter bovis caput et corpusprograediens iuravit, sic sibi contingi, si promissa non servaret' (*Scriptores Rer. Pruss.* iii. 420).

But human blood likewise might be used for purposes of prophecy. Thus, in 1325–26, when the Grand-duke Gedimin sent twelve hundred horsemen to the assistance of King Lokietek in his struggle with the margrave of Brandenburg,

'prepositum de Bernow, hominem corpore grossum et pinguem vinciunt, caput inter crura detorquentes, dorsum eius gladiis aperiunt, profluvium sanguinis attendunt, de exitu belli per ipsum divinare cupientes'; and it is also recorded that in the same campaign 'quibusdam guttura preciderunt et divinationes suas exercuerunt' (cf. A. v. Mierzyn'ski, 'Der Eid des Keistutis,' *Sitzungsber. d. Altertumsgesellsch. Pruss.*, no. 18, Königsberg, 1893, p. 104).

Such incidents show that as late as the 14th cent. of our era the Lithuanians, like the prophetesses of the Cimri (cf. *ERE* ii. 54[b]), were in the habit of killing their prisoners of war in order to ascertain by an inspection of their blood whether the approaching battle would result in victory or defeat.

Leaving the Baltic peoples, we proceed to speak of the Slavs, and, more particularly, of the Russians. Here, in the 16th and 17th centuries—a period from which several continuous records survive[1]—we find an almost incredible development of the belief in omens (*primětŭ*) and the practice of fortune-telling (*gadanie*). It is scarcely too much to say that among the Russians of that age the individual's course of life was entirely conditioned by premonitions. Books of magic and collections of warnings and predictions, though banned by the clergy, were passed from hand to hand. A creaking in the wall or a singing in the ears foretold a journey. An itching in the palm signified a gift of money. Itching eyes betokened weeping. The croaking of ravens or the crowing of cocks was an omen of misfortune. The cackling of ducks or geese, twitching of the eyelids, the crackling of the fire, the howl of a dog, the squeaking of mice or their nibbling of clothes, a cat appearing at the window with a captured mouse, a terrifying dream, meeting with a blind person—all these foreboded loss by fire. In a MS in the Rumjanzov Museum we read:

'When the shores heave, and the sea rages, when dry or moist winds blow, when rain-, snow-, or storm-clouds appear, when thunder rolls, the storm howls, the forest rustles, the trunks of trees grate on one another, wolves howl, or squirrels leap—then will ensue plague, or war, or scarcity of water; in summer fruits will grow nowhere, or they will disappear.'

The people believed in dreams, and framed an elaborate system of reading their significance. They saw portents in the act of sneezing, in the crawling movements of insects, in every sort of object they came across. It was thought unlucky to meet with a monk, a horse with hair worn off, or a pig. As early as the 12th cent. we find St. Theodosius censuring those who allowed such occurrences to scare them home again. Native and foreign superstitions were inextricably blended. The people had also complete written systems of prophecy, called *rafli*—a term of Arabic origin ('libellus astronomicus seu mathematicus Persarum' [Ducange]; Arab. *raml*, 'geomancy'); the *Domostroj* (cf. *ERE* iii. 465, note 1), § 23, warns against their use. Mention should also be made here of the so-called 'birth-magic' which the sorcerer, at the mother's request, performed over the newly-born child, and by means of which he ascertained or

[1] Cf. for what immediately follows, Kostomarov, 'Sketch of the Domestic Life and Customs of the Great Russians in the 16th and 17th Centuries,' in *Sovremennik*, vol. lxxxiii. (Russ.).

determined its lot in life. It is, therefore, no exaggeration to say that the Russians of that day lived from the cradle to the grave in an atmosphere of constant dread and solicitude regarding the future; and the beneficent and emancipating results of culture and enlightenment are never more profoundly felt than when contrasted with a human existence thus harrowed by omens and superstitious terrors from morning till night (cf. *ERE* ii. 55[b]).

Even at the present day, however, among the Russian peasantry, the belief in omens and predictions still prevails to an extent without parallel among any other European people. The manifold superstitions of an aged Russian peasant woman are thus set forth in Turgenev's romance, *Fathers and Sons* (ch. 20, at the end):

'She was pious and impressionable to a degree; she believed in all kinds of omens, predictions, spells, dreams; she believed in lunatics [see below], in household spirits, forest spirits, unlucky forgatherings, enchantment, popular remedies, Maundy Thursday salt [the salt sprinkled on Maundy Thursday bread ranks as a powerful specific]; she believed that the end of the world was at hand, that the buckwheat prospers if the candles are not extinguished at the evening service on Easter Sunday, and that mushrooms cease growing when they have been seen by a human eye,' etc.

In the present article we do not propose to deal further with this mass of detail, but will restrict ourselves to a somewhat fuller consideration of two particular points: (1) peasant weather-lore, which, amid a chaos of absurdity, nevertheless contains a certain measure of rationality, based upon experience and the observation of Nature; and (2) the interval between Christmas and Epiphany—a period during which, even in the Russia of to-day, all conceivable forms of augury and prophecy are still in full swing.

(1) The first of these topics, *peasant weather-lore*, has been dealt with by A. Ermolov in two volumes of his comprehensive work, *Agricultural Folk-wisdom in Proverbs, Sayings, and Weather-saws*: i. 'Der landwirtschaftliche Volkskalender,' Leipzig, 1905, and iv. 'Popular Weather-lore' (Russ.), St. Petersburg, 1905. It is shown in these works that, while all European peoples have a vast store of weather-wisdom, sometimes exhibiting remarkable affinities and parallels, yet the inhabitants of Eastern Europe surpass all others in this regard. In that region there is no animal so diminutive, no herb so insignificant, but its doings or properties may supply omens of future events, of weather that will be favourable or unfavourable to the husbandman; while, again, there is no natural phenomenon, occurring at some particular time, but may act as the harbinger of a good or a bad harvest. In Kasan, the Chuvashes (a Finnish, now Finno-Russian, tribe) are said to be looked upon as oracles.

'Strange as it may seem, they scarcely ever go astray in their predictions. By long-continued observation they have become sensitive to signs which enable them almost unerringly to forecast the weather.' 'Their memories are stored with a mass of all but infallible maxims inherited from the past.'

(2) The period between Christmas and the Feast of Epiphany is known in Russia as *svjatki* (from *svjatŭ*, 'holy'), or *koljada* (from Lat. *calendæ*), the latter term being also applied to the practice of going about from house to house at Christmas and on New Year's morning. During the Christmas week the practice of prognostication, which is applied in the main to affairs of love and marriage, and partly also to forecasting the weather and the harvest, attains its highest vogue (cf. *Russian Folk-poetry* [Russ.], Glasunov ed., St. Petersburg, 1904, p. 86; Stepanov, *Popular Festivals in Holy Russia* [Russ.], St. Petersburg, 1899, p. 149). When young men or young women wish to know something of their future partners in life, they have recourse to the *horse-oracle*. The young women, for example, take out a horse, and walk it over a beam: if it stumbles, the husband of the person consulting the oracle will be a good man; if it steps clear, he will be bad.[1] Divining the future by means of a splinter of wood is also concerned with marriage. When the splinter has been partly dipped in water, it is set fire to at the dry end; then the shorter or longer interval before the flame expires foretells respectively a happy or unhappy marriage.[2]

The period between Christmas and Epiphany was, as already indicated, a special time for weather-prophecy, as witness the following extract from Ermolov, *op. cit.* i. 518 f.:

'In Little Russia, before the supper on Christmas eve, the oldest of the household brings a bundle of hay into the cottage, spreads it upon the bench in the front corner, covers it with a clean tablecloth, and then places above this, and just beneath the bracket for the saint's image, an unthreshed sheaf of rye or wheat. During supper those present engage in reading the signs which indicate the character of the ensuing harvest. For this purpose they draw hay-stems from under the tablecloth, and from the length of these form an estimate as to the growth of the corn. They likewise pull stalks of straw out of the sheaf under the ikon; if the stalk bears a full ear, they may look forward to a good harvest; while, if the ear is shrivelled, the crops will be a failure. When the supper is over, and the housewife has cleared the table, the reading of omens is renewed, these being now found in the seeds dropped from various plants among the hay. If most of the seeds are black, the buckwheat will turn out well; while, if white or red seeds predominate, oats, millet, and wheat may be expected in abundance. At the killing of the pig before the Christmas festivities, the peasants in Little Russia inspect the pancreas. If it is large, thick, and of equal breadth throughout its whole length, the winter will not be a long one, and there will be no severe frosts; but, if the gland be of irregular shape—thick at the head end and thin at the other, or inversely—the winter will be cold at the beginning and warm towards the close, or *vice versa*. If the pancreas be thin about the middle, the peasants expect a thaw in mid-winter.'

This custom recalls the Roman Saturnalia and haruspication; and it is also said that the Russians have a parallel to the *signa ex tripudiis*, i.e. divination by the eating and drinking of fowls (cf. the 'Roman' section of this article). It may be said without misgiving, indeed, that analogies of the Roman auguries and their underlying superstitions are nowhere found more abundantly than in the east of Europe. It should be observed, however, that the peasantry are quite well aware that during the *svjatki* they have still one foot in paganism, for, as they say, 'the beginning [of the season] also ushers in the revelries of the Evil One and the witches, who steal the moon and the stars from the sky, keep holiday, and disport with the demons.'

While, nowadays, as the foregoing bears out, the Russian people—men and women alike—are all highly proficient in *primĕty* and *gadania*, these arts were formerly to a great extent in the hands of wizards and sorcerers, the various names applied to whom are enumerated and explained in the art. CHARMS AND AMULETS (Slavic), vol. iii. p. 465[a]. Besides these adepts, however, there are other two classes of persons to whom is attributed a special measure of supernatural and prophetic power, viz. women and lunatics.

The belief that the faculty of seeing into the future belongs in an eminent degree to *women* can be traced everywhere in ancient Europe, and, as existent among the Germans, finds its clearest expression in Tac. *Germ.* 8:

'Inesse quin etiam sanctum aliquid et providum putant, nec aut consilia earum aspernantur aut responsa negligunt'; cf. also *Hist.* iv. 61: 'vetere apud Germanos more, quo plerasque feminarum fatidicas et augescente superstitione arbitrantur deas' (further particulars in K. Müllenhoff, *Deutsche Altertumskunde*, Berlin, 1870–1900, iv. 208 ff.).

As regards the basis of fact which underlies the real or imaginary prophetic gift thus ascribed to women, and exalting them in the people's eyes to

[1] For the horse-oracle among the Indo-Germanic peoples, cf. *ERE* ii. 55.

[2] On this topic, cf. the present writer's remarks on the Indo-Germanic marriage in *Die Indo-Germanen*, Leipzig, 1911, p. 87 f.

the position of *Haliurunnas* (Goth. [Jordanes, *Get.* xxiv.]), 'those who know the secrets of hell, or of the under world,' we shall hardly err in tracing this element to the nervous and hysterical nature of woman, which, in moments of excitement, seems to raise her above earthly conditions. It was in the state of ecstasy likewise that the Greek *Pythia* uttered her oracles. This was also the case in the remarkable outbreak of the Russian *klikuši* (from *klikati*, 'to shriek'), the 'possessed' or 'epileptic,' who greatly disturbed the country in the 16th cent., and had to be dealt with by the Church Council of Moscow (*stoglavny soborŭ*) in 1551. They were principally elderly unmarried women—and thus specially liable to hysteria; they ran about barefoot and unkempt; they shook, they fell, they whirled, they writhed, and amid such doings uttered their predictions of the future. Frequently—and sometimes as a result of bribery—they brought criminal charges against individuals, who were thus rendered liable to legal proceedings. The presence of these women in a city was a veritable plague, and the Church Council referred to petitioned the Czar to order the inhabitants to expel the lying prophetesses from their midst (cf. Kostomarov, *op. cit.* p. 547).

Of a somewhat similar character are the prophetic powers ascribed among the Slavs to *lunatics*. The insane fall under the same category as the Roman *monstra*, as is borne out by the Russian terms applied to them, viz. *juródivy* (from *uródŭ*, 'prodigy,' 'monster'). They filled the soul of primitive man with amazement, and even with reverential awe. Like the hysterical women just spoken of, they poured forth incoherent words and phrases, which seemed to come from another world, and to betoken a supernatural knowledge. Precisely the same process of thought manifests itself in the Greek series of words: μαίνομαι, 'I rave,' μανία, 'lunacy,' μάντις, 'soothsayer'—a development which goes to prove that at a very early period there must have existed in Greece the same sort of prophetic lunatics as are found in ancient and modern Russia. During the reign of Boris Gudunov there lived in Moscow a lunatic of this type, who was revered as a saint. Naked and with hair dishevelled he went about the streets in the coldest weather, uttering his prophecies of coming woes. In awe-inspiring accents he arraigned Boris for the murder of the young Czarevitch; but the Czar—afraid, it may be, of offending the people, or else convinced of the man's holiness of character—made no sign, and did not attempt to interfere with him in the least (cf. Giles Fletcher, *Of the Russe Common Wealth* [London, 1591], Hakluyt Soc., Lond. 1856, p. 118 f.). Even at the present day the insane fill a somewhat similar rôle in Russian village life. In a sketch called 'Village Drama,' by J. Garin (who has a masterly knowledge of the village communities), a merchant makes inquiry regarding a certain lunatic whose favourite occupation it is to pray for the dead upon their graves, and receives the following answer:

'We believe thus: he is a great servant of God. And he has taken up his abode in the bathroom at my house. I do not know why he has chosen me, for I am more wicked than others, and wholly covered with sins, as a mangy dog with fleas. So I cannot tell why it entered his mind to live with me. Still, he has fixed upon me, and now lives with me. We cannot account for him with *our* thoughts, and so we can understand only by signs (*primětŭ*)—he is, in truth, a great servant of God.'

Such are the ideas which still prevail regarding the insane among the Russian peasantry.

LITERATURE.—This has been given in the course of the article.

O. SCHRADER.

DIVINATION (Muslim).—The methods of divination in use among the Muslims are enumerated in the following order by Ibn Khaldūn (*Prolegomena*, tr. de Slane, 1862–68, i. 218): (*a*) gazing at polished surfaces or 'crystal-gazing'; (*b*) haruspicy, *i.e.* observation of the entrails of slaughtered animals; (*c*) sortilege with nuts or pebbles; (*d*) *zajr* or *'iyāfah*, augury, or observation of the motions of beasts and birds; (*e*) possession; (*f*) casual utterance; (*g*) *ḍarb al-raml*, geomancy or divination with sand; (*h*) (in Rabbinic phrase) *gematria*, or divination by letters. Under one or other of these heads all the forms of divination in use among the Muslims can be ranged; thus the discipline which corresponds with palmistry, but deals preferably with other lines than those on the hand, is clearly akin to haruspicy. Into most of them astrology enters, for the process is supposed to be influenced by the controlling planet.

Of these *augury* certainly goes back to pagan days, and it is noticeable that the word by which the Hebrew prophets describe their visions (*ḥāzōn*) comes from a root whereby in Arabic this process is described. The verses collected or invented by antiquarians in illustration of the Arabian augury indicate that it was in part etymological; the word for 'raven' comes from a root meaning 'to be a stranger,' whence the appearance of a raven indicates parting or pilgrimage; the name for the hoopoe suggests 'guidance,' whence its appearance is of good omen to the wanderer. Two ancient augural words refer to the motion of the creature from right to left and from left to right; but the usage of the terms seems to have varied with different tribes, nor were they in accord as to the favourable direction.

The following rules are given in the treatise *Mufīd al-'ulūm* of Khwārizmī:

'When mountain beasts and birds leave their places, this presages a severe winter; a plague among cattle presages a plague among human beings, but a plague among swine presages health; a plague among wild beasts presages a famine; loud croaking of frogs presages plague; snoring by a man of importance presages promotion; loud breathing in sleep presages loss of money; loud hooting by an owl in a house where there is an invalid presages his recovery; but loud croaking presages the arrival of an enemy.'

From the practice of augury it is not easy to separate divination by encounter, and indeed the Greeks are said to have applied the word 'bird' loosely to whatever came in their way. In general, meeting with anything which suggests ill-luck is unlucky; the poet Ibn al-Rūmī permitted no inmate of his house to leave it for days, because they would have to encounter a one-eyed neighbour. It is lucky to meet some one who is carrying milk; all over N. Africa it is considered good manners to permit the wayfarer to dip his finger in it (Doutté, *Magie et religion*, p. 352). In the same region it is unlucky to hear the braying of an ass (which, according to the Qur'ān, is the most disagreeable of sounds), and the hearer should pronounce an exorcism. An early European traveller records that Maghribine warriors on their way to the front regard it as a good sign to meet big game, such as lions or boars; a bad sign to meet hares or rabbits. Certain omens are drawn from the conduct of domestic animals and of children; at Onja, when the children took to lighting bonfires in the streets in the evening, their parents knew that war was at hand. There are cases in which the symbolism is rather less intelligible. Thus in N. Africa honey is thought to be unlucky, and must not be offered to a guest on the evening of his arrival or to a bride.

Haruspicy is properly connected with sacrifice, which occupies a very subordinate place in the Islāmic system. The Zenatah who lived between Tlemsen and Tiyaret practised divination by inspection of shoulder-blades, taken from sacrificed animals; from the lines or formation the *haruspex* could tell whether the year was going to be good or bad. This 'scapulomancy' is called *'ilm al-aktāf*.

In Turkestan, 'the most common method of divining the course of future events is to place on the coals the shoulder-blade of a sheep, which has been carefully cleaned of the flesh. This is gradually calcined, and the cracks, the colour, and the small particles which fall away from it, denote good or bad luck or the various accidents which may happen on an expedition. Another kind of divination is very common: *kumalak*, by means of dried sheep-dung. The Kirghiz selects forty balls of dung, and divides them roughly into three heaps. He then takes four at a time from each heap, until only four or less remain in each. The remainder he also divides into three heaps, and again takes from each by fours. Three more heaps are thus made, so that at last there are three rows of three piles in each. What is left he divides by three, and sees whether the remainder be one, two, or three. The varying numbers and positions of the balls of dung can be explained by an experienced soothsayer to the intense satisfaction or to the disappointment of the one who consults him' (Schuyler, *Turkistan*, New York, 1876, ii. 31).

Similar omens are drawn in N. Africa from the excrements in the rectum of the victim, and the blood. Scapulomancy is mentioned by Jāḥiẓ († A.H. 255) together with palmistry and another mode of augury which is far less familiar, viz. divination by the gnawing of mice. When the Khalīf Manṣūr (A.D. 754–775) was in a village, a mat of his was gnawed by a mouse; he sent it to be mended, but the workman suggested that it ought to be examined by a diviner first; the diviner foretold the Khalīf a quiet and prosperous reign (*Zoology*, A.H. 1323, v. 93).

The use of the *polished surface* or magic mirror goes back to ancient times; according to Ibn Khaldūn, who agrees in this respect with modern crystal-gazers, the image appears not on the mirror itself, but on a kind of vapour which floats between the surface and the gazer's eye. The Khalīf Manṣūr had a mirror which told him whether a man was a friend or an enemy; according to Sir 12[10f.], the mirror rusted in the case of the enemy, and this was probably how the Agamemnon of Æschylus worked his 'mirror of friendship' (line 839). The process varies very much in different places, different materials being employed, with great varieties of symbolism. In Egypt the practice called *ḍarb al-mandal* is common, and performed with liquids, *e.g.* water or ink, or else with solid mirrors, such as sword-blades. Lane (*Modern Egyptians*, ed. 1871, i. 337–346) gives an account of some extraordinary performances of the kind which he witnessed in Cairo; the visions were seen by a boy, casually asked to gaze, in ink placed in the palm of his hand and surrounded by certain numerals; other features were a chafing-dish with live charcoal, in which spells written on paper by the diviner were burned together with frankincense and coriander-seed. In the mirror so arranged the boy saw among other persons Lord Nelson, of whom he had never heard. Lane's story provoked considerable discussion in Europe, but was defended by Sir R. Burton (*Pilgrimage*, ed. 1893, ch. xviii.), Sir Gardiner Wilkinson, and other persons familiar with the East. This process is used for discovering offenders; according to the account of it given by Doutté (p. 390), which tallies in many respects with Lane's but adds many details, the medium is supposed to command the services of ten of the *jinn*, who are first told to discharge certain domestic duties and then compelled by an oath to tell the medium anything which he wishes to know. The function of medium is limited to a small class: boys under age, negresses, *enceinte* women, and people with a long 'line of fortune.'

Possession, or inspiration by the *jinn*, appears to have been a principle of the pre-Islāmic divination, and the archæologists profess to name some of the early diviners. Probably possession was not regarded as their normal state, and they hypnotized themselves by some process or other. The importance of the *casual utterance* doubtless goes back to an early date in Semitic civilization; what is required is that the utterance should either be wholly unconnected with the matter on which it is made to bear, or that it should proceed from an invisible speaker. The author of *al-Fakhri* gravely narrates cases in which information was conveyed by these mysterious channels.

The two last methods—*geomancy* and '*gematria*'—are probably the most characteristically Muslim methods of divination, and the literature on both subjects is copious. In the former, some sand casually taken up is arranged in fifteen columns of from 5 to 7 grains, bearing technical names; conventional values are assigned to the combinations of these, and these conventional values give the answers to the questions addressed. A Bodleian MS contains a dictionary of those values; but it is not very lucid as to the mode whereby the column is obtained. Divination by the values attached to the letters of men's names is a highly complicated subject; Sabti (a man of Ceuta) invented a divination-table for this purpose called *Zairjah*, consisting of concentric circles, accompanied by an explanatory poem, based partly on letter-values, partly on astrology. Ibn Khaldūn inserts it in his *Prolegomena*; but his translator, de Slane, confesses his inability to follow the system. Some use, which is not very clear, is made of such groups as 222, 333, 444, etc.—a fact which indicates, what is otherwise attested, that the 'number of the Beast' is something far more complicated than the letter-values of a man's name. An obscure discipline, based on the numerical values of the letters, is called *jafr*; the Khalīf 'Alī is said to have composed two books bearing the names *Jafr* and *Jāmi'ah*, wherein, by calculations of this sort, doubtless connected with Qur'ānic texts, he foretold the whole history of the world until the Day of Judgment. These books are supposed to be in possession of the descendants of 'Alī, and, as was the case with the Sibylline books, some of their contents are occasionally divulged; the author of the *Dict. of Tech. Terms in the Mussalman Sciences* saw an extract which foretold the fate of the Egyptian sovereigns.

A classical manual of the black art is the 'Goal of the Sage' of Maslamah of Madrid († A.H. 398 = A.D. 1007–8), which it took him seven years to compose, containing matter which astonishes the reader. It there appears that both the planets and the constellations divide between them the various objects to be found in the world, and the different avocations of mankind. Thus to Mars belong the power of attraction, natural science, surgery, farriery, tooth-drawing, the Persian language, the right nostril, the gall, heat, hatred, the theology which denies the Divine attributes, silk, hareskin and dogskin, iron-work, brigandage, bitter tastes, dryness, and red stones; to the Ram belong the face, pupil, and ear, yellow and red, bitterness, deserts and robbers' caves, fuel, animals with cloven hoofs. The week-days, besides their planetary assignation, belong to certain angels: Monday to Gabriel, being cold and wet; Thursday to 'Isrāfīl, being hot and wet; Saturday to 'Azrā'īl, being cold and dry; Wednesday to Michael, as being a mixture of all four. The nature of the ink to be used in charms varies with the planets and constellations; and, according to the position of the moon, a charm when written should be disposed of in earth, air, fire, and water. Those who desire the services of the planets should bow down to them, and address to them complimentary speeches calling them by their Arabic, Indian, Greek, or Yunani names. The Greek names (called by this author *Rūmī*) are correctly given. One author, Ja'far of Baṣrah, whom this writer cites, invented a planetary division of the Qur'ān: by counting the mystic letters contained within

these divisions, he discovered how long each dynasty was to last; for each was controlled by one of the planets.

Lane (i. 328) describes some of the consulting tables or books in use in Egypt. The table of Idris consists of 100 compartments, in each of which a letter of the Arabic alphabet is written; the questioner, after reciting a text bearing on the subject of the Divine omniscience, places his finger at random on a letter; he then makes a sentence by adding every fifth letter till he comes back to the first; the sentence thus formed tells him whether to proceed or desist; it is so constructed that the proportion of negative replies to positive is four to one. Some which the writer has seen consist of Qur'ānic texts written in a mysterious alphabet; therefore only an expert can use them; the more cautious experts are ready to give general answers out of them, but decline to give replies in which any sort of exactitude is required. The use of *sortes Koranicæ*, or divining by the first text that meets the eye on opening the sacred volume, is said to go back to very early times; many copies of the Qur'ān contain directions for this method of using the book. One method mentioned by Lane consists in counting the number of times the letters which commence the Arabic words for 'good' and 'bad' occur on the page, and in deciding for or against a course by the majority. Another substitutes the rosary for the Qur'ān, and employs the three formulæ, 'God's glory,' 'Praise to God,' and 'There is no god but God,' to represent 'good,' 'indifferent,' 'bad'; two beads are then selected at random, and the formulæ recited in the above order, the beads being counted between the two selected; whichever formula goes to the last bead is regarded as answering the question.

That the *dream* should be commonly employed for ascertaining the future is natural, and there is a considerable literature on *ta'bīr*, or 'dream interpretation,' mainly founded on the work of Artemidorus. Lane mentions an Egyptian practice of praying for dreams which can be used in this way: the questioner requests to be shown something white or green, or water, if the course which he contemplates is approved; something black or red, or fire, in the other case. Certain mystical words uttered before going to sleep will produce, it is thought, veridical visions. In some places the Qur'ān serves as a sort of vocabulary for the language of dreams; a ship signifies safety, because the word 'save' is used in the Qur'ān in connexion with Noah's ark; to dream of a king entering an unusual abode is unlucky, because the visit of a king is said in the same book to be a prelude to disaster. Similar glosses can be got from traditions, current proverbs, or familiar usage of words, while, in other cases, the theory that dreams signify their contraries can be applied; *e.g.* the victor in a dream-duel will be the defeated in the real encounter. The author of the *Mufīd al-'ulūm* gives a brief glossary of the dream-language, in the main on these principles; a complete dictionary of it was composed by 'Abd al-Ghanī al-Nāhlusī (printed at Cairo, 1307), including proper names; the number of meanings assigned to the symbols is unfortunately perplexing; thus, to dream of Adam may either signify a warning to repent, or presage promotion to high office, or indicate that the dreamer will be deceived by the words of an enemy, etc. There are places where veridical dreams are more likely to be obtained than elsewhere; these are sometimes caves, more often the graves of saints.

The attitude of Islāmic theology towards all these practices is, in general, tolerant, and indeed the presence in the Qur'ān of mystic letters strongly favours its magical employment, which is exceedingly natural in those countries in which Arabic is little understood, though used in both private and public worship. The belief in the *jinn*, who discharge some function in many of these operations, is also orthodox. The prophet himself appears to have attached considerable importance to omens, and, as might be expected, had prophetic dreams. Astrology was a highly respected discipline, on which even orthodox theologians might write. Further, some forms of Ṣūfīism took up with ardour the Qabbalistic study of the Qur'ān, and in these speculations the letter-values play a prominent part. On the other hand, students of philosophy found ways of introducing a theory of divination into their system. The two most famous essays on the subject are those of Mas'ūdī (ed. Barbier de Meynard, 1861–77, iii. 323–364) and Ibn Khaldūn (tr. de Slane, i. 216–237, and iii. 199 ff.). The former mentions three theories to account for divination: some suggested inspiration by *jinn*; others, the influence of the planet Mercury at the diviner's birth; yet others based the diviner's special knowledge on the purity of his soul; and this last appears to be the view held by Mas'ūdī himself. He confirms it by the facts that the genuine diviner is usually an anchorite and devotee, and that the famous pre-Islāmic diviners showed a tendency to get rid of their bodies altogether: thus the wizard Saṭīḥ had no bones save in his head.

Ibn Khaldūn's theory is that, in all cases of divination which do not depend on calculations, the soul is detached from the senses, and so comes in contact with forms to which it (the soul) serves as matter; such powers, in the case of the Ṣūfīs, are an accident of their *askesis*; and, so long as the ascetic is only accidentally a diviner, his statements are more trustworthy than those of the astrologer; but, if he becomes a professional diviner, then he becomes less trustworthy, since some of the purity of his soul is affected by the diminished sincerity of his purpose. This theory can be accommodated to the supposed prophetic *powers of the mad* (which Aristotle seems to have recognized) by the supposition that, in their case, the connexion between soul and body is less stable than it is in that of the sound-minded; and it suits still better the supposed phenomenon of prophecy by persons at the point of death, or who are just going to sleep. According to Ibn Khaldūn, tyrants sometimes put men to death, with the view of learning the future from their dying utterances.

LITERATURE.—E. Doutté, *Magie et religion dans l'Afrique du nord*, Algiers, 1910; *Ghāyat al-Ḥakīm*, by Maslamah of Madrid (MS); *Shams al-Ma'rifah* of al-Būnī (MS). Cf. also the authorities cited in the article.

D. S. MARGOLIOUTH.

DIVINATION (Persian).—While the Avesta polemizes repeatedly against sorcerers and witches (*yātu*, *pairikā*; see the references collected in Bartholomae, *Altiran. Wörterb.*, Strassburg, 1904, cols. 1283–85, 863 f.), these attacks are levelled only against 'black magic'; magic operations for beneficent purposes, as for the counteracting of black magic, are quite permissible, and amulets are prescribed for certain contingencies, as well as the repetition of sacred texts for banishing powers of evil (*Yašt* xiv. 35–40, 45, 57–60; *Vend.* ix. 45 f., x. 1 f., xx. 12; cf., further, art. CHARMS AND AMULETS [Iranian]). A precisely similar state of affairs meets us in the *Šāh-nāmah* of Firdūsī (tr. Mohl, Paris, 1876–78), where, side by side with black magic—usually performed by a non-Iranian (a Turk raises a magic storm against the Iranians [iii. 26 ff.; cf. vi. 494 f.]; a Jew envenoms food by causing his glance to fall on milk in it [vi. 235 ff.]; a Turk sends false dreams [vi. 500 f.])—beneficent magic is mentioned, and evidently approved (King Minōčihr 'closed the gate of magic by his incanta-

tions' [i. 164]; a physician employs incantations to aid in childbirth [i. 277]; the use of a magic tamarisk arrow enables Rustam to slay Isfandiār [iv. 539 f., 545]). There is, therefore, more than a grain of truth in the statement of Diogenes Laertius (*Proœm.* 6), that the Magi 'did not know black magic' (τὴν δὲ γοητικὴν μαγείαν οὐκ ἔγνωσαν), though they 'practised the mantic art and prophecy' (ἀσκεῖν τε καὶ μαντικὴν καὶ πρόρρησιν).

Divination relies in great part upon omens (*q.v.*), which may depend upon the day when they are seen. Thus, on the 'Fox-day' festival in the month of Ātarō a white ram was believed to be seen on a certain mountain; if he bleated, the year would be prosperous; but, if he did not bleat, it would be sterile; and, in like fashion, the spectre of a white ox bellowed twice on the night of 16th Dīn if the year was to be fertile, and once if it was to be barren (al-Bīrūnī, *Chron. of Anc. Nations*, tr. Sachau, London, 1879, pp. 211, 213).

Omens were also drawn in later Zoroastrianism from the appearance of a snake on each of the thirty days of the month, each of the days of the week, and each of the signs of the zodiac (al-Bīrūnī, p. 218; Modi, *Persian Mār-nāmeh*, Bombay, 1893; Salemann, in *Travaux du iiime Cong. des Orientalistes*, St. Petersburg, 1879, ii. 497 f.; Gray, 'Alleged Zoroastrian Ophiomancy and its Possible Origin,' in *Hoshang Mem. Vol.*, Bombay, 1911, pp. 454–464), and also from the first appearance of the moon in each of the signs of the zodiac (Gray, 'Parsi-Persian Burj-Nāmah,' *JAOS* xxx. [1910] 336–342; Rosenberg, 'Burdz-Nâme,' in *Trans. Orient. Sect. Imp. Russ. Archæolog. Soc.* [Russ.], 1911). These omens Gray seeks to derive ultimately from Babylonia, while Rosenberg finds their source rather in India. Besides all this, certain days were lucky, and others the reverse, as in a calendar for A.H. 1099 = A.D. 1687 (ed. Beck, *Ephemerides Persarum*, Augsburg, 1696), where the lucky days are Artavahišt 3, 10, Horvadaṭ 1, 6, 30, Tir 9, Amerōdaṭ 2, 24, Šatvairō 2–3, Mitrō 4, Ātarō 1, 16, 30, Dīn 3, 30, Vohūman 7–8, Spendarmaṭ 10, 25, and the first epagomenal day; while the unlucky days are Fravarṭin 23, Artavahišt 11, 28, 30, Horvadaṭ 26, 28, Tīr 28, Amerōdaṭ 28, Šatvairō 4, Mitrō 14, Dīn 4, 29, Spendarmaṭ 9, and the third epagomenal day.

That omens were not regarded as unlawful among the Iranians is clear from the mention of their study without condemnation in the *Epistles of Mānūščihar* (I. i. 2, II. i. 3 [*SBE* xviii. 280, 326]); and in the *Šāh-nāmah* they also find a place.

Chosrū Parvīz sees a portent of his approaching downfall when a quince rolls from his hand (vii. 295 f.), and a happy omen is drawn by Bahrām Cōpīn (vi. 475). It was, however, possible to avert an omen. When Isfandiār was on the march, a camel in the van lay down and refused to move, thus delaying the entire army. This was an evil portent, and the general ordered the camel's head and feet to be cut off, 'that the misfortune might fall upon the camel' (iv. 464). On the other hand, omens might be misinterpreted, as when, just after the completion of the bridge across the Hellespont and the canal around Athos, an eclipse of the sun occurred, which the Persian astrologers explained to Xerxes as foreboding the eclipse of the Greek power, whereas the reverse was actually the outcome (Herod. vii. 19).

The regular forms of divination among the Iranians were astrology (which may here include horoscopy [see, further, the 'Persian' section in art. STARS]), oneiromancy, cylicomancy, and rhabdomancy.

1. Astrology.—Reserving for the art. STARS (Persian) a full discussion of that astrological and astronomical knowledge to which the Persians were indebted for no small part of their fame in the classical world, we may note here that the Pahlavi *Dīnkarṭ* (9th cent.)—a work which, though late, may be regarded as authoritative in its field —has an interesting summary of the Iranian views regarding astrology (ed. and tr. Peshotan Behramjee Sanjana, Bombay, 1874 ff., p. 590 f. [vol. ix.]):

'The star-readers understand the worth of the allotment (of destiny by the stars). How long are the chief allotting (stars) to move in bad aspects? How long are they in conjunction with the malignant owner of bad aspects? How long does the man (influenced by such stars) work in the way of wisdom? The laws relating to these and other (astrological) details the astrologers learn from writings on the earth (*i.e.* from astrology). Astrologers can foretell the good events of a man's (life) from his horoscope.'

Although astrology is not mentioned in the Avesta, there is no reason to doubt that it existed in Irān from a very early date. The first mention in any Pahlavi text thus far accessible, however, seems to be in the romance *Kārnāmak-ī Artaxšīr-ī Pāpakān* (dating probably from the middle of the 6th cent.), which relates that Ardavān (Artabanos V. [A.D. 215–224]) summoned before him the sages and astrologers and asked them:

'What do you observe regarding the seven planets and the twelve signs of the zodiac, the position and the motion of the stars, the condition of the contemporary sovereigns of different kingdoms, the condition of the peoples of the world, and regarding myself, children, and our family?' The answer from the two chief astrologers was: 'The *Nahāzīg* [Capricorns] is sunk below; the star Jupiter has returned to its culminating point and stands away from Mars and Venus, while Haptōirang [the Great Bear] and the constellation of Leo descend to the verge and give help to Jupiter; whereupon it seems clear that a new lord or king will appear, (who will) kill many potentates, and bring the world again under the sway of one sovereign. . . . It is so manifest that any one of the male servants who flies away from his king within three days [from to-day] will attain to greatness and kingship, obtain his wish, and be victorious over his king' (ed. and tr. Darab Peshotan Sanjana, Bombay, 1896, p. 10 f.). The servant in question (the hero of the romance) does flee, and the king again inquires of the astrologers, learning that the fugitive must be captured in three days, or not at all (p. 15 f.).

The richest source for examples of Iranian astrology is unquestionably the *Šāh-nāmah*, the enumeration of the principal instances in which is as follows:

Farīdūn casts the horoscope of his son Salm (i. 104); the astrologers and *mobeds* (priests) do the like for Zāl, the father of Rustam (i. 184); astrologers declare to king Minōčihr that his death is approaching (i. 298); they find that the children alleged to have been born of Sūdhābah were neither begotten of the king nor brought forth by her (ii. 185); they foretell misfortune to a city built by Siāvaxš (ii. 274); they choose a lucky day for the departure of the army of Kai Chosrū to Tūrān (iii. 9); they prophesy the fortunes of battle to Ṭūs (iii. 24); they are among those sought to inquire the reason of the disfavour of heaven toward Irān (iv. 186); the famous Jāmāsp (the hero of the *Jāmāsp-nāmak*, ed. and tr. Modi, Bombay, 1903) foretells to Guštāsp the outcome of battle (iv. 309 ff.) and the death of Isfandiār (iv. 453 ff.); astrologers draw an ill-omened horoscope for Saghād (iv. 567); Queen Humāi has a lucky day chosen by the astrologers for the commencement of her campaign against Rūm (Greece) and for the coronation of Dārāb (Darius III.) (v. 24, 33); the Aškānian Ardavān directs the astrologers to divine the future, and they foretell sorrow (v. 228); the horoscope of Bahrām Gūr is cast by the astrologers (v. 396 f.); Yazdagird, the father of Bahrām Gūr, seeks from them the day and manner of his death (v. 416); ill forebodings are given to Bahrām Gūr by the astrologers (vi. 55); defeat is prophesied for Bahrām Cōpīn in his expedition against Sāvah (vi. 474); Ai'īn Gušāsp seeks the future from an aged female astrologer, her evil tidings confirming a former astrological prognostic concerning him (vi. 561 f.); it was prophesied to Chosrū Parvīz that he would die far from his retainers by the hand of a slave, between a mountain of gold and one of silver, under a heaven of gold and on an earth of iron (vii. 286); the same king had had a horoscope cast for his son, Qubād (vii. 299 ff.); and an astrologer foresees evil for Yazdagird, the last of the Iranian kings (vii. 350).

Precisely similar methods of astrology are ascribed by Firdūsi to the Chinese (vi. 276, 463), the Arabs (v. 399), and the Greeks (vii. 89); while the Persians are represented as using not only their own astrological tables, but also those of the Hindus (v. 276) and the Greeks (v. 396). At the court of Farīdūn there was a council of sages, scholars, priests, and astrologers (i. 112). It may also be noted that the *Cahār Maqāla* of Niẓāmī of Samarqand (tr. Browne, *JRAS*, 1899, ed. Mīrzā Muḥammad, London, 1910) has an entire chapter on astrologers and their art, and there are many other notices on the matter, as that the poet Anvarī made a notably unsuccessful forecast of the weather (Browne, *Lit. Hist. of Persia*, London, 1902 ff., ii. 367 f.), though here we are no longer on purely Iranian ground.

2. Oneiromancy.—Early in his invasion of Greece, Xerxes had three disturbing dreams, the last of which was (somewhat artificially) interpreted by his magi as portending the subjection of all the world to the Persian sway (Herod. vii. 12 ff.; see also the dream of Cyrus interpreted by Hystaspes [Herod. i. 209 f.], another dream of Cyrus recorded by Dinon [in Cicero, *de Divinat.* i. 23], and the dream of the mother of Cyrus given by Nicolaus Damascenus [frag. 66; *FHG* iii. 399]). In Pahlavi literature the *Kārnāmak-ī Artaxšīr-ī Pāpakān* (p. 3 f.), which is closely followed by the *Šāh-nāmah* (v. 218 f.), ascribes to Pāpak a vision, duly interpreted by the diviners, of the future greatness of Sāsān, the eponymous ancestor of the Sasanian dynasty; and in like manner, ac-

cording to the late *Zarātušt-nāmah* (ed. and tr. Rosenberg, St. Petersburg, 1904, p. 23 f.), Zoroaster himself had a prophetic dream, for the understanding of which the services of an 'interpreter of dreams' were necessary. But it is in the *Šāh-nāmah* that we find the richest material for a knowledge of the system of interpretation of dreams in Persia.

The evil Ḍaḥḥāk (the Azi Dahāka of the Avesta) sees in a dream his approaching downfall at the hands of Farīdūn (i. 51 ff.); Sām has two visions which cause him to find and restore to favour his son Zāl, whom he had exposed in infancy (i. 171 ff.; cf. *ERE* i. 7ᵇ); a lucky dream of Kai Qubād is interpreted by the hero Rustam (i. 363 f.); the Turanian king Afrāsiāh has a dream of evil portent (ii. 206 ff.); Siāvaxš is warned by a dream of his impending death (ii. 311), and himself appears in a vision to Pīrān, the general of Afrāsiāh, to announce the birth of Kai Chosrū (ii. 333); the archangel Srōš tells Gūdarz in a dream of the future great deeds of Kai Chosrū (ii. 380 f.); Jarīrah is told in a dream of the death of her son, Farūd (ii. 503 f.); Siāvaxš appears in a dream to Ṭūs and foretells the successful outcome of the impending battle (iii. 55); a vision of ill omen is seen by Bizan (iii. 254 f.); the archangel Srōš in a dream warns Kai Chosrū of his approaching death (iv. 182 f.); Nūšīrvān the Just has a vision which is interpreted by the famous sage Buzurjmihr (vi. 190 ff.); Bahrām Cōpīn, on the eve of battle with Sāvah, had a dream foretelling defeat; but this was a false vision, sent by a Turk, and it was Sāvah who was routed in fact (vi. 491, 501). Firdūsī also records similar prophetic dreams by a Greek princess (iv. 239 f.) and a Hindu king (v. 88 ff.).

3. Cylicomancy.—Divination by cups is mentioned among the Persians both by Athenæus, on the authority of Hermippos (*Deipnosoph.* 478 A: τὸ δὲ κόνδυ ἔστι Περσικὸν τὴν ἀρχήν· εἶδος δ' ἔχει, ὥς φησιν Ἕρμιππος, ὡς ὁ κόσμος, ἐξ οὗ τῶν θεῶν τὰ θαύματα καὶ τὰ καρπώσιμα γίνεσθαι ἐπὶ γῆς· διὸ ἐκ τούτου σπένδεσθαι), and by the *Šāh-nāmah* (iii. 274 ff., 281 f.). The latter work refers specifically to the magic cup possessed by Kai Chosrū, whose properties are thus described (iii. 275; ed. Vullers-Landauer, Leyden, 1877 ff., p. 1100, lines 2–6):

'He took that cup in his hand and looked. In it he perceived the seven *kišvars* [regions of the world]; of the activity and character of high heaven he made evident the what, and the how, and the how much. Within the cup he perceived the reflection all at once from Pisces to Aries; what Saturn, what Mars, what Jupiter and Leo, how the sun, and how the moon, and how Venus and Mercury—the magician ruler of the world saw within it all that was to be.' By this method of divination, which is precisely that of crystal-gazing (*q.v.*), the king was enabled to discover the exact plight of the hero Bizan and to take steps for his rescue from captivity. This magic cup was later said also to have been possessed by the earlier and wholly legendary monarch Jamšīd (the Yima of the Avesta, concerning whom see art. BLEST, ABODE OF THE [Persian]); and 'Umar Khayyām could even allegorize the legend, when he wrote (quatrain 355, ed. and tr. Whinfield, London, 1883):

'To find great Jamshed's world-reflecting bowl
I compassed sea and land, and viewed the whole;
But, when I asked the wary sage, I learned
That bowl was my own body, and my soul!'

4. Rhabdomancy.—The use of rods for divining is recorded by Dinon (frag. 8 [*FHG* ii. 91]) among the Medes, and by Herodotus (iv. 67) among the Iranian Scythians, whose 'ancestral mantic' (μαντικὴ πατρωΐη) was by means of willow rods, employed as follows:

'When they have brought great bundles of rods, they lay them on the ground and untie them, and, putting the rods one by one, they divine; and while saying this they collect the rods and again lay them together one by one. . . . They also practise divination with the bark of the linden; when one has split the linden in three parts, he unweaves and separates it (διαπλέκων . . . καὶ διαλύων) in his fingers.'

There is also a trace of hippomancy in Persia. According to Herodotus (iii. 84–87), after Darius and six other Persian nobles had slain the pseudo-Smerdis, they agreed that he should be king whose horse should first neigh after sunrise, when they had mounted their steeds. It is true, if we may believe Herodotus, that the choice of Darius in this manner was won by trickery, but the fact remains that the selection of a king by an animal is frequently mentioned in the East. A noteworthy parallel is the repeated account in Indian folk-tales whereby he who is chosen by an elephant (sometimes accompanied by a hawk) is made king (Knowles, *Folk-Tales of Kashmir*², London, 1893, pp. 17, 159, 169 f., 309; Steel and Temple, *Wide-Awake Stories*, Bombay, 1884, p. 140 f.; Day, *Folk-Tales of Bengal*, London, 1883, p. 100). And, according to Agathias (ii. 25), the Persians sought to know the future by gazing into the sacred fire—a practice which he thought might be derived from the Chaldæans or some other nation.

In conclusion, mention may be made of an interesting form of minor divination practised by the sage Buzurjmihr, as recorded in the *Šāh-nāmah* (vi. 371 ff.; see also Tha'ālibī, *Hist. des rois des Perses*, ed. and tr. Zotenberg, Paris, 1900, pp. 633–636). He had been imprisoned by Nūšīrvān the Just, to whom the Emperor of Byzantium sent a sealed casket, the contents of which were to be divined without opening it. All the *mobeds* failed, and Buzurjmihr was accordingly set at liberty and requested to use his skill. As he passed along a road, the sage met three women—one having a husband and child, the second married but childless, and the third unmarried; and he accordingly was able to inform the king that the casket contained three pearls under more than three wrappers—one of the pearls being pierced, the second half-pierced, and the third unpierced.

LITERATURE.—The passages in the classics regarding Persian divination are indicated by Rapp, *ZDMG* xx. [1866] 76 f. The Iranian material appears to have remained unconsidered hitherto.

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DIVINATION (Roman).—Among the inhabitants of ancient Italy we find abundant evidence of the desire to hold intercourse with the gods as a means of securing intimations of their will and disclosures regarding the future. In Italy, however, this desire assumes forms essentially different from those met with in Greece. Thus, the Italians were strangers to the idea that the Deity takes possession of the mental and spiritual faculties of a human being, making him ἔνθεος, and using him as the medium for the revelation of its designs; and even if—as has recently been conjectured (W. F. Otto, *ARW* xii. [1909] 548 ff.)—they had in the word *superstitio* a term signifying the state of trance, and thus corresponding to the Gr. ἔκστασις, yet the former carried with it from the outset a suggestion of something odd and sinister. In Italy there was no practice of inquiring into futurity by the trance or by immediate Divine enlightenment, and accordingly no trace of that species of divination which the Stoics called ἄτεχνον καὶ ἀδίδακτον μαντικῆς γένος, in contradistinction to the skilled interpretations of casual appearances in the external world (Plut. *de Vita et Poesi Homeri*, ii. 212; cf. Cic. *de Div.* ii. 26 f.). Among the Italian peoples, therefore, we meet neither with predictions emanating from Divinely inspired prophets and prophetesses (the word *vates* being probably borrowed from the Celt.), nor with dream oracles in which the gods vouchsafe their revelations to inquirers sleeping in temples. When Vergil (*Æn.* vii. 81 ff., imitated by Ovid, *Fasti*, iv. 649 ff.) tells us that King Latinus performed the rite of incubation, and received a dream-oracle, in a sanctuary of the god Faunus near Tibur, we shall hardly err in regarding the narrative as a product of the poet's fancy (cf. R. Heinze, *Vergils epische Technik*², Leipzig, 1908, p. 174, note 2), for which the descriptions of famous Greek incubation-shrines, such as that of Trophonios in Lebadeia, may have supplied the model. It is true that, when the Greek cult of the Epidaurian Asklepios migrated to Rome, it carried thither its associated practice of ἐγκοίμησις (cf. M. Besnier, *L'Ile Tibérine dans l'antiquité*, Paris, 1902, p. 223 ff.); yet it did not force its way into the ancient Roman or Italic cults; for, of course, the language of

Plautus, *Curc.* 266, 'namque incubare satius te fuerat Iovi,' in no sense implies that incubation was practised in the Capitoline temple, as the poet is merely in jest contrasting Juppiter as the god of oaths with Asklepios; while the testimony of Schol. *Pers.* ii. 56, 'cum Romani pestilentia laborarent, Castor et Pollux in somniis populum monuerunt quibus remediis uterentur,' is not sufficient to justify the hypothesis that incubation was practised in the temple of the Dioscuri in the forum (L. Deubner, *de Incubatione*, Leipzig, 1900, p. 79; *Neue Jahrb. f. klass. Altert.* ix. [1902] 384 ff.). The inscriptions, no doubt, furnish a large number of dedications which were made 'iussu,' 'imperio,' 'ex praecepto,' 'ex visu,' etc., to various deities, or in which the dedicator speaks of himself as 'somno monitus' (instances in Marquardt, *Röm. Staatsverwaltung*, Leipzig, 1885, iii. 100, note 7; A. De Marchi, *Il culto privato di Roma antica*, Milan, 1896, i. 285 ff.); but the majority of these inscriptions are connected with the worship of alien deities, such as Asklepios, Isis, Juppiter Dolichenus, Mithra, etc.; while, again, such dedications as *CIL* xiv. 23 (Ostia): 'Iovi optumo maximo ex viso aram aedificavit,' or v. 2472 (Ateste): 'C. Titius C. l. Pelops a Iove ex visu iussus posuit,' refer, not to incubation at all, but to ordinary dreams, which naturally attracted notice in Italy as elsewhere. L. Coelius Antipater, the historian, who revelled in stories of dreams that came true (Cic. *de Div.* i. 49, 55 f.), and who was probably the object of Sisenna's polemic *somniis credi non oportere* (*ib.* i. 99), no doubt borrowed this artifice for enlivening historical narrative from his Greek models, but he could not have resorted to the expedient unless the Italians had shared the general belief in the significance of dreams. Our contention is, however, that neither the dream nor the dream-oracle was an element in the religious practice of the Italic peoples.

Nor do we find the *gnomic oracle* on Italian soil. The reference of Ennius (*Ann.*, frag. 214, Vahlen, Leipzig, 1903) to the 'versus quos olim Fauni vatesque canebant' (cf. Varro, *de Ling. Lat.* vii. 36), and the ascription of ἔμμετροι χρησμοί to the goddess Carmenta (Plut. *Qu. Rom.* 56), are simply hypotheses designed to favour the etymology of the time (Faunus from *fari*, Carmenta from *carmen*), like the derivation of *ager Vaticanus* 'a vaticiniis' (Aul. Gell. xvi. 17. 1; cf. Paul. p. 379). The *carmina Marciana* certainly gained official recognition at the hands of the Roman authorities in 212 B.C., but, as appears from the text in which Livy (xxv. 12) renders them, they were simply Greek Sibylline sentences in a Latin redaction, and their supposed author, Cn. Marcius vates (Fest. p. 165), has as little right to be regarded as an ancient Italic soothsayer as the Publicius vates mentioned only by Cicero (*de Div.* i. 114, ii. 113). In point of fact, the oracle as met with in Italy never signifies an utterance emanating from an individual possessed and inspired by a divinity; it involves no more than the listening for and interpretation of the mysterious voices and noises to be heard in the world of Nature. It is to such manifestations likewise that the fragment of the 'Mysteria' of Varro's *Saturæ Menippeæ* (326, Buecheler) refers: 'prisca horrida silent oracla crepera in nemoribus.' The belief in the prophetic powers of certain water-nymphs, such as Carmenta and the Camenæ, may be supposed to indicate a practice of drawing cryptic revelations from the murmur of springs. In the rustling of the forest was heard the voice of the god Faunus, or his later representative Silvanus—the voice, *e.g.*, which on the stricken field at length announced the sternly contested and long doubtful victory (Dion. Hal. *Ant.* v. 16. 2 f.; Livy, ii. 7. 2; cf. Cic. *de Div.* i. 101, *de Nat. Deor.* ii. 6, iii. 15); while at Tiora Matiene, a place in the old Sabine country, the woodpecker, the sacred bird of Mars, perched upon a wooden pillar, exercised its prophetic gift (Dion. Hal. *Ant.* i. 14. 5; the 'picus Feronius' mentioned in Fest. p. 197, has, no doubt, a similar reference). There are numerous stories of supernatural voices which, echoing forth from sacred woods and temples, intimate the warnings or behests of the Divine powers (*e.g.* Livy, i. 31. 3, vi. 33. 5; Cic. *de Div.* i. 101); and the unknown divinity who in a communication of this kind had foretold the irruption of the Gauls was honoured—as Aius Locutius—with a shrine erected on the slope of the Palatine Hill above the temple of Vesta—at the very spot, in fact, where his voice had been heard (Livy, v. 32. 6, 50. 5, 52. 11; Cic. *de Div.* i. 101, ii. 69; Varro in Aul. Gell. xvi. 17. 2, etc.).

The distinctively Italic method of divining the future was carried out by means of *sortes*, i.e. small rods or plates bearing inscriptions and strung together (*serere*, whence *sors*); one of these was drawn, and the inscription upon it was read and interpreted in such a way as to provide an answer to the question put by the inquirer. The fact that in process of time the word *sors* came to mean 'fate' in general, and was even used as a designation of Fortuna, the goddess of destiny and luck (thus, according to the inscription *CIL* x. 6303 [Terracina], a 'Sortis signum memphiticum' is dedicated to Isis), clearly shows the importance of the device of sortilege in Italic divination. Cicero (*de Div.* i. 34) draws a rigorous contrast between the oracles 'quae aequatis sortibus ducuntur' and those 'quae instinctu divino adflatuque funduntur.' The procedure followed in drawing the lots is described most precisely in the accounts of the celebrated oracle at Præneste, which maintained its reputation till the later years of the Imperial period. According to Cicero's description (*de Div.* ii. 85 f.), the *sortes*—mysteriously discovered in some remote age—were inscribed upon tablets of oak, and in this form were preserved in a chest (*arca*) made from the wood of a sacred olive tree; it was from this chest that Juppiter, who shared this particular sanctuary with Fortuna, derived his appellation of Arcanus (*CIL* xiv. 2937, 2972; cf. 2852 = Buecheler, *Carm. epigr.*, Berlin, 1897, no. 249, 17). At the bidding of the goddess, a boy mixed the lots and then drew one out; the technical terms for this were *trahere*, *tollere*, and *ducere* (Serv. *Æn.* i. 508: 'trahuntur sortes'; Tibull. i. 3. 11: 'sacras pueri sortes ter sustulit'; cf. *CIL* v. 5801: 'sacro suscepto, sortib(us) sublatis'; Juven. vi. 583: 'sortes ducet'). Denarii of M. Plætorius Cestianus from Cicero's time show on the reverse a figure of the boy, with a tablet below him bearing the word *SORS* (E. Babelon, *Monnaies de la répub. rom.*, Paris, 1885, ii. 315, no. 10; also H. Dressel, *SBAW*, 1907, p. 371). To bring the gnome thus drawn into connexion with the question asked, and to interpret it accordingly, was the work of the *sortilegi* (Cic. *de Div.* i. 132, ii. 109; Lucan, ix. 581; Isid. *Orig.* viii. 9. 28; Porph. on Hor. *Sat.* i. 9. 29), of whose function we have direct evidence, not only as regards the worship of Fortuna at Præneste (*CIL* xiv. 2989: 'sortilegus Fortunae Primigeniae'), but also in connexion with other localities (*CIL* iv. Suppl. 5182, vi. 2274, viii. 6181). When a favourable prediction was fulfilled, it was customary for the inquirer to express his gratitude by a votive offering to the goddess, as is shown by the inscription *CIL* xiv. 2862: 'Fortunae Iovis puero Primigeniae d. d. ex sorte compos factus Nothus Ruficanae L. f. Plotillae.' The oracle was open for

consultation only on certain days—in particular on one of the two annual feast-days of the goddess (according to *CIL* i.[2] p. 339: '[hoc biduo sacrifici]um maximu[m] Fortunae Prim[i]g(eniae): utro eorum die oraclum patet, ii viri vitulum i[mmolant],' the Prænestine festivals fell on the 11th and 12th of April); but exceptions were no doubt permitted in the case of distinguished inquirers, as, *e.g.*, the Emperor Domitian, who, on New Year's Day for many years in succession, obtained a *sors* of happy omen, but received a forecast of disaster in the year of his overthrow (Suet. *Domit.* 15). The Emperor Tiberius, having become sceptical of the Prænestine oracle, resolved to destroy the *sortes*, and had the sacred *arca* sealed and conveyed to Rome; here, however, it was found that the tablets were no longer in the box, and the supposed miracle induced the Emperor to abandon his harsh design (Suet. *Tiber.* 63). In the later period of the Empire the 'sortes Vergilianae' (*Hist. Aug. Hadr.* 2. 8; *Alex. Sev.* 14. 5) were resorted to at Præneste as elsewhere, *e.g.* in the temple of Apollo at Cumæ (*Hist. Aug. Clod. Alb.* 5. 4), and on the Apennines (*ib. Claud. Got.* 10. 4–6). In this form of divination the tablets were inscribed with verses from Vergil which seemed peculiarly pregnant with meaning and capable of various interpretations; thus, *e.g.*, Alexander Severus, at the time when Elagabalus was harbouring designs upon his life, received the premonition in *Æn.* vi. 883 f.: 'si qua fata aspera rumpas, tu Marcellus eris' (*Hist. Aug. Alex. Sev.* 4. 6). Still another Italic cult of Fortuna, that, namely, located at Antium, with its two images of the goddess, was associated with an oracle, and it is recorded 'apud Antium promoveri simulacra Fortunarum ad danda responsa' (Macr. *Sat.* i. 23. 13; cf. Suet. *Calig.* 57; Martial, v. i. 3), but we do not know whether *sortes* were employed there or not. They were still in vogue, however, at Cære (Livy, xxi. 62. 5–8; cf. Sidon. Apoll. *Carm.* ix. 190), and Falerii (Livy, xxii. 1. 11; cf. Plut. *Fab.* 2), and in the cult of the river-god Clitumnus at Mevania in Umbria (Plin. *Ep.* viii. 8. 5; cf. Suet. *Calig.* 43) and of Juppiter Appenninus at the summit of the mountain pass near Iguvium ('Appenninis sortibus,' *Hist. Aug. Firm.* 3. 4; cf. *Claud. Got.* 10. 4); also in the so-called Oracle of Geryon at Fons Aponi near Patavium, where lots were cast by means of dice; it was here that Tiberius, while on the march to Illyria, was advised, *sorte tracta*, to make a throw into the fountain with golden dice, and in the event gained the maximum number of points (Suet. *Tib.* 14). According to a most felicitous conjecture of Mommsen, the seventeen bronze tablets which were discovered in the 16th cent. and then—all but three—lost again, and whose texts are given in *CIL* i. nos. 1438–1454, as also in Buecheler, *Carm. epigr.* no. 331, came originally from the shrine at Fons Aponi. They consist of little bronze plates, with a ring to hang them upon, and each is inscribed with a hexameter verse. Their language, prosody, and metre are archaic (cf. F. Ritschl, *Opusc. philol.* iv., Leipzig, 1878, 395 ff.), and would appear to be traceable to a renovation of older material made—with many misunderstandings—about Cicero's time. In purport they are banal to the last degree, and doubtless all the better adapted to supply answers to any kind of question; thus, *e.g.*, 'credis quod deicunt? non sunt ita, ne fore stultu(s),' and 'nunc (*nuncine*, Ritschl) me rogitas, nunc consulis, tempus abit iam.' The three *sortes* found in the Forum novum near Parma, and now in the museum of that city, are of a somewhat different character (*CIL* xi. 1129); on each of their four sides they bear a gnomic saying, composed, so far as we can judge from the much mutilated text, in hexameter verse of very irregular type (cf. A. Swoboda, in *Wiener Studien*, xxiv. [1902] 485 ff.).

While the practice of supplying oracles by means of *sortes* was thus indigenous to Italy, and prevalent everywhere on Italian soil, yet the Roman State religion took up a curiously disparaging attitude towards it. None of the recognized divinities of the ancient Roman régime delivered oracles, and, while Paulus (p. 368) speaks of deities called 'Tenitae, quae credebantur esse sortium deae, dictae quod tenendi haberent potestatem,' we cannot say whether he was thinking of Roman deities at all, or whether his statement has any better foundation than the obviously absurd etymology of the name. The only reference to *sortes* connected with the city of Rome is supplied by the inscription of a 'sortilegus ab Venere Erucina' (*CIL* vi. 2274)—an item of evidence emanating from a cult of Greek origin, and dating from a time when the lines of demarcation between native and foreign divination had been obliterated in private life, and when all kinds of Greek and Oriental soothsaying had found adherents in Rome. But the injunction by which the Senate, as late as 241 B.C., prohibited the consul Q. Lutatius Cerco from consulting the Prænestine *sortes* (Val. Max. *Epit.* i. 3. 2), and the scornful question of Cicero (*de Div.* ii. 87): 'quis enim magistratus aut quis vir inlustrior utitur sortibus?' are really explained by the fact that the State religion took a narrower view of the character and purpose of divination than that which prevailed in Greece, or, indeed, among other Italian tribes; note the tone of disdain in which Cicero (*ib.* i. 105, 132, ii. 70) refers to 'Soranus augur' and 'Marsus augur.' From the Roman point of view, the operations of divination were concerned, not with those things 'quae fortuitae putantur, praedictio atque praesensio' (*ib.* i. 9), but exclusively with the determination of the question whether an action just about to be performed had or had not the sanction of the gods. It is true that in Cicero's day there emerged within the Collegium of the official representatives of Roman divination—the 'interpretes Iovis optimi maximi publici augures' (*de Leg.* ii. 20)—a conflict of opinion as to the function of the augurs, viz. whether they merely expounded a system of doctrine which had been devised for reasons of State, or whether they could actually furnish a 'praesensio aut scientia veritatis futurae' (*de Div.* i. 105). Cicero, who himself became an augur in 53 B.C., and to whom Ap. Claudius Pulcher (Consul in 54 B.C.), the champion of the second of these views, had dedicated his work *de Disciplina Augurali* (Cic. *Ep. ad Fam.* iii. 4. 1), took up a mediating position, holding, on the one hand, that the augural science of his day was nothing more than an instrument put into the hands of statesmen for political ends, while maintaining, on the other, that it had originally been a 'divinatio rerum futurarum' (*de Div.* ii. 75; *de Leg.* ii. 32 f.). Even on the latter hypothesis, however, the *disciplina auguralis* had never besought the Deity for light upon the occurrence and course of future events (*de Div.* ii. 70): 'non enim sumus ii nos augures, qui avium reliquorumve signorum observatione futura dicamus'), but had merely solicited indications of the Divine consent to intended actions, and endeavoured to recognize the warnings proceeding from the gods; and, accordingly, Cicero is quite correct in speaking of the 'rerum bene gerendarum auctoritates' as the subject-matter of the science (*de Har. Resp.* 18). Such indications of the Divine will, the interpretation of which was the function of the *disciplina auguralis*, were called *auguria* or *signa*, and were either the solicited intimations of the Divine compliance (*auguria impetrativa*), or signs—chiefly of

disapproval and foreboding—spontaneously vouchsafed by the gods (*auguria oblativa* [Serv. *Æn.* vi. 190, xii. 259]). Solicited omens—so far, at least, as concerned the magisterial consultation of the gods, yet not the priestly operations of the augurs —were originally taken solely from phenomena connected with birds, and thus the word *auspicium* (=*avispicium*) became the general term for those intimations of the Divine will which, approving or dissuading, guided human conduct, as also for the art of identifying and interpreting such intimations. Consultation of the *auspicia* was in ancient times an indispensable preliminary to all important actions both in public and in private life (Cic. *de Div.* i. 28=Val. Max. ii. 1. 1): thus, we are told that the species of hawk called *ægithus* was held to be 'presperrimi augurii nuptialibus negotiis et pecuariae rei' (Pliny, *HN* x. 21). Latterly, however, the practice was discarded in private affairs, leaving as its sole vestige the designation 'nuptiarum auspices,' which was applied to certain witnesses in marriage contracts (Varro, in Serv. *Æn.* iv. 45, etc.). In public affairs, on the other hand, the science of the *auspicium* was practically the basis of official authority, as every public functionary had to make sure of the Divine sanction for every action within his jurisdiction. Accordingly, the prerogative of taking the auspices coincided with the official warrant for undertaking any particular action, so that the *auspicium*, as the Divine guarantee of success, was co-ordinate with the *imperium*, or secular authority, and the phrase 'auspicium imperiumque' covered the entire range of official power (cf. the expression 'ductu auspicio imperioque eius Achaia capta,' in the epitaph of L. Mummius [*CIL* vi. 331]).

As regards the mode of procedure in taking the auspices, we have numerous sources of information (*e.g.* Fest. p. 348; Serv. *Æn.* vi. 197; Cic. *de Div.* i. 71). When the consul had occasion to perform some duty which must be undertaken *auspicato*,—if, *e.g.*, he was about to enter upon office, to direct the proceedings of the comitia, to hold a meeting of the Senate, or to set out upon a campaign,—he proceeded, in the early morning of the day of action, and in company with one or more assistants ('qui in auspicio sunt consuli'), to the scene of the proposed task (in the case of an expedition, to the Capitol). Here a tent (*tabernaculum*) was pitched, open on the one side. Within the tent the consul, having first uttered a prayer, seated himself on a solid chair (*solida sella*), and then, directing his gaze towards the field of vision on the open side, awaited the advent of favourable auguries. It was, however, only a relatively small number of species of birds that were taken into account for the *augurium impetrativum* (Cic. *de Div.* ii. 76); the books of the augurs contained full lists of the *aves augurales* (Serv. *Æn.* i. 398), with precise regulations as to the circumstances in which, for any particular case, the omen was to be recognized as favourable or the reverse. With some kinds of birds the *auspicia* were determined by their flight, with others by their cries, and, accordingly, the augural birds were divided into the two classes of *alites* and *oscines* (Fest. p. 197; Serv. *Æn.* iv. 462). Many species, again, were propitious at one season of the year, and unpropitious at another (Pliny, *HN* x. 30: 'cornix . . . inauspicatissima fetus tempore, hoc est post solstitium'). The Divine assent was intimated by the appearance of certain birds on the right hand of the observer, of others on the left (Plaut. *Asin.* 259 f.: 'impetritum inauguratumst, quovis admittunt aves: picus et cornix ab laeva, corvos parra ab dextera consuadent'; cf. Cic. *de Div.* i. 85). The auguries, in fact, were subject to an elaborate system of casuistry, certain details of which are given in the extract in Pliny, *HN* x. 6–42 (cf. D. Detlefsen, in *Hermes*, xxxvi. [1901] 5 ff.). If during the period of observation one of the recognized favourable omens appeared (the technical phrase for this was 'addicunt aves'; cf. Livy, i. 36. 3, 55. 3, xxvii. 16. 15; Fest. p. 241), the phenomenon was accepted as evidence of the Divine consent; but, if such favourable omen did not present itself, or if the proceedings were interrupted by the fall of some object ('caduca auspicia,' Paul. p. 64), or by a disturbing noise, *e.g.* the squeak of a mouse (Pliny, *HN* viii. 223), or by a deprecatory portent (Paul. p. 64: 'clivia auspicia dicebant quae aliquid fieri prohibebant'), *e.g.* the appearance of *obscenæ aves* (Serv. *Æn.* iii. 241; Aul. Gell. xiii. 14. 6), such as owls or owlets, the consultation was regarded as having miscarried, and the action for which Divine sanction was sought could not be undertaken without a *repetitio auspiciorum*; this, however, could not usually take place until the following day (Livy, ix. 38. 15, 39. 1).

Even when a consultation had resulted favourably, however, it was still possible that the divinity might in some way interfere with the provisionally sanctioned undertaking by sending intimations that had not been asked for. The range of such *auguria oblativa* was very extensive. In the system of the augurs five varieties of *signa* were distinguished, viz. 'ex caelo,' 'ex avibus,' 'ex tripudiis,' 'ex quadrupedibus,' and 'ex diris' (Fest. p. 261), but this classification was by no means exhaustive. An official who was about to discharge some duty of State might find a propitious or deprecatory sign in any occurrence in Nature or in his immediate surroundings which he was willing to bring into relation with his intended action. Here lay the vast province of *omina*—events which in many cases were of an altogether indefinite character, but in which the person concerned might read a significance favourable to his design, and which he could, so to speak, press into his service by pronouncing the words 'accipio omen' (examples in Cic. *de Div.* i. 103 f.). Of the omens thus spontaneously granted, those which were unfavourable were naturally of greater account than the favourable, as the latter merely confirmed the result of the antecedent solicited auspices, while the former actually reversed the Divine consent already granted, and gave warning that the previously sanctioned course of action should not be carried out or persisted in: 'etenim dirae (*i.e.* all events of an abnormal and therefore alarming nature) sicut cetera auspicia, ut omina, ut signa, non causas adferunt cur quid eveniat, sed nuntiant eventura, nisi provideris' (*ib.* i. 29). Among such prohibitory omens, the phenomena of thunderstorms were regarded as of special importance. The lightning-flash was a solicited portent of great significance, not indeed for the divination of the magistrates, but for certain priestly ceremonies of the augurs (*auguria*), in which the latter sought to make sure of the Divine consent to specific actions by *auguria cœlestia* (Paul. p. 64): with their *lituus* they divided that portion of the heavens lying within their field of vision into four regions ('antica,' 'postica,' 'dextra,' 'sinistra'), and then decided, by a special *legum dictio* (Serv. *Æn.* iii. 89), the regions in which the celestial signs were to be regarded as favourable. The best-known example of this procedure is the inauguration of priests which Livy (i. 18) describes in full detail, but Cicero (*de Leg.* ii. 20) refers to other *auguria* of a similar kind, regarding which strict secrecy was maintained (Paul. p. 16), so that the actual character of many of them, such as the *verniscra auguria* (Paul. p. 379) and the *augurium canarium* (Pliny, *HN* xviii. 14; Fest. p. 285; Philarg. on Verg. *Georg.* iv. 425), is very obscure, while the frequently

mentioned *augurium salutis* (Cic. *de Div.* i. 105; Dio Cass. xxxvii. 24 f., li. 20. 4; Suet. *Aug.* 31; Tac. *Ann.* xii. 23) is expressly spoken of as μαντείας τις τρόπος (Dio Cass. xxxvii. 24. 1), in which the divinity was asked whether it was permissible to pray for the *salus publica*. The latter ceremony is referred to in a *cippus* recently discovered in Rome, and bearing the inscription (*Notiz. d. Scavi*, 1910, p. 133): 'Auguria: maximum quo salus p(opuli) R(omani) petitur, quod actum est (here follow the names of the consuls in A.D. 3 and 7), quae acta sunt (consuls of the years 1, 2, 8, 12, and 17 A.D.).' In all these augural rites the lightning-flash, and especially the *fulmen sinistrum*, was a highly favourable *impetrativum auspicium* (Cic. *de Div.* ii. 74; such an augural ceremony is probably indicated also by the African inscription *CIL* viii. 774, bearing the representation of a lightning-flash, together with the words: 'Deo loci, ubi auspicium dignitatis tale, municipes Api-[senses]'—a dedication which dates, at all events, from the time when the lightning was regarded as a solicited sign even in magisterial divination). As a spontaneously given sign, on the other hand, lightning was assumed to be wholly unfavourable. Thus, a marriage by the solemn rite of *confarreatio* could not be proceeded with if a peal of thunder was heard (Serv. *Æn.* iv. 339), and the supreme deliberative assemblies of the Roman people were subject to the principle, 'Iove tonante fulgurante comitia populi habere nefas' (Cic. *de Div.* ii. 43; cf. *in Vatin.* 20; *Philipp.* v. 7), so that thunder or lightning led to the adjournment of the comitia as inevitably as did an epileptic seizure ('morbus comitialis' [Fest. p. 234]). It is true that in these, as in all other cases of the unsolicited sign, it rested with the presiding official to decide whether he would apply it to the matter in hand and take account of it (Pliny, *HN* xxviii. 17; Serv. *Æn.* xii. 260); such emergencies fell under the maxim of Cato the Elder, viz. 'quod ego non sensi, nullum mihi vitium facit' (Fest. p. 234)—a principle according to which the magistrates tried their best to avoid the possibility of even noticing unwelcome signs (Cic. *de Div.* ii. 77). But, as such disregard of Divine warnings might result in serious mischief to the State, the legislature put an obstacle in the way of anything like extreme neglect of unfavourable signs by enjoining that the magistrates must, without further investigation, take full account of all such *auguria oblativa* as were announced to them either by another magistrate ('obnuntiatio'), or by the augur who was officially in attendance ('nuntiatio'). This injunction came to have great influence upon the procedure of the comitia, and in the political conflicts of the day it became an effective instrument of obstruction, as a meeting which took a course unsatisfactory to any party could be adjourned simply by an announcement that a flash of lightning had been seen (cf. I. M. J. Valeton, 'De iure obnuntiandi comitiis et conciliis,' in *Mnemosyne*, N.S., xix. [1891] 75-113, 229-270).

This political perversion of a statute which was in its origin the expression of a religious sentiment is but a symptom of that general deterioration of the auspices which showed itself more and more during the later years of the Republic. The stringency of the ancient regulations was relaxed first of all in the army, and especially during war, as the conditions were then frequently most unfavourable for the ceremonious and protracted observation of the flight of birds. For a time, as would appear, the place of the traditional ceremony was taken by a special *auspicium militare*, which involved some sort of observation of spear-points ('ex acuminibus' [Cic. *de Nat. Deor.* ii. 9; Arnob. ii. 67]), but, when—during the Second Punic War—this device had at length been abandoned (Cic. *de Div.* ii. 77), every other expedient for divining the will of the gods was superseded by the observation of *signa ex tripudiis*, i.e. the manner in which fowls pecked the food strewn by the *pullarius* —the point being, not simply that they ate, but that they fed so greedily that part of what they picked up fell to the ground again (*tripudium*= *terripavium, pavire enim ferire est* [Paul. p. 244; Cic. *de Div.* ii. 72]). Such accidental dropping of food was formerly considered a favourable *signum oblativum*, and might as such be mediated not only by birds of any kind, but also by quadrupeds (Cic. *de Div.* ii. 73; Pliny, *HN* viii. 83). These *pullaria auguria* (Serv. *Æn.* vi. 198) eventually degenerated into a mere form, especially as the act of feeding could be so managed as greatly to influence the result of the *signum* (Cic. ii. 73); and a similar fate befell municipal divination, in which the observation of birds was at length abandoned in favour of observation of the sky (*de cælo servare*); this, however, was performed, not by the official himself, but by his servant the *pullarius* ('iam de caelo servare non ipsos censes solitos, qui auspicabantur? nunc imperant pullario, ille renuntiat' [Cic. ii. 73]). On account of the comparatively rare performance of the augural ceremonies, it had been possible to solicit a lightning-flash as an indication of Divine consent, but with the manifold applications of magisterial divination such a demand could be met only by way of a gross fiction, so that Cicero is perfectly justified in saying (ii. 71): 'haec certe, quibus utimur, sive tripudio sive de caelo, simulacra sunt auspiciorum, auspicia nullo modo.'

The performance of divination during war came to be still further circumscribed by the circumstance that in the *imperium militiæ* the duty was assigned—from Sulla's time regularly, and often before—not to the real functionaries of the *auspicium*, i.e. consuls and prætors, but to the holders of prorogated authority, the proconsuls and proprætors, who had no *auspicia* of their own (Cic. *de Div.* ii. 77: 'ubi ergo avium divinatio? quae, quoniam ab iis, qui auspicia nulla habent, bella administrantur, ad urbanas res retenta videtur, a bellicis esse sublata'). But, as it still remained necessary to make sure of the Divine sanction before entering upon any decisive line of action, divination by ordinary methods was superseded in the field by *extispicium*, i.e. the inspection of entrails ('omitto nostros, qui nihil in bello sine extis agunt, nihil sine auspiciis domi' [Cic. i. 95; cf. 28]), which, however, had been previously employed as a supplementary expedient; thus, *e.g.*, according to Livy, xxvii. 16. 15, before Fabius Maximus moved his camp from Tarentum to Metapontum, he first of all inquired by means of birds, and then, not having received the required indication of Divine consent, he caused the haruspex to inspect the entrails of a victim. But it should be clearly understood that the inspection of entrails as a means of ascertaining the future was a foreign, not a Roman, method of divination. It is true that the indigenous religious practice sanctioned the inspection of the *exta* of a sacrificial animal—not, however, for purposes of divination, but only as a part of the requisite test applied to the victim in order to determine whether it was acceptable to the deity and suitable for a sacrifice. In such instances the entrails of the victim were examined in connexion with the body as a whole ('adhaerentia exta inspicere' [Paul. p. 100]), and boiled in a pot (Varro, *de Ling. Lat.* v. 98); if any abnormality was discovered, the animal was regarded as unsuitable, and the sacrifice could not be validly performed—it did not become a *litatio* ('non perlitatum est'). An abortive sacrifice of this sort might, of course, bear the character of a *signum*

oblativum, and thus be recognized as a Divine warning (as was the case, *e.g.*, in the incident related by Livy, xli. 15), and it was therefore possible to speak of *auspicia* in connexion with *extispicia* (*e.g.* Paul. p. 244: 'pestifera auspicia esse dicebant, cum cor in extis aut caput in iecinore non fuisset'); but, as already said, this Roman *extispicium*, with its scrutiny and interpretation of entrails, was never resorted to for the purpose of acquiring information as to the course of coming events.

This function, however, was the distinctive feature of the Etruscan *haruspicina*, which had found its way into Rome at the time of the Second Punic War, and in process of time gained so firm a footing that in the closing century of the Republic the *haruspex* became permanently attached to the staff of the commander-in-chief. The Etruscan *haruspicatio* (*CIL* vi. 32328, l. 78) was performed prior to all important undertakings, such as the departure of the army for war, or the beginning of a battle; and its object was, from an inspection of the entrails of a victim slaughtered expressly for the purpose (animals from which 'voluntas dei per exta exquiritur' were called *consultatoriæ hostiæ* [Serv. *Æn.* iv. 56; Macr. *Sat.* iii. 5. 1]), to deduce information regarding the issue of the proposed action—information which was not confined merely to a presage of success or non-success, but frequently extended to details, as, *e.g.*, an ambuscade of the enemy (Livy, xxvii. 15. 16), or a case of imminent death (Ammian. Marc. xxii. 1. 1). The interpretation was arrived at upon the basis of a highly complex system of doctrine, involving a most precise observation of the nature, and especially the abnormalities, of the victim's inner organs—more particularly the liver. The celebrated bronze liver of Piacenza[1] is a direct survival from the practice of the *haruspices*, and, by means of its precise division of the organ, with its various convexities and indentations, and the inscribed names of the gods associated with the several parts, gives us some idea of the procedure of the priests. Moreover, the fact that models of the livers of animals, formed of terra cotta and covered with inscriptions, have been found also in Babylon,[2] points to a relationship between Etruscan and Chaldæan haruspicy which awaits a more thorough investigation.

The Etruscan divination of the future, which, as we have seen, went far beyond the limits of the Roman practice, makes its influence felt likewise in the official treatment of prodigies, *i.e.* unnatural and alarming occurrences, such as showers of stones, earthquakes, monstrous births (see PRODIGIES AND PORTENTS [Rom.]), regarded as signs of Divine resentment. To the Roman mind such phenomena were an evidence that the normal relations between the community and the higher powers were disturbed, as also an admonition to take the necessary steps towards retrieving the *pax et venia deûm*, and those who in such emergencies wished to ascertain the measures requisite to an effective reconciliation had recourse either to the *pontifices*, as the custodians of the ancient Roman ritual, or to the representatives of foreign cults, such as the *decemviri* (later, the *xv. viri*) *sacris faciundis*, who were proficient in the *Græcus ritus*, and the Etruscan *haruspices* (Cic. *de Div.* i. 97, 98). The *haruspices*, however, did not confine themselves to a simple specification of the means of reconciliation; on the contrary, they also undertook to deduce from the character and course of the prodigy an answer to the question, 'quid portendat prodigium?' *i.e.* to discover the future events, such as civil war and conspiracy (Cic. *de Har. Resp.* 18), foreboded by the prodigy. Cicero's oration *de Haruspicium Responso* gives us a clear conception of the matter and form of such a professional finding. The sacred books of the *Etrusca disciplina* supplied full directions for the interpretation of *ostenta*, and in particular they contained a doctrine regarding the interpretation of lightning which was absolutely alien to the augural science of the Romans. According to Roman ideas, the lightning might be either an *augurium impetrativum* (as in the sacred rites of the augurs), or an *augurium oblativum* (as in the proceedings of the magistrates), and in both cases it required to be weighed as a token of Divine consent or prohibition; or, again, especially if it struck something and wrought damage, it was regarded as a *prodigium*, and in that case had to be rendered innocuous by certain acts of propitiation. The procedure of the Etruscan *haruspices*, however, was of a very different character (for their system, cf. *e.g.* Pliny, *HN* ii. 138 ff.; Seneca, *Nat. Quæst.* ii. 39 ff.). They first of all ascertained the region of the heavens whence the flash proceeded, and thereby identified the deities from whom it came; further, they defined the several kinds (*manubiæ*) of lightning-flash sent forth by particular gods, and determined the place, the time, the effect, etc.; then from all these data they elicited not only the kind of propitiation required, but also the import of the phenomenon. Nor did they rest satisfied with a simple announcement that the lightning signified the deity's consent to, or warning against, a given design ('consiliaria fulmina' [Seneca, *Nat. Quæst.* ii. 39. 1]), but they also gave quite definite predictions of future events, such as an extension of the frontier and a defeat of the enemy (Livy, xlii. 20. 1), or the approaching death and deification of the Emperor (Suet. *Aug.* 97).

It is a fact worthy of note that this mode of divination was always regarded by the Romans as outlandish and unreliable, and this explains why the *haruspices* were never admitted into the official priesthood, and why their teachings never found a place in the Roman *disciplina auguralis*; so that, when the Senate wished to have the opinion of the *haruspices* in any particular case, it summoned them from Etruria expressly for the purpose (the regular phrase for this was 'haruspices acciendos ex Etruria' [Cic. *de Har. Resp.* 25]). This proceeding, however, must be regarded in the same light as the action of the Roman State in sending ambassadors to lay certain questions before the Greek oracles, such as that at Delphi; the first deputation of this kind was sent just after the battle of Cannæ (Livy, xxii. 57. 5, xxiii. 11. 1). Livy's statements as to still earlier consultations of the Delphic oracle (i. 56. 9, v. 15 f.) are rightly regarded by H. Diels (*Sibyllinische Blätter*, Berlin, 1891, p. 49, n. 3) as without foundation in fact. The truth is that, in times of severe national trial, the Roman people habitually resorted to the vaticination of foreign cults, but they did not thereby admit such practices into their own religion. The case was different with the so-called Sibylline Oracles (*libri fatales*), which were authoritatively introduced into Rome as early as the period of the Tarquins, and had their official custodians and interpreters in the *duoviri* (later *decemviri* and *quindecimviri*) *sacris faciundis*. The Sibyllines, however, were not oracles in the proper sense, but καθαρμοί; *i.e.* the sentences specified the

[1] Cf. W. Deecke, *Etruskische Forschungen*, iv. 'Das Templum von Piacenza,' Stuttgart, 1880; L. Stieda, *Anatomisch-archäol. Studien*, i., Wiesbaden, 1901; G. Körte, *Röm. Mitteil.* xx. (1905) 348–379; C. Thulin, 'Die Götter des Martianus Capella u. der Bronzeleber von Piacenza,' *Religionsgesch. Versuche u. Vorarbeiten*, iii. (Giessen, 1906).

[2] Cf. A. Boissier, *Note sur un monument babylonien se rapportant à l'extispicine*, Geneva, 1899, *Note sur un nouveau document babylonien se rapportant à l'extispicine*, Geneva, 1901; cf. also C. Bezold, in *Religionsgesch. Versuche u. Vorarbeiten*, ii. (1905) 246 ff.

particular measures—sacrifices, *lectisternia*, supplications, admission of new cults—by which impending dangers could be turned aside and the anger of the gods appeased; but actual predictions of future events lay outside their province, and were first deduced from them at a relatively late period, the earliest known instance dating from 187 B.C. (Livy, xxxviii. 45. 3).

We may thus venture to affirm that the aversion to an over-curious prying into the unborn future, as also to the practice of consulting the Deity with reference to coming events, was a characteristic feature of ancient Roman life, and that the Romans manifested this reluctance in considerably greater measure than the other peoples of Italy. For, as we have seen, they asked no more from their auguries than an assurance of Divine concurrence with their actions, and were unwilling to do anything in opposition to the Divine counsel, being for the rest content to abide the issue, and seeking no further revelation of the future. But, when we bear in mind that in times of calamity even the supreme authorities succumbed to the temptation of resorting to the practitioners of foreign divination for the occult knowledge which their own religion failed to supply, we cannot wonder that in private life all manner of mantic devices of exotic origin acquired in process of time a great and growing influence. Cato the Elder already found it necessary to insert among his directions for the conduct of an estate steward (*vilicus*) the warning: 'haruspicem augurem hariolum Chaldaeum ne quem consuluisse velit' (*de Agri Cult.* 5. 4); while Cicero gives quite a list of fortune-tellers who, finding their clientele among the middle and lower classes, made a profitable trade of forecasting the future: 'nunc illa testabor, non me sortilegos neque eos qui quaestus causa hariolentur, ne psychomantiam quidem . . . agnoscere; non habeo denique nauci Marsum augurem, non vicanos haruspices, non de circo astrologos, non Isiacos coniectores, non interpretes somniorum' (*de Div.* i. 132). These references are elucidated by evidence from the Imperial period, which shows that the people were in the habit of consulting soothsayers regarding such things as sickness (Pliny, *Ep.* ii. 20, 2 ff.), prospects of marriage (Juven. vi. 588 ff.), the whereabouts of runaway slaves, or the advisability of purchasing an estate (August. *de Civ. Dei*, x. 11). A further illustration is supplied by a collection of oracular sayings of very general application—and, as it would seem, from a Greek original—extracted from the Merobaudes palimpsest of St. Gall, and published by H. Winnefeld (*Sortes Sangallenses*, Bonn, 1887); from these sayings the inquirer probably selected his particular oracle by means of dice.

The most influential of these exponents of exotic divination were the *Chaldæi*, or, as they were subsequently styled, *mathematici* (Aul. Gell. i. 9. 6), *i.e.* the professors of Babylonian astrology, who presaged the destiny of individuals by means of the horoscope (hence they were also called *genethliaci* [*ib.* xiv. 1. 1]), and gave information regarding the future according to the movements of the heavenly bodies. These astrologers were banished from Rome and Italy for the first time in 139 B.C., in consequence of an edict of the Prætor peregrinus, Cn. Cornelius Hispalus (Val. Max. *Epit.* i. 3. 3), but in the Imperial period, by a long series of resolutions passed—often at short intervals—by the Senate, they were made liable not to expulsion only, but to the severest penalties (Tac. *Ann.* ii. 32, xii. 52, *Hist.* ii. 62; Dio Cass. lxvi. 9. 2; Ulpian, *Mos. et Rom. leg. coll.* [1768] 15. 2). These measures, however, brought about no considerable diminution of their activity (Juven. vi. 553 ff.), as their clientele included people of the highest rank, and even the Emperors themselves made use of their art. Hence Tacitus (*Hist.* i. 22) could with perfect justice speak of the *mathematici* as 'genus hominum potentibus infidum, sperantibus fallax, quod in civitate nostra et vetabitur semper et retinebitur.' In later times it was only the seeking and giving of information bearing upon the life of the Emperor and the succession to the throne—and, in the case of slaves, consultations regarding the duration of their master's life—that ranked as capital crimes (Paul. *Sent.* v. 21. 3–4; Mommsen, *Röm. Strafrecht*, Leipzig, 1899, p. 861 ff.); and, indeed, Alexander Severus actually instituted public chairs of astrology in Rome, and endowed them from the national exchequer (*Hist. Aug. Alex. Sev.* 27. 5; 44. 4). Then at length Diocletian, in A.D. 294, issued a universal interdict against the 'ars mathematica damnabilis' (*Cod. Just.* ix. 18. 2). The death-blow to divination in Rome, however, was given by the severe decree (25th Jan. A.D. 357) of the Emperor Constantius (*Cod. Theod.* ix. 16. 4 = *Cod. Just.* ix. 18. 5; cf. also *Cod. Theod.* ix. 16. 6 and 8): 'Nemo haruspicem consulat aut mathematicum, nemo hariolum, augurum et vatum prava confessio conticescat. Chaldaei ac magi et ceteri, quos maleficos ob facinorum multitudinem vulgus appellat, nec ad hanc partem aliquid moliantur. sileat omnibus perpetuo divinandi curiositas. etenim supplicium capitis feret gladio ultore prostratus, quicunque iussis obsequium denegaverit.' Nevertheless, in spite of all such repressive measures, the deep-seated craving of the human heart for light upon the future still continued to assert itself, even after the triumph of Christianity, as is shown by the zeal and vigour with which Christian evangelists like Cæsarius of Arles and Martin of Bracara made war upon the vestiges of pagan divination. The first-mentioned gives a long and detailed list of the various modes of soothsaying still in vogue in his own day (6th cent. A.D.): 'nullus ex vobis caragos vel divinos vel sortilegos requirat . . . nullus sibi praecantatores adhibeat . . . similiter et auguria observare nolite nec in itinere positi aliquas aviculas cantantes attendite nec ex illarum cantu diabolicas divinationes annuntiare praesumite' (Migne, *PL* xxxix. 2269); to these must be added the 'sortes Sanctorum' mentioned later in the records of Councils (cf. R. Boese, *Superstitiones Arelatenses e Cæsario collectæ*, Marburg, 1909, p. 42 f.), *i.e.* the practice of opening the Scriptures at random in order to find a sentence which might furnish the solution of a stubborn dilemma or give information regarding the future ('qui de paginis evangelicis sortes legunt' [August. *Ep.* lv. 37, p. 212, 3, Goldbacher]) —a device which Augustine himself had employed (*Conf.* viii. 12. 29), and which was at an earlier day applied in exactly the same way to the works of the ancient poets, especially Vergil (*ib.* iv. 3. 5). Cf. art. DIVINATION (Christian).

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ib. xxi. (1908) 103–126; F. Cumont, *Les Religions orientales dans le paganisme romain*, Paris, 1907 [Germ. tr. by G. Gehrich, Leipzig and Berlin, 1910, pp. 191–214].

G. WISSOWA.

DIVINATION (Teutonic).—Tacitus (*Germ.* x.) states that the German tribes practised augury and divination by lot as much as any people. He proceeds to describe the latter, which, he says, was used in both public and private life, and which from other references appears to have been a common custom. He says that it consisted in picking up and interpreting chips of wood that were inscribed with some kind of signs (which may possibly have been runic characters), and that had been scattered haphazard:

> 'If the twigs prove unfavourable, the matter is left over for that day; while, even if they are favourable, the confirmation of augury is still required. For they are also familiar with the practice of consulting the notes and the flight of birds; and it is a characteristic of this people to seek warnings and omens from horses. There are kept at the public expense, in the woods and groves, white horses, free from all taint of human labour; these, yoked to a consecrated chariot, are accompanied by the priest and king or chief person of the community, who observe their manner of neighing and snorting. Nor is there greater reliance on any form of augury, both among the common people, the nobility, and even the priests; for they regard themselves as the ministers of the gods, the horses as acquainted with their will.'

We may compare a passage in the *Flateyjarbok* (saga of Olaf Trygvason, 322), where we hear of horses sacred to Frey at a sanctuary in the Throndhjem fiord. In the sagas we hear also of wolves being used in augury, but the majority of the instances are concerned with birds, usually the raven. This bird was evidently considered to possess wisdom and knowledge of events, and is specially connected with battle; should one be heard thrice screaming on the roof, it bodes death to warriors; but the appearance of ravens following a host or a single warrior will bring good luck in battle.

A striking instance of the significance of the raven occurs in the saga of Olaf Trygvason in the *Heimskringla*. Earl Hakon, after the defeat at Danevirke, made a great blood-sacrifice, and 'there came two ravens flying, which croaked loudly, and now, thought the earl, the blood-offering has been accepted by Odin, and he thought good luck would be with him any day he liked to go into battle' (tr. Laing). Here the two birds were perhaps supposed to have been Odin's own ravens, Hugin and Munin, from whom he learnt all that was going on in the world. In this connexion we may mention the raven banner of the Northmen described in Anglo-Saxon records; it was woven of plain white silk, but on it in war time there became visible a raven, which by its drooping or flapping wings portended defeat or victory.

Augury from the voices of birds is frequently found in the form of a belief that certain specially gifted persons could understand the language of birds. Procopius (*de Bell. Goth.* iv. 20) gives the story of Hermigiselus, king of the Varni, who interpreted the loud and incessant croaking of a bird as presaging his own death. In the sagas various birds act thus as soothsayers—the raven, the crow, and the nut-hatch. Thus in the poem *Fafnismal*, Sigurdr, after tasting Fafnir's blood, is able to understand the speech of certain nut-hatches which warn him of the treachery prepared by Reginn; and the *Ynglinga Saga* gives the legend of a certain king Dag who had a sparrow which he greatly valued, since, like Odin's ravens, it flew to different countries and brought him much news.

Divination appears to have been largely practised by 'wise women,' both among the early Teutonic peoples of the Continent, and in later times in the North. Strabo (bk. VII. ch. ii. [p. 294]) states that the Cimbri were accompanied to war by grey-haired prophetesses, who presaged victory in battle from the blood and entrails of slaughtered prisoners; Tacitus has several references to the prophetess Veleda, who was held in much reverence by the Bructeri, and who had predicted the success of the Germans and the destruction of the legions; and Cæsar and other writers also refer to the divinations of 'wise women' among the Teutonic armies.

In the sagas, too, we hear of the 'wise woman,' such as Thorbjorg, who, in the saga of Eirik Raudha, visits the house of Thorkel. She has a special dress, seat, and food, and further requires one of the women of the house to sing the 'warlocks,' or spell song. Then she predicts the end of the sickness and famine, and foretells the future of many of the people.

In addition to these forms, we have vague references to some sort of inquiry of the gods, accompanied by sacrifices; as, for example, in the *Eyrbyggia Saga*, where Thórolf of the Mostr makes a great sacrifice and consults Thor, 'his well-beloved friend,' as to whether he shall emigrate or make peace with the king, 'but the word showed Thórolf to Iceland.'

We hear also of divination by dreams, and of the practice of single combat, as a kind of ordeal by battle, to decide disputes, which Tacitus (*loc. cit.*) states was also used to presage the result of a war.

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C. J. GASKELL.

DIVINATION (Vedic).—The Vedic art of divination, when contrasted with the Greek art, presents striking differences. Institutions comparable with the wide-reaching influence of the Greek oracles were never developed, and, while the gift of prophecy could, like other mystic powers, be acquired and increased by religious austerities (cf. *Mahābhārata*, 3. 16,870, Calc. ed.), still the power of seeing what is hidden, especially what is hidden in the future, depended in the main not on inspiration or personal gifts, but on the knowledge of how to interpret certain *omina* and *portenta*. The chief reason for this fact must be sought in the great development of the other branches of magic (cf. MAGIC [Ved.]). A man who is in possession of the magical means to acquire any desired blessing has little reason to inquire what the future has in store. Indeed, his only motive for inquiring about the future can be to learn when danger is impending, in order that he may avert it by the timely performance of the necessary rites. It was primarily to this need that the observance of omens and portents in India was due, though further development was sure to follow, as the attempt to define an evil portent leads of itself to the observation of favourable omens.

The omens and portents recognized in the Vedic system of divination may be classified as follows: (1) ominous appearances and actions of animals, especially birds—*śākuna*; (2) phenomena at variance with the usual course of Nature—*adbhuta*; (3) physical marks—*lakṣaṇa*; (4) omens of an astrological nature; (5) omens drawn from occurrences at the sacrifice; and (6) dreams.

With regard to the omens drawn from the sacrifice, it must be noted that, while they depend in part upon things not wholly subject to the regulation of the celebrant (*e.g.* the movements and colour of the fire), in part they depend upon things that are subject to his will (*e.g.* when it is stated that Parjanya will give rain if both or one of the bulls that draw the cart is black [*Śatapatha*

Brāhmaṇa, 3. 3. 4. 11]), and so pass over by almost imperceptible transitions from divinatory observances into directions about the sacrificial technique required to obtain a desired object. This subject will be referred to in other articles (cf., *e.g.*, art. DREAMS [Vedic]), and the present article will be devoted to the ceremonies the purpose of which is the attainment of knowledge (*vijñāna*), usually of future events, which is unattainable by natural means.

1. Sources.—As was to be expected, the chief source for such ceremonies is the *Kauśika Sūtra*, which is supplemented by an interesting chapter in the *Sāmavidhāna Brāhmaṇa*, 3. 4. Sporadic instances occur in other Vedic texts, sufficient to show that such practices were not confined to these two schools, and that the reason why they are not more frequently mentioned in other texts is to be sought in the nature of the literature.

2. The ceremonies.—The most widely attested *vijñāna*-ceremony is the test of the bride, advised or enjoined by the Gṛhya Sūtras (Āśvalāyana, 1. 5. 4–5; Gobhila, 2. 1. 3–9; Āpastambīya, 3. 14–17; Mānava, 1. 7. 9–10; Kāṭhaka, 14; Bhāradvāja, 1. 11 [the last two in Caland, p. 127, n. 8]; Kauśika, 37. 7–10; cf. Winternitz, *Das altind. Hochzeitsrituell*, 1892, p. 37). It is based upon the principle of *attractio similium*, and consists in offering from four to nine clods of earth, taken from different places, to the bride, whose choice is ominous. Āśvalāyana's list is typical, and comprises clods from a field that yields two crops a year, from the stable of a cow, from a *vedi* (altar), from an undrying pool, from a gambling-place, from cross-roads, from a barren spot, and from a cemetery. They signify respectively that the bride's offspring will be rich in food, rich in cattle, rich in holy lustre, rich in everything, addicted to gambling, wandering in different directions (according to Kauśika, that she will be unfaithful), poor, and the cause of the death of her husband (according to Kauśika, that she will not live long). When there is a ninth clod (Gobhila and Kāṭhaka), it is mixed of all these substances. The ceremony is recommended when it is impossible to determine the bride's qualities from the marks on her body (*lakṣaṇāni*), but Āpastamba implies that her family have a right to object to this test. An alternative in Kauśika, 37. 11–12, is to require the bride to pour out a handful of water that has been blessed. If she does this in an easterly direction it is a good omen.

With this may be compared the practices for the purpose of seeing whether the ground selected for a house is suitable (Āpast. GS 2. 8. 1–8), though these may appear to us practical rather than magical, and the impression is strengthened by the absence of all religious elements from the ceremony. A pit is dug and refilled. If the earth more than refills it, the site is good; if it fails to fill it, the site is bad; if it fills it exactly, the site is indifferent. Or, after sunset, the pit is filled with water. If, in the morning, there is water still in it, the site is good; if the ground is dry, it is bad; and if it is moist, it is indifferent.

Another method of divination in the Kauśika, with parallels in the hieratic literature, is based upon the wide-spread belief that a man's reflexion or shadow is part of his personality. Hence, when one cannot see his reflexion, his spirit is gone (he is *gatāsu*, *itāsu*, or *gatamanas*), and he is in danger of death. The Kauśika, 15. 9–10, employs this idea as follows: Before a battle the king causes his warriors to look, two by two, into a vessel of water over which Atharva Veda, 5. 2. 6, has been recited; if any warrior does not see his reflexion he must not take part in the approaching battle. Similar applications of this idea are found in Tāittirīya Saṁhitā, 6. 6. 7. 1; Maitrāyaṇī Saṁhitā, 4. 7. 2; Āśvalāyana Srauta Sūtra, 5. 19. 5; Āpastamba ŚS. 13. 14. 3. 4; Kātyāyana ŚS. 3. 3. 6 (cf. Oldenberg, p. 526, n. 4).

Another method of divination practised before a battle is as follows: Three ropes, made of bowstrings, are laid upon heated coals, and Athar. Ved. 5. 6 is recited over them. The middle string represents death, the other strings the two armies. If the middle string passes over one of the other strings it forebodes the defeat of that army; if one of the outside strings passes over the middle string it signifies the victory of the army it represents. Further auguries as to the rank of the men who will fall are drawn from the portion of the string that curls—the top, middle, and bottom of the strings denoting men of similar standing. Reed-stalks (*iṣīkā*) may be used instead of the ropes (cf. Kauśika, 15. 15–18). The Sāmavidhāna Brāhmaṇa (3. 4. 10) attains the same purpose in the following manner: each contestant is represented by a pile of glowing smokeless coals; these are sprinkled at the same time with ghī. He will be victorious whose pile first blazes up with flames free from smoke and moving from left to right.

To learn who will live long (*jīvita-vijñāna*) the same text (3. 4. 11) proceeds in a similar way, but in this case the ghī must be made from woman's milk and churned on the same day. The favourable omen in this case is for one's pile to burn longest. For the same purpose the Kauśika, 15. 13–14, directs that three ropes of bowstrings be laid on heated coals; if they curl upwards it is a good omen.

Another augury before the setting out of a warlike expedition is to produce an inauspicious smoke by sprinkling grass with *iṅgiḍa*-oil, reciting certain hymns over it, and burning it with an uncanny fire (for these details cf. art. WITCHCRAFT [Ved.]). The expedition will conquer the region towards which the smoke goes (cf. Kauśika, 14. 30–31).

The direction in which a lost object must be sought is discovered in the following ways: A water pitcher is covered with a new cloth and placed upon a bed which is not in its usual position, and the leavings of an offering made with recitation of Athar. Ved. 2. 1 are poured over it. The faces of two girls who have not yet menstruated are covered with a cloth so that they cannot see, and they are told to remove the pitcher. The lost object is in the direction in which they carry the pitcher. Dice may be used instead of the pitcher and a plough instead of the bed (cf. Kauśika, 37. 4–6). Another method consists of throwing down and spreading out at cross-roads twenty-one pebbles blessed with Athar. Ved. 7. 9, but how they indicate the direction is not specified (cf. Kauśika, 52. 12 ff.).

Whether a woman will get a husband is ascertained by tying calves to a seven-ply rope, smeared with the leavings of an offering made with recitation of Athar. Ved. 2. 36, and bidding her loose them. If she does so in order from left to right she will marry (cf. Kauśika, 34. 17). The direction from which the wooer will come is discovered by letting loose a steer, whose head is covered with a new cloth on which have been placed the leavings of an offering made with recitation of Athar. Ved. 2. 36 (cf. Kauśika, 34. 18–19). The same information is gained, at an oblation offered at dawn to Aryaman to obtain a husband for one's sister, by observing the direction from which the crows come (cf. Kauśika, 34. 21–24).

The sex of a child is foretold by placing four fruits of the flax plant in the mother's hand, blessing them with Athar. Ved. 1. 11, and pouring water over them. If they adhere to one another the child will, for obvious reasons, be a boy. Or the priest may whisper the same hymn over the son of a

Brāhman and order him to touch the mother. If the name of the limb touched is grammatically masculine, the child will be a boy (cf. Kauśika, 33. 17–20). The conclusions drawn from the appearance of the root of a plant dug for a charm to secure easy delivery, and from the fact that the symbolical drawing apart of the *muñja*-grass is accomplished without tearing them, are to be considered as the observance of omens rather than charms of divination (Kauśika, 33. 12. 3).

The prediction of the weather was an especial object of divination, and apparently undertaken by means of the smoke of burning dung. The idea readily passed into the form that the weather prophet controlled the weather. Hence, Athar. Ved. 6. 128 says: 'When the stars made Śakadhūma (he who predicts the weather from the smoke of dung) their king, they bestowed good weather upon him. "This shall be his dominion," they said.' The hymn is employed in Kauśika, 50. 15–16, for the propitiation of Śakadhūma by one who is about to start on a journey (cf. Bloomfield, *AJPh* vii. 484 ff.). Among the Pariśiṣtas of the Atharva Veda is also a text entitled *Sadyovṛṣṭilakṣaṇa*, and devoted to the signs of rain that will come immediately.

In addition to these, the Kauśika has a number of charms for obtaining the answer to any question. They are referred to briefly, with rubrication of the hymns required, in Kauśika 37. 1–3, but fuller details are given in the commentary of Keśava. The first is as follows. The questioner thinks either to himself or aloud of the question he wishes answered. Then he recites a hymn over a milk-porridge; while it is cooking he thinks, 'This porridge is done,' or 'This porridge is not done.' If he has guessed correctly, the answer to the original question will be according to his wish. Similarly, the answer may be made to depend upon whether a substance laid upon heated coals will curl upwards or not; whether the number of blades in a bunch of grass is odd or even; whether a flower will close on the day after a hymn has been recited over it; whether he can foretell the direction in which a reed or arrow shot straight upwards will fall, or the side towards which a yoke or *kāmpīla*-branch (*Crinum amaryllaceæ*) balanced on his head will fall; whether the quantity of milk he takes will be sufficient to fill to overflowing a vessel partly filled with water; whether the smoke from the fire moves from left to right, or *vice versa*; whether he can foretell the throw of the dice;[1] whether he can divide twenty-one pebbles into two heaps in such a way that the odd and even numbers will be in the hand that he expected.

On the same principle rest two charms of the Sāmavidhāna Brāhmaṇa, 3. 4. 9 and 6. Two heaps of unhusked grains are designated respectively as 'to be' and 'not to be,' and the person who is consulting the oracle is told to take his choice. Or the celebrant orders two pupils (*brahmachārins*) to raise two bamboo poles; if they bend (as he expects them to do), it is a sign of success. In both of these cases the necessary magic potency is imparted to the apparatus by the celebrant keeping it with him over night, and singing over it a certain *sāman*. At dawn this *sāman* is sung again, and the test takes place. In the same way, a maiden who has not yet menstruated is enabled to see the future in a mirror or spoonful of water (3. 4. 4, 5); a rod is made to forebode success by growing longer in the night (3. 4. 7); and the seeds that will thrive are distinguished by their increase of weight on the night of the full moon of the month of Āṣāḍha (3. 4. 8).

[1] For a late text containing elaborate oracles from dice, cf. Weber, 'Ueber ein indisches Würfel-Orakel,' *Indische Streifen*, i. (Berlin, 1868) 274 ff.

As an example of such practices in a *śrauta*-text may be cited Tāittirīya Saṁhitā, 3. 3. 8. 4, where directions are given to cook a cake of a certain size on the *ekāṣṭakā* (the first or last night of the year), and in the morning to attempt to set fire with it to a thicket. If the thicket burns, it will be a lucky year. The same text also (ii. 509; Hiraṇyakeśin ŚS. 22. 13–14) employs a horse as a weather prophet. But the ceremony enjoined in Gobhila GS 4. 8. 14 ff.—one goes out of the village in an easterly or northern direction, and erects at cross-roads or on a mountain a pile of the dung of wild beasts, sets it on fire, sweeps the coals away, and makes an oblation of butter with his mouth: if the butter catches fire, he will get twelve villages; if it smokes, three—is less a means of divination than a charm to effect the desired purpose, combined with an augury from the ceremony, comparable with such practices as those of Kauśika, 19. 21, 47. 29, and others.

In looking back upon these performances, certain common features may be observed: (1) A religious or quasi-religious ceremony is necessary to impart efficacy to the apparatus. (2) The general principle upon which most of them rest is the idea that, an association being established between two questions, the answer to the one will be the answer to the other, or that the person can answer both correctly who can answer one correctly. This is but a particular application of the fundamental principles of magic, that the part may be substituted for the whole, and that objects connected in any way, even though merely by an association of ideas, constitute a whole. (3) It is noteworthy that none of the *mantras* seems to have been primarily intended for the purpose for which they are here employed. (4) There is a marked tendency for the charms to pass from an inquiry about the future into a means of compelling a desired end.

In some cases the indication of success is the occurrence of what we would term a miracle, *e.g.* a growing rod, seeds increasing in weight. This idea is employed in several forms of the ordeal (*daivya*, *divya*), while in other cases the ordeal is merely a particularly intensified form of oath. Hence it is also called *śapatha*, literally 'oath' or 'self-curse.'

In reality the ordeal is but a particular form of divination, the question being the guilt or innocence of a suspected man. In view of the occurrence of this belief among other Indo-European peoples (Schrader, *Reallex. der indogerm. Altertumskunde*, *s.v.* 'Gottesurtheil'), it is surprising to find only two incidental allusions to the practice in Vedic literature. The first of these is Pañchaviṁśa Brāhmaṇa, 14. 6. 6, where the story is told of how the Ṛṣi Medhātithi taunted the Ṛṣi Vatsa with being not a Brahman, but the son of a Śūdra woman. The latter proposed that they should both pass through the fire to see which was the better Brahman. They did so, each singing the *sāman* that bears his name, and Vatsa emerged without losing a hair, for that was his wish, and the *Vātsa sāman* is a winner of wishes. The other passage is Chhāndogya Upaniṣad, 6. 16. 1–3, where the trial of a man accused of theft, by a form of the fire ordeal in which the instrument is a heated axe, is employed as a parable. Another passage, Kauśika, 52. 8, may bear upon the question. Among the practices assigned to the hymn Athar. Ved. 6. 106, which is used to prevent or heal the effects of fire, is the sūtra, *śapyamānāya prayachchhati*. Sāyaṇa, who is following Keśava, and who is followed in turn by Caland, explains that in place of the *taptamāṣa* ordeal (cf. below), the celebrant must recite the hymn over the oil or other substance employed before handing it to the person who is undergoing the ordeal. This interpretation cannot be correct, as such magical aids are especially forbidden in

the case of the *viṣa* ordeal; and, according to the *paribhāṣā* (general rule), Kauśika, 7. 7, the *sūtra* must mean that the hymn is recited over a stirred drink and porridge which are given to the *śapyamāna*. If it has anything to do with the ordeal, it must refer to a secret preparation, which would have been forbidden had it been detected. In this sense the middle, not the passive participle, should have been employed, and it is best to give to the word the general sense of 'one who is suffering from a curse.' That in later times the ceremony may have been performed especially by those about to undergo with guilty consciences the *taptamāṣa* (and *agni*?) ordeal is not improbable, and Keśava may be accepted as a witness to the fact; but there is no reason to believe that the ceremony was originally devised for such cases, or ever restricted to them.

Further evidence for the fire ordeal was formerly found in Athar. Ved. 2. 12. 1–8 (so Schlagintweit, *Die Gottesurtheile der Inder*, 1866, p. 9; Weber, *Indische Studien*, xiii. (1876) 164 ff.; Ludwig, *Der Rigveda*, iii. (1878) 445; Zimmer, *Altindisches Leben*, 1879, p. 183 f.; Kaegi, *Alter und Herkunft des germ. Gottesurtheils*, 1887. The interpretation was first doubted by Roth (cf. Grill, *Hundert Lieder des Atharva Veda*, 1888, p. 16), and the ritualistic manipulation of the hymn in the Kauśika Sūtra finally disclosed its true nature as an imprecation against an enemy for thwarting holy work (cf. Bloomfield, *AJPh* xi. 330 ff.; *SBE* xlii. 89, 294 ff.).

The earliest lawbooks, also, make but slight reference to the practice, most probably because it was not considered of great importance, and because they were consequently willing to leave the details to be decided by local customs. These have been gathered and systematized by the later treatises on law, which finally recognize nine forms of ordeal.

(1) By the scales (*dhaṭa*, *tulā*). The accused is placed in one scale of a balance and his weight in stones and sand in the other scale. He descends from the scale, and after certain ceremonies is again placed on the balance. If he is lighter, he is innocent; if heavier, guilty. Equality of weight is generally considered proof of guilt in a less degree, though the authorities differ upon this point and upon the significance of accidents to the apparatus.

(2) By fire (*agni*). The accused, whose hands are more or less protected by leaves and grains, is required to step in seven circles, while holding in his hands a piece of heated iron. If his hands are burnt it is a proof of his guilt.

(3) By water (*salila*). To prove his innocence, the accused must remain under water until a swift runner can bring back an arrow shot at the time of submersion.

(4) By poison (*viṣa*). If no ill effects are observable within a certain time after the accused has taken the poison, he is declared innocent.

(5) By holy water (*kośa*). An image of a god recognized by the accused is bathed in water, which is then given to the accused to drink. If he does so without betraying his guilt, and no misfortune happens to him within a certain time, he is innocent.

(6) By rice grains (*taṇḍula*). Grains of unhusked rice are soaked in water in which an image of a god has been bathed, and are given to the accused to chew. He is then required to spit upon a leaf. If there is no blood evident, and his gums are uninjured, he is innocent.

(7) By a heated gold-piece (*taptamāṣa*). The accused is required to take a gold-piece from a vessel of heated ghī and oil. Quivering and blisters are proofs of guilt.

(8) By a ploughshare (*phāla*). The accused, to establish his innocence, must lick a heated ploughshare without burning his tongue.

(9) By lot (*dharmādharma*). Representations of innocence and guilt are placed in a vessel, and the accused is required to draw one.

The form of ordeal is determined by the nature of the crime, the position of the accused, and the season of the year. There is observable, as always in Hindu law, the tendency to favour the upper castes, but there is also a tendency to moderate the conditions of the ordeal in favour of the accused, and the accuser is generally required to undergo the penalty in case the accused is acquitted. The ordeal can be applied only in the absence of human evidence, and, as was to be expected, is accompanied by religious ceremonies (for further details cf. J. Jolly, *Recht und Sitte*, 1896, p. 144 f., and esp. A. F. Stenzler, 'Die ind. Gottesurtheile,' *ZDMG* ix. 661–682).

The practices described must be much older than the texts in which they are contained. There is no warrant for declaring the essentials of any one form later than another; and the familiar nature of the Vedic allusions to the fire ordeal as something well known warrants the belief that similar, if not identical, practices were in vogue in Vedic times.

Allusions to ordeals are found in the classic literature in Rāmāyaṇa, vi. 101–103 (Gorresio), where Sītā proves her innocence by walking through fire; and in the Mṛchchhakaṭikā, 9. 43, p. 156 S., where the ordeals by fire, water, poison, and the scales are referred to.

LITERATURE.—In addition to the articles cited, cf. **Victor Henry**, *La Magie dans l'Inde antique*, Paris, 1904, pp. 59–78; **A. Hillebrandt**, *Rituallitteratur*, Strassburg, 1897, p. 186; **H. Oldenberg**, *Die Religion des Veda*, Berlin, 1894, p. 509 ff.; and the indexes to 'Hymns of the Atharva-Veda' [tr. M. Bloomfield], in *SBE* xlii., Oxford, 1897, and **W. Caland**, *Altindisches Zauberritual*, Amsterdam, 1900.

G. M. BOLLING.

DIVINE RIGHT.—Divine right is a right conferred by God, sanctioned or inspired by Him, and based on His ordinance and appointment. The phrase is generally used to express the theory that kings hold their authority, not from the choice or consent of their subjects, but from God Himself alone. In English history it came into specific use in the 17th century, during the disputes between the Stuarts and their people. The claim of Divine right was pre-eminently made for that dynasty; the doctrine became the badge of Tories and High Churchmen; and at the Restoration in 1660 it was the accepted royalist creed. It was seriously maintained that hereditary monarchy, as opposed to every other form of government, has the Divine approval; that no human power can justly deprive a legitimate king of his rights; that the authority of such a king is necessarily always despotic; that constitutional liberties are not rights of the people, but concessions freely made by the king and liable to be resumed at his pleasure; that treaties which he may make with his subjects merely inform them of his present intentions, and are not contracts of which the performance can be demanded.

The chief representative of the Divine right party was **Sir Robert Filmer**, who in his books and pamphlets laid down the doctrine that the government of a family is the true original and model of all government, that all kings and governors derive their absolute authority from the patriarchs, and that to the end of the world the king will always have the natural right of a supreme father over a multitude. This fantastic theory was fully developed in his *Patriarcha*, a posthumous work (1680), but his position was sufficiently indicated in works published during his lifetime, his 'Freeholder's Grand Inquest touching our Sovereign Lord the King and his Parliament'

(1648), his 'Anarchy of a Limited and Mixed Monarchy' (1648), his 'Observations upon Mr. Hobbes' Leviathan, Mr. Milton against Salmasius, and H. Grotius, *De jure belli et pacis*, concerning the Original of Government' (1652). It amounted to a paternal despotism: the king alone is the maker of laws, the Lords only give counsel to the king, and the Commons merely 'perform and consent to the ordinances of parliament.' It was this 'patriarchal' theory of government, doggedly adhered to by the Stuarts, that rent the fabric of the constitution in the reign of Charles I., and drove the long-suffering nation to the Revolution of 1688.

In the previous century, **Richard Hooker** (*c.* 1553–1600) had given a philosophical statement of the principles of government, making the consent of the people the prime requisite:

'Without which consent there were no reason that one man should take upon him to be lord or judge over another; because, although there be according to the opinion of some very great and judicious men a kind of natural right in the noble, wise, and virtuous, to govern them which are of servile disposition; nevertheless for manifestation of this their right, and men's more peaceful contentment on both sides, the assent of them who are to be governed seemeth necessary.

'To fathers within their private families Nature hath given a supreme power; for which cause we see throughout the world, even from the foundation thereof, all men have ever been taken as lords and lawful kings in their own houses. Howbeit over a whole grand multitude having no such dependency upon any one, and consisting of so many families as every politic society in the world doth, impossible it is that any should have complete lawful power, but by consent of men, or immediate appointment of God; because, not having the natural superiority of fathers, their power must needs be either usurped, and then unlawful; or, if lawful, then either granted or consented unto by them over whom they exercise the same, or else given extraordinarily from God, unto whom all the world is subject' (*Eccl. Polity*, i. 10; Keble's edition, i. 302 f.).

To popularize the principles of the liberty of subjects, the fiery logic of **Samuel Rutherford** did more than the massive learning of Hooker. His *Lex Rex* (1644) was intolerable to the Royalists. Not only was it burnt by the hangman in Edinburgh in 1661, and by the hands of Sharpe under the windows of its author's college in St. Andrews, but it would probably have cost him his life, as he was about to be tried for high treason when he 'got another summons before a superior Judge.'

'The king,' he contends, 'hath no masterly dominion over the people, but only fiduciary' (116). 'That the power of the king is fiduciary, that is, given to him by God in trust, Royalists do not deny; but we hold that the trust is put upon the king by the people' (124). 'The people may be without the king, but not the king without the people' (144). 'Though God immediately without any action of the people make kings, this is a weak reason, to prove they cannot unmake them' (146). 'I utterly deny that God ever ordained such an irrational creature as an absolute monarch' (216). 'Whatever the king doth as king, that he doth by a power borrowed from the Estates, who made him king. He must then be nothing but an eminent servant of the State' (233).

The democratic principle was argued for in another classical work on English constitutional law and polity—**Locke's** *Two Treatises on Government* (1690). In the 'First Treatise' he subjects the writings of Filmer to a searching analysis, going over his arguments *seriatim*, and in the 'Second Treatise' he maintains that civil rulers hold their power not absolutely but conditionally, government being a moral trust which is forfeited if the conditions are not fulfilled by the trustees. Written for the immediate purpose of vindicating the Revolution, Locke's work contains the essential principles which have regulated political progress for over two centuries, and gradually moulded the British constitution.

Carlyle, in his lecture on 'The Hero as King,' remarks that 'much sorry stuff, written some hundred years ago or more, about the "Divine right of kings"' had better be left to rot silently in the Public Libraries. At the same time he does not wish to 'let the immense rubbish go without leaving us some soul of it behind.'

'Find me the true *Könning*, King, or Able-man, and he *has* a divine right over me. That we knew in some tolerable measure how to find him, and that all men were ready to acknowledge his divine right when found: this is precisely the healing which a sick world is everywhere, in these ages, seeking after!' (*On Heroes*, People's ed. p. 183 f.). 'He that models Nations according to his own image, he is a King, though his sceptre were a walking-stick; and properly no other is' (*Frederick the Great*, People's ed., vol. i. p. 286). In this high sense Cromwell is a king by Divine right; while Pitt is 'not born a King,—alas, no, not officially so, only naturally so; has his kingdom to seek. . . . tragical it is . . . to see a Royal Man, or Born King, wading towards his throne in such an element. But, alas, the Born King . . . so seldom can arrive there at all' (*ib.* vii. 139 f.).

The older doctrine had an ephemeral revival at the time of the **Holy Alliance** (1814), which, while to all appearances an attempt, inspired by the religious idealism of the Czar Alexander I., to find in the 'sacred precepts of the Gospel' a common basis for a general league of European governments having for its object the preservation of peace, was really a brotherhood of sovereigns holding the reins of government by Divine right. The same high doctrine was dear to the first German Emperor, who intensely believed himself to be the vicegerent of the 'God of battles'; and it is held as firmly by his grandson, who habitually lays stress on the Divine right by which alone the kings of Prussia rule, sincerely holding that they are appointed and inspired to shape their people's destinies. 'Considering myself as the instrument of the Lord, without heeding the views and opinions of the day, I go my way' (Königsberg speech, 1910). The principle is logically applied in Russia, where the Emperor places the crown (as the first Napoleon did) on his own head, deriving his kingly prerogative from no man, and being answerable to no man.

The **Old Testament** has often been regarded as teaching the Divine right of kings. But it speaks with a somewhat uncertain voice. In gratitude for the monarchy, which, arising out of natural beginnings, drew together all the vital energies of Israel in devotion to one God and one king, the prophets went to all lengths in proclaiming the king's person sacrosanct and his rule Divine. The earthly monarch was sent in the place of the heavenly; he was Jahweh's anointed and His son, the mediator through whom help, salvation, and blessing came to the people. The Civil State was a miracle, a gift of God, and even the glorious kingdom of the future was inconceivable without a heaven-sent king. Time, however, brought disillusionment; a succession of weak and unrighteous kings were unfaithful to the pure religion; Hosea (13^{11}) regarded the monarchy itself as an evil; and, according to a late stratum of the historical books, Samuel from the very beginning foresaw a dangerous rivalry to the kingship of Jahweh, an autocracy substituted for a theocracy (1 S $8^{7ff.}$). It is certain that the prophets never renounced their Divine right of criticizing the policy and the character of their kings, and that long before the end came they remorselessly foretold the dissolution of the State and the abolition of the monarchy, at least until the Messiah should come to restore all things.

In the **New Testament**, Christ Himself acknowledges the rights of Cæsar (the reigning Emperor was Tiberius) within his own sphere (Mk 12^{17}), and St. Paul declares that the Powers that be (ἐξουσίαι ὑπερέχουσαι) are ordained of God, so that resistance to the Power is resistance to the ordinance of God (Ro $13^{1f.}$). The Divine-right party in the Jacobean and Caroline period regarded such utterances as strongly supporting their cause; and even Bishop Berkeley appears to have interpreted them as prescribing an unlimited obedience. 'Loyalty is a moral virtue, and "Thou shalt not resist the Supreme Power" a rule or law of nature, the least breach whereof hath the inherent stain of moral

turpitude' (*Works*, iv. 111 [quoted by Sanday-Headlam, *Romans*, Edin. 1895, p. 372]). But the early Christians, who were so loyal to Cæsar 'for conscience' sake' (Ro 13[5]), were loyal to Christ for the same reason; and, when Cæsar went beyond his sphere and claimed from them Divine honours, they not only refused to bow to his authority, but branded him as 'the Beast.'

In truth, the despotic claim of Divine right must always make kings either odious or ridiculous. King James I., who was in the habit of telling his Parliament that 'they held their privileges merely during his pleasure, and that they had no more business to inquire what he might lawfully do than what the Deity might lawfully do' (Macaulay, *Hist. of Eng.*, ed. London, 1871, i. 37), was reminded by Melville that, though he was king over men, he was only 'God's silly vassal.' It was not a courtly speech, any more than Knox's memorable saying to Mary, 'Your *will*, Madam, is no reason.' But such bold utterances—the expression of the Divine and indefeasible right of private judgment—becoming household words, created an atmosphere in which the doctrine of Divine right to unlimited power ultimately died a natural death. Faint and ghostly echoes of it are still frequently heard abroad, as when Martensen (*Christian Ethics* [*Social*], Eng. tr., Edin. 1882, p. 187) advocates hereditary monarchy,

'because of its full manifestation of the fact that the king exists not by the will of the people, but by the will of God, that the king and his authority are *given* us, that he is exactly the person whom we ought to have, that subjective arguing is in this matter of as little use as it would be to complain that we have not other parents than those whom God has given us, although those parents may have undeniable imperfections, to which we need not be blind, but by which our dutifulness must not be disturbed.'

The ideal State is that in which the Divine right of every personality is recognized, and the throne thus broad-based upon the people's will. In such a State each individual can say, in a much higher sense than was meant by the Grand Monarque, 'L'état c'est moi.' It is vain to imagine that 'there's such divinity doth hedge a king' (*Hamlet*, IV. v. 123), when the king happens to be Hamlet's stepfather, lawless and murderous; but the words have a profound significance when the Divine protection of a good king is mediated by the fervent loyalty of a great nation.

'Where the king doth guide the state, and the law the king, that commonwealth is like a harp or melodious instrument, the strings whereof are tuned and handled all by one, following as laws the rules and canons of musical science' (Hooker, viii. 2, Keble's ed. iii. 440).

See also art. GOVERNMENT, and Literature there cited. J. STRAHAN.

DIVORCE.—See MARRIAGE.

DOCETISM.—**1. Name and definition.**—Docetism (δοκητισμός) is the heresy which teaches that Christ had no real material body and human nature, but only an apparent body, a phantasm of humanity (like the angel Raphael in To 12[19]). His acceptance of the ordinary laws that govern our life, His eating, drinking, birth, and death, are so many illusions (δοκεῖν, in the sense of 'seeming' only).

The name δοκηταί (δοκιταί) appears first in a letter of Serapion of Antioch (191–203 [reproduced by Euseb. *HE* vi. 12]), in which he forbids the reading of the apocryphal Gospel of Peter because it is corrupted by the 'successors of those who preceded Marcion, whom we call Docetes.' It appears again in Clem. Alex. *Strom.* iii. 13 (*PG* viii. 1192), vii. 17 (*ib.* ix. 553), in Hippol. *Philos.* viii. 8 (*ib.* xvi. 3347), in Theodoret († *c.* 458), *Ep.* 82 (*ib.* lxxxiii. 1264): 'Marcion, Valentine, Manes, and the other Docetes.' But the heresy existed long before the time of these writers. There are traces of it in the NT, it recurs in the Apostolic Fathers, it became part of the Gnostic system, continued in various forms among Manichæans and Monophysites, lasted into the Middle Ages, and was adopted (in part) by Muhammad.

Docetism was not so much a definite system as a tendency. There was not one organized Docetic sect; nor was the idea of a phantasmal body of Christ adopted for its own sake, for the sake of apparent reasons of philosophy, or on the ground of texts of Scripture, or other such arguments. It is rather the consequence to which other heresies led. It is found, moreover, in various forms, more or less perfect. One school had only few Docetic tendencies, another more; it was possible to hold Docetic views about our Lord's birth or conception, but not about His death, and *vice versa*. So we find it in many grades, ranging from a slight tendency to consider Christ's humanity as privileged, more spiritual than ours, less subject to humiliating conditions (in which form it might be held by orthodox Christians), to the extreme school which made all His life on earth a senseless mystification.

2. In the NT and the Apostolic Fathers.—Docetism is the first known Christian heresy. 'The blood of Christ was still fresh in Judæa,' says Jerome, 'when His body was said to be a phantasm' (*adv. Lucif.* 23 [*PL* xxiii. 186]). There are passages in the NT against those who deny the reality of our Lord's body. Certain texts in St. Paul which insist on Christ's birth from a woman, or on His having flesh (Gal 4[4], Ro 1[3] 9[5]; cf. He 2[14]), are sometimes supposed to be directed against Docetes. In any case, there is undeniably a polemic anti-Docetic meaning in the Epistles of St. John; 1 Jn 1[1-3] and 4[1-3] clearly have this sense, just as 2[22] rejects the Gnostic basis of Docetism. In 2 Jn [7] there is the statement that 'many deceivers are gone forth into the world, even they that confess not that Jesus Christ cometh in the flesh' (A. Wurm, *Die Irrlehrer im ersten Johannesbrief*, Freiburg, 1903, pp. 53–62).

It may seem strange that Docetism should thus be the earliest of all heresies. One would have thought that the first and second Christian generations would at any rate have had no doubt about our Lord's real manhood. The explanation is that Docetism did not develop by a perverse process from the gospel and the Christian system, but came to Christianity from without. Already, before the time of Christ, the philosophy of dualism (*q.v.*) was in possession in Greek and Jewish schools. The concept of the universe as the battle-ground between two worlds—a good world of spirit and a bad world of matter—had a large number of adherents when the Christian gospel was first preached. Dualistic philosophies, then, combining with the Christian faith, produced the long chain of heresies that we class together as Gnosticism and Manichæism. In all the problem of evil (Tertullian, *de Præscr.* 7: 'unde malum et quare') is explained by dualism; and it must be remembered that dualism is not so much a Christian heresy as a totally un-Christian, pre-Christian, philosophy. Certainly in some of the extreme Gnostic schools there is hardly any Christianity at all. Docetism is a corollary of Gnostic dualism. All these combinations of the old Persian philosophy with the new religion took from the gospel at least the name of Jesus Christ as the leading champion of the good world of spirit, if not a final emanation from God its creator and protector. It followed, then, that He could not be Himself polluted by matter. He had come down to redeem men's souls by freeing them from matter; He Himself must be pure spirit. The body is bad, made by the powers of darkness and evil; therefore the Saviour could have no body. So all the passages of the Gospels that refer to His flesh, or to His dependence on matter in birth, eating, death, must be understood as describing mere appearances. It was necessary that He should seem to

have a material body, but this was only what seemed to be.

Docetism in the first period is always the corollary of some Gnostic system. F. Chr. Baur (*Die christliche Gnosis*, p. 258) held that all Gnostics were Docetes. This is not correct. There were Gnostic schools, as that of Basilides, which solved the problem in another way, denying any essential union between Christ, the spiritual Saviour-Æon, and the man Jesus—thus foreshadowing Nestorianism. But more or less advanced Docetic ideas accompany most Gnostic systems; although we cannot say that all Gnostics were Docetes, we may safely say that all early Docetes were Gnostics. Docetism was always a consequence of that representation of matter as evil which is the common element of Gnostic schools. It was a feature of Gnosticism specially hateful to the early Fathers, because it made of the Gospel story—all the Life that is to be our example (Jn 13^{15})—a vain pretence. 'Spare the one hope of the whole world,' says Tertullian to Marcion (*de carne Christi*, 5 [*PL* ii. 760]). Although this theory was not a separate heresy, but rather a consequence of the larger issue about dualism, it could be refuted separately. Apart from the general question whether matter be an emanation from the evil principle, it was possible to defend the real humanity and so the material body of Christ; it was possible to show to any one who accepted the story of His life in the Gospels that He was a real man, subject to the normal conditions of human life. Many Fathers accordingly discuss this question separately, and refute those who deny it, without dealing with the reason of their denial. So they have left us the concept of Docetism as a special heresy, and of Docetes as a particular class of persons.

The *Epistle of Barnabas*, v. 12 ('God says that the stroke of his flesh is from them [*sc.* the Jews]'), is sometimes supposed to contain a Docetic idea ('naiver Doketismus' [Harnack, *Dogmengesch.* i. 215]), but unjustly. The text goes on to declare the reality of the Passion and Crucifixion; the words quoted mean only that this was the fulfilment of prophecy (Funk, *Patres apost.*, Tübingen, 1901, i. 53, n. 12). *Ignatius of Antioch*, in the Greek version of his Letters, repeatedly and vehemently denounces those who say that Christ 'suffered apparently' (τὸ δοκεῖν πεπονθέναι [*Trall.* 10]), and insists on the reality of His flesh (*Eph.* 7, 18; *Trall.* 9–10). All the first part of *Smyrn.* (1–6) is devoted to anti-Docetic polemic.[1] *Polycarp* quotes 1 Jn $4^{2f.}$, adding that whoever does not confess the witness of the Cross is of the devil, and whoever denies the Resurrection and the Judgment is the first-born of Satan. He describes these ideas as 'the folly of many people' (*Phil.* vii. 1–2). This is generally believed to be directed against Marcion and his followers. Irenæus tells the story of Polycarp meeting Marcion and calling him the first-born of Satan (*Hær.* III. iii. 4). *Justin Martyr* counts Marcionites among the other Gnostics who 'in no way worship Jesus, but only confess Him in words' (*Dial.* 35 [*PG* vi. 551]), and insists on Christ's real human nature (*ib.* 43 [568]).

3. Docetism in apocryphal scriptures.—There are traces of Docetism in several apocryphal books that circulated for a time among early Christians. We have seen that Serapion of Antioch forbade the reading of the *Gospel of Peter* because it had been corrupted by Docetes. The fragment lately discovered (in 1887 at Akhmîm in Upper Egypt, published by U. Bouriant in 1892) confirms his judgment. Verse 10 says (of Christ on the cross): 'But he remained dumb, as one who feels no pain' (Harnack, 'Evang. u. Apokal. des Petrus,' *TU* ix. 2 [1893], p. 9).

Except those of Paul, all the apocryphal *Acts* of Apostles contain more or less Docetic ideas, often together with a certain amount of Encratism (a similar corollary of hatred of matter). The *Acts of John* (early 2nd cent.; cf. Euseb. *HE* iii. 25) exhibits the most pronounced form. At the Last Supper, St. John, leaning on Christ's breast, found it non-resisting (89 [Hennecke, *NT Apokryphen*, Tübingen, 1904, p. 451]); at the entombment, the body of Christ was at one moment apparently solid, at another it was 'immaterial and incorporeal and like nothing' (93 [*ib.* 452]). The Crucifixion was only an appearance; at the same moment Christ appeared to John on the Mount of Olives and explained this (97 [*ib.* 454]). The *Acts of Peter* (cf. Euseb. iii. 2) has the statement, characteristic of one school of Docetism, that God sent His Son '*through* the Virgin Mary' (7 [Hennecke, 399]). The material Passion was an appearance: 'What appears is quite different from this suffering, as it was from the passion of Christ' (37 [*ib.* 421]). The *Acts of Andrew* is strongly Encratite; its Docetism appears in § 6 (Hennecke, 466), where man is said to be 'immaterial, holy, light,' etc. In the *Acts of Thomas*, Docetism is less evident, but the usual Gnostic antithesis between matter and spirit is supposed throughout; Christ is spirit (Hennecke, 480–544). Only the *Acts of Paul* (*ib.* 369–383) seems free from any trace of this heresy.

In many cases the Docetism of these apocryphal scriptures is latent rather than manifest, or it shows itself only in one or two sentences. For the rest they speak of our Lord in much the same tone as the Canonical books. This explains how they could be read in orthodox circles often without suspicion. On the other hand, they were rejected by authority (cf. Euseb. iii. 25) because of their heretical tendency, shown chiefly in the form of Docetism.

4. The Gnostic Docetes.—The apocryphal scriptures quoted were composed in Gnostic circles; the quotations have anticipated part of what follows. With regard to Docetism the Gnostic schools fall into three classes: (1) those which were not Docetic at all, but distinguished Christ the spiritual Saviour from the normal man Jesus; (2) the milder Docetes, who admitted a body of Christ, though it was a spiritualized one (σῶμα ψυχικόν or πνευματικόν), and only passed *through* His mother, was not formed of her; (3) the extreme Docetes, who denied all reality to the body of Christ; He was born in no sense at all, and all His human life was a mere phantasm (Harnack, i. 285).

(1) *Basilides* (*q.v.*) (in Alexandria at the time of Hadrian, A.D. 117–138 [Euseb. iv. 7]) was not a Docete, but solved the Gnostic problem in the other way, by distinguishing the man Jesus from the Spirit, the νοῦς, who entered into Him at His baptism. Irenæus says that Basilides' account of the Crucifixion was that Simon of Cyrene was crucified by mistake, 'and Jesus Himself took the form of Simon, and stood by and laughed at them' (*Hær.* I. xxiv. 4). If Basilides really taught this [it is disputed], it shows a trace of one idea, common to most Docetes, namely, the denial of the Crucifixion.

(2) The milder school is represented by Valentinus, Apelles, Bardesanes, and Marinus. *Valentinus* (*c.* 120–160) taught that Jesus had a 'psychic' body which could not decay, was not subject to the normal laws of matter (Letter to Agathopus in Clem. Alex. *Strom.* iii. 7 [*PG* viii. 1161]): He passed through His mother as water through a pipe (καθάπερ ὕδωρ διὰ σωλῆνος [Iren. I. vii. 2]). He was an emanation from the thirty Æons, the visible appearance of the pre-existent Christ produced

[1] These passages are wanting in Cureton's Syriac version (Lightfoot, *The Apost. Fathers*, pt. ii. vol. i. [1889] p. 320).

through Mary by the lowest (female) Æon, Sophia, and the power of the Creator-demiurge (*ib.* I. xi. 2, 3). Later Valentinian schools developed and modified the founder's ideas in various directions. Some, keeping the idea of the non-natural body of Jesus, further distinguished between Him and Christ as two persons (*ib.* III. xiv. 1). Mark (Irenæus' contemporary of this school) distinguished two baptisms of Jesus, one the (psychic) baptism of the 'apparent Jesus' (τοῦ φαινομένου Ἰησοῦ) by John for the forgiveness of sins, the other a pneumatic baptism, to which Mk 10[38f.] refers, in which He received Christ, or the Spirit, for His perfection (*ib.* I. xxi. 2). This represents exactly the combined milder Docetism and (as we should say) Nestorianism of this school. Marcion's disciple *Apelles* so far modified his master's teaching that he, too, must be classed among the milder Docetes. He admitted that Christ had a real body, formed from the stars and 'higher' substances of the world, not really born of Mary, but like the body of an angel (*sic*) (Tert. *de carne Christi*, 6 [*PL* ii. 763]; *adv. Marc.* iii. 11 [*ib.* 335]). We hear nothing of Docetism in *Bardesanes* himself (in Syria, A.D. 154–223? [Euseb. iv. 30]). Ephraim Syr. in his account (*Serm. polem. adv. hær.* 1 [*Opp. Syr.*, Rome, 1740, ii. 437–439] says nothing of Christological errors, nor does Epiphanius (*Hær.* lvi. [*PG* xli. 989–993]). But *Marinus* and others of Bardesanes' school taught the milder form of Docetism—that Christ had a 'heavenly' body, was not born of a woman, and suffered only apparently (Adamantius, *Dialog. de recta in Deum fide*, iii. [*PG* xi. 1793]).

(3) The chief defenders of extreme Docetism are Cerdo, Satornil, and Marcion. *Cerdo* (Κέρδων, a Syrian in Rome at the time of Hyginus, *c.* 136–140 [Iren. I. xxvii. 1; cf. III. iv. 3]) is known chiefly as the teacher of Marcion. He is said to have denied absolutely the reality of Christ's body and of all His apparently human actions (birth, death) on earth (Epiph. xli. [*PG* xli. 692–693]; Hippol. *Philosoph.* x. 19 [*PG* xvi. 3435–3438]). Irenæus (*ib.*) counts him a follower of Simon Magus, the supposed father of all Gnostic and Docetic theories. *Satornil* (Saturninus, a Syrian [2nd cent.]), mentioned already by Justin (*Dial.* 35 [*PG* vi. 552]), was a consistent dualist in all his system, and carried his principles to their logical consequence in absolute Docetism. Our Lord was the Saviour, opposed to the God of Israel, and came to separate the sparks of life and spirit in men from matter. His own freedom from matter is emphasized strongly.

'He said the Saviour was unborn, incorporeal, without figure (*sine figura*), without real matter, apparently seeming a man; and he said the God of the Jews was one of the angels. . . . Christ had come to destroy the Jewish God and for the salvation of those who trusted Him (Christ); these are they who have a spark of His life' (Iren. I. xxiv. 2; cf. Hippol. *Philosoph.* vii. 28 [*PG* xvi. 3322]).

The most famous of all Docetes is *Marcion.* He was a sailor from Pontus (Tert. *Præscr.* 30 [*PL* ii. 48 f.]; Euseb. v. 13), who became a Christian at Rome at the time of Eleutherius (*c.* 177–190? [*Præscr.*, *ib.*]). Then he was attracted by Gnostic circles, and evolved a Gnostic system of his own which obtained a considerable following. Marcionites occur among the heretics in all the anti-Gnostic Fathers. Irenæus traces the line of Marcion's heresy through Cerdo from Simon Magus (*Hær.* I. xxvii. 1). His Docetism, as regards the beginning of Christ's life, was complete. His followers read a corrupt version of St. Luke (*Hær.* III. xii. 7; *adv. Marc.* iv. 2 [*PL* ii. 364]), in which all the account of the birth and infancy was cancelled. Suddenly Christ appeared as a grown man: 'In the fifteenth year of the reign of Tiberius He descended into the city of Galilee Capernaum from the heaven of the Creator, into which He had already descended from His own' (*adv. Marc.* iv. 7 [*PL* ii. 369]); cf. Lk 3^1 4^{31} (*adv. Marc.* i. 19 [*ib.* 267]; Iren. *Hær.* I. xxvii. 2). He was in no sense really a man, had no real body; any connexion between the Divine Spirit Christ and matter is impossible (Tert. *de carne Christi*, 3 [*PL* ii. 757]). Marcion accepted the idea of the sacrificial death of Christ. For this reason it is often said that he admitted a real passion and death. But there is reason to doubt this. It seems that, although he constantly spoke and wrote of the death of Christ as did orthodox Christians, he understood it in a merely Docetic sense. Nikephoros I. of Constantinople (806–815) quotes a sentence from a lost work of Marcion: 'Christ *seemed* to suffer and be buried' (*Antirrhetika*, 21, in Pitra, *Spicilegium Solesmense*, Paris, 1852, i. 406). Tertullian devotes *adv. Marc.* iii. 8–11 (*PL* ii. 331–336) to proving, against the heretic, that Christ did not have a 'corpus phantasticum.'

There remains *Simon Magus*, the reputed author of Docetism, as of all Gnostic theories (Iren. *Hær.* I. xxiii. 2; II. Præf.; III. Præf.). His name appears repeatedly as the inventor of this idea; but it is very doubtful how far he is not simply a type to whom all Gnostic developments are traced back.

Clement of Alexandria refers to Docetes (δοκιταί) in *Strom.* vii. 17 (*PG* ix. 553); in iii. 13 (*ib.* viii. 1192 f.) he alludes casually to a certain *Julius Cassianus* (Ἰούλιος Κασσιανός), who, he says, was the leader of the sect of Docetes and a disciple of Valentinus. But the passage tells us nothing about Julius' Docetic ideas; the fragments that Clement quotes of his works (*ib.* iii. 13 and 14 [*PG* viii. 1192–1196]) show only Encratism. Jerome (*Com. in Gal.* vi. 8 [*PL* xxvi. 460]) repeats that Cassianus was a Docete. Otherwise nothing is known of him.

The Docetes, besides their principle that the Saviour could not be defiled by a material body, quoted certain texts of Scripture in favour of their view. Marcion made much of Mt 12^{48}, as showing that Christ had no mother (*adv. Marc.* iv. 19 [*PL* ii. 404]). He also quoted Ro 8^3 (ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκός); so Nikephoros (in Pitra, *loc. cit.*). On the other hand, the Fathers had no lack of texts to quote against Docetism. The Epistles of St. John supplied, of course, many such. Polycarp quotes 1 Jn $4^{2f.}$ (*Phil.* vii. 1); Ignatius uses Lk 24^{39} (*Smyrn.* iii. 2). Iren. *Hær.* III. xxii. 1–3 and Tert. *de carne Christi*, 15 (*PL* ii. 779 f.), are good examples of contemporary controversy against Gnostic Docetism. It may be noted, too, that the body of Christ in the Holy Eucharist is frequently used as an argument against Docetes. Already in the time of Ignatius, Docetes 'abstain from the Eucharist and prayer (προσευχή, prayer of oblation?) because they do not confess that the Eucharist is the flesh of our Saviour Jesus Christ' (*Smyrn.* vii. 1). Irenæus (*Hær.* IV. xviii. 5, V. ii. 2–3) and Tertullian (*adv. Marc.* iv. 40) use the Eucharist as a proof of the reality of Christ's body.

5. Docetism in the Fathers.—Certain Fathers have been accused of Docetic ideas. We have seen that Docetism admits of many degrees. It may be a question whether an otherwise orthodox Father conceived some mild form of it with regard to certain incidents of Christ's life. The *Epistle of Barnabas* has been accused wrongly (see above, p. 833[a]), nor does there seem to be any foundation for the alleged Docetism of Origen (cf. Harnack, i. 688). The case of Clement of Alexandria is more serious. Photius accuses him of this heresy (*Biblioth.* 109 [*PG* ciii. 384]). Yet he categorically rejects it (*Strom.* vii. 17 [*PG* ix. 553], iii. 17 [viii. 1205]); he says that our Lord was really a man

(*Pæd.* iii. 1 [viii. 556]), speaks of His flesh and blood (cf. *Strom.* v. 6 [ix. 58]; *Pæd.* ii. 2 [viii. 409]; *Quis dives salv.* 37 [ix. 641]), etc. His alleged Docetism consists of an idea that the body of Christ was not subject to natural desires, nor His soul to human passions, such as joy, sorrow, etc. (*Strom.* vi. 9 [ix. 292]; *Pæd.* i. 2 [viii. 252]). And in his *Adumbr. in Joh.* i. 1 (*PG* ix. 735) he repeats, as a tradition, the story told in the *Acts of John* (see above, p. 833ᵇ), that at the descent from the cross, St. John, trying to touch the body of Christ, found a void there (the legend is told by Leukios Charinos, for whom see Photius, *Bibl.* 114 [*PG* ciii. 389]). Hilary is quite clear as to the reality of the body of Christ and its natural qualities (*de Trin.* x. 19 [*PL* x. 357]); but he calls it a 'heavenly' body (x. 18 [*ib.*]), and thinks that Christ's soul was not naturally subject to pain (x. 23 [*ib.* 361]). This idea, not uncommon among the Fathers, occurs as a supposed consequence of the hypostatic union, and can hardly be considered Docetism of even the mildest kind (Harnack, ii. 316 f.).

6. The Docetes in Hippolytus.—Hippolytus twice describes a sect whom he calls Docetes (*Philosoph.* viii. 8-11 [*PG* xvi. 3347-3358] and x. 16 [*ib.* 3434]). These people seem to have hardly anything of what is generally called Docetism; their use of the name is difficult to explain. Hippolytus says they call themselves Docetes (δοκητάς, *ib.* viii. 11); he explains the name (ironically) as derived from the *beam* (δοκός) in their eye (Mt 7³). Their system ('a much-tangled and inconsistent heresy' [*ib.* 11]) is one of the many forms of tortuous Gnostic philosophy about the origin of the universe. God is like a grain of the fig-tree, very small in size, infinite in power of development. From the seed come forth three emanations—branches, leaves, fruit; so from God three Æons, and all other things from them. Each Æon becomes perfect, that is, tenfold; so we have 30 Æons. They are male and female; they generate a middle Æon, who is the Saviour. So it goes on. One Æon, a fire-god, is the Creator-demiurge. Souls transmigrate. In a long tangle of wild nonsense the only trace of what we call Docetism is the statement that our Lord (whose life was as in the Gospels [*PG* xvi. 3355]) received at His baptism another body, the 'image and seal of the body born of the Virgin.' When His material body was crucified, His soul put on this other one, evidently a spiritual Docetic body. He lived 30 years, in each year manifesting the teaching of a different Æon. No wonder, then, that so many different heresies can appeal to His teaching! But only the Docetes, who are 'from the middle decad and the best ogdoad,' can really understand Him.[1]

7. Later Docetism.—The Manichæans, as a consequence of their dualism, took over the Docetic idea. Augustine represents Faustus as denying the birth of Christ (*c. Faust.* ii. 1 [*PL* xlii. 209]), as describing His body as not human but formed of celestial elements (v. 1 [219]; cf. xi. 1 [243]), as denying the reality of His passion and death (xiv. 2 [296]). Mani's Docetism is further complicated by a curious distinction between the *Iesus impatibilis*, who is 'living spirit,' and the *Iesus patibilis*, who is the Soul of the world (G. Flügel, *Mani, seine Lehre u. seine Schriften*, Leipzig, 1862, pp. 35, 258, 337 f.).

Later developments of Manichæism continued the Docetic idea. The Priscillianists in Spain were not Docetes, though they were Dualists (Prisc. *Can.* 17; ed. G. Schepss, *Corp. Script. eccl. Latin.* xviii. 118, Vienna, 1889). But the Cathari, Albigenses (*q.v.*; see especially vol. i. p. 281ᵇ), and other mediæval Manichæan sects adopted Docetism as part of their system. The Albigenses carried it so far that they taught that the Virgin Mary, St. Joseph, St. John, as well as our Lord Himself, were all angels in the appearance of men (see documents in Döllinger, *Beiträge zur Sektengesch. des Mittelalters*, Munich, 1890, ii. 34, 58, 66 f., etc.). In the year 1017 a Synod at Orleans condemned a number of heretics who denied the reality of the body of Christ (Mansi, xix. 377; Döllinger, i. 65, gives the date as 1022).

Pope Leo I. accuses the Monophysites of Docetism (*Ep.* xxvi. [*PL* liv. 745] etc.). There is something of this heresy in their system and in that of their predecessor Apollinaris, inasmuch as they taught that the body of Christ, absorbed in the Divinity, lost the natural qualities of human flesh. Julius of Halicarnassus († *c.* 518) and his followers, the Aphthartodoketai, held this view as their distinguishing theory (cf. Liberatus, *Breviarium*, 19 [*PL* lxviii. 1033 f.]). Muhammad adopted a Docetic view of the Crucifixion (*Qur'ān*, iii. 45, tr. E. H. Palmer, *SBE* vi. [1900] 53 and n. 3). Some Anabaptists were Docetes (see ANABAPTISM, vol. i. p. 410). Lastly, various modern revivals of old heresies—theosophy and such like—have adopted Docetic ideas. Mrs. Eddy introduced a kind of Docetism as part of her 'Christian Science.' Her literary adviser, Rev. J. H. Wiggin, recognized her system as 'an ignorant revival' of Gnostic and Docetic theories (G. Milmine, *Life of M. B. G. Eddy*, London, 1909, p. 337).

LITERATURE.—For Gnostic Docetism the chief sources are Irenæus, *adv. Hær.* (*PG* vii. 437-1224); Tertullian, *adv. Marcion.* (*PL* ii. 243-524), and *de carne Christi* (*ib.* 752-792); Hippolytus, *Philosophumena* (*PG* xvi. 3347-3358, 3434); Clem. Alex. *Strom.* (*PG* viii. 685-ix. 602), and *Pædagog.* (*PG* viii. 249-682). For Manichæan Docetism: Augustine's works against the Manichæans, esp. *c. Faust.* (*PL* xlii. 207-518); A. Hilgenfeld, *Ketzergesch. des Urchristenthums*, Leipzig, 1884; A. Harnack, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengesch.*, new ed., 3 vols., Tübingen, 1909-10 [Eng. tr. of 3rd ed., 7 vols., London, 1894-9]; F. Chr. Baur, *Die christliche Gnosis*, Tübingen, 1835; Hilgers, *Krit. Darstellung der Haresie*, Bonn, 1837; L. J. Tixeront, *Hist. des dogmes*, Paris, 1909, i. 196-207; G. Salmon, art. in *DCB*; J. Arendzen, art. in *Cath. Encyclopædia*; G. R. S. Mead, *Fragments of a Faith Forgotten*, London, 1906.

ADRIAN FORTESCUE.

DOCETISM (Buddhist).—**I. Origin and nature.**—Speaking generally, the Buddhist religion has a strong tendency towards docetic ideas as to the personality of its founder. The strictly orthodox Theravādins adhered to the practical moral teaching of the Master, and limited themselves to pious obedience to the rules and traditions of the community. This is the reason why they, and they alone, resisted strongly the docetic tendency of the heterodox Mahāsaṅghikas. On the other hand, the latter, not content with the mere formulæ of the doctrine, tried in various ways to amplify the teachings of the Buddha and to pursue them to their respective consequences. The more they deified the Master and developed the idealistic sides of his doctrines, the less they came to think of his historical personality. They were more broad-minded, so to speak, and were not afraid to fly above the clouds of mythical fancies or of metaphysical speculations. On this account the men of this tendency called themselves the Mahāyānists, in contrast to the orthodox Hīnayānists (see artt. MAHĀYĀNA, HĪNAYĀNA), though the origin and date of the former are still involved in obscurity. In this way we may fairly say that the Mahāyānists were more or less docetists, as their mythic fancy or idealistic speculation laid less stress on the historical Buddha.

Though a sharp demarcation can hardly be drawn between these two forms of Buddhism (the Mahāsaṅghikas, for example.

[1] There is so little resemblance between the ideas of Hippolytus' Docetes and ordinary Docetism that Salmon in the *DCB* treats them separately as representing different heresies (i. 865-870).

stand midway between them), one of the characteristic differences is that the Hīnayānists believe in a single Buddha, whereas many Buddhas are recognized by the Mahāyānists. The former believe in Gautama or Śākyamuni as the sole Tathāgata who is to be adored in this world-period, while the latter see in him one of the Buddhas residing in various Buddha-lands and influencing believers. The *Ekottara-āgama*,[1] the Mahāsaṅghika counterpart of the Pāli *Aṅguttara*, tells of Maudgalyāyana's visit to the land of the Buddha Śikhi. This belief is extended to the ten directions, in each of which there is a Buddha-land, where a Buddha or many Buddhas reside in the state of bliss and attract their respective believers. It was inevitable, when faith was in this way extended to mythical Buddhas, that the concentration of belief in the actual Buddha should become more difficult or less necessary, and that the historical personality of the present Buddha should become more and more ephemeral and rarefied. This mythologizing and mystifying process of Buddhological speculations went on parallel or conjointly with the metaphysical identification of all the Buddhas in their essential reality. A Buddha appeared once in this world-period, and his historicity is established; but the importance and significance of his personality do not lie in his actual life, but in his connexion with the universal Buddhahood, the so-called *Dharmakāya* (see below).

Thus, docetism, or, to speak more generally, the docetic tendency in Buddhism, made its progress in two ways: one the way of mythical fancies about the Buddha's superhuman qualities, and the other that of metaphysical speculations on his personality as a Tathāgata and on its relations with the truth (*dharma*) which he revealed. So long and so far as the faith of Buddhists in the Master amounted to the reverence paid towards a sage who, having practised all the three branches of the Buddhist training, attained Buddhahood and led his followers in the same way, the Buddha remained a Tathāgata who, starting from the position of a human being, attained to his superhuman (Pāli *manussuttara*) state.[2] Whatever his merits and powers, his earthly life was believed to have been as real as that of any other human being. But, as soon as the pious thoughts of believers began to place him side by side with a mythical Chakravartin or to make him far superior to the highest deity Brahmā, whether in his lifetime or after his death, his personality became more mythical and less human. Progress along this line is seen in the myth of his pre-existence in the *Tuṣitā* heaven and also in various *Jātakas* and *Nidānas* (such as that of the king Sudassana); and the tendency reached its acme in the mythologizing biographies, like that of the *Mahāvastu* or *Lalitavistara*. Of course, these mythologizers did not all go so far as to deny the reality of the Buddha's earthly life, yet their ideas verged on docetism and had a close kinship with the decidedly docetic theories, or at least supplied the materials to docetists.

Though the development of these ideas and their mutual relations cannot now be traced historically, it seems nearly certain that the mythologizing began soon after the Master's death, and found many adherents outside of the pale of the strictly orthodox teachers. The resistance of the orthodox Theravādins to this stream of thought is clearly seen in the Theses (*Kathāvatthu*), composed in the reign of Aśoka.[3] The materials and composition of the *Mahāvastu*, above referred to, may be earlier than, or contemporary with, this orthodox defence of the historicity of the Buddha's life.

A more powerful impetus to docetic tendencies was supplied by the philosophical speculations contained even in Buddha's own teaching. The five *skandhas*, under which he classified the constituents of our bodily and mental life, had been declared to possess no final reality. He also emphasized the illusiveness of the six senses and of the desires arising from them.[4] In short, the Buddhist ideal of an Arhat or of a Buddha consisted in transcending the passions and turbulence of physical life, and in finally overcoming life and death. Though the Buddha was not a nihilist, it was not without reason that his doctrines were charged with being 'a nihilistic wisdom' (*suññāgāra-hatā paññā*). Vacuity (*suññatā*) was one of his most important tenets, and, though this final vacuity could be attained only after the cessation of the bodily life, the aim of a Buddhist sage was to realize this ideal, among others, even in this life. Thus arose the question whether the Tathāgata existed or not after his death. Though this question was not answered in the negative (or in the affirmative), and though it did not raise the question of the reality of the Master's earthly life, the solution turned inevitably in the direction of docetism, when the transient life on earth was contrasted with the profound abyss of the vacuity beyond. The vacuity of the phenomenal world was still more emphasized in the later 'non-mark' (*alakṣaṇa*) philosophy of the Mahāyāna school, and it became a decidedly docetic theory, as applied to the personality of Buddha.

Another direction taken by Buddhist philosophy had its origin in the emphasis laid on the reality of the truths (*dharma*) revealed by the Buddha. His personality and his personal life are not ignored, but he is the Master and the Tathāgata, because he taught men truths according to reality (*yathābhūtam, tathatāya*). These truths are set forth, first of all, apparently in his sermons and doctrines (*dharma*), but they are universal in their nature as truths (*dharmatā*), and the capacity or dignity of a Buddha is due to the realization of them. So it is said that all the Buddhas have attained their Buddhahood by respecting these truths and living according to them.[1] Moreover, they are stable (*dhamma-ṭiṭhitā*) and fixed (*dhamma-niyamatā*),[2] whether the Tathāgata arises or not in this world. Buddha's own utterance that he who sees the *dhamma* sees him, and *vice versa*,[3] brings out clearly the identification of his personality with the truths, and this may further be noted as implying a distinction between his transitory life and his life as the Tathāgata according to truth. Here we have the clue to, and the source of, the idea of the *dharmakāya*, i.e. the Buddha's personality identified with *dharma* and opposed to his physical life. Though the followers of this school, sometimes called the Dharmalakṣana, do not deny the reality of a corporeal existence of the Tathāgata, they are always inclined to emphasize the metaphysical or transcendental side of the Buddha's personality, and to regard his earthly life as a mere manifestation or a condescension for the sake of common mortals. The tendency is manifested in the *Lalitavistara*,[4] and is represented chiefly by the *Suvarṇaprabhā* and the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*. Those who developed from this thought a systematic Trinitarian theory were Aśvaghoṣa (*q.v.*) and Vasubandhu (*q.v.*), whose followers in this respect are the majority of Buddhists in the Far East.

2. The Mahāsaṅghikas.—While the orthodox Theravādins adhered strictly to the realistic view of the person of their Master, the heterodox progressionists, or Mahāsaṅghikas, boldly proceeded to idealize the Tathāgata. This tendency had long been fostered, as we have seen, and the materials for it were ready to hand in the belief in the Buddha's pre-existences both in this world and in the *Tuṣitā* heaven. The results of the idealization,

[1] Preserved in a Chinese tr. (Nanjio, *Catal.*, Oxf. 1883, no. 543).

[2] The present writer cannot agree with Kern (*Manual*, Strassburg, 1896, p. 64) in explaining *Aṅguttara*, iv. 36, in a docetic sense. There the expression 'not man' is to be understood in the sense 'not a common man,' *i.e.* that he is in the world but undefiled by the world, as is said in *Aṅg.* iv. 36; *Saṁ.* 22, 94, etc. On this point other passages might be adduced.

[3] *Kathāvatthu*, xviii. 1.

[4] See *Saṁyutta*, xxii., xxv.; *Udāna*, i. 10, viii. 1; *Dīgha*, 11; *Kevaddha Sutta* (tr. Warren, *Buddhism in Translations*, Cambridge, Mass., 1896, pp. 308-313), etc.

[1] *Saṁ.* 6. 1. 1; *Aṅg.* iv. 21.

[2] See *Aṅg.* iii. 134 (Warren, *Buddhism in Translations*, p. xiv, where the translation does not bring out the full sense of the word *dhamma*), and *Saṁ.* 12. 20. The same idea is expressed in the *Saddharmapuṇḍarika*, ch. ii. vv. 100-103 (vv. 99-102 in Kern's tr. *SBE*, vol. xxi. p. 53).

[3] *Itiv.* 92.

[4] ed. Lefmann, Halle, 1902, pp. 436-437.

according to the authority of Vasumitra,[1] manifested themselves clearly in the schism of the schools, the orthodox and the heterodox. The idealizing process led to the identifying of the actual Buddha, in the essence of his personality, with all the Buddhas of the past, and thus to the neglecting of his historical personality. It was thought and taught that all the Buddhas were beyond worldly fetters (*lokottara*) and freed from all human passions. This is not very heterodox, but the Mahāsaṅghikas further argued that the single utterances of every Tathāgata implied the revelation of all truths at once. The physical body (*rūpakāya*) of a Tathāgata, they taught, has no limit in space, his virtues and powers are infinite, and his life has an immeasurable duration. How they thought of the infinity of the physical body is unknown, but probably they identified his personality with the cosmos (*dharmadhātu*) itself, as was done by the later Mahāyānists and Tantrists (see below). Further, they taught that the Buddha neither sleeps nor dreams. He is all the time in the state of complete union with all truths, in a deep contemplation, *yoga* (here we have a trace of the Ādibuddha [*q.v.*] or Dhyānibuddha), and therefore what he preaches is expressed by no notions or names. He is omniscient, comprehending all things at once, in the thought of one single moment, because in his mind is always present the mystic store of the *prajñā* wisdom. In his thought are constantly present at the same time the wisdom of extinction (*kṣīṇa-prajñā*, i.e. the consciousness that all pains are extinguished) and the wisdom of non-growth (*anutpāda-prajñā*, i.e. in which is assured extinction in the future for ever). In these theses we see an idealizing identification of the Buddha's person with a universal Buddhahood, despite times and circumstances, the essential quality of a Buddha being his identification with the universe.

Quite naturally from these fundamental ideas is deduced the illusiveness of the corporeal life of a Buddha or of a Bodhisattva, *i.e.* of one who is preparing for Buddhahood. 'All Bodhisattvas,' the Mahāsaṅghikas say, 'enter the mother's womb, but they do not take up (the successive stages of embryonic development) *kalalama*, *arbuda*, *peśi*, and *ghana* in their own bodies.' They would be born in the various forms of transmigration, as brutes or as human beings, as told in *Jātakas*; but this happens not by necessity, but owing to their own decision and for the purposes of accumulating merit and of leading other beings to salvation. Their bodies are furnished with sense organs, which seem to be sometimes attached, sometimes unattached, to outward objects, and appear to be nourished by the bodies. Nevertheless, the Bodhisattvas do not see forms and colours by eyes, or hear sounds by ears, or smell by noses, or taste by tongues, nor have their bodies any real sense of touch; but their minds receive all impressions at once and thoroughly (this state is called the *samakṛṣaṇa* [?]). What they utter in speech or act by body is done for the sake of others, in order to enlighten them. Therefore, when all is done that is to be done (*kṛta-karaṇīya*), they shut themselves out from all outward impressions and objects. In short, they are supra-men, and their physical lives are mere appearance, in contrast with their eternally serene essence.

Thus we see that the Mahāsaṅghikas were thorough docetists, whose ideas seem to have proceeded parallel or conjointly with the mythologizing of the Buddha's life, as we see it in the *Mahāvastu* or the *Lalitavistara*.[2]

[1] See Wassilieff, *Buddhismus*, pp. 258–262. The following statements as regards a Buddha and Bodhisattvas are founded on this authority.

[2] See *Mahāvastu*, ed. Sénart, Paris, 1890, and his *Essai sur la légende de Buddha*[2], Paris, 1882. The present Sanskrit text is said to belong to the Mahāsaṅghika school, but, according to the Chinese version (Nanjio, no. 680), it used to be revered by the other schools also. We can trace the development of the legends and materials from the Pāli *Vinaya* (with which the Mahīśāsaka and the Dharmagupta traditions stand nearly on the same level) to the Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya* (Nanjio, no. 1121) and then to the present text. The accumulation of biographical materials with addition of *nidānas* and *avadānas*, and the adoration of the life incidents through mythologizing, can be exhibited by bringing these texts together in a series.

3. **The Prajñā school.**—Though the name *prajñā* meant originally intellectual training in general, it became gradually restricted to the exercise of contemplation transcending all discursive and rational knowledge. The content of this kind of meditation amounts to transcending self and all actual aspects of things, and ascending to the highest region of mystic union (*yoga*). In the Buddha's teaching we repeatedly find admonitions to this exercise, and it is said that his profound doctrine consisted in the teaching of vacuity (*suññatā*, Skr. *śūnyatā*).[1] Among his disciples Subhūti is praised by the Master as the foremost of those who practised this method of contemplation among forest trees, as the man of meditation abandoning every thought of visible forms.[2] It is he to whom are ascribed the occasions of the conversations on the subject, and the various texts known as the *Prajñā-pāramitā* are handed down to us bearing his name. Though the longest of the texts is said to contain 100,000 *ślokas*, the gist of the whole amounts to nothing but the vacuity of all phenomena. All possible arguments, including a number of similes and parables, etc., are used to convince man of the non-reality of what is deemed by the common mind to be reality. Thus it is quite natural that the argument should be applied to the person of Buddha, and a most decided docetism is represented by this group of texts and its followers, whom we would now call the Prajñā, or Alakṣaṇa, school.

Seeing the non-entity of everything phenomenal, and attaining to the height of mystic contemplation, one could realize in himself the depth of the *prajñā* wisdom.[3] Buddhahood is the position wherein this wisdom is fully enlightened and the highest illumination is seen face to face. Even when denying any reality, the Prajñā school could not deny the reality of this state of illumination. Not only are a hundred thousand words and phrases used to describe this condition, but it is regarded as the most real of realities and is called the mother of all the Buddhas, the source from which they derive their enlightenment. Thus the innermost qualities of Buddhahood can be sought nowhere else than in the profound abyss of the *prajñā*. The natural consequence of this thought is that the earthly life of the Buddha Śākyamuni, including its incidents and his teachings, is in reality nothing but illusion, like all other phenomena of the visible world (*loka*). As the five constituents (*skandhas*) of the visible world are mere manifestations of what is in itself beyond all these forms, so the person of Śākyamuni is a perfect manifestation of omniscience (*sarvajña-jñāna*) which consists in the full realization of vacuity. All that he did and preached during his lifetime was only a matter of pedagogic (*upāya-kauśalya*), intended to admonish men to the exercise of the method and to lead them to this ultimate truth. He showed himself to have accumulated all possible merits of the six Pāramitās and to have accomplished his attainments in behaviour (*śīla*), contemplation (*samādhi*), wisdom (*prajñā*), deliverance (*vimukti*), and the realization of the knowledge leading to it (*vimukti-jñāna-darśana*); but all these were done not for himself, but for the

[1] See above, p. 836. [2] *Aṅg.* i. 14. 2; *Udāna*, 6. 7.

[3] The following statements are founded mostly on the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā*, esp. pp. 58, 135 f., 256–276, 306–308, 512 f. (ed. Mitra, Calcutta, 1888).

sake of common men, in order to admonish (*anumodana*) them to similar attainments.

The final extinction (*parinirvāṇa*) of his physical body was, of course, not the end of a mortal, but was meant to be a visible example of ultimate absorption into the depth of vacuity. This applies to all Buddhas, past as well as future, who are infinite in number and nothing but individualized manifestations of the mother Prajñā. The name *Buddha* means the one who has realized the omniscience of the truth and identified himself with vacuity; and *Tathāgata* is a title applied to him on account of his revelation of this ultimate truth (*tathatā*) of vacuity. Common men see in him one who has attained this truth by the accomplishments of Buddhahood (i.e. *tathā-gata*), and who has appeared among men to reveal it to them (i.e. *tathā-āgata*). But, just as every phenomenon leaves no trace (*apada*) either of whence it comes or of whither it goes, so the Tathāgata in reality comes from nowhere (*na āgamana*) and goes to nowhere (*na gamana*). In this respect he is like space, and his person has essentially nothing other than the ultimate quality of all things, vacuity. The thirty-two special marks attributed to him are in reality 'non-marks' (*alakṣaṇa*), and 'non-mark' is the characteristic of any Tathāgata. He teaches men and leads them to deliverance; still they are mere illusions, and the Tathāgata convinces them of their own vacuity. If this paradoxical argument be followed out, the conclusion runs as follows:

'They who saw me by form, and they who heard me by sound,
They engaged in false endeavours, will not see me.
A Buddha is to be seen from the Law (*dharmatas*); for the Lords have the Law-body (*dharmakāya*);
And the nature of the Law cannot be understood, nor can it be made to be understood.'[1]

4. Nāgārjuna.—We do not know where or when these Prajñā texts originated. But we have before us one of them translated into Chinese in the 2nd cent. A.D. (Nanjio, no. 5). A tradition says that the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā* was first preserved in Southern India, and was then transmitted to the West and to the North of India.[2] Whatever the authenticity of the tradition may be, we see in Nāgārjuna, who is believed to have lived in Southern India in the 2nd or 3rd cent., a conspicuous propounder of the doctrine. He was a great dialectician, and pursued the negative dialectics of the Prajñā school till he reached a complete denial of any definite thought about anything, especially in his *Madhyamika-śāstra* (Nanjio, no. 1179). In the 22nd chapter of this treatise he denies step by step every quality thinkable of the person of the Tathāgata. He has no physical body; yet, apart from physical body (which is in reality vacuity), there is no existence. He has no mind; yet, apart from mind, he is an inconceivable thing. Inconceivable and unthinkable as he is, he is not a non-existence. Being (*sat*) or non-being (*asat*) is never to be predicated of him, because both are illusions. He is neither a being nor a non-being, neither a non-being nor a non-nonbeing. In short, he has no substance (*ātma-bhāva*), just as every other being, both in his lifetime and after his death, has none. Any attribute, any thought of his substance, is to be denied, and thorough negations of relativities could lead to the deep insight into it in which is realized the contemplation of *prajñā*.

Thoroughgoing docetist as Nāgārjuna was, he did not deny the historicity of the Buddha's life, and thus was compelled to distinguish between the empirical and the transcendental standpoints in his Buddhology. This distinction is pointed out in his commentary[3] on the *Śatasāhasrikā*, the largest of the Prajñā texts. In this work he does not employ negative dialectics, but endeavours to state the common view, *i.e.* the so-called Hīnayānist standpoint, faithfully, according to its adherents, and then to elevate it to, or explain it away from, his own transcendental, *i.e.* Mahāyānist, standpoint. Thus he admits therein the actuality of the occurrences and teachings in the Buddha's lifetime. In this respect his treatise is a kind of encyclopædia of Buddhist legends and doctrines, and the author reproduces faithfully the anti-docetic arguments, as found in the *Kathāvatthu* (or elsewhere), enumerating the incidents of the Buddha's life and their respective scenes. But Nāgārjuna's arguments run finally to the conclusion that all these earthly incidents belonged to the phenomena of the Buddha's physical body (*jātakāya*, i.e. 'born in flesh'), in contrast with his real substance (*dharmakāya*, also called *ātmabhāvakāya* and *prajñākāya*). The former view is admitted from the standpoint of the earthly principle (*loka-artha*), and the latter is the only true view according to the first principle (*parama-artha*) of Prajñā. The thirty-two marks, etc., may be attributed to a Buddha only from the former point of view, and the final truth should amount to non-marks (*alakṣaṇa*). If the *dharmakāya* should be stated positively, it fills up the infinite space in all directions, being furnished with all possible and imaginable qualities and dignities. Its activities have no limit; it preaches ceaselessly, and leads all beings to enlightenment with every means and method beyond our imaginations. The *jātakāya* may be of any number and of any kind, the Buddha Śākyamuni being one of them, and the most conspicuous to every eye in this world-period. Yet he was a mere manifestation of the true body, adapted to the needs of common men, who could be educated only by a phenomenal manifestation and by verbal teachings of the Tathāgata, appearing in a physical body like themselves. The sunlight pervades everywhere in space, but it can be seen by physical eyes only when reflected from a material body.

Thus Nāgārjuna does not wholly reject the existence of an historical Buddha, but this is a concession made to the common view, just as the physical life of a Tathāgata is a condescension for the sake of ordinary men. Yet it is undeniable that Nāgārjuna's speculations proceeded from faith in Śākyamuni's personality as a Buddha; hence he recognizes a distinct personality in Śākyamuni, as one of the innumerable Buddhas, and his descriptions of the Buddha's life and capacities are on the same lines as in the other forms of Buddhism. In short, Nāgārjuna's docetism was a necessary consequence of his philosophical standpoint; but his Buddhology is characterized by a sharp distinction between the *jātakāya* and the *dharmakāya*, in emphasizing the sole reality of the latter according to the fundamental principle of the Prajñā doctrine, and in admitting the historicity of the Buddha's life as a concession to the common view, and also as a manifestation of the Buddha's mercy and potency for the sake of the beings to be led.

5. Eternal Buddhahood.—Just as in Christianity the dogmas of *homoousia* and the Trinity stood in opposition to Docetism, so we see, in Buddhist history, similar aspects of the Buddhological speculations opposed to pronounced docetism. But most Buddhist thinkers had hardly reached a clear understanding of the demarcation between docetism and anti-docetism, and even among those Mahāyānists who, upon the whole, occupied an anti-docetic standpoint very few combated docetic tendencies so decidedly as the earlier Theravādins. The truths (*dharma*) revealed by the Buddha con-

[1] *Vajracchedhikā* (*SBE* xlix. 140–141).
[2] *Aṣṭasāhasrikā*, pp. 224–245. [3] Nanjio, no. 1169.

tinued to hold the first place, and his person, Tathāgata, the second.

In this way a derivation of the personal Buddha from the original universality of the Truth or Buddhahood constantly taxed their ingenuity. Many thinkers tried to solve the problems in a way very similar to the Christian theories of the Logos and *kenosis*, but with this difference, that their ideas constantly verged on a docetic tendency in emphasizing the Buddhahood *a priori*, thus sacrificing more or less the actuality of the Buddha's life. Some of them laid special stress upon the eight (or four) important incidents in his life as the 'signs' (*lakṣaṇa*) of his Buddhahood; yet those signs were merged in the all-absorbing universality or monotony repeated in the career of each of the innumerable Buddhas. Even the anti-docetic Theravādins saw in Śākyamuni one of the Buddhas who appeared in the past and will appear in the future, and so his Buddhahood was made to consist in the realization of the one road (*ekayāna*) common to all Buddhas.[1] This capacity or dignity of a Buddha is expressed by means of the appellation Tathāgata. Hence the questions arise whether the various Buddhas, though individualized in personal distinctions, are one in substance, and whether the true personality of the present Buddha should be sought beyond his earthly life.

A solution of those questions was attempted in the *Suvarnaprabhā*,[2] which took the question of the duration of the Tathāgata's life (*Tathāgata-āyuṣ-pramāṇa*) as its text. In order to answer this question raised by an inquirer, the Buddha manifests himself in heavenly brilliancy, surrounded by the Tathāgatas Akṣobhya, Ratnaketu, Amitābha, and Dundubhīśvara on four sides; the questioner utters verses in praise and admiration of the Buddha's infinite life. Further, it is explained that his appearance in this world is with a view to the education of common mortals (*sattvānam paripāchāya*), in a way adapted to their capacities. Thus what is essential in a Tathāgata is not his temporary appearance (*nirmita-kāya*), but the eternal and universal life, in full possession of the Truths, *i.e.* the *dharmakāya* (or *dharma-dhātu*), of which any particular Buddha partakes, and on account of which he becomes a Buddha.[3] 'All the Buddhas are identical in their substance (*sama-varṇa*);[4] therein lies the essence (*dharmatā*) of the Buddhas. The Revered One is not a maker, nor the Tathāgata a born one.' Thus the universal predominates over the particular, and a docetic tendency is manifest in this idealistic speculation in connexion with the mythologizing processes.

Another book, the 'Lotus of the True Law' (*Saddharma-puṇḍarika*),[5] tries to answer the same question on similar lines, and on a grander scale, but in a less docetic fashion. We might call this book 'the Johannine Gospel of Buddhism,' and the quintessence of the whole argument consists in identifying the actual Buddha with the Buddha who had no beginning. His appearance in this world as Śākyamuni was 'for the sole object, the sole aim, . . . of exhibiting to all beings the sight of the Buddha; . . . of opening the eyes to the sight of Tathāgata-knowledge.'[6] For this purpose, for the sake of all beings, the Buddha adopted the expedient (*upāya-kauśalya*) of being born among the Śākyas, and manifested himself to have attained Buddhahood under the Bodhi tree, near Gayā, and to have entered into nirvāṇa. But in reality he has neither beginning nor end. He existed from eternity, and is to live for ever.[7] Thus the second chapter of the book, which explains the cause and purpose of the Buddha's appearance, forms the centre of the introductory part; the fifteenth, which reveals the eternity of his essence, the centre of the middle, or main part; and the twentieth, the centre of the concluding part, shows the efficiency of the Buddha's teaching and authority for ever in the future. In other words, we have in the first place the actual appearance of the Buddha among men, as their father and the Lord of the world;[8] then is revealed the original (*agra*) essence of the Tathāgata, existing and acting from eternity (*chiram*); in the conclusion we have the assurance of the endurance of his personal influence as well as the mission of the Paraclete, so to speak, who is to appear in the latter days of the world. In these statements, however mythical and fantastic they may be in many passages, the text never loses sight of the Buddha's personality.[1] At all events, we have in this book a Buddhist parallel to the Christian doctrines of the Logos and *kenosis*, if it does not wholly agree with them. Without going into the philosophical ideas underlying these Buddhological speculations, we can easily see how, according as the emphasis is laid on one or other of these two aspects of the Buddhahood,—the eternal and the temporary,—one who derives his ideas from this book may be led to an anti-docetic or a docetic view of the Buddha.

After a profound and elaborate system of Buddhist scholasticism, known as the T'ien-t'ai school, was organized by Ch'-i[2] (531–597), the disputes were revived, both among his followers and among his opponents, as to which of the above two aspects was to be emphasized. The original (Chinese *pen*) and fundamental Buddhahood is the real essence, untouched by changes; and the Buddha, when viewed from his own substance, is nothing but his eternal person (the T'ien-t'ai school does not see in this a mere 'thatness,' *tathātā*, as did Nāgārjuna, but constant activities for the good of all beings). On the other hand, the derivative (Chinese *chi*, which means 'trace') Buddhahood is the trace left by the real Buddha among men, in order to educate them. Though Ch'-i himself emphasized the inseparable unity of the two aspects, the disputes never ceased about the difference between the two, and as to the superiority of one over the other. Those who emphasized the original as superior to, or more real than, the other took refuge, more or less, in Nāgārjuna's philosophy, and thus inclined towards docetism. The difference of opinion continues to this day in Japan. Among the followers of Nichiren, the most ardent expounder of the orthodox T'ien-t'ai, the problem is shifted, and concerns the importance to be attached to either the Truth (*Dharma*) revealed by, or the person of, the Buddha, but the question remains substantially the same as before.

6. The Trinitarians.—The contrast between the eternal and the temporary aspects of the Buddha's person led to the assumption of a third aspect, which, after the fashion of Gnosticism, was to be the revelation of the Buddha to himself and to the superhuman beings, the Bodhisattvas. We see in Aśvaghoṣa (*q.v.*), the Buddhist Origen, the first systematization of the Trinitarian theory.[3] The ultimate principle of his philosophy is the identity of Mind (*chitta*), which is 'thatness' or essence, in the person of the Buddha and in common men. This 'thatness' (*tathatā*) is the *dharmakāya* of the Buddha, or the *tathāgata-garbha*, i.e. the womb and source from which every being derives its existence and activities. The Buddha does not remain in tranquillity in the womb, but manifests himself in the various conditions of bliss, according to the respective merits and enlightenment of the superhuman beings. These manifestations make up the bliss-body (*saṁbhogakāya*). Further, he adapts himself to the individuation-consciousness of common mortals, and appears in this world in condescension or incarnation, *i.e.* the *nirmāṇa-kāya*. Men see in it a body composed of gross matter which, though in itself not different from mind, is considered by them to be something outward, and thus what they look upon as the Buddha is only something like shadow or reflexion. Aśvaghoṣa's theory of the Trinity is, in this way, based upon an idealistic philosophy similar to the Prajñā school, at the same time with a Gnostic gradation of the Buddha's manifestations to all kinds of existence, and in this respect his Buddhology verges on a docetic view, almost abolishing the distinction of persons in the Trinity through its emphasis on the identity of the substance.

Another representative of the Trinity theory is

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1 *Digha*, 14; *Mahānidāna* and *Saṁyutta*, 47, 18, 47.
2 ed. Sarad Chandra, fasc. i., Calcutta, 1898.
3 *Suvarṇaprabhā*, pp. 6–8.
4 This translation of the word *varṇa* is given on the authority of the two Chinese translators.
5 ed. Kern-Nanjio, St. Petersburg, 1908–1911. Kern's tr. is in *SBE*, vol. xxi.
6 Tr. p. 40. 7 See tr. pp. xxv, 54–57, 292–297, 307–310.
8 Especially in this part, chapters ii.–vii., we can trace many passages to the Pāli *Nikāyas* of the Theravādins.

1 On this point the present writer differs from Kern's remarks on p. xxvi of his translation.
2 See Nanjio's *Catalogue*, Oxford, 1883, Appendix iii. no. 12.
3 In his work 'The Awakening of Faith' (Suzuki's Eng. tr., Chicago, 1900).

Vasubandhu, together with his brother Asaṅga. His standpoint is essentially that of Aśvaghoṣa, differing from the latter only in nomenclature and subdivision. Vasubandhu is a theosophist, or a Gnostic, in his way of thinking and in his descriptions of the various mystic attainments. Moreover, he almost loses sight of a definite incarnation, such as Śākyamuni, and believes in innumerable condescension bodies (which he calls apparitions, *nirmita*), appearing everywhere in any form, in the visions of the Bodhisattvas. These apparitions can meet and cross one another without any hindrance, and can assist one another in their educative purposes. Thus Vasubandhu, though an ardent believer in Maitreya, the future Buddha, opposes most decidedly the view that there appears only one Buddha in one world-period. The universe he sees is filled with all possible apparitions of Buddha, from gross matter, plants, and animals, up to the highest manifestations in the states of bliss.[1] Mysticism, Theosophy, Gnosticism, and Pantheism are combined in his docetic Buddhology, which at last amounts to nothing else than Cosmology and Psychology.

Lastly, a similar docetic Buddhology is represented by a chapter entitled the 'Trikāya' in the *Suvarṇaprabhā*, which is found only in I-tsing's translation, and is probably a later interpolation from the pen of a follower of Vasubandhu. This is apparently intended to be a further interpretation of the second chapter. Nevertheless, the writer makes no mention of the actual Buddha Śākyamuni, but emphasis is laid on the substantial identity of all the Buddhas, who are considered to be mere apparitions of the sole essence, the *dharmakāya*. He thinks that, if one sees in the Buddha or Buddhas this identity of substance, as well as of intention and activities, according to truth (*dharmatathātayā*), there can be no talk about life or death, sleep or dream, thirst or hunger in the Tathāgata, because his own mind is, in reality, always tranquil in profound contemplation (*yoga*).

Thus we see Trinitarianism finally reaching a decided docetism, though it started from a standpoint different from that of the Prajñā school. Aśvaghoṣa's psychological cosmology did not decidedly deny the reality of the condescension body. Nevertheless, the idea of unity in the Trinity proceeded, in Vasubandhu and his followers, to that of identity (*samatā*), verging on the negation of differences, as we have found in Nāgārjuna. These docetists, however, did not go to the extreme of the latter's doctrine, but developed the Mahāsaṅghikas' Pantheism into their own theosophy. This theosophy is again worked up in the mysticism of the Mantra system, another form of decided docetism, at which we shall now give a glance.

7. Mantra Buddhism.—Though we know very little about the origin and history of Mantra (Jap. Shingon) Buddhism, or Buddhist Tantrism, it shows a most abstruse form of religion, made up of extremely idealistic and materialistic elements. Its origin is ascribed to Nāgārjuna, and it has certainly his all-identifying idealism at its basis, but at the same time mystic interpretations of the material as well as ideal worlds, as found in Vasubandhu, play a great part. Numerous texts and formulæ were produced in India and were widely prevalent there in the last centuries of Buddhist history. We see them also used by the Lamas to-day side by side with their Prajñā texts. The most important text of this mysticism, the *Mahāvairochana-abhisambodhi*, was brought to China by an Indian, Śubhakarasiṅha († 735), and its final systematization was carried out in Japan by Kūkai († 835).

[1] See esp. ch. xx. of his *Vijñātimātrā* (Nanjio, no. 1215).

The Buddha, according to this philosophy, is nothing but the whole universe, the *dharmadhātu*, including its six elements—earth, water, fire, air, space, and consciousness. It is his real body, the *dharmakāya*, and it may be divided into two complementary constituents, the mental and the material. The former is called the *Garbhadhātu*, corresponding with the *Tathāgatagarbha* of Aśvaghoṣa; and the latter the *Vajradhātu*, the indestructible substance. The individualized phenomena are, in this way, nothing but the Buddha's revelation to himself, and at the same time the methods of benediction (*adhiṣṭhāna*) embracing all beings. The whole is called the Buddha Mahā-Vairochana. The numberless manifestations of his body, such as Buddhas, Bodhisattvas, Vajrapāṇis, Padmapāṇis, etc., make up the whole pantheon of the religion, which is represented symbolically in the two sets of cycles or assemblages (*maṇḍala*), corresponding to the above divisions of the *Dhātu*. We shall not here enter into the details of this symbolism, for, as we might naturally expect, the historical Buddha dwindles almost to naught in this recondite system of mysticism. The name Śākyamuni is preserved in one corner of the *Garbhadhātu-maṇḍala*, but his actual personality means so little that these mystics have almost nothing to say of his life or teaching. A disciple of Śubhakarasiṅha tried, in his commentary on the text named above, to explain the eternal Buddha taught in the Lotus as identical with Mahā-Vairochana, and later on some Japanese Mantrists identified Śākyamuni with their supreme Buddha. But all these attempts were carried on to neglect of the historical signification of Śākyamuni. In short, the person of the Buddha is, with them, dispersed and diffused over the whole universe, and he is ranked on the same level as any other superhuman beings. He is elevated on one side to the all-embracing *dharmakāya*, and on the other is degraded to mere dust. This was a consequence of Buddhist materialism and idealism. It is only natural that, with the disintegration of the personal Buddha, the Buddhist religion, in this form, reached dissolution, and all kinds of abuses and superstitions were accepted and justified.

LITERATURE.—Besides the references and original materials cited above, see W. Wassilieff, *Buddhismus*, St. Petersburg, 1860, p. 128 f.; E. Burnouf, *Introd. à l'hist. du Bouddhisme indien*, Paris, 1844, pp. 108-123, 219-229, 438-444, 514-555; L. de la V. Poussin, *Bouddhisme; études et matériaux*, Paris, 1898, *Bouddhisme: opinions sur l'histoire de la dogmatique*, Paris, 1909, p. 248 f.; D. T. Suzuki, *Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, London, 1907, chs. vi. ix.-xii.; B. Nanjio, *Twelve Japanese Buddhist Sects*, Tokyo, 1886, chs. iv. v. vii. viii. xi.

M. ANESAKI.

DOCTRINE AND DOGMA.—See CHURCH, CONFESSIONS, CREEDS.

DOG.—See ANIMALS.

DOLMEN.—See DEATH (Europe, pre-historic).

DOM.—The menial tribe of Dravidian origin, widely spread under various names in most parts of continental India. The Census returns of 1901 (*Census India*, ii. 323) show their numbers to be 977,026; and of the Ḍommara, Ḍomar, or Ḍombar, 97,456. But there must be some error in the tabulation, as none are shown in Bengal, where the Maghaiyā Ḍoms of Bihār are an important tribe. The Ḍoms seem to be of diverse origin, and the social position of their various branches is very different. They certainly belong to a large extent to one of the non-Aryan races; but in many places they may be the descendants of the mixed race of serfs or slaves of the early conquerors. As Risley remarks:

'The fact that for centuries past they have been condemned to the most menial duties, and have served as the helots of the entire Hindu community, would of itself be sufficient to break down whatever tribal spirit they may once have possessed, and to obliterate all structural traces of their true origin' (*Tribes and Castes*, i. 241).

The Ḍoms of Northern India may be divided into three territorial groups, the ethnological connexion of which can be only a matter of speculation: (1) the eastern branch of the tribe found in the Plains districts to the east of the United Provinces and in Bihār; (2) the Ḍoms of the Himālayas; (3) the Ḍom or Ḍūm Mirāsīs of the Panjāb.

1. *The Doms of the Ganges Plains.*—These are divided into numerous sub-tribes, such as the Bāṅsphoṛ (*q.v.*), the Basor, and others. They differ in social position according to the business in which they are engaged, and in particular their rank depends upon whether they do or do not practise scavengering. The most interesting of these groups is that of the Maghaiyā Ḍoms, who take their name from the ancient kingdom of Magadha or South Bihār. They are found in the western districts of Bengal and to the east of the United Provinces. In their original state they are vagrants pure and simple, who do not possess even mat shelters or tents to protect them in the cold and rainy season, but cower under trees, or lurk in cattle-sheds or under the eaves of houses. They live by burglary, petty theft, and begging, and their women are prostitutes. In Gorakhpur they have two special divinities of their own—Gaṇḍak and Samaiyā. Gaṇḍak is said to have been hanged for theft a long time ago, and when he was dying he promised to help the Maghaiyās in times of trouble. He is worshipped by the whole sub-tribe, and is invoked on all important occasions; but he is pre-eminently the god of theft. A successful raid is always celebrated by a sacrifice and feast in his honour. Samaiyā is a female deity, and apparently, as is usual among the Dravidians, she is recognized in a vague way to be the consort of Gaṇḍak. She is without special history or legend, and no sharp line of distinction is drawn between her functions and those of Gaṇḍak; but she seems to be especially invoked at childbirth and in illness. Both these deities are honoured with sacrifices of young pigs, with an offering of spirits mixed with sugar and spices. The Maghaiyās employ no priests; any of their number is capable of performing the rite. The meat and other things, after dedication, are divided among the worshippers. Sometimes at childbirth, or when a child is teething, a pig is specially sacrificed to Samaiyā, or this is done in fulfilment of a vow. They have no idol, altar, or religious platform. When a sacrifice is to be made, a space is cleared in a field, and the rite is performed.

Among those branches of the tribe whose social rank is superior to that of the Maghaiyās there is some approach to Hinduism, and the Mother goddess is worshipped as Bhavānī, while they have some vague idea of an all-powerful male deity called Parameśvar, 'the great god,' who punishes the guilty, and of a hell; but what it is and how sinners are punished they know not. As Risley, writing of Bihār, remarks (*op. cit.* i. 245):

'The religion of the Ḍoms varies greatly in different parts of the country, and may be described generally as a chaotic mixture of survivals from the elemental or animistic cults characteristic of the aboriginal races, and of observances borrowed in a haphazard fashion from whatever Hindu sect happens to be dominant in a particular locality. The composite and chaotic nature of their belief is due partly to the great ignorance of the caste, but mainly to the fact that, as a rule, they have no Brāhmans, and thus are without any central authority, or standard, which would tend to mould their religious usages into conformity with a uniform standard.'

The Maghaiyās, apparently as a survival of the matriarchate in some form, employ a sister's son to act as funeral priest and to recite the spells (*mantra*) which are intended to lay the ghost of the dead.

'If a man dies of snake-bite, say the Maghaiyā Ḍoms of the Gya district, we worship his spirit as a *Sāmperiyā* [snake godling] lest he should come back and give us bad dreams; we also worship the snake who bit him, lest the snake-god should serve us in like fashion. Any man, therefore, conspicuous enough by his doings in life or for the manner of his death to stand a chance of being dreamed of among a tolerably large circle is likely in course of time to take rank as a god' (*ib.* i. 247).

Hence arises the worship of Śyām Singh, the deified ancestor of the Ḍoms of Bihār, who may have been a successful robber, or of Gaṇḍak, to whom reference has already been made. The Bihār branch, again, worship Sansārī Māī, whom some identify with Kālī, but who is probably, as her name implies, the Earth Mother, known to most primitive religions.

'No image, not even the usual lump of clay, is set up to represent the goddess: a circle one span and four fingers in diameter is drawn on the ground and smeared smooth with cow-dung. Squatting in front of this the worshipper gashes his left arm with the curved Ḍom knife, and daubs five streaks of blood with his finger in the centre of the circle, praying in a low voice that a dark night may aid his designs; that his booty may be ample; and that he and his gang may escape detection,' with which Risley (*op. cit.* i. 247 f.) aptly compares the prayer to Laverna:

'Da mihi fallere, da justo sanctoque videri,
Noctem peccatis et fraudibus objice nubem'
(Horace, *Ep.* i. 16. 61 f.).

Similarly in the United Provinces the Ḍoms, whose business it is to slay ownerless dogs, have a female deity called Kūkarmarī, 'slayer of dogs,' to whom a sacrifice of a young pig and an offering of spirits are made as a propitiation for the death of the animals of which she is the guardian. The Ḍom executioner, on the same principle, as he lets the gallows fall, calls to the Emperor, the judge, and all who are concerned in the conviction and sentence of the criminal, to take the guilt of his death upon their own heads, and to save him thus from responsibility. In a still lower grade of belief are the so-called fetishistic practices of worshipping the 'jemmy' with which the Ḍom burglar makes entry into a house. They also when encamped near a village worship the local gods of the place.

This branch of the Ḍoms feels the dread of evil spirits which is found among all races in a similar stage of culture. Marī Masān, the death spirit of the cremation ground, represents the impersonated dread which attaches to such uncanny places, and it is considered necessary to appease the ghosts of the dead by an annual celebration, if they are not to appear in dreams and afflict the living.

2. *The Himālayan Ḍoms.*—These are in a much higher grade than those of Bihār and the neighbouring districts. They carry on various trades which in the Plains are each allotted to a separate caste. Their beliefs are of the same animistic type as those of the Ḍoms of Bihār. In the first place, they worship a number of deified ghosts who are specially commemorated on account of the tragic circumstances of their death. Gangānāth was a prince murdered on account of a sexual intrigue, and he and his paramour are worshipped. When any one is aggrieved by a wicked or powerful enemy, he goes for aid to Gangānāth, who invariably punishes the wrongdoer. He sometimes possesses one of his followers, and through him prescribes the offerings which must be made to propitiate him. Bholanāth is a deity of the same type, the ghost of a prince who was assassinated. He is represented by a small iron trident placed in a corner of the house, to which offerings are made when any sudden calamity attacks the inmates.

Another class of deities represents the impersonated horror of graveyard or forest. Masān lives at a burning-ground, is black in colour and hideous in appearance. He comes from the ashes of a funeral pyre and chases passers-by at night, some of whom die of fright, whilst others go mad and linger for a

while. He possesses the sick, causes disease, and can be expelled by exorcism. Khabīsh lives in remote, dark glens, sometimes imitating the bellow of a buffalo, the cry of a goatherd, or the grunt of a wild pig. He frightens and besets unwary travellers. Besides malignant ghosts of this kind they also worship Khetrpāl, 'protector of the land,' the male consort of the Earth Mother, and Kalbisht and Chūmū, kindly deified ghosts who protect the herds and flocks. More terrible is Rūniyā, who rides from village to village on immense boulders, the impersonation of the avalanche or of the rocks falling from the mountain side. He attacks only females; and, should any one attract his attentions, she invariably wastes away, haunted by her demon lover, and joins him in spirit land.

3. *The Ḍom or Ḍūm Mīrāṣīs.*—Quite different in occupation, at least from the Maghaiyā or Himālayan Ḍoms, is the Ḍom or Ḍūm Mīrāṣī of the Panjāb, who has been well described by Ibbetson (*Pānjāb Ethnography*, 289). He is a minstrel and ballad-singer, plays on the little drum, cymbals, and fiddle, and his women amuse ladies in zanānas by appearing as jesters and singers. It would not be difficult to show that these arts may have developed among the more savage Ḍoms. But the Panjāb Ḍoms are now quite distinct from the Maghaiyās and the Ḍoms of the Himālayas, and in religion they have become nominally Muhammadans, though they still retain many of the animistic beliefs of the other branches of the tribe.

LITERATURE.—For Bengal, see Risley, *Tribes and Castes of Bengal*, Calcutta, 1891, i. 240 ff.; Wise, *Races, Castes, and Trades of Eastern Bengal*, London, 1883, p. 265 ff.; Gait, *Census Report Bengal*, 1901, i. App. vii. p. xlix. For the United Provinces, Crooke, *Tribes and Castes of the N.W. Prov. and Oudh*, Calcutta, 1896, ii. 312 ff.; Atkinson, *Himalayan Gazetteer*, 1882–84, ii. 319 ff. For the Panjāb, Ibbetson, *Panjāb Ethnography*, Calcutta, 1883, p. 289. For the Dōmbs of the Madras Presidency see Thurston, *Castes and Tribes of Southern India*, ii. (1909) 173.

W. CROOKE.

DOMESTICATION.—The term applied to the control by human beings of the conditions under which animals and plants live and propagate their species. The extent of this control varies from case to case, and, although, logically, German authorities who include oysters and silkworms among domesticated animals are justified by the definition, the term as a rule is limited to such animals and such plants as are necessary for the existence or well-being of the human race—among animals, to the dog, the horse and the ass, the cow and other ruminants, the rabbit and similar rodents; to animals of great value for transport like the camel and the elephant, and to some birds; among plants, to cereals, roots, and tubers which have an agricultural value, various species of trees, and plants like flax and hemp which contain fibres of great use to man. The most primitive men do not possess either domesticated animals or domesticated plants. So far as at present is ascertained, palæolithic man in Europe possessed neither, though in a stratum intermediate between palæolithic and neolithic, at Mas d'Azil in the South of France, Edouard Piette found representations of heads of horses which in the woodcut look certainly as if they were fitted with halters (though this has been denied). Piette found also a little heap of wheat, which, except in one form, is no longer known in Europe as a wild plant. In rock-shelters of the palæolithic period many admirable drawings have been found of such animals as the reindeer, the horse, and the mammoth, and also large quantities of their bones. But it is generally believed that the bones came into the shelters clothed with flesh intended for food. Even in the 'kitchen-middens' of the coast of Denmark, which belong to the neolithic age, the only animal which can be identified as domesticated is the dog, so that we may imagine the state of civilization of that period to resemble in the main that of the native Australians at the present day. These have no cultivated plants, and the only animal which can be called in any sense domesticated is the dingo—the native dog. As even the dingo in the pairing season often deserts its master, it cannot be considered entirely domesticated. Other animals are obviously not likely to be long kept as pets among savages who lay up no stores and at certain times of the year find natural products so scarce that they are driven to devouring their own children. The primitive savage has, however, undoubted ability to make friends with dumb animals, and in South America, where the conditions of life are on the whole easier than in Australia, the huts of the natives are full of animals, mostly birds, which they have tamed. The native, however, turns them to no practical use, and when he has been presented with ordinary fowls he uses neither their eggs nor their flesh. When the American Indians were given cattle, they could not imagine any other method of treatment for them than as animals to hunt.

The domestication of animals has obviously been a process continued over a long period of time, and in the case of most animals repeated at many different places by different persons. The stages in this process are not very clear. The most important animal to man in many ways is the cow. Its flesh and milk supply food; its skin provides clothing; its sinews, bones, and horns yield primitive implements. From very early times it has also been used as a means of exchange. As an early Persian writer says in the *Bahrām Yasht* of the Avesta, developing the texts of an earlier Yasna, 'in the ox is our strength, in the ox is our need; . . . in the ox is our food, in the ox is our clothing; in the ox is tillage, that makes food grow for us' (*SBE* xxiii. 247). In other circumstances the goat is of hardly less importance, while the sheep has been much more modified by its contact with man than these; and its bones, in Northern Europe at any rate, are found later and more rarely than those of the ox and goat. The conditions in which the horse was domesticated are also obscure. But this animal became indispensable in countries where large herds of cattle more or less domesticated came into existence. Sheep and goats can be controlled by shepherds with dogs; large herds of cattle can be controlled only by the mounted cowboy, who on the great plains of both the Old World and the New has become an important political factor. The geographical conditions which brought about the domestication of the camel and the elephant were much more limited in range. In the case of the pigeon it has been shown by Darwin that all varieties have arisen, under domestication, from the 'blue rock.' The goose was early domesticated; in the *Odyssey* (xv. 161–2) an eagle carries off one of Helen's geese as she feeds them in the courtyard at Sparta. The goose, duck, and pigeon were domesticated with a view to their use as food, but the turtle-dove was often kept simply as a pet, while the game-cock (the 'Persian bird' of the Greek poets) was kept from a sporting interest. It is impossible here to discuss other birds which have become thus domesticated in different parts of the world in more modern times, *e.g.* the turkey, the guinea-fowl, the pheasant, and the ostrich.

The causes which produce domestication in animals were classified nearly half a century ago by Francis Galton (*Trans. of the Ethnol. Soc. of London*, 1868, p. 123 ff.). To his analysis, though rarely quoted in recent times, later writers have added nothing of importance. He shows that animals which become domesticated must have an

inborn liking for man, be fond of comfort, be useful to savages, be hardy, breed freely, and be gregarious. The cat, it may be argued, is not gregarious; but it is fond of comfort, and, except in rare instances, is more attached to a place than to a person. The pig, on the other hand, has many of the qualities in which the cat is lacking, but it has for various obvious reasons never been domesticated in the same way, and even the crofter of the Hebrides or of Western Ireland, who shares his habitation with the cattle, as a rule excludes the pig. Some animals are kept by man in captivity without their being in the proper sense domesticated. Till lately the wild elephant had to be tamed, because elephants did not breed in captivity. But the speculations to which this fact has given rise are in the main ill-founded. The tame elephant in conditions approaching his wild state does breed (Darwin, *Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication*, popular ed., 1905, ii. 165).

Besides the natural causes postulated by Galton, the existence of animals both domesticated and undomesticated was probably to some extent guaranteed by religious or quasi-religious sanctions. In Persia and in Germany white horses were specially sacred (Herod. i. 189; Tac. *German.* 9, 10). In India animal life generally is sacred, but in Greece and Rome the ox which drew the plough was not to be killed. What effect totemism had upon the maintenance of particular animals and plants will be clearer when experts have decided precisely what totemism is (see Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, 4 vols., London, 1910; and, for a different view, A. Lang, art. 'Totemism,' in *EBr*[11], 1911). Hahn's contention (*Die Haustiere*, 1896) that the domestication of kine began with animals kept in an enclosure by a temple for purposes of sacrifice has no real evidence in its support. The great enclosures belonging to the Persian kings, called in Avesta *pairi-daēza*, a word borrowed by Greek in the form παράδεισος, had, it is true, many animals contained within them; but their religious character is not more obvious than that of an English gentleman's park. Most Greek temples stood in an enclosure (τέμενος), but the presence of cattle except at the time of sacrifice was not encouraged there, and in the Æolic inscription published by Kretschmer in 1902 (*Jahresh. d. oester. arch. Inst. in Wien*, v. 141) it is distinctly laid down that such animals are not to be fed in the precinct: [μὴ σι]τίζην δὲ μηδὲ κτήνεα μηδὲ βοσκήματα ἐν τῷ τεμένει. That, however, there were several stages in the domestication of cattle, as Hahn contends, may be readily admitted. Some people, like the Chinese, who have domesticated cattle, look with disgust upon the use of their milk; others, who use both their flesh and their milk, have never employed them as draught animals. But Hahn probably exaggerates the length of time that it took to accustom the cow to yield her milk to a milkman or milkmaid instead of to her calf—a difficulty which is as present to a modern farmer with a cow that has been once allowed to suckle her calf as it was in early times. Probably milking began in the case of cows which had lost their calves, and to which milking was a relief, if they were already, in the Latin phrase, *mansuetæ*, 'accustomed to handling.' The careful selection through untold ages of animals which were 'good milkers' has no doubt increased the size of the cow's udder, but from the beginning the cow and the mare differ in this respect that the foal accompanies its mother from the first, while the cow in her native state when she goes to pasture leaves her calf in a brake and often does not return to it for a long time.

The domestication of plants is not exactly parallel with the domestication of animals. While savage herdsmen like the Bechuanas object strongly to the women interfering with their animals, woman is undoubtedly the first gardener and agriculturist. As Lumholtz says (*Among Cannibals*, 1889, p. 160),

> savage woman 'must do all the hard work, go out with her basket and her stick to gather fruits, dig roots, or chop larvæ out of the tree-stems. . . . The stick in question, the woman's only implement, is indispensable to her on her expeditions after food. It is made of hard tough wood four or five feet long, and has a sharp point at one end made by alternately burning it in the fire and rubbing it with a stone. Even at dances and festivals the married women carry this stick as an emblem of dignity, as the provider of the family.'

This stick survives as an agricultural implement even among civilized peoples. The next step, and a long one, is to plant seeds the produce of which will be at hand when it is wanted. But for this several conditions are necessary which do not exist among the lowest savages even now: (1) the family must be either settled in a particular place or wandering in a very circumscribed area; (2) the planter of the seeds must be able to secure by some kind of sanction that they will not be injured by other persons; and (3) the planter herself must have more foresight than the lowest savages, so as to wait for the ripening of the fruit. At present there are hardly data by which we can explain how this was accomplished, but we may guess that the dibbling of seeds began with persons who found movement from place to place difficult, *e.g.* through the encumbrance of infant children, or through lameness or other physical disability. The protection of the plants, as it seems, could be secured only by superstitious dread. A precinct must be made which it would not be safe for other persons to invade. In other words, a *tabu* protected them. How such a tabu developed into law is well seen in the case of the sacred olives (μορίαι) in ancient Attica, which were protected with a fence (σηκός), and damage to which was punished with confiscation and banishment.

Here we are faced once more with the problem which arose in connexion with the domestication of animals. Is this protective tabu totemism? F. B. Jevons (*Introd. to History of Religion*[3], London, 1904, pp. 114 ff., 156, 210 ff.), who is followed by S. Reinach (*Cultes, mythes et religions*, i. [Paris, 1905] 86 ff.), would attribute domestication of both animals and plants entirely to totemism; van Gennep (*Tabou et totémisme à Madagascar*, Paris, 1904 [Bibliothèque de l'école des hautes-études, sciences religieuses, xvii.]) no less emphatically argues for the existence of other causes (pp. 241 ff., 307 ff., and *passim*).

From the gathering of grass seeds, as still practised, *e.g.* in Australia, among the Hottentots, and among the lowest natives of the Pacific slopes of America, there was no doubt a gradual progress (which we cannot trace) to the planting of cereals. The Hindu writer who says that barley was the first of plants is from the point of view of food-grains probably right, but wheat in its many varieties speedily became of equal, if not greater, importance. It is on the different forms of grain that domestication has had more influence than anywhere else. Hence, for wheat, at any rate, the only species for which a wild original has been found is *Triticum monococcum*, of which the origin is said to be *Triticum ægilopoides*. This is found wild from Servia through Asia Minor to Mesopotamia and Antilibanus.

LITERATURE.—Besides the works mentioned above, see artt. AGRICULTURE and ANIMALS in vol. i. A good account of the domestication of animals and plants is given by H. Schurtz, *Urgesch. der Kultur*, Leipz. 1900, p. 253 ff.; but this, like L. Reinhardt's *Kulturgesch. der Nutzpflanzen* (2 parts, vol. iv. of *Die Erde und die Kultur*, Munich, 1911), is vitiated for scientific purposes by a lack of references. See also A. de Candolle, *Origin of Cultivated Plants*, Lond. 1884; G. Buschan, *Vorgeschichtl. Botanik der Cultur- und Nutzpflanzen der alten Welt*, Breslau, 1895; E. Hahn, *Die Haustiere*, Leipz. 1896, and other works; C. Keller, *Die Abstammung der ältesten Haustiere*, Zurich, 1902, and a charming short account by the same author, *Die Stammesgesch. unserer Haustiere*, Leipz. 1909, in Teubner's series, *Aus Natur und Geisteswelt*.

P. GILES.

DONATISTS.—'Donatists' is the name given to the adherents of a schismatic Church which was formed in N. Africa at the beginning of the 4th cent., and continued, in spite of severe persecution, for more than a hundred years. Within the area which it affected, Donatism was for the greater part of the 5th cent. numerically the preponderating form of Christianity, but its influence was practically confined to the dioceses of Numidia and Mauretania. While in its origin it was largely due to personal and provincial rivalries, the schism came rapidly to involve serious problems concerning the nature and the functions of the Church, and it was crushed only by a combination of force applied by the State and the dialectical ability of Augustine.

The persecution under Diocletian had revived the question whether a priest or a bishop who had shown weakness or unfaithfulness could continue in, or be restored to, his office. The question had been answered with an unhesitating negative by Cyprian:

'They who have brought grievous sin upon them, that is, who by sacrificing to idols have offered sacrilegious sacrifices, cannot claim to themselves the priesthood of God, or offer any prayers in His sight for their brethren' (*Ep.* lxv. 2; cf. lxvii. 2, 3).

When, on the death of Mensurius, bishop of Carthage (A.D. 311), the deacon Cæcilian was elected as his successor, and consecrated by Felix, bishop of Aptunga, objection was at once raised to the election, on the threefold ground that Cæcilian himself was unworthy of the office; that he had been elected only by the bishops in the district of Carthage, and not by those of the whole province of Numidia; and that his consecration was invalid, having been conferred by one who was himself a *traditor*. The opposition was led and organized, in the first place, by Secundus, bishop of Tigisis and primate of Numidia, who visited Carthage attended by seventy other bishops, excommunicated Cæcilian and those who adhered to him, and consecrated in his place Majorinus, a 'reader' who belonged to the opposite party. The Church of N. Africa was rent in twain. Each side excommunicated the other. Both appealed to the Emperor Constantine, ignoring thereby Tertullian's principle, 'Quid Imperatori cum ecclesia?', and setting an evil precedent for the future. The Emperor, who, under the guidance of Hosius, bishop of Cordoba, had already shown favour to Cæcilian, yielded to the request of Majorinus, and called on Miltiades, bishop of Rome, with the assistance of the bishops of Arles, Autun, and Cologne, to investigate the dispute, and especially whether Felix was indeed a *traditor*. Their decision cleared the reputation of Felix and confirmed the consecration of Cæcilian, and also condemned Donatus of Casæ Nigræ, a leader of the opposite party, on the ground that he had re-baptized Christians and re-ordained bishops who adhered to the schism. As the principles at issue were thus brought to the surface, the Donatists were only confirmed in their resolve to separate from the Church, and Constantine remitted the whole matter to a Synod which he convoked to meet at Arles (A.D. 314). This Synod, which, though described by Augustine as 'plenarium universae ecclesiae concilium,' cannot claim to be more than a General Synod of the Latin West, condemned the Donatists on all points of their contention. The schism, nevertheless, continuing to spread, and Majorinus having been succeeded by Donatus Magnus, from whom the schismatic Church probably took its name, Constantine proceeded to civil measures, issuing a decree threatening to deprive the schismatics of their churches and to banish their bishops (A.D. 316). The policy of forcible suppression was pursued with great severity by Ursacius, the Imperial commissioner, but with little success; and in 321 Constantine instructed both Ursacius and Cæcilian to adopt a policy of moderation.

Under his successor, Constans, the history of the schism followed much the same course. Both the persecution and the resistance were more determined. It was a period of much social distress and disturbance in Africa. The Donatists, as ecclesiastical rebels, provided a rallying-point for all the discontented and seditious elements in the population. There was a breakdown of social order. Bands of dispossessed peasants and escaped slaves infested the country, committing abominable outrages and exposing themselves to death with fanatical enthusiasm. They sought to make common cause with the Donatists, and called themselves *milites Christi agonistici*, but are better known as *circumcelliones*, 'hut-haunters.' The Donatists were discredited by these excesses, and suffered in their suppression. Many of them were put to death, many others were banished, and their churches were closed or confiscated. The accession of Julian brought a temporary relaxation to them, as to other schismatics and heretics, but under Gratian and Honorius the persecution was renewed. The schism continued, however, to flourish. Donatus Magnus, who died in exile, was succeeded by Parmenianus, and he by Primianus. The situation which Augustine found at Hippo was probably characteristic of many districts: the Catholics were in a minority, and the Donatists refused to supply them with bread. Towards the end of the century the movement was seriously weakened by internal dissension. Tychonius, the celebrated grammarian, was condemned by a Donatist Synod in 390 for having acknowledged that there were saints in the Catholic Church. A further breach took place over the question of admission to the Eucharist. Moreover, the continued and vigorous polemic undertaken by Augustine began to tell. A conference between the two parties was arranged by him at Carthage in 411, and was attended by 286 Catholic and 279 Donatist bishops. It led to no satisfactory conclusion, but provided an excuse for again putting the civil law in motion. Augustine himself provided the first reasoned defence of the persecution of Christians by Christians, though he demurred to the infliction of the death penalty. Fines, imprisonment, and confiscation followed, and in 415 the Donatists were prohibited from meeting for worship. Along with the Catholics they suffered grievously in the Vandal invasion, but there were still traces of their existence as late as the 7th cent., when they are referred to by Gregory the Great.

Donatism was not a heresy; neither did it develop any heretical teaching. It was not a dispute as to the organization of the Church, or even one concerning discipline merely, which underlay the schism. Both parties held by the episcopate, as both held to the Creeds. Donatism represents an attempt—the final one for a thousand years—to resist the process of secularization by which the Church was gradually transformed from a community of holy persons into an institution of mixed character, offering to secure salvation for its members by means of grace over which it had sole control. It belongs, therefore, to the same series of movements as is represented by the Encratites (*q.v.*), Montanists (*q.v.*), followers of Hippolytus, and Novatians (*q.v.*). Insistence on a minimum of personal worthiness in the clergy at least was 'the last remnant of a much more earnest conception' of the Church. It was met by the defenders of Catholicism with a new emphasis on the objective character of the sacraments, and upon

the holiness of the Church apart from the holiness or otherwise of its members and clergy. It was in the controversy with the Donatists, therefore, that the Catholic doctrine of the Church was completely developed. To the foundation principle of Donatism ('qui fidem a perfido sumserit, non fidem percipit sed reatum') Optatus of Mileve opposes an equally fundamental position, 'sacramenta per se esse sancta, non per homines.' It was not difficult for Augustine to show how many practical difficulties were involved in the Donatist contention, chief among them the difficulty, amounting to impossibility, of knowing the true character of the officiating priest. But he went further, and, by asserting the indelible character of Orders, whereby an ordained person retains the power to celebrate a valid sacrament, whatever be his views or his conduct, and the mixed composition of the Church as containing not only 'vessels for honour' but 'vessels for dishonour,' stamped its final form on the Catholic doctrine of the Catholic Church. It is true that in doing so he had to abandon the position taken by Cyprian, and assert the validity of all baptism, even that performed by heretics, provided that it was in the name of the Trinity. It is true also that baptism in this way came to lose some of its significance and to represent only a 'marking' of the recipient, the beginning of a process which, though it might begin anywhere, could be consummated only within the Catholic Church and by the addition of 'charity' to faith. Moreover, in the theory of the Church thus developed in opposition to the Donatists, Augustine at least prepares the way for the Reformation distinction between the Church visible and the Church invisible.

LITERATURE.—Optatus Milev., *de Schismate Donatistarum* [*PL* xi.]; Augustine, *c. Epistolam Parmeniani, de Unitate Ecclesiæ, de Baptismo contra Donatistas, c. Literas Petiliani, c. Cresconium, Breviculus collationis cum Donatistis, c. Gaudentium, Ep. ad Bonifacium*; F. Ribbeck, *Donatus und Augustinus*, Elberfeld, 1858; D. Völter, *Ursprung des Donatismus*, Freiburg, 1882; L. Duchesne, *Dossier du Donatisme*, Paris, 1890; A. Harnack, *Hist. of Dogma*, Eng. tr., 1894-99, esp. vol. v.; N. Bonwetsch, art. 'Donatismus,' in *PRE*³, iv. 788-798.

C. A. SCOTT.

DOOM, DOOM MYTHS (Teutonic).—The belief in supernatural powers who preside over the destinies of mankind is met with among all the Teutonic peoples. These powers have more especially the end of life in their control, and they are accordingly now and then identified with the spirit of death. They are believed to become incarnate in female form, now coalescing in a single being, now appearing as three sisters, or even in whole multitudes. According as they dispense good or evil fortune to men, they are distinguished as friendly or hostile. To the individual they frequently reveal his fate in dreams, and this explains why dreams hold so important a place, not only in the common life, but also in the literature, of the Teutonic race (cf. W. Henzen, *Über die Träume in der altnord. Sagalitteratur*, Leipzig, 1890).

The ancient Teutonic dialects possess several designations for the powers of destiny, and in not a few cases the terms have already acquired an abstract sense. All the tribes had the word meaning *fatum* or *eventus* which appears in O.H.G. *wurt*, A.S. *wyrð*, O.N. *urðr*, and which sometimes signifies the spirit of death or destiny, and sometimes death or destiny itself. In the old Saxon and Scandinavian dialects, again, the name found in O.S. *metod*, A.S. *meotod*, O.N. *mjotuðr*, the power which 'metes out' or 'orders,' was in current use; while among the Southern Teutons we find O.H.G. *gascaft*, O.S. *giskap*, A.S. *gescap*, 'the spirit who creates' ('shapes'), which is given in Græco-Latin glosses as the equivalent of *parca*. In works of the 15th cent. the *gachschepfen* are still referred to as powers who bestow life upon man and order its course (Vintler, *Blume der Tugend*, 1411, line 7865).

The belief in the powers of destiny has assumed an altogether peculiar form in northern Scandinavia. Here they are known for the most part by the name of *nornir*. *Norn* is a word of obscure etymology, but appears to be connected with Swed. *norna*, *nyrna*, 'to tell secretly,' 'to warn,' and Mid. Eng. *nyrnen*, 'to recite.' The fate of man is the work of the Norns (*skop norna*), and none can evade their decree. Even the destiny of the gods lies in their control. Hence they make their appearance at the birth of human beings, and support the mother in the pains of labour. People seek to win their favour by offerings. In the Faroe Islands it is still the custom for mothers to eat the 'Norn-groats' (*nornagreytur*) after a birth—a survival of the ancient oblation. The Norns then set the tokens of their goodwill upon the finger-nails of the child, and those who have white spots, the 'Norn-marks,' on their nails are children of fortune. Like the *fylgjur* (see art. DEMONS AND SPIRITS [Teutonic], vol. iv. p. 633), the Norns continue their good services to human beings throughout life. Oðin puts his protégé Sigurðr on his guard against the evil Norns, who in battle stand on either side of a man, wishing that he may receive wounds. The blows of fate are supposed to be the work of angry Norns, and defeats in war are also traced to their dictates. A person's death is likewise due to their decree. We thus see the hostile aspects of their character becoming more and more pronounced, and hence, as is stated in the *Völuspá* (8 ff.), they were believed to have sprung originally from the race of giants, and the golden age of the gods came to an end when the Norns came into being. From their leading representative, Urðr, is taken the name of the only fountain in the under world, the *Urðr* fountain; here, according to Snorri, lay their abode, and from this retreat they exercised their sway over the fruitfulness of the earth.

The Norns are often found in a group of three, or in three companies. It is possible that in this point the classical myths of the *Parcæ* may here and there have had an influence upon the sagas of the Norns. They are depicted as maidens who spin the thread of destiny for man. Their doings at the birth of Helgi, the slayer of the Hundings, are narrated as follows:

'Night lay over the house when the Fates came to forecast the hero's life. They said that he should be called the most famous of kings and the best among princes. With power they twisted the strands of fate for Borghild's son in Bralund; they spread the woof of gold and made it fast under the midst of the moon's hall. In the east and the west they hid the thrums; all the land between was to be his. Neri's sister fastened one strand in the sides of the north, and prayed that it might hold for ever' (*Helgakviða Hundingsbana*, ii. 2 ff., *Corp. poet. bor.*, 1883, ii. 131).

The story of Meleager likewise reappears among the Norn myths. The fatal three are present at the birth of Nornagest. The two elder sisters ordain fortune and renown for the child, but the younger decides that he shall live only so long as the taper by his cradle remains unconsumed. Thereupon the elder sister seizes the taper, extinguishes it, and hands it to the mother, thus conveying to mother and child the power of fixing the term of the child's life (*Nornagestssaga*, ed. Bugge, 1865, p. 77).

The names *Verðandi* and *Skuld*, sometimes given to two of the Norns, are due to a learned blunder of the 12th cent., and have no better authority than an interpolation in the *Völuspá*. The author of the passage erroneously connected the name *Urðr* with the preterite stem of the verb *verða*, 'to be,' and interpreted it as denoting the Norn of the past; he then proceeded to fabricate a *Verðandi* as the Norn of the present, and a *Skuld* as the Norn of the future, taking the former from *verða*, and the latter from *skulu*, the word used to denote the future tense. The idea that the three Norns inscribe the life of man on tablets emanates from the same writer (*Völuspá*, 20).

LITERATURE.—J. Grimm, *Deutsche Mythologie*⁴, Göttingen, 1875, i. 335 ff.; E. Mogk, *Germanische Mythol.*², Strassburg, 1907, p. 52 ff.; E. H. Meyer, *Mythol. d. Germanen*, Strassburg, 1903, p. 251 ff.

E. MOGK.

DOOR.—Doors, whether of dwellings or of temples, play an important part in ritual and belief over a very wide area. Often the dwelling-place of a spirit or divinity, the door has almost invariably a sacred character. The origin of the latter is perhaps best sought in the conception of the door as separating between two worlds—the outside world, where are innumerable hostile influences and powers, and the region within the limits of the house, the influences and powers of which are friendly. The door is at once the barrier against those hostile influences, and that which gives entrance to those who have a right to pass to the sacred region within. Hence those who pass through the door—the limit of the sacred region, and therefore itself sacred—must do so with care and often with certain ritual acts. Thus the sacredness of the door was probably at first independent of its connexion with a god or spirit. But that connexion, once established, could only add to its sacred character. Again, being the dividing line between hostile and friendly spheres, the doorway was supposed to be a place where evil influences clustered, or sometimes even dwelt. But more usually the household spirits dwell at the door and protect it. As these are generally connected with the hearth, it is not clear why they should also be associated with the door. But two reasons may be suggested. The door is the exterior limit of their dominion, where their influence would first be met with, and where they might reasonably be supposed to dwell. And when men dwelt in rock-shelters, caves, or half-open huts, the fire would be at or near the entrance, as it still burns in front of savage huts.[1] When, later, it was taken into the house, the connexion of ancestral ghosts with the hearth would be shared with the entrance, their former exclusive domain. In some cases also burial takes place at the doorway.

Besides being sacred as a whole, the door has special sanctity in its more important parts—threshold, side-posts, and lintel—as will be seen in the course of this article. But it is impossible, with Trumbull, to regard the sacredness of the threshold as originating in its having been the primitive altar—first of the house, then of the temple. The many rites connected with threshold or door by no means bear out this theory, though, where sacrifice is performed at the door, the threshold stone may become for the nonce a species of altar. But more probably the sacrifice is not slain on the threshold, just as the fire at the entrance would not have the threshold for a hearth, while the altar of primitive tribes is unconnected with the threshold (see ALTAR).

The sacredness of the door as the passage to a different domain is seen in many folk-tales of the Forbidden, or Tabued, Door, through which certain persons must not pass, and beyond which lie matters into which they must not penetrate. To do so is generally followed by fatal consequences (*CF* 306 ff.). Similarly the stranger must not, without due preparation, pass the family door, nor may the profane cross the temple threshold.

1. Ritual acts at doors.—The sacredness of the door as a means of passage from one state to another appears in numerous rites connected with the threshold.

(*a*) *The bride must step across the threshold of the husband's house with the right foot foremost*, the bridegroom in the ancient Vedic ceremonial instructing her to do so (*SBE* xxx. 193). This custom is also found in more modern times elsewhere. Or, again, an animal is sacrificed at the threshold, and the bride must step across the outpoured blood—a custom existing among the Somalis, in Syria, Armenia, and with the Copts in Egypt (*FLJ* vi. [1888] 121; Trumbull, *Threshold Covenant*, 1896, p. 26; Garnett, *Women of Turkey*, 1890, p. 239; Lane, *Modern Egyptians*, 1846, iii. 192). Or an offering is made, the materials being often presented to the bride, while she smears the door-posts with them, before crossing the threshold (see Trumbull, 29 f.). Even more wide-spread is the custom of carrying the bride across the threshold—a rite occurring among the Greeks, Romans, Chinese, Mordvins, Abyssinians, in Syria and Egypt, and found as a survival in parts of England and Scotland (Plut. *Rom. Quæst.* 29; *FL* i. [1890] 459, 487; Bruce, *Travels*, 1804, vii. 67; Burckhardt, *Arab. Proverbs*, 1875, p. 137; *NQ*, 8th ser., x. [1896] 328; Dalyell, *Darker Sup. of Scotland*, 1835, p. 291; Gregor, *Folk-lore of N.E. of Scotland*, 1881, p. 51; Van Gennep, *Les Rites de passage*, Paris, 1909, p. 186; for other refs., see Trumbull, 38 ff.). The last custom has sometimes been explained as a relic of marriage by capture, but it forms one of a group of rites by which it is sought to safeguard the sanctity of the threshold. Generally, before a stranger can be received, certain rites must be performed to remove the contagion of tabu resting on him *qua* stranger. The bride, belonging primitively to a different kin, was so far a stranger, and therefore dangerous. Hence certain precautions must be taken to render propitious the spirit or divinity of the threshold—an offering is made, or the bride is carried over the sacred spot (carrying or suspending above ground of tabued persons is a common rite), or she steps over, not on, it, but always with the right foot foremost, or she steps over the blood by which the spirit is propitiated, and through which, perhaps, she is brought into a kin or covenant relation with him. This is seen more clearly in a Panjāb rite. The bride holds the door-frame of the bridegroom's house. His mother gives her a cup of water to drink and welcomes her, and presents are given by members of the husband's family. Cotton is laid down, and she is bidden to come in. She steps on it, and is now an integral member of the family (*FL* ix. [1898] 152 f.). In some cases the bridegroom makes an offering at the threshold of the bride's house—perhaps a relic of those marriages in which the husband went to live in her home. Crooke (*FL* xiii. [1902] 238, 'The Lifting of the Bride') sees in the lifting a charm to promote fertility in some instances, in others a method of protection against evil influences. It should also be noted that in Lapland and Hungary stepping over the threshold ensures the protection of the family and of the tutelar spirit (Jones and Kropf, *Folk-Tales of the Magyars*, 1889, p. 410 f.).

(*b*) *Treading on the threshold is frequently forbidden, or is considered unlucky.* It must be stepped over, usually with the right foot first (cf. *FL* i. 459 [Tatars]; Conder, *Heth and Moab*, 1883, p. 293 [Syrians]; Lane, *Modern Egyptians*, i. 118; Morier, *Second Journ. through Persia*, 1818, p. 254 [Muham. mosques]; Trumbull, 12 [Finns and Teutons]; 1 S 5[1-5] [ætiological myth explaining why a temple threshold is not trodden on]). This scrupulous care in stepping over the threshold of a temple, *e.g.* that of Baal and of Jahweh, is also referred to and condemned in Zeph 1[9]. It is obvious that the act had the force of a religious rite. Similarly, novices, on initiation into a secret society among the Bella Coolas, had to leap over the threshold of the dancing house (Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, 1910, iii. 512). Hence it is also unlucky to stumble on the threshold, especially when going on a journey or on business, etc. (Highlands, Germany, Transylvania, Malaysia, Syria, etc.; see Grimm, *Teut. Myth.* 1815; *FL* i. 156, xviii. [1907] 59). Pythagoras refers to this belief, and says that 'he who strikes his foot against the threshold should turn back' (*Frag. Phil. Græc.*, ed. Mullach, 1868, i. 510). It is also dangerous to sneeze at the threshold, to sit, or to linger at it; or

[1] Cf. *ERE* ii. 356 for instances among the Hereros.

for women to suckle their children there (Hindus, Slavs, Syrians, etc. [Crooke, *PR* i. 241; Trumbull, 11–12; *FL* xv. [1904] 208—negroes of Jamaica believe that 'duppies' will take those who sit at thresholds; *FL* xviii. 59]).

(*c*) The sacredness of the door, and especially of the threshold, demands also that *acts of reverence be paid there.* The threshold is to be crossed with the right foot first. Or a charm or prayer or sacred formula should be said ('Bismillah' [Arabs], Palgrave, *Arabia*, 1865, i. 51; a formula of blessing when the door is first opened in the morning [Hebrides], *FL* x. [1899] 261). Or prostration and touching the threshold with the forehead, kissing it or the door, taking off the shoes, crossing oneself on entering, are practised ([Muhammadans] Trumbull, 11, 123; Morier, 254; *Frag. Phil. Græc.* i. 510; Ralston, *Songs of the Russian People*, 1872, p. 137; Layard, *Nineveh*, 1849, i. 69).

(*d*) The sacredness of the door[1] makes it *a place to deposit objects which are to be preserved in safety.* In Iceland the caul, in which the child's guardian spirit or a part of its soul resides, was buried under the threshold, possibly with a view to re-birth in the event of the child dying. The spirit would pass into the mother as she crossed the threshold (Grimm, *Teut. Myth.* 874). Among the Baganda, at the monthly ceremony connected with the king's placenta, to ensure his life and health, it is deposited in the doorway for a night and a day (Roscoe, *JAI* xxxii. [1902] 63, 76).

(*e*) The door is a usual *place at which to offer sacrifices*, either to propitiate the household spirit or god, and so to unite the 'house' with him, or to repel evil influences, or to remove the contagion of uncleanness from all in the house.

In Zindero two human victims were sacrificed, one at the threshold, which was smeared with the blood, before a new king entered the royal hut (Bruce, *Travels*, ii. 514). In W. Africa, in time of smallpox or expected trouble, gateways are sprinkled with sacrificial blood (Kingsley, *Travels in W. Afr.*, 1897, p. 451; Nassau, *Fetichism in W. Afr.*, 1904, p. 93). The Dayaks sprinkle the doorway with the blood of a pig sacrificed as an expiation for unchastity, and also with sacrificial blood at seed-time (St. John, *Life in the Forests of the Far East*, 1862, i. 64, 157). Among the Aztecs it was also usual to smear the temple doors with the blood, the sacrifice being offered on an altar near the door (Réville, *Native Rel. of Mexico*, 1884, pp. 179, 183). A similar custom may be seen in Herodotus' account (ii. 48) of the sacrifice of a swine to Osiris, at the door of each house. The carcass was given to the swineherd, so that the main part of the rite was the blood-shedding. In Bab. rituals a lamb was sacrificed at the gate of a house, and its blood smeared on lintel and doorposts, and on the huge images guarding the entrance (Zimmern, *Beiträge z. Kenntnis der bab. Rel.*, Leipzig, 1901, p. 127; cf. Layard, ii. 202). In Muslim houses it is usual to dip the hand in the blood of sacrifices offered on special occasions, and to mark the surface near the door in order to repel the *jinn* (*FL* xviii. [1907] 66). For other examples, Abyssinian, Hindu, see *ERE* i. 56^{b}, iii. 445^{a}. The same rite of smearing the doorway with blood occurs as a survival in European folk-custom, *e.g.* in Greece at Easter, and in Ireland on St. Martin's eve, to keep out evil spirits during the year (*FL* i. 275; Mason, *Stat. Account*, 1814–9, iii. 75). It can hardly be doubted that the Hebrew Passover rite goes back to a sacrifice by which the household divinity dwelling at the doorway was propitiated and his protective power secured against the evil powers (the 'destroyer'). The blood was smeared on doorposts and lintel, and was perhaps first poured on the threshold (Ex 12^{22} 'basou' [? 'threshold']).

The custom of slaying a sacrificial victim at the door to welcome a guest, or before the entrance of a stranger, or even on the return of the master of a house from a journey, which is so wide-spread, especially in Africa, Syria, and the East (see *FL* xviii. 66; Trumbull, 1 ff.), had probably the primitive intention of neutralizing the contagion of evil which a new-comer brings with him, and also of making the household gods propitious to him. From this it may have passed into a species of covenant rite—by the blood shed the new-comer or guest was made one with the household or its god. In other cases salt is sprinkled on the threshold, or bread and salt are offered to the guest (cf. Trumbull, 3 ff., where the importance of the covenant aspect is perhaps over-emphasized).

Other offerings occur at the door. In ancient Vedic law the householder had to place an offering on the threshold, at the same time reciting a *mantra* (*SBE* ii. 107, 203). At seed-time in N.W. India a cup-shaped cake of cow-dung filled with corn, and water poured over it, is placed on the threshold (*FLR* v. [1882] 34). The first bundle of corn is placed near the threshold, and between it and the threshold a libation is poured forth, forming an offering of first-fruits to the household god (*ib.*; Trumbull, 16). In the north of Scotland, part of the first load of sea-'waar' used for manure was placed on New Year's day at each door of the farm to bring good fortune (Gregor, in *FLJ* ii. [1884] 331). In Babylonia, libations of oil, honey, and wine were poured over the thresholds of temples, and honey and wine over bolts (Jastrow, *Rel. Bab.*, 1898, p. 664 f.).

(*f*) The frequent use of sacrifices at or near doors of temples is seen from the fact that in many temples *an altar stands beside the door or entrance.* Among the Hebrews the altar of burnt-offering stood at the entrance of the tabernacle of the tent of meeting (Ex 40^{6}). Offerings were brought to the door of the tent of meeting and slain, and the blood sprinkled on the altar (Lv 1$^{3.5}$ 3^{2} 4$^{4.7}$ etc., cf. 17$^{2ff.}$). Similarly, in the temple the altar of burnt-offering stood before the entrance to the Holy Place, like the large altar of the outer court of Bab. temples. The greater Greek and Roman altars frequently stood before the entrance to the *ναός* or *cella*. Trumbull notes other instances from Assyria and Asia Minor, Mexico, Polynesia, etc. (115, 121, 144, 150; cf. Ellis, *Pol. Researches*, 1832–6, iv. 89). In Dahomey little mounds of earth are often found at doorways, and on them offerings are laid (Schneider, *Rel. der afrik. Naturvölker*, Münster, 1891, p. 115); and in Greece altars were often placed at gateways or doors. The sanctity of the door or threshold is also emphasized in the OT. At the door of the tent of meeting took place the consecration of Aaron and his sons (Ex 29$^{4ff.}$). In Ezekiel's ideal temple the 'Prince' is to worship at the threshold of the gate of the inner court (46^{2}). When Moses spoke to Jahweh, the pillar of cloud descended and stood over the door of entrance to the tent of meeting; and in Ezekiel's temple the glory of Jahweh mounts up from the cherub and stands over the threshold of the house (Ex 33$^{8ff.}$, Dt 31^{15}, Ezk 9^{3} 10^{4}). The thresholds of the tent of meeting had their guardians (1 Ch 9^{22}), and later those of the temple (2 K 22^{4} 23^{4}, 2 Ch 23^{4}, Jer 35^{4}; cf. Ps 84^{10}). The office of doorkeeper (*θυρωροί, πυλωροί*) soon came into existence in the Christian Church (Cornelius, *ap.* Eus. *HE* vi. 43; Bingham, *Antiq.*, 1829, i. 293, cf. 257).

The ancient custom of baptistery and font being outside the church (Eus. *HE* x. 4; Cyril, *Catech. Myst.* i. 2), preceded by the custom of baptizing in any place where there was water (Tert. *de Bapt.* 4; Justin, *Apol.* i. 61), is connected with the general idea that none but the initiated can enter the sanctuary, and also with the ritual of purification before sacrificing, entering a temple, etc., for which special vessels stood near the entrance—the *περιρραντήρια*, or fonts, at the entrance of the Greek *ναός*, the jars for ablutions which stood beside the altars of Bab. temples, the Bab. *apsu*, and the lavers and brazen sea of Solomon's temple (Jastrow, 652–3; Sayce, *Rel. of Anc. Egypt and Bab.*, 1902, p. 458; 2 Ch 4$^{2-7}$).

2. Guardian spirits and divinities of doors.—The sacredness of the door was connected with its spirit or Divine guardianship. In many cases we find deliberate methods resorted to in order to secure a spirit guardian, in the first instance, of the door of a house, and later, of the gate of a city. One of these is *burial*. House burial is of very wide occurrence, and is probably primitive. It usually takes place under the floor, but there are occasional instances of its occurrence under the threshold

[1] The Celto-Iberian custom of dancing at the doors at the time of full moon may be noted (Strabo, iii. 4. 16).

(Ralston, 326 [Slavs]; Jastrow, 599 [Bab.]; *ERE* iii. 34ᵃ [Burma]). Burial at gates is also found in Greece—Ætolus was buried in a tomb in the gate leading to Olympia, and, from his grave over the Scæan gate at Troy, Laomedon was believed to guard the city. Neoptolemus was also buried under the threshold of the temple at Delphi (Pausanias, ed. Frazer, v. 4. 4 and notes). The ashes of Belinus, a British god, were said to have been preserved at the gate on the Thames (=Billingsgate [Geoff. Mon. iii. 1])—a myth founded on gate-burial and Divine guardianship of the gate. In other cases, sacrifice was resorted to. At the building of a hut or house a human victim is often placed under the roof-post, the four corners, the threshold, or the foundation, whatever that may be, or the walls; and the same is true of the building of a gate. There is no proof, however, that (as Trumbull supposes [*op. cit.* 21]) the threshold stone was originally the foundation stone. The victims may be intended to propitiate the earth-spirits whose domain is disturbed by the digging, but they are also expected to act as guardians of the house, door, or gate. In old Canaanite houses new-born children were sacrificed and buried under floor, corners, or threshold—a custom later commuted to burial of a lamp or bowls in these places (*PEFSt*, 1903, pp. 10 f., 36 ff.). The passages in Jos 6[26], 1 K 16[34] have an undoubted reference to this custom. In Phœnicia, men were buried beneath gates to make the town secure (Movers, *Die Phönizier*, Berlin, 1840, ii. 46). Instances of sacrifices at the building of a city gate are cited from the farther East (Alabaster, *The Wheel of the Law*, 1871, p. 212 [Siam]; Tylor, *Prim. Cult.*[4], 1903, i. 106; *ERE* iii. 27ᵃ [Tenasserim, Mandalay]), and in Senegambia it was formerly the custom to bury alive a boy and girl before the chief door of the town, in order to make it impregnable (Waitz, *Anthrop.*, Leipzig, 1860, ii. 197). The coins placed under the door in China and Syria at the building of a house are probably surrogates for such sacrifices, like the Canaanite lamps. In Syria a cock is sacrificed, and its blood poured over the lintel and steps of a new house (Doolittle, *Social Life of the Chinese*, 1866, ii. 75; *FL* xviii. [1907] 59).

On foundation-sacrifices in general, see Sartori, *ZE* xxx. [1898] 1 ff.; Liebrecht, *Zur Volkskunde*, Heilbronn, 1879, p. 284 ff.; Gomme, *Folk-Lore Relics*, 1883, p. 24).

In all such cases it is evident that the spirit of the door is connected with the household spirit, and that both are ultimately ghosts of the dead, though the sacrifice or burial took place there because the door or threshold was already considered an important part of the house. Souls were supposed to dwell under the threshold in ancient India (Oldenberg, *Rel. des Veda*, Berlin, 1894, p. 553). Among the Slavs the *domovoj*, or house-spirit, associated with the hearth, is propitiated at certain times by offerings buried beneath the threshold (Trumbull, 19). Similarly the household *penates* of the Mordvins receive offerings at the door, which is their seat (*FL* i. 422 ff.). In Germany a spirit sits between door and doorpost; hence the door must not be banged, and other precautions must be taken lest he leave and take the luck with him (Grimm, 1820; *FL* xiii. [1902] 238 ff.). In Irish and Scots belief the household fairies reside at the threshold (Crooke, *PR* i. 241). In Samoa the tutelary spirit is also associated with the doorway, and is angry when water is spilt on the threshold (Turner, *Samoa*, 1884, p. 37).

In many regions the door or gate is put under the protection of special divinities, or is called by the name of a god. The Ainus have a god of door-posts, and to him, as to the gods of other parts of the hut, worship is paid at its construction, and offerings of *inao* are made at other times (*FLJ* vi. [1888] 40; Batchelor, *Ainu and their Folk-lore*, 1901, p. 129). The Japanese have gods of doors and gates who guard against 'unfriendly things from below and above,' and are in some cases personifications of the gates, since these were conceived as living things exercising protective powers. Small prints of the *Ni-ô*, guardians of holy places, are set on the doors for protection (Revon, *RHR* li. [1905] 389 f.; Aston, *Shinto*, 1905, pp. 168, 283). In China the usual gods of the doors are Shen-Shu and Ju-Lu, though other divinities or guardians occur. They guard the house and other buildings; and images of them, larger or smaller, or pictures of them, or simply their names, are found at the door, with a shrine on the left hand (de Groot, *Les Fêtes annuellement célébrées à Emoui*, tr. Chavannes, Paris, 1886, p. 597 ff.; Williams, *The Middle Kingdom*, New York, 1848, i. 731). In India, Vāttuma is the threshold god, dwelling there, to whom offerings are made when the doorway is set up. Or, as among the Mulers of Chotā Nāgpur, Dwāra Gusāīn is lord of the house door, and is propitiated with rites and offerings, in time of calamity, at the doorway. Images and pictures of gods are also placed round doors (Trumbull, 95; Crooke, *PR*[2] i. 104). In Egypt each building had its protecting deity, as doorway inscriptions prove, while sphinxes guarded the entrances of tombs and protected them from the attacks of the spirits of the desert. An inscription runs: 'I protect thy sepulchral chamber, I keep away the stranger, I overthrow the foes with their weapons.' In other cases a royal statue, wearing the magic *uræus* diadem, guards the tomb (*ZÄ*, 1880, p. 50; Wilkinson, i. 362 f.; Maspero, *Études de myth.*, Paris, 1893, i. 79). The gates of Thebes were each dedicated to a planet, and connected with planetary worship (Nonnus, *Dionys.* v. 64). In Babylonia and Assyria gates of cities, palaces, etc., were often dedicated to gods or named after them, and each part of a house doorway was associated with the great divinities to whom appeal was made (Maspero, *Life in Anc. Eg. and Assyr.* 1891, p. 220: Jastrow, 237). But, besides this, human-headed winged bulls, lions, and other monstrous forms stood at the entrances of temples and palaces to guard them against the approach of the demons, the brood of Tiamāt, with their composite forms (Maspero, 198 f.; Jastrow, 263; Sayce, 119). In Guatemala, Chahalka was the god of houses, and his protection was assured by sprinkling the doors with sacrificial blood. The great doorways of Central American temples were also guarded by human male and female or animal figures (Trumbull, 98, 146). In Rome, Janus was the primitive *numen* of the doorway of the house and the city-gate, preventing the passage of all evil things into the house, and so one of the Penates. He was god of the *jani*, gates in the form of arches on the roads, etc., the most ancient of which was that of the Forum, originally a temple in the form of a gateway. But Janus, as god of doors and gates, was rather god of the entry and departure through the gate or door. This is seen by the fact that each part of the door had its *numen*—Limentinus, of the threshold; Forculus, of the leaves of the door; Cardea, of the hinges (Wissowa, *Rel. u. Kult. der Römer*, Munich, 1902, p. 91 ff.; Toutain, *Études de myth.*, Paris, 1909, p. 197 ff.; Tert. *de Corona*, 13). In Greece, Apollo Aguieus or Thyræus and the Anteii were concerned with entrances and doors. Images of Hecate stood at doors, to prevent the entrance of evil spirits and ghosts, and she was also invoked before the threshold for protection against them. At doors and gates stood also the ἑρμαί, protective images or symbols of Hermes (*CGS* ii. 509, 516; Brunck, *Analecta*, 1772–76, iii. 197; Tert. *de Cor.* 13). See *ERE* iii.

155, for Cambodian spirit-guardians of the door. The belief in Divine guardians of the doorway among the Hebrews is suggested by Ex 21[6], where the bondman who does not wish to go free is brought to the *Elôhîm*, to the door or doorpost, where his ear is pierced with an awl (cf. *ERE* i. 445[b]).

The preseuce of the household spirit or god makes the doorway sacred. This receives illustration in other directions in which sacred persons confer sacredness on the door. In Polynesia, wheo the king or queen entered a temple, the door was shut up as being sacred (Turner, *Polynesia*, 1861, p. 328). In India, any one ill of smallpox, being possessed by the smallpox deity, makes the house sacred, and the door is tabu to certain persons, or must only be crossed with a due ritual (Crooke, *PR* i. 135; cf. *ERE* iii. 312[b]). In the South Sea Islands, the first-born being sacred, no one can pass through the door by which he enters his father's house (Gill, *Life in S. Isles*, 1876, p. 46). Cf. also Ezk 44[2] (the door by which Jahweh enters the temple is to be shut, and none but the 'Prince' can enter it).

The gates and doors of temples are always peculiarly sacred, since the temple is the abode of a god. The outer courts of Buddhist temples in China and Japan have single or double roofed gateways, *mon*, coloured a dull red, with figures on either side. In front are the 'heavenly dogs,' and under the gateway in some instances is the figure of Buddha, and the *Ni-ô*, or two kings, hideous and gigantic figures guarding the gate. Other hideous forms of the thunder and wind gods are set on niches in the gates. Petitions are made to the *Ni-ô*, written on paper pellets, which are chewed and flung against them. Before the inner sanctuary is reached many other gates must first be passed (Curzon, *Problems of the Far East*, 1894, p. 109; Bird, *Unbeaten Tracks in Japan*, 1893, pp. 21 f., 59).

Not only is the temple door sacred, and therefore highly decorated with carving or precious metals, but an isolated gateway or entrance arch is often found in front of it. This is a duplicate of the door, serving the same purpose, but acting as a preliminary entrance to the sacred precincts and a barrier against evil influences. It may be derived originally from the barriers or porticoes hung with charms which are often stretched across roads and entrances to villages to prevent the intrusion of all malicious things, *e.g.* in Africa (Kingsley, 450–1; van Gennep, 22). Such isolated doorways are placed in front of other buildings than temples, or they occur in other isolated situations, for particular purposes, *e.g.* monumental memorials. The *tori-wi* of Japan is found in front of all Shinto and many Buddhist temples and shrines. It consists of two uprights and two or more cross-beams painted red, the upper projecting and curving upwards at both ends. Though now regarded as a bird perch, *i.e.* for the birds sacred to the gods, its original purpose is unmistakable (Aston, 231–2; Chamberlain, *Things Japanese*, 1890, p. 356; Bird, 148). In Korea the isolated gateway, *hong-sal-mun*, is a symbol of majesty and government, and is erected in front of palaces, government buildings, temples, and monasteries under royal patronage. The primitive purpose of the *hong-sal-mun* as a doorway is seen in the *geo-man*, an archway outside the western gate of the capital on the road to Peking, where the king goes to meet the Imperial envoys (Curzon, 142). In China these arches, *pailoo*, are of a commemorative nature. Similarly, the triumphal arch of the Romans suggests its primitive purpose as the gate through which the triumphant soldier returned from a hostile country into his own district. The *propylon*, or towered gateway, of Egyptian temples, with its flanking towers, obelisks, or statues, and tall masts, all led up to by an avenue of sphinxes, forms another example of such gateways. In Babylonia, before the gateway of the great court of the temple, stood two detached pillars, like the Egyptian gate obelisks. They correspond to the pillars Jachin and Boaz in front of Solomon's temple (1 K 7[21]), and were doubtless the originals of these. Such pillars were commonly placed before Semitic temples, *e.g.* at Paphos and Hierapolis (Lucian, *de Dea Syria*, 16; W. R. Smith[2], 457, 483).

Sayce regards the Bab. pillars as representing Nin-gis-zida ('Lord of the upright post') and Tammuz, warders of the gate of heaven, just as the flanking towers of the Egyptian gate were said to represent Isis and Nephthys. In his opinion, Jachin is a translation of Nin-gis-zida, and Boaz perhaps a corrupt reminiscence of Tammuz (Sayce, *op. cit.* 350, 459–60; Jastrow, 624 f.).

3. Amulets at doorways.—Images of divinities and monstrous figures at doors and gates are intended to repel evil influences and powers, and to guarantee the protection of the doorway gods. The process is largely a magical one. As the demoniac figures keep off demons, so also the Medusa head, represented on door-knockers, has the same effect, or repels the evil eye. Such door-knockers or handles were used in ancient Italy, and are still common in modern Italy for the same purpose, while the female face on English door-knockers is derivative from these (*FL* xiv. [1903] 217). The same purpose was served by the small images of protective divinities, often with invocations printed on them, buried under the threshold of Assyrian houses, palaces, or temples, or placed at the doors to keep the house from the entrance and malice of fiends or enemies (Jastrow, 269). But, since amulets of all kinds are placed on the roofs, gables, windows, and walls of houses to ward off evil influences, they are naturally also fixed on doorways through which their entrance might so easily be effected. The custom is found from the lowest up to the highest levels of civilization. It is also very ancient. This is proved by the fact that, on the entrances of Neolithic cave-dwellings in Palestine, cup-markings which undoubtedly were religious symbols or served a magical purpose are found (see *ERE* iii. 178[a]). In various parts of Africa, charms are hung on the doors to prevent evil spirits from entering; and in civilized Greece, doors and gates of all kinds were similarly protected (Kingsley, 450; Mackay, *Mackay of Uganda*, 1890, p. 112; *ERE* iii. 438[b]). The door amulets used among all peoples are of various kinds, and only the principal varieties need be alluded to here.

(*a*) *Saered plants, flowers, or branches* are commonly used, especially on particular occasions when evil forces are most to be dreaded, *e.g.* at a birth.

In Bab. iucantations against demons, various plants are mentioned as having been hung on the lintel (Thompson, *Devils and Evil Spirits of Bab.*, 1903–4, i. 137). In India, at a birth, leaves and flowers along with a sickle, edge outwards, are placed outside the door to bar the demons (Billington, *Woman in India*, 1895, p. 2). The Greek and Roman practice of crowning the door with sacred garlands on various occasions (Tert. *de Corona*, 10) had more than a festal purpose. In Attica, at the birth of a boy, an olive-wreath was hung on the door (Hesychius, *s.v.* στέφανον ἐκφέρειν). In Rome, doorpost and threshold were touched thrice with an arbutus branch, and water was sprinkled at the entrance, at a birth, to keep off witches. Branches and wreaths were also hung up at the Palilia (Ovid, *Fasti*, iv. 721 ff., vi. 155). In modern Greece, a piece of wild onion is placed over the lintel to keep off the evil eye, or garlands of flowers and garlic are hung up on May-day for the same purpose (*FL* x. [1899] 181, 260). In China, at a birth, pummelo-leaves and slips of a fragrant thorn are suspended over the door to keep off evil spirits (*FLJ* v. [1887] 222). In Japan, on New Year's day and on other occasions, branches, etc., are fixed up as averters, or a rope of rice straw with fern and holly leaves is hung up (Aston, 191, 312 f.). The Aiuus place *inao* in doorways as charms against evil (Batchelor, 91). In Ireland, on May-eve, the threshold is strewn with marsh marigolds to keep out fairies and to bring luck (*FL* xv. [1904] 457). For similar practices in European folk-custom, see Frazer, *GB*[2] iii. 334; Grimm, *Teut. Myth.* iii. 1200, 1209, 1211; and for additional instances, see *ERE* iii. 354[a], 394[b]; Lane, *Mod. Egyptians*, 1846, ii. 77. In the W. Highlands, pearl-wort placed on the lintel keeps out ghosts (Campbell, *Witchcraft and Second Sight*, 1902, pp. 103, 172).

(*b*) *Salt* is sometimes strewn on the threshold, on account of its apotropæic properties, as in Syria (*FL* xviii. [1907] 70). In Aberdeenshire it was placed

with fire on the threshold of a byre, before a cow after calving left the byre (*FLJ* ii. [1884] 330). *Pebbles and grains* are sprinkled on the doorstep to keep out ghosts, who must count them and cannot get beyond three (*FL* xv. 214). *Iron* is also a powerful charm at doors as in other places, especially at birth, when an iron weapon or utensil is placed at the door (India [Campbell, *Spirit Basis of Belief and Custom*, Bombay, 1885, p. 387], and very commonly in European folk-custom at birth, after a funeral to keep the ghost out [*JAI* xv. 69], and on other occasions). Both because it is made of iron and also because of other reasons connected either with the former sacred nature of the horse or with its supposed resemblance to the form of the female sex organs, *the horse-shoe* is a very common door charm in most countries. Usually the charm is effective only when the ends are placed upwards. It keeps out fairies, witches, ghosts, and other evil powers, and keeps in or brings luck; and for this purpose it is found on house-, byre-, or stable-doors, doors of mosques, temples, or even Christian churches (see R. M. Lawrence, *Magic of the Horse-shoe*, Boston, 1899; Farrer, *Primitive Manners and Customs*, 1879, p. 293; Crooke, *PR* ii. 15 [India]; *ERE* iii. 451[b] [Japan]; *FL* xi. [1900] 108, *FLR* iv. [1881] 189 [England]; *FLR* iv. 102, *FL* xvi. [1905] 70 [Jamaica]; Campbell, 12, 13, 15 [Hebrides]; *FLJ* ii. 43 [Turcomans]; *Gentleman's Magazine*, 1867, p. 307 ff.). This charm is also very common on houses in the West Highlands.

(*c*) *A hand with the fingers extended* is represented on or above doors. Sometimes it is formed by dipping the hand in the blood of an animal slain at the door, and then making an impression of it on the door. Or the hand is painted—usually in vermilion—or carved. The custom is very common in the East among both Jews and Muhammadans (*FL* vi. 174, xv. 189, xviii. 66; Luncz, *Jerushalayim*, Vienna, 1892, i. 19; Conder, *Heth and Moab*, 1883, p. 275 f.). It is found in India, Japan, ancient Assyria, in Babylon and in Carthage (see *ERE* iii. 411[a], 446[a]; Trumbull, 75, 78, 323). The hand thus serves the purpose of the open hand in folk-belief, as a powerful charm against the evil eye, and it also distracts and repels evil spirits (see Elworthy, *Evil Eye*, 1895, p. 233 ff.). Used to make an impression of blood, its purpose as the sign of a covenant between the contracting parties, human and Divine (so Trumbull, 66 ff.), if it exists at all, is secondary, as, wherever the hand is used, it is believed to be apotropæic, like the blood sprinkled on the doorposts. It is then, in fact, a double charm, both hand and blood having repellent powers. Analogous to the use of blood in this way is the touching of the doorposts with menstrual blood or urine, to dissolve spells of witchcraft or to keep off fairies, ghosts, or the evil eye (Pliny, *HN* xxviii. 24; Campbell, *Superstitions of the Highlands and Islands of Scotland*, Glasgow, 1900, p. 36, *Witchcraft*, 11, 137).

(*d*) *Sacred symbols* are affixed to doors as a powerful means of protection, like the Divine images at doors and gates. In Christian lands no symbol is more effective than the cross marked on the door or simply signed upon it or some particular part of it, or signed on oneself when entering or going out. It keeps off ghosts, witches, and all powers of evil (*FL* x. [1899] 178, 260, xvi. [1905] 50, 70; Grimm, iv. 1781; Trumbull, 18; cf. Tert. *de Cor.* 3). The *swastika* symbol is commonly marked on doors in the East for the same purpose (Hindus, Buddhists, etc. [Crooke, *PR* i. 12, 160; *ERE* iii. 412]). Perhaps the figures of cherubim carved on the doors of Solomon's temple served the same end (1 K 6[32. 35]), as well as figures of the Paschal lamb, and other symbols on ancient synagogue lintels in Palestine (Trumbull, 70). For a door charm composed of dust from Muhammad's tomb, see Lane, ii. 76. Over the doors of Egyptian temples was placed the winged disk of the sun, to drive off demons from the building (Erman, *Life in Ancient Egypt*, 1894, p. 272).

(*e*) *Sacred formulæ* written on doors have also a powerful apotropæic virtue, and are of very wide occurrence.

In Babylonia, tablets with sentences from the sacred texts were hung up to protect against demons (Jastrow, 269). In ancient Egypt, names and sentences of a lucky or favourable import were written over the doors or on the doorposts to secure a good dwelling (Wilkinson, i. 346, 361). In modern Egypt, and among all Muhammadans elsewhere, invocations to God, descriptions of His might, or passages from the Qur'ān, are inscribed on doors (Lane, i. 26, ii. 74; Porter, *Travels*, 1821-2, i. 440). The Greeks placed inscriptions and wishes for 'good luck' over their doorways. Similar usages are found in India and China (Crooke, *PR* i. 160; Williams, *Middle Kingdom*, i. 731), while the Buddhist prayer poles and flags outside doors are analogous to door inscriptions. These usages show that the command to write the words of laws on 'the door posts of thy house, and upon thy gates' (Dt 6[9] 11[20]) was intended to take the place of some analogous heathen custom, though by the Hebrew the words must have been regarded as efficacious against evil powers. If the household gods had been associated with doors, this dedication of the door to Jahweh showed that He was intended to take their place. Later Jews still fix the *mĕzûzâ* to doorposts in the form of an amulet with sacred words and Name. This is touched with a finger of the right hand and kissed on going out, while a sacred formula is repeated. For the use of sacred writings or pictures affixed to doors among Christians see *ERE* iii. 425[b], 428[a]. Texts carved on the lintel are commonly found on old houses, and this custom is undoubtedly derived from the older practice.

The wide-spread use of these door charms shows that the attack of ghosts, evil spirits, witches, or fairies was chiefly dreaded at the door, through which they sought to enter and do harm to those in the house. Hence at the Compitalia the Romans hung up effigies of all in the household, hoping that the ghosts coming to the door would be satisfied with these and not enter to take the living. But a closed door is not sufficient to keep out ghosts and demons, as in Babylonia they slip through bolts, doorposts, and sockets (Jastrow, 265); hence the value of charms to prevent this. But in some cases the evil powers actually dwell at the door or in its vicinity.

In Germany they are banished to between the door and doorpost (Grimm, iv. 1815). In Jerusalem the powers of evil are supposed to infest the threshold, doors, and entrances (*FL* xviii. [1907] 58). Among the Birhors of Bengal the spirits lurk at the door (Crooke, *PR* ii. 56), and in Burma different evil spirits reside at doors and gates (*ERE* iii. 25[a]). These beliefs perhaps explain the curse of Allatu to Uddushu-namir, 'the threshold be thy dwelling,' suggesting that in Babylonia it was the abode of dangerous spirits who would torment him.

But even against such door-dwelling spirits charms were efficacious, since they could keep them in check.

4. Magic rites at doors.—Many magical rites are performed at the door, either (1) to transfer evil to those who enter or pass out; or (2) to secure the assistance of the spirits, good or bad, dwelling or lurking there; or (3) simply because the doorway is a sacred place.

For examples of (1), see *FL* xv. [1904] 69; Crooke, *PR* i. 164; Lane, ii. 46; Grimm, 1095 f.; of (2), Jastrow, 268; of (3), Trumbull, 18, 20; Theocritus, *Idyl.* ii. 63; *FL* xii. [1901] 299; Campbell, *Witchcraft*, 287.

Other magical rites take place there, to keep off and get rid of ghosts and evil spirits. Of this class was the Roman birth-rite, in which three men struck the thresholds with an axe and a pestle, and swept them with a broom. The iron axe and the pestle tipped with iron had apotropæic virtues; the action of the broom was perhaps symbolic, though all three, being connected with vegetation and agricultural usages, may have had magical virtues, and are charms against spirits and witches. In this case they were supposed to keep out the god Silvanus, and they later supplied names to the three protecting spirits—Intercidona, Pilumnus, and Deverra (Aug. *de Civ. Dei*, vi. 9). Among the Letts, at the feast of souls, the ghosts were got

rid of by taking the staff which served as a poker, cutting it in two with an axe on the threshold, and bidding them go (Frazer, *Adonis*^{2}, 1907, p. 312). See also § 1.

5. Gate as seat of judgment.—On account of the sacred nature of the gate, the seat of a spirit or god, it is often a place of judgment, especially in the East. Kings, chiefs, and judges hear complaints, try causes, and decree judgments at the gates of the palace, house, or city. Examples of this are found in ancient Babylonia, Persepolis, Egypt, and among the Hebrews (Trumbull, 60 f. ; Dn 2^{49}, Ex 32^{26}, Dt 16^{18} 21^{19}, Ru $4^{1ff.}$, 2 S 15^{2} 19^{8}, Pr 24^{7} ; cf. Am 5^{15}, Zec 8^{16}). Probably connected with this custom of administering justice at the gate is that of a person fasting at the door of another against whom he has a claim or proffers a request. In cases where this is refused the claimant starves to death at the door ([Celts] *Anc. Laws of Ireland*, Dublin, 1869–70 ; Joyce, *Soc. Hist. of Anc. Ireland*, 1903, i. 204 f. ; [India] Crooke, *PR* i. 191–2).

6. The door and death-rites.—In many regions it is not customary to carry a dead body, especially that of a suicide or criminal, through the door of a house, and various expedients are resorted to in order to avoid this.

Thus the body is taken through the window of the house, or through a special opening made in roof or wall. This is a widespread custom, found, *e.g.*, in W. and S. Africa, Siam, Indonesia, India, China, Tibet, among the Ostiaks and Eskimo, in Fiji, with the ancient Norse, and as a folk survival in Europe (Scotland, Germany). See Liebrecht, *Zur Volkskunde*, Heilbronn, 1879, p. 373 ; Frazer, *JAI* xv. 70 ; Tylor, ii. 26 f. ; Westermarck, *MI* ii. 537 ; Ramseyer and Kuhne, *Four Years in Ashantee*, 1875, p. 50 ; Dubois, *Hindu Manners*, Oxford, 1897, ii. 27 ; Williams, *Fiji*, 1860, i. 197 ; Gregor, *Folklore of the N.E. of Scotland*, 1881, p. 206 ; Wuttke, *Der deut. Volksaberglaube*, Berlin, 1900, § 756 ; Lippert, *Die Seelencult*, Berlin, 1881, p. 11). Or the body is passed through an opening made under the threshold (Hyltén-Cavallius, *Wärend och Wird.*, Stockholm, 1863–8, i. 473 [Sweden] ; Birlinger, *Volkstümliches aus Schwaben*, i. [1861–62] 321 [Swabia] ; Grimm, *Deutsche Rechtsalt.*^{4}, Leipzig, 1899, p. 726 [Germany] ; Ralston, *Russ. Folk-tales*, 1873, p. 318 [Slavs]).

The usual reason assigned for these practices is that they are used to confuse the ghost, and prevent its finding its way back into the house (Liebrecht, 414 ; Frazer, *JAI* xv. [1886] 69 f.). The special aperture is afterwards closed up, or the window is kept shut after the burial (it is often opened to allow egress to the soul when a person is dying, and again closed to prevent the soul's return) ; or often both windows and doors are closed when a funeral is passing, lest the soul should enter the house (Liebrecht, 372 f. ; *FLJ* i. 218, vi. 243 ; Wuttke, § 250). Or, again, when the body is taken through a hole in the roof, this may be an archaic survival of a time when entrance and egress were obtained through the roof of the hut, as among the Eskimo and Aleuts (Liebrecht, 372, 426). Hence, in some cases, one supposed dead must not, when he returns, enter by the door, but by the roof (Plut. *Quæst. Rom.*, no. 5 ; Brugsch, *Aus dem Orient*, Berlin, 1864, ii. 110 [Persians]). Here the thought of death is enough to suggest its contagion, and entrance must not be first made by the sacred door. But, whatever be the origin of the customs referred to, they are certainly connected with the sacredness of the door, which must not be polluted by the passage of the dead body. If it were merely the return of the ghost which was feared, that could be prevented by door charms (§ 3), and it should be remembered that ghosts at the yearly festivals of the dead are invited to enter by the door and then pass out by it. That it is the pollution of death which is feared for the sacred doorway may be established by other rites of mourning and by analogous tabus.

Thus the Banjara of Khandesh move the hut, and make a new entrance after a funeral, as the door has been polluted by the passage of the corpse (Crooke, *PR* ii. 56). Propitiatory rites are in some cases performed at the door when a corpse has been carried out by it (the threshold is sprinkled with salt [Japan : Griffis, *Mikado's Empire*, New York, 1876, pp. 467, 470], or with wine [Greece : *FLJ* i. 218]). Among the Kwakiutl Indians, mourners must not use the house door, as they are unclean ; a separate door is cut for them (Westermarck, *MI* ii. 537) ; and in China a messenger who brings news of a death should not pass the threshold (de Groot, *Rel. System of China*, 1894, ii. 1. 644). In various regions a special door or gate in house or city wall is used for the passage of a corpse and for no other purpose (Burma [Sangermano, *Burm. Empire*, 1833, p. 143], Korea [Landor, *Corea*, 1895, p. 118], Italy, Holland [Trumbull, 24, 325] ; cf. the 'sacred gate' at Athens, used for funerals [Theophr. *Char.* 14]).

Analogous cases are those in which women at puberty, or during menstruation and pregnancy (tabu states), must not leave the hut by the usual door without special rites ; or, again, the flesh of animals slain in hunting is carried in by a special opening (*ERE* ii. 643^{a} ; Westermarck, ii. 537 ; Frazer, ii. 415). Perhaps connected with the danger of female pollution is the superstition that a male, not a female, should be the 'first-foot' *i.e.* the first person to cross the threshold at New Year ; but he must not come empty-handed (*FLJ* iii. 282, vii. 53 ; Campbell, *Witchcraft*, 229).

7. Doors and gates of the Other-world.—The eschatological beliefs of many peoples show that they consider heaven and the under world to be regions and abodes with doors or gates, bars and bolts, and guardians. The doors of heaven shut out those who have no right to enter there ; the doors of the under world enclose those who would fain leave it.

In Bab. writings, reference is made to gates of heaven, especially that of Anu, guarded by Tammuz and Gish-zida. In the account of creation, the great gates attached to both sides of the heavens by Marduk are mentioned. They are secured by bolts, and guarded by scorpion men. Through them the sun passes at morning and evening. The under world, Arallu, has also gates and bolts, seven or fourteen in number, and a warder stands at the outer gate. They are graphically described in the Descent of Ištar (Jastrow, 301, 435, 523, 549, 569 ; Sayce, 79). The Egyptian Other-world was plentifully supplied with gates. Duat or Hades, through which the boat of Rā travelled by night, had twelve divisions and as many fortified pylons with closed doors and serpent guardians, or gates with other keepers. The gates opened at the repetition of magic formulæ, and thus entry was freely obtained. Each gate had its own name. The heaven of Osiris was also entered by a gate in the mountain of the West, and this domain in the fields of Aalu had numerous gates, with porters, warders, and heralds. But all these opened to those who knew the true formulæ and names of gates and guardians (Maspero, *Études*, Paris, 1893, i. 377, 381, ii. 27 ff., 165 ff. ; Budge, *Gods of the Egyptians*, 1903, i. 170 ; *Book of the Dead*, ch. 147 ff.). The classical Hades and Tartarus had also their gates, those of Tartarus being of iron with a bronze threshold. Cerberus guarded the gate of Hades, a hydra with 50 gaping mouths that of Tartarus (*Il.* viii. 15 ; Virgil, *Æn.* vi. 576). The Scandinavian Valhalla had 540 gates, and Hel had also its portals (Grimm, *Teut. Myth.* 818). In Mandæan mythology, the seven lower worlds of the dark powers have doors which can be made secure by magic spells and talismans (Brandt, *Mand. Schriften*, Göttingen, 1893, p. 147 ff.). The Hebrew Sheol had gates and bars (Job 17^{16} 38^{17}, Ps 107^{18}, Is 38^{10}, cf. Mt 16^{18}). It had divisions, and in later belief these (of hell) were 7 in number, with as many doors (Pr 7^{27} ; Gfrörer, *Das Jahrhundert des Heils*, Stuttgart, 1838, ii. 45–6). The 'gate of heaven' is already spoken of in Gn 28^{17} (cf. Ps 78^{23}), and the seven heavens of later Jewish theology had gates. Serpent-like guardians of the gates of hell are referred to in the *Book of the Secrets of Enoch* 42^{1}. The entrance to Eden was guarded by cherubim (Gn 3^{24}, cf. *Enoch* 42^{3}), and the two gates of the heavenly paradise were of rubies and guarded by myriad angels (Gfrörer, ii. 44). These ideas are found in early Christian theology. Hades has gates of brass, bars of iron, bolts, keys (Rev 1^{18}), and warders ; but they are burst open by Christ as He descends there (*Gospel of*

Nicodemus, § 5, and many other writers referring to the descent; cf. Rev 1^{18}). Paradise is often described as a city with walls and gates guarded by angels (e.g. *Passio Perpetuæ*, § 11). The analogy is that of the heavenly Jerusalem with its twelve gates and angel guardians (Rev 21^{12}). In those documents which uphold the old idea of several heavens, each has its gate or door (*Apoc. of Paul*, § 19 ff.; *Test. of Abraham*, § 11), while Ps $24^{7f.}$ was frequently applied either to Christ's bursting the gates of Hades or to His ascension through the heavens, *e.g.* by Hippolytus, who speaks of Christ passing through the heavenly gates (Hippol. in Theod. *Dial.* 1; *Comm. on Prov.* [Mai, *Bibl. nova Patrum*, Rome, 1854, ii. 72]; cf. also Rev 4^1 'a door was opened in heaven'). Those Gnostic groups which taught the existence of seven or more heaven-spheres ruled by the Demiurge and Archons, assigned to these heavens doors guarded carefully. This is found, *e.g.*, among various Ophite groups and the followers of Bardesanes. The gates were themselves dangerous in some cases—'a fiery gateway'—and the Archons or door-keepers would have kept them closed against souls ascending to the Pleroma. But the Gnosis, initiation into sacraments and mysteries, possession of the names of the Archons and of the true magic formulæ, or of symbols and amulets, caused the doors to be opened (see Hippol. v. 8. 9, 26; Wright, *Apoc. Acts*, 1871, ii. 26; Origen, *c. Cels.* vi. 31; *Pistis Sophia*, bk. i. § 20 f.). These ideas of the magical opening of the gates are derived from Egyptian beliefs, and also, perhaps, from Mithraic teachings of the ascent of the soul through the planetary heavens with their gates (Origen, vi. 22). Mystico-magical cults having affinity to Mithraism knew also of the fiery gates of the upper spheres, which opened at the utterance of the names of the gods (Wessely, 'Griech. Zauberpapyrus,' *Denk. d. Kais. Ak. d. Wiss. zu Wien*, xxxvi. [1888] 56 ff.).

8. The door being regarded as a means of passage from one state to another, it was easy to apply the word in a metaphorical sense. Christ speaks of Himself as the 'door.' 'By me if any man enter in, he shall be saved' (Jn 10^9, cf. Eph 2^{18}). This idea is repeated in Christian theology. Ignatius calls Christ 'the door of the Father by which Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and all the prophets enter in, as well as the apostles and the Church' (*ad Philad.* ix.). In *Hermas* the gate of the tower is the Son of God (*Sim.* ix. 12); and in the *Clementine Recognitions* (ii. 22) the gate through which men enter the city, the kingdom of the Father, is 'the true Prophet.' The same ideas were current in Gnosticism. The heavenly Christ is the true gate, through which the Gnostic ascends to the Pleroma (Hippol. v. 8, 9). In the hymn used by the Priscillianists, but which was Gnostic in origin, Christ says: 'Janua sum tibi, quicunque me pulsas' (Aug. *Ep.* ccxxxvii. § 8). Among the Bābīs the name *Bāb*, assumed by the first preacher of this new religion in 1844, means 'gate,' and was formerly the title given to those intermediaries through whom, as through a gate, communication was made by the Imām to his followers (see art. BĀB, BĀBĪS).

LITERATURE.—A. van Gennep, *Les Rites de passage*, Paris, 1909; H. C. Trumbull, *The Threshold Covenant*, New York, 1906; and the authorities cited in the article.

J. A. MACCULLOCH.

DOSĀDH, DUSĀDH.—A menial tribe in Northern India, of Dravidian origin, which at the Census of 1901 numbered 1,258,125, of whom the vast majority are found in Bengal and the United Provinces.

1. Religion in Bengal.—In Bengal they profess to be orthodox Hindus, and it is true that in some districts they employ in their religious rites Brāhmans of a degraded class, while some belong to the Śrīnārāyaṇi sect, or follow the doctrines (*panth*) of Kabīr, Tulsī Dās, Gorakhnāth, or Nānak (for which see BENGAL). These beliefs, however, seem to be of comparatively recent origin, and the basis of their religion is Animism.

(*a*) *Worship of Rāhu.*—Their tribal deity is Rāhu, 'the seizer,' who seems to have been adopted from the pre-Aryan races, and to have been transformed by the Hindus into a Daitya or Titan, who is supposed to cause eclipses by swallowing the sun and moon. The Dosādhs, in order to avert disease and in fulfilment of vows, offer to him annual sacrifices and the fruits of the earth through a tribesman who is known as Bhakat or Chatiyā.

'On special occasions a stranger form of worship is resorted to, parallels to which may be found in the rustic cult of the Roman villagers and the votaries of the Phœnician deities. A ladder, made with sides of green bamboos and rungs of sword-blades, is raised in the midst of a pile of burning mango wood, through which the Bhakat walks barefooted and ascends the ladder without injury. Swine of all ages, a ram, wheaten flour, and rice-milk are offered up; after which the worshippers partake of a feast and drink enormous quantities of ardent spirits' (Risley, i. 255).

In another form of this rite, the man who has vowed to offer a fire sacrifice to Rāhu must build within the day a thatched hut, in which the Bhakat or priest, himself a Dosādh, must spend the night, sleeping on the sacred *kuśa* grass with which the floor is strewed. In front of the hut a bamboo platform is erected, and beyond that a trench is dug, which on the feast day is filled with mango wood soaked in butter, while two earthen vessels of milk are placed close to the platform. The Bhakat bathes and dons a new cloth dyed with turmeric. He mutters a number of mystic formulæ (*mantra*), and worships Rāhu on both sides of the trench. The fire is then kindled, and the Bhakat solemnly walks three times round it in the course of the sun, keeping his right hand always towards it. The end of the third round brings him to the east end of the trench, where he takes by the hand a Brāhman retained for this purpose with a fee of two new wrappers, and calls on him to lead the way through the fire. The Brāhman walks along the trench from east to west followed by the Bhakat. Both are supposed to tread with their bare feet on the fire and to escape unharmed. Risley supposes that this is the result of optical illusion, because by the time they start the flames have subsided and the trench is so narrow that an active man may walk along it resting his feet on either edge, without touching the smouldering ashes at the bottom. Meanwhile the milk has been boiled, and it appears that in some cases the Bhakat pours the boiling liquid over his body, being, it is said, uninjured.

'By passing through the fire the Bhakat is believed to have been inspired with the spirit of Rāhu, who has become incarnated in him. Filled with the divine or demoniac afflatus, and also, it may be surmised, excited by drink and *gānjā* [hemp], he mounts the bamboo platform, chants mystic hymns, and distributes to the crowd *tulsī* [basil] leaves, which heal diseases otherwise incurable, and flowers which have the virtue of causing barren women to conceive. The proceedings end with a feast, and religious excitement soon passes into drunken revelry lasting long into the night' (Risley, i. 255 f.).

The ritual is a good illustration of Dravidian shamanism. Accounts of fire-walking among the S. Indian Dravidians will be found in Thurston (*Ethnographic Notes in S. India*, Madras, 1906, p. 471 ff.). Frazer (*Adonis, Attis, Osiris*², London, 1907, pp. 88, 136 f.) regards it as a commutation of an original human sacrifice by means of fire.

(*b*) *Worship of deified robbers.*—The Bengal Dosādhs worship a host of deified heroes, in honour of whom huts are erected in various parts of the country. Many of these are the ghosts of bandit chiefs, such as Goraiyā, Salesh, Chūhar, or Choar Mal, and others. In none of these shrines are there any idols, and the officiating priests are

always drawn from the Dosādh tribe, who minister to the Śūdra or menial castes which frequent them. The offerings usually are appropriated by the priest or by the head of the Dosādh household performing the worship; but, where this worship has adopted some of the principles of Islām, the fowls sacrificed to the Saint Mīrān and the Pāñch Pīr (see PĀÑCHPĪRIYA) are given to local Muhammadans.

2. Religion in the United Provinces.—Here also the cult of Rāhu prevails, and it is carried out in a manner much resembling that of Bengal. In one form of the rite the priest climbs the rungs of sword-blades with his naked feet, pours some milk on the ground in honour of Rāhu, sacrifices a cock tied to the summit of the ladder, or, descending, slays a young pig with repeated blows of a spear. Some spirits are poured on the ground, and the meat and the remainder of the offerings are consumed there and then by the worshippers (Crooke, *Pop. Rel.*[2], 1896, i. 18 ff., *Tribes and Castes of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh*, ii. 355, where one of the songs in honour of Rāhu will be found).

They also worship Chhath or Chhathī, the impersonated sixth day after birth, when, owing to lack of sanitary precautions at childbirth, the child is likely to be attacked by infantile lockjaw. On the day before the feast the worshippers purify themselves with fasting, and go singing to the river side. Here they strip and walk into the water, remaining facing the east till the sun rises, when they stand with folded hands and bow in reverence, making offerings of cakes and other kinds of food, which are consumed by the worshipper and his friends. Their other tribal deities are Bandī, a female, and Mannkh Deva, the deified ghost of some tribal worthy, who are propitiated by the sacrifice of a pig or fowl and an oblation of spirits. Seven cups of milk and seven pairs of cakes are also offered round the earthen mound which is the common abiding place of the tribal gods. They observe most of the Hindu holidays, particularly those like the Holī spring fire feast, and the Kajarī of the autumn season, which are the occasion of coarse orgies accompanied by drinking and sensuality.

LITERATURE.—H. Risley, *Tribes and Castes of Bengal*, Calcutta, 1891, i. 252 ff.; W. Crooke, *Tribes and Castes of the N.W. Prov. and Oudh*, do. 1896, ii. 346 ff.; E. A. Gait, *Census Report Bengal*, 1901, i. App. vi. p. xlix; *N. Ind. Notes and Queries*, ii. 15, 31 f., 111, 207 f., v. 204; F. Buchanan, in M. Martin, *Eastern India*, 1838, i. 192; S. Wise, *Races, Castes, and Trades of Eastern Bengal*, 1883, p. 268 ff.; E. T. Dalton, *Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal*, Calcutta, 1872, p. 326.

W. CROOKE.

DOUBLES.—The beliefs to which the term 'double' refers may be traced back to two psychological sources. In the first place, they may result from elementary speculation on the category of duplication; in the second place, the phenomena on which the notion of the divisibility or duality of personality is based are such that a potentially duplicate existence was inevitably ascribed to every concrete object of thought. The two sources constantly mingle. The main characteristic of the former is that a double or counterpart arises by multiplication; of the latter, that it arises by division. A secondary characteristic is that in the latter the counterpart tends to be of a different substance, though of the same accidents—the so-called 'spiritual double.' Again, the connected categories of duality, substitution, representation, impersonation, and so forth, combine with such results of the category of duplication as identity, original and copy, idea and reality, to complicate the general conception of doubleness in pre-scientific speculation; and the whole combination binds together a number of customs, some of which are apparently widely dissimilar in origin, though all, psychologically speaking, are based on the mathematical ideas of multiplication and division. We shall refer to these subsidiary forms of the notion only for the purpose of illustrating what is sociologically the main connotation of the term, namely, the double in the sense of *Doppelgänger*, second self, visible or invisible counterpart, spiritual or material double.

1. Duplication in general.—It is not surprising that in early thought two became a sacred number, when we consider the mystery so often connected with duplication. Conversely, in the creation of certain abnormal mythical beings, the mind frequently unifies a natural duality, as in the one eye of the Cyclopes, and the combination of horse and rider in the Centaurs, and, most notably, in androgynous ancestors and deities. Duplicity in nature is still enough of an abnormality to warrant its inclusion in the list of magical or sacred centres of mystery.

Thus, in Samoa all double things were sacred. Among the native deities were two household gods, represented as 'Siamese Twins,' Taema and Titi. They appear to have been regarded as a sort of gods of doubleness.[1] Similar ideas were connected in Roman religion with the deity Janus, and in Greek with the Dioscuri. The images of many Mexican idols had double faces, back and front, like the Roman *Janus bifrons*.

'The reason,' E. J. Payne observes, 'why the features were duplicated is obvious. The figure was carried in the midst of a large crowd; the duplicate at the back was for the benefit of those who followed. Probably it was considered to be an evil omen if the idol turned its face away from its worshippers; this the duplicate obviated. . . . This duplication of the features, a characteristic of the very oldest gods, appears to be indicated when the numeral *ome* (=two) is prefixed to the title of the deity. Thus the two ancestors and preservers of the race were called Ometecuhtli and Omecihuatl (=two-chief, two-woman).'[2]

A close connexion is constantly maintained between diet and conception or the nature of the offspring. A frequent belief is that if a woman eats anything double—a double cherry or a double banana, for example—her child will be double.[3]

Twins themselves are a striking example of the mystery attached to double objects. See, further, art. TWINS.

Various miscellaneous applications of the double idea may be grouped together here. The law of equivalence, as illustrated by the *lex talionis*, is often superseded by the enforcement of a double penalty. Among the Bedawîn the family of a slain man may slay two of the murderer's family. In this case the feud continues. If they slay but one, it is ended.[4] The Hebrews condemned a thief taken *flagrante delicto* to restore double.[5] Hence the moral principle of receiving double as a form of pardon.

'The Lord gave Job twice as much as he had before.' 'For your shame ye shall have double . . . in their land they shall possess double: everlasting joy shall be unto them.' 'She hath received of the Lord's hand double for all her sins.' 'Even to-day do I declare that I will render double unto thee.'[6] Similarly in moral retribution: 'Render unto her even as she rendered, and double unto her the double according to her works: in the cup which she mingled, mingle unto her double.'[7]

A double share may be either an honour or a security. 'Elisha said, I pray thee, let a double portion of thy spirit be upon me.'[8] The idea of corroboration and finality belongs to repetition.

'The dream of Pharaoh,' Joseph says, 'is one: what God is about to do he hath declared unto Pharaoh. The seven good kine are seven years; and the seven good ears are seven years; the dream is one. . . . For that the dream was doubled unto Pharaoh twice, it is because the thing is established by God, and God will shortly bring it to pass.'[9]

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[1] G. Turner, *Samoa*, London, 1884, p. 56.
[2] *Hist. of America*, Oxford, 1892–99, i. 424.
[3] J. Garnier, *Océanie*, Paris, 1871, p. 187.
[4] Burckhardt, *Bedouins and Wahabys*, London, 1830, p. 86.
[5] Ex $22^{4.7}$.
[6] Job 42^{10}, Is 61^{7}, 40^{2}, Zec 9^{12}.
[7] Rev 18^{6}.
[8] 2 K 2^{9}.
[9] Gn $41^{25\text{-}32}$.

A similar principle is reached from a different origin in such beliefs as that an echo is a confirmation.

Miracles and magic acts of duplication and multiplication have a psychological interest in connexion with the development of the metaphysical theory of creation and the mechanical or biological theory of evolution (see below). Such bits of folklore as the notion that turning one's money when one sees the new moon causes it to increase have a significance in both respects. The influence of the waxing moon has been well illustrated.[1] As the moon grows, the money will grow. No doubt, the act of turning the money is also a piece of imitative magic. Turning an object shows its reverse side, its double face, and is equivalent to a duplication of it. On a similar elementary fallacy perhaps depends the actual point of miracles of multiplication (which in the Christian examples lies in the handling or the breaking of the food). It may consist, that is, in an application of a vague theory of *homœomeria* (see below, p. 857[b]), according to which each particle of a substance or thing is a miniature duplicate of the whole. Breaking bread would thus produce a multitude of microscopic loaves; their manipulation in the hands is sufficient to institute growth by apposition (analogous in principle to the production of separate pieces of money by turning them), especially if the hands are instinct with *mana*. The case of natural objects is identical, for to the pre-scientific mind there is no essential difference between the artificial growth of a manufactured article and the natural growth of an organism.

There is a fairly large class of customs in which the chief performer—as a rule a sacred person or a person engaged for the time being in a sacred function—is attended, or represented, or impersonated, by one or more persons who are his duplicates in appearance or action. The principle may be either sympathy or the impulse of imitation—'Never alone did the king sigh, but with a general groan' (Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, III. iii. 23)—or delegation for reasons of safety or convenience.

In European folk-custom, particularly in Germany, it is frequently the rule for bride or bridegroom to be attended by one or more persons dressed in the same attire. At Egyptian weddings the bridegroom walks between two friends dressed precisely as he is.[2] In Abyssinia a bride is accompanied by her sister; both are dressed alike, and their horses are also caparisoned alike.[3]

In such cases, and in others which follow, the motives originally prompting the custom were no doubt mixed. Sympathy and fellow-feeling may be combined with the idea of safety in duplication or in numbers generally. Duplication is a form of concealment and security. It is commonly employed for the protection of a palladium, as the sacred *ancile* by the ancient Romans, who kept it among a set of duplicates, on the same principle as a valuable jewel is protected by a worthless copy. It is possible that customs like the following of the Kaffirs have a similar underlying meaning.

A Kaffir king employed 'a sort of valets,' who wore his cast-off clothes. When he was sick, they were wounded in order that a portion of their blood might be introduced into his system. They were killed at his death.[4] The motive is explicit in the Abyssinian custom. The king has four officers, called *lika mankua*, 'who have to clothe themselves exactly like the king,' so that the enemy may not be able to distinguish him. 'It is an honourable and dangerous post,' and was once filled by an Englishman, Mr. Bell.[5] On the Gold Coast an important person bought a slave of his or her own sex, termed *crabbah* or *ocrah*. This slave was looked upon 'as the soul or spirit, *alter ego*, of the master or mistress.'[1]

Thus service, substitution, disguise, and 'other-selfhood' shade into each other.

Many cases of mock kings may be resolved into duplication by way of disguise or impersonation. In Siam and Cambodia the king's temporary representative impersonates him in function, performing his magical duties.[2] The 'king' of the Babylonian festival *Sacaea* was dressed in the king's robes.[3] In the evolution of the monarchy a frequent stage is the division of the office into temporal and sacred. But such duplication of the king may arise in various ways. When actual substitution is practised in sacrifice, the vicarious sufferer tends to become a spiritual double or unreal phantom. A case in point is the belief found in early Christian speculation that a phantom of Jesus was crucified in place of Jesus Himself. Impersonation is frequently found in funeral customs. Thus, among the Eskimo the first child born after a death bears the dead man's name, and has to represent him at festivals. To these 'namesakes' of the dead, offerings of food and drink and clothes are made. They eat and drink and wear the clothes 'on behalf of the ghosts.'[4] A case which may be compared with the Kaffir and Abyssinian royal customs is from Fiji.

A certain clan has the duty of supplying the king with a special sort of attendants, who nurse him when he is ill and bury him when he dies. In particular, they conceal his death; in one locality the head attendant 'personates the dead chief, and issues his orders from within the mosquito curtain of native cloth, in the faint querulous tones of a sick man.'[5]

The art of the actor is essentially representation. He is a duplicate of the character, its 'person.' Similarly, his understudy or substitute is, both in English and French terminology, a 'double.' Lastly, the ideas of friendship approximate the friend to the status of the material duplicate. 'Fellow' is a word used in this connexion with a distinct reference to its meaning of a replica. A similar play of thought is seen in the word 'pair.' A friend is, in the commonplaces of literature, a second self, an *alter ego*. Duplication by division is applied here also; the pair being the unit, one or other of them is the 'half'; just as on the other principle he is the 'double.'

The impersonation of a man by a 'spiritual' being cannot always be distinguished from the appearance of a man's ghost or wraith. But there are clear cases—chiefly in connexion with the supernatural impregnation of a wife—where a man's double is a 'spiritual' impostor.

In the Dutch East Indies it is commonly believed that male and female evil spirits, *nita*, can assume the form and personality of lovers and friends. A man or woman keeping an assignation in the forest is liable to be duped in this way. A person who has intercourse with a *nita* dies in a few days. The *nita* is supposed to take away the soul. In some islands an ancestral spirit, named *Boitai*, is the bogey of women working in the forest. He assumes the form and appearance of their husbands. The occurrence is proved later when the victim suffers from hæmorrhage. The practice is followed even by human magic-workers. The Babar Islanders believe that a male *suwanggi* is able to take the shape of a young woman's husband and cause her to conceive.[6]

When the double, either visible or invisible, does not impersonate, but attends as a helper or enemy, it is not clear whether this can be traced back to beliefs about the soul. Primitive psychology succeeded thoroughly in dividing human personality into two more or less identical duplicates, and there are many cases where the derivation of the guardian angel from the separable soul is explicit. Of course, when developed, the two notions easily pass into one another, and the soul itself is con-

[1] Frazer, *GB*[2], 1900, ii. 155 ff.
[2] E. W. Lane, *Modern Egyptians*, London, 1836, i. 212.
[3] W. C. Harris, *Highlands of Ethiopia*, London, 1844, ii. 225.
[4] J. Shooter, *Kafirs of Natal*, London, 1857, p. 117.
[5] J. L. Krapf, *Travels, etc., in Eastern Africa*, London, 1860, p. 454.

[1] T. J. Hutchinson, in *Trans. Ethnol. Soc.*, new ser., i. (1861) 833.
[2] Frazer, *GB*[2] ii. 31. [3] *Ib.* 24.
[4] E. W. Nelson, *18 RBEW* (1899), p. 363 f.
[5] L. Fison, in *JAI* x. (1881) 140.
[6] Riedel, *Sluik- en kroeshar. rassen*, 1886, pp. 57, 252, 340.

stantly regarded as a protecting spirit. The illustration of this belongs to another inquiry, but a typical case may be cited, where the guardian is actually the double. In Upper Egypt it is believed that with every child there is born a *jinn* companion, which acts as a guardian angel, but sometimes evilly entreats its possessor. It is termed *karina*, and is exactly like the person it attends.[1]

In some cases a spiritual entity passing into another form leaves behind it, automatically, a double of itself. It is as if a man, when leaving a place, automatically left a duplicate in his stead. The example which follows comprises this naive instinct for having one's cake as well as eating it, together with other ideas. In Central Australia, 'when a spirit individual goes into a woman' (who thereby conceives), 'there still remains the *Arumburinga*, which may be regarded as its double.' Spencer-Gillen also speak of this as the double of the person himself, and as his guardian spirit.[2]

A man may be regarded as a dual person because he is attended by an invisible protector. Such a conception is implicit in the European folk-belief about the guardian angel. This belief is extremely vague in its form, but it shows a tendency to regard the angel as a double of the person, his eternal counterpart, which after his death is, like even the Australian *Arumburinga*, 'changeless and lives for ever.'[3] The following example is a case of duplication by apposition, distinct in origin from other forms. The Japanese pilgrim to the Thirty-three Holy Places, or to the Eighty-eight Holy Places of Shikoku, wears a special hat with this inscription—'Two pilgrims travelling in company to such and such a shrine.' This reference to two persons is explained by the idea that the pilgrim is not alone, but is accompanied by the great saint Kōbō Daishi, or the Goddess of Mercy, who

'travels with him along the stony path, supporting his footsteps, encouraging his religious fervour, guarding him from evil all along the way. Therefore not one only but two walk under that broad-brimmed hat on the road to Paradise.'[4]

Similar ideas of the invisible Divine helper are found in most of the organized religions; and, where it is part of the general teaching that the worshipper may become a sort of incarnation of the god by following in his footsteps, we have an interesting case of duplication in the form of the individual as microcosm and the god as macrocosm, the latter being indefinitely multipliable or indefinitely ubiquitous.

Thaumaturgic persons are sometimes credited with a similar ubiquity or power of self-multiplication. There need be no implication that the duplicate in such cases is a spiritual replica, or an entity of different substance. It is simple multiplication, without any question of the method or the vehicle. The ordinary limitations of ordinary humanity are merely suspended. The legends of many Christian saints refer to this power of being in two places at once—bilocation. Thus, it is recorded of St. Alfonso di Liguori, that

'a person going to confession at the house where Alphonsus lived found him there at the very time for beginning the sermon in the church. After he had finished his confession, he went straight to the church, and found Alphonsus a good way advanced in his sermon.'[5]

2. The spiritual double.—The special meaning of the term 'double,' as the so-called 'spiritual double,' is the 'wraith' or visible counterpart of the person, seen just before or just after, or at the moment of, his death. This belief is derived directly from the theory of the soul. Hallucination corroborates it. Few phenomena seem to be better attested than the subjective perception of a 'phantasm of the living' in the circumstances mentioned. It is a remarkable agreement between psychological fact and primitive psychological theory, but the latter is alone quite sufficient reason for the genesis of the belief.

[1] C. B. Klunzinger, *Upper Egypt*, London, 1878, p. 383.
[2] Spencer-Gillen[a], p. 514. [3] *Ib.* 515.
[4] B. H. Chamberlain, in *JAI* xxii. (1893) 361.
[5] J. Gardner, *Faiths of the World*, Edinburgh and London, 1858–60, *s.v.* 'Bilocation.'

The soul itself constantly tends to be a counterpart or duplicate, a spiritual-material double of the person. The reason for this tendency is to be found in the main source of the belief in the soul. This is the mental percept and the memory-image of an object, which is inevitably a replica of the sensational percept (though possibly not technically identical in its physiological causation), somewhat incomplete, but often vivid enough.[1] It is called up most vividly in dreams, but also in waking memory. It may include roughly the whole personality, or be confined to one aspect of it; but its general foundation is visual.

Some cases may be cited where the soul shows this tendency to be, or actually is, a double. It is to be premised that speculation frequently draws a distinction between this form of the soul and a later transcendental conception.

The *kelah* or *là* of the Karens 'cannot be distinguished from the person himself,' when, as sometimes happens, it appears after death. It is described as 'the individuality, or general idea, of an inanimate object. It is also the individuality of the animated being. It, in fact, personates the varied phenomena of life.' 'It is distinct from the body,' and 'its absence from the body is death,' yet it is not regarded as the soul proper, which is the *thah*. 'The body and the *là* are represented as matter and spirit, yet materiality belongs to the *là*.' It is also described as a guardian spirit, walking by a man's side or

'wandering away in search of dreamy adventures. If it is absent too long, it must be called back with offerings. When the *là* is absent in our waking hours, we become weak or fearful or sick, and, if the absence be protracted, death ensues. Hence it is a matter of the deepest interest with a Karen to keep his *là* with him. He is ever and anon making offerings of food to it, beating a bamboo to gain its attention, calling it back, and tying his wrist with a bit of thread, which is supposed to have the power to retain it.'

Not only every living creature, but also every inanimate thing—axes and knives, for instance, as well as all trees and plants—has its *là*, which is 'liable to wander away from the individual.' When, thus wandering, it is 'interfered with by an enemy of any kind, death ensues to the individual' to whom it belongs. If a man drops his axe while up a tree, he looks down and calls out, '*Là* of the axe, come, come!'

'When the rice-field presents an unpromising appearance, it is supposed that the rice-*kelah* is detained in some way from the rice, on account of which it languishes. It is recalled with this invocation—"O come, rice-*kelah*, come! Come to the field. Come to the rice. With seed of each gender, come. Come from the river Kho, come from the river Kaw; from the place where they meet, come. Come from the West, come from the East; from the throat of the bird, from the maw of the ape, from the throat of the elephant. Come from the sources of rivers and their mouths. Come from the country of the Shan and Burman. From the distant kingdoms come. From all granaries come. O rice-*kelah*, come to the rice."'

As distinguished from the *thah*, the *là* or *kelah* 'is not regarded as the responsible agent in human action. . . . When we sin, it is the *thah*, or "soul," which sins.' 'By some the *kelah* is represented as the inner man, and with others the inner man is the *thah*.' It may leave the body in sleep. Such an absent *là* may be caught by a wizard, and transferred to a dead man, who is thereby resuscitated. In this case the friends of the robbed man procure another *là* from another sleeping man, and so on. The same Karens hold that the world is more thickly peopled with 'spirits' than with men, and that 'the future world' is a counterpart of this. Lastly, every organ of the body has its *là* counterpart. Blindness is due to an evil spirit having devoured the *là* of the eye.

[1] Crawley, *Idea of the Soul*, London, 1909, pp. 73–78, 193–207.

The *là* in all cases, though not immortal, 'exists before man, and lives after him. It is neither good nor bad, but merely gives life.'[1] In analogous cases this last detail is negatived, and it is precisely a mystic unrealized element that is supposed to produce the phenomena of life.

The Lushai term *thla* is possibly connected with the Karen *là*. It is 'a sort of double.'[2]

The Chinese hold that the soul may exist outside the body, 'as a duplicate having the form of the body, as well as its solid consistency.' De Groot describes it also as 'the invisible duplicate' of a person, and speaks of 'a conviction which calls up the body immediately before their eyes whenever they think of the soul.'[3]

Some striking examples apply the principle so as to form a double creation. Thus, the Asabas of the Niger hold the following opinion :

'Every one is considered to be created in duplicate, and the representative, or, as it were, the reflection in the spirit world of the body and of its possessions, is the *chi* and its possessions. A man'a *chi* marries the *chi* of the woman the man marries, and so on. In addition, the *chi* . . . acts as a guardian spirit. . . . *Chi i me jŭm*, "My *chi* has done badly," is a not uncommon expression.' 'Entirely distinct from his *chi*' is the spirit *mon*, which inhabits the man himself.[4]

The Ba-Huana believe in a soul, *bun*, and a double, *doshi*. Only adults have *bun* ; animals and fetishes have *doshi*, but no *bun*. The *doshi* appears in dreams. The *bun* of a dead man may be seen only at night ; it is in human form, white and misty.[5] The peasants of Sicily believe that 'every material thing has an impalpable image or double, which can be detached, and can penetrate other bodies.' The phenomena of dreams are thus explained.[6] The Zapotecs regarded the soul as a 'second self.'[7]

The tribes living at the southern end of Lake Nyassa believe that the *mzimu*, or soul, has the form of the owner, but is intangible and unsubstantial, though it can talk and act as well as the real man. It is visible only in dreams, and the shadow is a 'part of' it.[8] The Delawares used for 'soul' a word indicating repetition, and equivalent to a double or counterpart.[9] The Iroquois soul was 'an exceedingly subtle and refined image,' yet material, 'possessing the form of the body, with a head, teeth, arms, legs,' etc. The spectre or wraith was animated by the soul.[10] The Aht soul was 'a being of human shape and of human mode of acting.'[11] The Eskimo say that the soul 'exhibits the same shape as the body it belongs to, but is of a more subtle and ethereal nature.'[12] Andamanese souls 'partake of the form of the person to whom they belong.'[13] The Sihanaka hold that the mirage is the soul of the reflected scene.[14] The soul is regarded by the East Indian Islanders as like the person in every respect, with all his qualities and defects ; it is a copy or abstract of him, but is always 'material.' In Java the term for soul is 'refined body' ; in Celebes, 'image' ; in Toumbulu, 'companion' ; in Sangir, 'duplicate.'[15] The Malagasy *ambiroa* and the Dayak *amirua*, *hambaruan*, and *bruwa* are connected with a word meaning 'two.'[1] Among the Karo Bataks the soul is 'the copy of the owner, his other self.' The soul which appears after death is the dead man's *Doppelgänger*.[2] Codrington describes the Melanesian *atai*, 'reflection-soul,' as an 'invisible second self.'[3] The soul of the Tongans was not 'a distinct essence from the body, but only the more ethereal part of it, and exists in Bolotoo (the spirit world) in the form and likeness of the body the moment after death.'[4] In the Hervey Islands the soul was regarded as an airy but visible copy of the man. 'The visible world itself is but a gross copy of what exists in spirit-land. If the axe cleaves, it is because the fairy of the axe is invisibly present.'[5] The Tahitian soul resembled the body ; everything had a soul.[6] The *wairua* of the Maoris 'seems to have signified a shadowy form.' It was sometimes mistaken for the man himself, and only by melting into thin air was its 'ghostship' recognized. It is described also as a 'similitude.'[7] The soul of the Dénés is described as a double.[8]

Frequently the soul-double is regarded as a miniature duplicate, varying in size from half size, or that of a child-copy of the person, to microscopic dimensions. In Egypt it occurs as half-size.[9] In Fiji it is found as of 'a little child,' or of 'small stature.'[10] In Australia, tribes near Adelaide held it to be of the size 'of a boy eight years old' ;[11] elsewhere 'a little body.'[12] The Dayaks of Sarawak regarded it as a 'miniature human being.'[13] This is the prevalent notion in the East Indian Islands, as among the Minangkabauers of Sumatra, the Tontemboan of Minahassa, the Toradjas of Celebes ; the Semang of the Malay Peninsula regard it as of the size of a grain of maize ; the Malays as a kind of 'thumbling,' a 'thin, insubstantial human image,' or 'mannikin,' of about the size of the thumb.[14] The Hindus regarded it as of the size of the thumb.[15] The Nutkas, the Indians of the Lower Fraser River, the Hurons, the ancient Mexicans, the Macusis, certain South African tribes, the Greeks, the Teutons, and other early European peoples also held it to be a miniature copy of the owner.[16]

The Egyptian *ka* is a classic example of these beliefs (see BODY [Egyp.] and DEATH, etc. [Egyp.]). The *ka* could live without the body, but the body could not live without the *ka*. Yet the *ka* was material.[17] It is represented not only as a miniature duplicate of the person, but sometimes as half

[1] E. B. Cross, in *JAOS* iv. (1854) 309–312 ; F. Mason, in *JASBe* xxxiv. [1865] 195–202.
[2] T. C. Hodson, *Nāga Tribes of Manipur*, Lond. 1911, p. 159 f.
[3] J. J. M. de Groot, *The Religious System of China*, Leyden, 1891–1907, iv. 99, i. 243, 355.
[4] J. Parkinson, in *JAI* xxxvi. (1906) 312 ff.
[5] Torday and Joyce, in *JAI* xxxvi. (1906) 290 f.
[6] Morrino, in *Macmillan's Magazine*, 1897, p. 374.
[7] H. H. Bancroft, *Native Races of the Pacific States*, New York, 1885, i. 661.
[8] H. S. Stannus, in *JAI* xl. (1910) 299.
[9] D. G. Brinton, *The Lenâpé and their Legends*, Philadelphia, 1885, p. 69.
[10] J. N. B. Hewitt, in *JAFL* viii. (1895) 107.
[11] G. M. Sproat, *Scenes and Studies of Savage Life*, London, 1868, p. 173.
[12] H. Rink, *Tales and Traditions of the Eskimo*, Edinburgh and London, 1875, p. 36.
[13] E. H. Man, 'The Aboriginal Inhabitants of the Andaman Islands,' in *JAI* xii. (1883) 94.
[14] Crawley, *op. cit.* p. 134.
[15] A. C. Kruijt, *Het Animisme in den Indisch. Archipel*, Hague, 1906, pp. 10, 253, 13.

[1] A. C. Kruijt, *op. cit.* 12. [2] *Ib.* 8.
[3] *The Melanesians*, Oxford, 1891, p. 251.
[4] W. Mariner, *The Tonga Islands*², London, 1818, ii. 99, 102.
[5] W. W. Gill, *Myths and Songs from the South Pacific*, London, 1876, pp. 154, 171, 199.
[6] W. Ellis, *Polynesian Researches*², London, 1859, i. 361, 397.
[7] E. Tregear, in *JAI* xix. (1890) 118, 120.
[8] A. G. Morice, *Proc. of Canadian Institute*, 1888–9, p. 158.
[9] A. Wiedemann, *The Ancient Egyp. Doctrine of the Immortality of the Soul*, Eng. tr., London, 1895, p. 12.
[10] L. Fison, in Frazer, *GB*² i. 250, and in *JAI* x. (1881) 147 f.
[11] E. J. Eyre, *Journals of Expeditions of Discovery into Central Australia*, London, 1845, ii. 356.
[12] Frazer, *GB*² i. 248.
[13] Spenser St. John, *Life in the Forests of the Far East*, London, 1862, i. 177 ff.
[14] J. L. van der Toorn, in *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land-, en Volkenkunde van Nederl.-Indië*, series 5, v. (1890) 48 f., 58, 61 ; J. A. T. Schwarz, in *Mededeelingen van wege het Nederl. Zendeling-Genootschap*, xlvii. (1903) 104 ; A. C. Kruijt, p. 12 ; W. W. Skeat and C. O. Blagden, *The Pagan Races of the Malay Peninsula*, London, 1906, ii. 4 f., 194 f. ; W. W. Skeat, *Malay Magic*, London, 1900, p. 47 ff.
[15] Monier-Williams, *Brahmanism and Hinduism*, London, 1891, p. 28.
[16] J. G. Swan, in *Smithsonian Contributions*, xvi. 84 ; Boas, *6th Rep. on N.W. Tribes of Canada*, 44, *9th Rep. on N.W. Tribes of Canada*, 461 ; *Rel. des Jésuites*, (1634) 17, (1636) 104, (1639) 143 ; Payne, *Hist. America*, ii. 407 ; Im Thurn, in *JAI* xi. (1882) 363 ; J. Macdonald, *Religion and Myth*, 1893, p. 321 ; Crawley, *Idea of the Soul*, 186 f.
[17] Wiedemann, 19.

the size, sometimes as full size.[1] After death it became the man's personality proper, being incorporated with the mummy. In 'the everlasting house,' the tomb, it dwelt as long as the mummy was there. It might go in and out of the tomb and refresh itself with meat and drink, but it never failed to go back to the mummy, 'with the name of which it seems to have been closely connected.' In hieroglyph it was 'represented by two upraised arms, the acting parts of the person,' with a depression in the centre of the horizontal bar which joins them, to suggest the head.[2]

Before discussing the relation between the full-sized and the miniature double, it is as well to repeat the fact that early thought insists very strongly on the principle of duplication, and extends the application very widely. It serves as a theory of the soul and of a future existence. It also serves as a theory of biological reproduction and of physical evolution generally. Without going into the subject of pre-scientific psychology, it is necessary to note the connexion between the belief in the miniature double and certain widely spread notions about the soul. Corresponding with the percept is the fact that the soul is invisible when its owner is visible, unless, as we shall see, there are special limiting circumstances. The comparative permanence and generalized nature of the memory-image of individuals correspond with the generalized idea of species, as an ideal of which individuals are copies. A belief which may almost be regarded as universal is that children are re-incarnations of the souls of parents or of ancestors. A connected and frequent belief is tantamount to a germ-plasm theory of the soul. Parallel with this is the notion that reproduction can be effected, even in the human species, by fission or budding. All these various beliefs are cases of duplication. They include good reasons why the soul should be regarded as a miniature, whether as germ or embryo, or as a child. A full-grown man develops from a smaller copy of himself, and this from an infinitesimally minute replica which has proceeded from another individual. The theory is applied in early thought far more than in a scientific age which professes practically the same theory. Thus, an Australian, rebuking his son, will say to him: 'There you stand with my body, and yet you won't do what I tell you.'[3]

The minute size of the soul is explained by the Australians as depending upon the necessity that it should be able to enter a woman's body. But there is also the widely spread recognition of the fact that it leaves the body, both in sleep and illness, and at death. The body remains. Two views are possible, and both are found. Firstly, the duplicate may be a film, easily separable from the body; this would correspond to an outer soul, the soul of the outer man. Or, secondly, the duplicate may be an inset, and therefore an eject. Small enough to leave the body by the mouth, or even by the fontanel, it is often regarded as expansible, filling the body as an inner shape, the soul of the inner man, or the 'inner man' himself. Its flimsy and insubstantial nature, whether in dreams, memory, or hallucinations, agrees well with this elasticity.[4]

The link between the soul as shape and the soul as inner movement may be found here, even if we do not identify the soul as germ and the soul

[1] Wiedemann, 12, 15; Lepsius, *Denkmaler*, Berlin, 1849–60, iii. 21, 87.

[2] Wiedemann, 19 f.; E. A. Wallis Budge, *The Mummy*, Cambridge, 1893, p. 328; W. M. Flinders Petrie, *The Religion of Ancient Egypt*, London, 1906, pp. 8 ff., 17; R. V. Lanzone, *Dizionario di mitologia egizia*, Turin, 1888, v. 387 ff., 390 ff., 1197 ff.

[3] A. W. Howitt, in *JAI* xiv. (1885) 145.

[4] See, on the whole subject, Crawley, *op. cit.* p. 230 ff.

as inner man. Each of the latter applies to its own peculiar circumstances, and neither is inconsistent with the theory of films. This last theory, in its converse aspect, has been made into a standard metaphysical theory of physical and æsthetic creation by Greek philosophy. It has even been elevated into a theory of vision and sensation generally. In the former application the filmy duplicate of savage thought becomes the transcendental Form, or εἶδος, which is impressed upon Matter, or ὕλη. Similarly, the savage theory of species and individual was canonized in the Ideal Theory of Plato.

The *oiaron* of the Iroquois[1] is paralleled in many rude philosophies. It is a permanent ideal duplicate of each individual of the species. When it is regarded as a reality, the difficulty of bilocation recurs, not to speak of the problem, Which is the essential reality, the original or the copy?—or, in other words, Which is the original? The Iroquois believed that the *oiaron*, the 'type or model,' was 'larger and more perfect' than any single member of the species. It was sometimes called 'the old one.' Thus, converting type into prototype, the Indian was perhaps more scientific than metaphysical.

The problem of personal identity (similar to that of original and copy in the case of duplicates) is raised in a curious way and with curious results by the duplication theory of reproduction. When the soul of a dead man is re-incarnated in a child, there is no practical embarrassment. But, according to Manu, the father is conceived in the body of his wife, and is himself re-born as his child.[2] A man is thus his own father and his own son simultaneously. Some analogous notion, combined with a fear of personal insecurity or loss of power caused by this division of personality, seems a not impossible factor in the superstitious form of infanticide.[3] A Kaffir will frequently kill one of his twin children, the belief being that otherwise 'he will lose his strength.'[4]

In some psychologies each part of the person has its 'spiritual' duplicate. The theory of *homœomeria* is foreshadowed so frequently in early speculation that we may fairly suppose it to be implicit in early atomic philosophy. When Chinese doctors speak as if the soul were breakable and divisible into molecules,[5] and when we read of Malay tin-magic that 'each grain of ore appears to be considered as endowed with a separate entity or individuality,' and that it possesses the power of reproduction,[6] it may well be that each atom is implicitly viewed as a minute replica of the whole.

Duplication by a process of fission or of budding (gemmation) is occasionally hinted at in early philosophy. The Central Australians tell how in the time of 'the ancestors' a man would shake himself, and spirit-children would then drop from his muscles. An ancestor suddenly found a duplicate of himself appearing at his side, and exclaimed, 'Hullo! that is me.'[7]

The development of dual personality by a process of division may be illustrated from Hindu theology. 'The One Being was not happy, being alone. He wished for a second. He caused his own nature to fall in twain, and thus became husband and wife.'[8] This duality is rather that of mirror-images; 'this (second) was only a half

[1] Hewitt, *loc. cit.*

[2] Manu (tr. G. Bühler, in *SBE* xxv. [Oxford, 1886] 329).

[3] See Westermarck, *MI* i. 461.

[4] D. Kidd, *The Essential Kafir*, London, 1904, p. 202.

[5] De Groot, v. 802 f.

[6] W. W. Skeat, *Malay Magic*, 266; A. Hale, in *JRAS*, Straits Branch, xvi. (1885) 319.

[7] Spencer-Gillen[b], 156.

[8] Monier-Williams, *op. cit.* p. 29, quoting the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* (xiv. 4), and *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (i. 3).

of himself, as the half of a split pea is.' Combination produces completeness, 'as a split pea is (completed) by being joined with its other half.'[1]

Modern psychology has studied many cases where the unity of personality is disturbed. The so-called double personality of such cases adds one more apparent confirmation of the ancient theory of duplication by division of what may be described as a two-layered unity. In the ethical sphere the ancient distrust of 'double-mindedness' implies more than a mere tendency to deceit and treachery. It implies the existence of two souls, or a double soul, in one person. Cf. 1 Ch 12[33] 'that were not of double heart' (lit. 'without a heart and a heart'); Ps 12[2] 'with a double heart [lit. 'with a heart and a heart'] do they speak.' Duplication involves not only duplicity but instability; 'a double-minded man, unstable in all his ways.'[2] It is possible that one factor in the general desire for sincerity was a superstitious notion of the danger of unreality. If a man professes non-reality, he may become non-real himself. 'There is,' says Westermarck, 'something uncanny in the untrue word itself.'[3] Cicero observed: 'Nothing that is false can be lasting'[4]—a rhetorical remark which to a savage might express a physical law. It is a curious fact that in civilization a sort of specific insincerity or double-mindedness is popularly ascribed to the artistic temperament, particularly in the case of actors. As the actor is a double, and plays a part on the stage, so is he regarded in his own character. Cf. art. DOUBLE-MINDEDNESS.

The analogy of the soul to the portrait, reflexion, and shadow has led to certain curious examples of the pictorial double. The easiest method of induction is by similars, and early thought seems to have noted identity far more than difference.

This tendency is well exemplified in Chinese psychology, and has to be taken into account in estimating many cases of spiritual identification.

'When a Chinese sees a plant,' for example, 'reminding him, by its shape, of a man or some animal, . . . he is influenced immediately by an association between it and that being. This being becomes to him the soul of the plant, anthropomorphous, or shaped as a beast. . . . Thus, association of images with beings actually becomes identification, both materially and psychically. An image, especially if pictorial or sculptured, and thus approaching close to the reality, is an *alter ego* of the living reality, an abode of its soul, nay, it is that reality itself.' . . . This kind of association is the backbone of Chinese religion.[5]

The soul of the Yaos, we saw, bears to the body 'the relation which a picture has to the reality.' But the Chinese go much further. For all practical purposes the life-sized picture of a dead man is a duplicate personality. It enables the deceased 'to live on among his descendants.' There are stories of statues and portraits acting for the persons they represent, and even begetting children.

There once existed also an art, *Khwai shuh*, by which life could be infused into a statue or portrait. The living image was then made use of, as Frankenstein employed his monster.[6]

Animal-souls or fetish-souls, external souls generally, are frequently described by observers under the term *alter ego*. Tribes of the Niger believe that each person has

'an *alter ego* in the form of some animal, such as a crocodile or hippopotamus. It is believed that such a person's life is bound up with that of the animal to such an extent that whatever affects the one produces a corresponding impression upon the other, and that if one dies the other must speedily do so too. It happened not very long ago that an Englishman shot a hippopotamus close to a native village; the friends of a woman who died the same night in the village demanded and eventually obtained five pounds as compensation for the murder of the woman.'[7]

In the Euahlayi tribe of Australia the *yunbeai*, or individual totem, is an 'animal familiar,' 'a sort of *alter ego*.' 'A man's spirit is in his *yunbeai*,

[1] Monier-Williams, *op. cit.* p. 183.
[2] Ja 1[8].
[3] *MI* ii. 116.
[4] *de Officiis*, ii. 12.
[5] De Groot, iv. 339 f.
[6] *Ib.* i. 114, iv. 342.
[7] C. H. Robinson, *Hausaland*, London, 1896, p. 36 ff.

and his *yunbeai's* spirit in him.' A medicine-man 'can assume the shape of his *yunbeai*.'[1] The *tona*, second self, soul, or tutelary genius, of the Zapotecs was an animal.

'It was believed that health and existence were bound up with that of the animals, in fact, that the death of both would occur simultaneously.'[2]

Even a substitute may be similarly described. Among the Bataks a piece of wood the length of the sick man's body is left at the place where the evil spirit that has taken the man's soul is believed to reside. Snouck Hurgronje describes this log as a *dubbelganger*.[3]

Examples might be multiplied. It is natural that, when once the notion of 'spiritual' duplication has been formed, it may be applied to any thing that strikes the fancy. The origin of external souls generally cannot be ascribed to a desire for safeguarding the life of the owner. At least the method is a very dangerous one. The soul is far more likely to be safe when it is in, or in combination with, the body of the owner. Moreover, this external soul not only dies when its 'original' dies, but involves in its own death the death of the owner. Duplication here simply duplicates danger; and it is unlikely that the derivation of the external soul is from any notion of placing the actual soul of a man in an external hiding-place. In fact, the theory of the soul which involves the belief in the appearance of a man's double or wraith shortly before, or at, or just after, his death brings into very strong relief the danger of making the unity of the person into a duality.

The phenomena of this wraith or double might be illustrated at great length, but they present hardly any variation of detail. A curious and significant fact is the large number of carefully studied cases in modern civilization of such 'phantasms' of the living or the lately dead, which have been seen by educated and intelligent persons, quite free from pathological abnormality.[4] It is a no less curious fact that the appearances present precisely the same features as are mentioned in mediæval and savage folklore. There is no doubt about the modern appearances, as far as their subjective reality is concerned; nor can there be any doubt about appearances in earlier culture. They are, so far as we know, cases of visual hallucination. Such hallucination may be defined as 'the projection of a mental image outwards when there is no external agency answering to it.'[5] Hallucination is not to be denied for earlier stages of human evolution, but there is no probability that it increases inversely as mental development. Be that as it may, the remarkable thing is this, that the 'primitive' notion of the soul supplies in theory not only what actually happens in practice, but also adequate speculative reasons for such happenings, though these reasons are both pre-scientific and opposed to all scientific facts. It is unnecessary to enter into any definition of 'ghost,' 'wraith,' 'spectre,' 'phantom,' and similar terms. The occasion of the appearance of the double has been noted. It remains to supply some typical examples and to draw out their spiritualistic explanation.

In Teutonic folklore to see one's 'angel' was regarded as an omen of approaching death.[6] In English folklore the belief still obtains that at midnight of St. Mark's Eve one may see from the church porch all those who are to die in the course of the year.[7] Mr. Baring-Gould knew of a young carpenter in Devonshire who was firmly convinced he had seen his own double on St. Mark's Eve. He went to the church porch in a spirit of bravado. 'All he could say was that he had seen

[1] K. L. Parker, *The Euahlayi Tribe*, London, 1905, pp. 21, 30.
[2] Bancroft, i. 661, ii. 277.
[3] C. Snouck Hurgronje, *Het Gajo-land en zijne bewoners*, Batavia, 1903, p. 310.
[4] See F. W. H. Myers and F. Podmore, *Phantasms of the Living*, London, 1886, *passim*.
[5] J. Sully, *Illusions*, London, 1895, p. 113.
[6] J. Grimm, *Teutonic Mythology* (Eng. tr. 1880-88), ii. 876.
[7] Cf. James Montgomery's poem, *The Vigil of St. Mark*.

himself go past him, thrust open the church door, which he knew was locked, pass inside, and shut the door after him. He could not be mistaken; the figure had turned and looked him full in the face, and he knew himself as surely as when he glanced into mother's looking-glass.' The young man took to his bed, though nothing ailed him, and died of sheer fright.[1] Shelley declared a few days before his death that he had seen his double. Goethe (who, by the way, practised the visualization of mental images) records his having seen 'an exact counterpart of himself coming towards him.'[2] Robert Perceval, second son of the Right Honourable Sir John Perceval, saw his own apparition, 'bloody and ghostly, whereat he was so astonished that he immediately swooned away, but, recovering, he saw the spectre depart.' Soon afterwards he was found dead, under mysterious circumstances, in the Strand.[3] In 1899, Mrs. Milman, wife of Mr. A. J. Milman, assistant clerk to the House of Commons, declared that her rooms in the Speaker's Court were haunted, and had been haunted for many years, by a spiritual double of herself, which had been seen by many people when she was elsewhere, though she herself had never seen it.[4] A well-known M.P. died suddenly when away from the House. It was stated that he was seen by several members in the lobby at the time he died.[5] In Alsace the belief is marked; *se voir soi-même, sich selbst sehen*, are familiar phrases. To see one's self, or meet one's double, portends one's death. A Strassburg man returning home saw himself, and soon after died. It is noted that in Alsace the occurrence is rare compared with the appearance of a man to others. An interesting detail, recurring elsewhere, is that, after seeing his double, a man has 'no repose.'[6] A question implying the same belief was put to Shelley by the lady to whom he confided his having seen his double. Art and literature are full of examples which might well be founded on fact. D. G. Rossetti's *How they met themselves*, and Calderon's *Purgatory of St. Patrick*, are examples. Sir Walter Scott observed that increasing civilization had 'blotted out the belief in apparitions.' This was to reckon without the phenomena of vision on which they depend.

These phenomena explain both the fact of the appearance of doubles, and also the pre-scientific theory of it which is a part of the early doctrine of the soul. According to that doctrine, the soul is separable from the body. This separation occurs at death, and may occur in illness, and even in a mere attack of fright, in sleep, and in other circumstances which need not be considered here. The soul is more or less universally regarded as a material, but etherealized, visible duplicate of the owner, whether full-sized or miniature, and as constituting his life. When it is removed, he is either dead or in danger of death. Primitive philosophy would say, perhaps, not that when a man dies his soul departs, but that he dies because his soul has departed. The soul of another is invisible when the man himself is seen, alive and well. In this case of full perception there is no mental image. But, when the man is not perceived, the mental image of him in the mind of the subject may suggest possibilities of separation, of division of personality. From another point of view, the man's appearance in death, sleep, or illness suggests the loss of something. Here, too, there is a percept, but it does not answer to the completeness of other percepts of the same object. Thus, whether as a film of the man's outward appearance, or as an ejected but expansible inner duplicate, the soul is easily supposed to leave its possessor. To the former view correspond those cases in which it is said to 'loosen itself' from the body, to the latter those in which it slips away from the mouth or other apertures. Before death the Haida soul 'loosens itself from the body.'[7] Of course, one cannot press the meaning of such descriptive phrases. But the fact remains that the separated soul is, when seen, a filmy double. The general belief that the soul is away from the body during sickness is significant. The Chinese hold that even in a fainting fit a man's 'soul is not united with his body.'[8] The 'other self,' *netsin*, of Déné belief, 'was invisible as long as a man enjoyed

[1] S. Baring-Gould, in *Sunday Magazine*, 1895, p. 744.
[2] Sully, *Illusions*, p. 116.
[3] T. F. Thiselton Dyer, *Strange Pages from Family Papers*, London, 1895, p. 150 f.
[4] *Evening News*, 30 June 1899. [5] *Ib.*
[6] A. Barth, in *FL* i. (1890) 227 ff.
[7] G. M. Dawson, 'Haida Indians,' in *Geological Survey of Canada*, App. A, p. 121 f.
[8] De Groot, i. 243.

good health,' but wandered away when he was sick or dying.[1] This account is very apt to the point. It explains how the spiritual counterpart of a man is sometimes described as invisible, sometimes as visible. It is invisible, in other words, when it is united with its owner. It may be visible, to himself or others, when it is no longer united. On this line of thought, combined with ideas of the life-giving property of the soul, is developed the notion that health and strength are the soul, or at least an outward show of it. The Minangkabau people of Sumatra regard the *sumange* as

'the cause of the impression a man makes on others: . . . it gives strength, splendour, and vitality to a man's appearance; it is expressed in his look and carriage. A man whose external appearance is weak or sickly, or who has little expression in his face, is said to have a feeble soul.'[2]

Similarly, the natives of the Congo identify health with the word *moyo*, and 'in cases of wasting sickness the *moyo* is supposed to have wandered away from the sufferer.'[3] The Malagasy supply a complete case. The *ambiroa*, or *ameroy*, the 'apparition' of a man, is, when seen, an omen of his approaching death. But this term is also applied to the soul of a man when there is no actual question of death; for instance, if a man is thin and does not thrive well on his food.[4]

It is clear from the above both why the soul should be away from the body just before, or at, or after, death, or even in illness, and also why it is then visible both to the owner and to others.

The double which appears after death might be supposed to be a duplicate of the man with the marks of death upon him. And so it is sometimes in early belief. Thus, among the Fijians the ghost is decomposed; it is the corpse 'walking.' But, with natural inconsistency, it 'can eat fruit, drink kava, throw stones, weep, laugh, compose poetry, and dance.'[5] So difficult is it for the mind to get away from the complete idea of the man. In a case already cited, the double appearing before death had the marks of the owner's violent end impressed upon it proleptically. But, as a rule, the 'spiritual' double is the exact counterpart of the owner as he was when last seen. Thus, by the natives of Paraguay

'the souls [*aphangak*] of the departed are supposed, in the ethereal state, to correspond exactly in form and characteristics with the bodies they have left. A tall man and a short man remain tall and short as spirits; a deformed man remains deformed. A kindly-natured man continues so in shade-land. . . . The spirit of a child remains a child and does not develop, and for this reason is not feared. . . . No punishment follows the murderer of an infant, nor is its murder attended by the ordinary superstitious fears.'[6]

The Polynesians were familiar with apparitions of the dead. These appeared also in dreams, and their 'shape or form resembled that of the human body.'[7] The natives of the Panjāb believe that 'the little entire man or woman inside the body retains after death the tattoo marks of the person whom it has left.'[8] Among the Nāgas the ghost is 'an exact image of the deceased as he was at the moment of death, with scars, tattoo marks, mutilations, and all—and as able to enjoy and to need food and other sustenance.'[9] In some cases the disembodied 'soul' after death is distinguished from the dead man himself, who is believed to 'walk.' The Australians speak of the ghost returning to the grave to contemplate its mortal remains.[10] But there are cases where it is practically the man himself, revived and as he was in life. The Ovaherero believe

[1] A. G. Morice, *loc. cit.*
[2] J. L. van der Toorn, *loc. cit.* v. 48 f.
[3] H. Ward, in *JAI* xxiv. (1895) 287. [4] Ellis, *loc. cit.*
[5] B. H. Thomson, in *JAI* xxiv. (1895) 354.
[6] W. B. Grubb, *An Unknown People in an Unknown Land*, London, 1911, p. 120.
[7] W. Ellis, *Polyn. Res.* i. 361, 397.
[8] H. A. Rose, in *IA* xxxi. (1902) 298.
[9] T. C. Hodson, *op. cit.* p. 159; cf. Kruijt, p. 235.
[10] A. W. Howitt, in *JAI* xiii. (1884) 187.

that the ghost speaks to people, drinks their milk, and takes their food; also that he is apt to seduce women and girls, and can even marry and live with a woman without her being aware that her husband is a ghost.[1]

In the Gospel narratives of the appearances of the risen Jesus it is remarkable that various tests are employed to prove that the form was no ghost or double, but the Lord Himself (cf. Lk 24[39. 43]). A test frequently employed in cases of the double is to ascertain whether the form casts a shadow or reflexion. For the 'spiritual' double, being itself a sort of reflexion, a visible but 'immaterial' copy, obviously cannot produce a reflexion itself. Hence stories are found, the point of which is either that a supposed real person is unreal, or that a real person, casting no shadow, has *ipso facto* lost his soul. We are thus led to the principle that the 'spiritual' duplicate, while supplying life to its owner, is 'real,' but in a different genus from the body or from the complete person. More precisely, the difference is a question of degree; the dead or sick body is negatively, the life-double is positively, real; the truth of both is the total living unity.

Most significant, perhaps, of the phenomena of doubles is the fact that they are seen just before death, and by their owners in particular. A usual endowment of the medicine-man is that he can see a soul at any time. But this capacity is often limited by the accepted principles of the doctrine of the soul. Thus the shamans of the Thompson Indians are able to see the soul

'before and shortly after it leaves the body, but lose sight of it when it gets further away towards the world of souls. . . . When a shaman sees a soul in the shape of a fog, it is a sign that the owner will die.'[2]

The rescue and restoration of the straying duplicate is universally, in early culture, the business of the soul-doctor, as in civilization the restoration of health is the business of the physician. The fact that, though ordinarily invisible, it is seen away from its place of location is the best proof that its owner is threatened with its permanent absence. This contingency receives the strongest confirmation when the apparition is seen by the threatened person himself. The inconsistency of the fact that he himself is still alive is one of those which cause no difficulty to the unscientific mind. The soul is separated from the body; that is enough for an absolute proof.

The persistence of the belief in the apparition of the double is precisely one of those cases which cannot be explained by any theory of survival or tradition. The belief is kept alive by hallucinations, and in uncultivated minds by the normal phenomena of visualization.

LITERATURE.—This is fully given in the article.

A. E. CRAWLEY.

DOUBLE-MINDEDNESS.—It is clear that many things in morality and religion which are censured as insincerity and hypocrisy are more accurately describable in terms of double-mindedness. The difference is that in double-mindedness a certain fraction of the entire complex personality—a special set of related states and processes—is so 'split off' from the rest of the self that it acts on its own account and forgets its relation to the full round of diverse elements of the ego. In cases of hypocrisy, if such exist, during the inconsistent act or attitude which has momentarily taken possession of the field of consciousness there is a haunting sense that it is not in harmony with the deeper-lying currents of the selfhood.

1. Pathology of the sense of self.—The diseases conditioned by the splitting of the self are those of *double* personality, in which two fairly defined selves in turn struggle for the possession of the field of consciousness, or may exist side by side, each more or less ignorant of the other; *multiple* personality, with the condition just described, existing among more than two split-off parts illustrated in the work of a skilful hypnotist, who can call up in turn as many selves as he chooses; and *alternating* personality, in which the two or more selves, like Dr. Jekyl and Mr. Hyde, take turns at ruling the field of consciousness.

Among the remarkable cases that have been studied are: Lucie, Louise, and Léonie, described by Janet, *L'Automatisme psychologique*, 1889; Félida, studied by Azam, *Hypnotisme, double conscience et altérations de la personnalité*, 1887; Mary Reynolds and Ansel Bourne, cited by W. James, *Princ. of Psych.*[2], 1905, i. 383 ff.; the case of Sergeant F., described by Mesnet and quoted by Binet, *Alterations of Personality* (Eng. tr.), 1896; 'Miss Beauchamp' with her four personalities, the subject of Prince's exhaustive study, *The Dissociation of a Personality*, 1906; the autobiographical account of the restoration of a personality by Beers, *The Mind that Found Itself*, 1908; the instance of 'D. F.,' a patient of Sidis, reported in his *Psychopathological Researches: Studies in Mental Dissociation*, 1909; and many others.

These studies are in essential agreement on many points in regard to the nature of the self, and throw light upon the milder forms of double-mindedness. The central fact underlying them is that the conscious self at any moment is only a small part of the entire personality, the larger share of which is the subconscious self. This sphere of the subconscious consists in the sum of partially lapsed memories, plus the sum of dimly appreciated instinct feelings and organic experiences, past and present. The elements of the entire self are always somewhat imperfectly knit together, and at best become organized in spots and sections, as determined, for example, by harmonious instinct reactions or a relatively consistent set of vocational experiences, personal habits, and intellectual interests.

The conscious self really consists in the drifting to the surface, out of the submerged selfhood, of certain fairly well organized cores or nuclei of related states and processes. Self-consciousness is potentially bound up in any and all of the elements of the personality. The ego is not a fixed entity that stands apart and watches the life processes go on. The self-feeling, on the contrary, is latent in every psychosis, and emerges when any group of processes is sufficiently organized and so far intensified as to form a warm spot in the usually somewhat diffuse group of experiences that cohere in the single organism. Whenever such a warm spot is formed, the self-feeling crystallized about it and everything else is sharply severed from it and stands as object. There are in the normal personality certain deep-going lines of organization that are fairly constant, and give some stability to the selfhood. It is shown, however, by the use of hypnotic suggestion, that there is no part of the personality that may not in turn be made subject and object. The same subject may seem to himself to be in turn king and peasant, preacher and humorist, saint and sinner, child and adult, kindly and irritable, motor- and visual-minded. While each character is in the centre of the arena acting out its part, it gathers to itself allies from the entire range of the self, and works them out into seeming consistency, and is entirely oblivious to the existence of other selves.

Now, the condition underlying double-mindedness is that two or more centres of related processes, or selves, may drift above the threshold of clear consciousness in rapid succession, while each is imperfectly cognizant of the other. Indeed, it is certain that one set of central processes can be 'thrown out of gear' with the rest, 'so that the processes in one system give rise to one conscious-

[1] Viehe and Palgrave, in *South African Folklore Journal*, i. (1879) 656 ff.

[2] J. Teit, in *Mem. of Amer. Museum of Nat. Hist.* I. (1900) iv. 363.

ness, and those of another system to another *simultaneously* existing consciousness' (W. James, *Princ. of Psych.* i. 399). Let us represent the entire self, consisting fundamentally of a mass of subliminal processes, by a sphere S. Two smaller spheres, A and B, within the larger one may represent the integrated nuclei of conscious selves. In so-called normal consciousness, these two selves, A and B, will be so nearly coincident, due to the continuity and consistency in the stream of experiences, as to have almost everything in common, M. Although the quality of mentality at any moment or in any situation is different from that of the next moment or situation, so that A and B each has a region exclusively its own, the large common ground M carries over into each successive state of consciousness a rich stock of memories, and accordingly a sense of personal identity. If, however, in an impulsive or impressionable person the successive consciousnesses are inharmonious——call them A^1 and B^1—and so separated as to have only a small region M^1 in common, we have the typical case of double-mindedness. There lie beyond these the extreme instances described above, when, due to some lesion, or to hypnotic influence, the consciousnesses A^2 and B^2 are so thrown apart that they have no background of definite memories to unite them.

Among the advantages of considering double-mindedness as lying in a progressive series between a highly unified consciousness on the one hand and alternating personalities on the other, are: (*a*) it is normal, but may become pathological; (*b*) the progressive decline of the memory of other selves in pathological cases shows the distinction between double-mindedness and wilful deception and insincerity. A religious enthusiast and propagandist, for example, impelled by the combined effect of auto-suggestion and social-suggestion may at other times be morose, unkind, and even treacherous, and still be only faintly aware of the incongruity. (*c*) There is, however, a subconscious interaction between the selves. Binet and Janet have shown (Binet, *Alterations of Personality*, Eng. tr. New York, 1896, p. 215 ff.) that, although either member of a double personality may seem to be entirely oblivious of the existence of the other, there is, nevertheless, a leakage between them through the deeper strata of personality. (*d*) The integration of the self is best brought about, if not invariably, in terms of the subconscious. In chronic cases of double personality there seems to be no way so effectual of healing the cleavage as by a vigorous use of suggestion, the blending of the different selves into the deeper-lying regions of the submerged selfhood. From this point of view the success of religion in the world may be accounted for by its consistent appeal to the 'divided selves,' 'sick souls,' and all who hunger after the higher life, that they renounce the lesser selves and, by an act of faith, sink them into the absolute righteousness of a limitless personality.

2. Sources of double-mindedness.—Whether or not the self is fundamentally or transcendentally a unity, it is more just to concrete facts of the mental life to assume that self-consciousness is inherent in the separate psychic processes themselves. Rather than try to explain the incongruous obsessions of the self, therefore, it is more judicious to accept the multiplicity of streaks and strains that inhere in the same personality as the given fact, and then to regard the integrity of the self as a selected product of development. Its utility, let us say, is found in the value to the individual of a self-consistent history, and the increased efficiency of a social order whose units are somewhat similar. The most potent fact about the self is the constant mutations that are going on within it (cf. W. James, *Princ. of Psych.*, chs. ix. and x.; Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*², 1897, ch. ix.). In any normal individual there are ceaseless alterations and re-combinations of the elements of the self in response to the situations that call them into activity. Each person is in turn, especially and for the moment, a bodily self, a social self, a courageous, a blushing, a righteous, an ambitious, a passionate, a logical self, and so on through a long list. There are conditions which tend to fix these various selves and perpetuate them. In the first place, it is the fate of states of consciousness to be self-limited in proportion to their intensity. To see with rapt interest a bit of colour harmony in a landscape is for the moment to be blind to all else. To feel the thrill of a heroic encounter creates a soldier whose heart is closed to every other 'calling.' The laws of habit get in their work, while vocational activities and the fixity of social customs assist in building the texture of the personality into a seemingly constant and consistent type. The twists and strains of split personality now arise through

'the irruption into the individual's life of some new stimulus or passion, such as love, ambition, cupidity, revenge, or patriotic devotion' (W. James, *Var. of Rel. Exp.*, 1902, p. 176).

It may arise from an enforced change of occupation when the cross currents are aggravated by a psychopathic temperament. The condition existing in milder forms is best seen in abnormal cases.

'A young woman, early abandoned to a life of shame, and later placed in a convent, would pass, as the result of nervous disorders, through two periods, believing herself to be alternately prostitute and nun; and in each her tone, manner, dress, and speech were radically different and appropriate' (Baldwin, *DPhP* ii. 285).

One of the chief sources of split personality is the difficulty of a smooth readjustment, during the growth periods from childhood to maturity, to the new demands of later stages. This is most marked during the age of most rapid readjustment in the early teens. The old habitual self of childhood persists with great tenacity. The instinctive uprush of new life floods the youth with a feeling of new possibilities and a sense of awakening, though dimly appreciated, ideals. The struggle between the old self and the new is the crisis long known as 'storm and stress.'[1] The period is well characterized by W. James as that of the

'divided will, when the higher wishes lack just that last acuteness, that touch of explosive intensity . . . that enables them to burst their shell, and make irruption efficaciously into life and quell the lower tendencies for ever' (*Var. of Rel. Exp.* p. 173).

3. Double-mindedness and immorality.—It would seem that most blemishes of character and nearly all misdeeds and crimes might be traceable to split personality. A passionate, shamming, or partial self, either too callous or too sensitive, loses its connexion with, and setting in, the full round of life. Treacheries, for example, are the obverse side of little loyalties, just as are foolish loves and misguided philanthropies. It would appear, too, from the stress which moral codes and precepts place upon such virtues as integrity, sincerity, consistency, *temperantia*, and the like, that the normal evolution of character chiefly consists in the straightening out and unification of the inner self.

'As a fletcher makes straight his arrow,' says the *Dhammapāda* (33), 'a wise man makes straight his trembling and unsteady thought, which is difficult to keep, difficult to turn.'

Something like this is, apparently, the purport of the golden mean of Aristotle, the middle path and the will of Heaven of Confucius, the harmony with the universe of the Stoics, and the straight and narrow way of Jesus.

The danger of a duplicity of the self has been almost universally recognized by morality and

[1] See, for a description of the accompanying phenomena, W. James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, N.Y., 1902, chs. vi. vii. viii.; Starbuck, *Psychology of Religion*², 1901, chs. v. xii. xvii. xviii.

religion. To heal up its ruptures and knit the entire life into a consistent whole has been their heroic task. Two extreme methods of unification have been advocated, with many gradations of the intermingling of both. At one extreme is the Stoical method of renunciation of everything which can disturb, distract, or tear asunder, so that the soul stands undisturbed in the midst of a changing universe, superior to all things in life or death. The opposite method is to extend the self until it is at one with all things in heaven and earth. Since the self, then, is at one with all-reality, there is nothing that can mar its serenity. One can distinguish at least four types of this latter method of unification: the mystical or baptismal or psychopathic, which would bathe in a limitless ocean of blessedness; the rational or Socratic, which would rise to higher definition and sink to profounder insight until the deeper wisdom catches up all virtue into itself; the æsthetic, as illustrated, for example, in Jesus, which is guided by a warm, refined sense of eternal values; and the practical or 'tough-minded,' represented by those who gird up their loins and preach and practise a doctrine of utmost consistency in thought and deed.

4. The value to morality of double-mindedness.—It is an instructive fact that the biography of so many moral and religious geniuses betrays a struggle between the cross currents of the self in the direction of good and evil. Like St. Paul and St. Augustine, what they would not, that they do, and, when the impulses lead towards the higher life, there is a stubborn inner resistance that is hardly overcome. It is probable that, just as an act of clear thought is bought of necessity at the price of severe mental tension, so a world of clean-cut moral values can exist only in the midst of conflicting inner impulses. It is 'when the struggle begins within himself' that 'man's worth something.' It is only then that 'the soul awakes and grows' (Browning, *Fifine at the Fair*).

'Of necessity every distinctly moral choice involves the previous presence of a certain tendency to choose the wrong. Yes, moral choice is essentially a condemnation of the neglected motive, as well as an approval of the accepted motive. Otherwise it could be no moral choice. A being possessed of but one motive could have no conscience. . . . You might as well try to define a king without his subjects as to define a moral deed without the presence in the agent of some evil motive' (Royce, in *IJE* iv. [1893-4] 57).

If, now, in the midst of the struggle the agent conquers the lesser motive, he may issue forth into a complex world of specific moral relationships and corresponding moral values, and so come to live victoriously in a 'two-storey universe' instead of floating along a misty stream of indefinite experiences into whose gloom the light of a bedimmed conscience can scarcely shed its radiance. The value of the conflicts, too, in the social order has long been recognized by students of ethics.

'The means which Nature uses to bring about the development of all the capacities she has given man,' says Kant, 'is their *antagonism* in society, in so far as this antagonism becomes in the end a cause of social order. . . . Men have a great propensity to isolate themselves, for they find in themselves at the same time this unsocial characteristic, and each wishes to direct everything solely according to his own notion, and expects resistance just as he knows that he is inclined to resist others. It is just this resistance which awakens all man's powers' (quoted in Dewey-Tufts, *Ethics*, 1908, p. 87).

The study of biographies would even suggest that, the greater the number of antagonisms and oppositions that play against each other, the more is the personality enriched, if only they can be so neatly balanced against each other as not to waste the energies, and if the central stream of life is so directed that the habit of conquering becomes the habit of growth. Luther, *e.g.*, is an instructive instance of a person containing what Ribot (*Diseases of Personality*, Eng. tr. Chicago, 1895, pp. 112, 126 ff.) designates 'successively' and 'even simultaneously contradictory characters.' He was jocose and serious, joyous and melancholy, submissive and independent, active and meditative, stoical and sensuous, warm-hearted and vindictive, mystic and hard-headed organizer, scholar and poet, and many things besides. The intimate relation between the presence, in such minds, of various cross currents and their moral strength is probably not an accidental one.

LITERATURE.—In addition to the references in the text, the reader may consult: J. Royce, *Studies of Good and Evil*, N.Y., 1898, ch. on 'Anomalies of Personality'; B. Sidis, *The Psychol. of Suggestion*, N.Y. 1911; J. M. Baldwin, *DPhP*, 1901-2, art. 'Personality, Disorders of'; D. H. Tuke, *Dict. of Psych. Med.*, 1892, art. 'Double Consciousness'; Worcester, McComb, and Coriat, *Relig. and Med.*, N.Y. 1908; H. Münsterberg, *Psychotherapy*, N.Y. 1909, pt. iii.

EDWIN D. STARBUCK.

DOUBT.—1. Definition and scope.—Doubt is the negation of belief, the condition of not having reached a positive conclusion for or against any proposition. In this negative nature doubt differs from *disbelief*, which is a positive conviction of falsity. Disbelief is a form of belief; it is a belief in some proposition which involves the falsity of another, with reference to which the attitude of mind is called 'disbelief.' We disbelieve the Ptolemaic theory because we believe the Copernican. Doubt, on the other hand, implies no such contrary belief. It implies suspense of judgment rather than a positive judgment to the contrary. It is the state of being unconvinced. In this sense an agnostic should be in the attitude of doubt, lacking knowledge (see art. AGNOSTICISM). Whether there is ever an absolute suspense of judgment may be questioned, but in the doubting attitude there is at least the absence of a categorical or of a settled judgment with reference to the idea in question. There may be the disjunctive judgment that A or B is true, but doubt as to which alternative is correct, or there may be an alternation of judgments, but no fixed conclusion. In the latter case doubt corresponds to deliberation, although expressing the negative element rather than the consideration of reasons.

As to the *objects* of doubt it is customary to distinguish between theoretical doubt and doubt as to values. The former may concern either (1) the evidence of sense, or (2) the truth of theories. The latter may be doubt as to the validity of our (3) æsthetic or (4) moral judgments. Since religion, as commonly understood, involves judgment as to both facts and values, religious doubt may be of either of the two main kinds.

The distinction sometimes drawn between *universal* and *particular* doubt is a verbal rather than a real one, the former being incompatible with sanity in things theoretical, and with life in things practical. The conscious life is essentially an active, assertive process by which objects are either assimilated, or neglected for those capable of assimilation. This limitation of doubt in the field of knowledge was shown by Descartes, and in the sphere of practice by Hume (see § 2).

The temporal relation of doubt to belief depends upon the conception of the nature of belief. If belief be taken as identical with the instinctive or immediate reality sense, doubt is a subsequent state arising from the conflict of primitive beliefs, especially as involving the disappointment of expectation and the checking of motor impulse. If belief be conceived as a reflective result dependent upon evidence, it is subsequent to doubt, and its legitimate outcome. The condition of doubt lasts as long as the idea in question fails to find its

place relative to the system which represents for us reality. When its position is discovered, the attitude towards it is one of belief—either positive as acceptance, or negative as rejection.

The resolution of doubt, consisting as it does in this determination of the place of an idea relatively to the reality system, involves the exercise of will. Yet this volition cannot be taken as a perfectly free or arbitrary action, without undermining the whole idea of truth. Doubt has significance only in so far as there is pre-supposed a system of conditions to which thought must adjust itself. There is doubt only where knowledge is possible, for doubt is always as to the judgment which ought to be passed if the purpose of thought is to be fulfilled. The resolution of doubt is therefore never a mere 'will to believe,' but a will to believe what conforms to given conditions of belief. The will is not absolute and alone in belief. See also articles BELIEF, FAITH, SCEPTICISM.

LITERATURE.—J. M. Baldwin, *Handb. of Psychol.*[6], 1889, ch. vii., 'Feeling and Will,' *DPhP*, artt. 'Doubt,' 'Belief'; F. Brentano, *Psychologie*, Leipzig, 1874, vol. i. bk. ii. ch. vii.; G. Vorbrodt, *Psychologie des Glaubens*, Göttingen, 1895; R. Adamson, *EBr*[9], art. 'Belief'; W. James, *The Will to Believe*, 1897; E. E. Saisset, *Le Scepticisme*, Paris, 1865; see, further, references below, and under BELIEF.

NORMAN WILDE.

2. The meaning and value of doubt as influenced by one's philosophical or theological position.—A person's attitude towards doubt and his conception of its meaning will depend much upon his philosophical or theological point of view. Apart from realism, whose psychological and epistemological ground-work is extremely varied, there are at least two general types of philosophizing, viz. absolutism and dynamic idealism, which directly influence one's estimate of doubt and its place in the moral and religious life; the former tending on the whole to disparage, and the latter to encourage, it.

(1) *Absolutism.*—Those who hold that truth or righteousness is of a fixed and changeless nature fall into several groups with a variety of shades of gradation among them. For our purpose it will be sufficient to mention two as types; (*a*) rationalists or a-priorists, and (*b*) absolutists basing their views upon Divine authority.

(*a*) Absolutism of the rationalistic sort. There are those whose confidence in a fixed and static truth is so implicit, and who believe so firmly that this truth is of the nature of pure reason and can be attained through a logical process, that doubt is to them synonymous with ignorance. It means failure, up to any given moment of time, to have discovered the whole of truth. Such an attitude is often found among logicians, mathematicians, and theologians who have built upon a rationalistic psychology, although some of them take the matter of doubt more seriously, if, like Plotinus, they have a mystical temperament, or if, like Augustine, they are oppressed by the contrast between finite knowledge and infinite intelligence. Doubt is sometimes employed systematically as a helpful scientific or philosophical procedure by those who, like Descartes, use it as a means of sifting out from the manifold experience the pure elements of knowledge that are changeless. During the quest, rationalism has employed doubt consistently and whole-heartedly. Having established a system of truth or belief, it tends towards dogmatic certainty.

(*b*) A fixed and static truth or righteousness based upon an external authority. From this standpoint doubt means perverseness, waywardness, or even sin, and is dealt with by disapproval, censure, condemnation, excommunication, punishment, or execution.

When either of the types of absolutism just described exists in its relatively pure form, implicit faith is demanded within the range of the firm foundation of the system, while doubt may in all other matters prevail. There are many also, among Catholics, Protestants, and non-Christian devotees, who accept the finality of both reason and authority and insist upon their oneness. An instructive instance in point is the case of Cardinal Newman. He says (*Gram. of Assent*, pp. 214, 146):

> 'Now truth cannot change; what is once truth is always truth; and the human mind is made for truth. . . . once certitude, always certitude. If certitude in any matter be the termination of all doubt or fear about its truth, it carries with it an inward assurance that it shall never fail.' 'The difficulty is removed by the dogma of the Church's infallibility. The "One Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church" is an article of the Creed. It stands in the place of all abstruse propositions in a Catholic's mind, for to believe in her word is virtually to believe in them all. Even what he cannot understand he can believe to be true; and he believes it to be true because he believes in the Church.'

(2) *Types of idealism with a dynamic or developmental conception of reality.*—This philosophical position, somewhat older than Aristotelianism, has arisen with new life during the last century and a half. It has been steadily undermining dogmatism and certitude, and not only accepting doubt as a wholesome mental regimen, but interpreting it as a necessary and intimate part of the growth process. Its representatives may be separated into two groups: (*a*) rationalists, who, like Hegel, abandon the law of identity and contradiction and posit a rational world-consciousness in a process of becoming or evolution; and (*b*) the large class, including pragmatists, voluntarists, and affectionists, to whom reality seems to be of a plastic, non-rational sort, which the thought-processes, since they are its products, can only symbolize, not reveal.

(*a*) Hegel may be taken as a representative of the idealists who hold a dynamic and teleological conception of reality, and insist that the 'cosmic spirit unfolds in a strict and vigorous logic, whose consummation is thought of thought' (Cushman, *Hist. of Phil.*, 1911, ii. 281). The absolute reason proceeds everywhere and always according to a law of negativity—passes over into its other or opposite only to return to itself enriched by the contradiction. There is always the threefold act, whether in the personal life or in history—affirmation, contradiction, and return-to-itself (the thesis, antithesis, and synthesis of Fichte and Schelling). The law of contradiction which formal logic and static rationalism respect is not 'true,' but only represents the second step in an endless process of becoming. The unfolding of the Absolute must of necessity, and by its very nature, have contradictions within it, as the condition of passing on to a richer synthesis. Doubt in the individual, therefore, and scepticism in history (see, *e.g.*, Hegel's discussion of the Sceptics, in his *Hist. of Philos.*, 1892-96) are not simply justifiable on account of their stimulating and intensifying power, but are wholly essential parts of the evolution of spirit.

(*b*) Non-rational idealism. Hegel's philosophical justification of negation was but the formulating of a world-attitude towards the value of doubt that had been developing during the Renaissance and has been gaining momentum to the present time. No reference is here made to its value in the way of mental clarification and as a means of arriving at certainty as in the Yes and No procedure of Abelard and Aquinas, or to the method by which Descartes doubted away everything possible in order to arrive at clear and distinct ideas and therefore dogmatic certainty; what we have in view is rather a growing conception that reality is of a non-rational kind which cannot be truly represented by the cognitive processes. The thought-life is one (among others) of the ways in which the world of being manifests itself. It is epiphenomenal. Its reports are suggestive and

symbolical, not final. Dogmatism is, from this point of view, no longer possible, and the *tentative* reliance upon a 'truth' so far forth apprehended, of which doubt is the wholesome sign, is fundamentally justifiable. Following upon the acute scepticism and criticism which culminated in Hume and Kant respectively, confidence in the power of pure reason to transcend itself and report objective reality was undermined, and with it the belief was displaced that the universe was constructed on logical principles. The conviction grew insistent that reality is plastic or dynamic, and is of the nature of feeling or will. Being so, its meaning is to be read out in terms of feeling or symbolized through ideation. Illustrative of the affectionists may be mentioned: Kant's faculty of taste and æsthetic judgment as the synthesizing principle behind reason and judgment; Schelling's notion that ideas have not *logical* worth, but are God's *intuitions* of Himself, and that æsthetics and religion contain the deeper wisdom which will resolve all contradictions; Schleiermacher's doctrine that religious ideas are forms of the manifestation of religious feeling; and Schiller's and Goethe's conception of the 'Beautiful Soul' revealed through 'disinterested contemplation.' The volitionists are equally numerous and commanding. Illustrations of these are the 'God-will' of Kant, the 'Deed-act' of Fichte, and the 'World-as-will' of Schopenhauer, with his teaching that Reason and Idea are indeed distorted expressions of this fundamental world-will. The doctrine of biological evolution is a concrete form of the prevailing passion (which had possessed the best minds for more than half a century before it was formulated by Darwin) for a developmental account of reality, and in turn has given vast impetus to the conception. Some of the modern forms into which it has become crystallized are pragmatism, radical empiricism, vitalism, and voluntarism. All these give up the possibility of the dogmatic certainty of a unified system of beliefs. As summarized by A. J. Balfour:

'No philosophy or theory of knowledge can be satisfactory which does not find room within it for the quite obvious but not sufficiently considered fact that, so far as empirical science can tell us anything about the matter, most of the proximate causes of belief and all its ultimate causes are non-rational in their character' (*The Foundations of Belief*, 365-6).

The attitude of all these towards doubt and certainty may be typified by the following from W. James:

'The safe thing is surely to recognize that all the insights of creatures of a day like ourselves must be provisional. The wisest critic is an altering being, subject to the better insight of the morrow, and right at any moment, only "up to date" and "on the whole." . . . "Heartily know, when half-gods go, the gods arrive." . . . I do indeed disbelieve that we or any other mortal men can attain on a given day to absolutely incorrigible and unimprovable truth about such matters of fact as those with which religions deal' (*Varieties of Religious Experience*, 1902, p. 333 f.).

3. Doubt for its own sake.—Most writers make a distinction between doubt as an end and its use in the growth of knowledge. Even those who justify it most unqualifiedly within its proper limits condemn it just as cordially as a chronic obsession.

James goes so far as to observe: 'It is often practically impossible to distinguish doubts from dogmatic negation. . . . Skepticism in moral matters is an ally of immorality. Who is not for is against . . . in theory as in practice, dodge, or hedge, or talk as we like about a wise skepticism, we are really doing volunteer service for one side or the other' (*The Will to Believe*, 1899, p. 109). Sir William Hamilton, who believes that 'doubt is the first step toward philosophy,' observes: 'Doubt, as a permanent state of mind, would be, in fact, little better than an intellectual death. The mind lives as it believes,—it lives in the affirmation of itself, of nature, and of God; a doubt upon any of these would be a diminution of its life—a doubt upon the three, were it possible, would be tantamount to a mental annihilation' (*Lect. on Met.* i. 91).

The danger of doubting is not only that it may become a fixed habit, but that interest may centre in the process itself as severed from the complex of normal mental activities and healthy enthusiasms and become a mania (doubting-madness; *folie du doute*; *Grübelsucht*). Pathologists have accepted this as a special type of insanity (see, for example, B. Ball's art. 'Doubt, Insanity of,' in Tuke's *Dict. of Psychol. Medicine*, 1892). Its symptoms are a state of persistent intellectual unrest, a devouring metaphysical hunger, a morbid anxiety for mental satisfaction, accompanied not infrequently by a Hamlet-like paralysis of the will.

4. Doubt as the condition of knowledge and of its growth.—The dictum of Hamilton, 'we doubt in order that we may believe' (*loc. cit.*), has been, as the result of modern psychological analysis of the nature of the thought-processes, settling into a truism. According to James, 'belief and disbelief are but two aspects of one psychological state . . . we never disbelieve anything except for the reason that we believe something else which contradicts the first thing' (*Princ. of Psych.*, 1890, ii. 284). Such a conception becomes self-evident through an analysis of the mental conditions involved in certitude. This is shown even in the simplest acts of cognition. No act of perception would be possible without selective attention, a narrowing of the field of consciousness, and a more or less sharp discrimination of the object perceived from related objects. Such an act often, if not generally, involves an artificial cutting away of the object from its setting, as hand from arm, leaf from branch, child from adult, day from night, and the like. Further perceptual processes almost invariably make cross-cuttings of these cuttings as hand-wrist-arm, leaf-twig-branch, normal-abnormal child, twelve-hours, six-months day, and the like. The growth of knowledge consists just in the healing of the cleavages, and the organization, through judgments, of the discrete elements of experience into wholes after they have been necessarily severed, as the condition of having clear images and states of consciousness. Without dissatisfaction with the accuracy and finality of the discrete perceptual images already experienced (which dissatisfaction is doubt in the making), the further organization, in terms of judgments, of which knowledge consists, would not be possible. All the higher acts of conception involve similar discriminations and artificial separations as the condition that they become clear. They are always interested in a *part* of experience at the expense of all the rest. Then, when general judgments are formed, it is inevitable that discord should arise between these and each and all the diverse details that they have sought to harmonize. Wenley, in a chapter on 'Pre-established Discord,' has given a faithful analysis of the principle as it concerns the limitation of science and the behaviour of scientists:

'Any science, that is, any body of judgments about a part of experience, becomes self-centred, if you insist that it transform itself into a rational account of experience *as a whole*. Nay, it may be maintained that, precisely in proportion as science conforms to the ideal of exactness, it declines in truth when universalized, just because it is able to grasp, or adjust, individual cases: advance in knowledge depends upon awareness of problems, of contradictions. Science as a process of investigation consists in an effort to erase these blots upon consistency' (*Mod. Thought and the Crisis in Belief*, pp. 200-210).

Without the intensification of consciousness resulting from clean-cut images along with their often necessary distortions, there would exist only a dim, confused state of general awareness or a 'feeling of simple reality.' All belief, in every case, has for its criterion, on the contrary, 'a feeling of resolved doubt.' 'What I believe has its pros and cons, and however vaguely, still really, I am better satisfied with the pros than with the cons. Now for the first time, therefore, we have belief' (Baldwin, *Handb. of Psych.*[6], 1889, p. 158). From

such a consideration it is evident that doubt is bound up necessarily with any act of faith. As expressed by Ladd:

'Skepticism and agnosticism remain legitimate and valuable (even indispensable) attitudes of the mind toward all the objects both of knowledge and of so-called faith. . . . To doubt and inquire, to refuse to affirm, and to deny, whether applied in the interest of conduct, of science, or of speculative thinking, are as essential to the process of cognition as are faith and affirmation of the most positive and undisturbed kind' (*Phil. of Knowledge*, p. 369).

The necessity of doubt to knowledge arises also from the retarding effect of a native inertia which causes a discord between thought and action; and this condition is aggravated by the deadening effect of habit and custom, which must constantly be transcended and replaced by a habit of growth, or, in other words, the habit of readjustment. Foster has compared doubt to the moulting of a bird by which it accommodates itself to the rotation of the seasons, and to the process of elimination in digestion. Doubt is therefore the 'purgative, eliminative, excretive side of religious experience, as faith is its nourishing; and therefore we are saved by doubt as well as by faith' (*The Funct. of Relig. in Man's Struggle for Existence*, p. 138 f.).

5. Development of doubt in the personal life.—A valuable suggestion as to the place of doubt in the constructive life of morality and religion is found in the fact that it is the rule rather than the exception, in the growth from childhood credulity, imitativeness, and external authority, into a personal grasp of spiritual verities, that men and women pass through, usually in the late teens, a stage of mental perturbation, and of inquiry into the groundwork of faith. The youth 'turns logician and proves everything, and accepts that only which seems to possess a reason.' A study of biographies and autobiographies seems to show that

'the higher life-purposes develop and intensify simultaneously with the growth of doubt. . . . Doubt is a process of mental clarification; it is a step in the process of self-mastery; it is an indication that all the latent powers are beginning to be realized' (Starbuck, *Psychol. of Relig.*, pp. 233, 242).

6. The cultivation of the science and art of doubting judiciously and constructively.—The number of recent sympathetic discussions by psychologists and theologians of the meaning of doubt would indicate that leaders of thought have come rather generally to accept a constructive interpretation of it when kept within certain limits. The art of judicious doubting was first formulated by Aristotle, who saw in it the golden mean between the scepticism of the Sophists and the dogmatism of the popular mind:

'It will contribute towards one's object, who wishes to acquire a faculty in the gaining of knowledge, to doubt judiciously, for a subsequent acquisition in the way of knowledge is the solution of previous doubts. . . . They who carry on an investigation without doubting first are similar to persons ignorant where they ought to walk. . . . There is a necessity that a person should be better qualified for forming a judgment who has heard all the reasons, as it were, of adversaries and opposing disputants' (*Met.* ii. 1).

It has been an advance over even that great thinker to discover the necessary relation of doubt to the acts of knowledge and belief, and so to find the element of faith which lies embedded in 'honest doubt,' provided one 'clings ever to its sunnier side.' In this view doubt is an index of the direction in which life's deeper problems lie. This has been tersely formulated by Royce:

'In these matters the truly philosophic doubt is no external opinion of this or that person; it is the very essence of our thought. . . . The doubt is inherent in the subject-matter. This doubt is to be accepted as it comes and then to be developed in all its fullness and in all its intensity. For the truth of the matter is concealed in that doubt, as the fire is concealed in the stony coal. You can no more reject the doubt and keep the innermost truth than you can toss away the coal and hope to retain the fire. This doubt is the insight partially attained' (*Relig. Aspect of Philos.* p. 229 f.).

LITERATURE.—E. Zeller, *Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics*, tr. Reichel, new ed. 1880; M. M. Patrick, *Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism*, Cambridge, 1899; J. Owen, *Skeptics of the Italian Renaissance*, London, 1893; J. Cairns, *Unbelief in the 18th Century*, Edinburgh, 1881; Descartes, *Discourse on Method*, *Meditations*; Hume, *Treatise on Human Nature*, *Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*; Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*; Pascal, *Pensées*; J. H. Newman, *Grammar of Assent*, London, 1870; R. F. Horton, *My Belief: Answers to Certain Religious Difficulties*, New York, 1908; G. A. Gordon, *New Epoch for Faith*, Boston, 1901; H. Van Dyke, *The Gospel for an Age of Doubt*[6], New York, 1898; W. Hamilton, *Lectures on Metaphysics*, London, 1859; A. H. Lloyd, *The Will to Doubt*, New York, 1908; R. M. Wenley, *Modern Thought and the Crisis in Belief*, New York, 1909; A. J. Balfour, *A Defence of Philosophic Doubt*, London, 1879, also, *The Foundations of Belief*, London, 1895 ([8]1901); G. T. Ladd, *Philosophy of Knowledge*, New York, 1897, ch. xiii.; J. Dewey, *Studies in Logical Theory*, Chicago, 1903; G. B. Foster, *The Function of Religion*, Chicago, 1909, ch. iv.; J. Royce, *Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, Boston, 1897, chs. viii. ix. and x.; J. Sully, *Pessimism*, London, 1877; W. James, *Principles of Psychology*, London, 1891, ch. xxi.; G. F. Stout, *Analytic Psychology*, London, 1896, vol. i. ch. v., vol. ii. chs. v. and xi.; Knapp, 'Insanity of Doubt,' in *AJPs* iii. 1; E. D. Starbuck, *Psychology of Religion*, London, 1899, ch. xviii. See also Literature appended to § 1.

EDWIN D. STARBUCK.

DOUKHOBORS [in pronunciation the *k* is scarcely heard, and the accent is on the last syllable; there are other forms of the name, but this is the form now usually employed].—The name Doukhobors was used at least as far back as the year 1785, and means 'spirit-wrestlers,' as the Doukhobors claim to fight not with carnal weapons, but armed with the Spirit of Truth. They regard as the founder of their sect a retired non-commissioned Prussian officer who lived and taught in a village of the Kharkof Government about the year 1740, and who, it is thought, was a Quaker. There is every reason to believe this anonymous leader to have been a man of high character, and devoted to the service of his fellow-men. Towards the close of the 18th cent. Doukhobors were scattered from the Volga southward and westward over Southern Russia, with adherents in various other parts of the Empire. The Czar Paul on his accession adopted a policy of toleration towards them, but changed his mind when, in 1799, some Doukhobors openly preached that rulers were not needed. Alexander I. allowed many of the Doukhobors to come together from various parts of Russia and to form a settlement of their own at the 'Milky Waters,' near the sea of Azof (1801–1824). This was a turning-point in their history. From being a religious sect held together by unity of beliefs, anxious to propagate their views among their neighbours, the Doukhobors became a community, and ceased to be propagandists. During the same period, moreover, their leader, Savely Kapoustin, gained such power over his followers that he could declare himself to be an incarnation of Christ, and could claim for himself and his successors Divine honours; while, on the other hand, his adherents were forbidden to acknowledge that they recognized any earthly leader, so that, even to the present, they endeavour to confuse any outsider who may seek to study their beliefs. It would also appear that the successors of Kapoustin, all of whom gained control of great wealth by the introduction of communism among the Doukhobors, sanctioned the assassination of those who opposed them. At all events, the Russian Government made a thorough investigation of these charges, and in 1841 the Doukhobors were banished from the Milky Waters to the Wet Mountains in Georgia, where the wild hill-tribes were favourably impressed by their non-resisting neighbours, who, when molested, neither retaliated nor sought police protection. There they led a prosperous existence, and later numbered about 20,000. In 1887, when general conscription was introduced in the Caucasus, came the last crisis in their history. Not even the power of the whole Russian Empire

could induce them to join the army once they were persuaded that it is wrong for men to kill one another. Even when they endured it, the Doukhobors had regarded military service as a tyrannous imposition. Meanwhile Tolstoi and his friends, intentionally kept in ignorance of the theocratic claims of the Doukhobor leader, and believing the sect to be merely harmless Anarchists of the Tolstoi type, became interested on their behalf, and at last, in 1898, permission was given them to leave Russia. Far removed and destitute, they suffered much until rescued by the united efforts of Russian, English, and American philanthropists, who came to their assistance in defraying the expenses. Aided by the Canadian Government, 7363 Doukhobors were in 1899 established in Canada, leaving in the Caucasus about 12,000 who did not wish to emigrate. At present their number in Canada exceeds 9000. The welcome given to the first contingent in Canada was overpowering in its cordiality. A salute of artillery greeted them at the port, and the railway journey was a triumphal procession. They were in Canada three years before their leader, Piotr Verigin, was liberated by the Russian Government after sixteen years of exile. The Doukhobor settlements are situated in N.E. Assiniboia, about a day's drive from Yorkton; they stretch still farther to the N.E. over into Saskatchewan on the north, and touch slightly on Manitoba in the east.

The first known leader of the sect was Sylvan Kolesnikof (1750–1775). He was succeeded by Ilarion Pobirohin (1775–1785), and he by Savely Kapoustin (1790–1817), the founder of a Doukhobor dynasty, and the most remarkable of all the leaders. By him communism was also introduced among the Doukhobors. He was succeeded by his son Vassily Kalmikof (1817–1832), and he by Ilarion Kalmikof (1832–1841) and Peter Kalmikof (?–1864). Peter Kalmikof was succeeded by his wife Loukeriya, who proved an exceptionally able leader. She died in 1886, and was succeeded by Piotr Verigin, the present [1911] leader. But his accession provoked such hostility on the part of an important minority that the Government was forced to intervene and to send him into banishment. From his exile he issued mandates, influenced by Tolstoi's teachings, which seemed to the Doukhobors so severe that a considerable split took place in the sect. In consequence, as already noted, less than half of the Doukhobors followed Verigin, these being the ones who emigrated to Canada. Besides those Doukhobors who have been under the leadership of this dynasty, there are other bodies scattered throughout Russia, the extant accounts of whom are so fragmentary that it is difficult to present a consecutive history of them.

Their history shows that, unfortunately, their ills were not always from without. They did not always hold their faith with the same amount of zeal, and it is a history of constant backsliding and revivals. That these revivals were due to the advent of some worthy leader of men seems clearly demonstrated. Recognizing the Doukhobors as morally a race of giants, we must in speaking about them acknowledge the clearness of their perception of certain fundamental formal principles and the heroic tenacity with which they have upheld them. The sect has erred and split in pieces in the past, but the validity of certain principles to which they have testified will remain. The Doukhobor statement of truth is sometimes calm, moderate, persuasive, imparting a philosophic truth to conventional phrases, and at all dangerous points taking refuge in mysticism. At times, on the other hand, it is clear, resolute, radical, and contemptuous of all authority.

The tenets of these men, who will not acknowledge an earthly rulership, may be stated as far as possible to the following effect. There is one God. Their leader Pobirohin in the 18th cent. is said to have explicitly taught that God does not exist by Himself, but is inseparable from man. It is for the righteous in a way to give Him life—a curious doctrine, perhaps, but one which seems to be the mainspring of their innate character. They explain away rather than affirm the doctrine of the Trinity. Jesus Christ was the spirit of piety, purity, etc., incarnate. He is born, preaches, suffers, dies, and rises again spiritually in the heart of each believer. He is the Son of God; but in the same sense we also are the sons of God. The inward word reveals Him in the depths of our souls. It existed in all ages, and enlightens all who are ready to receive it, whether they are nominally Christians or belong to some other religious community. Our souls existed and fell before the creation of the material universe. The Church is a society selected by God Himself. It is invisible and scattered over the whole world; it is not externally marked by any common creed Not Christians only, but Jews, Muhammadans, and others may be members of it, if only they hearken to the inward word. The Scriptures must be understood figuratively to represent things that are inward and spiritual; and the Bible has less authority than 'the Living Word' (which may imply either an 'Inner Light' or the oral teachings of the head of the Doukhobors). The Christ within is the only true Hierarch and Priest. Therefore no external priest is necessary. The sons of God should worship God in spirit and in truth. The external sacraments have no efficacy. To baptize a child with water is unbecoming, but an adult baptizes himself with the word of truth by the true priest, Christ, with spirit and with fire. Confession is heartfelt contrition before God. The external sacraments are offensive to God, for Christ desires not signs but realities. The forms of worship of all Churches in the world are in themselves but dead signs, mere figures. To pray in temples made with hands is contrary to the injunction of the Saviour. Yet a son of God need not fear to enter a temple of any religious community. Icons are regarded as idols; the saints should not be prayed to; fasting should consist in fleeing from lusts. Marriage should be accomplished without any ceremonies; it needs only the will of those who are united in love to one another, and an inward vow in the souls of those who are marrying. An external marriage ceremony, apart from the inward marriage, has no meaning. The Doukhobors hold that no man and woman should continue to live together as man and wife unless they love and reverence each other. They wish to live up to their belief in 'peace at any price'; to go to war is forbidden. They refuse military service, which was the cause of their persecution in Russia and the reason of their emigration to Canada. Taxation, law courts, and all police regulations are condemned. Commerce is despised, and agriculture should be the great source of livelihood. All men are equal, and all rank and power is unnatural and mere usurpation. They believe that men gifted with reason should not use violence against others, but should influence one another by the appeal of mind to mind. Less violence, crime, vice, poverty (apart from the effects of persecution), superstition, luxury, or wretchedness is to be found among the Doukhobors than among their neighbours. They are sober, laborious, and frugal, clean and tidy in their houses and clothing, and attentive to their agriculture, which is their chief occupation. Those in Canada are almost all vegetarians, total abstainers, and non-smokers.

Under their present leader, Piotr Verigin, the

commune in Canada appears to be a financial success. He arrived there immediately upon his release from the Siberian mines, and has proved himself to be an eminently practical man. The Doukhobors adopted improved agricultural machinery, and established various mills, such as flour mills, oatmeal mills, saw mills, flax mills, etc. They also acquired a brick- and tile-making plant. The communism of their villages in Canada is centralized so that the communal funds of both the Doukhobor North and South Colonies are now all under the control of a Committee of Three. A large warehouse for the distribution of goods among the villages is situated in a convenient position on the Canadian Pacific Railway. The Doukhobor community is the largest experiment in pure communism that has ever been attempted. The Doukhobors of the Prince Albert Colony are more individualistic; they do not hold their land in common, and only to a small extent co-operate with the North and South Colonies.

Previous to Verigin's arrival in Canada, there was much confusion among the Doukhobors, who were too ignorant, under new conditions, to arrange their plans; and even after he had come there was some friction with the authorities owing to the Doukhobor reluctance to recognize any allegiance except to Verigin. It is about this question, indeed, that all the trouble of the Canadian Government with the sect has centred, and in consequence more than a thousand Doukhobors, forming the Prince Albert Colony, have formed a sub-sect, marked chiefly by their refusal to render to Verigin the honours to which he lays claim.

LITERATURE. — *Orest Novitsky Doukhobortsi ih Istoriya i Verooutchenie*, Kief, 1832; *Christian Martyrdom in Russia*, ed. by Vladimir Tchertkoff, with a preface by J. C. Kenworthy, and a concluding chapter by L. Tolstoi, London, 1897; Peter Verigin's *Letters*, Christchurch ed. 1902; *Obrashenie Kanadskih Douhoborof*, Geneva, 1901; *Tolstoï et les Doukhobors: faits historiques*, collected by J. W. Bienstock, Paris, 1902; Joseph Elkinton, *The Doukhobors: Their History in Russia, Their Migration to Canada*, Philadelphia, 1903; Lally Bernard, *The Canadian Doukhobor Settlements*, Toronto, 1899; 'P. A. Tverskoy,' *New Chapters of the Doukhobor Epic*; Aylmer Maude, *A Peculiar People: the Doukhobors*, New York, 1904; J. Gehring, *Sekten der russ. Kirche*, Leipzig, 1898; and various articles in Russian, American, English, and Canadian periodicals and newspapers.

A. A. STAMOULI.

DRAMA.

DRAMA (Introductory). — **1. Definition and affinities.**—In the most primitive sense of the term, the word 'drama' denotes simply 'deed,' 'action,' as in Æsch. *Agamem.* 532 f.:

> . . . Πάρις γὰρ οὔτε συντελὴς πόλις
> ἐξεύχεται τὸ δρᾶμα τοῦ πάθους πλέον,—

but before long it had gained the signification which it was henceforth to bear: 'a representation by persons (less frequently by puppets and the like), usually suitably disguised by dress, masks, etc., of acts believed to have been performed, or supposed to be performed, by other beings, the effect often enhanced by appropriate scenery,' etc. That this is true was perceived centuries ago by the most rigidly analytic of all thinkers, Aristotle, in whose *Poetics* tragedy and comedy are among those arts 'which are all in their general conception modes of imitation' (πᾶσαι τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι μιμήσεις τὸ σύνολον [i. 2]); 'hence, some say, the name of "drama" is given to such poems, as representing action' (ὅθεν καὶ δράματα καλεῖσθαί τινες αὐτά φασιν, ὅτι μιμοῦνται δρῶντας [iii. 3]; for the Aristotelian meaning of 'imitation' ['an idealized representation of human life—of character, emotion, action—under forms manifest to the sense'], see Butcher's discussion in his *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art*[3], London, 1902, ch. ii.).

Whether the idealization implied by Aristotle may fairly be sought in primitive drama, or in comedy as a whole at any period, or in certain specimens of modern tragedy, is not beyond question; but there still remains the fact that 'imitation'—and imitation only—accounts for the rise of drama and for the attraction which it holds to-day, as in the remote past when it originated. To-day, as in its primitive form, drama is designed to reproduce events which already have happened or which are supposed to be happening; and, since such reproduction normally requires the spoken word, it is obvious, as Aristotle already saw, that the drama is closely connected with the epic and the lyric, the difference being that the epic and the lyric require only the spoken word, while the drama always requires action and, except in rare instances, words as well. These exceptions are formed chiefly by the puppet plays, or marionettes (on which see Pischel, *Heimat des Puppenspiels*, Halle, 1900 [Eng. tr., London, 1902]; Magnin, *Hist. des marionettes*[2], Paris, 1862; Maindron, *Marionettes et guignols*, Paris, 1900; Rehm, *Buch der Marionetten*, Berlin, 1905), which, doubtless originating in India, have spread thence throughout Europe (finally degenerating into the 'Punch-and-Judy show') and also far into the East (cf. the interesting varieties discussed below in the 'Javanese and Further Indian' section). Another exception might possibly be considered to be formed by the modern 'moving pictures,' but these have no right to come under the dramatic category at all.

Drama is also linked to yet another art, the pictorial; but the imitation by means of pictorial art, besides lacking the spoken word, is static, whereas dramatic art is continuous throughout the time which the production may consume. Far otherwise is the case with two more of the fine arts—music (whether instrumental or vocal, or both together) and the dance (using this term in its widest connotation). Indeed, so closely connected with the drama is the dance that the Skr. term for 'drama' is *nāṭya*, which literally means 'dance'; and even on the modern stage an entire drama may be performed by pantomimic dance, without the utterance of a single world.

2. Origin.—By the Aristotelian definition of drama, which is neatly epitomized by Suidas and the *Etymologicum Magnum* as 'a doing, an action . . . and also those things mimetically performed by actors, as in a rôle' (ποίημα, πρᾶγμα, ὡς καὶ δρᾶσαι, πρᾶξαι. λέγεται δὲ δρᾶμα καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν θεατρικῶν μιμηλῶς γινόμενα ὡς ἐν ὑποκρίσει), it is an *imitation* of something. The question then arises, Of what or of whom? On the modern stage this imitation may be of some event known to have happened or supposed to have happened in past time, in both cases considerable elaboration, and even departure from strict historical or traditional accuracy, being allowable to heighten dramatic effect. Such

a drama may be represented by the *Herod* or by the *Ulysses* of Stephen Phillips. Or we may have an acted imitation of a purely fanciful series of events, as in the case of the greater number of Ibsen's plays. Yet it may well be questioned whether in origin the drama admitted any merely imaginary themes. This is, of course, a subject upon which it is extremely dangerous to dogmatize, and our knowledge of the mental processes of primitive man is by no means sufficient to warrant hard and fast conclusions.

The problem with regard to the origin of the drama is here precisely that which confronts us with regard to the folk-tales. It is perfectly true that at a relatively early period folk-tales may be told for the entertainment which they afford, and in like manner a primitive drama, because it chances to give pleasure to its spectators, may come to be regarded as pleasure-giving, and may conceivably be produced time and again for the mere purpose of pleasure. In spite of all this, it seems to the writer highly problematical whether any notion of pleasure, either to actors or to spectators, was intended by drama at its inception. The best evidence at our command seems to show that for primitive man life was by no means simple delight or poetic outlook upon the beauties of Nature, but rather a matter of deadly earnest, a struggle for existence, and a terror of mishap of which we, in modern days, can scarcely form an adequate conception. If such was the case, there can have been scant opportunity of amusement for amusement's sake. We have no right even to assume that the few carvings of primitive European man which have been preserved were made by him for his own delectation; for aught we know they may have been magical in purpose—the figure of a reindeer, for example, being drawn to gain power over reindeer; or they may have been historical—a picture of a reindeer that the particular artist had either tamed or killed (cf., for example, the American Indian 'winter counts'). This is a conjecture, but it is one that must be reckoned with. Again, in the popular stories told as fairy tales to children to-day there is unquestionably present an element—and that element the essential one—which was once believed to be no mere tale to amuse an idle moment, but a fact of grim and terrible reality. The story of Bluebeard is now a common nursery story which the most simple child knows was never 'really and truly so'; but there was undoubtedly a period when it was regarded as an historic and awful instance of the peril of broken tabu (see *CF*, ch. xi.). Throughout their history the drama and the folk-tale have been interlinked; and in India this was also true (cf. Gray, 'The Sanskrit Novel and the Sanskrit Drama,' in *WZKM* xviii. [1904] 48–54). Perhaps the 'dramatized novel' really reproduces at least a portion of the process through which the primitive drama passed. The same principle receives another exemplification from children's games. Without citing the mass of American Indian games to which Culin (*24 RBEW* [1907]) attributes a purely religious origin, it may here be sufficient simply to allude to the basal idea of the English and American game of 'London Bridge' (see *ERE* ii. 852[a]).

If stories, games, and the like were thus profoundly serious in their origin, may not the drama have been equally serious? It must not, of course, be forgotten that early man, like all his succeeding generations, was an imitative creature, and that within the sphere of everyday life he may have seen happening to his fellows events which awakened either his concern or his ridicule, and these he doubtless narrated to his companions with appropriate gestures. In the ludicrous events of this sort, and in the rough jests on his fellows which primitive man may have occasionally permitted himself, may well be found some of the germs of what was later to develop into comedy. Yet, on the whole, it would appear that drama took its origin, not from the imitation of men, but from the actions, whether legendary or mythological, of far more worshipful beings than men, that is to say, of Divine beings, the very gods themselves, as comes out most clearly in the masks worn in the Hopi *katcinas* (cf. below, p. 871 f.). Nor, if this hypothesis be correct, is the reason for such imitation far to seek. The motive was no idle one, nor had it merely a didactic end. It was probably rather one of the wide-spread manifestations of that homœopathic principle of primitive religion conventionally known as 'sympathetic magic.' By representation of an action believed to be performed, or in past time to have been performed, by worshipful beings, it was held that these worshipful beings would be constrained, were the ritual unerringly performed, to repeat the action in question. The drama would thus be, in origin, a part of magic, and, since the action represented by the drama would be desirable to the community, and since the chief needs of a primitive community are normally connected with the food supply and with other matters more or less conditioned by the powers of Nature, there is reason to suppose that the earliest drama was, in the main, associated with the worship of Nature-gods. The theory here advanced seems to receive confirmation from the development of the Egyptian drama (see *ERE*, vol. iii. pp. 99[b], 101 f.), especially when it is remembered that the ancient Egyptians were singularly tenacious of primitive concepts; so that in many ways they recall the far ruder religious principles which we may still find in vogue among the African *Naturvölker*. Yet more elaborate is the drama as a mimetic representation of the acts of worshipful beings among many American Indian tribes, such as the Kwakiutl (Boas, *Rep. U.S. Nat. Mus.*, 1895, p. 500 ff.), but more especially the Tusayans, the Hopi, and the Zuñi (Fewkes, *15 RBEW* [1897], p. 251 ff., *21 RBEW* [1903], p. 40 ff.; Stevenson, *23 RBEW* [1904], pp. 66 ff., 217 ff.). The actors are masked to represent the appropriate deities; and so important is the connexion of dancing with these primitive dramas that one is strongly tempted to seek in some similar phenomenon the origin of the designation of the Sanskrit drama by the simple term 'dance' (*nāṭya*). It is furthermore noteworthy that in the Hopi and Zuñi dramas religious ritual and mimetic representation are so interwoven that any strict limitation of the two is practically impossible. Indeed, Grosse (*Beginnings of Art*, New York, 1897, p. 224 f.; cf. von Schröder, *Mysterium und Mimus im Rigveda*, Leipzig, 1908, p. 13 ff.) goes so far as to declare that the drama 'appears, from the point of view of development of history, as a differentiated form of the dance.' In this connexion it is interesting to note that Hindu tradition declares that the first dramatic representations in the presence of the gods were of three sorts: *nṛtta*, simple dance; *nṛtya*, a dance with gestures, but without words; and *nāṭya*, a dance with words and gestures (von Schröder, p. 14).

There is yet another vital resemblance, not only between the American Indian and the Sanskrit drama, but also between both these and the Greek. This is song normally accompanied by instrumental music. Without here entering upon the theory of poetry, it will be sufficient to observe that the poem, so far as it relates to drama, falls into two large categories, which we may roughly describe as epic and lyric. Epic poetry is pre-eminently narrative, and originally it was perhaps simply a rhythmic narration of events first told in prose.

Lyric poetry, on the other hand, is produced under stress of some sort of emotion. The outworking of this dramatic use of epic and lyric may be seen at its best in the Greek tragedians; but in the Sanskrit drama, on the other hand, although the Hindus were well acquainted with the epic, we have what is in all probability a more primitive type than the Greek; for here we have, not epic and lyric, but prose and lyric, and the Hopi drama shows that, just as in the Sanskrit drama, the lyric is the essential portion of what we may term the text. A clear light is thrown on this matter by the Buddhist *jātakas*, in which the essential teachings of the tales are in verse, the prose being a mere expansion of them; and the same holds true of the *gāthās* in the northern Buddhistic *Lalitavistara*. There is, therefore, much to be said for the theory of Oldenberg (*ZDMG* xxxvii. [1883] 78–82; cf. von Schröder, p. 4 ff., and Geldner, *GIrP* ii. 29 f.) that certain hymns of the Rigveda and the Iranian *gāthās* originally contained a framework of prose, although only the verse, as being the most essential portion, has survived.

We have seen that drama is an imitation of the acts of worshipful beings; and this implies that, to the primitive mind, the actor is, for the time being, the deity whom he represents. It is for this reason that only those deities can be represented with whom the actor believes that he can become identified. In the most primitive stage of belief probably no deity would thus be excluded, but with the development of religion some Divine beings assume a character which no human being can hope to possess. It is universally recognized that the Greek drama was closely connected with the cult of Dionysus, and Miss Harrison is doubtless correct when she writes (*Proleg. to the Study of Gr. Rel.*[2], Cambridge, 1908, p. 568):

'Surely it is at least possible that the real impulse to the drama lay not wholly in "goat-songs" and "circular dancing places," but also in the cardinal, essentially dramatic conviction of the religion of Dionysos, that the worshipper can not only worship, but can become, can *be*, his god. Athene and Zeus and Poseidon have no drama, because no one, in his wildest moments, believed he could become and be Athene or Zeus or Poseidon. It is indeed only in the orgiastic religions that these splendid moments of conviction could come, and, for Greece at least, only in an orgiastic religion did the drama take its rise.'

The drama falls into two main types, which we conventionally term comedy and tragedy. In the very beginning there was probably no such division, for the acts of Divine beings are in themselves neither tragic nor comic; they are events, either desirable or undesirable, and consequently to be deprecated or sought; just as in life itself grave alternates with gay—all blended in one whole. Yet certain events, being more important than others, naturally receive emphasis, and certain seasons when the primitive dramas were presented lent their colour to the mimic action. It was particularly in the spring and at the harvest that the more joyous element was predominant. Many Sanskrit plays explicitly state that they were produced at the spring festival, and we know that the harvest feast was the time in ancient Italy when the *Fescennini* and other rude folk-dramas were enacted (Verg. *Georg.* ii. 385 ff.; Hor. *Ep.* II. i. 139 ff.; Tibull. II. i. 55 ff.; cf. also Liv. vii. 2), in which connexion it is noteworthy that the *Fescennini* were also sung at weddings (Catull. lxi. 122 f.; for further refs. see Teuffel-Schwabe, *Gesch. der röm. Lit.*[5], Leipzig, 1886, p. 5). The Greek word κωμῳδία in itself means simply 'revel song' (Meyer, *Handbuch der griech. Etymol.*, Leipzig, 1901–2, ii. 345), and Aristotle was, therefore, right when he said that comedy originated from the leaders of phallic songs (*Poet.* iv. 12). Every trait of comedy points to the conclusion that it was a manifestation of happiness at the re-juvenation and re-birth of Nature, and an expression of joy that Nature had given birth to the crops; but, by the wanton and even indecent spirit which this joy often excited, it was doubtless believed that, through the principle of sympathetic magic, a genesiac energy would be inspired in the Divine wedlock of heaven and earth, that similar, and even richer, fertility might be experienced in seasons to come. It is evident that what we call indecency must not be regarded as a primitive motive of comedy at its beginning; yet it must be confessed that libidinous pleasure was doubtless aroused by witnessing or taking part in these comedies. With increasing forgetfulness of the primary purpose of the comedy, the salacity which had at first been a mere incident, and designed (from the point of view of primitive man) for a good and desirable end, came to be the dominating motive; and it is the indecency of the comedy that accounts for many of the protests which, from the days of Tertullian to the present time, have been levelled with only too much justice against the entire drama.

Far different, in all probability, was the origin of the second great type of the drama—tragedy. It is true that this, as well as comedy, has been derived by more than one classical scholar from the same source—the worship of Dionysus (Harrison, p. 568 ff.; Gruppe, *Gr. Mythol. und Religionsgesch.*, Munich, 1906, p. 1436; Farnell, *CGS* v. 229 ff.); but this theory rests on slender evidence. It is far more probable to suppose, with Crusius (*Preuss. Jahrbücher*, lxxiv. [1893] 394), Hirt (*Indogermanen*, Strassburg, 1905–7, pp. 477 f., 727), and Ridgeway (address before the Hellenic Society, 3rd May 1904 [cf. *Athenæum*, no. 3995, p. 660], and especially in his *Origin of Tragedy*, Cambridge, 1910 [see esp. ch. i.]), that the ultimate source of tragedy was in the funeral songs and funeral games celebrated in honour of deceased heroes, the whole being performed to honour and appease the dead. A noteworthy instance here was the case of Adrastus, a hero-king of Sikyon, where his ἡρῷον stood in the market-place. Regarding him, Herodotus (v. 67) writes that

'the Sikyonians were wont especially greatly to honour Adrastus. . . . Both in other respects the Sikyonians honoured Adrastus, and in addition they celebrated his misfortunes by tragic choruses (τὰ πάθεα αὐτοῦ τραγικοῖσι χοροῖσι ἐγέραιον), not honouring Dionysus, but Adrastus. But Cleisthenes gave away (ἀπέδωκε; for the force of this verb, see Ridgeway, *Tragedy*, p. 28 ff., and cf. the parallel ἀπελόμενος ἔδωκε in this same passage) the choruses to Dionysus, and the rest of the sacrifice to Melanippos.'

This theory finds a support in the hypothesis of Hazeu, to be cited below (p. 896), that the Javanese *wayang* was originally a form of ancestor-worship; and Forster (*Reise um die Welt*, ed. Leipzig, 1843, i. 330 f.) saw primitive dramas produced at funeral feasts on the Society Islands.

Here, at a funeral, two young girls danced to the music of three drums, and 'zwischen den Acten fuhrten drei Mannsleute ein pantomimisches Drama auf, in welchem schlafende Reisende vorgestellt wurden, denen einige Diebe mit grosser Geschicklichkeit die Bagage wegstahlen, unerachtet sich jene, grösserer Sicherheit wegen, rund um dieselbe herum gelegt hatten.'

A further confirmation of the theory here advocated appears to lie in the essentially epic movement of the action of the Greek tragedy, and there may be more meaning than is commonly supposed in Plato's characterization of Homer (*Theætet.* 152 E) as 'the foremost poet of tragedy.' In fact, there seems to the writer to be scant reason for connecting the rise of Greek tragedy with the worship of Dionysus, who was essentially a revel god, or, indeed, with any other specific Greek deity. Primarily the son of Semele, an ancient Thracian goddess of Mother Earth, Dionysus was, it is true, later identified with Attis, Adonis, and Osiris, and in an obvious way he was regarded also as a chthonic deity and as releasing from the under world (see the full discussions in Harrison, ch. viii.; Gruppe, pp. 1407–1440; *CGS* v. ch. v.); but

all this seems scarcely sufficient to account for the rise of tragedy from this cult, whereas, on the principles set forth above, his connexion with comedy is readily explicable. At most his association with tragedy rests on the slender logic that, since comedy was (reasonably enough) connected with his cult as a Nature-deity, and since tragedy, like comedy, was a division of drama, therefore tragedy also must be associated with him. Cf. and ct. the 'Greek' art. below.

In this connexion it may not be out of place to consider the original meaning of the word 'tragedy,' which the writer hopes to discuss in fuller detail in the more appropriate pages of a technical philological journal, giving merely his summarized conclusions here. The conventional derivation of *τραγῳδία* from *τράγος* + *ᾠδή*, 'goat-song,' while possible so far as mere phonology and noun-composition are concerned, has long been felt to be unsatisfactory on any of the theories (1) that a goat was the prize for the best performance; (2) that a goat was sacrificed at or during the performance of the play; or (3) that the actors were dressed in goat-skins. It has accordingly been supposed by Miss Harrison (most recently in *Proleg.* p. 420 f.) that tragedy really means 'spelt-song' (from *τράγος* in its meaning of 'a mess of groats made of wheat, spelt,' etc.). This, however, seems little more satisfactory on the score of semasiology. Since comedy is repeatedly contrasted with tragedy, and since 'comedy' almost certainly means, as already noted, 'revel song,' one would expect 'tragedy' to have some meaning antithetic to 'comedy.' If, then, in view of the unsatisfactory derivations commonly assigned to the word, we may resort to the principles of comparative philology for a solution, it may be suggested that the first part of *τραγῳδία*, *τραγο-* (the second part, *ᾠδία*, plainly means 'singing'), is etymologically connected with O. Norse *þrekr*, 'strength, courage, daring,' Anglo-Saxon *þracu*, 'attack, fury, conflict, pressure' (for further, less certain, cognates, reference may be made to the projected article). This would be the second full grade of the Indo-Germanic base **tereg*, and the base meaning appears to be 'mighty, bold, terrible,' or the like. On this hypothesis, the meaning of *τραγῳδία* would be 'the singing of bold (or terrible) things'—a signification that would not only contrast admirably with the 'revel song,' but would also correspond with all known characteristics of the tragedy, as well as harmonize with the theory of the origin of this type of drama favoured in this article, that it was primarily connected with the funeral rites of deceased heroes (cf. also the noteworthy passage of the *Etymologicum Gudianum*, *s.v.* *κωμῳδία*: Κωμῳδία *τραγῳδίας διαφέρει· κωμῳδία γὰρ ἔστι βιωτικῶν πραγμάτων διήγησις· τραγῳδία δὲ ἡρωικῶν παθῶν*).

The original functions of the drama, as here outlined, were soon obscured among all those peoples, as the Greeks and Hindus, with whom it became a distinct form of literature and amusement. The two features which now became prominent, and which have remained the most important ever since, were the light vein of comedy and the heavy vein of tragedy, while the religious foundation survived only in isolated and obscure fragments. Thus comedy became, as with Aristophanes, a means of satire, whether of the 'suffragettes' of his day (as in the *Ecclesiazusæ*) or of the radicalism of Euripides, whom he lashed, and with very good reason. With the rise of the 'New Comedy,' as represented by the fragments of Menander and, most fully, by Plautus and Terence, we have a comedy of manners which finds its analogues in many of the better-class comedies of the present day. India is conspicuous for having no tragedy, though there are scenes, as in the *Nāgānanda* and the *Mālatīmādhava*, which closely approach the tragic, just as in our melodrama.

3. Divisions.—It seems scarcely necessary to enter here into a discussion of all the possible subdivisions of the drama, whether of Polonius's 'tragedy, comedy, history, pastoral, pastoral-comical, historical-pastoral, tragical-historical, tragical-comical-historical-pastoral,' of the minute Skr. classification into ten 'forms' (*rūpakas*) and eighteen 'sub-forms' (*uparūpakas*; see Lévi, *Théâtre indien*, Paris, 1890, i. 140 ff.), or of the more technical division into classic and romantic tragedy, romantic drama, melodrama, emotional drama, spectacular drama, musical drama, classic and romantic comedy, comedy of manners, farce, burlesque, burletta, comedietta, and vaudeville (Hennequin, *Art of Playwriting*, New York, 1890, chs. vii.–ix.); nor is it needful to consider the problems of the unities, climaxes, catastrophes, scenery, 'business,' and the like. It is, however, worth while to note two forms of drama—opera, and the morality. The opera, which is a drama accompanied by music, and often by an elaborate ballet, is a survival of the very primitive type in which the dialogue was regularly associated with instrumental and vocal music and with dancing; and the writer has elsewhere ventured to suggest that the whole Sanskrit drama 'is to be compared with an opera rather than with a play' (*JAOS* xxvii. [1906] 5). The other type of play, the morality, is of particular value for the student of religion, for in it there is a deliberate effort to present, under allegorical form, a distinct moral or religious teaching. This form of play, to which more special attention will be given in art. MIRACLE PLAYS, is found not only in Europe, but also in India, as is evinced by the Skr. *Prabodhachandrodaya* ('Rise of the Moon of Intellect,' tr. J. Taylor, Bombay, 1812, [3]1893); and that the morality has not ceased to charm in our own day is shown by the welcome accorded, both in Britain and America, to the charming production of *Everyman*. Finally, it may be noted that, as the writer once heard Brander Matthews say in a lecture, the most primitive form of drama to be found at the present day is that in the lowest type of music hall, with its rough jests and horseplay, its dances (all often of a somewhat questionable character), and its scanty plot.

4. Actors.—The position of the actor in the primitive drama is, of course, a most honourable one; for, where the player is enacting the rôles of the gods themselves, he cannot be other than a most highly respected person; the esteem accorded him is precisely what is accorded, *e.g.*, to the actors in the Passion Play of Oberammergau. But this position of honour does not last long; and in China, Japan, India (cf. the Skr. proverbs given by Böhtlingk in his *Ind. Sprüche*, St. Petersburg, 1870–73, nos. 1593, 2235, 2278, 3165, 5315, 6284), and Rome the actor was regarded as an outcast, this, doubtless, being due, as Krause (*Pariavölker der Gegenwart*, Leipzig, 1903, p. 3 f.; cf. Beneke, *Von unehrlichen Leuten*, Leipzig, 1863, p. 21) says, to the fact that the actor's profession demanded a roving life, so that he could not belong to any regular community, while his subordination of his own personality to the rôles which he was to play robbed him of respect in the eyes of the spectators. In consequence, the actors suffered certain civic disabilities, as when they were debarred from being witnesses in courts of law, or when, as in China, their descendants were forbidden to compete in public examinations for three generations (cf. also Post, *Afrikan. Jurisprudenz*, Oldenburg, 1887, i. 171 f.). Equal contempt was manifested towards actresses, so that in India they were classed among courtesans and bawds (Schmidt, *Beitr. zur ind. Erotik*, Leipzig, 1902, pp. 283, 778 f.); and, as in India and China, many peoples have forbidden women to appear upon the stage, their rôles being taken by men and boys. More or less social ostracism still attaches to the great majority of those connected with the stage, and it is unfortunately true that the lives of many players, with their flagrant disregard of social conventions, and even of common morality, have given only too much reason for disfavour. To the peculiar temptations of stage life, increased greatly by the wanderings to which the actor is normally doomed, only allusion is necessary. Yet it must not be forgotten that this darker side is, in reality, nothing but an unhappy incident; only the faults are generally known, and the brighter and nobler side of the actor's life is too little recognized. Accurate statistics of the moral and intellectual standard of the

acting profession would, doubtless, compare favourably with similar standards of many other professions.

5. **The ethical aspect of the drama.**—Outside the Christian world this problem seems to have received slight consideration. The Buddhist 'Ten Precepts' for monks include 'abstinence from the sight of dancing, singing, music, and shows' (*naccagītavāditavisūkadassanā veramaṇī* [*Khuddakapāṭha*, 3; cf. the citations in Lévi, ii. 54]); but the history of Buddhism proves that this interdict was ill obeyed (Lévi, i. 319–323). The theoretical position of Jainism against the theatre was the same (*Āyāraṁgasutta*, II. xi. 14), with the same disregard of it in actual life; and we have not only the fine Buddhistic drama *Nāgānanda*, but also such Jain plays as the *Rājimatiprabodha* (Lévi, i. 323 f., ii. 57).

The chief objection to the drama from the ethical standpoint has arisen from Christianity. In the case of the pagan dramas this can readily be understood. They were pagan, and countenanced idolatry (Tertullian's first objection to them in his *de Spectaculis*); they were frankly immoral; and the ascetic tendency of Christianity was against such idle amusements (cf. 'Roman' art. below). With the decay of paganism and the creation of a purer sentiment the first two objections disappeared, while the value of the stage as an educational factor led the Church to encourage the drama; nor is there any doubt that the theatre was a powerful agent in bringing the less educated to a knowledge of Bible history and in enforcing the Church's moral teachings (see MIRACLE PLAYS). The whole tradition of the Catholic Church, whether Roman or Anglican, has been, like that of Lutheranism in Protestantism, distinctly favourable to a pure and lofty drama. Far different was the position of Reformed Protestantism. The most fervent admirers of Calvin, Zwingli, Knox, and their followers would be the most unwilling to deny that these men, one and all, set their faces against everything that they deemed folly; nor can the warmest advocate of the theatre deny that much had come into the drama to arouse antagonism even from men of more compromising type. But, unfortunately, they, as the German proverb has it, 'shook out the child with the bath,' and condemned the theatre utterly. In England, attacks on the stage have come almost entirely from the Puritans, as in Northbrooke's *Treatise wherein Dicing, Dauncing, vaine Playes or Enterluds . . . are reproved* (1577–79, ed. Collier, for the Shakespeare Society, 1843), Gosson's *School of Abuse* (1579, ed. Collier, 1843), Stubb's *Anatomie of Abuses* (1583, ed. Furnivalle, New Shakespeare Soc., ser. vi., 1876–82), and especially Prynne's *Histrio-Mastrix* (1632; on all these see Ward, *Hist. of Eng. Dramatic Lit.*, London, 1899, i. 459–461, iii. 239–245). But suppression of the theatre was hopeless, and has ever since remained hopeless. The Reformed Church has, nevertheless, maintained its position; and in this it has been followed by the Wesleyans and, on the whole, by the Baptists, as well as by many of the smaller sects of the United States, though here, too, practice lags far behind precept. On the other hand, the Anglican Church, by its Actors' Alliance, has set an example which other communions might do worse than follow.

But is the suppression of the theatre desirable? The writer is inclined to doubt it. That there is much represented on the stage which is utterly vile is only too apparent; and that should be crushed (cf. also art. CENSORSHIP). On the other hand, there is an abundance that is of the highest ethical value, and this becomes the more important when it is remembered that the theatre is largely patronized by the non-churchgoing classes. Without entering into a technical discussion of Ibsen, it would seem that his dramas are full of moral lessons of a Puritanical sternness: the fearful consequences of the sins of the fathers in *Ghosts*, the need of absolute confidence between husband and wife in *A Doll's House*, or the scathing condemnation of hypocrisy in *The Pillars of Society*. And Ibsen is but one of a host of dramatists who for centuries have conveyed through the stage lessons of value for mankind who might otherwise never have received them. There is, moreover, in humanity a real need for the stage; had it not been so, the long-waged war on the theatre would have been crowned with success. From this point of view the question of attending the theatre merges into that of amusements (*q.v.*). The theatre has perhaps yet another *raison d'être*, often overlooked. In a famous passage (*Poet.* vi. 2) Aristotle defines tragedy as 'an imitation of an action that is serious, complete, and of a certain magnitude . . . through pity and fear effecting the proper purgation of these emotions' (*μίμησις πράξεως σπουδαίας καὶ τελείας, μέγεθος ἐχούσης . . . δι' ἐλέου καὶ φόβου περαίνουσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν*); and this has been admirably explained by Butcher (*op. cit.* ch. vi.) as meaning that the witnessing of a tragedy rouses in the spectator emotions of fear and pity which expel those same emotions that are lying latent within himself, while 'in the pleasurable calm which follows when the passion is spent, an emotional cure has been wrought.' On this principle, the attendance on any good drama would, in like manner, effect a pleasurable and healthy excitation, and a discharge of emotions, latent indeed, but so seldom aroused as to be in danger of atrophy.

LITERATURE.—The bibliography of the drama is enormous, though much is irrelevant in the present connexion, and more special branches will be given in the literature appended to the following special sections. This section has been intentionally restricted to problems of the origin, primitive purpose, and general ethics of the drama; and the history—here omitted—will be more appropriately discussed in the following sections. There is no complete history of the drama, the most important works on which are Klein, *Gesch. des Drama's* (14 vols., Leipzig, 1865–86); Prölss, *Gesch. des neueren Dramas* (Leipzig, 1880–83); Petit de Julleville, *Histoire du théâtre en France* (Paris, 1880 ff.); Berendt, *Schiller—Wagner* (Berlin, 1901); Ward, *Hist. of Eng. Dramatic Lit. to the Death of Queen Anne* (3 vols., London, 1899); Seilhamer, *Hist. of the American Theatre* (Philadelphia, 1888–91). For interesting studies of some of the great modern dramatists, see Archer, *English Dramatists of To-Day* (London, 1882); Huneker, *Iconoclasts* (New York, 1905); Hale, *Dramatists of To-Day* (New York, 1905). Special attention is due to the edition and commentary on the *Poetics* of Aristotle by Butcher (*Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art*[3], London, 1902), and Ridgeway, *Origin of Tragedy, with Special Reference to the Greek Tragedians* (Cambridge, 1910). The technical side is conveniently treated by Freytag, *Technique of the Drama* (tr. MacEwan[3], Chicago, 1900); Woodbridge, *The Drama, its Law and Technique* (Boston, 1898); Price, *Technique of the Drama* (New York, 1892); Hennequin, *Art of Playwriting* (New York, 1890). For an interesting form of primitive drama among the Manses of N.W. Siberia, see Gondatti, *Traces of Paganism among the Aborigines of N.W. Siberia* [Russ.] (Moscow, 1888; epitomized by Schmidt, in *Cultur der Gegenwart*, i. part 7 ['Die orientalischen Literaturen'], Leipzig, 1906, p. 21 f.).

LOUIS H. GRAY.

DRAMA (American).—In America, particularly in Mexico and Peru, the drama reached a relatively high degree of development. Even at an earlier stage, North American Indian pantomimic dances, usually named after the animals imitated, show an approximation to the drama. Thus, among the Dakotas, a youth on admission to full tribal rights was clothed in a bearskin and pantomimically hunted by the members of the tribe—a scene which reminds one of the Greek mimetic dance described by Xenophon (*Anab.* vi. 1). Among the Puebloan Tusayans and Hopis an elementary form of drama is found in the *katcinas*, which are primarily 'spirits of the ancients of the

Hopis, and personations of them by men bear the symbols which are supposed to have characterized these ancients' (Fewkes, 'Hopi Katcinas,' p. 16). In a secondary meaning *katcina* also connotes a dance in which these heroes are impersonated; and such dramas are presented at stated festivals in honour of the arrival or departure of the heroes or gods. Other *katcinas*, while equally religious in origin and spirit, are given only occasionally. Some *katcinas*, such as the *powamû*, or bean-planting, are performed partly in the open air, and occupy a number of days; but others are given in the *kivas*, or assembly-houses, and approximate more closely to the drama proper. One of the latter class, described in considerable detail by Fewkes (*op. cit.* pp. 40–51; *Proceedings of the Washington Academy of Sciences*, Washington, 1900, ii. 607–626), is noteworthy for its elaborate mimetic dances, while dialogue, as in the Polynesian dramas, plays but a minor part. In the Hopi play, moreover, scenery is employed and stage properties are used, while marionettes are not unknown. Costume is, of course, an important feature of the *katcinas*, and the masks are a characteristic part of the entire ceremony (cf. the collection reproduced by Fewkes, *op. cit.* plates i.–lxiii.).

In Yucatan a form of drama was known, in which 'buffoons' (*balzam*) represented ancient legends, interspersed with jests at the expense of local dignitaries; but such plays seem to have had no connexion with religion (Fancourt, *History of Yucatan*, London, 1854, p. 122). Both in ancient Mexico and in Peru mimetic dances were known (Klein, *Gesch. des Drama's*, Leipzig, xi. [1874] 97 f.), the former being in great part fertility-ceremonies, and accompanied with phallic gestures. The Aztecs also had, however, a more developed drama, of which an example has survived in the *Rabinal-Achi*, a sort of ballet with dialogue. This play is concerned with the tragic fate of Prince Cavec Quiche Achi, who is captured after a long struggle by the hero, Rabinal-Achi. As a dramatic production the *Rabinal-Achi* is of little value, excepting as an interesting example of a play produced by a people devoid of contact with other nations possessing a developed drama.

The Inca *amantas*, according to Garcilasso de la Vega, ii. 26 (tr. by Markham, Hakluyt Society, London, 1869, xli. 194), composed both comedies and tragedies, which were presented at important festivals before the king and high nobles, while the actors, who received rich presents for their services, were themselves men of rank. The tragedies 'always related to military deeds, triumphs, and victories, or to the grandeur of former kings and of other heroic men. The arguments of the comedies were on agriculture and familiar household subjects. . . . They did not allow improper or vile farces; but all the plays were on decorous and important subjects, the sentences being such as befitted the occasion.'

The only Inca drama which has survived in its entirety, however, is the play of *Ollanta*, which seems to date from the reign of the Inca Huayna Ccapac, in the first decade of the 16th century. The scene is laid in the reign of the Inca Yupanki, in the early part of the 15th cent., and the theme is one of love. Ollanta, raised from a humble station to the dignity of a chief by the Inca Pachacutek, falls in love with Cushi Ccoyllur, the daughter of Pachacutek, but his suit is denied by the Inca. Ollanta then declares war upon his sovereign, and, though at first successful, is at last betrayed to his enemy. Meanwhile the princess had been imprisoned, and in her cell had given birth to a daughter, who, however, was allowed her freedom. The captive Ollanta, condemned to death by Yupanki, who had succeeded Pachacutek in the course of the ten years' war, is later spared, and even declared the heir-apparent to the throne. At this juncture, Ollanta's daughter, learning that her mother is a captive, implores the Inca to release her, whereupon he repairs to the cell, accompanied by his retinue, and in the happy *dénouement* Cushi Ccoyllur is re-united with Ollanta. The drama may well have a historic basis, and it is noteworthy that it contains songs which strikingly correspond to the Greek chorus.

Another Inca drama has been preserved, the *Usca Paucar*, treating of the love of its hero for the beautiful Ccori-ttica; but it has been so changed by later interpolations that it is of relatively little value for a knowledge of the Inca drama. While a generalization on such scant data may be deemed hazardous, it may perhaps be suggested that in the bloody fate of the Aztec Rabinal-Achi, who dances to his death on the sacrificial stone amid twelve eagles and wild beasts, as contrasted with the beauty and pathos, with a happy ending, of the drama of *Ollanta*, there is a suggestion of the cardinal traits of the ancient Mexicans and Peruvians themselves. Dramatically, moreover, the Aztec play is far inferior to the Inca—the former a mass of repetition, the latter a work of art, which is most closely paralleled in its supreme devotion to the theme of love, as Klein has well pointed out, with the drama of ancient India. In the number of acts, exceeding the conventional five, and in the disregard of the 'unities,' the *Ollanta* presents another point of similarity with the Sanskrit drama.

LITERATURE.—Gerland, *Anthropol. der Naturvölker*, iii. 210 (Leipzig, 1862); **Fewkes**, 'Tusayan Katcinas,' in *15 RBEW* (1897) 251–313, 'Hopi Katcinas,' *21 RBEW* (1903) 1–126; **Klein**, *Gesch. des Drama's*, iii. 513–598 (Leipzig, 1866); **Preuss**, 'Phallische Fruchtbarkeits-Dämonen als Träger des altmexikanischen Dramas,' in *AA*, new series, i. 129–188; **Brasseur de Bourbourg**, *Gramm. de la langue quichée* (Paris, 1862; containing the text and a French tr. of the *Rabinal-Achi*); **Tschudi**, 'Ollanta, ein altperuanisches Drama,' in *DWAW*, philos.-hist. Classe, xxiv. 169–384; **Fletcher**, 'Dramatic Representation,' in *Bull. 30 BE*, part 1, p. 400 (Washington, 1907).

LOUIS H. GRAY.

DRAMA (Arabic).—It is a strange feature of Arabic literature (otherwise so rich, developed even to the point of degeneration) that the art of the drama has never advanced beyond the very crudest beginnings.[1] Even to-day there is no Arabic drama; there is only a drama in the Arabic language; for all plays that have appeared in the language of Muhammad during the last fifty years are nothing but translations, or, at best, imitations, of European works; and, before this period, all that was written and played in the form of dialogue can hardly be called drama in the real meaning of the word; it was simply a rudimentary form of it.

The earliest traces of Arabic dramatics are to be found, as Horovitz says, in the art of the *ḥākī*,[2] or *muqallid*, the imitator of dialectic[3] and personal peculiarities. This individual, though not now known under the same name, is still to be frequently seen in modern Egypt. A certain Aḥmad Fahīm al-Fār in Cairo, for instance, enjoys a wide-spread popularity because of his ability to reproduce the cries of different animals and to depict comic scenes of all kinds, especially those of harem and peasant life.[4] Women, in particular, are very fond of such

[1] Richard F. Burton, in the terminal essay of his tr. of *The Thousand Nights and a Night* (Benares, 1885), vol. x. p. 166, says: 'Turkey is the only Moslem country which has dared to produce a regular drama.'

[2] Horovitz, *Spuren griech. Mimen im Orient* (Berlin, 1905), pp. 18–21; Sachau, *Am Euphrat und Tigris* (Leipz. 1900), p. 65.

[3] Dialectic peculiarities still play an important part in the Arabic farce, the shadow-play, and the puppet-show.

[4] Aḥmad al-Fār, known under the name Ibn Rābiya, works with a troupe of about 12 persons, exclusively men, who also play the female rôles. His most popular pieces are the *faṣl eṭṭuruqi*, a most indecent farce picturing the deeds of a charlatan who expels a devil, an *'afrīt*, from a woman; the *faṣl eṣṣa'idi*, wherein

performances. A similar figure in the streets of Cairo is the well-known, but nowadays rarely seen, fun-maker, *'Alī Kākā*,[1] who appears occasionally at *mūlids* (birth festivals), and at the fair held every week on the open square below the Citadel. He is the prototype of the coarse, half-idiotic, clownish peasant who, to the music of two flutes and a *darabukka* (earthenware drum), performs ape-like, obscene dances and makes absurd jokes. He goes barefoot, and wears a bent tail of stiffened cotton; in one hand he holds a long peasant's stick (*nabbūt*), and in the other a so-called *farqilla*, a kind of long, thick, noisy, but harmless, whip of twisted cotton, with which he constantly lashes his musicians, and even his audience.

The recitations of the story-tellers (*rāwī*), who were formerly to be found throughout the Arabic Orient, and who related in public places tales from the *Arabian Nights*, had without doubt, as the manner of the stories themselves proves, a dramatic character;[2] and this is certainly so in the case of the recitations of the modern epigones of the *rāwīs*—the *šu'ara* and *muhaddithīn*,[3] who, to the accompaniment of the *rubāba* (a kind of stringed instrument), recite in coffee-houses the stories of 'Antar, Abū Zaid, Ẓāhir Bībars,[4] and other national heroes. Worthy of note is the fact that Dozy,[5] quoting Pedro de Alcala, gives for the word *šā'ir* the meaning 'acteur, qui joue un rôle (representador de comedias, de tragedias).' Female reciters are also occasionally, though not often, seen at fairs in Cairo.

Of this kind of folk-literature the classical and highest expression was reached by the poets of the *Maqāmāt*, by Hamadhānī[6] (967–1007), Ḥarīrī[7] (1054–1122), and many others. The *maqāma*, called by Chenery[8] 'a kind of dramatic anecdote,' relates, in a most vivid and animated but somewhat artificial style, the deeds and speeches of wandering scholars, beggars, and jugglers, and has not even yet entirely disappeared from modern Arabic literature.[9]

In spite, however, of all these preparatory mimic and dramatic elements in their literature, the Arabs, as has already been stated, have never found their way to the actual drama. At all events, there seems to be no positive proof of the existence of an early Arabic stage. If, occasionally, we meet with the word *ḫijāl* or *ḫajāl*,[10] it means, in all probability, nothing more than the already mentioned *taqlīd*,[11] the mimicry of comical personal characteristics, or the presentation of short, loosely connected scenes, not a theatrical piece. The complete lack of all dramatic texts, the absence even of the description of any dramatic representation, would be, when one considers the numerous chronicles of mediæval Arabic amusements, an altogether too remarkable omission to be regarded as possible, had there been a stage. The earliest description of an Arabic drama known to the present writer is that given by the famous Danish traveller, Carsten Niebuhr,[1] who visited Cairo a hundred and thirty years ago; but even this performance, which bears a close resemblance to the scenes of Aḥmad al-Fār, seems to correspond in form only, not in substance, to our conception of the drama.

The reasons for this curious failure of the Arabic mind to produce anything really dramatic have been discoursed upon at length by Jacob in his history of the shadow-play.[2] He points out that the Muhammadan view of life, with its autocratic idea of God and fate, has absolutely no comprehension of individual conflict, of rebellion against the 'eternal mover,' the Muḥarrik, or of any combat between will and duty, and has therefore no comprehension of the dramatic. Joy in tragedy, that most individualistic form of dramatic art, must seem to the passively feeling and thinking Arab a very great absurdity. The artistic pleasure which we feel in the beauty of the awe-inspiring, in magnificent decline, in the grandeur of the desperate battle of life, without hope and without success, is entirely foreign to the Arab. His ideal hero is too practical to allow himself to be uselessly conquered, and no Arab poet would venture to represent him in such a manner. He does not defy fate: he gets round it! It never occurs to the Arab to try to determine the main lines of his own life, for 'there is no strength or power but in God the Great'; his eye is turned towards that which lies nearest, to the detail, that which is decorative only; all Arabic art is nothing but detail work, merely putting on the finishing touches; it is never original creating; the great decisive tendencies and forms of art have always come to the people of Muhammad from other lands.[3] Their manner of thinking, too, is epic, and opposed to all rapid development. For them accumulation, repetition of the same *motif*, is not tiring or an evidence of bad taste; on the contrary, they consider it a most effective artistic principle. Quick action in the progress of a story, that which is really dramatic, is therefore actually unpleasant to the Arab. He relates everything with epic breadth, never referring to an already related incident without repeating the whole story to the point of tediousness. Tension in the plot is unknown to him; when he has found a theme that pleases him, he makes variations upon it until the subject is completely exhausted. This is well illustrated by Arabic music. A European listener, after half an hour of such music, with its constant reiteration of the same series of tones, its interminable variations of the same melody consisting of scarcely a dozen notes, sinks into a state of despair, whereas the Oriental never has enough of it.

The only form of dramatic art which, though probably not originated by the Arabs, has nevertheless been developed to a certain degree by them, is the shadow-play, the *ḫajāl eḍḍill*.[4] The history of the Arabic shadow-play, thanks to the thorough investigations of Jacob,[5] and to the publications of Littmann,[6] Kern,[7] Prüfer,[8] Wetzstein-Jahn,[8] and, lately, those of Kahle,[10] is now, in its essential points, very well known. There is undoubtedly no question that the shadow-play was brought to the Muhammadan peoples of the Orient from the Far East.[11] Which of those peoples was the first to cultivate this curious kind of theatrical art, it is

are described the adventures in Cairo of a stupid, yet shrewd, peasant of Upper Egypt; and the *faṣl:el-Ḥigāz*, the pilgrimage to Mecca. Aḥmad al-Fār's performances are given only at weddings and other private festivities.

[1] See Kern in the Appendix (p. 104) to Horovitz's work cited above.

[2] Burton (*op. cit.* x. 9, note 1): 'No wonder that the *Nights* has been made the basis of a national theatre amongst the Turks.'

[3] An exact description of the *šu'ara* and *muḥaddithīn* and of their performances is to be found in Lane's *Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians*, 1836, chs. 21–23.

[4] The subjects of these recitations have all been published in romance form. See, for example, *Sīret eẓ-Ẓāhir Bibars* (Cairo, 1908, 50 vols.); *Sīret Banī Hilāl* (Beirūt, 1891, 52 vols.); *Tagrībet Banī Hilāl* (Beirūt, n.d., 26 vols.); and *Sīret 'Antara* (Cairo, A.H. 1306–11, 24 vols.).

[5] *Suppl. aux Dict. arabes* (Leyden, 1881), vol. i. p. 764.

[6] See Brockelmann, *Gesch. der arab. Litt.* (Weimar, 1898), vol. i. pp. 93–95.

[7] *Ib.* i. 276 f.

[8] *The Assemblies of Al-Ḥarīrī* (London, 1867), Preface, p. 40.

[9] For the dramatic elements in the *maqāmāt* poetry, see Horovitz, *op. cit.* pp. 21–27.

[10] For the meaning and literature of the word *ḫajāl*, see Jacob, *Gesch. des Schattentheaters* (Berlin, 1907), p. 23 f. Dozy quotes Pedro de Alcala as giving for the meaning of the words *la'ābu'l-ḫijāl*, 'momo contrahazedor.'

[11] See Jacob, *op. cit.* p. 100 f.

[1] *Reisebeschreibung nach Arabien und anderen umliegenden Ländern*, vol. i. (Copenhagen, 1774) p. 187.

[2] Jacob, *op. cit.* p. 93 f.

[3] *Ib.* pp. 25–27.

[4] In using the Arab. name for the shadow-play, we have chosen its Egyp. dialect pronunciation (classic *ḫijālu' ẓẓulli*).

[5] 'Zur Gesch. des Schattenspiels' (*Keleti Szemle*, i. [Budapest, 1900] 233–236); 'Drei arab. Schattenspiele aus dem 13. Jahrhundert' (*ib.* ii. [1901] 76 f.); *Das Schattentheater, in seiner Wanderung vom Morgenland zum Abendland* (Berlin, 1901); *Textproben aus dem Escorial-Codex des Muḥammad ibn Dānījāl* (Erlangen, 1902); *Gesch. des Schattentheaters*.

[6] 'Ein arab. Karagöz-Spiel' (*ZDMG* liv. [1900] 661); *Arab. Schattenspiele* (Berlin, 1901); 'Arabic Humor' (*Princeton Bull.* xiii. [1902] 92–99).

[7] 'Das ägypt. Schattentheater,' Appendix to Horovitz's *Spuren griech. Mimen im Orient*.

[8] *Ein ägypt. Schattenspiel* (Erlangen, 1906); 'Das Schiffspiel' (*Beiträge zur Kenntnis des Orients*, ii. [Munich, 1906]).

[8] Wetzstein, 'Die Liebenden von Amasia,' a Damascene drama, ed. by G. Jahn, in *Abhandl. f. d. Kunde des Morgenl.*, vol. xii. no 2.

[10] *Zur Gesch. des arab. Schattentheaters in Egypten* (Leipzig, 1909); *Zur Gesch. des arab. Schattenspiels in Egypten* (Halle, 1909); 'Islamische Schattenspielfiguren aus Egypten,' in *Der Islam*, vol. i. nos. 3 and 4 (1910), and vol. ii. nos. 2 and 3 (1911).

[11] Cf. Jacob, *Gesch. des Schattentheaters* (Berlin, 1907), p. 4: 'Die Forschung der letzten Jahre hat daruber jeden Zweifel benommen, dass die Heimat des Schattentheaters im fernen Osten zu suchen ist' (p. 4).

difficult to say, but there is no great probability that the credit belongs to the Arabs. The earliest mention of the shadow-theatre in Arabic literature is found in the verses of Wagīh ad-Dīn Dhijā' b. 'Abd al-Karīm el-Munawī (13th cent.), quoted by Ghuzūlī and translated by Jacob.[1] It is obvious, however, that the play must have been known in Egypt before that time, because Ibn Ḥigge [2] speaks of a shadow-player who performed before the Sultan Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn (1169–1193) in Cairo. From this time onwards the existence of an Arabic shadow-stage, especially in Egypt, which, as Jacob observes,[3] seems always to have been the land where the *ḫajāl eddill* has flourished the most, has been proved by several passages in Oriental and Occidental literature.[4] If Kahle,[5] influenced by statements made by a modern shadow-player of Cairo, and by the self-glorifying poetry of the father of the same player, thinks that the *ḫajāl eddill* was unknown in Egypt from the beginning of the 19th cent. until about 1860, the present writer fears that his opinion is not wholly tenable. There is evidence that the shadow-play existed during this period of time in Egypt. Lane, for instance, of whom Kahle asserts that he does not mention the shadow-play with a single word,[6] speaks of such a play, although the *khayal ed-dill* (sic !) which he mentions was given in the Turkish language.[7] It is not clear from the statement of Didier,[8] who saw a 'lanterne magique' (*kara-gueuz*) in Cairo, in the year 1859, whether he witnessed a Turkish or an Arabic performance, but at all events it was a shadow-play at which he was present. The probable truth of the matter is that the play did in fact become for a time almost obsolete in Egypt, and that Ḥasan el-Qaššāš, the father of Kahle's informant, the self-styled re-inventor of the play in this country, came into possession, in some manner, of the old manuscripts, and may thus very likely have acquired an influence on the development of the play. Certain it is that the Egyptian shadow-performers of to-day regard Ḥasan el-Qaššāš and his son Derwīš as their masters.[9] Some of the manuscripts are now in Kahle's hands.[10]

Kahle's texts and three pieces written by the Egyptian physician, Muḥammad ibn Dānijāl,[11] in the 12th cent. A.D., are up to the present time the only two known shadow-play manuscripts. The poetic form that is common to both has given place, in the modern productions, to a prose dialogue, which is only occasionally interrupted by songs and passages in rhymed prose. In the Syrian pieces, published by Littmann, the poetic lines seem to be entirely lacking. The pieces of Ibn Dānijāl have disappeared from the present shadow-stage, while Kahle's plays, although in essentially different form, are still given in Cairo. The répertoire of the Cairo shadow-players is not very large ; only the *li'b eddēr*,[1] consisting of many acts (*faṣl*), and the much shorter *li'b elmarkib*,[2] undoubtedly influenced by the Turkish Karagöz-play, *Kajyk ojunu*,[3] are still frequently produced. The other pieces mentioned by Prüfer and Kern [4] are very seldom given, and then only by special request. The above-mentioned Syrian plays are, in material and *dramatis personæ*, much nearer to the Turkish Karagöz than are the Egyptian pieces.[5]

The shadow-theatre, as a folk-amusement, can now hardly be said to fill an important rôle in the Arabic Orient. In fact, most of that which is indigenous, including native art-ideas, is slowly disappearing behind a thin veneering of European culture. The Europeanized *efendi* snobbishly prefers the Frankish theatre, even though it bore him, to his own native stage; and the *šēḫ* and small bourgeois do not dare to risk their reputations by letting themselves be seen in the obscure dens in which the shadow-play has been obliged to take refuge from European innovation. Thus there now remains only the lowest class to form an audience for a production, of which an unknown Arab poet has written : [6]

'A meaning deep is in the shadow-play
For him who sits on wisdom's highest throne.
Figures and forms pass by and fade away,
Then all is gone, the ruler stays alone.'

The scenic apparatus (*'idda*) of the *ḫajāl eddill* is the simplest imaginable.[7] The player (*usṭa*) sets up his *kušk*, a movable wooden booth, wherever he wishes it ; there he sits behind a tightly stretched muslin curtain (*šāš*), which is lighted from behind by a primitive oil lamp (*ši'la*), and presses the transparent leather figures against the curtain by means of wooden sticks fastened to the figures at the back, and serving at the same time to move their limbs. The player is supported by his troupe (*gōq*), who help him with the manipulation of the figures and in reciting the different rôles.

The only shadow-stage where continual performances were given, the little theatre in the ill-famed Cairo Fish Market, has been closed, by order of the police, since the beginning of the summer of 1909 ; so that, for the time being, at any rate, the play can be seen only on the occasion of folk-festivals, or, sometimes, at weddings and other family merry-makings.

As Kahle [8] tells us, figures older than forty years are not to be found in the hands of the Egyptian shadow-player of to-day, and one can hardly judge from the present figures what the old ones were like. Derwīš shows, with pride, pictures and fashion-plates of the early seventies, and says that they were the models for the modern figures.

Besides the *ḫajāl eddill*, there exists in Egypt a marionette show, whose hero bears the same name as the protagonist of the Turkish shadow-play—Karagöz, pronounced in the Cairo vernacular, *Aragōz*.[9] Under this name the puppet-show is mentioned in the *Description de l'Egypte*.[10] Carsten Niebuhr [11] also describes at length the Cairo marionettes. The picture, however, which he

[1] Cf. Jacob, *op. cit.* p. 30 f.
[2] *Ib.* p. 32 f.
[3] *Ib.* p. 33.
[4] Jacob gives an exhaustive index of the shadow-play literature in his *Erwahnungen des Schattentheaters in der Welt-Litteratur* (Berlin, 1906). It may be added that the shadow-play was mentioned in a work written at the end of the 17th cent., the *Hazz el-quḥūf* of Serbīnī (Būlāq, A.H. 1274 [A.D. 1857]), p. 39.
[5] See Kahle, *Zur Gesch. des Schattentheaters in Egypten*, p. 4 f. Kahle himself, in his very important *Islamische Schattenspielfiguren aus Egypten* (1911), modified his former opinion somewhat.
[6] *Ib.* p. 3.
[7] Lane, *Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians*, p. 359. 'Les ombres chinoises' are mentioned also in *Description de l'Egypte*, vol. xviii. p. 441.
[8] *Les Nuits du Caire*, Paris, 1860, p. 353 : '. . . et a côté la lanterne magique, *kara-gueuz*, ravissait la foule par de fabuleuses obscénités. . . .'
[9] Parts of the texts of the shadow-player Mūsā Eššā'ir are in Kern's possession.
[10] Derwīš is still in possession of a number of fragments of shadow-play manuscripts.
[11] An extensive study of these three pieces may be found in Jacob's *Gesch. des Schattentheaters*, pp. 34–75. Besides the two manuscripts of Ibn Dānijāl's plays described by Jacob, another exists in Cairo. It is in the hands of Aḥmad Bē Teimūr, who kindly gave the present writer permission to have it copied. The manuscript, which is not clearly dated, seems to be not much older than 300 years.

[1] See Prüfer, *Ein ägypt. Schattenspiel.*
[2] See Prufer, 'Das Schiffspiel' (*Beitr. zur Kenntn. des Or.*).
[3] Jacob, *Gesch. des Schattentheaters*, p. 82.
[4] Prufer, *Ein ägypt. Schattenspiel*, p. xii ; Kern, *Das ägypt. Schattentheater.*
[5] For information concerning the Maghribine shadow-play, see Quedenfeldt, 'Das türk. Schattenspiel im Maghrib' (*Ausland*, lxiii. [Stuttgart, 1890] pp. 904–908 and 921–924).
[6] Cf. Jacob, *Gesch. des Schattentheaters*, p. 77, and Seybold, 'Zum arab. Schattenspiel,' *ZDMG* lvi. (1902) 413 f.
[7] See the description given by Prüfer in *Ein ägypt. Schattenspiel*, pp. v–ix.
[8] *Zur Gesch. des arab. Schattentheaters in Egypten*, p. 6 f. After this was written Kahle found in Egypt a great number of very fine old shadow-play figures, which may have been manufactured as early as the 13th century.
[9] Kern, *Das ägypt. Schattentheater*, p. 104.
[10] *Description de l'Egypte ; Etat moderne*, xviii. 170 ([2] 1825).
[11] *Reisebeschreibung nach Arabien und anderen umliegenden Ländern*, i. 188.

shows on plate xxvi. does not give a correct idea of the modern marionette stage, and very likely not of the old one. Didier[1] speaks of 'polichinelle arabe.' But an exact description of the Egyptian Aragōz-play[2] has never been published, nor have its texts ever appeared in print.

The only Aragōz-player known to the writer at the present time [1911] is the *usṭa* Aḥmad 'Alī el-Ḫuḍarī, who lives in Būlāq, in the Turgumān quarter. His little theatre is even simpler than that of the shadow stage; it consists of a folding booth of cloth, not much higher than a man's head; the front side is somewhat lower than the other sides, and the player sits inside this *kušk*, moving on his fingers, just above the edge of the front side, the roughly made wooden figures, which are dressed in bits of coloured cloth, the puppets being visible to their hips. More than two figures cannot appear at the same time. The répertoire is very limited, and, just as in the Turkish shadow-play, but in contrast to the Egyptian *ḫajāl eḍḍill*, some types of the *dramatis personæ* re-appear in every play (if these loosely strung scenes and dialogues can be called plays): *e.g.* Aragōz, the cruel, stupid, yet sly clown, similar to the characters Punch, Kasperle, and Pulcinello, and the dialect types,[3] such as the loud-mouthed Turkish soldier, the uncouth Nubian, and the Italian or Greek priest; then the saucy beggar, and the different female figures from the lively Ezbekīje quarter. A characteristic feature of Aragōz is the high, nasal voice, produced by the player by means of the *zummara*, a little whistle which he holds in his teeth. Aragōz wears the *ṭarṭūr*,[4] or pointed fool's-cap. The player has an assistant who joins the audience and carries on the conversation with Aragōz when the latter is alone on the stage and addresses the public.

Considered æsthetically and as an element in the development of Arabic culture, the Aragōz-play stands on a much lower plane than the *ḫajāl eḍḍill*. Written texts apparently do not exist, and the tradition has therefore not much stability. Improvised jokes and the mood of the player change the wording of the piece without let or hindrance. The show is occasionally to be seen at fairs and at weddings of the lowest order.

The following is a *faṣl*, or marionette play, dictated to the writer directly by Aḥmad el-Ḫuḍarī:

Aragōz: essalām 'alēkum nahārak sa'īd wĕmnbārak salāmāt šarraftūna[5] wăgarrastūnā.[6] āh jāna min gharāmuh win kunt aḥibbak lam 'alai ja malāma.	Peace be with you! May your day be happy and blessed! My compliments! You have honoured us and disgraced us. Woe be unto me because of my love for you! But if I love you, I cannot be blamed for it
Gindi (a Turkish soldier who had been asleep): abradana sana sitikihim[7] fallāḥ ḥaššāš ḫanzir jabn elkalb jin'al abū ummak.	[a very obscene Turkish curse]. You peasant! You hashish-smoker! Pig! Son of a dog! May your mother's father be cursed!
Aragōz: inta magnūn wallā masṭūl.[8]	Are you crazy or drunk?
Gindi: ana ba'dēn amauwitak.	Later I shall kill you.
Aragōz: taijib rūḥ liḥālak.	All right! Go about your business.
Gindi: win ma-kuntiš arūḥ. (Aragōz beats him.) ti'mil ē jā wād ba'dēn amauwitak.	And if I won't go? What are you doing, boy? Afterwards I shall kill you!
Aragōz: šarraftīnā wānisatīnā jā sī mauwitak.	You have honoured us and made us happy, Mr. I-shall-kill-you!

(The soldier beats him and goes away.)

Aragōz (to the audience): mauwitūni wăḍarabūni wămazza'ū minna 'saakkō wazza'būt.[1]	They have killed me, and beaten me, and torn my jacket and my smock-frock!
Voice from the audience: wăba'dēn baqā.	Well, and then?
Aragōz: aqūl limrāti.	I shall tell my wife!
Voice: ismhā ē.	What's her name?
Aragōz: Baḫita jā bint jā Baḫita jā mara jā Baḫita.	Baḫita. Girl! Baḫita! Woman! Baḫita!
Baḫita (who is not his wife, but a woman of a public-house): ṣabbāḥak ḫēr.	May your day be happy!
Aragōz: a'ūzu billāh jā Baḫita.	God save me, Baḫita!
Baḫita: mā lak jā ḥabībī mā lak jā ṣalāt ennabi 'alēk wa 'ala ṭarṭūrak jā ḥabbet 'ēni ta'āla jā ḥabibi nerūh genēnet el-Ezbekīje nitfassaḥ sawa.	What is the matter with you, my dear? What is the matter with you, oh you, on whom and whose *ṭarṭūr* be the prayer of the prophet! You pupil of my eye! Come, my dear! Let us go to the Ezbekīje garden, and take a walk there together.
Aragōz: rūḥī 'tfassaḥi fī harrāra imšī min hina jā mara jalla.	Go to walk in the cesspool! Go away from here, woman! Go!
Baḫita: ana wiḥša ana muš a'gibak.	Am I ugly? Don't I please you?
Aragōz: inti wiššik zaijĕ wišš abū šabat.[2]	Your face is like the face of a centipede.

(Aragōz beats Baḫita off the stage, and knocks with his *nabbūt* on the wall.)

Aragōz: jā bint jā Dūdū (calling another woman).	Girl! Dūdū!

(Dūdū, abominably ugly, appears, coughing excessively.)

Aragōz: bass bass 'ala bēt abūki 'ala 'ṭṭūl.	Enough, enough! [curse] upon the house of your father at once!

(He beats her away from the stage.)

Aragōz: (knocking again) jā wulēd jā barbarī.	Little boy, Berberine!
Barbarī (from inside): jā Aragōz mā lak.	What's the matter, Aragōz?
Aragōz: fēn hūwa 'lbarbarī (the Berberine appears) da barbari iswid wamukaššar tiḫdim jā barbarī.	Where is the Berberine then? That is a Berberine, black and sullen! Are you in service, Berberine?
Barbarī: ḫaddām markūbak 'ala ḥabbet 'ēnak min fōq.[3]	Servant of your shoe! Upon the pupil of your eye from above.
Aragōz: elbadawīje[4] jā salām 'alēk wă'alaija.	Oh, ye saints! Mercy on us, you and me!

(Berberine disappears.)

Saḫḫāt (beggar): 'āgiz maakīn ardabbĕ bāmja[5] wānuṣṣ lillāh.	[I am] infirm, poor! For the sake of God, one and a half *ardabb bāmja*!
Aragōz: wădē de kamān.	Now what's this again?
Saḫḫāt: šaḫḫāt 'āwiz jākul.	A beggar, who wishes to eat.
Aragōz: tākul ē.	What do you wish to eat?
Saḫḫāt: ākul ruzzĕ wŭruzz.	I would like to eat rice and rice.
Aragōz: ruzzĕ ē wŭruzzĕ ē.	What kind of rice and what kind of rice?
Saḫḫāt: ruzzĕ bilaban wŭruzzĕ mefalfil.	Rice with milk and rice *pilav*.
Aragōz: (imitating his accent) wŭruzzĕ mefalfil.	And rice *pilav*!
Saḫḫat: wăbitingān qūta.	And tomatoes.
Aragōz: (beats him) ḫud ruzzĕ wŭruzz.	Take some rice and rice!
Gindi: kamandūr[6] nimritak ṭili'et fi 'l 'askarije tāḫud ruthet šawiš riglak eljemīn gamb eššimāl imsik elbarūda.	Who is there? Your number came out for military service. You will have the rank of a *šawiš*. Your right foot beside the left! Take the musket!
Aragōz: tōb[7] 'alaija jā rabb.	Lead me to repentance, O Lord!

[1] *Les Nuits du Caire*, p. 353: '. . . et tout près le polichinelle arabe débitait aux badauds ses lazzi grivois, car le théâtre de guignol n'est pas le privilège exclusif des Champs-Elysées.'

[2] For the connexion between the figure of Aragōz (Karagöz) and the Egyptian vizier Karakūš of the 13th cent., see Casanova in *Mémoires publ. par les membres de la mission archéol. française du Caire*, vi. (1897) 447; and Kahle, *Zur Gesch. des arab. Schattentheaters in Egypten*, p. 17 f.

[3] Dialectic peculiarities form an essential part of Egyptian folk-humour, just as they do in Turkish folklore. Cf. Jacob, *Türk. Litteraturgesch. in Einzeldarstellungen*, pt. i. 'Das turk. Schattentheater,' Berlin, 1900, pp. 29–37.

[4] See Prüfer, *Ein ägypt. Schattenspiel*, p. 40, note 3.

[5] A comical over-politeness such as one often finds among ignorant Egyptians. Cf. Prüfer, *op. cit.* p. 38.

[6] Said jokingly for *ānistūnā*, 'we are glad to see you.'

[7] Barbarous Turkish for *ōrada anasyny sikidim*.

[8] 'Intoxicated' (Spiro, *Arab.-Eng. Vocabulary*, Lond. 1895).

[1] 'Sarrau de laine brune, ouvert depuis le cou jusqu'à la ceinture et ayant les manches larges, que les hommes du peuple portent en Egypte, surtout en hiver' (Dozy).

[2] Instead of *šabath* ('millepieds, scolopendre' [Dozy]).

[3] The meaning of this sentence is very ambiguous. It may mean the expression of obedience as well as that of a curse.

[4] The derwishes of the order of Saiyid Aḥmad el-Badawī.

[5] One *ardabb*, a measure for cereals, is equal to 197·75 cubic litres. *Bāmja*, hibiscus (leguminous plant) (Spiro, *Arab.-Eng. Vocabulary*).

[6] For *kimdir*.

[7] For *tauwib*.

Gindi: hāz dūr bir hik.[1]	Present arms! One, two!
Aragōz: hāz dōr (kills him).	Present arms!
Voice from audience: mauwittuh.	You have killed him!
Aragōz: wana mā lī jā ḫūja wa mā-mauwittūš.	That is all the same to me, my brother! I haven't killed him!
(He brings a bier, on which he puts the dead body. A priest appears and sings a parody of a mass.)	
Priest: morto buona sera addio sī jorji.	Dead! Good evening! Adieu, Mr. Jorji!
Aragōz: lā ilāha illa 'llāh wă-Muḥammad rasūl allāh qūl kida jā 'akrūt.	There is no God but God, and Muḥammad is the apostle of God. Say that, you scoundrel!
Priest: lā ilāha illa 'llāh.	There is no God but God!
(Exit Aragōz.)	
Priest (singing): morto, morto, morto!	Dead, dead, dead!
(Enter Aragōz.)	
Aragōz: kaffartīna jā šēḫ (kills him).	You have made us infidels, old chap!

Real dramatie art, in the European sense of the word, is, as we said before, a foreign and comparatively reeent phenomenon in the Arabic literature. The faree which Carsten Niebuhr saw in the house of an Italian in Cairo, and which had to be broken off prematurely owing to its lasciviousness, seems, according to his aecount, to have been nothing more than a series of lewd-comic scenes without any kind of plot or catastrophe, in the manner of the Thu Rābiya performances, manifestly neither more nor less than an Aragōz representation, played by living persons.[2] The pieee described by Lane,[3] giving a vivid picture of the corruption of public officials of the time of Muhammad 'Alī, is of a little higher order, and is of the same type as the modern Arabic comedy, the *faṣl muḍḥik*, as it is played in Cairo to-day. All that Lane, that unrivalled observer of Egyptian folk-life, has said about the *Mohabbazeen*, the actors of such dramatie performances, is true now of the *faṣl muḍḥik*: 'Their performances are scarcely worthy of description. It is chiefly by vulgar jests and indecent actions that they amuse and obtain applause.' To-day, too, the 'actors are only men and boys,' the latter appearing in female rôles;[4] and the *faṣl muḍḥik*, like Lane's example, still has some didactic elements, even when the only lesson taught is that of getting the better of a European by beating and cheating him. A shade better are the produetions of the Syrian *faṣl muḍḥiks* from Beirūt or Damascus.[5] A Syrian troupe, with women taking the female rôles, was playing, until a little while ago, in Cairo in the Syrian Café Kāmil; but there is no great difference between the performanees of this company and those which one could see, up to a short time ago, in the two small theatres that were formerly in the Fish Market but are now in the Sāri' Wagh el-Birke.

The *faṣl muḍḥik* last seen by the present writer in one of these cafés consists of a number of clownish scenes, that always end in the whipping of one of the participators. The chief character of the flimsy plot is the servant Ḥusēn, who appears in a pierrot costume.[6] He makes a dupe of his master (an officer) by entering into illicit relations with the latter's wife. The deceived husband notices from time to time, of course, the love-making that is going on behind his back, and the result is a series of roughly ludicrous mistakes and mystifications. For instance, the servant embraces his master, who has seated himself, unnoticed by the servant, in his wife's chair, and receives as a reward a box on the ear. A boastful, silly European—a Greek (dialect type), with a battered tall hat and a bright red British uniform—is beaten continually throughout the play. The other characters are a saucy beggar woman, a cook, and three *ḥarāmīje* (robbers); the last named, with the help of the servant, steal the clothes of the officer from his body while he sleeps. The dialogue, as is always the case in a *faṣl muḍḥik*, is in prose, and in the vernacular of the lowest elements of the population. It is full of invectives and obscenities. Sometimes the *faṣl muḍḥik*, of which there is a great variety, are preceded by a performance of the famous *dance de ventre* or by a *faṣl* of the shadow-play.

A number of such farces in the vernacular have been published in Cairo of late;[1] but they are very seldom played, as they naturally do not contain the flagrant indecenciea which would make them popular with the public. One of the best of these pieces is *Hāt lī min de*, 'Give me some of That,' by Aḥmad Ḥamdī er-Rašīdī. The piece, a modern variation of an old fairy-tale subject, showa clearly the characteristics of the *faṣl muḍḥik*. Nadīm Efendī has engaged the Syrian Amīn as a servant and watcher for his daughter Farīda. Amīn displaya a very impudent manner towards his master, and falls in love with Farīda. The three friends of Nadīm—Sī Gara, Sī Fōn, and Sī Finga—come one by one to sue for the hand of Farīda for their sons 'Azīz, Gamīl, and Farīd. Nadīm gives his consent to each one provided he presents a bridal gift of unsurpassable value. The curious names of the guests ('Cigarette,' 'Siphon,' and 'Sponge') are a souree of rude jokes for the jealous Amīn. In the second act the three suitors meet by chance in a hotel in Malta. Each displays his bridal gift. Gamīl has a mirror in which one can see things at a great distance; Farīd has lemons that can waken the dead; and 'Azīz has a carpet upon which one can ride through the air. In order to test their presents they look into the mirror and see Farīda upon her death-bed, whereupon they travel quickly on 'Azīz's carpet to Cairo, and by means of the lemons bring Farīda back to life. Then (third act), since they cannot agree among themselves as to who shall marry her, they go to the *qāḍī* Sī Bōja, whose daughter gives a *fetwa* (judgment founded on canon law) in favour of Farīd, and, in characteristic Oriental manner, consolingly advises the other two suitors to sell their bridal gifts. The servant, who acts the clown throughout the piece, also goes with the others to the *qāḍī*, but his suit naturally meets with no success.

Besides these more or less original Arabie works, there is to-day a European drama that has been conseiously and artificially transplanted into the Arabic Orient. The initiative herein came from Syria. Mārūn b. Iljās b. Miḫā'īl-Naqqāš (born 1817 at Saida in Lebanon) was the first who tried to make this innovation. Of the life and works of this man we have an excellent account in the records made by his brother and follower Niqūlā.[2] While he was still a boy, Mārūn's family moved to Beirūt, which was then, as now, the intellectual centre of Syria. Here he was brought up according to old-fashioned Arabic ideas, his naturally good taste being therefore quickly spoiled by the forced learning of syntax, grammar, stylistics, metrics, and all the rest of the huge chaos of scholastic knowledge. When he was but eighteen years of age, he began to compose poems. This did not prevent him, however, from studying European book-keeping and commercial law, and from learning Turkish, French, and Italian. In his thirtieth year he went to Italy, where he saw for the first time a large European theatre. The play so impressed him that, after his return to Beirūt in the year 1848, he wrote a drama in the Euro-

[1] Military terms in barbarous Turkish.

[2] Almost the same description is found in *Description de l'Egypte*[2] (1825), p. 172 f.

[3] *Manners and Customs*, pp. 357–359.

[4] See Kern, *Das ägypt. Schattentheater*, p. 103 f.

[5] See Kern, 'Neuere ägypt. Humoristen und Satiriker' (*Mitteilungen des Seminars f. orient. Sprachen*, ix. [Berlin, 1906]). A Syrian *faṣl muḍḥik* is the *Riwāyat elguhalā elmudda'īn bil'ilm*, by Ibrāhīm Bēk eṭ-Ṭabīb, Beirūt, n. d.

[6] The European fool's costume of Ḥusēn points to the Frankish origin of the *faṣl muḍḥik*, and, just as in the Aragōz-play, which is without doubt nothing but a Pulcinello theatre orientalized by the influence of the Turkish Karagöz, some of the *dramatis personæ* are the same types for all pieces. From these types one easily recognizes Italy as the home of the *faṣl muḍḥik*. The Arlechino of the Italian *commedia dell' arte* is the stupidly bold, sly servant; and the cowardly boasting Greek we also find in Scarramucia; the coquettish, amiable little woman, who is not altogether too scrupulous in keeping her nuptial vows, is the Columbine type. The dialectic humour is perhaps the result of shadow-play influence.

[1] *Riwāyat hāt lī min de*, by Aḥmad Ḥamdī er-Rašīdī (Cairo, 1907). Other pieees of this kind are: *Riwāyat Ba'gar*, by Muḥammad Efendī Ḥusnī (Cairo, n. d.); and the *Riwāyat ezzawāg binnabbūt walbaḫīl el'akrūt* (Cairo, anon. and n. d.). The latter is a variation of the popular type of *L'Avare*, who is cured of his greed after great money-losses. The same theme is treated by Muḥammad Efendī Safīq, in the *faṣl elbaḫīl*. Still other pieces are *Ṣadr elbaghāša*, by Amīn Saiyid Aḥmad 'Abd el-Wāḥid ez-Zaiyāt (Cairo, n. d.), a piece in which the different beggar-types are shown; a play with a purpose of the kind described by Lane is the *Riwāyat elmuḥaddamīn*, by Muḥammad Bē 'Othmān Galāl, printed after the death of the author. This little comedy scourges the deceptions and tricks of servant-intermediaries.

[2] After the death of his brother, Niqūlā published three of his theatrical pieces under the title *Arzat Lubnān* (Beirūt, 1869). He gives an extensive biography of his brother in the preface. A strangely mistaken remark concerning this book is found in C. Huart's *History of Arabic Literature* (Eng. ed., London, 1903), p. 420: 'Nicolas Naqqāš, who was born at Saida in 1817, died at Tarsus in 1855, having written a play called *Arzat Lubnān*.'

pean style, called it *Elbahīl*[1] ('The Miser'), and soon afterwards produced it in his own house before an invited audience, amongst whom were all the foreign consuls and the governor of the Lebanon Province. The actors were young friends of the author. This attempt was followed by a second in 1850, *Abū 'l-Ḥasan el-Mughaffal*, a dramatic version of the well-known story of Hārūn ar-Rašīd and Abu 'l Ḥasan from the *Arabian Nights*; and then, encouraged by the success of this piece (which, by the way, is still given), Mārūn Naqqāš, with the permission of the Sultan, founded in Beirūt a permanent stage, where he brought out his *Riwāyat elḥasūd* ('The Jealous Man'). The plays of his brother Niqūlā, *Esšēḫ elgāhil* (written 1840) and *Rabī'a ibn Zēd elmukaddam* (written 1852) also made their first appearance in this theatre. In 1855, while on a business trip, Mārūn died of fever in Tarsus, and two years later his body was transferred by his family to Beirūt and there buried with great ceremony.

After Mārūn's death the theatrical art suffered a decline,[2] and it was not until 1860 that Niqūlā Naqqāš resuscitated the *Ḥasūd* on his brother's old stage. In the same year Niqūlā published, in one book,[3] Mārūn's three pieces, which are a kind of light opera, comedies with musical accompaniment and interspersed with numerous songs and dances.

We give, as an example, the contents of the first piece. The extremely miserly, rich Qarrād, a man of advanced years, had made an agreement with the greedy old Tha'labī to marry the latter's daughter Hind, a young widow. He comes for the wedding to the house of Tha'labī, but Hind loves young 'Īsā, the friend of her brother Ghālī. These three, and the old servant Umm Riša, slyly plot together to make Qarrād give up his plans of marriage, and at the same time to part with some of his beloved money. Hind makes such extravagant demands of Qarrād that he finally wishes nothing more ardently than to be rid of her. Hind, however, now declares that she will not release him; in the meantime Ghālī appears, disguised as a Turkish *agha*, with his secretary 'Īsā and several soldiers. By means of threats and thrashings they force Qarrād to pay to 'Īsā a large sum of money as a compensation to Hind, who thereupon marries 'Īsā. Finally, the supposed Turks confess their deception to Qarrād, who is by this time very much ashamed of himself, and freely forgives them.

The language of the play is affected and heavy, the piece itself, with its five weak acts, extremely tiresome. When the author makes a joke, the publisher thinks it necessary to call the reader's attention to the fact in a footnote. Here again we have, as the comic elements, the dialect types—Umm Riša the peasant woman from Lebanon, Ghālī the Turk, and 'Īsā the Egyptian secretary.

Under the influence of the brothers Naqqāš, several theatrical companies were formed in Syria; but, as there were no trained actors to be had, the authors or translators saw themselves obliged, if they wished to have their plays produced, to form and train a troupe of amateurs. Famous as author, director, and *régisseur* all in one person, were especially Sēḫ Abū Ḫalīl el-Qabbānī in Beirūt, and Iskander Faraḥ in Damascus. The latter, more organizer and actor than author, was born in Damascus in 1855, the year of the death of Mārūn Naqqāš. He attended the Jesuit school in that city and there became acquainted, through amateur school dramatics, with European drama. Encouraged by Midhat Pasha, who lived at the time in Damascus, he produced, in a public garden, his first play, a translation from the French. He then moved to Beirūt, where he joined with Sēḫ Abū Ḫalīl in forming a theatrical enterprise; but owing to intrigues his licence was taken from him, so that he saw himself compelled to settle permanently with Abū Ḫalīl in Cairo (in 1882), where he and his partner had already made successful tours. From this time dated the existence of a theatre in European style in Egypt. In the *Gōq elmiṣrī el'arabī* (in the Šārī 'Abd el-'Azīz in Cairo)

[1] See *Arzat Lubnān*, p. 4: '. . . The play *Elbahīl*, which was the first drama given in our Arabic tongue. . . .'

[2] *Ib.* p. 5: 'Hereafter this kind of art was buried with its initiator and nearly forgotten.'

[3] *Arzat Lubnān* (Beirūt, 1869)

a great many pieces—mostly translations and only a few original works—have appeared above the footlights.

This theatre has not proved to be a success of late, owing partly to the death of Iskander Faraḥ's partner, Abū Ḫalīl, but especially because of the attitude of one of the actors, Sēḫ Salāma el-Ḥigāzī, whom Faraḥ himself had taught. Salāma separated from his master and founded a theatre of his own,—the *Dar ettamthīl el'arabī*,—and induced a number of Faraḥ's actors to accompany him. In contrast to the Christian Syrian Iskander Faraḥ, Salāma was a Muslim and an Egyptian, and that was enough to secure him the affections of the Cairo public. Then, too, he laid more weight on the musical part of his performance than his old master had done, and the Egyptians love nothing so much as singing and the music of their national orchestra. In 1909, Sēḫ Salāma had an apoplectic stroke, which partially paralyzed him, so that his acting days are probably over.

A number of small wandering theatrical troupes have branched off from the theatre of Iskander Faraḥ. One often stumbles upon them in Syria and Egypt. The best known in Egypt are the companies of 'Auwad Farīd, Aḥmad Ḥigāzī, Ibrāhīm Aḥmad, and Sēḫ Aḥmad eš-Šāmī. The last named was to be seen in the winter of 1908 in Luxor in *Romeo and Juliet*. The late Nagīb el-Ḥaddād, one of the most prolific translators of European plays, also experimented with a troupe of his own. In Syria, 'Azīz 'Īd and Raḥmīn Bibis are the chief followers of Iskander Faraḥ's school; the only one of Faraḥ's pupils who went to the Maghrib—Solīmān el-Qirdāḥī—died in the summer of 1909 in Tunis.

Amateur theatrical clubs have been started in several places in Egypt. The most important of these is the *Gam'ījet el-Ma'ārif* in Cairo; it was founded by Iskander Faraḥ in 1886, and is still under his direction. There was a similar club by the name of *Gam'ījet taraqqī 'ttamthīl el'adabī* in Manṣūra.[1]

It is utterly impossible to give an approximately complete bibliography of the Arabic dramatic literature of to-day, as there is an unusually great productivity along this line at the present time. Most of the works are translations, of which the only really valuable ones are the excellent renderings, in the vernacular, of some of the writings of Racine and Molière by the late Muḥammad Bē 'Othmān Galāl.[2] Unfortunately these pieces, in which the highly talented translator has shown his ability to render the tone of the originals in the idiomatic peculiarities of his own language, have never been recognized by the stage. The stiff, ridiculous Shakespeare translations[3] do not show the least trace of the spirit of the great British master, and still less worthy of mention are the childishly Arabized French dramas[4] of the Romance period. A little better are the different dramatizations of the stories from the *Arabian Nights*[5] and

[1] We are indebted to Mr. Taufīq Faraḥ, the brother and manager of Iskander Faraḥ, for the greater part of these statements.

[2] See Nallino, *L'Arabo parlato in Egitto* (Milan, 1900), pp. 349-351. The translations of Muḥammad Bē 'Othmān Galāl are as follows:—*Eššēḫ elmatlūf* (*Tartuffe*, by Molière), Cairo, 1873, reprinted in 1890 with *Ennisā' ul 'ālimāt* (*Femmes savantes*); *Madraset el 'azwāg* (*Ecole des Maris*); and *Madraset ennisā* (*Ecole des Femmes*) under the title *El'arba' riwāyāt min nuḫab ettijātrāt*; *Erriwājāt elmufīda fī 'ilm ettaragīda* (*Esther*, *Iphigénie* and *Alexandre*, by Racine), Cairo, 1893; *Riwāyat ettuqalā* (*Les Fâcheux*, by Molière), Cairo, 1896. The *Sēḫ matlūf*, the *Madraset el 'azwāg* and *Ennisā' ul 'ālimāt* have been published in European transcription. See Vollers, 'Der neuarab. Tartuffe' (*ZDMG* xlv. [1891] 36-96); Sohernheim, *Madraset el 'azwāg: arab. Comödie transkribiert und ins Deutsche übersetzt* (Berlin, 1896); Kern, *Innisā' ul 'ālimāt: neuarab. Bearbeitung von Molière's Femmes savantes transkribiert, übersetzt*, etc. (Leipzig, 1898).

[3] For example, *Romeo and Juliet*, *Hamlet*, and *Othello*.

[4] *Hernani*, *Marie Tudor*, by Victor Hugo; *Katherine Howard*, by A. Dumas; *Fernande*, by Sardou; *Sevère Torelli*, by Ohnet; *L'Africaine*, by Scribe, and many others. The chief translators, besides the already mentioned Nagīb Ḥaddād, are Taniūs 'Abduh, Ḫalīl Miršāq, Faraḥ Anṭūn, Bišāra Kan'ān, and Sam'ān el-Ašgar.

[5] From the *Arabian Nights* have been dramatized, among others, the stories of Hārūn ar-Rašīd and Qūt al-Qulūb, by Maḥmūd Wāṣif, and Uns al-Galīs, by Abū Ḫalīl el-Qabbānī.

from the Arabian history and hero-legends.[1] The only other class that is somewhat worthy of notice is the drama with a political purpose.[2] Here genuine feeling has succeeded in instilling a little life into the inflexible, stilted, Arabic literary style.

Whether a well-developed branch will ever grow from the scion of Western dramatics that has been grafted upon the Arabic literature seems to the present writer to be somewhat doubtful, and it is not only the lack of dramatic feeling, natural to the Arab through race and religious peculiarities, that prevents him from finding the way to dramatic art; it is also the character of his language. The Arabic literary language is petrified—an artificially preserved corpse, which pleases only its preservers, the literary gild and the *'ulamā*. The people hardly understand this language, and do not recognize themselves or their feelings when so presented to them. The living idiom, on the other hand, that in which the Arab thinks and speaks, is scorned and regarded as vulgar by priests and pseudo-learned men, who see the end of their own glory in the decay of that idolized, thousand-year-old mummy, the fetish of the holiness of God's language. Before anything great can be created, either in the province of the drama or in Arabic literature in general, the modern writer must cease to work with forms, words, and metaphors of the language of nomadic desert tribes of fifteen hundred years ago.

LITERATURE.—The literature has been given fully in the footnotes.

CURT PRÜFER.

DRAMA (Chinese).—Music and dancing are frequently mentioned in the Chinese classics. For instance, in the days of Confucius we read of the services held in the ancestral temples of princes and great nobles, when there were men arranged in rows, who moved in time with the music, and brandished feathers, flags, or other articles. Moreover, in those times, and even later, dancing of a slow and dignified character formed part of civil as well as of religious ceremonies. Thus at public feasts there were performances representing the joys of harvest, the fatigues of war, the pleasures of peace, and suchlike subjects. According to one theory, the regular drama was gradually evolved from these displays; but there are persons who maintain that it was purely exotic, having been introduced into China from the West. One writer says, perhaps with some boldness:

'The whole idea of the Chinese play is Greek. The mask, the chorus, the music, the colloquy, the scene, and the act are Greek.' 'The Chinese took the idea, and worked up the play from their own history and their own social life.' 'The whole conception of the play is foreign, while the details and language are Chinese' (J. Dyer Ball, *Things Chinese*[4], p. 707).

The highest literary authorities among the Chinese agree in dividing the history of their drama into three distinct periods. The first of these is the latter part of the T'ang dynasty (A.D. 720–906); the second, the Sung dynasty (A.D. 960–1126); the third, the Chin and Yüan dynasties (A.D. 1126–1367). One very great writer of the 13th cent., Ma Tuan-lin, gives 581 instead of 720 as the earliest date; but it is generally agreed that his view was based on a misconception.

No specimens of the T'ang dynasty plays have been preserved; but it is said that they were historical in character, and also that pieces were played of which the prologue was recited by an actor called 'the introducer of the play.'

In the time of the Sung dynasty, it was customary to sing the greater portion of the play. The plot was very simple, and everything was sacrificed to the lyric parts. Further, the action was hampered by a convention limiting the number of the actors in the play to five.

The third, or Yüan, period is the golden age of the Chinese drama. The plays written at that time, or shortly afterwards, not only surpassed their predecessors, but have never been equalled by later writers. Moreover, the alterations and novelties then introduced have since remained unchanged. Indeed, it may be said that the drama of the Yüan times 'is to all intents and purposes the drama of to-day' (H. A. Giles, *Chinese Literature*, p. 258).

The list of the Yüan dramatic authors comprises 85 persons, of whom four were women ('actresses,' as the name by which they are described should probably be translated). There are extant 564 plays, of which 105 are by anonymous writers. Practically all kinds of subjects are represented among them. There are mythological, historic, religious, and domestic plays; comedies of character, and comedies of intrigue. There is no formal division into tragedy and comedy; but a play belongs to one class rather than to the other, according to the subject and the way in which it is treated. Every rank of life is represented, from the Emperor to the humble slave girl. Even gods and goddesses appear and speak. It is nominally illegal to put on the stage Emperors, Empresses, and great men of old; but the law is entirely disregarded. The dialogue is in the ordinary spoken language, varying in some degree according to the social position of the character speaking. In the historical plays it is further removed than in the others from the language of common conversation. There is no chorus, but the actors constantly break out into song. These songs express the most passionate parts, and therefore they are given only to the leading characters.

A play consists usually of five acts, or rather of four acts and an introductory part, called 'the opening,' in which the principal characters come on, describe themselves, and give any information that may be necessary as to former doings. If there is no 'opening,' the descriptions and information are given in the first of the four acts, and the unfolding of the story is left to the second. But, as there is no curtain to fall, and no stopping at the end of the acts, the distinction between them is hardly noticeable on the stage. Entries and exits are marked in the books, and so are the 'asides,' for which there is a technical name. The famous play called the *Pi-pa-ki* consists of 24 scenes, or, according to another arrangement, of 42 scenes.

In theory every Chinese play should have a moral object, and the serious drama is supposed to place on the stage scenes which will lead the spectator to the practice of virtue. Actually, their tendency is on the side of justice and morality; and, as regards decency, they are, at any rate in their written form, entirely free from objection.

In addition to the serious pieces, which form the bulk of the plays acted, there are also farces, which are generally brought in at the conclusion of the bill, and are highly appreciated by the audience. They 'depend for their attractiveness upon the droll gesticulations, impromptu allusions to passing occurrences, and excellent pantomimic action of the performers' (S. W. Williams, *Middle Kingdom*, i. 715). In these farces there is much 'gagging,' and the actors often lapse into coarseness.

To return to the serious drama. It is true that Chinese plays do not, as a rule, possess much intricacy of plot; but we think that their merits, in many respects, will not be denied by any one who

[1] *e.g. Riwāyat Ṣalāḥ addin*, by Nagīh el-Haddād, Alexandria, 1898.

[2] The most prominent are *Riwāyat el-'Azhar* (Cairo, 1909), and *Riwāyat Denšawāi* (Cairo, 1907), by Ḥasan Mar'i. The latter is reviewed in the *Revue du Monde musulman*, vol. iii. Nov.-Dec., nos. 11–12, Paris, 1907, pp. 504–509. The representation of both pieces is forbidden by the Egyptian Government.

can keep in mind that both Chinese ideals and Chinese modes of expression often differ considerably from our own. They are certainly remarkable in both distinctness and consistency of characterization. As regards other qualities, a very high authority has recently said of the famous 'Story of a Lute' (*Pi-pa-ki*), that 'it is not only truly pathetic in the conception and the main situations of its action, but includes scenes of singular grace and delicacy of treatment' (A. W. Ward, in *EBr*[11], viii. 486). Of another great play, 'The Sorrows of Han,' its distinguished translator, Sir John Davis, wrote that 'the grandeur and gravity of the subject, the rank and dignity of the personages, the tragical catastrophe, and the strict award of poetical justice, might satisfy the most rigid admirer of Grecian rules' (*China*, p. 92). In order to give the reader some idea of what the Chinese historical drama is like, we insert here a short sketch of this play. The events described in it are partially founded upon fact. The scene is laid in the 1st cent. B.C., at a time when China was weak and the Tatars were strong.

The play opens in Tartary. The Tatar Khan appears, and announces that, in accordance with an hereditary right, he has sent to demand of the Emperor of China the hand of a princess in marriage. The second scene is in China, and shows the Emperor entrusting a minister with the task of selecting beauties for his harem. The minister discovers a maiden of surpassing loveliness. He demands from her parents a large sum of money as a bribe, but they are too poor to give it to him. He therefore contrives that, though the maiden is admitted to the palace, her charms shall remain unknown to the Emperor. A chance causes them to be discovered, and she becomes the Imperial favourite. The faithless minister is condemned to death; but he escapes, and takes refuge at the court of the Khan. To revenge himself, he shows the Khan the lady's picture, declaring that she would have come in response to the Khan's demand, but the Emperor would not permit her; he (the minister) had remonstrated with his master for thus embroiling two nations, and had been forced to flee for his life: let the Khan demand the princess, and she must be given to him. Overcome by the beauty of the portrait, the Khan despatches an envoy with a threat of war, and prepares for the invasion of China. Next, the lady, now a princess, is adorning herself in the palace; the Emperor comes in, and shows his admiration. The chief minister enters and reports the arrival of the envoy with the Khan's demand. The envoy is received. After the audience the Emperor takes counsel with his ministers. He wishes to appeal to arms; but the case is adjudged hopeless. The princess declares her willingness to sacrifice herself for her country's sake, in spite of her love for the Emperor. The Emperor at last consents, and the sad parting takes place. The Khan is seen at the head of his troops, leading away the princess. The army is on the march. It arrives at the bank of a river, the boundary of the Chinese empire. The princess addresses the Khan: 'Great King, I take a cup of wine and pour a libation towards the south, my last farewell to the Emperor.' She pours the libation, and cries, 'Emperor, this life is finished. I await thee in the next.' She throws herself into the river and is drowned. The Khan laments, orders her burial, and declares that he will maintain peace with China. Now we are back again in China. The Emperor is wandering in the palace at night, still overwhelmed with grief, and unable to attend to affairs of state. He sleeps, and we see the princess, escaped from her captors, appearing to him in a vision. A Tatar soldier comes in and carries her off again. The Emperor awakes to fresh grief. The arrival is announced of a Tatar envoy. He is come to tell the sad story and bring back the faithless minister. The traitor is led away to execution.

We think the reader will acknowledge that this story is one well fitted for dramatic representation.

The scenery of a Chinese theatre is very simple. It consists of a few mats, perhaps rudely painted, arranged at the back and sides of the stage, and some tables, chairs, and couches, which serve for many purposes, and are brought in from the robing rooms as required. The imperfections of the scenery are made good by simple devices: a courier, on being despatched, seizes a whip, and lifts his leg as though he were mounting a horse; passing over a bridge is indicated by stepping up and then down, crossing a river by imitating the rolling motion of a boat. The actors are dressed in costumes appropriate to their parts, and of antique style. The robes are very splendid, made of bright-coloured silks and satins and really magnificent embroideries, which have cost large sums of money; but in the humbler theatres they are much tarnished and worn.

Only in Peking and the great towns of the North are there permanent play-houses. The simplicity, however, of Chinese theatrical arrangements enables performances to be given without difficulty all over the country, even in small towns and villages. Subscriptions are collected on the occasion of a festival, or a rich man wishes to give his neighbours a treat. A travelling company of players is engaged; and, in a couple of days, sheds, which serve their purpose sufficiently well, are erected, at little cost, with rough planks, poles, and mats. The humbler members of the audience stand in the pit, without any protection from the weather. The performances frequently last for three days, with intervals only for eating and sleeping. This does not mean that the plays are long. In the acting editions they are usually short, but a very large number are produced on such occasions.

As was the case not long ago in France, the profession of an actor is, at least nominally, considered disreputable. Members of it are classed with barbers and domestic servants, and, with their sons and grandsons, they are not allowed to compete in the public literary examinations.

Translations into French of several Chinese plays will be found in the published works of A. Bazin and Stanislas Julien.

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T. L. BULLOCK.

DRAMA (Greek).—**I. Origin of the drama.**—From the time of its origin down to the days of its latest representatives, Greek drama was closely associated with religion. A Greek tragedy or comedy was a religious service rendered by the State to one of its gods. Plays were performed only at the festivals of Dionysus—at the *Lenæa*, the festival of the wine-press in January; at the country *Dionysia* held in the villages in December; and at the city *Dionysia* in March (this the most important and brilliant). There was no long season, and plays were given all day long during the festivals, the spectators paying no admission fee except what the State provided, and often bringing their own lunch and cushions. Not until the 3rd cent. B.C. did the drama, as was natural, become a secularized performance arranged by the head of a troupe and often financed by private liberality.

The development is paralleled in mediæval times by the Mystery and Miracle plays, which at first were attached to the Church but in time became dissociated from religion and formed a true dramatic literature, the actors, like Thespis, wandering about and performing their plays wherever convenient, whether in church or inn-yard. In modern times we have the Passion Play at Oberammergau, which is beginning to be more than a merely religious performance, although the Bavarian peasants have refused an enticing offer to play in America. Just as the old Greek play always began with a sacrifice to Dionysus at the altar or *thymele*, so to-day at Oberammergau every performance is preceded by Mass, in which all the actors and members of the Greek-like chorus participate.

That the spirit of the Greek drama was strictly religious is evident from its early history. In a larger, more philosophical sense, it is the outgrowth of the mimetic or play instinct in humanity, and the sense of the pathetic. The mimetic element is well illustrated in the dances and burlesques on Greek vases from the 7th to the 4th cent. B.C., especially on Corinthian, Cæretan, Bœotian, and Attic vases. The sense of the pathetic Croiset (iii. 24 f.) finds in the legends of heroes and the religion of Dionysus. As Plato (*Rep.* 394, 595, 598 f.) and Aristotle (*Poet.* ch. 4 f.) say, Homer is the real author of tragedy, which is a novel all dialogue, or an epic all speeches, wherein the poet omits his own narrative comment and leaves in the amœbean speeches. Æschylus (cf. Athenæus, 347 E) said

that his tragedies were but crumbs from Homer's table. But historically the drama, though latent in the epic and drawing upon it for subject-matter and retaining much of the epic technique, especially in the messenger's speeches, developed out of the lyric—not the personal passionate lyric of Archilochus, Sappho, and Alcæus, but the choral lyric of a disciplined chorus chanting in unison to the measure of the dance. This choral lyric of Alcman and Stesichorus, which later reached its zenith in Simonides, Bacchylides, Pindar, and the choruses of the Greek drama, flourished chiefly among the Dorians of early Sparta, Sicily, and Magna Græcia. There were many forms, such as hymns to the gods, marching songs, dancing songs for boys and girls.

We have preserved to us, on a papyrus discovered by Mariette in Egypt, a partheneion, or highly dramatic virginal song, by Alcman, which consisted of 140 verses in ten strophes, of which the first two and part of the third are missing. This song gives a pretty picture of a dance of Spartan maidens in honour of Artemis, by the banks of the Eurotas, such as we see on a beautiful Attic red-figured crater in the Museo di Villa Papa Giulio at Rome (cf. Furtwängler-Reichbold, *Griech. Vasenmalerei*, Munich, 1904, pls. 17–18). The chorus addresses the poet, and the poet speaks to the whole body of dancers or to an individual.

This kind of choral lyric combined with its praise the epic recital of a local or national or religious legend.

The specific and immediate origin of the Greek drama, however, is in one form of this choral lyric—the dithyramb or hymn, usually to Dionysus, though not confined to his ritual. The word 'dithyramb' first occurs in Archilochus (fl. *c.* 670 B.C.), who was the first to use to any great extent the iambic trimeter and trochaic tetrameter, the two chief metres in Greek tragedy. We do not know its derivation. Many etymologies might be given, each more absurd than another. Originally it may have been an epithet of Dionysus, the name not of the hymn but of the god to whom the hymn is sung, commemorating possibly his double birth from Semele and from the loins of Zeus—the scene on Greek vases which perhaps was the prototype of the Christian representations of Eve springing out of Adam's side (cf. Eurip. *Bacch.* 519 f.). More probably 'dithyramb' is connected with *thriambos*, meaning 'mad song.' It appears from Archilochus that the dithyramb was either a banquet song or more probably a popular rude rustic hymn in honour of Dionysus, who introduced from Thrace the wild orgiastic ceremonies so foreign to Greek soberness. Out of these rustic dithyrambs—not always licentious, but often solemn hymns—after they had received a systematic form under the Dorian choral lyric, tragedy grew (cf. Aristotle, *Poet.* iv.). The dithyramb, pathetic as well as comic, flourished throughout Greece long before Arion of Lesbos (600 B.C.) gave it a distinct artistic and recognized form, fixing the number of the chorus at fifty and dressing them in the likeness of satyrs, half-animal, half-human, with the legs, ears, and snub-nose of a goat; although, according to Herodotus (i. 23), who tells the famous dolphin story about him, Arion was the best lyrist of his time and the first to compose, name, and teach the dithyramb at Corinth. His chorus had fifty satyrs or goat-men, the same number as we find in the earliest play of Æschylus, the *Supplices*, noted for its depth of religious feeling. The chorus of satyrs or goat-men (singers clad in goat-skins) danced and sang about a circular orchestra, and so were called a cyclic chorus (from κύκλος, the orchestra) or tragic chorus (from τράγος, a goat or satyr; cf. Æsch. fr. 207). Of course, this chorus of satyrs was replaced in later times by a chorus appropriate to the plot, except in the Satyr-drama, which retained the satyr chorus; but tragedy originally meant a goat-song rather than a spelt-song, as Miss Harrison (*loc. cit. infra*) argues. This is also more likely than that the goat was the prize, as might be argued from a vase in the British Museum, which, however, is not Attic. It is more likely than that the goat was the sacrifice, because other prizes were given, and the bull was equally associated with Dionysus. Dionysus was a bull-god as well as a goat-god, and often appears in Greek art with bull's horns. He had no monopoly of the goat-skin, which was the primitive costume in ancient times, and is worn by peasants in Greece to-day and at modern Dionysiac plays in Thrace (cf. *JHS*, 1906, p. 191 ff.) and at the performances of rude dramas in Thessaly and elsewhere. It is difficult, then, to agree with Farnell that the origin of Greek tragedy is an ancient European mummery which was a winter-drama of the seasons, in which the Black Personage, Dionysus Μελάναιγις or Μέλανθος, killed Xanthus, the Fair One, the actors wearing the black goat-skin of their god. The word 'tragic' did not mean at first dramatic or pathetic, and Aristotle (*loc. cit.*) says that the grotesque diction of earlier times was not discarded till late for the statelier manner of tragedy. But tragic soon became associated with the pathetic, because the habitual theme of the dithyramb was the adventures and sorrows of Dionysus, the new religion which had to struggle to win its way. The limitation to Dionysus was not essential, as the story in Herod. v. 67 shows. About 600 B.C. the people of Sikyon honoured their local hero Adrastus and celebrated his sufferings in tragic choruses, but Cleisthenes, being hostile to the cult of Adrastus, restored the chorus to Dionysus.

Ridgeway makes large use of this to support his theory that the origin of Greek tragedy was in the worship of the dead. There is, to be sure, much of this in our extant dramas, since they naturally deal with death for the most part, and undoubtedly the worship of the dead, the Orphic and Eleusinian Mysteries in which Dionysus or Iacchus was associated with Persephone, the farces and burlesques, as at the later sanctuary of the mystic chthonic Cabiri near Thebes, who became closely connected with Dionysus, and the rude choral songs and mimetic dances contributed much, but they were all swallowed up by the coming of Dionysus, whose cult spread over the whole Greek world and was easily grafted on the native worship. Cf. and ct. art. DRAMA (Introductory).

Many elements, therefore, combined to make the Greek drama, but the main one was the worship of Dionysus, the god of wine, vegetation, and moisture. Dionysus, the youngest of the Greek gods, a mystic Phrygian deity, came into Greece over the mountains of Thrace, met with opposition in Thrace and Bœotia, but finally reached Delphi and the villages of Icaria and Eleutheræ. From the country he made his way into the town of Athens under Pisistratus, although legend said that, under king Amphictyon, Pegasus of Eleutheræ had introduced him into Athens (cf. Paus. i. 2. 4, and schol. to Aristoph. *Acharn.* 243). Dionysus is already known to Homer, by whom he is mentioned twice in the *Iliad* (vi. 132, xiv. 325) and twice in the *Odyssey* (xi. 325, xxiv. 74). The opposition to his worship in Thrace is embodied in the story of his harsh treatment by Lycurgus (*Il.* vi. 132); in Bœotia in the legend of Pentheus, the subject of lost plays by Thespis and Æschylus, and of the most Dionysiac play of Euripides, the *Bacchæ*, written at the court of Archelaus at the very birthplace of Dionysiac performances. The village of Eleutheræ claimed to have been founded by Dionysus and to have been his birth-place, whence the archaic wooden image, or ξόανον, of the god was brought to Athens by Pegasus to the precinct beside the Dionysiac theatre on the southern slope of the Acropolis, where in the front row is still to be seen the seat of the chief priest, ἱερεὺς Ἐλευθερεύς, so named from Eleutheræ. At Icaria, where Thespis, the founder of Greek tragedy, was born, there was a story, of which there are many illustrations in art, that Dionysus came and was hospitably received by the farmer Icarius. Dionysus gave

him wine, which the people thought was poison, and they slew Icarius. Erigone, his daughter, hanged herself, and Dionysus sent a plague, which was appeased by instituting the festival of the swing.

The Americans excavated Icaria in 1888 and found many inscriptions illustrating the origin of the Greek drama and many traces of the worship of Dionysus (cf. Dyer, *Gods in Greece*, 1891, pp. 104–117; Frazer, *Pausanias*, ii. 461 f.; *Papers of American School at Athens*, v. [1892] 43 f.; Nonnus, *Dionysiaca*, bk. xlvii.).

The story was a favourite subject in the Greek drama. Phrynichus, Philocles, Cleophon, and others treated the theme, although it was avoided by the three great dramatists. Naxos, where the story of the waking of Ariadne is laid, Crete, Corinth, Athens, and other places are also intimately associated with the beginnings of the Greek drama and Dionysus. Dionysus was the god of life, enthusiasm, and rustic merriment, the liberator of men's lips and hearts, rightly called Dionysus Eleutherius. His orgiastic and religious influence was connected with the resurrection of life and immortality (cf. Wheeler, *Dionysus and Immortality*, 1899). Legends told how the god slept in winter and awoke in summer, or was bound in winter and released in spring. Flogging also filled an important rôle in the rites of Dionysus, as in the Dionysiac rites in Thrace to-day. Even women were flogged in being initiated into the Dionysiac rites (cf. Paus. viii. 23. 1, and the recently discovered Pompeian painting, *Notizie degli Scavi*, 1910, 4, pl. xvii.). At Delphi, the centre of Greek religion, where a ceremony described by Plutarch represented his mystical resurrection and the waking of the new-born child after his winter sleep, he was important enough to have his coffin beside the image of Apollo and to share with him the pediment of the temple. So Dionysus was also the god of sorrow and pathos, acquainted with grief. What more natural than that tragedy and comedy should arise in the worship of a deity the thought of whom covered the whole field of human emotion, whether grief or gaiety, 'a complete religion, a complete sacred representation of the whole of life'? Even before the coming of Dionysus there were the crude beginnings of the drama. If we seek the ultimate and final source, perhaps we can find it mainly, but not entirely, in the cult of the dead. The main real historical source was the poetic and literary inspiration of the wine-god, especially as exhibited in the dithyramb. Aristotle rather than anthropology should guide us in this question.

The dithyramb of Arion was, if not dramatic, mimetic, and the chorus by its dancing illustrated the story told in words. The drama proper, however, began to evolve when the choral chant was interrupted by a rude dialogue, perhaps improvised, between the leader and the chorus. The dithyramb was sung at the spring festival of the wine-god, and at any time the coryphæus may have stepped out and spoken to the chorus as a whole. When that happened, the song became dramatic, and drama was born. Pollux (iv. 123) and the *Etym. Magnum* (*s.v.* θυμέλη) say that there was a kind of table on which, before Thespis, one mounted and answered the chorus. This rustic use of tables as extemporized platforms is confirmed by illustrations on Greek vases (cf. Cook, *ClR* ix. [1895] 370 f.; Ridgeway, p. 44 f.). While tragedy developed out of the dithyramb, the dithyramb continued at Athens and elsewhere. The intermediate forms have been lost, and only a few notices and a list of poets from Arion to Thespis remain to fill the gap. Pindar is said to have composed seventeen tragic dramas in addition to his dithyrambs, but we know almost nothing of their character. A few years ago, however, a new piece of evidence was found in the newly-discovered eighteenth poem of Bacchylides—a short dramatic lyric dialogue, which some call a dithyramb, between Ægeus and the chorus. Although written about the time of Sophocles, it illustrates the development from the dithyramb to the drama. The evolution of the drama consists, as Croiset says, in the elimination of the satyric element, the transformation of the primitive narrator into an actor, and the constitution of a regular plot. Thespis did this and employed a regular actor. Thus the element of acting was now added to that of impersonation, that is, he himself stepped out and recited to the others, for in early days the poets were also actors. Thespis was born in Icaria, where, as we have seen, the worship of Dionysus flourished and where tragic choruses performed in his honour. Thespis first produced his tragedies at the city *Dionysia* in 534 B.C. He is also said to have invented the mask, which is ritualistic and reflects the origin of tragedy in a Dionysiac festival. The successors of Thespis and immediate predecessors and rivals of Æschylus were especially Pratinas, Chœrilus, Phrynichus.

According to Suidas, Pratinas was the first to compose a satyr-drama. During the performance of one of his plays in competition with Æschylus (499 B.C.), the temporary wooden seats collapsed, leading to the erection of a regular theatre at Athens. His son Aristeas wrote among other satyr-dramas one called *Cyclops*—the title also of the only extant satyr-drama, written by Euripides and translated by Shelley. Chœrilus also distinguished himself in the satyr-drama, and won for himself the title of king among the satyrs. The satyr-drama, illustrated by the satyric masks with semi-bestial features, was originally a gross licentious Dionysiac rite, which with its Sileni and satyrs came down into Greece from Thrace. There dwelt a tribe called Satræ, among whom was the chief sanctuary of Dionysus, and who were thought to be lax in their morals and given to wild orgiastic rites. Even to-day in Thrace and Greece one may see phallic and Dionysiac dances [the writer has witnessed them in Bœotia and Thessaly], which resemble the scenes on Greek vases which were inspired by, and inspired, the satyr chorus (cf. Furtwängler-Reichhold, pls. 47, 48). So from the Satræ perhaps arose the name 'satyrs,' the constant companions of Dionysus in art and literature. It was necessary only to change the costumes of the chorus to widen the scope of subjects. This was done, and Greek tragedy got further and further away from Dionysus; and almost the whole of Greek mythology was drawn on for the plots of the Greek plays. Even the chronicle-play, or drama of contemporary events, was invented. The only extant example is the *Persæ*, in which Æschylus avoided the fate of Phrynichus (who was fined a thousand drachmas for his *Sack of Miletus*) by mentioning no contemporary Greek name in the play, and by placing the scene at the remote court of Susa. But the Dionysiac element was kept to a large extent in the coarser satyr-drama, which every tragic poet must present after a trilogy, or set of three dramas. Sometimes, however, a tragedy of a comic character, like the *Alcestis* of Euripides, could be substituted, and later only one satyr-drama instead of three was given at each festival, to remind one of the origin of tragedy in the worship of Dionysus. Then, as we know from inscriptions, it had the least important place, namely, at the beginning of the festival, and not at the end as previously. The satyr-drama, like tragedy, was a regular ritual supported by the State.

2. Tragedy.—The three great Greek tragedians were Æschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, whose plays are full of religious and ethical ideas (discussed in the articles about them in this Encyclopædia). Æschylus added a second actor, thus introducing true dramatic action, and diminished

the songs of the chorus. Of about seventy dramas by Æschylus we still have seven, among them the only Greek trilogy preserved, the *Oresteia*, the masterpiece of Greek drama, produced in 458 B.C. Æschylus, born at Eleusis in the strong religious atmosphere of the Mysteries, extended the bounds of tragedy to deal with the great moral and religious problems of life and the relation of man to man and to God. He developed the plot, made tragedy a dignified instructor in ethics and religion, and laid down the principles followed by all succeeding Greek tragedians with few changes. One of the great features of Æschylean theology is the predominance of Zeus, to whom even Destiny is coadjutor. This is perhaps best seen in the *Supplices*, which has been pronounced 'one of the most truly religious poems in ancient literature' (Adam, *Rel. Teachers*, p. 142). Æschylus verges almost on monotheism, or rather pantheism (fr. 70: 'Zeus is æther, Zeus is earth, Zeus is heaven; Zeus in truth is all things and more than all'). Sin is ὕβρις, or insolence, and must be expiated by suffering; and punishment is for the most part retributory. He protests against the doctrine of the envy of the gods (cf. *Agamemnon*, 749 f.), and emphatically affirms that the world is governed by Justice. As is well expressed in Abbott's *Hellenica* (1880, p. 66), 'the undertone of Divine vengeance running through the dramas of Æschylus seems in Sophocles to pass away into an echo of Divine compassion, and we move from the gloom of sin and sorrow towards the dawning of a brighter day in which strength is made perfect in weakness.'

Sophocles, who added a third actor and raised the number of the chorus from twelve to fifteen and employed scene-painting, in contrast to Æschylus, is the poet of reconciliation and not of strife between right and wrong. He was the most religious of the Greek poets, and piety is the basis of his religion. In Euripides, the gnomic poet of everyday life and realism, there is much polemic against popular religion, much scepticism and cynicism. He robbed tragedy of its idealism, but brought in romance and pathos and melodrama, which made him very popular in his own and later times. Euripides still further diminished the importance of the chorus as an organic part of the drama, made the prologue serve to tell who the persons were, and largely employed the *deus ex machina* to close his dramas, of which we still have nineteen, including the doubtful *Rhesus*. After Euripides, new tragedies continued to be written, down to the 3rd cent. A.D., and old tragedies of the 5th cent. were reproduced along with the new. But there was little growth or innovation except in better stage-machinery and improved scene-painting. Professional actors took the stage in the 4th cent. B.C., and troupes were sent out to the villages by the gilds of the Dionysiac artists. Almost every town after the 4th cent. B.C. had its theatre and its performances. For Delos, Samos, Delphi, and other places we still have several of the choregic inscriptions.

3. **Comedy.**—As in the case of tragedy, the origin of Greek comedy is connected with the worship of Dionysus, and especially with the Dorians. Comedy arose in the phallic song of Bacchic dancers and revellers, a comus-song (from κῶμος, 'a revel,' not κώμη, 'a village,' as Aristotle says). One sees such a phallic procession in honour of Dionysus in Aristophanes' *Acharn.* 237 f., and on many Greek vases. The primitive rude impromptu performance was developed by Susarion of Megara, who substituted verses of his own, and introduced into these indecent performances the abuse of individuals. Susarion brought these comic performances from Megara first to Icaria, where, as we have seen, tragedy also was born. Till Epicharmus, comedy was only a series of unconnected episodes and burlesques; but Epicharmus, the Sicilian father of Greek comedy, introduced unity of subject and plot, though he seems not to have had the comic chorus, which developed out of the comus. He was the first to bring forward the character of the parasite. His comedies were of two kinds—mythological travesties, and comedies with scenes from daily life, which developed into comedies of intrigue. But the comus of Attica was combined with the episode-comedy of Epicharmus and Sicily to form Attic comedy, though, of course, the *agon*, or contest, also played an important part, as Zielinski has shown. But the *agon* theory, according to which comedy arose from γεφυρισμός, or the jibing at one another at the bridge passed over by the initiates on their procession to Eleusis (cf. Gildersleeve, in *AJPh* x. [1889] 383, xviii. [1897] 243), would make comedy belong to Demeter and Persephone rather than to Dionysus. Whichever theory is right, Attic comedy in its origin certainly was clearly separated from tragedy and the satyr-drama, which were regarded as regular rituals by the State. But comedy grew out of mere buffoonery, and had no claim to religious respect, though it was given unofficially at festivals of Dionysus. The State did not take it up until comedy was developed on the lines of tragedy as a legitimate form of drama. Probably about 487 B.C., as Capps thinks,—and not so late as 467, as Wilamowitz argues,—comedy was officially recognized at the city *Dionysia*. Chionides and Magnes are the first great names, and from their time onwards comedy developed after the pattern of tragedy. Three comedies were given at the *Dionysia* and *Lenæa* by five separate poets. From 425 to 405 B.C. the number was only three. The number of actors who could take part in the discussion at any time was three, as in tragedy (though, as Rees has shown, this does not mean that only three actors were employed to give a tragedy or comedy). The number of the chorus was twenty-four—double the number in tragedy before Sophocles. Comedy, like tragedy, had its prologue, *parodos*, *exodos*, and choruses; but two features, the *agon* and *parabasis*, are peculiar to comedy alone. The *agon* is a debate between two antagonists and the chorus, and often seems to be the essence of the comedy. So, in the *Clouds* of Aristophanes the *agon* is the contention of the Just and Unjust Arguments for the Athenian boy. The *parabasis* is the part where the chorus faces the spectators and addresses them in the name of the poet.

Three periods of comedy are distinguished—the Old (down to, say, 390 B.C.), the Middle (from 390 to, say, 324—the date of Menander's first play), and the New (from 324 onwards). The Old Comedy, of which Cratinus, Eupolis, and Aristophanes are the three great poets, ridiculed with gross abuse and obscenity an individual or any subject, whether from mythology, literature, Utopias, daily or public life. Imitations of animal life were common, and there were choruses of snakes, wasps, fishes, or birds, as in the *Birds* of Aristophanes, the prototype of Rostand's *Chanticler*. Such choruses existed even before Aristophanes, since a vase in the British Museum of the 6th cent. B.C. shows men dressed as birds dancing to the sound of the flute. Great licence was allowed in ridiculing statesmen and politics, but for a while it became necessary to curb the satire and forbid the comedians to satirize individuals by name. The plays of the middle period of Aristophanes are not so pungently political as the earlier ones, and the *Plutus* belongs to Middle Comedy. Aristophanes was the greatest representative of the Old Comedy, and of his fifty-four plays we have eleven preserved entire—the

only extant examples of a complete Greek comedy. The Middle Comedy, best represented by Alexis and Antiphanes, in which political and personal satire hardly appears at all, is a period of transition to the more refined and less personal New Comedy, which developed the comedy of manners with its stock characters and with the every-day interests of eating, drinking, and intrigue. The greatest poets of the New Comedy were Philemon (who in a life of ninety-nine years produced about ninety plays), Menander, Diphilus, Apollodorus, and Posidippus. Recently considerable fragments of four plays of Menander have been recovered in Egypt (cf. Capps, *Four Plays of Menander*, 1910), but we still get our best idea of the Greek New Comedy from the Roman comic poets Terence and Plautus, who took their plots from the Greek, and led the way to the comedy of Molière and modern Europe. See DRAMA (Roman).

4. The structure of the theatre.—It is impossible even to touch on all the subjects connected with the Greek drama in this article, but something should be said about the form of the Greek theatre, which to-day is the most conspicuous ruin throughout Greek lands. The best preserved auditorium is that of the beautiful and harmonious theatre of Epidaurus; the best preserved stage-building is that of Priene. All date after the middle of the 4th cent. B.C. The first stone theatre in Athens dates from the time of Lycurgus,—long after the days of Æschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides,—and would seat about 15,000 people. With the semi-circular auditorium rising in tier after tier of seats divided into κερκίδες, or wedges, by aisles, the theatre of Lycurgus probably reproduces the plan of the temporary structure in which Æschylus acted his own dramas. The performance was always out of doors, and the spectators sat on the slope of the hill, which was made into the form of a semi-circle with the ends extended. Generally even in later times the side of a hill was used for the auditorium of stone, but at Eretria an artificial embankment had to be heaped up. The chorus and actors performed in a circular orchestra at the bottom of a semi-circular auditorium. Here was an altar of Dionysus, at which every performance was begun with sacrifice; and, as the Greek drama was essentially a religious service, not far away there often was a temple, generally of Dionysus, in whose precinct the theatre was. Part of the 6th cent. temple of Dionysus remains even to-day, to the south of the stone theatre of Dionysus in Athens, although the later 4th cent. temple is better preserved. However, we must remember that, while Dionysus was the usual deity associated with the theatre, we sometimes find others. So the stage-building of the theatre at Oropos, which seems to have had wooden seats, with the exception of a few stone ones for the priests and dignitaries, bears an inscription to Amphiaraus. At first there was no scenic background, but, when painted scenery had been introduced, a *skēnē* was erected behind the orchestra containing dressing rooms, and was later adorned with a proscenium of half columns, originally wood, but later stone, between which were slabs, or *pinakes*, on which the scenery was painted. These slabs could be removed when the actors came out into the orchestra. Even when there was a stone *skēnē* and proscenium, most scholars now agree that the actors performed in the orchestra, where even a whisper could be heard by the topmost row, as the writer can bear witness from experiments at Epidaurus. The gods, of course, appeared on top of the proscenium, or *theologeion*. Ghosts, like that of Darius in the *Persæ*, would appear by 'Charon's stairs,' which descended in the middle of the orchestra and connected with an underground passage to the *skēnē*, as at Eretria and Sicyon. The actors were distinguished from the chorus by their costume, often padded, and by their wigs and masks. It used to be thought that their height was increased by the *cothurnus* on the feet and the *onchos* on the head. But it is likely that the *cothurnus* was unknown till late times. Doubt has also been thrown on the use of the *eccyclēma*, or machine to roll out the corpse, since no murder could be represented in full view of the spectators. But there seems to be evidence for its use. Men played the part of women. There was no curtain, as in the Roman theatre, so that there was rarely a change of scene; but the three unities of time, place, and action were often violated, and not consciously formulated by the Greeks.

LITERATURE.—Cf. the different histories of Greek Literature, esp. Croiset, *Hist. de la litt. grecque*, iii. (1891), tr. in abridged form by Heffelbower (1904); Christ, *Gesch. der griech. Litteratur*[4], 1905; Fowler, *Hist. of Ancient Gr. Literature*, 1902; Capps, *From Homer to Theocritus*, 1909, pp. 182–300, 414–440 [one of the best accounts of the subject]; Wright, *Short Hist. of Gr. Literature*, 1907; Verrall, *Student's Manual of Gr. Tragedy*, 1891; Barnett, *Gr. Drama*, Temple Primers, 1900 [an excellent little book, with a good account of the origin and early history of the drama]; Haigh, *Tragic Drama of the Greeks*, 1896, *The Attic Theatre*, 1889 (3rd ed. by Pickard-Cambridge, 1907); Moulton, *Ancient Classical Drama*, 1890; Weil, *Études sur le drame antique*, 1897; Campbell, *Guide to Gr. Tragedy for English Readers*, 1891; Ridgeway, *The Origin of Tragedy*, 1910 [the most recent and important treatment]; Farnell, 'The Megala Dionysia and the Origin of Tragedy' (*JHS* xxix. [1909] p. xlvii), also *Cults of the Greek States*, v. [1910], *s.v.* 'Dionysus'; Reisch, 'Zur Vorgesch. der attischen Tragödie' (*Festschrift für Gomperz*, 1902, p. 459 f.). For the religious side, cf. esp. J. Adam, *The Religious Teachers of Greece*, 1908; Campbell, *Religion in Greek Literature*, 1898; Dyer, *Gods in Greece*, 1891; Foucart, *Le Culte de Dionysos en Attique*, 1904; J. E. Harrison, *Proleg. to the Study of Greek Religion*[2], 1908 (esp. pp. 359–453); Pater, *Greek Studies: A Study of Dionysus*, 1895; Wernicke, 'Bockschöre und Satyr-drama' (*Hermes*, xxxii. [1897] 290 f.). For the ruins of theatres and their interpretation, cf. Dörpfeld, *Das griech. Theater*, 1896; Puchstein, *Die griech. Bühne*, 1901. On the dramatic inscriptions, cf. Wilhelm, *Urkunden dramat. Aufführungen in Athen*, 1906, and the artt. by Capps cited there, esp. the 'Introduction of Comedy into the City Dionysia' (*Chicago Decennial Publications*). Other important works are the editions of Aristotle's *Poetics* by Butcher (1898) and Bywater (1909); O'Connor, *Chapters in the History of Actors and Acting in Ancient Greece*, 1908; Rees, *The So-called Rule of Three Actors*, 1908; Smith, 'The Use of the Buskin in Greek Tragedy' (*Harvard Studies*, xvi. [1905]); Hains, 'Gr. Plays in America' (*Classical Journal*, vi. [1910] 24 f.). Other books on the Greek drama are being prepared by Capps, Harris, Harry, Flickinger, and others.

DAVID M. ROBINSON.

DRAMA (Indian).—**I. The classical Indian drama.**—The extant masterpieces of the Indian drama belong to the most flourishing period of classical Sanskrit literature, which may be supposed to begin with the establishment of the Gupta Empire in A.D. 319, and to extend to about the year 800, though the literature of the next three or four centuries, which may be regarded as the silver age, includes a number of dramas of considerable interest and importance; and this species of composition has continued to be cultivated in India even down to the present day. But these later productions are destitute of originality. They are either imitations of the old models, or exercises constructed in accordance with the rules of the rhetoricians and the writers on the dramatic art. Recent discoveries have, however, shown that the antiquity of the classical drama is much greater than is represented by the extant literature. Fragments of Indian palm-leaf MSS found in Central Asia show that a dramatic literature possessing substantially the same chief characteristics (§ 2) was flourishing several centuries earlier in the Kuṣana period (§ 3).

Like all other works of the classical period—such as the romances, the literary epics, and the lyrical poems—the Sanskrit dramas are of an artificial and highly elaborated character. The rules which govern their language, their structure, the choice of their *dramatis personæ*, and their plots are

those which had been already fixed by grammarians and theorists. Dependent as they are for their interest, not so much on originality of plot or a life-like portrayal of character, as on their power to excite emotion, on refinement of language, and on subtlety of expression, they can have appealed only to cultivated audiences. We thus find the drama, at its first appearance in literature, to be a perfected work of art, the form of which, already definitely settled, does not subsequently undergo any important modification.

This drama must have had a history; but such earlier forms as might have enabled us to trace its origin and growth directly were either not committed to writing or have disappeared in the course of time. References in early literature prove, indeed, that a drama of some kind flourished in India at least as early as the 4th cent. B.C. (see § 8); but there is nothing actually extant in Indian literature which stands to the classical drama in the same relation as the early epics, the *Mahābhārata* and the *Rāmāyaṇa*—the oldest portions of which probably go back to *c.* 500 B.C.—stand to the later epics of the classical period. All that can be now known of the history and development of the Indian drama must be inferred: (1) from the plays themselves, (2) from works dealing with the arts of dramatic composition and dramatic representation, (3) from references in other literature, and (4) from a consideration of the popular theatre which continues still to flourish in India.

2. Chief features.—Some of the most important characteristics which are common to all Sanskrit plays are the following:—

(1) *The benediction.*—Every play begins with a solemn prayer in verse, addressed to some deity—usually Śiva or Viṣṇu or some Divine personage connected with them. In the case of one drama, the *Nāgānanda*, Buddha is invoked.[1] This prayer, called the *nāndī*, was pronounced by the manager of the theatre (*sūtradhāra*), who was also usually the principal actor. It formed part originally of an introductory religious ceremony called the *pūrvaranga*, and remained prefixed to the drama as a sign of its religious origin.

(2) *The prologue.*—At the conclusion of the *nāndī*, the manager calls to his side one of the actors or actresses; and the dialogue which follows is adroitly used to bespeak the good-will of the audience, to give some account of the piece to be performed, and to lead up to the action of the opening scene by calling attention to the character or characters who now appear on the stage. This introduction (*āmukha* or *prastāvanā*) differs from the prologue in the Latin, French, or English comedy, in so far that it is not definitely separated from the play itself, and is intended to set the plot in motion.

(3) *The acts.*—The play thus begun divides itself naturally into acts (*aṅka*), each forming, as it were, a chapter in the story. The hero appears in each act; and an act comes to an end when all the characters have gone off the stage. The unity of time is preserved only within each act and not throughout the whole play; and even within the act the rule is liberally interpreted by a proviso that the events described must not be supposed to have lasted more than twenty-four hours. The time supposed to elapse between one act and another is, in theory, limited to a year; but in practice a longer interval is sometimes permitted.[2] The audience is made acquainted with events which have taken place between acts by means of interludes (*viṣkambhaka* or *praveśaka*), which take the form of monologues or duologues. The unity of place is not observed. Journeys from one spot to another, or from the earth to the sky, for instance, may be represented dramatically within the act.

(4) *Expression of emotions.*—The object of the dramatic art is to produce emotion in the mind of the spectator; and to this end everything else is subordinated. In the course of a play all the emotions (*rasa*), enumerated as eight,[1] may be excited; but those of love and heroism should preponderate. Death and fighting must not be represented on the stage; and every play must have a happy ending. Tragedy, therefore, in the ordinary sense of the word, finds no place in the classical Hindu theatre. These characteristic aims and limitations produce in Sanskrit plays a sentimental and conventional atmosphere which distinguishes them in a very marked manner from the tragedies and comedies of ancient Greece and Rome.

(5) *Verse and prose mixed.*—A no less striking contrast is presented by their form. Sanskrit plays are written partly in verse and partly in prose. The verse portions consist of short lyrical poems descriptive of the beauties of Nature, the charms of women, feelings of love, joy, despair, etc., and these are connected by a prose dialogue. The action of the plot is carried on almost entirely in prose, while the personal feelings of the characters inspired by their surroundings are expressed in the most formal verse. These lyrics, couched in a great variety of metres, and adorned with all the devices of rhetoric, are highly polished specimens of the poetic art such as could have been appreciated, or even understood, only by a cultured audience. It seems probable that, in the earlier stages of the drama, the verses only were fixed, while the connecting dialogue was left to improvisation, as in the popular plays at the present day.

(6) *Sanskrit and Prakrit.*—The *dramatis personæ* speak either the literary language (Sanskrit) or one or other of the popular dialects (Prakrit). The distribution of languages among the various characters may be given as follows from the *Daśa-Rūpa* ii. 97–99 (ed. and tr. Haas, p. 75):

'Sanskrit is to be spoken by men that are not of low rank, by devotees, and in some cases by female ascetics, by the chief queen,[2] by daughters of ministers, and by courtesans. Prākrit is generally [to be the language] of women, and Śaurasenī in the case of male characters of low rank. In like manner Piśāchas, very low persons, and the like are to speak Paiśāchī and Māgadhī. Of whatever region an inferior character may be, of that region is his language to be. For a special purpose the language of the highest and subsequent characters may be changed.'

This diversity of tongues would seem to indicate that the drama assumed its final form at a period when the educated classes were in the habit of using Sanskrit as an ordinary means of communication, while the uneducated classes still continued to employ their own dialects. But, though the classical drama may thus show conventionalized a state of things which must at one time have had its basis in actual fact, its Prakrits are no longer the genuine language of the people. They, too, have become conventional; that is to say, they are merely Sanskrit changed into the various Prakrits in accordance with what were supposed to be the phonetic peculiarities of each, in much the same way as the Scotch and Irish characters on the English stage are often made to speak a jargon which is nothing more than perverted English—the work of a dramatist who has no knowledge of the living dialects. These dramatic Prakrits are, further, assigned to different classes of characters, and applied to different uses in the plays, in a manner which is also purely conventional. The Prakrits thus represented most commonly are three in number—Śaurasenī, Māhā-

[1] See § 3; cf. also the fragments of plays discovered in Central Asia (*ib.*). These are definitely Buddhistic in character.

[2] See Jackson, 'Time Analysis of Sanskrit Plays,' in *JAOS* xx. [1899] 341–359, xxi. [1900] 88–108.

[1] For an elaborate study of the *rasas*, see Regnaud *Rhétorique sanskrite*, Paris, 1884, pp. 267–364.

[2] In the extant plays the queen regularly speaks Prakrit.

rāṣṭrī and Māgadhī; but a number of others are found occasionally. Śaurasenī, the dialect of the region of the Mathurā (Muttra), is used in prose by the queen and her attendants and by the higher subordinates generally. In verse the same characters use Māhārāṣṭrī, the language of the Mahratta country. The lower subordinate characters speak either Māgadhī, the dialect of Magadha (Bihar), the country around Pāṭaliputra (Patna), or some peculiar *patois* of their own. A fourth Prakrit, Paiśāchī, spoken in certain districts of N.W. India, is said by the grammarians to have been used in the drama, but is known at present only from their quotations, and has not been found in any extant play.[1]

The predominance in the plays of Śaurasenī, the dialect of the country of Mathurā, the holy land of Kṛṣṇaism, lends some support to the theory, which is not improbable otherwise, that the drama had its origin in religious performances celebrating the life and exploits of Viṣṇu-Kṛṣṇa.

(7) *The characters*, etc.—The characters in a play may be either semi-Divine or human; and, as according to Hindu ideas there is no very definite line of demarcation to be drawn between these two classes, they are often brought into association, as, for instance, when a king falls in love with an *apsaras*, one of Indra's nymphs.

The plot may be taken from legend or from history, or it may be founded on contemporary life and manners. In any case, the main interest almost invariably centres in a love-story. For a rare exception, see § 3, vi. '*Mudrārākṣasa*.'

The scenes are predominatingly, though by no means exclusively, those of court life; and the persons most frequently represented are kings and queens and their *entourage*. There can be no doubt that the classical drama was developed mainly under the influence of royal patronage, and that the dramatists were usually also court poets. The dependants of the court, too, supplied certain types which are especially characteristic of the Indian stage. The most noteworthy of these are the *vidūṣaka* (who appears in nearly all the plays except those of Bhavabhūti), the *viṭa*, and the *śakāra* (who are known chiefly from the *Mṛchchhakaṭikā* [see § 3] and the text-books).

The *vidūṣaka*, who has often been compared with Shakespeare's clown, is the king's confidant and go-between. His gluttony, his stupidity, and his foibles make him the comic character of the piece. Although a Brahman, he speaks Prakrit, like the uneducated characters. This fact probably denotes that the type has been borrowed by the literary drama from the popular stage.[2]

The *viṭa*, another associate of the king, is a person of wit and refinement, who combines the graces and the subserviency of the courtier.

The *śakāra* is the brother of one of the inferior wives of the king, and is represented as an insolent, overbearing upstart. The name, according to the grammarians, denotes a person of Śaka descent (Patañjali, *Mahābhāṣya*, *ad* Pāṇini, IV. i. 130). As Sylvain Lévi (*Le Théâtre indien*, p. 361 f.) has pointed out, this etymology is historically important, as showing that the character in question first found a place in the Indian drama at a period when Śaka princes were ruling in India, and matrimonial alliances between royal houses of Hindu and Śaka nationality were possible. The peculiar language spoken by this character is also said to be that of the Śakas (*Sāhityadarpaṇa*, 81, 85).

Historically interesting also on account of their name are the *yavanīs*, who attend the king as armour-bearers. These must have been originally Yavana ('Greek') women, although, like the French word *suisse*, the term may at a later date have been used to denote any attendant of a particular kind.[1]

(8) *Buildings and stage-properties*.—From the prologues to the dramas we learn that they were usually performed on the occasion of a festival—most frequently the Spring Festival (see § 10). The simple arrangements of the Indian stage required no building fitted with special contrivances like our own theatres or the Greek θέατρα. The plays were, as a rule, given in the hall of a royal palace which was used for exhibitions of singing and dancing (*saṃgīta-śālā*).

No doubt the hall was sometimes specially intended for dramatic representations, and was, therefore, called *prekṣā-gṛha*, 'play-house.' Such buildings are described in the *Nāṭya-śāstra* (see § 4). Inscriptions in a cave at Rāmagadh seem to indicate that it was intended to be used as a theatre (see Bloch, *ZDMG* lviii. [1904] 455; *Ann. Rep. of the Archæol. Survey of India*, ii.).

The stage was open to the audience in front, while the background was formed by a curtain divided in the centre. The tiring-room (*nepathya*) was immediately behind the curtain. When characters came on the stage in a dignified manner, the two halves of the curtain were drawn aside by attendants; but, when haste was to be indicated, the actor entered 'with a toss of the curtain' (*apaṭī-kṣepeṇa*).

One of the names for this curtain, *yavanikā*, was supposed by Weber (*ZDMG* xiv. [1860] 269, *Ind. Stud.*, Leipzig, 1868, xiii. 492) to mean 'the Greek cloth,' and the etymology was used by him to support his theory of Greek influence in the Indian drama. The word, however, more probably denotes some fabric made by the Yavanas. If so, it is, like *śakāra* and *yavanī*, interesting as evidence of the period in which the drama assumed its form.

Stage-properties of the most obvious description only, such as thrones and chariots, were used; and there was no scenery in the ordinary sense of the word. Its lack was supplied by lyrics describing the imaginary surroundings, supplemented by mimetic action, and by an elaborate system of gesture to which a conventional significance well understood by the audience was attached, somewhat in the style of the modern ballet.

3. **The most important plays.**—

The earliest specimen of the Sanskrit drama was formerly supposed to be the *Mṛchchhakaṭikā*, which was referred to the 4th cent.; but, since the appearance of Sylvain Lévi's *Le Théâtre indien*, it is now generally believed to belong to a later period (see below, iii. '*Śūdraka*'). The earliest complete plays which have been published would seem to be those of Kālidāsa, who probably lived in the reign of the Gupta monarch Chandragupta II. Vikramāditya (A.D. 401–415). But, in the prologue to what is usually regarded as Kālidāsa's earliest drama, the *Mālavikāgnimitra*, he records the names of some 'far-famed' predecessors—Bhāsa, Rāmilla, Saumilla, and Kaviputra. Until recently only fragments of plays by these dramatists were known; but, in May 1910, Paṇḍit T. Gaṇapati Śāstri discovered, in an old library in Travancore, MSS of ten dramas of Bhāsa, including the *Svapna-vāsavadattā*, of which Bhāsa was previously known to be the author, and the *Daridra-chārudatta*, from which the plot of the *Mṛchchhakaṭikā* was borrowed. Editions of these plays may be expected to appear shortly in the Trivandrum Sanskrit Series (see Sylvain Lévi, *JA* xvi. [1910] 388).

Fragments of Indian (Buddhist) dramas of a much earlier date have been discovered in Central Asia. These belong to the early Kuṣana period, when Central Asia formed part of the Indian Empire; and one of them is actually the work of Aśvaghoṣa, the court poet of Kaniṣka. The chronology of the Kuṣana period is at present in an unsettled state; and the age of these fragments will be variously estimated according to the different views which scholars hold as to the epoch of Kaniṣka.

[1] For a fuller account of the Prakrits, see R. Pischel, *Gram. der Prakrit-Sprachen* (*GIAP* i. 8, Strassburg, 1900); on the Paiśāchī, see also Konow, 'The Home of Paiśāci,' in *ZDMG* lxiv. [1910] 95–118.

[2] Pischel (*Home of the Puppet-play*, Eng. tr., London, 1902) supposes the *vidūṣaka* to be the original of the buffoon who appears in various forms in the popular theatres of mediæval Europe. It is perhaps more probable that some such character is inevitable wherever a popular drama is developed. A nearer parallel to the *vidūṣaka* would seem to be supplied by the friar, who was often represented as a comic character. On the *vidūṣaka*, see especially Huizinga, *De vidūṣaka in het indisch Tooneel* (Groningen, 1897). Cf. also Schmidt, *Beiträge zur ind. Erotik*, Leipzig, 1902, pp. 200–203.

[1] For the period to which these foreign invaders belong, see § 10.

That is to say, while some will suppose them to belong to the 1st cent. B.C., others will assign them to the 1st or to the early part of the 2nd cent. A.D. These dramas are of the conventional form (see § 2), and do not differ essentially in language or style from the well-known examples of the classical period. Their evidence is extremely important, as showing that the structure of the drama was already settled at a period which may be from three to four and a half centuries anterior to Kālidāsa (see § 10 (4)). See *Königlich Preussische Turfan-Expeditionen: Kleinere Sanskrit-Texte*, Heft 1, 'Bruchstücke buddhistischer Dramen herausgegeben von Heinrich Lüders,' Berlin, 1911; *Das Śāriputra-prakaraṇa, ein Drama des Aśvaghoṣa*, by Heinrich Lüders, Berlin, 1911 (*Sitzungsber. der König. Preuss. Akad. der Wissenschaften*, Phil.-Hist. Classe, p. 388).

The number of extant plays recorded in Schuyler's *Bibliography of the Sanskrit Drama* exceeds five hundred, but a great number of these are late and purely imitative productions of little interest or literary value. The following list contains the titles, with short descriptions, of the most important:

i. KĀLIDĀSA.—(1) *Mālavikāgnimitra*: the story of King Agnimitra and the Princess Mālavikā (repeatedly translated, *e.g.* Tawney[2], Calcutta, 1891). The play is historical in the sense that some of the characters are known to history. Agnimitra was the second member of the Suṅga dynasty, which succeeded the Mauryas in the kingdom of Vidiśā (E. Malwa), *c.* 178 B.C. Incidents referred to in the play, such as the war with Vidarbha and the defeat of the Yavanas, are also perhaps historical. (2) *Śakuntalā* (the most popular of Skr. plays; first tr. Jones, Calcutta, 1789): the story of King Duṣyanta and the nymph Śakuntalā, taken from bk. i. of the *Mahābhārata*. (3) *Vikramorvaśī* (repeatedly translated, *e.g.* by Wilson): the story of King Purūravas and the Nymph Urvaśī, which goes back to Vedic times. A dialogue between these two personages is found in the Rigveda (x. 95).

ii. HARṢA (reigned A.D. 606—*c.* 648).—(1 and 2) *Ratnāvalī* (Eng. tr. by Wilson) and *Priyadarśikā* (tr. Strehly, Paris, 1888; Eng. tr. in preparation by A. V. W. Jackson), named after their heroines. The plots are taken from the cycle of stories about the adventures of King Udayana of Vatsa. (3) *Nāgānanda*: founded on the Buddhist story of the Bodhisattva Jīmūtavāhana (Eng. tr. by Boyd, London, 1872). In the opening benediction Buddha is invoked.[1]

iii. ŚŪDRAKA.—*Mṛchchhakaṭikā*, 'The Clay Cart': a comedy of middle-class contemporary life. The plot gathers around the love of the rich courtesan Vasantasenā for the poor but well-born Chārudatta (Eng. tr. by Wilson, and especially Ryder, Cambridge, Mass., 1905). This, the most human and amusing of Sanskrit plays, is now known to be an adaptation of Bhāsa's *Daridra-chārudatta*, 'Poor Chārudatta.'[2]

iv. BHAVABHŪTI (flourished at the court of Yaśovarman of Kanauj, *c.* A.D. 690).—(1 and 2) *Mahāvīracharita* (tr. Pickford, London, 1871) and *Uttararāmacharita* (several translations, *e.g.* by Wilson): founded on the story of Rāma. (3) *Mālatīmādhava*: a comedy of contemporary life named after the two chief characters Mālatī and Mādhava (Eng. tr. by Wilson).

v. BHAṬṬA NĀRĀYAṆA (before the second half of the 9th cent.).—*Veṇisaṃhāra* (Eng. tr. by Tagore, Calcutta, 1880): the plot is taken from the *Mahābhārata*.

vi. VIŚĀKHADATTA or VIŚĀKHADEVA (about the same date as the last).—*Mudrārākṣasa*: a political drama with no principal female characters and no love interest (Eng. tr. by Wilson). The plot is historical. It turns on the fall of the Nandas and the coming to power (*c.* 315 B.C.) of Chandragupta, the founder of the Maurya dynasty, the Σανδρόκοττος of Alexander the Great's historians.

vii. RĀJAŚEKHARA (lived at the court of Mahendrapāla of Kanauj, *c.* A.D. 900).—(1) *Viddhaśālabhañjikā*, 'The Pierced Statue' (Eng. tr. by Gray, *JAOS* xxvii. [1906] 1–71); (2) *Karpūramañjarī*, 'The Camphor Cluster' (ed. and tr. Konow and Lanman, Cambridge, Mass., 1901); (3 and 4) *Bālarāmāyaṇa* and *Bāla-bhārata*. The first of these is, in some respects, an imitation of the *Ratnāvalī*; the second is noteworthy as being the only extant example of a play written altogether in Prakrit; the third and fourth are founded respectively on the stories of the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata*.

viii. KṚṢṆAMIŚRA (11th cent.).—*Prabodhachandrodaya*, 'The Rising of the Moon of Wisdom': an allegorical play in which the characters are abstract ideas, virtues, or vices.[3] Its object is to glorify the Vedānta philosophy and to inculcate the worship of Viṣṇu (Eng. tr. by Taylor[3], Bombay, 1893).

For dramas inscribed on stone, see Kielhorn, 'Bruchstücke ind. Schauspiele in Inschriften zu Ajmere' (*GGN*, 1901); and Hultzsch, *Epigr. Ind.* viii. [1905–6] 96.

4. **Works on the theatre.**—Of the Sanskrit treatises which deal with dramatic composition and theatrical representation the following are the most important:—

The *Nāṭya-śāstra* is an encyclopædia dealing with the theatre and all the arts associated therewith. It is regarded as the highest authority, and is supposed to be of Divine authorship. It is said to have been revealed as a fifth Veda by the god Brahmā to the sage Bharata, who is often mentioned in the plays as the stage-manager of the gods. It is at least as old as the earliest extant dramas, and may be much older. The list of foreign invaders of India mentioned in it—Śakas, Yavanas, Pāhlavas, Bāhlīkas—seems to indicate the same period as the dramas themselves (see Sylvain Lévi, *op. cit.*, Appendix, p. 3).

The *Daśa-Rūpa* (ed. and tr. Haas, New York, 1911) of Dhanaṃjaya, who lived in the reign of Muñja or Vākpatirāja, king of Malwa (last quarter of the 10th cent.), deals only with the dramatic art, which it analyzes under four headings: (1) the plot, (2) the hero and the other characters, (3) the prologue and the various species of dramatic composition, (4) the poetry and the sentiments to be expresssed.

The *Sāhityadarpaṇa* (ed. and tr. Ballantyne and Mitra, Calcutta, 1875) of Viśvanātha, of uncertain date, treats not only of the drama but also of the whole art of poetry.

These works show a subtle power of analysis which is characteristically Indian; but the analysis is rather of the form than of the spirit, and is as alien as possible from what has, since the days of Aristotle, been regarded as dramatic criticism in the West. Thus, the principles in accordance with which dramas are classified are founded on what we should consider accidents rather than essentials; for example, the rank of the hero, the number of the acts, the kind of language (whether partly in Sanskrit and partly in Prakrit, or altogether in Prakrit, etc.). According to such principles, all dramas are divided into two main classes—a higher (*rūpaka*), of which there are 10 varieties; and a lower (*uparūpaka*), of which there are 18 varieties. Of the *rūpaka*, the first variety is the *nāṭaka*, which must consist of not fewer than 5 and not more than 10 acts, and in which the hero must be a god or a prince, e.g. *Śakuntalā*. The next variety is the *prakaraṇa*, a love-story of real life, in which hero and heroine must be of good family, e.g. *Mṛchchhakaṭikā*. Of the *uparūpaka* the chief variety is the *nāṭikā*, which has the same type of hero as the *nāṭaka*, but is confined to 4 acts, e.g. *Ratnāvalī*. Another variety, the fourth in the enumeration, is the *saṭṭaka*, which (according to the *Sāhityadarpaṇa*) is like the *nāṭikā*, except that it is written entirely in Prakrit, e.g. *Karpūramañjarī*.

[In addition to the *rūpakas* and *uparūpakas* just noted, the following types described by the Indian dramaturgists are also accessible, though the majority of them are still untranslated.

1. RŪPAKAS.—(i.) The *Bhāṇa*, or monologue, descriptive of the passing throng or of a rascal's exploits (e.g. *Vasantatilaka* of Varadāchārya, ed. Vidyāsāgara, Calcutta, 1872; Eng. tr. in course of preparation by L. H. Gray). (ii.) *Prahasana*, or farce (*e.g.* Jyotirīśvara's *Dhūrtasamāgama*, tr. Marazzi, *Teatro scelto indiano*, Milan, 1871–74, ii. 189–231). (iii.) *Dima*, or presentation of terrible events, the effect of the combats, etc., often being enhanced by sorcery, eclipses, and the like (*e.g.* Rāma's *Manmathonmathana*, ed. R. Schmidt, *ZDMG* lxiii. [1909] 409–437, 629–654). (iv.) *Vyāyoga*, or military spectacle, from which the sentiment of love is excluded (*e.g.* Kāñchanāchārya's *Dhanaṃjayavijaya*, ed. Śivadatta and Parab, Bombay, 1895).

2. UPARŪPAKAS.—(i.) The *Troṭaka*, merely a variety of the *nāṭaka* (*e.g.* the *Vikramorvaśī* [§ 3, i.]). (ii.) *Śrīgadita*, in which the name of the goddess Śrī ('Fortune') is frequently mentioned, or the divinity is imitated by the heroine (*e.g.* Ma-

[1] Although these three plays bear the name of King Harṣavardhana Śilāditya of Thanesar, and each contains a verse asserting the royal authorship, it is probable that they were the work of a court poet, perhaps Bāṇa, to whom also a play entitled *Pārvatī-pariṇaya*, 'Parvatī's Wedding' (tr. Glaser, Trieste programme, 1886), is attributed (on this whole problem, see Ettinghausen, *Harṣa Vardhana, empereur et poète*, Paris, 1906).

[2] King Śūdraka, to whom this comedy is attributed, is the central figure of a group of legends, from which no exact information as to his date or locality can be obtained. As in other similar cases, it is probable that the actual author was some court poet. The *Mṛchchhakaṭikā* may perhaps belong to the 6th or 7th century.

[3] Allegorical characters are also found in one of the Buddhist plays of which fragments have been discovered in Central Asia.

dhava Bhaṭṭa's *Subhadrāharaṇa*, ed. Durgāprasāda and Parab, Bombay, 1888). (iii.) *Bhāṇikā*, a comic piece in one act (*e.g.* Rūpa Gosvāmī's *Dānakelikaumudī*, ed. Jīva Gosvāmī, Murshidabad, 1881).

To these should be added, though unmentioned by the native dramaturgists, the very interesting *Chāyānāṭaka*, or 'shadow play' (*e.g.* Subhaṭa's *Dūtāṅgada*, tr. Gray, *JAOS* xxxi. [1911]; see below, § 6).—L. H. Gray.]

In the same spirit the theorists delight in arranging into divisions and sub-divisions—according to rank, character, and circumstances—all the conceivable types of hero and heroine, and all the possible varieties of plot. Artificial and meticulous as is the theory of drama thus presented, it is substantially observed in all the plays extant, and it acquires a more binding power as time goes on, so that the later productions are no longer works of art, but exercises written to illustrate rules.

5. Prakrit nomenclature a sign of popular origin.—The whole nomenclature of the drama, however, as employed and expounded by the theorists, supplies indisputable evidence of its popular origin. The terms denoting acting and actors, the different kinds of plays, theatrical appliances, etc., are predominatingly Prakrit and not Sanskrit, as they must have been if the drama had been literary from the first. The very root *naṭ*, 'to act,' is the Prakrit equivalent of the Sanskrit *nṛt*, 'to dance,' in the Indian sense, that is, 'to express by mimetic action.' It occurs in Pāṇini's grammar (IV. iii. 110, 129; 4th cent. B.C.), and both Pāṇini himself and, still more explicitly, his commentator Patañjali (2nd cent. B.C.) show that, at their respective dates, the educated classes spoke Sanskrit, while the common people still continued to use their native dialects. The drama, then, had its origin among the common people; and, at the later period when it assumed a literary form, its nomenclature was so firmly established as not to suffer change through the influence of its new surroundings.

6. Influence of the puppet-play.—Further evidence of a popular origin has been seen in the titles *sūtradhāra* and *sthāpaka* applied to the manager and to his principal assistant. The word *sūtradhāra* means literally 'the holder of the strings,' and *sthāpaka* 'the placer.' These terms are supposed to have been borrowed from the puppet-play, which was undoubtedly a very ancient form of dramatic representation in India, and is alluded to by Nīlakaṇṭha in his commentary on *Mahābhārata*, XII. ccxcv. 5 (Shankar Pandit, in notes to *Vikramorvaśī*, p. 4, Bombay Sanskrit Series, 1879; Pischel, *Home of the Puppet-play*, and 'Das altind. Schattenspiel,' *SBAW* xxiii. [1906] 482–502; Gray, introduction to his tr. of the *Dūtāṅgada*, in *JAOS* xxxii. [1912]).

The *sthāpaka*, who is well-known from the text-books, has almost vanished from the stage. He probably, however, appears in the *Karpūramañjarī*, although the MSS are not in agreement on this point (see Konow and Lanman, *Karpūramañjarī*, p. 196, Harvard Oriental Series, vol. iv. [1901]).

7. Popular plays (*yātrās*).—The classical drama is, therefore, a popular product which has received a literary development. This development took place, as is, indeed, true of classical Sanskrit literature generally, under royal patronage. The plays, as we learn from the prologues, were most frequently performed at palaces on the occasion of the Spring Festival; the characters represented are most commonly kings and queens and the *personnel* of the court; the dramatists are usually court poets; and the authorship of a number of plays is attributed to the kings themselves.

The popular drama, however, did not cease to exist because it assumed a more polished form at courts. While the works of a Kālidāsa or a Bhavabhūti were being performed before a courtly audience in the hall of the palace, the popular plays were appealing to humbler folk in the open air. They still survive in India under the name of *yātrās*, a name which declares their religious origin; for *yātrā* means a festival in honour of some deity. The plots, too, of these popular plays are still religious in character. They are still taken from the legends of the gods and heroes of the *Mahābhārata* and *Rāmāyaṇa*. The striking similarity between the *yātrās* and the 'mysteries' of mediæval Europe has been pointed out by Nisikānta Chattopādhyāya (*The Yātrās, or the Popular Dramas of Bengal*, London, 1882, p. 3; *Ind. Essays*, Zürich, 1883, p. 3), and there can be no doubt that the theatre in India, as in Europe, had its origin in religion.

8. References to drama in early literature.—The earliest certain mention of a dramatic literature appears to occur in Pāṇini's grammar (*c.* 350 B.C.), IV. iii. 110–111, where he gives rules for the formation of the names denoting the followers of two text-books on the drama—those of Śilālin and Kṛśāśvin. These treatises are lost; it is probable that they and all other works of the same nature were superseded by the *Nāṭya-śāstra* (see § 4). Pāṇini's commentator, Patañjali (*c.* 140 B.C.), often refers in his *Mahābhāṣya* to actors, and mentions two plays by name—*Kaṃsavadha*, 'the Slaying of Kaṃsa,' and *Balibandhana*, 'the Binding of Bali'—with the additional information that in the former the adherents of Kaṃsa and Vāsudeva respectively reddened and blackened their faces (Weber, *Ind. Studien*, xiii. 487; cf. also Keith, *ZDMG* lxiv. [1910] 534–536). As both of the earliest recorded plays celebrated the exploits of the god Viṣṇu, it has been suggested that the drama may have taken its origin from religious performances in his honour. There are also other indications that this view may possibly be correct (see § 2 (6)).

9. Dramatic character of some early literature.—The earliest literature of India, extending back to a period *c.* 1200 or 1500 B.C., includes certain compositions which are to some extent dramatic in character, and which may well have supplied the germ of a regular drama. In the Rigveda there are fifteen hymns written in the form of dialogues, which, if recited with appropriate action and with the parts assigned to separate actors, would make diminutive plays.[1]

The ancient epic poems, the *Mahābhārata* and *Rāmāyaṇa*, contain many scenes which might well be acted. The step from the epic to the drama, if such a development had taken place in India, would have been a short one, since the change of speaker in the epic is denoted by a short prose statement, which is little more than a stage direction—'A. spake'—and not by a line of verse incorporated in the poem, as in Homer.

The Brāhmaṇa literature, dating from *c.* 800 B.C., also contains accounts of performances of a dramatic character which took place in connexion with certain religious ceremonies:

'On solemn occasions, such as that of the sacrifice of a horse, it was the custom in Vedic times to recite old histories and songs; and the performers, the priests of the Rig-veda and the Yajur-veda spoke turn and turn about' (Hillebrandt, *Ritual-Litteratur* [*GIAP* iii. 2], Strassburg, 1897, p. 150). On the day of a Mahāvrata an Ārya and Śūdra appeared, who disputed about a skin (Hillebrandt, *Roman. Forsch.* v. [1890] 327); and at the ceremony of the purchase of soma a buyer and seller were introduced, who held an animated conversation about the price. The buyer made his offer, the seller raised his price. If the soma-dealer proved refractory, the purchaser was bound to tear the soma from him, and also to take away the gold and the cow which he had given for the soma. If the dealer resisted, the buyer had to beat him with a leather strap or with billets

[1] For these '*saṃvāda*' hymns, see Oldenberg, *ZDMG* xxxvii. (1883) 54, and xxxix. (1885) 52; Sylvain Lévi, *op. cit.* 301; von Schröder, *Mysterium u. Mimus im Rig-veda*, Leipzig, 1908, p. 1; Winternitz, *WZKM* xxiii. [1909] 102; Hertel, 'Ursprung des ind. Dramas und Epos,' *ib.* xviii. (1904) 59–83, 137–168; Keith, in *JRAS*, 1911, p. 979.

of wood (Hillebrandt, *Vedische Mythologie*, Breslau, 1891–1902, i. 75; Pischel, *Home of the Puppet-play*, p. 12).[1]

10. Origin of the drama.—The foregoing paragraphs contain a summary of such evidence as bears on the question of the origin of the drama. From a consideration of the evidence thus summarized, the following four points would seem to be established:

(1) The drama was of popular, not of learned, origin (see § 5). It is, therefore, difficult to suppose any connexion between it and the *saṃvāda* hymns of the Rigveda (see § 9).

(2) The drama is of lyric, not of epic, origin. The actual plays are essentially lyrical. Their frame-work consists of a number of little poems about the beauties of Nature, or personal feelings, somewhat after the manner of Heine's *Lieder*. The prose dialogue which connects these is of minor importance, and originally was probably left to improvisation (see § 2 (5)). It is probable, then, that the drama arose from songs associated with gestures, *i.e.* 'dancing,' in the Indian sense. Its form could not be explained if it were supposed to be of epic origin (see § 9).[2]

(3) Its origin was religious. This is inferred from the existence of the *nāndī* (see § 2 (1)), from the analogy of the *yātrās* (§ 7), and from the titles of the earliest recorded plays (§ 8). The fact that dramas were regularly performed at the Festival of Spring would seem to indicate that the rites from which they derived their origin may have been originally associated with some primitive form of Nature-worship, like those which are found incorporated in Brāhman ritual (§ 9). It is quite possible that, in certain parts of India, the worship of Viṣṇu-Kṛṣṇa, with which the drama would appear to be especially connected (§§ 2 (6), 8), may have been at a later date superimposed on some popular festival of the kind.

(4) A drama of some kind certainly existed as early as 350 B.C. (see § 8), and, at some period between this date and the date of the fragments found in Central Asia (see § 3), the form of the classical drama was stereotyped. The peoples of foreign nationality who have left their traces in the drama, and who are mentioned in the dramatic text-books, are those who occur in the other literature—epics, grammatical works, law-books, etc.—and in the inscriptions which fall within this period (Rapson, *B. M. Cat.*, 'Andhra Dynasty,' etc., London, 1908, p. xcviii).

11. The question of Greek influence.—The view, formerly widely accepted, and most fully expounded by Windisch ('Der griech. Einfluss im ind. Drama' [*Verh. d. 5 Internat. Or.-Cong.*, Berlin, 1882, II. ii. 3]), that the Indian drama had been influenced by the Newer Attic Comedy of Menander and Philemon (340–260 B.C.), probably finds few supporters at the present day. The arguments of Windisch are carefully considered one by one by Sylvain Lévi (*op. cit.*), who finds none of them convincing; and, as has been pointed out (§§ 2, 10), there are so many fundamental differences between the Indian and the Greek drama that, *prima facie*, they have all the appearance of being independent developments.

LITERATURE.—The standard work on the Sanskrit drama is **Sylvain Lévi**, *Le Théâtre indien*, Paris, 1890; the best collection of English translations is still that of **H. H. Wilson**, *Select Specimens of the Theatre of the Hindus* = vols. xi. and xii. of *Works of H. H. Wilson*, London, 1871; the best *Bibliography of the Sanskrit Drama* is that of **Montgomery Schuyler**, vol. iii. of the Columbia University Indo-Iranian Series, New York, 1906. A survey of Indian dramaturgic literature, with references to parallel passages, is given by **G. C. O. Haas**, in his ed. and tr. of the *Daśa-Rūpa* in the same series (New York, 1911). Reference may also be made to **A. V. Williams Jackson**, 'Certain Dramatic Elements in Sanskrit Plays, with Parallels in the English Drama,' in *AJPh* xix. (1898) 241–254, and 'Children on the Stage in the Ancient Hindu Drama,' in *Looker-On*, v. (1897) 509–516; and to **L. H. Gray**, 'The Sanskrit Novel and the Sanskrit Drama,' in *WZKM* xviii. (1904) 48–54.

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[1] To the reference given by Pischel add von Schröder, *Mysterium u. Mimus*, and Keith, *Śāṅkhayana Āraṇyaka*, London, 1908, Appendix on the Mahāvrata, p. 73.

[2] An extremely polished form of the primitive *yātrā* probably exists in Jayadeva's *Gītagovinda* (12th cent.), made accessible in Sir Edwin Arnold's *Indian Song of Songs* (London, 1875).

DRAMA (Japanese).—**1. Origin.**—The Japanese themselves do not hesitate to carry back the drama to mythological times.

The *Kojiki* tells us how the great sun-goddess Amaterasu-ō mikami-no-mikoto, angry with her mischievous and turbulent brother Susa no wō, god of winds and storms, hid herself in a cave and refused to come forth. The gods, distressed by the eclipse of light which ensued, sought to lure her from the cavern, and at last succeeded in doing so by means of a simple play. A young and beautiful deity, Amatsu-uzume-no-mikoto, clad in moss from the mountain of Kayou, garlanded with flowers from the spindle-tree, and bearing in her hand a bunch of bamboo-fronds, was set to dance a hieratic dance at the entrance to the cavern. The dance (it is still exhibited at Ise and Nara, and in Izumo) was found vastly amusing by the crowd of gods assembled at the cave to witness the success or failure of the experiment, and a roar of delighted laughter went up from them. The sulking sun-goddess was filled with woman-like curiosity, peeped out from her hiding-place, and was finally presuaded to return to her proper sphere. Thus the *Ama-no-iwado-no-kagura*, or 'play before the celestial gate,' came to be looked upon as the germ from which has sprung the classical drama of old Japan.

The value of the above legend depends on the view taken as to the historic value of the *Kojiki*, a compilation of the 8th cent. A.D., to which few foreigners would assign the same high position that is accorded to it by the Japanese. Under the year A.D. 671, however, the *Nihongi* speaks of a *tamai*, or 'rice-field-dance,' connected with the ingathering of the harvest; and this, by the beginning of the 11th cent., had developed into a more or less formal pantomime under a Chinese name *dengaku*, which signifies the same thing as *tamai*. The *tamai*, however, seems to have been a purely Shintoistic dance, connected with the indigenous Nature-worship: the *dengaku* was more or less buddhicized, and was performed by men with shaven crowns who were called *dengaku-bōshi*, or teachers of the law connected with the rice-field-dance, and who belonged (doubtless irregularly) to the Buddhist clergy. We have here a point of contact with the history of Buddhist developments in Japan. During the 9th and 10th cents., when the miseries of the country were very great, and when little, if anything, was done for the amelioration of the people by the selfishly cultured monks whose chief seats were in Nara, Kyoto, Hieizan, and a few other seats of monastic piety, travelling priests belonging to no particular sect of Buddhism itinerated throughout the country, gathering the people round them by simple dances and religious performances, and teaching the elements of popular religion. These men were known as *odori-nembutsu*, 'dancing reciters of prayers.' They were also *dengaku-bōshi*. The most famous of these men was Kūya Shōnin (9th cent.), a prince of the Imperial blood, who travelled all through the country with his mystery plays and dances. It is in these itinerating preachers that we find the true successors of that faith in Amitābha alone, which, developed in the 7th cent. by the Chinese patriarch Zendō, and encouraged by Shōtoku Taishi, disappeared for a while under the ritualistic burdens of the systems in vogue at Nara and Kyoto, to reappear in the simpler Jōdo systems of Hōnen and Shinran.

But the 'rice-field-dances' developed in another direction. By the side of the solemn and sedate *dengaku*, with its religious tone, there arose the *sangaku*, or 'Chinese dance,' full of humour and comedy, and hence changed in popular parlance to *sarugaku*, or 'monkey-dance,' which presently became the most popular of all the forms of

dances, and eventually developed into the '*nō*' *par excellence*.

The word *nō* presents certain difficulties. Used as a verb it means 'to be able,' 'to have the power'; as a noun it signifies 'power,' 'faculty,' 'capacity,' 'talent.' It is much used in Buddhist philosophy, though this fact does not throw much light on its employment as a designation for lyrical dramas. Péri (*op. cit. infra*) quotes Motoori (1730–1801) as suggesting that the character is a contraction for *waza*, a term frequently used to denote 'actions,' 'liturgies,' 'dances.' We have *kami-waza*, 'liturgies'; *mai-waza*, 'dances'; *oko-waza*, 'comic spectacles'; and Fujiwara Akihara (1020–1068) even speaks of *sarugaku-no-waza*. There is much to be said for this theory, but it still leaves untouched the problem as to how the pronunciation *waza* came to be changed to *nō*. Can it be that there lurks in *nō* some echo of the Indian word *nāṭa* ('nautch')? The *nō* came into vogue in Japan at a time when Japan had close intercourse with China, when China was greatly influenced by India; and there is much in the *nautch* that reminds one of the *nō*. Motoori's theory, that *nō*=*waza*, is strengthened by the fact that the principal actor in a *nō* drama is called *shi-te* (lit. ποιητής).

2. The 'nō.'—Apart from the philological difficulty involved in the name, the *nō* is a lyric drama composed mainly of two factors—singing and posturing. Of these, posturing is the more ancient. We have seen that the Japanese assign the origin of the *nō*, as of the temple-dance itself, to that original *kagura* dance which was performed at the cave of the sun-goddess, and which is still perpetuated in the *kagura* dances at shrines and temples. The *tamai* was also mainly a dance, probably not unlike the country dances which still survive in remote country districts, wherever the police can be persuaded to shut their eyes, in connexion with the Feast of *O-bon*. These dances are almost invariably accompanied by some rude instrumental music, and it is almost inevitable that singing should ensue when the bodies of a company of men and women are set in harmonious motion by the sound of some simple instrument. The country dances of all peoples are accompanied with song. The dialogues connecting the various songs and dances came in later, but so subsidiary is the place assigned to what in Europe would be considered the most important portion of the drama, that they are frequently omitted altogether from the *utaibon*, or printed copies of the *nō* dramas. The place where the dialogue should come in is indicated by the simple addition at the end of the song of the words *shika-jika*, 'and so forth,' or *serifu ari*, 'there are words spoken' (Péri, *op. cit.* 263).

When the *nō* appeared in its perfected condition during the Nambokuchō and Muromachi periods (1332–1603), it had a libretto, or book of words, many of which have come down to us. Over a thousand *nō* dramas are known to have existed: they were divided into two classes—*uchi*, the inner circle, the plays most commonly represented; and *soto*, the outer ring of less familiar, because less popular, plays. Common parlance speaks of *naigwai* (=*uchi soto*) *ni-hyaku ban*, 'the 200 pieces inner and outer,' but the number extant is a little in excess of that. There are about 250 which are now actually current (for their names see Péri). A new *nō* play occasionally finds its way to the stage even now, but rarely with great success.

The *nō* are classified according to their subjects, as follows: (1) *Kami nō*, or *shinji nō*, dramas which concern the gods or things divine, *i.e.* mythological pieces or pieces relating to the legends connected with some particular god or temple. These pieces are also termed *waki nō*, though the reason for this term is not quite clear. (2) *Shūgen nō*, or 'dramas of good wishes,' written for the purpose of celebrating heroes, famous men, emperors, etc. Some dramas evidently are capable of being treated as either *kami nō* or *shūgen nō*. This class includes nearly all the so-called *otoko mono*, or *shūra mono*—pieces relating to warriors, whom Buddhism relegated to the path of the *Shura* (or Asuras) as a punishment for the bloodshed connected with their lives. (3) *Yūrei nō* and *seirei nō*, dramas connected with apparitions, ghosts, spirits—the former class referring to the spirits of warriors or women; the latter, to the manifestations of the spirits of animals, plants, flowers, etc. In these plays (hence called *jo* or *onna mono*) the principal actor, or *shi-te*, is always a woman, the name *katsura mono* being also given to them from the *katsura* head-dress worn by the female character. Many of the plays classified as *kami nō* or *genzai nō* may be put down as *onna-mono* as well. (4) *Genzai nō*. Whilst all the dramas hitherto considered have dealt with problems of another world, the gods great and small, the spirits and souls of the righteous and unrighteous, the fourth class deals with problems, not of the present time, but of the *present world*. It represents the human side of the lyrical drama, scenes more or less historical, illustrations of manners and customs, etc.

A second classification, dating apparently from the Tokugawa period (1603–1868), gives a fivefold division—*jin, dan, jo, kyō, ki*, 'god, man, woman, folly, demon'—the fourth practically corresponding to the *genzai nō* of the classification just given.

3. The 'kyōgen.'—The writers of the *nō* dramas were all either Buddhist monks or persons impregnated with the spirit of Buddhism. The present world is to Buddhism nothing but 'folly,' and it is easy to see how the plays of the *genzai nō* came to be classed as *kyō*, 'folly.' But the present world has a constant tendency to assert itself even in the most monastic of minds, and not only do we find the *kyō*, or *genzai mono*, occupying their own position among the legitimate dramas of the *nō*, but we find evolving out of them a new species of theatrical composition, the *kyōgen*, or satirical farce, which came to form a pendant to the lyrical drama, just as a satiric drama was appended to the conclusion of a Greek trilogy.

Nō and *kyōgen* are acted on the same stage, but never by the same actors. In the *nō* the actors wear masks, in the *kyōgen* they wear none; the dances are the same, but the manner of execution is different. In the *nō* everything is solemn, stately, impressive; in the *kyōgen* there is a sound of laughter, mixed with an undertone of sadness. In the *nō* we have the Buddhist clergy preaching their highest doctrines of life, and setting up an ideal which shall influence society; in the *kyōgen* there is the sense of the ridiculous and the sense of sadness which both alike come from the consciousness of failure to attain to an ideal. If the *nō* gives us the high ideals of life as dreamed of by the recluse priesthood of the period, the *kyōgen* gives us a true picture of the degenerate national life of the Ashikaga (or Muromachi) age. It would be possible to re-construct a picture of the social conditions of the age from the texts of the extant *kyōgen*. Following the analysis given by Florenz, we should see, in the sketches made by these anonymous satirists, a nobility and clergy effeminate and worldly, and meriting the disdain of the fighting classes whose hand was uppermost in the affairs of the distracted empire, a low state of social morality, much poverty and distress, no efficient system of police, and, above all, a general callousness and indifference to suffering which acquiesced in the ridiculing of the blind, the maimed, and the suffering. Read in connexion with works like the *Tsurezure gusa* and the voluminous correspondence of men like Nichiren, Rennyo, and others, now being gradually made accessible to Western readers, the *kyōgen* texts are invaluable for all students of Japanese life and society during the Middle Ages.

4. The 'kabuki.'—The *nō* and *kyōgen* were never popular performances. They were composed for the amusement of certain privileged

classes in the capital and elsewhere; they were patronized by Shōguns and courtiers; and, when the *kyōgen* had lost their sting by reason of the *pax Tokugawica* introduced by Iyeyasu (1603–32), almost every *daimyō* of any importance or wealth kept his own troupe of actors at his little court. But for the common people, the merchant, the farmer, and the artisan, the lyrical dramas were never intended.

About the year 1569 there appeared in Kyoto a woman named Izumo no O Kuni, whose genius produced a remarkable revolution in the dramatic world of her country. O Kuni was the daughter of an Izumo blacksmith, and, being a girl of prepossessing appearance, was early engaged as a *mikō*, or *kagura*-dancer, at a temple in the village of Kitsuki. The temple was destroyed by fire, and O Kuni started on a quest for money to rebuild it. It is probable that she went first to Sado, where gold had recently been discovered, and where money was readily spent. Soon afterwards, in 1569, she made her appearance at Kyoto, where she set up a booth (or *shibai*) in the dry bed of the Kamogawa, and began giving performances which speedily became very popular. She was dressed in the black robe of a priest of the Shinshu sect of Buddhists, and her dancing was of the style known as *yaya-odori*, or *nembutsu-odori*, the pantomimic sacred dance which, as we have seen, Kuya Shōnin and others used in their itinerating preachings through the country. She accompanied her dancing by rude songs on the impermanency of this transient world. Her performances attracted much attention, and her quest for the temple was soon accomplished. In the meantime she had discovered her vocation. To this she was helped by a certain Nagoya Sanzaburō, the son of a *samurai* in Owari, who had been educated by monks at Odawara, and adopted later by Gamo, lord of Aidzu, one of the political supporters of the Taikō Hideyoshi. Nagoya was a handsome and brave man, with a great reputation as a lady-killer. It was said that the fair Yodogimi was one of his conquests, and that Hideyoshi's reputed son, Hideyori, was in reality his. Gamo died in 1595, and Nagoya, now a *rōnin*, or masterless knight, came presently to Kyoto, where he became attached to O Kuni, who was some fifteen years his senior. Under his influence, she changed her methods. She discarded her priest's robe for the dress of a two-sworded *samurai*, sang popular ditties instead of *nembutsu* hymns, and began to act on themes of a purely secular nature. Her popularity increased still more. Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, and Hideyoshi's son, Hideyasu, invited her to act in their presence, and there is an old print in the Museum at Uyeno, which represents her performing before a crowded house in which several Europeans are to be seen. This touch of the West in contact with the East is not without its significance. Every resident in Japan knows how marvellously quick the Japanese are to adopt the latest ideas from foreign countries, and it is quite possible that the modernized drama which was thus instituted by O Kuni and Nagoya contained elements derived from the European drama. Shakespeare was in the zenith of his power when O Kuni was acting, and there were but few Englishmen in Japan who could have told the Japanese of him. Corneille was not yet born; but the Spanish drama had been at its topmost point of fame for many years, and there were many Spaniards, clerical and other, in the Imperial city. It is possible that the Europeans represented in the old print in the Tokyo Museum are Spaniards.

The popular name for these representations was *shibai*, a name still in universal use to denote a theatre, the secular drama, or a secular play. The name chosen for it by its founders was *kabuki*, a word originally signifying comedy and licence, but in later days ennobled so as to denote 'the art of singing and dancing.' Tokyo still boasts of a *kabuki-chō*, or street devoted to this sort of drama, and of a *kabuki-za* theatre, which has hitherto attracted to itself some of the greatest names of the Japanese theatrical world.

The year 1604 marks the height of O Kuni's personal popularity. About that year, Nagoya, who had returned to his *samurai* life, was killed in a brawl, and O Kuni, who was getting on in years, retired to a nunnery in her native place, where she died in obscurity, nine years later.

5. The 'onna-kabuki.'—Imitation is always one of the greatest tests of popularity. Before O Kuni retired from the histrionic life, her theatres had already found imitators in various cities, notably at Osaka and Yedo, and the movement showed signs of permanent vigour. But the *onna-kabuki*, as it was called, fell into disgrace with the Shōgunate, and its prominent feature was prohibited by the police of Iyeyasu in 1629. One of the chief novelties of O Kuni's representations had been her bold assumption of male attire. But when she fell in with Nagoya she was no longer a young woman, and it does not seem that there were other women directly associated with her in the enterprise. What was probably harmless in her case became a precedent of doubtful character in the hands of others. Women of uncertain reputation were brought on the stage in the rival *kabuki* theatres; with them were associated men of low life, and the result seemed very dangerous to the public morals. The employment of women in *kabuki* plays was therefore prohibited by the Shōguns' police. No woman was employed as an actress in a theatre from the year 1629 until the début, in the so-called *sōshi-shibai*, of Sada Yakko, at the end of the 19th century.

6. The 'ningyō-shibai.'—The prohibition of women actors was, for the time being, an almost crushing blow to the *kabuki*. The place of the women, banished by the decree of 1629, was taken by young boys, who played the women's parts; but the moral consequences of the so-called *wakashū-shibai* were worse than those of the *onna-shibai* had been. Besides, the boy-actors had not yet been trained, and some time had perforce to elapse before the *kabuki* could regain its former popularity. In the meantime a new species of dramatic performance got an innings, which its promoters used to great advantage. The visitor to Japan will still sometimes meet with a travelling mendicant, carrying on his back a portable shrine containing some religious image or symbol which is the pilgrim's object of devotion. It is probable that in these mendicant vagrants we have a relic of the ancient *odori-nembutsu*, and that the itinerant preachers carried with them an idol, before which they performed their simple religious dances, and which they used as a visible emblem of the faith they preached. O Kuni had discarded the emblems, whilst retaining for a while the religious dance and song; but there were (and still are) travelling priests who retained them. The founders of the *ningyō-shibai*, or 'dolls' theatre,' made these dolls or images the central feature of their art. The itineration ceased, and the idol, settled in a permanent abode, developed into a marionette, or set of movable dolls. The marionettes of the *ningyō-shibai* were extremely popular during the whole period of the Tokugawa government, and performances of this sort are still to be met with, especially in Osaka. Strange to say, the marionettes had a considerable influence on the subsequent developments of the *kabuki*.

'Among the things,' says Balet, in a lecture delivered before the Alliance Française at Yokohama, Feb. 1911, 'which strike and shock us most in the popular theatre must be placed the singular gesticulation of the actors. Stiff, and moving by brusque starts, their gestures completely lack the ease and naturalness of real life; one would say they were marionettes, and not without good reason; for the actors of the *kabuki* took the marionettes of the booths in the fairs as their models. By an incomprehensible aberration, the Japanese have imitated these gestures, have elaborated them, and have fixed them permanently in the drama—except in comedy,—thus keeping aloof from the true imitation of life, falsifying the expression of even the simplest sentiments, to the point of making them a pure pantomime. From the theatre, these gestures passed insensibly into daily life. It is not difficult to find traces of them in the current expression of certain emotions; anger, scorn, especially defiance, are often expressed among the Japanese in the manner of the actors of the *kabuki*. Apart from this influence of gestures, the other—that of the manners and morals preached up *ad nauseam* in bloodthirsty tragedies—has not been the least effective in the formation of the Japanese mentality.' It is not necessary to follow Balet in all his conclusions and inferences. The main thing is to note the effect of the marionette theatres on the gestures of the *kabuki* actors.

7. The 'jōruri.'—Japan, like every Oriental country, has always had its story-tellers and wandering minstrels, whose répertoire included stories and legends of gods, heroes, and personages famous in national history, such as Benkei, the fighting monk. One of the most popular of these stories was the history of Jōruri, the famous mistress of Yoshitsune—a story belonging to the same cycle of epos as Benkei (see *Saitō Musashi-bō Benkei*, by de Benneville, Yokohama, 1910). The story of the loves of this celebrated woman was so popular that it overshadowed all the rest and gave its name to the whole class of minstrel narrative, so that a *jōruri* came to be the generic name for this class of recitals. The *jōruri* stories were originally unwritten, handed down from minstrel to minstrel in substance but not in letter. Ōta Nobunaga, the rival of Hideyoshi, and a man of considerable literary judgment, is said to have suggested that it would be an improvement to the *jōruri* to have an established written text, and his mistress, Ono no O Tsu, is said to have been the first person to commit a *jōruri* to writing. A few years later, about A.D. 1600, a *jōruri* singer, Menukiya Chōzaburō, conceived the idea of a partnership with the master of a marionette show near Osaka, and the result was a form of *ningyō-shibai*, which soon gained the popular favour. In 1685, a certain Takemoto Gidayū opened a marionette theatre, bearing his own name, in Osaka, and the *jōruri* came to be equally well known under the new name of *gidayū*.

8. The Genroku theatre.—The influence of the marionette show on the legitimate drama is seen in the fact that some of the greatest dramaturgists of Japan under the Tokugawas, notably Chikamatsu and Takeda (middle of 18th cent.), were also writers of *gidayū*. From the marionette theatre they had learned the value of the literary side of the drama. They appreciated the fact that it was something more than a mere collection of lyric songs loosely strung together by words which were scarcely worth recording, more than a mere exhibition of gestures and movements such as could be done by marionettes quite as well as by living men—above all, that it was more than the diversion of the passing hour by realistic, but motiveless, imitations of scenes of real life. Chikamatsu Monzaemon (1653–1724) stands a very long way behind Shakespeare, but he understood, as Shakespeare and his contemporaries had done, the vocation of the dramatic poet. He aimed at, and to a certain extent succeeded in, putting the dramatic poet into his proper place as the creator of a drama with ideals, representing life, and forming manners. The mediæval *nō* had been the sole property of the ruling military and cultured classes; O Kuni's work had been an appeal to the vulgar; Chikamatsu and his school, without excluding the educated or despising the ignorant classes, made their appeal to the great common-sense *bourgeoisie*, which forms the mainstay of every nation. That their appeal was not made in vain, may be seen in the immense influence exercised by Takeda's *Chūshingura* in keeping alive in the people's heart the spirit of loyalty to the Imperial throne.

9. Difficulties besetting the 'kabuki.'—One of the great difficulties in the way of realizing the highest dramatic ideals lay, and still lies, in the despised position of the actors. The *kabuki* has never quite effaced the bar sinister in its escutcheon. Its founders, O Kuni and Nagoya, were deemed none too respectable; the *onna-kabuki* were performed mostly by prostitutes; the lads who acted in the *wakashū-kabuki* were connected with vices which flourished in one of the 'cities of the plain.' There was reason in abundance for the Tokugawa government to take alarm: there was not merely the love of pleasure and the increase of luxury among the people to be feared, but also the danger to the social order, and the confusion of classes and castes. The Shōgunal government did not weaken in the carrying out of what it conceived to be its duty. In 1609, Iyeyasu prohibited all theatres in Shidzuoka, which was at that time his residence; in 1610 certain court ladies at Kyoto were sent into exile for going to a theatre, the manager of the theatre being executed. In 1629 every performance in which women appeared was forbidden. In 1641 a manager who had allowed his 'young men' to appear as women on the stage was severely punished. A few years later, under strict regulations, a few actors were allowed to appear in female characters, but they were forbidden to wear silk or brocades, and had to shave the front of their head. Theatres, like brothels, were relegated to certain quarters, *samurai* were forbidden to attend them, and the actors were not allowed to associate with the ordinary citizens. They were classed apart, like the *eta*, and the numeral substantive used for them classed them with animals rather than with men, as though one should say, 'so many head of cattle,' 'so many head of actors.' The term *kawara-mono* refers to the origin of the *kabuki* amongst the heap of broken 'tiles' and rubbish in the dry river-bed of the Kamogawa. Under such circumstances it was extremely difficult for the *kabuki* drama to struggle into respectability.

10. Earliest written 'kabuki.'—We have already seen that the writing of *jōruri* influenced the production of regular dramas. It is worthy of notice that, in 1655, a theatre in Yedo produced a consecutive drama of several acts, entitled *Soga no Jūban Kiri*, which required 15 actors. Another play, in 1666, also produced in Tokyo, was written by Kawara Jonnosuke, and was entitled *Soga no kyōgen*. One may see from the titles of these plays how strong was the appeal made to the national imagination by the stirring events of the Middle Ages, which have furnished Japan with a genuine, if informal, epic poem.

11. Actor families.—One of the results of the Tokugawa legislation, which compelled the actors to live by themselves, apart from their fellow-citizens, was the formation of an actor class. This was quite in accordance with ancient Japanese tradition. Japan has, from the earliest times, had castes of doctors, wrestlers, sword-makers, painters, etc., and the result of the system may be seen in the specialized skill of production combined with a marvellous lack of creative power, which marks almost all Japanese work, especially in the various departments of art. In the Japanese drama, we observe the rise of great actor families, *e.g.* that of Ichikawa Danjurō, which has, as it were, stereo-

typed the dramatic art along certain definite lines, and thereby produced an article perfect in its own way, but which has stifled originality and well-nigh killed the art of the playwright. Judged by its own standards, the Japanese *kabuki*, with its posturings and intonations reminiscent of the recitatives of the *nō* and the *jōruri*, its stilted language, and its simple dignity, is a thing as perfect as an art influenced by very imperfect ideals can make it. But what playwright could do his best, if he were 'bossed' from the beginning to the end of his composition by a clique of hereditary actors, who said that things had always been just so in their family?

12. The Meiji theatre.—Like everything else in Japan, the drama stagnated from about the end of the second decade of the 18th cent. to the end of the seventh decade of the 19th. The actors were a class of social outcasts, but they had the supreme sway in their own little kingdom, where things went leisurely along the old grooves. The Meiji Restoration swept away all class distinctions, and the actors emerged from their isolation. In 1876, at the opening of the Shintomiza theatre in Tokyo, the Foreign Ministers and members of the *corps diplomatique* accepted invitations to be present at the opening performance. It was a great shock to Japanese conservatism, but it proved to be a wholesome example; in 1886, Count Inoue ventured to give a performance at his own residence, at which Ichikawa Danjurō acted, in the presence of the Emperor himself. The visits of distinguished personages, *e.g.* Prince Arthur of Connaught, gave opportunities for official recognition of the dramatic profession; and, in 1903, Prince Ito delivered a funeral oration in honour of the popular Danjurō. The old ostracism has not yet quite gone; a statue of Danjurō, erected a few years ago in front of the Kabukiza theatre, had to be removed; but it is abundantly evident that the actors are winning for themselves a recognized position in the Japanese world.

13. The 'sōshi-shibai.'—One of the most hopeful signs connected with the modern Japanese stage is that the monopoly of the great actor families has been broken. The *sōshi-shibai*, born some 25 years ago, presents many points of resemblance to the earlier enterprise of O Kuni and Nagoya, coming into the world, as did its predecessor, at a time when 'a fever of reform and innovation' was raging throughout Japan. Kawakami Otojiro, the flighty son of a toy-dealer, had an undistinguished course at school at Fukuoka, and then flung himself into political stump-oratory, after the fashion of young Japan in the early days of Meiji. He had many fellow-travellers along the paths of stump-oratory; the Japanese of the day invented a word to denote these political adventurers. They were known as *sōshi*; they were oftener than not impecunious. Kawakami and a few brother-*sōshi* formed themselves into a sort of amateur dramatic company, and their plays were called *sōshi-shibai*. They gave representations of actual life, and gained many hearers. Their first object was to make money, but success gave them higher ambitions. They declared war against the *kabuki* school, and announced a programme of theatrical reform. In this they have not succeeded. Kawakami has been ably seconded by his wife, Madame Sada Yakko, and the Kawakami troupe has been well received in Europe and America. They draw their material from many quarters: from Dumas and Maeterlinck, from Shakespeare and Ibsen. But they have presented crude, ill-adapted matter, strongly impregnated with a Western flavour, to an audience that can only relish the sauces of Japan, and they have not yet succeeded in capturing the popular taste. The dramatist is lacking who can draw, as did Shakespeare, on all the wealth of accessible literature, and yet present it to his audience in a thoroughly native form. The lack of a dramatist has been acknowledged in many quarters. Writers like Fukuchi, Tsubouchi, Ihara, and Masuda have tried to supply the vacancy. They are undoubtedly on the right track; but a Shakespeare is born, not made, and Japan may perhaps still be said to be waiting for the 'mother of Shakespeare.'

Efforts have also recently been made to conform the architecture of Japanese theatres to European ideas and requirements. This is notably the case in Tokyo with the Yurakuza (built 1909) and the Teikokuza (opened 27th Feb. 1911). It is impossible as yet to say what effect these buildings are likely to have on Japanese dramatic developments. A recently established training school for young actors and actresses will, if successful, be a step in the right direction, as eliminating the hereditary principle which has done so much in the way of fossilization. It also provides a way by which a young woman of respectable family can adopt the stage as a profession in an honourable manner without the loss of caste.

14. Actors in the 'nō.'—The *nō* is essentially a piece to be acted by two players, and this fundamental idea is maintained, however great may be the number of players actually employed in the performance of any particular piece. The principal personage is the *shi-te*, the ποιητής, or actor. His duty is both to dance and to sing, and his rôle is the pivot on which the whole piece turns. We may call him the protagonist. By his side is the *waki* ('side'), who may be compared with the deuteragonist of the Greek classical stage. As the name implies, his rôle is secondary to that of the *shi-te*; but he is nevertheless a necessary adjunct, because it is his presence on the stage that gives the requisite stimulus to the activities of the *shi-te*.

Some plays require the presence of only two actors; and we may with justice consider them as types of the primitive drama. When more actors are required, they are considered as assistants or companions to the *shi-te* or *waki*. They are designated as *tomo*, 'companions,' but more frequently as *tsure*, and appear as *shi-te-dzure* or *waki-dzure*, according to the part they represent. But they can scarcely be said to have an independent personality: 'ce sont deux voix qui se répondent, et non deux personnages qui se parlent' (Péri). In some pieces there appears another actor, known as the *kogata*, or 'child,' whose rôle is occasionally of some importance, as when, *e.g.*, he represents an emperor or nobleman; and in a few places we find indefinitely designated personages, *otoko* and *onna*, 'man' and 'woman.' Again, in one or two plays we have companies of people representing, *e.g.*, pleasure-seekers, or attendants. These are known as *tachi-shū*. The clown's part is assigned to a personage known as *kyōgen* or *okashi*. He is sometimes entrusted with comic parts during the play itself, but more frequently with the comic interlude, *ai*, which separates the first act of a *nō* drama from the second. This *ai no kyōgen* is not to be confounded with the independent *kyōgen* which comes between two distinct *nō* dramas. He had his part in these also.

15. The chorus.—The chorus, *ji* or *ji-utai*, consists of from 8 to 10 musicians, under the command of a *ji-gashira*. The musicians wear the ordinary clothes of the citizen, and have no functions beyond those of music and singing. The chorus sometimes takes part in the *nō* drama by acting as a substitute for a *shi-te* in the rendering of some song, and sometimes it will take part, in a sort of impersonal way, in the dialogue. It has some of the functions of a Greek chorus, but it never represents

a definite group of persons, such as, *e.g.*, the Phœnician women.

In addition to the actors and chorus, there are two persons whose functions are of the greatest importance in the performance of the *nō*—the *kōken* and the *mono-kise*. The former, in plain clothes, has the duty of looking generally after the performance, bringing in swords, fans, etc., as required, and removing them unostentatiously when no longer needed. The *mono-kise* has the superintendence of the wardrobe, and assists the actors in their changes of costume, etc.

16. The orchestra.—This is composed of three, sometimes four, instruments. These are: (1) *fue*, (2) *ko-tsutsumi*, (3) *ō-tsutsumi*, (4) *taiko*. The first is a flute; the second and third are a small and a large drum, struck with the hand, the former carried on the right shoulder, the latter on the left knee. The fourth, which is a species of tambourine, is used only when something awe-inspiring is going on, such as the appearance of a demon or spirit, or the 'lion-dance.' The general name for the musicians is *hayashi-kata*, each individual being designated by his instrument—*fue-kata*, *taiko-kata*, etc. It is extremely probable that a comparison of these instruments with the musical instruments in use in ancient China, India, etc., might throw much light on the origin of the *nō* dramas.

17. Schools of 'nō' actors.—We have seen that the *nō* actors are divided into three classes—*shi-te*, *waki*, and *kyōgen*. These are further subdivided into various schools, or *ryū*. The most important are the schools of the *shi-te*—*kwanze*, *hōshō*, *komparu*, *kongō*, and *kita*—which between them furnish most of the *shi-te* and *shi-te-dzure*, also the *tomo*, *koguta*, *ji*, *kōken*, and *mono-kise*. These five 'schools' are by far the most important. The *waki* are also subdivided into five schools—*harufuji*, *fukuō*, *shindō*, *takayasu*, and *hōshō*. There is a further distinction made in these two classes, which is of some importance. They are divided into *kami-gakari*, and *shimo-gakari*, according as they base their acting on traditions derived from Kyoto (*kami*) or Nara (*shimo*). We shall see the importance of this distinction if we remember that the Kyoto Buddhism, mainly that of the Tendai sect, with its offshoots, is of Chinese origin, whilst the Nara Buddhism was predominantly Hindu. The *kyōgen* actors are subdivided into three classes, each named after its founder—Sagi, Izumi, Ōkura—as indeed are also the various classes of the *shi-te* and *waki*. All these families of *nō* actors were originally connected with the *kagura* dances of the Shinto and Ryōbu-Shinto rites, and it is in the *kagura* that the origin of the *nō* drama as found in Japan must be sought.

18. The 'nō-kyōgen' stage.—The *nō* was originally intended, like the *kagura*, for outdoor performance, and this fundamental theory is still preserved in the arrangement of the stage. It is a perfectly simple platform about six yards square, with three of its sides open. The fourth side is a wall of plain wood panel, with a painting of an old pine-tree to suggest an open-air performance. The actors have their exits and entrances on the right hand of the stage, the chorus on the left. One of the pillars supporting the roof is called the *kōken bashira*, and it is from behind this pillar that the *kōken* keeps a watchful eye on the performance. The green room or vestry is behind the wood-panelled wall.

19. Sung forms.—The *nō* drama is a metrical composition, the measure adopted being known as a *kusari*, or 'chain,' for the structure of which the reader is referred to Péri's solid treatise already quoted. Terms especially noticeable are, *e.g.*, the *shidai*, very often used as an introduction, and containing a statement of the general purpose and 'circumstances' (*shidai*) of the piece. The *issei* is very similar to it, only more definite, the *shidai* giving, as it were, only a general statement, while the *issei* explains some particular point. The *uta*, or 'song,' is the prerogative of the *waki* and his assistants; it has nothing in common with the *tanka* of later Japanese literature. To take an example: in the *uta*, the *waki* and his friends will describe the journey they have taken in order to reach the scene of action. The *sashi* and *kuri* are two minor forms: the former a simple recitative, which is not used by the *kami-gakari* schools, the latter a lively song, serving as an introduction to the *kuse*. The *kuse* may be looked upon as the form out of which the *nō* has developed. It is accompanied by a dance, and is a remnant of the ancient *kuse* dances which have been so popular in Japan since the 10th century. It is the *kuse* which brings us into touch with the itinerating *odori-nembutsu* preachers. The *rongi*, or 'discussion,' a dialogue chanted by *shi-te* and chorus, is another remnant of the Buddhist influence. It is a relic of the scholastic discussions of the Buddhist monasteries, especially of those in the Kyoto schools of Buddhism. In the *waka*, which follows the *rongi*, we have, it is said, the remnants of the popular songs chanted by the *shirabyōshi*; and the gestures of the actors at this point are generally suggestive of the same origin. The *kiri* is the closing song, and is often closely connected with the *waka*.

20. Spoken forms.—The spoken forms are the *nanori*, or 'announcement of the name,' spoken by the actor on his first appearance, or, for a woman, by the chorus; the *mondō*, or dialogue; the *yobi-kake*, or words addressed to a person supposed to be at some distance from the speaker; and the *katari*, or narration. In the *kyōgen* we have also various forms of *ai*, 'interludes.' In the *katari-ai* the *kyōgen* actor gives a new exposition, sometimes with considerable variations, of the plot of the drama. The *tachi-ai*, while ultimately connected with the development of the drama, is spoken by outside personages, as, for instance, by a *deus ex machina* in the form of a god or spirit. The *ashirai-ai* is an interlude in which a servant, boatman, etc., plays a principal part.

21. Masks used in the 'nō.'—There are about thirty masks in common use for *nō* representations—though there are, of course, special masks for use in the rarer pieces. The particulars of these masks are given in Kamen-fu, Nōgaku Unnōshū, and Nōgaku Shōzoku.

The introduction of masks into Japan is generally attributed to Shōtoku Taishi (†621), the great patron of Buddhism. This is another indication of a point made elsewhere in this article, that the *nō* is of Indian origin, for the Buddhism which Shōtoku favoured was notoriously of the Indian variety. Other famous mask-makers of primitive times are Tankaikō, Kōbō Daishi, and Kasuga—all well-known carvers of Buddhist images. These were succeeded by the Jissaku, or ten mask-makers, of the Heian (800–1186) and Kamakura (1186–1332) ages, and these by the Rokusaku and Chūsaku schools, who bring us down to the end of the Ashikaga period. We then come to the well-known Kawachi, who at one time worked as a saddler in the retinue of the great Taikō Hideyoshi (1536–98). Hideyoshi was a great patron of the lyrical drama, which he treated with almost religious respect. One day Kawachi peeped from behind some curtains at his master robing himself for a dramatic performance. Before he donned his mask, Hideyoshi held it over his head and did obeisance. From that moment Kawachi determined to abandon the calling of a saddle-maker and devote his energies to the making of masks.

22. Fans.—The fans used are of two kinds—*suyehiro* and *shimai-ōgi*. The former seem to correspond with the rôle of the actors. Thus we have *okina-ōgi*, the 'grown man's fan,' with a representation of waves and of *hōrai*, the Elysium of perpetual felicity, which, like the classical Islands of the Blest, is supposed to exist in the midst of the Ocean. Another, the so-called *shūra-*

ōgi, represents the world of the Asuras, the Buddhist world of bloodshed and slaughter. Significantly enough, there are two forms of *shūra-ōgi*, the *genji-shūra* and the *heike-shūra*, which thus perpetuate the memory of Japan's most famous period of internal strife. Other memorials of that sad time may be found in the *kyōjo-ōgi* and *kyōjo-ironashi-ōgi* (respectively, the 'insane woman's fan,' and the 'insane woman's colourless fan'), the latter with its sad pictures of the heron amongst the snow, and the ill-omened crow sitting on a withered tree. It would be beyond our scope to describe all these varieties. The *shimai-ōgi* does not present so many varieties. The simplest form, the *midzumaki-no-ōgi*, 'water-sprinkler's fan,' is used by the lowest grade of actors, whose humble performances are fitly symbolized by the unobtrusive but necessary work of the 'water-sprinkler'—an important functionary in hot dusty countries. When the actor-student has been promoted to a higher grade, and is allowed to dance for the first time, he uses a *midzuhiki* fan, *i.e.* the fan of the 'water-drawer'; while the next promotion, to the rank which permits him to perform the *mochidzuki* dance, is marked by the use of a fan known as *chidori*. Buddhist influence, chiefly of the Hosso and Kegon schools, may be seen in the clouds—five, seven, or nine, according to circumstances—which distinguish other fans of a higher order. But the gradation of actors, dramas, and dances is very clearly due to Chinese thought.

It would take us too long, for the purposes of this article, to trace the connecting points between the Japanese lyric drama and the drama of the Hindus. But there certainly are such points of connexion, traceable through fans, masks, musical instruments, dresses, and dress-materials, not only with India, but with the Levant. Thus, for instance, there are two names for dress-materials much used in the *nō*—*donsu* and *shu-su*, translated by Brinkley as 'damask' and 'satin'—which are said, though perhaps not with much probability, to point to a Damascene and Syrian origin for these materials. But these are points which still await investigation.

23. Peculiarities of construction of the 'kabuki' theatre.—The word *shibai* means 'a lawn,' or 'on the lawn.' There is an old tradition, connected with the Nan-yen-dō temple at Nara, which says that, at a very remote period, the earth opened with a yawning cavity right in front of the temple, with much exhalation of poisonous gases and smoke. It being evidently advisable to propitiate the incensed deities who had brought about this calamity, the Government of the day ordered that the *okina* and *sanbasō* dances should be performed in front of the chasm. This was done on the smooth grass before the temple, and with the desired effect. This incident is still commemorated by the *Takigi-no-Nō* at Nara, which is always performed 'on the lawn.' It is possible, therefore, that O Kuni, in inaugurating the *shibai* or *kabuki* drama, meant it to be a resurrection, as far as possible under altered circumstances, of the primitive dances of pre-historic times.

The first theatre in Kyoto was erected in 1632; in Osaka, in 1633; in Yedo, in 1624; and the construction of these places of amusement was speedily followed by others. The first theatrical building in Yedo was the Saruwakaza, which was the outcome of the philanthropic efforts of a certain Saruwaka Kanzaburo. The Genna period (A.D. 1615-1643), whilst enjoying the firm hand of the Tokugawa Shōgunate, was still one of considerable confusion and unrest. The cessation of the long-continued civil wars and the subsequent dissolution of many of the opposition clans had filled the country with unemployed men-at-arms (*rōnin*), who flocked to the larger cities in search of employment. Yedo was naturally their chief place of refuge, and in the crowded quarters of Asakusa, Ryōgoku, and Shiba, they might be seen in their hundreds, concealing their faces beneath large straw hats, and waiting for any chance opportunity of congenial occupation. When they could do nothing else, they beat drums and sang ballads, and thus gained a few *rin* from the good-natured citizens. Saruwaka saw that these unemployed fighting men constituted a real danger to the State, and set to work to find safe outlets for their superfluous energies. He built himself a large villa, the construction of which gave employment to many hands; he lived luxuriously and ostentatiously, and kept large retinues of servants; at last, the idea occurred to him of founding a theatre as an institution by which many of these unemployed warriors might gain a living, and all might find recreation and amusement. The idea was very well received, the *rōnin* organized themselves *con amore*, the Government gave its consent to the undertaking, and a dream in which Saruwaka saw a crane flying towards him, with the leaf of an *ichō* (*Ficus religiosa*) on a plate in its bill, was interpreted as an omen of the best sort. Saruwaka's theatre was the first permanent *kabuki* building in Japan, and gave a model which all subsequent *kabuki* theatres have followed. The *nō* dramas in the Middle Ages were performed in the most flimsy of temporary booths.

The construction of the old *kabuki* theatres may be understood by the consideration of certain theatrical words which are still in use, but which cannot be made clear except by reference to old usages and peculiarities. Thus the word *haneru*, 'to turn aside,' is, in theatrical parlance, 'to finish a performance.' In Saruwaka's building, the entrance was protected by a hanging mat, which the spectators had to push aside in order to enter. When the performance came to an end, the mat was 'turned aside' to facilitate egress, and left so. Similarly, *futa wo akeru*, 'to open the lid,' is used of the opening of a theatre—the heavy, lid-like shutters all round the building being tightly closed when there was no drama in course of performance. The quasi-military character of the actors in Saruwaka's theatre showed itself in the *yagura*, or castle-tower (now disused), erected on the roof to give the building something of the appearance of a feudal castle. On two sides of the *yagura* were suspended *zai*, the baton used by a Japanese general in the direction of a battle. But these theatrical *zai* were known as *bonten*—the name given by Buddhists to Brahmā, the greatest of the guardian deities—and replaced the Shintō *gohei* which O Kuni had used in her temporary erections. The use of the *bonten* and *gohei* is a proof of the existence of a certain amount of religiosity, but need not be pressed further.

While certain of the minor structural features of the early *kabuki* have disappeared, certain others remain. Thus the modern Japanese stage is distinguished by: (*a*) the *hanamichi*, or 'flower-way'—a raised platform or corridor by which the actors have access to the stage from the other end of the theatre, passing right through the spectators in the pit. The *hanamichi* was at one time bordered with flowers, hence its name. It is always on the left hand of the spectators; on their right there is sometimes another passage of the same sort, called the *karibanamichi*, or 'temporary flower-bridge.' (*b*) Between the *hanamichi* and the stage is a space called *hashi-gakari*, 'bridge-space,' sometimes also known by a term derived from the usages of the camp—*musha bashiri*, 'warriors running.' It is through this space that warriors reach the stage. Near it is the *okubyō-guchi*, 'coward's hole,' the significance of which is obvious. (*c*) The *butai-ban*, or 'stage-watch,' with its reliefs of sentinels, again betrays a quasi-military origin. (*d*) The central part of the stage is made to revolve (*mawari-butai*)—an arrangement which calls to

mind the ἐκκύκλημα of the Greek stage; the machine which works this is situated in the *naraku*, 'hell,' below the stage, where is also to be found the *scriage*, or *seridashi*, by which actors are 'pushed up' through the flooring of the stage. There are two or three trap-doors for this purpose (*kiri-ana*) on the stage itself, and a similar one (*suppon*) on the *hanamichi*. Only the larger theatres were allowed to have *mawari-butai*—possibly only they could afford the luxury. (*e*) The *kōken* calls to mind primitive conditions in the history of the European drama. He is the attendant (supposed to be invisible) of the principal actors, wears black clothes, removes articles that are not required, adjusts the actors' robes, and holds a candle for them. (*f*) The *tedai*, who represents the proprietor and is charged with the business of the theatre, sits, during the performance, near the main entrance of the house. When there is nothing on, his office is in the *shikiri-ba*, or accountant's room. The *tōdori* has the supervision of everything connected with the performance and the actors. His office (*tōdori-ba*) is in the back part of the building, as are also the *hayashi-beya*, or room for the musicians, the *gakuya*, or 'green room,' for the actors, and the *sakusha-beya*, or 'authors' room.' This last calls for a few words. The Japanese have scarcely any dramatic writers, and none of great note. Very few of the *nō* dramas can be assigned to any particular writer, and the same remark holds good of the *kabuki* drama. The actors themselves, sitting in committee, compose the play as a joint-effort, and it is this, perhaps, more than anything else that has helped to keep the Japanese stage so stagnant and unprogressive. Recent efforts at reform, such as Kawakami's *sōshi-shibai* and the construction of the new Imperial Theatre, must be looked upon as so many efforts to overthrow the tyranny of the player-actors. The student of English literature will see here the point of analogy with the pre-Shakespearean dramatists of the Elizabethan age.

24. Influence of the drama on the development of 'Bushidō.'—The *nō* drama had its first glory in the Middle Ages, when the military and chivalrous spirit of Japanese knighthood was at its prime. We may seek for its origin in the oldest religious sentiment of the people, in the Buddhism of the Nara age, in Chinese and Indian influences. But the fact still remains that the drama never took root until the spirit of the nation was moved by the incidents of that great national epic (for it was nothing less) which gathers round Yoshitsune, Benkei, Yoritomo, and the great warriors of the Genji and Heike. Then it was that the heart of Japan went forth in sympathetic response to the great ideals set before it during that period of national distress. It was then that the imagination was quickened, and the image formed of the ideal hero, brave, loyal, patient, quick in honour's quarrel—and yet a religious mystic, whose poetic insight enabled him to see, dimly perhaps, but with faith, the underlying verities of existence. This is the ideal set before us in the *nō*, and the idealization was much assisted by the quietistic teachings of the Zen school of Buddhism.

The ideals were, however, indistinct, and the principles underlying *Bushidō*, or the 'Way of the Ideal Knight,' were felt rather than understood. It was reserved for a later age to elaborate the philosophy of life with which *Bushidō* presents us, and Yamaga Sokō (born 1622), the disciple of Hayashī Razan, and the instructor of Ōishi Kuranosuke, who headed the celebrated band of the forty-seven *rōnin*, has been often singled out as the first formal exponent of *Bushidō*. According to Yamaga (the present writer is here following the Rev. J. T. Imai, who in his turn follows Prof. Inouye Tetsujirō), *Bushidō* may be summarized somewhat as follows:

To know one's proper work or duty, to have the will to do it, and to carry out one's good intentions with diligence and zeal. True manliness is shown by not being moved by poverty, wealth, or power. In order to reach that ideal, there should be acquired large-mindedness, a noble ambition, gentleness, courtesy, contentment; a power of discerning right from wrong, gain from loss; uprightness, honesty, constancy. These virtues are to show themselves in the deportment, in gravity, in the care taken in seeing, hearing, and speaking, in the expression of the countenance, in temperance and propriety in dress, houses, furniture, diet. The knight must have a right way of using his time, his wealth, his pleasures (J. T. Imai, *Bushidō*, Tokyo, 1910).

It has been said that the old-fashioned *Bushidō* of the mediæval knights gave its last expiring flicker in the deaths of Ōishi Kuranosuke and his band of *rōnin* in 1703. Certainly the *pax Tokugawica* which lay on Japan from the middle of the 17th to the middle of the 19th century was no favourable soil for the production of so delicate a flower. But Yamaga Sokō and his Confucianist successors were in the meantime busy laying the foundation of a new *Bushidō*, and in this they were ably aided and abetted by the dramatists, both of the *kabuki* and of the *ningyō-shibai* (marionettes).

'It was at this period,' says Imai (*op. cit.*) 'that the historic dramas began to be produced by Chikamatsu, Takeda, Izumo, and later writers. They were exponents of *Bushidō* to the mind of the people, to men and women alike of all classes, just as Sokō and others were to the learned. It was through these historical plays . . . that *Bushidō* influences acted and re-acted on the Japanese people.'

We can scarcely over-estimate the influence that the stage has had and still has in forming popular ideas of religion and morality in Japan, but we must remember that the words 'honour,' 'loyalty,' 'duty,' 'honesty,' and 'truth,' which these plays directly and indirectly illustrate, are not quite the equivalents of the same words when found in Christian writings. They must be interpreted according to the standards of morality which were generally accepted in 18th cent. Japan.

LITERATURE.—Students desiring to pursue their studies beyond the limits traced by this article are recommended to consult, for European and American authorities, the very complete Bibliographies published by von Wenckstern, in 1894 and 1904; and, for Japanese writers, the list given by Péri in *Bulletin de l'École Française de l'Extrême Orient*, vol. ix. pp. 254–273. The writer's own obligations are to the works of W. G. Aston, esp. *History of Japanese Literature*, London, 1898; K. Florenz, *Geschichte der japanischen Literatur*, Leipzig, 1901; M. Revon, *Manuel de la littérature japonaise*, Paris, 1910; Péri, articles in *Bulletin de l'École Française de l'Extrême Orient*, 1904–5; Balet, articles in *Japan Daily Herald*, Yokohama, Nov.–Dec. 1910; and B. H. Chamberlain, *Things Japanese*[5], London, 1905; also to various articles which have appeared from time to time in the *TASJ*. A. LLOYD.

DRAMA (Javanese and Further Indian).—The Javanese drama is one of the most interesting of the entire Orient, particularly through its high development of the 'shadow-play.' Seven distinct forms of drama in Java are enumerated by Juynboll (*AE* xiii. 4–5): (1) *wayang purwâ*, which are played with puppets of buffalo leather, which cast their shadows on a curtain, and draw their themes from the *Mahābhārata*, the *Rāmāyaṇa*, or the Javanese *Manik Maya*; (2) *wayang gĕḍog*, the same as the preceding, except that the subjects are drawn from the native Javanese *Panji*-cycle; (3) *wayang kĕliṭik* or *kĕrutyil*, which are played with flat unclothed wooden puppets, and draw their themes from the cycle of *Damar Wulan*; (4) *wayang golek*, which are played with round clothed puppets, and draw their themes from the *Damar Wulan* and the Muhammadan *Amir Ambyah* cycles; (5) *wayang topeng*, with a répertoire identical with that of the first three classes, but played with masked actors; (6) *wayang wong*, the same as the last, except that the actors are unmasked; and (7) *wayang beber*, with the same répertoire as the preceding, but represented by a pictured scroll which is unrolled and explained by the *dalang*. The usual mode of presentation of a

wayang is as follows:—A white sheet (*kĕlir*) is stretched on a wooden frame (*panggung*). At the top of this frame a lamp (*bleñeon*) is placed so as to cast its light upon the screen, and on the same side as the lamp the 'director' (*ḍalang*) squats, having on his left a chest (*koṭak*) containing the puppets (*wayang* or *ringgit*). On the side of this chest are a few small plates of metal, which are struck by the *ḍalang* to imitate warlike sounds. Near him, moreover, is a bowl of incense, and also a basin containing the offerings (*sayen*) for the spirits. The men in the audience are seated on the same side of the curtain as the *ḍalang*, while the women are placed on the opposite side, so that they do not see the puppets, but only their shadows. All the lines are recited by the *ḍalang*, who varies his voice or gives other indications of the change of character. This holds good, at least in some cases, even in the *wayang wong*, or plays with unmasked human actors. In the *wayang topeng*, played with masked actors, on the other hand, the players themselves speak the lines. Both women and men may act, as in the ancient Sanskrit drama.

The *ḍalang* of the Javanese drama corresponds closely to the *sūtradhāra* of India (cf. Pischel, *Heimat des Puppenspiels*, Halle, 1900, pp. 8–10), both being primarily 'thread-pullers (of the puppets),' although the word *ḍalang* itself seems to connote originally much the same as the English 'stroller' (Hazeu, *Bijdrage*, pp. 23–24).

The Javanese *wayang* was undoubtedly religious in origin, as has been elaborately shown by Hazeu (*op. cit.* pp. 39–59), who calls attention to the offerings (*sayen*) to the spirits, to the incense offered before the presentation begins, to the fact that the plays are given at night, when the spirits are abroad, and to the circumstance that the presentation is a meritorious act on the part of the patron who hires the troupe, and that a *wayang* should be given by all means at certain important periods in the life of the individual, such as the festivals at the seventh month of pregnancy and the cutting of the navel-string. According to him, moreover, the entire shadow-play sprang from a desire to represent the ghosts of departed ancestors by what resembled them most closely, that is, by shadows, while the *ḍalang*, who causes the puppets to cast their shadows on the screen and recites lines for them, is primitively a priest performing a religious ceremony of ancestor-worship. The religious character of the Javanese *wayang* is also confirmed, perhaps, by the phallic character of many of the puppets, since nudity is not only a well-known fertility-charm (cf. Serrurier, *De Wajang Poerwå*, pp. 187–203), but also a potent means of frightening away demons (Hazeu, *op. cit.* p. 43; cf. Crooke, *PR*, 1896, i. 68–72). At a later period this phallicism may, of course, degenerate into mere obscenity, as in the Turkish *karagöz*.

The age of the drama in Java is uncertain, but it is at least clear from allusions to it in the literature that it was popular by the beginning of the 11th cent. A.D. Its origin is still more problematical, the leading authorities on the subject holding views diametrically opposed. Serrurier, Hageman, Poensen, and others believe that the Javanese drama was profoundly influenced by the Hindu; while Crawfurd, Niemann, Brandes, and especially Hazeu, deny that Hindu plays formed the model of the *wayang*. An absolute decision of the matter is not easy, but in the present state of knowledge it would seem that the Javanese drama is indeed an original device. India, it is true, numbers among its dramatic categories a 'shadow-play' (*chāyānāṭaka*), which has been elaborately discussed by Pischel in his 'Das altindische Schattenspiel' (*SBAW*, 1906, pp. 482–502; cf. his *Heimat des Puppenspiels*), with the conclusion that the shadow-play in the technical sense of the term was known in India. Nor is there any inherent impossibility that the *Dūtāñgada* of Subhaṭa (produced in Feb.–Mar. 1243; tr. Gray, *JAOS* xxxii. [1912] 1–20)—the only *chāyānāṭaka* thus far edited—was produced somewhat like the Javanese *wayang*; nevertheless, the difference in spirit between this and other plays of the Rāma cycle in India (cf. Lévi, *Théâtre indien*, Paris, 1890, pp. 267–295), as compared with the Rāma plays of Java (Juynboll, 'Indonesische en achterindische tooneelvoorstellingen uit het Rāmāyaṇa,' in *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land-, en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indië*, 6th series, vol. x. pp. 501–565), must be taken into serious consideration. The profound influence of the literature of India upon Java is too well known to require emphasis (cf. Lassen, *Ind. Alterthumskunde*, Leipzig, 1861, iv. 524–531), and it is obvious, moreover, that both Hinduism and Muhammadanism have given themes to the Javanese drama. If a conclusion may be hazarded, one may say that the Javanese *wayang* is indigenous, and that foreign influence is manifested only, or at least chiefly, in the subjects of many of the Javanese plays.

From Java the drama seems to have spread to Burma, Siam, and Cambodia (cf. Serrurier, *op. cit.* pp. 170–186; Hazeu, *op. cit.* pp. 28–37). In all these countries the Rāma cycle forms the favourite theme, although Buddhistic plays are also frequent in Burma. The Burmese drama is divided into *zaht-pwés*, in which men and boys (but never women) act, and *yoht-thays*, or puppet-plays. Here again the drama is partly religious, not only in subject, but also in occasion, as at the birth of a child. It is, furthermore, produced chiefly at night, and is thus obviously designed to frighten away demons. The Siamese plays, in many of which only the verse is written, the prose being improvised, deal chiefly with the theme of Rāma, while the classifications recall those in Java, the chief ones being *len khon* (plays by masked actors), *len hun* (puppet-plays), and *len nang* (rolls of ox-hide pricked with patterns through which the light of a fire is allowed to shine).

Among the Malays, finally, the *Rāmāyaṇa* is likewise an important theme, and the drama shows the influence not only of Siam and India, but also of China. Here the religious basis of the plays is strongly evidenced both in the invocation (*lagu pĕmanggil*), which is performed by a *pawang* ('magician') to the accompaniment of various musical instruments, and in the propitiation of spirits (*būka panggong*). The Malays are extremely partial, moreover, to shadow-plays, where, as in Java, the showman repeats all the lines, while in Siam this monologue becomes a real dialogue between two persons. Throughout Java and Further India, then, the drama is characteristically either a shadow-play or a mask. There seems, therefore, to be little association with the mimetic dance-drama of the Polynesians; while, on the other hand, masks are undoubtedly one of the most primitive forms of all drama, as is clear from the analogies of the American Indian and of Greek tragedy, to say nothing of the early Roman *fabulæ Atellanæ*. So far as evidence now accessible goes, it would seem that the dramatic art of Java and Further India is an indigenous product, despite later undoubted influence from India.

LITERATURE.—Serrurier, *De Wajang Poerwå* (Leyden, 1896); Hazeu, *Bijdrage tot de Kennis van het javaansche Tooneel* (Leyden, 1897); Juynboll, 'Wajang Kĕliṭik oder Kĕrutjil,' in *AE* xiii. 4–17, 97–119, also 'Das javanische Maskenspiel,' *ib.* xiv. 41–70, 81–111; Hazeu, 'Eine "Wajang Beber" Vorstellung in Jogjakarta,' *ib.* xvi. 128–135; Bohatta, 'Das javan. Drama,' in *Mitt. anthropolog. Gesellsch. Wien*, xxxv. [1905] 278–307; Shway Yoe, *The Burman, his Life and Notions* (London, 1882); Bastian, *Reisen in Siam* (Jena, 1867); Hallett, *A*

Thousand Miles on an Elephant (London, 1890); Bock, *Im Reiche des weissen Elephanten* (Leipzig, 1885); Müller, 'Nâng, siam. Schattenspielfiguren im konigl. Museum für Völkerkunde zu Berlin' (supplement to *AE* viii.); Moura, *Le Royaume du Cambodge*, ii. (Paris, 1883); Skeat, *Malay Magic* (London, 1900); Knosp, 'Théâtre en Indochine,' in *Anthropos*, iii. [1908] 280–293; Jacob, *Erwahnungen des Schattentheaters in der Welt-Litt.* (Berlin, 1906), also *Gesch. des Schattentheaters* (Berlin, 1907), pp. 9–15.

LOUIS H. GRAY.

DRAMA (Jewish).—Dramatic literature among the Hebrews, as among all Semitic peoples, was scanty. Attempts have indeed been made to interpret the song of Moses (Dt 32^{1-43}), the song of Miriam (Ex 15^{20-21}), and, above all, the Song of Songs (cf. *HDB*, *s.v.*), as dramatic; but these endeavours have been unsuccessful. Nor is the Book of Job a drama in any true sense of the term. Whatever the Jews accomplished in the drama was, and is, due to imitations from the Indo-Germanic races with whom they have come in contact. The earliest Jewish play dates from the 2nd cent. B.C., when Ezekiel of Alexandria attempted to dramatize the events of the Exodus. Fragments of his play have been preserved by Clem. Alex. (*Strom.* i. 23, 155) and Eusebius (*Praep. Evang.* ix. 29); and Schürer (*GJV*[3] iii. 373–376) believes that this drama was intended for the stage, although it is difficult to imagine its production. In Ezekiel's work the influence of the spirit of Euripides is evident, and his object seems to have been not only to instruct the Alexandrine Jews in Biblical history, but also to wean them away from Gentile plays.

The general attitude of the Jews, however, towards the drama was extremely hostile, in conformity with their policy of self-imposed isolation, and their bitterness was increased by their hatred of the Romans and their suspicion of the Greeks. It was not until the middle of the 17th cent. that the increased scope allowed to Jews gave rise to a Neo-Hebrew drama, modelled, of course, upon the theatre of the Christians by whom they were surrounded. The first of these plays was the *Yesodh 'Olam*, by Moses Zacuto, a Marano, or renegade crypto-Jew, of Amsterdam, and its theme is the Talmudic legend of Abraham's destruction of his father's idols. The plots of the Neo-Hebrew drama are either religious or ethical, as in the *Asire ha-Tikkoth* of Joseph ben-Isaac Penzo (Amsterdam, 1673) and the *La-Yesharim Tehillah* of Moses Ḥayyim Luzzato (Amsterdam, 1743), the former play having as its theme the attempts of Understanding, Providence, and an angel to lead back to the path of rectitude a king distracted, against his will, by his impulses, his wife, and Satan; while the latter drama is an allegory designed to show the victory of truth over falsehood. No fewer than forty-six Neo-Hebrew plays are enumerated by Seligsohn, the majority of them based on Biblical or ethical themes.

Many foreign plays have also been translated into Hebrew, including, for instance, the *Gemul 'Athalyah* of David Franco-Mendes—an adaptation from Racine and Metastasio (Amsterdam, 1770)—and versions of Racine's *Esther*, Schiller's *Die Räuber*, Lessing's *Nathan der Weise* and *Die Juden*, and Shakespeare's *Othello*, *Romeo and Juliet*, and *Macbeth*. The Yiddish dramatists are active, and many great cities support one or more Yiddish theatres which cater to the Jewish population. These plays are, however, for the most part translations or adaptations of dramas by non-Jewish authors. The Jewish drama must, therefore, be regarded merely as a literary parasite; even its apparently original productions are really copied from Indo-Germanic sources.

LITERATURE.—Kuyper, 'Le Poète juif Ezéchiel,' in *REJ* xlvi. 48–73, 161–177 [French tr. from *Mnemosyne*, new series, xxvii. 237–280]; Seligsohn, 'Drama, Hebrew,' in *JE* iv. 648–651; Wiernik, 'Drama, Yiddish,' *ib.* 653–654, and the bibliographies appended to the two latter articles; Freidus, 'List of Dramas in the New York Public Library relating to the Jews, and of Dramas in Heb., Judeo-Spanish, and Judeo-German, together with Essays on the Jewish Stage,' in *Bull. N.Y. Pub. Lib.* xi. 18–51.

LOUIS H. GRAY.

DRAMA (Persian).—The drama of Persia is both scanty and late, due in part, at least, to Muhammadan rule, which has never been favourable to the development of this art, reflecting herein the dramatic poverty of the entire Semitic race. There are, however, two categories of Persian plays, exclusive of the marionettes or shadow-plays (*karagöz*), which are of Turkish origin. The native Persian drama, then, may be divided into comedies (*tamāšā*) and mysteries (*ta'ziya*, lit. 'consolation, condolence'). The comedies are, for the most part, improvised by *lūṭīs*, or itinerant buffoons, and offer little of interest. It is very different, however, with the *ta'ziya*, which is the most striking mystery-play of the entire Orient, and possesses a sway over the Shī'ite Persians comparable with that of the Passion-Play of Oberammergau over Christians. The individual *ta'ziyas* are comparatively short, and are concerned entirely with religious subjects, especially with the martyrdom of Ḥasan and Ḥusain, the sons of 'Alī, who was the first cousin of Muhammad and the husband of the Prophet's youngest daughter Fatima. 'Alī, the rightful successor of Muhammad, was rejected in favour of Abu Bakr at the instigation of 'A'isha, and was later assassinated, while Ḥasan's own wife poisoned him in obedience to the Sunnite Muawiyah, and Ḥusain was later slain in battle with the adherents of the rival sect. The Persians, being Shī'ites, have accordingly adopted Ḥasan and Ḥusain as martyrs of the faith, and commemorate their death annually during the first ten days of the month of al-Muḥarram. In each house that can afford it a place is constructed for the representation of the mystery, and on the side towards Mecca is set the model of the tombs of the martyred Ḥasan and Ḥusain. The actors of the drama are not specially trained for the purpose, but their deep religious feeling, and their regard for their performance as for a sacred duty, lend a power to the presentation which works the audience into a frenzy and renders it necessary to provide for the safety of the hated Sunnites whom they may meet as they go in procession through the streets. These processions occur especially on the fifth, seventh, and tenth days of al-Muḥarram, the most important being the two last, symbolizing respectively the marriage of Kasim with Fatima and the death of Ḥusain. The concluding day is often marked by bloody conflicts between the Shī'ites and Sunnites.

Dramatically the mystery-play of Ḥasan and Ḥusain, which is essentially a series of *ta'ziyas*, is rude but effective, gaining strength from the very popularity and vulgarism of its style. Its length is prodigious, and the unities of time, place, and even action are set at defiance. The author of the play as a whole or of its parts is unknown, and it is doubtless a product of the people, revised and altered according to need by those who act it, rather than a definite dramatic work. The number of *ta'ziyas* composing it varies, but it would seem that the play is of comparatively recent development, possibly as late as the beginning of the 19th century. As an independently developed Passion-Play, untouched, apparently, by non-Persian influence, the drama of Ḥasan and Ḥusain is one of the most remarkable dramaturgic creations in the history of the religious stage.

LITERATURE.—Ethe, *Morgenländ. Studien* (Leipzig, 1870), pp. 174–194, also in *GIrP* ii. [1900] 315–316; Chodzko, *Théâtre persan* (Paris, 1878); Pelly, *The Miracle Play of Hasan and*

Husain, Collected from Oral Tradition (2 vols., London, 1879); Montet, 'Religion et théâtre en Perse,' in *RHR* xiv. 277–290.
LOUIS H. GRAY.

DRAMA (Polynesian).—Among the Polynesians, rudiments of the drama may be traced. While these embryo plays were often comic in character and analogous to the early Roman *fabulæ Atellanæ*, particularly in Raiatea (Cook, *Voyage towards the South Pole and round the World*, London, 1777, i. 173–176), they were evidently derived ultimately from religious sources. This is distinctly affirmed by Moerenhout (*Voyages aux îles du Grand Océan*, Paris, 1837, i. 133–134), who states that the dramas were presented under the auspices of the *Arii*, while the plays themselves were devoted to the description of the two principles, Taaroa and the matter with which he unites, the creation of the universe, the gods, elements, spirits, plants, and other productions of the earth; then the life of the demi-gods or heroes, their journeys, combats, and the like; then love-themes, dialogues between lovers (laments, quarrels, true comedy-scenes); and the presentations invariably ended in dances. It is also noteworthy that, according to the same traveller, the 'musicians, singers, and declaimers' at these plays had an orchestra slightly elevated above the rest, while the 'actors or dancers' occupied a special place before or in a house. It would therefore seem that the function of the Polynesian actor was primarily that of the mimetic dancer, the words being supplied by separate reciters, a proceeding for which parallels may be found elsewhere, as among the Javanese. The religious basis of the Polynesian drama receives an additional confirmation in the fact that plays were also presented in connexion with funerals.

LITERATURE.—Waitz-Gerland, *Anthropol. der Naturvölker* (Leipzig, 1872), vi. 99–100.
LOUIS H. GRAY.

DRAMA (Roman).—**1. Native Italic drama.**—The Roman critics were deeply interested in the Italic beginnings of their drama, and investigations of the subject seem to have begun as early as the time of Accius (*c.* 100 B.C.). Two generations later the whole subject was taken up and examined anew by Varro, notably in his lost *Origines Scænicæ*. His views, so far as they survive, are found in the treatises of Diomedes and Donatus *de Comœdia*. The intermediary was probably Suetonius. Apart from scattered references in various authors, we also have Horace (*Epist.* ii. 1. 139 ff.) and Livy (vii. 2). It is quite clear, however, that the Roman critics discovered nothing very definite.[1] This is shown by their lack of agreement on any given point, by their inconsistencies and incredible combinations; above all, by their frequent appeals to etymology, that last resort of the desperate investigator. It is impossible, for example, to reconcile Livy's famous account with facts, probabilities, or even possibilities. Jahn saw that it was the result of ætiology and of mere philological 'combinations'; Leo pointed out that there was a more than suspicious parallelism with Aristotle's περὶ κωμῳδίας, the standard work on the origins of the drama at this time; Hendrickson [2] followed and elaborated Leo by showing that Livy goes back to Accius—perhaps by way of some Annalist (Valerius Antias?). Horace's account adds something to Livy's, but seems to have been derived more or less indirectly from the same source. Varro, as Hendrickson shows, was inclined to distrust the earlier (Accian?) account, and appears to have concluded that the Italic origins were a *terra incognita*.

Such were the views of the greatest Roman scholar; and, on the whole, we are still constrained to agree with them. Neither for him, however, nor for us do they preclude the existence of a native Italic drama in the wider sense. The Romans, like the Greeks, were gifted with a keen dramatic instinct and a large modicum of the mimetic faculty.

The liturgies of the Salii and of the Arval Brothers, the *carmina triumphalia*, the *versus Fescennini*, the songs of beggars and of shepherds —all indicate clearly enough that the temperament which is responsible for the modern *Commedia dell' Arte* is the same as that which greets us at the very dawn of history on the Italian Peninsula. Irrespective of the character and credibility of the testimony offered by the Roman critics, we may safely agree with Mommsen—and so far as the present discussion is concerned this is quite sufficient—that the simplest elements of the mimetic art were in Latium and Hellas altogether the same. The dance (*triumphus*, θρίαμβος, διθύραμβος), the use of masks or their equivalent, the accompaniment of the pipe, the rude songs ceremonially abusive and obscene (to avert the evil eye, as the *carmina triumphalia*, and the *versus Fescennini* at weddings), the wearing of the phallus for the same purpose—all in honour of the gods and associated from the first with rustic festivals —this protoplasm of the drama, to which Horace gives the indefinite name of *Fescennina licentia*, may be assumed for Italy quite as much as for Greece. In fact, if *Fescenninus* in this connexion (*Fescenninus versus*) is to be derived from *fascinum*, *Fescenninus* literally = φαλλικός, and the parallelism is complete between *Fescennina licentia* and τὰ φαλλικά, the phallic verses characterizing Aristotle's first division of the Comedy. The derivation from Fescennium (another antique theory) might have been suggested, though this is more than doubtful, by a trustworthy tradition that this old Latin town, so long under the influence of Etruria, was a centre of the worship referred to.

It is neither possible here nor necessary to discuss the vexed and vexing question of the dramatic *satura*, the name given by Livy to a play with a more or less amorphous plot and rude improvised dialogue assumed by his authority as the second stage in the development of dramatic art on Latin soil. It is not unlikely *per se* that a play of the type described did develop in Latium as it did in Greece, but, if *satura* is the traditional name of such a play instead of being (as Hendrickson suggests) merely a later invention, we should agree that the word was a corrupted form of σάτυρος, and look to Southern Italy for its ultimate origin.

However that may be, it is fairly certain that the Romans were affected at an early period by the Dorian comedy of their neighbours to the South. This is shown by Bethe's investigations,[1] and is in harmony with Livy's statement (vii. 2), under the year 364 B.C., that *histrio* is an Etruscan word, and that the artistic beginning of the drama came from Etruria. This means ultimately Magna Græcia, for in such matters Etruscan influence was Greek influence at second hand. Etruria was not creative in the sphere of art, it was not even a first class imitator; but it was a good purveyor.

2. The 'Palliata.'—Let us turn, however, from the crude beginnings of mimetic art, Italic or otherwise, to a brief consideration of the Roman drama as a literary production. From this point of view the Roman critics, especially after Varro, agreed that the first definite event in the history

[1] For the remains of antique discussion and criticism of the drama, see esp. G. Kaibel, *Comic. Græcor. Frag.*, Berlin, 1899, vol. i. 1, p. 3 f. For the early period of the Roman drama the most important literature is cited by Schanz, *Röm. Literatur*, I. i., 1898, par. 9.

[2] 'The Dramatic Satura and the Old Comedy at Rome,' *AJPh* xv. [1894] 1–30. For Jahn, see *Hermes*, ii. [1867] 225; and for Leo, *ib.* xxiv. [1889] 67.

[1] *Proleg. zur Gesch. des Theaters im Alterthum*, Leipzig, 1896.

of the department was associated with the year 240 B.C. The long war with Carthage had just been brought to a successful termination, and it is a matter of record that, in order to indicate its especial gratitude for Divine protection, the Government, among other things, commissioned the Greek freedman Livius Andronicus to enlarge the usual scope of the *Ludi Romani* by the presentation of two plays, a comedy and a tragedy, translated, or, more properly speaking, adapted from the Greek for a Roman audience. For the one he resorted to the New Comedy, which, being both contemporary and cosmopolitan, was best fitted to reach the hearts of another nationality; for the other he had a large body of old favourites from which to choose. The experiment was eminently successful, and it is characteristic of Roman conservatism, especially in connexion with any religious rite, that the types thus established were in certain respects rigidly adhered to. The *Comœdia Palliata* (from *pallium*, a Greek soldier's cloak) is always the adaptation of a play from the sphere of the New or occasionally (as perhaps in the case of the *Amphitruo*) of the Middle Comedy; the scene, the characters, and, as the name indicates, the costumes, are all Greek. The Greek atmosphere is not always consistently preserved, especially in Plautus; but even here, though the man lived and wrote during and immediately after the blazing excitement of the Second Punic War, deviations are for the most part unimportant and, so to speak, accidental. Comparison, however, with fragments of the Greek originals, wherever available, shows that the poet treated his exemplar with great freedom, both in content and in form, changing what was originally a dialogue in trimeters into the lyric measures of a *canticum*, abridging here, expanding there, and otherwise manipulating his text to suit his taste and that of his Roman audience. Frequently, too, he enlivened the action of his play by constructing an underplot from a certain number of scenes supplied by a second Greek exemplar. This process was technically known as *contaminatio*. On the whole, however, the *Palliata* is a faithful representation of the New Comedy of Greece. Indeed, owing to the loss of all complete originals, it is our only representative. The characteristics of this comedy of manners, or, as Ben Jonson would say, of 'humours,' are familiar to all.

The popularity of the *Palliata* and the creative period of its existence belong in round numbers to the century lying between 240 and 140 B.C. The names of at least twelve comic dramatists belonging to this period are known, and the number of *Palliatæ* written by them must have been not less than four hundred. We now have the six plays of Terence and twenty plays, more or less complete, of Plautus. Of the remainder, we have the names of about one hundred and forty plays, and fragments amounting in the aggregate to about eight hundred lines. Apart from Plautus and Terence, the great names of the department were Nævius and Cæcilius Statius. In the famous canon of Volcacius Sedigitus—which from time to time some scholar claims to understand—the order of merit is Cæcilius, Plautus, Nævius, Licinius, Atilius, Terence, Turpilius, Trabea, Luscius Lanuvinus, Ennius. Apparently the latest of the group was Turpilius, who died at Sinuessa in 103. He had already outlived the popularity of his department by nearly a generation.

The *Palliata* was carefully studied in the two great eras of Roman scholarship—the age of Varro and the age of Suetonius. Many plays of that type were doubtless composed, especially by 'persons of quality,' in the time of Domitian, when it was the fashion to write books. But, after the first great period of its existence, the stage tradition of the *Palliata*, so far as we are now able to trace it, is largely the stage tradition of Plautus and Terence. Indeed, the only Roman comedy to survive, apart from these two authors, is a reworking of the *Aulularia*, belonging probably to the second half of the 4th cent. A.D., and known as the *Querolus*.[1]

3. The 'Togata.'—This was the successor of the *Palliata* in public favour. Its *floruit* belongs to the two generations between the fall of the *Palliata* and the time of Sulla, and the great names of the department are Titinius, L. Afranius,[2] and T. Quintius Atta. Little is known of these men personally, except that Atta died in 77 B.C., and that Afranius was an older contemporary. Seventy titles and about four or five hundred fragments, mostly lexical, are all that remain of this type.

According to the ordinary Roman definition (*e.g.* esp. Horace, *Ars Poetica*, 288), which we have inherited, the *Togata* was the Roman parallel of the *Palliata*. It was a Roman comedy of manners, representing Roman life, as the *Palliata* was a Greek comedy of manners representing Greek life. The scene was Roman and the costumes were Roman; hence, of course, the name. Thanks to Varro, however, we learn that this is not a definition of the *Fabula Togata* as a whole (which ought to mean any play distinctively Roman), but of its most important sub-variety, the *Tabernaria*. The distinction is valuable to us, because the word itself is more significant and descriptive than is *Togata*. Moreover, Diomedes adds that 'tabernariae dicuntur et humilitate personarum et argumentorum similitudine comoediis pares, in quibus non magistratus regesve sed humiles homines et privatae domus inducuntur, quae quidem olim quod tabulis tegerentur communiter tabernae vocabantur.' This statement is amply supported by the titles and, so far as they go, by the fragments. The scene was generally (perhaps always) outside of Rome, and for the most part in the small towns of Southern Latium. Indeed, Mommsen claimed that the scene had to be laid in a town of the Latin league, because the poet was not allowed to represent either Rome or a Roman citizen on the stage. Hence Mommsen would connect the death of the *Togata* in Sulla's time with the extension of citizenship to the Latin towns at that date. If so, why was it that the *Togatæ* of the great masters were popular on the stage until late in the Empire?

The fifteen titles of Titinius represent what was originally about twenty thousand lines of text. About one hundred and eighty fragmentary verses survive. So far as form is concerned, the model was the *Palliata*. In his metrical art, Titinius followed the greater regularity of Terence, but in language and temperament he seems to have had more in common with Plautus. His plays were all family pieces, and it is clear that the life depicted was that of the lower classes and of the country folk. The prominence of women, noticeable not only in Titinius but in other authors of this type, is itself characteristic of Italian life. There is no sign of the kidnappers, and very little of the slaves which Festus tells us were standard characters in these plays. The only type suggesting the *Palliata* is the parasite. The others are more Italic, and remind us rather of the *Atellana* and the mime than of the *Palliata*.

By far the greatest, the most prolific, and the best known of the trio was Afranius. Indeed, like Molière and Ben Jonson, Afranius seems to have

[1] *Querolus sive Aulularia*, ed. by R. Peiper, Leipzig, 1875, etc.

[2] F. Marx, in Pauly-Wissowa, i. 708 f. For the *Togata* as a department, see esp. Edmond Courbaud, *de Comœdia Togata*, Paris, 1899.

been an excellent illustration of Gildersleeve's statement that 'in literature as in life the greatest borrowers are often the richest men.' Cicero (*Brut.* 167) says that he imitated G. Titius the orator, and even in the disjointed fragments now surviving we hear echoes of Pacuvius, possibly even of Cato, but above all of Menander. In fact, enough is left of his prologue to the *Compitalia* to show not only that he followed Menander, but that he was criticized for it. His reply was that 'he borrowed not alone from Menander, but from any other writer, Greek or Latin, whenever he found something suitable to his purpose.' 'Why not? Is any Latin writer comparable with Terence in either language or wit? At the same time, was there ever such a borrower?' Evidently we have here the echoes of a lively discussion among the critics of the Gracchan Age—one which was doubtless taken up in some of the lost satires of Lucilius. Cicero (*de Fin.* i. 7) explains the nature of the debt to Menander. It concerned not plots, or scenes, or characters, but *locos quosdam*, detached passages; it was the same relation which Ennius bore to Homer that every first-class Roman poet bore to his Greek models. But in itself the genius of Afranius seems to have had much in common with that of Menander, and Horace's (*Epist.* ii. 1. 57)

'dicitur Afranii toga convenisse Menandro'

was evidently the prevailing opinion of critics in his time. Doubtless, he did not entirely accept it; nevertheless, he quotes it without comment. Forty-three titles and over four hundred lines of fragments survive. Noticeable in Afranius as compared with Titinius, and in Atta perhaps as compared with Afranius, is the steady growth towards the literary *Atellana* and mime, those rivals of the *Togata* which were already at hand.

The *Togata* was much read and admired as a classic in the age of Hadrian and the Antonines. After that we hear little of it. In all the great library of antique realism, now gone beyond recall, there is probably no department, at least so far as Rome is concerned, which we could so ill afford to lose. The literature of Rome as it now survives is largely the literature of a great capital—in other words, that portion of the written word which was capable of appealing to the common denominator of taste for a long stretch of time in a universal empire. Whatever was local or peculiar in form or content was for that very reason heavily handicapped in the struggle for existence all through the arid waste which lies between the 3rd or 4th century and the Renaissance. The *Togata* was the artistic comedy of the Roman *bourgeoisie*. It must have been an incomparable picture of the ordinary life of the Italian countryside, of old towns like Præneste or Veliternum, with all their local ambitions, characters, and peculiarities, during the 2nd cent. B.C. As it is, our knowledge of this aspect of antique Italian life must be derived for the most part from the priceless fragments of Petronius, and the great palimpsest of Pompeii written over by the hand of Vesuvius.

4. Tragedy.—The rules of the Roman tragedy founded by Livius Andronicus and developed by his followers are practically the same as those already stated for the *Palliata*. The great names are Ennius, his nephew Pacuvius, and Accius. Accius survived until the youth of Cicero, but it is clear that even then the stage tradition of the tragedy lived in the fame of the great actor Asopus rather than by the popularity of the department as such. The tragedy of this period, the only great period of its existence on Roman soil, is now represented by nearly one hundred titles and about twelve hundred lines of fragments. Among the numerous lost tragedies written in later times the famous *Thyestes* of Varius and the equally famous *Medea* of Ovid were the most important. Irrespective of such monstrosities as the *Medea* of Hosidius Geta (a Vergilian cento [see *Anth. Lat.* 17, R]), the only survivors of this department are the plays of Seneca, belonging to the time of Nero. It has often been said, though the statement is really quite without warrant, that they were never intended for the stage. However that may be, it is certain that their influence on the early tragedy of England and France is one of the most important chapters in the formative history of the modern drama. Their connexion, if they have any, with the tragedy of the Republican period cannot be stated definitely. Formally speaking, the choruses go back to the school of Horace, and the plays throughout were deeply affected by contemporary rhetoric.

5. The 'Prætexta.'—The *Prætexta*, the Roman parallel to the *Tragœdia* of Livius and his followers, as the *Togata* was the Roman parallel to the *Palliata*, was the invention of Nævius, the greatest constructive genius, perhaps, of Roman poetry. But, owing in part, no doubt, to the comparative poverty of native Roman legends, the idea was not especially fruitful. One example, however, survives. This is the *Octavia*, a play by some unknown author, probably of the Flavian period, and possibly connected in some way with the house of the Annæi, inasmuch as it has come down to us in the corpus of Seneca's tragedies.

So much for a brief survey of the Roman drama as a purely literary production from beginning to end (*Palliata* and *Togata*, *Tragœdia* and *Prætexta*). It remains to consider those types of the drama which had a popular as well as a literary history. The most important of these, and the only ones with which we need to be concerned in the present inquiry, are the mime and the *Fabula Atellana*. Strictly speaking, the *Atellana* should be considered a variety of the mime. Here, however, we take it up first, not only because as a literary form it is the immediate successor of the *Togata* in public favour, but also because as a popular form it is probably the oldest dramatic entertainment known to have existed on Roman soil.

6. The 'Atellana.'—The *Fabula Atellana*[1] is the 'play from Atella,' a little town in Campania. Campanian origin is also attested by the fact that the play was known as 'Oscan,' and the characters as 'Oscae personae' (Diomedes, i. 490, *i.e.* Varro). Generally speaking, of course, these plays were acted in Latin, but Strabo (v. 233; cf. Sueton. *Jul.* 39) tells us that in his time (the Augustan Age) they were still acted in Oscan κατά τινα ἀγῶνα πάτριον, 'during the national festival.' This statement, so far from being incredible, as many have thought, is merely an excellent illustration of the well-known tendency of liturgy to linguistic conservatism (compare the use of Sumero-Akkadian by the Babylonians; of Greek in the Roman worship of Ceres, as attested by Polybius, xxx. 14, and Cic. *Balb.* 55; of Greek in the Russian, and of Latin in the Roman Church, etc.). It proves beyond a doubt not only that the play was Oscan, but that the Romans took it over in the first place in consequence of some vow or in connexion with some special occasion, and acted it at 'the national festival.' It is, therefore, reasonable to suppose that the small and obscure town of Campania recorded in the title *Atellana* was either the centre of the worship commemorated or in some way associated with its adoption. The date, though uncertain, was at least anterior to the time of Livius Andronicus, and probably by a considerable period. This is shown in two ways. The first is

[1] F. Marx, in Pauly-Wissowa, ii. 1914 ff., with ref.; A. Dieterich, *Pulcinella, Pompejanische Wandbilder und römische Satyrspiele*, Leipzig, 1897.

derived from the special and peculiar privileges of the actors. The first actors hired by Livius Andronicus were either slaves or freedmen. Hence the invariable rule of later days that no Roman citizen could go on the stage without *ipso facto* incurring *infamia*, i.e. the loss of certain important civic rights (as exemplified, for instance, by the famous case of the mimograph Laberius in Cæsar's time). The one exception was the *Atellana*. Here and here only the actor was not obliged to remove his mask, and a citizen could take part without incurring any legal disability. This can only mean that the *Atellana* was introduced at a time when the Romans had no professional actors, and probably no festival at which theatrical performances were regularly given. The *Atellana* had been acted by Campanian citizens. The Romans followed their model, and acted the play themselves as best they could. When the Greek drama was introduced in 240 B.C. with its professional actors (slaves and freedmen), the business ceased to be honourable, and Roman citizens gave it up. But that they had once taken part in the *Atellana* was reflected in the freedom from *infamia* which ever after remained a privilege of the actors in this particular type of drama. The special privilege of retaining the mask also shows that the *Atellana* came early to Rome; not, however, because the professional played without a mask in early times, but because of the extreme antiquity of masks in the religious rite.

The second argument for the high antiquity of the *Atellana* among the Romans is derived from the well-known principle that, unless the ground is already occupied, the play always brings its theatre with it. Now, Bethe (*Proleg. zur Gesch. des Theaters im Alterthum*, Leipzig, 1896) has shown, we think conclusively, that the peculiar shape of the Roman stage, about which so much has been written, is not due to the fact that it was a modification of the Hellenistic type. On the contrary, it reflects the type associated from time immemorial with the *Atellana*. In other words, when Livius Andronicus brought out his first Greek plays, the *Atellana* was already in possession, and he adopted its stage as a matter of course. The same rule and the same line of investigation applied to the stage of the *Atellana* itself tend to prove that this play was not an Oscan invention. It was a popular Oscan representation of the φλύακες, one of the oldest types of the ancient Dorian comedy in Southern Italy.

The importation of the *Atellana* to Rome may have been due to some incident in connexion with the fall of Campania in 338. Perhaps, too, Livy's description of the play which he calls a *satura* may go back ultimately to a confused recollection of the Roman *Atellana* in those early days.

Like all genuine folk-dramas, the *Atellana* was not committed to writing. The actors merely agreed upon the plot. The dialogue was improvised. The characters were confined to a certain number of fixed types, each with a generic name, and there were no women. These features are all typical of genuine folk-drama the world over, and the last two, especially, indicate the high antiquity of the play. The use of masks has already been mentioned. This and the wearing of the phallus are ceremonial, and show the antiquity of the type. The use of masks also accounts for the extreme liveliness of gesture characteristic of the *Atellana* (Juvenal, vi. 71). They were also peculiarly applicable for 'Oscae personae,' for a play in which all the characters were fixed. The plot, whatever it happened to be, attached itself to these familiar personified types, and represented their various adventures in the given situations. As befitted the roaring farce, the situation was always ludicrous and the plot full of intrigue. In fact, 'intrigue' is derived from *tricæ* (Dieterich, *Pulcinella*, 98, n. 2), and *tricæ*, 'tricks,' was the word used to describe the action of these plays (Varro, *Sat. Men.* 182 B; cf. Ribbeck, *Leipzig. Stud.* ix. [1886] 337). The language was conversational, and the life depicted was the life of ordinary people (Varro, *de Ling. Lat.* vii. 84). Obscenity was notably prominent (Quint. vi. 3. 47, etc.); but this, too, was ceremonial and traditional as well as a matter of choice. The most striking and instructive modern parallel—in fact, if we may believe Dieterich, the actual descendant and representative of the *Atellana* in the world of to-day—is the Neapolitan *Commedia dell' Arte*.

The four fixed characters of the *Atellana* are Maccus, Bucco, Pappus, and Dossenus. Maccus (probably Oscan and borrowed from μακκοᾶν, to sit 'mooning') is stupid, greedy, and lustful—the butt of every one. He corresponds to *Stupidus* in the mime. His weapon is the 'clava scirpea' (Novius, 79 R), for which we have a striking parallel in Bajazzo (of the *Commedia dell' Arte*), *i.e.* Pagliazzo, the man with the 'hay club' (Dieterich, p. 112). Bucco (a popular derivation from vulgar Latin *bucca*, as the name indicates; cf. Gr. Γνάθων) is a great eater, a huge talker, an unconscionable braggart, an arrant coward. 'Overlarge jaws,' as we learn from the old *Scriptores Physiognomonici* (i. 412, 7 Foerster), 'betoken a blockhead, a babbler, a well-spring of words, words, words,' a man who 'talks with his mouth' (*bucca*), as our popular expression goes. Bucco is the talkative and aggressive fool, the 'cheerful ass,' as opposed to Maccus the great gaby, the simple and confiding blockhead. Pappus (from Greek πάππος) is the 'old man,' avaricious, surly, lustful, foolish, conceited, therefore always being overreached: in short, Pappus is Pantalone. Dossenus (from *dorsum*, a pure Latin word) is 'the man with the back,' *i.e.* the hunchback. In the popular conception this affliction has always implied wisdom and cunning (cf. Æsop) as well as certain powers more or less uncanny. Hence, in the *Atellana*, Dossenus, like his modern representative *Il Dottore*, in Pulcinella, is the sly and cunning rascal, the 'professor,' the caricature of the scholar and philosopher. His second name of Manducus (cf. *manducare*, *mangiare*, *manger*) shows that, like Bucco, he is also a great eater.

Such were the standard characters, and such seem to have been the main characteristics of the *Atellana* in its traditional and purely popular form.

For a brief period this old folk-drama was raised to the dignity of a literary department, and succeeded the *Togata* in public favour. The period is the time of Sulla, and the great names are Pomponius of Bologna and Novius. The lines upon which they worked out the problem were doubtless suggested in no small degree by the dramatic studies of Accius and his contemporary, C. Iulius Cæsar Strabo. These men investigated the Roman drama in connexion with Greek models, the question of correct titles (Varro, *de Ling. Lat.* x. 70), of masks, etc. Influence of the *Palliata* and *Togata* is suggested, though not proved, by occasional identity of titles. We also hear of *cantica* in Galba's time (Suet. *Nero*, 39, *Galba*, 13), and it is natural to suppose that in raising the old farce to the dignity of a literary product something was borrowed from the higher types. It is clear, however, that the essential characteristics of the folk-drama were all preserved. The dialogue was now written out, of course, and the statement of Terentianus Maurus (vi. 396 K), that the metre used was the *septenarius*, is borne out by the fragments. In other words, there was no recitative, the play was all comic. Indeed, in language, humour, and situation these plays were more distinctly

Aristophanic than anything else in Roman literature. Equally Aristophanic was the habit of personal criticism, the ὀνομαστὶ κωμῳδεῖν, of which we hear during the Empire from Tiberius to Trajan (Tac. *Ann.* iv. 14; Suet. *Tib.* 45, *Calig.* 27, *Nero*, 39, *Galba*, 13, etc.).

With the rise of the *Atellana* to a literary form, we have to deal with a confused and confusing tangle of testimonies regarding the *Atellana*, the *Exodium*, the *Rhinthonica*, and the Greek Satyr-drama.

The conclusion seems to be (cf. schol. Juv. iii. 175, vi. 71; Suet. *Tib.* 45; Cic. *Fam.* vii. 1, ix. 16) that the literary *Atellana* was used as an *exodium*, and the first mention of the word in Lucilius (180–103 B.C.) coincides with its development in this sphere. A short piece of three to four hundred lines, and with only a few actors (Ascon. on Cic. *Verr.* 15), it seemed hardly worth while, so to speak, to put it on the stage by itself. Apparently, therefore, it was the analogy of the Satyr-drama that suggested the use of the literary *Atellana* as an *exodium*, an after-piece. By later critics it actually was identified with the Satyr-drama (schol. Juv. vi. 71; Porphyr. on Hor. *Ars Poet.* 221, etc.). But it is hard to see how the two could coalesce. The literary model for the *Atellana* to follow ought to be the *Hilarotragœdia*, the *Rhinthonica* (Porphyr. *l.c.*; schol. Juv. *l.c.*), and that it actually did so is suggested by certain titles of Pomponius (Vahlen, *Rhein. Mus.* xvi. [1861] 472). As Rhinthon's plays were travesties of Euripides, so the *Rhinthonicæ* of Pomponius and Novius were travesties of Pacuvius and Accius. Were the *Rhinthonicæ* of Pomponius and Novius *Atellanæ*, or is this idea of later critics due to the fact that Pomponius and Novius wrote both kinds and used both kinds as *exodia*? We believe Marx is right in adopting the second alternative. In fact, the loss of all these departments, the similarity in type, use, titles, and characters, make it extremely difficult to decide whether the *Atellana*, *Rhinthonica*, and Satyr-drama ever did coalesce to any extent. Probably not. The explanation seems to be that Pomponius and Novius wrote all three and used them for *exodia*.

The *Atellana* was evidently popular under the Empire; the old folk-drama was never forgotten, but as a living department of literature it seems to have been largely the creation of these two men, and as early as 55 B.C. (cf. Cic. *Fam.* vii. I, 3 [written in 46]) the literary *Atellana* as an *exodium* had already given way to the mimes of Decimus Laberius and Publilius Syrus, the only two men of note who raised the mime to a literary form in the Latin language. If this were all, or if this chapter could be dealt with independently, the mime might be dismissed with the few phrases usually accorded to it. We have learned from Reich,[1] however, that this cannot be done, and with his general conclusions we must agree in the main. The literary productions of Laberius and Syrus, like the *Atellana* by which the mime was preceded, are a mere branch of the parent stock.

7. The mime.—In its larger sense the mime is the most important phenomenon in the history of dramatic art; it appears in a dozen different forms, it is responsible for a dozen others; the history of it is the history of the growth of realism, of the rise of the democracy; it has popular periods and literary periods, a Greek history, a Roman history, a Græco-Roman history, a modern history. Indeed, after reading Reich one may sum up the whole story of the antique drama with the simple phrase, 'Mime thou wert, to mime didst thou return.' For the complete and detailed discussion of this long and interesting development, the reader is referred to Reich himself. Here it is manifestly impossible to give anything more than some of the important facts in outline.

The earliest appearance of the word 'mime' is as a title for the famous compositions of Sophron (5th cent. B.C.). These dramatic presentations of single incidents or situations, according to Suidas, were in prose and written in the Doric dialect. The substitution of the *scazōn* for prose gives the form and the atmosphere of the *mimiambi* of Herondas, the Teniers of Alexandrian life. A more elevated metre, on the other hand, starts us, by way of Sophron's imitator Theocritus, on the long history of bucolic poetry. A convenient generic term for this type is Reich's *mimologia*, i.e. the mime as a recitation.

There were also purely lyric mimes, which were sung. To these Reich gives the generic title of *mimodia*. Particular species of it are *magodia*, *Simodia*, *hilarodia*, *Lysiodia*. Between the two we have *kinaidologia* and *Ionikologia*, all in verse, but partly recited, partly sung. Finally, in the Alexandrian period, comes the fully developed mimetic drama, which was a combination of *mimologia* and *mimodia*, and retained the characteristics of both. With a fully developed plot, it had prose parts and iambic parts, like the *mimologia*, and lyric parts—*cantica*—like the *mimodia*. With the conquests of Alexander this new invention began to spread in the Greek East, and soon took entire possession of it. Indeed, the time came when it ruled the stage, even to the exclusion of its ancient rival, the comedies of Menander.

Toward the end of the 2nd cent. B.C., after the Romans conquered the East, and especially after Sulla's time, they brought the dramatic mime to Rome. From Rome it spread over the West, and thenceforth held possession of the entire Græco-Roman theatre until the fall of the Empire. The irruption of the Barbarians upon the West made an end of the theatre. Only the *mimi* survived, and they did so by returning to their primitive original function of θαυματοποιοί and γελωτοποιοί. Such were those tumblers, jugglers, etc., of later times who went on with the ancient art of the *mimus*. It was thus that the mime of antiquity was enabled to survive the Middle Ages and reach modern days alive. In the Greek East the mime was not subjected to the same strain. For centuries the Byzantines clung to the classic dramatic mimes of Philistion. They also produced a large number of mimographs, and a number of new mimic types and figures were added to the old stock inherited from classical times. Here, as in the West, the regular classical drama had long since disappeared from the stage. When Byzantium fell, the remains of Greek culture took refuge in Italy, to reappear there at the Renaissance. Only the mime remained, and in a debased form survives to-day in the Turkish popular drama known as the *karagöz*. Two distinguishing features of the mime from beginning to end and in all its types and variations have been the mimic dance and the wearing of the phallus. The mime of all times and forms is also realistic; the very name implies it. Of course, all poetry was properly defined as μίμησις, but the mime was felt to represent a specific type; to give the substance of Diomedes' definition (i. 491 K), it was realism unmitigated and undiluted. We get an idea of the relentless realism of the mime when we see how much of it is still left in the refined literary representatives of it furnished by Theocritus and Herondas. Without the restraint of higher genius and literary form, it was easy for the realism of the mime to sink to mere obscenity and its wit to mere dullness.

The realism of the mime is also seen in its characters. Many of them, perhaps all, were creations of the ancient folk-mime, and had long been familiar to all classes from this source. As early perhaps as the 6th or 7th cent. B.C. we have the first development of this species of folk-composition by quasi-professionals, those θαυματοποιοί, jugglers, rope-dancers, ventriloquists, and other homeless nomads who had been wandering about through Greece and elsewhere from time immemorial. They must soon have seen the advantage of the mimic dance, and of the mime itself, whether spoken or sung, for getting together an audience. In this way, thinks Reich, sprang up a new profession, that of the wandering *mimi*.

Among all the varieties of dramatic composition

[1] Reich, *Der Mimus, ein litterar-entwickelungsgeschichtl. Versuch*, vol. i., Berlin, 1903.

the mime was the lowest, as it were, in the social scale. The same was true of the actors. Even the players of the *kithara* and flute were admitted to the Dionysiac gild, but never the *mimus*; he was always looked down upon by his more distinguished colleagues. The difference was marked from the first by the fact that the actors wore no masks, and that women's parts were taken by women. Doubtless, this was inherited from their early days as jugglers, but the 'regulars' even in their own later and evil days would never join the *mimi* on account of the women.

A convenient division of the mime as a whole is afforded by the words παίγνιον and ὑπόθεσις. The mimic ὑπόθεσις is the developed mimic drama, the regular dramatic mime; the παίγνιον is everything below it, i.e. *hilarodia*, *magodia*, etc., mentioned above, *kinaidologia*, *Ionikologia*, φλύακες, even the works of Sophron, etc., none of which were regular dramas. Frequently the παίγνιον is what we should call a music-hall 'turn.' It was extremely popular in both Greece and Rome; and there were many varieties, such as educated animals (Vopiscus, *Carinus*, 19; Plutarch, *de Sollert. Anim.* 19, etc.), and special feats of imitation. Imitation of pigs seems to have been particularly popular (Phædrus, v. 5; Plutarch, *Mor.* 674 B; *Parœm. Græc.* ii. 84, etc.). Plato (*Rep.* iii. 8) speaks of performers who could give perfect imitations of animals, the sound of running water, the sea, thunder, etc. See also Friedländer's *Petronius*, 1891, pp. 64, 68, 69, and 293 (note). These varieties of μίμησις are eternally popular.

The most important figure in the history of the department is Philistion, who lived and wrote in Rome during the 1st cent. A.D. He is the classic of the mimic ὑπόθεσις, the regular dramatic mime; hence the comparison of him with Menander, the classic of the New Comedy.[1] The statement of Cassiodorus (*Var.* iv. 21), that he invented the (dramatic) mime, is doubtless due to the fact that he was the first to write it all out, *i.e.* the dialogue as well as the songs. Evidently he was the culmination of the mime among the Greeks. But the beginnings of it take us back to pre-historic times. The mime of Sicily and Italy came from the Peloponnesus with the early Dorian settlers. It was extremely popular in Sicilian Megara and Syracuse. Tarentum was especially fond of the Italic mime, the φλύαξ. All these cities were founded near the beginning of the 8th cent. B.C.

The original kernel of the mime, the source from which it sprang, was the mimic dance, the beginnings of which belonged to the Stone Age, and may be seen to-day among all peoples who still belong to that stage of civilization. The ancients never forgot the connexion between the two. The mimic dance survived in all types, and the *mimus* himself was always a trained dancer. The *kinaidologi*, for instance, were originally dancers who thus accompanied their ᾄσματα ἰωνικά (cf. Petron. 23); Hesychius describes the *magodia* itself as ὄρχησις ἁπαλή, the Romans designated the action of the ὑπόθεσις by *saltare*, and the actresses were known as *saltatriculæ*. The use of *gesticulatorius* in the same connexion indicates the *kind* of dance.

The development of troupes of regular professional *mimi* from the old wandering γελωτοποιοί of primitive times seems to have taken place about the 3rd cent. B.C. These primitive ancestors of the mediæval *jongleurs* had gradually taken up all the types and themes of the old rustic mime. They travelled everywhere, they were great favourites at the court of Philip, and hordes of them followed Alexander into Asia Minor. Here the Dorian mime met the Ionian mime, and the result was the ὑπόθεσις, the regular dramatic mime. The Dorian mime was originally prose (hence Sophron), although great artists like Epicharmus put it into metre. The dramatic mime (ὑπόθεσις), however, was noted for its *cantica*, and this combination of Dorian prose (*mimologia*) and Ionian song (*mimodia*) is what ensured the lasting success of the dramatic mime. Great emphasis was laid upon *mimodia*, and this brings the dramatic mime near to the modern opera or operetta. In this way, too, we get a substitute for the missing chorus of the *Palliata*. Plautus took over *mimodia*, and the result is the mimic *canticum* of his comedies. Pomponius and Novius seem to have done the same thing for their *Atellanæ*.

Now, the Ionian *mimodia* itself, like the ὑπόθεσις, throughout its entire history, falls into a mythological and a 'biological' type (cf. Aristox. *ap.* Athen. xiv. 621 C), the one, *hilarodia* (and *Lysiodia*), dealing with mythology and the gods (paratragic and burlesque), the other, *magodia*, with real life. Both were entirely melic, and in both singing was accompanied and supported by mimic dance and gesture; but the accompaniment of *hilarodia* was stringed instruments, of *magodia*, drums and cymbals (Athen. 620 D–621 D), and the choice of instruments itself indicates that the dancing of the latter was much freer and more lascivious.

Hilarodia and *magodia* were wide-spread and very popular in Ionia, and acquired literary form —*hilarodia* through Simos of Magnesia, *magodia* through Lysis. Hence these new literary types were called after their founders *Simodia* (*hilarodia*) and *Lysiodia* (*magodia*). Through famous poets and a regular class of actors these two types of Ionian *mimodia* survived into Roman times. Sulla's friend Metrobius was an actor of the *Lysiodia*.

Kinaidologia, or *Ionikologia*, was another type of the Ionian mime. This was not really sung, although accompanied by the mimic dance (hence it was more *mimologia* than *mimodia*). This also was very popular in Ionia, and was cultivated by such famous poets as Sotades, Alexander Aetolus, Pigres, etc.

It will thus be seen that we have an unbroken connexion between the mimic-dramatic dances of the primitive Greeks, the ancient folk-mimes of the Dorians, the Italic φλύακες of the 8th cent. B.C., and the dramatic mime of later times (not only in its popular form, but in its literary form; Laberius and Syrus on the Latin side, Philistion and his successors on the Greek side).

The relation of Rome to Greece in the matter of the mime now becomes more definite. Antiodemis (Antipater Sidon. *Anth. Pal.* ix. 567), the actress of *Lysiodia*, came to Rome in the 2nd cent. B.C.; Metrobius, as we have seen, in the 1st cent. B.C. In 211 B.C. an old *mimus* (Festus, 326) danced to the flute in the Roman theatre. His dance was an intermezzo, but his mere presence shows that the *mimi* had already reached Rome. The *mimi* who satirized Lucilius and Accius (150 B.C.) from the stage were following an old-established custom of the dramatic mime (ὑπόθεσις). The fact that they took such liberties shows that even then they must have been in Rome for a long time. The satire in question must have taken place at the *Floralia* (April 28–May 3), which was the special feast at which mimes were given. The *Floralia* were first celebrated in 238 B.C., and every year after 173. It is quite possible that the mime was connected with this feast from the first. In that case, the dramatic mime, which was established in the Greek East by the 3rd cent. B.C., was already settled in Rome in connexion with the *Floralia* by the end of the same century. Thus we see how the mimodic portion of the dramatic mime was the suggestion

[1] Σύγκρισις Μενάνδρου καὶ Φιλιστίωνος, ed. Boissonade, *Anecd. Græca*, 1829, i. 147–152; and by Studemund, *Lektionskatalog*, Breslau, 1887.

of the *cantica* of Plautus and Cæcilius Statius. The introduction of the mime and of *mimi* at that time was facilitated by the fall of Tarentum in 272, and by the fact that in 190 Scipio Asiaticus returned from Antioch, a centre of the dramatic mime, just as long afterwards Verus (Capitol. viii. 7) came back from his Parthian campaign with shiploads of *mimi*.

The early *mimi*, of course, acted in Greek, and the *scæna Græca* remained in Rome until Theodoric.[1] One is reminded of such modern parallels as the *Théâtre italien* in Paris, etc. The Latin mime was a copy of the Greek (technical terms, rules, etc.).[2]

Having traced the history of the department as a whole, let us pause a moment upon the fully developed dramatic mime of the best period. We have already seen that it inherited dialogue in prose and iambic verse, also lyric portions (*cantica*), accompanied by music and the traditional mimic dance. The same principle also justified the introduction of παίγνια, such as trained animals, imitations, etc. In plot, too, and in length it was fully equal to the old classical drama; in compass and variety it was superior.

A good example of the type is an old favourite, well known to Ovid, and still popular in the days of Chrysostom and Chorikios.[3] The name of the piece has not survived; we might, however, for convenience call it *Divorçons*, as it is an early exploitation of the inevitable 'triangle.' In the first scene we have the facile young wife and the jealous husband. Then the lover, the *cultus adulter* as he is called, appears, and with the help of Thymele's faithful abigail, the *cata carissa*, gains an interview with her mistress in the absence of Corinthus. In the following scenes the jealous husband is subjected to all sorts of tricks and mystifications, *artes mimicæ*. Finally, the lover has to hide from him in a large chest (*perituri cista Latini*). He is discovered. The husband, breathing fire, tells the slave to fetch him a knife, large and very sharp, as he proposes to render the *cultus adulter* harmless. Then he changes his mind, and decides to air his wrongs in court. Then comes the court scene, and the piece is brought to an end in some farcical fashion.

The final tableau of *Divorçons* requires not only the three principal characters and the judge to be on the stage at the same time, but also a throng of slaves, witnesses, court officials, supernumeraries, etc. Other plays show even more clearly that in the mime, as in the modern drama, with which, in fact, it has much in common, the actor played but one part and the number was unrestricted. It is also clear that the 'unities' were disregarded.

Variety in form was accompanied by variety in characters. True to its composite origin, the mime is hospitable to all, from thieves and prostitutes to emperors and gods.[4] The same was true of costume. The *Stupidus*, or clown (a typical character inherited from the primitive stock), wore the regular clown's costume, the *centunculus* (cf. the mediæval 'motley'), a shaved head, an *apex*, a mimic club (like Maccus and Bajazzo), and always the phallus. The old women, too, wore a burlesque costume. Otherwise, as in the modern drama, the dress was according to the character and the situations.

So, too, the whole gamut of human emotions was played upon: comic and tragic, humour and sentiment, go hand in hand, as in the Romantic comedy of the Elizabethan Age. The titles of Laberius suggest realistic plots for the most part. It is doubtful, however, whether such mimes as his *Necyomantia* and *Lacus Avernus* were altogether realistic. In fact, even when the mime dealt with contemporary life and was purely realistic, great emphasis was laid on the unusual, strange, and astonishing. Nothing indicates more clearly the really popular origin of the mime.[5] A favourite character was the beggar who suddenly becomes rich (Cic. *Phil.* ii. 27); another, the rich man who becomes a beggar (Sen. *Epist.* 113. 6). Shipwreck was a favourite *motif* (Sen. *Dial.* iv. 2, 5; Petron. 114 and 115). The *Laureolus*, a favourite mime of Domitian's time, gave the romantic adventures of a robber chieftain, and ended with his execution. Especially characteristic of the mime was some serious crime, something unusual and horrible, like parricide or incest or poisoning. Trials for perjury or poisoning are frequent, and generally serve for the *dénouement*. An interesting example, which will also illustrate the part occasionally taken by animals (cf. such titles of Laberius as *Catularius* and *Scylax*, and see Petron. 95), is given by Plutarch, *de Sollert. Anim.* ix. 7.

This was a mime with a large number of characters and a complicated plot, which he saw in the theatre of Marcellus. Vespasian himself was present. The intrigue centred in what purported to be a poison, but was in reality a sleeping potion. As in the case of Juliet, whoever took it apparently died, but after a time revived. One of the star actors was a trained dog, and the most important incident of the mime, because it doubtless led to the *dénouement*, was trying the effect of the supposed poison upon him. As soon as he had eaten the piece of bread upon which the poison had been placed, he began to tremble and stagger, his head grew heavy, and he finally stiffened out as if dead, and allowed himself to be carried about in that state. When it was time to recover, he imitated perfectly all the phases of returning consciousness, and, while the actors indicated their astonishment at the fact that the supposed victim of a deadly dose had come to life again, the dog himself ran to his master and joyously fawned upon him.

The connexion of this incident with the plot is not stated, but we may believe with Reich that there was a connexion, and that the probable nature of it is illustrated by (the mime from which was derived?) the famous story of Apuleius, *Met.* 10. 2. A rich old grandee took for a second wife a young and very beautiful woman. She fell violently in love with her stepson, but was rejected by him, and her passion was turned to hatred. (Note that this *motif* has been a popular favourite ever since the days of Joseph and Hippolytus. It appears constantly in folk-tradition, in the mime, in that echo of the mime, the rhetorical *controversiæ* and *suasoriæ*, in the Italian *novelle*, etc.) A slave procures her a sudden and deadly poison, she drops it in a cup of wine, and the pair leave it where the young man will take it without arousing suspicion. Presently, however, her own son returns from school, and, being thirsty—as small boys always are—drinks the wine and falls dead on the spot. (Here is the unexpected turn of fortune which the mime, that faithful interpreter of the popular mind, so dearly loves.)

It is, of course, clear to all that the child has died of poison. The woman accuses her stepson of the deed, and alleges as a cause that he had attempted incest with herself. The young man is arrested, there is a great trial scene in court, and, after much oratory on both sides, he is condemned to death. At this point, however, we have another unexpected turn. An old judge, who is also a skilful physician, has been quietly listening to the trial all this time. At this point he rises to his feet and informs the court that he himself had sold the drug to the slave, and that it is not a poison at all, but a sleeping potion. 'Let us go now to the tomb,' said he, 'the child will soon be waking up.' Thus the woman's guilt was discovered; but, true to the mime, she was merely turned adrift, not executed.

Another plot eminently characteristic of the mime is Phædrus, *App.* xiv. 'The two suitors,' which reappears in an old French *fabliau* known as 'Le vair Palefroi,' 'The grey Horse.'

This is Romantic comedy. So, too, the mime takes us into the world of phantasy. Witches, warlocks, magicians, prophets, ghosts, are all favourite characters. In the old Dorian mime popular demons were presented, and the metamorphosis of men into animals, which is well attested for the mime of all periods, takes us straight into the fantastic land of 'the Frog King,' of 'Beauty and the Beast,' of 'the Golden Crab,' of 'the Three Citrons,' and the like. In this function the mime is a curiously complete prototype of Carlo Gozzi's famous experiment with the fairy tales of Italy. To the same category belong the mythological mimes, *Priapus*, *Anna Perenna*, *Anubis Moechus*,[1] *Kinyras and Myrrha* (Jos. *Ant.*

[1] Cicero, *Fam.* vii. 1; Sueton. *Jul.* 39, etc.

[2] See Reich, *op. cit.* p. 561 f., for details.

[3] Ovid, *Trist.* ii. 497 f., etc.; Juvenal, viii. 196, vi. 42; Chrysost. ii. 318. 13; Chorikios (Reich, p. 204 ff.). In Juvenal's time the wife was acted by Thymele, the husband by Corinthus, the lover by Latinus. They were all famous 'artists.' Thymele well might be called the Mrs. Bracegirdle of the Flavian period.

[4] See esp. Cyprian, *de Spect.* 6. Many titles of Laberius and Syrus speak for themselves in this respect.

[5] The Latin mimes were carefully studied in the rhetorical schools during and after the Augustan Age. To this fact is due the survival of the *Sententiæ* of Syrus. These were extracted from his mimes at an early date, and published as a sort of *vade-mecum* for the use of students and professors, from which might be drawn those sententious observations so dearly loved by the rhetoric of the Silver Age. For those who wish to recover the plots, scenes, and *motifs* most characteristic of the mime, the practice declamations of the rhetorical schools probably afford the richest field for investigation.

[1] See esp. Zielinski, *Die Märchenkomödie in Athen*, St. Petersburg, 1885; Weinreich, *Trug des Nektanebos*, Leipzig, 1911, p. 25,

XIX. i. 15), *Paris and Œnone* (cf. Suet. *Dom.* 19), Philistion's *Deukalion and Pyrrha*, etc.

It will be seen that in form and type the mime was not subject to the restrictions of the classical drama most familiar to us. It may be added that the same was true of many details of its presentation. First and most important, the actors, as we have already seen, never wore masks. It is not necessary to explain what this means for dramatic art. The *mimus* wore his own face only; indeed, one of the principal characters of the mime was known in Latin as *Sannio* (Cic. *de Orat.* ii. 61), *i.e.* 'the man who makes faces'—a speciality of the mime.[1] So, too, as we have seen, only in the mime were women's parts always taken by women. And, as there was no restriction of type, the characters included women of all ages and kinds. It is characteristic of the mime as a whole, however, that old women should be a speciality. This enabled a talented actress to keep on indefinitely (Pliny, *HN* vii. 48).

The original stage of the mime, as we see from old vase paintings of the φλύακες,[2] was a platform on props about three feet from the ground, and with steps in front by which the actor mounted. Change to the regular stage was very slow. With the beginning of the theatres the mime was acted on a small platform in the orchestra and in front of the regular stage. It was thus given as an *emboliarium* (Diomed. 490) or intermezzo. The next step was to the regular stage, upon which in Cicero's time the mime took the place of the *Atellana* as an *exodium* (Cic. *Fam.* ix. 16). At the *Floralia*, however, it had always been acted independently, and it gradually drew away from its function as an *exodium* (Diomed. 491 f.), until in the early Empire it took to the regular stage, upon which, together with the pantomime, it finally ruled alone. One distinction, however, survived. The mime was acted in front of the *siparium*, and it was through this that the actors made their exits and entrances. The stage was dressed as in Shakespeare's time, but, as also in Shakespeare's time, there was no scene-shifting. Claudian (*Epig. Græc.* 6) shows that there was, as we might assume, a regular *corps de ballet*. Doubtless it filled the same place and did much the same thing as in our times.

In view of what has been said, it is not difficult to understand why the fully developed dramatic mime, in spite of its faults, finally ruled alone. If the drama springs from the people, and if its highest function is to represent their life and their point of view, then the dramatic mime has a greater right to be called the national drama of the Græco-Roman world than has the classical drama of Greece or its short-lived and always more or less exotic representative in Rome. It is likely that Quintilian's verdict of 'in comoedia maxime claudicamus' might have been applied with equal justice to the Roman tragedy. Cicero was a notorious lover of the mime, a man of judgment and taste in such matters, if there ever was one. It is true, of course, that the mime was the drama of the age, and that the age was an age of realism. For that reason alone the average man of to-day would doubtless have agreed with him. But, after all, the realism of Cicero's time, however relentless, was not the realism of our time. The mimograph of those days, realist though he was, still possessed the vivid imagination, the nimble fancy, and, therefore, the sentiment of his race and time—those qualities without which the bubbling well-spring of humour and invention must soon dry up. Moreover, his audience was endowed with the same qualities. It still believed in ghosts and magic, it still had a folk-lore, it still possessed an incomparably rich mythology. Hence the real world of antiquity finds its parallel in the age of Elizabeth rather than in our own. It was only partially real after all. And so the mime, like the Elizabethan 'tragi-comedy,' was now wildly humorous, now fantastically horrible. The Romantic and the real, humour and pathos, comic and tragic, fact and fancy—all these and more were called upon to picture a life which, real as it once was, is no longer ours and will never be ours again.

The dramatic mime, however, seems never to have taken its position as a great literary department. In the long run the habit of leaving the dialogue to the actors proved to be inveterate, and this alone would have been fatal. But the most serious menace to the mime was its own splendid inheritance of versatility. Dialogue and plot, music, singing, dancing, an occasional weakness for 'specialities'—the combination is unstable, and, except in the hands of a great genius like Philistion, one or another was sure to be magnified at the expense of the rest. Audiences are uncritical, playwrights are human, actors are—actors. Between the three the mime of the 4th cent. A.D. no doubt deserved the adverse criticism bestowed upon it by Donatus and Cassiodorus. But, whatever its faults and virtues, the vitality of the mime was amazing. Time and change, national ruin, ecclesiastical fulmination and anathema—nothing could prevail against it. We cannot ignore a dramatic type which finally ousted both Euripides and Menander from the stage, and ruled alone for over half a millennium.

8. State control of the theatre.—The Roman theatre,[1] like the Roman play, and, for the most part, the details of its presentation, were a continuation and development of the Greek prototypes as they existed in the Alexandrian period. All derive ultimately from the one fact that the Roman play, like its predecessor, was clearly and distinctly an act of worship to the gods. It was, therefore, given at festivals, more especially at those festivals which the State religion, hence the State itself, had set apart for purposes of public worship. The plays were merely one item of the ritual observed. Other items were the races, gladiatorial combats, etc., which gave the general name of *ludi* to these occasions. In the time of Augustus, the regular annual *ludi*, during which plays were given, were the *Megalenses* (April 4–10), the *Ceriales* (April 12–19), the *Florales* (April 28–May 3), the *Apollinares* (July 6–13), the *Romani* (Sept. 4–19), the *Plebeii* (Nov. 4–17). Other *ludi* of the Augustan Age, during which plays were or could be given, were generally sporadic and meant to commemorate some special occasion, such as a great victory or the death of some distinguished man. Later in the Empire the tendency to increase the regular annual *ludi* became very marked, and serious attempts to reduce the number were made by several of the Emperors, notably Nerva, Septimius Severus, and Macrinus. Nevertheless, according to the calendar of 354, not less than 175 days in the year were given to *ludi*, and 101 of this number to plays.

The play was managed by the State. It is true that *ludi* were given by persons more or less in private life, but they were still an act of worship, the consent of the State had first to be secured, and, lastly, they were supposed to be under the

[1] Quint. vi. 3, 8; the epitaph of the mimus Vitalis, in *Anth. Lat.* 487a, R. etc.

[2] See Bethe, *op. cit.* ch. 13, for the full discussion.

[1] The best authority for Rome here is L. Friedländer in Marquardt-Mommsen's *Handbuch der röm. Altertumer*, vi. [1885] 482 f. See also G. Oehmichen, 'Das Bühnenwesen der Griechen und Römer,' in Müller's *Handbuch der klass. Altertumswissenschaft*, Munich, 1890, v. 3, pp. 181–304. For colours in theatrical tradition, see especially Donatus, *de Comœdia*.

general supervision of State officials. At no time apparently was the antique theatre a purely private enterprise; still less was it ever a purely financial one. One or two exceptions under the Empire are mentioned by Tacitus, but with such disapprobation that they illustrate rather than invalidate the rule.

Until the time of Augustus five of the six great annual *ludi* mentioned above were in charge of the various ædiles. The sixth, the *Apollinares*, which occurred in July, was managed by the *prætor urbanus*. The officer in charge had everything to do. Indeed, in earlier times, as we learn from Plautus, he even attended to the matter of costumes. He also built the theatre, and afterwards had to clear it away and put the place in order. Oddly enough, Rome never seems to have had but two permanent theatres—the theatre of Pompey, built in 55, and the theatre of Marcellus, which belongs to the Augustan Age. The ædile also had charge of the audience during the performance. In this he was assisted by his corps of *designatores*, or ushers. The *designator*, however, was a vastly more important person than is the modern usher. He was a regular deputy of the civil magistrate in charge, and as such the majesty of the law was with him. He had lictors, and was expected to move or remove people whenever necessary. In the 2nd cent., as we learn from the jurist Ulpian, this office was in the gift of the Emperor, and was of great value. The ædile had a regular sum allowed him from the State treasury to meet the bills incurred. But this *lucar*, as it was called, had been fixed as early as the Second Punic War, and was far from keeping pace with the growing expenses of the function for which it was designed. Nevertheless, the office of ædile as *maître de plaisir* made one so prominent and popular that it was much sought after by the aristocracy as a means to further advancement, and they spent fabulous sums in giving the shows devolving upon them. But at the accession of Augustus no patricians could be found who were willing to accept the office. He, therefore, transferred the management of theatrical matters to the prætors, and this remained the law under the Empire.

It is well known that one's seat at the theatre was determined by one's position in the State, and that it was regulated by law. The theatre was a religious institution, in charge of the Government. Such being the case, a seat at the theatre, like a right to vote or to bear arms, was a privilege of citizenship, and therefore to be assigned according to that principle. For that reason, in the earlier days of the Republic, slaves could not attend the theatre; and the same must have been true of strangers unless they were guests of the State. But in the time of Augustus these restrictions had ceased to be in force. The law on the subject of seating as it existed under the Empire rested for the most part upon enactments of Augustus, although these had been largely anticipated by generations of growth in Republican times. The orchestra, though the name reflecting its original use was and still is retained, was set apart for the senators. This rule had been in force since 194 B.C. Representatives of foreign States and, under the Empire, certain members of the reigning house were allowed to sit here. The position of the knights was finally established by the *Lex Roscia Theatralis*. This famous law was pushed through by L. Roscius Otho, tribune of the people in 67 B.C. Among other things it provided that the property qualification of a Roman knight should be raised to 400,000 sesterces, and that the first fourteen rows behind the orchestra should be set apart for the exclusive use of this order. The law also provided that even within these rows careful distinctions should be made among the knights themselves. For example, the first two rows were reserved for those knights who had served as military tribunes or land-commissioners. The younger knights also had a separate section, which under the Empire was known as the *Cuneus Germanici*. Even insolvent knights, *decoctores*, were obliged to sit in a group by themselves.

Previous enactments were extended and strengthened by the *Lex Iulia Theatralis* of Augustus. This law, which was much affected by Greek theatrical ordinances, prescribed the place of every one in all parts of the house. The general public sat according to *tribus*, or wards. But even here distinctions were made—for instance, in favour of husbands and fathers as against bachelors and spinsters. The women, and with them the young children, had to sit by themselves on the back rows. The one most notable exception was the Vestals, who had seats of honour near the front. So the various colleges of priests and other officials had seats of their own, often of a special form, with backs, arms, etc. Sometimes a certain seat was given a man *in perpetuum*, usually in return for distinguished services rendered to the State. Such a seat was also used by his family and could be inherited.

The usual time for a play to begin was early in the morning. A play of Plautus, including the music, would take about three hours. Whether two or more should be given in succession, as was sometimes the case, was left to the official in charge. Plays were never given at night except for ceremonial reasons. This was always the case when mimes were acted at the *Floralia*. Other details, so far as they bear upon the present discussion, have already been dealt with elsewhere.

9. The Roman drama not truly national.—In view of what has been said in the previous pages, we might perhaps conclude that as a literary production the life of the Roman drama was surprisingly brief, its great authors comparatively few, its genuine popularity problematical. We cannot agree, however, that the reasons for it were that the *Palliata* died of too much Greek, that the mimic sorrows of the tragedy could not appeal to an audience steeped in the bloody realities of the arena, that idealism does not and cannot reach a generation of realists. These are all true, but they are symptoms, not causes. There were plenty of men in the Golden Age of Pericles who preferred cock-fighting to comedy, and athletics to Æschylus. Nevertheless, the drama really did reach the hearts of the people. This was because it was theirs, because it was truly national. The Roman drama, on the contrary, both as an institution and as a department of literature, was profoundly affected by the intrusion upon it at an early date of the fully developed Hellenic tradition and the long-established Hellenic masterpieces. The consequence was that the Roman drama as we know it, and as the Romans themselves knew it during the historical period, was not really national, and had no deep roots in the national life. The atmosphere of the *Palliata* was foreign, the material of the tragedy was not only foreign but comparatively remote; even the worship of Dionysus—god of the drama—was an exotic, and the feeling of mistrust entertained by the genuine old Roman is clearly indicated by the famous *Senatusconsultum de Bacanalibus*. His affections, his traditions, his beliefs were deeply rooted in his own deities, the old rustic deities of the Italian countryside. Foreign gods, above all foreign gods with 'mysteries,' did not appeal to him. He was opposed to Dionysus, as long after-

wards he was opposed to the Christians, and it was the same feeling which prompted him to ignore for generations the intrusion of the Hellenistic week of seven days, each under the protection of a planetary deity. The actor, too, as we have seen, was a foreigner or its equivalent. In other words, the profession which in Greece was a consecration, involved in Rome the loss of civic rights. Who shall say how far the development of histrionic talent and the appreciation of it as such were affected by this absurd but entirely logical rule?

We have seen that two types of drama among the Romans remained popular for an indefinite period. The statements just made, however, are proved, rather than disproved, by these exceptions. The *Atellana* was a folk-drama, which in itself ensures longevity; it was also very old, and for the average Roman it was Roman from the first. The mime also was very old, but in its developed dramatic form it was neither Greek nor Roman, but really the child of the new era. It was Græco-Roman, and belonged to the Empire. The mime, too, as was said above, maintained itself for an indefinite period. In the long run, however, its vitality was due not to its superiority as an organic play, but to its enormous flexibility and to its power of adapting itself to the tastes of the passing hour. It always had a residuum of folk-elements, such as a few fixed characters and the habit of improvising dialogue; it could introduce popular songs and dances, also imitations and other music-hall 'turns.' In short, whatever it was capable of or had once been under Philistion and his compeers, it survived only as a theatrical performance, not as a high-class dramatic composition.

10. Parody of Christian rites.—Hatred of the Christians, for example, was long popular, and the consistent appeal of the mime to the populace is seen in the fact that as early, perhaps, as the beginning of the 2nd cent. the 'Christian' (ὁ Χριστιανὸς κωμῳδούμενος [Greg. Naz. *Orat.* ii. 84]) had become a regular character in the mime. The favourite act was parodying the rites of the Christian Church, especially baptism. The candidate was brought on the stage accompanied by bishops, priests, and deacons; and all the ceremonial was gone through with.[1] A number of early saints were *mimi* who in the course of time had been converted then and there by the Divine power of the rite they were parodying, had confessed their faith from the stage, and had suffered martyrdom soon after. The most famous was Genesius in Diocletian's time. His speciality had been to imitate the 'working of the spirit' with a pretended fit, after which he proceeded to baptism. A church was erected to him, and to this day Saint Genesius still remains a specialist on epilepsy.[2] Even martyrdom was depicted in the most realistic fashion. But this was nothing new. In the old mime of *Laureolus*, the robber chieftain was (apparently) nailed to the cross, and, as Josephus tells us (*Ant.* XIX. i. 13), the realism was heightened by a large supply of blood brought in for the occasion. In fact, Domitian once put the last touch to this delectable speciality by substituting the genuine crucifixion of a condemned criminal. That such an entertainment could still remain a burlesque is partly due to the fact, as Reich observes, that the sufferer was the clown. It is expressly stated that Saint Gelasinos was the μῖμος δεύτερος, *i.e.* the μωρός or *stupidus*.

Occasionally the *mima* was converted. The famous case was that of Pelagia by Bishop Nonnos.[3] As a rule, however, the *mima* was a much harder nut to crack. The Christian Fathers were especially fond of designating her as a πορνή (Chrys. vii. 665 f. etc.).

It is only just to add that the *mimus* was not really to be blamed for his parodies. Throughout paganism he had ridiculed the ancient gods. This was characteristic of Hellenism, and no one thought anything of it. In their case, however, the Christians objected to it—a new point of view had come in from the East. And, when Christianity won the upper hand, the mime returned again to the old gods of paganism.

11. Christian opposition.—Attacks on the theatre begin with the first Christian writers (so Minucius Felix, Tatian, Arnobius, Augustine, Lactantius, Gregory Naz., etc.). Special works aimed at the theatre alone were written by Tertullian and Cyprian; and Chrysostom rarely forgets this his special vessel of wrath. In the course of time all this bitter polemic was systematized, supported, and connected by the dialectic of the law and of the Church.

All the old gods are devils (Tert. *Spect.* 19): Dionysus the old god is the lord of the theatre; therefore, the theatre belongs to a devil, *the* devil. He built it himself, and says expressly that it belongs to him (Tert. *op. cit.* 26). In the same way all dramatic arts come from the devil (pseud.-Cypr. *Spect.* 4; Tatian, *Orat. ad Græc.* 22). This is a favourite topic for Chrysostom: through the mouth of the monks Christ speaks, through the mouth of the *mimi* the devil speaks (vii. 675 B). The songs of the mime are Satan's own, the dances of the mime are not otherwise (vi. 77 B, viii. 422). Πομπὴ πάντα ἐστι, etc., the whole show and all that is said and done by and during the same is inspired of hell, a demon's litany, a devil's sacrament (viii. 6 C, ix. 323 B). All who go to the mime become the devil's own (viii. 114 C). Therefore the Christian who goes to it is a perjurer, for when he was baptized he swore to renounce the devil and all his works (viii. 6 C). Everything about the mime shows that it comes hot from hell. Dissembling, disguise, imitation, μίμησις, is the devil's stock-in-trade, his reason for existence, the origin of his name. The chief aim of the mime is to raise a laugh. But laughter and gaiety come not from God—θεὸς οὐ παίζεται—but from the devil (x. 590, vii. 97).

Long and fiery passages are given up to the various actors, above all to the *mimæ*. They curl their hair, they paint their cheeks, they roll their eyes, they glitter in jewels and gold—and who are these *mimæ*? The daughters of butchers, of shoemakers, even of slaves! Most seductive of all is the beautiful voice with which they know how to sing their ᾠδαὶ πορνικαί, their ᾄσματα σατανικά, their 'ballads of the brothel,' their 'devil's own ditties.' Then, too, the language is common, vulgar, frivolous, full of oaths, not even intelligible, eking out its meaning with shouting and squealing! Yet the Christians are forever talking about the actresses, what they say, how they look, what they wear. Which one of these Christians can repeat the Psalms or passages from the Scriptures? Which one of them does not know all the songs from the mimes? The young people are singing them the entire day long. The mime is the theatre of concupiscence, an incurable plague, a poison, a snare of death (vii. 172), the training school of immorality, the seed of iniquity, the haunt of impurity and lewdness, the fiery furnace of the Babylonians heated to seventy times seven by the devil himself, etc. etc.

The above is a fierce arraignment, but of no great value except to indicate why Bishop Johannes was given the name of 'Chrysostomos.' As a matter of fact, the anathema of the Church was utterly powerless. Indeed, the Church actually lost ground, as there was evidently a large body of more or less conscientious Christians that saw no such harm in the mime as Chrysostom would have us suppose. Until the very end of the Eastern Empire interest in the mime never abated in the slightest degree, and it is well known that the metres, if not the music, of these same ᾠδαὶ πορνικαί and ᾄσματα σατανικά attacked by Chrysostom actually entered into the hymnology of the Greek Church. Arius was accused of the same thing by Athanasius. Every hymnology bears traces of a similar process, and, as a matter of fact, this is by no means the only indication that neither time, nor change, nor creed has ever been able finally to sever the ancient bond between the Church and the theatre.

LITERATURE.—This is given in the text and footnotes. Cf. also the list of authorities appended to art. DRAMA (Greek).

KIRBY FLOWER SMITH.

[1] Migne, *PG* cxvii. 134 and 144.
[2] *Acta Sanctorum*, Bolland. v. 120 (August).
[3] See esp. Usener, 'Legenden der Pelagia,' *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, Leipzig, 1907, pp. 191-215.

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